

No. 2670

EX 2670

DEF. DOC. #1151

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: FASAHARA, Yukio

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I gave the following answers to interrogation of defense counsel Mr. Ben Bruce Blakeney and Mr. M. Miyata on 6 November, 1946, at Tokyo,

- Q. Will you state your positions and terms of service in the Kwantung Army?
- A. I was the vice-chief of staff from August 1937 to October of the same year, and Commander of the 12th Division in Tong-Niang from May, 1941 to August, 1942. I served also as Chief of Staff from August, 1942 to April, 1945.
- Q. Will you state the times you worked under Commanders-in-Chief UMEZU and YAMADA?
- A. I worked under UMEZU not only at the time I was Commander of the 12th Division, but also from August, 1942 to August, 1944 as the Chief of Staff, his direct subordinate and Chief Staff Officer. After that I was a direct

assuming an offensive in the southern Maritime Province. The reason was that if Japan should fight the U.S.S.R. it would be the duty of the Kwantung Army to attack the airbases in the Maritime Province by all means, since one of the most difficult problems in defense of Japan Proper was that they might immediately bomb Japan Proper and sea-communications with planes based on the Maritime Province. As for the Kwantung Army this plan was an offensive unavoidable for self-defense. The Soviet Army based 170 long-range bombers, TB-3's, on the Maritime Province, and this fact constituted a grave menace to Japan.

Q. Would not the occupation of the southern Maritime Province alone have been a death-blow to the whole Soviet Army?

A. No. The occupation of the Maritime Province alone would not be a death-blow to the Red Army; it was the minimum requirement for our self-defense.

Q. If this is so, how did you plan to terminate the war with the U.S.S.R.?

A. We anticipated a decisive battle between main forces on the western front after the occupation of the Maritime Province, but Tokyo gave us no instruction about this. We would have, so we expected, a maximum strength of about 40 divisions one year after the outbreak of the war, but the Red Army's power would be about 70-80 divisions by that time, so it would be very difficult to defeat them. We thought that we would be quite fortunate if we could hold the line of the Khingan Mountains for a protracted warfare. I was stricken by horror when I imagined the progress of operations in the eventuality of a war against the U.S.S.R.

subordinate of YAMADA as his Chief Staff Officer.

- Q. What contact had you with these Commanders-in-Chief?
- A. Since I was their Chief of Staff, I was always close to them and received their instructions on all kind of matters, as well as giving them my own opinions.
- Q. Will you state how the operational plans of the Kwantung Army were made?
- A. We used to receive "the Operations Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army" as an instruction for the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army from Tokyo, and we made up the detailed plans according to it at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Were those instructions given regularly every year?
- A. They were usually given, but if not we followed the previous year's plan. In 1943 no plan was sent, and we followed the previous one; however in other years they always sent us instructions, and we made up the plans according to each instruction.
- Q. Why was the plan of 1943 to follow the previous year's one?
- A. I was told that it was because the Pacific War had become more intense, and it had become difficult to draft a plan of operation against the U.S.S.R., therefore we were obliged to follow the previous one.
- Q. The plans for the years previous to 1943 show operations by main forces in the southern Maritime Province. Why was an offensive operation planned?
- A. I don't know very well about it before my arrival in Hsinking, but the plan of 1942 (the plan for 1943 followed this one) had a content of

assuming an offensive in the southern Maritime Province. The reason was that if Japan should fight the U.S.S.R. it would be the duty of the Kwantung Army to attack the airbases in the Maritime Province by all means, since one of the most difficult problems in defense of Japan Proper was that they might immediately bomb Japan Proper and sea-communications with planes based on the Maritime Province. As for the Kwantung Army this plan was an offensive unavoidable for self-defense. The Soviet Army based 170 long-range bombers, TP-3's, on the Maritime Province, and this fact constituted a grave menace to Japan.

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Q. What was the position of the strength of the Kwantung Army compared with that of the Far Eastern Red Army?

A. Our strengths were always inferior to theirs. For example, during the five years from 1932 to 1936 the Kwantung Army had three divisions, one mixed brigade, two or three cavalry brigades and not more than 200 airplanes. This strength was never increased, while the Red Army was strengthened as follows:

	Sharpshooter-divisions	Cavalry	Planes	Tanks
1932	8 - 9	1 Division & 3 Brigades	200	500
1936	16 - 20	4 Divisions	1,200	1,200

Comparative strengths of the two armies at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-German War (the spring of 1941) were as follows:

	Sharpshooter-Divisions	Planes	Tanks
Kwantung Army	12	800	200-300
Red Army	30	2,500	2,500

By the end of 1941 the Soviet Army transferred some of its strength to the West and it was, therefore, weakened but still superior to us, as the following table shows:

	Sharpshooter-Divisions	Planes	Tanks
Kwantung Army	13	500 (?)	
Red Army	23	1,000	1,000

The comparison of strength in 1943 was as follows:

	Sharpshooter-Divisions	Planes	Tanks
Kwantung Army	15	400	900
Red Army	19	1,100	1,000

- Q. If the Japanese Army was so much inferior to the Soviet Army as you have just mentioned, you could not have had any hope of victory in the event of war against the latter. Why did you not make efforts for the reinforcement of the Japanese Army?
- A. When I was Chief of the Russian section in the General Staff Office (1933) the whole Japanese Army had only 16 Divisions, 100 tanks and not more than 1,000 planes, while the U.S.S.R. had 70 Divisions (3,000,000 men) and 2,000 planes. Seven hundred additional tanks were being made in every half year; military expenditures were doubled; their power, especially mechanized forces, was reinforced with wonderful speed. Considering this fact, and, especially being afraid of difficulties in case of Soviets' armed interference in the Manchurian question, section chiefs of the General Staff and the War Ministry gathered and planned ^{the expansion} of our military power in order to cope with the U.S.S.R. We agreed upon accomplishing our preparations by 1934, but finding that carrying out of the plan was entirely impossible with the national power of Japan, after making concrete estimation of the necessary materials and money, we were obliged to abandon this plan made with much effort, and to agree to complete armaments as much as possible. Because of such circumstances much desired

improvement of armaments could not be carried out, and the Kwantung Army had to remain inferior in strength to that of the U.S.S.R.

Q. Do you know anything about Japan's having had a plan of aggression against the territory of the U.S.S.R.?

A. I can testify concerning only operational plans, not war plans. The Army staffs drew up the plans of operations, but the war plans were under the jurisdiction of the cabinet and not matters for military staffs. In the plans of operations the only subject was the manner of operation in the event of an outbreak of war, and the object of war or the starting of war, etc. -- matters connected with war plans -- were never touched upon. I should think this is true in every country. I distinctly knew that the Army had no plan of war at all, and I had never heard that the Cabinet had any. But as for me, I thought there was no hope of victory in a war against the U.S.S.R. since I knew that our power was inferior to theirs. I believed that an aggressive plan against Soviet territory would be thoroughly impossible in view of our inferior armed strength.

Q. Were you the commander of the 12th Division at the time of the ~~WAR~~ ~~WAR~~?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you given any special instructions by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at that time?

A. At the time of the outbreak of the Russo-German War I received a special order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to make efforts for prevention of any border clashes since we could not be sure that the

U.S.S.R. would never attack us and to strengthen the preparation for defensive operations against U.S.S.R. Accordingly I hurriedly constructed second-line fortifications behind the front line on the heights east of Sekimonshi and east of Hakutsoanshi, and also a third line on the heights southeast of Rokokusan.

Q. Why were not the second and the third-line fortifications constructed previously?

A. Reasons lay in monetary cost and manpower for the work. By the Kantokuen plan our funds and military personnel were increased, and we could achieve our long cherished desire.

Q. Do you know anything else about Kantokuen?

A. In August of the next year I was appointed the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and had opportunity to learn the outline of the Kantokuen from papers and reports by my subordinates.

Q. Will you give its summary?

A. With the outbreak of the Russo-German War, in view of the existence of the German-Japanese Pact the Soviets might attack us thinking that a Russo-Japanese War would be unavoidable after all; Since the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Soviet Far Eastern Army were much different, as I stated before such an occurrence would be very dangerous for us; therefore the object of the Kantokuen was to complete the Kwantung Army's defensive power by expanding its strength. That is to say, reinforcement by two divisions (the 51st and the 57th divisions, which had second-rate equipments) and attached companies, and replacement of men and horses

(300,000 men in total). This plan was called Kantokuen. In truth, however, since there was no indication of a U.S.S.R.'s assuming positive policy against us, the newly despatched 51st division was transferred to China and Formosa in September.

Q. Did it not mean the drawing up of a new plan of operations named Kantokuen?

A. No, it signified only the expansion reinforcement of the Kwantung Army's strength.

Q. Why did they use such a secret term?

A. The Kwantung Army used to employ such secret terms for all maneuvers, transportation, fortification work or railroad work, etc., for simplicity of reference and for secrecy. Kantokuen was not the only secret term so employed.

Q. Was there not some plan of aggression against the U.S.S.R. by seizing the opportunity of the Soviet Army's removal to the West in connection with the outbreak of the Russo-German War?

A. We were instructed from Tokyo that Japan would devote all her efforts to settling the China Incident, as before, and that we should forestall trouble with the U.S.S.R. We were never instructed concerning our aggression against the U.S.S.R.

