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NEXT week, behind the closed doors of the Congress Hall, Clapton, fifty-five members of the Salvation Army's High Council will elect a successor to General Evangeline Booth, who retires under the age limit on October 31.

The result may be surprising. Unlike other elections, no "probables" have been mentioned. There is merely a hint that some of the councillors will urge that the post shall be filled by a man. Another suggestion is that many of the powers held by the General should be delegated to a Cabinet. If this is adopted, the Salvation Army will become a "democracy." Once it was a "dictatorship."

It was an oft-repeated phrase of William Booth, the founder of the Army, that it was "not a family affair." It is still less a family affair to-day than it has ever been. No one anticipates a repetition of the "regrettable affair" of 1929, when General Bramwell Booth was compulsorily retired, and the hereditary autocracy of the generalship was destroyed by the election of Commissioner Higgins.

On that occasion the Army was split. Some wanted an end of the Booth dynasty; others regarded it almost as sacrilege that anyone but a Booth should be at the head of affairs. It almost seemed that the Army was doomed. Many Americans were in favour of abolishing one-person control. The Booth dynasty was broken, although, after the retirement of General Higgins, Evangeline Booth, sister of the late Bramwell, was elected.

In Sealed Envelope

Old William Booth established the principle of election of a new leader by the retiring General. The name was written on a paper, placed in a sealed envelope and handed to the Army's solicitors, to be opened only on the death or retirement of the nominator. This method of election was abolished in 1931, and it is now the duty of the High Council to choose a new General.

It is laid down in the Salvation Army records that "the High Council is a body of officers holding positions of responsibility. They must be Commissioners or Officers holding Territorial Commands." The Council was constituted by a deed executed by William Booth in 1904, after "several years' consideration and consultation with the most eminent lawyers of that time."

Among the fifty-five members of the High Council sitting next week will be two grand-daughters of William Booth. They are Commissioner Catherine Bramwell Booth, and her sister Mary Booth, territorial commander for Belgium. What chance has either of these succeeding to the supreme office? No one knows.

But if the Council want to cut down the

powers of the elected General they will find it difficult to know how to proceed. For they meet only to elect a leader, and when that duty is done "all the duties and powers of the High Council shall cease, and they shall stand ipso facto dissolved."

Most people thought that when William Booth died in 1912 the Salvation Army was doomed to be disbanded. Few people knew that for years the driving force had been his son, Bramwell. The mantle fell from William's shoulders on to Bramwell's without dispute. It was when Bramwell fell ill that the trouble began. At that time the General was required to nominate his successor. It was said that Bramwell had nominated his wife, or, in the event of her refusal, his eldest daughter, Catherine Booth.

£30,000,000 Property

At the disposal of the General was property said to be worth £30,000,000. Something had to be done about it quickly. Army commissioners met secretly. There had been a tradition that a General was General till he died. Pamphlets were sent out to clarify the situation among the rank and file. "Contrary to what is generally supposed," said the pamphlet, "there is no ground in our Constitution for the idea that every General shall hold office for life. The Founder alone, and by name, was given that privilege in the Deed of 1878, and it is a privilege which does not necessarily descend to his successors. This was a most wise precaution on the part of the Founder, for it restrains for all time any disposition on the part of any General to regard the army as peculiarly his own, and its officers and soldiers merely as his servants or employees. The Founder, moreover, had no intention of establishing—nor did he establish—anything in the nature of a dynasty."

The pamphlet went on to say that in establishing the principle of non-dynastic leadership, William Booth "endured the anguish of broken family ties."

American Triumph

There were many among the rank and file who were astounded when they

received the pamphlet. They had regarded the Booths as hereditary leaders.

It was an American triumph when Edward Higgins; then Chief of Staff of the British territory, was elected General, for he had worked in the United States years before. It was a triumph for the Americans, too, when the right to elect a General was invested in the High Council.

With Higgins wielding the baton, everything went well. Then in 1934 came another problem. General Higgins was 70 that year, and that was the age limit which he himself had imposed.

Many people anticipated another crisis. General Higgins soon made it clear that there was nothing of the kind. "There is no crisis," he declared. And there was none. For shortly afterwards came the official statement that "General Higgins will retire from the office of General of the Salvation Army on November 10."

A High Council was convened. Forty-seven of its 47 members could have been elected General.

General Higgins would have no intrigue. He handed over his authority to the new elected General, Commander Evangeline Booth, who had come from America.

The retiring age of Generals is now 73. Will a Booth be elected?

Meanwhile, the Army go on with their work. And the cymbal, tambourine and drum echo in our highways and byways.



It was an American triumph when Edward Higgins was elected General.



The founder, General William Booth, with his family.

THE SALVATION ARMY

AND

THE PUBLIC

‘Verily “a bolt from the blue.”’ **METHODIST TIMES.**

PRESS OPINIONS ON THE FIRST EDITION.

SPECTATOR.—‘Deserves careful and respectful consideration.’

METHODIST RECORDER.—‘This book has left us feeling very unhappy about General Booth and his Army. . . . It should be answered, for unless it is many of us can never feel as we should like to feel towards the great movement which has loomed so large in English religious life for the last generation.’

METHODIST TIMES.—‘It ought to receive an effective reply on every account.

. . . . It is a well-written book, and the author does not ask the public to receive his bare statements. . . . It is certain to do a great deal of damage to the popularity of the Army unless it receives an effective reply.’

GUARDIAN.—‘Certainly calls for an answer. . . . We fancy that those who read carefully Mr. Manson’s weighty indictment will feel themselves in need of a good deal of reassurance before they endorse by their approval and support any extension of General Booth’s social schemes in this country.’

CHURCH TIMES.—‘There may be a good answer forthcoming; we shall hope to see it.’

SUNDAY SCHOOL CHRONICLE.—‘The present reviewer has always supported the Army, but he is bound to say that Mr. Manson’s survey has given him pause. . . . It would be unwise for the Army to ignore this book.’

CHRISTIAN.—‘Such an indictment as is contained in this book requires . . . an explanation as detailed and as precise.’

NEW AGE.—‘A closely reasoned indictment. . . . Requires the earnest attention of every one interested in the system.’

CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOURER.—‘The chapter on High Finance is startling, and altogether the book is one demanding an immediate and effective reply.’

TABLET.—‘. . . The step from all this to the dogma of the Infallibility of the General would not seem to be a very long one!’

FREETHINKER.—‘A book deserving of careful study, one that calls for notice, not only from the general public, but from the Salvation Army itself.’

PIONEER.—‘The most serious attack that has ever been made on the methods and constitution of the Salvation Army. . . . A serious indictment, and it demands an answer.’

DAILY NEWS.—‘On the financial side the questions raised appear to be exceedingly serious. . . . Mr. Manson’s strictures deserve serious consideration.’

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—‘Its calmness of attack is, in fact, remarkable, in view of Mr. Manson’s standpoint and of the facts he thinks it possible to adduce.’

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.—‘Since the late Professor Huxley’s slashing attack on General Booth’s “Darkest England” scheme we have seen no criticism of Salvation Army methods so persistent and unsparing.’

LIVERPOOL POST.—‘Mr. Manson has performed a public service.’

GLOUCESTER JOURNAL.—‘By far the most serious, systematic, and real criticism to which the Salvation Army has yet been subjected. . . . Ought to be read by every Christian leader, philanthropist, economist, and social reformer. It is a work of very high significance.’

DAILY CHRONICLE.—‘Mr. Manson believes that the Salvation Army is the least understood organization in the world. Obviously he believes also that it stands in need of a candid friend, now that it has grown popular.’

THE SALVATION ARMY AND THE PUBLIC

RAPID REVIEW.—Here we have reaction in its most complete and vigorous form. . . . Can hardly fail to be very damaging unless it receives an effective reply. . . . There is no imputation against General Booth's honesty; but the wisdom of his unchecked rule, and of the public in supporting it, stands in need of vindication after this tremendous attack.'

TRIBUNE.—It is financially that the Salvation Army seems to this opponent at its worst, and the financial argument is at the basis of every statement in the book.'

EAST ANGLIAN TIMES.—A scathing and searching attack. . . . Mr. Manson appears to be well informed, and argues logically and well. His is no mere vulgar assault. . . . It will be interesting to learn what General Booth and his advisers have to say in reply.'

GLASGOW HERALD.—The methods and weaknesses of the Salvation Army have often been criticized before, but never, so far as we are aware, with such a combination of ruthless logic with intimate and detailed knowledge.'

STANDARD.—Mr. Manson has been at pains to investigate the works and ways of the Army with minute care, and his book contains an elaborate statement of evidence which is far from favourable to that body.'

BRITISH JOURNAL OF INEBRIETY.—No authoritative answer to this disturbing and distressing work has been issued, and until General Booth sees fit to authorize such, he can hardly wonder if many hitherto well-wishers and supporters remain silent and hesitant.'

MORNING LEADER.—Contains grave charges. . . . No doubt an answer will be made fully and authoritatively.'

SUNDAY SUN.—The apologist for the Salvation Army, if there is to be one, must hurry up.'

WESTMINSTER REVIEW.—A grave attack . . . which is entitled to the serious attention of the public. . . . We have said enough to show the importance of this work and the crying need for a public inquiry.'

DRAPERS' RECORD.—With what the author has to say about the methods of the Army and its internal organization—apart from trading—we are not concerned. Our own view is that there is no justification for the Army's competition with the individual trader. When it steps outside its social and religious work and enters into subsidized competition with the ordinary trader, it loses its right to appeal for monetary support from the general public. A blend of religion with business is most objectionable.'

JAPAN CHRONICLE.—Despite the opinion of leading newspapers and religious organs that this book called for an answer . . . no attempt has been made to refute Mr. Manson's indictment. . . . The advisers of "General" Booth may consider that they have done wisely in refusing to allow us to interview their respected leader, but the inference to be drawn by every fair-minded man from this absolute and autocratic refusal to permit the "other side of the question" to be investigated is creditable neither to the "General" nor his advisers.' (Kobe, May 14, 1907.)

WORLD'S CARRIERS AND CONTRACTORS' REVIEW.—Written not with any feeling of antagonism to the Salvation Army as such, but dealing in a very searching manner with its financial standing, and probing deeply into its ramifications as a commercial organization, this book demands attention, and more than attention, it demands an answer.' (December, 1907.)

COMMONWEALTH.—When a definite, full, and grave indictment is framed by a responsible person, in a serious spirit and without malice, against any institution that claims popular support, that indictment must be met. . . . In the interests of the Army itself, in the interests of general principles of straightforwardness in public affairs, one can only hope that the public will demand a reply, and that it will make it a condition of its future support that one is forthcoming and that soon.' (January, 1908.)

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NEW YORK : E. P. DUTTON & CO.

THE
SALVATION ARMY
AND
THE PUBLIC

A RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND
FINANCIAL STUDY

By
JOHN MANSON

SECOND EDITION AUGMENTED



LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS LIMITED
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON AND CO

1908

TO

The Salvation Army

' But, beloved, we are persuaded better things of you, and things that accompany salvation, though we thus speak.'—HEBREWS vi. 9.

AND

The Public

' Se sacrifier à ses passions, passe ; mais à des passions qu'on n'a pas ! O triste . . . siècle ! '—GIRODET.

PREFACE

SINCE the first edition of this work appeared at the end of July, 1906, no errors have been pointed out in it either by the Salvation Army itself or by its friends. Subsequent events have not suggested the desirability of any modification in its statements and conclusions.

In this cheap edition important additions have been made. The trading operations are subjected to a fuller and more intimate analysis in the new chapter entitled 'The Army and the Trader'. In the light of recent events a detailed examination of the operation of one of the Army's 'elevators' seemed desirable. This is contained in the new chapter entitled 'The Case of Hanbury Street'. The development, actual and potential, of the emigration business has suggested the expansion of the earlier treatment of this subject into the separate chapter, 'Emigration and Shipping'. To this is appended an account of the Rhodesia Settlement Scheme, now either temporarily or permanently abandoned. A copy of the Army's trust deed of 1904, providing for the removal and election of a General in certain circumstances, is now inserted in the Appendices (1, 3), the document being examined in Chapter xvi.

Incidental additions, such as that relating to the recently-established Anti-suicide Bureau, will be apparent either in the text or in the form of footnotes. The small amount of tentatively adverse opinion discernible in a few of the press reviews of the earlier edition has been considered as opportunity offered.

With almost entire unanimity the press have insisted—ineffectually, however—that it is the duty of the Army to publish a detailed and satisfactory reply. To the reflective reader it cannot but seem strange and unsatisfactory that the press should have shown little sign of being able to defend their own protégé. If journals which support and advertise Salvationism cannot of their own knowledge refute the principal statements and conclusions in this book, at least to their own satisfaction, the inference must be that the foundations of their belief in the system are much less substantial than the public have a right to believe.

Surprise has been expressed that certain journals, which have recognized the seriousness of the author's criticisms, and the necessity for their satisfactory refutation, should nevertheless continue to foster the system as assiduously as before. The reviewer of a particular work, however, although naturally the most competent member of the staff for the purpose, is not usually the editor or the sub-editor. These probably find it difficult, at this stage, to correct the public opinion which they have done so much to form. Moreover, many of the objects for which the Army solicits the publicity and support of the press are—in appearance, at all events—sufficiently innocent and praiseworthy. Such things as Anti-suicide bureaux, children's farthing

breakfasts, Embankment free suppers, Universities of Humanity, and the selling of grain 'at cheap rates to the starving' in India, have a certain relationship to the less desirable operations of the system. But that relationship, though important and even vital, cannot be said to be obvious.

One cannot profess indifference to the spectacle of an influential journalistic convert—or, at least, 'recruit'—slipping, as it were, through one's fingers from causes which seem inadequate. The reviewer of the *Methodist Times* (September 20, 1906) was among those who thought that this study of Salvationism demanded 'an effective reply'. Fourteen months later (November 28, 1907) the *Methodist Times* reviewer of *Essays and Sketches: The Salvation Army*, wrote as follows regarding two of the contributions in that official publication:—"The article by L. A. Atherley-Jones, K.C., M.P., on the "Legal and Financial Aspects of the Army," should receive attention from those who have deemed it their duty to put the Army through the mill of criticism in recent months; likewise the article by Mr. Arnold White which was contributed to the *Fortnightly* by the special request of half-a-dozen gentlemen of "standing and position," who wanted to know the facts of the case. These articles ought to be enough for all fair-minded persons, and the Army has done wisely in republishing them.' Mr. Atherley-Jones's article first appeared anonymously—"by an eminent K.C."—in the *Grand Magazine* for April, 1905, and Mr. Arnold White's ('The Truth about the Salvation Army') in the *Fortnightly* as long ago as July, 1892. Both articles received the author's careful consideration before this work was written, and their contents have extremely little—if, indeed, any—application to its criticisms, whether legal, financial, or otherwise. If the *Methodist Times* reviewer of *Essays and Sketches* will consult his colleague who reviewed this work, it will be strange if he receives any different opinion.

One critic has pointed out that 'the indirect result of the Army's work on other denominations' is ignored in this book. It seems far from certain, however, that that result has been so beneficent as is frequently asserted. In so far as any particular denomination may have closely imitated the Army's methods, it seems liable to be exposed to similar condemnation. The constant reiteration of the Army's originality and ability, whether as a religious or a 'social' force, is in reality an injustice to other denominations and other philanthropic bodies. In the preparation of the Darkest England Scheme the reports of other agencies appear to have been scoured for an idea. It would be difficult to find anything of moment in that scheme, or in its realization, that had not already been practised by others—less ostentatiously, perhaps, but with at least equal success. It seems necessary, nevertheless, to insist that General Booth and Mr. W. T. Stead, his distinguished journalistic collaborator in that scheme, were not, after all, the discoverers of the poor, the depraved, and the unfortunate. Other denominations have, no doubt, been largely led to depute their responsibilities, and to constitute the Salvation Army their charitable agent or almoner. That, in itself, is hardly the most convincing sign of an awakened 'social' conscience and intelligence on their part.

Another troubled critic has endeavoured to find solace in the theory that 'autocracy openly disclosed', like General Booth's, 'is quite a different thing from autocracy in disguise'. Whether it be an open or a disguised autocracy is immaterial: this work is an examination of its operation and its results. The autocracy of other religious leaders has been 'openly disclosed' also. That of the late Dr. Dowie, of Mrs. Eddy, and of Mrs. Tingley,

have all within the past two years suffered under the lash of our press. There are, doubtless, well-meaning and well-doing Dowieites, Eddyites, and Tingleyites, just as there are irreproachable Salvationists. Unlike General Booth's autocracy, the three American autocracies are all practically self-supporting, and make little or no appeal to outsiders either for subscriptions or investments. Still, it is only the religious autocracy of native growth that finds favour with the British press.

In one quarter it has been suggested (*Daily News* review, July 31, 1906) that this work insists upon 'only one side of the question,' and that it would have been 'more fair' if 'the counterbalancing features of the great social and religious work' of the Army had been set forth. What these counterbalancing features may be the *Daily News*, unfortunately, does not suggest. The author feels himself at liberty to repudiate the charge of one-sidedness from this particular quarter rather more to-day than two years ago. It has, at least, been his aim throughout this work to state fully and fairly the Army's claims regarding every point examined. Apart from this, there is surely very small ground for the *Daily News's* apparent apprehension that the public may not enjoy the advantage of having the Army's side of the question sufficiently 'insisted upon'. It is, in fact, practically the only side with which the public have hitherto had much chance of becoming acquainted.

The author's appeal was not to the Army but to the public. He is, therefore, neither surprised nor disappointed by a silence—both on the Army's part and on that of its numerous literary advocates—which is one of the most trusty weapons in an otherwise noisy armoury. This silence does not signify indifference or equanimity. It means, rather, that there are certain parts of the Army's system that it cannot afford even to discuss. In September, 1906, an interviewer was airily informed at Headquarters that this book was officially admitted to contain 'a good deal of truth', and that 'some kind of reformation movement' would doubtless be one of its results. Unfortunately, General Booth himself seems to see no necessity for anything of the kind. Only a few months later, just before leaving for Japan, he appeared unaware of any criticisms except such as were 'too silly to need refutation'. Such 'attacks', he said, only caused people to double their subscriptions. 'With the enthusiasm of one who knows', according to his interviewer, he confidently predicted that the 1907 Self-Denial Fund, then about to be collected, would be 'bigger than ever'. Instead, however, of showing an increase of over £9,000 as in 1906, or over £7,000 as in 1905, the 1907 Fund showed an actual decline—from which the Army did not recover in its Self-Denial effort of 1908—for the first time in fourteen years. It would seem, therefore, that General Booth has mistaken the nature of the 'attacks' of which he spoke.

On landing in Japan the General found that, although his agents had been employed for months in making straight his paths in official and journalistic quarters, the principal English newspaper, the *Japan Chronicle*, was then publishing a lengthy analysis of this book in a series of special articles, supported by several leading articles repeating and emphasizing the demand of the British press for a reply. An interview, requested by the Army, which had been arranged between the General and a representative of the *Japan Chronicle* was in consequence cancelled. It was, apparently, found inadvisable that the General should meet one of the few journalists in the world qualified to ensure that an interview should be made to serve the

public interest rather than the Army's need for flattery and advertisement. This incident and its effects were discreetly ignored by the official reporters on the General's staff who chronicled the events of the Japan campaign by cable and 'special' correspondence for the world's press.

In this work the need of a public inquiry rather than of an official reply has been urged. A number of official replies on certain points have been examined, and the reader will be able to set his own estimate upon them. This work is a protest against the growing practice, fostered by the Army, of accepting the replies or denials of its officials on subjects of serious public importance as being necessarily the last word in respect of truth.

It seems desirable to contradict the statement, circulated and credited in certain Salvationist circles, that the author has been an official of the Army. He has never had any official or other connexion, or any relations—direct or indirect, financial, commercial, or otherwise—with that body or those who conduct it. He must, therefore, disclaim the compliment, if the statement be intended as a compliment, or resent the imputation in so far as it may be regarded as an imputation. The suggestion, however, that an ex-official must be animated by prejudice or malice is really as groundless as the opposite view, which the author now confidently expects to encounter, that, never having been an official, he cannot reasonably be expected to know very much about the organization. When one knows enough about certain subjects one's lips are sealed. The instruments of any autocracy are especially liable to find themselves in that position when they sever themselves from its rule. The author does not labour under that disadvantage.

General Booth has of late referred frequently to the contingency of his own death. That that event may be long delayed no one wishes more sincerely than the author. The criticisms in this work are not directed at General Booth as a person but as the holder of an office. So far as the author's feelings are concerned, the words 'General Booth' throughout this book might, to all intents and purposes, be read 'the General for the time being of the Salvation Army'. The public of many nations have recently been told by General Booth that no one need be under any apprehension about the Army's future, as the resources of human ingenuity and foresight (embodied, apparently, in the trust deed of 1904) have been exhausted to ensure that it shall go on after his death just as before. To any but the most superficial observers of the organization no fact could well be less reassuring.

It remains for the author to thank the numerous correspondents of both sexes, all classes, and widely divergent shades of religious opinion, who have written to him sympathetically and helpfully from different parts of the world. He must also express his special indebtedness to three friends for their very valuable aid and counsel in the preparation of this work.

April, 1908.


J. M.

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THE SALVATION ARMY AND THE PUBLIC

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY

WHETHER the reader actually loves the Salvation Army or merely regards it tolerantly as a necessary evil in an imperfect world, he is fairly certain to have heard again and again that it has in past years come triumphantly through the fires of criticism. As this is a critical study, the results of which are far from being favourable to that body, it may be well to indicate broadly the scope of this work as contrasted with such other criticisms as the Army may either have come through or, by ignoring them, lived down.

The author is well aware that some of the questions examined in this book have been discussed by other writers. But he is not acquainted with any other work which endeavours to examine the whole Salvationist system, to lay bare the inner working of the machine, and to trace the interdependence of its various parts. In this task he has endeavoured to approach the subject without prejudice. It is for the reader to say whether any feeling or hostility displayed as a result of the examination is or is not justified by the facts.

That Salvationists have come triumphantly through the fires of persecution is, of course, true. But persecution must be distinguished from criticism. In most armies those who stand the fire are usually pawns in some higher game. In the case of the Salvation Army the thoughtless persecution of former years was not animated by any such considerations as are to be found in this book. Those who are moved by such considerations as are here submitted are much less likely to entertain feelings of hostility towards

the pawns than towards those who play them.

Some further distinctions may be necessary. This work has not been inspired by hostility to the free propagation of any religious doctrine by the effort and at the cost of those who believe in it. It is hostile to a system which renders easy the unsuccessful propagation of such doctrine at the voluntary cost of those who either do not believe in it or disapprove of the methods of its propagation.

This work is not opposed to the performance of so-called 'social' work by any religious body, even with the financial help of those who do not belong to it. It is opposed to a system which enables a religious body as such to derive undue financial advantage from the public interest in its less important 'social' work, and to exist as a religious body mainly by virtue of a misconception in the public mind encouraged by the disproportionate combination of its religious and 'social' functions in its appeals.

It is not maintained that certain members of the Salvation Army may not, in the stereotyped phrase, 'do good work'. It would be difficult for any organization not wholly maleficent which draws hundreds of thousands of pounds every year from the public to prevent its members from doing some good. It is maintained that the public are not supplied with proper means of judging whether the work, if done at all, is worth its cost, and that they are debarred from applying to that work, whether religious or 'social', the tests of success recognized and ostensibly applied to it by the Army itself.

This work does not question the right of a religious body to mortgage

or pledge its property for religious purposes provided it is its own members who pay the interest on its loans. It does question the right of the Salvation Army, whose members do not and cannot pay such interest, to turn the property given to it by the public into a gigantic investment business, necessitating a payment—mainly at the public expense—of over £30,000 a year in interest for the satisfaction of the Army's shareholders in Great Britain.

This work does not condemn the formation by religious bodies of independent financial institutions for the encouragement of thrift among the masses. It does condemn as dangerous the formation by the Salvation Army of great financial institutions which attract the savings of the poor, but which, instead of furnishing the guarantee of 'perfect safety' so prominently held out, seem to ensure—owing to the manifold and incompatible functions of their management, the nature of the security, and the absence of all proper guarantee of its adequacy—the certainty of ultimate financial disaster, serious in its volume, and not merely national but world-wide.

If in this work the author has been unable to adopt the subdued, respectful, and even reverent attitude towards their works, which the Salvationist hierarchy have of late years been so successful in imposing upon the public and press, it is because in none of the ramifications of the complex Salvationist structure has he been able to discover anything possessing the attributes, or imparting the inspiration, of a sacred edifice such as it professes to be throughout. Salvationism having become so largely a business concern, the attitude, language, and tone of the market-place seem, in discussing it, more fitting and more sincere than those of the sanctuary.

This work, however, has not been inspired by animosity towards the personality of General Booth or any of his officers. The heroic efforts of an aged autocrat to control and maintain still further the costly and ineffectual system that has overmastered him might well constitute a pathetic spectacle even for an enemy. That of

the Army's thousands of devoted but deluded officers, blindly labouring with much privation and infinite effort to gather fruits which even they are not allowed to see, would command its meed of admiration even in an age that had lost the savour of self-sacrifice.

It was General Booth's belief in 1890 that only those who were 'determined to bring about by any and every means a bloody and violent overturn of all existing institutions' could logically be his opponents. Of such social desperadoes the late Professor Huxley was, while not the least logical, assuredly the most redoubtable. It was he who foretold the development of Salvationism on lines similar to those followed by the Franciscans, who, within thirty years of the death of St. Francis, had become 'one of the most powerful, wealthy, and worldly corporations in Christendom, with their fingers in every sink of political and social corruption, if so be profit for the order could be fished out of it'. 'Who is to say,' asked Huxley in 1890 (*Social Diseases and Worse Remedies*), 'that the Salvation Army, in the year 1920, shall not be a replica of what the Franciscan order had become in the year 1260?'

Huxley's vantage-point of comparison is still a dozen years ahead, and in some respects, possibly, the Army is not yet a perfect counterpart of this picture. It is here the purpose of a humbler pen than his to show how far the early religious and 'social' aims of Salvationism have already become warped from the lines of their good intent. And this in the hope that, well within the lifetime of its founder, the Salvation Army may yet be moved, either by internal or external influences, to have done with reticence, autocracy, mingled motives and 'two-fold' financial dealings, to look diligently to the recovery and saving of its own soul, and so to set its house in order that, even if its spiritual and 'social' activities have perforce to assume more modest proportions in the eyes of the world, it shall at least cease to be an instrument of physical and spiritual oppression to its members and protégés, as well as an economic peril to the community.

CHAPTER II

THE TEST OF SUCCESS

THE work and finance of the great religious bodies in this country are not subjects in which the general public are apt to display any particular or lively interest. Nor is it, on the whole, necessary that they should. If the two established Churches in the kingdom be disregarded, it may be fairly said that the finance of each sect concerns almost exclusively its own members alone—that of Methodism mainly Methodists, of Congregationalism mainly Congregationalists, of the Baptist body mainly Baptists, and so on. In no case is there any material or systematic exchange either of service or of money between the members of any one denomination and the organization of any other. Regarded as purely religious bodies existing primarily for the spiritual advancement of their own members, each of them is, in effect, self-supporting, and is in no appreciable degree dependent upon the financial help of other Christian bodies, and still less upon that of such members of the public as belong to no Christian body at all. It is true, no doubt, that each and all of these bodies may fairly be regarded as performing some sort of public service in virtue merely of their religious activity in the community; but it is certain, nevertheless, that no one of them would find it at all easy on that account alone to obtain even a moderate measure of financial aid for religious purposes from the community at large. Particular sectarian funds destined for purposes not strictly religious in the sense usually accepted may, of course, form exceptions to this rule; but in such cases the public are usually conceded the right of assuring themselves that their contributions are devoted, not to the general religious work or the maintenance of the sect as a whole, but directly to the particular philanthropic object which it may desire, with the help of the public, to promote.

The Salvation Army, compared with other Christian bodies, possesses many essential points in common—more, indeed, than is generally be-

lieved. But at the outset one striking difference is observable even by the most casual observer: its confident dependence upon and immense indebtedness to the members of other religious bodies as well as to large sections of the general public who display no disposition whatsoever to join its ranks, or, perhaps, the ranks of any other sect. Salvationist finance, therefore, concerns everybody. If one inquires the grounds upon which the Salvation Army is so generally accorded this exceptionally favourable treatment the answer usually is to the effect that the Army ministers to a class of people not successfully touched by other religious bodies, and that—leaving religion practically out of account—it does a large amount of 'social' work which serves to distinguish it from other religious bodies. This is, indeed, the claim officially made by the Army itself (*Orders and Regulations for Field Officers*, p. 297; *In Darkest England*, p. 241). The public have, in consequence, come very generally to imagine that the Army as a religious body differs materially from all other religious organizations in its aims, that its work is mainly if not exclusively 'social', and, therefore, that money given to the Army at large is devoted, not to mere religious propaganda, but to the furtherance of objects more practical and more generally approved.

The 'social' work of the Army has for many years been so widely advertised in the press and on the platform that it is little wonder if in very many minds the Army should be almost solely identified with such work. General Booth himself appears to be keenly conscious of the fact that it is in his 'social' work that the public are disposed to display most practical interest. In the course of his religious motor campaigns of 1904-1907, he repeatedly insisted upon the great public service performed by the Farm Colony, the City Colonies, the Emigration Agency, and the other departments of his 'Social' (Darkest England) Scheme. He has frequently complained that this work is not at present adequately supported by the public. He has at the same time

thrown out certain proposals of the most ambitious nature with the view of securing a very much larger measure of external financial help in the realization of these 'social' ideals. To few people, apparently, does it ever occur to differentiate between the Army's 'social' and its religious activities, or to inquire what proportion of the immense but unknown sums already contributed annually by the public to the Army's exchequer is devoted to those 'social' objects which alone serve to excite special public sympathy with the Army at all. The public are apt to overlook the fact that it is still, first and foremost, a religious body. Its spiritual effort, in fact, appears to cost from twelve to twenty times as much as its 'social' effort. The question of its alleged spiritual success is, therefore, of primary importance to the public.

Even if it were possible to assert that the majority of the public are well aware that the destination of their contributions, not specifically given to the Darkest England Scheme, is religious and not 'social', we should be at once placed in a serious dilemma—that of accounting for the necessity of external financial help in the case of an evangelical religious body which professes, as the Salvation Army does, to be a success and not a failure. Granting, for the moment, that it is the evangelization of the masses in which the public are interested, and for which they are willing to pay, as they have done, many millions in Great Britain alone, how comes it that General Booth has never yet found it advisable to supply the public with the only data which can enable them to test the alleged success of his organization in this, by far its most important, department?

Few religious bodies in this country are content to exist solely for the spiritual interests of their members at any particular moment; all seek in a greater or less degree to grow by influencing their environment. The Salvation Army, like every other sect, can only grow by accretion, and numerical growth is, in fact, the one test of progress which religious bodies gener-

ally are content to impose upon themselves.

If, by way of example, the Presbyterian Church of England be selected, we find that the *Minutes of Synod*, published each year, contains congregational tables giving, *inter alia*, the membership in the current and the preceding year, not only of the body as a whole, but of every one of the 339 congregations which compose it (1904) throughout the country. Thus the growth or decline of the whole body, and of any particular congregation in it, can be seen at a glance. In the case of the Presbyterians, however, there is no public obligation or reason for the compilation and issue of this return. In that of the Salvation Army there are most obvious public reasons why a similar return, at least as detailed, should be made. In view of the Army's constant and ubiquitous financial appeal to the public, and the alleged success of its work of evangelization, it is surely a remarkable fact that in not one of its numerous publications is there any annual record of the number and location of its corps, or congregations, throughout the country, with the number of officers, members, and adherents attached to each.

Is there any reason why such a test of the Army's success should not be applied? One of its higher officials, acting on instructions, recently deprecated it on the grounds (1) that the Army is still a young organization, (2) that such a publication would be expensive, and (3) that it is impossible to estimate spiritual work by statistics. It is true that the Army is only forty-three years of age, but in that short time it has probably obtained from the British public alone at least ten millions of pounds for the promotion of its spiritual work. The cost of printing an extra thirty or forty pages of tables statistically depicting the Army's local progress year by year could hardly swell unduly a printing bill already enormous. The publication might even be found to repay its cost in consequence of the emulation between corps which it might fairly be expected to stimulate, to say nothing of the increased financial aid that might be

derived from outside sympathizers thus enabled to assure themselves that their money was bringing forth tangible fruit. As for the plea that it is impossible to test spiritual work by statistics, this happens to be the test ostensibly recognized and imposed by the Salvation Army itself for its own purposes.

In General Booth's *Orders and Regulations for Field Officers* (1904) there is (p. 323) the following definite statement on the subject of numbers as a test of the Army's success :—

To record what is being done. 'The work of the Army is to secure the Salvation of men, and then to preserve them in the favour of God and train them to fight for the Salvation

of their fellows. In order that we may know the extent to which this work is being accomplished, it is necessary to make and keep careful records of the names of all those who may, in any way, be united with the Army. These records are called "the Rolls".'

On page 326 there is this further regulation concerning these rolls :

Not to be taken away. 'The Rolls are the property of the Army, and must not be taken away from the Corps, except by the authority of the P.C. (provincial commander)

or D.O. (divisional officer). Their contents are not to be disclosed to any one but the persons officially concerned.'

Why, it is necessary to ask, is this reserve regarding its strength observed by the Army, seeing that publicity is frankly practised for their own sake by other religious bodies which, unlike the Army, owe little or nothing to the public? No one, of course, would wish to make use for public purposes of the names of the persons inscribed in the rolls. If it is necessary for a successful organization financed by the public to make and keep careful records of its work, the public are surely entitled to be shown a regular digest of them. If General Booth's alleged evangelical success has any foundation in fact, he has, in refraining from publishing periodically detailed figures of his organization's strength, departed for once from his acknowledged practice of utilizing every possible opportunity of securing an effective advertisement for his work. Figures of strength are admittedly necessary in order that he and his staff

may know 'the extent to which this work is being accomplished'. There is, as will be shown, but too much ground for the fear that, if such figures are not regularly imparted to the public, who finance the Army's efforts so lavishly, no one may ever know, in the possible event of evangelical failure, the extent to which the work is not being accomplished.

The public, then, are supplied with no record of 'what is being done' in the spiritual department in return for their money. The statistics of officers in General Booth's employment, which figure prominently in the Army's reports, do not constitute such a record. They represent the machine, not the work which it is intended to perform. Before attempting any independent estimate of the work itself and the amount contributed to it by the public, it may be well to note that the very absence of such a record helps in no small measure to account for the continued toleration of this unsatisfactory state of things. The public, who are not afforded a complete survey of the entire field, are generous enough to assume that the work is being prosecuted elsewhere with more success than is possibly the case in their own immediate field of observation. Moreover the idea is widespread that street preaching is a thing to be regarded as an end in itself, and that the evangelist—even apart from visible results—may, after all, be not unworthy of his hire. This idea, however, is in reality opposed to the principles of the Army, inasmuch as the very reason of its being is to supersede the alleged inconclusive religious propaganda among the masses of the older religious denominations. Those of the public whose acquaintance with the Army's work extends beyond its open-air meetings are relatively few. While the sympathy or the good nature of many leads them to contribute to the outdoor collections, it is seldom that the public are sufficiently interested in the Army's spiritual work to take the trouble to acquaint themselves with the nature and functions of one of the Army's corps. Were it otherwise it would be much more generally and clearly recognized than it is at present

that each of these corps is, in every essential particular, a congregation of worshippers existing primarily, like any other congregation, for its own spiritual benefit, for its own numerical advancement, and consequently for the numerical advancement of the sect of which it is a member.¹

The idea, frequently fostered of late by the officials of the Army, that the body acts largely as the recruiting sergeant for other denominations cannot, unfortunately, bear examination. As has just been seen, the work of the Army is 'to secure the salvation of men, and then to preserve them in the favour of God and train them to fight for the salvation of their fellows'. Officers are further reminded that 'salvation means enlistment into the Army'—being 'made soldiers' (*O. and R.*, p. 74), and that 'the conversion of sinners and their enlistment in the Army' (p. 415) must be their constant object. Here there is no idea of working for the increase of other sects, and no one who knows anything of the constitution of the Salvation Army can deny that it is expressly, and even ingeniously, designed—in a degree unapproached by any other religious body—for the retention within its ranks of every convert that it is capable of making.² There must always, of course, be a certain amount of leakage between sects. But on the whole the atmosphere and ritual which suffice to convert a man will, in nine cases out of ten, be more congenial to him for his regular edification than the atmosphere and ritual of those bodies

¹ A critic has argued (Correspondence in the *Daily Graphic*, September 13, 1906) that a false assumption is here made, viz. that the Army is a Church or a sect. We are here less concerned with names than with things. A religious body does not escape being a sect merely by calling itself an 'Army', its meeting-places 'barracks', its ministers 'field officers', its members 'soldiers', its spiritual head a 'general', and its lesser hierarchs 'commissioners' and 'colonels'. The Army is nothing if not self-sufficing: it makes all the spiritual pretensions, and has furnished itself with all the material appurtenances, of a sect.

² It is an invariable rule in the Salvation Army to keep its hold on the repentant one' (*The Romance of the Salvation Army*, by Hulda Friederichs, with a Preface by General Booth. Cassell & Co., October, 1907).

which have failed to convert him. The atmosphere and ritual of the Salvation Army are admittedly very different from those of any other sect; they are, in fact, deliberately designed to influence the minds and satisfy the spiritual aspirations of the particular class of people for which the Army exists, and for which the other sects, it is asserted, do not. Why, then, should one be expected to look for the Army's converts elsewhere than in its own corps or congregations?

In all ages the organization, the person, and even the spot associated in the sinner's mind with the crowning incident of his conversion have in innumerable instances been the object of the most signal gratitude, devotion, or veneration. Are we to assume that the Salvationist convert more than any other is prone to turn his back upon the divine instrument (*O. and R.*, p. 303) of his regeneration, and to commit the ingratitude of diverting his spiritual energies to other organizations which, he must know, are less divine because less effectual (p. 303)? Whatever may be said of the constitution and administration of the Army, there is certainly nothing about its aims or about the individuals forming its membership, that is designed to repulse any one capable of being once influenced by its doctrines and inspired by its mission. Its professed aims, whether successful or not, are lofty; its congregations, whether numerically strong or not, pass muster in the matter of respectability; if its claims to success are justified membership may well be a matter of legitimate pride. All these considerations lead inevitably to the conclusion that, if the Army is not merely a great auxiliary revival agency working, say, on the lines of certain well-known peripatetic missions, but possesses an adequate permanent congregational system entirely in its own hands, then the strength of its congregations or corps is a reasonable test—and, indeed, the only test—of its success.

What means, then, are possessed by the Army of making converts in the first place, and of keeping them in the second? It is unnecessary here to

examine the doctrines taught by the Army, but only those claims in regard to their propagation which distinguish the Army from other sects. Others may content themselves with preaching at large, trusting 'that good shall fall at last—far off', and look for the results of their sowing in other men's sheaves. Not so the Army. 'The work of the F.O. (field officer) is not to make ungodly people better—that is, more moral—but to make them feel how awfully bad they are, that they are utterly lost' (p. 89). The F.O.'s business, in short, is first of all 'to save men' (p. 88). 'This done, other teaching can commence' (p. 90). Those who have never perused General Booth's six hundred odd pages of *Orders and Regulations* can have little idea of the care, minuteness and exhaustiveness with which his system of converting men is elaborated for the guidance of his officers. The peculiar merit of the system is, however, that there is nothing fallible about it:—

'Many people think it is all a sort of chance, as to whether they will succeed or not. They think they have no more power—to bring about the salvation of souls, than they have to produce a thunderstorm, or manufacture an earthquake. This is a mistake. If the F.O. will be at the trouble to qualify himself, and follow the counsels given in these Orders, he will be as certain to succeed in bringing an abundant harvest of grain into the heavenly garner, as a farmer would be who ploughed and sowed and reaped according to the fixed laws that govern the natural world in raising a good crop of corn. . . . There are fixed methods of moving men. If the F.O. will read the counsels that follow, he will know how to produce conviction in the hearts of the people round about him, and if he will adopt them, he will be successful in doing so' (pp. 90, 91).

The F.O., in fact, is told that if he does not succeed he must necessarily recognize that it is his own fault, and not that of the system (p. 23). The Army, then, permits no one to doubt its ability to succeed. In order to succeed, however, it must get into contact with the people aimed at. Either they must come to the Army's officers, or the Army's officers must go to them:—

'The easiest, quickest, most economical, and most effective method by which the F.O. can reach people is to have them come to him,

crowding his Barracks, and sitting before him ready to listen to what he has to say.

'Every effort therefore should be made to draw people to the Barracks. Various methods of advertising and other attractions are set forth in Chapter II., part xi. . . .

'Nothing succeeds like success. If souls are getting saved night after night, this fact alone will draw people to the place' (p. 93).

Clearly if people are not drawn to the place, it can only mean that souls are not getting saved night after night and, consequently, that the work of the Army, for some reason or another, is not being accomplished. It may be said, however, that the people to whom the Army ministers are frequently compelled by industrial and other considerations to remove from one district to another or from one town to another, and that for this reason the membership of any one corps or congregation cannot possibly show all the converts made by that corps. This is no doubt true, but it is nevertheless reasonable to look for such converts as may have been compelled to remove in some other corps, either in the same town or in some other part of the country. Ample provision has, in fact, been made for such contingencies. The names of all penitents professing conversion in connexion with any corps are placed on a converts' register (*O. and R.*, p. 326). When the officer is convinced that a conversion is sincere the convert is regarded as a recruit, and after an interval of four weeks from conversion the recruit may become a member or soldier of the corps (p. 327). A soldier, in accepting and signing the 'Articles of War', subscribes, in addition to doctrinal professions, to these words: 'I do here declare my full determination to be a true Soldier of the Army till I die' (p. 331), and he is enjoined to be 'regular in attending its meetings, outdoor and in, as often as you can' (*War Cry*). When a soldier is about to remove 'it is the duty of the commanding officer to see that such Soldiers do not suffer by their removal, and that the Army is not weakened thereby' (p. 335). The soldier himself is furnished with a 'transfer note', intended to be handed by him to the officer of the corps nearest to his destination, and the

counterfoil of this note is transmitted by the officer of the corps of departure to his divisional officer, who in turn transmits it to the officer of the corps of destination, and it is this latter officer's duty to make suitable arrangements to receive and welcome the soldier on his arrival, if possible at the railway station (pp. 335-6). It will be seen, therefore, that the safeguards against desertion are much more stringent than in any other religious organization.

It is curious to note that, within the Army, every provision is designed to increase its numerical strength, and every test of spiritual progress is, or was, ostensibly based on numerical strength, and yet that when a similar test is applied from the outside it is declared to be inapplicable to the Army's work. Not only is the numerical test the principal one said to be applied by Headquarters, but it is prominently kept before all candidates for officership as the principal factor in determining their promotion:—

'Improvement is the only road to promotion. . . . Promotion means usefulness. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate from these motives for every F.O. to desire promotion. Paul says he that desires the office of a bishop desires a good work (p. 18).

'In order that Field Officers who are in command of Corps may know the estimate placed by their leaders upon their work at the various corps, and that the measure of success attending their labours may be known, the work of every Commanding Officer will, at the time of his Farewell, be graded by his Divisional Officer. . . . The principal items which will be taken into consideration by the D.O. in forming this estimate will be:

(a) The number of Soldiers added to the Roll.

(b) The Indoor Attendances.

(c) The amount of Income and its relation to the Expenditure.

(d) The Young People's Work—all branches' (p. 525).

In practice the third of these items is generally the only test of 'improvement', but to give it precedence in *Orders and Regulations* would, obviously, not be politic. How, in view of all these official facts, any officer of the Salvation Army can have the hardihood to declare the test of numerical strength to be inapplicable to the work of the Army is incomprehensible. That General Booth should have been allowed for so many years

to retain in his own hands the only valid evidence of his evangelical success, while the public, without whose financial support every one of his corps would fall to pieces to-morrow, remain in ignorance of it, is surely a striking proof of the extremelaxity of thought prevalent throughout the country in regard to the whole work of his extraordinary organization.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY'S 'SUCCESS' IN LONDON

THE field most favourable to the Salvation Army for estimating its success is undoubtedly London. Here the special ground for which its evangelical methods are expressly designed is immense, and there is no difficulty about getting into contact with the people aimed at. The flow of population is towards London from the provinces, and success in the provinces ought, therefore, to contribute to an increase of strength in the metropolis. In London the Army began its operations, and there it has its Headquarters and training homes for officers. The best Salvationist talent and the most attractive methods of Salvationist publicity have for many years been available for the conversion of London's population. Here, then, if anywhere, we ought to encounter indubitable evidence of that 'success' of which General Booth has of late been so indefatigable in disclosing the 'secret'.

What, then, is the result of the Army's more than forty years of labour? It was not until 1904 that the data necessary for making an estimate existed, but it is not to General Booth that the public are indebted for the data in question. The religious census taken by the *Daily News* between November, 1902, and November, 1903, the final results of which were published in 1904 under the title of *The Religious Life of London*, is the only published source from which any light on the subject can be obtained. When this interesting and valuable work was published the Army had not as yet succeeded in securing the best advertisement it ever had, and its existence and pretensions were not so largely in

the public mind as they have been since. For this reason, perhaps, the particular application of the results of the census to the Salvation Army received comparatively little attention. This was unfortunate, for it is mainly upon the alleged evangelical success of the Army with the masses that General Booth's claims to be entrusted with larger powers and increased financial support for the purpose of socially regenerating the industrially 'submerged' must necessarily rest (*In Darkest England*, Appendix, p. vi.).

There are two convenient methods of estimating the Army's success in London, (1) that of comparing its strength with the total religious strength of all denominations, and (2) that of comparing its strength with that of the missions of other sects which are intended to appeal to the same class as that to which the Army appeals. These tests the religious census renders possible. The census gives the attendances of men, women and children at the morning and evening services of every place of worship, as far as they were discoverable, in the metropolis, and so careful and thorough were the methods and the organization employed that it is improbable that even the smallest and most obscure of meeting-places was overlooked. The basis of the census is indoor attendances—not actual membership. In the case of the Salvation Army it is clear that an estimate based on the assumption that every adult present at a corps service is a member, or soldier, of the Army, is particularly favourable to the Army.

In an article entitled 'The Salvation Army: A Review' which appeared in the *Monthly Review* for November, 1904, the author furnished a series of tables, based upon and calculated from the figures of the census, showing the effective adult strength of the Army compared with that of the principal religious bodies in each borough in London. In these tables children were excluded from all sects, the aim being to ascertain the number of voluntary attendances throughout. It was established by the census that the average proportion of 'twicers', i.e. worshippers attending both morning and

evening service, was 39 per cent. of the morning service for the whole of London, and, this deduction being uniformly made, the tables of the *Monthly Review* article gave the relative 'adult effective' of all the sects dealt with for the purposes of the review. Here it is to be noted that the deduction of only 39 per cent. is particularly favourable to the Army, as attendance at both services ought, in that body, to be much more frequent than in other bodies where discipline is either lax or absent. It must be noted that the outdoor meetings cannot be regarded as any test of the Army's strength or success. It is officially admitted that these meetings are merely a prelude to the indoor meetings, and are held for the sole purpose, apart from that of collecting money, of getting people to come to the halls (*O. and R.*, p. 401).

The total number of adults attending religious services of every kind in London was 556,200. Among these the number of Salvationists was 12,741, or 2·3 per cent. of the whole adult religious effective. In East London the Army's strength was 3,064, or 3·4 per cent. of the adult strength of all the sects in the division. This number, however, includes the adults attending the Army's great Congress Hall at Hackney, where abnormal means exist of attracting a congregation. If allowance be made for the 1,784 adults (including officers) attending there, the Army's strength throughout East London would be only 1·5 per cent. of the total strength of all sects. The census gives separate tables of the missions conducted by the Church of England, and the Methodist, Baptist, Congregational and Presbyterian bodies; and as these missions are at least intended to reach the same classes that the Army professes to reach, a comparison of the respective results cannot but be legitimate and valuable. In addition to the missions of the leading bodies, however, there are a large number of mission halls, such as those of the London City Mission, the attendances at which are given in each borough under the heading of 'Other Services'. A small proportion only of these meeting-places differ in respect of aim from

the meeting-places or barracks of the Army, and it will, therefore, be more than fair to the Army if 50 per cent. of the adults attending these 'other services' be added to the adults attending the missions of the principal bodies in each borough. This method has been adopted in the following table for East London, which shows (1) the total adult effective of all sects, (2) the total adult effective of the Army, (3) the total adult effective of all missions, and (4) the proportion borne by the Army and by the missions to the whole :—

THE ARMY'S STRENGTH IN EAST LONDON

	All Sects.	Salvation Army.	Missions.	S. Army per-centage.	Missions per-centage.
Poplar . .	13,579	370	1,071	2·7	7·8
Stepney . .	27,274	200	4,243	0·7	15·5
Bethnal Green	9,691	61	805	0·6	8·2
Shoreditch .	8,097	470	802	5·8	9·9
Hackney . .	30,271	1,963 ¹	2,038	6·4	6·7
Totals . .	88,912	3,064 ²	8,959	3·4	10·0

¹ Including 1,784 adults at Congress Hall, Hackney.

² 22 congregations.

How any one, whether in the Army or out of it, can, in face of these extraordinary figures, use the word success with reference to General Booth's evangelical labours in East London surely passes human comprehension. It must not be forgotten that in 1865, when he began operations, General Booth had the whole field of East London practically in his own hands for the reaping. This, at least, is his own account of the position at that time :—

'While conducting meetings in the East of London, he was led to have a tender regard for the multitudes he saw around him, uncared for by any Religious Agency. The great mass of the population attended neither Church nor Chapel, but spent their Sabbaths in idleness, or business, or revelry; drink, sin, and the devil being triumphant. As the General looked upon these neglected, perishing crowds, the question occurred to him, "Cannot they be reached with Salvation?" He thought that there must be some method of carrying the truth home to them, and he decided to devote himself to the discovery and adoption of such methods as would be likely to bring these outcast classes to God. This decision, put in practice, and persevered in, resulted in the formation of the Salvation Army'¹ (*O. and R.*, pp. 297-8).

¹ General Booth ought to have said the Christian Mission—a very different thing.

When it is remembered that the Army is now in its second generation, that the strength of every sect is increased—apart altogether from the accession of converts—by its own share of the increase of population, and that the Army makes the dedication of children by parents and their training for future membership practically unavoidable (*O. and R.*, pp. 190, 358-368), one is compelled seriously to ask, in view of the handful of 3,000 Salvationists throughout East London, whether the Army exercises any external religious influence at all. Had the Army at its

origin been an obscure and retiring sect, without any particular faith in the fitness of its doctrines for its environments, and without either the means or the desire for publicity, one could hardly have looked for a more meagre muster of followers to-day. Moreover, the 370 Salvationists of Poplar are distributed among 4 corps or congregations; the 200 of Stepney among 4; the 61 of Bethnal Green among

3 (slum posts); the 470 of Shoreditch among 4; and, excluding Congress Hall, the 777 of Hackney among 6. The weakness of Salvationism, therefore, is not owing to any defective geographical distribution of its forces. The foregoing table shows, moreover, that if General Booth's statement regarding the neglect of East London by other religious agencies forty-three years ago is well founded, these religious agencies—despite the fact that they came after the Army had occupied the field—have since far outdistanced the results of the Army in every borough. In Shoreditch their strength is nearly double, in Poplar nearly three times, in Bethnal Green over thirteen times, and in Stepney over twenty-one times that of the Army.

It may be said that the results of the missions are distributed among a very much larger number of halls than those of the Army. This is quite true, but the number of halls that can be set going—provided the field for evangelical labour exists beside them—is also an essential element in estimating evangelical success. Had the Army

been successful in proportion to its pretensions, it would have had in East London many more halls than all the missions put together, as well as many more people in them. In spite of the united efforts of the Army and the missions, it cannot yet be said that the field in East London has been exhausted. The melancholy fact is, indeed, that it has been scarcely more than touched, and in view of the financial generosity of Londoners towards General Booth's organization and its attention to districts more wealthy and apparently less deprived than the slums, they may well conceive that his reproach of 1865 may to-day be capable of a different, but more fitting, application.

Under the Army system every congregation considers itself licensed to collect from the public on every possible occasion as much money as it can for its own and other purposes, and the public, owing largely to a misconception regarding the nature of the bulk of the Army's work, good-naturedly accepts the principle. This being so, it should require very few converts,

and very little of those converts' own money, to start a small corps or congregation, either in East London or anywhere else. If, then, more corps cannot be started, one can only conclude that the Army's methods are incapable of securing the few converts necessary. The missions, on the other hand, are financed partly by the principal religious bodies and partly by the people who attend them. They do not, except in rare instances, make any financial appeal to the public at large, and if they did it is to be feared that the public would show but little disposition to encourage them. It is not, of course, the purpose of this inquiry to promote the interests of missions as a whole, or those of any particular mission. It is impossible, however, not to admit that, even on ground so favourable to the Army as East London, those desirous of promoting the evangelization of the masses stand an enormously better chance of obtaining some reasonable return for

their money by placing it in the hands of one or other of the younger religious agencies operating there, rather than in the hands of the Army.

If a similar examination be made of the Army's religious activity in the three other great divisions of London, no more satisfactory result in respect of reaching the masses is perceptible. In West London, the adult strength of all religious bodies is 146,883, while that of the Army is 3,132, or only 2·1 per cent. of the whole. The following table gives the details for each borough, as has been done in the case of East London :—

THE ARMY'S STRENGTH IN WEST LONDON

	All Sects.	Salvation Army.	Missions.	S. Army percentage.	Missions percentage.
Marylebone .	26,503	410	1,744	1·5	6·5
Paddington .	19,275	262	542	1·3	2·8
Westminster .	31,302	1,536	1,010	4·9	3·2
Kensington .	26,812	314	478	1·1	1·7
Chelsea . . .	9,407	103	776	1·1	8·2
Hammersmith	9,609	247	242	2·5	2·5
Fulham . . .	8,994	260	475	2·8	5·2
City of London	14,981	—	12	—	—
Totals . . .	146,883	3,132	5,279	2·1	3·5

In considering these figures it must be noted that the Army's strength in the whole division is distributed among 16 corps or congregations, and also that nearly half its strength is contributed by the 1,395 adults attending a single corps, that of Regent Hall in Oxford Street. This hall is that of one of the very few large corps in London, and like Congress Hall, Hackney, it has means of providing altogether special attractions. It can show an exceptionally strong 'platform', and has a numerous and well-trained band. It is doubtful, however, whether more than a small proportion of the worshippers are residents in the neighbourhood. It is probable that, as at Congress Hall, many of them are members or adherents of other churches, temporarily in search of a more intense religious experience than their own denomination affords them. It is certain that few belong to the particular social class for which the Army is supposed to exist. Situ-

ated in the full tide of the Sunday holiday crowd, it would be strange if, on autumn and winter evenings, this hall, the entrance of which is usually made to bustle with uniformed official life, did not succeed in attracting a tolerably large number of chance passers-by. But to say that such people are in any way members, or even adherents, of the Army, is impossible.

To resume, then, the results in West London, the 410 Salvationists of Marylebone are divided among 3 congregations; the 262 of Paddington among 2; the 1,536 of Westminster among 2 (1,395 belonging to one of them); the 314 of Kensington among 3; the 103 of Chelsea among 2; the 247 of Hammersmith among 2; and the 260 of Fulham among 2. In only one district does the Army outnumber by more than a few units the missions—that of Westminster, in which Regent Hall is situated. In Fulham, Marylebone and Chelsea—to name only those boroughs in which one would expect to see the Army most active—it is outnumbered by the missions twice, four times and nearly eight times respectively.

The corresponding tables for the divisions of North and South London may be given and summarized in similar fashion without further comment. In the north division (see next column) there are 16 Army congregations, and the 461 Salvationists of Stoke Newington are distributed among 2; the 168 of Hampstead among 2; the 1,111 of Islington among 6; the 657 of St. Pancras among 3; the 100 of Finsbury among 2; while the 27 of Holborn belong to 1. In one borough the missions are slightly weaker than the Army. In the others, leaving Holborn out of account, they are from two and a half to six times as strong.

In South London (see next column) where there are 37 Army congregations, the 412 Salvation-

THE ARMY'S STRENGTH IN NORTH LONDON

	All Sects.	Salvation Army.	Missions.	S. Army per-centage.	Missions per-centage.
Stoke Newington . . .	10,133	461	380	4.5	3.7
Hampstead . . .	13,295	168	489	1.2	3.6
Islington . . .	43,097	1,111	5,175	2.5	12.0
St. Pancras . . .	24,562	657	1,636	2.6	6.6
Holborn . . .	7,901	27	537	0.3	6.7
Finsbury . . .	10,350	100	596	0.9	5.7
Totals . . .	109,338	2,524	8,813	2.3	8.0

ists of Wandsworth belong to 4; the 987 of Lambeth to 8; the 1,023 of Camberwell to 6; the 291 of Lewisham to 3; the 156 of Deptford to 1; the 190 of Greenwich to 4; the 377 of Woolwich to 3; the 321 of Battersea to 2; the 166 of Southwark to 3; and the 98 of Bermondsey to 3. In no borough does the Army's strength equal that of the missions. In Woolwich, where it is relatively greatest, it is outnumbered by 40 per cent., and in the other boroughs the missions are from about twice to twenty times as strong.

THE ARMY'S STRENGTH IN SOUTH LONDON

	All Sects.	Salvation Army.	Missions.	S. Army per-centage.	Missions per-centage.
Wandsworth . . .	31,081	412	1,250	1.3	4.0
Lambeth . . .	37,381	987	2,883	2.6	7.7
Camberwell . . .	35,027	1,023	5,228	2.9	14.9
Lewisham . . .	23,544	291	480	1.2	2.0
Deptford . . .	10,857	156	620	1.4	5.7
Greenwich . . .	12,074	190	570	1.5	4.7
Woolwich . . .	16,170	377	545	2.3	3.3
Battersea . . .	14,622	321	787	2.2	5.3
Southwark . . .	18,229	166	1,710	0.9	9.3
Bermondsey . . .	12,082	98	1,877	0.8	15.5
Totals . . .	211,067	4,021	15,950	1.9	7.5

The summary of the figures for the whole of London is as follows:—

THE ARMY'S STRENGTH IN ALL LONDON

	All Sects.	Salvation Army.	Missions.	S. Army per-centage.	Missions per-centage.
East . . .	88,912	3,064	8,959	3.4	10.0
West . . .	146,883	3,132	5,279	2.1	3.5
North . . .	109,338	2,524	8,813	2.3	8.0
South . . .	211,067	4,021	15,950	1.9	7.5
Totals . . .	556,200	12,741	39,001	2.3	7.0

Summing up the results for the whole metropolis, we find that the missions, which aim at accomplishing similar work, which make little or no appeal for financial help to the public generally, which make no pretensions to infallibility of method, and which display but little genius for advertisement, can show in respect of results an adult strength at least three times that of the Army, and that this striking disproportion is largely increased in nearly all those districts where the Army, if its pretensions were but justified, ought to be strongest.

Two other considerations must be taken into account before passing from this important question of strength. A comparison with the work of the missions alone is really inadequate in one respect—that of being unduly favourable to the Army. Whatever may have been the case forty-three years ago, it is not to be denied that to-day a large number of the churches and chapels themselves in the poorer districts can show among their members or adherents a fair proportion of people who, whether actually 'submerged' or not, belong to a class in no perceptible degree more prosperous than that from which General Booth derives the majority of his poorest recruits. The other consideration is this: It is by no means certain that the bulk of the Army's members or adherents, whatever their number may be, belonged at any time to the class described by General Booth as being 'uncared for by any religious agency'. On the contrary, it is certain that a great many of them did not. 'Among those who join the Army in England,' says Mr. Charles Booth (*Life and Labour in London*, vol. vii. p. 336), 'many, if not most, have come to it from some other religious body, and may even have been ardent Christians previously.' It is true that Mr. Charles Booth has recently given a handsome donation to the Army's 'social' work, but there appears to be no ground for believing that this implies any alteration in his conclusion that the Army's religious section, to which by far the greater part of the public contribution goes, has

'altogether failed' in accomplishing its professed objects (*ibid.*, p. 326). Even if it is an over-estimate, the first statement undoubtedly contains some truth, for the Army, whether sympathetic to the masses or not, does possess definite attractions not to be found elsewhere for a certain type of 'ardent Christians'. The advantage to society of providing such good people with a more congenial religion at the public cost is not immediately apparent, and if their accession to the ranks of the Army does not serve to bring in converts of another class, no other advantage to the community appears possible.

'If at the present moment,' says Miss Friederichs (*The Romance of the Salvation Army*, October, 1907), 'you assist at a Salvation Army gathering in any city, town, or hamlet of the fifty-three countries in which the Army is established, you can convince yourself of the fact that the flag and motto are still leading from victory to victory, as they have done from the beginning.' As one of the 'critics of little and uncertain knowledge' to whom she casually alludes, the author confesses that he is unable to speak with absolute confidence regarding the Army's operations in all of these fifty-three countries. In the land of its origin, however, he finds conviction on this point much less easy than she appears to have found it. Unfortunately, the scope of Miss Friederichs' work—written, according to her publishers' announcement, 'with a restraint that only inside knowledge could give'—seems to have precluded her from furnishing any detailed evidence such as might have served to substantiate in some measure her definite but exceedingly general statement regarding local progress. In this, as in most other matters of importance, she—unwisely, one may venture to think—neglects her opportunity of extending and consolidating the necessarily uncertain knowledge, owing to the Army's system, of critics whom she has evidently some right to regard as outsiders.

Although the Army has not yet disclosed its numbers it has apparently been moved by the criticisms in this

chapter to make at least a show of accepting the numerical test. On January 21, 1907, a great 'swearing-in' of new members or soldiers was for the first time in its history held at Exeter Hall. Some 1,500 members were then enrolled, and these were stated to represent, with few exceptions, the Army's net gains in London during the preceding three months. It was claimed that the meeting, which was widely reported in the daily press, was 'a perfect refutation of the unfounded yet persistent statements continually made as to the Salvation Army having lost its grip on the non-churchgoing classes' (*Social Gazette*, February 2, 1907). The truth of this statement depends a good deal upon what one is to understand by the 'grip'. The census figures indicate that previous to 1902-3 that grip was neither very firm nor very extensive. If the Army's growth during that period is to be taken as the standard of its 'original capacity for reaching and reforming the non-churchgoing and lapsed masses', it is not easy to see how the Army could well fail, with its resources, to maintain the level of that singularly ineffectual performance. Obviously, the difficulty will be for it to maintain its new three months' record. If the rate of progress now indicated were anything like normal—as, indeed, appears to be suggested—one might reasonably have looked for a muster of at least 150,000 adult members in London at the census instead of the less than 13,000 attendants. Clearly the 'net gains' of three months bear little or no relationship to those of more than forty years.

Mere figures of enrolment, therefore, are worthless as an indication of growth. There is nothing new, moreover, about the process of 'swearing-in'. To celebrate the function *en masse* instead of separately and locally, as hitherto, certainly indicates a development in the Army's need for *réclame*. It can hardly furnish any additional guarantee of steadfastness or permanence in regard to those enrolled. This remark applies specially to the 'numerous reformed drunkards and convicts' stated to be among the new members.

It is usually well to take rather longer views than those favoured by the Army's statistical department. It is also well to remember that other workers among the lapsed and the depraved, who receive little or no financial help from the general public, have either less opportunity, desire, or necessity to advertise their show cases. Large and continuous accessions of new members which do not obviously increase the attendances are unsatisfactory and even mysterious. In spite of them, and in spite of the increased liberality of the public during the greater portion of the past five years, there is little or no indication that any more people are in the habit of attending the halls than at the time of the census. In several quarters a considerable falling off is apparent. The supposition that the three months' net gains of 1,500 are a fair representation of the Army's capacity, whether original or actual, is impossible to reconcile with the facts.

CHAPTER IV

'SOCIAL' WORK AND RELIGIOUS FUNDS
 THERE are throughout the country some 1,500 Salvationist corps or congregations similar to those whose position in London has been examined in the preceding chapter. It is these corps that collect all but a small proportion of the entire sum contributed by the public to all the departments of the Army's work, both 'social' and spiritual. It is, however, to the maintenance of these congregations themselves and their oversight by Divisional and Provincial Headquarters, and not to the 'social' work, that all but a relatively small proportion of the aggregate ordinary income so collected is devoted, the proportion in question going to the costly maintenance of the International and National Headquarters of the religious department. To imagine that, because the Army possesses a 'social' wing, the local corps also are in some effectual way engaged in promoting 'social' work, and therefore require the financial aid of the public for that purpose, is a delusion. The delusion is, unfortunately, widespread. 'It is the "social" efforts of the Salvation

Army,' writes a journal sympathetic to the body, 'which have kept this great religious organization sane and wholesome in mind.' How efforts made by other people can exercise this salutary influence upon the Army's congregations it is difficult to see, for the truth is that none of these congregations or their officers take any direct part in the Army's 'social' work at all.¹ Their efforts are religious only, and the results of these efforts in London we have just seen.

'But,' it may be said, 'the Army's congregations make special efforts to reclaim drunkards. Is not this "social" work?' Here it is necessary to distinguish. The victim of intemperance is not always impoverished or industrially ruined by his vice. In such a case the Army's congregations, like innumerable other religious agencies, endeavour to convert him. This effort, however, is entirely religious, the appeal being chiefly to the victim's religious hopes and fears (*O. and R.*, pp. 102-4), and it is, moreover, in no sense costly for any existing congregation to make. The victim whom drink has ruined physically and socially presents a different problem. General Booth himself seemed to come to the conclusion (*In Darkest England*, Preface) that in such a case religious influences alone are apt to be inadequate to effect a complete reformation, and that these influences must be combined with sequestration, discipline, healthy habits, and regular labour. This class of work was intended to be provided for by the Darkest England Scheme, which the public enabled General Booth to establish in 1891. The funds, property, and personnel of this—the 'social'—department are required by deed to be kept separate from those of the religious department. The relationship, attitude, and duties of the religious field officer towards the 'social' work are exhaustively treated in the space of a single page of *Orders and Regulations* (pp. 576-7). It is clear, then, that the Army's religious corps or

congregations do not even possess the means of engaging in the 'social' work, and that, beyond occasionally notifying suitable local 'cases' to the 'Social' Headquarters, neither they nor their officers have any connexion whatsoever with such work. Not only can it be said that the public and the press generally are under a different and an erroneous impression in regard to this important matter, but it must also be said that the Army's practice of mingling 'social' and religious objects in its financial appeals cannot but produce and maintain that impression.

In January, 1891, at the inception of the Darkest England Scheme, Commissioner Smith resigned his post as head of the 'social' wing chiefly because the heads of the Army would not then consent to the separation of the finances of the religious and the 'social' operations. 'The social scheme,' said Commissioner Smith, 'would be existing to finance the Salvation Army, which would not be right' (Letter in the *Times*, January 2, 1891). In spite of the subsequent separation of the finances, the undesirable result apprehended by Commissioner Smith has actually come to pass. Ever since the Darkest England Scheme was instituted it has been assisting to advertise and finance the Salvation Army as a purely religious body. General Booth's conviction that 'the Army's spiritual work is greater than its "social" ' (Interview, *Tribune*, April 7, 1906) is possibly the explanation of this fact. In view, however, of the circumstances attending the separate institution of the 'Social' Scheme, of the public interest in 'social' work rather than in mere evangelization, and of the inadequate evidence officially furnished of the Army's alleged spiritual success, it seems highly desirable that financial appeals to the public for religious work should leave the 'social' work entirely out of the question.

The letter issued by the General in March, 1905, in connexion with the Army's annual Self-Denial Appeal read as follows:—

'DEAR FRIEND,—

'All through the long days of Summer and the dark nights of Winter, the Salvationist

¹ 'I only speak of the spiritual side. . . . I have nothing to do with the "social" side' (A Provincial Commander in charge of 180 corps: *Daily Dispatch*, July 26, 1907).

is busy relieving the Poor, nursing the Sick, reclaiming the Drunken, raising the Fallen, caring for the Children, preaching Salvation to the Heathen, and seeking the Lost in the market-places, streets and slums of our own dear old Land.

'Self-Denial Week is a beautiful opportunity for helping this most humane and Christ-like work, and for giving the Salvationist a little cheer in his self-denying toil. What will you give for the Master's sake ?

'WILLIAM BOOTH.'

Here it is to be noted that, while five items descriptive of the Army's 'social' work are put in the forefront of the appeal, the solitary item of religious work—'preaching salvation' and 'seeking the lost' being synonymous—is placed at the end. The front page of the circular reads thus:—'The Salvation Army: Self-Denial Week, March 11–18, 1905. We make a little go a long way in relieving the misery of the Distressed. Your help is needed'. On another page are some particulars headed, 'Economical Philanthropy', showing what various sums of money will accomplish if contributed to the Self-Denial Fund. The objects mentioned are: Children's breakfasts, the 'social' workshops, slum officers' work, rescue homes, famine orphans in India, abandoned and destitute women, village day-schools in India, prison-gate homes in Japan, and homes for fatherless children. Here the religious work entirely disappears. Finally yet another page sets out in two columns, 'What the Salvation Army Is' on the one hand, and 'What the Salvation Army Has' on the other. Both columns are very largely occupied with details of the various 'social' activities and institutions which form part of the Army's Darkest England ('Social') Scheme in this country, or which constitute its extra-religious work abroad. Taking the Self-Denial Appeal as a whole, therefore, it is impossible for any reasonable person to deny that it is mainly the 'social' work of the Army for which the money is solicited from the public.

-- To what objects is it devoted? The Balance Sheet and Statements of Account (General Funds for the year ending September 30, 1905) show that £63,114 4s. 10d. was contributed and

collected in that year for the Self-Denial Fund by the Army's congregations throughout the United Kingdom. It is improbable, as will appear later, that the members of these congregations themselves contributed more than a small proportion of this total. The other side of the account shows that only £11,291 15s. 4d., or much less than a fifth of the whole sum collected, was devoted to the 'social' purposes of the Darkest England Scheme. The remaining four-fifths were devoted to the foreign service general fund, the international training homes, the sick and wounded fund, the junior and young people's work, grants to divisions, the maintenance of British Headquarters, grants to poor corps for rent, junior soldiers' buildings, the general administration of the British territory, and a small portion of the grants made to foreign and colonial territories. These objects, whether at home or abroad, are religious and not 'social', but while they are much more costly than the 'social' work, the public generally are much less interested in them.

The Self-Denial Appeals of 1906 and 1907 also gave special prominence to the 'social' work. In certain districts, moreover, a separate leaflet accompanying the appeal called attention to the free distribution of food and clothing by the local (collecting) corps during the preceding winter. The systematic distribution of free food and clothing is opposed to the principles of the Darkest England Scheme and is not, therefore, 'social' work. In any case, the expense of the distribution is usually borne, not by the corps funds, but by a special fund for the purpose raised mainly among the charitable public of the locality. Unless the corps is 'poor and struggling' it receives no contribution from the Self-Denial Fund. The bearing on that fund of such 'interesting local facts' of a merely charitable nature is, therefore, difficult to discern.

A distinguished friend of the Army has informed the author that in March, 1907, he was led by the criticisms in this book to question some of the collectors regarding the distribution of the Self-Denial money. The an-

swers were various, uncertain, and unsatisfactory.¹ For this the collectors are not entirely to blame. The boxes entrusted to them bore various legends. In 1906 the two apparently most widely distributed were, typographically, somewhat as follows:—

PLEASE ASSIST
OUR
RELIGIOUS, SLUM, RESCUE
AND
SOCIAL
WORK.

PLEASE ASSIST
OUR
RESCUE, SOCIAL
AND
RELIGIOUS
WORK.

These inscriptions seem to indicate that those responsible for the appeal were under the impression that both the slum work and the rescue work are distinct from the 'social' work, instead of being merely departments of it. In the search for a telling word such details are apt to be overlooked. In 1906 the Self-Denial Fund amounted to £72,726. Out of this the entire 'social' work received only £11,305—that is, practically the same amount

¹ This is not surprising. The *War Cry* of March 14, 1908, informed the collectors, under the heading of "'S.D." Questions', that it is 'quite false' to say that 'money raised for Self-Denial is used to pay the salaries of staff officers'. None of the Self-Denial money, it declared, is used for Headquarters' salaries, which 'are paid out of the profits of the trading operations'. Nothing could well be more misleading. The accounts (1906) show, under the heads of International Headquarters, National Headquarters, International Training Homes, and Foreign Service General Fund, items of expenditure on 'salaries of staff and employes', etc., amounting to some £18,000. On the income side of the same account appear contributions from the Self-Denial Fund amounting to £28,000. The Self-Denial money was, therefore, used to pay Headquarters' salaries.

as it received in 1905, although no less than £9,448 more was collected.² How much did the rescue work and the slum work, which figured so prominently in these appeals, receive? The grant from the Darkest England central fund, was, in the first case, £3,550, and, in the second, £2,148. Only a fifth of the central fund, however, was supplied by the Self-Denial Fund. It will, therefore, be fair to say that, out of the £72,726 collected for the Self-Denial Fund, the rescue work benefited to the extent of £710 and the slum work to that of £430.

It would surely be more illuminating if General Booth, in making his Self-Denial appeals to the public, gave prominence to the following quotation on the subject from his own *Orders and Regulations*:—

'This effort is mainly in aid of the International Funds of the Army, and the money raised is principally devoted to the work of the Army in other parts of the world' (pp. 489-90).

In other parts of the world, as in England, the work of the Army is chiefly that of evangelization, its 'social' activities being relatively small.³ If the Self-Denial Appeal made this fact clear—as well as the fact that the object is largely the maintenance of the religious 'staff' everywhere—and if the public were placed in a position to value the religious work, in England and elsewhere, on its own merits, it is tolerably certain that the financial result of the appeal would speedily assume much more modest proportions.

The only item of income derived from the profits of the Trade Department was one of £2,750. Perhaps the *War Cry* will explain how the Headquarters' salaries were paid out of these profits.

² In 1907 the British Self-Denial collection amounted to £72,653. Despite the prominence of the 'social' objects in the appeals, only £6,300, or about 1d. in the shilling, was devoted to all the 'social' objects of the Darkest England Scheme together (Balance Sheet of 'Social' Work for year ending September 30, 1907).

³ It should be noted that each foreign 'territory' raises a separate Self-Denial Fund. In Australia nearly £29,000 was collected in 1905, and of this amount International Headquarters in London received close upon £9,000. The aggregate proportion of the Fund remitted to London by all the foreign territories was, in 1906, over £28,000.

This method of solicitation appears to be essential to the Army's existence. General Booth's recent declaration that 'the "social" work is not, as is often supposed, a separate organization; it is as much an integral part of the Army as the arm is a part of the human body' (*War Cry*, January 6, 1906), does not seem to be at all in accordance with the terms of his 'social' trust deed of January 30, 1891, a copy of which is contained in the Appendices to this work. As far as the contributing public in this country are concerned the 'social' work is, and was intended to be, a separate organization. Money contributed to the Army through the ordinary collections of its religious corps is not devoted, and—whatever the public may generally imagine—is not intended by the Army to be devoted, to the promotion of the 'social' work. Money contributed to the 'social' work cannot legally be applied to the promotion of the religious work. Officers engaged in the religious, or corps, work do not engage in 'social' work, and they cannot be paid out of 'social' funds. Officers engaged in the 'social' work are required, in principle, to confine themselves to that work and are paid out of 'social' funds. 'Social' officers cannot be employed in other departments of the Army's work without a proper equivalent being paid by those departments to the 'social' funds for their services ('Social' Trust Deed, § 6). The one thing common to both organizations is the control of the General. Apart from this it would be impossible for separation to be more complete whether in regard to personnel, property, or finance. Financially, and in other respects, the religious section is very much more important to the Army than the 'social' section, its maintenance probably costing from twelve to twenty times as much. This being the case, the blending of the two sections together in the eyes of the public, whether by General Booth or his officers, cannot but tend to lead people to imagine that they are helping the 'social' work whenever they contribute to the Army's funds through its ordinary religious channels.

The application of General Booth's dictum is sometimes seen in connexion

with the outdoor collections of the local religious corps. An officer, before beginning this painful but necessary function, will enter the ring for the purpose of impressing upon the audience what 'we' are doing in the way of 'social' work, the 'we' in question being a totally different section of the Army, and the 'work' that which is done in the shelters, 'elevators,' rescue homes, etc., with none of which the speaker or any one present has anything whatsoever to do. It is true that in some instances the officer takes care to mention—though sometimes after the collection is well under way—that the money then being asked is to be devoted, not to these 'social' purposes, but to the local work of the corps. Even when this is done, however, the impression is apt to be conveyed either that the local work of the corps is of a similar nature to that which the speaker has just described, or that it is in some essential way instrumental in promoting the Army's 'social' work elsewhere. If, as is admittedly the case, the money asked is to be devoted solely to the local religious work, the officer ought to confine himself to a description of that work and its success, instead of treating his contributors to a description of other work which is, possibly, more interesting to the public than his own, but which has no connexion with it. Presumably most officers feel the difficulty of talking of the success of their own work in view of the extraordinarily meagre muster made by their soldiers either in their halls or out of doors. The fact may explain but it does not excuse their frequent allusions in public to the 'social' work. If, then, the impression is widespread among the public that all Salvationists are chiefly occupied in work of a 'social' nature, and that all money given to them goes mainly to promote such work, it is now possible to perceive how that impression has been originated, and to conjecture the nature of the interests that depend upon its maintenance.

CHAPTER V

CORPS FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC

It has been seen that the Salvation Army does not choose to take the

public into its confidence in regard to its strength or success as a religious body. What is even more significant is that it does not take them into its confidence in regard to its cost as an organization, to which cost the public contribute an enormous but unknown amount every year. It is constantly stated by the Army and on its behalf that it publishes a balance-sheet and statements of account, and that this document is audited by a firm of chartered accountants of the highest standing. This is so, and the accounts in question can be obtained by applicants who state a satisfactory reason for desiring them, and who give their name and address. The constant reiteration of the fact that a balance-sheet is published seems almost to do away with the necessity of publishing one at all, for a high official of the Army recently declared that it was a mistake to suppose that the public interested themselves to any extent in Army finance, inasmuch as the number of applicants for balance-sheets in any year might be counted on the fingers of his two hands. This fact may account for the meagreness of the financial details confided to the public, but it can hardly be said to justify it.

While the balance-sheet proper gives the assets and liabilities of the whole Army in this country, the statements of account accompanying it refer only to moneys received at and expended through International Headquarters. It is so far satisfactory to be able to ascertain the income and expenditure of Headquarters, but this particular account (General Income and Expenditure) amounted in 1906 only to £54,427, and it cannot well form more than a small portion of the aggregate income and expenditure of the organization as a whole in this country. Few of the public pay their contributions to Headquarters. It is by the local corps or congregations, numbering some 1,500 throughout the kingdom, that nearly all the public contributions to the Army's religious work is obtained. This being so, it is surely strange that no publication exists giving a survey of the income and expenditure of all the corps, as well

as of the various Divisional and Provincial Headquarters, throughout the country.

It has been shown that other religious organizations not financially dependent on the public issue an annual statement showing the growth or decrease of the membership of every church belonging to them. In the same way certain of them publish, at the same time and in the same return, a sufficiently full summary of the finance of all their congregations. If the same body be taken as before—the Presbyterian Church of England—it will be found that a congregational financial summary of this kind is clearly and fully set out in the annual 'Minutes' within the space of fourteen pages. The Army has, of course, many more congregations than the Presbyterian Church, but for public purposes a much less detailed statement would suffice, so that very few more pages would probably be necessary. As these financial particulars—like the congregational figures of strength—already exist in convenient form, the plea of expense can hardly be urged in support of the policy of reserve. What the public are entitled to know respecting the finance of each and every one of the Army's congregations is (1) the total ordinary income and expenditure, (2) the amount contributed by members or adherents, (3) the amount contributed by the public, (4) the proportions contributed by members and by the public to special funds, such as Self-Denial and Harvest Festivals, and (5) the principal items of expenditure, such as rent, salaries, etc.

It may be and, indeed, is said that the Army's present system of local balance-sheets suffices, and that any collective publication of the kind is unnecessary. The system consists in the preparation of a balance-sheet in every corps each quarter, audited and signed by the local officers, which is, or may be, read out at a quarterly meeting to the members. This is so far well, but it cannot by any possibility be described as publication. True, the document may be seen by a member of the public who cares to call specially upon the officer for the pur-

pose; but it is prepared quarterly and not annually, it is not printed or even distributed, and therefore it never comes into the public's hands and almost never before the public eye. To innumerable people the only possible motive for the publication of accounts is that of guarding against the possibility of the misapplication of funds by the individuals in charge of them. To them the Army's stereotyped statement regarding balance-sheets, with the imposing provision of a first class firm of chartered accountants to audit them, is, naturally, sufficiently reassuring. Although this professional audit does not extend beyond the relatively small central funds, there is little reason for doubting that the Army's financial system is well adapted to prevent even a single sixpence from being misappropriated in the course of its somewhat intricate peregrinations between the pocket of the public, and Divisional, Provincial, and International Headquarters. There is no reason for suspecting the probity of any one of the Army's staff, field, or local officers. The purpose served by a proper publication of accounts in an organization like the Army is that the public, or at least those who lead or form public opinion, shall be able to see clearly the main principles of its financial administration, and to judge whether the return to the public is in due relation to their sacrifice. These matters do not come within the functions of any firm of chartered accountants,¹ however eminent. It is not the duty of a chartered accountant to say, as might have been said in recent years to General Booth: 'Your Self-Denial Appeal

¹ General Booth—who, by the way, displays a curious uncertainty as to the precise title of the firm he employs—is usually disposed to magnify the importance of his auditors' functions. Interviewed early in 1907, before leaving for Japan, by a representative of the *Daily Chronicle*, and questioned as to certain vague and unspecified 'attacks', the General is reported to have replied: 'We have consulted our auditors, . . . and they tell us that if there was any fault in our accounts they would hear of it. But they have heard nothing—not a syllable.' It is, however, General Booth himself—not his auditors—who is alone responsible for those matters, whether financial or otherwise, to which exception is taken in this book.

seems to give special prominence to your "social" work. I cannot therefore pass the absorption of four-fifths to eleven-twelfths of the proceeds by the religious work'. Similarly, if one of General Booth's most 'successful' congregations should by chance be found to subsist almost entirely on the public, no amount of auditing by local, Divisional, or Headquarters officers is ever likely to direct public attention to the fact and its significance.

The Army authorities take up the position in regard to local finance that, as every collection is counted and registered immediately it is made, as every contributor apart from the collections is given a receipt, and as inspection of a quarterly balance-sheet, though difficult, is not absolutely impossible, neither the members of a corps nor the public who help to support it have any need or right to demand anything else. That is to say, in the first place, that all knowledge of the finances of any but their own particular corps is forbidden to the officers and members of the Army themselves. Merely from a congregational point of view this, as will presently be seen, is unjust. From considerations of expediency it would seem that the Army itself has just as much to gain as other religious bodies in the way of inter-congregational rivalry by a collective publication of its corps finance. From the public standpoint, however, there is not only the need but also the right to demand collective publication. This right is established by the Army's system of finance.

When a person, from whatever motives, contributes 10s., either in a lump sum or in the course of a series of outdoor collections, to the general funds of any one corps, 10 per cent. of that sum, or 1s., has to be paid over by the corps to its Divisional Headquarters (*Orders and Regulations*, pp. 315, 479). The divisional fund so formed is—*theoretically, at least—applied, among other purposes, to that of establishing new corps and assisting 'weak and struggling' corps in the division (O. and R., p. 479).* The contributor, therefore, displays a practical, though quite possibly an unconscious, interest

in the welfare of a large number of corps other than that which receives his money. Similarly, a contribution to the Harvest Festival Fund is—again theoretically—devoted in equal portions to the funds of the collecting corps and to the maintenance and furtherance of the Army's work throughout the country (*O. and R.*, p. 492). The Self-Denial Fund, as has been shown, is used largely for the general administration of the religious work of the British territory, the maintenance of Headquarters, and the assistance of poor corps (*Statements of Account*, 1906). In addition to all this, the divisional officer has the right, when circumstances seem favourable, to arrange for special collections at any particular corps, the whole of which is devoted to the divisional fund, i.e. for the ostensible purpose of promoting the religious work of the other corps in the division (*O. and R.*, p. 479). It is not the practice of Headquarters to permit prosperous corps to accumulate funds locally. The public case for collective publication of corps or congregational finances is, therefore, complete. If the necessity of such publication has never yet occurred to any of the Army authorities, this serves to prove, not so much the existence of public indifference in regard to the subject, as the easy readiness of the authorities to avail themselves of it.

A knowledge of the details of corps finance is, evidently, of some importance. The ordinary income is derived from (1) indoor collections, (2) outdoor collections, (3) the offerings of soldiers or members in their weekly 'cartridges', (4) the subscriptions of sympathizers among the public in the neighbourhood, and (5) the results of special efforts authorized by Divisional Headquarters (*O. and R.*, p. 480). The ordinary expenditure, on the other hand, may be summarized as follows: (1) rent of hall, light, fuel, water, insurance, etc., (2) rent of officers' house, (3) 10 per cent. divisional tithe, (4) tribute—a weekly contribution to the Army's Property Fund, levied on all indoor collections and special efforts, (5) 'sick and wounded' contributions, (6) salary of half keeper, (7) stationery and sundries, (8) travelling expenses of

incoming officers and family, (9) expenses of officers attending special meetings by superior authority, and (10) the salaries of officers (*O. and R.*, p. 316).

