

RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX "B"DISCUSSION1. Special Characteristics of Japanese Agriculture.

Agriculture has long been the most important single economic activity in Japan. In 1939 40.4 percent of the Japanese families were listed as "agricultural". A somewhat higher percentage of the gainfully employed people follow this occupation. Few Japanese are more than one or two generations removed from the farm and typical Japanese life has been that of the farm village.

Japanese agriculture is of a special character, suited to the peculiar conditions prevalent in Japan, particularly the great population per unit of arable land. The farms average 2.7 acres in area and are tended like gardens. Only about 16 percent of the land has been made cultivatable and that only through elaborate terracing, diking, levelling, irrigation and inundation. So scarce and expensive is land and so plentiful and cheap is labor that great quantities of manpower are spent on very small plots. The type of crops grown and the methods used have been adapted over the centuries to give the largest possible amounts of produce, (chiefly food) per unit of area. Heavy yielding crops, which respond to abundant supplies of water, large applications of fertilizer and hand labor, and which require only small amounts of "land-time" are highly favored. This means careful preparation of the soil, the selection of such crops as rice which grow in inundated land, the forcing of crops first in seedbeds, and later in the fields by generous individual manuring. By rapid succession of crops, rising, in some cases, to three per year, all pushed to the heaviest possible production, each acre in Japan is able to feed some four persons and provide besides such important crops as silk, tea, tobacco and rushes.

The most important farm product is rice, in the production of which over half the arable land is used. This is the



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basic food of the country. Also important are wheat and barley. Indeed some 80 percent of the "crop area" is used in food production and most of this for cereals. Among important non-cereal food crops are sweet and Irish potatoes, different kinds of beans, several other vegetables and increasing amounts of fruit.

Most of the crops are used directly for human food. An animal food diet would require many times the acreage available in Japan. There are few animals and they are used almost wholly for draft purposes. A few dairies have developed around the larger cities but meat and dairy products play a very small role in the diet of the average Japanese. Even fish, which with beans provides half the total amount of protein, is consumed mainly by the coastal and the more prosperous urban populace.

2. Methods of Control.

Maximum domestic production of food must be required because of the world-wide shortage of food supplies, particularly in view of the needs of liberated areas, the inadequacy of Japan's means of payment, and the need of providing labor to the great army of unemployed. If at all possible production and consumption must be brought into balance in order to relieve the occupation forces of any responsibility for food imports. Since normally Japan has imported 10-15 percent of her food, this will require vigorous measures.

Since fortunately the 1945 crops are nearly ready to harvest, chief efforts must be centered on the food supply for 1946.

In view of the recognized high efficiency of Japanese agriculture in the production of food and of the means in the hands of the Japanese Government for collecting information about and controlling agriculture in its technical, social and economic aspects, the occupation forces should make full use of the Japanese Department of Agriculture and Forestry.



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Responsibility should be placed on the Japanese. They should therefore be allowed to formulate and implement their own programs. American agricultural specialists attached to the occupational force, several of whom have wide knowledge of Japanese agriculture, should be organized as an advisory group to consult with Japanese agricultural agencies, approve the programs presented by them and appraise the effectiveness of those programs in operation.

3. Crops to be Produced.

The first problem is to devise programs which will result in maximum food production. There is doubt of gain and some danger of loss from shifting of land from one food crop to another. Most Japanese crops are food crops and are grown in an intricate rotation which follows the seasons and is suited to the character of the land, the seasonal supplies of labor and the food habits of the people.

During the war there has been some transfer of land from silk (mulberry) and tea to food production, generally on the older plantations where the land was adapted to food growing. In view of our policy to require Japan to pay for imports with its own exports during the occupation period it is believed wise to deviate from the general program of maximizing food production to the extent of keeping most of the remaining mulberry and tea plantations intact. Only in case the plantation is about to be abandoned because of the age of the plants or for some other reason, and in case the land would be especially productive if used for food production, should the transfer to food be made.

Raw silk and tea production provide the best means open to many farmers to secure cash income and they offer to Japan one of the few means of securing foreign exchange with which to pay for the imports which may be required to support the civilian economy. These products have been grown mainly on land which because of its soil, topography or local climate is not very effective for food production.



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It is not anticipated that there will be marked difficulty in securing Japanese cooperation with respect to the foregoing proposals. The individual farmer depends upon high production for his own income and the Japanese Government has always aimed at maximum outputs of food.

4. Fertilizers.

Japanese agriculture is far more dependent on the use of fertilizers than is most American agriculture. The Japanese land is generally poor, it has been heavily cropped for many generations and is subject to constant leeching by heavy rainfall and flooding. In fact a relatively small proportion of Japanese cultivated land is of a quality which would make its use practical under the agricultural standards of the United States. In normal times, an average of about 250 pounds of fertilizer was applied per acre, of which about half was supplied directly from the farm. The remainder was made up of fish guano, bean cake, and inorganic chemical fertilizers. Nitrogenous fertilizers have been most important although potassium and phosphorous were also used in large amounts. Much of this material was imported. Soy beans and bean cake and much inorganic fertilizer have come from Korea and Manchuria. Phosphorite has been obtained mainly from the mandated and other South Sea Islands, more recently from China.

Since fertilizers have been in short supply during the war years, there is an unusual need of regular supplies. It may be assumed that China will wish to utilize her own output, including Manchuria's, and that much less of Korea's product will be available for Japan. Lack of fertilizer may constitute the most important bottle-neck in the entire food program.

The shortage is most important in nitrogenous inorganic fertilizers. A recent radio report from Japan indicated that the supply was extremely low even in 1944.

One possible means of meeting the shortage would be by the use of Japan's nitrogen fixation plants. The Foreign



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Economic Administration estimates that these were expanded by four times between 1934 and 1938 and that their capacity, if intact, should be about 543,000 metric tons. This expansion, designed to meet the needs of war, should be ample to supply the inorganic nitrogen required for peace time agricultural needs.

5. Farm Tools and Equipment.

While Japanese farm implements are crude and simple in construction they have been especially adapted to the physique of the people and to the tasks of Japanese farming. A sufficient supply is essential to the effective application of manpower on the land. It is probable that spades, hoes, plows and various other tools have been taken from the farms of many neighborhoods for the preparation of fortifications, trenches, etc. This will result in a short supply, which because of the specialized character of the Japanese equipment will be impossible to overcome by importation.

The only possible relief appears to be by way of increased production in Japan. Some of the labor formerly employed in armament industries may well be employed on "plow shares". If actual swords are not available there should be at least a plentiful supply of scrap iron.

6. Work Animals.

Livestock plays a small but important part in Japanese rural economy. The principal function of farm animals is that of the rougher field labor, such as plowing and carrying or carting the harvested crops. This work is done by horses or small cattle of which there is on the average about one horse and one cow per each four farm families. These animals are most plentiful in northern Honshu and Hokkaido but numerous also in Kyushu and southwest Honshu. A few fowl, pigs and goats are kept to supply food in certain areas, but these products, as in the case of beef and dairy products, play a small part in the Japanese diet. There will probably be a considerable



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shortage of these animals in the post-surrender period, horses having been taken pursuant to the war effort for draft purposes and cattle for food. There seems no way by which this shortage can be quickly and effectively overcome, apart from distributing to the regions most dependent on horses some of the stock from the Japanese army horse farms. These animals, most of which will be young, will require a year or two of maturing and training before they will be very useful.

Since in Japanese agriculture there is traditionally and economically an easier interchangeability between manpower and animal power, the post-war shortage of animals in Japan can be partially offset by the probable abundance of human labor.

7. The Local Production of Useful Low Income Consumers' Goods which are in Short Supply.

Experience has shown that under the inflationary conditions which exist in Japan, accompanied by a great scarcity of consumer goods, however large their crops may be, farmers sometimes hoard them and thus deprive the general public of food supplies. There is evidence that this practice is developing in Japan. Under such conditions the farmers, although they are in dire need of goods, refuse depreciated money with which they can buy little or nothing and hoard their crops.

The solution of this problem has been met elsewhere by the provision, frequently by importation, of consumers' goods which, being placed on the market, tend to coax the farmer to part with his produce for money which immediately can be converted into much needed consumers' goods.

Since it is our policy to hold imports to a minimum the importation of completed goods would be out of the question. There are two ways, however, by which the situation might be met. One would be by the importation of raw material, such as raw cotton, which could be manufactured into yarn or cloth.

Many other simple articles are made up from Japanese materials by partially mechanized or handicraft industry. If these goods were of such kinds as the farmers use they would



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tend to break down the practice of hoarding food. Especially in view of the expected unemployment the Japanese authorities might well be directed to encourage this kind of production, especially of goods made from indigenous raw materials.

8. Rationing.

The best of planning and execution can hardly avoid a marked shortage of food for the coming year. Under the conditions an effective system of rationing and price control will be necessary to secure even an approximately just distribution of food and other essential goods. Reports since the occupation indicate that rationing unfortunately is not very effective and that inflation and black markets are out of hand.

This is a matter, however, which, in both planning and execution, should be left to the Japanese. The Japanese commodities are mostly unfamiliar to Americans and the local conditions under which they are produced, exchanged and consumed can hardly be understood apart from rather long residence among the people. The staff of trained occupational personnel would be insufficient to perform this onerous task effectively. Furthermore, being an administrative task for the welfare of the Japanese populace, this could well be left to the Japanese authorities. The Supreme Commander should, however, require that appropriate steps be taken by the Japanese Government to ensure effective rationing and price control.

9. Supplementary Vitamin Rations.

Since food production is bound to be low, the occupation should take all practicable steps to avoid serious malnutrition. Consumption may be reduced to little more than 1,500 calories per capita per day, a seriously low figure at a time when the people have just passed through several years of underfeeding accompanied by the strain of war and perhaps the more serious strain of defeat.



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In order to avoid acute physical distress, possible disease and serious social unrest during the period prior to the availability of the 1946 crop, some strategic foods might be imported. Especially, steps should be ordered for the supply, possibly from Japanese vitamin production, of essential food elements to the ill, to children and both expectant and nursing mothers.

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No. 16

To the  
Acting United States Political Adviser to  
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
American Embassy Building,  
Tokyo.

There are enclosed for the information of the  
Acting Political Adviser copies of SWNCC 98/1 and SWNCC  
98/2 regarding "CONTROL OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN  
JAPAN".

The conclusions in paragraph four of SWNCC 98/1  
have been made available to the members of the Far  
Eastern Advisory Commission but have not been released  
to the press.

Enclosures:

- 1. SWNCC 98/1, copy no. 62
- 2. SWNCC 98/2, copy no. 57

DCR - NE Unit


GR ✓  
NOV 16 1945

FE:JKPenfield:hst  
11-15-45

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JA

A true copy of  
this document is  
being furnished to

*[Handwritten signature]*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-645 CS/LE

740.00119 Control  
(Japan) / 11-645



AIRGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED X

# Department of State

NO. A-21

Washington,

TIME \_\_\_\_\_

Restricted

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, Nov 6, 1945  
TOKYO, (JAPAN).

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

In letter addressed to President, Kazuo Aoyama, leftist anti-imperialist Jap leader now in Chungking, requests transportation to Japan to assist in QUOTE true advancement of democratic movement UNQUOTE. Aoyama is said to be well known to Mr. Emmerson.

Your comments on advisability of acceding to above request will be appreciated.

*Byrnes*

Byrnes (JEP)

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 111 240.00119 Control  
645 CS FILE 11-6-45

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*EX 145*  
*4-1-52*  
*CSA*

	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  UNCLASSIFIED	
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FORM DS-507 3-5-47 REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECTION A

TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION <b>FE</b>	EXTENSION <b>2951</b>	BUILDING <b>NS</b>	ROOM NO. <b>3151</b>
2. REQUESTER'S NAME <b>Wilson C. Flake</b>	DIVISION <b>FE</b>	EXTENSION <b>4834</b>	BUILDING <b>NS</b>
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. <span style="margin-left: 100px;"><b>DC/R</b></span>			

SECTION B

ATTACHED  
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE OF DOCUMENT  
**Airgram**

TO: <b>Tokyo</b>	DATE <b>11/6/45</b>
FROM: <b>Department</b>	
SUBJECT: <b>Transportation to Japan of Kazuo Aoyama</b>	
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <b>Restricted</b>	

SECTION C

THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.

RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <small>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</small>
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BY AUTHORITY OF: <b>U. Alexis Johnson</b> <i>U. Alexis Johnson</i>	DATE <b>3/24/52</b>	OFFICE OF THE ASST SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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SECTION D

**INSTRUCTIONS—** (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.  
 (2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.  
 (3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.  
 (4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.  
 (5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).  
 (6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47	REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
SECTION A	
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION	EXTENSION
<b>FE</b>	<b>2951</b>
BUILDING	ROOM NO.
<b>NS</b>	<b>3151</b>
2. REQUESTER'S NAME	DIVISION
<b>Wilson C. Flake</b>	<b>FE</b>
EXTENSION	BUILDING
<b>4834</b>	<b>NS</b>
ROOM NO.	
	<b>3181</b>
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: <b>DC/R</b>	
DC/R, REF, PD, etc.	
SECTION B	
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
TYPE OF DOCUMENT: <b>Airgram</b>	
TO: <b>Tokyo</b>	DATE: <b>11/6/45</b>
FROM: <b>Department</b>	
SUBJECT: <b>Transportation to Japan of Kazuo Aoyama</b>	
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION: <b>Restricted</b>	
SECTION C	
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.	
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO:
	<input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED
	*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side)
BY AUTHORITY OF: <b>U. Alexis Johnson</b>	DATE: <b>3/24/52</b>
	OFFICE: <b>OF THE ASST SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS</b>
SECTION D	
<p><b>INSTRUCTIONS—</b> (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.</p> <p>(2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.</p> <p>(3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.</p> <p>(4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.</p> <p>(5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).</p> <p>(6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.</p>	
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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

UNCLASSIFIED Tokyo, Japan, November 7, 1945.

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OFFICE OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JAN 7 - 1946  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

NO. 43

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During  
Week Ending November 3, 1945.

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

NOV 19 1 39 PM '45  
The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

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I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 31, October 27, 1945, and previous, and to transmit for the information of the Department a copy of a memorandum of November 3, 1945, prepared for the Supreme Commander, on the subject: "Political Parties: Developments During the Week Ending November 3, 1945."

Summary. The Social Democratic (Socialist) Party had its formal inauguration on November 2, adopting a program which is broad but vague in some respects. However, it still appears to be the most promising of the new political groups. There was some criticism because of the decision to omit the word "democratic" from the Japanese name. At least 18 small political groups in the Tokyo area have announced intentions of organizing parties. The publication of the Communist Party, Red Flag, made its first appearance, attacking the Emperor and the Socialists and calling for a republic. End of Summary.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum of November 3, 1945: "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending November 3, 1945."

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to the Department.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 43 of November 7, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments during Week Ending November 3, 1945".

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 3, 1945.

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 3, 1945.

Inauguration of the

Social Democratic Party in Japan

The first major political party to be officially founded since the end of the war, the Nippon Shakai-to or Social Democratic Party of Japan, held its inauguration meeting at Hibiya Hall on November 2 (details in Appendix 1). The presence within the party of elements of divergent political opinion was indicated by the dispute over the official party name. It was contended from the floor that the absence of the word democratic in the Japanese version of the name indicated a failure to champion true democratic ideals. The platform of the party previously published omits all mention of the Emperor but touches on most present political and social questions. It was criticized in the meeting as being vague in certain of its proposals. Regardless of its many shortcomings, the Socialist Party still appears to represent the most hopeful of the political forces now active in Japan.

Formation of Small Parties

In Tokyo alone at least eighteen political parties have made their appearance (Appendix 2). Without restrictions and with no requirements for registration, numerous small groups representing various shades of political opinion are constantly organizing. Many of them have small or no following and their continued existence and agitation may further confuse the politically uneducated electorate of Japan.

Communist Organ, "The Red Flag"

The first issue of the Communist publication Red Flag has appeared on the streets of Tokyo (Appendix 3). The Red Flag was issued clandestinely during the early days of the Japanese Communist movement. The contents of the present issue were undoubtedly written before the proposal made to the Socialists of a united front, since it is highly critical of the present Social Democratic Party of Japan and of its leaders.

In its article on policy, following the "Appeal to the Japanese People" drafted by the political prisoners before their release, the Red Flag attacks the Emperor system and calls for a People's Republic for Japan. It points out that the Bolsheviks have always been able skillfully to adapt their methods to special situations and that under present circumstances in Japan, the party must change the tactics used during its period of suppression; that the

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movement



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movement must grow from the bottom and propaganda and agitation must be carried on among labor unions, the unemployed, farmers, and youth organizations; and that the end of the war and the Potsdam Declaration provide a great opportunity for the Communists.

The second issue of Red Flag is due to come out soon, and it will be interesting to see whether there is modification in the stand taken or in the tone of the writing. The first issue, written in the heat of new-found liberty, is a diatribe against the Emperor system and the capitalists, an appeal to arouse popular support rather than a sober discussion of practical problems facing Japan.

#### Appendices

- I. Inauguration of the Social Democratic Party of Japan
- II. Report on Small Parties
- III. Resume of Communist Publication Red Flag dated October 20, 1945.

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APPENDIX I UNCLASSIFIEDInauguration of the  
Social Democratic Party of Japan

The Nippon Shakai-to or, by its formally adopted English name, the "Social Democratic Party of Japan" was officially inaugurated at Hibiya Hall in Tokyo at 10 a.m. on November 2. The Hall was filled to its capacity of 2,600 persons.

At this meeting, officers were elected, and the principles, platform, and constitution of the party were approved. In each case, affirmative vote was taken by calling for applause. No provision was made for a negative vote.

Komakichi MATSUOKA was elected chairman, Jiichiro MATSUMOTO and Motojiro SUGIYAMA, vice chairmen.

A lively discussion arose over the selection of the party name. It was announced that the Preparatory Committee had narrowed its choice to two names, the Nippon Shakai-to (Japan Socialist Party) and Nippon Shakai Minshu-to (Japan Social Democratic Party) and that a majority had favored the former. However, the committee had also decided that in English the official name of the party should be "Social Democratic Party of Japan."

A member of the audience immediately arose and asked the reason for this discrepancy in the Japanese and English titles. He said that he assumed the party was working toward a democratic Japan and if so, why did it hesitate to use the word democratic in its Japanese name? He asked whether this meant that the Shakai-to was to be construed as a national socialist party and warned that Fascism in Germany had grown out of a national-socialist party. The speaker was constantly interrupted with shouts of both approval and dissension.

To explain further the choice of the party name, Mr. Suehiro NISHIO was called to the platform. He insisted that there was no political significance in the omission of the word "democratic" from the Japanese name, that it was simply a matter of "liking" one name more than the other. From the floor one member explained that there was already in existence a party called the Nippon Shakai Minshu-to (Japan Social Democratic Party) and that it would therefore be impossible to use that name. The uproar continued until the chairman, MATSUOKA, was able to make his voice heard and call for applause to signify approval of the name chosen by the Committee. Thus the names Nippon Shakai-to and Social Democratic Party of Japan became official.

Various party leaders explained the principles, platform, and constitution of the party. In each case opportunity for questions was given and some discussion ensued from the audience. One pointed out that the population problem had been omitted from the platform. Another asked

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for a more specific plan for solving the food shortage. Still another criticized the vagueness of the party's stand on the agrarian problem. Replies to most of these questions were made by Mosaburo SUZUKI who explained the party policies outlined in the platform. He explained that the platform did not pretend to go into detail and that special studies were being made to arrive at concrete solutions of some of the pressing problems facing the country.

Speakers who addressed the meeting were as follows: Yoshi SUGINAGA, food problem, Rikizo HIRANO, agrarian system; Mitsu KONO, inflation; Suehiro NISHIO, unemployment; Koichi NAKAMURA, housing in devastated areas; Hyu HARA, election law; Shunji TAHARA, demobilized soldiers overseas and returning Japanese; Kanju KATO, apprehension of those responsible for the war.

APPENDIX II

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## APPENDIX III

Resume of Communist publication "Red Flag" dated October 20, 1945

The first issue of the Red Flag contains the "Appeal to the People" issued October 10 in the name of Kyuichi TOKUDA, Yoshio SHIGA and the released political prisoners and an article entitled "The New Policy for the Struggle", summarized as follows:

1) Attitude toward the new political parties:Socialist Party

The new Socialist Party states that it supports Socialism but actually its policies have nothing in common with true government by the people. The party supports the Emperor system and the present national polity (Ko-kutai). So long as the Japanese Emperor system remains there is danger it will lead in the direction of the militarists' dream of world conquest and to a world emperor system. The "cooperative trade unions" proposed by the Socialist party actually mean a Fascist system controlled by monopolistic capitalism.

Toyohiko KAGAWA, one of the leaders of the Socialist party, was adviser to the former Prime Minister Higashikuni. Before the war he preached Japanese Imperialism throughout the United States. In the early history of the Japanese labor movement, together with Bunji SUZUKI he sold out the strikers and the trade unions to the capitalists.

Chosaburo MIZUTANI, another leader of the Japanese Socialist party is an ambitious bureaucrat who before the war supported such organizations as the Kyocho Kai which was no more than a cover for the Home Office police.

In Italy Fascism rose out of the Socialist Democratic party of which Mussolini was a leader. Fascist success in Italy owed much to its close alliance with the Italian Royal House. Hitlerism developed out of the labor groups in Germany. Polish Fascism had its origins in the Polish Socialist party. There is equally great danger that Japanese Imperialism will continue to exist and that its control will pass from the hands of the militarists to those of monopolistic capitalism. The present Socialist party by its strong support of the Emperor system will encourage such a development.

Liberal Party

Outwardly liberal, this party is actually reactionary and a tool of the capitalists. It supports the Emperor system and the Japanese national polity. Ichiro HATOYAMA, its leader, has close connections with MITSUI and YASUDA among the Zaibatsu as do other prominent members of the party. Hatayama was secretary to Baron TANAKA and he is remembered for his suppression of educational freedom when he was Minister of Education in 1933. The Liberal Party might opportunistically join the Popular

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Front temporarily but its policies point toward Fascism.

2) Our Policies

Our fundamental policies have been established for many years. We shall now work faithfully to put them into practice. However, defeat and the fact that the country is under foreign control mean that we cannot use tactics adapted to normal times. The Japanese masses have been suppressed for so many years that they lack initiative to take positive action. Enemies of the Communists will take advantage of this situation and attempt to influence labor and youth organizations. Former methods used by the party during its period of illegal existence are valueless at present.

We must come out publicly and must explain the present situation to the masses. The power of the militarists and the police has been broken by the application of the Potsdam Declaration. With this opportunity the Communist party must become the spearhead to lead the masses to action.

The movement must grow from the bottom. It must be carried on by propaganda and agitation among the unemployed, trade unions, youth groups and farmers. Leadership must be encouraged to emerge from the masses.

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We have three slogans:

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- c. Provide work and food. We must open a large scale program for the unemployed. This will include immediate unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, increase of wages and, in order to make more work, reduction in hours (from 8 to 7 to 6, if necessary).

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As to land reform we recommend the confiscation of unused land, especially forest land and its distribution to the farmers. This distribution is the key to the food problem. The actual execution of such policies must be entrusted to the local farmer's unions. Cooperative cultivation should be undertaken at a later appropriate time.

#### 4) Industries

Allied Headquarters has taken positive steps to urge conversion of war industries to a peace time basis. However, there is danger of sabotage to such a program on the part of the capitalists. Laborers should be given a voice in the future handling of the problem of industrial conversion; otherwise the danger of exploitation by the capitalists will continue and will increase.

#### 5) Freedom of speech and assembly, abolition of control over the newspapers and distribution of paper.

Equally necessary is abolition of peace preservation laws and the law defining crimes against the Imperial Household. At the present time, 95% of the people are without any organ of self-expression. Through the mass movement of the people we must influence General MacArthur's Headquarters to take action to provide the media of expression for laborers, farmers and clerical workers.

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The realization of democracy will provide political education for the people. Schools and newspapers alone are insufficient. Such political education will be impossible unless the Emperor system is abolished and a people's republic established. If we say that we must use the Emperor and his government until political education is completed then we must wait for a hundred years. Bourgeois ideology is mistaken on this point.

#### 7) Large scale factories and large scale management

The development of the railroads, communication systems and government monopolies has been prevented until now. Effort should be exerted toward a system of large scale factories for the heavy, light and chemical industries. We must remove all traces of the industrial patriotic associations of the war period. We must organize self-governing trade unions. We cannot trust such matters to the government or to the capitalists. Through the political participation of all laborers in our struggle we shall proceed toward success.

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## OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 7, 1945.

~~SECRET~~  
NO. 43

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SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During  
Week Ending November 3, 1945.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 31, October 27, 1945, and previous, and to transmit for the information of the Department a copy of a memorandum of November 3, 1945, prepared for the Supreme Commander, on the subject: "Political Parties: Developments During the Week Ending November 3, 1945."