Q. Have you any other facts to prove this point?

A. The replenishment of the divisions was not a complete mobilization (70-80% of the war-time organization); only two additional divisions were despatched. At that time in the plan of operations the standard was

prescribed, in the eventuality of a Russo-Japanese War, that the 14 divisions in Manchuria should be replenished to full war-time strength, and 16 other divisions should be transferred to Manchuria from Japan proper and other regions. Relations with the United States becoming strained at that time there could have been no plan for operations on two fronts.

Q. Was there any change in the plan of operations of the Kwantung Army after the outbreak of the Pacific War?

A. Since the personnel, equipments and munitions of the Kwantung Army were gradually transferred to the south, resistance on the Manchurian border was planned in 1944, but in 1945 the plan was for retreating gradually into Manchurian inland and if necessary, abandoning Manchuria and holding out in the southeastern Manchurian mountains. Under this plan the construction of fortifications in the rear, which could not be done before, was carried out.

Q. How much power was transferred to the south?

A. I do not remember exactly, but at first some battalions and regiments were transferred from divisions; later the divisions themselves were transferred. By the end of 1945 no highly trained divisions were left, only newly-organized divisions remaining. Tanks and planes were transferred from the fall of 1943 and at the end of 1944 we had almost no tanks and only about 100 planes. Munitions and fuel were simultaneously transferred, so that we could hardly hold out for even one battle.

Q. In such circumstances, what did you think would be the result if the

U.S.S.R. participated in the war?

A. I thought there would be no hope for us, therefore I hoped Japan could make Russia remain neutral by diplomacy or other means, and always exerted all my efforts not to irritate her.

Q. Do you know the circumstances in which General UMEZU was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army?

A. Since I was in charge of personnel affairs as Chief of General Affairs in the General Staff at that time, I do know the circumstances.

Q. Will you state them?

A. Since the basic policy of the Japanese government as well as of the Japanese army then was to avoid trouble with the U.S.S.R., UMEZU was selected as the man to satisfy best the following requirements as the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at that juncture: namely, the character of the man should be such as to invite no trouble with the U.S.S.R.; he should be a fair, steady and careful man who could put an immediate and sure end to a trouble, and could settle it in a peaceful manner. Not only he, the Commander-in-Chief, but also the Chief of Staff, Vice-Chief of Staff and staff officers in charge of operations were also selected on the same principle.

Q. What kind of measures did UMEZU take for prevention of troubles?

A. (a) He made up the Border Guard Regulations and established non-fortified zones along the border, thus removed causes of border troubles.

(b) An item of his instructions given to me when I assumed the position of a division commander was prevention of trouble between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

(c) He very often gave instructions concerning prevention of troubles on the border to the corps commanders meetings which were held twice a year and which I also attended.

(d) He gave me the direction when I arrived at Hsinking as the Chief of Staff that in our relations with the U.S.S.R. our attitude should be "not to invade, not to be invaded", thereby preventing border trouble.

(e) He also advised the Manchoukuo government to avoid irritating the U.S.S.R.

(f) He inspected the front very often, and did his best to see that his policy might be thoroughly understood by his men.

Thus during the five years of his term there was not a single serious border incident.

Q. What have you to say of the guidance given to the White Russians in Manchoukuo?

A. In spite of the fact that the White Russians had no nationality, U.S.S.R. or any other, as residents in Manchoukuo they were treated almost the same as Manchoukuo nationals. At first the Special Service Organ took charge of their guidance in all matters; but in 1943 everything except purely military matters was put in charge of the Manchurian government, and the White Russian Guidance Committee was established with officials and civilians as members to advise the government on giving them guidance.

Q. What are the "purely military matters"?

- A. They were instruction in military matters in preparation for their employment for the defense of the Manchoukuo in case of war, or preparation for utilizing them in wartime intelligence service, propaganda, etc. But these were not for them only; Japanese, Manchurian and Korean nationals were also given the same training.
- Q. What White Russian troops were there?
- A. There were organized three groups (Shokako, Hailar and Odokashi, totalling 800) for the sake of sharing a part of the Manchurian national defense. They were educated, under guidance of the Special Service Organ, in the form of military training as well as intelligence service. However, in consideration of their ability and of the fact that their existence might irritate the U.S.S.R., they were reorganized in 1944 on the same basis as the Manchurian Army and at last were abolished in the following year.
- Q. Did you use them in peace-time?
- A. We used them in the intelligence duty, but not any other services.
- Q. How were they to be utilized at the time of Kantokuen?
- A. Although some preparations were made, they were never sent secretly into Soviet territory. Lest it might irritate the U.S.S.R. their employment in such a way was specially prohibited.
- Q. What was the reason that the preparations for the training of additional interpreters was ordered in the name of the Commander-in-Chief?
- A. It was an order for preparedness for an emergency. Usually instructions on such slight matters would be given in the name of the Chief of Staff; that this one was given in the name of the Commander-in-Chief might have

been due to mistake in administrative routine.