Here there is no provision or outlet whatsoever for the application of a single penny of the money contributed or subscribed by the public to the funds of any one of the Army's numerous corps to the furtherance of 'social' work of any kind, or to the furtherance of any work other than religious. That few of the public who contribute are aware of the fact is, for reasons that have been touched on, tolerably certain. Throughout the motor-tours made by General Booth in 1905, 1906 and 1907, for example, the Army's 'social' work was everywhere kept prominently before the public; indeed the object of such tours, according to one of his principal supporters in the daily press, has been to urge the local authorities to aid him in that work. In his appeals for 'social' funds published early each winter the exchequer is invariably described as being absolutely empty, and it is stated that if funds are not forthcoming many of the 'social' institutions will have to shut their doors. And this in spite of the fact that, between two and three months before, the General had made a motor tour through the kingdom with an object which his admirers never bring themselves seriously to examine, and that the public—led by many circumstances to see in him the 'social' regenerator rather than the mere evangelist—freely poured their money into the coffers of the Army. Full particulars of the number of miles travelled, the thousands of people addressed in halls and market-places, the millions of curious lookers-on encountered by the way, were all freely furnished by the officials and duly recorded by an indulgent press. But the precise number of pounds sterling collected one sought to learn in vain. Certainly no portion of the amount figures in the income of the 'social' work for the years ending Sept. 30, 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907. There is as little trace of it in the General Income and Expenditure Account of the religious section for the

same years. The only possible conclusion, then, is that the money was collected and absorbed by the various Divisional Headquarters, and that it was they and the local religious corps within their jurisdiction, and not the failing exchequer or the 'social' institutions of the Darkest England Scheme, that alone directly benefited.

If the public wish to promote the Army's 'social' work, it is clear that they cannot do so by contributing to its corps funds or to ordinary collections made in the course of official motor tours. If, as is improbable, they wish to contribute to the religious work, it is desirable that they should know, not only whether it is successful or not, but also what proportion of its cost is borne by them and what proportion by the members of the Army's congregations. It is frequently said that it is not so much the public who finance this department of the work as the soldiers or members themselves. General Booth himself has asserted (Westminster Chapel, December 14, 1905) that the majority of his corps throughout the world are 'self-supporting.' It would be well if this were so, for, once the complete severance of the corps from 'social' work is realized, there appears to be no more reason why the public should finance them than, say, the various congregations of the Primitive Methodists.

General Booth, unfortunately, appears to speak with two minds regarding the manner in which his own people bear their share of the financial burden. In the report of an interview published in *The World's Work* (August, 1904) he is described as speaking admiringly of the enthusiasm and liberality of his soldiers. 'There are thousands,' he is represented as saying, 'who give five shillings a week out of a wage of five and twenty shillings.' It is almost to be feared that here the General has been misreported, for if there are thousands who contribute 5s. each week there must be tens of thousands who contribute 1s. The smaller sum would, indeed, be a reasonable one to select as representing the average adult contribution, and a simple calculation will show that no corps of moderate strength which came

up even to this low standard of liberality would have any need to ask contributions from the public at all. In *Orders and Regulations* (p. 483), however, the 'Scriptural plan of setting aside one-tenth of all income' is mentioned with approval, but obviously as a counsel of perfection, for we learn further, that 'if it were regularly practised by our people, we should have no further burden or anxiety as to the raising of funds in any department of Army work'. Evidently even half a crown out of a weekly wage of five and twenty shillings would be far above the average. This is confirmed by a statement on the same page that, 'after all, very little is given by the bulk of our soldiers in comparison with the amount they spent before conversion in drink, tobacco, worldly pleasure and dress, and on other evil things, and little indeed compared with the money they spend even now in self-indulgences, such as rich and injurious food, unnecessary clothes, and so on'. If *Orders and Regulations* is right, and the statement made to the interviewer of *The World's Work* wrong, it is certainly possible to perceive one reason why the religious enthusiasm of General Booth's battalions requires the financial aid of outsiders, and how without it his corps would have immediately to be disbanded.

The staple contribution of the Army's members themselves to corps funds is in the form of a weekly contribution known as a 'cartridge'. An example of the method of showing the contributions from this source for the various 'wards' of a corps is given in *Orders and Regulations*, p. 343. thus:—

CARTRIDGES

For week ending Friday.....

Name of Ward.	No. of Soldiers.	Amount.
Briggate	30	£ s. d. 0 16 0
James Street	28	0 5 3
North Town	20	0 13 2
The Market	25	0 3 7
Town Hall	18	0 11 9
Gordon Square	10	0 0 9
The Common	8	0 2 6
	139	£2 13 0

It may be reasonably supposed that this model does not err by placing the expectations of the authorities on too modest a footing. Yet here the average contribution is only $4\frac{1}{2}d.$ a week for the whole corps, while in the most prosperous or most enthusiastic wards the average does not exceed $8d.$ a week. There are only three wards in which five-shilling enthusiasts could find a place, but if they did the average for the other members in those wards would be seriously impaired.

To pass from precept to practice, what do we find? In a certain corps about eighteen years old, classified officially, not as 'poor' but as 'very good', with a membership of 'between two and three hundred' and an actual adult attendance of a little over 200, the weekly total received in 'cartridges' is about 30s. This makes the average contribution $1\frac{3}{4}d.$ per week on this head. The quarterly balance-sheet, unfortunately, does not distinguish between indoor and outdoor collections, as it certainly ought to do. There are three outdoor collections on Sundays, and usually three during the week. The Sunday afternoon outdoor collection averages about 25s., and those held in the morning and evening about 5s. each. The three weekday open-air services probably bring in another 15s. a week. Thus we have a total weekly contribution from the public, by way of ordinary collections and apart from 'special efforts' and personal solicitation in the neighbourhood, of £2 10s.

There remains, on the other hand, to add to the amount of the members' 'cartridges' that of the indoor collections, for there is obviously no reason why members should contribute to the outdoor collections, except for the purpose of stimulating to the fullest degree the generosity of the public, and this a very few judiciously thrown coppers will accomplish. The weekly contribution of members to all collections will seldom exceed 30s., which with the 'cartridge' money makes a total corps contribution of £3 against a public contribution in collections of £2 10s. a week. But the total annual expenditure of this corps is close upon £400, and these two sources of income

together amount only to £286, leaving a balance of £114 still to be provided. It seems tolerably certain that the gross average weekly payment of $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ by the members and adherents of the corps itself cannot be very far below the extreme limit of their enthusiasm in such matters, and if another £20 or £30 can be got out of them the officer will no doubt think himself fortunate. The Harvest Festival Fund, most of which is obtained from the public and half of which belongs nominally to the collecting corps, will reduce the deficit to some extent. 'Every F.O. is responsible for making the most of this effort for raising funds, arousing interest in the Army, and laying hold of strangers' (*O. and R.*, p. 492). The officer has, however, another resource if the outdoor collections do not suffice to keep his corps out of debt, and that is to make personal appeals for funds to friendly individuals in his district. It is unlikely that a 'very good' corps can hope to qualify as 'poor and struggling' in the eyes of Divisional or National Headquarters and so obtain relief. Therefore the officer sets about collecting, taking care 'not to go too frequently to the same individual', for 'some generous friends have been lost to the Army altogether owing to repeated appeals being made to them by the same individual' (*O. and R.*, p. 484). In one way or another, then, the accounts are balanced, with the result that of the total expenditure of about £400 the members of the congregation pay something like £180 and the public pay about £220, or a little more than half. This, moreover, leaves out of account the public contribution through the same corps to special efforts organized by and for the support of Divisional Headquarters, and to the Self-Denial Fund which, though not devoted to the benefit of the particular collecting corps, is for the most part applied to the furtherance of the religious work of all of them together, or, rather, to the cost of their control.

The foregoing estimate is necessarily imperfect, but no one who cares to study the interesting subject of Army collecting can doubt that the example given fairly represents the relative financial contributions of Salvationists

and the public to the religious work of a 'good' corps with an adult strength of about 200. In order not to enhance the public share unduly, however, let it be assumed that in such a case each contributes one half of the total annual expenditure. In the case of corps described as 'poor'—whether in respect of numbers or of liberality matters little—it is almost certain that the contribution of the public will, in nearly every instance, be relatively much greater than in the case of a 'good' corps. Although corps finances are affected in some degree by strength—and particularly by musical strength—it is quite possible for a small number of Salvationists to take a large outdoor collection. With even a score or a dozen soldiers in addition to the band, an officer who has seriously taken to heart the precepts of *Orders and Regulations* in regard to collecting may reap quite as rich an open-air harvest as another officer with stronger or more liberal forces whose financial straits are consequently less pressing.

There is one device peculiar to the Army which ensures that the field officer, whether he succeeds as an evangelist or not, must be an adept at collecting money if he is not to be graded as a failure. This is the provision (which does not apply to staff officers, who enjoy a stable and comfortable income) that he must be able to meet all the expenses of his congregation before he can draw a penny of his salary (*O. and R.*, pp. 496, 503). His rent must be paid to Headquarters, tribute must be paid to the Property Fund, tithe must be paid to assure the salaries and expenses of Divisional Headquarters, and when these and the less important items have been met, the poor officer begins to rank. True, the Army allows his house rent to have precedence over his food and clothing, and it may, if it thinks fit, be gracious enough to permit him to draw arrears of salary if his own subsequent efforts should produce the wherewithal (*O. and R.*, p. 496), but the Army acknowledges no liability towards him either in respect of salary or arrears ('Memorandum of the Engagements entered into by the Field Officer,' par. 10). He is considerably warned against

allowing himself to be injured in health by unreasonable sacrifices or deprivations (p. 496). Yet he is told he should 'rather suffer' than get into debt, for 'where officers are willing to suffer instead of going into debt, the way to keep out will seldom be wanting' (p. 503).

'In all public appeals for money, the C.O. (commanding officer) should let it be known in a straightforward and respectful manner that he is not asking for money for himself, but for the Kingdom of God. If, however, his own support should be mixed up in the object for which he is appealing, let him say so honestly and frankly, and if he is appreciated and loved by the people they will give accordingly' (*O. and R.*, p. 484).

To talk of the possibility of the officer's support being 'mixed up' in the objects for which he appeals, when the Army's regulations render such mixing up a certainty, is surely an unparalleled example of unconscious irony. Yet, amid all his financial difficulties, the officer is cautioned that he must on no account allow collecting to interfere with soul-saving (p. 484). How any man placed in this extraordinary position, however sincere, devoted and energetic he may be, can prevent his spiritual aims and activities from being overshadowed and impaired by the financial considerations that must constantly engross him is surely incomprehensible. That the officers of the Army have made collecting a fine art is a commonplace of observation everywhere, and the peculiar forces behind their genius in this matter are now apparent. If, accompanying it, there is no evidence of spiritual influence or progress, it is not unreasonable to suspect that failure in this respect may be, in some measure at least, the consequence of the Army's peculiar financial system.

So far no reasons have appeared why the Army's congregations should be other than self-supporting in the ordinary acceptance of the term. It would even seem that this was at one time the view of the authorities themselves. There is certainly much in *Orders and Regulations* that seems to be applicable to the Army as it was intended to be rather than as it actually is, and it is not impossible that the following regulation, like some others,

really applies to a condition of things to which it has been found impossible to attain :—

'Every F.O. must intelligently understand, heartily embrace, and faithfully adhere to the principles of self-support. He must see that it is hopeless to deal effectually with any neighbourhood 'unless there is a reasonable probability that the persons benefited by the work will themselves support, and ultimately meet, the expenses involved in carrying it on' (*O. and R.*, p. 495).

Unless a corps is making serious inroads on the evildoers of a neighbourhood by getting them to join its ranks (pp. 323, 326, etc.), the 'persons benefited by the work' cannot be supposed to be the contributing public in the neighbourhood, who are neither evildoers nor disposed to join the Army. As it has been seen that, in London at least, there is little indication of inroads of this kind having been made on the population of any neighbourhood during the past forty years, two questions remain to be answered—why the public pay, and why the members of the Army, who are the only 'persons benefited', do not.

It is now possible, despite the absence of official figures on the subject, to make an estimate of the total amount contributed by the public throughout the United Kingdom to the religious work of the Army. In London there were, in 1903, 91 corps or congregations, some of which, it is certain, collect much more than £200 a year from the public for the purposes of their ordinary expenditure, while a few may possibly not collect quite so much. If this sum be taken as the average, it would appear that the religious work in London itself costs the public each year £18,000. This, of course, does not include the public contribution to 'special efforts' organized for the maintenance of Divisional Officers and Headquarters, or to the Self-Denial Fund, or to the Christmas appeal of all corps on behalf of their bands, the up-keep of which costs a considerable sum each year. These objects would probably obtain altogether another £20,000 or £25,000 from the London public. This would make the total sum contributed by the London public to the whole religious

work, in London, the provinces and elsewhere, some £40,000. In the United Kingdom there are altogether close upon 1,500 corps or congregations. It is possible that in some parts of the country these are stronger numerically than is generally the case in London. If the Army's adult strength in London is only 13,000, it is difficult to see how its adult strength for the kingdom can exceed 60,000,¹ inasmuch as this proportion between metropolitan and total aggregate strength is exceeded by few religious bodies. The number of sittings in the Army's halls in England and Wales is estimated at a little over 500,000. In the Baptist, Congregational and Wesleyan bodies the sittings are to the membership as about 4 to 1. One of the Army's halls in a poor district of London, capable of seating over 1,200 people, showed at the census only 310 attendances, including 143 children, for both services together, while at a recent date (1905) the total muster at its evening service was less than 150, of whom about a third were children and infants. Mere seating accommodation, therefore, is not necessarily an indication of adult strength.

If, however, the Army's strength is greater in the whole country than

¹ If this estimate is at all below the mark, it at least appears liberal in the light of the Army's American strength in relation to the number of halls and officers. According to Dr. H. K. Carroll's statistics of religious bodies in the United States for 1906, the Salvation Army there had 3,773 ministers (paid officers), 983 churches (barracks), and 28,500 communicants (soldiers or members). This works out at 29 members to each corps or congregation.

The Army's official 'field statistics' for 1906 in the United States represent the strength thus :—

No. of Corps (places of meeting)	727
No. of Outposts	104
Total	831
Total attendance (indoors)	11,140,732

It is quite possible to reconcile these 'startling statistics' with Dr. Carroll's presentation of the same fact. Thus, 11,140,732 + 831 = 13,406 = average attendances per corps per annum. The average number of indoor meetings per corps throughout the year would be about 300. 13,406 ÷ 300 = 45 average attendances at each corps, which would be quite consistent with Dr. Carroll's average membership of 29.

the number estimated, it is as certain as it is in London that such strength is not derived from conversions among the unregenerate masses. In Dover, for example, which has a population of 41,000, largely composed of the very class with which the Army should prove most successful, there is only one barracks, the evening attendance at which, on a recent occasion of special attraction, did not exceed 370, including children and infants. This is less than 1 per cent. of the population. Here the Army not only does not influence its environment, but it seems to have given up the attempt. In this seaport and military town, with a public-house to every 210 inhabitants, nothing is to be seen on Saturday or Sunday nights of the much advertised process of 'pub. booming', to which General Booth has pointed (*World's Work*, August, 1904) as a set-off against, and an explanation of, any apparent weakness in the muster of his forces. But if the Army's 72,001 'visits to public-houses' in 1904 produced any result beyond contributions and *War Cry* sales, that result—according to the Army's own tests—must be apparent in the muster-roll. In Dover, then, as in the poorer and drink-ridden boroughs of London, the public-houses appear to be left alone, for on such ground the business of 'booming' pays neither spiritually nor financially. But in the West End of London—in the neighbourhood, for example, of Regent Hall, Oxford Street—where the licensed houses are more fashionable and their frequenters, if less drunken, are more good-natured and more generous, 'pub. booming' is found to be well worth practising. In the provinces, then, as in London, appearances serve but to confirm the suspicion that the Army, whatever its strength, draws its members very largely from a class who may or who may not have been, as Mr. Charles Booth phrases it, 'ardent Christians' previously, but whose adhesion to the Army's ranks cannot in any case be said to justify financial sacrifices on the part of other people.

If the adult strength for the United Kingdom be set down at 100,000 in-

stead of 60,000, to allow for the possibility of greater progress, though of this unsatisfactory nature, in the provinces, and if 6*d.* a week instead of the gross London average of 3½*d.* be taken as average contribution of each one of the paying units, we obtain an aggregate annual payment for ordinary purposes by members and adherents themselves of £130,000. What the aggregate ordinary expenditure of the 1,500 corps may be it is difficult to estimate, for the important item of hall rent must vary greatly in different parts of the country. The salary and house rent of the officers can be estimated with approximate accuracy. There were in 1901, 4,859 paid officers in the United Kingdom, and of these it may be assumed that 4,000 are engaged in the religious work. There are among these a large number of staff officers, who may receive from £2 to £3 a week. An adjutant receives 30*s.* a week and, in London, an allowance of 12*s.* a week for rent. In many cases the officer of a corps is married, and in that case his wife is expected to help him, one enhanced salary covering the work of both. It will, therefore, be reasonable to take 20*s.* a week as the average wage, and 5*s.* a week as the average rent, of the 4,000 officers. On this moderate estimate the aggregate cost of the officers' maintenance works out at £256,000 a year.

The idea that field officers are liable to receive a salary much below the official scale is scouted by the authorities themselves (*War Cry*, August 15, 1903), and the average here taken is therefore justified. If, as is but too plainly the case, many of these officers are in reality compelled to 'suffer' (*O. and R.*, p. 503) on a very few shillings a week, the cost of Salvationism, though lessened in one sense, is seriously heightened in another (see Chapter xv).

Unless it can be shown, then, that the provincial Salvationists are much more liberal in their own cause than their London comrades, it would appear that the total contribution of the members of the Army in the United Kingdom barely suffices to do more than pay half the cost of the maintenance of the field and staff

officers of the whole organization. It has been seen, however, that in London the officers' maintenance represents only about a quarter of the total expenditure of a corps described as 'good'. There are admittedly corps that are indifferent or even bad, and the money for their support must come from the public either in their own or some other neighbourhood. If we assume the average ordinary expenditure of the whole 1,500 corps to be only £250 a year, we obtain an aggregate ordinary expenditure of £375,000, although it is quite possible that the real figure is 50 per cent. greater.¹ It is scarcely possible, under a system that deliberately stifles the principle and practice of self-support, for the estimate of £130,000 as the aggregate Salvationist contribution towards this expenditure to be beneath the mark. This leaves a deficit of £245,000, which must necessarily be made up from the contributions of the public. To this, as in the case of London, must be added the public contribution throughout the country to 'special efforts', the Self-Denial Fund, and the collections in aid of the bands. It will be safe to set down the public share of the Self-Denial collections as £55,000 out of a total of £72,653 (1907), and the three items together will easily absorb another £100,000. There still remain the public donations and subscriptions given direct to Divisional and National Headquarters, but these are no doubt relatively unimportant. It would thus appear that the public of the United Kingdom contribute to the religious work of the Army at least £345,000 a year.

The whole of this sum is not, of course, contributed by the public living in the neighbourhood of the corps whose expenses absorb the greater part of it. Nothing in connexion with the Army is quite so striking, in view of its professed functions, as its altogether remarkable activity at nearly every seaside resort

¹ This estimate of the ordinary corps expenditure, it should be noted, includes the budgets of the 10 Provincial and 37 Divisional Headquarters, with their by no means insignificant establishment and travelling expenses, necessary, under the Army system, to maintain in being the corps themselves.

during the summer months. Every week, almost without exception, it was, for a considerable time, Brighton² that easily headed the list in the Army's prize competition in selling the *War Cry*. Why is it that the Army is so active in such places as Brighton and Piccadilly and so languid in regions like Stepney and Deptford? It is difficult to believe that it deems its particular doctrines and methods likely to prove especially congenial to the habitual 'week-ender' or the man about town. Nor can the Army suppose that the class 'uncared for by any religious agency' in London are in the habit of taking their ease each year at Eastbourne, Hastings or Worthing, and that there they may be readily captured in a softer mood. If any spiritual purpose animates the Army in such places, it is nevertheless certain that financial necessity is the principal factor governing its presence and activity.

It is on such ground that the deficits of 'poor' corps elsewhere are made good, the process of collecting from the visitors being kept going every day and often all day. Officers from London and the other towns are brought down to help; the bandsmen of distant corps are drafted down at week-ends in order to obtain as many and as large open-air audiences as possible; and upon these the acute maxims of *Orders and Regulations* in regard to collecting are effectually brought to bear. Thus it is that the 'poor and struggling' corps are enabled by the public to keep struggling on still farther. Here it may be profitably asked what, precisely, a 'poor' corps is. It is clear that no officer of a corps which has even a small deficit can continue to carry that deficit on from quarter to quarter and from year to year. If it amount to only £10 it must soon be paid, and if the local members and the local public together decline to pay, either Divisional or National Headquarters must. A 'poor' corps is, therefore, simply a

² Since this work was first published Brighton appears to have backslidden very badly. Nor have seaside sales recently been so prominent in the weekly lists as might reasonably have been expected.

corps with a deficit, however small, which cannot be met locally. But even in the case of such a deficit the corps will already have paid all its 'tribute' to the Property Fund, all its tithe to Divisional Headquarters, and very nearly all its rent to Headquarters or others, and it is quite capable, if matters do not become very much worse, of continuing to do so for a considerable time to come. The 'poor' corps, therefore, may still be financially a help and not a burden to the Army, whatever it may be to the public, the officer, and itself.

The chief defect of the Army, viewed as a religious body in relation to the work done as evidenced in its own strength, is that it is over-provided with halls and over-staffed with officers to an enormous extent. The Presbyterian body, which has an adult strength in the country of 83,000—that is nearly the same as the assumed strength of the Army—has that strength distributed among only 339 congregations as compared with the Army's 1,500. There is certainly no spiritual reason why the Army should be found specially in sparsely populated districts; indeed, its field of labour ought to be mainly in just those districts where the population is most congested and where, consequently, the need for subdivision of forces is small. The total cost of the whole Presbyterian body is only £284,354, of which £103,000 is expended on stipends. The total cost is entirely paid by the members themselves, who, however, would hardly be classified by General Booth as religious enthusiasts, seeing that their average contribution, in spite of their greater wealth, is only 1s. 4d. a week, or about one quarter of the contribution said to be given by 'thousands' of poorer Salvationists. The average individual salary in the two cases cannot, of course, be compared, as it is a fixed and a necessary principle in the Army that the field officer's devotion must be such as to make him willing to forego all expectation, unless he can become a staff officer, of anything better than a moderate standard of comfort. If expenditure of effort alone be considered, the individual

Salvationist officer is assuredly well worth all he receives. In the aggregate, however—and from the standpoint of work actually accomplished—he is, largely because of the nature of the system to which he is subjected, certainly not worth his cost to the public who support him. In the Presbyterian body the average membership of congregations is 250 and the average stipend £300. If the Army's aggregate membership be divided into imaginary congregations of the same membership, there would be only 400 of them instead of 1,500, and the aggregate salaries now paid would allow for an average payment on this head alone of over £600 per congregation. The Army, therefore, is not only the least effectual of religious bodies, but it is relatively the most costly of any of its kind,¹ some two-thirds or three-fourths of its total cost as a religious organization being borne by the public, for no other reason than that they are unable and are not encouraged to distinguish between the Army's religious and its 'social' departments.

The true test of devotion is sacrifice, and if General Booth imposes this test upon his officers the public are equally entitled to impose it on his soldiers or members. It is plain that they cannot stand even the mildest test, and it is certainly not undue poverty that prevents them. If it is impossible to credit the members of the Army's corps with any share whatever in promoting 'social' work, it is equally impossible to credit them with the performance of charitable undertakings in their own neighbourhood. Other religious bodies do such work and bear the cost; the Army

¹ Some curious figures relating to the cost of conversions effected by various sects in America were recently sent over by a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent (July 23, 1906). The Salvation Army was stated to be the most economical body, its [converts costing from 6s. a head in Indianapolis to £4 a head in New York. The basis of the calculation is puzzling, in view of what appears to be the Army's strength in the United States. In this country, if the official definition of 'salvation' (p. 6) is accepted, the cost of its conversions would apparently work out at a good many hundreds, if not a few thousands, of pounds a head.

can never do it without the aid of the public. Even if they did it at the cost of their own members, this financial effort must still be regarded as a minus quantity so long as the upkeep of the corps as religious institutions has first of all to be paid by other people. General Booth adduces (*O. and R.*, p. 303) the extraordinary success of his organization in proof of the divinity of its origin. Its success has been extraordinary, but it has plainly not consisted in raising up, out of any class, a band of devoted men and women whose 'social' work is the natural and spontaneous outcome of their fervent religious faith and is cheerfully done or paid for by their own unaided effort. The success has rather consisted in placing the cost of holding the fervent faith upon the shoulders of people who, for the most part, frankly disapprove of it and of the methods by which it is maintained and sought to be spread; and in allowing the relatively insignificant 'social' work—also mainly paid for by others—constantly to act as an advertisement for and to disguise the religious work, so that the public are hopelessly confused in regard to it, paying several hundred thousands of pounds a year in England for something which they do not want—and which, if they did want, they assuredly do not get—to the real detriment of all the Army's aims, both 'social' and religious.

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGH FINANCE OF SALVATIONISM

NOT only is the Salvation Army as a religious body enormously over-officered. It is also enormously over-capitalized, the over-officering being, in fact, one of the results of the over-capitalization. That a religious body like the Army should be capitalized to any material extent at all is, at first sight, a little remarkable, although if it were self-supporting the financial policy involved would clearly be its own affair. Other sects also, unfortunately, have debts, and are consequently under the necessity of paying interest on borrowed money, but if they are wise they do not allow their

powers of borrowing to be transformed into a business for the benefit of pious investors. When a new church is deemed necessary to a certain district the local adherents of the sect will first raise as much money as they can towards the building fund; members of the same body elsewhere may contribute; and sometimes an appeal to sympathizers in the neighbourhood will also be made. A deficit remains, but the church is built, the remainder of the sum required being usually borrowed on the trustees' note of hand or, possibly, on the security of a mortgage given on the fabric. The lender may be a wealthy member of the church or of the sect, or the money may be borrowed from a bank. In either case interest is paid for the loan. The bank must act, of course, from purely business motives, but in the case of the private lender it is not necessarily for the sake of the interest that he lends the money.

Unless some interest were stipulated, incentive on the part of the congregation to pay off the loan would be removed, and in all such cases it is the very essence of the transaction that the debt shall be removed as the congregation increases in numerical and spiritual strength. If the debt cannot be removed, it means that the erection of the church in that particular spot has been to that extent a failure, and for this reason far-seeing managers will consider carefully the probability of attracting the surrounding population before deciding upon the nature and capacity of the church or chapel that is to be erected. The bank, too, will take account of this and other circumstances before lending the money, for it is to the future congregation and their liberality that it must look for payment of its interest. In the case of the Presbyterian Church of England the aggregate value of the church property is estimated at £2,303,767, and the total debt on it is £112,250, the ratio of debt to value being 4·87 per cent. (*Minutes of Synod*, 1905). Thus, at 4½ per cent., the annual charge for interest on the whole loan is just over £5,000.

How does this matter stand in the Salvation Army? It appears from

a little pamphlet entitled *Twofold Investments: About Salvation Army Finance* (Finance Office: 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, 1903) that the Army is disposed to plume itself on the fact that its ratio of debt ('proportion of loans and mortgages') to the 'total cost' of its properties is 'considerably less than 60 per cent. of the whole'. The present state of things is shown in the balance-sheet of the religious section for 1906 as follows:—

LIABILITIES.		£	s.	d.
Dr.				
	To loans on mortgage (on freehold and leasehold properties, including accrued interest)	415,370	1	6
	To loans for fixed periods, including accrued interest	152,842	1	7

The sum of these amounts, viz. £568,212, represents the amount of money invested in the religious section¹ of the Salvation Army, upon which interest has to be paid each year. The principal assets are shown on the other side thus:—

ASSETS.		£	s.	d.
Cr.				
	By freehold (at cost) and leasehold property acquired for use of the Army throughout the United Kingdom, as on September 30, 1905	845,894	6	7
	Additions during the year	29,503	8	8
		£875,397	15	3

The total assets amount to £1,145,320, and the balance of assets over liabilities is shown as £342,943. A later issue of *Twofold Investments* (1905) amends its former statement thus: 'The proportion of mortgages to the total cost of our properties is less than 50 per cent.' The preceding extracts from the 1906 balance-sheet support this statement; but if the 1903 basis of comparison be adopted, it will be found that the proportion of loans and mortgages to the cost of the same properties is now nearly 65 per cent. instead of being 'considerably less

than 60 per cent.'² The amount of interest paid by the Army on the loans to its religious section alone was in 1906 £25,944, the apparent rate being a fraction under 5 per cent. over all. 'We need money,' wrote Mr. Bramwell Booth in 1884. 'When one looks at the need for such agencies it is simply heartbreaking to think of abandoning them. But abandon them we must and will rather than go into debt.' In spite of this laudable declaration, however, the Army—unlike other religious bodies—has since then for some reason transformed its borrowing into a business, and thinks it rather creditable than otherwise that no less than 35 per cent. of its properties, as valued by itself, is still unmortgaged and unpledged.

Why should the Army have adopted to this extraordinary extent the policy of borrowing more money than its growth and progress warrant, and how comes it that the Army, in spite of spiritual failure, is able to continue the payment of interest so liberal and in amount so heavy? There is a fund of uncertain amount for the redemption of mortgages, but as the figures quoted above show that about 50 per cent. of the estimated value of the freehold and leasehold property is still mortgaged it would appear that, whenever the redemption fund is applied to the reduction of the debt on certain properties, this is only to facilitate the taking up of fresh mortgages on others. It is possible that in the early years of the Army's activity the zeal to extend its influence by building barracks and citadels was uninfluenced by considerations other than spiritual. But since then experience has taught the Army that so long as the public can be induced to support it in the liberal way they do, neither the actual necessities of a neighbourhood nor the spiritual success of a corps need be seriously considered when it is a question of building new barracks almost anywhere, inasmuch as it is safe to assume that the public can always be saddled with a half to

² General Booth stated (Queen's Hall, April 10, 1908) that he was 'against going into debt'—a curious observation in view of the facts cited in this chapter.

¹ For the investments in the 'social' section see p. 94.

three-fourths of the annual cost of working the establishment. Headquarters will receive its rent, Divisional Headquarters its tithe, and the Property Fund its tribute, if only the officers are apt at collecting money from the public. In most other religious bodies the property of individual congregations is vested in local trustees, who have no power to raise money on the fabric of any church except for its own congregational needs. In the Army all the property of the whole organization is held in trust by the General, who has the power to mortgage any hall or barracks, not only for the benefit of the corps occupying it, but also 'in the interests of the Army' as a whole (*Orders and Regulations*, p. 305). This means that in the event of commercial or other depression adversely affecting the Army's finances in one country it would be possible for the General to mortgage or over-mortgage the Army's property in another country in order to make good the deficit, while throwing the burden of paying the interest of the loan upon the country on whose property it is raised.

The practice of the Army, then, in relation to its halls and barracks, is this: As much money as possible is raised among Salvationists and the public for the purpose of building; the Property Fund makes up the deficit, and charges the corps or congregation an annual rent payable weekly representing interest on the amount so invested; the building is vested in the General for the purposes of the whole Army, and he may at once proceed to mortgage it for those purposes, which usually means the building of further halls in a like manner. The corps, however, although initially compelled to borrow money for building, will, if moderately successful financially, have raised with the help of the public in a short term of years enough money to wipe off the original debt entirely. Yet it is the Army's policy to keep it under a perpetual rent-charge on account of a loan which it may possibly have repaid several times over in some other form. Local contributors to the cost of a hall must be supposed to be specially interested in its work,

but that work is necessarily hampered by General Booth's policy of not allowing it 'to be at any time unburdened'. There are signs that the inherent injustice of this policy has begun to be felt by the corps themselves in this country and elsewhere, and in certain cases it has, apparently, been judged advisable to reduce the original rent-charge in order to avoid disaffection or secession.

But the Army believes very firmly in rent, and as firmly in mortgages. A whole chapter in *Orders and Regulations* is devoted to the subject of 'Debt' in relation to the field officer. Its evils are forcibly brought home to him, and he is counselled both how to keep out of personal debt and how to get out of it. In case any officer should think that a principle deemed so excellent in his own case should also apply to those in authority over him, the following passage is interlarded for his instruction:—

'Money borrowed on Barracks or other property as a mortgage, cannot be truly said to be "debt" in the sense in which debt is spoken of in this chapter. Such liability differs nothing in principle from the liability for rent, and therefore is not bad either in principle or practice. It may be said that it is better not to have a mortgage, to which it may be replied that it is better not to have to pay rent. But of the two the former is at least as unobjectionable as the latter.'

This lucid exposition of the Army's policy of getting into debt, not with the view of getting out of it but with the deliberate purpose of getting farther into it at the public expense elsewhere, would have been enhanced by some examination of the circumstances which ought, one must assume, to differentiate in principle the security of the Army's income on the one hand from the salary of the field officer on the other.

It has been seen that General Booth's followers, in spite of their alleged enthusiasm, contribute only a relatively small proportion of the total cost of his religious organization in this country. General Booth has, apparently, discovered that where an appeal to their generosity fails an appeal to their desire for gain has at least a chance of success. This the

periodical publications of the Army serve sufficiently to show. The advertisements of the *War Cry* furnish a clue to the identity of the holders of General Booth's £568,000 in mortgages and loans, and the receivers of his annual dividend of £26,000 on these spiritual investments. The following are fair specimens of a particular class of financial appeal by General Booth in which the element of self-denial is not at once apparent:—

Wanted to Borrow, £15,000

To PROVIDE for necessary Capital Expenditure in connexion with the improvement and development of the Printing and Publishing and other business Departments of The Army.

The profits of these Departments are entirely devoted to the maintenance and extension of the Work of The Army, and form a valuable source of income. SUMS of £50 and upwards received.

REPAYABLE in Five or Seven years as desired.

INTEREST.—4 per cent. or 4½ per cent. according to term, paid promptly on each Quarter Day.

SECURITY.—Note of hand, signed by General Booth, as responsible Trustee for all the Funds of The Army.

A PERFECTLY SAFE INVESTMENT, with the additional satisfaction of helping forward the Army's great work.

MORTGAGES

We have PROPERTIES in every part of the United Kingdom AVAILABLE AS SECURITY for loans from £200 to £10,000, upon which we will pay a LIBERAL RATE OF INTEREST. An ample margin of value is given in each case. Legal costs and expenses borne by The Army. Particulars and full information sent upon application to the Finance Secretary, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

Help Without Giving

This can be accomplished by the INVESTMENT of funds with The Salvation Army, upon first-class securities, at rates of interest up to FOUR per cent. per annum.

SPECIAL TERMS TO OFFICERS.

An illustrated booklet, giving full information, will be sent post free upon application to the Finance Secretary, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London.

General Booth's financial advertisements appear to be confined to the *War Cry*, and it is therefore to be presumed that, in his opinion, some of the readers of that interesting journal are in a position to spare the minimum of £50 in the one case and of £200 in the other. The satisfaction of helping on the Army's great work is, no doubt, worth something, but if Salvationists in general really desired that satisfaction unalloyed there would be no necessity for General Booth to offer them 4½ per cent. along with it (*O. and R.*, p. 483). One is compelled, therefore, to conclude that the gilt-edged security combined with the liberal interest is the controlling

motive in the Salvationist mind in responding to such appeals.

Every Salvationist, however, has not £200 or even £50, and General Booth has therefore provided ample accommodation for still smaller investors. The following advertisement, also from the *War Cry*, appeals to 'all seeking for investments':—

Loans to the Salvation Army

OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO ALL SEEKING FOR INVESTMENTS

We have just issued an interesting little Pamphlet, setting forth the various ways in which money can be invested with The Salvation Army, and all persons looking for a fair rate of interest should write at once for a copy of "TWO-FOLD INVESTMENTS", which will be forwarded, post free, on application.

Loans may be made either to the PROPERTY, TRADING or SOCIAL DEPARTMENTS, and may be invested at rates of interest varying from 3 per cent. to 4½ per cent. per annum.

MORTGAGES are accepted on Freehold and Leasehold Properties in Great Britain, bearing Interest at 4 per cent. to 4½ per cent. per annum.

A list of available Securities will be forwarded on application. Legal and Survey Costs are borne by The Army.

All communications treated with the strictest confidence.

Address:—Finance Secretary, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

The interesting little pamphlet in question supplies 'information as to the methods by which investments can be made in its (the Army's) various business departments'. The 'two-fold' character of such investments consists, of course, in the combination of the spiritual satisfaction already alluded to with some material interest in the return. It is explained that in connexion with, and as an outcome of the Army's work, 'there have grown up business departments, which do not appeal for donations, but continually require the investment of money in the shape of capital to extend their operations. For the use of such funds, the Army is prepared, and can afford, to pay a reasonable rate of interest'. The purchase and erection of public halls, the Trading Departments, and the printing works are instanced as objects which the invested capital is desired to promote. 'In all these Departments,' the prospective investor is informed, 'the money employed produces profit, and therefore makes it possible to pay interest.' The admission that the Army's congregations throughout the country are trading concerns is certainly candid. The printing works and the Army's supply

stores may not appeal for donations, but it is surely evident to all the world that the halls, barracks, and other religious properties do very little else. It is chiefly on these that over £400,000 of the Army's liabilities to its investors is secured.

In what respect can these halls and barracks be said to 'produce profit'? Evidently the item rent is intended to be so regarded, and it might possibly be contended that the total amount of the rents received by the Army, viz. £52,310, is double the amount paid in interest on mortgages and loans, and that the security therefore is excellent. It might be excellent if the Army's congregations were able unaided to pay these rents and all their other expenses as well. But when corps after corps is obliged to beg the public to pay its rent for it, and most of its other expenses also, the question of security is materially altered. In the most favourable cases, even if it be assumed that the contributions of members themselves suffice to cover the item of rent, it is nevertheless true that other equally essential expenses in the corps maintenance, such as the salaries of officers or the support of the band, have to be begged from the public. But without officers and a band there would be no corps, and consequently no rent would be forthcoming. This, it is to be feared, will be the result as soon as clear ideas regarding the Army's spiritual work and its cost gain ground among the public, who are content at present to take upon trust nearly everything connected with the organization. Whether the numerous halls, barracks, and citadels could be readily realized for purposes other than religious is somewhat doubtful, but it is very probable that the rents obtainable for them if devoted to such other purposes would, on the whole, be much lower than those now exacted by Headquarters from the corps and the public. It is, however, mainly as a religious investment that it is necessary to examine the security offered by the Army's building property, and, having regard to the uncertainty of the public support which alone enables the Army's corps to 'produce profit',

it seems desirable that the adequacy of that security should be guaranteed by some authority other than, and independent of, General Booth.

One of the earliest means adopted by General Booth for introducing his followers' money into the capital of his 'business departments' consisted in the formation in 1884 of the Salvation Army Building Association, Limited. The object of this company was, 'The negotiation of loans, and advancing money upon the security of any hereditaments and premises, buildings and other erections or property . . . intended for the use of, or calculated to be of service in advancing the aims and objects of, the people called "The Salvation Army" and now under the direction of William Booth.' It is apparent from an advertisement of the Association which appeared in the Army's annual report for 1884 that the conditions as to security and interest on which General Booth had hitherto been obliged to borrow from the ordinary building societies or other lenders were beginning to be irksome. The advertisement expresses the belief that the Building Association will remove the difficulty of obtaining capital on suitable conditions, and it assures the public that, from a commercial and business point of view, its success 'seems likely to exceed the anticipations of the directors, whose hearts the Lord at first moved to form the Association', and that the names of these gentlemen 'will be sufficient to secure the fullest confidence on the part of our friends'. It is stated that the dividend is not to exceed 6 per cent. per annum, and pleasure is expressed that many of the Army's friends whose hearts had longed to help it, but whose circumstances prevented them from giving large sums of money, had already taken up shares, thus securing 'the intense satisfaction of knowing not only that their money is being used for the glory of God, but that it is safely and properly invested on substantial property, and at a good rate of interest'.

The nominal capital of the Building Association was originally £50,000, divided into 10,000 shares of £5 each.

In 1896 the nominal capital had been raised to £100,000, divided into 18,000 shares of £5 and 10,000 of £1 each. General Booth and Mr. Bramwell Booth held over 500 shares between them, but the great majority of the shares were held by the Army's officers, by members of the corps throughout the country, and by their sympathizers. The supreme importance to the Army of obtaining money from outside sources must tend to render enterprise in obtaining it the principal path to preferment for its officers, and all of them soon get to know this. When financial enterprises are tacked on to a religious organization similarly constituted, it is in the nature of things almost inevitable that influence will be brought to bear upon people to induce them to withdraw any savings they may have invested in merely worldly enterprises and to place them instead in that of the 'twofold' description. That some of the shareholders in the Building Association were so influenced is beyond a doubt. The Company—which was described as 'really safe' in an advertisement at the end of *In Darkest England*—did not long survive the increase of its capital and the introduction of shares of a lower denomination. The directorate and management of the Association, it must be noted, were absolutely independent of the Army. It is true that General Booth made endeavours to get his own nominees on the board, but this the directors refused to allow, 'merely as a matter of commercial right, as they did not think the borrower and the lender should sit on the same authority' (Chairman's statement, March 22, 1897).

It was precisely because of the independent nature of the concern that trouble ultimately arose. The Army, on the ground that it could now obtain money on more favourable terms, was no longer willing to borrow from the Association on its conditions as to interest or security, while the directors were not willing to lend their shareholders' money to the Army on the conditions as to interest or security to which the Army might have been prepared to agree. Moreover, the directors felt impelled to inform the

shareholders (Statement, March 31, 1897, *vide* Appendix iv.) that 'the experience of the past few years had convinced them that the necessary conditions of safety had ceased to exist'. The result was, therefore, a deadlock, for the sole purpose of the Association was the lending of money to the Salvation Army. Whatever influence may have moved the directors' hearts at first to form the Association, that which at last moved them to put an end to it did not commend itself to General Booth. Their efforts to repay the shareholders their capital and interest within the shortest possible time met with his active opposition, but they were fortunately strong enough to frustrate his proposal to break up the shareholders as a united body and treat with them as his individual creditors (Appendix iv.). A resolution to wind up the Association voluntarily was therefore passed in March, 1897. The realization of the securities presented considerable difficulty, but in January, 1899, the final meeting of members was held, the shareholders ultimately receiving 20s. in the £, and a bonus. At this meeting the official who had acted as liquidator pointed out how thoroughly the course recommended by the directors had been justified by the results. If the shareholders received their lesson, so, apparently, did the General, for I cannot find that he has since launched any financial undertaking for the purpose of obtaining capital from the public, in which he has given the persons who lend it a controlling voice—or, indeed, any voice—in the management.

It is certain that General Booth had little cause to regret the collapse of the Building Association, for he had meanwhile created 'facilities for securing advances at much lower rates of interest'. Those few people who have not forgotten the contents of *In Darkest England* may, perhaps, recall the chapter entitled 'The Poor Man's Bank' (p. 213), in which General Booth expressed his anxiety to establish a bank to help the honest clerk or working man in temporary difficulties, 'for the making of small loans on good security, or making advances to those who are in danger of being

overwhelmed by sudden financial pressure—in fact, for doing for the “little man” what all the banks do for the “big man”. There is mention of a ‘Poor Man’s Lawyer’ but not of any ‘Poor Man’s Bank’ in the accounts of the Darkest England Fund, so it is necessary to conclude that it is in the Salvation Army Bank—transformed in 1900 into the Reliance Bank, Ltd.—that the General’s benevolent financial intentions towards the ‘little man’ are to be found crystallized. If so, these intentions would appear to have got somewhat warped from their original cast at a very early date—indeed, before the projected institution was successfully floated.

Within two months of the publication of *In Darkest England* the late Dean Plumptre pointed out in the *Times* (December 8, 1890) that General Booth was appealing for money on loan ‘at rates of from 2½ to 5 per cent. interest, according to the period of time for which the money is lent’. The Dean not unnaturally connected an announcement to this effect at the end of *In Darkest England* with the banking scheme, although in point of fact the announcement in question made no allusion to it, but simply stated that loans were received by the Army at the rates mentioned, ‘on the security of the bond of the General or in the form of a promissory note’. In a letter published in the *Times* on December 22, 1890, General Booth, while admitting that a bank was to be inaugurated, stated that it was to be ‘chiefly for the benefit of our own people’. Alluding to ‘the assumption of Dean Plumptre’s letter that I offer 5 per cent. for money placed in this bank’, he declared: ‘This assumption is unfounded. I have not offered, nor do I propose to offer, more than 2½ per cent. for such deposits.’ Here, it may be noted, the original design of lending money to the ‘little man’ has already become altered to that of borrowing money from him. General Booth has also found it necessary to abandon his intention not to offer more than 2½ per cent. for deposits, for the advertisement of the Reliance Bank in the *War Cry* in 1903 offered ‘3 per cent. interest on deposits repay-

able on demand, and 3½ to 4 per cent. on fixed deposits, according to term’. These, according to the Bank’s prospectus, are the present rates, except that the ordinary deposit rate is reduced to 2½ per cent.

If it be the purpose of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., to do anything for the ‘little man’ on the lines laid down in connexion with the ‘Poor Man’s Bank’ scheme in *In Darkest England*, it must be said that the institution succeeds most successfully in concealing it. The Bank’s prospectus says nothing about advancing money on personal security to the harassed clerk or working-man. ‘The usual banking facilities,’ it is stated, ‘are allowed in respect to Advances. Loans are granted for short periods to customers on reliable securities such as: British, Foreign, Colonial and Government Stocks, etc.’ The Reliance Bank prospectus is, therefore, disappointing. It is unusual banking facilities that one had a right to expect. The Bank can apparently do only one thing for the ‘little man’, and that is in the ordinary deposit branch, where ‘any sum from 1s. upwards may be deposited’, such deposits bearing no interest until they reach £1. The Bank offers to purchase and sell stocks and shares; receives fixed deposits of £25 and upwards; and opens current accounts with trading firms and private individuals, allowing 1½ per cent. interest on minimum monthly balances if not drawn below £100. Clearly, then, it aims at nothing else but what all the banks do for everybody.

The Salvation Army Bank was converted into the Reliance Bank, Ltd., towards the end of 1900. According to the prospectus of the latter institution ‘depositors in it assist the Army in so far as a certain proportion of its funds are lent to the Army’, but in its articles of association this object, if covered by them at all, is not given the prominence accorded to it in the case of the defunct Salvation Army Building Association, Ltd. In point of fact, however, the Bank does lend money largely to the Army, for its balance-sheet for March 31, 1907, shows that £105,669—over one-third of its assets—consists of ‘loans on

mortgage of Salvation Army property'. This portion of the security, therefore, is of the same nature as that offered by General Booth to investors who lend him their money direct without the intervention of the Bank.

'Many assurances', says the Bank's prospectus, 'have been received of the high value set upon the help rendered to the Salvation Army by the Bank from time to time. That this assistance is given on thoroughly business lines is all the more gratifying, and affords a good reason why the soldiers and friends of the Army, and business people generally, should transact their business through us'. The expression 'thoroughly business lines' is intended to convey that the Army pays the Bank interest for the accommodation, but, as has been seen, it would be quite impossible for the Army as a religious organization to pay the Bank any interest at all without the constant and liberal aid of the public.

But who is it that gives and receives the 'assurances' referred to in the prospectus? The official register at Somerset House shows that a company to be called the 'Reliance Bank, Ltd.', was formed on December 28, 1900, with a nominal capital of £100,000 in £1 shares. The principal object was 'to enter into and thereafter carry out . . . an agreement for the acquisition of a banking business, heretofore carried on by General Booth, at 107, Queen Victoria Street, in the City of London, under the style of "The Salvation Army Bank"'. The vendor to the Company was 'William Booth', the price paid him being £40,000 in the form of 39,993 £1 shares fully paid up and £7 in cash. Seven gentlemen, all leading officers of the Salvation Army, were appointed directors, their qualification being the holding of one £1 share each. In 1901 'William Booth' held 39,991 shares, and nine directors—among whom was Mr. Bramwell Booth, the Chairman—held the remaining nine £1 shares among them. In September, 1902, 'William Booth' held 59,991 shares, Mr. Bramwell Booth one share, and the eight other directors eight shares among them, 5s. per share having meanwhile been called up on the

20,000 additional shares then held by the General. This was still the position on December 31, 1906. The arrangement, then, amounts to this: General Booth is substantially the Reliance Bank, Ltd., his directors and chairman being entirely subject to him. He enters into an agreement with himself to do certain things, and to refrain from doing certain others. He undertakes, for example, not to compete with himself by carrying on any other banking business within twenty miles of his own banking premises for a period of ten years to come. He allots himself all the shares except nine. As banker he borrows money from the public and lends a large portion of it 'on thoroughly business lines' to himself as General of his religious organization; as General he receives from public contributions to his corps money wherewith to pay himself interest in the capacity of lender, and it is this money which enables him to pay his investors their interest at the starting point. It is he who assures himself of the 'high value' set upon the help rendered to himself as General by himself as banker, and it is he alone who is the judge of the 'thoroughly business lines' upon which the whole autocratic transaction is conducted. The state of things is very much more objectionable than that so wisely opposed by the directors of the Building Association—viz., the representation on the same authority of both borrower and lender. Neither in this nor in any other of General Booth's financial institutions can the lender—i.e., the investor—be said to enjoy any proper representation at all.

The Reliance Bank, Ltd., is now described as being 'in connexion with the Salvation Army', and it is evident that that connexion could not well be more intimate. In the agreement for the formation of the Bank General Booth gave himself the right to use the expression 'late the Salvation Army Bank, or any similar words', and the present style of the establishment appears admirably designed to attract 'the soldiers and friends of the Army', without unduly repulsing 'business people generally' who may

like to think that the interests of the establishment with which they bank are not precisely identical with those of the individuals or concerns in connexion with which the establishment employs their money.

The liabilities of the Reliance Bank (1906) show that it held £141,340 in fixed deposits for a term of years, £84,932 in ordinary deposits 'subject to notice', and £54,391 in the form of current accounts, the total being £280,663. The total assets amount to £327,558, in which the amount £40,000 is set down on account of 'goodwill', which, however, can hardly, in the circumstances, be described as realizable. There are cash assets to the amount of £39,268, Government and other first class securities valued (at cost) at £107,623, short loans, advances, and bills discounted amounting to £44,299, and loans on mortgage of Salvation Army property amounting to £93,706. The reserve fund is £1,307, the preliminary expenses having now been written off.¹ It will be noted that in the balance-sheet the ordinary deposits (£84,932) are said to be 'subject to notice', and the prospectus states that the term of notice in question is 'three months, although 'this proviso . . . is one to which the Bank would not resort save under extraordinary circumstances'. Evidently the Bank itself realizes more clearly than its depositors that a large proportion of its assets are not particularly liquid. How much of the short loans, advances, and bills discounted represent 'help rendered to the Salvation Army' is not, of course, apparent.

A recent incident in the history of the Bank has been the retirement of the staff officer who was for many years its virtual manager and was generally regarded as a strong financial man of the Army. In ordinary circumstances the retirement of the manager of a bank is of some interest to its depositors, and the precise cause

¹ The corresponding figures for the year ending March 31, 1907, are: Fixed deposits, £144,826; ordinary deposits, £76,230; current accounts, £31,925; total assets, £308,371; cash assets, £10,850; first-class securities, £107,879; short loans, advances, and bills discounted, £40,232; loans on mortgage of Salvation Army property, £105,669; reserve account, £1,710.

is usually known. The health of the officer in question was temporarily affected, and he was given a long rest and a sea voyage in order to recruit. There is no reason for believing that his superiors had any cause for feeling anything but satisfaction in connexion with his services. On his return to this country he did not resume his former duties, and since then, although presumably bound by the usual life-long engagement, he has found it necessary to retire from the Army's service. He is, fortunately, still a young man, and he is now devoting his restored health, energies, and abilities to the ordinary business of the outside world. As his financial duties did not debar him from appearing on the Army's religious platforms, it would be interesting to learn why his superiors were unable to retain his services in some other capacity. The nature of the organization should not allow the retirement or secession of tried and competent men to be taken as a matter of course by the public who support it. The permanent vows of service exacted and the alleged beneficence of all the Army's operations lend such secessions a significance which is usually absent from similar incidents in religious bodies otherwise constituted. No department—religious, financial, or 'social'—appears to be exempt from them. They are, in fact, one of the most striking proofs of the defects of religious-military autocracy as it is found in Salvationism.

The task of obtaining sufficient capital for maintaining and extending the Army's spiritual work is, however, insufficiently performed by the Reliance Bank alone, and an even more efficient scheme has been adopted. This is seen in operation in the Salvation Army Assurance Society, Ltd. 'This department', according to *Two-fold Investments*, 'carries on its work not only for the benefit and advantage of the Policy-holders, but also with the object of assisting the Salvation Army. This it does in two ways—(1) by investing a certain portion of its rapidly accumulating funds in mortgages of Salvation Army properties, and (2) by the direct evangeliz-

ing efforts of its superintendents and agents.' Of the Society's total assets, amounting to £382,188 in 1907, no less than £155,420 figures as 'Mortgages on property within the United Kingdom', and it must be presumed that, if the Society is adequately fulfilling its spiritual functions, all, or nearly all, of the property in question consists of the Army's halls, barracks and citadels, none of whose congregations are anything like self-supporting or, therefore, capable—unaided by the public—of 'producing profit' by paying rent. The value of the 'direct evangelizing efforts' of the Society's superintendents and agents does not, of course, appear in the balance-sheet, nor, as has been seen, is it perceptible in the Army's congregational strength either in London or elsewhere. The cost of their twofold efforts is, however, visible enough, for in the Revenue Account 'commission' figures for £49,397 and 'expenses of management' for £69,065, the total being £118,462.

Here again, as in the case of the Reliance Bank, it is essential to ask what guarantee the policy-holders possess that proper discretion and independence of judgment is, or will be, exercised by the management of the Society in entrusting their money to the various departments of the Army. The bankers of the Assurance Society are the Reliance Bank, Ltd., which, again, is the lending banker of the Army proper. Mr. W. Bramwell Booth is the chairman of both concerns, and he is also Chief of the Staff of the Salvation Army in the country. Several of the directors of the bank are also directors of the Assurance Society, and all of them are officers of the Salvation Army pledged to unquestioning obedience. The Assurance Society is a proprietary company 'limited by guarantee', and while the Army authorities admit that the greater number of the 2,400 shares or interests of £10 each into which the undertaking of the Society is divided are held by General Booth, they are not disposed to state the precise number held by him or by others. The presumption must be, therefore, that the proportion very nearly reaches totality as in the

case of the shares held by the General in the Reliance Bank, and that he alone virtually constitutes the Society and is responsible for the proper investment of the funds entrusted to him by his policy-holders.

When an individual lends money directly to General Booth on mortgage, he has at least the chance of satisfying himself that the security given him is sufficient. But when 'William Booth', whether as banker or 'proprietor' of the Assurance Society, deems it desirable to lend the money of his depositors or policy-holders to himself as General of the Salvation Army, on the security of its property or credit, it is certain that no such safeguard exists. There is no proper guarantee, in fact, that any scruples in regard to security likely to be entertained by any General as lender, and as the responsible owner of either financial institution, will always prove themselves impregnable to the financial needs and the persuasions of the same individual in his borrowing capacity as head of the Salvation Army. If General Booth's investments are 'twofold' his own functions in dealing with them are certainly manifold as well as absolutely incompatible with each other. Not only is the objectionable principle of borrower and lender sitting on the same authority established, but the borrower and lender are substantially the same person, and on that person's actions his investors have no check. It is, therefore, safe to assert that, but for the extraordinary ignorance regarding the Army's work, constitution, and finance that everywhere prevails and is at the bottom of the public's financial support of the organization, the whole edifice of subsidized but ineffectual evangelization, 'social' work acting as an advertisement for religious funds, and pious investments for everybody, 'at a fair rate of interest', instead of having become the imposing structure it now appears to be could never have been erected.

Both the Bank and the Assurance Society are recommended to the public on the ground that they exist for the benefit of the Salvation Army.¹ In a

¹ The difficulty hitherto experienced by both establishments in fulfilling their acknow-

certain sense the recommendation is justified. In the Society, for example, £118,462 or over 51 per cent. of the premium income of £232,052 (1907) is absorbed in management expenses and agents' commissions, and thus a large amount of 'evangelizing effort' which would otherwise be lost is retained in the organization. About five-sixths of the Society's business is industrial, the number of policies in this section being 293,108 (1903). If in the slums the Army's uniform can seldom win the people's souls it can at least help to secure their savings, for in such regions the attitude of the population in regard to persons of official appearance is apt to fall easily into one or other of the opposite categories of unreasoning fear or equally unreasoning confidence and respect. It is not surprising to find that the Army's competition in this business should have excited widespread dissatisfaction among insurance agents generally.

If, however, the Bank and the Society exist for the benefit of the Army, it must also be said that the Army, in a truer sense, exists for the benefit of both one and the other. Its membership, adherents, and sympathizers constitute a fruitful field for business. Moreover, it is from the incomes of the local corps throughout the country, which could not be maintained without the constant and liberal financial aid of the public, that the interest on a large proportion of the investments of both institutions is derived. It has been shown that the money collected by the 1,500 corps throughout the country for ordinary purposes is not applied in any degree towards the furtherance of the Army's 'social' work. It has been seen, moreover, that, in every collection made, the support of the collecting officer is inevitably—in General Booth's phrase—'mixed up' with the ostensible object. The payment of the Army's annual interest of £26,000 on the investments in its religious property or work, whether directly or through the Bank and the Assurance Society, is a necessity even more pressing than the ledged object of paying over profits to the Army is examined in Chapter xvi.

payment of its officers' salaries, and is also, therefore, inextricably 'mixed up' in every one of its public appeals. It follows, then, that when Salvationists obtain money from the public for any general purpose whatsoever they are engaged to a very large extent in a task which is neither 'social' nor religious—that of collecting their own or their 'friends' dividends.

So long as this important purpose of business and dividend-getting is not generally apparent to the contributors it is clear that the Army has much to gain by this financial device in regard to cohesion, discipline, and apparent enthusiasm. Hitherto, it would appear, the system of ensuring that the Army's members and supporters shall be financially interested in its progress has not been sufficiently concentrated. It is so far well that a person in Manchester should hold a few Army ten pound 4 per cent. mortgage bonds on a citadel, say, in Liverpool, but it is better that he should hold them on one in his own immediate neighbourhood. The Army's London officers have sometimes lamented the fact that the nature and situation of their districts have rendered it difficult to enlist the active sympathy of mayors, councillors and other official persons, and have sighed for the facilities offered in this respect by a provincial command. These facilities have recently been enhanced by the formation of 'Citadel Companies' in such places as Blackpool, Boscombe, Coventry, Grantham, Highgate, Southend and Southsea. The capital of these companies is in £1 shares, on which a non-cumulative dividend of 4 per cent. is, or may be, paid. The companies rent the buildings to the local corps at 5 per cent. on the amount expended, any profit made beyond the 4 per cent. dividend being devoted, according to *Twofold Investments*, to the benefit of the local corps. 'Each company is managed by a Board of Directors, the majority of whom are gentlemen residing in the town in whose interest the Company has been floated.' In spite of this assurance the fact remains that the borrower, i.e., the Army, is also represented on the Board and, moreover, possesses the real control of the concern. It is not necessary

to suppose that it is solely for the sake of the 4 per cent. return that such gentlemen interest themselves financially in the Army. The fact, however, that they are financially interested—to however small an extent—renders it easy for the Army to make use of them for purposes of publicity and advertisement. Their active co-operation with the work of the local corps, or even an occasional public appearance on its platform, will certainly not tend to diminish the value of their own holdings. The countenance of prominent citizens is in itself of less value to the Army than the contributions of the more numerous class of smaller men, but these contributions are secured when something like official sanction is given to the idea that the Army's congregations differ essentially from those of other sects in constitution and aim, and that they therefore stand in need and are worthy of general public help. This is one of the functions of these Citadel Companies, and if they cannot be established so successfully in London there is no reason to doubt that in the provinces they cannot but serve to extend and perpetuate the misconception on these points which appears to be absolutely necessary to the Army's existence as a religious body everywhere.

The mainsprings of any religious organization intended to be a power for the spiritual and social redemption of the masses must necessarily be the devotion, enthusiasm, and self-sacrifice of its own members. Possessing these qualities, even poverty itself, with whatever creed, might well prove omnipotent. In the Salvation Army there is no room for devotion except on the part of its unfortunate field officers, hundreds of whom every year are remorselessly broken in body and in spirit on the wheel of its insatiable financial system. For true religious enthusiasm there can be no place, inasmuch as the real purpose of every word and deed must—in spite of all appearances—be inevitably the accumulation of funds for the payment of salaries in the aggregate out of all proportion to the Army's strength and work, of rents that are a hardship on the corps, and dividends that are an undue

burden on the public. Self-sacrifice, instead of being stimulated, is stifled and rendered impossible, and in its place self-interest is set up and encountered at every step. Whatever may have been the case twenty or thirty years ago the organization to-day is held together by its mortgage bonds rather than by its love of sinning and suffering humanity. The petty trafficking of the money-changers in the Temple, which had, at least, the merit of simplicity and straightforwardness, was venial compared with the complicated 'twofold' finance of Salvationism. However suitable the quality of unquestioning faith may be in the spiritual sphere, its exaction in connexion with the management of the savings of the pious small investor and of the confiding poor has too often been productive of economic disaster in the long run. When a religious body loses its soul in worldly enterprises the devout and the credulous stand in peculiar danger of losing their money. And if there is one thing about the Salvation Army beyond all doubt it is that it has lost its soul.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARMY AND THE TRADER

AMONG the many curious developments to be found throughout the Salvationist system that of the Trade Department is by no means the least interesting and important to the outside public. The department is a religious growth, and its commercial undertakings must be distinguished from those to which the 'Social' Scheme has also given birth. Each territory or country, it appears, has its own trade department, but that connected with International Headquarters, 'besides acting as the trade centre for the United Kingdom, buys and manufactures largely for oversea territories'. The British Trade Department is financed by the Army's religious funds—to which, as has been shown, the public contribute enormously—and it owed those funds on September 30, 1906, the sum of £45,517, being capital advanced.

The object of the Trade Department

is officially defined as follows: 'Controlling the production and selling of uniforms and general outfit, musical instruments, and other Salvation Army necessities, including the publishing of our books and newspapers' (*Salvation Army Year Book*, 1907). The trading operations began in the Army's infancy with the publication and sale of a penny song-book and a penny monthly magazine, afterwards transformed into the weekly *War Cry*. Later, 'certain articles of uniform being required by our officers, difficult to procure elsewhere, we had them prepared and sold them ourselves'. It was from these modest beginnings, the *Year Book* explains, that the present trade operations, 'in their large and ever-increasing proportions', sprang. The variety, as contrasted with the volume of the operations, is not officially insisted upon in this publication. Evidently there are those who experience some difficulty in perceiving a spiritual justification for the Trade Department as it exists to-day. They are, therefore, assured that 'trading is now a Salvation Army necessity', and that 'the Army must buy and sell'. In case this bare assertion should prove inconclusive it is urged that, as 'all the profit is spent in publishing salvation, its trading institutions become auxiliary forces'. It is deemed necessary to insist upon this. Thus:—

'The entire profits are devoted to the extension of the Spiritual work. Sovereigns means souls. The Trading is done for God, and the aim of the Army is that strict truth and righteousness actuate every transaction. Every Salvationist ought, therefore, to buy all he needs or can from the Trade Department.'

Orders and Regulations for Field Officers (1904) also contains much to the same effect. The Army, it is stated, 'only engages in trade so far as it is helpful to the war, whether by supplying publications, books, uniforms, badges, musical instruments, and other articles to our own people and institutions, at the lowest possible prices, or by securing the profits arising from such sales for our funds' (p. 538). It is the duty of the field officer (i.e. the paid officer in command of a religious corps) to take an interest in the trade, push it, and seek to in-

crease it as much as possible. He must announce the visits of the trade Headquarters' representatives, give them a hearty welcome, and 'afford every facility both in public and private for getting into touch with his soldiers and friends'. It must be as laudable, he is told, and will often be much easier, 'to earn a sovereign in this way for the Kingdom of God than it will be to beg one'. Every officer should see 'that a small stock of samples and patterns of materials and other goods are always on hand at the corps'. Every Salvationist should be made to feel 'that the increase of our trade is an object worthy of earnest prayer and effort', and that objections to trading have usually been based upon false statements and notions regarding it, 'especially upon the idea that it is carried on for the purpose of putting money in the pockets of self-seeking individuals'. A paragraph entitled 'F.O.'s Commission' reads:—

'The arrangements made with regard to drawing a commission on sales by the field officers have not been intended to add to their personal income in any case where they receive their full amount of salary, but simply to enable them to meet the losses and expenses which they must incur (if they push the trade energetically, increasing their orders time after time), and to help those who are in the poorest corps to add to their allowances.'

The relations of the religious work and the Trade Department, therefore, are intended to be intimate. The intimacy is unlikely to be lessened by the difficulty frequently experienced by field officers (see Chapter xv) in earning any salary at all as a result of their religious work.

While much of the Army's apology for trading may have been valid in the far-off penny song-book days, little of it seems to have any application to its trading activities at present. These activities are much more extensive and diverse than the public usually imagine. In addition to religious publications and uniforms, the list of articles sold includes:—

- Women's dressmaking and tailoring.
- Men's and children's suits.
- Drapery.
- Hosiery.
- Boots and shoes (men's, women's and children's).
- China.
- Glassware.

Brushes, mats, and kitchen utensils.
 Earthenware.
 Hardware.
 Cutlery.
 Sewing machines.
 Wringers.
 Kitchen, bedroom, and other furniture.
 Ladies' and gentlemen's bicycles.
 Bicycle accessories.
 Mail carts.
 Printing of all kinds.
 Bookbinding.
 Stationery.
 Books (not necessarily religious).
 Fountain pens.
 Watches and clocks.
 Pianos, harmoniums, and organs (hire system).
 Other musical instruments.
 Travelling bags and portmanteaux.
 Men's and women's underwear.
 Flannelette and 'Non-Flam'.
 Fancy goods.
 Bread ('Families waited on daily').
 Tea.
 Coffee.
 Cocoa.
 'Masc de la Ville' wine (non-alcoholic).
 Etc., etc.

This list will suffice to show that nowadays the Army thinks itself entitled to compete with the ordinary trader in the supply of almost any article whatsoever, and to take advantage of its peculiar position, reputation, and influence—as well as of the subsidies given it by the public for religious purposes—in the competition. Here, then, as in the 'social' section (see Chapter viii), a serious and ever-increasing displacement of trade and employment is necessarily effected in favour of the Army.

It will, I think, puzzle any one to discover in the list of articles cited above anything which can fairly be brought under the description of 'Salvation Army necessities', or which would be found 'difficult to procure elsewhere' than at the Trade Headquarters, 79 and 81, Fortress Road, London, N.W., or at its branches. A careful search of the trade catalogues has revealed only one possible exception. In the illustrated timepiece catalogue there is a certain half-guinea musical clock which is advertised to play, according to the particular number selected, (1) 'Grace there is' and 'Trusting Thee ever', (2) 'Oh, that's the Place' and 'Wonderful Love', or (3) 'Wonderful Love' and 'Yesterday, To-day, and Forever'. As the qualities attributed to all the other timepieces in the catalogue

appear to be purely secular, it may be presumed that even Salvationist households do not nowadays find the twofold performances of this article indispensable, and that it is really an old 'line' in which the spiritual beginnings of the clock and timepiece department may even yet be discerned.

It is not only to members of the Army itself that the articles in which it trades are supplied. 'The Trade Department,' says an advertisement in the *War Cry*, 'is at the service of any and every person who contemplates purchasing any such goods as are mentioned.' Not one of its numerous catalogues betrays any reluctance to supply any one outside the Army who possesses the necessary cash; for no credit is given except in the case of articles—such as pianos, organs, bicycles, sewing machines, and furniture—sold on the instalment system. The *War Cry*, which had a weekly sale in the United Kingdom of 230,458 in 1897, is the principal official organ for the Trade Department's advertisements. Its circulation, which is probably much greater to-day, is very largely, if not mainly, among persons who do not belong to the Army, and who, although probably in some degree sympathetic towards it, are not even among its adherents. These *War Cry* advertisements invite readers to send for any particular trade-lists or catalogues they may wish. It is evident, therefore, that in this respect alone—and disregarding such advertising mediums as the *Trade Journal*, posted free to customers monthly, the *Social Gazette*, and other official publications—the Army's power of appealing to the general public for trading purposes is at the outset considerable.

It is evident, too, from the numerous testimonials inserted in the trade catalogues, that the efforts of members and patrons to secure further custom among their friends are warmly appreciated at Fortress Road. The following extracts from the elaborate boot and shoe catalogue are typical:—

'Boots to hand. I am delighted, etc. . . . I have never yet purchased such good value for money. . . . I have already shown them to friends, feeling that they only want to be seen to set folks buying.'

'Just a line to say that the boots give every satisfaction, and I think it is my duty to advertise it all I can, and I have several orders waiting to send you.'

'... Nobody can buy a boot like them, go to what shop they like, for the money.'

Another quotation from the same catalogue may prove interesting to the retail boot and shoe trader who is not subsidised by the philanthropic, and who, having frequently a wife and family to maintain, cannot plausibly put forward the publication of salvation as the principal justification for his business:—

'The following argues in favour of the low Prices of our Boots:—

'The representative of a manufacturing firm remarked recently that we were selling a certain class of their boots 1s. *gd.* per pair less than they were to be obtained at several well-known establishments mentioned by him. We were ignorant of the prices of any of the goods sold by the retailers mentioned, or even that this identical boot was sold by any of them. Any idea of "cutting" the price was, therefore, quite out of the question, showing that either we buy better or are content with smaller profits.'

The compiler of the boot catalogue has, unfortunately, refrained from stating, in connexion with this official example of underselling, whether it was the Army's ability to buy better, or its ability to be content with smaller profits, that was the actual cause of the difference in price. Possibly both causes may have contributed. In any case, it can be little satisfaction to the trader who is undersold to know that the Salvation Army, because it is financed by the public, because it possesses peculiar advertising advantages derived from the public interest in its religious and 'social' activities, and because it is able by its spiritual appeal to staff its Trade Department on peculiarly advantageous terms, can buy better than he or be content with smaller profits. 'If you are not willing to be sweated,' said General Booth recently, 'don't have anything to do with the Salvation Army' (September 9, 1907). The remark, which had special reference to the field officers in the religious work, was made on the eve of his departure for America in the course of a farewell address on behalf of what he jocularly, but quite accurately, termed 'the old firm'. As the trading, like the religious work, is

officially described as being 'done for God', the Trade Department doubtless finds it unnecessary to pay its employes on the same scale that obtains in the outside market. No department of the Army is at all likely to burden itself unnecessarily in this particular way. There would be manifest injustice, indeed, in sweating the regulars and not the professional 'auxiliary forces' in the extension of the spiritual work. These considerations will probably be found to have some bearing, not only on the price of the Army's boots, but upon its successful competition with the ordinary trader generally.

Besides issuing a comprehensive catalogue of the nature of a 'store list', the Trade Department distributes separate catalogues relating to its principal branches of business. A discount of 1s. in the £ is allowed for cash, and trading by post is encouraged, carriage being paid on orders of the value of 5s. and upwards. The contents of the drapery catalogue will give some idea of the capacity and enterprise of the other branches:—

DRAPERY DEPARTMENT

Art muslins.	Huckabacks
Art serges.	Oxford shirtings.
Bed ticks.	Pillow slips.
Blankets.	Quilts.
Bolster cases.	Serviettes.
Calicoes.	Sheets.
Curtains.	Sheetings.
Diapers.	Table covers.
Dimities.	Table cloths.
Down quilts	Tapestry quilts.
Doyleys.	Tea cosies.
Dusters.	Tea cloths.
Flannels.	Toilet covers.
Flannelettes.	Towels.
Glass cloths.	Travelling rugs.
Hessians.	Turkey twills.
Hollands.	

Neither in this nor in any other catalogue is there any allusion to the religious motive; the appeal is invariably to the customer's love for a good bargain. The drapery catalogue, however, furnishes an instructive example of what appears to be lofty principle on the Army's part struggling ineffectually against the unregenerate business instinct. It occurs in connexion with flannelettes.

On September 22, 1906, a column advertisement, in the form of an 'open letter' signed by Lieut-Colonel W. L. Simpson, General Booth's trade secre-

tary, appeared in the *Social Gazette*. It directed attention urgently, with a liberal use of black capitals, to the dangers incurred by children from the use of ordinary flannelette. Flannelette, it was stated, was responsible for most of the 1,500 deaths of children from burning in the preceding year. 'How terrible,' exclaims Colonel Simpson, 'must death from burning be!' He then discloses the fact that the Army is prepared to supply a new non-inflammable flannelette—variously described as 'Our Non-Flam' and 'Our Excellent Safety Flannelette'—designed to obviate such calamities. 'Your duty, then,' he declares, 'is plain, and that duty is—NOT TO USE FOR THE PRECIOUS LITTLE ONES THE DANGEROUS FABRIC WHICH HAS BEEN THE CAUSE OF SO MUCH SUFFERING AND DEATH.' 'I am a parent myself,' he proceeds warmly, 'and feel that you will do as I will—seek to make it impossible that the children shall be injured, either in body or in soul.' No doubt Colonel Simpson did his utmost. The precise date of his awakening is uncertain, but his department had sold flannelette for years before September 22, 1906. What is more remarkable, in view of his official position and the very creditable strength of his feelings on the subject, the Department continued to advertise it for some time after the discovery and adoption of 'Non-Flam'. While a drapery catalogue, issued six months after Colonel Simpson's 'open letter' appeared, advertises 'Non-Flam' (with the recommendation 'Protect the Children'), it gives precedence and nearly three times the amount of space to flannel-ettes, priced at from $2\frac{3}{4}d.$ to $8\frac{1}{2}d.$ a yard, none of which are described as being non-inflammable. The reader, indeed, is urged to write for patterns of these less desirable or even dangerous materials. In their own kind, however, they are of 'exceptional value', one line being described as $2d.$ a yard cheaper than 'many leading drapers' ask for it. Apparently Colonel Simpson's principles and feelings were his own, and could, therefore, be sacrificed; the remainder of the flannelette stock was the Army's, and could not. Such little inconsistencies, together

with the fact that General Booth admits that he has a special agency and special terms for 'Non-Flam', cannot but suggest a certain doubt whether the Army's principal concern in abandoning the sale of flannelette was really 'safety for the little ones' or simply to sell as much as possible of the article that pays it best.¹

The Trade Department's methods of attracting business are not uniform in every branch. Sometimes it is found helpful to make use of the reputation of the Army as a religious body. The following extracts from an announcement on the cover of the juvenile clothing catalogue are a fair example of this kind of commercial appeal:—

'I am a representative of the Salvation Army Outfit Department. . . . I am glad that I belong to the Salvation Army, as people will not only listen to what I have to say, but will know they can believe what I tell them. I am devoted to the selling of children's cloth-

¹ The Army is the 'sole proprietor' of a species of underwear called 'Sanis'. The possessive pronouns in Colonel Simpson's 'open letter', combined with the enthusiasm he displays, might reasonably suggest that the Army has proprietary rights in 'Non-Flam' also. This appears not to be the case, however. The Army has stated that "'Non-Flam" is not made by us'. The press advertisements and the circulars relating to the article do not give the name of the Manchester firm which manufactures it. The latest I have seen simply bear the words: 'Patentees, Non-Flam, Desk 47, Aytoun Street, Manchester.' The *Draper's Record* of February 23, 1907, while remarking that the patentees gave no details of their identity, complained that they issued circulars inviting the public to canvass the sale of 'Non-Flam'. The patentees replied (March 9, 1907), explaining, quite satisfactorily, that the policy objected to had been necessitated by the reluctance of the drapers in certain districts to stock the goods in preference to the dangerous, cheaper, but more profitable flannelettes. The Army, however, informs the consumer that it has a special agency and special terms, thereby suggesting that it is in a position to supply the goods more advantageously than the trader can. Probably, as in the boot business, it is able to be content with smaller profits. It is certainly desirous of diverting possible custom from the trader to itself. The patentees of 'Non-Flam', whom I assume to be its proprietors, may, therefore, find it worth while to consider whether the granting of a special agency and special terms to a religious trading body like the Salvation Army might not, for more reasons than one, tend to defeat their declared object of inducing the ordinary trader to stock and push this apparently very meritorious fabric.

ing. Every moment of my time, night and day, is given up to it. . . . I am in every way up to date, although it is myself that says it. Not only can I show you a good variety of styles in boys' suits, girls' dresses and coats, etc., but offer you a choice in some cases of six materials, patterns of which will, on application, be sent. Some of the big stores cannot do better than that. I am not afraid of the keenest competition. Compare my prices with those of other sellers of juvenile clothing. I shall like it, and have no doubt about my coming out on the top.'

On the other hand, the bicycle catalogue and leaflet, which contain descriptions of machines (the 'Arc' cycles) at from £5 to £14, do not venture to make any mention whatsoever of the Salvation Army, either as the vendor or in any other connexion. This is strange. One would have thought that the Army's reputation for truthfulness would be appreciated by the buyer of a bicycle no less than by the buyer of juvenile clothing.

Certain leaflets advertising men's clothing do not mention the Army by name except in the printer's imprint ('The Salvation Army Printing Works, St. Albans'). The postal and self-measurement chart system is suggested. The tweed suits offered—at 21s. to 40s., in four styles, six qualities, and thirty-six patterns—have certainly nothing of the Salvation Army about them, but are purely worldly in cut and finish. The prices, it is stated, 'will be found much below those often charged for these goods.'

Once embarked in trading for the purpose of 'publishing salvation' with the profits, it is obvious that the Army may in certain cases find this end more easily attainable by withholding its identity from the particular public with whom it is anxious to do business. The method is adopted quite legitimately by worldly men for less lofty ends. If, then, the Army has found it advantageous to adopt it, there is no reason to suppose that its sense of strict truth and righteousness has been unduly strained in the process. The end being excellent and the method lawful, General Booth would probably regard it as an impertinence to ask him to justify the means. These remarks apply, in the first place, to the provincial branches of the Trade Department. According to the trade balance

sheet (1906), the assets of these branches, in fixtures, etc., debts, and stock, amounted to £13,000. Neither the *Salvation Army Year Book* nor any of the Army's trade catalogues appear to disclose the whereabouts of these branches. The bicycle catalogue, however, which makes no allusion to the Salvation Army, mentions 79 and 81, Fortress Road, London, N.W. (i.e. the Army's trade Headquarters), as the 'head office'. It also states that there are branches (presumably of the 'Arc' cycle business) at 210A and 211, Westgate Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and 83, Frederick Street, South Shields. An advertisement of the 'Arc' cycles, in the *War Cry*—which, by the way, makes a virtue of the practical necessity of admitting no other trade advertisements but the Army's own—also states that a stock is held at both these addresses. For these reasons and for others, I do not think the Army will deny that the Newcastle and South Shields businesses are, or were recently, branches of its Trade Department.

Although the Newcastle business was at one time entitled 'The Salvation Army Trade Depôt' it was transformed a few years ago into 'The International Supply Stores'. The South Shields business was until recently carried on under the same title. Both establishments were managed by Salvation Army officers, but plain clothes were worn by managers, assistants and canvassers. The principal business done was that of general furnishers, much of it being conducted on the instalment system. Although the local Salvationists gave the stores their custom, most of the business appears to have been done with the general public, few of whom could possibly have been aware that they were dealing with the Salvation Army, or with officers of that Army. The International Supply Stores at Newcastle were lately closed, and the official who had been in charge of them opened a similar business under his own name opposite the Army's old premises. In order to do this he has, necessarily, ceased to be an officer, and has become a private tradesman. There is no suggestion that his conduct

of the International Supply Stores was in any way incompetent or unsatisfactory. Not unnaturally, the circumstances have made it necessary for him to explain that the new business, unlike its predecessors, is really his own, and that it has no connexion whatsoever with the Salvation Army. This being the case, it only remains to congratulate the proprietor upon his good fortune, not only in being able to begin business on his own account, but also in being able to do so unhampered by the Army's competition over the way.

The Trade Department seems to share the difficulty experienced by the Reliance Bank, Ltd., and the Salvation Army Assurance Society, Ltd., in fulfilling their object of making profits for the extension of the Army's work and paying them over to it (see p. 161).

Its 'entire profits', as has been seen, are officially stated to be devoted to 'the extension of the spiritual work'. It is improbable that the Army will be able to discover any stronger justification for its trading than this. It is necessary, therefore, to apply its own test to the Trade Department, and to inquire—apart altogether from the question of undue competition with the private trader—(1) whether the profits ascribed to the Department bear a reasonable proportion to its trading activity, and (2) whether the spiritual work has received the profits or a due proportion of them.

The following table affords, for the twenty years 1886–1906, a comparison of the Trade Department's assets, its turnover (to 1896), the amount advanced to the Department from the Army's spiritual funds, the net profit in each year, the grants made from profits to the Army's spiritual work, and the amount carried to or deducted from capital account.

Before examining the significance of these remarkable figures, it should be noted that since 1896 the trading and profit and loss account has been omitted from the financial statements issued to the public. In the last ten years, therefore, only the balance-sheet,

TRADE DEPARTMENT.

	Assets	Turn-over.	Capital advanced from spiritual unds.	Net profit for year.	Grants to spiritual work.	Added to or deducted from Capital Account.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
1886	29,978	61,630	—	(Loss £62)	3,983	4,045 -
1887	29,682	72,247	—	6,757	6,219	538 +
1888	34,927	84,247	—	8,098	8,642	1,456 +
1889	34,367	109,385	2,810	12,286	8,456	3,829 +
1890	47,654	127,134	2,750	12,838	10,365	2,473 +
1891	58,698	193,105	2,750	17,101	14,041	3,059 +
1892	63,641	152,350	17,716	9,070	10,824	1,753 -
1893	67,469	139,535	25,388	4,437	6,826	2,389 -
1894	69,021	136,747	26,236	1,468	1,376	91 +
1895	73,151	183,878	27,208	4,006	3,498	507 +
1896	97,538	217,312	31,719	3,602	3,250	352 +
1897	94,012	—	43,118	2,904	2,230	674 +
1898	97,722	—	41,250	4,155	1,500	2,655 +
1899	96,758	—	40,000	6,513	5,000	1,513 +
1900	88,342	—	35,250	8,175	6,833	1,342 +
1902	99,815	—	48,492	5,869	3,250	2,619 +
1903	107,876	—	48,830	4,725	2,500	2,225 +
1904	107,173	—	45,769	4,226	1,400	2,826 +
1905	100,722	—	41,755	10,516	1,000	9,516 +
1906	107,496	—	45,517	15,152	2,750	12,402 +

showing the Department's assets and liabilities, is available. The disappearance of the working account in 1897 is puzzling and seems difficult to justify, for there is every indication that the Army's trading operations did not suddenly cease to be of public interest in that year. In this later period the trading balance-sheet does not state either the amount of the net profit, or the amount of the grants to the spiritual work. The difference between the two is merely shown as being carried to capital account 'after deducting grants to Headquarters'. The amount of the grants themselves must be sought in the accounts relating to the religious work. It is reasonable, and even necessary, to assume that the word 'Headquarters' in the expression 'grants to Headquarters' has the same meaning in the accounts subsequent to 1896 as in those before that date, particularly as the same firm of chartered accountants (Messrs. Knox, Cropper & Co.) has audited the accounts since 1889. The net profit given in the table since 1896, therefore, has been obtained by adding the amounts capable of being identified as grants¹ in the spiritual accounts to

¹ *Orders and Regulations* (1904) states (p. 476): 'The Trade Fund . . . transfers

the amount actually carried to capital account in the trading balance-sheet each year.

One hears so much about the Army's 'business methods' in its religious and 'social' work that it is a little startling not to find them more obviously effectual when it betakes itself to business undisguised. Let any one glance down the net profit column in the foregoing table, and consider the amazingly erratic results of Salvationist trading. If the official figures up to 1896 represent the profits of the concern, most people would probably think twice about accepting General Booth's invitation to put their money in it unsupported by philanthropic subsidies. If the estimated profits since 1896 are not absolutely accurate, that is the Army's fault; extraordinary as they are, the figures are at least as stable and coherent as their official predecessors. The turnover was trebled between 1887 and 1896, while the profit in the same interval was almost exactly halved. Between 1889 and 1896, again, the turnover was doubled, while the profit in the latter year was about a fourth of that in the former. The percentage of net profit compared with the turnover in a few of the years may prove instructive:—

TRADE DEPARTMENT.

	Turnover.	Net Profit.	Profit Percentage.
	£	£	
1888	84,247	8,098	9'6
1890	127,134	12,838	10'0
1893	139,535	4,437	3'1
1894	136,747	1,468	1'1
1896	217,312	3,602	1'6

It is evident that if the turnover has been increasing since 1896 at anything like the rate indicated above, the profit percentage must have fallen considerably below unity in several recent years, and it is even doubtful whether the curious spurts of 1905 and 1906 would work out very much above it.

