

Doc. 2498 Evid

Folder 10

(175)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2498

25 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Record of Interrogations of Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro

Date: Jan-~~1946~~ 46 Original  Copy  Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHIMADA, Shigetaro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Attack on Pearl Harbor; Violation Hague 3; Japanese-USA Relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

SHIMADA interrogated on formulation of plans and responsibility for attack and Pearl Harbor, decision to declare war, and intended time of delivery.

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

Doc. No. 2498

2498

Sherrada  
16-30 Jan

36-8

The original transcript of this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 212. The original shorthand notes of Miss Evelyn Cordell on this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 213.

FILE NO. 36

SERIAL NO. 8

INTERROGATION OF  
ADMIRAL SHIMADA, SHIGETARO

Date and Time: 16 January 1946, 1430-1645 P. M.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro  
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator  
T/S Rickey Yamaguchi, Interpreter  
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, Administered by Mr. Darsey:

MR. DARSEY: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

MR. YAMAGUCHI: I do.

Questions by : Mr. Darsey.

Q. What is your full name:

A. Shimada, Shigetaro

Q. Where were you born and how old are you?

A. I was born in Tokyo in 1883. I am 63 years old.

Q. Did your father or any other members of your family have Navy careers or any other public service careers?

A. No.

Q. Will you relate in chronological order from beginning to end the history of your public service, naming the offices which you have held and the tenure of each?

A. I entered the Naval Academy in 1901, and graduated as a Midshipman in 1904; participated in the Russo-Japanese war; became Ensign in October 1904; entered Naval War College in 1913 as Lieutenant, First Grade; graduated in 1915 as Lieutenant-Commander; went to Italy as

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 2 -

Assistant Naval Attache in February 1916; in December 1917 became Naval Attache; was there until end of war; became Chief of Staff of training squadron and toured Europe with them in 1919 and came back to Japan in 1920, becoming a staff officer of the Naval Staff upon return. In 1921 I became Commander; was Commander of the ship "Huga" in 1922-23. During the year 1923 I became an instructor of the Naval War College; became Captain at the end of 1924. In 1926 became Commander of the Seventh Submarine Unit; was Captain of the cruiser "Tama", August 1928; in December of the same year became Commander of the battle cruiser "Hiei". In December 1929 I became Rear Admiral and on the same day became Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet. In December 1930 I became Chief of Staff of the Combined First and Second Fleet; was appointed Chief of the Submarine School in December 1931; became Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet in February 1933; became Chief of the Naval Information Bureau of the Naval General Staff in June 1932; became Chief of Operations Bureau in November of the same year; served in this capacity until 1935; was attached to the Naval General Staff as an attached officer in February and became Vice-Chief of Staff in December 1935; served in that capacity until December 1937; became Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet in December; became Commander-in-Chief of the Kure Naval Station in December 1938; became Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet in May 1939; came back to Japan in September 1941, and became the Commander-in-Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station; became Navy Minister in October (18) 1941; also became Chief of the General Staff in February 1944.

Q. Were you serving in a dual capacity during this period?

A. Yes, as Navy Minister and Chief of the General Staff. I resigned in June as Navy Minister and as Chief of Staff in August of 1944; became member of the Supreme Council in August of the same year, and left this position to retire in January 1945.

Q. Was your retirement voluntary?

A. No, at the request of the Navy.

Q. When were you apprehended?

A. September 12, 1945.

Q. What was the nature of your activities between the time of your retirement and the date of your apprehension?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 3 -

A. I didn't do anything; just stayed at home.

Q. You became Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet on October 18, 1941, you say?

A. Yes.

Q. Serving in that capacity you had occasion to know personally Ambassador Grew, I presume?

A. I met Mr. Grew at a dinner at the Embassy.

Q. You had many occasions to be associated with him, did you not?

A. No, I was just introduced to him, and although there may have been small talk, there was nothing of any serious nature.

Q. Serving in your official capacity from the time you met the Ambassador you had a number of occasions to be associated with him subsequently, did you not?

A. I had no interviews or any meeting with Mr. Grew upon being the Minister. I had occasion to see him while I was serving as Chief of Staff.

Q. Do you recall the funeral services for Princess Kava on December 3, 1941?

A. I don't recall a name like that.

Q. Do you recall attending any funeral services on December 3, 1941?

A. I don't remember any, I don't remember.

Q. You do not recall attending any funeral services with Premier Tojo on December 3, 1941?

A. I don't remember going to any funeral, and I also doubt if that name is correct. There must be some mistake.

Q. Just forget that I mentioned the name of Princess Kava, and answer whether or not you attended any funeral services for anyone in company with Premier Tojo on December 3, 1941.

(Shimada, cont'd)

A. I don't remember.

Q. You do not recall any funeral services which you attended on that date which were also attended by Premier Tojo and Ambassador Grew?

A. I have no recollection whatsoever of that.

Q. You do not recall extending personal and cordial greetings to Ambassador Grew on that occasion?

A. I have no recollection of it.

Q. These were important days in the Japanese Cabinet, were they not?

A. That is right.

Q. They were so important that you recall most of your official conduct during those days, don't you?

A. I have a general idea of those days, but don't remember the details.

Q. What was the date that the orders were issued dispatching the task force for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. The Navy Minister has no connection and doesn't know anything about it.

Q. MR. DANBY: Mr. Interpreter, will you please have the witness understand that I would much prefer him to state that he would rather not answer questions than for him to make obviously evasive answers.

A. I have no intention whatsoever to hide anything, because I feel there is no necessity for it.

Q. Do you mean to have us understand that you, as Navy Minister, had no knowledge that orders had been issued dispatching a task force for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, I didn't know anything about it. I knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor for quite a while, but just when orders were issued I don't know.

Q. Do you mean by that answer to say that you knew the Japanese Government had decided to launch an attack on Pearl Harbor a number of days in advance of the day of the attack?



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 5 -

- A. I knew about the fact that unless negotiations with America went through there would be an attack. I also knew about the fact that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent.
- Q. You know enough about the government service, from your public career, to know that the Japanese Navy would not order an attack on Pearl Harbor or any other place unless its government had authorized it to do so, don't you?
- A. The Navy does not need the approval of the government itself for an attack, because the Naval General Staff and the government is on the same level working for the Emperor, and in any case of any authorization both parties must come together for agreement, which is presented to the Emperor.
- Q. You do not mean to have us understand that should the Navy, the Operations Branch of the Navy, issue an order for an attack on Pearl Harbor or any other place that you, as Minister of the Navy, would not have knowledge of the issuance of such an order, do you?
- A. I knew that they were going to attack but just when I didn't know.
- Q. Do you mean by that that you knew, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, that an order for the attack on Pearl Harbor had been issued?
- A. Yes, I knew about the order.
- Q. You also know from your experience in the Operations Branch of the Navy that as a practical matter an attack on Pearl Harbor or any other place could not be made on the date that the order was issued, do you not?
- A. No, I think it is not practical.
- Q. In the case of the Pearl Harbor attack you know, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, that the order authorizing the attack was issued several days in advance of the actual attack, do you not?
- A. Yes, I know about that.
- Q. Do you know the exact date of the issuance of that order by the Operations Branch of the Navy?
- A. I have a general idea but I don't know exactly when the order came out to attack Pearl Harbor. It must have been close to Dec. 2, 3, or 4th.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 6 -

- Q. Did that order for the attack on Pearl Harbor have your support as Minister of the Navy?
- A. I was in favor of it.
- Q. Did you participate in Cabinet discussions or in any conferences at which the subject of the date upon which the Government of the United States should be apprised of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. When was it determined by the Japanese Government that the United States Government should be advised of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor?
- A. Although the severance between Japan and America was to be made clear they had no intention of letting America know of any assault on Pearl Harbor.
- Q. Do you mean by that that the Japanese Government did not propose to indicate to the United States Government that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with it and declaring war upon it in advance of its attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. Japan's intention was to cut off diplomatic relations before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
- Q. Do you mean by that to say that you planned to notify the United States Government of the proposed attack on Pearl Harbor in advance of its actual execution?
- A. We had no intention to indicate the place of attack.
- Q. That doesn't answer my question. You have previously stated that you, as Minister of the Navy, knew that the order to attack Pearl Harbor was issued sometime around December 2, 3, or 4th. Now, what I am asking you is between any one of these dates and the actual date of the attack, did the Japanese Government plan to declare war on the United States and break off diplomatic relations in advance of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. Japan's intention was to cut off diplomatic relations and to send in a declaration of war on the United States before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 7 -

- Q. Don't you know that it was the plan of your government to break off diplomatic relations with the United States Government and to declare war upon it not any earlier than simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. Japan had no intention of attacking Pearl Harbor simultaneously with the cutting off of negotiations and she wanted to send the declaration of war before hand, but as you can see now due to circumstances this plan was not carried out accordingly.
- Q. What do you mean by "due to circumstances this plan was not carried out accordingly"?
- A. The Foreign Ministry sent out a message in code to Ambassador Nomura in Washington, but due to some entanglement of code and translation the actual message was delivered later than expected.
- Q. Are you familiar with the fact that the United States Government intercepted a number of the diplomatic communications between the Japanese Government and its Ambassador in Washington?
- A. No, I am not.
- Q. Are you familiar with the fact that the communication from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in Washington in which the Japanese Government stated as a condition precedent to the Ambassador that he should not deliver to the United States Government the message from the Japanese Government breaking off diplomatic relations and declaring war until after the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually under way?
- A. There was absolutely nothing like that in the code.
- Q. Did you actually see this code message?
- A. No, I haven't seen it.
- Q. Then how do you know that this condition precedent was not contained in it?
- A. I saw the original in Japanese, but not in code.
- Q. Who prepared the original?
- A. The Foreign Ministry.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 8 -

- Q. Did the message become the subject matter of Cabinet discussions before it was forwarded?
- A. I don't remember clearly, but I don't think it was discussed in the Cabinet. The figure-heads in the Cabinet, those persons like myself, or representatives from the Army and Navy may have discussed the matter.
- Q. Was Premier Tojo familiar with this message?
- A. I don't know whether Tojo had seen the original copy or not.
- Q. Do you mean to have us understand that anything so important as an attack on the United States, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with it, and the declaration of war upon it, did not become the subject matter of serious discussion with every member of the Cabinet and with the Emperor?
- A. Prior to the making up of the message it had been discussed in the Cabinet, but after the message was made up I don't remember whether it was discussed further or not in the Cabinet.
- Q. Didn't they also discuss the subject with the Emperor?
- A. I don't know, because that is the work of the Foreign Ministry.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the United States were the subject matters of most serious Cabinet discussions for a number of days immediately preceding the attack?
- A. I think that although there were discussions on the severance of relations with the United States, that there were no discussions as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, because it was supposed to be a secret move.