Q. Did you ever plan the employment of White Russians in the operations plans?

A. We thought of using them for the national defense of Manchoukuo in war-time; however, considering their number and ability, their employment was not considered seriously. Accordingly there was nothing about their employment in the plans of operations.

Q. Were the papers concerning guidance to be given to White Russians presented at the conference of the chiefs of the special service organs approved by the headquarters of the Kwantung Army?

A. Since they were contrary to the policy of the Commander-in-Chief, I ordered them amended.

Q. What attitude did the Kwantung Army adopt toward Semsonoff?

A. Since he had cooperated with the Japanese Army at the time of the Siberian expedition, it seemed true that he was helped out by the Japanese Army in financial and other matters for a few years after that incident. However, since he was extremely factious and biased and was unpopular among the White Russians, it was feared that he might destroy the harmony among them and exert a bad influence on the friendship between Japan and the U.S.S.R. The Kwantung Army therefore severed relations with him entirely and ordered him to live in Dairen in order to prevent him from travelling in Manchuria.

Q. Did not the Army give him monthly allowances and utilize him in intelligence service?

4. Considering his past cooperation with the Japanese Army, we took pity on his life ^{and} poverty and gave him about ¥1,000 a month. However, such a small amount of money was too little to be a reward for any special services. The headquarters of the Kwantung Army never received any information from him; I too never received such information through the special service organ nor saw it. Neither the Commander-in-Chief, nor staff officers including myself of the Kwantung Army headquarters ever interviewed him at all. If we had had any intention of utilizing him, we should have allowed him to travel around Manchuria freely, for it was entirely impossible to gather information or conduct activities while living in Dairen.
- Q. What was the relation between him and the Special Service Organ in Dairen?
- A. Colonel Yasue had close private relations with him when the former was the chief of the Special Service Organ in Dairen; however, since Yasue interfered in the gold-brick case which Semeonoff had agitated for ten or more years and showed an attitude to defend Semeonoff, he was placed on reserve list for that reason (in about 1938). Colonel Ukai, who was successor to Yasue, held to a firm policy of non-interference in regard to Semeonoff.
- Q. What relations did you have with the Emperor of Manchoukuo, P'u-yi?
- A. Since I used to see him and give him a lecture on military matters once a week during my tenure as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, I have

learnt about him very well directly and indirectly.

Q. What did you observe his attitude toward Japan to be?

A. I respected him because I believed that he was the man who could put into actual practice the principle of "one virtue and one soul for Japan and Manchoukuo". In general political matters, he always left them in charge of his government, and seldom interfered; but he was entirely positive and voluntary about friendship with Japan, and Shinto, and joint war efforts with Japan.

Q. Have you any concrete examples to prove that?

- A.
1. When he came back from his first visit to Japan, he himself created the phrase "one virtue and one soul for Japan and Manchoukuo" and put it into an Imperial Rescript. I was often told this by Lieutenant-General Yoshioka, who always praised Fu-yi's wisdom and deep desire for friendship between Japan and Manchoukuo.
 2. When the Imperial Rescript for the Manchoukuoan army was drafted, his opinion about it was asked first. He emphasized the adding of the two following items; (a). soldiers must follow and cherish the belief of "KIN_NIGARA_NO_MICHI" (The Way of the Gods); (b). soldiers should be imbued with the credo of "one virtue and one soul for Japan and Manchoukuo". Though he was advised that those items were inappropriate, he did not accept the advice.
 3. He himself contributed precious metal, furniture and carpets, etc., for the sake of supplying the Japanese with war materials, in spite of the dissuasions of his officers of the Imperial Household. He stated then that Manchoukuo could have no existence if Japan should

lose the war, and that he intended to give the first example to the people.

4. Wherever he went he used to stand and pray for the victory of Japan and to offer silent prayer for the war dead of Japan.
- Q. State the relation between P'u-yi and Lieutenant-General Yoshioka, if you know.
- A. General Yoshioka had been very helpful to P'u-yi, as he had been a staff officer in Tientsin at P'u-yi's time of stress. He served P'u yi quite earnestly and faithfully and should have had a large measure of his confidence. He worked for P'u-yi during his career from lieutenant-colonel to lieutenant-general, regardless of his own promotion or praises or criticisms of the world. If somebody misunderstood P'u-yi, in tears he would make efforts to defend the Emperor.

On this 4 day of Apr., 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT M.S.H.R. Yukio (seal)

I, NISHI, Haruhiko hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ NISHI, Haruhiko (seal)

O..TH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KASHIWARA, Yukio (seal)