Whatever may have been the cause of the omission of the trading account since 1896, it effectually debars us from ascertaining either the total turn-

over, or the proceeds of sales in the principal sections, at the present time. A comparison of 1896 with 1890, however, is here given, the latter year being selected in preference to 1891, in which the trade turnover was inflated as a result of the publicity given to the Darkest England Scheme. The profits, grants, and trade expenses are also shown, as well as the Trade Department's indebtedness to the spiritual funds of the Army:—

TRADE DEPARTMENT: TURNOVER, ETC.

	1890.	1896.
	£	£
Sales—		
Book Department	14,755	17,673
War Cry, ¹ Young Soldier, and Printing Department	68,772	101,341
Outfit Department	33,130	88,588
Tea Department	8,441	—
Music Department	2,033	9,708
	127,134	217,312
Trade Expenses	7,496	17,707
Net Profit for the Year . .	12,838	3,602
Grants from Profits to Headquarters (spiritual work)	10,365	3,250
Trade Department's In- debtedness to Army's Spiritual Funds	2,750	31,719

The first table (p. 46) shows, moreover, that the Department's indebtedness has not stopped at the 1896 level. In 1903 it had increased 50 per cent., the profits remaining, apparently, at an extremely low level notwithstanding. In the absence of a more thorough inquiry into the entire business than the published accounts permit, it is impossible to ascertain the cause or causes to which the smaller

¹ Mr. Arnold White, in an article entitled 'The Truth About the Salvation Army' (originally published in the *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1892, and since republished by the Salvation Army in two different volumes of collected papers, 1900 and 1906) stated: 'The *War Cry* yields a profit of £10,000 a year. The whole of this falls [or flows] into the coffers of the Army.' I do not know to what source Mr. Arnold White was indebted for this information, but it cannot well have been the published accounts. The particulars here given of the profit in 1890 and 1896 profess to include those of the *War Cry*. In no year, however, is there any separate indication of the *War Cry's* profits or of their destination. This is very undesirable, as there is a good deal of curiosity on these uncertain points among the Army's members. If the *War Cry's* profits were £10,000 in 1890 or 1891, what are they to-day? Why do the accounts not show them, and the particular manner in which they fall, or flow, into the Army's coffers?

profits—both relatively and actually—in the past fifteen years may be due. Possibly the willingness or ability of the boot section to be content with smaller profits than the private trader, furnishes an explanation applicable to the whole Department. Possibly the Department is overstaffed with incompetent though cheap labour. Possibly there may be other explanations, more or less satisfactory, of what can only be termed the mystery of the Trade Department's profits. Meanwhile, certain conclusions seem to follow from the official figures which have been cited: (1) that the qualities usually comprised in the expression 'business methods' are extremely difficult to discern in the profit-making performances of the Trade Department; (2) that trading, as a means of finding money to promote the Army's work, is disappointing and—even from its own point of view—a mistake; and (3) that the ever-increasing amount of trading effort might be more profitably diverted to those uncommercial methods of money-raising in which the Army is an acknowledged adept.

Even more important than the profit-making capacity of the Trade Department is what may be called its grant-paying propensity. It must, of course, be borne in mind that the Army's General is as responsible for this department as for any other. A comparison of the net profit column with the grants column in the first table (p. 46) will show that the facts are difficult to reconcile with the official statement that 'the entire profits are devoted to the extension of the spiritual work'. Without suggesting that an absolutely literal observance of such a principle is possible or desirable in the case of a promising commercial undertaking for spiritual ends, it may at least be said that General Booth, in disposing of the profits of his Trade Department, frequently appears to regard the needs of his spiritual work much more lightly than his public utterances on the subject would lead one to believe possible. Possibly Mr. Bramwell Booth would reply that it is the policy of the department—like that of the Reliance Bank and the Assurance Society—to

strengthen its reserves rather than pay away profits (see p. 161), and that it may be trusted to do wonders for the spiritual work at some future time. Unfortunately, the erratic course of the profits indicated by the balance-sheets in the past twenty years point to no such certainty. Neither, to all appearance, do the grants from those profits. The following years are given by way of illustration:—

TRADE DEPARTMENT.

	Net Profit.	Grants from Profit.
	£	£
1889	12,286	8,456
1891	17,101	14,041
1904	4,226	1,400
1905	10,516	1,000
1906	15,152	2,750

In considering these figures it may be of interest to note that, even in the years antecedent to our twenty years' survey of the Trade Department, when its business was not nearly so extensive or so varied as it now is, and when it was only very slightly indebted to the Army's spiritual funds for its capital, both its profits and its grants were actually or relatively greater than in recent years. Thus, as far back as 1883 the net profit of the book and printing section alone was £5,213, and that of the outfit section £2,728, the former handing over £5,656 as grants to the spiritual work. In 1884, when the accounts of the sections were slumped together, the net profit was £6,790, while the grants were £5,593. If the more recent developments of Salvationist trading justify their existence on similar grounds in anything like the same degree, it can only be said that the published accounts fail lamentably in making this clear. The alleged 'auxiliary' nature of the trading stands in need of fuller demonstration than the bare official assertion. It is difficult, indeed, to avoid the conclusion that the tail has begun to wag the dog, and that the Army's spiritual work and organization show a marked tendency to become auxiliary forces to the operations of the Trade Department.

For a considerable number of years the Army has devoted rather a special attention to the sale of tea for spiritual

purposes. For certain reasons it seems desirable here to deal with this article separately. From 1886-94 it was a distinct and distinguishable section of the Trade Department, though in the last three of those years it was combined in the accounts with an article called 'kaffy'. It must be presumed, therefore, that in these nine years the profits on the sale of tea formed part of the total profits of the whole Trade Department as shown. The sales were as follows :—

	Sales.
	£
1886. Tea Section	512
1887. "	5,311
1888. "	5,475
1889. "	7,566
1890. "	8,441
1891. "	9,596
1892. Tea and 'Kaffy' Section	13,182
1893. " " " "	13,216
1894. " " " "	8,583

In 1895 and 1896, the last two years in which a trading and profit and loss account was given, tea—as well as 'kaffy'—disappeared from the Trade Department's published statement. In the absence of a trading account since 1896 it could not very well re-appear in later years. In the three years, 1895 to 1897, no grants from profits on tea are traceable in any of the various religious accounts. From this one might reasonably conclude that the tea trade had come to an end. Evidently it had not.

It was about this time that an institution called 'The Missionary Tea League' was started. In 1898 a page advertisement in one of the Army's publications describes the League as 'still advancing'. It is described as 'a League of people pledged (when buying tea) to purchase teas supplied by the Salvation Army'. The teas could be obtained either direct from the Army or through agents appointed 'in many towns and villages throughout the British Isles'. 'Tons of tea', it was stated, 'are sold weekly'; also that 'the profits of the teas sold by the Trade Headquarters are devoted exclusively to the foreign work of the Army'. On turning to the foreign service general fund for 1898 we do, in fact, find the round sum of £1,000 described as 'Missionary Tea League—Grant

from Profits'. In each of the two following years we find, in the same place, the equally round sum of £2,000 similarly derived. In none of the four years 1902 to 1905 are any grants from Missionary Tea League profits apparent in the foreign service account or in any other. But in the accounts for 1906, the latest available, the League reappears in the old place thus : 'Missionary Tea League Profits, £500'. If the profits of the League are 'devoted exclusively to the foreign work of the Army', and if they appear in the foreign service general fund, as the official description of their destination inevitably suggests they must do, it is reasonable to conclude that about double as many tons of tea were sold in 1899 and 1900 as were sold in 1898; that about half as many tons were sold in 1906 as in 1898; and that from 1902 to 1905 inclusive, the League either suspended operations or did not succeed in making a profit. These conclusions certainly do not seem in harmony with the probabilities of the case. If, on the other hand, the Tea League—or the tea business—has been still advancing since 1898, as appears quite probable, there seems no good reason why consumers and others should not be enabled to mark its progress more clearly by the accounts.

The Army's teas are called 'Triumph' teas, and the retail prices are 1s. 8d., 1s. 6d., and 1s. 4d. a pound. An advertisement in the *War Cry*, asking for agents, states that 'all wholesale profits are devoted to the missionary work of the Salvation Army'. Trade terms, it is stated, are given to grocers and agents. Applicants are requested to write to 'The Secretary, Salvation Army Tea Warehouse, 88A, Old Street, London, E.C.' Although it has been found necessary to have this special warehouse, the 'Triumph' teas are also sold retail by the Trade Headquarters in Fortress Road. For some reason the packets of 'Triumph' tea themselves bear no internal or external evidence that the Salvation Army is in any way connected with their sale. One side of the label states that they are to be obtained 'of the local agent, or of the 'Triumph' Import and Export Warehouses, 88A, Old Street, London,

E.C.' Another side is occupied with a eulogy of the quality, and with the statement that 'all profits arising from the sale of this tea go directly to extend missionary work in foreign lands'. Which missionary work is not stated. Evidently the intention is, while retaining the purely Salvationist custom, that no sectarian prejudices shall be unnecessarily aroused, but that all shades of evangelical tea-drinkers and grocers shall be equally appealed to. This serves to make the tea business or League a matter of even greater public interest than it would otherwise be.

The three lower floors of the large five-story block in Old Street, Clerkenwell, where the Salvation Army Tea Warehouse is sited, as above, to be housed, are occupied by a firm engaged in the South African export trade. No. 88A is a side entrance in a court on the right running off the main street. The 'Triumph' Tea Warehouse occupies the fourth and fifth floors on the right-hand half of the building, but there is no indication of any 'Salvation Army Tea Warehouse'. No. 88 is an entrance on the main street at the left of the building. The fourth and fifth floors of this half of the block are also occupied by a tea company, viz. the Empire Tea Co. Ltd. I have not had an opportunity of examining the building internally, but I should be surprised to learn that any partition existing between the premises of the 'Triumph' Tea Warehouse on the right, and those of the Empire Tea Co. Ltd., on the left, is impenetrable.

The Empire Tea Co., Ltd., was incorporated on February 26, 1902. This was the first year of the four years in which the Missionary Tea League suspended its contributions to the foreign service general fund. The company's registered offices are at 20 and 21, Harp Lane, Great Tower Street, E.C., while 88, Old Street, is its second address according to the directory, which, by the way, makes (1908) no mention of No. 88A, or of any Salvation Army Tea Warehouse or 'Triumph' Tea Warehouse at that address. The nominal capital of the company is £50,000 in £1 shares, of

which 5,000 had been allotted in 1902, 6,000 in January, 1907, and 8,000 on December 31, 1907. The principal objects are: (a) 'To plant, grow, import, manufacture, blend, sell, and in any way deal in tea, coffee, cocoa, and chocolate and other Eastern and Colonial products,' etc., and (b) 'to carry on any other business, whether manufacturing or otherwise, which may seem to the Company capable of being conveniently carried on in connexion with the above, or calculated directly or indirectly to enhance the value of or render more profitable any of the Company's property.' I fail to discover anything in the company's objects capable of being identified with the promotion of missionary work, whether by the Salvation Army or any other evangelical agency. On March 19, 1902, the shares were allotted as follows:—

	Shares.
Edwin G. Le Butt, Secretary of the Reliance Bank	1
G. A. Pollard, Managing Director of the Reliance Bank	1
Arthur Bates, Accountant	1
Wilfrid L. Simpson, Clerk	1
George Mitchell, Clerk	1
Charles W. Latham, Accountant and Actuary	1
Frederic Van Allen, Tea Merchant	1
Adolphe Egger, Clerk	1
Jonathan B. Stewart, Estate Agent	1
G. A. Pollard (as above)	4,991
	5,000

The directors were Messrs. Pollard, Bates, Van Allen, Latham, and Simpson. On December 31, 1907, the 8,000 shares then taken up were held thus:—Mr. Albert Edward Collins, tea buyer, and Messrs. Pollard, Latham, Egger, and Stewart, 1 share each; Mr. Mitchell, 1,002 shares; Mr. Simpson, 1,000 shares; Mr. Le Butt, 1,001 shares; and Mr. Bates, 4,992 shares. The directors at the same date were Messrs. Simpson, Mitchell and Le Butt.

To the uninitiated there is nothing in the descriptions of these shareholders or directors to connect them with the Salvation Army. Yet all of them (with possibly one unimportant exception) are, or were, officials of that body. Commissioner Pollard, who held the 4,991 shares until November, 1905, after which he resigned from the Army's service, was for some years vice-chair-

man of the Reliance (Salvation Army) Bank. Colonel Bates, to whom these shares were afterwards transferred, and who still held them recently, (December 31, 1907) is the 'auditor-general' of the Salvation Army. Lieut.-Colonel Simpson, who holds 1,000 shares, is the Secretary or head of the Army's Trade Department. Lieut.-Colonel Mitchell, who holds 1,002 shares, is financial secretary at International Headquarters, while Brigadier Le Butt (1,001 shares), is private secretary to Mr. Bramwell Booth, Chief of the Staff. It may be noteworthy that, in the case of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., which is admittedly 'in connexion with the Salvation Army', and in which General Booth holds all but 9 of the 60,000 £1 shares allotted, all the shareholders and directors are described in the register as 'officers of the Salvation Army'. In the case of the Empire Tea Co., Ltd., none of them are so described. It is necessary to consider, therefore, whether this concern, with its Salvationist management in Harp Lane, and its 'Triumph' Tea neighbourhood in Old Street is (December 31, 1907) really what it appears to be—a business unconnected with the Army and conducted for the personal advantage of its members in accordance with its registered 'objects', or whether it is a Salvation Army business founded and controlled by or for General Booth.

On either supposition the conduct of such a company seems open to grave objection. Officers, whether on the staff or in the 'field', whether engaged in the literature, trade, 'social', or other departments, are required to 'devote the whole of their time and energies to promoting the Army's interests and spreading salvation'. Obviously, then, if the Empire Tea Co. is not an Army concern, the Army officials associated with it would be guilty of a serious infringement of regulations, as the tea business cannot but take up a good deal of their time and energies. It would be interesting to know precisely what relations exist between the two tea businesses of No. 88 and No. 88A, Old Street. It seems unlikely that the Empire Co. should purchase its tea from the 'Triumph'

(S.A.) Tea Warehouse, and not improbable that the company is the source from which the latter draws its supplies. In that case, does the Empire Tea Co. work on the usual 'business lines' with its 'Triumph' or Salvation Army neighbour? If so, the gentlemen composing the company would be deriving considerable advantage from the large and assured outlet for teas secured to the 'Triumph' Tea Warehouse solely by virtue of the particular missionary appeal of the Salvation Army, and the general missionary appeal of the 'Triumph' canvassers and tea-packets. Their dividends, in short, would be obtained by virtue of the Army's peculiar position and peculiar means of inducing its own adherents and the general public to buy its teas. If, however, the company does not supply the 'Triumph' teas, or does not confine itself to supplying them, it would be interesting to know to what business, or what additional business, it devotes itself. The articles of association evidently afford it every latitude for doing business in those quarters where the missionary motive might prove unworkable. The manner in which the company is constituted certainly makes it necessary to consider it from this point of view, viz. that the shareholders actually own the shares which they hold. The nature of the allotments, the changes which the list has undergone, and other circumstances, seem to make this view less probable than the other hypothesis mentioned, viz. that the officials of the Army who conduct the Empire Tea Co., Ltd., are not infringing regulations in so doing, but obeying orders.

If the Empire Tea Co. is in reality General Booth's creation (on behalf of the Army's work), some of the preceding considerations would still apply. There would also be others. This is not an investment company like the Reliance Bank. Why, as in that case, does not the General hold the 7,995 shares in his own name? Why is not the business called the Salvation Army Tea Co., Ltd? Why is the Salvation Army present only in spirit both at No. 88 and No. 88A, Old Street? Why the mysterious three

in one and one in three arrangement? Does General Booth know anything about this particular business—any more than he seems to have known of the transatlantic line of Army steamers projected at Queen Victoria Street during his recent absence in America (see p. 106)? If of late years he has ever ascended to the fourth and fifth floors of No. 88A, it still remains doubtful whether on coming down he re-ascended to the fourth and fifth floors of No. 88. Possibly he interests himself only in the Army's waste-paper 'elevator' on the same site at the back, access to which is had through the covered court-way of No. 88. It is not easy to learn how much or how little he knows. Trading is not a subject upon which either he or any other leading official of the Army has ever insisted on talking in public. The official justification for the Empire Tea Co. would doubtless be that, constituted as it is, the company is naturally able to do much more business and earn much greater profits on behalf of the Army's spiritual work than would otherwise be the case. It certainly ought. But is it the case? If so, the evidence ought to be more accessible and convincing than it is. Is the company working at a profit or a loss? What is the turnover? What is the profit or the loss? Have the company's operations exercised any influence on the absence of grants from the Missionary Tea League's profits in the foreign service general fund in the four years 1902 to 1905? And, if so, why? As a section of the Army's trading operations, the company must be presumed to have been financed with the aid of public contributions to its religious funds. There is no allusion either to it or to the 'Triumph' Tea Department in the published accounts of the Trade Department. If, as is possible, the capital sunk in the company is included in the item 'Investments, £34,990' figuring among the Trade Department's assets, I would suggest, in the interests of contributors and traders alike, that full details of all such investments and their proceeds should in future be given. The same suggestion applies

in an even greater measure to the similar but much larger item among the assets of the religious work proper: 'Investments and loans, £178,346' (1906).

Young as it is, the Empire Tea Co. has already succeeded in accomplishing the second of its objects. It has given birth to at least one subsidiary company. This is called the Quaker Tea Co., Ltd., incorporated on April 25, 1906, with a nominal capital, taken up, of £500 in £1 shares. Although it is only a little one, the venture would seem to indicate that the tea trade is more attractive to the Salvationist mind than profitable to the Salvationist cause—that is, if we are to judge by the results in the form of visible missionary grants. The registered office of the Quaker Tea Co. is at the address of its progenitor, 20 and 21, Harp Lane, E.C. There is no external indication of its presence at 88 or 88A Old Street. Its registered objects appear to be identical with those of its parent. On August 11, 1906, the shares were held as follows:—

	Shares.
George Mitchell, Director of Public Companies	1
Ernest R. Moore, Clerk	1
Arthur T. Daniells, Accountant	1
Samuel Hurren, Clerk	1
Arthur Bates, Accountant	1
Edwin G. Le Butt, Secretary	1
Albert Edward Collins, Tea Merchant	1
Wilfrid L. Simpson, Clerk	1
The Empire Tea Co., Ltd.	492
	500

On September 18, 1906, the directors were Messrs. Simpson, Mitchell, Le Butt, and Collins, whose relations with the Salvation Army have already been indicated, and of whom the first three are, or were (December 31, 1907), directors of the Empire Tea Co. Ltd. The criticisms which apply to the parent, therefore, also apply to the child. The particular purpose or function of this offshoot is difficult to see. It may possibly be the pioneer company in a great sectarian tea enterprise beginning with the Society of Friends. In any case, it would be interesting to know just what it is and what it does, and whether it has yet any brothers or sisters.

It is high time that the trader and the public alike were placed in a position to enable them to identify the hand of the Salvation Army in commerce. What are the businesses and what are the articles in which the Army is financially interested, and which it either wholly or partially controls? Some are known, others may be surmised. But a complete list is required, and the means of ensuring that it shall be complete. The Army's need for noise about certain things and silence about others is, I think, unequalled in the religious world. The extent and nature of its trading will suggest means, legitimate but insidious, whereby the satisfaction of either or both of these needs might frequently be facilitated. Even apart from trading the Army is an immense purchaser, and by the intelligent placing of its orders it can do not a little indirectly to control or mould public opinion. The reader will readily imagine how much greater this power may be in consequence of its ubiquitous trading activities and its ability to invest large sums in trading and other concerns not obviously associated with it.

The *Trade Marks Journal* of October 16, 1907, contained the following announcement:—

SILMER.—Class 31. No. 294,431. Silk Piece Goods. WILLIAM BOOTH, trading as THE SALVATION ARMY, 79 and 81, Fortress Road, London, N.W. Merchant. July 8, 1907. (To be associated. Sect. 24.)

This particular 'Salvation Army necessary' was placed upon the market in the middle of Self-Denial Week, 1908. A 'three-quarter jacket and skirt' costs £2 2s. 6d. or £2 4s. 6d., the price by the yard being 3s. 11d. or 4s. 9d., according to quality. According to the *War Cry*, the material has a dozen different merits, including the circumstance that 'it has been entirely produced by ourselves and is not to be obtained elsewhere.'

The press, on the whole, are singularly blind to the pursuits of 'William Booth, trading as the Salvation Army, Merchant'. They obviously think his other side—the evangelical and philanthropical—the only one that is of interest or impor-

ance to their readers. The mercantile side is a sealed book to them. Otherwise, their complaisant puffing of the other side could hardly continue. They would inquire into it, too, a little more independently. As it is, their knowledge of the one side and their ignorance of the other are derived from the same source. It has, unfortunately, to be admitted that the relations of the editorial and advertising departments of our newspapers are nowadays much more intimate than they were twenty years ago.¹ Although General Booth definitely instructs his officers (*O. and R.*, pp. 388-9) to utilise any advertisements they may have to insert as means of securing free 'notices', I do not suggest that any important newspaper has succumbed to such an inducement. I regret to say that the amount of space accorded by the press to the Army's doings seems really to be the measure of their honest belief in it. Still, General Booth is a large advertiser, and he has influence over others who are larger. In these days of competition newspapers must do their best to oblige good customers. Certain advertisements would probably be found to disappear from certain papers if the Army were criticized in them or ignored. The surreptitious extension of the Army's trading, therefore, is unlikely in future to induce the press to take the Army's religious and 'social' performances any less seriously than they have hitherto done.

The heads of the Army were recently given an opportunity of explaining or justifying certain of their trading operations by the *Drapers' Record*, one of the most influential trade journals in the world. That journal published (April 27, 1907) a leading article based upon certain passages

¹ The *Daily Chronicle*, which has probably now supplanted the *Daily News* in General Booth's affections, appears to realize this evil much more keenly than I do. Its recent (December 7, 1907) 'protest against the degradation of the press' by means of what it calls 'paid "puffs"' indicates a belief that certain of its contemporaries were not proof against the seductions of a certain prospectus, for the *Daily Chronicle* was, it declares, the only journal which protested against the flotation in question 'on both moral and financial grounds'.

on trading in the first edition of this book, and upon the contents of certain catalogues of the Trade Department which the editor had obtained. Before publishing the article the editor communicated with the officials of the Army, drawing attention to the passages in question with the view of learning what reply they might have to make. 'We have been unsuccessful', said the *Draper's Record*, 'in inducing the Army to offer any reply beyond this: that it makes no special efforts to attract the custom of the public, and that its advertisements of its trade department are confined to its own publications.' The contents of this chapter will enable the reader to judge the adequacy and sincerity of this justification.

The *Draper's Record* undertook in its article to publish any reply the Army might care to make. No reply was offered. I understand that Mr. Bramwell Booth has replied privately to a correspondent, his attitude being, apparently, that 'when the Army is reviled, it reviles not again'. A correspondence lasting many weeks ensued in the *Draper's Record*. With one exception the letters were all on one side. All that this correspondent, who wrote under a pseudonym, could say in defence was that the Army's trading was due to the fact that many years ago it could not get suitable materials for its uniforms in the ordinary channels, and so was obliged to get them made for itself. Readers will be able to judge whether the Army tried very hard, or whether the 'regulation' colours, etc., insisted upon, do not indicate a desire—even in regard to uniforms, etc.—to build up a monopoly, rather than an inclination to utilise the usual channels when possible. As to the innumerable other articles dealt in this apologist was discreetly silent.

The number of people who make their living by the sale of such goods, and who also help to finance their Salvationist competitor, cannot be insignificant. Hitherto they may have thought the matter too small to be worth troubling about. I think they are mistaken. As for contributors to the Army who are not traders, they

will possibly consider more seriously than they have hitherto done whether the spiritual results of Salvationist trading are at all commensurate with the amount of commercial energy expended. If 'sovereigns means souls' the record of the Trade Department indicates the desirability of saving them directly with the money given for that purpose, rather than indirectly with the problematical profits of businesses established with the aid of the contributions.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WORKING OF THE 'SOCIAL' SCHEME

THE precise circumstances which led General Booth, aided by Mr. W. T. Stead, to launch his Darkest England ('Social') Scheme in 1890 are somewhat difficult to analyse and appreciate. Certainly those set out in the pages of *In Darkest England* are a little conflicting. On the one hand no explicit indication of a failing faith in the alleged power of Salvationist doctrines and methods to effect unaided the reformation of the most degraded is allowed to appear. 'Wherever the Army goes', we read, 'it gathers into its meetings, in the first instance, a crowd of the most debased, brutal, blasphemous elements that can be found who, if permitted, interrupt the services, and if they see the slightest sign of police tolerance for their misconduct, frequently fall upon the Army officers or their property with violence. Yet a couple of officers face such an audience with the absolute certainty of recruiting out of it an Army Corps' (*In Darkest England*, Appendix, p. vi). On the other hand, it appears to be implicitly admitted that the Army's religious propaganda alone is, in reality, very much less effective than the foregoing statement would lead one to believe, and the whole argument of the book is, in fact, necessarily based upon the principle that, in dealing with such material, 'some kind of extraordinary help'—in addition to that furnished by the process of conversion—is absolutely essential to its successful and permanent transformation (Preface). The 'extraordinary help' in question con-

sisted of the various 'social' institutions which constitute the Darkest England Scheme, to start which over a hundred thousand pounds was asked and obtained from the public.

In order to launch the 'Social' Scheme General Booth found it necessary to secure the active sympathy of two classes of people—those who already approved of his evangelical methods, and those who either disapproved of them or else tolerated them in view of the alleged excellence of their results. To the first class the necessary assurance was given that under the 'social' scheme the Army's religious work was not to be placed in the background. 'In proposing to add one more to the methods I have already put into operation to this end, do not let it be supposed that I am the less dependent upon the old plans, or that I seek anything short of the old conquest. If we help the man, it is in order that we may change him' (Preface). The second class, on the other hand, were assured that, whether they liked the Army's methods or not, these methods were specially efficacious in reforming the debased, the brutal and the blasphemous, and that under the 'social' scheme these methods would be mingled with and modified by other methods, neither doctrinal nor religious, which, therefore, could not but merit the approval even of those entirely opposed to evangelical propaganda. The further assurance was given that the inmates of the various 'social' institutions would be under no compulsion to take part in the Army's religious services (pp. 98, 138, 139).

Thus the two parties were satisfied, and in spite of much criticism, which was necessarily, to a great extent, of a prophetic nature, the money was subscribed and the Darkest England Scheme was successfully launched. It was launched mainly on the strength of the Army's alleged success as a religious body in reforming the more debased section of the masses. If the public had not been content to take that success entirely on trust, and if they had had the means of testing it for themselves, it is probable that the Darkest England Scheme could never

have been carried out. If a couple of Salvationist officers could with 'absolute certainty' recruit a corps out of a crowd of 'the most debased, brutal, blasphemous elements that can be found', it is certainly not easy to see why the spiritual influences of Salvationism required to be supplemented by 'social' influences to the extent prescribed in *In Darkest England*. It cannot be said that the unlovely elements referred to have disappeared even yet, either in London or other parts of the country. But the Army corps recruited out of them will be sought in vain, and there are, unfortunately, no records to show that the case was otherwise in this respect in 1890. The days of oppression had been outlived, and whatever spiritual life the movement then possessed had long been killed by the mere mechanism of the organization designed to direct and control it. The early religious fervour had waned along with the hostility of the public. The increase of public favour and support, while materially contributing to the extension and elaboration of the system, had not infused strength or life into the movement, but had rather been productive of respectability and spiritual dry-rot. Had General Booth in 1890 had the spiritual vitality of his organization really at heart, he might well have prayed for the return of the days of persecution through which the Salvation Army had come, when the combined advantages of militarism and Jesuitism in spreading the Gospel among the masses first mastered his imagination. Instead of this, he demanded further funds and started the Darkest England Scheme.

It was not, of course, the purpose of this 'Social' Scheme that a largely increased measure of financial support from the public should be secured for the purely religious operations of the Army. It is necessary, however, to note that this has been one of its most striking effects. In October, 1890, the number of corps or congregations in the United Kingdom was 1,375 and the number of officers or persons wholly engaged in the Army's work was 4,506 (*In Darkest England*, Appen-

dix, p. iii). To-day, the number of corps is about 1,500, while in 1901 the officers numbered 4,859 (*Encyclopædia Britannica*). That the Army's religious work stood sadly in need of a fillip in 1890 is shown by the steady diminution in the number of its corps in this country during the two preceding and a few of the succeeding years. In 1888 the number was 1,412, in 1889 it fell to 1,395, and in 1890 to 1,364. In 1894 it reached the minimum, for this period, of 1,211, but in this year the Army's assiduous advertising of its 'social' work began to tell materially on its religious funds, so that in later years a slight increase in the number of corps is seen (*Annual Reports, 1888 et seq.*). The number of soldiers or members actually belonging to the corps has never been published by the Army, and it is, for this and other reasons that have been indicated, exceedingly doubtful whether the rank and file have at all increased in strength since 1890, and more than probable that they have actually diminished considerably. A very different state of things, however, is seen in connexion with the religious finances. In 1889, the year preceding the initiation of the Darkest England Scheme, the proceeds of the Self-Denial Fund in the United Kingdom, to which the public have always contributed liberally, and which is devoted mainly to the religious work, amounted to £14,000 (Statements of Account 1889). In 1891 the amount rose to £20,300, in 1896 to £25,000, and in 1906 the amount collected in this country for this fund reached the highest point hitherto, viz. £72,726. In 1890 the property vested in the Army in the United Kingdom was valued at £377,500 (*In Darkest England, Appendix*). In 1906 the assets of the Army's religious section alone amounted to £1,145,320, exclusive of those of the religious Trade Departments, which were valued at £107,496. There can be no doubt, therefore, that a very considerable proportion of the total annual public contribution of over £300,000 (see Chapter v) to the Army's religious funds through the local corps in the United Kingdom to-day has been secured, not in consequence of any increased religious

influence or strength since 1890, but as a direct result of the launching of the Darkest England Scheme in that year.¹

It has been seen that in 1891 Commissioner Smith, then superintendent of the 'social' work, resigned his post because he saw that, if the finances of the 'social' and the religious branches were not separated, 'the "social" scheme would be existing to finance the Salvation Army'. The subsequent separation of the finances in consequence of this and other criticism has clearly not prevented the evil, and it is easy enough now to see how impossible it was that it should prevent it. The public are not apt at drawing distinctions, and the Army is certainly not anxious to help them to distinguish between its religious and its 'social' branches. Even if the fact be disregarded that money is solicited—as in the 1905-8 Self-Denial Appeals—most prominently for 'social' purposes, and is nevertheless applied mainly to religious purposes, it is still inevitable that the destination of money given by the public to an organization like the Army will most often not be in accordance with the real intention of the giver. The first and essential qualification of any religious body that appeals to all sects and classes for funds on behalf of its charitable, philanthropic, or 'social' schemes, is that it shall at least be self-supporting as a religious body. In the absence of this qualification, no separation of finances can prevent the religious body from deriving financial advantage from the public contributions intended to promote its extra-religious work, and that financial advantage will be proportionate to the degree of importance which the public have become accustomed to attribute to such work. The Salvation Army is very far from being self-supporting as a religious body, although—apart from its peculiar organ-

¹ Miss Friederichs (*The Romance of the Salvation Army*) alludes to 'the temporary decrease of popularity and the consequent serious loss of funds' caused by this development. It is impossible to recall or trace either of these alleged results, and Miss Friederichs, unfortunately, adduces no evidence in support of her statement.

ization and finance—there is nothing in its aims, its methods, its membership, or its public utility to excuse it from being absolutely independent of public help. If, then, 'social' work of any kind is deemed desirable in the public interest, the Salvation Army, in view of its inability to exist as a religious body without an enormous annual subsidy from the public, and in view of its apparent inability to obtain that subsidy without mingling its 'social' activities with its religious appeals, is assuredly the very last religious body to which such work can properly and profitably be entrusted.

The Darkest England Scheme has now been in operation eighteen years, and it is therefore possible fairly to compare its performances with its promises. As General Booth recently initiated a great emigration scheme, for which further public funds were solicited, for the permanent elimination of the evils of unemployment in the country (*War Cry*, September 30, 1905), and as he has yet another and a greater under consideration (*see p. 107*), it is desirable to recall the fact that this was also the principal purpose of the plan of 1890. 'This Scheme', wrote the General, 'changes the circumstances of those whose poverty is caused by their misfortune. To begin with, it finds work for the unemployed. This is the chief need' (*In Darkest England*, p. 253). Just as in 1890 it was necessary to supplement the successful reformation of the debased, the brutal and the blasphemous by the establishment of 'social' institutions for their 'elevation', so in 1905 it was, apparently, equally necessary to supplement the successful operations of these 'social' institutions by a great emigration scheme. Previous to 1890 the Army had already had some experience of 'social' work, and the public confidence was secured on the strength of that experience and of the apparent care and minuteness with which the financial estimates accompanying the scheme had been prepared. That it is one thing to promise permanence and finality and another thing to give it, no one ought to know better than General Booth, for his Darkest England Scheme—like his present emigra-

tion schemes—held out all the advantages of a final settlement. 'If we can do it', the public were assured, 'we have the field entirely to ourselves. The wealthy churches show no inclination to compete for the onerous privilege of making the experiment in this definite and practical form' (p. 241).

The purpose of the experiment is generally described in the following passage:—

'This scheme takes into its embrace all kinds and classes of men who may be in destitute circumstances, irrespective of their character or conduct, and charges itself with supplying at once their temporal needs; and then aims at placing them in a permanent position of comparative comfort, the only stipulation made being a willingness to work and to conform to discipline on the part of those receiving the benefit.

'While at the commencement we must impose some limits with respect to age and sickness, we hope, when fairly at work, to be able to dispense with even these restrictions, and to receive any unfortunate individual who has only his misery to recommend him and an honest desire to get out of it.

'It will be seen that, in this respect, the Scheme stands head and shoulders above any plan that has ever been mooted before, seeing that nearly all the other charitable and remedial proposals more or less confess their utter inability to benefit any but what they term the "decent" working-man' (p. 252).

If this description fairly represents the idea generally held by the public of the Army's 'social' enterprises, it unfortunately cannot be said to apply to certain of them as they are in operation to-day.

In appealing to the public for the Darkest England funds, General Booth held out the prospect that the scheme, unless its area of operations were largely extended, would be self-supporting in all its branches (p. 246). 'We have carefully calculated', he wrote, 'that with £100,000 the scheme can be successfully set in motion, and that it can be kept going on an annual income of £30,000.' This income, however, was not to be required permanently, for he goes on to say: 'Supposing . . . by the subscription of this amount the undertaking is fairly set afloat, the question may be asked, "What further funds will be required for its efficient maintenance?"' This question he proceeded to answer in a most reassuring sense in connexion with each of the

various departments of the scheme.

The most attractive feature of the scheme was the admirable manner in which its various sections were related to each other and made mutually interdependent. Alluding to its three main departments, the City Colony, the Farm Colony, and the Over-sea Colony, General Booth said :—

'The whole scheme of the three Colonies will for all practical purposes be regarded as one; hence the training will have in view the qualification of the Colonists for ultimately earning their livelihood in the world altogether independently of our assistance' (p. 273).

The food and shelter depôts were to act as collectors and feeders for the city industrial section ('elevators' or work-shops), and this in turn was to feed the farm colony, while the colony was to administer, when necessary, the final touches of the process of renovation before restoring its settlers to the world.

In regard to the Farm Colony, which, for several reasons may best be considered first, it was admitted that a certain amount of money would have to be expended at the outset in the purchase of land, the erection of buildings, the supply of stock, the production of the first crops, etc. (p. 248). Thereafter, as the following passages indicate, there would be no further burden involved in its maintenance :—

'Every man who goes to our Farm Colony does so, not to acquire his fortune, but to obtain a knowledge of an occupation and that mastery of his tools which will enable him to play his part in the battle of life. . . . We shall have worse luck than the ordinary market gardener if we do not succeed in making sufficient profit to pay all the expenses of the concern, and leave something over for the maintenance of the hopelessly incompetent, and those who, to put it roughly, are not worth their keep' (p. 134). . . .

'When acquired and stocked, it is calculated that this land, if cultivated by spade husbandry, will support at least two persons per acre. The ordinary reckoning of those who have had experience with allotments gives five persons to three acres. But, even supposing that this calculation is a little too sanguine, we can still reckon a farm of 500 acres supporting, without any outside assistance, say, 750 persons. But, in this Scheme, we should have many advantages not possessed by the simple peasant, such as those resulting from combination, market gardening, and the other forms of cultivation already referred to, and thus we should want to place two or three times this number on that quantity of

land. By a combination of City and Town Colonies there will be a market for at least a large portion of the products' (p. 248).

This roseate prospect was accompanied by an expression of confidence that after a time the Army would be able 'to deal with land of almost any quality (and that in almost any part of the country) in consequence of the superabundance of labour we shall possess'. So far the Army has only one farm colony of the kind in this country, that of Hadleigh in Essex. It consists, not of 500, but of 2,000 acres (leaving out of account about 1,000 acres of foreshore and water), of which about 300 acres are let off to a farmer (Mr. Rider Haggard's *Report on the Salvation Army Colonies*, 1905). On General Booth's computation this area ought to be capable of supporting some 6,000 to 9,000 persons. The total population of the colony, inclusive of officials and their families and employés indirectly associated with the undertaking, does not usually exceed 500 souls, and if half this number be assumed to represent the average number of persons undergoing the actual process of reclamation, it will probably be well above the mark. So that instead of General Booth's 6,000 to 9,000 settlers we find 250 (and one farmer), or one twenty-fourth to one thirty-sixth of the number set down by him as reasonable, on the basis of 'the ordinary reckoning of those who have had experience with allotments', and in view of the advantages to be possessed by the Hadleigh colonists collectively over those enjoyed by the simple peasant. This, in itself, is a sufficiently serious miscalculation in connexion with a scheme requiring public funds for its effective realization.

The miscalculation, however, is found to be enormously increased when it is considered that the colony of 2,000 acres, having been capitalized at the outset and financed by the public for seventeen years, does not even yet, in any sense, support its meagre handful of colonists 'without outside assistance'. The working account for the years ending September 30, 1904, 1905, and 1906 shows a deficit of £4,866, £5,597 and £5,355 respec-

tively,¹ which had to be met by the central fund, which, again, is mainly fed by public contributions. This amount annually is very nearly sufficient to support 250 men in comfort, without engaging in any labour at all. It is clear, therefore, that it is the 'outside assistance' of the public that almost entirely supports the colonists, and not the produce of their labour on the 2,000 acres. This labour has, of course, a value, for the sales of produce and manufactures in the various sections of the colony amounted in 1906 to nearly £30,000. In one of the sections—the colony market—a profit of over £122 is shown, and in the others a deficit. It follows, therefore, that the proceeds of the settlers' labour is swallowed up by expenses of management, and that the only persons really supported by that labour are the Salvation Army officials who supervise the operations.²

The number and the salaries of the officers and staff employed in the different departments of the colony cannot be ascertained from the published accounts, salaries being apparently included, under each section, in the general item 'purchases, wages, and expenses'. The ostensible purpose of the Darkest England Scheme was not to provide posts for Salvation Army officers. Yet, as far as the Farm Colony is concerned, this purpose would appear to be that which is most prominently present in its operations and their results. The Army may be able to point to cases of moral and

industrial reformation accomplished at Hadleigh. In view of the money originally sunk in it and poured into it annually for eighteen years, the public may reasonably expect to see a fair number of successes without being moved to any undue demonstration of gratification or emotion. But, judged by the standard which General Booth has himself chosen and supplied, the Hadleigh Colony, regarded as a 'social' institution for the purposes set forth by him, can only be regarded as a gigantic and most costly failure.

What General Booth describes as 'the "decent" working man' did not, as has been seen, come within the real scope of the projected operations of the 'Social' Scheme in 1890. Other charitable and remedial organizations could admittedly do something for men of that class, and for this reason it was, apparently, unnecessary for the Army to display any particular enthusiasm about helping them. Of late, however, the Army has definitely abandoned its somewhat disdainful attitude of eighteen years ago. It has taken a somewhat lively interest in the 'decent' working man, and has in its own peculiar way done something for him on certain occasions when the initiative has been taken and the financial burden borne by other people. In the winter of 1903-4 it was found necessary to open a Mansion House Fund for the relief of the London unemployed, and under that fund a number of men were taken on the Hadleigh Colony. The transaction was thus described in the *War Cry* (November 19, 1904):—

'Our readers will remember that we received under that (the Mansion House Fund) committee, 400 married men, and for their labour on the colony these men were supplied with board and lodging and 15s. a week.'

This statement is about as inaccurate and misleading as any statement could well be. The men sent to Hadleigh numbered 219, not 400. It was not the Army—as any one unacquainted with the actual facts would be led to believe—that supplied the board and lodging and the 15s. a week, and it was not in virtue of the men's labour on the colony that either one or other was supplied,

¹ To this amount the annual charge for interest and repayment of capital (£126,000) ought properly to be added. This charge would exceed £6,000, making a total deficit of £11,600 (1905), or over £46 per head. Colonel Lamb accepted this figure in his examination by the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy in 1905 (*Report*, vol ii, p. 253). In 1907 the deficit on the working account was reduced to just under £3,000.

² Miss Friederichs (*The Romance of the Salvation Army*) evidently regards the colony's deficits very much as Commissioner Nicol regards those of Hanbury Street (*see* Chapter ix). 'Does the farm colony pay?' she asks. 'Do free hospitals ever pay? How can they?' She says of the men, 'it takes weeks of careful feeding and constant encouragement and sympathy to put any energy and strength and hope into them'. The rural retreat is evidently a worthy companion picture to the 'labour hospital'.

The Mansion House Fund, which amounted to £4,350, was subscribed by the public. For every man sent to Hadleigh the Army received from the fund 10s. 6d. a week to cover the cost of his board and lodging. On this head the fund was charged with £666, which was paid over to the colony. The average weekly payment to the men's wives and children amounted to 13s. 11d. (not 15s.), and this, like the cost of boots and the men's travelling expenses to and from Hadleigh, also came out of the Fund (*Mansion House Committee of the Unemployed 1903-4. Report of Executive Committee*). All that the Army gave the men, or any one else, was a coupon for 6d. a week with which to purchase tobacco, stamps, etc. The colony, on the other hand, received from the fund a special grant of £150 for the promotion of a scheme of roadmaking. Finally, it received the value of the men's labour. It must be noted that every effort was made by the Mansion House Committee, in conjunction with the Army, to ensure that the men selected should be as 'decent' as possible. All were required to be married men, to have a home, and—as far as possible—to show by means of references from their last employer or some other trustworthy person, that their lack of work did not arise from any fault of their own. The men, in fact, were picked, and the great majority of them were labourers by trade. Yet in these peculiarly favourable circumstances all that the Hadleigh Colony, with the accumulated experience of years and large annual subsidies from the public, could do for 'decent' working men was to receive them on the footing of paying guests at half a guinea a head, make a handsome profit on their board and lodging¹ and appropriate the entire value of their labour, minus only the sum of 6d. a week.

If the labour of such men is not worth more than 6d. a week to the colony, the fault is obviously that of the colony and its management rather

¹ 'The cost of feeding the Colonists is now 5s. 3d. per week.' (*Report of the Committee of Inquiry upon the Darkest England Scheme, 1892*).

than that of the men. It was not, of course, necessary under such a scheme of relief that the men should receive a proper equivalent for their labour, inasmuch as their families were separately provided for by the fund. In such a case the question of wages is rather one of justice to the public who subscribe the money, for if the value of the men's labour had been credited to the Fund by the Army, a much greater number of men and families might have been relieved. If, with all its experience and the special advantages conferred upon it by the public, the Salvation Army cannot find work worth more than a penny a day for 'decent' working men, fed at other people's cost, it surely seems high time that it gave up the whole 'social' business.

Clearly, the Army found the results of its experiment of 1903-4 with the 'decent' working man not ungratifying, for in the following winter it was early in the field with an offer to repeat it on similar terms, but on a much larger scale. 'If Mr. Long and the Mansion House Committee,' remarked one of its officials in an interview published on November 30, 1904, 'would only hurry up, we are ready to take 1,000 men at our Hadleigh Colony as soon as they like'. This anxiety to relieve 1,000 men was not unnatural. If the average length of stay were the same as in the previous year, 1,000 men would have brought in the Army over £3,000 in cash within a period of about thirteen weeks. Probably a much larger grant than £150 would also have been requisite by way of extraordinary public subscription to the colony's capital. In addition, the Army would have received, on the basis of 1903-4, a free gift of the men's labour, less only the 6d. coupon given them weekly. Putting this labour at the modest figure of 10s. 6d. a week also, this works out, for the 1,000 men desired, at another £3,000 at least. So that, provided the public would support both the 1,000 men and their families, the Army was prepared to accept money or value to the amount of something like £7,000. The colony, however, did not receive its thousand men, but a number not greatly in

excess of that sent in 1903-4. As the Army did not itself take steps independently to secure the balance of the number for which it was prepared to find accommodation, one is forced to conclude that even when it is a question of dealing with 'decent' working men who are unemployed, and not with mere wastrels, it is either unable or unwilling to trouble itself very much in the matter, on the particular financial lines laid down in *In Darkest England*.

The inaccuracy displayed by the editor of the *War Cry* regarding the part played by the Army in connexion with the Mansion House Fund of 1903-4 is by no means avoided by General Booth himself. In the course of a statement prompted by the initiation of Queen Alexandra's Fund (November 14, 1905) he instanced—apparently as an illustration of one of the evils that are apt to accompany relief funds generally—'a case where last winter one man and his family were getting about 27s. per week from the Mansion House Fund, while he had never previously averaged over 18s. on his own account'. Something precisely similar to this occurred in the case of the men sent to Hadleigh under the Mansion House Fund of 1903-4. The colony received the value of the men's labour plus 10s. 6d. a week for their support from the public, while the men's families received from the public an average amount of 13s. 11d. a week for their maintenance. No doubt many of the men would not in normal circumstances have earned so much as the average sum of 24s. 5d. paid by the public for their relief and that of their families, but in view of the fact that the men gave the Army a week's work it seems a little ungrateful on the part of General Booth to include in the amount received by the men and their families the 10s. 6d. which was not received by either of them, but by the Salvation Army. If, under such relief funds, the public are to be spared the necessity of paying for the support of the men and their families more than the breadwinners are in the habit of earning when regularly employed, it is clear that the costly services of Hadleigh

Colony will have to be dispensed with.

The question whether men working on a reformatory labour colony, and not sent there by any independent public relief fund, ought to receive wages in addition to their keep, may, possibly, be debatable. It is remarkable, however, that while the successful Farm Colony projected by General Booth was not intended to pay its settlers wages, the unsuccessful colony of reality has in certain cases—though not in that of men entrusted to its care under such a relief fund or by other public bodies—found it advisable to do so, as well as to insist upon the fact that it does do so. The following passages from *In Darkest England* are sufficiently definite on this point:—

'It is not our business to pay wages' (p. 106).
'While there will be no systematic wage-paying there will be some sort of rewards and remuneration for honest industry, which will be stored up for his (the colonist's) benefit, as afterwards explained' (p. 134).

'No wages will be paid the colonists, as has been described, beyond pocket-money, and a trifle for extra service' (p. 249).

'No wages would be paid, except by way of encouragement for good behaviour, or to those occupying positions of trust, part of which will be saved in view of exigencies in our Colonial Bank, and the remainder used for pocket-money' (p. 273).

The intention, evidently, was that the colonist, having been placed on his feet industrially, should forthwith make room for others and proceed to 'play his part in the battle of life' elsewhere, and it was therefore, apparently, deemed reasonable to withhold from him anything in the shape of regular wages during the comparatively short stay expected to be required for its rehabilitation. In certain cases the men, at least, have been unable to see the reasonableness of the arrangement, as it is now in operation. On October 5, 1904, a man who had been sent to Hadleigh was summoned at Clerkenwell police court by the Holborn Guardians for refusing to work on the colony at the rate of 6d. a week, and the magistrate somewhat indignantly dismissed the case. In this instance also the arrangements between the Guardians and the Army included a payment to the latter of 10s. 6d. a week on account of board

and lodging during a probationary period of thirteen weeks.¹ The man was described as the laziest man who had ever been on the colony. The description may have been perfectly justified, but in view of his knowledge that the Army was not under the necessity of supporting him for at least three months, the offer of 6*d.* a week was not designed to stimulate any latent industrial activity he might have possessed.

The case naturally excited some public attention, and on October 18 a curious article, which seemed to betray signs of official inspiration, appeared in the columns of the London daily journal (*Daily News*) that had most prominently published the report of the incident in the police court. The article took the form of a lengthy dialogue between an old navy, who was also a Hadleigh colonist, and a middle-aged workman, the scene being a third-class smoking carriage of the last train from Fenchurch Street to Southend. The variety of happy circumstances which must have concurred in affording a contributor to the journal in question the privilege of overhearing an exposition and defence of the Army wages system from the lips of one so qualified to speak on the subject as the belated Hadleigh colonist, cannot but command one's admiring wonder. The net result of the dialogue was to show that, while some of the men at Hadleigh did, in fact, get only 6*d.* a week, some got more, and some nothing at all, and that the whole of them were paid strictly according to their deserts, in addition to receiving their board and lodging. The old navy declared himself the recipient of 'ten shillings every week in 'ard silver cash', which with his keep he regarded as practically equivalent to a pound. He had been on the colony six months, and meant to stay as long as they would have him.

¹ Of the 523 men received in the two years 1902-3 and 1903-4, 142 men were sent by boards of guardians, who paid the Army a diminishing rate varying from 10*s.* 6*d.* to 5*s.* per week per man. The guardians are notified when a man earns all he is costing, 'but naturally that is a slow process' (Colonel Lamb's evidence before the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, vol. ii, p. 243). Other inmates are paid for by friends.

Mr. Rider Haggard states with reference to his visit in February, 1905: '... The men are, as far as possible, paid by piecework, and there have been some in the colony who have taken as much as 15*s.* per week, in addition to their board and lodging. . . . One man was receiving 9*s.* a week for clay digging, and another, working on the market garden, 7*s.* 3*d.* per week, in either case plus their board and lodging. Both of these men came from a London Poor Law Union. The average man, however, is paid about 3*s.* per week, of course in addition to board and lodging.'

If the system here described is that in vogue at the colony it differs as widely as possible from that outlined by General Booth in connexion with its origination. The interesting thing to know would be just how long the authorities are prepared to keep on men who turn out as well as, or—because younger—better than, the old navy. Evidently he had been there quite long enough to enable him—unless his age were excessive—to 'play his part in the battle of life', and this no one, however diligent, can be said to be doing while in an institution, like Hadleigh Colony, supported so largely by the public. Men leave the colony at different stages, of their own accord, and some are dismissed for misconduct. The question for the public is: How many leave from reasonable dissatisfaction with the reward of their labour, and how many of those who do well are not allowed to stay on, but are sent back to take their places in the ranks of industry? Men who can earn the equivalent of a pound a week under the discouraging conditions prevalent in Hadleigh Colony ought surely to be restored to the ordinary labour market as speedily as possible, so that others of the 'submerged' class may in turn receive the advantage of the Army's reformatory system.

The following extract from the evidence of Colonel Lamb, of the Hadleigh Colony, before the Special Committee on the Unemployed of the Charity Organization Society (1903-4) appears here to have some application:—

'Could you tell us at all what proportion

the permanent residents of the Colony bear to the temporary ones? I understand that there are a considerable number of permanent officials and permanent employes?—Yes.

'Could you tell us at all what proportion they bear to those who come and go?—We divide them really into four classes. Those who come and go are received at one place and they pass off under a month. Then there are those that pass on to the main colony, where the average stay is about nine months. Then we have a certain percentage taken from them and classed as employes. At the end of the stay as a colonist, for skill or for other reasons, we may keep a man on, and regard him as an employé. Then there are the employes who are hired in the neighbourhood for specific purposes. Speaking off-hand, the proportion would be about 60 in 300.

'Permanent or quasi-permanent?—Yes.'

From this statement it appears that, of all the persons on the colony, one in five is either a Salvationist officer or a member of the permanent staff, and not in any sense a person standing in need of the Army's 'social' ministrations. Should this enormous proportion of officials tend still further to increase, the Army has, of course, ample facilities for enlisting its successes at Hadleigh as paid officers in other departments of its operations. If its successes exist elsewhere, it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify them. According to Colonel Lamb's evidence, out of some 700 to 900 persons passing through the colony in a year, about 300 to 400, or some 50 per cent., leave within a month.¹ Of the remaining 400 to 500 who stay for a longer period, 90 per cent. was regarded by the Army 'as the figure for those who are satisfactory'. This statement, however, has to be read in the light of Colonel Lamb's explanation of what the Army regards as 'satisfactory': 'When I say that, I mean that there are less than 10 per cent. that we have to send away for misconduct', and of

¹ According to Colonel Lamb's evidence before the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy in the following year (1905) there were then only 250 colonists. The 'total number of colonists received' in the year 1902-3 was then given as 239, of whom 104 left within a month; in the year 1903-4 the total number received was 284, 105 of whom left within a month. In 1904, however, the proportion leaving 'before the month was over' Colonel Lamb stated to be 'one a day, roughly', or 'six or seven a week'. It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile the official evidence of the Army in the two inquiries of 1904 and 1905.

the further fact that the Army makes 'no systematic attempt to follow the men for any period after they leave'. Out of the total 700 to 900, therefore, the Army fails at the outset in regard to about half of them, and the satisfactoriness of the 90 per cent. of the other half is clearly far from being synonymous with industrial rehabilitation. The only verifiable approach to success of this kind is, therefore, to be found in the colony's permanent staff which numbers about 20 per cent. of its whole adult population, and which—according to Colonel Lamb's statement—may be largely composed of outside hands not in any sense in need of 'elevation'. In any case the employment permanently or quasi-permanently on the truck system of a certain number of men who ought no longer to stand in need of the Army's ministrations is rehabilitation of a nature undesirable in itself, and apt to be productive of economic effects tending to increase the evil which it was the purpose of the 'social' scheme to cure.

At the base of the 'Social' Scheme are the food and shelter depôts of the City Colonies, which were intended to act as the principal agents for bringing the mass of the submerged into touch with the Army's elevating operations. These depôts were expected to pay their own working expenses, but this expectation is not always realized, for the Food and Shelter Section shows a deficit of £1,198 in 1906. In view of the cash basis on which they are uniformly run, this is rather a remarkable financial result. The statistics for 1907 state that 5,408,728 meals were supplied in the food depôts, and that 1,872,116 'cheap lodgings for the homeless' were also provided. In practice this means that the hungry and the homeless who are unable to produce 2d. to 6d. a night, and to pay for their food as well, stand the slenderest possible chance of getting into a Salvation Army shelter. It is a popular but quite an erroneous belief that the penniless but deserving man is received in these institutions with open arms.²

² This is one of the few erroneous impressions which one is apt to receive from Mr. George

What he meets with—except in instances so rare that they may be disregarded, for the officials have practically no discretion—is a closed door. Under the scheme as originally outlined, however, neither destitution nor demerit was to be a bar to admission. A workshop or labour yard was to be established in connexion with every shelter; the work test was to be applied, so that even 'a crowd of hungry desperate wretches, without even a penny in their pouches, demanding food and shelter', did not disturb the equanimity of General Booth when making his appeal (*In Darkest England*, p. 105). In reality, however, the qualification for admission is payment, not willingness to work. The shelters impose no work test. They differ in no essential from other shelters run as a commercial enterprise by private individuals and not subsidized by the philanthropic. General Booth may plead that free admission would only encourage the unprincipled loafer. If so, that is only a demonstration of the fundamental miscalculation of forces that vitiated his 'social' scheme, for the shelters were ostensibly designed, to a great extent, for the unprincipled loafer's reform. Begging, too, was one of the numerous social evils which the scheme was to stamp out, but the shelters, as actually conducted, simply encourage it. 'To make up the price of an Army doss' is a cogent plea in the mouth of the mendicant in certain districts. The Army has, apparently, come to see that it need not admit the penniless destitute, or be at the trouble of providing work for them, now that it has furnished them with such an excellent motive for begging from the public the money for their lodging and food. Thus the public pay twice, while the Army, whose advertisements state that 'some 6,000 poor are cared for nightly', acquires a reputation as the greatest, most tender-hearted, most zealous, and most 'expert' of philanthropic

Bernard Shaw's picture of 'the West Ham shelter' in *Major Barbara*. Others are that men and women are housed in the same shelter, that male inmates are tenderly ministered to by female officers, and that the work of the Army's religious wing is intimately associated with the conduct of its lodging-house business.

agencies. Evidently, the financial success of the shelters is of less public importance than the question of their 'social' success. The supplying of cheap meals and shelter to the floating mass of casual labour in our great cities may be profitable, but is not necessarily even charitable. Certainly if nothing else comes of it it cannot be regarded as 'social' work in the sense laid down in *In Darkest England*.¹

The industrial section ('elevators' or workshops) of the City Colonies was estimated to require 'no further outlay... except for the necessary reparations' after the department had once been set going. The working account for the years 1904, 1905, 1906, and 1907 shows in this section a loss of £4,881, £3,142, £2,566, and £3,202 respectively. This also, as will appear, (*see* Chapter ix) is a strange financial result in view of the conditions under which these workshops are conducted.

It is one thing, however, to found institutions and obtain public money for them, and another thing to ensure that they shall fulfil their purpose. Unless the food and shelter dépôts really feed the workshops or the farm colony in some reasonable measure, they fulfil no function that is not performed by the ordinary cheap lodging-house of commerce. But as

¹ The actual operation of these institutions should be compared with General Booth's allusions to the workhouse and the casual ward, from which it was the principal purpose of the shelters to save the submerged (*In Darkest England*, Chapter ix, 'Is There No Help?'). In the Army's 'Social' Report for 1906 Mr. F. A. McKenzie states that from these shelters there 'emerges a steady stream of men—upwards.' In the six months ending June 30, 1907, no less than 326 inmates of Army shelters were admitted to the Holborn Poor Law institutions. According to the Annual Report of the Local Government Board for 1906-7, 389 applications for relief were received by the officers of the City of London Guardians from inmates of the Army's shelters in the City during the twelve months following the opening of the Middlesex Street shelter on February 7, 1906. During 1906 the Marylebone relieving officers received 520 applications from Army shelters in that borough. The question of the influence on the rates is, of course, one of serious local interest; but, from the general point of view, it is much more important that the significance of these typical examples of the effect of General Booth's 'social' system, as contrasted with its professed aims, should be clearly and widely realized.

the farm colony, instead of the 6,000 to 9,000 settlers suited to its acreage, has as yet only about 250 colonists at any given time, it can be only a very minute percentage of the many thousands of men passing annually through the shelters who ever reach the workshops or the colony at all. It has been seen, moreover, that half of those few who enter the colony from whatever quarter are failures and leave within a month, while the other half—90 per cent. of whom are regarded as successes by the Army—ultimately go, for the most part, no one knows where. With the industrial section of the city colony between the two, the failure becomes still more glaring, for if the workshops, in their turn, do not feed the farm colony or else restore their inmates to industrial life they lose the reason of their being.¹

So long as the men's labour is profitable to the Army it is quite natural that it should not be over-anxious to find places for them in the outside world. Frequently applications for men from outside employers of labour are declined because the Army chooses to regard the inmates of its elevators—who are under restraint as to securing other work, and most of whom, if paid at all, are paid as little as possible, and that on the truck system—as 'employed'. Thus the city colony workshops go on, solving the wages dilemma by both paying wages and not paying them, counting as successes those who leave after a stay of a few weeks, getting and keeping as many 'decent' working men as they can, enlisting a very few who possess the proper Salvationist temperament as employés, without any guarantee to any one against summary dismissal and possible re-submersion, and squaring the account of the whole costly operation at the expense of the contributing public and of society at large.

The Committee of 1892 which in-

quired into certain aspects of the Darkest England Scheme two years after its initiation were careful to state that they did not enter upon any consideration of 'the very many economic questions affecting the maintenance of the system sought to be carried out' (Report). In a scheme intended to benefit society at large as well as the individuals immediately operated upon these economic questions are at least as important as the integrity of its founder, his adhesion to the terms of his trust, his tenure of the trust property, and the prudence displayed by him in the expenditure of his subscribers' money, which subjects formed the scope of the Committee's inquiry (*see* Chapter xvi). That the Committee were conscious of this fact was shown by their recommendation 'that every care should be taken when disposing of the articles produced in the institutions under the control of the Social Wing, that the prices charged should not be lower than those which may fairly be demanded by ordinary tradesmen or workmen'. It is, of course, nobody's business to see that the Army, in disposing of its multifarious industrial products, does not undersell the products of ordinary labour which is not financed by philanthropy, and of which the wages cannot legally be paid on the truck system. The conditions under which the Army obtains and is required by the terms of its 'social' trust deed to pay its labour are peculiarly favourable for underselling; the temptation to practise it when circumstances render it necessary is undeniably great, and at present the public possess no safeguard whatsoever against it. Even if no underselling of ordinary labour took place a serious economic question would still remain to be considered. Unless the Army succeeds in creating a new or an increased demand for the commodities produced and placed upon the general market by its industrial section, the effect of its participation in their production and sale is necessarily to diminish the demand for labour in the production of the same commodities in the ordinary labour market of the country. In proportion as the Army increases its production of

¹ During the two years ending September, 1904, only 137 persons were sent from the shelters to the colony; so that it would not appear that as feeders to the colony the shelters are of much value. We have no information that any considerable number of men were sent to the workshops from the shelters' (*Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, 1906, vol. i, p. 90*).

those commodities more men will be employed (by the Army) under bad economic conditions, and fewer men will be employed (by ordinary employers) under economic conditions that are relatively favourable.

If the Army found a sufficient market for its commodities among the inmates of its own institutions this evil would be lessened. Unfortunately this is not the case. It has become the competitor of 'ordinary tradesmen and workmen' in the manufacture and sale of innumerable articles of public utility which are produced neither under the conditions of the ordinary labour market nor under the conditions imposed upon General Booth by his Darkest England trust deed. It must be repeated that under the Darkest England Scheme no wages, as the term is usually understood, were to be paid to the inmates of the various 'social' institutions, although the industrious were to be given small money grants by way of encouragement (*In Darkest England*, pp. 106, 134, 249, 273). This plan may be justifiable so long as it is practised merely as a temporary expedient for the express purpose of placing submerged men on their feet and restoring them to the ordinary ranks of industry. The matter is entirely altered if the Army, instead of accomplishing its professed object, retains such men as permanent employés (whether actually described as such or not) on similar conditions, or on any conditions in regard to wages or freedom inferior to those that prevail in the same trades outside the Army, and with their aid develops great industries which compete with the products of free, unsubsidized, and more highly paid labour in the world's market. Again, the public possess no guarantee that this shall not take place, while—apart from actual instances that have occurred—they have, in the Army's irresponsibility, incoherency of economic purpose, and steadfastness of financial aim, every possible guarantee that it shall. In 1892 the 'maximum money grant given to the most skilled workmen' in the 'elevators' or factories was 5s. a week, and the average time that the men remained was stated to be three months. This system

certainly bears some resemblance to that which was set out in *In Darkest England*. The fact, however, that the average stay was only three months does not exclude the possibility that many men remained a much longer period, or that the Army had no objection to keep all the satisfactory workers as long as possible at the same rate of remuneration. Assuming that the cost to the Army of feeding its factory hands was the same as on the farm colony, viz. 5s. 3d. a week, and that the most skilled workmen received 5s. in cash in addition, the total wage paid, if the cost of lodging be added, would not exceed 12s. a week. At the Spa Road and Old Street waste-paper sorting 'elevators' the men, whether on the barrows or at the screens, are lucky if, in addition to their 'keep' (valued at 7s.) they get more than a money grant of 6d. or 1s. for a very long week's work. The Army, of course, obtains much if not most of its waste paper for nothing, on the plea that it is elevating its employés. Nevertheless, the Spa Road accounts usually indicate a loss, and many of its inmates remain for years, without showing any sign or seeing any prospect of elevation. Under the Army's system no force exists to urge it to transfer its skilled or competent hands who are content to work on such terms to the ordinary labour market, while all the circumstances combine to induce it to retain them. It is only natural that many men leave from dissatisfaction after trying the system long enough to learn that, instead of raising them, it is designed to keep them in perpetual submersion, and that this state is preferable outside the Army rather than in it. To count such men as 'successes' is, manifestly, absurd.¹

One of the Army's principal industries was until recently the manufacture of firewood. The British public are unlikely to have consumed more firewood in con-

¹ The appointment of numerous Army officials as probation officers under the Probation of Offenders Act (1908) is difficult to regard with equanimity, in view of the conditions of employment in the 'elevators', to which probationers may be sent. It is obviously undesirable that probation officers should also be virtually the employers of the men regarding whose conduct during probation they are required to report.

sequence of the Army's participation in this business, and if this is the case it follows that the ordinary firewood manufacturers, in the absence of other outlets, have produced less firewood and employed fewer hands in its manufacture since the Army entered into competition with them. In 1892 the average earnings of an Army wood-chopper were 1s. 2½d. per day, which amount was paid in tokens thus: breakfast 3d., dinner 4d., tea 3d., bed 2d., and 2½d. reserved as money grant and to cover the cost of Sunday meals. The average wage paid was thus 7s. 3d. a week, while the highest possible wage was 11s. a week, 7s. of which was paid in the form of board and lodging. To-day the state of things would appear to be somewhat altered. The Army, having forgotten the purpose and principles of its Darkest England Scheme, and secure in the fact that the public also have forgotten them, not only declares, in opposition to the assertions of the ordinary manufacturers, that it does not undersell the trade, but also has the hardihood to maintain that it pays its workpeople as much as, or even more than, the standard rate of wages in the outside labour market (*Standard*, Nov. 21, 1905). In regard to the question of underselling we have, on the one hand, the Army's general statement that it does not undersell, and, on the other hand, the explicit statement by particular firewood manufacturers that in specified instances they have lost orders and contracts through being undersold by the Salvation Army, and are now compelled to employ very much fewer hands in consequence of the capture of their trade, to which statements the Army is either unable or unwilling to reply. There the question must remain for the present, for the public, who are responsible for the maintenance of the 'social' operations, possess no means of extracting definite particulars from the Army authorities either in regard to wages paid or prices obtained—a truly extraordinary state of things which no one not directly interested seems to think it worth while to resent.

The question of underselling, however, is of less importance economically

than that of the wages paid and the conditions under which the workmen are employed. If, as is asserted, the Army is able with the financial aid of the philanthropic public to pay its firewood hands more than the standard rate of wages in the outside market, and at the same time to dispose of its products—even assuming that no underselling took place—on the same terms as the ordinary manufacturers, it is clear that the transference of the whole firewood industry to the hands of the Salvation Army is only a question of time. This would apply also to any other industry undertaken by the Army. Apart from the fact that this kind of enterprise is a contravention of the Darkest England trust deed, the process of undermining industries and creating unemployment in order that the Army may re-employ the workless under conditions that enable it to capture those industries cannot be regarded with equanimity, except by economists of the Booth school who value so highly the moral and intellectual ideals of Salvationism that they regard their enforced imposition on the ranks of labour as desirable at any cost. That the Army really pays its hands in general as much as, or more than, the standard rate of wages is, however, highly improbable, though it is usual, in most of the workshops, to have a few 'paid' or 'outside' hands—not in any sense belonging to the submerged class—who can always be shown to receive something like a reasonable money wage. In regard to wages, however, the authorities, although ready to make general statements, refuse to give the details necessary to enable the public to judge.¹ Over-

¹ While the first edition of this work was in the press the firewood manufacturers and the woodchoppers raised a considerable agitation and gained much public sympathy, which, no doubt, reacted detrimentally upon the Army's finances. This, at least, seems to be the only reasonable explanation of General Booth's recent declaration, when questioned on the firewood business: 'We have practically no firewood-making now. It raised so much prejudice and silly opposition that we gave it up' (Interview, *Blackburn Times*, August 3, 1907). The illustrations entitled 'Wood Chopping' and 'Preparing Firewood,' in the *Social Gazette* of March 21, 1908, would seem to indicate that the 'silly opposition' is believed to have subsided.

estimation of the value of articles given in lieu of wages was one of the evils which it was the object of the Truck Acts to remedy. The conditions enjoyed by the Army in its industrial operations could not well be more favourable for succumbing to this natural temptation with impunity. The difference between the cost of feeding its own colonists and that charged to the public for feeding men entrusted to its care under the Mansion House Funds sufficiently indicates the need of some independent estimate of the value of the Army's bounty to its workmen in the shape of food and lodging. It is unnecessary as well as undesirable that the Army should impose upon itself and on the public the burden of overpaying its employes. Even if it were permissible—which it is not—to pay wages in the usual sense, there is no valid reason why these wages should not be paid entirely in cash, and the men be left free to spend them in their own way and live their lives, as they were intended to do, free from the economic, personal, and other restraints which the Army imposes upon its employes.

The Army must feel less obligation to restore to the world men to whom it pays, or professes to pay, the standard rate of wages than men less capable or less fortunate to whom it pays little more than the cost of their keep. The promotion of men from the latter class to the former—if, indeed, it ever occurs—is far from being systematic. In any case, men who are alleged to earn the standard wage and who have had full opportunity of absorbing all the moral and spiritual benefits which the Army is capable of imparting, stand no longer in need of any help except that of enabling them to find employment outside the Army. This is precisely the kind of help that is not given them. Their state is one of semi-captivity. No proper opportunity is given them for finding, or even looking for, other work. Any definite steps in this direction must be taken by the men themselves, who well know that in the event of failure their reinstatement by the Army is very unlikely to be permitted or considered—unless, of course, they are valuable

hands. It is evident that the spirit of the Army's employes must be well subdued, and that peculiarly effectual means exist for keeping it in due subjection. It was General Booth's ambition to remedy the sins of the capitalist and the sweater, but the economic operation of his workshops seems strangely inadequate for such a purpose. Statements as to the fairness and benevolence of their internal management, the innocuousness of their external economic operation, and the proportion and kind of their inmates alleged to receive adequate remuneration, cannot be accepted on the unsupported testimony of those responsible for their institution and conduct. If it is the rehabilitation of the submerged and not their industrial subjection and exploitation that the public wish to promote they will be well advised to see that a competent Committee is without delay imposed upon the Army for the consideration of those vital questions into which the Committee of 1892 did not think themselves called upon to enter.

CHAPTER IX

THE CASE OF HANBURY STREET

'There is no discipline so brutal as that of the sweater; there is no slavery so relentless as that from which we seek to deliver the victims'—*In Darkest England*, p. 266.

'Although our factories will be permanent institutions they will not be anything more than temporary resting-places to those who avail themselves of their advantages.'—*In Darkest England*, p. 109.

SINCE the foregoing chapter was originally published attention has been prominently directed to the operations of one of the Army's 'social' institutions, the carpentry and joinery 'elevator' in Hanbury Street, Whitechapel. This was done by the instrumentality of Mr. S. Stennett, Secretary of the London District Management Committee of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, to whose expert knowledge, energy, and courage the public and the press are indebted for one of the most edifying 'social' lessons published of recent years. As a result of the meeting organized by Mr. Stennett on August 24, 1907, at Chandos Hall, Maiden Lane, W.C., to protest against the

conditions of labour imposed by the Army upon its workmen, and of the public discussion which ensued throughout the press, the question was raised at the Trade Union Congress at Bath on September 5, and a resolution was unanimously carried instructing the Parliamentary Committee of the Congress to open negotiations with the Army authorities with a view to an inquiry.

Towards the end of September the Army intimated that the questions at issue had already been sufficiently discussed in the press, and declined an invitation to meet Mr. Stennett and others at a public meeting called and held for the purpose of debating them. It is improbable that this official attitude will satisfy the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress in view of the evidence before it or at its disposal. It is true, however, that the numerous and plausible 'replies' which different officials of the Army have published in the form of statements and interviews have served to disarm the reluctant suspicions of certain journals which seemed at last to have discovered, when it was forced upon them, the one blot on an otherwise faultless organization which they had loved to honour and allowed to belaud itself freely for years in their columns.

It is easier, however, to ask for an inquiry into Hanbury Street than to get it. It will be easier, too, to get an inquiry of a certain kind than the particular kind of inquiry that is necessary. There is a public interest involved as well as a Trade Union interest. It is not at all certain that the points in which the unions are chiefly concerned would, in the event of a public inquiry being granted, entail an examination of certain important matters in which contributors to the Salvation Army's funds ought to be seriously interested.

In this chapter certain replies of Army officials to Mr. Stennett's criticisms are examined, because they are before the public, and because they are equally applicable to my own investigations regarding Hanbury Street. Here I may state that, while Mr. Stennett's inquiries and my own

were pursued quite independently, our information and conclusions are substantially the same, although in no case did our investigations happen to touch the same individuals. Had General Booth or Mr. Bramwell Booth announced that a full and free public inquiry would be readily granted this chapter need not have been written. As they have not done so, and seem to see no necessity to do so, they must be held to stand by, and be responsible for, the replies of their subordinates. This chapter is written, then, in the hope that the demand for an independent inquiry—by which the Army ought to have nothing to lose—will not be weakened, and that all General Booth's 'labour hospitals' or 'industrial asylums'—of which Hanbury Street is one—may, if they are to be tolerated at all, be subjected in future to a closer public scrutiny than the Army's system has hitherto permitted.

From sixty to eighty men are usually employed at the Hanbury Street joinery works. Except in the case of a very few outside or 'paid hands' employed from time to time, all the men taken in are of the out-of-work class. Their workless state may be due originally to economic chance, misfortune, or personal fault, such as drunkenness. Before going to Hanbury Street many of them have lodged at the Army's Whitechapel Road shelter. On entering the works they are required to sign a declaration that they are 'homeless, friendless, and destitute'. Unless this declaration is intended as a safeguard against the application of the Truck Acts its purpose is not very clear, for as none of the men are given anything in return for nothing there is little room for the Army's generosity being imposed upon. The general purpose of the Truck Acts is to ensure that the wages of workmen shall be paid only in the coin of the realm, and that any food supplied to them (under special conditions and by written agreement) shall not be overvalued. The Acts contain no exceptions in favour of charitable bodies engaged in industries. Whether or not the system of wage-paying actually practised constitutes

an infringement, the Acts certainly seem applicable to Hanbury Street. In any case, it is in order to avoid becoming 'homeless, friendless, and destitute' that any workman applies for work to an ordinary employer. It is only Hanbury Street that finds it necessary or advantageous to exact a declaration of a need which is really common to all men in search of a job.

The men admitted may be young, middle-aged, or elderly. None appear to be decrepit. With very rare exceptions, if any, only men who are or who have been carpenters and joiners by trade are taken. Men out of work who know no trade can be more profitably employed in sorting waste paper at the Spa Road and Old Street 'elevators' than in being given carpentry lessons at Hanbury Street.

The condition of the carpentry and joinery trade is obviously such as to make it tolerably easy for Hanbury Street to find and keep as much skilled labour as it requires on its own peculiar terms. The 'elevator's' population is to some extent a floating one, for a certain number of men who enter leave as soon as possible after they discover how little the place is able or willing to do for them. A skilled workman, though 'homeless, friendless, and destitute,' who is given a shilling in addition to his 'keep' at the end of his first week, which is frequently the case, is not likely to be unduly elated. Possibly he leaves at once; possibly he decides to give the 'elevator' a longer trial in the hope of earning enough to recover his tools—generally sold or in pawn—so as to have some chance of getting an outside job. He discovers in time that other men as competent as himself, who have worked in the 'elevator' as carpenters for years, are still getting a money grant of one, two, or three shillings a week, and are as far from the recovery of their tools as when they started. It would not be strange, therefore, if before long he came to the conclusion that his chances of elevation are at least as good outside Hanbury Street as in it. What becomes of such men after their few weeks' or months' stay it is difficult to say. Some may land on their feet again, some may not. The

Army, if it does not classify them as having found other work as a result of its beneficent care, probably regards them as ungrateful and incorrigible good-for-nothings. But a great many men do not leave; they stay on, and have, to all appearance, little thought of leaving. This fact, it is urged by the officials, speaks well for Hanbury Street: the men are free to go if and when they like, and there are no locks bolts, or bars to obstruct them. This may be quite true. There is, however, a kind of constraint much more compelling than that of merely material obstacles. When we have examined in detail the actual conditions under which these men are employed we shall be able to judge whether the statement that they are quite free to go is not something very like a mockery.

The joinery works are well equipped, and the machinery is driven by electricity. Practically every kind of work is undertaken—inside doors and front doors, ordinary, bay and other windows, office partitions, flights of stairs, benches for halls, kitchen dressers, garden gates, train indicators, etc. To do such work at all competently a man must be a very good joiner. No inexperienced man could do it. If there is any work done on which inexperienced men, or men not carpenters are employed, I have failed to discover or hear of it. In the opinion of men who have been there long enough to know, the officials do not want any men but carpenters; nor, in their experience, has any man much chance of being allowed to stop who, although formerly a carpenter, does not display a reasonable proficiency with his tools within a very few days. At a recent date few, if any, of the men had been at Hanbury Street less than a year, many had been there longer, a number over four years, and some over six. I know of only one man who has received at all regularly as much as 5s. a week in cash. He has been there for over three years, and he did not always get as much. Another man who has been there some years longer, and who is often engaged on the most difficult joinery jobs, still receives about 2s. or 2s. 6d. in cash for a full week's work. Both

consider—with, as will be shown, some reason—that the value of their labour to the Army over and above the price of their keep and money grants has averaged 30s. a week during all the years they have worked for it. They are not aware that the Army holds a few hundred pounds or any other sum at their credit. They are, they hold, in a more hopeless condition than when their elevation started, for Hanbury Street, rather than the fact that they are past middle age, is written against them for life. Should they fall ill, the London Hospital or the infirmary, which are both handy, will have to see to them, for the Quaker Street 'Lighthouse', which houses the inmates of the Hanbury Street 'labour hospital', has yet to make its reputation as a convalescent home or nursing institution. Should they die, there is the workhouse within a stone's throw to bury them. The Army cannot divert its energies and funds from the welfare of the living.

The hours worked at the 'labour hospital' are from 6.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. (except on Saturdays), with an interval of $\frac{1}{2}$ hour for breakfast and 1 hour for dinner, both of which are provided at Quaker Street, half a mile away. The working week is $53\frac{1}{2}$ hours, with frequent overtime, the result of which is not always apparent in the men's grants. An $11\frac{3}{4}$ hours' working day is far from being uncommon. The men's work is rated by time or by piece. Two shillings a day, or 12s. a week, is the wage or allowance given for time or day work. The same man may be employed on difficult piece work, and on day work at 2s. a day, in the same week. This suggests that 12s. a week is, in the Army's opinion, about the average of some of the best men's earning capacity. This appears to be, in fact, a favourable representation of the case under Hanbury Street conditions. The sum of 9s. a week is deducted as the cost of board and lodging. This leaves an average of 3s. a week which is regarded as the money grant. It was formerly, in certain cases, the custom to stop and reserve one-third of this for the purpose of providing the men with clothes and boots, so that if the grant were 3s.

only 2s. in cash would be received. There was generally, under this system, a good deal of disagreement between the officials and the men as to the precise amount standing to their credit, and there seems to have been an undesirable measure of arbitrariness about the manner in which their clothes and boots were dealt out. As Commissioner Nicol (*Tribune*, September 7) appears to deny that any such deductions are now made, it is to be hoped that the men clearly understand that they have been discontinued. The Army, says Commissioner Nicol, now supplies the men with new clothes and boots at wholesale cost price. I know some men who greatly prefer to buy them retail elsewhere. Most of the men will, naturally, have various personal expenses to swallow up their meagre grant without being open to the charge of extravagance. One may well be concerned, therefore, as to their ability in future to purchase clothes and boots. Probably the system of deductions will have to be reintroduced. In that case it is to be hoped that there will be less uncertainty on both sides regarding the credits of the individual workmen than has hitherto been the case.¹

Much, if not most, of the work is paid, or rather valued—for there is a distinction—as piece work. This system is found, apparently, to develop the highest degree of efficiency, for it holds out to the men the hope of an extra shilling or so on the week's work, by which liberality the Army cannot be said to lose. It is important to discover what the Army professes to pay its hands on the piece system, because on this system the men make certain specified articles, the price for making which in the outside market, under similar conditions as regards machinery, etc., can be readily and accurately ascertained. The work-tab supplied to the men for each job bears a drawing, with measurements and other particulars, of the article to be made, the price allocated to the

¹ Commissioner Nicol appears to have overlooked the fact that the 'Social' Scheme actually prescribed that a part of the money grant was to be 'saved' by the Army on behalf of the men in the 'elevators' (*In Darkest England*, p. 273).

man for making it, and the signature of the officer in charge. The following list, which is compiled from the official work-tabs,¹ shows the prices professedly paid by the Army for certain work, and the prices actually estimated by an ordinary master builder as those which he would have to pay for the same work:—

	Salvation Army Price.	Builder's Estimate
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1. Make one large frame and sash, 5 ft. 10 in. high by 6 ft. 8 in. wide	0 4 6	0 7 6
2. Make three large square bay windows, 6 ft. 6 in. high, 9 ft. 2½ in. wide on front; one mullion; side lights, 1 ft. 7 in.; 1½ in. sashes. The lot . . .	1 2 6	2 14 0
3. Make eleven seats for hall use, 4 ft. 6 in. long, with back rail, one support in centre, one support in front of seat. Each	0 0 10	0 2 3
4. Make seven frames and sashes, all different sizes, 3 ft. by 1 ft. 9 in. (no mullion), to 3 ft. 6 in. by 8 ft. (4 mullions); oak sills; moulding, etc., round frame. The lot	1 0 0	1 15 0
5. Make five bath-room mullion frames and sashes, 6 ft. high; each sash 2 ft. 3 in. wide; twelve lights in top sash. The lot	0 12 6	1 17 6
6. Make two balcony frames and diminished style sash doors, with fanlight; height 8 ft. 3 in. over all; door, 6 ft. 7 in. by 2 ft. 10 in. moulded inside; bead and flush panels. Each	0 4 6	0 12 0
7. Make two glass partitions, 5 ft. by 5 ft. 9 in.; two mullions; one cross-bar in each sash. The lot	0 6 0	0 13 6
8. Make eight sashes and frames, 2 lights, 6 ft. 4 in. by 1 ft. 5½ in. Each	0 1 0	0 3 0
9. Make four twin sashes and frames, 6 ft. 4 in. high; each sash 3 ft. wide; 8 in. mullion. Each	0 2 0	0 4 6

¹ These tabs, with some of the other evidence upon which this chapter is based, have been handed by me to the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress.

	Salvation Army Price.	Builder's Estimate
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
10. Make four wing frames doors and sashes (two right, two left), height 6 ft. 8½ in.; width over all, 4 ft. 3 in.; width of door, 2 ft. 10½ in.; 12 lights in door; one panel with bolection moulding; sash to open. Each	0 3 6	0 12 0
11. Make four dressers, 3 ft. 1 in. high, base; 4 ft. 1 in. wide; height over all 6 ft.; two cupboards and drawers; one shelf inside; four shelves above, 11 to 14 in. deep. Each	0 6 0	0 14 0
12. Make four casement frames, two 5 ft. 5 in. high by 9 ft. 6 in. wide, two 5 ft. high by 6 ft. 6 in. wide; transom bar in each frame; ten lights in sash, four lights in transom. The lot	1 5 0	3 10 0
13. Make five sashes and frames, four lights, all different sizes, 4 ft. 9 in. by 2 ft. 7 in. to 6 ft. by 2 ft. 9 in. The lot	0 5 0	0 17 6
14. Make one oriel solid frame and sash, height 5 ft., width 3 ft. over all, depth 1 ft. 6 in.; two upright bars in top sashes, one upright bar in bottom sashes.	0 7 0	1 5 0
15. Make twelve front doors, three each of different elaborate patterns, 7 ft. high by 3 ft. wide, 2 in. thick; raised panels, moulding stuck on solid both sides. The lot	1 4 6	6 0 0

It will be seen that there is a considerable degree of arbitrariness about the prices marked by the Army. They vary from about one-half to about one-fifth of the ordinary builder's price. Nor is the same article invariably marked with the same price. It may be reasonably surmised that if the men's work were always marked at one-half, or even one-third, of the ordinary market price, and if they actually received it, a good many of them might succeed in leaving Hanbury Street happily elevated. It would

seem that the Army has foreseen this possibility—though in a different light—and that the strange fluctuations of the work-tab prices are in reality a beneficent provision against it in the higher spiritual interests of the men. It may be, on the other hand, that Hanbury Street has always been sufficiently busy to be compelled to ignore it. As the men have no appeal against any official act, it is evident that the vagaries of the piece system, while serving to stimulate them, are not designed to raise the best of them much, if at all, over the 12s. a week level for time work.

