

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy,

2 officers in the Department that knew anything about it and  
3 they were conducting a school. It was purely in the train-  
4 ing stage.

5 Mr. Murphy: The Chairman then asked you:

6 "Well, was it because of that deficiency that you  
7 didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked  
8 full time, or was it because that expedient didn't occur  
9 to you?

10 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir; there was no discussion  
11 of that, sir."

12 Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

13 Colonel Phillips: That is not entirely correct.

14 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is not entirely correct. There  
16 had been some discussion.

17 Mr. Murphy: That is what you told the Roberts Board in  
18 January 1942, wasn't it?

19 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

21 "The radar and its operation was under the inter-  
22 ceptor commander and also the Department signal officer  
23 at that time. He was training these people, and that was  
24 his function.

25 "The Chairman: But inquiry could be made of one or

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 both those men?

3 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

4 "The Chairman: But as I understood your answer that  
5 expedient occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody  
6 in the superior command?

7 "Colonel Phillips: So far as I know, sir, that was  
8 not discussed. It is possible that the Department Com-  
9 mander took consideration of that. I didn't."  
10 Was that a correct answer in January of 1942?

11 Colonel Phillips: No, there was discussion. I modify  
12 that just the same as I did the one before. There had been  
13 some discussion of it. It was a training matter, I repeat,  
14 and it was purely in the training stage.

15 Mr. Murphy: You paid no attention to this did you, as  
16 Chief of Staff?

17 Colonel Phillips: I had a G-3 on the staff that --

18 Mr. Murphy: I say you personally paid no attention to it  
19 as Chief of Staff, did you?

20 Colonel Phillips: Yes, I did. I gave it much attention  
21 but there were many things that I had to pay attention to at  
22 that time.

23 Mr. Murphy: Let me read that answer again:

24 "So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It  
25 is possible that the Department Commander took consider-

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Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2       ation of that. I didn't."

3       That is pretty plain, clear English, isn't it?

4       Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

5       Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

6               "Colonel Phillips: We felt secure against a raid,  
7       particularly with the Fleet here, yes, sir."

8       In other words, you felt more secure with the Fleet in  
9       than with the Fleet out, is that right?

10       Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir. It would in-  
11       crease the armament, the anti-aircraft guns and all of that.

12       Mr. Murphy: You thought that the Japs were more likely  
13       to attack Hawaii than to attack the Fleet as such, is that it?

14       Colonel Phillips: Well, we were there to protect the  
15       installations when the Fleet went in.

16       Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you talked about task forces and  
17       what you knew.

18       On page 236, our number 11, the Chairman asked you a ques-  
19       tion.

20               "The Chairman: And you didn't know how many forces  
21       they had out?

22       "Colonel Phillips: As I said a while ago, sir, I  
23       never knew what the Navy had."

24       That was your answer in January of 1942, wasn't it?

25       Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Now, you were asked before the Roberts Board  
3 as to your conversation with General Marshall and you were  
4 asked to go out and prepare some notes as to your recollec-  
5 tion of that conversation. Do you remember that?

6 Colonel Phillips: That is right, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: And then you subsequently came back later on  
8 with some notes as to what the conversation was.

9 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

10 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, you talked to General  
11 Marshall on the afternoon of December 7th or some time that  
12 day?

13 Colonel Phillips: On the eighth.

14 Mr. Murphy: This is in Washington you mean or Hawaii?

15 Colonel Phillips: I talked to him from Hawaii, called  
16 him on the scrambler phone.

17 Mr. Murphy: General Marshall asked then of you, "Did  
18 you get a message," is that right?

19 Colonel Phillips: "Did you get my message"?

20 Mr. Murphy: That is right. And your answer was what?

21 Colonel Phillips: "What message"?

22 Mr. Murphy: And his answer was what?

23 Colonel Phillips: "The message" -- I believe, to the best  
24 of my recollection -- "The message I sent last night or yes-  
25 terday." I am not sure of the day, whether it was last night

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 or yesterday, but following that I said, "No, sir, we did  
3 not receive that message."

4 Mr. Murphy: Now, we have heard a lot of conversation  
5 here and testimony about a Lieutenant Burr. As I understand  
6 it, he is being blamed for the lack of the Navy not knowing  
7 what was going on. He is the one who should have told your  
8 liaison officer?

9 Colonel Phillips: He was liaison officer, a staff of-  
10 ficer of Admiral Kimmel.

11 Mr. Murphy: Who was your liaison officer?

12 Colonel Phillips: Major Fleming was the General's Navy  
13 liaison.

14 Mr. Murphy: Who else?

15 Colonel Phillips: We had a Colonel Dingman who was in  
16 the harbor control post and we also had two officers at one  
17 time from G-3 who operated not definitely as liaison but al-  
18 most continuously in the drawing up of the local defense plan.

19 Mr. Murphy: Did you say anything about Major Fleming be-  
20 fore the Roberts Board as a liaison officer?

21 Colonel Phillips: I am not sure what I testified there.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, on page 243, our page 114 a question  
23 by General McCoy:

24 "And who is the Army officer on duty over there at  
25 the District?"

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 "Colonel Phillips: Lieutenant Colonel Dingman.

3 "General McCoy: What are their respective duties?

4 "Colonel Phillips: I do not believe they have ever  
5 been given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers."

6 In other words, they had no particular duties; they were  
7 over there to look around and find out what they could, is  
8 that it?

9 Colonel Phillips: Our liaison officer is defined in our  
10 Army manual, it gives the definite duties, it tells them ex-  
11 actly what they are to do. An Army officer would know what  
12 those are.

13 Mr. Murphy: Was this question asked of you in January  
14 1942?

15 "What are their respective duties?"

16 "Colonel Phillips: I do not believe they have ever  
17 been given prescribed duties."

18 Did you say that?

19 Colonel Phillips: "They are liaison officers." That was  
20 an interruption in that answer. "They are liaison officers",  
21 I stated.

22 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, then, when you were drawing  
23 up that standard operating procedure on November 5th did  
24 you have any meetings with the Navy since you were planning  
25 joint action? Did you have any meetings with Navy, with A1-

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 rival Kimmel's staff, preparatory to bringing it to a comple-  
2 tion?  
3

4 Colonel Phillips: That is a matter that I am unable to  
5 answer. I am sure that the staff who were working on the  
6 various sections conferred with the Navy from time to time.  
7 I have no personal knowledge of it myself.

8 Mr. Murphy: At page 245 of the Roberts Board, our number  
9 115, you said:

10 "They had not been taken up with the Navy so far as  
11 I know, sir."

12 Was that your answer?

13 Colonel Phillips: Not officially. It was merely a pub-  
14 lication of the Hawaiian Department.

15 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

16 "General McCoy: Did you furnish the Navy with a  
17 copy of this Alert No. 1?"

18 "Colonel Phillips: I cannot say about that, sir. I  
19 did not myself.

20 "General McCoy: Did the Navy have a corresponding  
21 plan, so far as you know?"

22 "Colonel Phillips: I do not, sir.

23 "The Chairman: To your knowledge were the naval  
24 commanders advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into  
25 operation?"

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Colonel Phillips: They were, sir.

3 "The Chairman: You think that what was communicated  
4 to the Navy by General Short would be known by General  
5 Short and his aide, rather than by you?

6 "Colonel Phillips: That is right.

7 "The Chairman: Nothing came to your knowledge with  
8 respect to the state of preparedness that the Navy was in  
9 in view of these warnings?

10 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir."

11 Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

12 Colonel Phillips: In regard to the state of preparedness  
13 of the Navy?

14 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

15 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. May I add there that the  
16 Navy, - you will find later that the Roberts Committee asked  
17 me to check on the Navy having received the standing operat-  
18 ing procedure.

19 Mr. Murphy: Yes, and the answer came back that there were  
20 ten, - yes, and nine of them were still in the safe, isn't  
21 that right?

22 Colonel Phillips: In the Navy safe.

23 Mr. Murphy: What is that?

24 Colonel Phillips: In the Navy safe.

25 Mr. Murphy: Yes, nine of them were in the Navy safe and



Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 only one of them out of the ten that you gave the Navy. That  
3 was the answer, wasn't it?

4 Colonel Phillips: I think it was.

5 Mr. Murphy: I believe it was.

6 "Admiral Stanley" -- you are speaking now about  
7 cooperative measures under the standing operating procedure:

8 "Admiral Stanley: But wouldn't the normal thing  
9 be to have this commanding general and the Commandant of  
10 the District discuss such a procedure as that?

11 "Colonel Phillips: That's right.

12 "Admiral Stanley: Prior to putting it into effect?

13 "Colonel Phillips: Prior to its adoption, yes, sir.