(The interrogation was adjourned at 1645 P. M.)

(Shimada, cont'd) 17 January 1946, 1430-1630 P. M.

- 9 -

- Q. Do you know about the Imperial conferences with respect to the war crisis which were held in July and September, 1941?
- A. No, at that time I was in China as Commander-in-Chief, and I returned to Japan the middle of September.
- Q. And you didn't attend any Imperial conferences after you returned from China?
- A. I attended a conference about the first of December.
- Q. Who was in attendance upon that conference?
- A. The persons present at the meeting were Premier Tojo, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, a person by the name of Hara, the Chief of the Privy Council, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Military General Staff, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, myself, and the entire Cabinet; there were also others but I don't know who they were.
- Q. What did you say was the date of that conference?
- A. I remember it was the first, but maybe it was the second.
- Q. What was the subject matter of discussion in that conference?
- A. The main subject of discussion was the negotiation between the United States and Japan; they thought in case the negotiation did not go through a battle might be inevitable.
- Q. Did you not learn on that occasion that there had been previous Imperial conferences in July and September of that year concerning the same subject matter?
- A. I remember they had conferences in regard to the negotiation with Japan and America in September, and also I remember that on October 18 when the Tojo Cabinet came into being the Emperor issued an order to Tojo that he would like to cancel all previous discussions on the possibility that there might be a war with America and start again on a clean slate. He had wanted them to study some means to avoid war.
- Q. How did you learn that the Emperor had issued such an order as that?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 10 -

- A. When Tojo received the message from the Emperor he sent it down to all the different branches, and immediately upon receiving this order they opened a new meeting, and through this very order Envoy Kurusu was sent to America.
- Q. You say that pursuant to this order Tojo opened a new meeting. Do you mean by that this was the Imperial conference you attended on December the first or second?
- A. This meeting that was opened after the Imperial order was not the meeting I attended in December, but this meeting was opened as soon as the order was given, and was kept on right through October and November, and the meeting I attended in December was the final meeting.
- Q. What was the ultimate result and conclusion reached in the new meeting which you say was opened upon the issuance of the order by the Emperor to Tojo?
- A. The final decision made was discussed in December and they thought war with the United States was inevitable.
- Q. Do you mean by that that at the meeting which you attended in December, on the first or second, that the conclusion that war with the United States was inevitable was reached?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you came into the Tojo Cabinet on October 18, 1941, and when you learned of the Emperor's order that the results and policies of all previous Imperial conferences be cancelled and the slate wiped clean, did you not know at that time that the Japanese Government had previously reached a decision in the summer of 1941 that war with the United States was inevitable?
- A. No.
- Q. Well now, what did you understand there was on the slate as a result of previous Imperial conferences which the Emperor was desirous of wiping clean by virtue of his Imperial order to Tojo on October 18, 1941?
- A. The Emperor had always in mind that there should be no war with the United States, and because there was a tendency or feeling among the Cabinet that war might be inevitable with the United States he wanted to start anew and to erase that feeling.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- Q. Then when you came into the Tojo Cabinet on October 18, 1941, you well knew that the previous cabinet had been proceeding on the basis that war with the United States was inevitable, did you not?
- A. When the Tojo Cabinet came into being I knew that the previous cabinet thought that war with the United States may be the outcome.
- Q. Didn't you know that the previous cabinet had been proceeding on the basis that war with the United States was most likely?
- A. I don't want to say what the previous cabinet felt, because I was in China before that and was not present, but I do know that the cabinet was dissolved because they felt there might be a war with the United States and did not wish to be involved or responsible.
- Q. In other words, do you mean to say for several months prior to the time that the Tojo Cabinet came into being that the current toward war with the United States had been running so strongly that the Cabinet felt it wanted to get out of the picture rather than to have any further responsibility for the government's war policy?
- A. The dissolving of the Cabinet was not due to the question of whether the responsibility would lie on the Cabinet or on someone else's shoulders, but rather it was because of the disagreement between the Cabinet and Tojo himself on political matters.
- Q. Aside from the Cabinets which were involved, didn't you learn when you became Minister of the Navy that the current toward war with the United States has been running very strongly for the immediate preceding months?
- A. In regards to the preceding months before the forming of Tojo's Cabinet I had no direct knowledge of the Konoye Cabinet since I returned to Japan in mid-September, and whatever opinions I am giving now are mostly based on newspaper articles which I have read recently.
- Q. Didn't you know that even while you were in China, and certainly after you came back to Japan in September that operational plans on the part of the Navy and the Army predicated upon a war policy with the United States had been made and executed throughout the summer of 1941?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 12 -

- A. I know that they had operational plans in regards to the possibility of war with the United States inasmuch as they must have some preparation for their own defenses in case any war should break out.
- Q. Do you consider that the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor which were ultimately executed could by any stretch of the imagination or by any standard be concluded to constitute defense plans?
- A. Certainly.
- Q. Did you consider, or did anybody in the Japanese Government consider, in the summer of 1941 that the United States Government was going to wage an aggressive war against Japan?
- A. They didn't know whether the United States would attack Japan or not, but seeing from the preparations taken by the United States in regards to the defense works they felt that they themselves should follow suit and make their own defensive preparations.
- Q. When you came back from China to Japan in September 1941 and became Commander-in-Chief did you not learn that specific plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made for some time?
- A. I didn't know.
- Q. Were those plans made under your supervision and during your capacity as Commander-in-Chief after September 1941?
- A. As far as operations were concerned I had no direct connection, as the plan is made up by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
- Q. When did you first learn of the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. I don't know exactly what date the decision was made for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but I heard that Admiral Yamamoto used to stress that in attacking the United States, the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be attacked.
- Q. From your experience as a career man in the Operations Branch of the Navy don't you know that an attack such as that which was made on Pearl Harbor would be considered to be one of the gravest assignments ever undertaken by any country's Navy?
- A. I do think it was a very grave assignment, and that Admiral Yamamoto thought that it was a very difficult task but that this plan should be carried out in order to gain victory.



(Shimada, cont'd)

-13-

- Q. Such a plan would require considerable long-range planning and meticulous coordination on the part of each branch of the Navy, would it not?
- A. Yes, it takes coordination of all the branches of the Navy. However, this plan was originally planned by Admiral Yamamoto and later presented to the Naval General Staff.
- Q. If you had remained in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief you would likely have actively participated in the execution of some feature of phase of this plan, would you have not?
- A. I was Commander-in-Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station, but I had no direct connection with the combined fleet.
- Q. Do you mean by that to say that if you had continued in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station rather than to have become Minister of the Navy that you would not have participated in the execution of some phase of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. Absolutely no, nothing.
- Q. Now, you say that Admiral Yamamoto presented this plan to the General Staff. Give us the approximate date of that presentation.
- A. When the plan was presented I was in China; thus I heard the story only after I came back to Japan.
- Q. Was that plan presented by Admiral Yamamoto to the General Staff sometime before September of 1941, which was the date of your return to Japan?
- A. Yes, sure.
- Q. From whom did you learn that the plan had been submitted by Admiral Yamamoto to the General Staff?
- A. I heard about this from the Naval General Staff.
- Q. Did you learn about it from meetings in which you participated after you returned to Japan?
- A. No. There was no such discussion in the meetings.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 14 -

- Q. Did you learn from the General Staff that Admiral Yamamoto's plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor had received the approval of the government?
- A. The government has no direct connection, so I don't think it was approved.
- Q. Did you learn it was approved by the General Staff?
- A. Yes, the Naval General Staff was in favor of it and approved it, and issued the plan as an order to Admiral Yamamoto.
- Q. What was the date of the approval of that plan by the Naval General Staff?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. It was prior to your return to Japan in September 1941, was it not?
- A. I think it was probably before I returned.
- Q. Don't you know it was before you returned?
- A. The approval was actually informal and was given before my return to Japan, and later the approval was made in the form of an order.
- Q. When was the approval made in the form of an order?
- A. I don't very well remember what date it was.
- Q. In any event, when the plan received the informal approval of the Naval General Staff the Operations Branch of the Navy proceeded with plans to make it effective, did it not?
- A. Yes, sure.
- Q. You previously stated that when you came into the Tojo Cabinet an Imperial order was issued cancelling all prior commitments of the government, insofar as any war plans were concerned, and that the Tojo Cabinet was directed to proceed anew in an effort to preclude war with the United States; will you explain from the point of view of a member of that Cabinet just what it was that the Japanese Government expected the United States Government to do before the Japanese Government with respect to war with the United States should be altered?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 15 -

- A. I thought as a member of the Cabinet we were to draw up plans for new proposals in the new Cabinet, and I thought America might refuse the latest proposals of negotiations between the United States and Japan. However, I thought the United States might make a counter-proposal which might be moderate in comparison with the former position of the United States.

(The interrogation was adjourned at 1630).

\*\*\*\*\*

- Q. The last question I asked you yesterday afternoon was just what it was that the Japanese Government expected the United States Government to do which might cause the Japanese Government to change its attitude as to war with the United States. Now, I would like to know if you, in your official capacity as a representative of the Japanese Government, ever learned of any demand which the United States made of Japan other than to cease its violation of international treaties and its expansion policies in violation of the rights of other nations?
- A. I am not familiar with the policies concerning the expansion because I was in China previous to the Tojo Cabinet, and I had very little connection with the political conditions during that time, but I more or less have knowledge of the negotiations held during the Tojo Cabinet, at which time Kurusu presented the policy of Japan to the United States.
- Q. That doesn't answer my question, which is: Do you know of any demand which the United States Government ever made upon Japan in 1941 other than to cease violation of international treaties to which it was a party and to respect the rights of other nations?
- A. I recall that the United States asked for the withdrawal of troops from China, and that the United States asked for the severance of relations with Germany and also the severance of relations with Wung, the Japanese Puppet Government set up by the Japanese Government in Nanking.
- Q. All those demands by the United States Government were demands calculated to have Japan comply with its international treaties and to respect the rights of other nations, were they not?
- A. I think that the above three demands were more or less made as a profit to the United States because the setting up of a government in China under Wung, the friendship with Germany and the troops in China did not infringe upon the international laws.
- Q. Wasn't it because Japan felt that it could not accede to anyone of these demands on the part of the United States that it was concluded that she would have to ultimately wage war with the United States?
- A. The demands by the United States were not the only reasons by which they were dissatisfied with the attitude of the United States. There were several other reasons.