A curious system of weekly 'balances' prevails, or prevailed, at Hanbury Street. The balance is the sum earned by the men over and above the cost of their keep and their money grant. It is carried—theoretically at least—to their credit from week to week. It is shown in a small pass-book which contains also the particulars of the men's work for the week, copied, when it is piece work, from the tabs. It does not appear that every man has, or ever has had, such a book. There is, in fact, a strange absence of system about their issue. Certain men see them at rare intervals—several months or longer. The officials, of course, keep the books for making-up. A man who thinks he ought to have a balance sometimes asks to be shown his book. He may or may not be shown it. If, as is frequently the case, he is told that he has no balance, it is, of course, unnecessary for him to see the book, and he must rest content with the official assertion. It is to be feared that the men have come to regard these balance books, wages books—or whatever may be their proper designation—as something of a delusion. They appear to realize, in time, the futility of troubling about them. A careful examination of one of the books themselves goes a good way to explain their attitude of scornful indifference, and serves incidentally to throw an interesting light on Hanbury Street book-keeping.

The following particulars are extracted, with only immaterial alterations as regards names, etc., from a

wages book bearing the official stamp, and relating to the work and wages of two carpenters working together. The extracts given are for three consecutive weeks:—

BROWN AND JONES.		£	s.	d.
Week ending August 7.				
6 drawing doors and frames at				
7s. 6d. each		2	5	0
2 solid frames and doors, lot		0	8	0
Day work between both		0	13	0
		£3 6 0		
Deduct—				
Cost of keep (2)		0	18	0
Brown's grant		0	4	6
Jones' grant		0	4	6
		1 7 0		
Balance		£1 19 0		

Week ending August 14.				
August 14, Balance				
		1	19	0
1 pair half-glass cupboard doors		0	5	0
2 pair circular sashes		0	8	0
		£2 12 0		
Deduct—				
Cost of keep (2)		0	18	0
Brown's grant		0	4	6
Jones' grant		0	4	6
		1 7 0		
Balance		£1 5 0		

Week ending August 21.				
August 14, Balance				
		1	5	0
Deduct—				
Cost of keep (2)		0	18	0
Brown's grant		0	3	6
Jones' grant		0	3	6
		1 5 0		
Balance		£0 0 0		

I do not know whether the officials have ever been called upon to explain this mystery—for so, I think, it must prove to most people—of the vanishing balance. I have suggested to Brown that he and his mate must have been allowed through some official oversight to over-do it the first week when, even at the Army's prices, they earned between them £3 6s.; that they were cautioned and restrained from over-zeal during the second; and that, nevertheless, they had to be ordered a complete rest as a precautionary measure during the third. Brown, unfortunately, scoffs at any such suggestion. There are, he declares, no restraints against work at Hanbury Street; there has been no such taking it easy, and there have been no such

holidays during all the years he has been there. He assures me that he and his mate would be doing, on an average, just as much work in the second week when they were credited with 13s., and in the third week when they were credited with nothing, as in the first week when they earned, on paper, no less than £3 6s. between them. The official figures themselves go some way towards confirming this statement, for the grants, which are ostensibly based upon the men's industry, are the same in the second week as in the first. Yet, according to the book, the two men did only one-fifth of their first week's work during the second. In the third week—for no work at all, according to the book—their grant was only 1s. less each. Had the balance in their favour—or should one say against them?—happened to be £1 7s. instead of £1 5s. at the beginning of the last week, there is no obvious reason why they should not have received the same grant throughout. Anyhow, whatever be the explanation, the fourth week sees the Army and the men starting quite square again, the latter with the renewed prospect of being able to earn another visionary £3 6s.

And so Brown has ceased to trouble about 'wages books'. He has almost ceased to trouble about anything. At perfect liberty to go, he still remains. He knows the length and strength of his tether just as well as the Army does. This skilled workman goes on, and doubtless will go on to the end, doing his 9½ or 11¼ hours' work in the twenty-four; trudging to and fro twice or thrice a day, in all weathers, poorly clad and poorly fed, between the Hanbury Street 'hospital' and the Quaker Street refectory half a mile away; and accepting the Army's 2s. or 2s. 6d. pittance at the end of the week as a matter of course. It is well for him—and for the Army—that there is little time for brooding. If work is sometimes a corrective for vice, drunkenness, and crime, it is happily an anodyne for injustice also. The irony of Hanbury Street is that it provides its own nepenthe—in the engrossing nature of the work itself. 'With your mind taken up all day with work like

ours', says Brown, 'you haven't time to think about anything else.' After their ten or twelve hours' 'treatment' the patients have little energy left for thought. Besides, of what use would it be? Thinking out of work-hours does not raise a man's grant. The intellectual interest of the treatment may tend to keep the inmates of the 'industrial asylum' sane. With the other conditions, it helps to make and keep them passive and inert. Their passivity is officially represented to the trustful public as satisfaction, their inertia as contentment. I know few things more deplorable in civilized life to-day than the operation of this 'elevator' which receives the helpless derelicts of industry and, with specious promises, systematically imbues them with dull and listless despair. 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might', is the appropriate text inscribed in large letters across this philanthropic carpentry shop. It is appropriate, for the officials see that the maxim is acted upon. I do not suggest its removal. But Dante's '*Lasciate ogni speranza*' might fitly be made to supplement it, beside the present business announcement about estimates, over the street portal.

Hanbury Street finds it necessary to keep the dieting of its patients in its own hands. It appears to be unable to trust the men to spend their earnings in food. If so, this is a serious reflection on the value of the Army's moral and spiritual influence, of which most of the inmates have had full advantage, not for months merely but for years. Even those certified as converted drunkards—frequently exhibited as trophies at suburban chapel evening meetings in aid of the Army's work—are trusted in this respect as little as those who are not and never have been drunkards. All have to trudge back to Quaker Street¹ for their meals, although there are plenty

¹ A large number of men employed at the Old Street salvage (waste-paper) 'elevator' are also fed and housed at Quaker Street. Their keep is rated at only 7s. a week and their money grants are smaller than those of the carpenters. Their rations are described as 'second grade', and they have to walk from Old Street to Quaker Street (20 minutes) for dinner.

of places close at hand where, there is no doubt, better food could be obtained at cheaper rates. Probably 2s. a week would be a fair estimate of the value of the men's lodging. This would leave 7s. (out of the 9s. a week charged for keep) as the Army's estimate of the value of the food provided. I question whether any of the men regard it as being worth quite 5s. Many assuredly do not. It is certain that any of them are very glad to be sent on an outside job, chiefly because of the better breakfast, dinner, and tea which they can buy with the 1s. 2d. a day necessarily allowed them for the purpose. Doubtless the Army really thinks it gives better value than could be obtained elsewhere with the money. The men might surely be trusted to discover this for themselves if they were free. As it is they have no choice. The eating of the Quaker Street pudding, therefore, is not its proof. Nor is the publication of the official daily menu for a week (*Social Gazette*, September 7, 1907) so convincing as the authorities seem to think it must be. The first two days are as follows :

SUNDAY.

Breakfast.—Fish, three slices of bread and butter or margarine, one pint of tea.

Dinner.—Three ounces of prime roast meat, greens, potatoes, bread, boiled pudding or stewed fruit, pint of tea.

Tea.—Two slices of bread and butter or margarine, two slices of cake, pint of tea.

MONDAY.

Breakfast.—Two ounces of corned beef, three slices of bread and butter or margarine (seven ounces), pint of tea.

Dinner. Meat-pie or stew, beans, potatoes, rice pudding and stewed plums, pint of tea.

Tea.—Two ounces of flank, or rice and jam, three slices of bread and butter or margarine, pint of tea.

This menu, like the first week's extract from the wages-book quoted above, reads extremely well. It should, however, be received with caution—as certain of its items have, in fact, to be received at times by those expected to consume them. The quantity of tea allowed with dinner each day is, I am assured, never a pint, but half a pint or less. The number of slices of bread and butter or margarine for breakfast and tea is habitually two, not three, although about the time the menu was published the

same quantity of bread was for a short period cut up thinner. Possibly the men gained a slight temporary advantage on the margarine. None of the men I know will own to two slices of cake with his Sunday tea, but as the expression 'slice' is elastic it would be rash to assume that they suffer any loss by having it in an undivided state. The word 'fish' with which the week opens, usually conceals a bloater or a kipper, as to the eatable condition of which there is often a marked difference of opinion between the officials and the men. The 'prime roast meat' of the Sunday dinner also provides matter for difference: apart from the question of quality, it does not appear to be a regular Sunday feature—not so regular as the 'cold scam' which it may occasionally replace. Greens, too, would appear to be a by no means invariable adjunct to the Sunday dinner. In one respect the Army's menu is neither better nor worse than other menus: it is no guarantee of the quality, and not always of the quantity, of the food it describes. An official effort was recently made at Quaker Street to obtain from the men a general expression of satisfaction with the food—a sort of vote of thanks to the catering department. I believe the effort was disappointing. To attribute any value to approbation obtained from men employed under such conditions would be as unwise as to accept the conversions of Hanbury Street and other 'elevators' at their face value. If the Army wishes to convince the public that its food is of good quality and is not over-valued, a better way of doing so than publishing menus would be to place its employés in a position to purchase it if they want it, and to refuse it if they do not.

As regards the men, then, we have (1) an amazingly low scale of prices for skilled work; (2) a method of book-keeping which deprives the men of their apparent earnings even at these low rates; (3) a system of catering open to grave objection in itself, and suggestive of profit-making on the food at the further expense of the men's earnings, and (4) a system of

money grants so small as to subject the men, as skilled workmen, to undue discomfort and hardship, and to make it practically impossible for them ever to better their condition.

The operation of Hanbury Street as a business is scarcely less important than its operation as an 'elevator'. It is in direct competition with the outside joinery trade, and is evidently in a most favourable position for competing, and so tending to produce further unemployment of which it may take advantage. Its products may be supplied to all kinds of people—builders, private persons erecting houses, shopkeepers, other departments of the Salvation Army, and officials of the Army or their friends who are able to invest some of their savings in house-building. There is little doubt—indeed, it is admitted—that a certain number of Hanbury Street's customers are induced to patronize it in preference to other sources of supply by the belief that the place exists primarily for the benefit of its submerged employés, whom they suppose it to be rapidly and systematically elevating. Such philanthropic customers, naturally, will not want to buy cheap: the Army admits, in fact, that it sometimes gets a trifle above the ordinary selling prices from them. If all the customers were of this class, the low wages paid the men would appear all the more inexcusable. To account for these low wages several possible explanations, apart from any that may already have appeared probable, naturally suggest themselves. If the quality of the work turned out were generally inferior, the Army might conceivably be obliged to accept much lower prices for its products than habitually prevail. Men have informed me that, when they have ventured to remonstrate regarding certain prices marked upon their work, an officer has told them that he could not pay more, as he only got so-and-so (mentioning an absurdly low selling-price) for the article. This must, however, be regarded as a private, unofficial, or out-of-date statement, for there have been recently no lack of emphatic and authoritative official declarations pub-

lished to the effect that none of the Hanbury Street goods are sold under the regular trade prices. If this is the case it is satisfactory in a double sense: it is a striking testimonial to the general merit of the men's work, and it speaks well for the Army's ability to resist temptation. Unfortunately, it leaves the low wages problem darker than ever.

There is no reason, then, for supposing that the quality of the work done is below the average. If any one will take the trouble to examine the large and elaborate train-indicator-cum-advertising-station erected towards the end of November, 1907, on the platform at Victoria (L.B. & S.C.) Station, London, he will be forced to admit that the workmen who executed it must have possessed considerable ingenuity and skill. This public monument to the ability of General Booth's Whitechapel 'dossers'—for so it is—was made in the Hanbury Street joinery works, and neither foreman nor 'paid hands' were employed on the job from start to finish. One of the hands engaged on it—an elderly man—received a grant of about 7s. a week for carrying through this special piece of work, the execution of which occupied some three months, but I have reason for believing that the men under him received a few shillings less. I have no reason for supposing that the L.B. & S.C. Railway Company were aware where, and under what conditions, this work was done.

In connexion with the Army's repudiation of the suggestion that it undersells, it is necessary to consider the fact that certain purely business customers evidently find it advantageous to deal with Hanbury Street. Some have admitted the advantage, but it does not follow that they are prepared to demonstrate the precise degree of the advantage in regard to different articles by exhibiting their books. Of this fact the Army naturally makes the most. When the Army officials talk of 'the regular trade prices', however, one would like to know exactly what they mean. Evidently, as there is such a thing as competition, there cannot be said to be a definite and invariable selling-price

in the regular trade for any specific article or class of work. It is, in fact, admitted (Colonel Nicol, *Tribune*, September 7, 1907) that 'nearly all' the Army's joinery work 'is done in keen competition with others'. This can only mean, then, that nearly all its work is secured for no other reason than that its prices are lower than those of its keenest outside competitor. As some of these keen outside competitors will probably be what is known as 'unfair' houses, Colonel Nicol's statement is far from reassuring. No one is likely to suppose that the Army would be foolish enough to undersell unnecessarily—say, by invariably quoting prices 25 per cent. below the lowest probable figure of the keenest outsider. Probably 10 per cent. less would sometimes be enough to get it the order, and as there might be differences equally great between the tenders of the outside trade, the Army no doubt thinks itself entitled to regard its superior keenness as nothing out of the ordinary.

An important question also arises in connexion with all the work done or sold, whether in the absence of direct and known competition or not. Does the Hanbury Street definition of underselling agree with that of the Trade Department attached to the Army's religious section? From the official example given on p. 43 of this work it will be seen that 'cutting' is not regarded as 'cutting' provided it is done unconsciously. It is argued, in fact, that if the Army is able to buy better, or to be content with smaller profits than the ordinary trader, the fact that it can sell a specific make of boots at 1s. 9d. a pair less than any one else, is eminently creditable to itself and satisfactory to all concerned. If this principle governs Hanbury Street, it may possibly explain the denial of underselling there also. As far as the important item of labour is concerned it is able to buy very much better than any unphilanthropic employer. As for its ability to be content with 'smaller profits' than the outside trader, it is not required to make any profits. It has the Darkest England ('Social') Fund, subscribed mainly by the public, to draw upon,

and it does draw upon this fund regularly and heavily every year. It is evident, therefore, that selling prices, based, as in the boot business, only on considerations of buying and profits, might well, when considered necessary, be much below those of the keenest outsider, while still, according to the Army's definition, escaping the imputation of underselling or 'cutting'.

The fact that Hanbury Street, like most of the Army's 'Social' institutions, does not make a handsome profit but a serious loss, must appear to many people the most remarkable thing about it. As 'rents, rates, management, and wages for the foremen and a few employes are all reasonable' (*War Cry*, September 14, 1907), the public importance of the fact is not lessened. The published accounts relating to the establishment could not well be more meagre than they are. The following are all the available details for the past five years:—

<i>Dr.</i>		<i>Cr.</i>	
Purchases, Maintenance of Men and their Allowances—		Sales, Earnings and Donations—	
£		£	
1903. . .	17,747	1903. . .	15,041
1904. . .	17,021	1904. . .	16,239
1905. . .	14,759	1905. . .	13,315
1906. . .	13,026	1906. . .	11,975
1907. . .	15,979	1907. . .	14,675
			£71,245
		Deficit .	7,287
	<u>£78,532.</u>		<u>£78,532</u>

The average deficit, therefore, has recently been about £1,500 a year. This loss, according to the Army, is practically entirely on the labour. Taking 65 men as the average number employed, it follows that each man contributes about £23 a year to causing the deficit. On the other hand, taking 12s. a week as the average wage in cash and in kind, each man receives £31 4s. a year for his work. That is to say, as the business is actually conducted, the Army finds that each man's labour is worth, in reality, only £8 4s. a year, or only 3s. 2d. a week instead of the assumed 12s. I think the officials will find it difficult to get any one to believe that the men's work is quite so bad as that. Yet that is

how it works out according to the accounts.

In reality, however, it appears to work out very differently. Men are frequently sent to work on outside jobs. As the Army declares it does not undersell, it must receive, as other masters do, at least 1s. an hour for these men's labour. Even for overtime (beyond the 53½ hours' week) the Army pays the men only 3d. an hour—that is, if they are not on piecework, in which case they frequently get nothing extra. Let it be assumed that the men, instead of the 2s. a day for timework, get the overtime rate when working outside. The Army's account for the week will work out thus:—

	<i>Cr.</i>	<i>£ s. d.</i>
53½ hours' work at 1s. per hour . . .		2 13 6
<i>Dr.</i>		
53½ hours' work at 3d. per hour		
—say 13s. 6d.		
Paid thus—		
Cost of keep	£0 9 0	
Money grant	0 4 6	
	0 13 6	
Gross profit per man per week	<u>£2 0 0</u>	

Clearly, after making every possible allowance, this does not help us to understand the average deficit of £1,500 a year. Again, at an average of 12s. a week, the annual wages bill would amount to £2,028 against a turnover (1907) of £14,675 with a deficit of £1,304. There is something incomprehensible about these figures from whatever point of view they are regarded. The Hanbury Street accounts, of course, disclose no details either of wages, cost of material, or establishment charges. In an ordinary business of this kind, however, it is possible to calculate approximately the cost of material from the wages bill for the year. If, as the Army states, the men are slow and their labour defective, it is obvious that the amount and cost of material used would be relatively less than if the men were good workmen. Let us, first, assume that the men are inferior, and also that the £2,028 paid in wages fairly represents the value of their labour on the material passing through their hands. In that case, after making a liberal allowance for cost of

material and establishment charges, there would be a balance of at least £7,000 representing profit out of the proceeds of £14,675. On a second and more reasonable hypothesis, viz., that the men's labour is as efficient as the Army's work-tabs indicate, we should reach a different but, in another respect, no more satisfactory conclusion. An ordinary shop, for the same labour, would, instead of a wages bill of about £2,000, have one of at least £6,000; the cost of material could not well be less than £7,000; and the turnover, inclusive of profit, would exceed £16,000 as compared with the Army's turnover of £14,675 and loss of £1,304. Obviously, this does not appear to support the Army's denial of underselling. On the other hand, as the Army pays £4,000 less in wages, and as no profit is included in its turnover of £14,675, the mystery of the loss of £1,304 is certainly not explained by the comparison.

If Hanbury Street would but publish detailed accounts all such dubious matters would be very easily cleared up, and the officials would be saved the trouble of denying charges of sweating, underselling, and profit-making. If the 'social' institutions did not make a loss it would not, of course, be necessary or possible to appeal to the public for contributions on their behalf. As there is a serious annual loss at Hanbury Street, as elsewhere, which the public are asked to make good, it is evident that an intimate and searching inquiry is desirable for the purpose of establishing, among other things, the precise causes to which the loss is really to be attributed. Regarding the fact that there is no profit Commissioner Nicol observes (*Daily Chronicle*, September 6): 'I say, thank God for it! And I hope there never will be'. It is difficult to see why the Commissioner should be so averse to the enterprise succeeding in making ends meet, so long as it did not cease to fulfil its alleged elevating mission. It is to be hoped that he will one day be given an opportunity of explaining more fully why he so devoutly accepts these Hanbury Street deficits as being in some special sense providential.

Since Mr. Stennett's criticisms were published on August 24, 1907, the attitude of the heads of the Army—that is, General Booth and Mr. Bramwell Booth—has been extraordinary. Both have been silent regarding Hanbury Street though eloquent about many less important things. The former, it is true, made a veiled allusion to the question in his parting appeal for more officers for his religious work just before leaving for America on September 9. 'They will say we sweat you,' he said. 'Yes, we will sweat you. But if you are not willing to be sweated, don't have anything to do with the Salvation Army' (*Daily News*, September 10). Further than this jocular dismissal of the subject the General has not gone. As for his son, the Chief of the Staff, the *Daily News* stated on August 28, that its representative was informed at the 'Social' Headquarters on the previous day that 'the question of the alleged sweating has been investigated by Mr. Bramwell Booth . . . who will issue a statement in reply to the charges'. On August 30, however, the *Daily News* stated in its news columns that, according to an unofficial announcement of the previous evening, 'in view of the serious nature of the charges made, Mr. Bramwell Booth, the chief of the staff, would issue an order for an inquiry into the whole of the circumstances'. In a leading article of the same day the *Daily News* said: 'We have reason to hope that Mr. Bramwell Booth will investigate the charges. . . .' Whether it be the case that Mr. Bramwell Booth had already investigated the charges on August 28, as stated, or that he issued an order for an inquiry since August 30, as unofficially promised, no statement professing to bear his personal authority has (April, 1908) been published.

The defence of Hanbury Street has been conducted in the ordinary press and in the Army's own journals by certain subordinate officials, viz. Colonel Moss, Colonel Jacobs, Commissioner Sturgess, and Commissioner Nicol. There is no reason why these gentlemen should not say what they wish to say on the subject, provided the public clearly understand that the

General for the time being of the Army—as well, of course, as the Chief of the Staff—is responsible for their utterances, and that it would not be easy for any subordinate official to publish anything within their cognisance detrimental to the Army while remaining in it (*see* Chapter xiv on Government). Not only are the General and the Chief of the Staff responsible for their subordinates' statements about Hanbury Street, but—what is more important—they, and no others, are responsible for Hanbury Street itself. It is necessary to say this, for it has been suggested that the General himself is not aware of what goes on. Unfortunately for this theory, the carpentry works were in operation in 1890, when the great 'Social' Scheme, of which they are a part, was launched. While their success as 'elevators' may be questioned, there can be no question that the lines on which the works are conducted are substantially those laid down for such institutions by General Booth in *In Darkest England*. If it were really the case, then, that the General is ignorant of the 'social' and economic operation of Hanbury Street in practice, so much the worse for the autocratic system of which he is the inventor and responsible head. When, therefore, Mr. Bramwell Booth talks or thinks, on the General's behalf, of issuing an order for an inquiry, the public would do well carefully to consider precisely what this means.

The *War Cry*, that is the General,¹ complains in a leading article (September 7), that the Army's critics 'calmly arraign us before a Court, find us guilty, pass sentence upon us, and, in almost the same breath, "demand an inquiry" into matters which are *sub judice*. . . .' This is hardly fair to the critics of Hanbury Street. We maintain that the facts in our possession warrant a certain conclusion, and for the present we appeal to the court of public opinion for want of any more competent tribunal. The Army, as it has a right to do, does precisely the

¹ 'All who read the *War Cry* will naturally conclude that whatever is published therein has the sanction of those in authority, and express (*sic*) the feelings and purposes of the General' (*Staff O. and R.*, p. 45).

same, in the hope that the matter will end there. But we go further. We do not profess to know everything about Hanbury Street, though we should like to. We think that the facts, as we know them, are such as to make it necessary that the public should know more. We therefore hold that an independent and competent inquiry into the whole administration should be instituted in order that the public should have the best possible opportunity of judging fairly between the Army and its critics. The Army's attitude is different. When it talks of matters being *sub judice* it apparently assumes that it is entitled to be its own judge. 'We hope', says the *War Cry* (leading article, September 28), 'we have now heard the last of these baseless charges'. We think it necessary to caution the public against mistaking the accused for the judge and their replies for the judgment. We are not prepared to accept as unprejudiced and final any investigations or inquiries instituted and conducted by Mr. Bramwell Booth, any more than we accept as conclusive the utterances of his subordinates which have prompted the General's hope just quoted from the *War Cry*. I do not see how the General and the chief of the staff can fail, on reflection, to recognize that the public, after all, have just as much reason for regarding the statements of the Army officials as partial and prejudiced, as the Army has for so regarding the statements of its critics, who, in this matter, have no self-interest whatsoever to serve. If the General and Mr. Bramwell Booth will turn to page 160 of Miss Friederichs' laudatory work, *The Romance of the Salvation Army* (1907), they will find in the chapter entitled 'The "Bottom Dog"', which is mainly an impressionist picture of the Hanbury Street 'elevator', the following passage:—

'The Army being an extremely busy institution, I suppose it would require some sort of qualification to gain access to its documents and to be made free of all the places where it performs its strange tasks, but the invitation, "Come and see us, just as we are; inquire into everything, and then judge us by results," is sincere, and well may the Salvation Army elect to stand or fall by this test.'

The critics of Hanbury Street ask for nothing more and nothing better, viz. an inquiry into everything, with free access to all necessary documents, but by persons possessing a different 'sort of qualification' from that which has hitherto been apparent in any published description of the institution, whether written by Army officials or—with one exception, presently to be mentioned—by independent journalists.

The Army's defence of Hanbury Street is to be found scattered throughout the press between August 26 and September 16, 1907, in the form of statements by, or interviews with, the officials already named. Similar, though lengthier, statements and interviews appeared in the *War Cry* and the *Social Gazette* of September 7, 14, 21, and 28. To any one not prepared to accept any and every Army official's statement as final on such a matter, the expedient of one official interviewing another official in the *War Cry* or the *Social Gazette* is, I fear, unlikely to commend itself as the most satisfactory method of disentangling the truth. Still, the dates are here given so that those wishing to read the official case in full may readily obtain the particular issues containing it. It is, on the whole, extremely well done: being liberally mingled with protestations of outraged virtue, and a fine show of honest indignation against the wickedness of the Army's critics, it would be strange if the *War Cry's* readers retained any very serious doubts. Some of the official statements have already been dealt with incidentally in this chapter. Only a few of the others, now to be examined, seem to have any bearing on the case of Hanbury Street as it is here presented.

The first official statement was that of Colonel Moss (August 25), who, although not in charge of Hanbury Street, evidently knew enough about it to characterize Mr. Stennett's statements as 'wild and whirling words' (*Morning Leader*, Interview, August 26). Asked, apparently, as to the wages paid, Colonel Moss said to a representative of the *Daily News* on the same day: 'I have not the facts

before me, but I want to point out that in our printing works I know we pay full trade union rates'. As Colonel Moss must have been well aware that the Army's printing works at St. Albans do not even profess to be an 'elevator' of the submerged, the application of his remark to Hanbury Street is difficult to see. He might as well have said that the Army paid the same price for its gas and water as other people. 'It is impossible,' he informed the *Morning Leader* representative, 'to pay trade union rates of wages to men who had never known or had forgotten how to perform the work of the trade.' No one, however, had suggested that Hanbury Street ought to pay its employés trade union rates if inefficient. The points at issue are the degree of their efficiency and the enormous margin between the trade union rate of 47s. 8d. a week (53½ hours) and the Army rate of 12s. or less, paid on the truck system. Colonel Moss does not say how many men who have never been carpenters are taken into Hanbury Street. The circumstances and evidence indicate that there are very few; indeed, I question whether there have ever been any at all. As to those admitted who may have forgotten how to do their work, there is better evidence than Colonel Moss' to show that they soon recover their memory. According to Colonel Jacobs, chief secretary of the 'social' work, the second and following days produce a considerable difference in men who are practically useless the first day, and 'even a week produces a remarkable effect on the "unemployable" and "unfit"' (*Social Gazette*, September 7). 'He will be all right presently', Miss Friederichs (*Ibid.*, p. 164) was informed by the staff officer regarding one old workman 'with trembling hands', who was stated to have been admitted on the day preceding her presumably recent visit of inspection, and who was stated to have done no work of that kind for twenty-four years. I understand that this man—whose hands, though capable enough, still tremble—was lately held up as an exemplar of industry and ability to some of the others who, the officer in charge thought, ought to

'slip into their work' better than they did. The Army, then, cannot have it both ways. If a few days produce the difference alleged, it is evident that men who have worked a few months or a few years cannot well be so worthless as the Army's scale of payment suggests. If, on the other hand, their labour is so worthless, it is difficult to understand what Colonel Jacobs can mean when he talks of 'the secret of the success' of Hanbury Street's mission.¹

Colonel Jacobs (*Daily Chronicle*, August 26) appears to be the author of the 'labour hospital' phrase. Enough has been said to show that that description would be tenable only on the supposition that the Army regards Hanbury Street as a hospital for incurables. This, however, it does not profess to do. 'We never pretend to pay the men wages in the ordinary sense,' says Colonel Jacobs, 'unless, of course, they rise to be foremen or regular employés'. He does not say, unfortunately, by what means the men may become regular employés, so as to receive wages in the ordinary sense. Evidently length of service alone does not make a man a regular employé, for nearly all the men appear to have been at Hanbury Street more than a year, many several years, and one about fourteen years, without receiving the advantages to which the description of 'regular employés' would seem to entitle them. Colonel Jacobs argues (*Morning Leader*, August 27) that, as many of the officials could command much more than their present salaries outside the Army, it is evident that they 'work for the love of their fellows'. One is impelled to assume that the fellows in question must be others than the inmates of Hanbury Street. Colonel Jacobs describes the comparison of the outside builder's prices with those marked on the Army's work-tabs as being 'totally misleading', because the Army price is that 'paid merely for putting to-

¹ The *Salvation Army Year Book* (1908) contains the following testimony to the efficiency of the inmates of Hanbury Street: 'The majority are accomplished hands, and are able to do any kind of work carried on in these trades'—viz. carpentry, joinery, and painting (p. 43).

gether the various pieces of wood after they have been prepared'. Colonel Jacobs is, I believe, seriously in error here. If he will consult the Hanbury Street tabs he will find that they usually instruct the men to 'make' the articles. The process of 'making' at Hanbury Street is precisely the same as in any other workshop, with one important difference: the Army hands have usually to do the preliminary work of 'setting-out' for themselves. In other shops the setting-out would be done for them, and they would merely have to 'make', 'put together', or 'finish'—Colonel Jacobs may call it what he likes—the article after the parts come from the machine. The builder's prices with which the Army's are here compared are based upon the assumption that the setting-out is done for the men, that the machinery is up to date, and that the machine hands are competent. His prices also are for smart workmen. These considerations, therefore, merely increase the discrepancy on paper between the two sets of prices, and render unconvincing Colonel Jacobs' statement about the 'putting together'.¹

In the course of an 'audience' vouchsafed by Colonel Jacobs, a representative of the *Westminster Gazette* (August 29) elicited the statement that, although new men, whose labour is 'practically valueless', receive only a small sum weekly, 'when a workman becomes experienced we put him on piecework', each case being specially considered as regards remuneration. It has, I think, been shown that whatever consideration is accorded to the

¹ Colonel Jacobs (*Social Gazette*, September 7), describes the prices for labour given on the tabs as 'imaginary'. Referring to a comparison of the tab price of 30s. with a builder's estimate of £5 5s. for making a certain lot of seats, he states that 'we should pay for labour alone between £5 and £6, the Army's charge for the seats being 'about £14'. This would be, in fact, about the right proportion between cost of labour and selling price. There are two difficulties about accepting Colonel Jacobs' figures. They contain enough margin for a very satisfactory profit—which Hanbury Street does not make. They also suggest, on a turnover of £14,675, a wages bill of at least £6,000, which would give the men an average wage of £60 to £90 a year, according to the number employed. Colonel Jacobs must admit, on reflection, that Hanbury Street is very far from professing to do that.

work under the piece system does not make very much difference to the men—not by any means so much as the Colonel's statement would seem to suggest. As to any possibility of Hanbury Street underselling, Colonel Jacobs says that idea is disposed of by the fact that the joinery works have recently failed to secure several large contracts for other departments of the Salvation Army, such as the fitting of the new emigration offices in Queen Victoria Street, and that of the alterations at the Spa Road waste-paper sorting 'elevator'. The conclusion which we are asked to draw from this fact is less reasonable than it looks. General Booth's occasional inability to accept his own estimates may very well depend upon other elements and conditions than that of price, so that without knowing all the circumstances of such cases it seems advisable to suspend one's judgment regarding their actual significance. Despite the loss of these domestic contracts Hanbury Street appears to be always tolerably busy, although 'nearly all' its work, according to Commissioner Nicol, 'is done in keen competition with others'.

Commissioner Sturgess, the governor of the City Colony, described Hanbury Street on his return to town (*Daily News*, August 30) as a 'harbour of refuge for the poor shipwrecked fellows whom nobody else will look at'. The rescuers of shipwrecked mariners have often found them extremely useful. Those who complain of their lot, the Commissioner says, are the 'black sheep', of whom there are some, as in every flock. He only wishes the prices quoted were correct. If they were, he would 'soon be full of orders', and be delivered from 'the miserable want of funds from which we always suffer'. This can only mean, apparently, that if the prices quoted from the Army's tabs were correct, the Commissioner would be able and willing to sell the products cheaper than he now does—in other words, without regard to what other officials have called 'the regular trade prices'. Commissioner Sturgess, it will be noted, does not yet, like Commissioner

Nicol a week later, see anything in a large deficit to be thankful for.

Commissioner Nicol, the author of the useful 'industrial asylum' simile, is, apparently, prepared to admit that the skilled workman of Hanbury Street may earn, in time, more than he receives (*Daily Chronicle*, September 6). This is an important admission, though the Commissioner refrains from stating just how much more. The justification he offers is interesting. 'The surplus,' he says, 'goes to assist the man by his side who is a loss to us.' This, then, must be the explanation of the elusive balance. This is the reason why my friend Brown, after years of skilled labour, is not yet a 'regular employé', does not yet receive more than 2s. or 2s. 6d. a week—with four weeks' involuntary deductions for Self-Denial—and is still 'unelevated'. He has been helping to elevate the others! But the others, if the Army's own pretensions are justified, do not remain a loss very long. Yet they too remain in Hanbury Street. If they did not, they could not well be a burden on it. Commissioner Nicol's ingenious explanation of Brown's case merely lands him, and us, in a dilemma. The only solution would seem to be that the others, when they cease to be a loss, start helping to elevate Brown.

Commissioner Nicol has yet another curious reason for the Army's scale and system of payment. 'It is not wages,' he says (*Star*, September 16), 'that these men are most in need of. Some would even be better without a sixpence, until such time as they are morally strong enough to spend it outside an aleshop. They need, in a word, remaking, etc.' He fears that this may sound 'serious' in some people's ears. It seems to me about as serious a reflection on the elevating influence of the Salvation Army as any enemy has ever penned. It is surely a little rash to assume how a man will spend the value of his labour if there is no possibility of his ever getting it. If he were given it, the Army would be able to deal just as effectually with drunkenness as it does now. The present system of all work, little pay, and nothing that can fairly be called recreation—

for the obligatory religious services of Quaker Street cannot be so described—seems not unsuited for driving any men so inclined to the numerous aleshops amidst which the 'elevator' is situated. The converted drunkards, I understand, are not all teetotalers. If the unconverted were really drunkards they would not be allowed to stop long at Hanbury Street. Even Commissioner Nicol admits that the men, on entering, 'do not all come under that classification', and here I agree with him, although it appears easy for them to be brought under the classification afterwards. The suggestion that the Army is morally entitled to deprive even potential drunkards, whom it has been elevating for years, of a large proportion of the value of their labour because, like the rest of us, they are still potential drunkards, is surely an amazing revelation of Salvationist ethics.

The foregoing examination covers all the official replies which appear to have any pertinence. Certain cases cited in the Army's newspapers, of men whom Hanbury Street claims to have elevated by finding them outside situations, are not here examined. For the present such cases must be taken on trust. Their number, nature, and the precise part played by the Army in their elevation, might fitly enough call for consideration in a public inquiry. Certain cases of men who have left without being elevated will also be available for comparison. It is with the conditions affecting the men in Hanbury Street, not outside, that we are concerned. Men who are capable of finding outside work of the same kind 'at trade union rates' (General Booth, April 11, 1908) after working in the 'elevator', must surely have been worth a good deal more than 10s., 12s., or even 14s. a week to the establishment nearly all the time they were in it. It cannot well be these 'successes' who cause the loss of which Commissioner Nicol speaks; it cannot be for their sake that the skilled workman who 'earns more than he receives' is, according to the same gentleman, made to suffer.

So far as I have discovered, only one editorial defence of Hanbury Street

has appeared in the London daily press. The *Tribune* appears to have been quite convinced, at any rate upon some points, by Commissioner Nicol's reply. In the same issue which contains the *Tribune* (September 7) virtually repeats in its leading columns some of the Commissioner's statements, characterizing them as 'decisive'. In support, apparently, of the Army's denial respecting underselling its products a curious suggestion is put forward. 'Presumably,' says the *Tribune*, 'they have a good deal of these products left upon their hands as a dead loss.' I should think this extremely unlikely, but if I am wrong it would be interesting to learn what the *Tribune* imagines ultimately becomes of these products. How are they got rid of? It is not suggested that the Army gives them away, nor is it at all probable. It is equally unlikely that the submerged are employed in destroying them. Hanbury Street, whatever it may be, is not a store for useless lumber. The one resource seems to be to sell the *Tribune's* presumably unsaleable products. In that case there would seem to be some-

thing about them to make it difficult for the Army to obtain 'the regular trade prices' for them. I do not know whether the *Tribune* would regard their sale at lower prices as underselling, and perhaps it is not. In any case the unfortunate products would be no longer on the Army's hands. As for the alleged dead loss upon them, that can hardly be admitted unless the cost of the labour in them is proved to be enormous, either because of high wages paid, or of a very serious and disproportionate inefficiency in the work at low wages. On either of these grounds a high cost of labour must be rejected as inconsistent with the facts. The *Tribune's* dilemma is scarcely less puzzling than that of Commissioner Nicol.

As the Army officials have most strenuously and indignantly denied that Hanbury Street undersells its products, and as they have refrained from specifying the prices at which the establishment is prepared to supply its principal manufactured articles, I propose to remedy this omission by reproducing here the official selling price-card:—

Hanbury St. Joinery Works,

159-161, Hanbury Street, Whitechapel, E.

Telephone—No. 1063 London Wall.

CHEAP JOINERY AT THE FOLLOWING PRICES—

1½-in. Sashes and Frames ..	5½d. per ft. super, 15-ft. minimum.	
1½-in. " " " " ..	6d. " " " "	
2-in. " " " " ..	6½d. " " " "	
	Oak Sill and Brass Face Pullies, 1d. per ft. extra.	
	2d. extra for every cut Bar over one.	
6-ft. 6-in. by 2-ft. 6-in. by 1½-in. 4-panel Doors ..		from 7s.
Dressers, 3-ft. by 1-ft. 6-in. ..	18s. each.	
" 4-ft. by 1-ft. 6-in. ..	21s. "	
" 5-ft. by 1-ft. 6-in. ..	25s. "	

ESTIMATES GIVEN FOR STAIRS AND SPECIAL JOINERY From Plans and Specifications.

SPECIAL SEATS FOR CHURCHES AND MISSION HALLS.

Shopfitting a Speciality. → → Repairs promptly attended to.

CONTRACTORS FOR IRON AND WOOD BUILDINGS OF ALL CLASSES.

¹ In a lengthy interview with Mr. W. T. Stead (*Daily Chronicle*, April 14, 1908), General Booth emphatically repeated these denials. Mr. Stead, on his own account, hazarded the opinion that it is 'stark, staring lunacy' to expect that the men should be paid otherwise than they are paid at present—that is, as grossly incompetent workmen instead of 'accomplished hands'. It would appear that both General Booth and his collaborator

in the 'Social' Scheme have lately lost touch with its development. From the *Daily Chronicle's* refusal to admit a letter (readily published, however, elsewhere) which would have enabled General Booth to compare his own selling prices with those of other competitive master builders, it would seem that that journal appreciates the importance of certain labour problems rather less than might reasonably have been expected.

For the purpose of comparison I have inquired of several builders whether they could supply me with the same articles at these prices for cash and for quantities. I fear they all think me an unconscionably 'keen' buyer. The prices in the second column beneath are those which one firm, the cheapest of those who have estimated, asks and obtains for similar goods:—

	Army Price.			Builder's Price.*		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Sashes and Frames—						
1½ in. per ft.	0	0	5½	0	0	7½
1¼ in. "	0	0	6	0	0	8
2 in. "	0	0	6½	0	0	8½
4-panel doors	0	7	0	0	9	3
Dressers—						
3 ft. by 1 ft. 6 in.	0	18	0	1	10	0
4 ft. " " "	1	1	0	1	19	4
5 ft. " " "	1	5	0	2	10	4

* Subject to 2½ per cent. discount at 1 month.

Apparently my suggestion that the Army uses the word 'underselling' in an unusual sense is not without foundation.

In making his demand for a public inquiry Mr. Stennett based it upon the ground that the Army is 'continuously appealing to the charitable public for funds to carry on its various concerns', of which Hanbury Street is one.¹ Surely no ground could be more reasonable. Commissioner Nicol, however, succeeds in educing from the statement this triumphant conclusion: 'It is the Salvation Army he detests' (*Star*, September 16). The man who does not love the Army, he tell us, 'rules himself entirely out of court' in regard to the particular question of Hanbury Street. Affection for the works of Salvationism is, I am aware, a respectable and even useful quality. Commissioner Nicol, who legitimately boasts of knowing Fleet Street from one end to the other, has played no small part in helping to make that quality popular. I should be the last to deny that it is easy to love the Army, and an extremely difficult business to learn enough about it to detest it. Hanbury Street is a case in point. As recently as January,

¹ Carpentry is also carried on in certain of the Army's provincial 'elevators', e.g. in Bradford.

1907, a large number of daily and weekly newspapers, secular and religious, were invited to pay a visit of inspection to these joinery works. Their representatives paid the visit, personally conducted by the Army officials, and for some time afterwards laudatory descriptions of the institution appeared throughout the press.* I do not suggest that the result could well have been otherwise, in view of the necessarily casual and superficial nature of such visits. If the journalists were invited to 'inquire into every thing', the fact remains that few of them appear to have inquired into anything of very much account. I fancy that even journalists, in dealing with the Army, are made somehow to feel that certain questions on certain matters cannot but be regarded as savouring of ungracious scepticism, and cannot but render suspect their love of Salvationism, which, according to Commissioner Nicol, is so essential to the accuracy and impartiality of their judgment. In any case, the representative of the *Times* appears, on this occasion, to have been the only one who came at all near risking that gentleman's displeasure. The principal passages from his report (January 24, 1907) were as follows:—

'. . . A good deal of hand work was being done also, and in this connexion it was plain that the vast majority of the men handled their tools with the familiarity engendered of long use. . . . Asked what was the average duration of a man's stay, the officer in charge frankly replied about four years; to quiet inquiries what the men earned different officers gave, doubtless in the most absolute good faith, answers varying from "it is all piecework," "food and lodging and a few coppers," to "food and lodging and a few shillings a week". The officers, in truth, are religious and philanthropic zealots, who perhaps hardly appreciate one's reasons for asking such questions, but the reasons are fairly plain to the outside world.'

² Presumably it is not often that such journals as the *Methodist Recorder*, the *Methodist Times*, the *Sunday School Chronicle*, and the *Freethinker* find themselves in such perfect accord as was the case in their reviews of the first edition of this work. Mr. Cohen, in the last-named journal, has accurately and admirably summarized this aspect of the Army's relations with the Press: 'The officials tell the newspaper man, the newspaper man tells the public, the public reads it as evidence of what the Army is doing, and finally it is reprinted by the Army itself as journalistic testimony to the value of its work.'

These reasons will, I trust, be plainer now. If the outside world are satisfied that the 'social' and economic operation of Hanbury Street is reconcilable with any religious or philanthropic zeal worthy of the name, they are at liberty to go on making good its deficits by means of their contributions to the Salvation Army. If they entertain any doubts, the issues are evidently sufficiently serious to make it their duty to insist that they shall be probed independently to the bottom. 'The temper of religious enthusiasm', said the *Spectator* (October 6, 1906) alluding to certain portions of this book, 'does require to be controlled when dealing with more mundane concerns.' I suggest that Hanbury Street is one of these, and that for such control, in the conduct of religious and philanthropic business enterprises, even Salvationist good faith and zealotry are singularly inadequate substitutes.

CHAPTER X

OTHER 'SOCIAL' PROMISES AND PERFORMANCES

THE Army's extraordinary confusion of mind in regard to such things as the relative importance of its religious and its 'social' devices, the particular class of people with whom it is its proper function to deal, the advisability of paying wages or not paying wages, and the conflicting claims of society on the one hand and of the 'social' institutions on the other, is unfortunately encountered in other departments of its activity.

The effectual treatment and cure of drunkenness among the masses was the purpose of one department of the Darkest England Scheme. Inebriate homes, somewhat on the lines of the Dalrymple Homes, were to be established, but on financial principles suited to the pockets of the very poor.

'We propose', wrote General Booth in 1890, 'to establish Homes which will contemplate the deliverance, not of ones and twos, but of multitudes, and which will be accessible to the poor, or to persons of any class choosing to use them. . . . A charge of 10s. per week would be made. This could be remitted when there was no ability to pay it' (*In Darkest England*, p. 186).

This project 'to practically assist the half-million slaves of the cup' would,

it was calculated, maintain itself when realized (p. 247). It has, apparently, succeeded in doing so, for the solitary men inebriates' Home run by the Army in this country managed in 1904 to make a profit of 13s. 4½d., the receipts on account of admission charges and work done by the inmates amounting to £1,564.¹ But on what principle is this Home actually conducted? 'Inebriates are taken in here', says Mr. Rider Haggard in his Report, 'at a charge of from twenty-five to thirty shillings per week.' As the Home is licensed for only twenty inmates it is evident that the deliverance of the half-million slaves of the cup is still seriously under contemplation.

Mr. Rider Haggard, on the occasion of his recent visit to Hadleigh, was informed that 'three years have passed since a drunk and disorderly case against any colonist was brought before a Magistrate', and he expresses the opinion that 'this immunity from crime doubtless arises from the kind but strict discipline practised in the colony, the moral tone which has grown up there, and from the circumstance that temperance is enforced'. He, however, adds: 'If by chance a man is found to be drunk he is warned, and should he repeat his offence he is sent off the place. There is practically no need for any other punishment.' Under this system it is not only the need, but the very possibility, of any other punishment that is excluded. If men who offend twice in this way are turned out into the world it is not easy for the colony can ever come before any magistrate. Be this as it may, the fact remains that the Army, with its inebriates' Home on the colony, does turn such cases out, thereby frankly admitting its inability to deal with them, for the prohibitive scale of charges attached to the institution naturally renders all attempts to induce such men to consent to enter it entirely out of the question.

An examination of the remaining departments of General Booth's 'social' work also reveals either a serious mis-

¹ In 1905, 1906, and 1907 there was a deficit of £134, £662 and £252 respectively, the receipts being £1,040, £818, and £1,328.

calculation of financial and other possibilities or a still more serious departure from the letter and spirit of the Darkest England Scheme as originally outlined by him and approved by the public. Ex-criminal work, ex-criminal homes and prison gates brigades occupied a distinctly prominent place in the scheme (pp. 173-179). In view of the peculiar regenerative power claimed for the Army's methods, it would be reasonable to expect a fair share of its 'social' resources to be devoted to this large and important field. Since 1890 the income of the Darkest England Scheme has largely increased year by year. It appears significant, however, that the annual grant from that fund to the ex-criminal work was in the four years, 1903 to 1906, £1,500, £750, £500, and £400 respectively. The utilization of £400 out of a total 'social' income of £56,000 does not seem to indicate special enthusiasm for, or special success in, a work so eminently suited to the Army's reputed qualifications.¹

The British Self-Denial appeal for 1905 stated that the Army had seventeen homes for ex-criminals. A few months before, however, it had only one such home in Great Britain. There is, in fact, a serious confusion of mind apparent in the official statements about the prison work. Since the first edition of this book appeared the old ex-criminal enthusiasm of 1890 has been revived. On January 5, 1907, a moving appeal by Mr. Bramwell Booth and Brigadier Playle appeared in the *Daily News*. Money, it appeared, was urgently required to establish homes for ex-criminals 'in Birmingham, Newcastle, Cardiff, and other important towns'. No allusion was made to the fact that the solitary British ex-criminal home, to which I have alluded, had recently been abandoned. That abandonment, it should be noted, was attributable to the discovery, after some twenty years' experiment in this kind of work, that ex-criminal homes are, in some serious

degree, a mistake. Mrs. Annie S. Swan, who wrote General Booth's 'social' Report for 1905 (*The Outsiders; Being a Sketch of the Social Work of the S.A.*), explains that 'the Army has ceased to set him [the criminal] apart either in their Homes or in their work', in order that the criminal 'label' shall be removed. The report for 1906 (*Sketches of the S.A. Social Work*, by various independent writers) contains a tabular summary of the 'social' operations throughout the world, indicating that there is, in fact, no ex-criminal home in Great Britain. Elsewhere in the Report it is explained that 'all our industrial Homes and labour factories are available for the reception and employment of prisoners upon their discharge'. It is unnecessary to discuss here this new policy of mixing criminals with the much more numerous non-criminal inmates of these 'elevators', but merely to indicate the Army's tardy discovery of its advantages. What is curious is that the very Report (Christmas, 1906) which admits that there is no ex-criminal home in Great Britain should include among the objects of its British financial appeal 'Homes for ex-criminals', and that under this same heading in the *Salvation Army Year Book* for 1907 should appear this statement: 'A number of these Homes are in existence in this and other countries'.

The appeal of January 5, 1907, is meaningless unless it is for the purpose of establishing distinctive ex-criminal homes. There is no allusion to the 'elevators'—the ordinary industrial homes and labour factories—stated only a few weeks previously to be available for ex-prisoners. The Army has three of these industrial homes in London, and seven in the provinces, five of the latter being in 'important towns'. Of labour factories there are four in London, and seven in the provinces, Birmingham being one of the cities supplied. If, as Brigadier Playle confidently asserts, the criminal 'is merely waiting to be instructed' and 'would cease his life of crime were the opportunity afforded him of earning an honest livelihood', it is evident that the Army is already tolerably well provided with the necessary means

¹ The amount spent on 'meeting discharged prisoners, etc.', during the five years 1903 to 1907 declined as follows: £597, £472, £291, £316, £263.

for this end throughout the country.¹ Nor should the work prove expensive, unless Brigadier Playle is over-sanguine. It may possibly be urged that the existing institutions, though theoretically 'available', are really inadequate to satisfy the Army's reforming zeal in this department because the 'elevators' are nearly always full. If so, this would indicate a decided tendency to transform their inmates—when satisfactory and willing to remain—into employés or fixtures, which is precisely what they were never intended to be, whether criminals or not.

The volume of the ex-criminal work furnishes an example of the general tendency on the Army's part to abandon its professed functions as a reformatory influence, and to find its work in the higher strata of society rather than in the depths. It has a great many different irons in the fire, and their relative importance in its own eyes appears to vary from time to time in the most erratic fashion. In these days of specialization this is particularly objectionable. It is highly desirable that an important philanthropic organization should display a reasonable degree of certainty, coherence, and frankness in its statements regarding the institutions it possesses and the reformatory methods pursued in them. These qualities are evidently difficult to trace in the Army's official references to its prison work. After all, it is not the only agency that aims at the reformation of criminals. Its operations in this department are certainly not the largest; their intelligence and success evidently stand in need of demonstration. In view of General Booth's repeatedly expressed desire to take over the prison system of the country—as well as the work-houses and asylums—one can but trust that the not very impressive or

precise annual statistics² at present published are less illusory than those relating to some of the more extensive and more costly departments of the Army's spiritual and 'social' activity.

It is pleasant to be able to encounter something like openness and business-like methods in the accounts and reports of at least one department of the Army's 'social' work. The reports and statements of income and expenditure relating to the women's work furnished separately each year by Mrs. Bramwell Booth (1906—*Lifted Up*) leave little to be desired in respect of detail, and if all the other departments of the Army had but taken her excellent example to heart the public would long ago have been in a position to know, with something approaching precision, their financial relations towards it. In these accounts the salaries paid to the officials attached to each institution are clearly shown, but an improvement could here be effected by indicating also the number of officers forming the staff of each establishment. It is very curious, in view of the active sympathy of the public with rescue and preventive homes and of the prominence given to them in General Booth's scheme (pp. 188-193), to find that no portion of the £298,000 figuring in 1906 as the assets of the Darkest England Scheme represents either freehold or leasehold property used in the women's 'social' work. The only capital sunk in this department is to be found in the furniture and fittings. The lack of freehold and leasehold property has, however, one advantage: the women's 'social' work has not yet become, like the Army's other religious and 'social' departments, a field for 'perfectly

¹ Miss Friederichs (*The Romance of the Salvation Army*) writes impressively, in her chapter entitled 'The Bottom Dog,' of the murderers and other 'life men' who have been entrusted to the Army's care by the Home Office, and who were inmates of a certain 'elevator', easy to recognize, when she visited it. The officials do not appear to have informed Miss Friederichs that some of these 'life men' find the 'elevator' intolerable, not because of the work (see Chapter ix), and are taken back to prison at their own request by the warders.

² Number of ex-criminals received into Homes, 249; number of ex-criminals assisted, restored to friends, sent to situations, etc., 241' (*Selected Papers on the Social Work of the Salvation Army*, 1907). The reports and statistics of the Royal Society for the Assistance of Discharged Prisoners and the Metropolitan Prisoners' Aid Society may be profitably compared. Both societies deal with a much larger number of prisoners, and their reports, eschewing the popular qualities of sentiment and colour which pervade the Army's literature, have the merit of being very much more precise regarding the details of the work done.

safe' investments on mortgage or loan at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. All the institutions, therefore, appear to pay rent, but, fortunately, not to the Army itself.

Mrs. Bramwell Booth, it appears, is not precisely at one with General Booth in his belief in the virtue of rent as a spiritual and 'social' spur, for we read in one of her Reports that it is her 'earnest desire to acquire some of the freeholds [of the homes] as Salvation Army property, and thus reduce the number of heavy rentals'. Mrs. Bramwell Booth is doubtless much too deeply engrossed in her noble and self-sacrificing efforts to raise her unfortunate sisters ever to have thought of inquiring of the Chairman of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., the Chairman of the Salvation Army Assurance Society, Ltd., or the Chief of the Staff of the Army itself, the peculiar advantages inherent in the acquisition of freeholds for the Salvation Army, otherwise she would assuredly know that freedom from rent is not usually one of them. In the interests of her work Mrs. Booth would be well advised in avoiding the acquisition of freeholds and in resigning herself to pay the existing rents. It is not she who can decide whether a building is to be mortgaged and made to pay rent to the Army or not, but the General of the Salvation Army, having regard to the peculiar financial exigencies affecting his trinity of functions as banker, life assurance contractor, and spiritual and 'social' redeemer of the submerged.

The women's work was estimated to require constant support from the public, and the annual amount at present required from external sources to keep the operations going is some £14,000. In the industrial, inebriate, and maternity homes a payment is expected from, or on account of, applicants. In all the institutions payment is taken, wherever possible, from the inmates for their board and lodging, and the proceeds of their work also forms a large proportion of the income. Thus, in the London homes alone (1906), board and lodging brought in £1,406 and 'girls' work and trading' £3,151. In spite of donations and collections amounting to nearly £1,196 there is a deficit on the

year's working of nearly £933. The work is clearly costly to every one concerned, and it is, unfortunately, a class of work in which it is somewhat difficult to estimate the measure of success. The proportion of acknowledged re-admissions in the rescue homes is about one in seven, the number of new cases in 1906 being 1,808 and of re-admissions 305. Of the new cases 272, or over one-seventh, are classified as unsatisfactory. About a thousand girls were sent into domestic service. These girls are called 'service girls,' and it is the duty of the Army officers to keep in touch with them as far as possible after their discharge. The actual number of such service girls is not given, although the number of personal interviews with them throughout the year is given as 65,014. This imposing statistical method is a favourite one with the Army. It would be more satisfactory to learn the number of individuals with whom these interviews took place. The number of 'visits made to service girls in service' is similarly set down as 7,864, from which it would appear that the great majority of these girls are otherwise occupied than in service. The number of 'letters written to service girls' is given as 14,245, while those received from them number only 8,401. This appears to indicate a decided tendency on their part to sever themselves from the influences of the Army. The number of service girls 'lost sight of and found again' is given as 277, but the much more important figure of those lost sight of and not found again is not given. It would appear, therefore, that a very large deduction must be made from the number of cases regarded as satisfactory by the Army. Moreover, as there are a number of homes, it cannot always be possible to recognize cases of re-admission, owing to the migration of inmates from one home to another, so that the re-admissions will probably be in reality very much more numerous, and the new cases proportionately less numerous, than the statistics actually indicate.

If only 50 per cent. of the satisfactory cases are permanently rehabilitated, it is clear that many thousands of

women must be under the greatest possible obligation towards this particular branch of the Army's work. It might, then, be reasonably expected that their gratitude would prompt them in after life to contribute at least a few pence a week in aid of the Army's rescue Homes. If this were done several thousand pounds of income might well be looked for from this source alone, whereas the actual contribution from service girls is only about £600, and this payment appears to be almost entirely by way of recouping the Army for the cost of the girls' maintenance over and above the estimated worth of their work during the process of their rescue. The system by which 'each rescued girl is encouraged to pay' this cost after her restoration to society is open to rather serious objection, whilst it may serve to inflate the statistics of personal interviews and unanswered letters. The purely voluntary principle would be more satisfactory both from the financial and every other point of view, for provided the cases of rehabilitation are genuine no further encouragement should be necessary.

The place occupied by the religious doctrines of the Army in its 'social' work, and the applicability of those doctrines to the various classes of people with which it seeks to deal, will be considered later. Here it need only be said that their applicability is ordinarily in direct ratio to the lack of general intelligence in the individual. The associations of the principal class of persons dealt with by this department of the women's 'social' work tend, for a time at least, to extend and sharpen the intelligence in many directions rather than otherwise. Acceptance of the Army's doctrines, however, is in this department admitted to be the factor upon which alone 'reliance for permanent results' can be placed. It follows, therefore, that an enormous portion of the total financial effort of the women's 'social' section must be expended in the futile task of implanting a particular seed in soil unfitted by nature and circumstances profitably to receive it.¹

¹ Mr. Thomas Holmes, the well-known police court missionary, and now secretary of the

Certain matters deserving consideration in connexion with the women's work will naturally suggest themselves to readers of this book. This section, like the men's, employs its protégées largely in industry and trading. If the Army gives a skilled workman half-a-crown or less for a week's work, what is it likely to give an unskilled and unfortunate woman? Is the reward of virtue enough to convince her that she did well to abandon the streets? The origin of this particular evil is largely economic, and the causes which produce it are unlikely to be lessened by underpayment of the Army's women workers on the one hand, and, on the other, by competition with the outside trade in disposing of their products.

The descriptions of the women's work published by the Army and others are usually overcharged with a spirit of tenderness and disinterested devotion which is not always discernible in the work itself. The women's shelters are ostensibly for the 'homeless,' but the homeless who are unable to pay are not admitted. In 1906 the receipts of the London food and shelter work were £1,227 and the expenditure £1,377. The deficit of £150 doubtless justifies the inclusion of these institutions in appeals to the charitable. Women who are regular inmates, and who may chance to have had an unlucky day in the casual work which most of them do, generally encounter the same closed door which faces the penniless stranger. The homeless Army woman boarder in this plight must either beg, go to the casual ward, or walk the streets. Many of them do the last. In spite of the spiritual encouragement which the Army shelter throws in, it is not easy to see how this kind of thing can conduce to virtue. In any case, the shelter business might very well, without hardship to any one, be so adjusted as to do away with the small but persuasive deficits which make possible its appeal to the philan-

Howard Association, has suggested, for reasons given (*Daily Graphic*, September 7, 1906), that the author has written too favourably of the women's work. This is quite possible. Any approval expressed in the preceding pages, however, was intended to apply particularly to the presentment of the accounts.

thropic. A number of distinguished people recently dined at Cannon Street Hotel (November 18, 1907) in aid of the women's 'social' work. Whether they have taken more trouble or less than the author in arriving at their favourable and laudatory conclusions he does not, of course, know. Their experience, at least, has differed from his, for they have evidently never been led to ask themselves seriously, as he has been, whether the lofty aims of the women's work are not liable to be materially thwarted by the Army's business instincts.

In addition to those departments of its 'social' activity already discussed the Army has yet other departments, the work of which, as it is not obviously spiritual, must be presumed to be 'social' also. The Lost and Found Department exists for the purpose of finding missing friends. In 1907 there were 2,656 applications for lost persons, and 517 lost persons were found. Any poor person in search of a missing relative would find on application that although it is part of a great institution to which the public contribute for the aid of the poor, the department has a separate business basis of its own. Unless the preliminary and any further fees requisite are forthcoming the missing friends of the poor must remain missing, as far as the Army is concerned. There is also the Intelligence Department, whose somewhat multifarious functions are set forth in the following advertisement taken from the *War Cry* :—

Intelligence Department

Will procure information upon all matters referring to the respectability of persons, houses, situations, etc.; will make searches for Wills, Patents, Certificates of Births, Marriages, Deaths, etc.; and advise in Divorce and Breach of Promise cases, Probate, Legacy, Property, Businesses for Sale, and Investments; will undertake Detective cases of certain kinds, and other confidential matters.

Communications should be addressed—Major—, Intelligence Department, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

Evidently the human affairs that cannot profitably be brought within the Army's sphere are few. The spiritual profit that accrues from the search for wills and patents, etc., cannot be great, but the Intelligence Department is probably not unduly spiritual. On what principles its advice in regard to

divorce and breach of promise may be based it is not easy to say, but one can at least conjecture with some assurance the direction in which its counsel to testators and investors would be likely to incline. In *Twofold Investments* some effort is made to convince testators that a bequest to the Army really possesses something of the nature of an investment, but sufficient evidence has been adduced to show that the interest-bearing form of that operation is that generally preferred by the Army's clients. Possibly the personal influence of the Intelligence Department may succeed where the written word fails. As for the intending investor, inasmuch as nothing can well be safer than that which is 'perfectly safe', the Intelligence Department can recommend him to put his money in the 'twofold' business of the Army with a clear conscience. Where precisely the Intelligence Department draws the line in regard to the detective cases which it is willing to undertake it would be interesting to know. It is so far satisfactory to feel that, at present, there is a line.

Perhaps the most instructive example of the Army's periodical need for a new sensation is to be found in the Anti-suicide Bureau, which was inaugurated on January 1, 1907, and was for several weeks freely and widely 'boomed' by a considerable section of the press. The statistics of this department seem to require actuarial, if not auditorial, scrutiny. At the end of the first week the 'results' of the cases then dealt with were officially given as follows :—

Non-suicide cases	12
Doubtful cases	5
Lives saved	194

As the 'provincial crusade' of the department had not then begun, it may fairly be presumed that all but a few of these 194 lives were 'saved' in London. The last Summary of the Registrar-General, however, indicates that only 537 suicides took place in London during the twelve months of 1906. General Booth's London Bureau seemed at the outset, therefore, to be in a fair way to 'save' in the course of the year at least ten times as many

lives as have hitherto been lost by suicide.

The following statistics of suicide in England and Wales are taken from the report of an interview with General Booth on the subject of his Anti-suicide Bureau, published by the *Daily Telegraph* a few days after its initiation:—

	SUICIDE IN ENGLAND AND WALES.	
	Women.	Men.
1890	570	1635
1891	620	1863
1892	676	1907
1893	659	1940
1894	677	2052
1895	726	2071
1896	677	1979
1897	702	2090
1898	711	2166
1899	723	2121
1900	730	2166
1901	803	2318
1902	807	2460
1903	871	2640
1904	822	2523

This appears to have been the painful record that convinced General Booth of the clamant need for his anti-suicide campaign. The period covered happens to be precisely that covered by the Darkest England ('Social') Scheme, which promised to do so much for the unfortunate, the despairing, and the desperate classes which, to no small extent, serve to produce suicides. In view of its pretensions, and the enormous amount of money sunk in it, one might reasonably have expected the scheme to react favourably upon the suicide death-rate, at least to the extent of preventing an increase. Unfortunately, the suicides have increased with the multiplication of the 'social' institutions. The increase, of course, has not necessarily been because of them. It is evident, however, that even the immediate ministrations of these institutions are not an absolute preventive of suicide. Within a few weeks of the establishment of the Bureau an inmate of the Hadleigh Colony was reported to have committed suicide, while almost simultaneously an inmate of one of the other 'social' institutions in London nearly succeeded in doing the same. Such occurrences do not, of course, obtain the journalistic publicity given to the facile 'successes' of the Anti-

suicide Bureau, pledged, though it is, to inviolable secrecy.

'Up to the time of going to press', said the *Social Gazette* of January 19, 1907, 'it is estimated that about 250 lives have been saved through the Bureau's agency!' (The note of exclamation, though appropriate, is not the author's.) This figure represented a fortnight's work for the whole country. The periodical publication of the statistics of 'lives saved' does not appear to have been continued after the collection of the annual Self-Denial Fund in the month of March. It is, however, abundantly clear that the Bureau's statistical methods are seriously misleading, and that no diminution in the evil it sought to allay can possibly be attributed to its operations. The Registrar-General's returns of suicides in England and Wales for 1907 are not yet available, but those for London during the four quarters of 1906 and 1907 are as follows:—

	DEATHS FROM SUICIDE IN LONDON.			
	Quarter ending			
	March.	June.	September.	December.
1906	116	158	139	124
1907	100	153	135	121

Obviously the decrease of 28 suicides in the twelve months cannot reasonably be attributed to an influence which, even in its early stages of organization, claimed to be capable of 'saving' 194 lives in a week and 250 in a fortnight. The explanation of the decrease must be sought in general causes. The statistics of the Registrar-General indicate a much greater decrease in the number of London suicides in certain years before the Anti-suicide Bureau was established:—

DEATHS FROM SUICIDE IN LONDON.	
1895	482
1896	426
1897	443
1898	437
1899	485
1900	451
1901	502
1902	535
1903	568
1904	517
1905	513
1906	537
1907	509

In 1896 there was a decrease of 56, and in 1904 a decrease of 51, compared

with the preceding year, so that there is nothing at all abnormal in the much slighter falling-off indicated by the 1907 figures.

A few months after the Bureau was founded with the indispensable journalistic *fanfare* we find the still small voice of an apparently disillusioned East End coroner thus mournfully alluding to it at an inquest: 'I cannot say that I have found any diminution of suicide in consequence'. The Army is happy in being free from the necessity of proving any diminution in the evils which it professes to be so successful in curing. Moreover, to bring about their diminution in the public mind might be impolitic from financial considerations. The arrangement is admirably adapted to enable General Booth to pass easily from failure to failure while appearing to go from strength to strength. Neither the observations of coroners nor the returns of the Registrar-General need trouble the man who can convince the public of a Salvation Army officer's ability to distinguish between a 'doubtful' and a certain case of problematical suicide, and to 'save' 250 lives in the latter category within a fortnight by means of a letter or an interview in Queen Victoria Street.

By the time the next 'social' sensation is required the Anti-suicide Bureau will probably have been forgotten. No one will trouble to apply to it the most obvious test, and it will be free to 'develop' like so many other departments of the Army. It has been officially stated in its favour that not more than 2 per cent. of the applicants asked for financial support. But financial support was precisely what the Bureau emphatically announced it could not promise. It could not promise it because it apparently wanted it itself. In the string of anti-suicide anecdotes purveyed to the Press was one of a German doctor, whose friends were led to entrust £500 to the Army for the purpose of saving him from his suicidal intentions. It is probably in ministering to such cases as this that the Bureau will ultimately find its vocation. It is absurd to imagine that it could possibly accomplish what the whole Army's

spiritual and 'social' wings together have failed to do. Even if it fail, however, it will at least have served to maintain for a season the financial interest of the public in the whole Army as the one religious or philanthropic body worth reckoning with in practical 'social' work.

On January 2, 1908, the first annual report of the Anti-suicide Bureau was published. The result of its twelve months' operations throughout the world was epitomized in the headline of one journal thus: 'Over 1,500 lives saved by the Salvation Army'. According to General Booth's own statement, however, 1,125 men made use of the Bureau's services in London alone, and of these no less than 75 per cent., or 843 men, were stated to have been 'diverted from the commission of the rash act they had contemplated'. The Bureau, therefore, apparently claims to have saved the lives of more than double the number of men who usually commit suicide in London in the course of the twelve months. It has accomplished this, unfortunately,—as the Registrar-General's figures show—without effecting any unusual diminution in the actual number of deaths from suicide. The 'sufferers', it appears, were principally middle-class men. In cases where these had influential friends, 'the Army was made the almoner of their assistance'. The 'submerged', General Booth notes, are either too 'bloodless', too inured to misery, or too well cared for by 'social' agencies, to think of suicide or, at least, to think of troubling the Bureau. Probably, the 'submerged' are wise. They know the capabilities of the Army's 'social' institutions tolerably well, and presumably few of them could, like the others, induce their wealthy friends to ask the Army to act as their 'almoners'. Anyhow, a comparison of the year's working of the Bureau with the Registrar-General's suicide returns seems to indicate that, whatever General Booth may mean, it would be premature to assume that his middle-class problematical suicides are really of the sort who seriously mean business.

The finances of the Darkest England Scheme, according to an official public-

ation entitled *Light in Darkest England* (1895), are 'kept quite separate from the other accounts and funds of the Army', while the books are 'independently audited'. This is, apparently, intended to assure the public that it is impossible for the religious section to derive financial advantage from the existence of the 'social' section, and that some sort of effectual control exists in the administration of the 'social' funds. If the finances are kept separately the books must of necessity be audited separately. The same firm of accountants audits the accounts of both the religious and the 'social' section, and there is no question of their standing, integrity, and competence. But as auditors their duties are ministerial only, and they are not required to furnish any guarantee whatever in regard to the proper administration of the Army's funds. The real question for the public is not whether General Booth's additions and subtractions are correct, and his vouchers in order, but whether the results obtained by the whole organization merit the expenditure lavished upon it by the public, and whether the distribution of the various funds is duly proportioned to the elements presented to the public mind in their collection. With such matters it is not the business of any firm of chartered accountants to deal, and at present there are no accounts or reports published by the Army that throw any proper light upon them. Notwithstanding its absolute dependence upon public funds, every statement of accounts and every report of work done issued from Queen Victoria Street comes to the public on the sole authority of Salvation Army officials, who would find it almost impossible to admit failure or defect in any department even if it existed (see Chapter xiv: 'The Government of Salvationism'). The only independence about such statements and reports consists in the absolute freedom from public representation and control that attends their compilation.

The accounts of the Darkest England Scheme show the value of the assets in 1907 as £331,451, that of the freehold and leasehold properties being given

as £221,254. Among the liabilities is the following item:—

LOANS AND MORTGAGES.
Sundry persons . . . £160,540

This sum of £160,540 represents the amount which General Booth has induced his followers and sympathizers to invest at 3 to 4½ per cent. in his 'social' work, directly in response to his financial advertisements in the *War Cry*, or which the depositors of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., and the policyholders in the Salvation Army Assurance Society, Ltd., may have been persuaded indirectly to entrust to him for the same 'twofold' purpose. The amount of interest paid by the 'social' section on these investments was last year £5,909. The Army's religious section usually figures as a creditor of the Darkest England Scheme. The sum advanced fluctuates from time to time. It was in 1902 £43,113, in 1903 £35,595, in 1904 £32,807, in 1905 £16,700, and in 1906 the indebtedness disappeared. From the amount of interest paid it would appear that the help rendered by the religious section to the 'social' work is based upon the same 'thoroughly business lines' that have been seen to prevail in the transactions of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., with the Army, and that the religious section also draws its percentage of interest on its loans. Possibly the religious section has now found a more profitable investment for its money. It is at least interesting to note that the chronic financial difficulties of the Darkest England Scheme do not prevent it from wiping off its debt to the Salvation Army.

Mr. Rider Haggard points out in relation to the finance of the Fort Amity Colony (see p. 99) that a great proportion of the loss sustained in that venture was due to the colony borrowing its capital at 5 and 6 per cent. 'Had the money,' he observes, 'been borrowed at, say, 3½ per cent., much of the loss would vanish'. Mr. Rider Haggard does not, apparently, know the identity of the lenders to the colony at these high rates of interest. It would at least be profitable to learn whether, as in the case of the Hadleigh Colony and the other 'social' institu-

tions in England, it was some other department, religious or financial, of the Army that lent the money and fixed the interest.

In *Twofold Investments* (see p. 30) it is stated that 'the "social" work of the Army offers a great field for the judicious expenditure of capital' in all that section's industries and works. The money employed, it is explained, produces profit, and therefore 'makes it possible to pay interest'. The prospective investor is assured in the *War Cry* advertisements that such investments are 'perfectly safe'. Yet on December 6, 1904—and again in the winters of 1905-6 and 1906-7—General Booth was under the necessity of pleading that unless further public funds were immediately forthcoming, several of these 'social' institutions would have to close their doors. As in 1906 the whole 'social' operations required £56,399, by far the greater portion of which was contributed directly or indirectly by the public, the profit-making capacity of these institutions is of the most doubtful character. At present it is the public, and not the industries and works carried on, who provide the Army's 'social' shareholders with their heavy dividends. Should the institutions really have to close their doors in consequence of a decline in public sympathy, the question of principal may possibly become of much higher importance to the readers of the *War Cry* than that of interest.

In 1890 General Booth held out the prospect that the 'social' scheme would be self-supporting, unless its area of operation were largely extended (p. 246). In 1895 'the total turnover of the scheme for the year, including the sales of goods manufactured by the people in the various institutes', was £151,000 (*Light in Darkest England*). As in 1907 the corresponding figure was as yet only about £232,000, the increase being mainly due to the greater output of carpentry, and the extension of the paper-sorting industry, in the industrial section, and to the growth of the paying food and shelter business—the turnover of the Farm Colony, however, remaining practically stationary—neither the volume of the operations

nor the extension of their area can well be regarded as large. Yet, while in 1895 the 'total cost to the Darkest England Fund of keeping the whole of these various undertakings going' was 'about £16,000', in 1906 the total expenditure of the Fund on the same undertakings was £56,399. In 1895 'only £4,000' of the turnover was expended 'in the salaries of officials—persons connected with the scheme, including legal, medical, and other professional charges'. In 1906 the salaries and allowances to officers in the women's section alone amounted to nearly £6,000, while the accounts furnished for the other sections do not permit the corresponding figure to be ascertained. In addition to the £100,000 originally sunk in it by the public, probably another £500,000 at least of public money has been absorbed by the scheme during the past seventeen years. The net result of the Darkest England Scheme may, therefore, be described as a stationary or dwindling effort performed at a largely and constantly increasing cost to the public.

General Booth's constantly expressed desire that the State should help to finance his 'social' undertakings, and his acknowledged anxiety to find a millionaire, are comprehensible in the light of their failure rather than of their alleged success. 'Englishmen', observes one journalistic champion of the Army approvingly, 'have got into the way of taking the Salvation Army at its own valuation, because it has proved its quality'. Unfortunately no other valuation is available or even permitted, and although sedulous reiteration of its quality may have gained it wide credence it cannot be said to have proved it. The press follows the public and the public the press in accepting the Army's by no means modest estimate of itself, and now, apparently, statesmen are prepared, on the same evidence, to follow both. Lord Rosebery, unlike some other politicians, is not without a remedy for unemployment. He would hand the unemployed over to General Booth. Speaking at Penzance on November 22, 1905, he said:—

'If I were dictator in this country I confess I should be disposed to try a daring experi-

ment. I should be disposed to take General Booth into council. He has the knowledge, he has the machinery, for dealing especially with this particular residuum, which we are unable on the whole to deal with. . . . Money might be worse spent, even (*sic*) by the incoming Government than by giving some contribution or some funds in order to assist General Booth to work out this problem, and to deal with the population which you are confessedly unable to deal with yourselves.'

Whatever outlets for spending or misspending money the present Government may discover it is to be hoped that this will not be one of them.¹ General Booth's qualifications as an expert in the question of unemployment are far from being established by his seventeen years' conduct of the Darkest England Scheme. That scheme was to deal with and raise the 'residuum', but it is impossible to maintain that the 5,408,728 cheap meals and the 1,872,116 cheap lodgings, which form the most imposing items in the Army's 'social' statistics for 1907, exercised any material influence whatsoever in that direction. In other departments General Booth appears to have forgotten that his business is with the submerged or the residuum at all. It is necessary that his sphere and aim as a 'social' regenerator should be re-defined. That sphere is the destitute who, through their own misdeed or any other cause, may be supposed also to stand in need of spiritual salvation; the aim is to accomplish their salvation, if possible, by removing the destitution (*In Darkest England*, p. 45), but without forcing salvation upon them (pp. 98, 110, 138, 139). If individual members of the public care to subscribe for the furtherance of this work that is their own affair, but there is obviously every

¹ There is little likelihood that it will. The Departmental Committee appointed to consider Mr. Rider Haggard's Report on the Salvation Army colonies in America were unable to endorse their work or to recommend the scheme formulated by Mr. Rider Haggard as a result of his study of them. With regard to Fort Romie and Fort Amity the Committee say: 'The settlements, then, do not prove that, so far as colonization is concerned, "unskilled and untrained persons can be taken from towns, put upon the land and thrive there". We are unable to see that Mr. Rider Haggard's statement to that effect (Report No. 19, para. 22) is borne out by, the evidence adduced' (*Departmental Committee's Report*, June, 1906).

reason why the State should give no contribution or funds towards it. Lord Rosebery's assimilation of the deserving unemployed as a whole with the particular 'residuum' for whose moral and industrial rehabilitation General Booth's 'social' scheme was instituted, is, surely, singularly inept. Moreover, his daring experiment has already been tried on a sufficiently extensive scale and—doubtless for that very reason, to no small extent—the evil, as General Booth himself appears to admit, seems quite as great as ever.

CHAPTER XI

EMIGRATION AND SHIPPING

THE emigration scheme which formed an important part of General Booth's Darkest England Scheme of 1890, while not absolutely undertaking to avoid the sphere of the ordinary business emigration agent, promised to make it the chief function and concern of this department of the Army's new work to send out of the country only such men and women as it had had through its hands and rendered fit for colonization abroad (*In Darkest England*, pp. 143-149). The emigrants were to be persons whom the Army had proved to be worthy of trust, instructed in all that concerned their future career, taught those industries in which they would be most profitably employed, inured to the hardships they would have to endure, etc. (p. 147). Having raised them from the slums and accomplished all this for them, the scheme was to 'pour them forth on to the virgin soils that await their coming in other lands' (p. 93). 'Why not?' asked General Booth in 1890. 'Why not?' the public may ask him today.

Out of the £46,563 forming the income of the Darkest England Scheme in 1903, the sum of £194 was expended on emigration under the head of 'passages to Canada, etc.' In 1904, out of an income of £42,189, the amount expended on the same head was £198, although in that year the Emigration Department's expenses (£1,272) in-

clude a proportion of 'advances made for passages' which is not ascertainable from the accounts. In 1905, out of a 'social' income of £66,875, the emigration of the Army's elevated submerged cost £234; while in 1906 £180 out of a total income of £56,399 was spent on the same object. Under the Army's system the sums advanced are, of course, repayable. Evidently the virgin soils in other lands will have to wait a considerable time before the funds and institutions of the Darkest England Scheme do very much for them. Yet General Booth's belief in emigration as a remedy for destitution and unemployment is not new-born. In 1890 he was 'strongly of opinion . . . that emigration is the only remedy for this mighty evil'. It was precisely this evil that the Darkest England Scheme came into existence to remove. How comes it, then, that so minute a proportion of its funds are devoted to the provision of the only remedy? The answer must be, Because the whole Darkest England structure, from base to summit, has proved a failure. General Booth's 'great Machine, foundationed in the lowest slums and purlieus of our great towns and cities, drawing up into its embrace the deprived and destitute of all classes' (p. 93), does not, unfortunately, land its salvage at the top—though if it did it is not necessary to agree with General Booth's view that it should then be straightway exported. There being little or no salvage to export as a result of the Darkest England scheme, and the evil of unemployment being still with us and likely to increase, General Booth has perforce had to find some means of securing to the Army the desirable reputation in these times of financial stress for it as well as others, of acting as a great and sagacious colonizing organization.

The Army has, therefore, been set up in the ordinary emigration business, giving its advice, taking its passage money, pocketing its commissions, and generally doing neither more nor less than any other emigration agent finds it in his own interest to do. When General Booth, in the course of his motor tour of 1905 laid stress upon the fact that the Army had recently taken several

thousands of emigrants to Canada and found most of them work, many of his listeners could not but imagine that this had been accomplished as the final act of the remedial work of the Army's 'social' section. His practice is to treat his audience to particulars of 'just one case' out of the several thousands, that one case being an out-of-work (not necessarily, however, a submerged person rehabilitated and fitted for emigration by the Army) to whom an assisted passage has been given under promise of repayment. In point of fact, however, very few of these emigrants were even Salvationists, while none—beyond the very few whose expenses are found on the debit side of the Darkest England central fund—had ever come through or even been in contact with, any Army institution at all.¹ The thing was done by means of extensive advertising in the general press throughout the country as well as in the Army's own journals. The following examples from the *War Cry* show the emigration system in its undeveloped stage:—

Our Shipping Agency

We are Agents for the leading Lines and book passages to all parts of the world. Advice and all particulars free. Apply Major Jones, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

Passages Booked

To Canada, America, South Africa, Australia, etc. No Booking Fees. Passengers met on landing. Advice and all particulars Free. Apply Major Jones, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

To act as agent for the ordinary shipping companies was so far well, but it was obviously better still that the Army should be its own shipping company. The following advertisement, which was freely inserted in the ordinary newspapers early in 1905, must be accepted as heralding the Army's tardy realization of the ideal 'Salvation ship', at once a hive of salvaged industry and a floating temple, which was launched by General Booth in 1890 (pp. 152-155):—

¹ Of the emigrants to Canada by the *Kensington*, which sailed on April 5, 1906, Commissioner Cadman said: 'In all the thirteen hundred there is not one single prison case—there is not even a farm colony case.'

LIVERPOOL TO CANADA.
SPECIAL SHIP FOR ORDINARY PASSENGERS.

SS. VANCOUVER, 5,251 tons.

Leaving on WEDNESDAY, April 26 next, chartered by the SALVATION ARMY, 1,000 Passengers. Second and Third Class only. Bookings at usual rates. Safety and comfort for women and families. FLOATING ADVICE and LABOUR BUREAUX for MEN and WOMEN without situations. Under care of Canadian Government Representatives and experienced Salvation Army Officers, who are coming to England on purpose to travel back on this boat. NO INTOXICATING LIQUORS WILL BE SERVED ON BOARD. Other parties at various dates designed to facilitate emigration for all Classes. Full particulars on application to Colonel D. C. Lamb, 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.

The resemblance between the ideal and the real is far to seek, for the other emigration agents are equally prepared to 'facilitate emigration for all classes', to effect 'bookings at usual rates', and even to throw in a word of gratuitous counsel in regard to finding situations at the end of the passage, without claiming on that account that their business is of such a praiseworthy and self-sacrificing nature as to command the admiration and financial support of the public. The qualification on the emigrant's part exacted by the Army is not, as might have been reasonably expected, proved fitness, combined with poverty arising from unemployment or other misfortune. In the *Social Gazette*, the official organ of the Darkest England Scheme, of August 26, 1905, under the heading, 'The Salvation Army Emigration Advice Bureau', there is the following answer to a correspondent:—

'Grace, widow, age fifty. Christian. No children, and "alone in the world", asks, "Am I too old to go to Canada?" We would not take the responsibility of giving a direct answer to your question without knowing more about you. You must be the judge; but we may say good, reliable servants are in great demand throughout Canada. There are splendid openings for housekeepers, cooks, as well as for "generals". . . . If you decide to go, and can pay your fare, £8 second class to Montreal, we shall be pleased to include you in our party of domestics sailing on September 7 next.'

'It is simply criminal', wrote General Booth in 1890, 'to take a multitude of untrained men and women and land them penniless and helpless on the fringe of some new continent' (p. 75). The example quoted shows that in its emigration business the Army does not always assume the responsibility which the public have a right to expect.

Clearly all responsibility in regard to fitness is thrown by the Army upon the applicant, and the chief qualification required for admission to the 'Salvation ship', as in the case of other emigration ships, not sailing under any philanthropic or 'social' flag, is ability on the emigrant's part to pay the passage money. It might be supposed that, in the absence of this ability, the Army would be able to spare a reasonable proportion of the public contribution of the Darkest England funds for the purpose of supplying the inmates of the 'social' institutions with what General Booth has described as 'the only remedy'. The accounts, however, show that this is done only on the minutest possible scale. That it is opposed to the Army's practice is sufficiently proved by its official 'social' journal's answers to correspondents of which the following is a fair specimen:—'. . . The fares for your family from London, third class, would be about £25. If you cannot raise the whole of this, perhaps some of your friends would assist you with the balance.' Here there is no encouragement to suppose that, if the friends fail to help, the Army's 'social' branch is prepared to recognize any further duty in the matter.

The desirability of pouring forth the competent and deserving unemployed of this country upon the virgin soils of others lands may be debatable. But the fact is that the emigration business conducted by General Booth has no direct application whatsoever to the real unemployed, whether deserving or not. Men and women who possess or can command £8 to £25 for passage money alone certainly do not fall within this category. They are much more likely to be persons who contemplate leaving the situations they already possess, in the hope of bettering their position abroad. No doubt there may be more places for the unemployed after they are gone, but deliberately to clear out the more competent in order to make room for the less competent is surely a remedy altogether too drastic even for the mighty evil which it was the chief purpose of the Darkest England Scheme to cure. That General Booth, like any one else, may,

if supplied with additional public contributions, succeed in removing considerable numbers even of the genuine unemployed from the country, it is unnecessary to doubt. But that his performances in the matter of emigration, whether under the Darkest England Scheme or in his business capacity as emigration agent for all classes, should be put forward and accepted as unquestionable credentials either for doing the work or administering the funds, is surely amazing. The necessity for a religious body betaking itself to the emigration galley is not at once apparent. In the case of the Army only one thing is certain to result from its presence there and the public misconception which naturally arises—a still further increase in the enormous subsidy drawn annually from the public by its local corps and devoted neither to emigration nor any other 'social' object, whether successful or not, but to purely religious work which is as costly as it is ineffectual.