14 "Admiral Stanley: Do you know whether General Short  
15 had such a discussion or not?

16 "Colonel Phillips: I do not."

17 Was that a correct answer in 1942?

18 Colonel Phillips: I cannot recall just now, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to go with you to the  
20 Army Pearl Harbor Board which commences at page 1107 Pearl  
21 Harbor Board, our number 2108. General Grunert asked you:

22 "The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Commanding  
23 General is that of 'right-hand bower', his advisor,  
24 his confidential assistant?

25 "Colonel Phillips: That is right."

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 That is a true description of his duties, is it not?

2  
3 Colonel Phillips: That is fairly descriptive, sir. There  
4 is much more to it than that.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, on page 116, our number 2112, General  
6 Grunert said the same day:

7 "The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert  
8 was made as a result of the conference on the two messages  
9 that I have read?

10 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

11 In other words, you had the message of the 27th from  
12 General Marshall and one from Adams, did you not? Is that the  
13 other message?

14 Colonel Phillips: That is not correct. No, we did not  
15 have any on the sabotage, we did not have any of the sabotage  
16 messages at that time. We had the message from General Mar-  
17 shall.

18 Mr. Murphy: Have you not testified on three or four oc-  
19 casions that you did?

20 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: All right.

22 Colonel Phillips: I think I have testified there and  
23 that was incorrect.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, you remember my referring to it in  
25 the Roberts Board. I will come to it in the Navy Board.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Now, let me read the exact question, 49.

3 "General Grunert: The same day? But the decision on  
4 the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference  
5 on the two messages that I have read?

6 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

7 "General Grunert: What can you tell us about the  
8 state of mind of the Army and Navy, particularly the higher  
9 commanders and staff, as to the probability or possibility  
10 or imminence of war?

11 "Colonel Phillips: In my opinion, General, we were  
12 all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibil-  
13 ity, the Navy as well as the Army. I do not speak for  
14 the Navy.

15 "General Grunert: Did you expect an attack on Hawaii?

16 "Colonel Phillips: Did I?

17 "General Grunert: Yes. You had better tell me what  
18 you expected, and not talk for the rest.

19 "Colonel Phillips: I was fully aware of the possibil-  
20 ity of such a thing. It struck me as possible.

21 "General Grunert: But still you concurred with the  
22 decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the  
23 alert against sabotage was the proper one?

24 "Colonel Phillips: That was his decision, sir."

25 Was that a proper answer in January of 1942?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Colonel Phillips: That is correct. That was the commanding General's decision.

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Colonel Phillips: Of course, that is a proper decision and that is why the alert went in.

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1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: "General Grunert: But still you concurred  
3 with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts,  
4 that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?"

5 "Colonel Phillips: That was his decision, sir."

6 Colonel Phillips: I testified here that I concurred  
7 fully.

8 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, then, you were questioned  
9 at page 1121, our page 2114, as to your training, at Leavenworth  
10 and as to the proper way to make an estimate of the situation.  
11 Do you recall that?

12 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: When you make an estimate of the situation  
14 you prepare for the worst, don't you?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

16 Mr. Murphy: You felt that war was a possibility in  
17 Hawaii, but you only prepared for sabotage, is that right?

18 Colonel Phillips: I said war was a possibility, yes,  
19 sir; that the worst was a landing.

20 Mr. Murphy: The worst was what?

21 Colonel Phillips: The worst was a landing and seizure  
22 of the installations by the Japanese. We considered all  
23 the enemy possibilities in our estimate of the situation  
24 which I presented this morning.

25 Mr. Murphy: You considered the worst a landing, but

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 you prepared for the least, did you not?

3 Colonel Phillips: We were prepared for what the  
4 information we had and the other circumstances concerned  
5 forced us to decide.

6 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, at Leavenworth you  
7 were taught to prepare for the worst and bring that into  
8 your estimate, is that right?

9 Colonel Phillips: If the worst were probable. If it  
10 was possible, it was considered in the estimate.

11 Mr. Murphy: You mean at Leavenworth they told you  
12 only to prepare for what was probable?

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes, when you arrive at your decision  
14 you must discard the least probable.

15 Mr. Murphy: Well, in question 100, on page 1124, our  
16 number 2115, General Frank stated to you:

17 "You stated a minute ago that the normal procedure for  
18 a commander in meeting a military situation is to make an  
19 estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the  
20 enemy can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.

21 "Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

22 "General Frank: Do you feel that that was done in this  
23 case?

24 "Colonel Phillips: The worst thing that the enemy  
25 could do was certainly considered. That was the possibility

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
2 of an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. But that was the  
3 worst possible thing that could occur.

4 "General Frank: You haven't answered my question.

5 "Colonel Phillips: Excuse me, sir. I misunderstood.

6 "General Frank: Do you consider that steps were taken  
7 to meet the worst situation with which the Japs could con-  
8 front you?

9 "Colonel Phillips: I am thinking now in retrospect.  
10 I am going back from here. That is a very difficult question  
11 to answer, sir. At the time the General made a decision  
12 to put in the sabotage alert I thoroughly agreed with it.

13 "General Frank: You just will not answer that question,  
14 will you?

15 "Colonel Phillips: I can't answer it specifically, sir.

16 "General Frank: Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert  
17 No. 3 been in effect, the damage would have been a great as  
18 it was?

19 "Colonel Phillips: It is a matter of assumption. I  
20 don't know. I am not in position to say.

21 "General Frank: You were Chief of Staff, weren't you?

22 "Colonel Phillips: Exactly.

23 "General Frank: How long would it have taken the  
24 planes to have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3  
25 alert?

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Colonel Phillips: I can't say as to that. It wouldn't  
3 have taken as long as it did take, of course."

4 I want to know, as Chief of Staff, how long it would  
5 take planes to leave the ground and go into the air.

6 Colonel Phillips: I knew at the time but not after a  
7 year of combat.

8 Mr. Murphy: What is that?

9 Colonel Phillips: I knew at the time, yes, sir, but  
10 not at the time I was testifying here. I had just flown  
11 from Burma when I testified before that Board, with a very  
12 few hours intervening.

13 Mr. Murphy: All right. Question 135, Army Pearl  
14 Harbor Board page number 1128, and our number 2117:

15 "General Frank: Yes, but you did not follow all this  
16 Leavenworth teaching that you were talking about here a  
17 little while ago, did you?

18 "Colonel Phillips: That is correct, sir.

19 "General Frank: Now, did you consider a Jap attack of  
20 this nature possible?

21 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

22 "General Frank: Did you consider it probable?

23 "Colonel Phillips: Not probable.

24 "General Frank: Why was it not probable?

25 "Colonel Phillips: Due to the distance."



1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 You considered it possible but not immediately probable.

3 "General Frank: Did you so advise General Short?

4 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I did not. This is when  
5 I first went to Hawaii. I made my decision -- I made my  
6 estimate of the situation as a G-3 at that time in regard  
7 to the possibility of the attack, the probability.

8 "General Frank: Did you so advise General Short at  
9 that time?

10 "Colonel Phillips: I advised him that the attack was  
11 possible.

12 "General Frank: Well, did you advise him that it was  
13 not probable?

14 "Colonel Phillips: I did not."

15 Did you make that answer before the Army Board?

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: On Pearl Harbor Army Board page 1133, and  
18 our number 2119, question number 157:

19 "General Grunert: Was the command war conscious, or  
20 peace-minded, or both?

21 "Colonel Phillips: I think they were thoroughly war  
22 conscious, sir.

23 "General Grunert: But you evidently thought war was  
24 in the distant future sometime?

25 "Colonel Phillips: Some did, perhaps; I did not."

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Were you asked that question and did you make that  
3 answer?

4 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now the question was asked you at page 1139,  
6 our number 2121:

7 "General Frank: As a matter of fact, it would have been  
8 very easy to have carried on this anti-sabotage activity and,  
9 at the same time, have used the anti-aircraft and air force  
10 and air warning service on an active alert so as to have been  
11 prepared for this air attack, would it not?

12 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, I am sure that could be done."

13 Was that a correct answer?

14 Colonel Phillips: It could have been done but not comply  
15 with the provisions as stated in the Marshall message of  
16 the 27th, in not alarming the populace, not showing intent,  
17 and so forth.

18 Mr. Murphy: Did you say one single word anywhere in  
19 your testimony before you came to this room about what you  
20 are saying now?

21 Colonel Phillips: In my testimony?

22 Mr. Murphy: Anywhere, yes, before you came to this  
23 hearing and have been listening to these witnesses.

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, I said so when we first went  
25 over this message of the 27th.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: You did? Before what Board?