Summary. The Social Democratic (Socialist) Party had its formal inauguration on November 2, adopting a program which is broad but vague in some respects. However, it still appears to be the most promising of the new political groups. There was some criticism because of the decision to omit the word "democratic" from the Japanese name. At least 10 small political groups in the Tokyo area have announced intentions of organizing parties. The publication of the Communist Party, Red Flag, made its first appearance, attacking the Emperor and the Socialists and calling for a republic. End of Summary.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of November 3, 1945: "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending November 3, 1945."

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to the Department.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 3, 1945.

Inauguration of the  
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Formation of Small Parties

In Tokyo alone at least eighteen political parties have made their appearance (Appendix 2). Without restrictions and with no requirements for registration, numerous small groups representing various shades of political opinion are constantly organizing. Many of them have small or no following and their continued existence and agitation may further confuse the politically uneducated electorate of Japan.

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The first issue of the Communist publication Red Flag has appeared on the streets of Tokyo (Appendix 3). The Red Flag was issued clandestinely during the early days of the Japanese Communist movement. The contents of the present issue were undoubtedly written before the proposal made to the Socialists of a united front, since it is highly critical of the present Social Democratic Party of Japan and of its leaders.

In its article on policy, following the "Appeal to the Japanese People" drafted by the political prisoners before their release, the Red Flag attacks the Emperor system and calls for a People's Republic for Japan. It points out that the Bolsheviks have always been able skillfully to adapt their methods to special situations and that under present circumstances in Japan, the party must change the tactics used during its period of suppression; that the

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movement must grow from the bottom and propaganda and agitation must be carried on among labor unions, the unemployed, farmers, and youth organizations; and that the end of the war and the Potsdam Declaration provide a great opportunity for the Communists.

The second issue of Red Flag is due to come out soon, and it will be interesting to see whether there is modification in the stand taken or in the tone of the writing. The first issue, written in the heat of new-found liberty, is a diatribe against the Emperor system and the capitalists, an appeal to arouse popular support rather than a sober discussion of practical problems facing Japan.

Appendices

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- II. Report on Small Parties
- III. Resume of Communist Publication Red Flag dated October 20, 1945.

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APPENDIX IInauguration of the  
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The Nippon Shakai-to or, by its formally adopted English name, the "Social Democratic Party of Japan" was officially inaugurated at Hibiya Hall in Tokyo at 10 a.m. on November 2. The Hall was filled to its capacity of 2,600 persons.

At this meeting, officers were elected, and the principles, platform, and constitution of the party were approved. In each case, affirmative vote was taken by calling for applause. No provision was made for a negative vote.

Komakichi MATSUOKA was elected chairman, Jiichiro MATSUMOTO and Motojiro SUGIYAMA, vice chairmen.

A lively discussion arose over the selection of the party name. It was announced that the Preparatory Committee had narrowed its choice to two names, the Nippon Shakai-to (Japan Socialist Party) and Nippon Shakai Minshu-to (Japan Social Democratic Party) and that a majority had favored the former. However, the committee had also decided that in English the official name of the party should be "Social Democratic Party of Japan."

A member of the audience immediately arose and asked the reason for this discrepancy in the Japanese and English titles. He said that he assumed the party was working toward a democratic Japan and if so, why did it hesitate to use the word democratic in its Japanese name? He asked whether this meant that the Shakai-to was to be construed as a national socialist party and warned that Fascism in Germany had grown out of a national-socialist party. The speaker was constantly interrupted with shouts of both approval and dissension.

To explain further the choice of the party name, Mr. Suehiro NISHIO was called to the platform. He insisted that there was no political significance in the omission of the word "democratic" from the Japanese name, that it was simply a matter of "liking" one name more than the other. From the floor one member explained that there was already in existence a party called the Nippon Shakai Minshu-to (Japan Social Democratic Party) and that it would therefore be impossible to use that name. The uproar continued until the chairman, MATSUOKA, was able to make his voice heard and call for applause to signify approval of the name chosen by the Committee. Thus the names Nippon Shakai-to and Social Democratic Party of Japan became official.

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Speakers who addressed the meeting were as follows: Yoshi SUGINAGA, food problem, Rikizo HIRANO, agrarian system; Mitsu KONO, inflation; Suehiro NISHIO, unemployment; Koichi NAKAMURA, housing in devastated areas; Hyu HARA, election law; Shunji TAHARA, demobilized soldiers overseas and returning Japanese; Kanju KATO, apprehension of those responsible for the war.

APPENDIX II

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## APPENDIX III

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The first issue of the Red Flag contains the "Appeal to the People" issued October 10 in the name of Kyuichi TOKUDA, Yoshio SHIGA and the released political prisoners and an article entitled "The New Policy for the Struggle", summarized as follows:

1) Attitude toward the new political parties:Socialist Party

The new Socialist Party states that it supports Socialism but actually its policies have nothing in common with true government by the people. The party supports the Emperor system and the present national polity (Ko-kutai). So long as the Japanese Emperor system remains there is danger it will lead in the direction of the militarists' dream of world conquest and to a world emperor system. The "cooperative trade unions" proposed by the Socialist party actually mean a Fascist system controlled by monopolistic capitalism.

Toyohiko KAGAWA, one of the leaders of the Socialist party, was adviser to the former Prime Minister Higashikuni. Before the war he preached Japanese Imperialism throughout the United States. In the early history of the Japanese labor movement, together with Bunji SUZUKI he sold out the strikers and the trade unions to the capitalists.

Chosaburo MIZUTANI, another leader of the Japanese Socialist party is an ambitious bureaucrat who before the war supported such organizations as the Kyocho Kai which was no more than a cover for the Home Office police.

In Italy Fascism rose out of the Socialist Democratic party of which Mussolini was a leader. Fascist success in Italy owed much to its close alliance with the Italian Royal House. Hitlerism developed out of the labor groups in Germany. Polish Fascism had its origins in the Polish Socialist party. There is equally great danger that Japanese Imperialism will continue to exist and that its control will pass from the hands of the militarists to those of monopolistic capitalism. The present Socialist party by its strong support of the Emperor system will encourage such a development.

Liberal Party

Outwardly liberal, this party is actually reactionary and a tool of the capitalists. It supports the Emperor system and the Japanese national polity. Ichiro HATOYAMA, its leader, has close connections with MITSUI and YASUDA among the Zaibatsu as do other prominent members of the party. Hatayama was secretary to Baron TANAKA and he is remembered for his suppression of educational freedom when he was Minister of Education in 1933. The Liberal Party might opportunistically join the Popular

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Front temporarily but its policies point toward Fascism.

## 2) Our Policies

Our fundamental policies have been established for many years. We shall now work faithfully to put them into practice. However, defeat and the fact that the country is under foreign control mean that we cannot use tactics adapted to normal times. The Japanese masses have been suppressed for so many years that they lack initiative to take positive action. Enemies of the Communists will take advantage of this situation and attempt to influence labor and youth organizations. Former methods used by the party during its period of illegal existence are valueless at present.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 3, 1945.

~~SECRET~~POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK  
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APPENDIX II

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APPENDIX IIReport on Small Parties

So far the Japanese Government has established no procedure for the registration of political parties. Consequently numerous groups are constantly springing up, spreading their posters about, holding meetings, and engaging in a flurry of activity. Many represent only a handful of people; some are on the "lunatic fringe." In some instances, several parties bearing identical names have announced themselves. It would appear that the mushrooming of parties of little or no significance will increase confusion among the people and contribute little toward education in democracy.

In addition to the two principal parties, the Liberal and the Social Democratic, the following have been announced:

Shin Nihon-to (New Japan Party)

Adviser, Viscount Takamitsu MIMUROTO  
President, Takayuki MIYATO

Zenkoku Kinrosha Domei (All Japan Laborers League)

Leaders, Masakatsu YOSHIMATSU, Yoshio FUJI

Seinen Taishu-to (Young Men's Masses Party)

President, Akinari INADA

Nihon Kinro Taishuto (Japan Labor Masses Party)

Leader, Seiji MIKAMI

Nihon Minseito (Japan People's Life Party)

Leaders, Hisaki NISHIMORI, Masaharu TANIGUCHI

Jichi Kominto (Self Governing Emperor's Subjects Party)

Leaders, Yoshimasa KATO, Taikichi ETO, Tatsuo  
HIRASHIMA

Seinen Jiyuto (Young Men's Liberal Party)

Leader, Kenji YANAGIZAWA

Seinen Jiyuto (Young Men's Liberal Party)

Leader, Hideo KURADA

Shin Nippon Minshuto (New Japan Democratic Party)

Leader Shoichiro CHIBA

Shin Nippon Kakushin-to (New Japan Reform Party)

Leader, Tomijiro MANABA

Shin Nosei Kurabu

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Shin Nosei Kurabu (New Farmers Political Club)

Leader, Yoshishige TANAKA

Nihon Jichi Nomin-to (Japan Self Governing Farmers' Party)

Leader, Akira NAGANO

Rikken Seinen Shimpo-to (Constitutional Young Men's Progressive Party)

Leader, Takashi KOIZUMI

Shin Nippon Seiji Domei (New Japan Political League)

Leader, Unkichi YAEKATA

Shakai Minshuto (Social Democratic Party)

Leader, Sukeo TOYOISO

Nippon Minshu Domei (Japan Democratic League)

Leader, Kiyoshi SHIRAISHI

Dai Nippon Kakumei-to (Great Japan Revolutionary Party)

Leader, Sakae OTA

Nihon Kokumin-to (Japan People's Party)

Leader, Yoshio KODAMA

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## APPENDIX III

Resume of Communist publication "Red Flag" dated October 20, 1945

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- b. Down with the policy of split trade unions. We advocate one union for each industry. The breaking up of trade unions must not occur again.
- c. Provide work and food. We must open a large scale program for the unemployed. This will include immediate unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, increase of wages and, in order to make more work, reduction in hours (from 8 to 7 to 6, if necessary).

With regard to agriculture, the bureaucratic controlled farmer's association (Nogyo-Kai) must be replaced by a self-governing organization of the farmers. Local farmer unions should be formed first with the objective of later joining the labor unions in a Peoples Liberation Committee which will be the foundation for a Popular Front.

As to land reform we recommend the confiscation of unused land, especially forest land and its distribution to the farmers. This distribution is the key to the food problem. The actual execution of such policies must be entrusted to the local farmer's unions. Cooperative cultivation should be undertaken at a later appropriate time.

4) Industries

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- 3 -

4) Industries

Allied Headquarters has taken positive steps to urge conversion of war industries to a peace time basis. However, there is danger of sabotage to such a program on the part of the capitalists. Laborers should be given a voice in the future handling of the problem of industrial conversion; otherwise the danger of exploitation by the capitalists will continue and will increase.

5) Freedom of speech and assembly, abolition of control over the newspapers and distribution of paper.

Equally necessary is abolition of peace preservation laws and the law defining crimes against the Imperial Household. At the present time, 95% of the people are without any organ of self-expression. Through the mass movement of the people we must influence General MacArthur's Headquarters to take action to provide the media of expression for laborers, farmers and clerical workers.

6) Political Education

The realization of democracy will provide political education for the people. Schools and newspapers alone are insufficient. Such political education will be impossible unless the Emperor system is abolished and a peoples' republic established. If we say that we must use the Emperor and his government until political education is completed then we must wait for a hundred years. Bourgeois ideology is mistaken on this point.

7) Large scale factories and large scale management

The development of the railroads, communication systems and government monopolies has been prevented until now. Effort should be exerted toward a system of large scale factories for the heavy, light and chemical industries. We must remove all traces of the industrial patriotic associations of the war period. We must organize self-governing trade unions. We cannot trust such matters to the government or to the capitalists. Through the political participation of all laborers in our struggle we shall proceed toward success.

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*Ex 111*  
*4-1-52*  
*WCS*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

FORM DS-507  
3-5-47

**REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**SECTION A**

<b>TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION</b> FE	<b>EXTENSION</b> 2951	<b>BUILDING</b> NS	<b>ROOM NO.</b> 3151
<b>2. REQUESTER'S NAME</b> Wilson C. Flake	<b>DIVISION</b> FE	<b>EXTENSION</b> 4834	<b>BUILDING</b> NS
<b>3. DIVISION OF RECORD:</b> DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R			

**SECTION B**

ATTACHED  
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

**TYPE OF DOCUMENT**  
Despatch No. 43

**TO:** The Secretary of State **DATE**  
11-7-45

**FROM:** George Atcheson, Jr., **USPOLAD TOKYO**

**SUBJECT:** Political Parties in Japan: Developments during week ending November 3, 1945  
*File No. 740.00119 Contad (Japan)/11-745.*

**PRESENT CLASSIFICATION**  
SECRET

**SECTION C**

THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.

**RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION**  **CHANGE TO:**  
 TOP SECRET\*  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  RESTRICTED  UNCLASSIFIED  
*\*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).*

**BY AUTHORITY OF:** U. Alexis Johnson *U. Alexis Johnson* **DATE** 2/1/52 **OFFICE OF THE ASST SECYFOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**

**SECTION D**

- INSTRUCTIONS—**(1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.  
 (2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.  
 (3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.  
 (4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.  
 (5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).  
 (6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
**UNCLASSIFIED**



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47	REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING		DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECTION A			
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING	ROOM NO.
FE	2951	NS	3151
2. REQUESTER'S NAME	DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING
Wilson C. Flake	FE	4834	NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. <u>DC/R</u>			
SECTION B			
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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TO: <b>The Secretary of State</b>			DATE <b>11-7-45</b>
FROM: <b>George Acheson, Jr., WSPOLAD TOKYO</b>			
SUBJECT: <b>Political Parties in Japan: Developments during week ending November 3, 1945</b>			
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>			
SECTION C			
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.			
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <small>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</small>		
BY AUTHORITY OF: <b>U. Alexis Johnson</b> <i>U. Alexis Johnson</i>	DATE <b>2/1/52</b>	OFFICE OF THE ASST SECYFOR <b>FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS</b>	
SECTION D			
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-JA

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A-R

A-R/W

SPA

SA

SA/GN

SA/M-2

PLAIN

Tokyo via War

Dated November 7, 1945

Rec'd 10:17 a.m., 9th.

JA  
DOR  
FE/R  
DC/R

Secretary of State

Washington

99, November 7.

Summary press comment Oct 29, through Nov 5.

ZA 8579. Thirty-eight editorials appearing in five Tokyo

vernacular dailies during week discussed following general subjects:

(This is our No. 99 dated Nov 7) Democracy 10, economics questions

8, politics and govt 7, food 6, labor questions 2, education 2,

war guilt 1, population problem 1, and Japanese culture for occupa-

tion troops 1. NIPPON TIMES editorials slanted for American

readers took up election reforms, labor strikes, democratization of

police, visit of American religious leaders, new reconstruction

board, education reforms, and the study of English. Only one

editorial during week discussed political parties. No mention made

of war criminals or constitutional reform.

Democracy. On Meiji birthday anniversary both MAINICHI and

TOKYO SHIMBUN stressed present applicability Meiji charter oath as

calling for participation of people in govt. MAINICHI stated

present

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-2- #99, November 7, from Tokyo via War.

present Emperor has followed Meiji's principles, had no will for East Asia war and now desires world peace. Several editorials discuss lack political education of people and necessity to shake off lethargic aftermath of war and political subjugation. TOKYO SHIMBUN noted special lack political consciousness among women who is claimed will hold twice number votes of men in coming elections. TOKYO SHIMBUN criticized present Jap leaders for lack of zeal and people for failure to comprehend meaning of defeat stating present actions and policies may determine whether Japan becomes true peaceful democracy when huge reparations finally paid or country enjoying liberty and democracy in name only. Both YOMIURI HOCHI and MAINICHI advocated abolition peerage as remnant of feudalism and inconsistent with democratization of Japanese people. TOKYO SHIMBUN stated secret politics must vanish if democratic govt to be established, attacked Konoye for not publicly clarifying his political responsibility.

Economic problems. Economic subjects treated editorially ranged from confiscation war profits to unemployment, coal crisis, production,, rural-urban clash of interests, and demand for explanation war expenditures. MAINICHI argues that huge war profits of small and middle industries should be confiscated as well as those in Zaibatsu. TOKYO SHIMBUN advocated concentration on increased production

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## PLAIN

-3- #99, November 7, from Tokyo via War.

production of goods with distribution treated as secondary problem.

Politics and govt. YOMIURI HOCHI attacked Shidehara Cabinet as impotent, reactionary, incapable coping problems present revolutionary period, appeals for Cabinet representing people; whether called "popular front" or "democratic union" of no importance. ASAHI criticized appointment of Parliamentary Vice Ministers as meaningless since present Diet not representative of popular will. SANGYO KEIZAI asked for repeal of innumerable laws, regulations and bureaucratic controls which have stifled activity of country,

Food. Urgency of food problem was indicated in numerous editorials calling upon govt to take positive action toward solution. ASAHI, YOMIURI HOCHI, and MAINICHI urged increase of rice rations. YOMIURI stated people are on verge starvation with malnutrition, beriberi causing many deaths. Excuse rice shortage unacceptable in face of reality. Govt asked thoroughly to investigate increase of production, transportation food, imports. TOKYO SHIMBUN warned riots may occur unless problem solved.

Education. Educational reform advocated by YOMIURI HOCHI and ASAHI asked for discharge of incompetent professors and proposes participation of public in school management. ASAHI emphasized primary school reform essential to change.

Labor. Two. Editorials on labor problems both appear in YOMIURI HOCHI now operated by revolting employees. One described  
new direction

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## PLAIN

-4- #99, November 7, from Tokyo via War.

new direction taken by labor unions under present freedoms speech and assembly emphasized present possible close cooperation between laborers and intellectual workers. Another discussed proposed labor arbitration committee stating it must aid labor unions and re-educate capitalists if not to become labor's enemy.

War responsibility. Only reference to war guilt made by YOMIURI discussing new govt organ to study reasons for defeat. Pointed out more important to discover causes of war than causes of defeat.

Population. SANGYO KEIZAI. Prewar Japanese population policy furthered militarism; scientific farming and industrial methods must be developed and population policy reconsidered to avoid over-population in future.

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Authority JCS Memo 11/1/45  
By DB/BZ NARS, Date 10/24/78

SWN-3499  
8 November 1945

Office of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
NOV 11 1945  
Director  
Department of State

DCIR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Policy with Respect to Relief in Japan

Reference: a. SWNCC 107/1

By informal action on 5 November 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 107/1.

In approving SWNCC 107/1 the Committee agreed:

a. That this paper be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance, and where appropriate, for proper implementation, and

b. That no part of this paper be either communicated to our Allies or released to the press at present.

A copy of the approved paper, SWNCC 107/1, is forwarded for such action as deemed appropriate under subparagraph a above.

A similar memorandum has been forwarded to the Secretaries of War, Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

*H. Freeman Matthews*  
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS  
Acting Chairman

Encl.  
SWNCC 107/1, Cpy No. 56

DCR - NE Unit  
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Confidential File

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 111-845

LR 894.48

later source  
informal  
action approved  
release to FEAC  
(FEAC 14)  
JCF



SECRETCOPY NO. 56SWNCC 107/11 October 1945Pages 5 - 14, Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEPOLICY WITH RESPECT TO RELIEF IN JAPANReferences: a. SWNCC 16/8  
b. SWNCC 107Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for comment from a military point of view. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 107/1

740.0019 Control (Japan) / 11-845



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ENCLOSUREPOLICY WITH RESPECT TO RELIEF IN JAPANReport by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee  
for the Far EastTHE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policies with respect to relief which should be followed by the Supreme Commander in Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The objectives of the relief policy of the United States are to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as would (1) clearly interfere with military operations or endanger the occupying forces, and (2) permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation.

The problem of relief, in the sense of imports to supplement Japanese resources, is an integral part of the general problem of supervising or directing the economy of Japan. Relief should be accomplished with a maximum of Japanese responsibility and a minimum of imports.

b. Widespread publicity should be given to the general policy that, the Supreme Commander should assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan; and that the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls, and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent.

c. Initially imported supplies may be provided only when it is clear that maximum Japanese efforts cannot produce

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or have not produced materials essential to a standard of physical well-being below which there would be such starvation, widespread disease or civil unrest as would clearly endanger the occupying forces, or interfere with military operations. Imported supplies may also have to be provided to prevent such widespread starvation or disease as would permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation. The burden of proof rests on those who present a plea for imports.

d. Disease rates may be used as an indication of the adequacy of living conditions in terms of danger to the occupying forces and the objectives of the occupation; but in such case should be independently verified by the Supreme Commander. In the absence of a pronounced increase in disease rates, a state of physical hardship should not for the present be construed as endangering the occupying forces or the objectives of the occupation.

e. Distribution of supplies should be made through Japanese public supply agencies or such other consignees as are acceptable to the Supreme Commander and under his direct supervision or control. In the event that, as a matter of military necessity, relief supplies are issued by the occupying forces, the cost of such issues should be paid for by the Japanese Government.

f. The Supreme Commander should immediately undertake a survey to determine the average caloric content required for two basic standards of diet. (1) that adequate to prevent, under present conditions in Japan, such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces; and (2) that adequate to prevent interference with attainment of the general objectives of the occupation. The results of such survey should be promptly reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for further planning. In the determination of such average caloric content it should be considered that variations in diet may be made according to age and work required, and that it is preferable to begin low and to increase as circumstances



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clearly permit rather than risk failure to maintain a standard once established. Meanwhile, the Supreme Commander should provide relief supplies unless it can be shown that a balanced diet of 1500 calories of rationed and non-rationed items is not available for urban consumption.

g. The existing dispersion of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas should be prolonged, exceptions being made for people of needed special skills. In the discretion of the Supreme Commander voluntary movement of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas may be encouraged.

h. Special attention should be given to encouraging production and sale of incentive goods to induce farmers and other food producers to move their produce to market.

5. The Japanese authorities should be required immediately to restore such public health services as water and sewage disposal systems, particularly in congested urban areas. Imports requested for this purpose must be justified as necessary relief measures before being approved. This is not to be construed as an authority to import supplies for housing, communications or other facilities necessary to restore the economy of Japan. Economic rehabilitation is a responsibility of the Japanese Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that:

a. This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for their comments from a military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the "Conclusions":

(1) this report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation, and

(2) no part of this paper be either communicated to our Allies or released to the press at present.



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APPENDIX "A"FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. SWNCC 150/4, approved by the President on September 6, 1945, included the following among the principal means for the achievement of the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan:

"The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met."

2. Part IV, Economic, of SWNCC 150/4 includes the following under the heading "Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity":

"The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

"Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

"The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

- (a) To avoid acute economic distress
- (b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies...
- (c) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied

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1. The responsibility for the welfare of the Japanese people is placed upon the Japanese authorities. The administration of relief, in the usual sense, is not the function of the Supreme Commander and no gratuitous distribution of supplies as direct relief should be made by him. The problem of relief, in the sense of imports to supplement Japanese resources, is an integral part of the general problem of supervising or directing the economy of Japan.

2. The central issue of relief policy is the extent to which the occupation authorities should sponsor imports. Although SWNCC 150/4 does not include a positive statement of policy on this point, it includes prohibitions which constitute adequate guidance in the formulation of such policy. The tenor of the relevant provisions of SWNCC 150/4 is that the Japanese people are responsible for their hardships and that they themselves must find their way out. The only statement involving any responsibility on our part for the Japanese standard of living is the purely negative one prohibiting us from requiring for the occupation forces goods or services to an extent which would cause "starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress." Other than this there is no reference to any responsibility toward the Japanese on their own account. The criterion appears to be basically the safety of the occupation forces, and, inferentially, the attainment of our other objectives in Japan.

3. Therefore, it is concluded that the policy of the Supreme Commander should be to provide no relief assistance unless the safety of the occupying forces seems to require it, or until the Japanese Government has requested it and it is demonstrated (a) that conditions are such, or threaten to become such, as to seriously endanger the occupation forces by exposing them to widespread disease or as to permanently prevent the accomplishment of our long-range objectives, and (b) that the Japanese Government



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and people have made every possible effort to correct the situation.

4. Without further information as to existing conditions in Japan it would be unwise to attempt to translate such a policy into precise terms. Prompt consideration however must be given to establishing for our guidance the minimum levels to which the Japanese people may be expected to adjust, if necessary. Such determinations are essential in making adequate provision for relief, since in many cases shipments must be decided on some months before arrival.

5. The restoration of Japanese economic well-being is referred to in SWNCC 150/4 only as something to be accomplished by the Japanese themselves "in due time" and as something we will do nothing to prevent. For the present no responsibilities should be assumed by us beyond those referred to above. The amounts of various supplies used for peaceful civilian consumption before the war do not constitute requirements under present circumstances and such amounts do not constitute a basis for imports ~~or for~~ calculating import requirements, though they may serve as some indication of what requests to expect. It may be inferred from the language of SWNCC 150/4 that a considerable measure of physical hardship for some time would accelerate Japanese efforts to help themselves and would not do harm to our ultimate objectives. The burden of proof definitely rests on those who present a plea for imports.