The fact that the famous Colony-over-sea, which figured so prominently in the Scheme of 1890, has not yet come into existence is rather remarkable, especially in view of the definite criticisms and recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry in 1892 (*see* p. 165). The failure to realize this, the crowning portion of the Scheme, cannot, seemingly, be attributed to lack of funds. A reserve of £25,000 was set aside for the Colony-over-sea in 1891. In 1895 a special donation of £5,000 was received for it. Between 1894 and 1898 over £1,000 in 'preliminary expenses' was spent on it. Since then the reserve and donation appear to have been absorbed by the 'Social' Scheme as a whole. The preliminary expenses, which recently seemed to have happily ceased, make a fresh start in the 1906 accounts with an item of £741. The only reasonable explanation of this Over-sea Colony mystery would seem to be that the 'Social' Scheme has not succeeded in fulfilling its purpose, or has departed from it, and that in consequence there have been few or no regenerated submerged of whom such an Over-sea Colony could be formed. For this Colony the Army's present immense business of emigrating 'the pick of the

population' on a cash or a loan basis is coolly described in the 'Social' Report for 1906 as 'a practical, if temporary substitute' (*Sketches, etc.*, p. 89).

The Army's colonies in the United States, on which Mr. Rider Haggard has published his report, though not conducted in connexion with emigration from this side of the Atlantic, may here be shortly considered. That at Fort Herrick, in Ohio, consists of about 280 acres and was started in 1899 as a land settlement colony. Owing to the impossibility of irrigation and the consequent difficulty of supplying the original eight or nine families with sufficient land, it came to an end as a colony proper in 1903. It is now used for a purpose similar to that of the Hadleigh Colony in Essex, that of a reformatory instrument in the Army's American 'social' work. The principal function of the colony at present is the treatment of inebriates, of whom sixty, taken from the cities, had been passed through the Home in four months and were all in good employment, some on the colony itself, the others apparently in the neighbourhood. There is no drinking saloon within nine miles. 'Here, it is probable', observes Mr. Rider Haggard, 'we have one of the main causes of this sudden access of sobriety among those who, in the immediate past have been complete strangers to that virtue'. It is more than probable. The Army's colony at Fort Amity, Colorado, of 1,760 acres, is run on a different footing. It is regarded by the Army as a 'sound business proposition'. The colonists, though taken from the towns, had for the most part worked on farms before. They are described as 'all family men, with two exceptions, with nice families, really worthy of assistance . . . all worthy poor', and it is stated that the Army had to bear the transportation expenses of every family to the colony and, in some instances, to pay for the food they consumed on the journey. The land was sold to the colonists, the purchase-money being, apparently, repayable to the Army—as in the case of the third American Colony at Fort Romie, California—over a term of years, interest on deferred payments being added at 5 per cent. Stock and

implements were also sold to them on similar terms, the interest charged on unpaid balances being 6 per cent. The Army took a mortgage or other analogous security over all live and dead stock so provided, no title to land being given until all payments were completed, the settlers being subject to ejection after notice in the event of their obligation being unfulfilled, and to have their land and all upon it seized to satisfy the debt.

The position as regards employment of the settlers before leaving the towns is not very clear. Many of them are stated to have possessed no capital at all. From the tabular statement given by Mr. Rider Haggard it appears that out of the thirty-one settlers one had 1,765 dollars to start with, one 1,000 dollars, one 600 dollars, two 300 dollars each, one 125 dollars, one 50 dollars, three 25 dollars each, one 20 dollars, one 13 dollars, one 10 dollars, and one 3 dollars. Of the remainder, three possessed before going to the colony a team and wagon; two, horses and cattle worth 700 dollars and 350 dollars; and one, live stock worth 300 dollars. No doubt the larger capitalists represent those men of agricultural experience who were 'sandwiched in as "pace-setters" and "examples"' for the benefit of the others. The colonists are described as being satisfied with their lot as well as with the Army, and from Mr. Rider Haggard's report there is no reason to doubt that they have cause to be.

Colonization of this kind may be a desirable thing or it may not. There are hundreds of thousands of people unable to produce a cash capital of 600, 300, 50, or even 10 dollars who are nevertheless fairly well off and have a useful and tolerably sure place in the ranks of industry. Their wholesale deportation from the city to the country on the same loose and ill-considered principles as those which appear to govern the Army's emigration business cannot sanely be contemplated. In colonization of this sort a religious body like the Army has no true place, for it is not even pretended that its spiritual doctrines and methods are at all exercised in promoting the alleged results. Though ostensibly entered into for the betterment of the needy it is,

in Mr. Booth-Tucker's words, a 'sound business proposition' on the Army's part and nothing more, the beneficial effect of which as an advertisement for the whole Army cannot but be seen and felt in the much more important finances of its religious operations. It was not the 'decent' working man with dollars that General Booth came to save (*In Darkest England*, p. 252), and his present anxiety to do so proves nothing so much as the absolute failure of his religious 'social' system, though so liberally financed by the public, to deal successfully with unfortunate men of any other class.

Since July, 1906, when this work first appeared, the Army's emigration business has been largely extended.¹ As it has hitherto been conducted by the ordinary agents and shipping companions, this kind of 'work' has had no 'social' or philanthropic flavour about it. It is not, in fact, 'work' but business. Conducted by a religious and ostensibly philanthropic agency, it is difficult for the public to realize that such 'work' differs in no essential particular from the emigration business of its worldly competitors. In the Army's case, that difficulty is not lessened by the methods of presentment employed in its appeals to the charitable. Thus, one of General Booth's type-written circular letters (January 11, 1907) says:—

'Our Emigration work—the largest effort of its kind—much needs help. We took 12,000 souls to Canada last year and found situations for all who needed them. The reports as to the results of transferring many from poverty here to work and comfort there are most gratifying. I can send 25,000 suitable people this year if help is given me. £10 will meet all expenses for one transfer. As

¹ An interesting adjunct to the Emigration Department is now the General Traffic Office. Its function is not only to book passengers to 'any part of the world by any line', but also to issue railway and steamboat tickets by all lines for all classes 'to all parts of the British Isles for long or short journeys'. Conducted parties are also arranged, and hotels and private lodgings are recommended. It is not clear what the particular justification for this inland or home railway and steamboat ticket agency may be, nor is it possible to gather from the Army's various accounts whether the work of saving travellers 'rush and worry at the station' is regarded as being 'social', religious, or merely 'auxiliary' trading, or whether it is profitable.

far as possible we arrange for the money to be loaned, instead of given, to the applicant.'

Again, the Army's 12,000 emigrants were utilised in the following advertisement which appeared prominently in the daily press during January and February, 1907:—

THE
SUFFERING HUNGRY POOR.

Thousands of needy men, women, and children are asking THE SALVATION ARMY for assistance in their bitter need. Will you please enable us to help as many as possible. Very keen distress exists. Some 6,000 poor are cared for nightly. Hundreds employed. 148 Homes and Agencies in full operation. Funds required to send people to work in Canada. 12,000 taken there last year. £10 will defray cost of adult's passage.

£45,000 needed for the year's Social Work. Please address cheques, crossed 'Bank of England, Law Court Branch,' to William Booth, 101, Queen Victoria Street, E.C.

W. BRAMWELL BOOTH.

It cannot, surely, be questioned that such statements and advertisements are apt to convey the impression that the 12,000 people concerned received assisted passages or other help, that they were of a needy or poverty-stricken class, that the Army's 'social' institutions had ministered to them in some way, and that public contributions were necessary to the performance of the work described. That impression would certainly be wrong. Any one who examines the persuasive advertisements of the Emigration Department, or who applies for an assisted passage, will find that the principal qualification for obtaining the benefit of its services is still, as formerly, ability to pay one's passage-money on this side of the Atlantic, as well as one's way on the other. In one of the emigration leaflets bearing the Army's imprint the following words occur in italics: '*There are neither free nor assisted passages*'. The advertisements in the press certainly disclose no anxiety to assist anybody. Certain inquirers at the Emigration Department have found the official attitude in perfect harmony with these announcements. Still, the official statement that some emigrants are assisted must be accepted. This, however, does not make their assist-

ance so philanthropic as might be supposed, or so deserving of large public contributions.

Alluding, apparently, to the criticisms contained in the first edition of this book Commissioner Nicol (*Sketches, etc.*, p. 47) says, 'It has not at all surprised me to find some people reviving the old cry of this being a mere money-making transport agency'. The 'old cry' cannot well be older than the emigration business, and that, though large, is still young. Of the financial basis of the business the Commissioner writes:—

'It will be allowed, I suppose, that legitimate charges against it are the Officers' time, rent, and so forth. And the profit? I apologize for asking the question; but new departures with the Salvation Army never involve any departure from its well-known principles, and it is desirable that this should be recalled at every opportunity. The profits arising out of this enterprise are not likely to mount up to large figures, but, whether small or large, they have been, and will be, entirely devoted to assisting the neediest cases of emigration. . . . The small loan advanced to them will, in time, be repaid by easy instalments, and thus on the crest of the New Emigration economic harassments are prevented at home,' etc. (pp. 47-49).

The Army's apology, then, for taking part in the business is that its profits may be devoted to assisting other and needier emigrants. In that case, it is surely necessary that the accounts of the two sections should be kept separately, and that the profits of the large business section available for the work of the small philanthropic or loan section should be clearly shown. It is also necessary that the 'social' reports should state clearly how many of the 12,000 persons (according to another statement 13,000) emigrated in 1906 received (1) assisted passages and (2) loans for other purposes. As it is, the reports are absolutely silent on the subject. As for the emigration account, it is a model of unilluminating slumping not merely of sections but of items. In January, 1907, in a letter published in the *Daily Telegraph* and other important journals, the author drew attention to these defects in the Army's statements, and gave the officials an opportunity to supply the missing information. The Army did not, apparently, reply to the criticisms in any journal in which they appeared. It was, however,

moved to profess to reply to them in the form of interviews with two journals in which they did not appear. Obviously, their readers could not well judge whether the alleged replies were adequate. In point of fact, so far as the questions actually raised were concerned, the official statements amounted to nothing more than a repetition of the assertions of Commissioner Nicol, which had inspired the criticisms. In one case (the *Tribune*) the author was permitted to repeat his questions, but Colonel Kitching, the official who had been interviewed, did not answer them. In the other case (the *Westminster Gazette*) he was not allowed to repeat the unanswered questions which had apparently moved the representative of that journal to solicit a lengthy interview with Mr. Bramwell Booth. In May, 1907, Colonel Lamb, the head of the Emigration Department, was challenged by the author in the columns of the *Labour Leader* to supplement a previous letter of his own with reference to certain criticisms based upon this book by answering the same questions. He too remained silent.¹ It is to be feared that the public will conclude from these facts that, whatever the profits may be, the assisted passage department's performances alone could not figure very impressively in Mr. Bramwell Booth's appeals on behalf of the 'suffering hungry poor'.

As regards the purely business section, neither Commissioner Nicol nor the author need apologize for inquiring about the profits. It is not easy to see why the Commissioner should not expect them to be large. The Army frequently charters steamers for its own emigrants while charging 'only ordinary fares'. Even when it does not do so it earns its commissions from the shipping companies. It also

receives a capitation grant of £1 for agriculturists from the Canadian Government. On account of passage money commissions, fees, and grants, it received no less than £79,609 in 1906. Compared with other emigration agents, it has a material advantage in free advertisements. It is very doubtful whether the Army's emigration is, as is alleged, so much more advantageous to the emigrants than that of other agents. This opinion is based not only upon the experiences of persons who have travelled by its agency, but also upon the emigration leaflets distributed by the Army and statements by the Canadian government. The Army's advertisements, both business and charitable, make a great feature of finding work for the emigrants. But work in Canada was for a time plentiful. 'It is not necessary', said a Government leaflet bearing the Army's imprint, 'to make any arrangement before leaving England'. Another leaflet recently used by the Army gave a reassuring answer to the question whether the Canadian Government itself could find the emigrant work. If the government can do so, can the Army do more? 'Government officers place applicants', states an advertisement of the Canadian Government Office. It is well known that there are Government employment offices, land agencies, and homes for men and women emigrants, in different parts of the Dominion. All the emigration agents on this side can give their customers whatever advantages may be provided by the Government's Immigration Department for the use of all immigrants, whether travelling by the Army's agency or any other. Recently some of the older agents have directly challenged the Army by advertising the fact that they are in a position to secure their customers practically the same, or even greater advantages. They are, of course, able to do so only by arrangement with the Canadian Government. Like the Army, they work 'under Government patronage'. Canada has shown herself to be a pushful colony, and she wants labour. She is aware that the Army, by virtue of its peculiar position, reputation, and influence, can on this side of the Atlantic do much more than

¹ He is equally silent regarding them in the third of his series of articles on emigration in the *Penny Pictorial* (March 28, 1908), although that article professed to 'deal' specially with criticisms relating to finance. The expenses, according to Colonel Lamb, are heavy, although the officials receive 'a mere pittance for their labour'. The profit, 'consisting of commissions and bonuses', is 'turned over towards the assistance of those waiting to go out'. This method of 'dealing' with financial criticisms is instructive only in an undesirable sense.

the ordinary business agents to induce people to emigrate. This may account, in some measure, for the complimentary remarks about the Army's emigration 'work' which fall from time to time from Canadian ministers and Government officials. It does not follow, however, that the material services rendered by the Army to its customers in Canada are of such a nature, compared with those rendered by other agents or by the Government itself, as to diminish seriously the profits which would otherwise be made. The emigration accounts not only do not show the profits, but they do not (1906) show the amount of the advances made, or the commissions, fees, and grants received.¹ As the sum of £1,823 is all that is carried to the loan account as a result of the year's operations, it would appear that the working expenses must be enormously high for a business of this nature and volume. In this connexion it is interesting to note, and will surprise Salvationists to learn, that, according to the *Toronto Globe* (December 18, 1907), Mr. Oliver, the Minister of the Interior, stated in the Canadian Parliament that the Government not only made the Army a grant to aid the work of distributing its emigrants, and assisted in paying the rental of its emigration offices in England, but also—contrary to a practice which members of the Army have hitherto been led to regard

¹ The 'social' accounts for 1907, issued since these pages were written, give rather fuller details of the emigration business or work than formerly. The commissions and grants earned (£13,118) are now separated from the passage-money received (£85,014). The ordinary business, however, is still slumped together with the assisted and loan business, and it is still impossible to see what the profits of the former are, or in what degree they may have contributed to the promotion of the latter. The 'advances made to emigrants' (whether for passages or otherwise is not stated) amounted to £10,594. The income side of the account, however, contains four items, not derived from profits, which nearly suffice to cover the amount advanced, viz.: loans repaid, £2,530; donations, £2,201; from Darkest England Fund, £548; from distress committees, guardians, and friends interested in emigrants, £4,504.—Total, £9,783. The Army could hardly do less than advance this amount. The extra £811 advanced is certainly not impressive as the result of such an excellent year's business.

as inflexible—'took advertising space in the Army papers'.

Taking the assisted passage or loan section alone, however, it seems desirable that its philanthropic basis and need for large public contributions should be more clearly established. It should be noted that the outstanding £18,000 advanced to date (1906 account) of which the officials are disposed to make so much, is not an advance out of profits. It is made up mainly of donations from persons interested in emigration, of special contributions from public bodies or private persons for the emigration of particular persons in whom they are interested, and a contribution of £2,500 from the Darkest England Fund, which is mainly subscribed by the general public. It cannot be said, therefore, that the persons assisted by the advance of this £18,000 were assisted in consequence of the operations of the purely business section. It should also be noted that the £18,000 advanced (£25,506 in 1907) figures as an asset in the balance-sheet of the Darkest England Scheme. The Army is a cautious lender, and the presumption must be that this money is safe to be repaid—to the Army, though not necessarily to the donors. In certain cases with which the author is acquainted the interest charged by the Army works out at close upon 10 per cent. on the sum advanced. If this is, as it appears to be, the uniform practice of the assisted passage and loan section, the charge—with commissions and grants—would seem quite adequate to cover whatever risks may be incidental to the business, without appealing further to the philanthropic public once a fair amount of capital is in hand. General Booth's Trade Department (*see* p. 40) supplies the public with pianos on the three years' system, and his prices are doubtless proportioned to the risk incurred. The cases mentioned seem to indicate that his emigration on the two years' system is essentially similar. If it is not, the Army ought to make it quite clear in what way and to what extent it differs. Emigration and pianos may be excellent things—instruments, even, of human happiness. But both are also

articles of commerce. Under the conditions on which General Booth appears to supply them, it is not easy to see why one and not the other should figure so prominently in his philanthropic appeals.

From the Army's 'social' report for 1907¹ it is not easy to gather precisely how many people emigrated through the Army's agency during the year. The tabular statement at the end of the volume, showing the 'Social' Scheme's performances, gives no particulars. Mr. Blathwayt's interview with Colonel Lamb contains a cross-heading: '20,000 Emigrated During Year', but the ensuing paragraph represents the head of the Emigration Department as stating that 'during the past three years about 20,000 people have emigrated through our agency'. The preface (anonymous) to the report observes: 'It would be thought, surely, no mean thing to have simply transferred nearly 15,000 capable citizens from this country to Canada during the year'. The interview contains touching passages descriptive of the Army's pitying regard for the citizen who is both capable and penniless ('a man staggers fainting to our doors', etc.), but it contains no details of the number of such cases actually aided. This kind of thing is all very vague and unsatisfactory, for the 'work', as a whole, has very little resemblance to the Darkest England Scheme under which it is done. It is, moreover, most undesirable that an organization like the Salvation Army should be allowed to occupy the dual position of agent for providing men with employment as well as employers with men. It is to be hoped that it may never be tempted to select the employers on the same 'business lines' as those upon which it selects its emigrants. The wisdom of the whole business of emigration, as artificially stimulated by Salvationist inducements, is seriously challenged by such reports as the following (*Daily News*, December 12, 1907):—

¹ *Selected Papers on the Social Work of the Salvation Army*, by Miss Hulda Friederichs, Clarence Rook, Olive Christian Malvery, Harold Begbie, Philip Gibbs, F. A. McKenzie, Raymond Blathwayt, and Others. With a Letter from General Booth, London: Winter, 1907-8.

'CANADIAN UNEMPLOYED.

'*Extensive Public Works Demanded.*

'(From Our Correspondent.)

'OTTAWA, Dec. 11.

'A deputation from the civic authorities of Toronto is on its way to Ottawa for the purpose of urging the Dominion Government to commence public works on an extensive scale forthwith, so as to provide means of dealing with the unemployed, who are increasing by hundreds, and in a state of complete destitution.—Copyright.

'The Dominion Government has telegraphed instructions to its agents in Europe to discourage immigration for the present winter.—Reuter.'

How many of General Booth's 12,000, 15,000, or 20,000 'capable citizens' have shared in the severe and widespread distress prevalent in Canada in the winter of 1907-8 we shall probably never know. Even if none of them were themselves affected—which, however, despite Commissioner Nicol's denial (December 21), was not the case—it is nevertheless certain that their presence has directly contributed in some measure towards it. Doubtless the Army's Canadian 'social' work will be prepared to undertake the mitigation or cure of any evils that its British partner in the emigration business may have brought about. This would certainly be another testimonial to the Army's universality and versatility. But it will hardly be reassuring to those who know its 'social' work in the land of its birth.

Commissioner Nicol attributes the cause of the distress in Canada to 'other emigration agencies—men who are out solely for the passage-money, commission, for bonuses of various kinds, and for the collection of funds from charitable people'. The ordinary emigration agents might well retort that this description is much more applicable to the Salvation Army than to them, and that while the business was in their hands—unstimulated by the Salvationist emigration propaganda—such distress as has recently been apparent was unknown. General Booth stated (*Manchester Guardian*, January 27, 1908) that out of 40,000 emigrants taken to Canada by the Army during the past three or four years 'not 100 are out of employment'. A little later (*Daily News*, February 20, 1908) he is reported to have said that 'fifty individuals could not be found who

are out of employment or in circumstances of distress'. Mr. Bramwell Booth, on February 29, stated: 'All our emigrants are at work or are provided for'. While it is possible to believe that fifty of the Army's emigrants could not be found out of work throughout the Dominion, it is not necessary to believe that the Army's officials tried very hard to find them. Reports from different trustworthy sources make it difficult to believe that their inquiry can have been very earnest or thorough.

On December 23, 1907, it was reported in the English Press, that an indignation meeting of 1,000 unemployed men, partly composed of Salvation Army immigrants, had taken place in Toronto. On December 28 (*Star*) Commissioner Coombs cabled stating that the meeting was attended by only 100 men, those being of the 'won't work' class. 'As a matter of fact,' he added, 'the meeting was held at a lodging-house, and thus was bereft of any public importance'. In the *Daily Chronicle* of the same date Mr. Bramwell Booth wrote to the same effect, repudiating the suggestion that the protest had been engineered by Salvation Army immigrants, and declaring that 'the Army's immigrants are all at work'. It seems, in the first place, a little hasty to declare that these men, whatever their number, belonged to the 'won't work' class, seeing that in Toronto at that time there were no means of putting them to the test. It is, too, rather rash to assume that a protest of unemployed men must be of no importance because they held it in a lodging-house instead, say, of hiring the Town Hall. The statement of the proprietor of the establishment is to the effect that between 300 and 400 men, all out of employment, took part in the meeting; that nine-tenths, if not all, were immigrants; that there were as many Salvation Army immigrants as those of any other agency; and that, while some may have been of the 'won't work' class, the great majority would have taken work if they could have got it. A gentleman connected with another institution in Toronto states that out of about 200 immigrants with whom he has lately had to do, quite

a third came by the Salvation Army, and of these two-thirds were unemployed 'with no prospect of the Salvation Army doing anything for them'. Instances can be given in which Army immigrants, after being unemployed, have had work found for them by other agencies. It is, of course, nobody's business to tabulate the cases of unemployment among the Army's 40,000 immigrants. It seems unreasonable to expect the Army itself to deal with this important aspect of its emigration business adequately. Otherwise, there can be little doubt, General Booth's 50—or 100—unemployed might readily have been discovered in one or two of the Toronto lodging-houses alone.

An interesting and important development of the emigration business was announced by the head of this department a few days before General Booth landed at Cherbourg from America on his way to Berlin by way of Paris (November, 1907). This was nothing less than the establishment of a trans-Atlantic shipping fleet by the Army. On November 14 Colonel Lamb disclosed particulars of the scheme to a representative of the *Daily News*. General Booth had for some years, he said, been looking forward to 'the time when all the machinery of emigration will be owned by the Army'. The time seemed 'nearly ripe' for the realisation of this ideal. At least one ship could even then be profitably maintained, and 'we should have no hesitation about purchasing and running additional boats as the traffic increased'. A number of ships had already been offered the Army for purchase, but the question of capital cost was still under consideration. It was hoped that some wealthy shipowner might be moved to present General Booth with the first vessel of the Salvation Navy. The intention, of course, was to carry freight as well as passengers. The entire complement of each ship from the captain downwards was to be composed of members of the Army, and Colonel Lamb declared there would be no difficulty about finding the men. To the representative of the *Pall Mall Gazette* he declared that there would be 'no swearing in the stokehole'! The entire staff would work 'for love—that

is to say, a bare living wage' (*Daily News* interview). In this way the service would be made to pay well, but special stress was laid upon the assertion that no rate-cutting would be attempted, 'thus competing with the shipping companies'. The Army would not be hampered like other companies, however; 'if the Atlantic traffic was slow we could go into the Pacific, and so on' (*Pall Mall* interview). Thus Colonel Lamb on November 14 and 15.

General Booth, who arrived in Paris shortly before midnight on Saturday, November 16, was questioned on the subject of the shipping scheme by an interviewer on the following day. A telegram in Monday's *Daily Telegraph* stated: 'General Booth denied the report that the Salvation Army had any intention of establishing an Atlantic shipping fleet of its own. "We charter the steamers for our own emigrants", he said, "and we do not contemplate doing any more for the time being"'. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the very precise details of the scheme—described as 'General Booth's Plan'—made public by Colonel Lamb three days previously, while the General was still at sea. The colonel certainly seems to have thought that his commander-in-chief knew all about it. The General, on the other hand, appears either to have known nothing about it, or to have thought the report to be an invention of the enemy. Three opportunities have since been given the officials of the Army to clear up the apparent contradiction between the plans of its head and the plans of his subordinates, but none of them have been accepted. Interviewed by a representative of the *World's Carriers and Contractors' Review* (December, 1907), Colonel Lamb would neither deny nor confirm the interview with General Booth in Paris. It is tolerably obvious, therefore, that the intentions of General Booth are no longer the intentions of the Salvation Army, at least in matters of business. It looks as if some one had blundered into allowing the General to miss his cue on landing from America. As a gift of steamers seems to be the only thing, according to Colonel Lamb, for which

the Army is waiting to enable it to start the shipping business, such negligence might easily prove serious. Possibly by this time, however, Colonel Lamb has been successful in convincing the General that the shipping plan is really his, after all.

Colonel Lamb's attempted justification of the shipping scheme (*The World's Carriers*, December, 1907) is unlikely to convince any one who is acquainted with the development of the Army's other business enterprises (see Chapter vii). He states that the emigration business 'has not received any help financially from the "social" fund' subscribed by the public. Out of what fund were the Army's magnificent new emigration offices provided? Out of what fund is it proposed to purchase the 'additional boats' after Colonel Lamb's philanthropic shipowner or 'Empire builder'—either, apparently, will do—sets the new scheme going? The emigration business, it must be remembered, is part of the 'Social' (Darkest England) Scheme. The freight-carrying project is a development of the emigration business; but, unless the vessels are to be officered and manned by the submerged, it is not easy to see how even General Booth will be able to convince the public that his freight business also is 'social' work. It would seem to fall more legitimately and naturally within the sphere of the Trade Department as an additional 'auxiliary' to the 'spiritual work'—a classification which would be in harmony with Colonel Lamb's allusion to the stokehole. In that case the Army's spiritual funds, contributed by the public, would provide the capital required for the enterprise, just as they have provided the capital for the multiple operations of the Trade Department.

It was recently reported by Commissioner Nicol that one of the Army's admirers, Mr. Brookes of the Ebbw Vale Collieries, thinks that the Army is 'gradually shaping itself into a social and spiritual commonwealth'. The importance of what this gentleman may think is more apparent to Commissioner Nicol than to the author. Probably Mr. Brookes would alter his opinion if General Booth proposed to

run Army collieries wherewith to stoke the Salvation Navy—the managers and men all working ‘for love, that is to say, a bare living wage’—even if ‘songs of Salvation’ could be guaranteed to replace swearing in the lower seams. If gentlemen like Mr. Brookes will but take the trouble to study those aspects of Salvationism which are neither social nor spiritual, they will be in a position to appreciate more accurately the particular form which General Booth’s ‘commonwealth’ is likely to assume.

During 1907 [numerous allusions appeared in the press to a certain scheme for the colonization of Rhodesia which General Booth was about to launch in co-operation with the British South Africa Co. These have no doubt already served to accustom the public to what must otherwise have seemed, when the time for action came, a strange combination. General Booth has always acknowledged that his efforts to save men’s bodies have for their ultimate object the saving of their souls, but it is unnecessary to believe that the Chartered Company, in this matter, has been inspired by that or any other spiritual aim. The Rhodesia Settlement Scheme is intended, like the Darkest England Scheme of 1890, to be a big thing—the greatest of its kind the world has known, according to General Booth, ‘since the children of Israel started out from Egypt’. When in Japan, the General confided to an interviewer (*Kobe Herald*, May 13, 1907) some further details. The scheme is described as a gigantic colonization enterprise, beginning with land settlement. When the preliminaries have been arranged, the ‘poor’ (of Great Britain) are to be taken back to the land (of Rhodesia) ‘in a continuous stream’ recalling the Exodus. ‘It is a beautiful land,’ says General Booth, ‘with a beautiful climate, and everything you can desire’—apparently a white man’s paradise. The Chartered Company, it appears, has offered the Army ‘a large tract of land’ and ‘a large sum of money’. To start the experiment ‘will involve an outlay of a quarter of a million of money’, but ‘the plan is to raise two millions by floating a company’.

It is evident that some difficulty has been experienced in bringing the plan to fruition and the projected Rhodesia Settlement Co., Ltd., to the point of flotation. The scheme, being ostensibly for the ‘poor’, is clearly intended to appeal to philanthropic investors. On the other hand, although Rhodesia requires white population, it does not require or desire the class of poor with whom General Booth’s name is generally associated. The sort of poor wanted in Rhodesia are, according to the Chartered Company’s report on land settlement, ‘men who have been born on the land, and who understand their business’, and who have or can obtain some capital. Evidently, it will not be easy, even for General Booth, to satisfy the philanthropic investor interested in ameliorating the condition of the poor or unemployed of this country, while at the same time satisfying those who are principally interested in improving the sad state of the 70,000 shareholders in Rhodesian companies. ‘Very few of these undertakings’, said a circular recently issued in their interests, ‘are earning any profit, the great majority of them being more or less in difficulties’. The issuers of the circular in question would probably agree that such a company as that projected in association with General Booth might have a salutary effect upon Rhodesian securities. Should the public, then, be asked to subscribe the £2,000,000 of capital required for the scheme, it may be desirable to examine more closely the nature of its origin.

The amount of money (in this country over £700,000) invested at interest in the religious and ‘social’ work of the Salvation Army is one of the most objectionable features of the organization. It is unlikely to dispose General Booth’s numerous investors to entertain or consider reasonable and wholesome criticism of any department of the vast public institution in which they are financially interested. The part intended to be played by the Army in the Rhodesia Settlement Scheme would, if realized, undoubtedly increase this evil enormously. The company’s appeal would be largely to small investors, and especially to those

who have been led to accept the Army's claim to be the 'social' miracle-worker of our time. It is reasonable to ask these good people to consider what would have happened if General Booth and Mr. Stead in 1890 had invited the public to take shares in the Darkest England Scheme instead of merely asking them for subscriptions to it. It is well, in one sense, that that scheme was not 'limited', and that the lenders of the £160,000 since invested in it are not dependent for their dividends upon its 'social' success so much as upon the contributions of the charitable public.

Just as General Booth has succeeded in inducing a large number of 'capable citizens' to go to Canada who might not otherwise have gone, so he may succeed in diverting the stream of such emigration to Rhodesia. If this is all the Chartered Company wants, its end may be attained. In that case, great advertising capacity and machinery rather than organizing genius will be the chief factor in any success achieved. If, as appears to be the case, the Salvation Army is to control the work of land settlement, it would be interesting to learn precisely on what evidence the Company's faith in the Army's capacity in such a matter is based. Its emigration business alone is, evidently, no criterion. The Boxted small holdings experiment, financed by the late Mr. George Herring in 1906, is neither old nor large. The Hadleigh Colony has for seventeen years persistently betrayed enormous miscalculations on the part of its founder. The performances of the three American colonies, at Fort Herrick, Fort Amity, and Fort Romie, have not been remarkable either from the point of view of 'social' success or of foresight. It is to be feared, therefore, that the Chartered Company has somehow acquired an exaggerated idea of the Army's powers. The received public opinion of its capacity—fostered mainly by itself—does not seem a sufficiently substantial basis upon which to establish a £2,000,000 company.

The Chartered Company's desire to obtain a large supply of white colonists or labour for Rhodesia is, of course, perfectly legitimate. It is with General

Booth's readiness to provide it that the public ought to be concerned. That he should propose to devote the Army's organization, with its peculiar reputation and influence, to such a purpose and in such a manner, is open to objection on many grounds. If a large company is required for the colonization of Rhodesia, it is eminently desirable that the Chartered Company should float and work it itself. What may be called the Darkest England motive, moreover, might very well be kept altogether out of the prospectus. A London journal recently likened General Booth to St. Francis—though Professor Huxley was once moved to apologize to the memory of the saint for having ventured upon a similar comparison. St. Francis embraced poverty in his early manhood. Even those who still retain some faith in the ideals of the Salvation Army would probably prefer to see its founder, in his old age, embrace poverty in some other form than that of the British South Africa Company and its numerous and needy concessionaires.¹

CHAPTER XII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SALVATIONISM

THE psychology of a religious organization which enjoys unlimited freedom and the use of almost unlimited funds in the performance of what must be regarded as a public work cannot profitably be ignored in a survey of the causes which may have contributed to its success or failure. It is noteworthy at the outset that, while nearly every other Christian sect that has striven in recent times to influence for good the particular class of people which the Salvation Army is disposed to claim

¹ The present position of this enterprise is uncertain. On April 11, when Mr. Stead interviewed General Booth on this and other subjects (*Daily Chronicle*, April 14, 1908), the Rhodesia Settlement Scheme was then still 'hanging in the wind'. On April 16 the announcement was made that it had been abandoned, 'for the present at any rate'. A Reuter's message from Cape Town published on the same evening stated that Dr. Jameson was on his way to England, where he would 'devote himself principally to negotiations in connexion with the Rhodesia land settlement scheme'.

as its own has done so by means other than religious dogma, the Army relies—in by far the larger portion of its field of operations—upon its religious dogmas alone as the instrument of human reformation. While other sects have seen the utility of methods that are gradual and natural in their operation, the Army holds rigidly to its belief in the efficacy of the sudden and the miraculous in pointing men and women towards a better or more spiritual life. While other sects have been busy broadening the basis of belief in order that the crudities of traditional theology may no longer prove a stumbling-block to minds rendered incapable of accepting them by the influence, affecting all classes, of the intellectual progress of the age, the Army has not consented, and cannot consent, to expand or remodel in any way those beliefs, crude and obsolescent though they are, which constitute at once the mainspring of its activity and the instrument by which any spiritual power it possesses is exercised.

The doctrines held and to be held by the body now known as the Salvation Army are defined by the deed poll subscribed by William Booth on August 7, 1878, in relation to the body at that time known as 'the Christian Mission'. Certain of these doctrines affect the Army chiefly as a body of worshippers. It is mainly with those so prominently utilized by it in its work of evangelizing the masses, and with the manner of their dissemination, that the public who finance the organization require to concern themselves. The Army, according to a recent boast of General Booth, is now the only religious body that 'believes in Hell-fire'. The statement is not, perhaps, strictly accurate, but it may at least be asserted that comparatively few of the public who contribute to the Army's funds hold that belief as individuals. The attitude of the great majority is, apparently, that though the belief is one that they themselves have grown out of, and that is to them obnoxious, it is, nevertheless, good enough to propagate among the masses, and is even likely to prove acceptable to them as a belief, as well as a powerful impetus

towards their moral and spiritual betterment. That this particular belief is almost as uncongenial to the masses as to those above them is sufficiently proved by the Army's meagre strength in London and in this country.

The Army's aim is first of all the conversion of men, and its principal instrument in effecting that conversion is a species of religious terrorism which proceeds from a belief in the wickedness of all unconverted men and in 'the everlasting punishment of the wicked' (*O. and R.*, p. 188). The numerous pages in General Booth's *Orders and Regulations* which deal with these matters make somewhat painful reading even for minds totally irresponsive to the persuasions of the higher criticism or the 'new theology'. Persons who doubt 'the existence of . . . a real Devil, a real Hell, . . . or . . . any of the principles and practices of the Salvation Army' must not be recommended as candidates for officership (p. 372). The officer must be sound on these essential doctrines, and he must see that his soldiers are sound on them also. He must teach them 'facts about Heaven and Hell' (p. 222), so that they too shall be adepts in the Army's practice of awakening the unregenerate. He must seek constantly to 'startle' people with much talk of such things as death, the judgment day, and Hell 'with its reproaches, upbraidings, and companionships; its memories, its despair, and its duration' (p. 104). In another of many similar passages we read:—

'The terrors of the law, that is, such subjects as sin, death, judgment, Hell, and the like, will be found most useful to awaken sinners and bring them to repentance. . . . These topics alarm, and make men think, and feel, and seek mercy. The F.O. . . . must not take any notice of the objections of ignorant people about working on the feelings of sinners, by trying to arouse their fears. . . . It will not matter much how the F.O. gets men to Christ, so that he does get them there' (p. 125).

That the end justifies the means is thus the principle laid down by the Army and accepted by the public in the belief that the end is actually attained. But what must be said of the means when, as is certain, the end is not attained? It is only because of

their alleged results that means in themselves disapproved by the majority of the public are tolerated by them at all. The Army's effective adult strength of less than 13,000 in London after more than forty years of labour and an expenditure of public money running into millions, is surely the most conclusive proof that the Army's end is not attained, and that its infallible methods are, therefore, as nearly as possible worthless. It would seem, indeed, that the 'fixed methods of moving men' prescribed by *Orders and Regulations* are beginning to be felt by the officers themselves to be no longer adequate for their purpose. This is indicated by such reports as the following, which appear in the *War Cry* :—

'Adjutant— conducted the meetings, and when the Ensign came upon the platform clad in sackcloth he received breathless attention. At the close many comrades consecrated themselves for service, while seven sinners surrendered.'

'A deep impression was made by the Major trying to talk with his head and face bound, "Freedom from Graveclothes" being the subject; two sought blessing of holiness; sixteen souls sought liberty at night.'

Even these lugubrious methods are sometimes outdone. In certain places in England the practice of addressing their audiences from coffins has within the past few months found favour with the Army's officers. Possibly even such gruesome devices as these may yet be developed and intensified still further, but it is a melancholy reflection that it should be possible in these days to induce the public to lend their countenance and their financial support to the moral regeneration of the masses by means of doctrines that are no longer reasonable even to the ignorant, propagated by methods that savour of nothing so much as the chamber of horrors in a third-rate travelling show.

It may be admitted that in every civilized community there is a certain proportion of people whose primitive intelligence may dispose them to accept any religious doctrine whatsoever, provided the mode of its presentment is sufficiently startling. It is even possible that such people may undergo some kind of moral reformation, at least of a temporary nature, in consequence of the nervous or men-

tal shock to which they have been thus subjected. What the Army fails to recognize is that the number of such people, whether actual evildoers or not, must necessarily be exceedingly minute in this country at the present day, and that the ideas which tend inevitably to reduce that number still further have long ago penetrated to the very classes—ignorant in other respects though they may be—which the Army regards as peculiarly fitted for the sincere reception of its doctrines and the enthusiastic adoption of its methods. Its mistake is in supposing and proclaiming that these doctrines and methods are capable of universal application to the spiritual needs and the mental development of the masses, and consequently nearly all its expenditure of effort and the public's expenditure of money are applied to the futile task of employing obsolete weapons in the moral and spiritual subjugation of the multitude who, quite as well as their betters, knows the weapons to be obsolete.

Professor Huxley pointed out in 1890 (*Social Diseases and Worse Remedies*) that to have the intellect of the nation put down by organized fanaticism was a greater evil than those which it was the professed mission of the Salvation Army to cure. Although the intellect of the nation has not been put down, the organization which aims, directly and indirectly, at accomplishing it to-day, is in greater public favour than ever before. It is bold enough to demand larger powers in its 'social' work, which powers would enable it to test the reforming efficacy, upon men in a state of captivity, of doctrines and methods that have egregiously failed with them in a state of freedom. It even demands that the State should subsidize this dismal business, so that its officers would practically become State servants, and its antiquated dogmas would constitute a religious test not only on the 'submerged' and the inmates of our prisons who might be handed over to its care, but also on all members of the public who might desire to take part in the 'social' work of the nation. It was one of the arguments of *In Darkest England* that the class de-

scribed by General Booth as 'submerged' was largely recruited from the upper ranks of society. In these ranks the general standard of intelligence may fairly be supposed to be higher than in those beneath. But misfortune, poverty, and even vice do not necessarily impair or lower the mental faculties of a man to the extent of making certain propositions acceptable which were formerly incredible. Intelligence, unfortunately, may be accompanied by depravity in any class, but when this is the case it is not easy to see how that depravity is to be mitigated or removed merely by an appeal which, to be successful, must be made not to intelligence but to ignorance. This is really the general dilemma which confronts the Salvation Army. As the beliefs and the mental calibre of its members enable or compel them completely to ignore it, their qualifications for dealing with any department of the nation's work are about as inadmissible as they possibly could be, even if the governmental and financial system of the organization were otherwise faultless.

The outlook upon life of the Salvationist is necessarily circumscribed, and it is tolerably evident that to people who sincerely accept the Army's doctrines the passion for souls must necessarily predominate over every other human interest. This passion is not very perceptible in the majority of the British public who finance the Army, and if they indulge it vicariously at considerable sacrifice to themselves it is only because they have been led to believe that the process of spiritual regeneration is accompanied by other improvement of a more material nature. With the sincere Salvationist soul-saving must come first, and when he is not engaged in the engrossing task of collecting money it appears to be the officer's business to utilize every occasion in life for that supreme purpose. What, for example, is the proper treatment for a person who faints at a meeting? 'When the person comes to herself inquiry should be made whether she has given herself up to God so far as her conscience bids her.' 'A faint,'

says *Orders and Regulations*, with composure, 'is often the result of agitation of mind caused by fighting against convictions of duty' (p. 395). Sometimes the 'startling' methods of Salvationism are apparently accompanied by more serious results than mere fainting, as the following report from the *War Cry* (April 11, 1903) shows:—

'SOLEMN PREDICTION VERIFIED.

'... Adjutant—solemnly predicted that some one present that evening would never enter the Barracks again. A few hours later, Brother—, an old and respected Soldier, who had attended all the Sunday meetings, was suddenly promoted to Glory. The event has made a deep impression.'

The field officer is enjoined to study carefully 'the instructive portions of the *War Cry*,' and though their discovery may embarrass him less than it would the ordinary member of the public, the significance of this particular incident is designed to impress itself on both, though, no doubt, in a somewhat different manner.

The 'closing hours of men's lives' are, in fact, specially recommended for the meditation of the officer. 'It is a very sorrowful thing,' says *Orders and Regulations*, 'and yet, nevertheless, very true that people will laugh at the mercy and tenderness of God while they will be hushed into solemnity by talk about death, and the grave, and the sorrows of lost souls' (p. 127). Nothing, the field officer is reminded, is more effective in bringing people to a sense of their condition than 'the lamentations of sinners, and the triumphs of saints, in their last hours' (p. 176). In visiting the sick he must, before all things, 'deal faithfully' with those who, he has reason to fear, are not prepared for death. Relatives and friends, he is told, will often be more concerned at such times for the quiet and comfort of the patient, but in these cases the F.O. must, if necessary, disregard their wishes and 'tell the truth in the most solemn and pointed manner' (pp. 175-6). He is to note down in his private pocket-book 'anything remarkable that may be said by the sufferer,' for use as startling evangelical material either at his meetings or in the columns of the *War Cry* (p. 176). At the funeral of an

unsaved person, or of one whose relatives are mostly unsaved, 'warnings of the plainest kind should be poured out' (p. 621). Thus, in every circumstance of life or death, the field officer is required to put soul-saving before everything. On board ship, if permission to hold services be refused him, he must 'contrive to get a few passengers in groups' in order to attain his purpose. Elaborate directions are given him as to how he shall comport himself with members of other sects, including Catholics, Mohammedans, and Jews. He is recommended to assume that such people are sincere in their beliefs, and is cautioned against attacking them on account of their creed or ceremonial. With Catholics he is not to admit being a Protestant, but only an 'attestant'; with Mohammedans he must beware of 'describing Mohammed as a false prophet'; and with Jews he 'should always decline any dispute about Jesus Christ or the New Testament'—all this the better to induce Catholics, Mohammedans and Jews alike to abandon their respective creeds in favour of his own. He is, in short, to be all things to all men but 'without any sacrifice of principle' (pp. 234-5).

Leaving Mohammedanism and Judaism out of account, it is tolerably certain that the Army derives no small satisfaction from any accessions of strength which it may be able to obtain at the expense of other Christian bodies, notwithstanding the fact that its leading doctrines are stated to be common to all such bodies. One of the most instructive portions of the *War Cry* is the 'In Doubt' column, which contains replies to correspondents on the most diverse subjects. From it the following counsel to seceders from the Church of England is taken:—

"L.M." asks if I think it would be wise for a Salvationist to attend church and partake of the Sacrament.

'I think it would be very unwise. By signing Articles of War, your friend declared she would be a true, faithful and loyal Soldier. She ought, therefore, to have more perfectly understood the principles and practices of the Army before doing this. There can be no greater folly than for a person to rush and join a society, not knowing what that society believes in, what it teaches, and what its

ceremonies and sacraments are. If "L.M.'s" friend felt that she could not serve God without taking the Sacrament, she ought not to have become a Salvationist. "L.M." should ask her friend to see the Officer, who will be able to advise her what to do.'

These criticisms of 'L.M.'s' conduct would be more convincing were the Army not a society in which a rush is really the approved method of entrance, and which is only too anxious to obtain members from any source at almost any price. Even if 'L.M.' before joining the Army had mentioned her scruples concerning the abandonment of the Sacrament to her officer, it is most probable that they would have been very lightly brushed aside. In point of fact, however, there is absolutely nothing in the Articles of War themselves to prohibit members of the Army from partaking of the Sacrament. In this instance, therefore, the lack of circumspection and frankness is surely on the part of the Army rather than that of 'L.M.' It was its business to know the body from which she had come and, therefore, its duty to instruct her in regard to those matters of importance which the document she was required to sign did not explicitly mention.

Another case of doubt which is solved in the same column is equally indicative of the Army's loose methods of securing members:—

"E.R." is much troubled through being told that it was Christ who founded the Church of England, but the General who founded the Salvation Army, and that in leaving the Church for the Army she is making a choice between God and man.

'This is an incorrect way of putting the matter. The Church of Christ is vastly larger than the Church of England; it includes "all who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity," whatever their name or creed. Consequently the Salvation Army is equally a part of Christ's Church with every other sect which seeks to do His will. Do as God bids you, not as man says. No one on earth can decide for you what you shall do with your life.'

It is unfortunate that the divinity of the Army's origin should not be more self-evident to those of its converts who, after all, evidently set some store by such an attribute, and that it should be necessary to establish it by correspondence in consequence of doubts upon the subject following the process of conversion.

In another somewhat similar case of doubt the problem and its solution are stated as follows:—

"W.F.C." was brought up to Church from childhood, but converted in the Army. Ought he to join the Army or stay in the Church? I confess I am puzzled that any one should find difficulty in deciding a question like this. "W.F.C." says himself that he "feels God is calling him to some definite work." And his eyes have been opened to the truths of salvation in the Army. If he meets with opposition on the part of those who should help him, this will only make him a better Christian, and more capable to fight the battles of the Lord. "W.F.C." should at once see the commanding officer.'

From these dicta it is necessary to conclude (1) that, in the Army's opinion, no definite work is available in the Church of England for a person in the position of 'W.F.C.' and (2) that, when the Army declares that 'no one on earth' can decide what such people shall do with their lives, it really means that no one on earth should presume to do so except the Army and its officers.

The advantages of the Army's disclaimer of the name of Protestant are seen in the following report relating to its inroads upon Swiss Catholicism (*War Cry*, June 6, 1903):—

'Commissioner Mrs. Booth-Hellberg, who, with her husband, is in command of the Army in Switzerland, has a most gratifying account to give of the position in Switzerland: "The two main features of last year's warfare have been a definite advance upon the Catholic cantons, and important developments of our Social Work. . . . The city of Fribourg may be considered the centre and stronghold of Swiss Catholicism. . . . In this place we opened fire last August. Efforts were not spared on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities to oppose us. . . . One energetic priest, in his great zeal, went even so far as to place himself several evenings before the door leading to our hall, where, with outstretched arms, he tried to prevent the people from entering, entreating them to return to "the only true church". The attraction of the Salvationists was, however, too great: the priest was gently pushed aside and the people entered. In this place we have now a number of Soldiers, nearly all of whom have been converted from Catholicism.'

This report hardly goes to confirm the idea entertained by some Roman Catholics that the Army in Catholic countries is not really a proselytizing body, for the 'gratifying' feature about the report is not so much the fact that converts have been made as that they have been made at the expense of the

Catholic Church. This aspect of 'attendant' Salvationism has, apparently, escaped the attention of the Roman Catholics of Port Glasgow, who are reported to have displayed the heartiest enthusiasm of any section of the community on the occasion of General Booth's recent visit to that town (*Daily News*, August 23, 1905).

It is, unfortunately, not only in its dealings with grown men and women that the Army's passion for soul-saving is seen. It is carried also into its training of the young. 'Nothing could be more dreadful', says *Order and Regulations*, 'than that the splendid organization of the Army should be used to familiarize children with the most solemn and awful truths, without securing their conversion to God' (p. 360). To most people the dreadful thing will seem the familiarizing of children with the most solemn and awful truths at all, and especially by the methods favoured by the Army. While the ostensible object of its juvenile Bands of Love is that of 'influencing the children to kindness to one another and to animals', the real object is 'specially that of attracting them to the meetings of the Army, and to lead them to God' (p. 361). Similarly, instruction is not the object of the various educational classes which form part, or, rather, were intended to form part, of the work of the Young People's Legion. Among the subjects are included geography, shorthand, composition, drawing, book-keeping, arithmetic, physical drill. In the Legion and in its classes the following principles are to be observed:—

'Nothing in the nature of debates or discussions . . . is to be permitted. Special care must be exercised in the Educational Classes to exclude anything which might lead to that idle questioning which serves no other purpose than the waste of time which ought to be otherwise employed.

'Resting at nothing short of the salvation of the young people, the whole idea of the Legion is to bring the young people to God, and train them to fight for Him, and no matter how prosperous in every other respect the Legion may be, it will be a failure unless it accomplishes this end' (p. 366).

That the Army's hesitating and distrustful utilization of education should be completely overshadowed by its fixed idea of the omnipresence of sin

and the necessity of violently eradicating it is, of course, only natural. In such circumstances knowledge cannot well be of any account except in so far as it can be made to minister to the 'blood and fire' propaganda. Reading and writing, fortunately, are not forbidden, but are even recommended for the education of officers. 'To be able to read and write plainly will be a useful acquirement; to be able to read rapidly in private will be a help to personal improvement, the value of which it is impossible to estimate' (*O. and R.*, p. 21). The amount of general knowledge considered essential for officership is evidently not oppressive:—

"E.H." must be a Soldier six months before applying for officership; she must also get some good, practical experience of Army work and methods. During the months she is waiting she should improve her writing and spelling, read all the good books she can get, such as the Warrior and Red-Hot libraries, *Salvation Soldiery*, by the General, and Mrs. Booth's works. "E.H." should have a dictionary, and always look at it for a word she does not know how to spell. This is a very helpful habit' (*War Cry*, November 26, 1904).

True, the field officer is recommended to 'improve his power to think'. This he is to accomplish by considering the 'character of the War', 'the reasons why things are done in a particular way', and 'what things are those which prevent people being saved' (*O. and R.*, p. 21). He is told to improve his memory and to cultivate his powers of observation. Thus, 'he should make a point of looking at every important object he meets, and considering it in its relation to the War'. In this sense he should observe 'the town in which he is stationed, the people with whom he meets'—and, indeed, everything animate or inanimate within the confines of his horizon. Geography is not forbidden him. Indeed, he is told to learn 'all about the nations', which means, however, 'those particulars concerning them which would be likely to have to do with the spread of Salvation amongst them' (p. 22). Even those Salvationists who are not officers are put on their guard against the dangers of enlightenment for enlightenment's sake:—

"Doubtful" asks if it is wrong to have an ambition to acquire knowledge and to

improve oneself. He feels that this ambition is selfish, and believes that unless he surrenders every idol he cannot obtain the blessing of a clean heart, for which he is so earnestly seeking.

'It is a perfectly lawful, reasonable, and even desirable thing that "Doubtful" should acquire knowledge and should improve himself. It would be selfish if the acquisition of knowledge became the whole aim of "Doubtful's" existence, and the ruling passion of his life. In "Doubtful's" case the acquisition of knowledge is merely a means to an end. It is, if I understand him rightly, in order that he may teach men and women God's laws and lead them to repentance and salvation. He should by all means, and at once, give himself to Christ, surrendering fully and absolutely. Are you certain, however, that the things you are pursuing will improve the mind?' (*War Cry*, August 2, 1903).

The 'Are you certain, however', of the final question is significant. If the Army does not succeed in 'putting down the intellect of the nation' it must at least be conceded that it does its best.

The general intelligence of the average Salvationist and the attitude towards worldly things which he is required to observe are fairly illustrated by the questions and answers relating to secular subjects which are dealt with in the 'In Doubt' column of the *War Cry*. A lingering trace of the old Adam is apparent in the inquiry of 'S.W.' whether it is wrong 'to keep eggs laid by his neighbour's fowls in his garden hedge'. On questions affecting the rights of property the Army speaks with knowledge and its views are irreproachable. 'N.H.', who is doubtful whether she ought to ride on Sunday to her corps, which is forty minutes' walk from her home, is told that if she is strong enough to walk she would not be justified in riding. 'If unable to walk, "N.H." must obey her own conscience. If she herself feels that it is wrong, it would be better for her not to ride.' What 'N.H.' must do if she is unable to walk and also feels that it is wrong to ride is, unfortunately, left unsolved. One correspondent inquires whether it is desirable for Salvationists to go 'to see a play, *The Sign of the Cross*', and asks whether such a play is considered by his moral censors to be elevating. One would have thought that here were startling religious devices enough after the Salvationist's own heart, and

that an acquaintance with Mr. Wilson Barrett's masterpiece might well have been thought to work towards edification. Yet the answer is unequivocal: There may be elevating features about the play, but 'the same amount of time spent in private prayer would be infinitely more elevating'. Theatre-going, in short, is 'a waste of time', and 'people who are baptized with the power of God have neither time nor desire to go to theatres'. After this one is prepared to find 'a play called *Uncle Tom's Cabin*' also condemned. 'L.M.' is informed that it 'would certainly be wrong' for her to see it, for she 'would find that she could not touch pitch without being smeared'—although it has been found possible for the Army to collect money in theatres, and even music-halls, with comparative impunity. In these cases, unlike that of Sunday travelling, the individual Salvationist conscience is not regarded by Headquarters as a trustworthy guide. An inquirer who asks whether it is right for a Christian 'to sing or listen to comic songs, or to attend worldly concerts' is curtly referred to Colossians iii. 16, 17, as 'an all-sufficient answer'. 'P.M.', who is in doubt whether he ought to read 'a religious story of high tendency', is told somewhat cryptically to read nothing which does not leave him better than before he began it, the suggestion being, apparently, that religious stories of high tendency are apt to have a contrary effect. In spite or in consequence of these and other official restrictions the Salvation Army has developed, in its officers at least, a certain element of joviality and even humour which is peculiarly its own. As it appears to be somewhat uniform in its quality, and is displayed chiefly in connexion with the process of taking the outdoor and indoor collections, it may be presumed to be merely an unnatural growth fostered by Congress Hall only under the stress of stern financial necessity.

It is obvious that the particular kind of mentality that pervades the Salvation Army as a whole is likely to form a congenial ground for the growth of practices based upon the literal and unenlightened interpretation of particu-

lar Biblical texts. Among such practices is that of faith-healing. This doctrine is explicitly taught by the Army, although it is certain that very few of the public who contribute to its propagation are aware of the fact. The subject, moreover, is one which evidently threatens to give General Booth a considerable amount of trouble, for he has recently been at great pains to warn his officers of the dangers accompanying the acceptance of the doctrine, and to instruct them regarding the limits within which the practice is permissible in the Army. In *Faith-healing: A Memorandum for the Use of Officers of the Salvation Army*, published in 1902, General Booth, while admitting that faith-healing is a Salvationist doctrine, protests against the abuse to which it has been subjected outside the Army, and declares with all the emphasis of plentiful italics that nothing similar can on any account be tolerated within it. It is not actually stated that members of the Army have already abused the practice, but there are good reasons for saying that it would not be surprising if many of them had done so. 'There is ever a class', we are told, 'who are more readily carried off by the ideas of signs and wonders. There are, as a matter of course, some answering to this description amongst us.' Here the word 'some' certainly errs on the side of moderation. According to the 'Memorandum' the principal things that must not be taught in the Army in connexion with faith-healing are these:—

- (1) That sickness is necessarily an evidence of the presence of sin in the persons afflicted.
- (2) That when disease is not healed in answer to prayer, or when death follows as the result of sickness, it is the result of the unbelief of the sufferer.
- (3) That those who exercise faith for the purpose of healing are cured when there is evidence that they are not.
- (4) That it is contrary to the will of God that means should be used for the recovery of the sick.

That it should actually be necessary in the twentieth century seriously to deliver these warnings to the members of an organization almost wholly supported by the money of the public is, in itself, astounding. The whole pamphlet is a laboured argument to

show that none of these extraordinary ideas are sanctioned, but that all are really excluded, by the Army's definition of faith-healing. That definition runs as follows: 'The recovery of persons afflicted with serious diseases by the power of God, in answer to faith and prayer, without the use of ordinary means, such as doctors, medicines, and the like' (*Orders and Regulations*, p. 51; *Faith-healing*, pp. 1-2). This definition is at least plain and comprehensible, and it appears to be an accurate literal interpretation of the well-known Biblical passage (James v. 14-15) upon which the whole practice of faith-healing is founded. In his pamphlet, however, General Booth now endeavours to persuade his followers not only that the neglect of ordinary means in the treatment of the sick is dangerous and, therefore, condemnable from a merely rational standpoint, but also that the Biblical passage in question actually enjoins the employment of such means.

It is exceedingly difficult to define precisely the net result of General Booth's exposition of the Army's present attitude, but it appears to be this: (1) The Army believes in faith-healing in the sense of its own definition; (2) it strongly discourages the neglect of ordinary curative methods; (3) it believes that such methods are explicitly enjoined by St. James's epistle, and (4) it allows the neglect of means 'when the sick have the conviction wrought in their hearts by the Spirit that God is willing to heal them', but recommends that, where the exercise of faith alone by the patient or by others fails, there should be 'a return to the use of the means that are usual and convenient in such sickness'—that is, of course, if the patient still survives when the experiment fails. All this seems a sufficiently confused and dangerous set of doctrines to instil into the minds of a class of people whose intelligence and discrimination in regard to natural and supernatural phenomena are as yet in a sadly uncultivated state. Why, in these circumstances, does not General Booth adopt the only clear and safe course of prohibiting absolutely the neglect of ordinary curative

means by his followers? The answer must be that it is because he himself has encouraged his followers to neglect the use of such ordinary means, with the consequence that he is now in danger of having two bodies of doctrine on the subject of faith-healing within the Army.

It will be remembered that the passage in St. James's epistle runs as follows: 'Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up'. Several pages of General Booth's pamphlet are occupied with a dissertation on the purpose of the act of anointing with oil recommended in the text. It was not, it is argued, a mere formality or symbol. Oil, it is explained at great length, was celebrated in Judea for its sanative qualities. In the Eastern world it was 'one of the most useful and popular remedies known'. 'Perhaps', writes General Booth, with an approach to enthusiasm, 'it comes nearest to being a universal remedy of any substance in existence'. What more natural, then, than that the Apostle should lay down the simple rule that the members of the early Church 'should call in their comrades for prayer, and that they should, by rubbing or bathing the body, or such part of it as might be specially affected, with oil, apply this simple and universally approved remedy?' Having shown thus ingeniously that the text sanctions the use of oil as a curative means, General Booth proceeds to put in a plea for his own panacea of water 'in nearly every form of illness', as well as for various means suited to the particular fancies of others, such as brown bread, milk, fruit, or even 'a little soda and water, or a little Seidlitz powder, or other corrective medicine'. All this is excellent precept, but some Salvationists may possibly have enough perception to see that when these prescriptions have been followed the element of faith, as understood by them, has practically vanished.

It is important to note that General Booth's *Orders and Regulations* give no-

countenance whatsoever to this later interpretation of the signification of means and the act of anointing with oil. The passages relating to the subject read as follows :—

'When Soldiers or others desire to present themselves to God for recovery by faith, or where the F.O. is led to seek healing for himself, his soldiers, or others, in this way, let the following suggestions be attended to—

'(a) Anointing with oil is evidently not essential, seeing that as many remarkable cases of healing have been wrought without it as with it. It is but a form. Still when persons attach importance to it, it can be used.

'(b) When oil is used, all that is required is to anoint the forehead with it. To suppose that there is any necessity to apply it to the parts affected is simply ridiculous, for if that line be followed out it may be said that the oil is essential to the healing. If the cure is wrought by God, touching the forehead with oil serves every purpose' (p. 53).

The corrective medicine of the 'Faith-healing' pamphlet was administered to his followers by General Booth in 1902, and the contents were republished in a series of issues of the *War Cry* towards the end of 1904. But the passages on faith-healing here quoted from *Orders and Regulations* are taken from the edition of that work bearing on its title-page the date 1904, and this issue is the edition at present current. They have, moreover, formed part of the official doctrine of the Army for many years, and it is therefore hardly reasonable for General Booth to expect his followers at this time of day to execute such a complete volte-face on a subject that is evidently quite in harmony with their whole system of religious belief.¹ It is well known that one of the General's sons-in-law found refuge for a time in the late Dr. Dowie's sect; and it is no secret in Salvationist circles that when Dr. Dowie

¹ In its review of the first edition of this work the Roman Catholic *Tablet*, commenting on the pages immediately preceding, remarks (March 16, 1907): 'General Booth practises extreme unction'. One naturally hesitates to question the authority of the *Tablet* in such a matter. It may be only fair to observe, however, that under Salvationism the practice is permissive only, that the act of faith is understood to have mainly a physical and temporal application, and that it does not appear to assure, in the event of a fatal issue, any such special graces and spiritual advantages hereafter as are believed to accrue from the reception of the Roman Catholic sacrament.

was in London several members and officers of the Army, in defiance of its rules, had themselves baptized in accordance with the rites of that gentleman's faith.

The freedom of the Army's officers and members even in regard to the furtherance of admittedly good causes promoted by other societies or organizations is, strictly limited. There is a paragraph in *Orders and Regulations* which purports to explain 'why we generally hold off' from taking part in demonstrations or meetings got up by other people for the attainment of specific objects with which the Army professes to sympathize. It reads as follows :—

'Hitherto, with rare exceptions, the Army has held aloof entirely from reforming societies, and at present there is no sufficient reason for any change of conduct in this respect' (p. 572).

Why we generally hold off.

This is certainly not very explanatory. Still, Salvationists may take part in independent demonstrations on behalf of such things as temperance³ or purity, but not without the authorization of the divisional officer. If a procession takes place there must be 'no mixing with others' doings'. The soldiers must 'march in one solid company . . . so as to retain their separate Salvation character'. When the function is over they must 'march off to their barracks or some other place appointed for them exclusively' (p. 574). In other words, the demonstration, if it can profitably be countenanced at all, must be utilized as far as possible as an advertisement for the Army. In most quarters the Army's numerical weakness would tend to frustrate rather than to attain this object, and this fact alone seems sufficiently to account for its policy of abstinence. 'All these agitations', it is explained, 'are in some measure calculated to take officers and soldiers off the main purpose for which the Army exists, that is, the salvation of souls' (573). There is, apparently, no need for the Army to help other people in their efforts to do good, inasmuch as these efforts, even if unsupported by it, cannot fail to work to its advantage. 'Every effort to do good, of every form

³ See, however, page 122, note.

and character, really and truly assists the Army in the accomplishment of its great work' (p. 574). It is, however, precisely to the alleged failure of other people's efforts to do good that the Army owes its origin, and it has certainly nothing to gain by their success. Thus, even in connexion with things that are acknowledged to be good, the personal liberty of the Salvationist is crushed, and in spite of his General's well-restrained sympathy with good causes, every possible means is employed in practice to dwarf his mind to the capacity which is capable of containing one belief only—that in the doctrines and activities of Salvationism alone reside all the elements and incentives that are necessary for the full development of all the religious, social, and civic virtues desirable in the members of a civilized community.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONVERSIONS OF SALVATIONISM

THE phenomena of conversion, which is of primordial necessity in the Salvationist system, have recently been made the subject of reasoned and systematic study by the psychologist. Professor William James, of Harvard, in his volume entitled *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (London: Longmans, 1902), reaches the conclusion that, in certain instances at least, the process and its results can only be accounted for by the direct action of an external objective influence which may be termed the Divine Spirit. In certain quarters there has been a disposition to appeal to this work for the purpose of lending scientific sanction to the methods by which conversions are ordinarily sought to be effected, such as those practised by the Salvation Army. It is not, however, with organized or mechanically produced conversions that Professor James deals. Even if experiences so produced may be regarded as religious, they certainly did not fall within the scope of Professor James's special study. For the purposes of that study 'religion' is carefully defined by him as 'the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to

stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine'. The Salvation Army, however, is a permanently established revival agency, and any conversions which it may be capable of effecting differ in every essential particular from those examined by Professor James, which took place without any direct intermediate human instrumentality or the employment of any such startling expedients as those utilized by the Army. This difference is important, for it accounts for the relative transitoriness of the Army's conversions, and for the fact that although an enormous number of so-called converts are stated to pass annually through its hands, it is apparently unable to point to any increase in its membership from year to year in this country.

The tale of these conversions is told every week in the pages of the *War Cry*. It is contained in some hundreds of telegrams and postal reports from a large number of the corps or congregations throughout the country, these telegrams and reports giving a concise account of their work during the previous week. The field officer is required to do his best to send suitable reports of this nature to the official journal, and in *Orders and Regulations* he is told how it should be done:—

'The following is an example of how press telegrams should be written:—

War Cry, ST. ALBANS.—Great Salvation Meetings led by General yesterday. Thousands of people. Processions through many of the lowest parts of the town. Excellent order throughout; police very kind. All four Town Corps took part in march; five brass bands and tambourine bands. Splendid meetings right through the day. Empire Theatre crowded with men. Finished with shouts of victory, over ninety sinners returning to God. Monday, wonderful meetings morning and afternoon. Great baptism of power and blessing. Night meeting, Town Hall crammed, and great effect produced by General's appeals. Forty-five more at Mercy Seat. Twenty-two Candidates' (pp. 533-4).

It must be admitted that most of the Army's officers or 'war correspondents' experience little difficulty in absorbing the spirit of this journalistic model. The following reports published at various times within the past few years are a few typical specimens of the messages actually sent. Although selected almost at random,

they serve to show, not only the methods of recording the results but, incidentally, some of the more characteristic traits of the Salvationist mind :

'EXMOUTH.—One hundred and four sinners have sought salvation within the past three months.'

'CHALK FARM.—Special week-end campaign led by Adjutant and Mrs.—, assisted by Salvation Lifeboat Crew. Saturday night, rousing open-air, plenty of drunks standing round. Inside, musical torrent by a host of Salvation Nightingales; two souls going into the Fountain. Sunday, four great meetings. Morning, a wake-up meeting, "Lights along the shore"; Brother—, of the Life Assurance, who has come to live and work amongst us, introduced. Three o'clock, singing service by Lifeboat Crew. Night, subject "Wreck"; crowded Barracks; while first song was being given out a soul knelt at the mercy-seat; two more afterwards—making five for week-end.'

'HOLLOWAY I.—In the absence of the band, who were away enjoying the sea-breezes at Margate, the Soldiers rallied well all day, and we had good meetings, both inside and out, closing up a day of salvation joy with three souls at the Cross.'

'BRIGHTON I.—A helpful and fruitful week-end with our own officers. Night, death beds of unconverted actor, men of society, and saints visited in imagination; the glorious entries of the latter invitingly depicted; two for salvation.'

'TWICKENHAM.—Visit of Battersea I. band for week-end much enjoyed. Four souls. Our band away.'

'REGENT HALL.—... A well-sustained Sunday. Adjutant and Mrs.— leading; nine souls, including a would-be murderer, who was arrested in his contemplated deed by the sound of the drum.'

'CARDIFF VII.—Visit of Captain and Mrs.—, of Life Assurance. Never-to-be-forgotten day; five souls surrendered. Finance above ordinary. Crys sold out.'

'ST. ANDREWS.—Good week-end. Tayport Band to the front; town stirred; Soldiers on fire; five souls in the Fountain.'

'NEWINGTON GREEN.—Staff-Capt.—, with Capt.— and Sergt.-Major—, from Training Home, with us. Twenty-four cadets farewelled for Field—one for Switzerland. Fifteen souls accepted Christ, including backslider who gave way on hearing one of his own compositions sung.'

'BARROW-IN-FURNESS.—... On Sunday afternoon at the three o'clock meeting the brigadier addressed the young people, and oh, what a sight the seniors had about four o'clock, when thirty-six boys and girls came out for salvation, many of them crying aloud.'

'RUSDEN.—Some appreciative remarks on the Army's work were made by the Rev.— during the J.S. Anniversary. Secretary—'s baby was dedicated, and eight souls cried for mercy.'

'CARDIFF V.—... Marvellous times ... Sunday, good times all day. Night, nearly all the congregation—young and old, saint and sinner—wept and prayed beneath

the power of God. Several backsliders were restored, and the Soldiers simply lost themselves in God. We are believing for twenty souls and £20. Corps in beautiful condition.'

'CHALK FARM.—Juniors' Anniversary, the children being well to the front all day. ... Meeting at night roused special attention by the peculiar subject announced, "She let the Baby Fall"; three souls at the Cross. There are good times in store for the juniors here.'

'SHEFFIELD I.—The public-house boomers on Saturday night were invited to speak and sing in a number of houses visited, admission being only refused in two or three cases. ... This work is being much blessed, and resulted in the disposal of sixteen dozen copies of Army literature. Adjutant— was with us for the week-end. On Sunday night twelve seniors and seven young people surrendered, also twenty-five young people in the Young People's Hall, making over forty for the week.'

'REGENT HALL.—... A "White Service" at night; impressive reading of God's views on sin and purity by three little children, driven home by addresses of Brother— and Mrs. Adjutant—. Results seen at Mercy-seat were nine for forgiveness.'

'CHALK FARM.—Welcome home of our officers; torrents of rain, but showers of blessing. Magnificent crowds at night; inside, eight souls sought salvation; corps in good fighting trim. Band going on ten days' tour through the south-west of England, taking in Bank Holiday.'

An examination of these weekly reports in 1903 appears to indicate that in normal circumstances the Army's conversions of adults alone must average at least some 400 or 500 a week through the year in Great Britain. This does not include those persons, understood to be already saved, who are enumerated in many of the reports as going up for 'sanctification' or 'holiness'. As a very large number of the corps do not send in a report regularly every week, it is probable that 500 adult converts a week will be a very moderate estimate as the aggregate for all the corps. This makes 26,000 adult converts a year.¹

¹ The moderation of this estimate is proved by the fact that the Army's annual reports for 1887 and 1888 give the number of persons who 'sought salvation at the penitent form in the United Kingdom' during these two years as 148,905 and 154,200 respectively. Since then no figure appears to have been given. As the field for this kind of work is still admitted to be almost unlimited, and as the Army's converting power must be assumed to have increased in some proportion to the enormous increase of its public subsidy since 1887-8, the corresponding annual number of converts to-day, inclusive of young persons, should be well over a quarter of a million in this country.

The Army has been in existence forty-three years under its various names and forms, and as far back at least as twenty years ago its converting power was probably no weaker than it is to-day. But its adult effective in London recently was less than 13,000 persons, and in Great Britain its strength is probably much less than 100,000 adults all told. What, then, it must be asked, has become of the millions of converts made in this country by the Army? For, when the work of conversion among children is also considered the total must run into millions. Even if it be admitted, however, that as many as three-fourths of the adult converts made by the Army escape it in consequence of backsliding or any other cause, it would still be reasonable to look for an adult membership of at least 750,000 in this country to-day. The objects of the Young People's Legion, it must be remembered, are 'to make Salvationists of the young people who come under the influence of the Army', and 'to be a middle link between the Juniors and the Seniors, completing the chain of lifelong Army Soldiership' (*O. and R.*, p. 363). Evidently the League does not accomplish its objects, and it follows that the conversions among the juveniles are as lacking in permanence as those effected among the adults. The Army, apparently, cannot produce or account satisfactorily for more than a very small fraction of the converts it claims to have made, and it is, therefore, necessary to conclude that, on the whole, its reported conversions are not conversions at all.

Even the successful reform of the evil-doer by sudden conversion is apt to be accompanied by increased antipathy towards religious influences on the part of those persons constituting his immediate environment. What must be said, then, of the influence upon the masses of conversions, of which they are the constant witnesses, in which the proportion of failures to nominal successes is, on the most moderate estimate—that is, after wiping off 75 per cent. of those reported—as something like nineteen to one? The spectacle of perpetual backslidings

alternating with re-conversions is not edifying to any one, and its influence upon the classes for whom it is so plentifully and so prominently provided by the Army cannot be otherwise than morally pernicious, and inimical to the appreciation of genuine religious influences and experiences of any kind. To the Army, then, must be given the credit, not so much of having effected numerous conversions, as of having done more than all other agencies, whether religious or irreligious, to bring the process of conversion, as well as religion generally, into disrepute and contempt among the masses for whose spiritual and moral improvement it professes to exist.

It would appear that a goodly number of the conversions recorded weekly in the *War Cry* are really those of members of the Army itself or of other Christian bodies who find it necessary to undergo the experience repeatedly and at frequent intervals. This is hardly, however, the purpose for which the Army is generally understood to exist. It is in the 'social' work rather than the religious work that the public are mainly interested, but it is for the religious work and not the 'social' that they mainly pay. In any case, while the public might conceivably think it worth while to pay a fair price for the spiritual redemption of the unleavened masses, it is not easy to see why any one should finance a scheme which, in practice, resolves itself into the multiplex conversion of multitudes of excellent people who need no conversion. In the 'In Doubt' column of the *War Cry* we read that 'B.A.'—evidently a Salvationist—'has been to the penitent form many times but cannot seem to get the right thing. As a consequence she feels very miserable'. In the case of a Salvationist this is serious enough, but in that of the many thousands of outsiders with still more elementary religious instincts who must often have gone through the same inconclusive experience, moral indifference and recklessness, rather than misery of conscience, is almost certain to have been the only result.

As for those belonging to other religious bodies who go to swell the

Army's statistics of conversions, it seems to be admitted by General Booth himself that unless they remain in the Army their last state is apt to be worse than their first:—

'Multitudes of members of churches have come to the altars of the Salvation Army, seeking and professing to find holiness, who have not previously known the forgiveness of sins. They obtain pardon, and go away with power over sin, and, it is to be feared, get into trouble afterwards by confounding that power with inward purity' (*O. and R.*, p. 426).

Whether 'afterwards' here signifies in this world or in the next is not quite clear, but in either case this effect of indulgence in the particular variety of religious experience provided by the Army must be admitted to be sufficiently serious for the members of the churches.

The reactive evils of suddenly effected conversions naturally appear specially in cases where drunkards are concerned. That the Army has been instrumental in reforming a certain number of drunkards by means of conversion may be admitted, but it is apt to be overlooked that other agencies and influences, of which one sees and hears but little, and in which conversion plays no part, have proved themselves capable of reforming a good many also. It is not improbable, however, that the Army's system of ineffectual conversion may, in reality, have produced indirectly quite as many drunkards as it has saved directly. 'I do not wonder now', writes a woman ex-officer, 'that as the Salvation Army holds its open-air at G.—ten ex-officers go past with jugs for their husbands' beer.' In these days any motive urged for reformed conduct in men must, if it is to avoid the risk of doing more harm than good, both individually and socially, recommend itself as reasonable to them in their normal state. Even drunkards are not all unintelligent, though those that are not may often enough come to the Army's penitent form when 'too much muddled with drink to understand their position' (*War Cry*). But the principal motive placed before such people by the Army is one which cannot well appeal to them, when in their sober senses, as

being reasonable, or, indeed, as anything else than a species of unsubstantial bogey such as those with which injudicious parents seek to obtain the instantaneous adhesion of their younger offspring to the moral law.

There are other, and official, grounds for doubting the alleged efficacy of the Army's dealings with drunkards, as the following somewhat irreconcilable statements, made within a couple of weeks of each other by two almost equally competent authorities, plainly show:—

War Cry, April 25,
1903.

'The Salvation Army, as the General explained to the well-dressed people in the boxes at the recent Albert Hall meeting, is by no means a community of converted drunkards.'

War Cry, May 9, 1903.

'When Mrs. Booth incidentally mentioned the fact that during the past twelve months 5,000 drunkards had knelt at our penitent forms and given up the habit which had blighted their lives . . . the assembly heartily cheered the statement.'

It is unnecessary to question Mrs. Booth's statement that the 5,000 drunkards knelt at the penitent forms, but if Mrs. Booth is able to assert that they gave up their drinking habits all, or very nearly all, of them must have become members of the Army, as one would naturally, indeed, expect them to do. But this kind of thing has been going on at about the same rate of progress for more than a generation, and it would give the Army an accession of 100,000 reformed drunkards in the space of only twenty years. There are, moreover, the wives and families of many of them to be taken into account. But if our estimate of 100,000 as the maximum adult strength of the Army in the United Kingdom is at all near the mark—and if it is not that is the Army's fault—it would follow that there is absolutely no room in the community for any members who are not converted drunkards. If, then, any partial reconciliation is possible between General Booth's statement to the staid and well-dressed people at the Albert Hall and that of Mrs. Bramwell Booth to the more dowdy and enthusiastic audience of Exeter Hall, this fact must remain—that, however many thousands of drunkards

knelt at the Army's penitent forms within the year, very few indeed of them can be stated with any assurance whatever to have given up their drinking habits.¹

The most remarkable religious event of recent years was the Welsh revival of 1904-5. That movement has exercised the minds of many people, but it must have troubled the mind of General Booth more than most. His 'divinely appointed' revival agency had been quartered permanently throughout the Principality for many years without effecting any very notable results. Yet here was a great religious upheaval, on the same ground and affecting the masses, in the production of which the Army could not by any possibility claim a part. Such a remarkable occurrence might well have served to disturb somewhat the convictions even of the most loyal Salvationist regarding the particular revivalist methods divinely favoured as most suitable to the circumstances

¹ The frequently acknowledged friendship of the 'Trade' for the Army is probably a fair index of the degree of damage which Salvationism has proved itself capable of inflicting upon it. According to Colonel Eadie (*Daily Chronicle*, April 7), one of the chief causes which prevented the 1908 Self-Denial Fund from rising considerably was that 'many publicans' withheld their usual support because of the detrimental effect which the Licensing Bill would have on their interests. On April 11, however, General Booth, interviewed by the *Eastern Weekly Press* at Norwich regarding the Army's attitude towards the Bill, stated, in the course of a pronouncement which the questioner thought insufficiently definite, that the publicans who help the Army are really 'few and far between'.

Commissioner Nicol's apology for the Army's policy of 'holding off' in connexion with the Licensing Bill, which appeared in the *British Weekly* of April 9, 1908, does not seem to have satisfied the readers of that journal, if one may judge by the letters that have appeared (April 19), and by the fact that the Editor has been 'overwhelmed' with others, 'all criticizing adversely the action of the Salvation Army'. It would appear that the temperance question was not regarded as 'political' in 1889, when a Salvation Army petition of nearly 300,000 signatures in favour of Mr. Stevenson's Sunday Closing Bill was presented by him to Parliament. In those days, however, the Army did not 'visit' 13,000 public-houses a week for the sale of its literature, as Commissioner Nicol states it does now, thereby demonstrating that it is not 'wobbling', but is 'against the drink traffic, lock, stock, and barrel'.

of Wales. No sooner was the real revival well started than the Army bestirred itself by way of helping it on. It was not apparent that the revival needed the Army's help, but the Army clearly needed that of the revival. Queen Victoria Street saw its opportunity, staff officers were despatched, and the Welsh corps were spurred on to unwonted exertions. A visit by General Booth himself was arranged, and the press was presently full of the Army's Welsh doings. Welsh hymns were even inserted in the *War Cry*. For a moment it seemed almost that the revival might actually be identified with the Army. But a serious miscalculation had been made, namely, that of imagining that the Salvationist atmosphere, methods, and organization could be made acceptable and congenial to the Welsh temperament generally. Very shortly after his arrival in Wales General Booth appears to have discovered this mistake. The following quotation from the *Daily News*, which he has since affectionately described as 'my own paper', relates to one of his meetings and a subsequent interview with him at Aberdare on December 18, 1904, and indicates that his first enthusiasm regarding the possibilities of the revival had already cooled:—

'Another point of difference was that there were two collections. The plate is never seen at Mr. Evan Roberts' meetings. When asked his opinion of the revival after the meeting, General Booth said: "I can say nothing about what I have not seen. I have seen nothing here that would not have happened if I had come here six months ago—nothing like the meetings we had in Berlin and Scandinavia and Holland, where I had to speak through an interpreter. Perhaps the people here came chiefly through a kindly interest in me. I don't want them to see me. I want them to think of God."

'I think on the whole General Booth is a little disappointed, and instead of making the tour in the valleys which was expected I am told he is going back to London to-morrow.'

Here General Booth seems to proffer the amazing suggestion that he could have produced the Welsh revival if it had only occurred to him to go to Wales six months earlier. But he had had his field officers there for years, and in their case the element of kindly interest on the people's part would be unlikely to exclude purely spiritual

motives in listening to their message and submitting to their influence. Yet the revival did not come through them. Possibly General Booth's allusion is to his own meetings only, and in that case his meaning must be that he could have had equally good meetings in Wales six months before, which is quite possible. It was, however, his opinion about the revival and not about his meetings for which he was asked, and even he appears to admit that his own meetings were not really revival meetings, inasmuch as it was probable that they were composed mainly of people curious to see him rather than anxious about salvation. Must we conclude, then, that after having been in Wales nearly a week he was unable to distinguish any signs of the revival that had brought him down from London? Whatever be the solution of the dilemma one thing is certain: the revival remained after General Booth's departure and, although some of his corps derived some advantage from it in the principal towns, it succeeded in running its course most satisfactorily for many months without appearing to stand in need of any assistance from the Army. The lesson of the Welsh revival in regard to the Army is, therefore, that even in a population permeated by the strongest evangelical influences, the seeds of which are latent even in the minds of the lapsed and the depraved in virtue of early religious training and environment, the Army's methods are incapable either of effecting a revival, or of permanently attracting to its ranks any considerable number of converts while a revival caused by some other agency was sweeping through the length and breadth of the land.¹

The mind of Salvationism, with its essentially materialistic spiritual beliefs, its benevolent bigotry, and its calculated ignorance, has now been analysed. The first public question

¹ This conclusion has since received support from the publication of Mr. Howard Evans' statistics of the religious bodies in Wales. In analysing his figures the *Daily News* observed (November 21, 1906): 'The Salvation Army, Unitarians, and the Society of Friends are so small that they have been left out of account.'

that requires to be asked in connexion with the system founded on these bases relates to it as a purely religious organization. That question is: Is its work worth several hundred thousand pounds a year to the public of this country? It has been seen that the corps which collect this money from the public do no work which the congregations of other sects do not do. They endeavour to influence their environment and gain converts by holding open-air meetings, but though much money is thereby collected few of the alleged converts are afterwards to be found in the Army's ranks, or, indeed, elsewhere. Even if this work were successful the effort involved is not in itself costly. Indeed there is no good reason—apart from the excessive cost of the governmental system—why Salvationists, who generally claim to be religious enthusiasts and who are not exceptionally poor, should not be able to bear all the cost themselves. Nothing remains but the religious activity of these corps as ordinary congregations, existing for no other effectual purpose than their own spiritual benefit.

The question then resolves itself into this: 'Is it worth while for the public to pay the immense sum it does pay in order to provide about a hundred thousand people with a particular form of religion which is congenial to them and suited to their mental limitations, of which the public who provide it for the most part disapprove, and which, but for the extraordinary financial system and governmental incubus that hamper and oppress it, might reasonably be expected to be wholly self-supporting? Is it to be supposed that, if these good people were no longer provided by the public with their barracks, their bands, their rapid changes of field officers, and the frequent visits of staff officers, they would straightway go morally to pieces to the hurt of society? This is unlikely, for they could quite easily enter or return to the other religious bodies from which, according to Mr. Charles Booth, many, if not most, originally came. There is also the alternative of providing these things themselves. This would not be im-

possible if only the corps possessed the power or the courage to make a clean sweep of the imposts of Headquarters in the shape of rent charges, tribute, divisional tithe, and periodical divisional levies. It is these imposts that make it easy for the Army to make the bravest possible show before the world as an organization, while all the time the spiritual life and the numerical strength of its branches throughout the country are being sapped owing to the supreme need of money-getting to which they are subjected. Whether the Army influences the masses or whether it does not, the case for publicly subsidizing its religious work has still to be made out.

The second public question in regard to the Salvationist system relates to that distinct and relatively small portion of it which aims at the reclamation and industrial rehabilitation of the submerged or unfortunate by methods known as 'social'. It has been shown that only a very small portion of the total amount contributed to the Army's funds by the public is devoted to this 'social' work, and that the principal result of starting the 'Social' (Darkest England) Scheme in 1890 has been to attract to the religious war-chest of the Army an enormously increased public contribution. And this, moreover, while the volume of actual work done by both the religious and the 'social' section appears to have been either stationary or dwindling. This anomalous state of things can never be remedied unless the public generally can be got to see clearly what is 'social' work and what is not, and to insist either that the Army as a religious and congregational body shall be made absolutely self-supporting, or at least that its 'social' and its religious objects shall not be mingled in its appeals.