3 Colonel Phillips: Not before any Board.

4 Mr. Murphy: The first time you ever said that was  
5 here, wasn't it?

6 Colonel Phillips: I said it to General Short at the  
7 time of the consideration of the message of the 27th.

8 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever say it before the Roberts  
9 Board, the Army Board, or the Navy Board?

10 Colonel Phillips: I was not asked such thing before  
11 the Navy Board.

12 Mr. Murphy: You did say, at any rate, "Yes, I am sure  
13 that could be done" before the Army Board, did you not?

14 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

15 Mr. Murphy: And without qualification, isn't that right?

16 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

17 Mr. Murphy: On page 1148, our number 2125:

18 "General Grunert: If you were war-minded, where did  
19 you think an attack was going to come?

20 "Colonel Phillips: Well, our mission was to defend  
21 Oahu from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it  
22 came at all -- the possibility."

23 That is the only place you had to defend, wasn't it,  
24 Oahu?

25 Colonel Phillips: That is right; that was our mission.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: "General Frank: Then why in the world  
3 did you not prepare for an attack?

4 "Colonel Phillips: That was considered.

5 "General Frank: What did you think you had? You had  
6 some 8-inch guns, and you had some British 75's, and you  
7 had a lot of infantry around there?

8 "Colonel Phillips: Yes.

9 "General Frank: You had those 8-inch guns and the  
10 British 75's, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS  
11 system, and the bombers, and the fighter planes, and your  
12 anti-aircraft shore defense batteries -- and you think  
13 that was all put there against sabotage, do you?

14 "Colonel Phillips: No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.

15 "General Frank: You say you were war-minded?

16 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

17 "General Frank: And you had all these facilities to  
18 prepare for a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for  
19 a war situation, did you?

20 "Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

21 "General Frank: Did you?

22 "Colonel Phillips: Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.

23 "General Frank: That is not a war situation?

24 "Colonel Phillips: No.

25 "General Frank: It is a local sabotage?

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Colonel Phillips: That is right."

3 Were you asked those questions and did you make those  
4 answers to the Army Board?

(8)

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: On page 1151 of the Army Board, our number  
7 2126:

8 "Colonel Phillips: I told him of the possibility of  
9 an attack.

10 \*\*\*

11 "General Frank: Yes. Did you present him with an  
12 opinion so it was possible for him to agree with you?

13 "Colonel Phillips: I gave him no definite opinions.

14 "General Frank: Yet that was your duty as Chief of  
15 Staff, was it not?

16 "Colonel Phillips: Exactly; if he desired it."

17 Were you asked those questions and did you make those  
18 answers?

19 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

20 Mr. Murphy: On page 1155, our number 2127, speaking  
21 of the radar:

22 "Colonel Phillips: I am not sure about that. That  
23 is also in the record. It was operating under the Signal  
24 Officer, and with the air, under General Davidson. Now,  
25 who gave the instruction I do not know."

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Was that a correct state of affairs?

3 Colonel Phillips: Exactly. That was a matter of record,  
4 as to who issued that order. It could be found in the record.  
5 At that time I had nothing available, not even notes of any  
6 type. I did not know who issued the orders. It was under  
7 General Davidson and Colonel Powell. They were operating  
8 there on a training schedule, had been on the 28th, and we  
9 know the hours of operation of that.

10 Mr. Murphy: At page 1157, our number 2128:

11 "General Frank: Did you read the Air Estimate prepared  
12 by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

13 "Colonel Phillips: I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did.  
14 I can't say definitely."

15 And you were asked the question on page 1158, our number  
16 2129:

17 "General Frank: That estimate anticipated an air attack  
18 by the Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in  
19 which it happened, and since that was a part of the evidence  
20 in the files of the Hawaiian Department, it constituted a  
21 recommendation for the defensive action to be taken in a  
22 critical situation, did it not?

23 "Colonel Phillips: Yes; undoubtedly.

24 "General Frank: Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff,  
25 have been conscious of it?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Colonel Phillips: I undoubtedly should have known of  
3 it, but I must say again that I cannot recall ever having  
4 seen it.

5 "General Frank: And yet it was one of the outstanding  
6 plans, which, if carried out, would have prevented this  
7 catastrophe. And you don't remember it?

8 "Colonel Phillips: I don't think that I have seen it,  
9 sir."

10 Was that a correct answer before the Army Board?

11 Colonel Phillips: That was not correct. Today I have  
12 refreshed my memory and I recall that very clearly.

13 Mr. Murphy: In 1944 you so swore before the Army Board,  
14 did you not?

15 Colonel Phillips: Correct. Again I will say I had no  
16 opportunity to read the evidence in the Roberts Commission,  
17 or refresh my memory on anything that had occurred almost  
18 four years before.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now I would just like to refer briefly  
20 to your testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry, and you  
21 say before the Navy Court of Inquiry you had difficulty re-  
22 membering most things, did you not, because of your peculiar  
23 situation at that time?

24 Mr. Masten, do you have that page?

25 You were questioned at page 477 of the Navy Board. I

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Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

will just go over this briefly. Question 20, page 4710, our number, their number 479:

"And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

"A. I do not."

Do you know now?

Colonel Phillips: I know generally. I might say that I have never had access to that record. I have never seen that Navy Board record.

Mr. Murphy: I notice in reply to question 20 you say, "I do not".

In reply to question 24, "I do not recall".

In reply to question 25, "I do not".

In reply to question 26, "I do not".

In reply to question 28, "I cannot say definitely as to that".

In reply to question 31, "I cannot".

In reply to question number 40, "I have not".

In reply to question 45, "I cannot recall that".

In reply to question 50, "I do not".

In reply to question 49, "I cannot recall".

In reply to question 56, "I cannot".

In reply to question 57, "I don't remember".

Mr. Keefe: What does that mean?

(9)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: That is in the evidence. I did not want  
3 to go into this thing. You can go into it further.

4 Those answers were in reply to questions where you  
5 were asked if you recall --

6 Colonel Phillips: I would like to see the book. I  
7 don't know what they are. I have never seen that evidence  
8 at all.

9 Mr. Murphy: All right, I will go over it with you, sir.

10 "13. Q. Were there any problems related to the defense  
11 of Pearl Harbor, that you recall?

12 "A. No. I don't recall any."

13 That was the question on the discussion that you had  
14 with the Navy.

15 "20. Q. And naturally, then, you probably do not remember  
16 where these guns were placed?

17 "A. I do not.

18 "22. Q. Do you remember what the official Army name  
19 for this type of alert was, by number of anything else?

20 "A. It was alert No. 1, I believe, or No. 3; I am not  
21 sure. It was one or the other. The alerts were divided into  
22 three; one for sabotage, the second requiring more troops  
23 with the idea of increasing the defense for anti-aircraft,  
24 and the third was an all-out defense against a landing.

25 "23. Q. Under the condition of Alert No. 1, can you

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
2 recall whether that alert required any of your anti-aircraft  
3 guns to be manned?

4 "A. I cannot recall right now the details that were  
5 in the plan.

6 "24. Q. Do you know whether or not under the condition,  
7 Alert No. 1, that gun crews were required to be at their  
8 stations continuously?

9 "A. I do not recall.

10 "25. Q. Can you recall whether or not under the con-  
11 dition of Alert No. 1, ammunition had to be at the guns?

12 "A. I do not.

13 "26. Q. Since you have testified that you do not  
14 know the positions of the guns that were designated for the  
15 defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, and further you  
16 do not know where the men were quartered, you probably would  
17 not be able to give us any idea of how long it would take  
18 to man these guns in the event that a general alarm was  
19 given?

20 "A. I could not.

21 "27. Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of mobile  
22 guns that were available for anti-aircraft fire in the  
23 Hawaiian Department just prior to 7 December 1941?

24 "A. I knew at the time, but I have no idea now.

25 "28. Q. Do you know if there was any plan in effect

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 between 27 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, for coordinating  
3 the anti-aircraft fire of Army units and Navy units in the  
4 defense of Pearl Harbor?

5 "A. I cannot say definitely as to that.

6 "31. Q. Can you recall when the last meeting was held  
7 prior to 7 December 1941?

8 "A. I cannot."

9 Now, then, the question was asked:

10 "39. Q. Are you acquainted with criticism that has  
11 been made public through several sources of the lack of  
12 cooperation between the Army and Navy before the outbreak  
13 of the present war -- that is prior to 7 December 1941?

14 "A. I am, generally speaking.

15 "40. Q. Do you have any idea of the source of these  
16 rumors or statements?

17 "A. I have not.

18 "41. Q. But in your opinion they are what?

19 "A. Absurd."

20 Do you think it was right that you, as Chief of Staff,  
21 should know what the Navy was doing?

22 Colonel Phillips: I do not understand that question, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: Well, you did not know what the Navy was  
24 doing, did you? You were not at the conferences, were you?