6. It is difficult to determine what measures of widespread disease or civil unrest would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with the attainment of our objectives. Civil unrest can readily arise for reasons other than the food supply or economic conditions. A diet so inadequate as to result in starvation usually reveals itself first in an increased incidence of disease. Therefore, it appears that some measure of conditions to be avoided can be sought in the disease rates. The disease rates should, therefore, be used as an index of the need of improving production or distribution of the necessities of life, or if Japanese efforts appear to have been exhausted, of the need



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of supplementation by imports. Since such statistics readily lend themselves to distortion or falsification, it is recommended that disease statistics provided by the Japanese authorities be carefully checked by independent investigation by the Supreme Commander.

7. The adequacy of a diet depends upon various circumstances: adequacy of shelter and clothing, the amount of activity required of the individual, his diet habits, and the composition of the diet. The average pre-war per capita diet in Japan was about 2,250 calories.

8. Food production from the four home islands only, for the past two years, is estimated to have been the equivalent of something over 1700 calories average daily per capita. This production was not as well-balanced as the pre-war diet. The principal deficiencies arising from an exclusive dependence on the home islands would be soya beans, sugar, salt, and, currently, fish.

9. In terms of calories, it is believed that about 1200 calories, assuming adequate variety, as average for a whole population is adequate to prevent starvation. At this level there would, after some months, be increased susceptibility to disease but there would not be starvation.

10. Beyond a period of a few months, it is believed that a diet containing 1500 to 1700 calories would probably need to be maintained to prevent such starvation, widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the objectives of the occupation.

11. No quantitative standard of the shelter, clothing and public services is possible. Elsewhere it is suggested that the aggregate of physical conditions be measured for the purposes of the occupation of disease rates.

12. No reference is made in SWNCC 150/4 to the use of the standard of living in neighboring allied countries as a yardstick to measure the permissible standard of living in Japan. The question of how high the standard of living in Japan should be allowed to rise is not a question of relief but is allied more nearly to the question of reparations and our political and



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economic objectives.

13. It would be desirable to be able to present some estimate in tonnage and value of the supplies which may be requested by the Japanese.

14. The ability of the Japanese to provide for themselves depends to a large extent (apart from the skill and cooperation of the people and the government) upon two factors which cannot be ascertained here at this time--the stocks of supplies they will have on hand and the extent of the destruction of facilities that has taken place. As to starvation, however, it seems unlikely that crops and stocks of food have been destroyed to an extent such that adequate amounts of food sufficient to prevent starvation will not be available. Transportation is more likely to be lacking than food supplies and it is to be anticipated that trucks probably will be needed. The other requests over a longer period would probably include:

(a) Fertilizer. Before the war Japan imported over a million tons a year, mostly of phosphate material but, in some years, as much as 300,000 tons of ammonium sulphate. The value was something over \$20,000,000. Some proportion of the usual imports will, eventually, prove necessary to sustain domestic food production.

(b) Clothing. The Japanese are reported to have been using various grasses and low grade woodpulp - base artificial fibres. They have probably also been mixing in their silk. Military stocks of cloth may be high, but civilians have been receiving only a small proportion of their usual textiles.

15. Normally about one-third of the textile industry produced enough for peacetime domestic purposes. The machinery needed to convert raw fibres into a "disease and unrest" textile capacity would almost certainly be available - perhaps by cannibalization - even after severe destruction. Something of the order of 200,000 bales of cotton (worth about \$25,000,000) and about \$10,000,000 worth of raw wool should be fully adequate.

(a) Sugar. A useful incentive stuff, high-priced in the



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black market. Five pounds per capita per year would come to 175,000 tons, worth about \$10,000,000.

(b) Soybeans. The average export of soybeans from Manchuria in the years 1933-37 was 2,864,000 metric tons (including soybean oil equivalent). In the period 1931-37 Japan imported from Manchuria an annual average of about 500,000 tons. This amount has roughly been trebled in 1943 and 1944. In the years 1936-39 Japan took from all sources about 1,200,000 tons of soybeans annually. Soybeans were an important element in diversifying the Japanese diet. They are not necessarily indispensable in terms of the methods and purposes of the occupation but should figure among the first foodstuffs to be imported into Japan if foodstuffs are imported.

Other oil seeds to the extent of about 250,000 tons annual average were imported in the years 1936-39.

(c) Salt. Salt was imported to the extent of about 1,500,000 tons in 1936-39. It is not known how much of this was necessary for use in connection with food, but unofficial reports of the black market price for salt indicate that it might be one of the best products to import in quantity for incentive purposes.

(d) Fuel. No data at hand sufficient to justify discussion.

(e) Other materials. Other goods, such as rubber and leather, may also prove desirable, for incentive purposes, but, by a strict interpretation of "disease and unrest", it is not clear that they will be needed.

(f) Parts. It will probably be wise to consider favorably minor parts and supplies to facilitate local production adequate to the disease and unrest standard; particularly fuel, and supplies not domestically available, for the fishing fleet.

(g) Facilities. There is likely to be disease and unrest in the cities unless the services are restored - particularly water and sewage disposal. It will be difficult to send provisions to the cities unless the railroads and highways - bridges, tunnels



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and such structures are restored and unless rolling stock or trucks are available. The Japanese themselves should be encouraged to undertake this work; for us to undertake it is beyond the scope of relief, in terms of the policies set forth, and also in terms of the cost, tonnage required, and competing superior demands of allies for the materials.

16. Since there may be difficulties in re-establishing sanitary conditions in the cities and in transporting food to them, the existing dispersion of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas should be prolonged, exceptions being made for people of needed special skills. In the discretion of the Supreme Commander voluntary movement of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas may be encouraged.

17. Measures to be taken to secure and distribute needed supplies constitute a factor in the general economic management of the country rather than relief as such. However, in relation to relief requirements it is considered advisable:

(a) That widespread publicity be given to the general policy, that the Supreme Commander assumes no obligation to maintain any particular standard of living in Japan and that the Japanese cannot rely upon imports but must depend upon the effectiveness of the government and people in utilizing their own resources.

(b) Dispersion of persons from food deficit areas should be encouraged as indicated above.

(c) That measures be encouraged looking toward production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, and the like, looking toward the most effective and equitable distribution of food supplies.

(d) In view of probable loss of confidence in the yen, the production and sale of incentive goods should be encouraged in order to provide a motive to farmers and other food producers for them to sell their produce.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

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DSH-356-Z  
No paraphrase necessary.  
(SECRET)

Tokyo via War  
Dated November 8, 1945  
Rec'd 4:45 p.m., 11th

Secretary of State  
Washington

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
NOV 13 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 13 1945  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

103, November 8

Revision of Japanese Constitution.

Reference penultimate sentence of Department's 38, Oct 17, instructing us to continue discussions and keep Department informed.

Following a request from Konoye that we discuss with him several draft articles prepared by his group, Gen MacArthur has advised that we not associate ourselves in the matter further. Gen MacArthur feels that Konoye would make political capital out of further association and that, as the Japanese Govt has been directed by the Supreme Commander through the Prime Minister to initiate a constitutional revision, none of us should be involved until Japanese Govt itself formally submits something on the matter. We are, of course, following Gen MacArthur's wishes and will refrain from further participation.

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ATCHESON

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DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAM SECTION

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DEPARTMENT  
OF  
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~~11-28-45~~  
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11-28-45  
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ACTION: JK  
INFO:  
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RKB-999.-G  
No paraphrase necessary  
(SECRET)

Tokyo via War  
Dated November 8, 1945  
Rec'd 12:10 p.m., 14th

Secretary of State  
Washington

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~~JK: EMM Martin: JK file~~  
~~11-28-45~~  
~~Telegram to Tokyo~~

102, November 8.

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-545

Are we to assume that the Department's 85 is an official instruction from the Secretary of State to this office?

Telegrams seeking action on important matters such as this addressed to individual staff members are likely to cause both those individuals and this office embarrassment unless they reflect the official desires of the State and War Departments.

ATCHESON

RB

Note: Delay in transmission

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
86

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Charge Department:

Charge to



**Department of State**

*Washington*

PLAIN

*AB X*

NOV 16 1945

SUPREME COMMANDER

FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

*127* ~~SIXTEENTH~~

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER and POLAD, USAFIK

Dept press release issued Nov 16 follows: (~~XXXX~~ Langdon's  
unnumbered, undated received Dept Nov. 8)

QUOTE United States Forces in Korea have been faced  
with many problems since they first landed on September 8.  
Some of these problems were foreseen and others, with the  
turn of events, were unexpected.

Because of the distribution of Allied forces at the  
time of Japanese surrender, General Order No. 1, which the  
Allied Governments through General MacArthur required the  
Japanese Government to issue, directed Japanese forces in  
Korea North of the 38th parallel to surrender to Soviet  
Forces, while those South of the 38th parallel were to  
surrender to United States Forces. This operational line  
was intended to be temporary and to serve only to fix re-

sponsibility for the purpose of carrying out the aims of

the General

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**Department of State****PLAIN**

Charge Department:

*Washington*

Charge to

87

-2-

the General Order. It was realized, however, that this line, even though temporary, might have the effect of jeopardizing the fundamental unity of the country. The United States Commander, therefore, was given complete authority to settle with the Soviet Commander any local problems caused by the unnatural division of the country. Practical difficulties in the accomplishment of this desired aim have been encountered locally, however, and in order to overcome these difficulties the United States Government has taken the subject up with the Soviet Government in Moscow with the suggestion that they be solved either through local negotiations, between the two occupational commanders, or on a governmental level. The practical problems include the reintegration of communications and the economic unification of the country, the realization of which would establish the country in a sound position.

Further problems arise from the fact that the leaders of Korea have been ruthlessly dominated and exploited for 35 years by the Japanese and therefore need political and administrative



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88

administrative assistance. General Hodge, appointed by General MacArthur to command United States Forces in Korea, arrived at Seoul, the capital, with a firm program for the elimination of Japanese from the government and the substitution of Korean leaders in their stead. He envisaged his own position as being merely that of a coordinator and adviser. Because of Japanese predominance in administrative positions and the need for their sudden removal, he found it necessary to assume, with United States personnel, the major burdens of governmental responsibility.

Many prominent and capable Koreans had taken up voluntary or enforced exile from their native land as a result of the Japanese occupation, some of them in the United States. They had a substantial popular following in the Korean underground which the Japanese had never been able to eliminate. These exiles represent democratic ideals and the United States authorities in Korea are encouraging their return, as rapidly as transportation difficulties will allow, to work with local Korean leaders in the unification of the diverse political elements.

The sudden



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Charge Department:

Washington

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Charge to

-4-

The sudden release from oppression has resulted in the equally sudden emergence of many political parties, happy in their new found opportunity for free speech. As might be expected in the establishment of a new nation, there are many differences among these parties and some have found reason for complaint, not only in the activities of the other political groups, but in the policies of the reorganized government.

The United States Government, in consultation with the Soviet Union, is making every effort to improve the situation in Korea and hopes that communications, trade and free passage of individuals will be resumed in the near future between the north and south of the country, thus facilitating the ultimate establishment of an independent and unified Korea. UNQUOTE

*Byrnes  
(JWP)*

*by 930.*  
JA:JZWilliams:mls  
11-16-45

*JWP*  
FE

*JWP*  
EE

GR ✓  
NOV 18 1945 M.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION:BC

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Secretary of State

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Washington

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11744, Eighth.

SL/GN

SL/M-2

NEWS CHRONICLE publishes results of latest

British Gallup Poll, based on question "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the Allies' treatment of Japan since the surrender?" It is stated that 44 % of those replying said they were dissatisfied, 33 % that they have no opinion.

Organization taking poll says that from comments made to interviewers "it is clear that dissatisfaction arose from the belief that the Allies were not handling the Japanese firmly enough".

*Wms*  
*11-9-45*  
*HS (Hunt)*

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DOR - EUR Unit

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PLAIN

London

Dated November 8, 1945

Rec'd 6:00 p.m.



740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-845 FILED

NOV 19 1945



DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

File Copy

INCOMING <sup>182923</sup>  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: BC

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Line seven, after "they" insert "were satisfied,  
and 23% that they" line now reading "33% that they were  
satisfied, and 23% that they have no opinion."

CORRECTION

PLAIN

London

Dated November 8, 1945

Rec'd 6 p.m.