Taking the 'social' department alone, however, the question is this: Is it quite certain that the particular set of beliefs and the particular mental attitude towards life which constitute Salvationism can be beneficially inflicted upon the unfortunate persons whom the public entrust to the Army's 'social' care? One of the Army's officials has alluded enthusiastically

to the spiritual and moral 'bracer' which the 219 men sent to Hadleigh Colony under the Mansion House Fund of 1903-4 were given during their stay there, and it has been seen that the colony gave little else in return for the £666 which was paid over to it by the Fund. It is not clear, in the first place, that respectable men such as these, thrown out of employment by the stress of industrial conditions, stand in any special need of the peculiar kind of 'bracer' which the Army deems indispensable to the welfare of humanity at large. If unemployment were an indubitable evidence of sin, as disease is said to be by faith-healers outside the Army, something might be said for the system. But when it appears, not only that the persons 'socially' operated upon do not need the 'bracer', but that it is generally rejected by those who—though not actually submerged—in the Army's opinion, do need it, it follows that an enormous proportion of the total 'social' expenditure must be wasted in unsuccessful as well as needless religious propaganda.

When General Booth appealed to the public for money to start his 'Social' Scheme in 1890 he deemed it necessary to give certain undertakings regarding the use which was to be made of the Army's religious doctrines and methods in the conduct of the various branches of the 'social' work. It was promised that no compulsion should be exercised in obtaining their acceptance by the inmates of the different institutions. The following passages from *In Darkest England* are of interest on this point:—

'There is no compulsion upon any one of our dossers to take part in this meeting; they do not need to come in until it is over, but as a simple matter of fact they do come in' (p. 98).

'No compulsion will for a moment be allowed with respect to religion' (p. 110).

'There will be no attempt to enforce upon the Colonists the rules and regulations to which Salvation Soldiers are subjected' (p. 138).

'The religious welfare of the Colony would be looked after by the Salvation Army, but there will be no compulsion to take part in its services' (p. 139).

It must be admitted, however, that there were other passages in the book which were designed to warn the

discriminating reader that the religious freedom of the submerged might not in practice prove so absolute as is here promised. Thus, we read :—

'The second credential [of the Army] is the fact that, while using all material means, our reliance is on the co-working power of God' (p. 24r).

'If these people are to believe in Jesus Christ, become the Servants of God, and escape the miseries of the wrath to come, they must be helped out of their present social miseries' (p. 257).

'I must assert in the most unqualified way that it is primarily and mainly for the sake of saving the soul that I seek the salvation of the body' (p. 45).

This is tolerably explicit, and certain conclusions follow. So long as the principal qualification for officership in the 'social' work is acceptance of the Salvationist view of life and the universe, and so long as the 'social' officers hold that view sincerely, the passion for souls must necessarily prevail over every other purpose, and it must in the long run be exercised to the detriment and disability of those under their charge who show themselves refractory in adopting the same mental attitude and beliefs.

It is not the purpose of this inquiry to examine how far 'social' enterprises similar to that of the Army may be successful without religious influences. It may be pointed out, however, that reliance on such religious influences as those furnished by the Army must necessarily be a very expensive business, even if they were efficacious, which, generally, they are not and cannot be. Some idea of the relative cost of the religious influences utilized in the case of the Belgian labour colony at Merxplas and in that of the Army's colony at Hadleigh is afforded by the evidence given before the Special Committee of the Charity Organization Society in 1904. The Rev. J. C. Pringle's evidence contains the following passages :—

'Comparing Hadleigh with the Belgian colony, do you think that the voluntary effort at Hadleigh has a more reformatory effect upon the men—I mean the personal influence of the Salvation Army officers?—At Merxplas the priest is authorized to do his best to get the men into touch with their families again. He can do anything that he likes, and any effort that he can make he is welcome to make, but he is specially authorized to do

his best to get them into touch with their families again. If he can guarantee to the Administration that the man is going home again to make a fresh start they have authority to release the man. I am told that about one a month is released on these grounds.

'The priest is only one man?—There are two priests, I think.

'At Hadleigh they have a large staff whose business it is to reform the men?—Yes' (*C.O.S. Report*, November, 1904, p. 202).

Before the same Committee Colonel Lamb, then director of the Hadleigh Colony, stated that he 'would not contemplate a colony without religious influences' (p. 135), while he also informed the Chairman that at Hadleigh the proportion of permanent or quasi-permanent officials and employés would usually be about 60 in 300 (p. 139). Speaking of Merxplas, Mr. Pringle mentioned a proportion of supervision of 1 in 80 as being in force there. Even if the same basis of comparison were not in the mind of both speakers, there can hardly be any doubt that the greater portion of the difference between 1 in 5 and 1 in 80 is to be accounted for by the Army's fixed belief that acceptance of its doctrines is essential to moral reformation and industrial rehabilitation, and by the defects of its management. The same criticism naturally applies to every other department of the Army's 'social' work. The following extract from the *War Cry* (June 6, 1903) relates to an interview with the director of one of the 'elevators':—

'This being an Army institution, you believe that salvation is an essential condition of lasting reformation?

"Yes," replied the Adjutant, whose patience did not seem even yet exhausted, "we aim at getting our men converted. At the present time, eighty-nine of the inmates of this institution profess salvation, and forty-eight of them are Soldiers of the Salvation Army."

The genuineness of 'professed' conversions obtained under such conditions it is permissible to doubt, but in any case it is hardly possible for an officer holding the opinions which he must hold, to deal impartially with those who, for any reason, hasten to get converted and those who, for any reason, do not. Even in the absence of actual compulsion—which absence, however, the inmates of the 'elevators' generally deny—it is clear that

sooner or later the Army's religious test must be brought to bear upon its protégés.

But is compulsion really absent? It is stated in 'The Religious Life of London' (*Daily News Census*) with regard to the Army's shelters in East London that 'while attendance may not have been compulsory, it is more or less regarded as such by all who use the shelters'. Moreover, General Booth's *Orders and Regulations* give, or gave, the following explicit directions for the guidance of his Prison Gate Brigades in the prosecution of their 'social' work :—

'The Brigade must understand that, when a man gives himself up to their care, they are under obligation to look after him until he has had a good chance of being saved. At the same time, no substantial help is to be given him until he shows proof of the genuineness of his desire for reformation at the penitent form, and by what appears to be to them a sincere profession in public, and corresponding proof in private, that he has given up his old life. When he gives evidence of being really saved, he must be provided with employment, and with some trifling help in the way of clothes, or payment for lodgings, until his own wages provide these things.'

These regulations, however extraordinary they may appear, must be admitted to be in perfect accord with the spirit of Salvationism which, so long as it is sincere, is hardly capable of modification.

As for the absence of religious compulsion in vogue at the Hadleigh colony, two cases which have recently come before the law-courts serve to illustrate how the undertakings of *In Darkest England* in regard to it are actually observed. A pauper chargeable to the City of London Guardians was sent to the colony, and on being asked to sign a form requiring him to attend divine service every Sunday he declined. He was thereupon sent back and given into custody for wilfully neglecting to maintain himself. At North London police-court on March 21, 1905, Mr. Fordham dismissed the charge on the ground that the condition to which he was required to agree was unreasonable. The second case was that of an inmate of the Poplar Union who, on being sent to Hadleigh, refused to sign a similar agreement. He also was placed in

custody and charged with the same offence. The magistrate held that he was justified in refusing to sign, and dismissed the case. In this instance the Guardians lodged an appeal, but on February 2, 1905, the Lord Chief Justice decided that the magistrate's decision must be maintained, on the ground that the conditions the man was asked to agree to 'had really no relation to the work at all'. Such cases serve to show that the unjustifiable detention and prosecution of innocent men might become one of the regular by-products of the 'social' enterprises of Salvationism if only the Army had its way.

Whatever objections may be entertained by individuals to all that is involved in Salvationism as a faith, it must be freely accorded the same right to live and influence its environment as that enjoyed by other religious bodies. There is as much reason and as little knowledge behind the present adulation of the Army as there was behind the persecution and the brickbats of former years. The question of toleration is one thing, but the question of publicly subsidizing such a body and becoming a partner in the work of disseminating its reactionary religious and secular opinions, is another and a totally different thing. With this question the much less extensive and less costly work done by the Army's 'social' department has nothing whatsoever to do. Other religious bodies have set up philanthropic institutions deserving of general public support, but on that account the public generally do not see the reasonableness of financing those religious bodies themselves. The case for demanding public contributions for the Army's religious work must also be considered on its own merits apart from its 'social' work, and once this is realized that case, to nine people out of ten among the Army's present supporters, will straightway fall to pieces.

CHAPTER XIV

THE GOVERNMENT OF SALVATIONISM
The application of an autocratic form of government to a religious organiza-

tion seems to require some justification, and the justification offered in the case of the Salvation Army is the success of its autocracy. The constant assertion of success must be distinguished from the thing itself, and it is impossible to deny that the statistical and financial data which are essential to show whether success has been achieved or failure have never yet been made public officially. Except in rare instances, the possibility of imposing and maintaining autocratic rule depends upon the lack of general intelligence that prevails among the governed. In this respect, at least, autocracy is not unsuited to the Army, but when the survival of the organization so long under its peculiar régime is instanced as being in itself a remarkable proof of its founder's power, it is necessary, on the other hand, to take into account the specially pliant nature of the material of which his forces have been and must necessarily be composed. Those who are fired with the belief that the instantaneous conversion of men is the one thing needful, and who are content to make every other interest in life subserve this end, are likely to prove as docile a set of subjects as any religious autocrat could well desire.

Though the nature of the governed tends to make the autocrat's task less difficult than it would otherwise be, it does not follow that the Army's autocratic and military constitution is that which is best adapted to attain the ends for which its members have banded themselves together. 'No religious institution', says General Booth, 'ever existed on the face of the earth which combined in so large an extent the two qualities of strength and freedom' (*O and R.*, p. 303). The question of strength has already been examined in some detail, the conclusion being that strength is one quality which the Army certainly does not possess and that, as certainly, it is unwilling to disclose its weakness. That it possesses great extension is true, but that extension only serves to throw into stronger belief its inherent local spiritual feebleness, as well as the evils of the system which, nevertheless, renders extensive growth possi-

ble and financially advantageous. As for freedom in an organization where independent intelligence is at a discount, where blind obedience is the golden rule throughout all ranks, where the most elementary rights of humanity are required to be signed away, and where the worldly savings of its members are utilized as yet another pledge of allegiance—the less said about that quality in Salvationism the better. 'If the value and utility of a government', says *Orders and Regulations*, 'be proved by its success in attaining the ends for which it is instituted, the successes which have accompanied the career of the Army, taken alone, establish its claims to be considered not only wise and useful, but of Divine appointment' (p. 303). The origin of the Army may or may not be divine, but it is in any case certain that benevolent institutions which are constantly proclaiming their divine origin as a reason for being freed from the obligation alike of internal representative government and external public supervision, are much more liable to become the vehicle of serious forms of abuse than institutions, equally benevolent in their aim, which are either less conscious of the divinity of their origin or less under the necessity of asserting it.

That the members of the Army should believe in the divinity of its origin and government is, of course, of some importance to those who control its destinies. It prevents, for one thing, a good deal of unwelcome inquiry on the part of the members as to the wisdom or justice of any particular official act. Occasionally, however, the spirit of inquiry will arise, as in the case of 'A. J.', who is bold enough to ask the editor of the *War Cry* (June 6, 1903) what will become of the Army and its property after the death of the General. In the reply 'A. J.' is assured that his anxiety is uncalled for. 'The Salvation Army', he is told, 'is divinely originated. The General—God bless him!—was the human agent to bring it into existence, but it was born in the heart of God, and He is well able to take care of it.' He is further informed, somewhat superfluously, that the property is held in

trust by the General for the organization, and is apparently left to draw the obvious inference that as the General's qualifications as founder and head of the Army are beyond human criticism all must necessarily be well. With minds capable of complying with such a demand upon the credulity, as with a system of government capable of making it, all things are possible. It is not surprising to find it laid down that 'loyalty to the Salvation Army means loyalty to God' on the part of its officers (*O. and R.*, p. 38), and that it is their business when told to do anything 'not to argue but simply to obey' (p. 300). There is, of course, as in the Society of Jesus, the proviso that the orders given must not be 'opposed to truth and righteousness', but as obedience is also required to all lawful commands 'whether understood or not' (p. 34), it would appear that consideration by officers of the truth, righteousness and lawfulness of orders given them is not likely to be encouraged. Officers must 'study the Orders and Regulations, and obey them to the letter like a little child' (p. 18). Observance of this species of corpse-like obedience is recommended to the officer as conducive to his true peace of mind (p. 300). 'If he commits his leaders to God', he is told, 'and trusts the Holy Spirit to guide them, he will have nothing to do but to obey their orders, and peace will be the natural result' (p. 301). This absolute abdication of one's own conscience and transference to others of the individual right to divine guidance in one's actions, may fitly be pondered by those members of other religious bodies who support the Army, but who profess to hold in abhorrence these identical principles when found in the government of the Jesuits, from whom they were, apparently, borrowed:—

'When it seems to me that I am commanded by my superior to do a thing against which my conscience revolts as sinful, and my superior judges it otherwise, it is my duty to yield my doubts to him, unless I am otherwise constrained by evident reasons.'

'I ought not to be my own, but His who created me, and his, too, by whose means God governs me, yielding myself to be moulded in his hands like so much wax. . . . I ought to be like a corpse, which has neither will nor understanding; or like a small crucifix, which

is turned about at the will of him who holds it; or like a staff in the hands of an old man, who uses it as may best assist or please him.' (St. Ignatius of Loyola, *On Obedience*).

If it be really the case that the obedience exacted by the Society of Jesus from its members is designed to destroy the individual conscience, it can only be said that that exacted by the Salvation Army is apt, in practice, to be a hundred times worse. The Jesuits point out, and plausibly, that a member of their order has in the course of the seventeen years that precede his full initiation every opportunity of understanding fully the purpose and bearing of every possible act likely to be required of him by his superior. The Jesuits, moreover, are intellectual men, and there is little risk of any of them starving if for conscience' sake they choose to forsake their order. The Salvationist officer, on the other hand, is frequently an ignorant man, his 'training' lasts but a few months, and it is utterly impossible for him to understand, or even to see, the working of the composite and complicated organization of which he is but an insignificant part. He is not, indeed, encouraged to understand more of it than is held immediately to concern him. If, therefore, his conscience is ever tried by his superiors, he is obliged to consider that he is a poor man, that his friends in the world are poor, and that in any effort made by him to find other work he will meet with no help, but with every possible hindrance, from his superiors. In such circumstances the problem must generally resolve itself into a choice between a stricken conscience and probable starvation. As for the relative probability under Jesuitism and Salvationism of commands offensive to the conscience being necessary to their maintenance and, therefore, being habitually imposed upon their members, it is not impossible, in view of the peculiar financial necessities and the manifold commercial enterprises of the Salvation Army, that even the Society of Jesus might come through the ordeal of comparison with credit or success. Whatever be the case under Jesuitism it is unnecessary to doubt that in the

Army the subjection of the conscience and will, 'means peace of mind,' as *Orders and Regulations* puts it, but it is peace of mind to the leaders rather than to their subordinates.

The subjection of the field officer to his superiors, even in matters that might fairly be regarded as his sole concern, is really about as absolute as it could well be. If his quarters are unsuitable he must on no account take any steps towards changing them without the written consent of his divisional officer. Moreover, 'no relatives, or friends from former corps or elsewhere, or other persons, will be allowed to stay with officers without the consent of the D.O.' (*O. and R.*, p. 474). The selection of the friends whom he shall entertain is thus one of the things in regard to which he must trust for divine guidance on behalf of his leaders. In entering upon his duties he is called upon to declare 'that he intends to live and die in the ranks of the Salvation Army' (Memorandum of Engagements, *O. and R.*, Appendix VII.). He also declares that he perfectly understands 'that no salary or allowance is guaranteed to him, and that he will have no claim against the Salvation Army, or against any one connected therewith on account of salary not received by him'. He must 'never receive any money for himself in the form of pay or presents or testimonials or other gifts' beyond the amount of his regulation allowance. This, as has been seen, leaves him the privilege of begging when the financial imposts of Headquarters leave him either with no salary or not enough. He must not accept bequests:—

'Officers should discourage any persons, whom they may have reason to believe to be desirous of benefiting them by will, from doing so, at the same time setting before them the claims of the cause they represent, and acting in this matter with the same disinterested devotion to the Kingdom of Christ as they would do in their daily labour for souls' (*O. and R.*, p. 499).

Headquarters recognize the possibility that the field officer, after having been moulded to the proper degree of self-renunciation, may nevertheless be left in possession of a heart. Even into its affairs the Army, frequently

with cruel and disastrous results, inserts its divinely fashioned finger:—

'If not courting, he [the officer] engages not to do so while he remains a Candidate, and not to begin to do so for at least twelve months after being appointed an Officer; he promises not to court any one at the Corps to which he is appointed, and never to commence, or allow to commence, or break off, anything of the sort, without first informing his D.O. or Headquarters, and never to marry any one marriage with whom would take him out of the Army altogether' (Memorandum of Engagements).

The regulations regarding courtship and marriage are really intended to be more stringent than the foregoing quotation conveys. In the chapter of *Orders and Regulations* which deals with what are described as 'the social relations of the F. O.' it is stated that 'officers will not be allowed to carry on any courtship in the town in which they are appointed' (p. 57). Moreover, the objection of Headquarters is not merely to marriages which would take officers out of the Army. 'Consent', it is stated, 'will not be given to the engagement of any male officer, unless the young woman is likely to make a suitable wife for an officer, and (if not already an officer) is prepared to come into training at once' (p. 58). Further, the officer is required to declare 'that he understands he may not be allowed to marry until four years after receiving his first commission as F.O., and agrees to that' (Memorandum). The justification for the engagement not to marry out of the Army is declared to be sufficiently established by the officer's own belief that the Army is 'God's method for promoting the salvation of souls' (p. 59). An official method of courtship is even prescribed for the amorous officer's guidance in the following curious paragraph headed 'Inquire of friends':—

'When the attention of an Officer has been drawn to any person, who seems to come up to his idea of a comrade for life, let him, after prayer and consideration, make careful inquiries of those likely to know something of the private character and real disposition of the individual' (p. 61).

Having thus given Headquarters the right to rule his entire life for him, the unfortunate field officer—with whatever free will he has left—sub-

scribes to the following engagements :—

20. (a) 'He will never, on any consideration, do anything calculated to injure the Salvation Army, and especially that he will never take any part in, or in carrying on, any services held in opposition to the Army.'

(c) 'He fully understands that the General and the officers acting under his authority do not undertake to . . . retain in the service of the Army any one who is not . . . faithful and successful in it; and he solemnly pledges himself quietly to leave any Corps to which he may be sent, without making any attempt to disturb or annoy the Army in any way, should his Superiors desire him to do so. He discharges the Army from all liability, and pledges himself to make no claim on account of any situation, property, or interest he may give up in order to secure an engagement in the Army' (Memorandum).

One is disposed to wonder how sincere men possessed of even rudimentary intelligence can tolerate this extraordinary subjection of their liberty. The answer must be that a very large number of the Army's officers do not tolerate it long. In 1890 the total number of paid officers in the United Kingdom was 4,506, in 1901 it was 4,859, and it is in all probability not very much larger to-day. The nominal period of training for officers is now ten months, but until recently it was only six months. The present capacity of the training home is about 500, and its annual cost is about £13,000. While only a very few hundreds, therefore, have been added to the officers' strength during the past fifteen years in this country, some five or six thousand officers at least must have been trained mainly at the public cost. One of the many interesting pieces of information which the Army keeps jealously to itself is the number of resignations and dismissals of officers which take place every year. Making every allowance for the smaller demands of the foreign field, it is clear that the number of these severances in the United Kingdom must be considerable. The General, we have seen, reserves himself the right to dismiss officers who are not 'faithful and successful'. The unfortunate thing is that, under the Army's peculiar financial system, faithfulness is almost incompatible with the only sort of success that is likely to count with an officer's superiors. The ability to collect money from the public is the supreme need, and there

is obviously no relationship between that ability and the exercise of spiritual influence upon the masses. The faithful officer, when he has had experience of enough different corps to convince him that the whole system is radically wrong, will do his best to be quit of the business before his superiors conclude that it is high time to have recourse to clause 20 (c) of his engagements, which requires him to take his departure quietly. The successful field officer, on the other hand, is apt to be the man who, by whatever means, can respond most readily to the insatiable financial calls of Headquarters, who can perceive, for example, that the Army's interests are best served by regularly stationing his band for collecting purposes in the middle of the wealthiest streets to the neglect of the evangelization of the poorer quarters, and who has no conscientious scruples about obeying his superiors in all things, possessing the tolerably sure and certain hope that in so doing he is qualifying himself for promotion to a position in which others shall in like manner obey him. There is no lack of intelligence of a certain kind in the higher grades of the Army's officers, but there, as in the lower ranks, any intelligence that is to be useful to the organization is almost bound to be antagonistic to the development of spirituality and to the exercise of moral influence.

The principles governing the activities of staff officers are elaborately set out by the General in a special handbook of some 300 pages entitled *Orders and Regulations for Staff Officers of the Salvation Army* (London: International Headquarters, 1895). The system of staff officers comprises the General, the Chief of the Staff, commissioners, colonels, lieutenant-colonels, brigadiers, majors, staff-captains, adjutants and ensigns. None of the Army's publications appear to facilitate a comparison of the number of staff officers with that of the field officers, but the proportion holding the higher commands must be considerable and their maintenance must be very costly. The method of government in force throughout all ranks is described in the following passage :—

'The Army is constructed . . . on the principle that makes every officer specially responsible for those under his control :

'(a) The Local Officer is responsible for the maintenance of Discipline in the Soldiers under his care.

'(b) The Field Officer is responsible for the Local Officers and Soldiers in his Corps. And in like manner—

'(c) The Divisional Officer for the Field Officer.

'(d) The Provincial Officer for the Divisional Officer.

'(e) The Chief Secretary for all Staff Officers in the Territory, except when the Commissioner shall direct otherwise.

'(f) The Commissioner for Officers of the rank of Colonel and above.

'(g) The Chief-of-Staff for the Officers bearing the rank of Commissioner, or others filling a Commissioner's command even though they do not bear that rank.

'(h) The General is responsible for all' (*Staff O. and R.*, p. 245).

This is the system of government which General Booth declares not only to be divinely appointed but also to possess 'a strong resemblance to the government of the Jewish Church and nation' as well as to the system 'which prevailed in the early Gentile Churches' (*O. and R.*, p. 302). The members of the Salvationist hierarchy are reminded that although their manual is not intended to be 'a perfected or final authority' the principles of the Army 'remain as unchangeable as the throne of Jehovah Himself' (*Staff O. and R.*, Introduction). Here, as in the field, obedience to superior authority is absolute, and must in the long run be fatal to the free working of the individual conscience. The justification offered to staff officers for requiring 'unquestioning obedience' (p. 244) is contained in the following pronouncement:—

'The authority of the Salvation Army government is based upon :

'(a) The conviction that God has Himself created the Army and therefore arranged for its particular form of government.

'(b) That God Himself continues to be leader of the Army, and therefore guides and influences those whom He himself has placed in authority.

'(c) The fact that the system of government which prevails in the Army is modelled upon methods admitted to be of Divine origin' (pp. 18, 19).¹

The nature of the obedience which

¹ Commenting on these passages, the Roman Catholic *Tablet* remarks (March 16, 1907): 'The step from all this to the dogma of the infallibility of the General would not seem to be a very long one.'

proceeds from the acceptance of these articles of faith is expounded explicitly in the following paragraphs in the section entitled 'Authority':—

'Such power of direction and control, to be effective, must be accepted and obeyed irrespective of any choice or knowledge of the conduct respecting which the authority is exercised on the part of the individuals directed and controlled at the time. That is to say, the party possessing such authority will, of necessity, frequently require things to be done or suffered which the individuals doing or suffering may not understand, and sometimes may not even approve. The opportunity for making such explanations may be wanting, or the ability to comprehend them, if made, may be lacking on the part of those from whom the service is sought.

'If authority must wait until it has explained the desired action to those from whom it needs the performance, such authority would be next to useless; indeed, it would no longer be authority, but simple *good advice*, and would most certainly be a *hindrance* rather than a help to prompt and efficient action' (p. 18).

In attempting to fathom the purport of these amazing maxims in a body whose sole purpose, according to its foundation deed, is the enjoyment of religious fellowship and preaching the Gospel (Booth, a Deed Poll, August 7 1878, see Appendix 1, 2, § 3), it is necessary to remember that the persons who are required to observe them are not novices but have, for the most part, had several years' experience of the Army's religious work in the field. Every possible requirement of that work must, therefore, be presumed to be familiar to them, and if their intelligence cannot enable them to comprehend an explanation of what is required of them in their own department by their superiors, it is reasonable to assert either that they would never have been made, or ought never to have been made, staff officers. What, then, are the things which the staff officer may not understand or even approve, which he is nevertheless obliged to do, and in regard to which he must seek no explanation from those who command him to do them? As it is inconceivable that such things can arise in connexion with the Army's purely religious work, one is forced to the conclusion that the treatment which staff officers are frequently compelled by the system to mete out to their subordinates, the

secret and objectionable methods which they are required to countenance in suppressing publicity in regard to abuses, and the trading and financial transactions which engage so large a portion of their energies, are all designed, on a first acquaintance with them, to exercise either their understandings or their conscience.

It is not possible or necessary to impose quite the same measure of governmental subjection upon the rank and file as upon the field and staff officers. It is, nevertheless, difficult to see how General Booth's boast, 'We are a free people' (*O. and R.*, p. 19) can with any degree of fitness apply even to them. They too must declare their belief in the divine origin and direction of the Army, and promise obedience to their officers and to all orders and regulations that govern the organization (*Articles of War*). One of the most vital defects of Salvationism as a congregational system—and one, at least, of the causes contributing to the weakness of its corps—is the unalterable rule that neither soldiers nor local officers (i.e., unpaid office-bearers) shall have any effective voice in the management of their own corps.¹ The great International Congress held in London in 1904, to which officers and soldiers were brought at enormous expense from all parts of the world, possessed none of the deliberative or legislative powers usually associated with such an assembly. It was nothing but a magnificently engineered advertisement rendered necessary by the Army's numerical and spiritual weakness, which is largely the effect of its system of government and largely the cause of its absolute dependence everywhere upon mere sensationalism.² The following is the Army's simple rule on the subject of discussion:—

¹ The long-drawn conflict between the Salvationists of Motherwell and the police of that town in 1907 has been described officially as a struggle on behalf of free speech. If the Army were a body which allowed its members to enjoy that boon, instead of merely encouraging them to go to prison on its behalf, the official apology for the conflict might appear more reasonable than other explanations which must suggest themselves.

² The cost of this Congress to Headquarters funds alone figures in the accounts as

'Soldiers' Meetings are not intended to be, nor must they be allowed to become, meetings for discussion or dispute; in fact, it would be regarded as a proof of great incompetence on the part of a Commanding Officer that he should be heard to say of any subject, "I have laid it before the Soldiers, and they object." The affairs of a Corps must be directed by the C.O., and not by the voice of the Soldiers.

'Nothing in the nature of voting or taking sides must be tolerated in any Soldiers' Meetings' (*O. and R.*, p. 165).

In another section entitled 'Mutiny' the rule is repeated even more emphatically, and the reason for its enforcement given:—

'No Soldier, no matter what his position, must ever be allowed to speak against any Officer or Order or Regulation of the Army in public. . . . Once let any F.O. allow a discussion, or a resolution to be moved and seconded, and supported, and voted for, whether that resolution is for or against him, or for or against any Order or usage of the Army, and the F.O. will have acknowledged a principle which is and must be for ever foreign to the Constitution of the Army, and which, if once allowed to become the regular practice, would be destructive of its very existence' (p. 549).

If the essential element in the Army is its machinery rather than the work it is intended to perform, there is no doubt that the machinery would be very speedily shattered if the right to representation were once acknowledged. The Army is constantly losing adherents, and has already suffered from several serious schisms, both in this country and abroad, owing to the intolerable tyranny of its rule, and there are probably few corps in the country that have not at one time or another been at the point of open revolt against Headquarters. Headquarters, however, have been careful to secure the whip hand of the corps by the simple device of vesting all their property, down to the very instruments purchased by their own bandmen (*O. and R.*, p. 350), in the General of the Army, and of inducing many of their members to invest their savings in Army property. If, therefore, the conditions of government enjoyed by General Booth's soldiers realize his idea of religious freedom,

£9,229 2s. 8d. This does not, of course, include the travelling and other expenses of the many hundreds of Salvationists who were brought from all parts of the country and the most distant parts of the world.

one can only pray never to be confronted with anything answering to his conception of religious subjection.¹

Whenever schisms or internal troubles do occur in the Army the knowledge of them is localized as far as possible, and no allusion to them or discussion of their causes need be looked for in any official publication. Headquarters are well aware that, if such publicity were once permitted, combination would be facilitated and a general revolt of corps from the central authority, with a rearrangement of their property, would probably follow. The Army is the same all the world over, and those acquainted with its inner workings in this country were, therefore, not surprised to learn recently through the news columns of the daily press of certain dissensions which had occurred in the German organization. During General Booth's visit to Germany in November, 1905, a public meeting, convened by several ex-officers of the Army, was held in the Germania Halle, Berlin, for the purpose of calling attention to certain evils of the Army's religious and 'social' administration. The meeting was attended by many of the Army's members and supporters, and the proceedings consequently became so riotous that after six hours the police had to intervene and put an end to it. A short description of the meeting, which took place on the evening of Thursday, November 23, was telegraphed from Berlin by the Central News Agency on Friday and was published by certain English journals on Saturday, November 25. On that day the *Daily News*, which before and since has frequently closed its columns to informed criticism of the Army's

¹ General Booth, when in Japan, assured a newspaper representative that his autocracy is in reality 'tremendously democratic', and the *War Cry* has recently been at pains to encourage the same idea. It is to be feared that General Booth's idea of a democracy is very like the Tsar's idea of a Duma. The Imperial formula: 'United and vigorous service in the direction indicated by us', is really a liberal interpretation of the measure of Salvationist freedom. What the General calls 'whole-hearted co-operation' of the simple souls who form the rank and file may be admitted. It serves admirably to blind the public to the actual and potential evils of the whole system.

finances and administration, expressed surprise that such a meeting should have been held, and suggested that it might be accounted for by the hypothesis that the German branch, being relatively young, was 'still misunderstood, as the British branch used to be'. The Berlin opposition, however, clearly came, in the first place, from the inside and not from the outside. If any one ought not to misunderstand the Army it is surely its own officers, but they obviously cannot remain in it if they mean to speak out regarding evils and abuses. Why officers who have been forced out of it in consequence of these evils, or who have left it for conscience' sake, should be open to the charge of misunderstanding it, is really difficult to see.

The *Daily News* considered General Booth's German tour of sufficient interest to its readers to engage a 'special correspondent' to report its incidents at some length. It appears that this gentleman was in Berlin when the 'protest' meeting was held and, moreover, that he was actually present at it. In these circumstances, as he ostensibly represented the interests of the *Daily News* readers and not those of the officials of the Salvation Army, it might reasonably have been expected that he would transmit to his journal some definite statement of the alleged causes which led to the action of ex-officers Roeder and Willich in holding the 'protest' meeting. The strange thing is that although he deemed the meeting of sufficient interest and importance to follow its proceedings throughout from 7 p.m. to 1 a.m., when it was broken up by the police, he did not think it worth while to mention a single word about it in his letter of November 26 to the *Daily News*. Not until over a week after the Central News telegram had appeared did he refer to the incident, and then the sole purpose of his observations was to lay stress on the absolute insignificance of the incident which seems to have interested him as a private individual so intensely. Thus:—

The *Daily News*, Dec. 5, 1905.
(From our Special Correspondent.)

'Throughout the tour in Germany there has been but one untoward incident, and to

that I would make no reference had not altogether exaggerated and garbled reports of it reached England. I allude to the "protest" meeting held in the Germania Halle, Berlin. As one who was present at that gathering, which was called by a few ex-soldiers of the Army and other opponents, let me say there were never more than 300 persons present, and by no means the whole of these were opposed to the organization the meeting was called to condemn.

There are several points of interest in this statement. The writer professes, apparently, to touch upon the matter solely for the purpose of rectifying certain exaggerated and garbled reports said to have appeared in the English press. He does not, however, so much as mention, much less rectify, any single statement made in the Central News report or any other report whatsoever. As he implies that he was present throughout the meeting it is necessary to conclude that, although the proceedings interested him personally for six hours, he nevertheless judged it unnecessary, for some reason, to instruct the British public regarding them. After the affair has been reported in England through another source he mentions it only to make light of it, and it is impossible to obtain from his account definite particulars of any single one of the charges against the Army ventilated at the meeting. He states that the meeting was called by 'a few ex-soldiers', but he does not mention or controvert the Central News statement that the principal speakers were the ex-financial secretary of the Army's Berlin Headquarters and an ex-lieutenant. The *Daily News* was not, apparently, the only journal to which this gentleman furnished his 'special' correspondence. The statement, made in a letter published in the *Westminster Gazette*, that the charges were merely 'a wholesale slandering of the Army and its methods' unfortunately tells us nothing. Every charge adverse to the Army, however explicit and however true it may be, is apt to be regarded officially as a slander. The fact that it is possible to make such charges wholesale is no valid argument against the proper consideration of each of them in detail. The grievances of officers and ex-officers, as the following chapter

essays to show, are not usually lacking in precision. Some explanation is required, therefore, of the singular interest shown by this extraordinary 'special correspondent' in the Berlin 'protest' meeting, of his strange silence in regard to it in the first place, and of his airy dismissal of it afterwards as a thing of no consequence. The most reasonable explanation appears to be that the writer was either an official or member of the Salvation Army, or else was in some way so sympathetic with its interests as to debar him from giving publicity to any charges publicly made against it and, therefore, seriously to disqualify him from giving an impartial opinion regarding the importance of such charges after they had been published.¹

The intrusion of Salvationist journalism into the ordinary press is already tolerably widespread. When its purpose is merely to record the 'pretty little incidents'—the baby-kissing, and other 'little impromptu scenes'—which marked the course of the General's German campaign, 'ordinarily humane editors can hardly be expected to see any serious objection to the practice. But when its object or its effect is to keep the public in ignorance of definite and serious evils inherent in the Army's system, of which the public have, and can have, little or no conception, for which the public are ultimately responsible, and the truth of which is vouched for by honest and competent men and women, it is the business of editors—however sympathetic to the doctrines of the Salvation Army they may be—to ensure that their 'special correspondents' are men who will display and have some intelligent regard for the public interest, and who are under no mental compulsion to refrain from

¹ Outside the religious sphere the *Daily News* imposes a higher standard of freedom and public duty for special correspondents: 'The cablegram arrives, it reads like an infallible message from another planet, but who . . . is the man at the other end of the wire? What does he represent, apart from himself? For what does he stand? Why did he write just that, and nothing more? By what rule does he select his facts?' etc. (*The Daily News*, leading article, 'The Press and the Empire,' April 5, 1906).

reporting public criticisms merely because they are antagonistic to the interests of Salvationism. It is strange that a Liberal journal should appear to find it natural to regard as incredible the existence of evil and injustice in an organization so reticent and so autocratic both spiritually and financially. That this has long been the attitude of the *Daily News*, ex-officers and others who have had their letters suppressed during the past few years can testify. Happily there appears at length to be a ray of hope even for General Booth's 'own' paper, and that from within. Very shortly after the Berlin incident Mr. Chiozza Money, M.P., who is responsible for the column in the *Daily News* entitled 'Life and Labour', was moved to address certain definite inquiries to the 'social' wing of the Salvation Army regarding the wages paid the men employed by it in the manufacture of firewood. Although he returned to the charge several times Mr. Chiozza Money failed to obtain a straightforward, explicit, and satisfactory answer to his questions. If the *Daily News* chooses to exercise a similar spirit of inquiry in the other departments of the Army's work its faith in the beneficent working of Salvationism is likely to be rudely shaken all round. One may even look forward with some confidence to the day when the *Daily News* will perceive some of the defects that lie behind the Army's system of publishing accounts which it lately deemed so satisfactory on the assurance of Headquarters, when it will hesitate to regard Farm Colony dialogues in the vein of Queen Victoria Street as unprejudiced contributions to a serious economic question, when it will recognize that the statements of ex-officers are not lightly to be rejected as biased or calumnious, and when it will be free to accept all the logical conclusions in regard to Salvationism of its own religious census.¹

¹ During the past year or so there have been intermittent indications that the faith of the *Daily News* is less implicit than it has been. It is doubtful, indeed, whether it is the *Daily News* that General Booth now regards as his 'own' paper in London. His official organ has had occasion to allude to it both in sorrow and in anger, in connexion

While the true purpose of Salvationism is to subordinate all material and worldly interests to what, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as the things of the spirit, the effect of its government is to subordinate all spiritual interests to the necessity of its own maintenance. The body and not the spirit of the Army is its chief concern. Its autocratic and military system has become a fetish. The adoption of military titles, organization and methods in religious warfare is imposing, but their utility is a mere delusion. When General Booth, in 1880, decided to christen his Christian Mission 'The Salvation Army' he was led astray by a phrase. There is, in fact, no real analogy between the enemy confronted by an ordinary army and that which it is the aim of his soldiers to subdue. The necessity of 'prompt and efficient action' (*ante* p. 131) is obvious enough when it is a question of circumventing the strategy of an elusive and mobile foe. Sin, however, is neither elusive nor mobile in a geographical sense. General Booth is, indeed, convinced of its stability and omnipresence. It is not sudden and endemic in its activity, and an emergency calling for the instant dispatch of an Army corps, say, from Hackney to Brighton, is hardly to be contemplated in the species of warfare engaged in by Salvationists. Apart from such emergencies no purpose whatsoever is to be served in the Army's religious work by 'prompt and efficient action'. Indeed, the very possibility of exercising such action does not exist. As the only justification for the Army's elaborate and expensive military system and discipline is the exercise of such action, the necessity of both system and discipline disappears and their futility ought to be apparent.

Headquarters are naturally apprehensive lest the enormous disproportion between the cost of the religious machine's maintenance and the insignificant amount of work it performs should penetrate the intelligence of the public. The staff officer, like the

with its reports of Mr. Stennett's charges as to the Hanbury Street 'elevator', as 'our usually well-informed contemporary'.

field officer, is told to remember that soul-saving must come before money-getting, but he is not told how he is successfully to observe this order of precedence under the Army's system. 'Only let the people come to imagine', says his manual, 'that we care more for money than for souls, and farewell for ever to our influence' (p. 35). This caution, coming at the end of several pages of directions as to the best means of collecting money and making others collect it, is, possibly, well advised. It is admitted in the staff regulations that the Army's chief source of income for religious purposes is the public and not its own members, and the staff officer is therefore recommended to 'invent new methods for getting money' from those outside its ranks. This appears to be the one thing in connexion with which individual initiative within the Army is permissible. Most people would be disposed to imagine, however, that here the field of invention was already exhausted, but there is, the staff officer is assured, 'as much room as ever for ingenuity in this direction' (p. 31). One of the conclusions reached in the course of this examination is that the Army no longer possesses the influence which it may once have exercised, and it is, therefore, not improbable that 'the people' have actually come not merely to imagine but actually to know that which it is, apparently, one of the functions of the staff officer to endeavour to conceal from them.

The evils of the Army's autocratic rule must be considered from the standpoint of the public as well as from that of its own members. It is bad enough that there should be no outlet either in the meetings or in the numerous publications of the organization for criticism from within or for the ventilation of internal suggestions for reform. It is worse that the public who maintain the system should be deprived of proper means of knowing how much or how little work is done, what it costs, how the funds are administered, and whether proper guarantees exist that the various financial undertakings that have grown up alongside the religious work are wisely and

safely managed. It has been the object of this inquiry to show regarding these points (1) that the public, in the first place do, in fact, contribute to the religious work largely under a misconception; (2) that they have no means of learning all that it is essential for them to know about the conduct of that work; and (3) that wisdom and safety in regard to the administration of the immense amount of money invested at interest in the Army directly, or indirectly through its financial institutions, are in the very nature of things impossible.

It is time that General Booth should be brought back to first principles, and the first principle applicable to the case of the Salvation Army is that autocracy, with its concomitants of secrecy and resentment of independent supervision, is absolutely inconsistent with a financial dependence upon the public so complete as that enjoyed by his organization. As for the contributing public it is hardly possible that belief in the divine conduct of the Army's affairs has, on the whole, very much to do with their sympathy and support. Even if they entertain any such belief in regard to its religious work, they are unlikely, in view of the history of the Army's defunct Building Association, to be willing to extend it to the 'twofold' operations of the Army Assurance Society and the Reliance Bank, Ltd. If such institutions are not to be productive of serious harm, the common worldly safeguards in regard to security must be imposed upon their management in preference to those furnished by the alleged divine nature of their origin or control, which, no doubt, carries considerable weight with many, if not most of, the Army's very numerous investors. The provision of dividends amounting to over £30,000 a year is as foreign to the true purpose of the Army as is the maintenance of a military system managed by an ornamental 'general staff' which is at once huge, costly and—for truly religious purposes—useless. Both the dividends and the system are in reality provided and made possible by the public, and if their money is productive of any other results the Army does not

allow them to be adequately seen and tested.

Religious autocracy of the Salvationist stamp is undoubtedly bad in itself, but the combination of the religious and the financial autocrat in one person possessing powers of dealing with the savings of the people free from any supervision or control, is a burden which no one man ought to undertake or be called upon to bear in any cause, however beneficent. The chief purpose of the combination is that the autocrat's financial needs in his religious capacity should be capable of being satisfied by the money lent or entrusted to him in his capacity as ordinary financier, and it is the autocrat himself who is the sole judge of the reasonableness and safety of the financial transactions that take place between the two personalities that thus constitute his being. If the Army cares more for souls than for money it is all the more unfortunate that it should be under the necessity of foregoing and repressing its real desires. But with the autocratic, military, and financial system by which the Army is governed, that necessity is and must be inevitable and perpetual.

CHAPTER XV

THE ARMY'S TREATMENT OF OFFICERS

THE fact, shown by the large number of men and women that pass annually through the Training Home without any material increase appearing in the number in the field, that many thousands of field officers have been compelled for one reason or another to leave the Army's service is in itself a striking proof that there is something fundamentally wrong in the conditions under which they are required to work. While the staff officers draw salaries which are both adequate and assured, these field officers receive their salaries only after they have met all the local expenses of their corps. If the amount remains in hand a captain, if unmarried, is entitled to 18s. a week, or, if married, to 27s. a week and an allowance of 1s. or 2s. for each child according to age, and the corps also pays the rent of the officer's quarters. If the amount does not remain in hand the

field officer, when in need, has three courses open to him: he must either beg, starve, or resign, for the Army's financial system excludes the possibility of any, or any material, help coming from divisional Headquarters. The provision that divisional officers shall see that every field officer receives a minimum salary of 5s. a week is, unfortunately, apt to prove theoretical. Under the Army's system the field officer will naturally do his utmost, when in need, to avoid applying for relief to his superior. The divisional officer, being himself squeezed financially from above, will be unlikely—even if he were always able—to grant it unasked. While many officers resign because their eyes are at length opened to the fact that their spiritual aims are inevitably frustrated by the Army's system of government, many others are forced to do so mainly because that system renders it impossible for them, however faithful and painstaking they may be, to obtain a decent living wage.

Those field officers who remain may be divided into three classes: (1) ambitious men who aspire at all costs to become staff officers, and in whom all spiritual aspirations are subordinated to the desire to get on and to exercise authority; (2) men who, though interested in the work and not, perhaps, undergoing excessive or incessant hardship, would gladly leave the service because of its official materialism if only they could find something better to do outside; and (3) men whose simplicity debars them from perceiving the Army's defects as a religious machine, and whose hearts are so thoroughly in the work that they are willing to suffer almost any hardship rather than abandon what they sincerely regard as their duty. The first class, whether they succeed or fail, require little sympathy. It is with the fate of the others that it is necessary for the public to concern themselves. The second and third class are, probably, about equally numerous, and they constitute all but a small minority of the field officers. The question what becomes of them when they are ultimately compelled to leave the Army, or when the Army

compels them to leave it, is economically serious. Legally the Army recognizes no obligation towards them. A man who has spent fifteen, ten, or even five years of his life as a Salvationist officer is apt to be at a serious disadvantage if suddenly called upon to take part in the ordinary secular avocations of the world, and even at its best the Army's scale of remuneration effectually debars him from making any provision for the future. The religious section, therefore, appears admirably designed for the wholesale manufacture of that submerged class which it is the professed mission of its 'social' section to succour and eliminate.

Nor are appearances deceptive. Sufficient facts exist to prove that if the Army would but set its hand to the task of raising its own submerged officers and ex-officers it would have neither energy nor time to spare for more imposing undertakings for a considerable time to come. It would surprise the public, if not General Booth, to learn what very many of the field officers actually in the service at present think about the administration of the Army, and what they say and write about it to their own friends. Evidence from within relating to officers' hardships, the precariousness of their position, the tyranny of superior officers, and the spiritual futility of the whole system, is, for obvious reasons, not available for publication with all the details necessary for its substantiation. But a mass of such evidence exists, and the public who, when all is said and done, are really responsible for the maintenance of the Army's system, should see to it that these officers are afforded facilities for discussing and publishing their grievances under a proper guarantee of indemnity in regard to the utterances of individuals. It is quite possible, however, to judge the manner in which the Army treats its officers from the statements of those who have either left the service or have been forced out of it. The Army has more than once cautioned the public against accepting the statements of ex-officers. Because they are ex-officers, it is argued, their evidence is especially

liable to be untrustworthy. Our examination of Salvationism has shown that if some people enter the organization in the hope of saving their souls it is certain that many must be obliged to come out of it—if they only can—for the same purpose. The interest of the higher staff officers in maintaining the existing state of things is material; but, on the other hand, the grievances of ex-officers are not usually accompanied by antagonism to the Army's religious aims and methods. It must be noted that men and women may become ex-officers after years of faithful service, and that their severance from the Army is not the result of dismissal for any fault. It is clear, therefore, that ex-officership cannot in itself be accepted as conclusive proof of a predisposition to lie, any more than staff-officership in itself can be accepted as an absolute guarantee of truthfulness in regard to any alleged evils in the organization.

The details of two cases in which Salvation Army officers have been harshly dealt with by the authorities are here given because there is ample evidence to prove (*see* Appendix v., 3) that the cases are by no means isolated, and that they fairly illustrate the treatment to which officers and ex-officers are liable to be subjected, as well as the customary and approved method by which the Army rids itself of men and women who have spent themselves physically and mentally in its service, shirks its moral responsibility towards them, and stifles publicity in regard to them. The particulars here given are based upon the verbal and written statements (*see* Appendix v., 1 and 2) of the men themselves, upon the independent investigations of their cases by the author, and upon the statements of the Army itself.

The first case is that of ex-officer S——¹, now 51 years of age. He was a sailor before becoming converted and entering the Army's service as an officer about eighteen years ago. During his fourteen years of service he never had a week's rest or holiday. He admits that he could have had a

¹ The Army authorities are, of course, aware of the identity of the cases cited.

periodical rest, but he was so taken up with his work that he did not want it. Such devotion is not unusual and is not officially discouraged. During his fourteen years' service his salary averaged only from 4s. to 5s. a week. If on a few rare occasions it was a few shillings more, on many others the whole amount available for his salary was only a few pence. There is ample evidence, apart from his own statement, to show that he was loved and respected in all his different commands, and that he bore the very highest character for honesty, truthfulness, piety and hard work. During the last two years of his service his health was seriously failing. He found it hard to do his work, but did not complain. His commands (Harlesdon, Snettisham Wymondham and Wells) were very poor, he had very little help, and he was for some time short of food. On many occasions he had nothing but bread and water, and sometimes, for several days at a time, not even that. During two winters he had no overcoat, and the outdoor work in all sorts of weather had its effect. He had to tramp some 50 or 60 miles a week in order to sell his fixed regulation number of *War Crys*. His divisional officer did not give him any help. When his health broke down completely, about October, 1903, and he was utterly unable to work, he petitioned his divisional officer for a long rest. He was peremptorily summoned to an officers' council 30 miles distant, although he was really too ill to attend, and was then told that Headquarters were not prepared to give him the rest he needed. He was thereupon obliged to resign (January 11, 1904).

The Army gave him £7, and later, when he was in great need, £6 more after much pleading. As he had no relatives to help him, no furniture, and very little clothes, this money did not last very long, and the circumstances in which he was placed—for several months he was without a bed in Norwich—were not designed to enable him to re-establish his health and obtain employment. As he was in great distress he wrote to Headquarters asking for help and work. He was offered an agency in the Assurance

Society, but as there was no vacancy in the town in which he was living he was asked whether he would accept an agency in another town. He said he would accept it, but pointed out that he was a good deal behindhand with his rent, and that, as his overcoat and other necessary articles of clothing were in the pawnshop, he did not see how he could leave the town and take up the agency unless the Army first enabled him to put these matters right. The official concerned did not offer to help him in this direction, but apparently took offence and wrote saying that if he would not work neither should he eat and that he could not have the agency. He was next referred to his former divisional officer, but he either would not or could not find him work. On several occasions, however, he was given (locally) a few shillings after much pleading. During the winter of 1904-5 he had for long periods no fire in the house, and for weeks at a time he had nothing to eat but weak tea and bread. On several occasions, when in Norwich, he had no food for two or three days at a time. When General Booth was in the town holding special meetings he wrote to him explaining his state, but although the letter is known to have been received by the General no proper notice was taken of it. On several occasions before and since S— wrote to Headquarters and laid his case before Mr. Bramwell Booth, the Chief of the Staff, but no help was given him and his letters were not answered. He was, therefore, dependent for many months in Norwich, and later in Ipswich, on the charity of friends, some of his principal helpers, curiously enough, being ex-officers of the Salvation Army who, unlike him, were fortunate enough to get out of its service before the springs of their manhood had been seriously undermined.

The second case is that of ex-employé C—, who was engaged for fourteen years in the Army's 'social' work in various capacities. Before entering the Salvation Army, C— was a bandsman in the Gordon Highlanders. An injury to his spine compelled him to go into hospital and left him very lame, although his health

has always been good otherwise and he has not been incapacitated from doing work of the most varied nature. He is now about 47 years of age, married, and has three children. On leaving the hospital, as he did not wish to be a burden to his wife, who then did dressmaking, he applied to the 'social' wing of the Army for work. For twelve months he did wood-chopping, receiving no salary but only board and lodging. He raised a brass band among old soldiers, begging old instruments from the Salvation Army bands, and the band so formed was made use of all over London on behalf of the 'social' work. After a time he was sent to the 'Metropole' in Stanhope Street, Strand, as cashier, where he received 3s. a week in addition to board and lodging. After five months he was sent to the Headquarters dépôt in Whitechapel Road to act as cashier and stockkeeper, and after six months of this work his grant was raised to 5s. a week. Subsequently he was given 16s. a week, he boarding himself. Three months later he was taken on the Headquarters staff, receiving 20s. a week, with board and lodging. In addition to his ordinary work he taught his Colonel's children, known as the 'Richards Midgets', music, and with them he was sent all over England giving musical evenings at week ends, and raising hundreds of pounds for the Army's funds in the course of three years.

When Colonel Richards was transferred to Denmark, C—— was sent back to the dépôt, his wages being reduced to 7s. a week with board and lodging. This reverse was a great blow to him, as he had a wife in bad health and two children. Some time later his Commissioner raised his salary to 17s. a week, and six months afterwards he was sent to Bristol as cashier and second in charge of the shelter work there. After twelve months he was transferred back to London, resuming his former duties of cashier and stockkeeper, and receiving 25s. a week minus board and lodging. Eight months previous to December, 1904, he was informed by Colonel Laurie that Commissioner Sturgess had instructed him to give him reasonable

notice to terminate his appointment, on the ground that the Army could not afford to pay 25s. a week for a cashier. Colonel Laurie did not then give him notice, but counselled him to look out for something else. It was admitted that C——'s services were possibly worth 25s., but no alternative proposal was made to pay him such a sum as the Army could afford. C—— looked out for work but, chiefly in consequence of his lameness, failed to find any. On December 16, 1904, he was informed that the Commissioner had definitely decided that his engagement should terminate on January 1, 1905. He was given £6 in lieu of a month's notice and was discharged next day. Since then C—— was for a considerable time dependent on charity, and so were his wife and family. He wrote to Mr. Bramwell Booth in February, 1905, but received no reply. He applied to the Army Labour Bureau to find him work, but the Army was, apparently, unable or unwilling to do anything for him. Moved by the urgent representations of Mr. David Lumsden, a gentleman who has for some years done his best to help distressed Salvationist officers, the Army consented to administer some small temporary help to C——'s wife and family when in great distress, but since August, 1905, the Army has done nothing to help them beyond giving some doles of a few shillings which it ultimately declined to continue.

The Army's extraordinary treatment of ex-officers S—— and C—— probably explains its desire to evade public discussion regarding their cases. On October 9, 1905, the *Times* published a letter from Mr. Lumsden calling public attention to these two cases, giving certain particulars but mentioning no names in order that the Army might be free to publish its reply. To the statements in that letter the Army vouchsafed no reply in the *Times*. On the same day, however, Commissioner Nicol granted an interview to, or obtained an interview with, the representative of a London evening journal (the *Evening News*) with regard to the statements made in the *Times* letter. In the report of that interview, published the same evening,

Commissioner Nicol caused it to be inferred that the Army authorities were not on October 9 in possession of any definite particulars regarding the two cases in question. 'When Mr. Lumsden', he said, 'gives the names and other facts we shall be prepared to deal with them; otherwise, we know nothing'. He further stated that 'under no circumstances would an officer be cast off from the service of the Salvation Army on account of ill-health or other kindred causes without being assisted, and every effort being put forth for putting him in the way of earning an honest and comfortable livelihood'.

It appears, however, that when these utterances were delivered the Army officials could not have been in any doubt or under any misapprehension whatsoever as to the identity of the cases to which allusion was made, inasmuch as both Mr. Lumsden and the two distressed officers concerned had been in communication with Headquarters for some time before the letter which occasioned the interview appeared in the *Times*. It has been seen that S—— himself had written once to General Booth and frequently to London Headquarters, and that previously some obligation towards him had been acknowledged. On September 17, 1905, about a fortnight before the *Times* letter was written, Mr. Lumsden telegraphed to General Booth:—'Field officer S—— discharged from Army owing ill-health. Fourteen years' service. Starving Norwich. Has written you for help.' To this message neither Mr. Lumsden nor S—— received any reply. With reference to C——'s case Mr. Lumsden wrote to Commissioner Sturgess on December 22 and December 27, 1904, and on January 4 and 5, 1905. On August 21, 1905, he telegraphed to the Army's 'social' Headquarters as follows:—"Submerged", London.—Send Mrs. C—— assistance immediately. Child dead, family starving. Give C—— work.' He also telegraphed to Mrs. Bramwell Booth about the same time. It was in response to these messages that some small temporary help was in this case given by the Army. On August 28, 1905, Mr.

Lumsden again wrote to Mrs. Booth urging that something more should be done, but since that time, with the exception already mentioned, the Army has done nothing further.

In view of these facts it is difficult to understand how an officer empowered, as Commissioner Nicol appears to be, to make a public statement in regard to alleged occurrences of this serious nature, can either be kept in ignorance of such facts, or, if they are within his cognizance—as they surely ought to be—can be permitted to inform the public that the Army knows nothing of them. Commissioner Nicol's extraordinary pronouncement is the only official statement that has been publicly vouchsafed with regard to the statements made in the letter published by the *Times*, and that official statement goes no further than suggesting that the Army was totally ignorant of the identity of the particular cases in question or of any definite charges in connexion with them. If Commissioner Nicol did not know that his superiors were aware of the identity of the cases, it was surely his duty, in view of the serious and definite nature of the details given in the letter, to make proper inquiries, either of his superiors or of Mr. Lumsden himself, before making any public statement concerning them. No such inquiries were made. If, however, his statement was made with the zealous precipitancy of ignorance, it was all the more incumbent on those of his superiors who were in a position to identify the cases to dissociate themselves from his inaccurate *communiqué*, and to give the public an opportunity of learning what the Army had to say about the cases on their merits.

It will be noted that, if the latter portion of Commissioner Nicol's statement is to be accepted as possessing official sanction, there was no essential difference between the Army and Mr. Lumsden as to the nature and extent of the Army's duty in such cases as those of S—— and C—— if only the men were deserving. As Headquarters showed no disposition to make any proper public statement regarding these cases an opportunity was afforded Mr. Bramwell Booth by the author of

stating by letter (1) how the discrepancy between his Commissioner's statement of ignorance and the actual facts was to be accounted for, (2) whether the cases of S— and C— were regarded by the Army as being in any respect undeserving, and, if so, in what respect, and (3) if they were not so regarded, what efforts had been put forth by the Army for putting the men concerned in what Commissioner Nicol had described as 'the way of earning an honest and comfortable livelihood'. To this invitation Mr. Bramwell Booth replied (November 24, 1905) that 'after careful inquiry he believes the departments of the Army concerned have done all, or more than all, for the persons referred to, that the resources at their disposal could properly allow'. This explanation, coming from the acting head of an organization which, at the moment when this letter was penned, was widely and expensively advertising its anxiety to undertake the relief of 'whole districts', is amazing. Whatever the Army may have done for S— and C— as ex-officers is little indeed in comparison with what they did for it as officers. If the Army had put forth 'every effort' to put them in the way of earning an honest and comfortable livelihood, this only goes to prove the extreme unwisdom of the Army's officers depending upon such efforts in the eventuality alluded to by Commissioner Nicol, for when Mr. Bramwell Booth dictated his letter both men were still dependent on charity, and one scarcely knew where his next meal was to come from. The inability of the Army to help its officers in the way mentioned by Commissioner Nicol when they are forced to retire through ill-health is, therefore, sufficiently proved, for up to this point Mr. Bramwell Booth's statement supports the hypothesis that the cases in question were not undeserving.

In the closing months of 1905, ex-officer S— was living in Ipswich, where Salvationism has already suffered one serious schism. A number of persons interested themselves in his case, which naturally excited a good deal of comment adverse to the Army in different parts of Norfolk and

Suffolk. It is not easy for an autocratic and divinely governed institution to acknowledge error or inconsiderateness in regard to actions that are essential to its very existence. The Army appears to have found itself obliged, therefore, to put forward some explanation of S—'s departure from its service and his subsequent treatment. It has been seen that on October 9, 1905, the Army stated publicly that it knew nothing about any such case. On November 24 Mr. Bramwell Booth, while offering no explanation of this denial and declining to say whether S—'s case was regarded as undeserving, stated that the Army had 'done all, or more than all', for him that its resources could properly allow. It appears, however, that a certain member of the Army in Norfolk, who had heard some particulars of the case, wrote to Headquarters asking for an explanation of the Army's conduct in connexion with it. Mr. Bramwell Booth's reply (signed, like the letter of November 24, by his private secretary) is dated November 30, 1905, and is marked 'Private'. The allegation that officers are allowed to starve is characterized as false. The case of S—, the correspondent is 'freely and confidentially' informed, 'is that of a lazy good-for-nothing man, who was turned out of the Army because he would not work, and has lived for the last two or three years on the product of begging letters, and although he has been two or three times offered employment—not as an officer—has refused it'.

Let it be assumed for a moment that this is an accurate statement of the facts. If Mr. Bramwell Booth thought it a conclusive answer to the letter in the *Times* of October 9, why—seeing that no names had been mentioned—was this statement not sent to the *Times* for publication? Why, at least, was not Mr. Lumsden given this information? Why, again, were these circumstances not mentioned by Mr. Bramwell Booth's Commissioner in his interview with the representative of the *Evening News* on October 9? Why were they not mentioned in Mr. Bramwell Booth's letter of November 24 to the author? Why were they

put forth only when it became apparent that the Army's repeated steps for the suppression of publicity had not, after all, stifled inquiry, and that in a 'private' communication to one of the Army's members in the district where its funds and organization were in danger of suffering.

If it were true that S—— was 'a lazy good-for-nothing man' it would still be necessary to inquire whether it was not the conditions of service in the Army that made him so. In the Army, however, laziness and good-for-nothingness have a meaning of their own, namely, a preference for religious work rather than mere money-getting. In this technical sense it is not impossible that Mr. Bramwell Booth's strictures might have some measure of justification. But if it were really the case that S——, after fourteen years' work as an Army evangelist, actually became lazy and good-for-nothing and refused other work—whether from a sense of his unfitness for it or from an actual dislike of it—what would this be but the strongest possible condemnation, from a moral and economic standpoint, of the Salvationist system in general and the conditions that regulate the activities of its field officers in particular? After this length of service ex-officers are what the Army has made them.

It is necessary, however, that Mr. Bramwell Booth's definite 'private' statements should be subjected to a more detailed public examination. Some time before his health began to break down S—— was actually raised to the rank of ensign, the lowest grade of staff officership, a mark of recognition not usually accorded, presumably, to the lazy and incompetent. 'Your superior officers,' wrote Commissioner —— to S—— (August 23, 1900) 'having made favourable representations to me concerning your work and character, I have decided, after careful consideration and prayer, to promote you to the rank of Ensign.' Moreover, S—— was never 'turned out' of the Army for any reason, nor was he even asked to go. He resigned, and of this there is official proof. How is it that Mr. Bramwell Booth's careful

inquiry did not disclose this fact? The statement that S—— lived for a time on the product of begging letters after his severance from the Army is, in view of his helpless and desperate condition at that time, hardly charitable, but neither gratitude nor ordinary human charity appears to be a characteristic of official Salvationism when it writes 'freely and confidentially' about the victims of its system. Mr. Bramwell Booth ignores the fact that S—— was the victim of a physical collapse which was primarily due to the privations suffered by him—as by so many others—in the Army's service, and which might have been avoided had ordinary kindness and consideration been shown him by his superiors, or had not such treatment been rendered impossible by the necessities of the system. To this physical and mental condition the description 'good-for-nothing' has, no doubt, a certain applicability, but that of 'lazy' assuredly has not.

We are, fortunately, not entirely dependent upon Mr. Bramwell Booth and his docile subordinates for the true character of S——. 'A more godly, self-sacrificing individual it would be impossible to find', writes one gentleman who was acquainted with him for twelve years. 'He was', writes another, 'a good and faithful officer of the Salvation Army and a man of God. . . . I believe he would rather have starved than beg for himself. . . . I also believe he was a very hard worker'. The latter statement, it may interest Mr. Bramwell Booth to know, this unfortunate victim of Salvationism has since fully proved. 'I knew Mr. S—— as an officer', writes a third, 'and always found him to be a true, consistent Christian man. He lived very near to God and did all he could for the salvation of others, not only by words but by life and actions. . . . There are others who would speak for him if necessary'. Many others have spoken, and all directly contradict the Army's charge against him. The writers of these letters are responsible persons who knew S—— when in the service of the Army, and in view of their statements and all the circumstances of the case

it is abundantly clear that it is not the character of S—— that requires clearing.

If the Army knew this man to be lazy and good-for-nothing when he left it, why did it help him on several occasions with money? As for S——'s alleged refusal of work on 'two or three' occasions, his account of the circumstances which prevented his obtaining the insurance agency, which he was willing to accept, is confirmed by other circumstances which have come to light since this account was originally written.

It appears, however, that another means of earning a livelihood was also officially suggested to him—though not by Headquarters—while in Norwich. This was to enter one of the Army's 'elevators' in London and do wood-chopping. This amazing proposal S—— was unable to entertain for the all-sufficient reason that his health, which had been shattered by the demands of the Army's religious work, was at that time still less fitted for the manual labour of its 'social' section. Even had his health been adequate he might well have been pardoned for declining such an extraordinary suggestion. Here was a man whom the Army took from good, useful labour in the world and, after subduing his mind to the fixed idea that nothing in life matters but the Army's particular scheme of salvation, employed him for fourteen years at a salary of 4s. or 5s. a week in the ostensible business of instilling the same idea into the minds of other people, and in the real business of collecting money for the upkeep of its costly organization. Then, when it had had all it could get out of him, the Army, recollecting that it had a 'social' wing for the special benefit of men inhabiting a lower depth than its religious section alone is able successfully to plumb, calmly said in effect to him: 'Let it never be thought that the Salvation Army does not care for its worn-out field officers. You can have work as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water at the bottom rung of our "social" ladder among the destitute and needy, the degraded and the criminal, and if you do not like it, we

will prevent others from helping you by proclaiming that you are nothing but a lazy and a good-for-nothing man.'

What the Army's 'social' section actually did for S—— remains to be told. Through the kindness of an anonymous friend arrangements were made shortly before Christmas, 1905, to provide him with a few weeks' rest at the seaside. Unluckily, the charges newly made against him by the Army came to his ears, and they so utterly upset him that, driven to despair, he felt it to be his duty to decline to take advantage of this or any other help until he should succeed in clearing his character. Instead of going to the seaside, therefore, Mr. Bramwell Booth's 'begging letter-writer' deliberately cut himself off from all communication with those who had helped him and were still ready to do their best to help him, and made his way from Ipswich to London with only a few shillings in his pocket. His simple idea was that he had been the victim of the malice of subordinates, and that a direct appeal to the 'servants of God' set in authority over them at Queen Victoria Street could not fail to obtain a ready and sympathetic hearing and secure him justice. His fourteen years' experience of Salvationism had not taught him much about the Army's system. His letters to the General and Mr. Bramwell Booth demanding justice remained unanswered.¹ Meanwhile his scanty funds had almost disappeared. For over a week he lived in shelters and had very little to eat. He sold for a few pence the few odd things he could

¹ Evidently the Army does not regard it as its business to remedy injustice suffered, or vindicate reputations unjustly damaged, in its service. A regulation in the section of *O. and R.*, entitled 'How to Resign' reads:—'When the Field Officer has resolved on the course of resignation, the next thing for him to do is to see that he acts in that way which will be least calculated to injure the Army, which he has so repeatedly and so solemnly promised not to harm. . . . If he has been unjustly dealt with, or if his reputation has been damaged, let him bear it for Christ's sake—God will vindicate him—and not do that which he knows will hurt the cause of Christ, and risk the loss of souls, in order to vindicate himself, gratify the spirit of opposition, or gain a livelihood.' (*O. and R.*, p. 569).

sell, but—still in the hope of finding work which would enable him to dispense with charity—he would not even yet apply to the friends with whom he had been in communication. On the night before Christmas Eve, his last penny gone, he applied for admission over the Christmas holidays at the Burne Street shelter of the Salvation Army, where he had already lodged for a few nights. As he was no longer able to pay the necessary pence he was refused admission. The shelter was not full, and he was not offered work for the purpose of earning his night's lodging. He stated, and was prepared to prove, that he was an ex-officer of the Salvation Army, but that made no difference. His assurance that he could find means to pay after the holidays was not listened to. He was, therefore, obliged to walk the streets all night in a famishing condition until the morning. Then, and only then, did he have recourse to the help which, had he felt himself at liberty to take advantage of it, would have spared him much suffering, and of which he would have taken advantage before but for the Army's inexplicable charges. This 'true shelter story' differs materially from that with which the public were regaled in the 1906 Self-Denial Appeal.

Since November, 1905, the Army has apparently discovered that the explanation then given has serious faults, and is not at all designed to convince the tolerably large number of people who, by one means or another, have been led to interest themselves in this man's case. Another and totally different explanation has, in fact, since been put forth. The letter containing it is dated February 8, 1906, and it appears to have the personal authority of General Booth, for it proclaims itself to be at once a reply to an inquiry addressed to the General by a gentleman in North Walsham on the S—— case generally, and to an inquiry from the same gentleman addressed to a subordinate officer to whom he has written for S——'s character with the view of giving or getting him employment. The circumstances in which this letter was written, therefore, made it privileged. Any true statement

detrimental to the character of S—— could have been freely made in it. Yet there is not a word in it about his having been 'a lazy good-for-nothing man who was turned out of the Army because he would not work', etc. Here General Booth was perfectly entitled to make this statement, and his correspondent was assuredly entitled to be told this circumstance if it were true. The letter further admits that S—— was not 'turned out' but resigned, and states that the Army—apparently with professed regret—accepted his resignation, for 'there was no alternative'. The letter admits that the Army knew that S——'s health was the alleged cause of his resignation, but asserts that 'any health difficulties he had were not due to his work or position as an officer'. The particulars I have given of his work and condition in the Army's service will, I think, enable the public to judge whether or not the introduction at this stage of any other cause is necessary to account for his breakdown. I do not think the cause now adduced by General Booth to account for it adequate, and even if it were adequate I do not think it any explanation or justification of S——'s forced resignation. It is unnecessary to discuss it as, in any case, it has nothing to do with the statement of November 30, 1905, in respect of which S—— has so long vainly demanded a withdrawal and reparation for the injury and mental suffering it has caused him. General Booth informs his correspondent that S——'s 'slanders and threats' against the Army have recently become serious, and I for one do not wonder at it. His letter concludes: 'If, on the face of these facts, you are disposed to employ him, we sincerely trust that he will give you satisfaction'. There is, fortunately, no doubt about S——'s ability to give satisfaction. What is now requisite is that General Booth should give it to him.¹

¹ Since this chapter was originally published in 1906, no withdrawal or reparation has taken place. While reviews of this work were appearing a gentleman, who did not disclose his identity, was at some pains to seek out S——, and at length managed to see him. He and some friends, he said, had been read-

There is, unfortunately, too much evidence to prove that certain circumstances of this officer's case are typical of the Army's general practice (see Appendix v., 3). At the outset General Booth exacts from candidates a vow of life-long service. It should be noted that if he did not do so he could not possibly get men and women at his price. Enthusiasts join believing that the work, though hard, will be congenial to them; they think little of the pay, believing that the Army will always look after them. They are quite prepared 'to live and die in the ranks of the Salvation Army'. Once in, however, they soon discover the importance of the financial test. If they cannot meet it satisfactorily they may as well come out. If they do meet it satisfactorily they find the business wearing. I am informed that a high official recently admitted that the average field officer is not really wanted for more than two or three years. This statement is at least more credible than the idea that they are really wanted for life.

Divisional officers and provincial officers are human, they have their personal likes and dislikes, many of them have a fine sense of their own importance and authority, and—what is most important—many of them are much more keenly alive to the financial necessities of the organization as a whole than poor field officers can possibly be expected to be. The system renders it possible, and may even make it seem necessary, to place good men and women in such a position that the difficulties and hardships are so great that they feel compelled to resign. The average time passed by an officer in one command is officially

ing about S——'s case, and wondered whether they could do anything for him. Would he, for instance, care to be sent to Canada? S—— replied that, for certain reasons, he did not care to go. The stranger seemed a little unsympathetic to S——'s observations about the Army, but as he did not wear General Booth's uniform one hesitates to connect him with that organization. On the other hand, as he seemed unable to devise any other means of easing the situation than that of Canadian emigration, and as he did not afterwards return, one must regretfully conclude that, for so painstaking a private philanthropist, his ideas were singularly inelastic.

stated to be from eight to twelve months, but in practice he can be moved about from one corps to another as often as his superiors think necessary. The system prevents the members of any one corps from knowing the fate or fortunes of their officer after he 'farewells' for another command. Yet Commissioner Nicol said in the course of the interview of October 9: 'If we had a system for working out members of the Salvation Army such as is suggested, it would long ere this have been brought to the light of day'. Commissioner Nicol appears to be a gentleman, one of whose duties it was at that time to go round lecturing the churches on their neglect of the working classes and, casually, to stimulate their interest in the work of the Army (*War Cry*, October 21, 1905). He is, therefore, probably too busy to be able to acquaint himself with the shortcomings of his own organization. The answer to his observation is simple. No better system for 'working out' its officers could be invented than the organization of the Army and the conditions under which its field officers are compelled to work. That the system is not prevented from accomplishing this result is proved by the fact that several thousands of officers are turned out by the Training Home who are not to be found in the field a few years afterwards. As for the fact that the process of 'working out' does not always come to the light of day, probably the part played by Commissioner Nicol himself in regard to the cases of S—— and C—— furnishes the best explanation.¹

While a knowledge of the hardships to which the Army's officers are subjected has not yet penetrated to the classes from whom it chiefly draws its

¹ The solicitude of Headquarters for the welfare of officers is indicated by the following fact. On December 6, 1905, a gentleman wrote to Mr. Bramwell Booth's department stating that within the previous fortnight he had heard a married officer declare publicly that all he and his wife had had to live on for the week was 10s. He volunteered to give the place, date, time and name, so that Headquarters might have no excuse for not inquiring into the case. Mr. Bramwell Booth's department, however, made no inquiry whatsoever of the writer of the letter, and its receipt was not even acknowledged.

financial supplies, it would be a mistake to suppose that they are unknown among the class from whom it chiefly draws its officers. These hardships are, of course, never allowed to be ventilated in the columns of the *War Cry*. Occasionally a prospective candidate for officership writes in obvious apprehension as to the future in store for him. Thus 'L. P', who has evidently heard something of starving officers, is answered in the 'In Doubt' column¹ as follows:—

'Treat all the talk about the "Starvation of Officers" as of the devil. True, the lot of some is trying and perplexing to the mind, wearying to the body, and sorrowful indeed to the soul But did we not bargain for that? "If all were easy, if all were bright", etc., you know we should not know the difference between the cross and the crown. Apply to Lieut-Colonel Rees, roo, Queen Victoria Street, E.C., without a moment's delay. We need a hundred young fellows like yourself. With enough to live decently on in the Army, you can be happier as an Officer than a millionaire' (August 15, 1903).

In view of the actual conditions which govern the service such inducements to men and women to forsake the ordinary work of the world for that of the Army are nothing short of deplorable. The mischief is increased by the Army's evident subjection to the need of prejudicing the motives and the character of all those who leave or are compelled to leave its service, and who show the slightest disposition to speak out.

In the annual report for 1899 Mr. Bramwell Booth wrote on this subject as follows: 'Those who listen to the tempter and go out from us—I rejoice that they are so few—usually wake up to deplore their terrible mistake' (*Servants of All*). The psychology of Mr. Bramwell Booth is to me one of the most important and most interesting things in the Salvation Army. I have read many of his pious periodical discourses on the second page of the *War Cry*. I have read other (un-

published) writings of his on the subject of ex-officers which, if inspired by piety, do that virtue very little credit. Such antipathetic elements refuse to blend under the ordinary processes of human reasoning, and whether any more satisfactory solution is to be obtained by postulating that divine guidance which, we are asked to believe, presides over all Mr. Bramwell Booth's official actions is a question which must be left to professed theologians.

If Mr. Bramwell Booth's energies were entirely absorbed in maintaining the religious enthusiasm of the *War Cry*'s readers it might be possible to attribute to mere ignorance the statement which has just been quoted. He has, however, to do with the mechanism as well as the doctrine of his organization. As Chief of the Staff of the Salvation Army he must be supposed to know something of the question of ex-officers, but his declaration is at variance with the statements of many others who know something of it also. It is, in one sense, no mean achievement to convince the world that men and women are to be condemned who choose, or are forced, to abandon an organization which, officially, is itself worldly and unspiritual to the core. It is to be feared that Mr. Bramwell Booth's power of distinguishing between the voice of the tempter and the voice of conscience in others is no longer infallible. Nor would this be at all surprising in the acting head of an organization which suppresses the individual conscience and exacts obedience to commands which may be neither understood nor approved. No one ought to know better than Mr. Bramwell Booth that it is not always those who voluntarily leave the Army that 'listen to the tempter', but sometimes those in authority who remain in it. The implication that all who 'go out' from the Army's service do so of their own accord and to the acute sorrow of their superiors is one which many circumstances discredit. That these men and women live to deplore their 'terrible mistake' is, no doubt, true, but it is the mistake of ever having joined the Army and not, as Mr. Bramwell Booth suggests,

¹ Since July, 1906, the month in which the first edition of this book was published, the 'In Doubt' column has disappeared, apparently for ever, from the *War Cry*. It is difficult to believe that the doubters have ceased from troubling. Possibly their misgivings may have assumed a character which makes the private reply preferable to their public examination.

that of having left it. From whatever cause the retribution comes it is clear that the Army possesses means of enhancing it still further, and has no compunction about exercising these means in circumstances where a severance from its service is likely to cause it trouble or financial loss. As for Mr. Bramwell Booth's joy that the officers who go out are 'so few',¹ its justification would be more readily gauged if each year, instead of treating his subscribers to vague and pious generalities, he disclosed the actual number of 'deserters'. There are practically the same number of corps and field officers in the United Kingdom to-day as there were twenty years ago. The Army's own statistics and various other circumstances point to the conclusion that the officers who have left or have been forced out of its service in this country during the past twenty years can hardly number less than 5,000 and may very well number 10,000 men and women or even more. Until Mr. Bramwell Booth, therefore, is prepared to give precision to his idea of fewness it will be only seemly, when dealing in future with this serious subject and the motives and character of the persons concerned, if he will leave the voice of the tempter out of the question.

It is apparent from the *War Cry's* constant and urgent solicitations for candidates that the Army's powers of consumption in the matter of officers are practically unlimited, and it is, therefore, of some importance to the public as well as to members of the Army to ensure that the 'working out' process shall not take place in secret and that its economic effects shall be known. The fact that no collective publication of corps accounts

¹ The same policy of reticence is still successfully pursued. In January, 1906, General Booth assured the 500 candidates for officership accepted for training at a public meeting at Exeter Hall that 'there had been fewer resignations from the ranks of the Army last year than in any previous year' (*Times*, January 9, 1906). If so, the fact would not be at all surprising in view of the fashionable boom in Salvationism during the preceding two years, and the increased financial harvest that must have accrued from it. What requires explanation is that the Army should be so reluctant to state the number of 'resignations' last year and in the previous years.

takes place makes it impossible to discover what salary a field officer, while still in the service, receives, or is likely to receive, at any particular corps. Such publication would enable candidates to see the actual condition of things over the whole field, and to estimate their prospects of getting enough to 'live decently on' much more accurately than the discreetly glowing assurances of the *War Cry*. Even if the Army's evangelistic efforts were effectual it would still be necessary to inquire whether the salvation of souls is not too dearly purchased by the systematic social submersion of the saviours. As these efforts are, in reality, startlingly ineffectual, there exists no public advantage whatsoever to set against the evils of a system which first of all holds out inducements in regard to officership that are delusory, and then, having seriously and prematurely unfitted its officers for the ordinary work of the world, complacently casts the cost and burden of its own ineptitude upon society.

It is curious to note how even the most serious defects of Salvationism are officially employed to testify to its merits. If officers die before their time that is only an evidence of the nobility of the work to which they gave their lives. If participation in trading causes resignations and desertions, that is only a proof of its spiritual advantages, for it should be evident to all the world that unless these advantages were both spiritual and preponderating the Army could never have consented or resigned itself to such a loss. If General Booth's own kith and kin forsake the organization because of its imperfections, that only proves the stern impartiality of the Army's head, and that in him 'the father is merged in the General' (*Life of General Booth*). Apparently this characteristic train of thought was responsible for the large gathering recently convened at the Albert Hall by General Booth for the purpose of commemorating 'the Army's officers in Heaven'. No vital statistics were furnished, but had they been available the fittingness of the service would no doubt have been emphasized in a somewhat startling fashion. It is

highly to be desired that General Booth would concern himself with the lot of those of his officers who as yet do not stand in need of memorial services, but who, although still on earth, are subjected to pangs, both of body, soul, spirit and conscience, comparable only to those reserved by Salvationism for those who neglect its message.

If the British public desire to continue their subsidy of several hundred thousand pounds a year to the Army's costly and futile religious work, it is necessary in the interests of the community, as well as of the work itself, that certain definite things should be done. (1) The field officers should be paid a regular wage sufficient for the necessities of life, so that they shall be free from the need of depending for these necessities on their soldiers and friends. 'I don't like to call them "paid",' said General Booth of his 16,000 officers throughout the world (Westminster Chapel, December 14, 1905), by way of emphasizing the Army's stern economy,¹ and the observation was, unfortunately, only too true of many of them in a sense little apprehended by his audience. (2) The service should be reformed so

¹ It is now possible to give an official explanation of this economy. General Booth and Mr. Bramwell Booth, it appears, would alter the system and pay a living wage if they only could. They cannot do so, however, because *Field Officers would then simply fold their arms and do no work*. This is a serious official reflection on the officers; one can imagine none more serious on the nature of the 'work' required of them. The author is indebted for the explanation to a correspondent who in past years spent much of his substance in helping the Army in his neighbourhood. He was given it by the staff officer sent down from Queen Victoria Street for the purpose of allaying an uneasiness stimulated, if not caused, by the study of this work. 'You can, of course, rest assured', he had been told previously by letter, 'that the charges certainly are not true', and surprise was expressed that he should be upset by them, 'seeing how closely you have been connected with so many officers of the Army'. When the subject of field officers was approached in the ensuing interview the author's correspondent disconcerted his visitor by saying: 'Now, Staff, I am myself a witness that officers would have starved and been found dead in their quarters from cold and hunger had it not been for me'. As my correspondent observes, the 'staff's' extraordinary explanation still further proves the extremely unhealthy state of the service.

that it shall not wear out officers in a few years, and unfit them for further work either in the Army or out of it.

(3) The proper and just administration of the so-called 'Sick and Wounded' Fund should be ensured. 'It should ever be an incentive to field officers,' says *Orders and Regulations* (p. 520) 'to co-operate heartily in the effort to raise money for the Sick and Wounded Fund, to know that the necessary provision for their wants whilst on sick furlough, although transmitted to them through the divisional officer, is partly provided by the National Funds.' Unfortunately, although the field officers do co-operate heartily in sending money to Headquarters, complaints are common that the fund is administered mainly for the benefit of staff officers who are comfortably off and do not really require its aid, while field officers who absolutely require it are refused it. (4) When officers are compelled to retire for good reasons and are unfitted for, or unable to obtain, other work, some provision should be made for their maintenance, based upon the necessities of the case and the length of their service, so that they shall not be entirely dependent on charity, or become a permanent charge on their friends or the community. There is at present an Officers' Pension Fund to which officers may contribute or not as they choose, but, on the other hand, 'there is no legal responsibility on the part of the Army to provide any officer with a pension' (*O. and R.*, p. 591). With the administration of this Fund (of which there is no trace in the accounts), as with that of the Sick and Wounded Fund, there is much dissatisfaction among the field officers, and as the public have at present no means of hearing both sides of the case they would do well to ensure that the autocratic and secret method of its administration is reformed.

If the possibility and desirability of maintaining Salvationism in any form be, for the moment, assumed, it is necessary to note that all these suggested reforms must be imposed simultaneously. It would, obviously, be almost impossible to provide for the

enormous number of officers who, under the present condition of things, are in one way or another cast off when their money-collecting capacities are exhausted. The imposition of the three first reforms would overcome this difficulty, remove the economic evil caused by the present system, place the Army on a spiritual instead of a mere money-getting basis, and—if combined with the recognition by the public that the Army's religious work, if successful, might well be entirely, or almost entirely, self-supporting—would reduce its spiritual pretensions to the proportions of its actual performance.

The circumstances of C—'s discharge from his post in the Army's 'social' wing form an instructive commentary on the principles upon which that department is worked. The purpose of the 'social' work, according to *In Darkest England*, is the elevation of the submerged and their industrial rehabilitation in the world. It has been shown (Chapter viii) that what the Army regards as success in this work is not at all synonymous with industrial rehabilitation, and that practically the only verifiable 'successes' are to be found in the members of the permanent staff of the 'social' department, by no means all of whom, however, have required elevation. The retention as permanent employes of the more satisfactory men who enter the 'social' institutions was not the principal purpose of the Darkest England Scheme, but if the Army chooses to make such men its permanent employes it must be supposed to assume some responsibility with regard to them. The extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune to which C— and his family were subjected during his fourteen years' service indicate on the part of his superiors a capricious disregard or a lamentable ignorance of the most conspicuous and elementary causes of social 'submersion' which one does not expect to find in the government of a body specially instituted to remedy that evil. Even if the Army could not afford the 25s. a week which C— was receiving towards the end of his service, the necessity for his dismissal

and relegation with his family to the ranks of the submerged is not apparent. Some middle course was possible, but it was not taken—with the edifying 'social' results that have been shown. As far as society is concerned it is evidently a much more serious thing that the destitute and workless should be composed of cast-off Salvationist officers than of almost any other class.

So many distinguished people have complaisantly lent themselves to advertising General Booth's alleged success as a raiser of humanity that the thousands of simple souls who have borne in their bodies the marks of Salvationism have, unhappily, almost as little chance of a hearing from the public as they have from the Army. When General Booth received the freedom of the City of London he was described by Sir Joseph Dimsdale as 'one whose object had been to rescue the helpless and elevate human nature'. A provincial municipal magnate is reported to have quoted on a similar occasion 'the Rev. R. J. Campbell's epitome of General Booth as "a rescuer, a man-maker, and a soul-saver"'. This species of indiscriminating laudation is common. In the face of such influential testimony to the divine conduct of the Army the motives and the character of any one uttering a complaint against it are apt, in the public mind, to be covered with suspicion at the very outset, for the official view impressed upon the public is that no trustworthy person can forsake or come out of Salvationism. If free discussion of grievances were not absolutely suppressed within the Army, both General Booth and the public would be able to see very clearly that his officers are in perfect accord with his ex-officers regarding the evils of the financial system by which they are being, or have been, oppressed. Instead of being the free leaders of a free people those in the service are bound hand and foot, body and soul—afraid, in spite of their hardships and ill-treatment, to open their mouths, well knowing that unless they can first make sure by stealth of securing another and a better livelihood in the event of their abandoning the Army their state outside it will in

all likelihood be even worse than in it. As for the ex-officers they are scattered, and they cannot but feel that combination, even if it were practicable, would be useless. In the case of some of them, moreover, the Army has, in effect, bought their silence; in that of others it can compel it. Many feel that they are 'well out of it', and it is hardly possible, therefore, for their grievances ever to reach the public ear. General Booth's broken men and women, whether within the Army or without, are voiceless. An organization which, while professing to raise men with one hand, deliberately and secretly sinks them with the other, and which oppresses both the bodies and the minds of those in its service, assuredly ought not to enjoy the use of public funds in any of its undertakings. While there can, on the one hand, be little doubt as to the extreme feebleness of the Army's powers for good in either its religious or its 'social' section, there can, on the other, be no doubt as to the high efficiency of its powers for evil in both.