25 Colonel Phillips: I was at some conferences -- all

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
2 conferences held at Fort Shafter I attended.

3 Mr. Murphy: Were you at any conference with anyone  
4 in the Navy staff before December 7?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, we had conferences before December 7,  
6 back before November 28.

7 Mr. Murphy: Between November 27 and December 7 were  
8 you at a single conference?

9 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I did not attend any  
10 conference at that time.

11 Mr. Murphy: Right. If you had it to do over again,  
12 would you?

13 Colonel Phillips: That is a matter that I would have  
14 to consider under the circumstances. I was carrying out the  
15 directives of General Short. I was General Short's Chief  
16 of Staff, and the way I functioned in my office as Chief  
17 of Staff was in conformity with his directions.

18 Mr. Murphy: Let me put it this way: Do you think  
19 the way you acted as Chief of Staff between November 27  
20 and December 7 was a model procedure?

21 Colonel Phillips: I did the best I could.

22 Mr. Murphy: You do not think you made a single mistake?

23 Colonel Phillips: I would not say it just like that.

24 Mr. Murphy: The Army and Navy were following pretty  
25 much a model procedure at Hawaii, is that it?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Colonel Phillips: That is my opinion.

3 Mr. Murphy: What is your opinion?

4 Colonel Phillips: We are human, after all, and certainly  
5 have made mistakes, have made wrong decisions, which I stated  
6 in my testimony here.

7 Mr. Murphy: You say the criticism is absurd. Now  
8 what did you mean by that?

9 Colonel Phillips: My answer to that question was it  
10 was criticism of failure to cooperate, I think. Isn't that  
11 correct? As I see it now, I heard the criticism about --  
12 if I may go back --

13 Mr. Murphy: The question was: "Are you acquainted  
14 with criticism that has been made public through several  
15 sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy  
16 before the outbreak of the present war -- that is, prior  
17 to 7 December 1941?"

18 Colonel Phillips: Exactly.

19 Mr. Murphy: Did you think it was right that the Navy  
20 did not tell you about the destruction of the codes?

21 Colonel Phillips: Of course I knew nothing at all about  
22 it then.

23 Mr. Murphy: I am asking you the question now, sir,  
24 do you think they should have told you?

25 Colonel Phillips: It would have been of great assistance

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 to us.

3 Mr. Murphy: Do you think they should have told you  
4 about the destruction of the codes at Hawaii on December 6,  
5 the destruction of the system?

6 Colonel Phillips: That also would have been of assistance.

7 Mr. Murphy: Do you think they should have told you  
8 whether or not they were having task forces out or in?

9 Colonel Phillips: All of that would have added to our  
10 knowledge.

11 Mr. Murphy: Do you think they should have told you  
12 whether they were having reconnaissance or not?

13 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

14 Mr. Murphy: Do you think they should have told you  
15 what kind of an alert they were on?

16 Colonel Phillips: All that information added up.

17 Mr. Murphy: Do you think they should have given  
18 information to your Intelligence Officers in sanitized form?

19 Colonel Phillips: I do not understand that.

20 Mr. Murphy: Well, that is the way they gave it, in  
21 sanitized form.

22 Colonel Phillips: I do not know what you mean by  
23 that, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Do you think it was right for your Air  
25 Corps Intelligence Officer to get material from the Navy,

(11)

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
2 Captain Layton, and not your General Fielder?

3 Colonel Phillips: It should have gone, of course,  
4 through normal channels right straight back.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, before the Naval Court of  
6 Inquiry, question 64, our number 4713 and the Navy number  
7 435. First, your answer to question 63:

8 "My personal estimate was that it was possible but not  
9 very probable."

10 That is talking about the attack on Hawaii.

11 "64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack  
12 that might be made by the Japanese?

13 "A. An air attack more probably than any."

14 That is what you told the Navy Court, isn't it?

15 Colonel Phillips: That is correct, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: "65. Q. Would you distinguish whether  
17 this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

18 "A. Generally, an air attack including everything  
19 concerned therein.

20 "66. Q. Did you receive any further information  
21 officially or in your conversations with your Commanding  
22 General after the information set out in Exhibit 19 that  
23 led you to believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was  
24 more imminent than it had been?

25 "A. We did not."

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 In other words, you told the Navy Court of Inquiry  
3 you thought an air attack was more probable than any other  
4 kind, did you not?

5 Colonel Phillips: More probable than a landing attack.

6 Mr. Murphy: You said, "more probable than any", did  
7 you not? Let me read your words.

8 Colonel Phillips: Yes.

9 Mr. Murphy: "63. Q. What I am trying to get at,  
10 Colonel, is this: Did you form any estimate of your own  
11 based on the information you had on, say, 28 November 1941,  
12 as to whether the Japanese would attack any objective in  
13 the Hawaiian area?

14 "A. My personal estimate was that it was possible but  
15 not very probable."

16 Colonel Phillips: That is right.

17 Mr. Murphy: "64. Q. Did your estimate include the  
18 form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

19 "A. An air attack more probably than any.

20 "65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack  
21 was bombing or torpedo, or both?

22 "A. Generally, an air attack including everything  
23 concerned therein."

24 Did you make that answer before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

25 Colonel Phillips: That is correct. More probable than



AL-21

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 a landing attack, is what I meant to say.

2  
3 Mr. Murphy: You said, "more probaby than any", without  
4 any qualifications, did not you?

5 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

6 Mr. Murphy: "80. Q. Then if it were functioning at  
7 that time, your answer is that you do not remember?

8 "A. I do not remember."

9 That was speaking of the air warning service.

10 "81. Q. Then you probably could not state what the  
11 set-up was in this Interceptor Command prior to 7 December 1941?

12 "A. I cannot.

13 "83. Q. You do not remember?

14 "A. I do not remember.

15 "85. Q. Do you know what the scheduled hours for  
16 this operation were?

17 "A. I cannot say. I do not remember.

18 "91. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Colonel, is  
19 this: Was the flight scheduled, and if it was, do you know  
20 the hour that the flight was due to arrive on the Island of  
21 Oahu?

22 "A. I do not."

23 That was speaking of the B-17's.

24 "92. Q. Can you remember, whether between October 1,  
25 1941, and December 7, 1941, any joint Army and Navy drills

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 were held involving long-range air reconnaissance?  
2

3 "A. I do not remember.

4 "93. Q. Can you recall whether or not there were any  
5 drills held between the same period involving Navy fighters  
6 and Army pursuit ships?  
7

8 "A. I do not remember.

9 "102. Q. Can you remember how long after you gave the  
10 directive for the general alert that it took to man the  
11 anti-aircraft guns for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl  
12 Harbor?  
13

14 "A. I do not remember.

15 "105. Q. About how long did it take them to get into  
16 the air?  
17

18 "A. I do not know.

19 "106. Q. Can you state approximately how many pursuit  
20 ships did get in the air at that time?  
21

22 "A. I cannot.

23 "107. Q. Do you know whether or not any bombers were  
24 able to take the air after the general alert you have  
25 described?  
26

27 "A. I do not."

28 I might say what I am saying as our numbers are galleyproof  
29 numbers, but I have given the question numbers also.

30 I have no other questions.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman.

3 The Chairman: Counsel.

4 Mr. Richardson: I have been advised that there is  
5 present in the room Sergeant Elliott, who, the record dis-  
6 closes, was one of the young men who had the radar first  
7 discover the approaching column of Japanese planes on the  
8 morning of the attack. Sergeant Elliott is just an observer  
9 here, and had no idea of being a witness, but I think the  
10 committee should hear his testimony, and I would like to ask  
11 the Chairman to invite him to be present at 9:30 in the  
12 morning when we reconvene.

13 The Chairman: Will you be present at 9:30?

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

15 The Chairman: We will be very glad to have you.

16 Thank you very much.

17 Mr. Gearhart. He is not here at the moment.

18 Senator Ferguson.

19 Senator Ferguson: Colonel, do you have personal knowledge  
20 as to how you were selected as Chief of Staff in the Hawaiian  
21 Islands?

22 Colonel Phillips: Other than to state what General  
23 Short has told me, and also from what General Marshall told  
24 me.

25 Senator Ferguson: What did General Marshall tell you as

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 to why you were selected?

3 Colonel Phillips: General Marshall told me, after I  
4 had arrived here and asked for an appointment with him, and  
5 he came down from New York, to discuss with him the proposition  
6 of going as Chief of Staff with General Short at Hawaii. I  
7 had known General Marshall for 20 years, having served with  
8 him in China, having been an instructor under him while he  
9 was Assistant Commandant at the infantry school. He made a  
10 number of efficiency reports on me and knew me quite well.