*182923  
740.0119 Control  
(Japan)/11-845*

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

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*740.0119 Control (Japan)/11-845*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

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London

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Dated November 9, 1945

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Rec'd 1:25 a.m., 10th

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Secretary of State,

ES

Washington.

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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN in brief editorial this

A-B

morning expresses approval of General MacArthur's

A-C

order for immediate dissolution of the "Zaibatsu"

SPA

in Japan. After a short explanation of the term

SA

and a statement that MacArthur has started with the

SA/M-2

"Big Four," Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda,

which are said to have controlled perhaps 60 percent

of all Japanese joint stock capital in 1938, the

paper says that it was natural they should be chosen

as the first target for reform. The editorial con-

cludes: "it is less easy to say whether the method

chosen--the resignation of all members of the four

families from the management and the selling of

their shares on the open market--will in fact bring

about the desired results. There would appear to be

room left for financial manoeuvres, and it would be

futile if

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-945

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NOV 19 1945



PLAIN

-2-#11777, Ninth, from London.

futile if the 'Big Four' were merely replaced by other groups with the same outlook and the same ideals."

WINANT

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In reply refer to  
JK

NOV 9 1945

Dear Colonel Davis:

The State Department would like to secure the cooperation of the War Department and the approval of the Theater Commander for the dispatch of a mission to Japan to prepare a factual report on the Japanese textile industry. Proposed terms of reference and personnel of the mission are described so far as they are yet known in the attached memorandum from Mr. Edwin M. Martin to Mr. Fisher Howe dated November 5, 1945.

I hope we may have your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Willard L. Thorp  
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary  
for Economic Affairs

Enclosure:  
Memorandum to Mr. Howe  
dated November 5, 1945

Colonel J. C. Davis,  
Civil Affairs Division,  
War Department,  
3-B-859 Pentagon,  
Washington 25, D. C.

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NOV 9 1945 P.M.

JK:EMMartin:lmc 11-8-45

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*gjk*

FE  
*gjk*

C/LE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-8-45  
740.00119 Control  
Japan/11-9-45



A-C - Mr. Fisher Howe

November 5, 1945

JK - Edwin M. Martin

**Japanese Textile Mission**

The State Department has been requested by the Combined Production and Resources Board to secure information on the position of the Japanese textile industry for the use of its textile subcommittee in allocating the world supply of textile products, particularly cotton textiles. Similar information will also be of value to this country and to other countries in the Far East in making plans for meeting their textile requirements.

Mr. Clayton and Mr. Thorp have decided that the State Department has sufficient direct interest in this question to initiate arrangements for a technical mission to Japan. A letter, copy of which is attached, is being sent to Colonel Davis of the CAD of War Department requesting War Department cooperation in the setting up and despatch of the mission.

The mission will be expected to survey thoroughly the position of the major elements of the Japanese textile industry, to report on the ability of the Japanese to produce textile products of which there are world shortages, and on the shortages of materials and equipment which are the most significant limiting factors on Japanese out-put of these products.

It is expected that the mission will require not more than two to three months in Japan.

It has been suggested by Mr. Clayton and Mr. Thorp and by Mr. Batt speaking for the Combined Production and Resources Board that the mission should be composed of three representatives of the U.S. textile industry and an observer from Great Britain, China and India.

It is proposed that the American members be Mr. Robert W. Phillip, President of the Calloway Research Institute, Mr. Hugh Comer, President of the Avondale Mills, and Mr. H. Wichford Rose, Vice President for Research and Planning of the American Viscose Corporation. Requests will be sent to the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, China and India in Washington for designation of their observers. It is also proposed to assign Mr. Fred Taylor and Mr. Stanley Nehmer, both listed as

potential



-2-

potential members of State Department economic missions in Japan, to this mission as secretarial aides. However, before any official requests can be issued, it is necessary to make sure that the State and War Departments will administratively sponsor the mission and to secure the permission of General MacArthur for its work in Japan.

I should appreciate it if you would make the necessary checks within State while I am clearing with the War Department.

JK:EDM:11



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

132

ACTION: S

INFO:

S EOC-1895 -Z  
U This telegram must be  
C closely paraphrased be-  
EUR-1 fore being communicated  
FE-1 to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War

Dated November 9, 1945

Rec'd 1:00 a.m. 10th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

3815, November 9, 11 p.m.

TOP SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

This evening I presented to Molotov verbally our position regarding the proposed Soviet amendments as set forth in Department's number 2303, November 7, 8 p.m., and left with him my statement in writing.

Molotov received my statement with equanimity and said he would have to study it. He pointed out that in his proposed amendment to paragraph three of the proposals for the council he had indicated that it referred specifically to matters of fundamental importance, such as changes in regime in Japan, etc, which should be reached by agreement between the govt's or in the FEC. I explained that I felt he had misunderstood

the functions of the two bodies and, referring to my statement



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133

TOP SECRET

-2-#3815, November 9, 11 p.m. from Moscow via War.

statement, pointed out that these were exactly the matters which would be considered fully in the FEC.

He then asked whether we would agree to his proposed voting procedure in FEC. I explained that if the fundamental principle of primary United States responsibility were accepted, the question of voting procedure was open for negotiation, but that I could not tell him whether or not his suggestion could be accepted. I explained that other countries were also making suggestions on this matter.

He asked whether I had an answer regarding his proposed change in title of the council. I replied in the negative. He appears to have this much on his mind, perhaps because Stalin has made a point of it.

In a further brief discussion I emphasized that we had every intention of consulting fully with our Allies, that our proposal provided for this. Although the proposed machinery was not the same as in the Balkans it was we believed, better adapted to the situation in regard to Japan. He replied that in the Balkans it was true there was nothing similar to the FEC.

I pointed out also the difference in Japan as compared and many of their leaders were basically friendly to the concept

TOP SECRET



134

TOP SECRET

-3-#3815, November 9, 11 p.m. from Moscow via War.

to the concept of the United Nations, whereas in Japan we are faced with a difficult and dangerous situation which makes it all the more important that the US, in the interests of the Allies, take primary responsibility. I assured him, on the other hand, that we recognize the Soviet Union's great interest in future developments, in Japan.

It is always dangerous to predict what the Soviets next move will be but I am inclined to believe that Molotov will come forward with some revised proposals accepting the principle of primary American responsibility on the condition that unanimity of the 4 principle Allies is agreed to in the voting procedure of the FEC and that he will attempt to change the title of the Allied Military Council and exclude India from participation in FEC.

HARRIMAN

JMS

TOP SECRET



# THE COOPERATIVE LEAGUE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSUMER COOPERATIVES

CHICAGO 4, ILL.  
343 S. DEARBORN STREET  
WABash 7680

NEW YORK 11, N. Y.  
167 WEST 12 STREET  
CHelsea 2-3320

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.  
726 JACKSON PLACE, N. W.  
NAational 8765



November 9, 1945  
NEW YORK 11, N. Y.

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DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

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RECORDS BRANCH

The Honorable James Byrnes  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

JK: EMM Martin: 12  
11/28/45  
Letter to Mrs. Lincoln

Attention: Erle R. Dickover

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is in further regard to our proposal that the United States and the Allied Powers encourage the development of cooperatives in Japan as one of the most satisfactory methods of achieving the proposal for increased democracy in Japan as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration.

LR 894.5032

We understand that General Douglas MacArthur has requested the appointment of a Mission on Labor Matters. Since the consumer cooperative movement and labor organizations in Japan have traditionally been closely associated, we would like to suggest that two cooperative experts be attached to this Mission. They would study cooperative organization and the extent of activity at the present time; they would learn what has happened to cooperative leaders during the war; they would also consult with the occupation authorities and interested Japanese in regard to the difficult and urgent problems of the Japanese economy.

If it is not possible to add these two people to the proposed Labor Mission, we suggest the formation of a separate Mission on Cooperatives.

A similar study should be made on Korea as well. We have been informed that Lt. Colonel Ernest Gross of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and Charles Douds, Chief of the Labor and Management Division, Enemy Branch, formerly of the Foreign Economic Administration, now attached to the State Department, have been working on this matter. Since this also affects economic matters, we are sending a carbon to Willard Thorpe as well.

LR 895.5032

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mdl-c	

Very truly yours,

THE COOPERATIVE LEAGUE

Murray D. Lincoln  
Murray D. Lincoln  
President

CS/VJ

A PEOPLE'S PROGRAM FOR PROSPERITY AND PEACE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/11-945

740.00119 Control (Japan) 11-945

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DC/R

NOVEMBER 30, 1945

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Lockwood



November 30, 1945

In reply refer to  
JK 740.00119 Control (Japan)/  
11-945

My dear Mr. Lincoln:

Your letter dated November 9, 1945 to the Secretary of State for the attention of Mr. Dickover, together with the copy which you forwarded to Mr. Therp, has been referred to me for reply.

I greatly appreciate the interest which you have shown in the development of cooperatives in Japan and Korea and agree that they are a form of economic organization which can be of great value in reviving the economy of Korea and in educating the Japanese in democratic principles of action.

Specific plans for promoting their organization have not been formulated as yet. The Department of State welcomes your offer of assistance. I should appreciate an opportunity to discuss methods for furthering the growth of cooperatives in these areas with you or a representative of your organization at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief  
Division of Japanese and  
Korean Economic Affairs

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Gen.	<i>jd</i>
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Mr. Murray D. Lincoln,  
President,  
The Cooperative League,  
167 West Twelfth Street,  
New York 11, New York.

*ms*  
NOV 28 1945 P.M.  
CR

JK:EMMartin:il

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**NOV 9 1945**

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

No. *13*

To the  
Acting United States Political Adviser to  
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
American Embassy Building,  
Tokyo.

There are enclosed for the information of the  
Acting Political Adviser one copy each of five SWNCC  
papers, as listed below.

It should be noted that none of these papers has  
been finally approved.

**Enclosures:**

- 1. SWNCC 99/2, copy no. 45.
- 2. SWNCC 186/5, copy no. 45.
- 3. SWNCC 217, copy no. 45.
- 4. SWNCC 214/D, copy no. 45.
- 5. SFE 146, copy no. 23.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-945

*NOV 9 1945*  
*CR* ✓ *[Signature]*

A true copy of  
the signed  
[initials]

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*  
*JA*

*[Handwritten initials]*

**FE:JKPenfield:hst**  
**11-8-45**





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

135

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 9, 1945.

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*File*  
*12-19-45*

TOP SECRET.

No. 45

SUBJECT: Suggested Action to Prevent Return to the Diet of Present Members.

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

NOV 19 AM 10 18

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

*HB*  
NOV 19 1945  
*W/T*

**TOP SECRET**

740.001: CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a brief self-explanatory memorandum of identic date to General MacArthur recommending that action be taken, and suggesting the means by which it might be taken, to prevent present reactionary Diet members from standing for re-election and being returned to office.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

To Supreme Commander  
dated November 9, 1945.

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

803  
GAtchesonJr:emi

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Confidential File



Enclosure to Despatch No. 45 of November 9, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Suggested Action to Prevent Return to the Diet of Present Members."

138

## OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: The Present Diet and the Forthcoming Elections.

Among the questions arising out of the forthcoming elections is whether there is any possibility that the elections will produce a Diet that is actually democratic in character as contrasted with the present reactionary body. We seriously fear that such possibility is very slight indeed, especially as the new political parties lack experience and will not have time to develop their organizations to the point of being in position to exert sufficient influence in the elections. The number and diversity of the new parties alone constitute strong obstacles against successful competition with well-in-trenched and reactionary politicians.

We suggest that consideration be given to what means might be appropriately pursued toward insuring that the Diet not be returned to office. Interference with the elections is, of course, out of the question as a matter of principal. But there is ample justification under the Potsdam Declaration to inform Shidehara that the present Diet members are (Article 10) "obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and should not, therefore, stand for re-election.

*apparent omission?*

*present reactionary members of the diet? #B*

Most of the present Diet members, it is understood, are members of the Great Japan Political Association, which is an outgrowth of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and would also fall within the purview of the second sentence, section one, part III of the general initial policy directive: "Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility."

If this suggestion is approved, Shidehara might also be informed that there should be no publicity in carrying out the Supreme Commander's oral instruction in this matter.

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.

George Atcheson, Jr.

803  
GAtchesonJr:emi







Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 46 of November 9, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Interrogation of Dr. George Asahara".

## INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING DIVISION

27 October 1945

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT : Interrogation of Mr. Genshichi Asahara.

1. Reference is made to first two paragraphs of WAR SVC 5438 (State Department Nos. 31 and 32, 17 October 1945) and to Mr. Atcheson's Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated 18 October 1945, recommending that the matter be referred to the Economic and Scientific Section. The main purpose of interrogating Mr. Asahara was for eliciting essential basic information concerning the Japanese Economic-Industrial exploitation of Manchuria.