It is, of course, unavoidable that criticism of the evils in an autocratic system should reflect upon the person who instituted and controls that system. In the Salvation Army, as has been seen, 'the General is responsible for all' (*Staff Orders and Regulations*, p. 246). General Booth, in fact, is the Army. To-day, in consequence of the General's presence being necessary almost everywhere at once in order to maintain the flow of public subscriptions and to keep his widespread but attenuated legions in being, rather than in consequence of his great age, much of his responsibility is now borne by Mr. Bramwell Booth, the Chief of the Staff. There is assuredly no lack of testimony to the goodness, and even the saintliness, of the two men who direct the fortunes of what a sympathizer of the Army has called 'that wonderful organization whose dynamic law is Love'. In the recently published *Life of General Booth (The Prophet of the Poor, by T. F. G. Coates)*, which appeared periodically in the columns of *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper*, we are informed that 'William Bramwell Booth, the eldest son of

the General . . . is the replica of his mother in looks and in devotion to the work she so loved and adorned'. The memory of Catherine Booth is rightly cherished by thousands to-day, and if Mr. Bramwell Booth is the inheritor of all her virtues it is surely all the more remarkable that he should permit such cases as those of S— and C— to occur under the system of which, as Chief of the Staff, he is responsible. Complaints of similar hardship and injustice are common throughout the organization. Yet the action or inaction of the Chief and his subordinates has the effect, not only of preventing the application of any remedy, but also of keeping the public in ignorance of the fact that serious evils exist, and that practically all ranks are cognisant of them and would speedily put an end to them if they were not effectually debarred from doing so by the Army's autocratic and military government.

The adulatory *Life* of General Booth informs us that 'there is too much of the humanitarian in William Booth to be bridled by the devotee who would spend hours and nights in prayer when the cry of the despairing is ringing in his ears'. In whatever manner General Booth spent the hours and nights of his stay in Norwich in the winter of 1904-5 he did not spend them in helping or even comforting the starving man in the same town who had spent fourteen years of life in his service. When the cry of the despairing S— went out to him General Booth was engaged in the task of impressing upon the inhabitants of Norwich the fact that 'the Salvation Army came into existence out of a simple desire to help those classes of the people who seemed to be, and who practically are at the present time, outside the pale of ordinary religious and philanthropic work' (*Norfolk Standard*, January 7, 1905). Speaking at Westminster Chapel (December 14, 1905) on the Army's religious and 'social' work General Booth raised a facile laugh by remarking: 'Our work is with the poor; we leave the rich to—Dr. Campbell Morgan!' Unfortunately there was more irony in the situation than humour in the

remark, for it had been precisely to Dr. Campbell Morgan that General Booth's two destitute servants were indebted for the greatest measure of effectual sympathy and help which they received in their distress. If General Booth gave any directions for his ex-officer's relief or for proper inquiry into his case, the fact remains that they were never carried out, the autocratic machine thus proving itself the master of its inordinately humanitarian maker.

'Hunger', said General Booth at Westminster Chapel, alluding to the causes of crime and wrong-doing—'hunger is a very sharp thorn'. No doubt; but it is still sharper when accompanied by a sense of injustice and cruelty inflicted at the hands of a professedly humanitarian organization which one has served for the best part of one's life in return for the most wretched pittance. 'Suppose I was ever so wrong', says S—— in his written statement, 'would it not have been a Christlike action on their part to at least give me a loaf of bread when they knew I had no food for two or three days at a time?' It would; but the action would have been too small and too obscure for Salvationism to contemplate. The Army professes to exist to help those who do things 'ever so wrong', whether against the laws of God or man. But to utter a word of reproach against the Army itself when one is starving and driven to despair by its oppression and injustice is, apparently, to be guilty of the one unpardonable sin. If, instead of being merely a man made destitute by the Army, S—— had been a 'whole district' of Norwich made destitute by economic causes or by its own vices, there is every probability that General Booth would have spent his hours and nights in strenuous efforts to arouse the town to the supreme necessity of his relief, or, at least, to the necessity of obtaining from its citizens the wherewithal to set in operation those 'social' experiments which were instituted by him for the purpose of effecting such magnificent objects. Unfortunately S—— was not a district, and neither, individually, are General Booth's other

distressed officers and ex-officers, although collectively they would probably be found to constitute a community of quite respectable dimensions.

Instances of the paternal affection of military leaders for the individual soldiers who fight under their command are not infrequent in military history. General Booth also, apparently, is moved by this sentiment. The *Life* relates that 'speaking recently to a great gathering of sons of the soil in the Black Country . . . he affectionately remarked: "*You are my family as well as my soldiers*", and from these words can be gathered the true spirit of love for mankind that fills the heart of this venerated evolutionist'. It has been said that, before modelling his Army, General Booth deemed it necessary to make an exhaustive study of many military text-books. It almost looks as if his curriculum had included the history of the Spanish civil wars of the early part of last century. At all events, as in his Army it is the field officers, and not the so-called 'soldiers', who do the real fighting and bear the real hardships, it is well that one detail of the touching incident which seems to have inspired General Booth's affectionate remark should here be filled in. When the Carlist rebellion was suppressed in 1839 Elio, one of the rebel commanders, was sent under arrest to Bayonne. Here General Harispe said to him: 'General Elio, I have orders to make an exception in your case. Ask anything you wish of me. What would you like for yourself and your family?' 'Bread and shoes for my soldiers', answered Elio. 'And for your family?' asked Harispe again. 'I have just told you', answered Elio. 'You spoke only of your soldiers', replied Harispe. 'My soldiers', said Elio, 'are my family. *I wish bread and shoes for my soldiers*'.

In the Salvation Army General Booth's paternal regard for his men is too often forced to stop short of considering the bread and shoes, and in a religious organization so constituted and governed this necessity must, unfortunately, be inevitable. It is the devotion and self-sacrifice of

good people, deceived by the system, and held by the vows wrung out of them with every circumstance of solemnity, which—with the financial aid of an indifferent but confiding public—serves to maintain the complicated and costly mechanism of that melancholy and sinister structure to which is given the collective name of Salvationism. The leaders, whether in the religious or the 'social' sphere, seem either to have forgotten or lost faith in the Army's aims; and in their efforts to meet the responsibilities imposed upon them by the mere maintenance of the machine which has got beyond their control, they trade upon the simple trust of their ignorant followers within, and without upon the unquestioning confidence of the public in the impossibility of anything but good existing throughout the ramifications of a society—not wholly religious even ostensibly—which is at once autocratic, Jesuitical, inquisitorial and secret. Vows and engagements ignorantly and rashly taken in such a cause are much better broken than kept, and this Salvationists themselves are beginning to understand. When the public, too, understand that such vows and engagements are degrading, not only to the name of Christianity but to humanity itself, and that the system which has such materials for its foundations is opposed to the moral and spiritual liberty of men, they will, if they really have the Army's professed aims at heart, see the necessity of imposing upon General Booth another system, free from these evils—that of the Christian Mission of 1878 which, as will be seen, it was his duty under the foundation deed of the Salvation Army to preserve.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TRUST DEEDS OF THE ARMY

A GOOD deal of effort has been expended by the Army in correcting the impression, fostered in the public mind by the autocracy of its constitution, that the manner in which its funds are administered and its property is held has for its object the personal enrichment of its founder and those members

of his family who have found it possible to remain in the organization. As this impression is wrong—for many official and semi-official assurances testify that it is wrong—the wonder is that it should ever have been allowed to arise, and that the Army's self-sufficient trusteeship and accountancy should still tend to encourage its prevalence. It appears from a work entitled *The Truth about the Salvation Army*, published by Headquarters, that only General Booth's travelling expenses are charged to the Army's funds, a small independent income having been otherwise provided for him through the generosity of friends. Mr. Bramwell Booth, the chief of the staff, the value of whose services are estimated at £4,000 a year at least, is variously stated by two different contributors to the official brochure to receive from the funds either '£250 a year and a house' (p. 30) or '£200 a year and the rent of an eight-roomed house' (p. 73). Mrs. Bramwell Booth, as head of the women's work, is stated to receive no salary in respect of it, but it is a little misleading to describe the cost of the second-class season-ticket which she does receive from the funds as the sole 'management charges' of her department. Mr. Arnold White, who does so, was asked some sixteen years ago by six other gentlemen 'of standing and position' to make an inquiry into the position of the 'Social Scheme' which had recently been floated. The possibility of the misappropriation of funds appears to have occurred to him, and with the view of enabling him to test the matter, Headquarters were kind enough to facilitate certain 'surprise visits' by him to Queen Victoria Street, so that he might 'specially overhaul the petty cash'. Apparently the only irregularity he was able to discover was the embezzlement of half a crown in the previous year, and he adds with humorous gravity: 'In justice to General Booth, it should be added that neither he nor any of his family was the delinquent'.

This is indeed an instance of not being able to see the forest for the trees. It is not the Army's petty cash that requires overhauling, or

the salaries of the Booth family that require criticism. It is the general financial principles governing the whole complex Salvationist machine that require to be brought into the light of day by means of an inquiry much more thorough than is possible in the course of any surprise visits to which Headquarters are likely to give their ready acquiescence.¹ The Booth family are, no doubt, honest in spite of their belief in autocracy and statistical reticence, in spite, even, of their belief in the direct divine guidance alleged to preside over all their operations. The public generally do not believe in such pretensions. It is with the wisdom rather than the honesty of the Booth family that they ought to be concerned. The wisdom of the relations existing between the Salvation Army, the Assurance Society, and the Reliance Bank, as well as of other important financial offshoots of Salvationism, has already been criticized. But apart from these relations, and admitting that no personal enrichment of its heads or personal misappropriation of its funds has ever taken place, it is nevertheless an important matter of public interest to inquire whether the Army's system provides adequate safeguards against

¹ Similarly, the *Homiletic Review* for November, 1907, contained an article, by the editors, entitled 'The Business Methods of the Salvation Army', which embodied the results of a 'careful inquiry' into certain matters regarding which, it was stated, 'questions' had been 'raised' and 'criticism offered'. The author has been unsuccessful in inducing the editors to inform him what the particular questions and criticism which prompted the inquiry were, where and when they appeared, and by whom they were put forward. This information seemed necessary in order to judge the adequacy of the *Homiletic Review's* investigations and conclusions. As it is, the inquiry is remarkable, in view of its title, in ignoring entirely the Army's 'business' pursuits. In so far as it relates to the religious finances, while it is a tolerably accurate description of their management, it does not seem to meet or answer any questions or criticism of much importance. Although at the beginning of the article the 'social' and the religious work are recognized as being separately administered in each country, they are slumped together at the end. The conclusion: 'We are glad to commend this organization to the confidence of pastors and the public alike', requires a more extensive and substantial basis than that of the inquiry of the editors of the *Homiletic Review*.

such undesirable occurrences in future, as well as against irregularities of another and—to the public—a more serious nature.

It is frequently asserted both officially and semi-officially that, because certain trusts have been declared by General Booth in connexion with the funds and property of the Army's religious and 'social' sections, the public who contribute to the work of either department, and the persons in whose interest the trusts may have been declared, possess sufficient safeguards against the diversion of funds or property to purposes other than those declared in the trusts, as well as against any possible dispossession in regard to property of whoever may be held legally to constitute 'The Salvation Army' after the death of its founder or at any future time. The principal objects aimed at in the settlement of Army property are officially stated to be (a) 'to secure the property to the objects of the Army for ever', and (b) 'to prevent any intervention in the internal management of its affairs which might impair the force or freedom of its peculiar form of government' (*O. and R.*, p. 305). It is further stated that decisions in the law courts and the opinion of leading lawyers in many countries serve to prove that the Army property is legally recognized as trust property, and that the courts will so act as to preserve it 'for the purposes for which it was acquired as described in the Declarations of Trust or Foundation Deeds' (p. 307). There is no difficulty in admitting that the Army's property is or ought legally to be regarded as trust property, but legal decisions which go no farther than such recognition are not very much to the point. If legal decisions existed supporting General Booth's right to acquire, use, and dispose of specific funds, etc., after that right had been definitely challenged as inconsistent with the purposes defined in either of his trust deeds, the public might fairly be expected to display a reasonable amount of confidence in the utility of these documents. The interest of the public, as well as of the members of the Army, is not merely to know that

the property is trust property, but rather to be assured that the property is, and will be acquired and used only for the specific purposes of the trust, and that the other conditions of the trusts are duly fulfilled.

It is tolerably clear that neither the interests of the public nor those of the Army's own members are adequately served by the autocratic methods in which the property is at present held and administered. It is somewhat idle to say, as General Booth's solicitors have said (*Times*, December 27, 1890), that it is competent for any aggrieved person who considers the funds to have been misapplied to set the Attorney-General in motion and to obtain redress. As far as the Army itself is concerned, it has been seen that the machinery for ventilating the opinions of aggrieved persons is about as imperfect as it could possibly be. If any such persons are left—and there are not a few—they are carefully kept in ignorance of any rights which, by any remote chance, they might possess under the religious trust deed of the organization. They have no voice and, therefore, little intelligence, and instruction is not the business of an autocrat. It is natural, therefore, that in no one of the Army's numerous publications, whether for the use of soldiers, field officers or staff officers, is a complete copy of the famous 'foundation deed' of the body to be found. Field officers are given a meagre abstract of it (*O. and R.*, p. 306) as well as of the 'Social' (Darkest England) Declaration of Trust, but it is extremely doubtful whether one in a thousand of the rank and file knows anything of the essential provisions of either. The probability of the Attorney-General being set in motion from within is, therefore, necessarily remote. When the *War Cry* informs its readers that 'the principle of trusteeship is the same' in the Army as in other religious bodies (June 6, 1903), it takes full advantage of their mental calibre and personal subjection—which alone constitute one material difference. As for the public, the maxim that everybody's business is nobody's is not, perhaps, sufficiently legal to carry weight with the Army's solicitors,

but it is, nevertheless, the universal acceptance of that maxim, combined with an equally universal ignorance of the documents in which they are interested, that keeps 'aggrieved subscribers' in the outside world from the knowledge of their grievance, and even from seeking to move the Attorney-General to action if they had the opportunity of knowing it.

The foundation deed of the religious branch of the Salvation Army is in the form of a deed poll executed by William Booth on August 7, 1878, and enrolled in Chancery six days later. As it is a deed poll there is no other party to it. At that time the Salvation Army did not exist by that name and in that form, and the body of which it is the development and to which the deed relates, was then known as 'The Christian Mission'. On this same date William Booth, with the consent of three-fourths of the members of the annual Conference of that body, of which he was the president, executed another deed poll annulling the deed by which the Mission had previously been regulated. This act had been 'deemed and held to be necessary in order to secure greater freedom for effectuating and furthering the principles of the Christian Mission'. With the consent of the Conference, William Booth became 'General Superintendent' of the Mission, and it was in this capacity that he executed the deed poll first mentioned, which constitutes the foundation deed of the Salvation Army.

The deed recites the circumstances in which the Mission originated in 1865, and states that 'a number of people were formed into a community or society by the said William Booth for the purpose of enjoying religious fellowship, and in order to continue and multiply such efforts . . . to bring under the Gospel those who were not in the habit of attending any place of worship, by preaching in the open air, in tents, theatres, music-halls and other places, and by holding other religious services or meetings'. It is provided that it shall be the duty of the General Superintendent to conserve the discipline, laws and operations of the Christian Mission 'to and for the

purposes for which it was first originated'. The only objects and purposes mentioned as being those for which the Mission was originated, are religious fellowship and preaching the Gospel. What 'are and shall be for ever' the doctrines of the body are set out in eleven paragraphs. Except for the statement that the Mission 'is and shall be always hereafter under the oversight, direction and control of some one person who shall be the General Superintendent thereof, whose duty it shall be to determine and enforce the discipline and laws', there is no allusion to the nature of the organization or system by means of which the objects and purposes were to be attained. Whether the power to 'determine' the discipline and laws legally enabled the General Superintendent to alter and recast them beyond all recognition is at least doubtful, and the provision must be read in the light of the fact that one of the objects of the deed executed by him was, not only to define for ever the doctrines, but also 'to preserve the system of the said Christian Mission generally'. Allusion is made to the property that had been or might be given or conveyed to certain persons upon trusts 'for the purposes therein and herein mentioned . . . and generally for promoting the objects of the said Christian Mission', and it was also in order 'to render valid and effectual such trusts and to remove doubts and prevent litigation', that the declaration was made. It is provided that the General Superintendent shall have power to expend all moneys contributed, and shall publish a balance-sheet; that he shall have power to acquire and deal with property for the purposes of the Mission, to appoint trustees in connexion with such property, and to revoke their appointment if it shall seem expedient to him; that William Booth shall continue to be General Superintendent for the term of his lifetime unless he resign; and that it shall be his duty and that of every future General Superintendent, to appoint his successor, or to make a statement in writing 'as to the means which are to be taken for the appointment of a successor', in whom all the

rights, powers, and authorities of the office shall vest.

No provisions other than the foregoing are contained in the deed poll of August 7, 1878. It was with this document in view that the Army's solicitors, writing with reference to its property, asserted that 'General Booth cannot dispose of it, or any part of it, . . . in any manner not in strict accordance with his deed of trust, without incurring the penalties of a fraudulent trustee' (*Times*, December 27, 1890). The word 'fraudulent' seems unnecessarily strong. Even solicitors must be aware that breaches of trust are not necessarily fraudulent, but are frequently accompanied by the strictest rectitude and the loftiest motives. It is not only rogues who are under the necessity of being bound by trust deeds, and, unfortunately, it is not only rogues who break them. It was not because William Booth's honesty was suspected that he was required by the Conference of the Christian Mission to execute the deed poll, and it is unnecessary to call his honesty in question in inquiring whether or not the provisions of that deed have been observed.

It has been seen that there is no mention of the Salvation Army in the deed of 1878 'under which', according to the letter of that body's solicitors already cited, 'the funds of the Salvation Army are administered'. The idea of the military organization and discipline by which that body is now regulated—and by which, as has been shown, its spiritual activities and aims are stifled and thwarted—had not then occurred to the General Superintendent of the Christian Mission, the system of which it was one of the objects of the deed to 'preserve generally'. It was not until the following year that the name itself of 'Salvation Army' was definitely formulated, and it was not until June 24, 1880, that it was officially adopted by the General Superintendent of the Christian Mission. On that date, a Memorandum under the hand of William Booth changing the name of the Christian Mission to that of 'The Salvation Army', was endorsed on the original deed poll of August 7, 1878. The precise terms

of this Memorandum were not until comparatively recently available for public inspection, for, unlike the deed poll, no copy of it was deposited in the Public Record Office.¹ In *Orders and Regulations for Field Officers* there is (p. 306) a bare allusion to the Memorandum, and the following provisions are stated to be contained in the deed poll of August 7, 1878, itself: 'No sittings in any of its [the Christian Mission's] buildings used for services are to be let for hire', and 'all the offices are to be open alike to men and women'. No such provisions, however, are contained either in the deed referred to, or in the endorsed Memorandum. The deed of 1878 contains no provisions for altering either the title or the nature of the organization of the Christian Mission, whether with or without the consent of its members.

In spite of the very despotic powers given to or assumed by William Booth under the deed, there is little doubt that his legal rights under it did not empower him to impose upon the members of the Christian Mission a system and discipline so absolutely foreign to them as the system and discipline imposed upon the body in consequence of the new title. If his legal rights did empower him to do so, it would be necessary to conclude that he could have made any changes whatsoever, that he alone legally constituted the Christian Mission, and that he alone was the legal beneficiary of his own trust. Had any of the members thought fit or been in a position to contest their General Superintendent's action, it is highly probable that a breach of trust would have been established, and that he would have been obliged to find for his new venture other funds and property than those that had been acquired for the purposes of the Christian Mission and for the preservation of its system generally.

The members of the Salvation Army to-day are admittedly the legal representatives of those members of the

Christian Mission who were the beneficiaries under the deed poll of 1878, and some of them, at least, were members of the body to which that deed originally applied. Their objects, methods and doctrines are the same. Their organization and system of government are totally different. But that organization and system are not imposed by the document which constitutes the Army's foundation deed, and seem to be excluded by it if the members think fit to contest it legally. It is, of course, possible that adhesion to the Christian Mission under its present name and government might legally be held to debar its members from enforcing whatever rights they may have possessed under the deed. If, legally, the Army is not merely its 'General' it must be either the officers or the soldiers, or both. The officers, however, are the General's paid servants, and before entering on their duties they voluntarily sign all their rights away. The soldiers are in a different position, and it does not appear that, in signing the Army's 'Articles of War', they renounce any of their rights under the foundation deed of the Christian Mission. They promise to obey 'the lawful orders' of their officers, but it is upon the interpretation of the foundation deed that the lawfulness of a large number of these orders must depend.

But apart from the legal aspect there is the moral aspect. Nothing is more certain in regard to the development of the Christian Mission than that 'the purposes for which it was first originated'—namely, the enjoyment of religious fellowship and bringing the masses under the influences of the Gospel—have not lately been promoted, and are now actually frustrated, by the cumbersome and costly governmental system which was imposed upon the Mission as an outcome of its new name.² Under the financial

¹ The author's former criticism appears to have been anticipated by the Army while the first edition of this work was passing through the press. The Memorandum (see Appendices, 1, 2) was enrolled on April 20, 1906, twenty-six years after its signature.

² While the Christian Mission began in the East End the Salvation Army is compelled to begin in the West. General Booth's assertion that he leaves the rich to others is not borne out by his own account of his recent evangelical campaign in Germany (December, 1905). 'My audiences', said he, evidently with satisfaction, 'have been very select, and have embraced not only State officials,

burdens which that system necessarily entails on both field officers and soldiers, as well as on the public, it becomes daily more difficult to keep together the meagre and diminishing strength of the organization, and daily more difficult for it to perform the work for which it was intended. A system which, to preserve its existence, is now under the constant necessity of extending the maximum regulation time of five minutes allowed for making outdoor collections (*O. and R.*, p. 486) to twenty minutes or even longer, and of constantly disregarding the prohibition of waiting to 'make up' particular sums (p. 405), cannot have much time or energy left for soul-saving and religious fellowship, or possess much attraction for 'those who are not in the habit of attending any place of worship'. Apart from these objects the Army, according to the terms of its foundation deed, has no reason for existing. As the property occupied and used by its corps or congregations has been acquired for these purposes mainly by the combined financial efforts of their own members and the public in their neighbourhood, it is necessary in the interests of their members and the public alike that legal means should be found or, if they do not exist, created, to ensure that these purposes—and these purposes alone—shall be effectually served.

The provisions of the foundation deed of August 7, 1878, seem to have been departed from in another respect seriously affecting the interests of the public. The provision in regard to the publication of accounts is as follows:—

members of the learned professions and large employers, but numbers of the middle and well-to-do working classes. The portions of the country travelled through include, I think, the best in the country—places where there is plenty of work and good wages. Hence the classes of people at the meetings. We have not been into the poorer parts of the Empire.' The Army's plan of converting the poor by courting the wealthy has not succeeded in this country, and if this is the object of General Booth's strategy in Germany it is still more likely to fail there. It is to be hoped that the State officials and members of the learned professions will at least insist upon being told each year, in detail, how many Salvationists there are in Germany.

'The General Superintendent shall have power to expend on behalf of the Christian Mission all moneys contributed for the general purposes of the said Christian Mission or for any of the special objects or operations thereof, but he shall annually publish a Balance Sheet (duly audited) of all such receipts and expenditure.'

The publication of the receipts and expenditure of International Headquarters alone does not seem to fulfil the obligation here imposed upon the General. The general purposes of the Army are to be found in the operations of its corps individually and collectively, but neither individually nor collectively is there any annual publication of a balance-sheet or balance-sheets of their receipts and expenditure or, for that matter, any publication of balance-sheets relating to their finances at all, for the preparation of a quarterly balance-sheet which may or may not be read out to the soldiers themselves cannot be regarded as satisfactory publication. It has been shown that a portion of the money collected by each individual corps is utilized, through the divisional headquarters, for the general purposes of the Army in the division. There is no annual publication of divisional balance-sheets showing the disposition of the money so contributed for such general purposes. Under the Army's system of religious finance very much more money is contributed through the local corps for the general purposes of the organization than through Headquarters, and the interdependence of local, divisional, provincial and national finance renders a reasonably complete annual publication of the receipts and expenditure of all the Army's financial departments from the corps upwards absolutely essential. The objects of the Army must, apparently, be either general or special. Even if it were possible, therefore, to regard the contributions to the local corps as being made for special instead of general objects, it is still undeniable that no annual publication either of separate or collective balance-sheets is made in connexion with such contributions. In whatever way the matter be regarded, then, the present method of preparing and publishing the Army's balance-sheets—which has the effect

of concealing from the public and from the members what they are fully entitled to know—would appear not to be that provided for by the religious trust deed.

If, as 'General' Booth's official journal has said, the principle of trusteeship is the same in the Army as in other religious bodies, its practice is certainly very different. Under most religious trusts there are several trustees in order that each may serve to check the others. They cannot sell or mortgage certain portions of the property of their trust without the approval of Parliament, the High Court, or the Charity Commissioners. General Booth considers himself free to sell and mortgage the property of his trust without any restriction. Other trustees, when in doubt as to their powers under their trust deeds, may consult the Charity Commissioners Board, and if they act in accordance with the Board's advice and direction, they are deemed to have acted in accordance with the provisions of their trust deeds. General Booth appears never to be in doubt that he may safely deal as he pleases with the property under his trust deed. As trusts relating to religious property are legally regarded as 'charitable', the analogy drawn by General Booth between his own and other religious trust deeds would seem to commit him to the acceptance of this description of his trust also. If the Army's property and funds are charitable, their application to the purposes of trading is, or ought to be, as improper as a similar use of charitable funds or property would be under any other religious trust. While the publication and sale of religious books, newspapers, etc., might be held to be legitimate, as being directly designed to promote the purposes of the Mission or Army, it is tolerably certain that the employment of the Army's funds or property in the business of ordinary trading, such as that described in Chapter vii, is, or ought to be, excluded by the terms and nature of the trust.

The Trade Department is financed by the Army's religious funds, and it owed those funds on September 30, 1906, the sum of £45,517. The

purpose of the department is to make profits for the benefit of the religious work, but, as has been shown, it is difficult to admit that that purpose is successfully effected. Even if it were, as the Army's property is governed by a charitable trust, trading, even for that purpose, is beyond its functions, and the foundation deed of 1878 itself makes no allusion to trading as being within the General's powers. The prohibition of trading under religious trusts is doubtless based upon the fact that trading may make losses as well as profits, and that in the event of losses being made the funds employed in producing them are necessarily diverted for ever from their legal purpose. It may be that the peculiar trading advantages accruing to the Army in consequence of its financial dependence upon the public have hitherto enabled it to make certain profits, but if so that very fact makes it all the more improbable that the same results would be attained if these advantages were withdrawn to any serious extent. To all appearance, then, General Booth's indulgence in ordinary trading is legally beyond his province, and it is assuredly desirable on many grounds that it should be.

There is no mention in the Army's foundation deed of banking or life assurance as occupations in which its General may legitimately engage, and in which he may employ the funds, property, personnel and energies of the organization. The relations of the Reliance Bank, Ltd., and the Salvation Army Assurance Society, Ltd., with the Salvation Army proper have already been examined, and the nature of the risks run in consequence of those relations by the many thousands of people who have been induced to put their money in these institutions has been shown. Here the question under consideration is whether the establishment and maintenance of these institutions is morally or legally a breach of trust. It is legitimate to inquire whether 'William Booth', in whose name practically all the shares or interests of both concerns are registered, holds them for his own benefit or for that of the Salvation Army, and whether any profits accruing from

either business or both are his personal property or that of the organization. If 'William Booth' and not General Booth were the proprietor, and entitled to draw the profits, it would be necessary to suppose that 'William Booth' must have established both concerns with his own money, and to conclude that the Army's religious organization and the contributions of the public are utilized for his own personal advantage. As this is not the case—for it is officially stated not to be the case—it would be reasonable to expect that 'William Booth', as registered proprietor of the shares or interests in the Bank and the Assurance Society, would have declared specific trusts with regard to them, making it clear that such shares and profits are not his own but that of the Army. Up to September 22, 1905, no such trusts had been declared. 'We have been advised', wrote Mr. Bramwell Booth, 'that there is no necessity for any declaration other than that already settled by the Deed Poll'. This can only mean that, although neither institution is mentioned in that deed, both the Bank and the Assurance Society have been established and financed with the aid of the religious funds of the Army, that the General of that body considers himself at liberty to establish and finance any institution whatsoever by the same means, that all future Generals are at liberty to do the same, and that all possible and necessary safeguards in regard to such institutions must be supposed to be furnished by a document which plainly never contemplated their existence.

It has been shown that the public are asked to do business with the Bank and the Assurance Society (as with the Trade Department) on the ground that these institutions exist for the purpose of helping the religious work of the Army. As the religious work is not visibly helped, while the operations of both institutions have been vastly extended, it seems more reasonable to conclude that it is the Army's religious work or aims that have benefited them. But accepting the official view that they are essential parts of the Army, and not distinct

from it, it is necessary to assume that the general or special purposes of the Mission, to which the foundation deed relates, are intended to be served by them. As it is largely the contributors to the religious work who enable them to pay their clients their interest or other benefits, it would be reasonable to expect some statement of their financial position and transactions to be included in the Army's annual publication of accounts. This is not done. Yet it is, apparently, the religious funds of the Army, and not 'William Booth', that are responsible for the liabilities of both concerns. In the Assurance Society 'William Booth' is almost sole guarantor and proprietor, and his liability in the event of the Society requiring to be wound up is close upon £24,000. In the Bank he is liable, in respect of shares not fully paid up, for £15,000. Over £250,000 worth of Army property appears to be pledged in the two companies, so that in the event of their getting into difficulties the Army's religious department is liable to them for over £280,000.¹

The reason given officially for retaining practically all the shares of the Assurance Society in the hands of General Booth is that the control of the company and the profits made by it, after its obligations to its policyholders have been discharged, shall be secured to the Army. The same purpose must be presumed to govern the similar arrangement in the case of the Reliance Bank. Both companies have now been in existence for a good many years, and their clients enjoy the assurance that the financial assistance which it is their purpose to render to the Salvation Army is executed 'on thoroughly business lines'. Such lines ought to be profitable, and yet, although the Assurance Society can pay £118,000 on account of agents' commission and management expenses in one year, and the Reliance Bank holds deposits to the amount of nearly a quarter of a million sterling, it is offi-

¹ 'The whole property and income of the Salvation Army are responsible to answer the obligations incurred to investors' in the Army (Pamphlet: *The Salvation Army Investments*).

cially admitted (Letter, September 22, 1905) that the Salvation Army has not yet received any profits from either one or other.¹ It is explained that the policy of the directors is to strengthen their reserves rather than pay away profits, but if this is so the reserve fund of £1,710 that figures among the assets of the Bank seems to indicate that even that purpose is not very successfully realized. A payment of £2,000 from the Assurance Society to the general income of the religious section in 1904 is stated to be not on account of profits but of 'services rendered'—that is services rendered by the religious organization to the Assurance Society. No doubt the Society received good value for its money, but the official justification both of the Society and the Bank seems to require that any services rendered shall be in the contrary direction.

It appears, however, that the absolute control of the Assurance Society by General Booth does not ensure that the profits actually made by it shall be secured to the Salvation Army, with whose funds the concern was apparently floated. The actuary's report for 1903 states that of the surplus shown, £5,226, '75 per cent. is divisible, in the directors' discretion, among policies in the ordinary branch which have been four years in force, the remaining 25 per cent. going to the proprietors'—that is, to the Army. 'On this occasion', the actuary continued, 'I understand it has been arranged that the proprietors [that is the Army] shall waive all right to share in present surplus in order that a larger bonus may be given to the policies entitled to participate.' If it be the object of the Assurance Society to pay its profits over to the Army it is quite right that such profits should constitute a fixed proportion of the surplus. The actuary's statement indicates that that proportion is 25 per cent. While it may be reasonable that the directors should have discretion as to the destination of the other 75 per cent., it is not reasonable, in the circumstances, that either the directors or the 'pro-

prietors' should have power to 'arrange' the diversion of the Army's share of 25 per cent. from its rightful object. Here there is no question of employing it even for the purpose of strengthening the Society's reserves, but merely for that of putting more money in the pockets of its policy-holders. Clearly the ostensible objects of the financial and trading institutions established with the religious funds of the Army are apt to be overlooked by General Booth in his twofold capacity as uncontrolled director and 'proprietor' of both departments, the end being entirely lost in the means intended to compass it.

Nor is it possible to argue that these institutions serve the Army by finding money to lend to it. If this inquiry has proved anything it is that the Army's unlimited business of borrowing is one of the principal causes of its spiritual impotence and its congregational weakness. If borrowing were necessary or justifiable there is no need for the Army itself to be the lender. If people wish to lend it their money, the Army boasts of enough influential sympathizers to render possible the formation of an independent company or companies to facilitate their purpose on really sound financial lines. The Salvation Army Building Association, Ltd., was such a company, but it was because it insisted on transacting its business with the Army on what it regarded as 'thoroughly business lines' that it had to be wound up, for the Army would not or could not continue to borrow the company's money on those conditions. If, in view of all these circumstances, the formation and conduct of the Reliance Bank and the Salvation Army Assurance Society do not constitute a breach of trust under the Army's religious foundation deed of 1878, then no more futile document was ever penned and enrolled in Chancery, or flaunted before the eyes of the public as a guarantee of security and good faith.

The trust under which the funds and property of the so-called 'social' branch of the Salvation Army are vested in its General was executed by William Booth on January 30, 1891, and enrolled in Chancery on the follow-

¹ The latest available religious balance-sheet (year ending September 30, 1906) indicates that this was then still the case.

ing day ('Booth, a Declaration of Trust, "Darkest England"'). The object of the trust is stated to be 'the social and moral improvement and regeneration of such as are destitute or needy, whether they are or are not degraded or criminal'. This is the only object, and it is to be accomplished 'in some manner indicated, implied or suggested' in the book called *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, published by General Booth in the previous year. 'All money and other property contributed, collected or received for the purposes of the Darkest England Scheme' is at all times to be held and applied upon trust for that purpose and in that manner. The scheme is always to be under the control and direction of the General for the time being of the Salvation Army. The General has power to expend, invest or otherwise deal with the funds and property of the trust, such funds and property being earmarked and kept distinct from all other funds and property of the Salvation Army. If, at any time, the property, funds or staff of the trust shall be used partially for the purposes of the Army's religious section, the Army's religious funds are to be charged with a fair proportion of the cost, such proportion being determined by the General. An annual balance-sheet of all receipts and expenditure is to be published. If, at any time, it appears to the General that the trust and the application of its property can be 'advantageously extended, altered or modified in some manner not wholly inconsistent with the main object thereof' he shall be at liberty to do so with 'the express consent in writing of two-thirds in number of the members of a committee' for whose nomination and appointment provision is made. This committee is to be formed in the following manner. The Archbishop of Canterbury, the President of the Wesleyan Conference, the Chairman of the Congregational Union, the Chairman of the Baptist Union, the Attorney-General of England, and the Chairman of the London County Council are to be invited by the General of the Salvation Army to nominate two members each, of whom the nomin-

ator may himself be one; and the General has himself the right of nominating six additional members. Such is the object of the 'social' (Darkest England) trust, and the functions and powers of the General of the Salvation Army under the trust deed.

The first thing calling for remark in connexion with this pretentious document is that the sole guarantee that the provisions of the trust will be observed is the wisdom and honesty of one man, who is, moreover, the autocratic director of another organization which is and must be perpetually in financial difficulties, as the General recently admitted, apparently as a merit, in America. The committee outlined in the trust deed has only a potential existence dependent on the will of the General alone, and it has never yet been called into being. Had General Booth desired adequately to safeguard the interests of the public he could easily have provided for the formation under the deed of a similar committee of a permanent nature, whose duty it would have been, not merely to give him authority to modify the scope of the scheme, but to ensure that it should not be modified without their authority. Even with such a committee the General's powers of direction would still have remained tolerably absolute. The position, then, is that there is no one whose business it is to remember what the objects and means 'indicated, implied or suggested' in General Booth's famous work really were, and to prevent its distinguished author from forgetting them.

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate in detail the results of our examination of the Darkest England Scheme in operation as compared with its delineation in the book called *In Darkest England*. In nearly every department the tendency is to neglect the 'improvement and regeneration of such as are destitute or needy' and to minister to the amelioration of such as are able to pay. It is seen alike in the work of the Farm Colony, in connexion with emigration, with the temperance work, and even with the maternity cases. That the 'social' branch is subject to some fatal com-

pulsion to avoid the destitute and needy is apparent from the following advertisement which appears in the *Solicitor's Journal* (November 4, 1905):—

HOME FOR LADIES ADDICTED TO INEBRIETY
Hillsboro' House, Upper Clapton.

Mrs. Bramwell Booth has a few VACANCIES for Voluntary Patients in the above 'Home'. Most encouraging results.—Particulars as to terms, etc., on application to Chief Secretary, 259, Mare Street, Hackney.

It cannot well be said that these ladies are accurately described either as destitute or needy, seeing that the terms asked for their treatment are 21s. a week, the diet being vegetarian. No doubt it sounds well to speak of the Army's homes for inebriates, even if there are but two of them, but the public will readily realize that their tariff is hardly within the means of General Booth's 'half million slaves of the cup' for whose benefit they were mainly intended. Even if it were admitted that *In Darkest England* implied or suggested that ladies and gentlemen in affluent circumstances should not, on occasion, be absolutely refused the benefit of the scheme, it is nevertheless true that the scheme was never intended for them. When, therefore, the Army's 'social' wing advertises throughout the country for emigrants and inebriates of means, and devotes its energies to helping them rather than the destitute and needy, a moral if not a legal breach of trust is apparently committed. Here again the Army's argument would no doubt be that participation in such work produces profit, and enables it to perform more work of a 'social' nature for the poor than it could otherwise do. But in every department of the 'social' work the amount of proved success is exceedingly minute, while the cost is enormous. Judged by General Booth's own standards, indeed, the failure of the whole scheme is gigantic. It would appear, then, that the purely business enterprises of the Darkest England Scheme have for their only effectual purpose the maintenance of its costly staff and organization. These enterprises, departing as they do from the letter of the trust deed and from the spirit of *In Darkest England*, are in reality a financial necessity resulting

from the failure of the scheme, in spite of its large public subsidies, to effect its true purpose. Under the 'social' trust deed, as under the foundation deed of the religious section, the maxim acted upon is that all means are justified by the end. But when the true end is not attained, the means, in an organization like the Army, become an end in themselves, and that end appears in many cases to be 'wholly inconsistent with the main object' of the scheme. This alteration or modification has been effected without the committee mentioned in the deed having been summoned, and it is doubtful whether even that committee, if it had been summoned, would have had power to divert the benevolent intentions of the trust from the destitute and needy to the comfortable and the well-to-do.

The provisions of the 'social' trust deed have also been seriously infringed by the Army's practice of paying the inmates of its various industrial institutions wages very much below the value of their labour, and of nevertheless retaining them—unless they leave from dissatisfaction—on the footing of regular employés. This is directly opposed to the principles of the Darkest England Scheme, under which no wages, but merely small grants, were to be paid the men in the various 'elevators', workshops and colonies on the express understanding that they were undergoing the merely temporary process alleged to be necessary for their industrial re-establishment in the world (*In Darkest England*, pp. 106, 134, 249, 273). Their re-establishment in the ranks of industry is, however, frustrated by the system of payment actually practised, which serves effectually to keep many of them permanently down, to the Army's profit. In consequence of it the Army is placed in command of a large and constantly increasing body of underpaid and truck-paid labour employed under conditions inconsistent with personal and mental freedom. The disposal of the products of such labour in competition with the products of ordinary manufacturers necessarily produces unemployment in the industries concerned. Of this unemploy-

ment the Army is able in turn to take advantage, with the effect of gradually transferring to its own hands the industries adversely affected by his 'social' operations. It is difficult to consider seriously the Army's statement that its firewood hands were paid more than the outside rate of wages. Such a practice, if general, would be absolutely at variance with the Darkest England Scheme, which explicitly guaranteed that no wages in the ordinary sense should be paid. It would indeed be productive of economic and other evils scarcely less serious than those of sweating. The exceptional treatment of a few favoured persons cannot be regarded as representative of the system.

One of the most serious features of the Darkest England Scheme is neither its failure nor its diversion from its true purpose, but the fact that in spite of both these defects it successfully operates to finance a religious body whose labours are ineffectual, with whose methods and doctrines comparatively few of the contributing public have any sympathy, and which has been the origin of certain financial and commercial enterprises possessing many extremely disquieting elements. That the religious section of the Salvation Army deliberately employs that body's 'social' work as an advertisement is proved by the terms of its Self-Denial Appeal of 1905, which has been examined in detail. That appeal makes prominent mention of the Army's 'social' institutions, and any one receiving it would conclude that the money asked for would be devoted mainly to the furtherance of their work. The 'social' trust deed of 1891 provides that 'all money . . . contributed, collected or received for the purposes of the Darkest England Scheme . . . shall at all times hereafter be held and applied upon trust for the social and moral regeneration and improvement . . . of such as are destitute or needy'. Money asked for the 'social' institutions of the Army must be supposed to be contributed for their benefit. Yet over four-fifths of the money contributed mainly for 'social' purposes in 1905 under the Self-Denial Fund was devoted to the

general religious work of the Army and not to the betterment of the destitute and needy at all. Nor has this amazing disproportion between the method of appeal and the method of distribution been remedied in later years. The sole purpose of the separation of finances under the 'social' trust deed was to remove the possibility of funds intended for the 'social' work being appropriated to the purposes of the religious section. The popular belief that the Army as a whole is engaged in 'social' work is sedulously fostered by the authorities with the result that in one year (1906), under the Self-Denial Appeal alone, over £60,000 asked by the Army and given by the public mainly for the promotion of that work was devoted to the furtherance of the Army's religious work, or, rather, the maintenance of its religious organization.

The great mistake of 1891 was in allowing a religious body which was under the constant necessity of obtaining financial support from the public for its religious purposes to take part in any extra-religious work for which constant public support would also be necessary. In such a case the particular work (in the Army's case the 'social' work) which seems most useful to the public and which is for that reason most widely advertised will, as a matter of course, come to be regarded as the principal occupation of the whole body, even if—as is the case with the numerous local corps, which collect an enormous but unknown amount from the public for their own maintenance—the body as a whole has nothing to do with such work. Upon the perpetuation of such a misconception the existence of the whole religious section of the Salvation Army depends. To associate the purposes of its two distinct sections in one appeal for funds is a highly questionable proceeding¹ under

¹ Here is a more recent example. In the earthquake at San Francisco the Army lost nine halls and four 'social' institutions. General Booth appealed for funds (advertisement, *Times*, April 24, 1906), with the three-fold object of (1) relieving the sufferers, (2) rebuilding the Army's religious property, (3) replacing its 'social' institutions. The needs and deserts of these three objects are

both the Army's trust deeds, but the application to the religious work of four-fifths (in 1907 about eleven-twelfths), of a fund ostensibly raised almost exclusively for the Army's 'social' work is, one cannot but conclude, a very loose observance of the provisions of the Darkest England trust deed.

The reviewer of the *Daily Telegraph*, (March 13, 1907), while admitting that the public may possibly be under the impression that a larger proportion of the money given to the Army is devoted to 'social' purposes than is actually the case, doubts whether the foregoing argument is as strong as the author seems to think. He says: 'It is not fair to argue that, because four out of five objects are social, therefore four-fifths of the money will go to social work'. This is not the argument, however. It is not a question of the number of the 'social' objects, but of the importance which the public—rightly or wrongly—have been led to attribute to them, and of the prominence habitually given to them (see Chapter iv) in the appeal. The fact that these objects receive less than one-fifth (in 1907 about one-twelfth) of the proceeds is not to be justified by saying, as the *Daily Telegraph* reviewer says, that 'General Booth has given no pledges as to the expenditure'. That is precisely what is objectionable. If an ordinary evangelical philanthropist were to take advantage of a great colliery disaster by appealing to the general public for money to relieve the sufferers and to repair and re-paint his chapel, the action might be justified in the same way. So, too—in the improbable event of the public responding—might the destination of £100 to

far from being equally clear. Of the claim of the sufferers on the sympathy of the public there can be no doubt. The *Guardian* states that at the recent religious census in San Francisco the Army's attendances numbered 689 in a population of 350,000. While the cost of the nine halls may well have been considerable, their public utility was evidently small. Of the 'social' work it need only be said that its nature and extent render it much less costly to the public than the religious organization. The problem presented by the equitable distribution of General Booth's relief fund appears insoluble.

the sufferers and £400 to the repairing and repainting. Our philanthropist might still be able to prove that specific donations for the first object alone had been properly expended, just as General Booth is able to maintain that specific donations to the Darkest England Scheme are devoted to the 'social' objects comprised under it. If the 'Social' Scheme, despite its spurious pretensions, is not to defeat one of the principal purposes of its trust deed, viz., that of preventing the 'social' work from financing the Salvation Army generally, it is clear that one necessary step in that direction is the exclusion of the 'social' objects from appeals of which the purpose is mainly the maintenance of the religious work and organization.¹

An impression is rather widely current that the now almost forgotten Report of the Committee of Inquiry of 1892 furnishes some sort of guarantee that the whole Salvationist system is beyond criticism. A recent utterance of General Booth's appears designed to maintain that impression. The Inquiry was mainly due to the criticisms of Mr. George Kebbell—himself a lawyer—who has frequently drawn attention in the *Times* to the unsatisfactory nature of

¹ Alone in the religious press, apparently, the *Christian World* (August 23, 1906) has succeeded in regarding the contents of this book lightly. It finds no cause for 'alarm' in the blending of the 'social' and religious sections, because 'the evangelistic efforts reach the people who benefit from the social endeavours of the Army'. The evangelistic efforts may be said to 'reach' a great many people who do not desire them, and upon whom they make no impression. It is the 'social' officers themselves who supply the religious services and influences of the shelters, 'elevators', etc. These evangelistic efforts are by no means costly. Those of the Army's corps or 'field' work, however, are very costly, and the field officers are usually more profitably employed than in attempting to 'reach' the inmates of the 'social' institutions. The *Christian World* further states that the author 'argues that apart from public support the corps are not self-supporting'. This was not an argument but a statement of fact. If the *Christian World* thinks that the religious corps are self-supporting, it would be interesting to learn the purposes to which it supposes the immense amount of money admittedly collected by them from outsiders is devoted. It would seem that the *Christian World* labours seriously under the common 'social' delusion.

General Booth's trust deeds, as well as to other objectionable features of the organization. The committee was composed of Lord (then Sir Henry) James, the Earl of Onslow, Mr. W. H. Long, Mr. Edwin Waterhouse, and Mr. C. E. Hobhouse. It must be noted in justice to the committee, that the Inquiry dealt only with the Darkest England ('social') Scheme, which had been launched little more than a year before, and which, financially, was and still is of small importance compared with the Army's expensive religious and extensive commercial operations. Into the latter no independent committee has ever inquired.

Even as regards the Darkest England Scheme the scope of the Inquiry was severely limited. It was 'for the purpose of investigating the manner in which the monies subscribed in response to the appeal made in the book, *In Darkest England and the Way out*, have been expended' (Report of Committee). Except in so far as they might relate to this purpose the committee did not deem it necessary to make any examination of 'the principles, government, teaching, or methods of the Salvation Army'. They did not profess to consider the economic effects of the scheme, and did not profess to supply any guarantee that it was fulfilling, or was likely in future to fulfil, the sanguine promises or expectations of its founder. The Report is dated December 19, 1892, and its contents have no application whatsoever to anything done under the scheme since that rather remote date. The following matters and no others were investigated:—

1. Whether the monies collected had been devoted to the objects and expended in the methods set out in the Darkest England appeal.

2. Whether the management had been businesslike and economical, and the accounts had been properly kept.

3. Whether the property and monies were so vested that they could not be applied to any purposes other than those set out in *In Darkest England*, and 'what safeguards exist to prevent the misapplication of such property and money, either now or after the death of Mr. Booth'.

'The Report', said General Booth to a friendly interviewer in Japan

(May, 1907), 'was that they [the committee] could not find a sixpence out of place, nor any mistake in the accounts'. The Report was not quite so simple and unqualified. The accounts were certainly found to have been kept 'in a proper and clear manner' (Conclusion No. 3), but the statement that the committee could not find a sixpence out of place is difficult to reconcile with their discovery (Report, p. 17) that "'barracks", used for the services of the Salvation Army, were erected on the [Hadleigh] farm, and paid for out of the Darkest England Fund'. These barracks cost £630 18s., and were rented by the Army's spiritual wing at £1 a week. The first of the committee's four conclusions, therefore, was that the money collected had been expended in accordance with the terms of the Darkest England appeal 'with the exception of the sums expended on the "barracks" at Hadleigh' (p. 38). The 'ignorant people' who, according to General Booth, 'questioned whether the money given for social work was not diverted to spiritual work', appear to have had their questionings sufficiently justified by the committee's first conclusion.

The second conclusion, that the expenditure appeared to have been of a 'business-like, economical, and prudent character', was subject to an important qualification, viz. 'the difficulty of forming an opinion at so early a stage in the existence of some of the institutions'. The fourth and last conclusion was as follows:—

'That, whilst the invested property, real and personal . . . is so vested and controlled by the trust of the deed of January 30, 1891, that any application of it to purposes other than those declared in the deed by any General of the Salvation Army would amount to a breach of trust, and would subject him to the proceedings of a civil or criminal character before-mentioned in the report, adequate legal safeguards do not at present exist to prevent the misapplication of such property.'

In other words, the deed provided no independent or adequate check upon any General's observance of its terms.

While in Japan, General Booth does not appear to have alluded to the four 'suggestions' or recommendations which the committee felt it their duty to append to their conclusions. The first was that the Colony-over-

sea, which was to form one of the most important parts of the Scheme, should be proceeded with. The committee found, in fact, that the Scheme did not then appear to be fulfilling one of its 'main objects', viz. that of fitting the submerged 'to support themselves in the Colony-over-sea' (p. 23). Fifteen years have passed, but there is still no such colony. It is, as General Booth confessed in Japan, a 'germ' that has not 'sprouted'. Yet the Darkest England accounts show that £25,000 was reserved for this Colony-over-sea in 1891; as late as 1895 a special donation of £5,000 was received for it, and the 'germ' has been tolerably well watered with 'preliminary expenses' before and since. As the 'Social' Scheme has had the money, one can only conclude that it has failed to produce the men.

The committee's second suggestion was that greater economy should be practised in the working of the Hadleigh Colony. As there is still an annual deficit of several thousand pounds, this recommendation cannot be said to have borne much fruit—particularly as the colony was expected to be self-supporting and show a profit. The third suggestion was 'that the real property holdings and investments in stocks should be held in the names of independent trustees' (p. 39), in order that the safeguards against misapplication referred to in the committee's fourth conclusion should be provided. The property was until recently, and is apparently still, held in the name of General Booth alone. The fourth and last suggestion was 'that every care should be taken when disposing of the articles produced in the "social" institutions, that the prices charged should not be lower than those which may fairly be demanded by ordinary tradesmen or workmen'. Whatever precautions may have been taken, they have not sufficed to avert the economic evil here apprehended by the committee, for the Army, by means of its 'social' work, is necessarily placed in an unduly favourable position—as in the case of the Hanbury Street Joinery Works—for capturing certain

industries to the detriment of the 'ordinary tradesmen or workmen' employed in them. From the foregoing facts it will be seen that General Booth's use of the committee's Report is best designed to impress those who have not read it, or who have forgotten it, and that his evident respect for the distinguished names which constituted the committee has by no means been extended to their counsel. The pious recommendations of committees without the power of enforcing them make no impression whatsoever on General Booth, who knows very well that it is nobody's business to institute either the civil or criminal proceedings of the possibility of which such a parade is made, in the event of the provisions of his 'social' trust deed being forgotten, disregarded, or contravened.

There are, apparently, people who have a large amount of faith in deeds poll as legal safeguards in the conduct of public institutions. The author, observes the *Christian World*, with reference to the foregoing criticism of the trust deeds, 'is evidently unaware of the third trust deed by which the future generalship of the Army is safeguarded and provision made for the dismissal of a General if he should prove incompetent'. The first public allusion to the document in question was, apparently, made while the former edition of this work was in the press. Having already examined in detail two trust deeds which, in his opinion, are futile so far as the guarantees which they supply the public are concerned, the author considered it unnecessary at that stage to trouble himself and his readers with the examination of a third.

This third deed, dated July 26, 1904, of which a slightly curtailed copy is given in the Appendices (i, 3), is certainly a sufficiently remarkable document, though not in the sense suggested by the *Christian World*. Its importance appears to be mainly domestic—possibly dynastic. It gives, or appears to give, certain powers to the officers of the Army known as 'commissioners' for the purpose of getting rid of a General in certain circumstances. In the first case, if a

majority of four in five of the commissioners declare in writing that they are 'satisfied' that the General is 'of unsound mind, or permanently incapacitated by mental or physical infirmity from the adequate performance of the duties of his office' [Clause 2, (1)], then the thing is done, and the General ceases to be General. This is called vacation of office through 'mental incapacity'. In the second case, if a majority of nine in ten of the commissioners declare in writing that they are 'satisfied' that a General is unfit to perform the duties of his office on account of 'bankruptcy or insolvency, dereliction of duty, notorious misconduct, or other circumstances' [Clause 2, (2)], the General also forthwith ceases to be General. This is called vacation of office through 'declared unfitness'. A General may also be deposed on account of 'unfitness' by the vote of a three-fourths majority of the 'High Council', composed of the Army's commissioners and 'territorial commanders', both of whom together appear to number at present about three dozen. This is called vacation of office through 'adjudicated unfitness' [Clause 2, (3) and Schedule]. It would appear, however, that the words 'or other circumstances' in the preceding sub-clause (2) suffice to render the action by declaration of the commissioners alone adequate to effect the General's removal for any cause in relation to which the High Council might be summoned.

As the deed contains no definition of the term 'unfitness', whether 'declared' or 'adjudicated', it is impossible to say that it furnishes any guarantee that the provisions of the Army's so-called 'foundation deeds' will be properly observed. As the present commissioners of the Army are obviously quite satisfied that the conduct of the organization has hitherto been without material defect, an independent estimate of the value of their opinion as to what may or may not constitute unfitness might reasonably differ widely from their own.

The particular utility and possible operation of this deed, with its ex-

tremely subtle and elastic provisions, cannot well be judged without having due regard to the Salvation Army's peculiar form of government, and to the fact that the particular persons to whom a certain measure of power is apparently given are bound by its system and discipline, and are required to believe in its divine origin and the divine guidance claimed by their superiors. The title of 'Commissioner' has, no doubt, an impressive appearance. The drawer of this deed, however, appears to have overlooked the important fact that every one of the commissioners is absolutely subject to a certain official between them and the General, viz. the Chief of the Staff. He has practically as much command over them as over the meanest officer in the organization. The commissioners are scattered throughout the world, and their opportunities for the study of their General's possible alienation or unfitness are, therefore, unlikely to be uniform. To any one conversant with the Army's discipline it is utterly inconceivable that any commissioner or commissioners should, of their own initiative—whatever his or their personal opinion on the subject might be—incur the present and future risk of declaring the General to be unfit under either of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Clause 2, or of initiating a round-robin or canvass by correspondence among their fellow-commissioners for their adhesion, without having first obtained the approval or the command of their superior officer, the Chief of the Staff, whose duty it is, under the deed, to receive their declarations and forthwith publish the vacation of office by the General. It is possible, however, to conceive circumstances in which the deed would be capable of effecting what appears to be its object, but in that case the object is less likely to be accomplished by the freedom of the commissioners than by their obligation to obey the will of another.

Certain of the provisions of the deed—especially those relating to a General's 'election'—will interest the Army's commissioners and territorial commanders more keenly than any one else. From the public standpoint, it may be regret-

able that no restriction is placed upon the Army's predilection for deeds poll. Yet another of these unsatisfactory documents is foreshadowed. The deed itself is liable to be 'revoked, altered, or otherwise varied' by the next General with the consent of a majority of at least two-thirds of the commissioners, who have certainly every inducement to avoid being in the minority in such a matter. It is not impossible, therefore, that the High Council, with all its impressive powers and privileges and its fine air of deliberative independence, may totally disappear after the new General's accession to office. In view of its constitution, and the obvious subjection of its members to certain higher authority, it is doubtful whether that would be any very great calamity, from the point of view of ensuring 'fitness'. Even with this aid autocracy, if it wished, cannot so easily jump from off its own shadow. The Salvationist autocracy has evinced no such wish, and an elective body constituted like the High Council of General Booth or Mr. Bramwell Booth can only be said to be not so much a counterfeit of free institutions as a satire upon them.

It is sufficient to compare the provisions of General Booth's two 'foundation deeds' (with the observance of which the deed just examined has obviously nothing to do) with the activities of the Army in its religious and 'social' departments in order to establish the worthlessness of both documents as guarantees that the trusts shall be duly fulfilled. The enrolment of these deeds 'in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice' may be reassuring to the ignorant investor and contributor, but those who have once grasped the essentials of the Salvationist system must perceive that the constant assurance of such enrolment tends to check inquiry, and that it is only by publicity and constant scrutiny by qualified and independent persons representing the public that the interests of the public, as well as those of the Army's aims, are to be secured. If, instead of being enrolled in Chancery, the Army's trust deeds were impressed upon the

public mind, or upon that of an independent committee empowered to safeguard the public interests, it would not be possible for General Booth to declare (*War Cry*, January 6, 1906) that 'the "social" work is not . . . a separate organization'. Such a view is liable to defeat the principal aim of the Darkest England trust deed, viz. that the 'social' scheme should not serve to finance the Army generally. That an autocrat should resent control is natural, but that an autocrat almost wholly dependent upon the public for his funds should be permitted to evade proper scrutiny of the legality of his actions is objectionable and dangerous. If his trust deeds have any value General Booth's is not an absolute but a limited autocracy. The limitations are as clear as his departure from them. Within the Army there exists no influence or power to make it adhere to the legal path laid down for it. In every department its performances are seriously at cross purposes with its aims: in the 'social' as in the religious sphere chaos and bemuddlement alone seem to inform the Salvationist mind. With such an organization some real assurance that it is divinely governed would certainly be welcome. But that assurance should come, not from itself, and not from General Booth's creatures, but from some authority entirely independent of it and enjoying of right every possible facility for studying and understanding it.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

IF advertisement and publicity were the same thing the Salvation Army would enjoy the distinction of being the best instead of the least understood organization in the world. That few of its own members know anything of the more important outlines of the system as a whole the simplest inquiry among them will serve to prove. To the public the attainment of knowledge is beset by difficulties that are almost insuperable, as any one can testify who has had occasion to pursue a legitimate inquiry beyond the point where it ceases to be entirely agreeable

to the Army officials. Some, at least, of these difficulties it has been the author's purpose to remove.

There are, however, certain difficulties in the problem of Salvationism that lie on the surface, and it would be interesting to know by what means the many influential and intelligent personages who unquestioningly accept the Army's estimate of itself and its work succeed in reconciling these difficulties, if, indeed, they have ever reflected on them. The anomalies are, in fact, startling. The Army is first and last a converting machine: it proclaims not only that it is successful in converting the masses, but also that its doctrines and methods are as nearly as possible infallible for that purpose. Yet when one asks to be allowed to impose the Army's own test in its days of innocence—of counting heads, one is told that it is impossible and unreasonable to seek to measure spiritual work by statistics.

If we consent to overlook the Army's refusal to produce its converts another difficulty at once confronts us. An examination of the work actually done by the individual corps or congregations which constitute the Army in this country discloses nothing of which the cost might not properly be borne entirely by their own members provided they are what they profess to be and what General Booth assures us they are. It is an admitted result of effectual conversion that the convert's worldly welfare may confidently be expected to advance with his altered spiritual condition (*In Darkest England*, Preface). Yet in nearly every case, under the Salvationist system, the greater part of the religious expenses of these corps is borne by the public, not because they are successful in influencing their environment, but simply because they are not. The public are led to imagine that though the influence of one particular corps may be imperceptible, it is nevertheless instrumental in some unseen way in promoting the asserted spiritual triumphs of the Army as a whole elsewhere. Elsewhere, however, the same state of things exists, and there the public are led to imagine precisely the same thing. Until they are afforded

a periodical survey of the whole Salvationist field there is obviously no reason why they should not go on imagining it.

Had General Booth never launched his 'Social' Scheme it is possible that public attention might ere now have been directed more closely to the work of these corps, which to-day, as in 1890, remains religious work. The missing millions of converts—if not the missing millions of pounds—might have been inquired about. The institution of the 'social' work, although separately organized and financed, effectually blinded the public's eyes, and to-day, in spite of all the defects and abuses with which that fantastic and ineffectual economic scheme is permeated, it still serves admirably to finance the equally fantastic but enormously more costly parent scheme of whose dismal failure it was apparently the outcome.

If in a religious organization the statistical method of testing success be imperfect, it is at least more fitting than the financial test. Yet to-day in the Salvation Army it is the financial test alone that counts. It counts, moreover, precisely because the statistical test is not applied and—because of failure—cannot be applied. Every officer knows that, whether he is capable of saving souls or not, he must collect money. Every reasonable man or woman must see that, under the Army's system, the more money an officer is obliged to collect the fewer souls he is likely to save. And yet the supreme test of an officer's success is 'target smashing' for the Self-Denial Fund during that protracted interval of each year which, with grim irony, is officially termed a week. The task of collecting, and if possible exceeding, the amount prescribed for him by his superior officer is for some weeks before the event depicted by the *War Cry* as the supreme joy of the wretched field officer's existence. His ambition is stimulated by the numerous portraits of those who have at untold cost in energy and privation attained the impossible and earned their 'D.S.O.' Then comes the final spur of the General's Self-Denial homily ('About Targets,' March 17, 1906). It is

written round and about the text: 'What will the total be?' The individual is urged by all that is most sacred to get beyond his total if possible—but anyhow come up to it. 'I must not forget to add', he observes, 'that if you don't you will not be pleased yourself'. The displeasure of the unfortunate field officer's superior in the event of the target remaining unsmashed, is, as every one from the General downwards well knows, the only uncomfortable manifestation of feeling which he has the smallest occasion to dread. The total collected in 1908 was £72,670, and yet the spiritual good—like the 'social' good—that results from this fund is imperceptible. The physical harm caused to many of the thousands of men, women, and young girls who spend themselves each year in their heroic efforts to top General Booth's ever-advancing totals¹ is an item on the other side of the account which even the high figures dealt with by Salvationism would scarcely adequately balance.

The money-collecting of Salvationism is constantly declared by General Booth to be the most natural thing in the world. It is spoken of as an excellent religious joke, and the public laugh when they are told that they

¹ It may here be noted that in 1907 the Self-Denial Fund showed a falling-off for the first time in fourteen years, the amount collected being £72,653, as compared with £72,726 in the preceding year. In 1905 and 1906 there was a rise, compared with the preceding year's figures, of £7,279 and £9,416 respectively. The figure here given for 1906 (£72,726) is the amount furnished, with local details, by the *War Cry* of April 14, 1906, and also by the *Army's Year Book* for 1907, issued about eight months later. The result of the 1907 collection, however, was published in the *War Cry* of March 30, 1907, with the bold headlines: 'Another Splendid Success' and 'Last Year's Remarkable Total Passed', the 1906 result appearing as £72,559. It is difficult to imagine a reasonable explanation of this shrinkage in the amount officially stated previously to have been collected. Anyhow, it enables the 1907 figure to show an advance of £94 instead of a decrease of £73. This serious check compared with the enormous advances of 1905 and 1906 is officially ascribed to special local efforts on behalf of new buildings during the year. There have, however, been other and more important causes. The 1908 figure (£72,670) is also below the level of April, 1906.

would not like the Army if it took less than three collections from them. If the organization existed solely for the maintenance of a set of free charitable institutions this eternal appeal for money might be understood. But the Army professes to be primarily and mainly a religious body composed of its conquests amongs evil-doers and of recruits drawn from other sects, and the justification of its financial appeal to the public at large is rendered all the more difficult by its alleged success and enthusiasm. As for the 'social' work, it is, if possible, still more difficult to understand why it should be unable to dispense with public contributions. Salvationism is peculiar in other respects. It is the one religious body in which 'doing good work' invariably and necessarily means getting other people to do it or bear its cost. The Army, too, appears to be the one evangelical body which, while firmly professing faith in the power of the printed word, possesses nothing in the shape of literature for free distribution—except, of course, its financial appeals. While other religious bodies find it beneficial to discuss publicly their own defects and failures in order that they may be remedied, the Army is the one religious body which never criticizes itself, and it is clear that it is failure rather than success that makes it impossible for it to do so.

General Booth has complained that it should still be necessary for him in his declining years to be constantly travelling about the world on behalf of the Army's funds, and has suggested that the public should support him in his plea for State aid. Does General Booth really expect the State to finance his religious corps for him? If they are not provided for, the financial difficulties of the body as a whole will not be dissipated. If it is only the 'social' work that the State is expected to provide for, that very fact will assuredly bring about a fatal slump in the public contribution to the religious work. When worldly enterprises are in a bad way in consequence of precarious bases of finance there is usually some one to declare that all that is wanted is more money

and more advertisement. This is General Booth's position, another resemblance being that the word failure is never allowed to be uttered. Yet it is in that word that the explanation is to be found of this desperate appeal to the State and the pathetic quest of a millionaire. This is the real cause of the laborious engineering of civic and state receptions, and of the cordial understanding with certain newspapers whereby the doings of the Army's head in different parts of the world are diligently chronicled and appraised by his own creatures. It is this that explains why of late years the Army's existence has become dependent upon merely sensational 'turns' without either a religious or a 'social' motive, which, while of a nature to persuade the public that their object is philanthropic and worthy of general financial support, are in reality conducted on the lines of 'sound business propositions'. Even when they appear otherwise, as in the case of free midnight meals on the Embankment, the student of Salvationism is forced to ask himself to what extent this lapse to indiscriminate charity and departure from the scientific 'social' principles of 1890, may be animated by financial needs and the necessity for *vêclame*. It is not more money or more advertisement that General Booth's Army requires. It is reorganization or rather, demolition and reconstitution on a spiritual basis.

The system of the Christian Mission, which it was General Booth's duty under his religious trust deed to 'preserve generally', did not contain or sanction two things—the over-capitalization of the body in proportion to its real strength, and the financial subjection of its paid workers to the necessities resulting from such a policy. The Report of the Christian Mission for 1870 shows that the purposes of the General Fund then included the payment of 'the salaries of evangelists' and 'the rents of theatres and halls'. The purpose of the Building Fund was 'to assist stations to secure halls for themselves, and so save the enormous outlay required to rent them' (the italics were Mr. Booth's). The aim, in fact, was to safeguard the

members from having 'all their little offerings . . . swallowed up in rent', but to this aim the financial system of the Salvation Army is opposed. Nowadays it is not only the little offerings of the members that are swallowed up in rent and many other Headquarters imposts, but the larger offerings of the public. The result is that, instead of enabling the various stations 'to plant the Mission banner in some adjacent neighbourhood as dark as their own' as an effect of their genuine growth and strength, the present policy merely facilitates the establishment and maintenance of innumerable collecting-stations which have nothing to do with spiritual growth, and which, together, can only be regarded as the shell of a religious system.

Just as the Army makes a virtue of its insatiable need for money, so it makes a virtue of its critics. It seems almost to have convinced the public that the universal beneficence of its operations is best gauged by the fact that a tolerably large number of honest men and women have tried at different times to pierce the shield of its autocracy and shed some light upon certain hidden portions of its system. The Army's approved way with its critics is simple. A mistaken or erroneous charge it will hasten to meet, for in that case publicity is a good advertisement. True and well-founded criticisms, however, are best met by silence, or, if necessary, by evasion and suppression. When, in such cases, its own friends or supporters are troubled in mind by official silence it is usually enough for them to be informed simply that the person making the charge is 'an enemy of the Army'. The argument may be stated syllogistically thus: 'Good men have enemies; the Army has enemies; therefore the Army is wholly good, and the particular charge must be false'. Thus the Army's policy of silence is made to signify that it has much more useful work in hand than that of replying to troublesome critics. The author has endeavoured to show that it is high time this state of things was ended, and that it is desirable, in regard to

many things for which General Booth and Mr. Bramwell Booth are directly responsible, that the necessity for either criticisms or replies should once for all disappear.

In concluding this examination of the constitution and work of the Salvation Army few more words are necessary. It is desirable that the public, who are so deeply interested financially, should realize that no statements regarding the success and value of the Army's work, the absence of oppression and hardship under its rule, the stability of its financial institutions, the aims and operation of its trading concerns, and the fidelity of its adherence to the provisions of its trust deeds, can be accepted as satisfactory so long as they possess no other authority than that of General Booth and those beneath his moral and intellectual yoke at International Headquarters. It is desirable that they should realize that the many-sided activities of Salvationism, the importance of the interests involved in these activities, and the curious and questionable devices to which the Salvationist hierarchy is frequently obliged to have recourse, render necessary an independent public inquiry which shall deal with every department of the Army's work, religious, 'social', financial and commercial.

It is unlikely that the results of such an inquiry would differ materially from the conclusions reached in this work. That anything in the nature

of adequate reform is possible under the present constitution and system of government is too sanguine a hope. All the evils of pseudo-religious autocracy are neither to be discovered nor cured in a day. The imposition upon the Army of an independent public committee, whose permanent duty it would be to supervise, if not to control, and report upon its work, seems desirable, but is probably impracticable. Where responsibility is not involved it is easy for distinguished men to praise the Army. If they were called upon to assume some degree of definite responsibility towards the public for the proper administration of its religious and 'social' funds, the beneficent operation of its 'social' institutions, the strictly 'auxiliary' nature of its trading, and the safety of any financial institutions associated with it, most of them would want to know something about these and other cognate matters before consenting. In all probability, then, there can be no independent body between the Army and the public. In that case it must be for the public to act for themselves. They supply the sinews of war. They are, therefore, not without responsibility. They are, also, not without power. The issues dependent upon their exercise of it are serious and far-reaching. It is for them to consider and decide how much longer the Salvationist octopus is to be nourished.

APPENDICES

- I. THE ARMY'S 'FOUNDATION DEEDS'.
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 2. The Religious Trust Deed.—Booth: A Deed Poll, August 7, 1878. (With Endorsement, June 24, 1880).
 3. The Removal and Election of General.—Booth: A Deed Poll, July 26, 1904.
 4. The 'Social' Trust Deed.—Booth: A Declaration of Trust, 'Darkest England,' January 30, 1891.
- II. THE ARTICLES OF WAR.
- III. THE FIELD OFFICER'S ENGAGEMENTS.
- IV. LIQUIDATION OF THE S.A. BUILDING ASSOCIATION: Directors' Statement.
- V. THE ARMY'S TREATMENT OF OFFICERS.
 1. Statement of Ex-Officer S—.
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APPENDIX I

THE ARMY'S 'FOUNDATION DEEDS'.

I. PRELIMINARY.

CLOSE ROLL (Chancery)
1878. Part 72. M.27.

BOOTH } TO ALL TO WHOM
A } THESE PRESENTS
DEED POLL } shall come I the within
named William Booth SEND GREETING
WHEREAS at an annual meeting of the Conference of The Christian Mission held at Whitechapel this seventh day of August One thousand eight hundred and seventy eight it has been deemed and held to be necessary in order to secure greater freedom for effectuating and furthering the principles of the Christian Mission as recognized and expressed by the Conference at their annual meeting in the year One thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven that the within written Deed should be annulled NOW KNOW YE AND THESE PRESENTS WITNESS THAT I the said William Booth by virtue of the power given and reserved to me by the said within written Deed and in particular of the clause or section numbered (5) of the Declaration contained in the body of the said within written Deed and therein designated 'lastly' and of all other powers and authorities whatsoever in any-wise enabling me in that behalf Do with the concurrence of three-fourths of the members of the said Conference by these presents wholly and absolutely annul the within mentioned Deed AND I DO HEREBY by virtue of all such powers as aforesaid declare as to any thing contained in the said within written Deed that the same shall henceforth so far as it derives force and effect by virtue of the said within written Deed be null and void and of no effect IN WITNESS whereof I the said William Booth have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my Seal this

seventh day of August in the year of redemption One thousand eight hundred and seventy eight

WILLIAM BOOTH (18)

SIGNED SEALED AND DELIVERED by the within named William Booth in the presence of

THOS. WHITTINGTON 3 Bishopsgate St Without Solr.

J. E. BILLUPS Cardiff Contractor

THIS DEED was duly presented to and approved by the persons assembled at the annual meeting of the Conference held in pursuance of the within written Deed at No 272 Whitechapel Road in the County of Middlesex and we the undersigned William Booth and George Scott Railton DO HEREBY in the name of the Christian Mission set our hands hereto in ratification of and for perpetuating testimony of this deed.

DATED this same seventh day of August One thousand eight hundred and seventy eight

President of Conference—WILLIAM BOOTH

G. S. RAILTON Secretary of Conference WITNESSES TO both Signatures

THOS. WHITTINGTON

J. E. BILLUPS.

ENROLLED the thirteenth day of August in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight (being first duly stamped) according to the tenor of the Statutes made for that purpose.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and authentic copy.

G. F. HANDCOCK

Assist. Keeper of the Public Records,
30th October 1905.

2. THE RELIGIOUS TRUST DEED.

CLOSE ROLL (Chancery)
1878. Part 72. m.28.

BOOTH } TO ALL TO WHOM
A } these Presents shall come
DEED POLL } I WILLIAM BOOTH of
3 Gore Road Victoria Park Road Hackney in
the County of Middlesex Minister of the Gospel
the Founder and General Superintendent
for the time being of THE CHRISTIAN
MISSION SEND GREETING.

WHEREAS in the year 1865 the said William Booth commenced preaching the Gospel in a Tent erected in the Friends' Burial Ground Thomas Street in the Parish of Whitechapel in the County of Middlesex and in other places in the same neighbourhood—

AND WHEREAS a number of People were formed into a Community or Society by the said William Booth for the purpose of enjoying Religious Fellowship and in order to continue and multiply such efforts as had been made in the Tent, to bring under the Gospel those who were not in the habit of attending any Place of Worship by Preaching in the open air in Tents Theatres Music Halls and other places and by holding other Religious Services or Meetings—

AND WHEREAS at the first the said Society was known by the name of the East London Revival Society and afterwards as the East London Christian Mission—

AND WHEREAS other Societies were afterwards added in different parts of London and a Society was also formed at Croydon—

AND WHEREAS the name of these united Societies was then altered to that of 'The Christian Mission'—

AND WHEREAS divers Halls or Meeting-houses School rooms Vestries lands buildings and appurts situate lying and being in various parts of Her Majesty's Dominions and elsewhere have been or are intended to be and hereafter may be given and conveyed to certain persons in such Gifts and Conveyances named and to be named upon trusts for the purposes therein and herein mentioned or any of them and generally for promoting the objects of the said Christian Mission under the direction of the General Superintendent—

AND WHEREAS in order to render valid and effectual such trusts to remove doubts and prevent Litigation in the interpretation thereof or as to the terms used therein to ascertain what is the name or title and what are and shall be for ever the doctrines of the said Christian Mission and also in order to preserve the system of the said Christian Mission generally by means of a General Superintendent it has been deemed expedient to make and execute these presents—

NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS that for the purposes aforesaid I the said William Booth DO HEREBY DECLARE—

FIRSTLY THAT the name style and title by which the said Religious Community or Mission hereinbefore described hath during the last nine years been called known and recognized is 'The Christian Mission'.

SECONDLY THAT the Religious doctrines professed believed and taught by the

Members of the said Christian Mission are and shall for ever be as follows :

1. WE believe that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments were given by inspiration of God and that they only constitute the Divine rule of Christian faith and practice.
2. WE believe there is only one God who is infinitely perfect the Creator Preserver and Governor of all things and who is the only proper object of Religious Worship.
3. WE believe that there are three persons in the Godhead the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost undivided in essence and co-equal in power and glory.
4. WE believe that in the person of Jesus Christ the Divine and human natures are united, so that he is truly and properly God and truly and properly man.
5. WE believe that our first Parents were created in a state of innocency but by their disobedience they lost their purity and happiness and that in consequence of their fall all men have become Sinners totally depraved and as such are justly exposed to the wrath of God.
6. WE believe that the Lord Jesus Christ has by his suffering and death made an atonement for the whole World so that whosoever will may be saved.
7. WE believe that repentance towards God faith in Our Lord Jesus Christ and regeneration by the Holy Spirit are necessary to Salvation.
8. WE believe that we are justified by grace through faith in Our Lord Jesus Christ and that he that believeth hath the witness in himself.
9. WE believe that continuance in a state of Salvation depends upon continued obedient faith in Christ.
10. WE believe that it is the privilege of all believers to be 'wholly sanctified' and that 'their whole spirit and soul and body' may be 'preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ' (1 Thess. v. 23).
11. WE believe in the immortality of the soul in the Resurrection of the body in the general judgment at the end of the World in the eternal happiness of the Righteous and in the endless punishment of the Wicked.

THIRDLY THAT the said Christian Mission is and shall be always hereafter under the oversight direction and control of some one person who shall be the General Superintendent thereof whose duty it shall be to determine and enforce the discipline and laws and superintend the operations of the said Christian Mission and to conserve the same to and for the objects and purposes for which it was first originated.

THE General Superintendent shall have power to expend on behalf of the Christian Mission all moneys contributed for the general purposes of the said Christian Mission or for any of the special objects or operations thereof but he shall annually publish a Balance Sheet

(duly Audited) of all such receipts and expenditure.

THE General Superintendent shall have power to acquire by Gift Purchase or otherwise any Hall or Meeting house School room Vestry Land building and appurts and any seats fittings furniture or other Property whatsoever which may in his judgment be required for the purposes of the said Christian Mission and to build upon such land or alter or pull down any such buildings and to hire on lease or otherwise any land or buildings and to lend give away let sell or otherwise dispose of any such property land or buildings as he may deem necessary in the interests of the said Christian Mission wherein all trustees shall render him every assistance and he may in all such cases as he shall deem it expedient so to do nominate and appoint trustees or a trustee of any part or parts respectively of such property and direct the Conveyance or Transfer thereof to such trustees or trustee with power for the General Superintendent to declare the trusts thereof and from time to time if it shall seem expedient to him so to do to revoke any such trusts or the appointment of such Trustees or Trustee and upon such revocation the same Property shall be conveyed or transferred to such persons or person and upon such trusts as he may direct but only for the benefit of the said Christian Mission.

FOURTHLY THAT the said William Booth shall continue to be for the term of his natural life the General Superintendent of the Christian Mission unless he shall resign such Office—

FIFTHLY THAT the said William Booth and every General Superintendent who shall succeed him shall have power to appoint his successor to the Office of General Superintendent and all the rights powers and authorities of the Office shall vest in the person so appointed upon the decease of the said William Booth or other General Superintendent appointing him or at such other period as may be named in the Document appointing him.

SIXTHLY THAT it shall be the duty of every General Superintendent to make in writing as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment a Statement as to his successor or as to the means which are to be taken for the appointment of a Successor at the decease of the General Superintendent or upon his ceasing to perform the duties of the Office such Statement to be signed by the General Superintendent and delivered in a Sealed envelope to the Solicitor for the time being of the Christian Mission but such Statement may be altered at will by the General Superintendent at any time during his continuance in Office upon a new Statement being signed by him and delivered as before mentioned to such Solicitor as aforesaid—

IN WITNESS whereof I the said William Booth have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my Seal this seventh day of August in the year of Redemption one thousand eight hundred and seventy eight

WILLIAM BOOTH (18)

SIGNED SEALED and DELIVERED by the said William Booth in the presence of
THOS. WHITTINGTON 3 Bishopgate St.
Without Solr..
J. E. BILLUPS.

THIS DEED was duly presented to and approved by the persons assembled at a General Meeting of the Christian Mission held at No. 272 Whitechapel Road in the County of Middlesex AND we the undersigned William Booth and George Scott Railton do hereby in the name of the Christian Mission set our hands hereto in ratification of and for perpetuating testimony of this Deed.

DATED this same seventh day of August, 1878

General Superintendent WILLIAM BOOTH
G. S. RAILTON Secretary of the Christian Mission

WITNESSES to both Signatures
THOS. WHITTINGTON
J. E. BILLUPS

ENROLLED the thirteenth day of August in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and seventy eight (being first duly stamped) according to the tenor of the Statutes made for that purpose.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and authentic copy.

G. F. HANDCOCK,
Assist. Keeper of the Public Records,
30th October, 1905.

ENDORSEMENT.

BOOTH Christian Mission to be known as 'The Salvation Army'. See Deed enrolled 13th Augt. 1878 Part 72/522	}	BE IT REMEM- BERED and entered as of Record That WHEREAS the Society called and known pre- viously to the end of the year One thousand eight hundred and seventy eight as 'The Christian Mission' was on or about the first day of January One thousand eight hundred and seventy nine with a view to the more beneficially extending of its operations renamed and has been since that time and is now usually known as 'The Salvation Army' NOW I WILLIAM BOOTH the General of the Salvation Army (and also the General Superintendent of The Christian Mission) do hereby by virtue of all and every powers and authority in me vested DECLARE that the said Society formerly known and in the within written Deed described as The Christian Mission is now and is intended to be hereafter called and known or described for all public purposes of its operations as 'The Salvation Army' and that the expression 'The Christian Mission' in the within Deed contained shall be taken to mean 'The Salva- tion Army' and that every thing in the within Deed contained relating or referring to the Christian Mission shall be taken as relating or referring to The Salvation Army.
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IN WITNESS whereof I have hereto set my hand this twenty fourth day of June One thousand eight hundred and eighty

WILLIAM BOOTH (18)

WITNESS
THOS. WHITTINGTON

ENROLLED the twentieth day of April in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and six
Supreme Court of Judicature.
Office Copy.

3. THE REMOVAL AND ELECTION OF GENERAL.
(Abridged).

BOOTH } TO ALL TO WHOM
a } these Presents shall come
Deed Poll, } William Booth of 101
Salvation Army } Queen Victoria Street
to 1103. } in the City of London
General of the Salvation Army sends Greeting.

WHEREAS in order to minimise the possibility of doubt dispute or litigation it is considered desirable to provide more fully and specifically than is done by the Deed of Constitution [the preceding Deed Poll, No. 2] for the events in which the General for the time being shall cease to perform the duties of his Office and also for the nomination and appointment of a successor to the General for the time being on his dying or ceasing to perform the duties of the Office and the said William Booth has accordingly determined to execute these presents. NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS that the said William Booth doth hereby declare as follows that is to say:

1.
2. Every General for the time being of the Salvation Army shall be deemed to cease to perform the duties of the Office within Clause 6 of the Deed of Constitution and to vacate such Office upon the happening of the following events that is to say:

(1) If he shall be found lunatic by inquisition, or if all the Commissioners of the Salvation Army (which expression as and when used in these presents and in the Schedule hereto shall except where and so far as the context shall otherwise require be deemed to include the Chief of the Staff and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the time being but not to include any retired Commissioners or Commissioner) or a majority of such Commissioners amounting to at least four in five declare by writing under their hands that they are satisfied that the General is of unsound mind or permanently incapacitated by mental or physical infirmity from the adequate performance of the duties of his office.

(2) If all the Commissioners of the Salvation Army or a majority of such Commissioners amounting to at least nine in ten declare by writing under their hands that they are satisfied that the General is in consequence of bankruptcy or insolvency dereliction of duty notorious misconduct or other circumstances unfit to continue to perform the duties of his office.

(3) If a resolution adjudicating the General unfit for office and removing him therefrom shall be passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the members present and voting of the High Council of the Salvation Army hereinafter referred to.

The following provisions shall take effect with regard to any declaration under either of the first two sub-clauses of this present Clause that is to say First: Any such Declaration shall shew on its face whether it is made under the first sub-clause or under the second sub-clause but subject to this need not state the incapacity or unfitness otherwise than in general terms or the nature of the evidence (if any) on which the declarants or any of them may have acted and it shall not be necessary to have given the General in question notice

of the intention to make such declaration; Secondly: Any such declaration may be by one or several documents and need not be signed simultaneously so long as there shall not be an interval of more than three calendar months between the first signature and the last; Thirdly: The date at which the Commissioners of the Salvation Army are to be ascertained for the purposes of this Clause shall be at the date when the declaration in question shall have been signed by the Commissioner who shall first sign the same to the intent that no dismissal of any Commissioner or other alteration in the Commissioners (whether by termination of Office by time or otherwise) between the date of such first signing and the date of the formal handing of the declaration as hereinafter mentioned shall in any way prejudice or affect the possibility of obtaining the declaration or the validity or operation thereof when obtained. Provided lastly that any such declaration shall be operative and the vacation of Office shall take place upon such declaration being formally handed to the Chief of the Staff or in his absence to the next highest Officer for the time being at Headquarters whose duty it shall be to receive such declaration and to publish the same with the date of its receipt within twenty-four hours of receipt or as soon as possible thereafter. Vacation of Office under the first sub-clause of this Clause is hereinafter referred to as vacation of Office through mental incapacity and vacation of Office under the second sub-clause of this Clause is hereinafter referred to as vacation of office through declared unfitness and vacation of office under the third sub-clause of this Clause is hereinafter referred to as vacation of Office through adjudicated unfitness.