- Q. What were the several other reasons which were the basis of Japan's decision to wage war?
- A. The reasons were (1) because of the economic blockade, (2) because of the breakdown of commercial relations, (3) the intense naval war preparations by the United States, (4) mobilization of Filipino troops in the Philippine Islands, (5) mobilization of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, (6) the agreement of England that they would not sell necessities to Japan, (7) the fact that Admiral Kimmel was said to have once said that he could knock out the Japanese fleet within four weeks, and (8) the American newspapers wrote articles, even the New York Times, which gave ground for Japan to think America was going to wage war, and that the one who touched the gun first should be the blame for the war. It was written in the American newspapers that the one who touched the gun first would be at fault, and the United States was at fault in this particular case and touched the gun first, although Japan was the one who fired the first shot.
- Q. Now, we spoke on yesterday about the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. At the time those plans were made for it, is it not a fact that as a result of the embargoes on certain strategic war material that Japan considered itself as extremely short of an adequate supply or source of supply of war materials such as oil and iron, etc.?
- A. Yes, we were short of these materials.
- Q. And did not your plans during 1941 contemplate that you would have to establish a source of supply for these strategic materials in the South?
- A. Yes. We realized that upon attacking the United States that we would be very short on oil and iron, and that we would have to procure these from the South Pacific?
- Q. And did you not conclude that in order to accomplish this program of obtaining these supplies from the South Pacific that it would be necessary for you to control Hawaii and Midway?
- A. Yes, we had such a plan.
- Q. Did you not have intelligence information to the effect that the United States Pacific Fleet was based at Hawaii?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 18 -

Q. And did not your plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor contemplate that you would knock out the United States Fleet in one blow in order that you might gain control of Hawaii and Midway, and thereby sustain your sources of supply of strategic materials from the South Pacific?

A. Yes.

Q. Your plan contemplated that in order that the United States Fleet be knocked out you would take the Fleet by surprise and catch it while it was in dock at Hawaii, did it not?

A. We had no idea whether the American Fleet was in the Harbor itself, but we were prepared in the event that the fleet might be scattered around the Island.

Q. The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to knock out the United States Fleet in the event it was docked in the Harbor, was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Japan would not have dispatched fleets of aircraft carriers across the Pacific for an attack on Pearl Harbor if it had not anticipated that the United States Fleet was docked at the Harbor, would it?

A. No.

Q. It would have been foolhardy for Japan to have given any advance notice to the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, which was to be the object of its attack, would it not?

A. Yes, it would have been fool-hardy.

Q. You recall on the first day of this interrogation the questions and answers concerning the time when the Japanese Government would break off relations with the United States Government and declare war upon it, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not mean to have us understand now, do you, that there was ever any plan, or ever any intention on the part of the Japanese Government to give the United States Government sufficient notice of its declaration of war upon it to permit the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor to prepare for your proposed attack?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 19 -

- A. Yes, we had such a plan to sever diplomatic relations with the United States and to send out the declaration of war long before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
- Q. You do not think for a minute that the United States Fleet would have remained at Pearl Harbor awaiting an attack by the Japanese Navy if Japan had previously declared war upon the United States, do you?
- A. Japan thought that the fleet might be waiting in the Harbor, or that they might be outside in the vicinity some place; and that they might have various other preparations ready for the attack, for which the Japanese Fleet had made plans to meet.
- Q. It was most desirable from the viewpoint of the Japanese Navy that the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor not have any advance notice of its planned attack, was it not?
- A. The Japanese Fleet did not think of any such case where they might catch the United States Fleet in the Harbor itself, but that they were just merely carrying out orders, and they had plans made out with the knowledge that the negotiations would be severed and that the declaration of war would be served before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
- Q. The United States Government and the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor did not receive any advance notice as to a declaration of war on the part of the Japanese Government against the United States prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, did they?
- A. They did not receive any. I found out later.

(Interrogation adjourned at 1622 P. M.)

\*\*\*\*\*

Q. Previously in this interrogation you spoke of the reason for the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, and stated that it was because of the disagreement between the Cabinet and Tojo himself on political matters. Isn't it a fact that the downfall of the Third Konoye Cabinet was the result of Tojo's unyielding attitude towards the opinion of Premier Konoye, Naval Minister Yakawa and Foreign Minister Toyuda, that there was still a way open for an amicable settlement of differences between the United States and the Japanese Government?

A. Since I was in China during that time- the time of the clash between Tojo and Konoye and his Cabinet - I could not say it is a fact; my opinion is based merely on the newspaper article which I read concerning the Konoye statement.

Q. Do you mean to have me understand that when you agreed to take on a Cabinet position in Tojo's Cabinet, carrying with it the authority, power and responsibility which it carried, that you, as a public servant did not learn first-hand of the issues which had previously arisen between the Tojo and the Konoye Cabinet?

A. Just then the order came from the Emperor to start on a clean slate so I did not question the previous activities of the Konoye Cabinet.

Q. What did you mean when you said previously in this interrogation that the fall of the Konoye Cabinet was because of the disagreement between the Cabinet and Tojo himself on political matters?

A. As I have previously stated, I have no knowledge in detail as to what political reasons came between Konoye and Tojo, and even now I don't know the exact reason which caused the disagreement between them. I think that the newspaper articles which gave the reason for the clash as a difference of political opinions between Tojo and Konoye are the truth.

Q. Don't you know that the Third Konoye Cabinet dedicated itself to the solution of the China Incident by negotiation?

A. I think that is probably so.

Q. Didn't you learn from your subsequent association in the Tojo Cabinet that that was the case?



(Shimada, cont'd)

- A. I think it is probably so, because even in the Tojo Cabinet the primary purpose was to settle the entanglement in China and also to settle the negotiations with the United States.
- Q. Do you mean to have us understand now that the Tojo Cabinet carried on with the same zeal and ardor as the Konoye Cabinet an effort to amicably settle the China Incident?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then what could possibly have been the occasion for the resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet if Tojo was in accord with its efforts to amicably settle the China Incident?
- A. During the Third Konoye Cabinet Tojo was in the Army, and his opinions at that time represented the viewpoint of the Army. Then when the Tojo Cabinet came into office the Imperial Order was issued to wipe the slate clean and to start anew, and the Tojo Cabinet also endeavored to amicably settle the China Incident and to avoid war with the United States. When Tojo took office as Premier his position became entirely different than his previous position when he was in the Army. Thus he could not express his views as freely as he did before.
- Q. What position did Tojo occupy in the Army immediately prior to his position as Premier?
- A. Minister of War.
- Q. Do you mean by your previous answer that Tojo during the regime of the Third Konoye Cabinet was reflecting the views of the Army in his dissatisfaction with the policy of the Konoye Cabinet in its effort to settle the China Incident?
- A. When Tojo was the Minister of War he received opinions from the War Department, his subordinates, as well as from the Army General Staff. When he became the Premier he received opinions not only from the two bureaus, but also from the Naval General Staff, the Foreign Minister, from the Navy Minister, and others. Thus his point of view became broader, and also he had more audience with the Emperor, all of which changed his perspective.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 22 -

- Q. Now, you say when he was War Minister in the Konoye Cabinet he received opinions from the Army General Staff, his subordinates, and other sources in the Army. What was the nature of those opinions?
- A. I don't know the details of their opinions then.
- Q. You do know that Tojo, as Minister of War, in the Konoye Cabinet, was constantly deploring the efforts of the Konoye Cabinet to play down the public agitation of the China Incident and to settle it amicably, don't you?
- A. There were disagreements between Tojo and Konoye as to the negotiation with the United States as well as for the settlement of the China Incident, but there may have been other disagreements which I don't know about in detail.
- Q. But don't you know that it was Tojo's impatience and disappointment with the efforts of the Konoye Cabinet to amicably settle the China Incident, and the strength and support which he had from the Army General Staff and other sources for a policy of enlarging and aggravating the China Incident, were the very reasons that the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet came about?
- A. It may be so.
- Q. Don't you know it is so.
- A. Yes, it may be so.
- Q. It is your opinion that it is so, isn't it?
- A. Yes, my opinion is that it may be so.
- Q. Didn't you learn when you entered the Tojo Cabinet as a public servant upon the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, that that was the reason for the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet?
- A. It may be so.
- Q. It is not a question of it may be so; of course it's so.
- A. I don't know.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 23 -

- Q. Don't you know from your association in the Tojo Cabinet when you came in as Navy Minister that that was the very reason the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet came about?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Didn't you learn from your service in the Tojo Cabinet that that was the reason the Konoye Cabinet resigned?
- A. I don't know the details; it was not necessary for me to know the details.
- Q. But you do know that Konoye and Tojo did have a clash?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you know that the principal basis of that clash was Tojo's impatience with the effort of the Konoye Cabinet to play down the China Incident and to amicably settle it, don't you?
- A. On that point I don't know quite well; as I said, Tojo was the Army Minister at that time and therefore he had to sustain the Army opinion; also for the Army General Staff.
- Q. In your opinion that was the basis for the difference between Tojo and the Konoye Cabinet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, you say as Minister of War he had to sustain the Army point of view with respect to the China Incident. What was the Army point of view?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Well, haven't you learned that the Army point of view was that they didn't want to play down the public agitation over the China Incident and that they didn't want to have it amicably settled? Haven't you learned that was the Army's position?
- A. I don't think so, because even the Army was much disturbed about the China Incident.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 24 -

- Q. But the Army was disappointed with the efforts of the Konoye Cabinet to amicably settle the China Incident, was it not?
- A. This thing was more or less started because the Army felt it could not meet the demands of the United States.
- Q. Do you mean the demands of the United States that Japan immediately withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, and to deny recognition of the Nanking Regime, and to renounce the Tripartite Agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So that as I understand it, you now say that the Army was urging Tojo, as Minister of War, to take the position that Japan could not afford to accede to those three demands which had been made by the United States as a basis for the settlement of the China Incident?
- A. Yes, they were.
- Q. Now, the General Staff of the Army was urging that they take this position, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was Chief of the Army General Staff at that time?
- A. I think General Sugiyawa, who died later.
- Q. Who else was on the General Staff at that time?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. And Tojo, as Minister of War, did aggressively take the position that the China Incident should not be played down, and should not be amicably settled, didn't he?
- A. While Tojo was not opposed to the settlement of the China Incident as such, he did voice vigorous opposition to some phases of the plan of the Konoye Cabinet for its settlement.
- Q. And it was because Tojo took this position aggressively, and because of the support which he had for it and his ability to impose it as a policy that resulted in the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, wasn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. It was on the day of the Kimegai, which is the Japanese holiday on which the first crop of rice of the year is dedicated to the Emperor, October 18, 1941, that Tojo received the Emperor's command to form a cabinet succeeding Prince Konoye, whose cabinet resigned on the previous day, wasn't it?