2. On 20 October 1945 the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo, was requested to have Mr. Asahara present for a conference in Room 252 of the Dai Ichi Building, Tokyo, at 1000 hours, 26 October 1945. (Mr. Asahara's last known address was 252 Kitazawa-2, Segataya, Tokyo.) In accordance with this request, Mr. Asahara presented himself at the specified time and place.

## 3. Conference:

Person interrogated: Mr. Genshichi Asahara, 252 Kitazawa-2, Segataya, Tokyo.

Interrogators: Major J. A. O'Hearn, CE,  
Industrial Division, ESS.  
Major W. L. Bunting, AC,  
Industrial Division, ESS.  
Captain H. L. McGurk, CE,  
Industrial Division, ESS.

Mr. Asahara was informed of the purpose of the conference and under questioning presented the following information.

a. For some time prior to 1934 Mr. Asahara was connected with the Nippon Sangyō KK (originally a holding company in mining ventures) which wished to expand by investing capital surpluses in various ventures outside of the mining field, notably Nissan. Mr. Asahara protested, insisting that the company remain in its original field of business. His opposition, however, was over-ridden and the company finally went into bankruptcy from over-expansion, finally selling the stock to the public. The number of stockholders was estimated to be 60,000. Due to Mr. Asahara's disagreement with the other officials of the Nippon Sangyō KK, Mr. Asahara left the company in 1934.

2. In 1937 Mr. Asahara became a director of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation (Mansyū Zyukōgyō - business code Mangyō). The Mangyō was formed to take over the South Manchurian Railway and all its satellite enterprises. The Manchurian Government did not wish the

South Manchurian



- 2 -

South Manchurian Railway to operate the subsidiary enterprises, so accordingly "asked" Sangyō (became Mangyō in March 1937) to take over all such enterprises. Mangyō accordingly took up the Manchurian leases and properties, moving to the Manchurian theater of operations. Mangyō, upon moving, however, removed all stocks held to Manchuria, gradually disposing of same to another Manchurian corporation (Mansyū Tōsi Chōken or the Manchurian Stock and Securities Corporation, the stocks finally gravitating to Tokyo). The Tōsi was a holding company only, Nissan being among the companies owned.

3. Mangyō was capitalized at 400,000,000 yen, the total amount being loaned by the Tōsi Company. Of the total amount, 399,000,000 yen was subscribed to by various Insurance Associations and 1,000,000 yen in holding stock subscribed by the New Nissan Investment Company. Mangyō originally had 220,000,000 yen in various Japanese stocks. The Manchurian Government subscribed about the same amount (voting stock) by issuing bonds to obtain funds from the Bank of Japan. It is now believed that the Manchurian Government holds this stock.

4. There were two principal and large operators in Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway and Mangyō.

5. The South Manchurian Railway operates all railways in Manchuria as well as collieries, the largest being the Fushun Coal Mines. At Dairen, the South Manchurian Railway manufactured its own rolling stock as the Manchurian railways are standard gauge. Difficulty, however, was experienced in obtaining the technicians and machinery. Japan remained the chief source of supply as the Manchurian Government had insufficient foreign exchange balances to purchase abroad.

6. The Mangyō had extensive subsidiaries, the chief ones being as follows:

a. Showa Steel Works - Anshan City. The Showa Steel Works was developed with United States technical aid, being planned as one of the largest in the world. It started production just before the war, operating one blast furnace. Two other furnaces were believed to have been installed but possibly were never operated.

This mill supplied about one million tons per year of steel and pig-iron to Japan, using the Open Hearth and Bessemer processes, utilizing the Anshan low-grade ore. Approximately 500,000 tons per year of steel and pigiron was used in Manchuria, chiefly by the South Manchurian Railway. The Showa Company had its own rolling mills and produced steel rails as well as structural shapes.

b. Manchurian Airplane Manufacturing Company - Mukden. About 1938 the above airplane company began producing small planes and fighter craft, principally of the Nakasima design. No large planes were produced.

duced.



- 3 -

duced. This company was entirely independent on Japan for materials and equipment. This plant was the only airplane manufacturing company in Manchuria. No data is available on its production.

c. Manshyū Keikenzotka Kaisha (Light Alloys - Fushun City). Starting production between 1938 and 1939, the above company produced aluminum ingots only. These ingots were shipped to Japan, principally to the Sumitomo Company. Sumitomo processed the ingots and shipped finished aluminum stock back to the Manchurian Airplane Company. No specific data is available on overall production.

d. Manchuria Coal Mining Company. Between 1936-37 the collieries of the South Manchurian Railway were transferred to Mangyō under the above subsidiary. Between 1940-42 the Manchuria Coal Mining Company was split into five or six smaller mining companies, difficulty in management having arisen due to the dispersion of the mines. Later the three largest coal mines were placed directly under Mangyō and the Manchuria Coal Mining Company dissolved. The larger mines were at Fushin, Tsuruoka and at Jalainol (near the Russian border).

e. Mansyū Zidōsya Seizo (Manchuria Auto Manufacturing Company).- Mukden. The above company was formed in 1939 in order to make Manchuria independent of Japan for automotive vehicles. The company was not successful, however, as it was dependent upon Japan for all auto engines and miscellaneous parts. As the Japanese auto industry manufactured and exported moto vehicles as a unit, the above company was doomed for failure from the outset.

f. There were numerous smaller subsidiaries of Mangyō, chief among them being the Manchuria Mining Company, mining non-ferrous ores, mainly magnesium.

7. There are several large power plants in Manchuria. The hydro-electric station at Kirin produced 400,000 kw's in its partial state of construction. Dependent upon development of a series of dams, the maximum potential was estimated to be around 1,000,000 kw's. This power plant was under Syōkako, a holding company controlled by Mansyū Dangyō.

8. The other large power station was at Oryōko and was built by the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company. It is believed to be similar in most respects to the Kirin power station, although its current kw output and maximum potential is unknown. Approximately one-half of the power developed was utilized in Manchuria, the other half being transmitted to Korea.

9. Mr. Asahara was asked for more specific information, development data and the structure of Mangyō and its subsidiaries. As Mr. Asahara retired from Mangyō in 1944, he stated that he was somewhat hazy as to definite figures or further data concerning Mangyō. Mr. Asahara

affirmed



- 4 -

affirmed his willingness to cooperate with the Allied Powers in any manner in which he could be most useful. It was pointed out that the information desired was along the line of questioning as presented above. Mr. Asahara stated that he understood what was desired and would return at 10 A.M., 30 October 1945 fully prepared with substantial data concerning Japanese economic-industrial exploitation of Manchuria.

Major W. L. Bunting, AC,  
Industrial Division, ESS.



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 46 of November 9, 1945 from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Interrogation of Dr. George Asahara".

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Genshichi Asahara.

1. When Mr. Asahara was interviewed on 26 October, he promised to return on 30 October with further information along the lines requested in the first interview. (see 27 October memo)
2. Mr. Asahara returned on 30 October and was interviewed by Lieut. John R. Stewart, USNR, Economics and Natural Resources Division, S&R.
3. Mr. Asahara had prepared the attached chart showing the organization of the Manchuria Industrial Development Co. (Mangyo). It was organized in 1937 under Manchoukou laws with a capital of ¥ 450,000,000, half subscribed by the Manchoukou Government and half by the Nippon Sangyo Co. It took over most of the industrial and mining enterprises previously operated by the SMR. The Manchoukou Government floated bonds to pay for the SMR's interest. Nippon Sangyo Co. put up its shares in the various Japanese companies that made up the "Nissan" group. Nippon Sangyo Co. then dissolved and Mangyo became the new holding company. On the one hand it had a group of Manchurian subsidiaries, and on the other a group of Japanese subsidiaries.
4. The leading figure in Mangyo was Yoshisuke Aikawa. He went into the Manchurian field for several reasons. One was a question of taxation, Manchoukou laws being much more favorable than Japanese in this respect. Another was the fact that Aikawa came from the same locality in southern Japan as Shinsuke Kishi and Yosuke Matsuoka, who were leading figures in Manchuria. A third reason was the attraction of business possibilities of the development of the resources of Manchuria.
5. Mangyo was never profitable on a business basis. There was too much interference from the officials of the Manchoukou Government and the Kwantung Army, furthermore, its plans were entirely shaped by the program of military development. Most of the Manchurian subsidiaries did not operate at a profit or at only a limited profit. Nevertheless, in the early years, Mangyo was able to maintain its dividend rate on private shares at 10%. This was based partly on subsidies from the Manchoukou Government, which had guaranteed a return of 8% on private investment and partly on the profits of the Japanese subsidiaries.
6. In 1942 a substantial change was made in the organization of Mangyo. The Manchuria Investment and Securities Company (Manto) was organized as a Manchoukou corporation with a capital of ¥400,000,000. The voting shares of the new corporation consisted of ¥ 1,000,000 subscribed by the K. K. Nissan (New Nissan), in which Aikawa was the dominant figure. The balance of the ¥ 399,000,000 capital consisted of non-voting shares subscribed by a group of ten (10) big life insurance companies in  
Japan.



- 2 -

Japan. Manto acquired the stock of the Japanese subsidiaries of Mangyo paying cash. This transfer left Mangyo a purely Manchurian enterprise. The transaction also netted Mangyo a considerable book profit which went into a special reserve. In about 1942 Mangyo raised its capitalization to ¥ 675,000,000. The increase consisting of non-voting preferred shares subscribed by the private share holders of Mangyo on the basis of one for one. The Manchukou Government did not participate in this increase in capital.


7. Mr. Asahara had earlier been connected with the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in Tokyo and did not join Aikawa's Nissan group until about 1930. In 1938 he went over to Manchuria and became a director of Mangyo and of one or two subsidiaries. He evidently was not one of the dominant figures in the management but was active mainly in production and engineering lines. He was in Manchuria for less than a year and then went to the United States on a trip to buy machinery. By this time he had had enough of the Manchurian business and requested Aikawa to assign him to Japan. Aikawa assented and put him in charge of Nissan Automobile in Tokyo, a position which he held until 1944.

Asahara is therefore not up to date on his information of Manchuria; he suggested that for more recent information we should get in touch with the following:


Shinji Okumura - Director of Mangyo  
Hikotaro Sakaya - Head of Research Dept  
of SMR  
Yoshisuke Aikawa - Former Head of Mangyo

Asahara is not sure whether Okumura and Sakaya are in Japan or Manchuria but says that Aikawa is in Tokyo.













THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 10, 1945.

SECRET

NO. 47

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Kotaro Honda.

RECEIVED DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

NOV 10 34 AM 10 34 The Honorable

NOV 23 11 23 AM The Secretary of State, Washington.

Sir:



I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 32 concerning the desire of the Department that Kotaro Honda, President of Tohoku University and Director of the "Research Institute for Iron and Steel and other Metals", as well as members of his staff at the Institute, be interrogated.

The Department's request was referred to General Headquarters which has reported that Dr. Honda had previously been interrogated. A copy of the record of interrogation is enclosed.

A group of American scientists with the mission of investigating the progress made by Japan in the field of magnetic materials recently arrived in Tokyo. It is planning to inspect the Research Institute for Iron and Steel in the near future and to interrogate Dr. Honda and his staff. The findings of the group will be reported to the War and Navy Departments. The group was sent to Japan chiefly at the request of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department and further information may be obtained from Commander C. S. Piggot of that Bureau.

Respectfully yours,


George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Conference with Dr. K. Honda, dated September 30, 1945.

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to the Department.

WWilloughby:anl



Administrative routing slip with fields for Anal., Rev., Cat., Dist. and handwritten notations.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-10-45

Confidential File

Handwritten notes and dates on the right margin.



Enclosure to Despatch No. 47 of November 10, 1945 from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Interrogation of Kotaro Honda".

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
Scientific and Technical Advisory Section

Advanced Echelon  
APO 500  
30 September 1945

SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. K. Honda, President of Metallic Materials Research Institute at Sendai, formerly President of Yohoku Imperial University, Sendai.

DATE: 27 September 1945

PLACE: Dai Ichi Sogo Bldg.

INTERVIEWERS: Drs. Longacre, Stephenson, Griggs (part time), Moreland.

1. The Metallic Materials Research Institute at Sendai was organized by Dr. K. Honda (who is probably the world's outstanding authority on magnetic steels and one of the foremost authorities on all types of steel).

The personnel of the laboratory consists of the following full-time employees:

15 Senior Scientists  
27 Senior Scientists  
80 Assistants and Technicians

Dr. Honda is 75 years old and does not look physically strong but his mental vigor is still unimpaired.