11 I asked him about the set-up. I was entirely satisfied  
12 in my position at that time as G-3 of the First Division,  
13 but General Marshall replied something in these words: He  
14 spoke very freely. He said, "General Short has asked me  
15 to approve you going to Hawaii as his Chief of Staff and,"  
16 he said, "I approve it and am convinced that you are  
17 thoroughly qualified. I want you to go out to Hawaii, and  
18 raise the training standards of the Hawaiian Garrison up  
19 to that of the First Division, as we now have it here in  
20 America."

21 When I first went to see General Marshall I felt that  
22 perhaps I was doing the wrong thing in accepting the offer  
23 to go to Hawaii, but on leaving his office I was convinced  
24 that I was doing the right thing. As a matter of fact,  
25 he practically directed me.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 I caught the regular Army transport going out about  
3 the middle of February, which was arriving in Hawaii on  
4 March 1st, about six weeks after General Short had arrived.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now do I understand then that the  
6 approval of the Chief of Staff is necessary in order that  
7 a Commander may select a Chief of Staff?

8 Colonel Phillips: That is correct. It was that way at  
9 that time. I was made Chief of Staff in the Hawaiian Depart-  
10 ment by War Department Orders, by an arrangement through  
11 General Short with the Chief of Staff, and I did not become  
12 Chief of Staff until the War Department issued those orders,  
13 which were effective on the departure of Colonel Hayes.

14 Senator Ferguson: You stated that General Short also  
15 made a statement as to why you were selected. Will you  
16 give us such statement?

17 Colonel Phillips: I am not sure what General Short's  
18 reasons were for my selection.

19 Senator Ferguson: I am asking for your personal  
20 knowledge.

21 Colonel Phillips: General Short was also a very old  
22 acquaintance. He had been my Commander here in the War  
23 Department in 1920-1921, and he stated that he wanted me  
24 to come out to be his Chief of Staff. That, normally, to  
25 an Army officer, is quite sufficient. A man is not selecting

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 someone for his Chief of Staff for whom he does not have  
3 respect and in whom he cannot trust and feel he is a loyal  
4 subordinate.

5 Senator Ferguson: How many hours after you received the  
6 message of the 27th did you put the sabotage alert on, or  
7 was the sabotage alert put into effect, if it was hours?

8 Colonel Phillips: It was, I should say, not an hour.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now could you sum up the reasons  
10 for putting the sabotage alert into effect?

11 Colonel Phillips: The reasons for putting the sabotage  
12 alert into effect were brought out in my estimate of the  
13 situation from notes which I read this morning.

14 Senator Ferguson: You feel then that your reasons have  
15 been stated and summed up?

16 Colonel Phillips: That is right. I haven't anything  
17 in addition.

18 Senator Ferguson: You have nothing in addition to that?

19 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now was Colonel Bicknell present  
21 when the alert was determined upon?

22 Colonel Phillips: Colonel Bicknell was not.

23 Senator Ferguson: How is that?

24 Colonel Phillips: He was not.

25 Senator Ferguson: He was not?

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Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know if he was notified about  
3 the kind of alert that was put into effect?

4 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. It was common knowledge.

5 Senator Ferguson: How?

6 Colonel Phillips: It was common knowledge throughout  
7 the entire staff in a very short time. We were, of course,  
8 limited by the directive in the message of the 27th and  
9 required to limit the dissemination of this information to  
10 the fewest possible officers. Colonel Bicknell, I am sure,  
11 learned of the alert on the 27th, or most certainly by early  
12 on the 28th.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now did you ever have any conversa-  
14 tions with Colonel Bicknell between that time and the time  
15 of the attack, as to the kind of an alert you were on?

16 Colonel Phillips: I never did. So far as I know,  
17 Colonel Bicknell made no recommendations as to anything of  
18 that kind.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversations with  
20 him at all, whether it was on the kind of an alert or not?

21 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you have any knowledge, as far  
23 as Bicknell or Mayfield are concerned, as to the burning  
24 of any code books or code papers?  
25

(14)

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I heard nothing about the  
3 burning of any codes. Colonel Bicknell brought up to the  
4 staff conference on the morning of the 6th the burning of  
5 papers by the local Japanese Consul. I was also told on --  
6 well, I am not sure when it was, perhaps that was later on  
7 the morning of the attack -- I wish to correct my statement  
8 about Bicknell's Mori message that he had taken up with  
9 General Short and Colonel Fielder. I did not hear about  
10 that until the next day, I believe. That was the night of  
11 the 6th. I made a statement that I had heard nothing from  
12 Bicknell. That is wrong to that extent.

13 Senator Ferguson: Of course you had no knowledge as  
14 to what the people in Washington were talking about, or  
15 thinking about, when they prepared, or at the time they were  
16 preparing the message that was sent on the 27th, signed by  
17 General Marshall.

18 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Have you ever seen Exhibit 45?

20 Colonel Phillips: I do not know that I have.

21 Senator Ferguson: I want to show you Exhibit 45, which  
22 is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: Far  
23 Eastern Situation, signed by L. T. Gerow.

24 (The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

25 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, I have never seen that before.



AL-29

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: So you had never learned later as to what may have been in the minds of the people here in Washington when that message was sent?

Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now you have been asked questions in relation to why General Short's reply to the message of General Marshall was not the same or similar to that of the Panama Command.

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that General Miles, on the 5th of December, after the message had been sent to Panama, sent a wire to the effect -- at least prepared it on the 5th -- to this effect and in these words:

"Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent."

Signed, "Miles".

Colonel Phillips: I have never heard of that message until this hearing.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that they were not satisfied with the reply of the Panama Command, would it not, and they were cautioning him that they would tell him if and when relations, that is severance of the diplomatic relations was imminent?

Colonel Phillips: That could be so interpreted, yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Phillips Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Did you get any word in any way as  
3 to the interpretation of the reply?

4 Colonel Phillips: We did not, except an interpretation  
5 that a message by General Adams on the 28th, which General  
6 Short felt was in reply to his message of the 27th, is a  
7 sabotage alert, and he felt that in sending that message the  
8 War Department had asked further details as to exactly what  
9 he was doing. The result was that his reply was very full,  
10 I think, extremely lengthy. That, with the exception of a  
11 similar message from General Arnold, was the last -- that  
12 is on the 28th -- was the last information we received in  
13 regard to the situation until after the attack, about 3:30  
14 on the 7th, when we got General Marshall's message.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON

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1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: How do you account, Colonel, for  
3 the fact that little attention was paid to the Intelligence  
4 Branch of the Army? Wasn't the Intelligence to tell you  
5 if a war was going to occur?

6 Colonel Phillips: Exactly.

7 Senator Ferguson: And when it was going to occur and  
8 where the attack would be and the strength of the attacking  
9 force?

10 Colonel Phillips: Certainly we must have that informa-  
11 tion of the enemy before you can arrive at any reasonable  
12 decision of issue any sensible order.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you feel that the Intelli-  
14 gence system was at all at fault in the fact that we were  
15 attacked, and didn't know that they were coming?

16 Colonel Phillips: Well, I have been astounded at the  
17 amount of intelligence I find that has been available  
18 since I have been listening at this hearing, and that we  
19 didn't get.

20 Senator Ferguson: Does that apply to what you had on  
21 the Island as well as what you had at Washington?

22 Colonel Phillips: No, sir, we thought that we were  
23 getting all that was applicable to the Army from the Navy  
24 on the Island. Locally -- we had no sources of intelligence,  
25 if I may go back a little bit -- we had no sources of

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2 2 intelligence other than the War Department and the Navy.

3 Locally our stuff was subversive and on spies, small, little  
4 stuff, that really didn't fit into the big picture.

5 Senator Ferguson: Is this what happened at Hawaii,  
6 that your intelligence branch had devoted itself to sabotage  
7 and had neglected the big question of whether or not a war  
8 was going to occur, when it was going to occur, where it  
9 was going to occur, and the strength of the enemy?

10 Colonel Phillips: I don't think they had any informa-  
11 tion to base those things on. We had no sources, just as  
12 I said, except the War Department and the Navy. We had no  
13 sources of our own. We were entirely dependent on those  
14 two sources for our information.

15 Senator Ferguson: You agree now, after hearing and  
16 reading the testimony that probably the Japanese knew more  
17 about what the Army and the Navy were doing than the high  
18 commanding officers did as far as Hawaii was concerned?

19 Colonel Phillips: Than the commanding officers knew  
20 about the Japanese, you mean?

21 Senator Ferguson: No, knew about their own.

22 Colonel Phillips: Well, that might be.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that they were going  
24 to shut off the radar at 7 o'clock in the morning, Sunday  
25 morning?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Colonel Phillips: Oh, yes, that was the end of the  
3 training day.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, that --

5 Colonel Phillips: Four to seven.

6 Senator Ferguson: That would be the exact time, Colonel,  
7 wouldn't it, if you were going to have an early morning raid  
8 they would come in on the sun?