A. When we have a presentation of the rice, it is not to the Emperor but to Heaven. We call it Kannasai, and the Tojo Cabinet was formed on the 18th, and I think the order to do this was handed down on October 17th.

Q. Navy Minister Oikawa had ardently supported the Konoye efforts to pacifically settle the China Incident, had he not?

A. I have no opinion of my own, but according to Konoye's statement in the newspaper Oikawa's attitude was to leave everything to Konoye.

Q. How many members of the Third Konoye Cabinet were retained by Tojo in his Cabinet?

A. There were five members left over from the Konoye Cabinet, namely: the Minister of Education, Hashida; the Minister without portfolio, Suzuki; Minister of Social Welfare; Minister of Justice, Iwamura; and, Minister of Agriculture, Ino.

Q. Each of them had actively and openly supported Tojo in his opposition to the policies of the Konoye Cabinet on the China Incident, had they not?

A. These five people were not with much to say in the Cabinet. I don't think their views were very important.

Q. Do you mean that because of the positions which they held that their offices did not wield much influence insofar as the formation of policies were concerned?

A. They were people with very little influence.

Q. And as you have previously stated, you were brought in to succeed the Minister of the Navy, Oikawa?

A. Yes, that is right.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1630 P. M.)

- Q. Your last answer on yesterday was that you were offered and accepted the position as Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet. Do you know why you were selected for this position by Premier Tojo?
- A. It was not Tojo who selected me. The Navy offered me to Tojo. I think the Navy thought I would be best.
- Q. Why did the Navy so suddenly become dissatisfied with Oikawa's service as Navy Minister?
- A. The most powerful person who offered me to Tojo was Oikawa. I was only a Naval officer, Commander-in-Chief, etc., never Navy Minister before. Oikawa asked me to be the Minister on the first day of the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, which was the 17th of October, and came back and strongly urged me to accept it on the 18th, which I did.
- Q. You first declined the offer of the position as Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet, didn't you?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. What was the reason for your declination of the office?
- A. I did not have the experience of administration.
- Q. On yesterday we talked about the points of difference of policy which arose between Tojo and Konoye, which ultimately resulted in the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet. Isn't it a fact that the strongest point of difference between Tojo and Konoye was that Tojo under no circumstances would agree to the withdrawal of troops from China, whereas Konoye was of the opinion that concessions along this line should be made?
- A. As I told you, I don't know about the details of the differences of opinion, because at that time I was not there, but it may be so; as I said on yesterday, it was most probable.
- Q. To the best of your opinion from the information you learned after you became a member of the Tojo Cabinet that was the principal point of difference between Tojo and Konoye?
- A. I don't know about that point; I know there was some difference over the negotiation with America.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 27 -

- Q. I said it is your best opinion that that was the strongest point of difference between the two, isn't it?
- A. I think even Konoye did not think it best to remove troops from China; he thought it would be very difficult; I know they differed on several matters.
- Q. You do know, don't you, that after you became a member of the Tojo Cabinet, at no time did Tojo ever agree to accede to the demand for the withdrawal of troops in China?
- A. No, he did not think about that.
- Q. And at no time did he agree that they should withdraw, did he?
- A. No, he never agreed.
- Q. You knew Admiral SUETSUGU, Nobumasa during his lifetime, didn't you?
- A. Not well; it was about 20 years ago, I think. We once worked together on the Naval General Staff.
- Q. You were quite an admirer and follower of Admiral Suetsugu, were you not?
- A. No; often I differed with him. I did not admire him at all.
- Q. You didn't admire his philosophy?
- A. No, I did not. I can't admire him, because of his interest in politics; I don't like a man who likes politics.
- Q. You know that he enjoyed the reputation of being violently anti-foreign in his views, don't you?
- A. I think it may be so.
- Q. You have, insofar as your public life is concerned, always enjoyed the reputation of being an extreme nationalist, haven't you?
- A. Of course I am nationalist, but not extreme.
- Q. You have also enjoyed the reputation of being quite anti-American, haven't you?
- A. No, I am not anti-American.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 23 -

- Q. You have always been a leader of patriotic youth groups, have you not?
- A. No, I did not engage in political matters; I was always on the sea, or instructor in the Naval War College, or etc. I had no interest in those things.
- Q. I do not mean in the political field, but in the service, in the Operations Branch of the Navy you always manifested an interest in the development of patriotic youth groups, didn't you?
- A. It was quite natural to do so, yes.
- Q. Now, in all your public life you have sedulously endeavored to avoid embroilment in politics, haven't you?
- A. I had no interest in politics.
- Q. And because of your reputation for steering clear of embroilment in politics you won the confidence of the Army by being regular Navy, didn't you?
- A. Since it is something about myself I can't say that the Army may have had confidence in me.
- Q. You mean you would prefer not to say because of modesty?
- A. I don't know about the Army's opinion about me.
- Q. Don't you know that it was because of the confidence which the groups in the Army, who were bringing pressure to bear on Tojo to revolt against the policies of the Konoye Cabinet, had in you that resulted in your selection as Minister of the Navy to succeed Oikawa?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. After you became Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet you had occasion to make a number of speeches in the Diet, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you make this statement in the Diet in 1942? "What is the use of occupying an area where the economy is in control of other races? The Japanese must have no scruples in eliminating any element reluctant to conform to the sphere of the Japanese race".



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 29 -

- Q. I don't remember clearly. Most of my addresses were made on the particular results of the battles, and it is best to examine the records in the Diet, as they have word for word what I said.
- Q. I am well aware of that. Now, you may well have said something along this line, although you don't remember whether this is the exact language you used or not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In any event, that statement is not inconsistent with the philosophy which you gave expression to in your public career in the Tojo Cabinet, is it?
- A. I can't say yes or no.
- Q. Don't you know that the reputation which you enjoyed as maintaining a philosophy such as is indicated by the quotation which I have just read was one of the major reasons for your selection as Navy Minister in the Tojo Cabinet?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Well, from the time you became Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet until the end of your service in that capacity, you did lend active support to the position which Tojo took with respect to the China Incident, and which was the position which the Army urged upon him as Minister of War in the previous Konoye Cabinet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, wasn't it because Tojo and the Army realized that Oikawa did not support that policy that he was not offered the position as Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Oikawa had previously supported Konoye in his opposition to the pressure which Tojo, as Minister of War, was placing on Konoye to alter his policy, had he not?
- A. Oikawa was never in opposition to the position which Tojo took as to the China Incident.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 302

- Q. Was Oikawa in opposition to Konoye's policy with respect to the China Incident?
- A. Oikawa had no connection with the China affairs, and he supported Konoye only in the matters regarding the negotiation with America.
- Q. He did not support Tojo's position with regard to his policy concerning America, did he?
- A. He did not support Tojo in this.
- Q. And isn't it for that reason that Tojo concluded he would not make a desirable member of his Cabinet?
- A. Oikawa offered me as Navy Minister.
- Q. Don't you know that when Oikawa talked with you about becoming Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet that he told you of his differences with Tojo insofar as negotiations with America were concerned?
- A. No, he didn't say anything about that.
- Q. You did support Tojo's position with respect to the negotiations with America, didn't you?
- A. Yes, yes.
- Q. And that position was as it had been by Tojo during the Konoye Cabinet that under no circumstances could Japan afford to agree to the withdrawal of troops from China, wasn't it?
- A. His position was if President Roosevelt would act as intermediary between China and Japan that they would withdraw the troops from China, but they could not withdraw the troops abruptly.
- Q. Don't you know that Tojo never did agree that the troops should be withdrawn from China?
- A. He did not agree.
- Q. He also did not agree to abandon the Tri-partite Agreement with Italy and Germany, did he?
- A. No, he did not agree.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 31 -

- Q. He also refused to accede to the demands for the withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China, didn't he?
- A. He did.
- Q. He also refused to agree to abandon recognition of the Nanking regime, didn't he?
- A. Yes, he wanted to continue to recognize the Nanking regime.
- Q. All of those positions which Tojo took in his capacity as Premier were the same positions which he urged upon Konoye when he was Minister of War in his Cabinet, were they not?
- A. They were the same. As Minister of War he did not agree to the withdrawal of troops from Indo-China, but as Premier he did agree.
- Q. With the exception of his agreement when he became Premier to withdraw troops from French Indo-China his position on these matters which you just recounted was the same when he was War Minister in the Konoye Cabinet, was it not?
- A. I don't know Tojo's opinions in the Konoye Cabinet, but I think they were the same. I am not sure.
- Q. Now, you say when you were Minister of the Navy in the Tojo Cabinet you actively supported these policies of Tojo's, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you are willing to assume your share of the responsibility for these policies, aren't you?
- A. Yes, sure.
- Q. Now, you will recall that on the first day of this interrogation I asked you about attending funeral services for Princess Kaya, and you stated you thought there was some mistake in that name. Did you attend any funeral services for Princess Kaya?
- A. I don't remember anything about that.
- Q. You didn't attend any funeral services on December 4, 1941?
- A. I don't remember.

(Interrogation adjourned at 1600 P. M.)

The Witness asked for permission to make the following statement in an effort to clarify a statement which he made concerning his philosophy indicated in the quotation which was read to him by Mr. Darsey with respect to a speech which the witness made in 1942 in the Diet:

Witness: My speech was perhaps a report of the occupation of South Asia. My philosophy about the occupation of the area in the South was that we must not only request the Japanese people to work for prosperity, but we must always work for co-existence and co-prosperity for all nations; that is to say, the principle was to live and let live for a long peace and welfare. During the war there may be some disturbance from the necessity of operation, but it must be removed as soon as possible. That was my belief then and is now the same belief I have.

Q. In short, you adhered to what was known as the Greater East Asia plan and philosophy?

A. I think co-prosperity is a nice idea.

Q. Previously in this interrogation we have talked about the order for the attack on Pearl Harbor. I want to go back now and develop your knowledge of the planning which resulted in the ultimate issuance of that order. I believe that you previously stated that you had heard of Admiral Yamamoto's proposed plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor long before you came back from China, is that right?