2. The financial support of the Institute comes from grants from:

a. Japanese Scientific Technical Committee of the Ministry of Education. (Dr. H. Hyashi, Head; Dr. Kinoshita, member of Committee)

b. Japanese Science Promotion Society. (Dr. Nagaka, Head)

c. Direct grants from the Imperial Government. (400,000 yen this year).

3. The workshop and the chemical analysis building were destroyed by fire (bombing) but are now being rebuilt. Otherwise the Institute is intact.

4. The major fields of activity of the Institute and the Chief Investigator in charge are as indicated below:

- a. Magnet Steels - Dr. K. Honda
- b. Stainless Steels - Dr. H. Endo
- c. Armor Plate - Dr. Naoyuki Watanabe
- d. Light Alloys for Airplane Construction - Dr. I Obinata (Duraluminum type, slightly modified).
- e. Powder Metallurgy - Dr. T. Okamura



- 2 -

f. Special Steels - Dr. T. Murakami (Heat-resisting steels. (Did not work on Carboloy which is made by Tokyo Shibaura Denki and called Tungaloy.)

g. Tool Steels and Hard Steels - Dr. R. Osawa

h. Heat Treatment of Steels - Dr. S. Takeuchi

5. General Information.

a. No work was being done on armor-piercing shells.

b. Work was being done on soft iron for shell cases and on powdered, low-carbon steel for wearing bands on artillery shells, following German methods, but only the experimental stage had been reached.

c. Dr. Honda had no direct contact with the Germans and he does not know of any German scientists coming to Japan during the war. All of his information as to German procedures was gleaned from abstracts of German scientific publications.

d. Apparently the activity of the Institute during the war years was largely along normal research lines and relatively little effort was related to direct war work.

e. The volume of work done during the war years was about the same as before the war.

f. Dr. Honda expressed the opinion that the addition of zirconium to steel would not increase its strength by more than one per cent or so and was not worth-while. (Compare greater enthusiasm of Lt. Gen. Tada, President of the Board of Technology.)

6. Conclusions. No information was secured of anything strikingly new, but in view of the outstanding ability of Dr. Honda and the magnitude of the research organization he has at work at the Institute, it would seem to be worth-while for the Ordnance Department to send an expert metallurgist, familiar with ordnance equipment, to Sendai to visit the Institute and get first-hand information. Dr. Honda said he would welcome such a visit.



DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: JA

INFO:

S RK-272 -P  
U No paraphrase necessary.  
C (SECRET)  
FE  
A-D

Tokyo via Army

Dated November 10, 1945

Rec'd 6:10 a.m. 11th

*JA*  
*DC/A*

Secretary of State  
Washington



109, Tenth

I had talked with the churchmen through Durgin and also with Horton personally before the receipt of the Department's number 93 November 9. (This is our number 109 dated November 10) Horton volunteered strong assurances that there would be no further meddling in political matters but, notwithstanding those assurances, Van Dirk during a call on the Emperor on November 9 told the Emperor that the American church had always worked for the abolition of discriminatory immigration legislation, would continue to work therefor as regards Japanese, and said that he hoped that the provisions of the immigration laws discriminating against Japanese would soon be repealed. He also, according to his story, told the Emperor in so many words that he hoped Japan would soon become a member of the United Nations.

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Cai  
Dist.

*Handwritten signature*

NOV 10 1945

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-1045

Confidential File

8/11-10



SECRET

-2-#109, Tenth from Tokyo via Army

of the United Nations. Upon recounting to me the interviews with the emperor after they had taken place and outlining an account thereof he was preparing for the press, I advised Van Dirk to omit from the press story any mention of questions of immigration and Japanese membership in United Nations.

When question of their calling on the Emperor first came up, I informed General MacArthur who consented only on condition that arrangements for the call had been made by Japanese purely on voluntary basis without American pressure. I had Durgin so inform churchmen, and they indicated their clear understanding. Prior to the call no mention was made to me by Durgin or by any of the churchmen that there was any question of Durgin calling with them; nor did Durgin or any of them mention that Durgin accompanied them, and I now learn from the NIPPON TIMES this morning that he also called in formal attire on the Emperor and was given <sup>N</sup> an additional interview at the time of the churchmen's call. I learn also from the paper that the four called on Konoye November 8 and Higashi-Kuni on November 9. Durgin made no prior report in regard to their calls or his participation.

He states that he

SECRET



SECRET

~~-3-~~#109, Tenth from Tokyo via Army

He states that he thought I would assume he would be included in the churchmen's activities as he has been devoting practically all of his time to them. I believe that he now understands the situation.

Dispatch follows.

The desired inquiry of Shafer will be made soon as practicable. Shafer is now in Korea.

ATCHESON

DM

SECRET



DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION : CU  
INFO :

S EC-998  
U No paraphrase necessary .  
C (RESTRICTED) -C

Tokyo via War  
Dated November 10, 1945  
Rec'd 12:10 p.m., 14th

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Secretary of State

Washington

*110*  
~~10~~, November 10.

~~GTS~~ ~~HST~~

*info passed on  
to Mr. Chen Chih-mai  
Chinese Embassy*

*DC/R  
file*

Preliminary information here indicates that because of very widespread destruction of cities there is not available in Japan (REDEPTEL 71, <sup>Japan AR40d.08</sup> November 1st) any large supply of scientific books and equipment. Only Chinese approach to headquarters has been request by Chinese Liaison Officer that technical library at Yokosuka Naval Base be turned over to Chinese.

ATCHESON



NB

Note: Delay in transmission

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-1045

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*2/11-10*



DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

C O R R E C T I O N

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No paraphrase necessary.  
(RESTRICTED)

Tokyo via War

Dated November 10, 1945

Rec'd 12:10 p.m., 14th.

Secretary of State

Washington

102, November 10

The serial number of this message received as  
102 should be corrected to read 110.

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

CSB

RESTRICTED

*Cards corrected 11-21-45  
HKW*

*J. W. 740. 00119 Central (Japan) / 11-10-45*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION - JA  
INFO:  
S  
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C  
FE

EK-1094 - H  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Tokyo via War  
Dated October 11, 1945  
Rec'd 12:10 p.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

#B  
T  
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WTT

WAR DEPARTMENT SERIES CA 53136

A reliable Japanese source close to Marquis Kido has privately informed member of my staff that the Emperor has for some time considered abdication but would like to abdicate at time of his own choosing. This source feels that reform of the Japanese constitution should come about in manner now provided, that is, through initiative of Emperor and that it would be unfortunate if constitutional reform were imposed from outside or if Emperor were forced to abdicate by action of American authorities.

Without entering into discussion of the general question of the Emperor, there would seem to be no doubt that, Imperial "initiative" of and sanction for an early and suitable revision of the constitution (see our Radio

31 October 10) would provide a firm basis for launching and establishment of an organic law of government.

ATCHESON

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-1145

Confidential File

4400119 Control (Japan) / 10-1145

X 48594.001 Hirohito



DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

File Copy

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

40

ACTION: JA  
INFO:

CORRECTION

S  
U  
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FE

EOC-0  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Tokyo via War  
Dated October 11, 1945  
Rec'd 12:10 p.m. 16th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

War Department Series CA 53136

The serial number of this message received as  
unnumbered should be corrected to read 38.

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES

CSB

Note: Abdication of the Emperor.

*Card corrected 11-5-45  
bkh*

*7.20.740.00229 Central (Japan) 110-1145 Div. Confidential File*



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By DR/BR NARS, Date 10/27/74

SECRET I VI

PRIORITY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET  
CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 44g and 53a, AR 380-5.

~~AREA~~  
~~DA MGR~~

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VNS  
11-16-45

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 15 1945  
DC  
OFFICE OF CHIEF

From: CINC AFPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan

To: War Department

Nr: CAX 54607

11 November 1945

From SCAP to WARCOS pass to SECState info COMGEN  
China pass to AmEmbassy Chungking WAR pls pass to Military  
Mission Moscow, pass to AmEmbassy CAX 54607.

Political summary October 31 to November 8 (reference  
our 79 October 30).

The govt created a number of new organizations, but  
in general continued to talk rather than act. Political  
and labor activity increased markedly but was still chiefly  
preparatory and organizational. Definite action was taken  
by headquarters to dissolve the Zaibatsu. Complaints of  
economic distress were increasingly vocal and reached stage  
peaceful mass demonstration.

Govt.

Fearing criticism of inaction, cabinet set up  
"War Calamities Rehabilitation Board", under Ichizo Kobayashi  
who was made minister without portfolio, with statement  
that it would plan rebuilding of destroyed cities and pro-  
vision of housing. General estimate of probable effective-  
ness was not optimistic. Conference of prefectural govern-  
ors, first since surrender, was given "Explanation of cab-  
inet's administrative policies and measures to cope with  
economics situation." Administrative Adjustment Council  
under cabinet was announced to study reduction of govt

CM IN 4226

(12 Nov 45)

DIV. OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION  
NOV 14 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET Unit  
138  
MRS. ROBINSON No. 38

NOV 12 1945  
NOV 16 1945

COPY No. 1

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/11-1145  
Confidential File  
740.00119 Control  
(Japan) /11-1145

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECRET IVI  
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CINCAFPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan

Nr: CAX 54607

11 November 1945

personnel by one half. Considerable importance seemed attached by cabinet to body being set up to study the war, with publicity emphasis on "Why war was lost". An indication of presently submerged tensions was an unsuccessful and unexplained attempt on life of the home minister. Several cabinet ministers showed their ties with the past by making the traditional pilgrimage to Ise and Emperor was scheduled to visit the shrine to report end of war.

Politics.

Cabinet announcement that it was considering "Restrictive plural voting system" provoked criticism by liberal parties who, apparently fearing inability to win majorities, favored straight proportional representation and claimed that proposal would play into hands of experienced political manipulators. Voters would select one name in districts having less than six representatives, two in districts having six to ten, three where more than ten. (This is our 107 dated November 9 signed Atcheson. Sent to Dept; repeated to Moscow was our number 1 and Chungking as our number 1) Cabinet's choice of parliamentary vice ministers was widely attacked on grounds some had been members of War Cabinets and as anachronism. Imperial rescript called diet session for December 24 but explanation was that Cabinet would ask for special session early in December to pass election law and then dissolve. Diet generally was sporadically criticized as reactionary and sharing in war guilt. Konoye affair died down with the Prince losing some face after statement by General MacArthur. Constitutional reform received less

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(12 Nov 45)

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SECRET IVI  
PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CINCAFPAC Advance, Tokyo, Japan

NR: CAX 54607

11 November 1945

public attention although an "Independent civilian group" to study subject announced itself.

Parties.

The Socialist Party, at present the most promising new group, held formal inauguration meeting, passed a broad program (by methods open to democratic criticism), adopted an official name (Socialist in Japanese; social democratic in English), and chose slate of middle of the road leaders, presumably in hope of uniting party's many factions. At least one instance reported of local cooperation between Socialist and Liberal parties. Minor parties proliferated, most appearing to have reactionary backing (such as one supported by Nakajima the aircraft producer) and to be offshoots of former Nippon Seijikai. Large funds possibly available to some of these parties make them unpredictable factors. Communist Party was expanding organization and interesting itself in labor controversies but actual strength remained unknown and probably not large.

Labor.

Considerable activity in labor organization, including fishing maritime gas press and transport industries. Cabinet announced as interim measures, pending expected revision of labor laws, a plan for arbitration committees in each prefecture with representatives of labor, management and public. However except among Korean and Chinese laborers there was still little organized labor unrest. Formation of a Japan farmers association was announced but

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(12 Nov 45)

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character not clear. Kagawa and Coutarima sponsored preparatory committee to establish national league of cooperative unions. Two women's bodies, apparently suffragist in character without specific party affiliations, were formed.

Education.

Seven former professors of Tokyo Imperial University including well known liberal economists were reinstated. There was movement for similar return of professors to Tokyo University. SCAP directive ordered the elimination from schools of all teachers associated with militarism. A lawyer's association refused membership to a former procurator who had been notorious in prosecution of thought cases.

Press.

Domei was reorganized on a mutual basis as the Kyodo News Agency and was distributing Associated Press Service. An ostensibly separated commercial agency was opened November 1st. The fight between owners and staff of the Nomiuri continued with staff in control of publication. The first strictly party organ to appear was first issue of Communist Red Flag, intended to be a daily. Paper shortage was an impediment to new publishing ventures.

Zaibatsu.

After the SCAP directive of October 31 preventing transfer of their assets, the four major Zaibatsu all

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