9 Colonel Phillips: Well, I didn't know -- I will correct  
10 that -- I didn't know on Sunday morning of the 7th that  
11 that radar was being cut off particularly at that time and  
12 everybody was quitting. Our normal was from four to seven.

13 Senator Ferguson: Colonel, if you had an alert intelli-  
14 gence branch, why would you have had a normal day?

15 Colonel Phillips: The radar, of course, was in its  
16 pioneer stage. It was a new thing. We had very few who  
17 were capable of operating it.

18 Senator Ferguson: It was an instrument of Intelligence,  
19 was it not?

20 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

21 Senator Ferguson: It was an arm that would extend out  
22 at least 100-and-some miles to ascertain if there was any  
23 danger within this realm?

24 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, why was that neglected? Why

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 did you not have that alerted? That arm?

3 Colonel Phillips: General Powell is to be a witness  
4 here and he can give you more information on that. He is  
5 a better witness than I am.

6 Senator Ferguson: What I am getting at is that you were  
7 the Chief of Staff and, apparently, the Japanese Fleet knew  
8 more than you knew about that arm of intelligence, and  
9 I am wondering how, as Chief of Staff you didn't know that  
10 that arm of intelligence was not working that morning .

11 Colonel Phillips: Well, Senator, we were on a training  
12 schedule entirely during that period. We were operating each  
13 day from four to seven with our Opana station, our mobile  
14 station, and we had 5 others that were operating part of  
15 the time.

16 We had an information center that was also functioning  
17 in a training way. We had but two officers on the Island  
18 that knew anything about a filter center or an information  
19 center and the radar. That is, prior to the 3rd of December.

20 On the 3rd, General Davidson and General Powell returned  
21 from the States having observed an exercise, I believe in  
22 the Northwest. They were just in the process of taking  
23 over our whole radar set-up and reorganizing the thing to  
24 get it functioning as we really should.

25 Senator Ferguson: Colonel, on Sunday morning, at the

Witness Phillips

Questions By: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 break of day, war was coming over the horizon from the  
3 North?

c2

4 Colonel Phillips: Right.

5 Senator Ferguson: Here you were as Chief of Staff in  
6 a training state. Is it that you were not prepared for  
7 war?

8 Colonel Phillips: Our radar was not complete by any  
9 manner of means; It was just in the initial stage. We didn't  
10 have sufficient operators. We didn't have sufficient officers  
11 who knew the whole story on the radar by any manner of means.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do we come to the conclusion that  
13 you, as far as the Chief of Staff was concerned, were blind  
14 and deaf, as far as that is concerned, that war was coming  
15 that morning?

16 Colonel Phillips: We did not expect an attack on  
17 Hawaii.

18 Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

19 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

20 Mr. Keefe: Nobody expected an attack on Hawaii, did  
21 they?

22 Colonel Phillips: No, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: I haven't found anybody that expected an  
24 attack, everybody was surprised that the attack came on the  
25 morning of the 7th of December.

Witness Phillips

questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You were utterly surprised out there, weren't you?

Colonel Phillips: Entirely.

Mr. Keefe: So am I to conclude that in the face of all the war warnings that were sent and all the messages that were sent, and which you did have information about, Colonel that pointed to the fact that war was imminent, with Japan, as far as you people were concerned, liable to take place at any minute, you all felt that it was going to take place some place else, down in the Far East; is that right?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct; because every bit of information that we had pointed in that general direction, the Kra Peninsula, Borneo, The Philippines.

Mr. Keefe: Thus, you continued the program for which you were sent out there, as I understand it and that was this training program?

Colonel Phillips: Intensive training. A unit is no good unless it is trained. It is just like a weapon. You have to have ammunition. We were doing everything we could to get that training completed so that we would have an efficient weapon when we needed it.

Mr. Keefe: Now, was there ever any talk or discussion



Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 among the officers out there as to the possibility of an  
3 attack on Hawaii?

4 Colonel Phillips: Oh, yes, many, many discussions.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, they must have resulted in the feel-  
6 ing of security and that there wasn't any attack probable.

7 Colonel Phillips: Well, we felt that there was not  
8 a probability of an attack at all. It was a possible one,  
9 but not probable.

10 We certainly expected to get further information if  
11 there was anything of that kind coming along.

12 Mr. Keefe: There were newspapers published out there  
13 and which you read?

14 Colonel Phillips: Newspapers were published, of course,  
15 but oftentimes the newspaper reports are based on very little.  
16 But we had our intelligence people operating and we, of  
17 course, expected to get any and all information from the  
18 War Department or from the Navy.

19 Mr. Keefe: Did you read the newspapers that were  
20 published out there in Hawaii?

21 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: I have finished reading the file of those  
23 newspapers, and have been reading the files of the news-  
24 papers here in the United States. It is a most astonishing  
25 thing. This committee ought to have some of those files

h7

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h8

1 brought in and put into this record to show the current  
2 information that was being given day by day, as it appeared  
3 not only in the press in Hawaii, but appeared in the press  
4 here in the United States.  
5

6 Astounding information as to what the probabilities  
7 were.

8 Now, there must have been somebody out there that had  
9 some idea that Hawaii was liable to be attacked, when the  
10 newspapers carried screaming headlines. Did you see those?

11 Colonel Phillips: I do not recall just now. We  
12 read all of the papers, of course, available.

13 Mr. Keefe: In any event, you were attacked, and you  
14 were caught flatfooted, and you weren't ready for it; that  
15 is the truth, isn't it?

16 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir; made a mistake in our  
17 decision; our estimate of the situation was wrong.

18 Mr. Keefe: I have been wondering whether this old Army  
19 and Navy line of command business that you fellows adhere  
20 to so meticulously has anything to do with that matter.

21 Now, here you get this war warning message of the  
22 27th and General Short replies, tells them that he is  
23 alerted against sabotage and nobody at Washington here,  
24 apparently, paid any attention to his reply.

25 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

Witness Phillips

questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 Mr. Keefe: Then, that same afternoon you get a  
3 message from General Miles, Chief of G-2, cautioning  
4 about sabotage and espionage.

5 Then the next day he gets a wire from Adams, from  
6 the Chief of Staff, a long wire, telling him entirely about  
7 sabotage and espionage, and General Short makes a long  
8 reply and says what he has done as to sabotage and espionage.

9 Then that same day he gets a long wire from the Chief  
10 of the Air Corps, General Arnold, telling them to look  
11 out for sabotage of the airplanes, look out for espionage,  
12 and he replies again to that.

13 Still you fellows sat out there thinking that you were  
14 doing the right thing, and on the 7th, the Japs hit and  
15 everybody is surprised, including the people here in  
16 Washington.

17 All I have got to say, Mr. Chairman, is that you have  
18 put a pretty tough proposition up to this committee, so  
19 far as I am concerned.

20 That is all.

21 The Chairman: Colonel, I want to ask you one or two  
22 questions.

23 You said the Navy had a liaison officer, but you didn't  
24 say that the Army had one out there. Did you or not have  
25 one?

1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Chairman

h10

2 Colonel Phillips: In the Navy headquarters, the Navy  
3 had a liaison officer who had a desk in the G-3 office  
4 of Army Headquarters, Lieutenant Burr, and when I was G-3,  
5 I asked Admiral Bloch's headquarters that he be sent over  
6 and he was.

7 The Army had nobody that compared with Lieutenant Burr  
8 in the Navy headquarters.

9 The Chairman: So that the liaison was sort of a  
10 one-way street; it was carried on by the Navy?

11 Colonel Phillips: From the Army to the Navy.

12 The Chairman: You had nobody whom you sent over to  
13 the Navy headquarters to bring back information to you or  
14 to take information to the Navy?

15 Colonel Phillips: Burr worked in both capacities.

16 The Chairman: You got no information from the Navy  
17 except when he came over?

18 Colonel Phillips: When he arrived every morning he  
19 came directly from the Navy.

20 The Chairman: If you got any information that the Navy  
21 ought to have, you didn't send it over until Burr came along  
22 and picked it up?

23 Colonel Phillips: That was just a matter of a few  
24 minutes, perhaps 20 minutes.

25 The Chairman: How often did he make the rounds?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Chairman

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Colonel Phillips: Whenever he felt it necessary.

He made two trips a day, I should say, a trip in the morning and one in the afternoon, normally, whether there was anything or not.

The Chairman: If you got information that the Navy ought to have, he wouldn't know about that until he came over?