A. Yes, that's true.

Q. There were two schools of thought in Navy circles early in 1941, were there not? Yamamoto's school of thought that the United States Fleet should be knocked out in Pearl Harbor as the first blow to be struck, and the other that efforts should be directed at solidifying gains and bases in the South in order to insure lines of supply; is that right?

A. At that time I was in China, and therefore do not know quite well about the details, but I knew the Japanese Navy was not strong enough to act offensively against America, and the Japanese thought we should deceive America's operations in the Pacific. Therefore, Yamamoto's idea to attack Pearl Harbor would be very difficult they thought, and in that point the opinion was divided in Navy circles. In ordinary planning the Japanese Navy did not plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

(Shimada, cont'd)

Q. Yamamoto proposed his Pearl Harbor attack plan to the General Staff early in 1941, did he not?

A. I heard that he offered it in January of 1941.

Q. At that time he was Commander-in-Chief of the combined fleet, was he not?

A. Yes.

Q. Admiral Nagano authorized him to proceed with a study of the plan in March of 1941, did he not?

A. In that point I don't know the date, but I think it was later.

Q. But it was early in 1941, wasn't it?

A. I think it was perhaps May or June.

Q. May or June when his plan was adopted for study?

A. At first the ordinary plan did not have any plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but it was made formal in May or June. The studying and training of a squadron by Yamamoto was begun in May or June of 1941, I think.

Q. Now, you say Admiral Nagano gave his approval to proceed with the development of the plan in May or June of 1941?

A. I think so; I am not quite sure.

Q. Admiral Nagano was then Chief of the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in August of 1941 the combined fleet assembled for its annual maneuvers, did it not?

A. I don't know of it, because I was in China.

Q. You don't know where the combined fleet held its annual maneuvers in 1941?

A. I do not know, because I was in China. I did not learn about them.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- Q. Don't you know that the combined fleet held its annual maneuvers, and in developing operational plans under Admiral Nagano's approval of Yamamoto's proposed attack on Pearl Harbor that they conducted maneuvers in simulation of the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. I don't know, but I think it is most probable.
- Q. You know that the Navy started developing a shallow water torpedo early in 1941, don't you?
- A. Yes, I know very well.
- Q. That was because the Navy was well aware that the water at Pearl Harbor was shallow water, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the fleet practiced with the use of such a torpedo throughout the summer of 1941, did it not?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Now, from September 3 to September 15 the Staff exercises were held at the Naval War College in Tokyo, weren't they?
- A. I don't know about that, but it is most probable.
- Q. You know Shigero Fugii, don't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He was your private secretary as Minister of the Navy, wasn't he?
- A. No, he was not in the ministry. He was in the Naval General Staff.
- Q. Was he ever your private secretary?
- A. No, but we had worked together before.
- Q. You didn't learn from him about the Staff exercises at the Naval War College in Tokyo in September of 1941?
- A. No, I did not learn that from him.

(Shimada, cont'd)

Q. You do know that these exercises were attended by the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet Staff?

A. At that time I was departing from China, and was travelling.

Q. After you arrived in Tokyo you didn't learn about the results of the studies which were made at these Staff exercises.

A. No, I did not learn about them.

Q. Don't you know that these exercises resulted in evolving a definite plan on paper with all the logistic details worked out for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I did not know.

Q. Yamamoto's plan became Navy General Order No. 1, did it not?

A. I don't quite well remember the number, but I believe that is so.

Q. And this general order was printed on November 5, was it not?

A. I don't remember the date exactly.

Q. Don't you know it was issued by Yamamoto, as Commander-in-Chief of the combined fleet, as an order on November 5?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You were Minister of the Navy at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Would an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the combined fleet of as much significance and importance as that order be issued without coming to your attention?

A. Of course I read it, but I don't remember the date.

Q. You read it?

A. I think so.

Q. And don't you know it was issued as an order by Yamamoto some time in November of 1941?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 36 -

- A. I don't remember the date. It was at the beginning of November we were studying for an honest solution to the negotiations with America.
- Q. You were also proceeding very ardently with your plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, weren't you?
- A. No, that was the work of the Naval General Staff.
- Q. But the Naval General Staff was proceeding as ardently with its plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor as you say the Foreign Minister was in his negotiation with America, was it not?
- A. Oh, yes.
- Q. Now, didn't this general order for the attack on Pearl Harbor provide that the plan would go into effect on Y-Day and that war would be declared on X-Day?
- A. We did not have a Y-Day; we did have an X-Day.
- Q. You did not have a Y-Day?
- A. No, X-Day was used. We had to have that because in case negotiations with America should not succeed we would use it, but if they did succeed we would always be able to check the assault.
- Q. Can you read English?
- A. If it is not too difficult.
- Q. I show you now what is identified as Document 23-15, composed of 18 pages, and ask you to read pages 6 and 7 thereof, and state whether or not that appears to be in substance General Order No. 1 issued by Admiral Yamamoto and providing for the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. (The witness reads the document). There may be some similarity between the order by Admiral Yamamoto, but since I cannot compare both I cannot readily say that this is exactly the same.

(The document which was presented the witness to read were pages 6 and 7 of Document No. 23-15, consisting of 18 pages and contained in case file No. 23, Serials 1-40 of the IPS, SCAP.)



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 57 -

- Q. It is substantially the same as you remember Yamamoto's order, isn't it?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Now, this order provides for Y-Day- does that refresh your memory as to some symbol that was used to designate a similar day in the Yamamoto order?
- A. We never used Y-Day. X-Day was used. It was used only by Yamamoto to the fleet.
- Q. The expression "climb Mt. Niitaka?" was the code term to be used for the order for the attack on Pearl Harbor, was it not?
- A. Yes, by that order.
- Q. By that order, you mean that order which Yamamoto issued?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the other code terms which you read on page 7 of the aforementioned document were code terms used in Yamamoto's order, were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, you have insisted that the term Y-Day was not used in this order, but that X-Day was used. Do you mean that when the striking forces were ordered to leave their naval bases or operating areas that you used the expression X-16 Day?
- A. Yes, Yamamoto used X-16 Day.
- Q. Which meant November 24, 1941, didn't it?
- A. Yes, that was fixed by Yamamoto.
- Q. Now, after this General Order No. 1 was issued Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 2, dated November 5, 1941, was issued, was it not, which order designated X-16 Day, or November 24, 1941, as the day upon which the Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1 was to become effective?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 38 -

- A. Very possible, I think. I don't remember quite well, but it is very possible.
- Q. Now, the date for the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not finally announced until November 10, 1941, was it, when the Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 3 was issued, stating that "X-Day will be 8 December"?
- A. There could not have possibly been an order selecting December 8 as the day of attack on Pearl Harbor on November 10, 1941.
- Q. Why?
- A. There may have been some order from Admiral Yamamoto, but there were no orders as such from the central authorities.
- Q. Now, on November 10, 1941, didn't Vice-Admiral Nagumo issue aboard his flagship, aircraft "Akagi" striking force operation order No. 1, which ordered all forces to complete battle operations by November 20, 1941?
- A. I think that is so.
- Q. Tankan (Hitokappu) Bay of Etorofu Island in the Kuriles was designated in the striking force order No. 1 as the rendezvous for the task force, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Between November 21 and November 27, 1941, the task force rendezvoused at Tankan Bay, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The task force left Tankan Bay on November 27, 1941, and sailed East until December 4th or 5th, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then it altered its course to the Southeast toward Hawaii?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 59 -

- Q. Upon reaching a point approximately 250 miles from Hawaii the first wave of planes was launched, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. A fleet of from 20 to 30 Japanese submarines from the Sixth Fleet was patrolling outside Pearl Harbor before the strike, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And a fleet of some 5 or 6 midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the Harbor, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And most of them were destroyed by American counter measures, weren't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, after you became Minister of the Navy, did you attend a meeting on November 28 or 29th which was attended by Premiers Tojo, Oka, Ohi, Haraguma and Yui?
- A. I don't remember quite well the time. The Emperor wanted to hear the opinions of all the Ex-Premiers about the negotiation with America, and Tojo therefore called them all together, and I attended.
- Q. Do you mean that the Emperor wanted to hear the opinions of the Ex-Premiers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And all those in attendance upon the meeting were Ex-Premiers except yourself, weren't they?
- A. I am not sure, but I think the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Finance also attended.
- Q. Now what was the subject matter of that meeting, the subject matter of discussion?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 40 -

- A. As I said, Tojo explained the results of the negotiations and the memorandum of November 26 of Mr. Hull, and said that the situation was very grave; therefore, Tojo, by order of the Emperor, asked every person present to narrate his opinion.
- Q. Now, you think what each of these persons present had to say on that occasion over night, because I want to ask you about it tomorrow.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)

(Shimada, cont'd) 25 January 1946, 1430-1630 P. M.

- 41 -

- Q. You stated at the end of the last interrogation that you attended a meeting on November 29th which was attended by Premier Tojo and others. Have you now recalled who was in attendance upon that meeting?
- A. Yes, the Ex-Premiers Watsutuki, Okada, Kono, Hiranuma, Hirota, Abe, Itonai; and the Cabinet members I am not sure about, but I think they were there, too; also Tojo, Shimada, (myself), Toga, the Foreign Minister, and Kaya, the Finance Minister.
- Q. Who of those present were Ex-Premiers?
- A. The first seven named.
- Q. I believe that you stated the Emperor had expressed the desire to have the opinions of the ex-Premiers about what appeared to be the grave situation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was this meeting held in the presence of the Emperor?
- A. No.
- Q. But a report of the results of the meeting was to be made to the Emperor?
- A. Yes, by Tojo.
- Q. And a report was made to the Emperor by Tojo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was that a written report?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Were minutes of the meeting made?
- A. Tojo made notes on the principal parts.
- Q. Made notes on the position taken by the persons present?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 43 -

Q. And these notes were made available to the Emperor?

A. Perhaps he took up the main points that were expressed.

Q. The main points made by the persons present were made known to the Emperor?

A. Yes.

Q. Now then, I believe you said previously that the subject matter of discussion in this meeting was the position taken by the United States as to the relation between Japan and China, as expressed in Secretary Hull's note of November 26, 1941?

A. Not only that point was discussed; the whole situation was discussed. Tojo explained the program of negotiation with the United States, and the attitude of the United States, i. e. , the disturbance of peace between Japan and China by helping and encouraging China with every means, war without arms by economic blockade; abrogation of the commercial treaty and the threat and oppression by the Navy and their military forces increasing with all speed, and Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26th which rejected Japan's proposal in a high-handed manner with no hope of diplomatic adjustment. We had two hours of explanation on these matters from Tojo, which also included the statements made by Secretary Hull on November 26th.