3. If the Vacation of the Office of General shall take place through declared unfitness or through adjudicated unfitness any and every statement made by the vacating General as to his successor or the means to be adopted for appointing his successor shall be void and be disregarded and shall be destroyed without being opened. And if the Vacation of the Office of General shall take place through mental incapacity any and every such statement which shall have been made by the vacating General later than one calendar month prior to the date of the commencement of the proceedings under which he shall have been found lunatic by inquisition or to the date of the signature by the Commissioner who shall first sign the same of the declaration declaring his mental incapacity as the case may be shall be void and be disregarded and shall be destroyed. But if the Vacation of Office of General shall take place through death or resignation and also if such vacation having taken place through mental incapacity there shall be in existence a Statement or Statements made by the General more than one calendar month prior to the alternative date lastly hereinbefore mentioned then and in any of the said cases his successor shall be appointed in accordance with the Statement made by the vacating General as in the Deed of Constitution and hereinafter provided but so nevertheless as not hereby to validate any statement made by a vacating General which though actually

made one calendar month or upwards prior to the said alternative date may nevertheless be proved to have been made when the vacating General was in fact non compos mentis.

4. If in any of the cases mentioned in the last preceding clause in which a Statement by the vacating General would be prima facie effective it shall happen either that there is no such Statement as therein mentioned (which fact shall be sufficiently proved by a joint Declaration in writing under the hand of the Chief of the Staff for the time being and the Solicitor of the Army for the time being that to the best of their knowledge information and belief there is no such Statement) or that no such Statement is found within a fortnight after the vacation of Office or that any such Statement is invalid by reason of the vacating General having been non compos mentis at the date of making the same or otherwise or that whether by death refusal or otherwise no successor can be appointed in pursuance of any such statement or is so appointed within one calendar month of the vacation of Office then and in any of the said events and also in the event of vacation of Office under circumstances in which any Statement by the vacating General is to be disregarded the appointment of the successor shall be determined by the High Council of the Salvation Army hereinafter referred to.

5. In the case also of vacation of Office through adjudicated unfitness the appointment of the successor to the vacating General shall be determined by the High Council of the Salvation Army hereinafter referred to.

6. During any interval that shall elapse between the vacation of Office by any General of the Salvation Army and the appointment of his successor the person who is at the date of vacation of Office the Chief of the Staff of the Salvation Army or (him failing) the next highest Officer for the time being may except as provided in the first proviso hereto exercise all and every the powers and discretions which are under the Deed of Constitution or these presents vested in the General for the time being. Provided always that the Chief of the Staff or other Highest Officer as aforesaid shall not do any one or more of the following things that is to say (a) Retire or reduce any Commissioner for the time being from that rank otherwise than with the consent in writing of at least three in four of the other Commissioners of the Salvation Army for the time being except upon a finding of misconduct by a Court Martial constituted under the Rules and Regulations for the time being (b) Make any change in the Orders and Regulations for the time being of the Salvation Army as printed and published (c) Enter upon or engage in otherwise than with the consent in writing of at least three in four of the Commissioners for the time being any new transaction or obligation involving an expenditure or liability or both to a greater extent in the whole than £10,000. . . .

7. Any General for the time being of the Salvation Army whether appointed under the Deed of Constitution or under these presents whether varied or not or under the conjoint operation of both deeds shall have full and unrestricted power to purchase hire or

otherwise acquire and to sell mortgage let or otherwise dispose of and deal with any real and personal property in any part of the world and all other the powers and discretions given by the Deed of Constitution.

8. Every General of the Salvation Army shall forthwith upon communication to him of his appointment execute a Deed accepting Office upon and subject to the terms not only of the Deed of Constitution but also of these presents either as originally fixed or as varied as hereinafter mentioned as the case may be. If any General does not execute such a Deed within 48 hours after being required in writing so to do by any three Commissioners or if no such request be made within one calendar month at latest after communication to him of his appointment then and in such a case and immediately upon the expiration of the alternative period in question such General shall be deemed to cease to perform his duties and to vacate Office and the like consequences shall ensue as on a vacation of Office through declared unfitness. Provided always that if the execution of a Deed Poll under the provisions of this Clause shall be delayed by illness or other inevitable occasion then and in such case the aforesaid alternative periods of 48 hours and one calendar month shall run only as from the ceasing of the cause of delay.

9. The provisions of these presents (including the provisions of the Schedule hereto) may at any time or from time to time hereafter be added to revoked altered or otherwise varied by any General for the time being of the Salvation Army by deed executed with the consent in writing of a majority in number of the Commissioners of the said Army amounting to at least two thirds of the whole number thereof, And any Statement in such deed of the number of the Commissioners of the said Army and of the fact that any named persons are some of such Commissioners shall be sufficient for the purposes of effectuating any such deed without any further proof of such total number or of the fact that all or any of such named persons are in fact such Commissioners.

10. For the purpose of adjudicating on the question whether any General is unfit for Office and should be removed therefrom under Clause 2, Sub-clause (3) of these presents and also for the purpose of electing a successor to the Office of General under Clause 4 of these presents there shall henceforth be established and shall from time to time and at all times when necessary be convened a Council of the Salvation Army to be known as the High Council of the Salvation Army. Such Council shall be constituted convened and regulated in accordance with the provisions contained in the Schedule hereto which shall be as valid and operative as if set out in the body of these presents. IN WITNESS whereof the said William Booth hath hereunto set his hand and seal this twenty sixth day of July One thousand nine hundred and four.

SCHEDULE ABOVE REFERRED TO.
THE HIGH COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY.

1. The High Council of the Salvation Army (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Council') may be convened for the purpose of adjudicat-

ing on the question whether the General for the time being of the Salvation Army is unfit for Office and should be removed therefrom under Clause 2, Sub-Clause (3) of the foregoing Deed Poll and shall be convened in any of the events mentioned in Clause 4 of such Deed Poll for the purpose of appointing a successor to the Office of General of the Salvation Army.

2. For the purpose of adjudicating as aforesaid the High Council may be convened at any time as follows and not otherwise that is to say either on the joint requisition of the Chief of the Staff for the time being and of not less than four other Commissioners of the Salvation Army for the time being or on the joint requisition of not less than seven Commissioners for the time being. In the event of the High Council being convened under this Clause the date of the despatch of the summonses convening the same or of the earliest of such summonses if the same are not all sent out on one day is hereinafter referred to as and shall be for the purposes of the provisions hereinafter contained be deemed to be 'the qualifying date' hereinafter referred to.

3. For the purpose of appointing a successor to the Office of General of the Salvation Army the High Council shall be convened by summonses despatched upon the date of occurrence of any event or of the last of any series of events upon which the appointment of a successor has under Clause 4 of the foregoing Deed Poll to be determined by the High Council or as soon after such date as possible. In the cases provided for by this Clause the date which is hereinafter referred to as and shall for the purposes of the provisions hereinafter contained be deemed to be 'the qualifying date' shall be the date of the vacation of Office by the General who has just vacated the same except in the case of vacation either through declared unfitness or through a declaration of mental incapacity in either of which cases the date shall be the date when the declaration shall have been signed by the Commissioner who shall first sign the same.

4. The duty of dispatching the summonses for and convening the High Council under the last preceding clause shall in the first place rest with and be performed by the Chief of the Staff at the qualifying date but if there shall be no Chief of the Staff at the date when the duty in question has first to be performed or he shall be unable or unwilling to act or shall not act within fourteen days then and in any of the said cases the said duty shall rest with and be performed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and if summonses have not been despatched for convening the High Council by either of the above persons within twenty one days after the date when the occasion for despatching them first arose then and in such case the summonses may be despatched and the High Council convened by any three Commissioners of the Army.

5. The High Council shall consist of and summonses shall accordingly be despatched to the persons holding at the qualifying date the following Offices that is to say :

The Chief of the Staff.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

All the Commissioners of the Army not being Commissioners on the retired list.

All the Officers holding territorial commands in the Army in any part of the world whatever their rank in the Army.

Provided always that in case under the foregoing qualifications of Commissioners and Territorial Commanders two persons being husband and wife and holding commissions or commands in respect of the same country or district are entitled to be members of the High Council they shall only have one vote which shall be given by the husband as he may think fit if he alone is present or both are present and shall be given by the wife as she may think fit only if she alone is present.

6. Summonses to members of the High Council at places which are within ten days ordinary post to Headquarters may be sent either by post or by telegram. Summonses to members of the High Council at places which are not within ten days ordinary post of Headquarters shall be sent so far as practicable by telegram.

7. The High Council shall be summoned to meet at the earliest date at which the person sending out the summonses shall bona fide consider that it will be reasonably possible for all the members or for the great majority of them to assemble by travelling express. Provided always that the date of meeting shall in no case be more than sixty days from the date of the despatch of the summons thereto which is first despatched. The place of meeting of the High Council shall be in or near to London or other the place where Headquarters shall be established at the qualifying date and such place and the date of meeting shall be named in the summons. It shall be the duty of all persons summoned to the High Council to forthwith obey such summons and in case any person or persons actually summoned shall not attend the other persons attending shall receive evidence of such person or persons having been summoned and shall record such evidence and the fact of non-attendance in a suitable form.

8. The persons actually summoned and meeting as the High Council may proceed and act notwithstanding that any person or persons who should have been summoned may not have been summoned or that any person or persons summoned may have refused or neglected to obey such summons or may not in fact have arrived or may from time to time neglect or fail to attend the meetings whether from illness death or any other cause whatever ; And the persons actually summoned and meeting as the High Council shall (in addition and without prejudice to any other powers) have the following powers that is to say :

(a) Power to elect a President and Vice-President of the High Council and to give the President and Vice-President such powers when presiding, including the giving of a second or casting vote as may be thought fit.

(b) Power to determine absolutely in case of any doubt whether there has or has not been a vacation of Office by the General of the Salvation Army and whether an event has or has not arisen for the convening and constitution of the High Council and whether the High Council has or has not been properly summoned.

(c) Power to determine whether the persons summoned to the High Council or any of them ought to have been so summoned, and whether any such persons

are or are not properly qualified to act as members of the High Council and to exclude any persons who ought not to have been summoned or who are not qualified to act.

(d) Power to summon to the High Council any persons who in their opinion should have been summoned thereto and should be members thereof but so that it shall not be obligatory to exercise this power by summoning all or any of such persons and that it shall not be exercised if the exercise of it would or might cause any considerable delay.

(e) Power to determine what if any report of the proceedings of the High Council shall be published.

(f) Power to adjourn at any time or from time to time and generally to determine and regulate their own procedure subject always to any express directions herein contained and also to appoint committees for such purposes as the High Council shall think fit to delegate or entrust to them, and so that such committees shall (subject to any directions of the High Council) have power to appoint sub-committees and generally to determine their own procedure.

(g) Power to determine how the costs and expenses of the summoning and attendance of the members of the High Council and of all proceedings in connexion therewith ought to be borne and defrayed, and in particular to what extent such costs and expenses should be borne and defrayed out of the funds of the Salvation Army. Provided always that primarily and without prejudice to any question of ultimate recoupment the reasonable travelling and other expenses that every person summoned as a member of the High Council shall incur by virtue of that summons and in connexion with his duties as a member of the High Council shall except in any case of neglect or misconduct be defrayed out of the funds of the Salvation Army.

(h) Power to do all things necessary for the purpose of settling finally and conclusively the question for the determination of which the High Council shall have been convened.

AND ALSO in the case of a High Council convened for the purpose of adjudicating on the question whether the General for the time being of the Salvation Army is unfit for Office and should be removed from Office the following further and additional powers that is to say:

(i) Power to summon the General or any other Officer of the Salvation Army or other person in such manner as shall be thought fit to attend before the High Council at any time or from time to time as the High Council shall think fit.

(j) Power to give such directions if any as the High Council or any committee or sub-committee to whom the question may be referred shall think fit as to the formulation of any charges against the General and as to the person or persons by whom the same should be formulated and supported and as to the formulation of the answer (if any) of the General thereto and as to whether the parties to the proceedings should be heard in person only or by solicitors or counsel.

(k) Power to decide all questions of the admission and rejection of evidence whether in accordance with strict legal rules or not.

(l) Power to appoint any committee not being less than thirteen in number for the purpose of investigating and reporting on all or any of the charges that may be made against the General and to adopt the Report of any such committee and so that any such committee shall in the course and for the purposes of such investigation and report have power to appoint a Chairman (if not appointed by the High Council) to determine their own procedure to direct and control the proceedings before them and generally all the like powers as those given to the High Council by Sub-clauses (f) (g) (i) and (k) hereinbefore contained.

(m) Power generally to direct and control the proceedings before the High Council for the purposes of a fair and proper ultimate adjudication and to pronounce such adjudication accordingly.

9. The proceedings before a High Council summoned for purposes of adjudication shall be conducted as continuously and with as great despatch as is reasonably possible and immediately on the conclusion of such proceedings or after as short an adjournment as possible a vote of the members of the High Council shall be taken in private in such manner as they think fit on the question whether the General is unfit for Office and should be removed therefrom. If a resolution in the affirmative shall be passed by a majority of not less than three in four of the members of the High Council present and voting then and in such case it shall be the duty of the actual President to forthwith make a public announcement to that effect and the General shall forthwith cease to be and vacate the Office of General of the Salvation Army and the High Council shall proceed to the election of a successor to such Office in like manner so far as may be as is hereinafter directed in the case of a High Council originally summoned for the purpose of appointing a successor. But if a resolution in the affirmative shall not be passed by the majority aforesaid then and in such case it shall be the duty of the Actual President to forthwith make a public announcement that the General has not been declared unfit for Office or removed and the proceedings of the High Council shall come to an end and their duties and powers shall cease and they shall stand ipso facto dissolved. In neither case shall the President make a public announcement of the names or numbers of the members voting for or against the resolution unless the High Council shall resolve to that effect.

10. A member of the High Council shall be competent to sit thereon and to take part in adjudication and to vote for or against the resolution in the last preceding clause mentioned although he may have been one of the persons originally convening the High Council or may make any statement or give any evidence against or for the General with reference to the matters being adjudicated on or may otherwise have been concerned or occupied in the matters in question and also although he may not have been present throughout the whole of the proceedings.

11. The summoning of the High Council for purposes of adjudication and any proceedings before such High Council shall not in any way prejudice or affect the liability of the General to vacation of Office through declared unfitness under Clause 2, Sub-clause (2) of the foregoing Deed Poll; And if after such summoning and before the High Council have passed or failed to pass as the case may be a resolution removing the General from the Office the Office of General shall have been vacated through declared unfitness or the General shall have died or resigned or otherwise vacated Office then and in any of the said cases the High Council summoned as aforesaid shall be capable of proceeding and shall proceed to the election of a successor to such Office in like manner so far as may be as is hereafter directed in the case of a High Council originally summoned for the purpose of appointing a successor and without any further or additional summons.

12. A High Council summoned for the

purpose of appointing a successor to the Office of General of the Salvation Army shall immediately after the constitution thereof and a High Council originally summoned for purposes of adjudication shall if and so soon as such High Council shall under the directions hereinbefore contained be competent in that behalf proceed to the election of a General of the Salvation Army in succession to the one who has vacated Office. The person so to be elected may be either one of the members of the High Council or some other person. The election shall be by ballot and shall require a two thirds majority of those voting and if at the first or any subsequent ballot no person shall obtain an absolute two thirds majority of the votes of the members voting a further ballot shall be taken until some person shall obtain such an absolute majority. The person first obtaining such an absolute majority as aforesaid of the votes of the members voting shall be thereby elected the General of the Salvation Army.

13. Immediately upon the election in manner aforesaid of a General of the Salvation Army the President of the Council shall forthwith publish the same (a) by notifying the same to the General so elected and (b) by giving notice thereof to the Solicitor for the time being of the Salvation Army; And such further publication thereof shall be made by exhibiting a Notice or Notices in some conspicuous place or places at Headquarters and by advertisement in Newspapers or otherwise as the said Solicitor shall in his discretion think fit but subject always to the direction and supervision of the elected General. Provided always that the notification of Election to the person elected and to the Solicitor aforesaid shall precede any other publication thereof and that if the person shall refuse or shall not accept the Office any further publication shall be foregone either permanently or until he shall accept the same.

14. Immediately upon the President of the High Council notifying to the General so elected as aforesaid the fact of his election and upon the General accepting Office all the duties and powers of the High Council shall cease and they shall stand ipso facto dissolved. But if the person so elected shall refuse or shall not accept the same within forty eight hours after election or within such further time (if any) as the High Council may determine then and in such case the High Council summoned as aforesaid shall proceed to the election of another person as General and so on toties quoties until some person has been elected General and has accepted Office whereupon all the duties and powers of the High Council shall cease and they shall stand ipso facto dissolved.

15. After any person has been elected General of the Salvation Army and has accepted Office his election shall not be invalidated by any flaw in the summoning constitution or proceedings of the High Council or by any other error in any matter or thing in anywise relating to such election or to any removal or other vacation of office by any prior General who may purport to have been removed from or otherwise to have vacated Office or whose vacation of Office may in any other respect be a condition of the election of the person so elected as aforesaid.

WILLIAM BOOTH (18)

SIGNED SEALED and DELIVERED by the above named William Booth in the presence of

WM. FROST, Solr., 17, Fenchurch Street E.C.

F. de L. BOOTH TUCKER, 120, West 14th St., New York, Commander of the American Forces.

T. HENRY HOWARD, 101, Queen Victoria St., London, E.C., Foreign Secretary Sal. Army.

U. COSANDEY, 3, Rue Auber, Paris, Commissioner of the Forces in France, Italy, and Belgium.

ADELAIDE COX, 259, Mare Street, Hackney, N.E., Commissioner for Women's Social Work, Gt. Britain and Ireland.

ENROLLED the twenty seventh day of July in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and four.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

Office Copy.

4. THE 'SOCIAL' TRUST DEED.

CLOSE ROLL (Chancery)
1891. Part 9. No. 12.

BOOTH TO ALL TO

a } WHOM these Presents
Declaration of Trust } shall come William
'Darkest England' } Booth of No: 101
Queen Victoria Street in the City of London
General of the Salvation Army sends Greeting
WHEREAS by a Deed Poll dated the seventh
day of August One thousand eight hundred
and seventy eight and under the hand and
seal of the said William Booth (then the
General Superintendent of a religious Society
or Organization known as 'The Christian
Mission') and afterwards enrolled in the
Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice
on the thirteenth day of August One thousand
eight hundred and seventy-eight the religious
beliefs of the Members of the Christian
Mission were declared and defined And it was
thereby further declared (by Clause 3 thereof)
that the said Christian Mission was and
should be always thereafter under the over-
sight direction and control of some one person
who should be the General Superintendent
thereof whose duty it should be to determine
and enforce the discipline and laws and super-
intend the operations of the said Christian
Mission and to conserve the same to and for
the objects and purposes for which it was first
originated and that the General Superinten-
dent should have such powers of expediture
and management as therein mentioned (by
Clause 4 thereof) that the said William Booth
should continue to be for the term of his
Natural life the General Superintendent of the
Christian Mission unless he should resign such
office (by Clause 5 thereof) that the said
William Booth and every General Superin-
tendent who should succeed him should have
power to appoint his successor to the office
of General Superintendent and all the
rights powers and authorities of the office
should vest in the person so appointed upon
the decease of the said William Booth or other
General Superintendent appointing him or at
such other period as might be named in the
Document appointing him and (by Clause 6

thereof) that it should be the duty of every General Superintendent to make in writing as soon as conveniently might be after his appointment a statement as to his successor or as to the means which were to be taken for the appointment of a successor at the decease of the General Superintendent or upon his ceasing to perform the duties of the Office such statement to be signed by the General Superintendent and delivered in a sealed envelope to the Solicitor for the time being of the Christian Mission but such statement might be altered at will by the General Superintendent at any time during his continuance in Office upon a new Statement being signed by him and delivered as before mentioned to such Solicitor as aforesaid. AND whereas on or about the first day of January One thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine the name of the said Religious Society or organization was changed from 'The Christian Mission' to 'The Salvation Army' as appears by a Memorandum under the hand of the said William Booth dated the twenty-fourth day of June One thousand eight hundred and eighty and endorsed on the said recited Deed Poll and the said Society or Organization has since been and is now known as 'The Salvation Army' and the title of the General Superintendent thereof has been altered and shortened into that of General and the said William Booth is now known and designated and it is expected that every successor of his will hereafter be known and designated as the 'General' of the Salvation Army AND WHEREAS in connection with and as the outcome of the work teaching and experience of the Salvation Army the said William Booth has conceived and promulgated in a book called 'In Darkest England and the Way Out' and with a view to the social and moral improvement and regeneration of such as are destitute or needy whether they are or are not degraded or criminal certain schemes which are known under the comprehensive title of the Darkest England Scheme and are hereinafter referred to either under that title or as 'the said Scheme' and has collected and is about to collect large sums of money and other property upon the terms that the said money and property shall be kept distinct from the other property of the Salvation Army and devoted exclusively to the said Scheme and that the said Scheme shall be defined and regulated and the trusts of the said money and property declared as hereinafter appearing NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS that the said William Booth Doth hereby declare as follows that is to say:

1. ALL money and other property contributed collected or received for the purposes of the Darkest England Scheme and the land investments and property for the time being representing the same (all which money land investments and property are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the trust property) shall at all times hereafter be held and applied upon trust for the social and moral regeneration and improvement in some manner indicated implied or suggested in the said Book called 'In Darkest England and the Way Out' or in some

such other incidental or similar manner as the said William Booth or other the General for the time being of the Salvation Army shall at any time or from time to time think fit of such as are destitute or needy whether they are or are not degraded or criminal Provided always that the substantial or principal destination of money and other property contributed or collected for the purposes of the said Scheme in the United Kingdom shall be for the benefit of persons belonging by residence or otherwise to the United Kingdom or some part thereof but that the General for the time being of the Salvation Army shall be at liberty to extend the benefit of the said Scheme or of any part thereof to the like persons in other Countries from or for which contributions may be received so far as such extension can in his judgment be effected consistently with the securing of such substantial or principal destination as aforesaid due regard being had (so far as is reasonably possible) in the case of any such extension to the proportional amounts contributed from or for the different countries to which the Scheme is made to extend Provided also that any persons originally objects of the said Scheme or any descendants of any such persons although they may by virtue of the Colonization Plan forming part of the Darkest England Scheme or by virtue of any other part of such Scheme cease or fail to belong to any part of the United Kingdom or to be destitute or needy need not thereby necessarily cease or fail to participate in the benefits and advantages of the said Scheme

2. THE Darkest England Scheme shall at all times hereafter be under the oversight direction and control of the person who is for the time being the General of the Salvation Army and he shall be called in relation to the said Scheme the Director of the Darkest England Scheme and it shall be his duty to determine and enforce the laws and to superintend the operations of the said Scheme and to conserve the same and the trust property for the social and moral regeneration and improvement in manner aforesaid of such as are destitute or needy whether they are or are not degraded or criminal Provided always that for the purpose of identifying and ear-marking the moneys and other property of the said Scheme and keeping the same distinct from all other funds and property of the Salvation Army full accounts of all moneys contributed collected or received for the said Scheme and of the application thereof shall be kept in such manner as to keep the same always distinct and separate from the accounts of all other funds of the Salvation Army, and that all Conveyances made to the General for the time being of the Salvation Army for the purposes of the said Scheme shall be expressed to be made to him as the Director of the said

Scheme and that whenever any property acquired for the purposes of the said Scheme shall be conveyed to any Trustees or Trustee other than the said General for the time being such Trustees or Trustee shall in each case execute a sufficient declaration of trust so as in every case to enable the property conveyed to be sufficiently identified or ear-marked as being property devoted to the purposes of the said scheme

- 3 THE General for the time being of the Salvation Army shall in his capacity as Director for the time being of the said Scheme have power to expend invest or otherwise dispose of or deal with for the purposes of the Darkest England Scheme or of any portion thereof all moneys or other property contributed collected or received for or in connection with the general purposes thereof or for or in connection with any of the special objects or operations thereof provided that he shall annually publish a Balance sheet duly audited of all such receipts and expenditure AND the said General for the time being shall also have power in the capacity and in the behalf aforesaid and in his absolute discretion to accept purchase hire or otherwise acquire any real or personal property whatsoever and whosoever or any estate or interest therein (including power to build or alter or otherwise improve land of any tenure and to pull down any buildings or otherwise alter or modify any alterations or improvements) and also to sell exchange mortgage lease or otherwise dispose of deal with or turn to account any such real or personal property estate or interest as aforesaid and to give good receipts and discharges for any purchase or mortgage money or any other money or property And no Vendor Lessor Purchaser Mortgagee Lessee or other third party dealing with the said General for the time being in his capacity aforesaid shall be concerned or entitled to inquire as to the expediency or propriety of the transaction in question for the purposes of the said Scheme The said General for the time being may in his capacity as the Director for the time being in any case in which he may think it expedient so to do cause any real or personal property to be assured to or vested in any Trustee or Trustees other than or in conjunction with himself and every person in or on whom any such real or personal property may thereby be vested or devolve shall hold the same upon trust to dispose of and deal with the same as the said General for the time being shall in his capacity as the Director for the time being determine and so that the said General for the time being shall in such capacity have the like absolute powers of disposition of the said property as if such property had not been so assured or vested but were vested in him solely upon the trusts hereof

4. THE General for the time being of the Salvation Army may in his capacity as Director for the time being of the said Scheme delegate any powers or trusts belonging to or reposed in him with reference to any of the purposes of the said Scheme to any such persons or person and upon any such terms (including power to subdelegate) as he shall think fit PROVIDED ALWAYS that every such person shall (except so far as may be otherwise expressed in the instrument of delegation or appointment) be removable at the pleasure of the General of the Salvation Army who appointed him and further that every such delegation or appointment may under any circumstances be cancelled by any succeeding General of the said Army
5. ARRANGEMENTS may be made between any other branches of the Salvation Army and the Darkest England Scheme (but only for what in each case shall amount to a full and sufficient valuable consideration) for the hire or other transfer of any real or personal property and the amounts of such consideration and the other terms of hire or transfer shall be determined or approved in such manner as the said General for the time being shall with regard to any case or class of cases determine
6. If in any case or class of cases property shall be used persons employed or moneys expended partly for the other purposes of the Salvation Army and partly for the purposes of the Darkest England Scheme a proper apportionment shall be made or contribution fixed so as to fairly charge the other funds of the Salvation Army and the funds of the Darkest England Scheme respectively in respect of such common user employment or expenditure having regard to the circumstances of each case And every such apportionment shall be made and contribution fixed in such manner as the General for the time being of the Salvation Army shall with regard to any case or class of cases determine
7. In case it shall at any time or times hereafter appear to the General for the time being of the Salvation Army in his capacity as Director for the time being of the said Scheme that the trusts of these presents or of any or all of the trust property can be advantageously extended altered or modified in some manner not wholly inconsistent with the main object thereof he shall be at liberty with the express consent in writing of two thirds in number of the Members of a Committee to be ascertained and nominated as hereafter provided to extend alter or modify any such trusts accordingly by any deed or deeds either irrevocable or revocable with the like consent as aforesaid
8. The Committee mentioned in the last preceding Clause shall consist of per-

sons to be ascertained and nominated in manner following that is to say the General for the time being of the Salvation Army in his Capacity as Director for the time being of the said Scheme shall invite the following six persons each to nominate in writing two members (of whom the nominator may himself be one) of the Committee namely (1) The Archbishop of Canterbury at the time of invitation. (2) The President of the Wesleyan Conference at the time of invitation. (3) The Chairman of the Congregational Union at the time of invitation. (4) The Chairman of the Baptist Union at the time of invitation. (5) The Attorney General of England at the time of invitation. (6) The Chairman of the London County Council at the time of invitation AND the said General for the time being in his capacity aforesaid shall also himself have the right of nominating six members of the said Committee Provided always that if at the time when the said General for the time being proceeds to ascertain and nominate and procure to be nominated the said Committee there shall in the case of any of the six persons first aforesaid to each of whom a right is hereinbefore given of nominating two members of the said Committee be no one completely answering to the description of such person hereinbefore contained then and in such case it shall be lawful (but not obligatory on) the said General for the time being in his capacity aforesaid to invite in the stead of any such person such other individual to nominate two members of the said Committee as shall in the opinion of the General for the time being most nearly be equivalent to or fill the capacity of the person so herein before described as aforesaid and the individual so invited shall have the like right as aforesaid of nominating two Members (of whom the Nominator may himself be one) of the said Committee

PROVIDED ALSO that in case any of the six persons aforesaid or any persons invited in their stead as lastly hereinbefore provided shall have failed at the expiration of four weeks from the date of invitation to effectually nominate in writing two members of the said Committee the right of such person to nominate shall cease and fail either wholly or to the extent to which it has not been effectually exercised as the case may be and the said Committee shall consist of fewer Members accordingly except so far as the General for the time being shall in any special case think fit to extend the period within which any such person may exercise his right of nomination

9. If any Member of the said Committee shall, prior to the final decision of such Committee die or desire to be discharged or become incapable or unfit

to act (of which incapacity or unfitness an unanimous vote of the other Members of the said Committee shall be sufficient evidence) then and in any such case it shall be lawful for (but not obligatory on) the remaining Members of the said Committee to appoint by co-optation some other person to serve on the said Committee in the place of the Member so dying or desiring to be discharged or becoming incapable or unfit to act PROVIDED ALWAYS (but by way of direction to the remaining Members of the said Committee only and not so as to invalidate or affect any appointment actually made or purporting to be made) that any such appointment shall so far as possible be made with regard to the representative character filled by or the original method of nomination or election of the Member to fill whose place the appointment in question is made

10. So soon as the Members of any Committee summoned as aforesaid shall have fully considered the questions submitted to them and shall have given a final decision thereon such Committee shall stand ipso facto [dissolved] But the dissolution of such Committee and any decision thereof or proceedings thereby shall be subject and without prejudice to the right of the General for the time being of the Salvation Army in his capacity as Director for the time being of the said Scheme to summon in manner aforesaid at any future time and for the consideration of the same or like questions the same or any like Committee

IN WITNESS whereof the said William Booth hath hereunto set his hand and seal this thirtieth day of January One thousand eight hundred and ninety one

WILLIAM BOOTH (18)

Signed Sealed and Delivered by the above named William Booth at a Public Meeting of Subscribers to and others interested in the Darkest England Scheme holden at Saint James Hall Piccadilly in the County of London on the 30th day of January 1891 and in the presence of

T. HENRY HOWARD 101 Queen Victoria Street London E.C. Commissioner in the Salvation Army.

WM. FROST Articled Clerk to Dr. A. W. G. Ranger Solicitor Langbourn Chambers 17 Fenchurch Street E.C.

Enrolled the thirty-first day of January in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and ninety-one (being first duly stamped) according to the tenor of the Statute made for that purpose

I certify that the foregoing is a true and authentic copy

G. F. HANDCOCK
Assist. Keeper of the Public Records,
October 26, 1905.

APPENDIX II

THE ARTICLES OF WAR

1. Having received with all my heart the Salvation offered to me by the tender mercy of Jehovah I do here and now publicly acknowledge God to be my Father and King, Jesus Christ to be my Saviour, and the Holy Spirit to be my Guide, Comforter, and Strength; and declare that I will, by His help, love, serve, worship, and obey this glorious God through all time and through all eternity.

2. Believing solemnly that The Salvation Army has been raised up by God, and is sustained and directed by Him, I do here declare my full determination by God's help to be a true Soldier of The Army till I die.

3. I am thoroughly convinced of the truth of the Army's teaching.

4. I believe that repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and conversion by the Holy Spirit, are necessary to Salvation, and that all men may be saved.

5. I believe we are saved by grace, through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and he that believeth hath the witness of it in himself. I have got it. Thank God!

6. I believe that the Scriptures were given by inspiration of God, and that they teach that not only does continuance in the favour of God depend upon continued faith in, and obedience to, Christ, but that it is possible for those who have been truly converted to fall away and be eternally lost.

7. I believe that it is the privilege of all God's people to be 'wholly sanctified', and that 'their whole spirit and soul and body' may be 'preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ'. That is to say, I believe that after conversion there remain in the heart of the believer inclinations to evil, or roots of bitterness which, unless overpowered by Divine grace, produce actual sin; but these evil tendencies can be entirely taken away by the Spirit of God, and the whole heart thus cleansed from anything contrary to the will of God, or entirely sanctified, will then produce the fruit of the Spirit only. And I believe that persons thus entirely sanctified may, by the power of God, be kept unblamable and unrepovable before Him.

8. I believe in the immortality of the soul; in the resurrection of the body; in the general judgment at the end of the world; in the eternal happiness of the righteous; and in the everlasting punishment of the wicked.

9. Therefore, I do here, and now, and for ever, renounce the world, with all its sinful pleasures, companionships, treasures, and objects, and declare my full determination boldly to show myself a Soldier of Jesus Christ in all places and companies, no matter what I may have to suffer, do, or lose, by so doing.

10. I do here and now declare that I will abstain from the use of all intoxicating liquors, and also from the habitual use of opium, laudanum, morphia, and all other baneful drugs, except when in illness such drugs shall be ordered for me by a doctor.

11. I do here and now declare that I will abstain from the use of all low or profane language; from the taking of the name of God in vain; and from all impurity, or from

taking part in any unclean conversation or the reading of any obscene book or paper at any time, in any company, or in any place.

12. I do here declare that I will not allow myself in any falsehood, deceit, misrepresentation, or dishonesty; neither will I practise any fraudulent conduct either in my business, my home, or in any other relation in which I may stand to my fellow-men, but that I will deal truthfully, fairly, honourably, and kindly with all those who may employ me or whom I may myself employ.

13. I do here declare that I will never treat any woman, child, or other person, whose life, comfort, or happiness may be placed within my power, in an oppressive, cruel, or cowardly manner, but that I will protect such from evil and danger so far as I can, and promote, to the utmost of my ability, their present welfare and eternal Salvation.

14. I do here declare that I will spend all the time, strength, money, and influence I can in supporting and carrying on this War, and that I will endeavour to lead my family, friends, neighbours, and all others whom I can influence to do the same, believing that the sure and only way to remedy all the evils in the world is by bringing men to submit themselves to the government of the Lord Jesus Christ.

15. I do here declare that I will always obey the lawful orders of my Officers, and that I will carry out to the utmost of my power all the Orders and Regulations of The Army; and, further, that I will be an example of faithfulness to its principles, advance to the utmost of my ability its operations, and never allow, where I can prevent it, any injury to its interests, or hindrance to its success.

16. And I do here and now call upon all present to witness that I enter into this undertaking and sign these Articles of War of my own free-will, feeling that the love of Christ, who died to save me, requires from me this devotion of my life to His service for the Salvation of the whole world, and I therefore wish now to be enrolled as a Soldier of The Salvation Army.

APPENDIX III

THE FIELD OFFICER'S ENGAGEMENTS

EVERY QUESTION MUST BE ANSWERED

THE SALVATION
ARMY

Candidates' Dept. No. 1.

CANDIDATE'S FORM OF APPLICATION
FOR
APPOINTMENT AS OFFICER IN THE
SALVATION ARMY.

NOTICE TO ALL CANDIDATES.

1. All Candidates are expected to fill up and sign this Form themselves. Before returning this Form please go through it carefully a second time and see that you have answered every question.
2. If, after receiving Forms, circumstances prevent you proceeding with your candidature, you must return these papers to the Officer from whom you received them, with any explanation that may be needed.

3. Making this application does NOT imply that we shall accept you, and you are, therefore, NOT to leave your home, or give notice to leave your situation until you hear again from us. No application will be made by The Army to your employer unless we are prepared to accept you.
4. If you are received into Training, or appointed as an Officer, and it is afterwards discovered that any of the questions in this Form have not been truthfully answered, you will be liable to be instantly dismissed.
5. If you do not understand any question in this Form, or if you do not agree to any of the requirements stated upon it, return it to the Officer from whom you received it, and say so in a straightforward manner.
6. Make the question of this application a matter of earnest prayer, as it is the most important step you have taken since your conversion.

Name in Full

Address

.....CorpsDivision.....

1. Do you offer yourself to become a Salvation Army Officer?
2. Are you willing to go to whatever branch of the Army's Work we think you best suited for after Training?
3. What is your AGE next birthday?
- Give the date of your birth (month and year)
4. What is your height? (exact measurement)
5. Are you free from bodily defect or disease?
6. What serious illnesses have you had, and when?
7. Have you ever had FITS or FAINTS of any kind? .. If so give date of last, and particulars
8. Do you consider your health good, and that you are strong enough for the work of an Officer?
9. Are you, or have you been married? ...
10. Have you any children?
11. Are you short of any teeth?
- If so, will you get others put in, if accepted?
12. Give the date of your CONVERSION (month and year)
- In what Corps or Religious Society? ...
13. Have you been a member of any other Religious Society?
- If so, give the name
14. Have you belonged to any other Corps of The Army, and if so, which?
15. How long have you been enrolled as a SOLDIER? Have you signed Articles of War?
16. Are you a Corps Cadet?
17. If you hold any OFFICE in your Corps, say what, and how long held
18. Do you intend to live and die in the ranks of The Salvation Army?
19. Have you ever been an open BACKSLIDER?
- If so, how long? ...
20. Why?
- Date of your Restoration (month and year)
21. Are you in DEBT?
- If so, how much?
- When can you pay it?
22. Did you ever use Intoxicating Drink?
- If so, how long is it since you entirely gave up its use?

23. Did you ever use Tobacco or Snuff?
- If so, how long is it since you gave up using either?
24. Do you wear Earrings?
- If so, will you give up wearing them?
25. What UNIFORM do you wear?
26. How long have you worn it?
27. Do you agree to dress in accordance with the direction of Headquarters?
28. Are you aware that you must provide your own 'Outfit' according to List sent with this Form before entering the Service?

29. Are you in any EMPLOYMENT or SITUATION?
- If so, how long?
30. What are you employed at?
- What wages?
31. Name and address of present employer. .
32. If unemployed, give date of leaving last employment
- How long there? ...
33. Why did you leave?
34. Name and address of last employer ...
35. If not in situation, do you follow any employment at home?
36. If not, how are you maintained?
37. Can you start the SINGING well and readily?
- Can you solo? ..
38. Can you play any musical instrument? .
- If so, what?
39. Do you read music?
40. Is this form filled up by you?
- Can you read well at first sight? ...
41. Can you write SHORTHAND?
- If so, what speed and system?
42. Can you speak any language other than English?
- If so, what? ..
43. Have you had any experience in keeping accounts?
- If so, what kind of accounts?
44. Are you willing to serve as an Officer of The Army in other countries if so required?
45. Are you willing to sell the WAR CRY on Sundays?
46. Do you promise to accept cheerfully the decision of Headquarters as to the person chosen from time to time as your Lieutenant or Commanding Officer?
47. Do you pledge yourself to spend not less than nine hours every day in the active service of The Army, of which not less than three hours of each weekday shall be spent in VISITATION?
48. Do you pledge yourself to fill up, for the inspection of your Superior Officer, forms and books showing how your time is spent?
49. Have you read, and do you believe the DOCTRINES printed on the back of this Form?
50. Have you read the 'Orders and Regulations for Field Officers' of The Army?

(If you have not read this book through, do not delay sending in your forms on this account, but say how many pages you have read.)

51. Have you read the 'Orders and Regulations for Soldiers'?
 (If not, you must do so at once. They cost one penny).
52. Do you pledge yourself to study and carry out, and to endeavour to train others to carry out, all Orders and Regulations of The Army?
53. Do you pledge yourself not to receive any sum in the form of pay beyond the amount of allowances granted under the scales approved by Headquarters?
 The scale for Field Officers is as follows:

ALLOWANCES.—From the day of arrival at his Corps, each Field Officer is entitled to draw the following allowances, provided the amount remains in hand after meeting all local expenses:—For Single Men: Lieutenants, 16s. weekly; Captains, 18s. weekly; For Single Women: Lieutenants, 12s. weekly, Captains, 15s. weekly; Married Men, 27s. per week, and 1s. per week for each child under 7 years of age, and 2s. per week for each child between the ages of 7 and 14.

Probation Officers' allowance:—Married, 24s. weekly, and 1s. per week for each child under 7 years of age; over 7 and under 14 years of age, 2s. per week; Single Men: Captains, 15s. per week; Lieutenants, 12s.; Single Women: Captains, 12s.; Lieutenants, 9s.

For certain Corps a regulated allowance of payment is arranged in harmony with the Officer's need and the finance of the District.

54. Do you perfectly understand that no SALARY or allowance is guaranteed to you, and that you will have no claim against The Salvation Army, or against any one connected therewith, on account of salary or allowances not received by you?
55. Do you engage not to publish any books, songs, or music except for the benefit of The Salvation Army, and then only with the consent of Headquarters?
56. Do you promise not to engage in any trade, profession, or other money-making occupation, except for the benefit of The Salvation Army, and then only with the consent of Headquarters?
57. Are you aware that Field Officers are responsible for their own doctors' bills unless they arrange otherwise with their D.O.?
58. Do you engage to carry out the following Regulation as to PRESENTS and TESTIMONIALS?

Officers are expected to refuse utterly, and to prevent, if possible, even the proposal of any present or testimonial to them.

59. Have you ever APPLIED BEFORE? If so, when?
60. Did you obtain forms?
 Did you send them in?
61. If so, with what result?
62. If you have ever been in the service of The Salvation Army in any position, say what
63. Why did you leave?
64. Have you ever been an inmate of any of the Social or Rescue Homes?
65. If we think it best for you to remain some months longer in your Corps for improvement, are you willing to do so

- cheerfully, and fill up monthly forms as to your progress?
66. Are you willing to come into TRAINING that we may see whether you have the necessary goodness and ability for an Officer in The Salvation Army; and should we conclude that you have not the necessary qualifications, do you pledge yourself to return home and work in your Corps, without creating any dissatisfaction?
- 66a. Do you understand you may be required to do at least twelve months' Probation Service after leaving the Training Home?
67. Are you aware that, if accepted, you will have to pay your own travelling expenses to the Training Home?
68. How much can you pay for your maintenance while in Training?
69. Will you give or collect at least £1 ros.—and, if possible, £2 ros.—as a Candidate's contribution towards the initial expense of receiving and preparing Candidates?
70. If we decide to accept you, what is the shortest time you would require—from the date of filling in this form—to be ready to enter Training in London?

NOTE.—This must, of course, include the time required to get your outfit completed, and for giving notice to leave your employer.

71. What notice are you required to give your employer, and when?
72. Are your PARENTS willing that you should become an Officer?
73. Does any one depend upon you for support?
 If so, who? How much?
- (Explain by letter how those depending on you would be supported should you be accepted.)
- 73a. Have you any relative or friend whose illness would necessitate your terminating your service in The Army?
74. Give your own parents', or nearest living relatives', full name and address
75. Are you COURTING, or writing some one with a view to an engagement?
 If so, give name and address of the person
76. How long have you been engaged or writing?
 What is the person's age?
77. What is the date of Birthday?
 How long enrolled as SOLDIER?
78. What uniform does the person wear?
 How long worn?
79. Has the person applied for the Work?
80. If not, when does the person intend doing so?
81. Do the parents agree to the person coming into Training?
82. If you are not courting, do you promise to do nothing of the kind while you are a Candidate, during Training, and for at least twelve months after your appointment as a Field Officer?
83. Do you promise not to carry on courtship with any one in the town to which you are appointed?

84. Do you promise never to commence, or allow to commence, or break off, anything of the sort without first informing your Divisional Officer, or Headquarters, of your intention to do so? . . .
85. Do you promise never to marry any one, marriage with whom would take you out of the Army? . . .
86. Do you agree to the following Regulations as to Courtship and Marriage? . . .
- (a) 'Headquarters cannot consent to the engagement of Male Lieutenants.
- (b) 'Before Headquarters can consent to the marriage of any Officer, the Divisional Officer must be prepared to give him three Corps as a married man.
- (c) 'No Officer accepted will be allowed to marry until he or she has been at least four years in the service, including Training, except in cases of long-standing engagements before application for Work, when special consideration may be given.
- (d) 'No male Officer will, under any circumstances, be allowed to marry before he is twenty-two years of age, unless required by Headquarters for special service.
- (e) 'Headquarters will not agree to the marriage of any Male Officer (except under extraordinary circumstances) until twelve months after consenting to his engagement.
- (f) 'Consent will not be given to the engagement of any Male Officer unless the young woman is likely to make a suitable wife for an Officer, and (if not already an Officer) is prepared to come into Training at once.
- (g) 'Consent will be given to engagements between Female Officers and Soldiers, on condition that the latter are suitable for Officers, and are willing to come into Training if called upon.
- (h) 'Every Officer must sign, before marriage, the Articles of Marriage contained in the "Orders and Regulations for Field Officers."

THE DOCTRINES OF THE SALVATION ARMY.

The principal Doctrines taught in The Army are as follows:—

1. **We Believe** that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were given by the inspiration of God, and that they only constitute the Divine rule of Christian faith and practice.
2. **We Believe** there is only one God, who is infinitely perfect, the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things.
3. **We Believe** there are three persons in the Godhead—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—undivided in essence, co-equal in power and glory, and the only proper object of religious worship.
4. **We Believe** that, in the person of Jesus Christ, the Divine and human natures are united, so that He is truly and properly God, and truly and properly man.
5. **We Believe** that our first parents were created in a state of innocence, but by their disobedience they lost their

purity and happiness; and that, in consequence of their fall, all men have become sinners, totally depraved, and as such are justly exposed to the wrath of God.

6. **We Believe** that the Lord Jesus Christ has, by His suffering and death, made an atonement for the whole world, so that whosoever will may be saved.
7. **We Believe** that repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit, are necessary to salvation.
8. **We Believe** that we are justified by grace, through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and that he that believeth hath the witness in himself.
9. **We Believe** the Scriptures teach that not only does continuance in the favour of God depend upon continued faith in, and obedience to, Christ, but that it is possible for those who have been truly converted to fall away and be eternally lost.
10. **We Believe** that it is the privilege of all believers to be 'wholly sanctified', and that 'the whole spirit and soul and body' may 'be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ'. That is to say, we believe that after conversion there remain in the heart of the believer inclinations to evil, or roots of bitterness, which, unless overpowered by Divine grace, produce actual sin; but that these evil tendencies can be entirely taken away by the Spirit of God, and the whole heart, thus cleansed from everything contrary to the will of God, or entirely sanctified, will then produce the fruit of the Spirit only; and we believe that persons thus entirely sanctified, may, by the power of God, be kept unblamable and unreprouvable before Him.
11. **We Believe** in the immortality of the soul; in the resurrection of the body; in the general judgment at the end of the world; in the eternal happiness of the righteous; and in the everlasting punishment of the wicked.

DECLARATION.

I **hereby Declare** that I will never, on any consideration, do anything calculated to injure The Salvation Army, and especially, that I will never, without first having obtained the consent of The General, take any part in any religious services, or in carrying on services held in opposition to the Army.

I PLEDGE MYSELF to make true records, daily, on the forms supplied to me, of what I do, and to confess, as far as I am concerned, and to report, as far as I may see in others, any neglect or variation from the orders or directions of The General and my Superior Officers.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND that he does not undertake to employ or to retain in the service of The Army any one who does not appear to him to be fitted for the work, or faithful or successful in it; and I solemnly pledge myself quietly to leave any Appointment or Army Corps to which I may be sent, without making any attempt to disturb or

annoy The Army in any way, should The General desire me to do so. And I hereby discharge The Army and The General from all liability, and pledge myself to make no claim on account of any situation, property or interest I may give up in order to secure an engagement in The Army.

I understand that The General will not be responsible in any way for any loss I may suffer in consequence of being dismissed during trial, or afterwards, as I am aware that a trial is necessary for the purpose of testing my suitability for the work.

I hereby declare that the foregoing answers on this form appear to me to fully express the truth as to the questions put to me, and that I know of no other facts which would prevent my engagement by The General, if they were known to him.

CANDIDATE } Date
TO SIGN HERE. }

Send us your Photograph. Please write your name, also name of Corps, on the back of the same, enclose it with your Forms, and return them as quickly as possible. If your photo is not ready, do not keep back your Forms on that account, but send them in with a note of explanation, and send the Photo as soon as you can.

APPENDIX IV

LIQUIDATION OF THE SALVATION ARMY BUILDING ASSOCIATION, LIMITED DIRECTORS' STATEMENT

DIRECTORS

J. KITCHIN, Esq. (*Chairman*).
HEYWOOD SMITH, Esq., M.A., M.D.
JOHN CORY, Esq., J.P.
LIEUT.-COL. PEPPER.
P. STUART, Esq., F.R.S.A.
R. LUKE, Esq.

REGISTERED OFFICES

LONDON BRIDGE HOUSE, 40A, KING
WILLIAM STREET, LONDON, E.C.

The Directors have already reported to the Shareholders that at the numerous attended Meeting, held at the Cannon Street Hotel on the 22nd ult., the resolution to wind up the Association was carried with only three dissentients, the Directors themselves holding proxies in favour of that course from 95 per cent. of the total number of the Shareholders who constitute the Association. Formal notice of the second Meeting has already been sent to each Shareholder.

An attack is now being made by the borrower [General Booth] upon the efforts of the Directors to protect the securities of the Shareholders. In order to place the Directors in a position to repel this attack, it is very necessary that each Shareholder should again return the proxy promptly.

The following letter, written by the late Chairman, Mr. W. J. Armitage, a few days before his death, will show that the Directors have not lightly resolved upon the present course. It will be remembered that Mr.

Armitage was largely responsible for the formation of the Association, and that up to the time of his death he remained in the position of Chairman of the Board. He was formerly amongst General Booth's most generous supporters.

[COPY.]

'56, THE DRIVE,
HOVE, SUSSEX,
August 3, 1895.

'DEAR MR. HARDING,—

'It will not be possible for me to meet Mr. Cory in London next week. I should like him and the other Directors to understand, however, that I am willing to be identified with any decision to which they may come with a view to ultimately winding up the Association. I have no doubt as to the wisdom of taking that course.

'It seems to me that a resolution to wind up ought to be passed by the existing Directors, all of whom, with one exception, were jointly responsible for the formation of the Association in 1884. But having in view the fact that each month's repayments increase the margin of security, I should personally prefer that the active operation of such a resolution should be delayed say, for three years at the outside, at the end of which time the question of adequate security would be placed beyond doubt. The resolution, however, would take effect at any time within that period, if it became evident either that the repayments were likely to cease, or that the existing Directors could not be kept together, for I regard it as of the utmost importance that they should themselves see the matter through to the end, and if at their meeting next week, they cannot arrange to act together for this further period, I would strongly advise them to give immediate effect to the proposed resolution to wind up, for while on the one hand it would be a pity not to wait while our security is increasing, on the other hand the interests of the shareholders would be less endangered by an immediate winding-up than by allowing the Members of the present Board to separate without that end being first effected. Our experience has shown us clearly that this is a Directors' rather than a Shareholders' question.

'The bulk of the Shareholders are poor people outside the radius of the Salvation Army who have placed all their savings with us in the belief that we shall protect their interests, and they are scattered in units all over the country, so that they could not be got to act in co-operation, even if it were possible (which it is not) to put before them the facts affecting their interests which are within our knowledge.

'It will be a great relief to me to hear from you after the meeting that some such course as that which I have indicated has been decided upon.

'Yours truly,

'(Signed) WM. JAS. ARMITAGE.'

The present position of the Shareholders is this: The securities in the hands of the Association, which are bound together by the consolidation clause, and which the Directors have so far succeeded, with much difficulty, in keeping intact, were originally valued by independent surveyors at about £135,000, without including the value of the Copyright of the *War Cry*, which is registered in the name of the Association. Upon this total security the Directors have lent in round figures £100,000; and this original sum has now been reduced by the operation of the monthly instalment principle to about £71,000.

The Directors can no longer take the responsibility of concealing from the Shareholders that the experience of the past few years has convinced them that the necessary conditions of safety have ceased to exist, and that any delay in carrying out the winding up would be at the expense of the Shareholders' inter-

ests, and would involve the sacrifice of their rights. As this is so important to hundreds of persons all over the country who have invested their savings in the Association, the Directors think it right to add that the statements in this week's *War Cry* in regard to the Association are misleading, and calculated to induce those Shareholders who are unacquainted with business matters to take a course in regard to the next meeting which would practically result in the whole of the Association's securities being handed over to the borrower without any cash payment.

In regard to these statements, the Directors beg to add :—

- (1) The rate of interest on the mortgages may seem high when compared with the rate at which General Booth states he can now borrow money; but the rate of 6 per cent. was fixed by himself when the Association was started, although the Directors have not charged more than 5 per cent. upon new proposals during the past seven years. The illustration given in the *War Cry* must be received with caution, because of the absence of full details of the transaction :
- (2) While it is true that the repayments of General Booth extend in some mortgages to twenty years or so from now, the Directors fully expect, if the proposal to wind up voluntarily is carried out, that the Shareholders will have received all their capital long before that time, and that the few long repayments may form a surplus to be received by the Shareholders. It will be seen at once that if General Booth has, as he states, 'facilities for securing advances at much lower rates of interest', it will be to his advantage to avail himself of these facilities and so put himself in a position to pay off, *in cash*, the total amount due to the Association. Or, as stated at the Meeting held on the 22nd ultimo, the Liquidators may succeed in transferring the whole of the mortgages to some other persons. In either case the Shareholders would then receive all their capital back, with interest, in a short time. But if that cannot be done, because of the character of the properties, the Liquidators will make to the Shareholders each half year a repayment of the principal, provided, of course, that General Booth makes his repayments according to his agreements.
- (3) The proposal referred to in the *War Cry* as having been rejected by the Association, was one which the Directors, as representing a large body of Shareholders, dared not accept, because they were advised that it involved the abandonment of the Association's legal rights under the mortgage deeds. It was briefly as follows :—

That the Directors should recommend the Shareholders, individually, to give up their existing rights in the Association by handing over th

Certificates to General Booth in exchange for his personal Bonds—a step which would have entirely destroyed the Association without the Shareholders receiving any money back, and which would have taken all the power out of the hands of the Directors—that then all the securities in the hands of the Association should be given back to him without any payments in cash (notwithstanding the stipulations contained in the mortgage deeds which he executed at the time he borrowed the money) and that after he had got all these properties into his own hands he should place what he terms 'a sufficient number' out of these same properties in the names of three trustees (about whose independence and fitness for such an onerous task nothing was said). This 'sufficient number' was to be subject to still further deductions from time to time at his hands as certain repayments were made.

The provision for the payment of the Shareholders as set forth in the proposal was as follows :—

'That the General should pay a certain fixed sum per annum towards the paying off of the bonds, a proportionate amount of the mortgaged property being released each year as this payment was made. The particular Bondholders to be paid off each year being decided by ballot or by some other convenient method.'

The Directors declined to recommend the Shareholders to take the dangerous step of exchanging their position as united investors in the Association with proper legal safeguards, for that of separate creditors of General Booth, especially as the proposal gave no assured prospect that such bonds would be convertible into cash at any particular time.

The arrangement for the return of the Shareholders' capital as proposed by the Directors, presents no such difficulties as those suggested in the *War Cry*. Its effect will be that the Shareholders will get their capital back with full interest.

The Directors wish to add that a considerable number of poor people are making appeals to them to refund their money; and yet, although the Association has an accumulation of funds in hand which cannot be safely and properly invested, the Directors are legally unable to return any portion of it until the resolution, which was almost unanimously passed at the last meeting, is finally confirmed.

Mr. Booth has informed the Board of Directors that he will actively oppose any liquidation of the Association which involves the return to the Shareholders of their capital. The Directors, however, are quite unable to accept the theory that the Shareholders, in placing their money in the Association, intended that it should in any sense be sunk in favour of any person.

The Directors (most of whom have been upon the Board from the commencement) are acting wholly in the interests of the Share-

holders. They still offer (without remuneration as hitherto) to look after the interests of the Shareholders. The alternative to the voluntary liquidation as proposed by the Directors would probably be that a body of the Shareholders would apply to the Court for a compulsory winding up—an expensive and dangerous proceeding.

The very efforts which are being made to hinder the Directors from carrying out the proposal to repay the capital, and interest, to the Shareholders, are another proof of the necessity of the step recommended. The Directors therefore ask the Shareholders again to send their proxies to the Association's Offices without delay.

We remain,
Yours faithfully,

J. KITCHIN, *Chairman*,
On behalf of the Directors.

Dated LONDON BRIDGE HOUSE,
40A, KING WILLIAM STREET, LONDON, E.C.
March 31, 1897.

APPENDIX V

THE ARMY'S TREATMENT OF OFFICERS

I. STATEMENT OF EX-OFFICER S—

Before entering the Salvation Army I was a sailor for a number of years. I was converted to God about eighteen months before I left the sea. I had a good situation as lamp-trimmer on a steamship running between London and Australia. After attending the Salvation Army and other meetings in different parts of the world I felt a great desire to give my life to the service of God and for the good of my fellow-men. I applied to the Salvation Army, and was accepted. After spending eight months in the Army Training Home I was commissioned to my first corps as lieutenant, nearly sixteen years ago. I loved my work and worked hard and faithfully for about fourteen years, including training, and during those years I never had a week's rest or holiday. I could have had, but was so taken up with my work that I did not want it. I was loved and respected wherever I went, and I believe God made me a blessing to many.

During the last two years my health began to fail and I found it hard work to do my duty, but I did not complain. One reason for this was that my appointment was very poor, and I had very little help and for some time was short of food; in fact, several times I had nothing but bread and water. For the last two winters I had no overcoat to wear and, having to work outdoors in all kinds of weather, it had its effect. My divisional officer did not do anything to help me.

About a year and nine months ago, through various causes, my health thoroughly broke down. I was two months at my last station, but was utterly unable to work. On one occasion there was an Officers' Council in Norwich, and I had instructions to attend. I sent a reply to say that I was really too ill to attend, which was true. To my surprise my divisional officer sent his secretary and

another officer over thirty miles with strict orders to make me come and to force me, and they were not to leave the place until I came. I was ill, but I went, and when I met him in Norwich he told me that Headquarters were not prepared to give me a long rest which I needed, so I could do nothing else but resign.

I have put this matter before the Army Headquarters and requested them to make the divisional officer prove his charges against me, but they have taken no notice, so there is no justice to be had from them. I am sure no one could have worked more faithfully, and no one ever tried to uphold the honour of the Army more than I did. When I resigned the Army gave me £7, and after much pleading they gave me £6 more. I had no clothing, and no relations to go to for help, and I had to pay for all I had, so that money could not last very long. I had hoped to get stronger and get some suitable work to do, and so be no trouble to any one, but my health has not improved much, and I was not able to get anything to do.

Last winter in Norwich work was very slack; there were something like 2,000 people out of employment, and I was unable to get anything to do. I was in great distress, and wrote to the Salvation Army Headquarters asking them to give me a little help, and also to help me to get some work to do. The Field Secretary promised to get me an agency in the Army Insurance, but there was no vacancy in Norwich, and he asked me if I would take an agency in another town. I told him I would, but did not see how I could leave Norwich under the circumstances, seeing that I was a good bit behind with my rent, and my overcoat and other needful articles of clothing were in the pawnshop.

Instead of helping me to get these things settled and put me on my feet, he got offended and wrote to say I could not get the agency. He told me to see the divisional officer then, which I did, but he said he was unable to find me any work. So no one made an effort to get me any work to do. They gave me a few shillings several times after much pleading. The latter part of the winter, from Christmas, I had no fire in the house, and for weeks at a time I had nothing but weak tea and bread. On several occasions I had no food for two or three days at a time. I wrote and explained my state to Headquarters, and laid the matter before Mr. Bramwell Booth, but he would not help me. I wrote and laid the matter before the General when in Norwich for special meetings last winter, but he took no notice. Since then, on several occasions I have written asking them to give me a helping hand, but they have not answered my letters.

I never had a wish to do any injury to the Army—I know their difficulties—but I do think, after spending fourteen of my best years and my health and strength in the Army for 4s. and 5s. weekly, they might at least have given me a helping hand when in great need, and have assisted me into something where I could help myself. It is most un-Christlike of men in their position to have spite on me and to refuse me a loaf of bread, even if it was to save my life. I have no relations who can help me, and I am not strong, and have no

income of any kind. I am thoroughly disappointed with the Army and the way they have acted towards me. Suppose I was ever so wrong, would it not have been a Christlike action on their part to at least give me a loaf of bread when they knew I had no food for two or three days at a time?

C. S.—.

October 10, 1905.

In a further statement S— says that the Army did not request him to resign, but that he was so ill that he felt it was utterly impossible for him to stand the strain and do his work successfully without a lengthy rest, which his divisional officer told him he could not have. He was, therefore, compelled to resign. He states further:—

'I have no wish to find fault with the Army, but I think they might act a little more Christlike towards their officers. I am not the only one, there are hundreds, I believe, who have spent their best years in the Army, but to-day have to struggle on under difficult circumstances that they would never have had if they had not spent their lives in the Army.

'I have been paying into the Salvation Army Insurance Society for five years, so that I could have £4 13s. at my death, but last winter I was unable to pay, so I lost it. I sent the policy and books to Mr. Bramwell Booth months ago, but he has not said anything about it.'

2. STATEMENT OF EX-EMPLOYÉ C—

Previous to applying for work with the Salvation Army I had been a bandsman in the Gordon Highlanders, under the command of Sir G. S. White, Field Marshal. I made my living afterwards by teaching music, until I was compelled to go into hospital with an injury to the spine, which left me very lame, walking with the aid of two sticks.

On leaving hospital, and not wishing to be a burden to my wife, who earned her living with her mother by dressmaking, which long since came to an end, I applied to the Salvation Army, 101, Queen Victoria Street, for work. They sent me to their factory in Old Street, St. Luke's, where I was employed wood chopping, which I did for twelve months, getting no money, only board and lodging. I had to walk a mile to and fro every day, which in my crippled condition was an awful strain, but I kept hoping for something better. In the Home I raised a brass band amongst old soldiers and begged old instruments off the Salvation Army bands, and the Commissioner made use of us all over London on behalf of the Social work. Eventually, it having come to the Commissioner's ears that I had to do all that hard work besides the walking, he sent for me to Headquarters and said he believed in a man doing his best but he did not believe in killing him, and ordered my train fare to be paid night and morning to and from the factory until they found me a better situation.

Three weeks afterwards I was sent to their Metropole in Stanhope Street, Strand, as cashier, and had a grant of 3s. a week. I remained there for five months, when I was

ordered to Headquarters depôt in White-chapel Road, to act as cashier and stock-keeper. After being there for six months I had my grant raised to 5s. per week. I did not get another lift until Colonel Richards came as Chief Secretary, and he gave me 16s. per week, to board myself. This lasted for about three months, when I was taken on the Headquarters staff at 20s. per week, with board and lodging.

Besides my duties in the office I, in my own time, taught the Colonel's children music, he having a musical family called the 'Richards Midgets', and we went at week-ends all over England giving musical evenings, and raised hundreds of pounds for the Salvation Army funds during the three years we went about. A case in point—Oldham I. corps, collections for week-end, £160. I got nothing but my travelling expenses paid, and it was hard work for me, being so lame.

On Colonel Richards being ordered to Denmark I was transferred again to the depôt, and my wages reduced to 7s. per week. We had two children to keep and my wife was in very bad health, so we were in great trouble, never dreaming that such a thing would happen. I was determined not to be beaten, so did my work and hoped on. Eventually the Commissioner had a talk with me, and I received 17s. per week, and six months afterwards was sent to Bristol to help the officer there, as he had asked for me, I having served with him in London. There I was for twelve months, second in charge and cashier, until Commissioner Sturges came in charge of the Social work, and on hearing of my case he took me back to London, where I took up my old duties of cashier and stock-keeper, receiving 25s. per week.

Eight months previous to last December Colonel Laurie sent for me to tell me that the Commissioner had instructed him to give me reasonable notice to terminate my appointment, as they could not afford to pay 25s. a week for a cashier. He said: 'I do not say but you deserve it, but we can't afford it'. He would not give me notice, but said I 'had better look out for something else'. On December 18 last, Major Fletcher came to me and said that the Commissioner had decided definitely that my engagement would end on January 1 this year, and I was given £6 in lieu of a month's notice and discharged next day.

Since first receiving the intimation that I was no longer required, and that I should find other employment, I did my best, during my remaining days in the Salvation Army, to find work, answering advertisements, writing and seeing people I knew. I also on many occasions begged the officer in charge of the Salvation Army Labour Bureau to find me a place, but all in vain, and since being turned away last Christmas Eve I have tried in every possible way to find employment, but to no purpose, so have been dependent on charity. I wrote Mr. Bramwell Booth in February last, but received no reply.

I applied to a friend, Mr. Lumsden, who was for some time the Chief Secretary at the Social Headquarters, and who has been doing his best for me all along, and I believe through his communications with the Salvation Army authorities they have given some help; but

I do not want charity, I want a chance to earn my own living. Why has the Army, after fourteen years' service, turned me adrift in a worse state than at first?

I am at the present moment receiving a little temporary help from a friend, just to keep me from dying in the gutter. My poor wife and family are absolutely starving and cannot face the workhouse. God only knows what the end will be.

October 5, 1905.

D. C.—.

3. OPINIONS OF OFFICERS, EX-OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS ¹

OPINIONS OF OFFICERS.

[The Salvation Army is the only sect indigenous to British soil whose members are either afraid to express their opinions about its system or, having expressed them, to have them published. The author has himself heard officers give expression to his own views on various points, and he has also had written testimony from officers of different grades confirming some of his conclusions. Until these officers attain a position of freedom by becoming ex-officers it is obviously impossible to obtain their permission to publish their letters, even in an anonymous form. It may, however, be stated without indiscretion or risk to any one that their statements serve to confirm (1) the prevalence of the hardship and suffering to which officers are liable to be subjected, (2) the financial benefit accruing to the religious funds from the institution of and publicity given to the 'social' work, and (3) the apprehension with which all officers are necessarily oppressed when writing letters containing such opinions.]

EXTRACTS FROM AN EX-STAFF OFFICER'S LETTER

'I have had ten years' experience in the Salvation Army work, latterly as a staff officer, acting in the capacity of Chancellor in one of the provinces. It is, therefore, with the knowledge of facts that I write. . . . One of the cases proves to be that of a man with whom I have been acquainted for twelve years, and a more godly, self-sacrificing individual it would be impossible to find. It is perfectly true that his salary amounted to no more than an average of about 5s. a week. He, unfortunately, is but one of many who have given up much to enter the work of the Salvation Army, and who, after spending years of toil and hardship, have broken down through ill-health, and so become reduced to starvation. It was the witnessing of such cases that compelled me to relinquish my position in the Army some years ago.'

EX-S. A. CHANCELLOR

EXTRACTS FROM AN EX-STAFF OFFICER'S LETTER

'I can most emphatically corroborate the statements with reference to starving, destitute, and ill-treated officers and ex-officers of the Salvation Army. . . . When I was a

¹ The letters in this section were communicated to the author after all but a small portion of this work was written. They are published not as bases but as confirmation of his conclusions.

staff officer engaged at the International Headquarters in Queen Victoria Street and travelled a good deal through the country on Salvation Army business, I was continually hearing of and seeing for myself cases of neglect and privation and of starved-out officers, men and women; and many of such cases were from time to time brought to the notice of Commissioner —, Colonel —, and other secretarial officers, responsible for the oversight of the spiritual operations of the Salvation Army. The case of the man who is a cripple is well known to myself and a great number of past and present officers.'

AN EX-STAFF OFFICER.

EXTRACTS FROM AN EX-STAFF OFFICER'S LETTER

'When one considers the very important part of Salvation Army operations for which the field officer is responsible, the ultimate treatment is all the more astounding. . . . True, at the outset he is assured that his salary shall never be less than 5s. per week (and, in the name of Christianity, what is this?) with which to feed and clothe himself, but, unfortunately, in very many instances the field officer does not receive even this amount. There is absolutely no excuse for any officer being allowed to suffer such unnecessary hardship and privation. His position is known to his superior officers every week from reports furnished.

'I state a case, one of many, which came under my own observation during eleven years' experience. Two officers were sent to the small town of B—, where the Salvation Army, for various reasons, was not liked and not wanted. Although both were good and earnest men they failed to make any impression, or enlist sympathy, and consequently were unable to raise funds. They were drawing 1s. 3d. to 1s. 6d. per week salary. They appealed to Headquarters for assistance on several occasions, and were invariably told they must put forth extra effort locally to raise money, although it was well understood at Headquarters that this was practically impossible. This went on for several weeks, only occasionally relieved by a paltry grant of 6s. (3s. each). At length the lieutenant took upon himself to write, pointing out that his clothes were shabby, and asking for immediate help. Receiving no reply, he asked his own relatives to advance his fare, upon receipt of which he returned home, and wrote expressing regret at being compelled to take such a step. The captain, discouraged and ill, had to adopt a similar course. For leaving thus they were branded as "deserters". By this process *hundreds* of good, promising officers are driven from the Salvation Army every year.'

AN EX-STAFF OFFICER.

EXTRACTS FROM AN EX-STAFF OFFICER'S LETTER

'It is desirable to correct the impression that relations in Great Britain between the Salvation Army Headquarters and many ex-Salvationists are any different to those which evidently obtain in Germany and—as recent events show—in Sweden. The facts are on all fours. A telegram in the *Daily News* has already informed us that at a Berlin

meeting Salvation Army officers had to be ejected for creating a disturbance. Herein, doubtless, lies the explanation of the "disorder" at the second meeting. There is nothing new in all this. I have seen Headquarters officers and their supporters endeavour to howl down, at a public meeting in Exeter Hall, ex-Salvationists who were simply defending themselves against injustice. Not long since, when an old half-blind ex-Salvationist was contending in the open air against what he conceived to be a wrong, he was violently set upon and his meeting broken up by Salvationists out of uniform.

'There is no disputing these things. They were not done in a corner. Volumes of evidence can be given in proof. It is no answer to this to say that General Booth has a farm colony and sometimes gives away soup. When we plead for consideration, that ex-Salvationists should no longer be persecuted and slandered—it is surely beside the question to answer that the Army lets cheap lodgings to the homeless.'

AN EX-STAFF OFFICER.

EXTRACTS FROM A WOMAN OFFICER'S
LETTER

DEAR CAPTAIN,—

'You will see by the above address that I have arrived quite safe. . . . It is a dreadful place—in *debt*, and by the books the last officer did not have enough to live on. One of the salaries is 3*d.*, 6*d.*, and so on. He was alone. No *War Cry* customers. What do you think? only 8 to our reception meeting and one of those a Junior, and no one turned up for open-air. He has only had 8*d.* for cartridges. Never mind, we shall have to go forward.

'I have been puzzling myself and wondering why I have to be parted so much from my captains. I have often looked round the Division to try and find one, but have never found one, only you and Capt. —. I have often thanked the Lord in sending me to two such good captains. I wish I was only coming back with this letter. . . . But how have you found X—? Better, I trust, than expected.

'It is one comfort that we have an heavenly Father, One who never parts from His children as long as we keep a Perfect Trust in Him. Cheer up, dear. I will pray for you. If ever you are this way come in, won't you? I thank you for all your kindness and the blessing I received while with you. I trust you are well. Best love. May God richly bless you is the prayer of

(Kept by the Power of God).'

EXTRACTS FROM A WOMAN EX-OFFICER'S
LETTER

'As you will know nine years of service bring no pension to Salvation Army officers. I have been an officer, and, like hundreds I have come across, I am not sorry I have spent what strength I had for God, but really sorry I ever saw the S.A.

'I enclose you a letter from my own lieutenant. She told me at — she lived nearly all her time on turnips . . . and I don't believe she would tell me a lie. . . . The pro-

1 Now an ex-officer.

fits of the *War Cry* we sell are supposed to be given out in pensions. Why don't they put it in black and white what officers get it, as I have yet to come across the first poor field officer that has got it?

'When an officer takes his or her weekly report, and 1*d.* for salary, they don't think it part of their work to ask you as to how you are going to get fire or food, and if you ask your next corps will be no better. I was three days without fire at —, and should have been longer had it not been for the kindness of Adj. —, now of —, then of —. I don't say this for myself—God has given me strength to work for my living—but for the poor officers that are in and those that are out I plead. They have the money to keep their officers. How many are laid on one side, and will never work again? How many that their fathers and mothers have to keep? . . . If they had work to go to hundreds would leave the ranks to-morrow, but it is their only shelter and bread and butter.'

A WOMAN EX-OFFICER.

EXTRACTS FROM A WOMAN EX-OFFICER'S
LETTER

' . . . Our poverty does not begin when we leave the ranks because of our health giving way, but right through many of our officers' careers they suffer great privation both of cold and hunger. If it were not for the good soldiers and friends, many of us would have suffered much more than we have. I had a Captain who went home ill . . . because of not having sufficient to eat. . . . She was the most saintly woman I had ever lived with. While the D.O. went to a good billet we two went home on that Self-Denial Sunday to bread and tea. We would not have murmured had not Major — come to our quarters when in —, and though there were two corps beside ours none would put him up, and he had to stay with us. We had very little in the quarters, so he gave us 2*s.* 6*d.* We got a bag of coals, ¼ lb. butter, 7 pennyworth of chop, and a loaf, and strange to say he sent in the bill for the 2*s.* 6*d.* the week we farewelled. My Captain refused to pay it as his wife and himself had these luxuries, and we did not ask for them, and our salary all the time we were in — did not come to 2*s.* 6*d.* per week, and we have taken our clothes off to give to poor ex-officers whom we have found out while visiting.

'You know how officers are marked . . . when they dare to speak out. . . . An officer rises according to the money he makes for Headquarters, not for the number of souls he is the means of saving. . . . I do not wonder now that as the S.A. holds its open air at G— 10 ex-officers go past with jugs for their husbands' beer. . . .'

A WOMAN EX-OFFICER.

EXTRACTS FROM EX-SOLDIERS' LETTERS.

' . . . I regarded your letter to the *Times* as an expression of honest indignation against acts of inhumanity and injustice. In such cases one does not generally use smooth words, nor did you. I hardly think they will reply, but it is stirring their up. . . . I can give other cases. One is that of a slum officer, compelled to leave the work, to which

she was devoted for years, when her health failed—the handsome sum of £3 being given her. The other is that of a man who died in —, an honest fellow whose death was directly due to the hardships he endured as an officer, and who was obliged to leave the work because of failing health, afterwards sinking into deep destitution. . . . It is the system which is at fault. A system of work and administration has been created which places financial burdens on the Army under which it groans. The result is that the exigencies of the case prevent adequate salaries being paid all round, prevent adequate allowances when retirements take place, and favour such treatment as your letter has described. The problem is much deeper than ways and means, or even of cases of bad treatment. It is a question of an anti-Christian system and its fruits. . . .

AN EX-SOLDIER.

. . . I am very pleased to see your letter in the *Times*. It is strong, but not a bit too strong, and I sincerely hope that it will cause investigation to be made as to the Army's methods of dealing with officers whose services they no longer need. These methods are cynical in the extreme, and if the public knew one quarter of what has come even to my notice—much less to yours—the S.A. donations would experience a very sudden drop.

AN EX-SOLDIER.

STATEMENT BY AN EX-STAFF OFFICER.

I have read the foregoing statements of ex-officers and soldiers of the Salvation Army, and from my experience of 23 years in the service, I am able fully to endorse all they say about the system: it is true, neither overdrawn nor exaggerated.

I was until recently for three years in command of one of the most important London corps, and then for a few months accepted a post at one of the Provincial Headquarters. What I then saw of the general run of corps and officers finished my career, and I resigned.

I resigned upon principle. I could no longer be a party to a terribly costly system of administration which upholds a great unnecessary military routine and staff, whilst hundreds of young men and women in the field try to live on doles of two or three shillings a week. I could no longer adhere to an organization which keeps money flowing to 'the top', effectually draining the corps until they cease to develop locally and thus cease to be a factor in the religious life of the people, there having been some 300 places closed during the six years ending 1905, while 2,900 officers have gone in the same time. I could no longer remain with a people who, while spending much money, brain, and time for the benefit of out-of-works, and the degraded of every kind, cause their own officers' children to be left to do the best they can, debarring them from being brought up so as to be able to earn their own living. I resigned because the development of rank-separateness and militarism convinced me that religion is best when separated from militarism.

Many of the simple Salvation Army officers drag along year after year trying to do a successful work in miserable halls, so-called, and poor uncomfortable quarters. I have this very year (1906) seen places of meeting and

'homes' of officers which must ruin the health and spirits of the young men and women who are consigned to drag out their existence in them. In one so-called 'quarters' the rain pelted in the passage, one old door supporting another to keep it from falling in; the upstairs room had an old iron bed-mattress and pillows, and the paper hung in yards off the walls from the damp. The floor was full of rats' holes, and the officer told me he had lain ill in that very room for days while the rats ran over his table and he could not help himself.

It is perfectly true that officers who mention their objections to the system are 'marked'. A system of 'dossiers' as complete as that which condemned Dreyfus is kept. In fact scores of staff officers are kept doing little else than looking after these bits of paper.

All who think of becoming officers in the Salvation Army should know the following facts. Parents especially should study them:—

1. By a system called Corps Cadetship, young men and women are induced to enter the Training Homes before they have learnt any trade or profession for self-support, and in the light of what happens to them afterwards this is a serious matter.

2. In the Training Home they are taught that they must 'burn their bridges', which means getting rid of their tools or anything by which they might earn a livelihood apart from the Salvation Army.

3. The teaching in the Training Home is given by persons who for many years have never been in a station. Therefore the actual work is in many cases found to be quite different: The principal occupation and worry of the field officer will be money-getting, literature selling, keeping up the appearance of statistics, and raising money for Headquarters at Self-denial and Harvest Festivals.

4. Many places in every district are in such a condition that the lads and girls put in as officers positively get their living by open-air begging, the public having long since ceased to attend the halls. The poor young officers, therefore, must go out and beg or go without, unless the divisional officer can make up their pittance to 5s. a week, which is all the regulations specify; and he cannot always find money to do that.

5. Officers are supposed to be able to get a small pension after 10 years' service, but it must be remembered that the printed regulations state (a) that 'no officer has any legal claim to a pension', and (b) that the rule 'is subject to frequent revision'. This means that, if you try to earn a shilling to help yourself, part of the dole is immediately stopped, until it becomes a mere nothing. The general procedure is to offer you two or three pounds to go.

6. The rate at which officers are missing from the ranks is enormous.

It was for these reasons that I resigned my position: I was utterly disappointed with the development of the system.

I had not the least acknowledgment of my resignation from Mr. Bramwell Booth or any London officer, or any word of thanks for over 20 years' service, although I left without any person in the Salvation Army being able to lay a finger of reproach upon either my work or my character.

I appealed for financial aid that I might get a little home together without being left burdened with debt, but this was curtly refused me, so that I have received neither a word of thanks for past services nor a farthing in assistance for myself and family. Yet I resigned purely upon principle and without the least quarrel with any man, the treatment being meted out to me, I presume, because I opened my mouth against the system and its development, to which as a man and a Christian I could no longer adhere.

AN OFFICER FOR 23 YEARS.

June, 1906.

APPENDIX VI

SALVATIONIST STATISTICS

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME¹

THE ARMY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE RELIGIOUS WORK

Souls seeking salvation in 1888 (see Annual Report)	154,000
Souls seeking salvation in last 20 years (estimated minimum)	4,000,000
Adult attendants in London, 1903 (Religious Census)	13,000
Adult members in United Kingdom (estimated maximum)	100,000
Paid officers in United Kingdom, say	5,000
Salaries and expenses of officers, United Kingdom (estimated)	£250,000
'Deserters' from officership, 20 years, say	8,000
Cost of training 'deserters', same period, say	£250,000
Annual contribution of Salvationists to religious work (estimated maximum)	£130,000
Annual contribution of public to religious work (estimated minimum)	£345,000
Annual aggregate cost of religious work (estimated)	£475,000
Amount of investments in religious work, 1906	£568,212
Annual dividends paid on investments, 1906	£25,944

2. THE TRADE DEPARTMENT

	Capital	Advanced	Net Profit.	Grants to
	by Army.			Army's
				Work.
1889	£109,385	£2,810	£12,286	£8,456
1891	193,105	2,750	17,101	14,041
1896	217,312	31,719	3,602	3,250
1905	?	41,755	10,516	1,000
1906	?	45,517	15,152	2,750

¹ The figures are official where no indication of an estimate is given. The arrangement only is the author's, and it is inspired by the Army's fondness for what it calls 'splendid' statistics (*War Cry*, December 24, 1904). There is no reason why such statistics should not be made instructive as well.

3. THE 'SOCIAL' WORK	
Total cost, 1895	£23,622
Total cost, 1906	£56,399
Turnover (and stock) of Farm Colony, 1895	£50,993
Turnover (and stock) of Farm Colony, 1906	£46,651
Total turnover (and stock) of 'social' section, 1895	£151,000
Total turnover (and stock) of 'social' section, 1906	£237,289
Total salaries of officials, etc., 1895	£4,000
Total salaries of officials, etc., 1906	?
Salaries and allowances, women's work only, 1906	£5,647
Amount of investments in 'social' work, 1895	£79,998
Amount of investments in 'social' work, 1906	£133,996
Annual dividends paid on investments, 1895	£2,125
Annual dividends paid on investments, 1906	£5,515
Emigration of submerged: average expenditure (loans) 1903-6	£202

4. RELATIVE PROGRESS OF RELIGIOUS AND 'SOCIAL' WORK

	1889	1906
(Previous to institution of 'Social' Scheme).		
<i>Religious.</i>		
Corps in the United Kingdom	1,395 (say)	1,500
Officers in the United Kingdom	4,575 ¹ (say)	5,000
Adult members of Army, U.K. (estimated)	100,000 ²	100,000
Self-Denial Fund Collection, U.K.	£14,031	£72,726 ³
Property in the United Kingdom	£333,849	£1,145,320
<i>'Social'</i>		
	1895	1905
Total cost	£23,622	£56,399
Total turnover (and stock)	£151,000	£237,289

Religious and 'Social'

Amount sunk in religious work, U.K., 1890-1905 (estimated)	£6,000,000
Amount sunk in 'social' work, U.K., 1890-1905 (estimated)	£500,000
Financial ratio of religious work to 'social' work	12 to 1

¹ The Army's figures of officers do not always clearly distinguish between religious and 'social'.


² Here the assumption, favourable to the Army, that its effective strength as a religious body has not decreased since 1889, is made.

³ The Self-Denial Fund in 1907 was £72,653, and in 1908 £72,670.

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AID TO WOMEN

Post, Tuesday, June 11, 1957

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Mrs. Bramwell Booth, who has died aged 95, was the widow of the Salvation Army general whose fatal illness in 1929 precipitated a crisis in the affairs of the Army. This led to the abolition of the right of nomination of successors to the leadership.

Bramwell Booth was removed from office by the High Council shortly before his death. Generals have since held office by election.

The daughter of a South Wales doctor, Florence Soper joined the Salvation Army, in the face of stern parental opposition, in 1880. Three years later she married Bramwell Booth, son of the founder of the Army.

ENDURED HOSTILITY

With other members, she endured for years the hostility, frequently taking the form of physical violence which greeted their processions and street meetings. Lacking the eloquence and fire of the Booths, she was yet a capable organiser, and possessed ample reserves of the courage essential to the Army pioneers who worked in the foulest slums.

Concentrating on women's social welfare, she founded in 1883 the branch of the Army which, by persuasion and practical assistance, rescued many thousands of women and girls from the prostitution to which they had been driven by the poverty of the period.

Her urgent appeals to her husband to expose the appalling clandestine traffic in young girls led him in 1885 to enlist the aid of Mr. W. T. Stead, the distinguished journalist. To bring home to the public in the most forceful manner the ease with which children were recruited to prostitution, Mr. Stead himself "abducted" a 13-year-old girl.

For this he and General Booth were tried and Mr. Stead suffered a prison sentence of three months. But their object was achieved by the passing of the Criminal Law Amendment Act that raised the age of consent from 13 to 16.

WORLD TRIPS

British Commissioner of the Salvation Army for six years, Mrs Booth also conducted congresses and other public meetings in many parts of the world.

Mrs. Booth was active in many spheres outside the Salvation Army. A member of the Birth Rate Commission from 1915-18, she was a J.P. and a visiting magistrate of Holloway Prison, and a vice-president of the League of National Life and of the British and Foreign Bible Society.

She is survived by two sons and four daughters.



MRS. BRAMWELL BOOTH

Daily Telegraph and Morning

Post, Thursday, October 3, 1957

MRS. BRAMWELL BOOTH'S £13,218

Mrs Florence Bramwell Booth, widow of the second General of the Salvation Army and daughter-in-law of its founder, left £13,218 (net duty paid £1,061). She died in June, aged 95.

In her will she left to her daughter, Miss Catherine Bramwell Booth, all private papers and copyrights in books of her late husband, Gen. William Bramwell Booth. Other property goes to members of her family.