Colonel Phillips: We would send it. Major Fleming was the Navy liaison officer. We also had Colonel Dingman who was in the Harbor Control Boat working over at the Navy. He was there, and they were coming and going all the time. That is, from the Army to the Navy.

The Chairman: I believe you said that you saw the message of the 24th?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: In which it was stated that a sudden surprise attack might be made in any direction?

Colonel Phillips: That is right.

The Chairman: Including Guam and the Philippines?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: You interpreted that neither to exclude nor include Hawaii; is that true?

Colonel Phillips: The distance was considered in that by General Short, and we discussed that fully. They said

Witness Phillips                      Questions by: The Chairman

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"in any direction" but the distance from Japan to Hawaii was what ruled that out.

The Chairman: You decided that the distance was too great from Japan to Hawaii to enable them to make a surprise attack?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And thereby the Japanese surprised you, you didn't stop to consider that they could come that far from their home base?

Colonel Phillips: That is right. The Navy didn't think they could either. The Navy advised us to that effect.

The Chairman: But the Japanese thought they could and did?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Well, when you were receiving information about the sudden attack, the surprise attack in any direction, what did you think about that surprise with relation to Hawaii? Why did you think the Navy Department had sent these messages to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and the War Department had sent them to General Short?

Colonel Phillips: Well, merely to inform them of the situation; chiefly in the Philippines and Guam; and that war was perhaps imminent.

The Chairman: These were direct messages to Hawaii.

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Witness Phillips

questions by: The Chairman

h13 They were not just for information?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: When they said that, whether it was the Army or Navy, Chief of the Navy in this case, that a sudden surprise attack might take place in any direction, mentioning Guam and the Philippines, they merely emphasized the possibility of greater possibility or greater probability at Guam and the Philippines, but it did not eliminate Hawaii because "all directions" includes 360 degrees around, doesn't it?

Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Notwithstanding that, the War and Navy Departments here in Washington thought that it was important enough to give you this information, and when I say "you" I mean General Short and Admiral Kimmel and our set-up out there, you, in reaching your conclusions, and I am talking about all of you, decided that the War Department and the Navy Department here were wrong, because Hawaii was so far from Japan that they couldn't reach them?

Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

The Chairman: So that you concluded that the War and Navy Departments here were all wrong about even warning you about an attack at Hawaii?

Colonel Phillips: We didn't think they had warned us

1 Witness Phillips Questions by: The Chairman  
2 about an attack on the Hawaii Islands.

3 The Chairman: "Any direction" would include them,  
4 and merely to mention two other places wouldn't exclude  
5 them, would it?

6 Colonel Phillips: Well, not entirely, no sir, but  
7 "in any direction" including Guam and the Philippines, we  
8 immediately went right straight on down to Borneo and the  
9 Kra Peninsula and the China Coast.

10 The Chairman: Now, in the message that General Marshall  
11 sent to General Short in which he set out the diplomatic  
12 situation between Japan and the United States, and then he  
13 gave directions, he didn't make a request; he didn't say  
14 "Will you please do this," he directed General Short to  
15 institute reconnaissance -- you know the difference and  
16 General Short knew the difference between reconnaissance  
17 and sabotage?

18 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman: So that there wasn't any trouble  
20 about that. He didn't tell you -- he didn't send you a  
21 message about sabotage. He didn't direct you to institute  
22 an investigation about sabotage. His direct instructions  
23 were to institute reconnaissance; isn't that right?

24 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

25 The Chairman: He must have known that your frontier

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 war defense plan, whatever it is called, was not in effect,  
3 had not been invoked, because he was in touch with every  
4 situation, wasn't he?

5 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir. That would have been  
6 implemented; it could have been implemented.

7 The Chairman: If he knew that the plan under which  
8 it was the exclusive duty of the Navy to indulge in distant  
9 reconnaissance had not been invoked, why do you think he  
10 instructed General Short to institute reconnaissance?

11 Colonel Phillips: That was the great question in General  
12 Short's mind at that time, when he got that message to insti-  
13 tute reconnaissance, because the distant reconnaissance as  
14 General Short understood the Chief of Staff knew was the  
15 mission of the Navy.

16 The Chairman: But not at that time, because the plan  
17 under which it was the mission of the Navy hadn't been put  
18 into effect; isn't that correct?

19 Colonel Phillips: That is correct. It hadn't been  
20 implemented by Washington, but, of course, we had no means  
21 of making the distant reconnaissance unless the Navy took it  
22 over.

23 The Chairman: Therefore, the Army couldn't fall back  
24 on the alibi that the Navy wasn't doing it because it  
25 wouldn't be its job until this plan had been invoked?

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Chairman

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1  
2 Colonel Phillips: Had been implemented at that time,  
3 yes, sir.

4 The Chairman: Now, in replying to General Marshall  
5 did you and General Short collaborate in reply? Did you  
6 confer about what would be the answer?

7 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

8 The Chairman: You decided then that you would send  
9 this brief reply that you had alerted against sabotage  
10 and that you had liaison with the Navy?

11 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: By which you meant that the Navy had  
13 liaison with you?

14 Colonel Phillips: Well, it is a two-way road.

15 The Chairman: It may be but it was a one-way horse,  
16 apparently; it was not an entire chain of liaison officers,  
17 if you depended altogether on the Navy to do the liaison  
18 work. Did it occur to you or to General Short that if  
19 there was any misunderstanding about what General Marshall  
20 meant, that you could wire and ask what he meant to clear  
21 up any misunderstanding?

22 Colonel Phillips: The normal procedure is that after  
23 an order is issued by a superior headquarters and there is  
24 any question about it being carried out in the way the  
25 superior desires, there is a check made by the superior.

Witness Phillips

Questions by: The Chairman

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1 We thought and of course General Short -- I say,  
2 "we" which is General Short -- General Short thought that  
3 when he received the message from General Adams on the  
4 28th, first receiving General Miles message he knew that  
5 couldn't have come out before his reply got back to Washing-  
6 ton, but the Adams message could, and he assumed that that  
7 was a reply to his alert for sabotage.

8 The Chairman: General Short had replied to General  
9 Marshall before the Miles message, or the Adams message  
10 got to Hawaii?

11 Colonel Phillips: That is correct.

12 The Chairman: Did you or General Short think that a  
13 reply saying he was alerted for sabotage was in response to  
14 a direct instruction to institute reconnaissance?

15 Colonel Phillips: That was General Short's idea, sir.  
16 I concurred.

17 The Chairman: He thought then if I understand you,  
18 that an alert against sabotage was carrying out the order  
19 of General Marshall to institute reconnaissance?

20 Colonel Phillips: He thought that General Marshall  
21 understood, General Marshall knew that the Navy was respon-  
22 sible for reconnaissance.

23 The Chairman: He also knew that General Marshall would  
24 know that the Navy was not responsible for reconnaissance  
25 until this plan had been put into effect, and which had

1 Witness Phillips questions by: The Chairman  
2 not been put into effect?

3 Colonel Phillips: Yes, sir.

4 The Chairman: He concluded that General Marshall  
5 didn't know what he was talking about, did he?

6 Colonel Phillips: I can't say as to that, sir.

7 The Chairman: That is all.

8 Thank you.

9 (Witness excused)

10 Mr. Richardson: I will direct the reporter to note  
11 the Exhibit No. 153 on the Hawaiian Exhibit.

12 (The document was marked as  
13 Exhibit No. 153.)

14 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, we will call Mr. Sonnett.

15 The Chairman: Come around.

16 TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT

17 (Mr. Sonnett was duly sworn by the Chairman)

18 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Sonnett, will you state your full name  
19 for the record?

20 Mr. Sonnett: John F. Sonnett; S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

21 Mr. Kaufman: What is your official position at the  
22 present time?

23 Mr. Sonnett: I am Assistant Attorney General of the  
24 United States in charge of the Claims Division of the  
25 Department.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1  
2 Mr. Kaufman: And prior to your becoming Assistant  
3 Attorney General, were you in the Navy?

4 Mr. Sonnett: I was.

5 Mr. Kaufman: And what was your rank?

6 Mr. Sonnett: While I was on active duty, I was Lieut-  
7 enant Commander in the Naval Reserve.

8 Mr. Kaufman: And was there a time when you acted  
9 as counsel to Admiral Hewitt in connection with the so-  
10 called Hewitt investigation?

11 Mr. Sonnett: There was.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And when was that?

13 Mr. Sonnett: I acted as counsel for Admiral Hewitt  
14 in the spring of last year, running until about July.

15 Mr. Kaufman: And what were your functions in connec-  
16 tion with the investigation conducted by Admiral Hewitt.

17 Mr. Sonnett: My functions were to investigate all  
18 prior investigations conducted by the Navy to recommend  
19 to the Admiral those subjects requiring further investiga-  
20 tion, to interrogate witnesses and generally assemble  
21 documentary evidence in order that I might present to  
22 him such information as was deemed necessary to carry  
23 out the further investigation directed.