Q. You discussed at some length Secretary Hull's note of November 26th, did you not?

A. We talked most of the time about the grave situation, not about the memorandum only.

Q. Secretary Hull's note enumerated the four fundamental principles, they being the execution of a multi-lateral non-aggression pact, immediate withdrawal of troops from China, and the immediate withdrawal of troops from French-Indo China, and the denial of the Nanking regime, as a basis for the settlement of the China Incident, did it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, what was the consensus of opinion of that conference as to what Japan could afford to do with respect to these proposed four principles?

(S himada, cont'd)

- A. I have no recollection about that; I just remember the general discussion which was held.
- Q. Did you agree that Japan could afford to accede to the principle of withdrawal of troops from China?
- A. My opinion could not coincide with America on this proposal, because we could not withdraw troops for we were then fighting.
- Q. You could not agree, as I understand it, to any one of the four principles which Secretary Hull proposed as a basis for the settlement of the China Incident?
- A. All those four points were most undesirable in that way; although Japan wanted them, but we felt we must settle the issue between China and Japan first.
- Q. Was that the position taken by Tojo, too?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was it acceded to and supported by each of the persons present at this conference?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So that as a result of the conference Tojo reported to the Emperor that all present agreed that Japan could not afford to accede to the four points set forth by Secretary Hull as a basis for the settlement of the issues between China and Japan; is that right?
- A. Not only the memorandum of November 26th was reported to the Emperor, but the talking about the whole situation with America was reported.
- Q. You say you did not talk solely about the four principles, but the entire situation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. But it was in Tojo's report to the Emperor that the consensus of opinion of the conference was that Japan could not afford to accede to Mr. Hull's four principles as a basis for the settlement of the issues between China and Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 44 -

- Q. In other words, this conference was of the opinion that Mr. Hull's proposal could not be made the basis of the settlement of the difference between China and Japan, was it not?
- A. Yes. The problem at this time was not only the four points, but the high-handed acts of Mr. Hull and the American people. At that time Tojo also explained that the American public opinion was toward war with Japan and strong statements to this effect were made in the newspapers. Therefore, Tojo concluded it was a matter of life and death, and that we must bow to the United States or be forced to fight. It was Mr. Hull's high-handed acts that were a problem.
- Q. So in that conference you concluded that Japan could not afford to bow to the United States and accept Mr. Hull's proposal for the settlement of the China Incident, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you concluded that the inevitable result of that decision would be war with the United States, didn't you?
- A. At this time we did not give up absolutely the negotiations, and we waited for the report from Nomura and Kurusu about the situation.
- Q. But you felt that this conclusion that you arrived at in this conference would most likely result in war with the United States, didn't you?
- A. Not in this conference.
- Q. You mean in a subsequent meeting which was attended by the Emperor?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, when you decided that Japan could not afford to accede to Mr. Hull's proposal for the settlement of the China Incident, you at the same time concluded that Japan would carry forward its program with respect to the China Incident, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And Japan's program with respect to the China Incident was to force China to recognize what Japan considered to be its right in China, even at the expense of the use of armed forces if necessary, was it not?



(Shimada, cont'd)

A. Of course the China Incident was a very difficult program; therefore we desired to negotiate with China, and we tried very often to talk about it, but that was disturbed, as I said before.

Q. You expected that you would have to continue to use armed forces in order to accomplish Japan's purpose and position with respect to China, didn't you?

A. Yes, I think so. At that time I had just returned from China, and therefore I thought we could not solve the problem with arms only; I thought we must talk with China with open hearts.

Q. But in this conference you all concluded that the continued use of arms would be required if Japan were to successfully carry forward its plan with respect to China, did you not?

A. All in attendance thought that it could not be solved by arms only.

Q. But anyway you all expected that you would have to continue to use arms in your plan with respect to China?

A. At that time, yes.

Q. And Tojo also reported this to the Emperor, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And recommended on the basis of the position taken by those in attendance upon this conference that Secretary Hull's proposal be rejected, did he not?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the Emperor's reaction to the report of this conference by Tojo?

A. I don't know about that; I only know that he heard the report.

Q. Did you hear from Tojo or from anyone else what the Emperor's reaction to this report was?

A. No.

Q. Have you subsequently learned from anyone what his reaction was?

A. No.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 46 -

Q. When was the next meeting which you attended with respect to this problem?

A. I think it was December 1 or 2; I don't remember exactly.

Q. What was that meeting; was it an Imperial conference?

A. Yes.

Q. Who attended it?

A. Yes; all cabinet members, the Military General Staff, the Naval General Staff, President of the Privy Council, and maybe the Secretary of the Cabinet, but I am not sure, and maybe others.

Q. There may be others whom you don't recall?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this conference held in the presence of the Emperor?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the subject of discussion there?

A. Japan's policy in regard to the Japanese and American relations.

Q. Proceed and tell us in your own way, giving names, about how this discussion developed.

A. Tojo explained the situation as I said before at the other conference. Also; Takatsuki and Okada spoke for the most part, saying that war against the mighty United States would be exceedingly grave, and that we must try to avoid war to the utmost; the economic blockade was gradually diminishing our supplies, giving us a pain, but a war might suddenly diminish all materials with great danger. They did not have a concrete opinion as to how to avoid war, however. The other five persons expressed the same opinions, but they had no concrete opinion. At the last they all acknowledged Tojo's explanation that the situation was grave and unsatisfactory, giving advice to give the matter the utmost attention.

Q. Then what happened?

A. We tried to do our best to the last moment to avoid war, but it was very hopeless.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 47 -

Q. What seemed hopeless?

A. To avoid war.

Q. What was the Emperor's reaction to that conference?

A. I don't know; the Emperor does not make decisions at a conference.

Q. Do you mean as a matter of practice he doesn't make any decision in a meeting?

A. He decided afterwards.

Q. So far as this conference was concerned you concluded that war against America and England was unavoidable, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And war was formally decided upon there, wasn't it?

A. We did not decide in that conference.

Q. Then you spoke of the fact that the Emperor makes decisions later?

A. Yes.

Q. When did the Emperor make a decision with respect to the subject matter of this conference?

A. I am not sure, but I think probably on that day or the next day.

Q. And how was that decision expressed?

A. The decision of the meeting was written, and the Emperor signed it.

Q. You mean that the decision of the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 that war with America and England was unavoidable and would be undertaken was made a written decision of that conference, and that the Emperor approved that decision by signing it, either the day of the Imperial conference or the next day?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you attend any later Imperial conference prior to December 8, 1941?

(Shimada, cont'd)

A. I don't think so.

Q. When was the message drafted to Nomura, authorizing him to advise the United States that Japan was rejecting Secretary Hull's proposal of November 26th, and which he was at some later date to convey to Secretary Hull?

A. I don't know. After the decision it went to the Foreign Minister, and became his responsibility.

Q. The decision made at the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 authorized the Foreign Minister to convey such a message, didn't it?

A. It is automatically the responsibility of the Foreign Minister to carry out the decision reached at the Imperial conference.

Q. The decision of the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 was unanimous, wasn't it?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. All present agreed to this decision?

A. Yes.

Q. And you actively supported it?

A. Yes, oh yes.

Q. Now, did the question of formal approval of General Order No. 1, providing for the attack on Pearl Harbor come up in this Imperial Conference?

A. No; that was Yamamoto's responsibility.

Q. Was Yamamoto or the General Staff authorized to proceed with the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor at this Imperial conference?

A. No. In this Imperial conference it was only decided that war was unavoidable.

Q. So that as a consequence of that decision Yamamoto was automatically authorized to proceed with the operational plans?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 49 -

- A. Yes, I do know that after the decision it was understood the Naval General Staff would proceed. I called Yamamoto to Tokyo and talked to him about the decision of the Imperial conference and talked to him about the entire program of the Navy. At that time Yamamoto also talked to the Naval General Staff; that of course was informal. The Naval General Staff issued a formal order perhaps sometime after the decision.
- Q. Was Yamamoto Chief of the Naval General Staff at that time?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you mean on some day subsequent to the talk with Yamamoto after you called him to Tokyo and advised him of the decision made in the Imperial conference on December 1 and 2 the General Staff authorized Yamamoto to put into effect General Order No. 1 which was issued by him on November 1, 1941?
- A. The Naval General Staff did not authorize him formally in that case. It was informally. After the decision by the Imperial conference the Naval General Staff perhaps issued a formal order.
- Q. Authorizing him to put into effect his operations Order No. 1 which was issued on November 1, 1941?
- A. I think the form would be different.
- Q. But in effect it authorized Yamamoto to put into effect his previous order?
- A. Yes, to put into effect the war with America.
- Q. Did the question of when the United States should be advised of the decision made in the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 come up during that conference?
- A. No; that was taken care of by the Foreign Minister.
- Q. Did you at any time during the period immediately prior to or immediately subsequent to the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 ever have any formal or informal discussion with Tojo, the Foreign Minister, or anyone else with respect to when the United States should be advised of the decision made in the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 50 -

- A. I don't remember quite well. The parties involved in this decision may have gotten together, but I have no recollection of speaking individually among the rest of the Ministers. The responsibility of this decision was on myself as Navy Minister to carry out the orders.
- Q. You held a position in the Japanese Government which carried with it great power and authority, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Such power and authority which you had carried with it grave responsibility, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The question of declaring war on the United States was the most serious that arose during your tenure of office, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, it was one grave problem, I think.
- Q. And the responsibility which devolved upon you in successfully carrying out the decision made at the Imperial conference on December 1 or 2 was just about the gravest responsibility you ever assumed, wasn't it?
- A. This problem was not only my problem, but also the problem of the Chief of the General Staff, the Foreign Minister, the Military Staff, Tojo, etc.
- Q. But insofar as your share of the responsibility was concerned it was just about the most serious responsibility which you ever assumed, wasn't it?
- A. I think it was a most serious problem.
- Q. Do you mean to have me believe that with this responsibility which you had and which your government had reposed on you, that Tojo and the other members of the Cabinet, the Foreign Minister, etc., never discussed with you formally or informally the question of the date when the United States should be advised of your plan to wage war against it?
- A. No, I don't remember talking face to face about it, but from time to time over a period of time it was talked about.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 51 -

- Q. Did you discuss that subject at the staff meetings?
- A. At all the stops from time to time we discussed it and decided.
- Q. You decided when you were going to notify the United States?
- A. All the men concerned with this decision decided on the best course and brought it to me for approval.
- Q. What was that course?
- A. The contents were to advise the United States on December 7.
- Q. Was that Japanese or American time?
- A. The contents were to read that this message would reach the United States before the opening of hostilities.
- Q. How long before the opening of hostilities?
- A. At least one hour before the start of war.
- Q. Now, you have stated all the men concerned with this decision as to when to notify the United States of the declaration of war by Japan made this decision and brought it to you for approval. Who were those people who were concerned with that decision, and who made it. Name those men?
- A. Nagano, (Admiral) of the Naval General Staff; General Sugiyama of the Military General Staff; the Foreign Minister Toga; Navy Minister Shimada, and Army Minister Tojo.
- Q. They made the decision you say, and brought it to you for approval. Did you approve it?
- A. Yes, oh yes.
- Q. And that decision which you approved was also approved by the Emperor?
- A. No; these things are not even shown to the Emperor.
- Q. Now, in view of your answers to the last series of questions, I want to read you a question which I previously propounded to you and your answer thereto, and ask you to explain the obvious inconsistency of your answer to this question and your answers to the questions which I have propounded to you today. QUOTE: Do you mean to have us

(Shimada, cont'd)

understand that there was ever any plan or ever any intention on the part of the Japanese Government to give the United States Government sufficient notice of its declaration of war upon it and to prepare the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor for your proposed attack? ANSWER: Yes, we had such a plan to sever diplomatic relations with the United States and to send out the declaration of war long before the attack on Pearl Harbor. UNQUOTE.

- A. In that statement I did not mean to say "long" before, but I meant "suitable", suitable time. At least one hour.
- Q. In any event the answers which you have made today with respect to the time when Japan intended to notify the United States of the declaration of war upon the United States are correct, aren't they?
- A. Yes.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1630 P. H.)



Q. You are familiar with what is often referred to as the Shinto Ideology of religion, aren't you?

A. Yes, I know about that.

Q. It had its origin in the foundation of the Empire, did it not?

A. Strictly speaking I don't think so.

Q. Since its origin at the time of the creation of the Empire it has always been associated with Japanese philosophy, hasn't it?

A. In those days they very strongly took the position of Shinto, but most of the Japanese people don't think like that now. They admire, of course, the so-called god, but I think the idea of Shintoism is very much misunderstood.

Q. The cardinal principle of Shinto religion was that the Emperor was divine, wasn't it?

A. The Japanese don't think so, I think; sometimes they say so he is the Son of God.

Q. What I am getting at is in olden times, in ancient history, 660 B. C., the Shinto religion, or the ideology that the Emperor was divine was associated with the history of the Japanese empire during those times, wasn't it?

A. In Japan they have the idea that after death he becomes god; they believe that the first Emperor was god and that the others after the first one are the sons of god. The first Emperor was Jimmu, and they say the Emperor is the son of Jimmu, but they do not mean God in the strictest sense. As for myself, I don't think of it in the terms of meaning God as it is thought of in Christianity.

Q. Up until the late 1800s the Shinto religion and ideology that the Emperor was divine was taught and believed in Japan, wasn't it?

A. But not divine in the sense as I said before; not in the strictest sense.

Q. But in the late 1800s the Japanese people had come to believe that the Emperor was not divine, and the emphasis on such teachings in Japan had played out, had it not?

A. I don't think so; I don't know of any teachings that the Emperor is divine in the strictest sense, I mean; they generally say the Son of God, as I said before.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 54 -

- Q. Don't you know that in the late 1800s the rank and file of Japanese people had become to believe that the Emperor was not divine?
- A. I don't know anything about it, except for the fact that the Emperor was thought of as as Son of God, or as a great person, but not as God in the strictest sense.
- Q. Are you familiar with the fact that in the early 1900s, 1920-1930, that a new movement developed in Japan to revive the Sinto ideology that the Emperor was divine.
- A. Absolutely I don't know; perhaps there were special persons who had such an opinion, but the Japanese people during that time didn't believe that, I think.
- Q. Who were the special persons that you refer to as holding to such ideology?
- A. I don't know. If it is true, then that would be only special persons, because the Japanese people as a whole did not believe it.
- Q. Don't you know that in the late 1920s the Army, certain influences in the Army, began a movement to revive in the public mind a consciousness of the old Shinto ideology of the divinity of the Emperor?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. Are you familiar with the creation of the Japanese Embassy, of which Premier Iwakura, Cabinet Ministers Ito, Okuma, Kido, Yamaguchi, and a number of commissioners representing every government department for 15 months or more visited practically every nation of the world?
- A. It may be so, but I don't know.
- Q. Don't you know that that Embassy visited Germany and that Bismarck talked to Ito at some length and encouraged him to revive those parts of Shinto that exalted the authority and divinity of the Emperor?
- A. I don't know about that.
- Q. Do you recall from your knowledge of history of the Japanese government the fact that Ito returned to Germany in 1882 for the purpose of consulting further with Bismarck?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 55 -

A. I don't know.

Q. Don't you know that after Ito came back from that visit that he urged and was able to accomplish the fact that the Army and Navy should be placed in a position to deal directly with the Emperor and on top of the Diet and Cabinet?

A. I don't know strictly about that, but it may be so, I think. I know that the Army and Navy deal directly with the Emperor now, but as to whether Ito was the man who made it possible, I don't know.

Q. You know that that revision in the Japanese Government came to pass about that time, about 1890 or the late 1800s, don't you?

A. By my memory I think the Army and Navy dealing directly with the Emperor began in the Meiji Era; Meiji was the 23rd Emperor, and before his era it was the feudal era; the Meiji Era started about 1868.

Q. Don't you recall that it was about this time, about 1890, that the Army and Navy began to wield a greater influence in the formation of the public policy of Japan than it ever had before?

A. I don't know quite well.

Q. Don't you know so?

A. I don't know; I do know that in about 1877 General Saigo strongly emphasized the opinion to attack Korea.

Q. But during the period from 1870 to 1900 the old Shinto primitive nature cult had fallen into discredit in the opinion of the Japanese people?

A. About that history I don't know quite well.

Q. Don't you know that after Ito's foreign visit with Bismarck particularly, which I have previously referred to, that there appeared on the political horizon of Japan an effort on the part of some of its leaders to revive a faith in some of the principles of the old Shinto ideology?

A. I don't know about that.

- Q. You don't know that during that period representatives of the governing class began to revive the old Shinto doctrine that the Mikado descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun?
- A. That idea was in ancient times - that the Emperor was descended from the Goddess of the Sun, but during the Meiji Era this was changed. That does not mean God in the strictest sense; it means the God of our ancestors; Son of God in Japanese.
- Q. But don't you know that about this time the Japanese press and public spokesmen began efforts to revive public faith in those old concepts of the Shinto ideology, that the Emperor was divine?
- A. I think the Shinto was not at the beginning of the Meiji Era, but in the feudal times; before that the public guarded the shrines. The beginning of the revival of the Shinto started from the early Meiji Era; until that time the Shintoism was very weak and oppressed; in Shintoism the Priest had complete power over all the shrines.
- Q. Don't you know that during the early 1900s the Japanese Education Ministry began a vigorous campaign to revive public faith and confidence in the principles of Shinto ideology?
- A. I may be so, I think; I don't know quite well.
- Q. Don't you recall public statements during that period by representatives of the governing class of Japan to the following effect:

Shintoshii (History of Shinto), by Sadao Kiyohara, Tokyo, 1935

"The Emperor is not to be worshipped exclusively by the Japanese, nor to be represented as Emperor of Japan alone. The Emperor governs Japan and is the Emperor of mankind the world over. He rules the universe with Amaterasu-o-Mikami and Taka-mi-Musubi-no-Mikami. Therefore Japan exists not only for Japan but for the whole world, and as a representation of the High Plain of Heaven must be expanded through the universe. Our national law is the representation of the Great Way of the High Plain of Heaven, which is the way of the Gods, and is creating the law of the Universe."

The Way of Subjects, by Japanese Education Ministry, July, 1941

"The ideals of Japan are to manifest to the entire world the spirit of her Empire-founding represented by the principle that "the Capital may be extended so as to embrace the six cardinal points, and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof." There is virtually no country in the world other than Japan having such a superb and lofty mission bearing world significance. World history is moving largely and impressively. The ideals of the construction of a world of moral principles based on the historic mission of Japan have been on a fair way toward fruition through the construction of a new East Asiatic order."

The Great Shinto Purification Ritual and the Divine Mission of Japan, by Professor Chikao Fujisawa, Tokyo, Feb., 1942.

"Japan is at war with the Administrations of Roosevelt and of Churchill, which have been eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, aggravating the disturbances in East Asia. But thanks to the prayers offered by the Emperor day and night to the spirit of the Sun Goddess, the Divine Power was at last mobilized to deal a thoroughgoing blow to those revolting against inviolable cosmic law. The fundamental character of Japan will be held to account for the mystic invulnerability of our Sacred Isles to whatever attempt at invasion is ever made by other nations. The Chin dynasty of China, the Romanoffs and the Hohenzollerns, who dared to assail their motherland, defying the inviolable cosmic law of blood priority, could not escape the divine castigation of suffering deadly blows. It is, therefore, quite evidence that any Power harboring sinister designs to hurt Japan in any way will sooner or later meet the same fate."

The Great Shinto Purification Ritual and the Divine Mission of Nippon, by Professor Chikao Fujisawa, Tokyo, Feb., 1942.

"It may be intimated that the present Greater East Asia War is virtually a second descent of the Grandchild, who perpetuates himself in the everlasting life of the Emperor."

Professor T. Kamaki, of Kyoto Imperial University, over Tokyo Radio, Feb. 22-27, 1942.

"Fortunately, Japan had from the beginning the ideal of Hakko Ichiu. Japan's Hakko Ichiu is the fundamental of Asia's characteristics. We are all brothers and friends. All are united under Japan's Emperor. The Emperor of all nations, the Japanese Emperor, is the ruler of all nations."

Goals of Japanese Expansion, by Tatsuo Kaiwai

"Jimmu, the first Emperor, on ascending the Throne, declared his intentions "to make the world one household", a cosmopolitan ideal which has always animated our nation."