24 Mr. Kaufman: During the course of that inquiry did  
25 you have occasion to interview Captain Safford?

Witness sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 Mr. Sonnett: I did.

2 Mr. Kaufman: And when was that, Mr. Sonnett?

3 Mr. Sonnett: I am sorry, I am not able to fix the  
4 exact date. It was sometime in the spring of 1944.

5 Mr. Kaufman: Captain Safford, in his testimony  
6 here at page 9696:

7 "It was apparent to me on my very first meeting  
8 with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as a  
9 'counsel for the defense' for the late Secretary Knox  
10 and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to  
11 the investigating officer."

12 Have you any comment to make with respect to that?

13 Mr. Sonnett: Only that my instructions from the Secre-  
14 tary of the Navy were to get all of the facts, no matter  
15 where we could find them, without regard to any special  
16 interest that any particular individual might have.

17 Concerning Secretary Knox, I might say I never had  
18 the pleasure of meeting him, nor to the best of my recol-  
19 lection have I ever met Admiral Stark.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Captain Safford testified further on  
21 page 9697 of the record here:

22 "I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May, 1945,  
23 and the third time a day or two later. On these latter  
24 occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me  
25

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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that there had been no 'winds execute' message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the 'false winds message' with what I had been expecting and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair.

"In some cases the idea was stated outright. In some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view."

Now, will you tell the committee, Mr. Sonnett, as nearly as you can, the substance of your talks with Captain Safford, and directing your attention particularly to any attempt by you to persuade Captain Safford to change any testimony that he had previously given.

Mr. Sonnett: In the first place, there was no such attempt at any time with respect to Captain Safford, or any other witness.

My instructions were to get the facts and nothing but the facts.

That is what I endeavored to do.

Any statement that I tried to get Captain Safford to change his testimony or any other witness to change his testimony is not true.

My experience with Captain Safford during the first several times I met him was that he produced at my request

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 a memorandum in which he discussed the so-called winds  
2 message.

3  
4 In that memorandum, in words or substance, at one  
5 point he said, "They have been accusing me of having  
6 hallucinations."

7 He implied that people, without identifying them,  
8 had regarded him as being of unsound mind.

9 I called him down after reading that memorandum--

10 Mr. Kaufman: When you say you called him down, you  
11 mean you called him to talk with him?

12 Mr. Sonnett: I called him on the telephone and asked  
13 him to come down so we could discuss it.

14 We discussed the memorandum. I held it for several  
15 days and discussed it with my assistant at the time, and  
16 then in a conversation with him subsequently, I said, "Captain  
17 Safford, I think for your own good, as a matter of your  
18 own personal welfare and just as a personal and friendly  
19 suggestion, I think you should withdraw this memorandum in  
20 which you state, in a formal Navy record that people have  
21 been casting doubts on your sanity."

22 I told him that so far as I knew no one had ever cast  
23 any doubt on his sanity, that he was entitled to his  
24 opinion as to what the facts were, that all we wanted was  
25 his best recollection of the facts.



Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 I told him that it didn't make any difference whether  
3 his recollection differed from someone else's, that what  
4 we wanted were facts and just facts.

5 I said, however, that his denial of the charge, in  
6 substance, is a denial of a charge that he was crazy. In  
7 a formal Naval document it seemed to me to put him in a  
8 very difficult position. I told him that I would forward  
9 his memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, if he wanted me to, but  
10 that as a personal matter, I didn't think it was good for  
11 him.

12 I told him that he would have the opportunity to testify  
13 fully concerning his recollection of the winds message.

14 Captain Safford withdrew the memorandum in question. He  
15 subsequently had the opportunity to testify fully concerning  
16 the winds message.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt  
18 regarding his version of the so-called winds message?

19 Mr. Sonnett: He did, Mr. Kaufman.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Now, Mr. Sonnett, I show you Exhibit 153  
21 produced by Captain Safford, and ask you to pick out that  
22 portion of the memorandum that he gave you in which he refers  
23 to people charging him with having hallucinations.

24 Mr. Sonnett: In the memorandum dated May 14, 1945,  
25 for me by Captain Safford, which is a part of this exhibit --

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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1 Mr. Kaufman: Part of Exhibit 151.

2  
3 Mr. Sonnett: At paragraph 9, Captain Safford stated  
4 and it was this paragraph that led me to suggest after my  
5 talk with him, that in his own best interest he should with-  
6 draw the memorandum:

7 "There is one final place where written confirmation  
8 of the Winds 'execute' message may exist -- the record of  
9 proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe  
10 that they could cover up so completely that some mention  
11 of the winds 'execute' did not slip into the record.

12 "First they said I didn't know what was going on around  
13 me: Now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations.  
14 Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted  
15 to search through the record for such evidence in order to  
16 prove my sanity as well as my intelligence and my veracity."

17 It seemed to me that the least duty I owed to a  
18 fellow Naval officer who was denying an accusation of that  
19 type in a memorandum, which accusation I had never heard  
20 from anybody in the Navy was to give him an opportunity to  
21 withdraw it.

22 I did give him that opportunity and he did withdraw  
23 it.

24 Mr. Kaufman: And you never saw it, he took that  
25 memorandum with him?

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Sonnett: He did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: He produced that memorandum here and it has been offered in evidence as part of Exhibit 115.

You just testified, Mr. Sonnett, that you were assisted in that proceeding?

Mr. Sonnett: I was.

Mr. Kaufman: Who was your assistant?

Mr. Sonnett: Lieutenant Commander John Ford Baecher, who has been the Naval liaison with this committee.

Mr. Kaufman: Was he present at all of the meetings that you had with Captain Safford?

Mr. Sonnett: He was, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did you at any time in words or in substance, request Captain Safford to change his testimony?

Mr. Sonnett: I did not.

Mr. Kaufman: Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. Sonnett: He did.

Mr. Kaufman: I have no further questions.

The Chairman: I have none. Mr. Cooper?

The Vice Chairman: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Clark?

Mr. Clark: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

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AL-1

1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Sonnett, Captain Safford before us,  
3 quoting Admiral Hart, said something to the effect that he  
4 misled him; second, he said he was not permitted to testify  
5 before the Roberts Board; third, he said he condemned, by  
6 gossip, General Marshall; fourth, he said there was a frameup  
7 in the Chief of Naval Operations Office in 1941; fifth, he  
8 said the Chief of Naval Operations could not be trusted in  
9 1944; sixth, he said there was some evidence of a conspiracy  
10 in the Army and Navy; seven, he talked of the destruction  
11 of records; eight, he gave some evidence of violation of  
12 security regulations; nine, he talked about falsification  
13 of records; ten, he talked about, apparently with some  
14 sinister implications, destruction of intercepting records  
15 at radio stations; eleven, he changed his own statement as  
16 to Pearl Harbor; twelve, he changed somewhat his statement  
17 as to the ability to receive messages in England; thirteen,  
18 he changed his testimony in some other particulars; and  
19 fourteenth, he charged you with subornation of perjury.

20 You say you did no such thing?

21 Mr. Sonnett: I cannot emphasize too much that Captain  
22 Safford had every opportunity to tell his story to Admiral  
23 Hewitt and to myself.

24 Mr. Murphy: Have you received some citations for your  
25 service in the Navy?

1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Sonnett: I have, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: What were they?

4 Mr. Sonnett: I received a citation from Secretary  
5 Forrestal for outstanding service as his special assistant.  
6 I also received a commendation from Admiral Hewitt at the  
7 completion of the Pearl Harbor investigation.

8 Mr. Kaufman: I have a copy of them, Mr. Congressman.

9 Mr. Murphy: You are a member of the Bar of what State?

10 Mr. Sonnett: Member of the Bar of the State of New  
11 York, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: And have been practicing for how long?

13 Mr. Sonnett: Approximately 10 years.

14 Mr. Murphy: Are you admitted to the Bar of the United  
15 States Supreme Court?

16 Mr. Sonnett: I am not, sir, but I have appeared in  
17 the various Federal Courts except that Court.

18 Mr. Murphy: And have been rendering service for the  
19 Attorney General of the United States since you left the  
20 service of the United States Navy?

21 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct.

22 Mr. Murphy: I have no further questions.

23 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

24 Senator Ferguson: It is apparent that I can't finish  
25 this evening.

1 Witness Sonnett

2 The Chairman: We will recess then until 9:30 o'clock  
3 tomorrow morning.

4 (Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock p.m., the committee  
5 recessed until 9:30 o'clock a.m. of the following day,  
6 Wednesday, February 20, 1946.)

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