Shintosh (History of Shinto) Sadao Kiyohara, Tokyo, 1935

"The Imperial Power, ruling Japan directly and setting up an ideal country as a model for all the world, bases itself on and expands this ideal country in order to realize a Universal Land of the Gods. Therefore the realization of a World Divine State is nothing other than the expansion of Japan."

General Sadao Araki, former War Minister, in pamphlet published in 1933.

"To fulfill the vision "to conquer the world and embrace the universe as our state" so as to pacify Emperor Jimmu's desire 'greatly to nourish and increase' our ambition has been our traditional policy. If the actions of any of the powers are not conducive to our imperialism, our blows shall descend on that power. Our imperial morality, which is the embodiment of the combination of the true spirit of the Japanese state with the great ideals of the Japanese people, must be preached and spread over the whole world. All obstacles standing in the path of this must be resolutely removed, even if it is necessary to apply real force."

- A. These professors are very notorious, and all that is not correct. All of these opinions written here are not correct, especially the idea of "the Capital may be extended so as to embrace the six cardinal points, and the eight cards may be covered so as to form a roof". To cover

all of Japan was Emperor Jimmu's idea. That phrase we find in the rescript of Emperor Jimmu, about 2060 years ago. He was thinking only of covering all of Japan, and these notorious persons take up the words from this rescript and make up peculiar ideas. The Japanese people who have common sense do not believe at all such ideas.

Q. I am not asking you now whether or not you agree with these quotations, not whether the Japanese people believed it, but what I am asking you is that during the period from 1925 to 1941 there was a revival of an effort on the part of the representatives of the governing class of Japan to bring these principles to the forefront in the public mind again? Was there any such revival of the effort on the part of the public representatives?

A. There were some who did.

Q. Isn't it a fact that beginning with 1930 and up to 1941 public representatives, such as General Araki, Prince Konoye, Premier Tojo, etc., in various capacities during that period, and public leaders of that type sponsored a program to revive in the public mind a belief in the concept that the Emperor was divine, and to revive the principles of the 8 corners of the universe under one roof? Didn't that happen?

A. General Araki I think sometimes said that, but Prince Konoye and Tojo, I don't think so, because generally when we referred to the 8 corners of the world it meant cooperation and co-prosperity, but it did not mean to conform to all the world to those people who had common sense, and was unthinkable.

Q. Didn't responsible public leaders in the Japanese government throughout that period of 1930 to 1941 constantly make public statements and public utterances to the effect of these which were made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Prince Konoye, Premier Tojo, and General Araki. (The witness reads the following statements).

Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, in the Diet, Jan. 24, 1941

"Our desire is to make the spirit embodied in the principle of the Eight Corners of the Universe under One Roof manifest throughout the whole world. The effort to construct a mutual prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia represents the first step toward the satisfaction of

this national desire. The firm establishment of the supreme ideal of our race within the confines of Greater East Asia should serve as an example to humanity in the construction of a new world order."

Yosuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, in new book published in 1941

"I firmly believe that the great mission that Heaven has given to Japan is to save humanity in conformity with the great spirit in which Emperor Jimmu founded the Empire. Japan should take over the management of the continent on a large scale, and propagate Hakko Ichiu and Kodo in Asia, and then extend it to the world."

Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoye, in message to the "Great Japan East Asia League, " Jul. 6, 1941.

"Shining as the sun and the stars is the goal of the Japanese Empire. The spirit of universal brotherhood denoted in the principle of Hakko Ichiu is embodied in concrete form in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. It is the greatest honor and the life mission of every Japanese to do his part in its construction. But our movement must not stop at the realization of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia alone. We must prosecute the movement for all time, and so realize peace and security for the whole world, now torn by violence and swept by a conflagration."

Premier Hideki Tojo, on opening first war Dist, Jan. 21, 1942.

"The fundamental policy underlying the work of establishing the greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is traceable to the guiding spirit of the founding of the country. That is to say, it is to enable all states and peoples in Greater East Asia each to have its proper place, and to establish a New Order based on morality under which all can live in mutual prosperity with Japan as leader."

A. I don't remember quite well.

Q. Don't you know that the divinity of the Emperor and the principle of the 8 corners of the universe under one roof, and the other principles set out in those quotations which I have just given you became the very bed-rock and foundation of Japanese international policy during the period 1930 to 1941?



(Shimada, cont'd)

- A. I don't know quite well. Perhaps, as I said before, the co-prosperity was used, but as to the question of meaning, I don't think so.
- Q. Do you mean that leaders holding public positions of responsibility such as Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Premier Konoye, Premier Tojo, and General Araki did not correctly state the public policy and the international policy of Japan in these quotations which I have just given to you?
- A. Tojo and Konoye only spoke of co-prosperity and co-existence. Araki and Matsuoka were extremists, and maybe they said such words. In the words of Konoye and Tojo we did not find such an extreme meaning.
- Q. What do you consider Premier Tojo meant when he stated that "All states and peoples in Greater East Asia each to have its proper place, and to establish a New Order based on morality under which all can live in mutual prosperity with Japan as leader". What do you consider he meant when he stated that?
- A. I think, as I explained, he meant co-existence and co-prosperity, under the leadership of Japan.
- Q. What did he mean by the leadership of Japan?
- A. There should be some guidance, I think. Therefore, I think he said as a guide, Japan would do that, but not to oppress, not to control or to govern them.
- Q. What do you consider that Matsuoka meant when he said, "Japan should take over the management of the continent on a large scale, and propagate Hakko Ichiu and Kodo in Asia, and then extend it to the world"?
- A. I don't know; he was an extremist, of course. I found some peculiar ideas in that phrase.
- Q. When he made that statement he was serving in the capacity of Foreign Minister. Do you consider that he incorrectly stated the foreign policy of Japan?
- A. I don't know quite well his meaning, but Konoye was Premier, and if Matsuoka thought such, the Premier controlled him, I think. Of course, we well know that Matsuoka was an extremist and a very dangerous person.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 62 -

- Q. There were a lot of extremists in the governing class of Japan, weren't there? During the period of 1930 to 1941?
- A. I don't remember quite well, but if you will answer me of any person then I will answer.
- Q. There were a lot of people in the governing class of Japan during that period who were of the same philosophy as is expressed in these quotations of Matsuoka and Tojo, and others, which I have just read to you, weren't there?
- A. I think there were some.
- Q. Don't you know that General Araki was representing the philosophy of the Army when he made statements and public utterances such as the one I have just quoted to you that he made?
- A. Yes, very often, and every morning when reading the newspapers I always frowned upon what he had to say. Generally, when I found the statements of Araki I did not read it. Most people such as myself did not.
- Q. Whether you liked it or whether you didn't there were many public statements made by government leaders during that period from 1930 to 1941 to the same effect as these quotations which I have just read to you, weren't there?
- A. Not many, but I remember Araki especially.
- Q. Don't you know that these public utterances, as represented in the quotations which I have just read to you, represented the foundation of the Japanese Foreign policy during that period from 1930 to 1941?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Do you have any opinion about it?
- A. I think it was not the Japanese policy, because the Emperor did not think it at all, but just to the contrary. He was always thinking deeply. Of course, there were some extremists, and extreme opinions were in the newspapers, but it was not the policy of our country.
- Q. When did the program of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere evolve?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 63 -

- A. I think it probably started about 1938.
- Q. Now, will you state as briefly as possible your conception or idea of what is meant by the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere?
- A. I think this idea was very nice, because all the people of Greater East Asia would be very happy not to be run by a special country, and free from aggressive power; free from other countries' financial effects, and to bring to greater East Asia a greater era, I think.
- Q. How was that program to be accomplished? How was it expected that you would accomplish that?
- A. At first we must have peace throughout the Greater East Asia, and all the nations should exchange everything as they like without any oppressive power.
- Q. How, did any nation or any people in the East Asia Sphere invite Japan to assume such a leadership?
- A. I remember in 1943 we held a meeting here in Tokyo with five or six representatives, and they talked quite freely on this idea.
- Q. Representatives of whom?
- A. China, the Philippines, Siam, Manchuria, Burma and India.
- Q. Those were representatives from the Nanking regime, and Japanese puppet governments, were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, Japan started out upon its program to put the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere into operation in the early 1930s, didn't it?
- A. I don't know quite well. There was one general who was very honest to speak of the Greater East Asia Idea, but only the voice was loud.
- Q. China didn't want any part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, did it, and resisted Japanese efforts to put it into effect?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 64 -

A. I don't know about China.

Q. You went to war with China in an effort to put it into effect, didn't you?

A. I went as Commander-in-Chief to China.

Q. You were fighting a war for Japan which was created by China's opposition to Japan's efforts to put its co-prosperity plan into effect, weren't you?

A. I don't think so.

Q. We'll talk about that some more tomorrow.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1630 P. M.)

(Shimada, cont'd) 29 January 1946, 1420-1615

- 65 -

Q. Before we leave the subject of the teachings of the ideology of Shintoism which we talked about on yesterday, I would like to ask you if you know that the Emperor recently issued an Imperial rescript renouncing the concept of his divinity?

A. On January 1; yes I know that.

Q. How did you learn about that?

A. From the newspapers.

Q. Are newspapers available to you here?

A. Yes, we get them every day.

Q. Then you also know that recently the Supreme Allied Commander caused an order to be issued requiring the discontinuance of the teaching of the concept of the divinity of the Emperor in Japanese educational circles, and the abolition of all books and literature which contained such teachings, don't you?

A. Yes, I know about that.

Q. Well, now, if a program of that nature hadn't been under way, in recent years, and if the Emperor and the public had not adhered to the principles of his divinity, what was the necessity of the issuance of an Imperial rescript denouncing that concept.

A. I think that was not necessary for educated persons like myself, but was for the lower class of people, and for the understanding of the American authorities; but for the educated people it was not necessary, and was for the benefit of the lower class of people in Japan.

Q. Regardless of whether or not the intelligent people of Japan ever believed in such a concept, don't you know it to be a fact that representatives of the military and other public leaders, in order to strengthen their hand and their influence of Japanese public opinion, aggressively revived an educational program in the early 1920s through public statements of public leaders, through the press and radio, and through the educational system, to the end of creating a belief in the lay mind that the Emperor was divine?

- A. In Shintoism the Divine God is not the same as in Christianity; Shintoism is ancestor worship. It is the worship of the ancestors of the Japanese people. Therefore, the Japanese Emperor is considered God only to emphasize the meaning that he is a perfect and powerful person. But it is not the true meaning of God, although sometimes it is perhaps misused.
- Q. Whatever may be the difference between the Japanese beliefs as to the meaning of divine and those of other peoples, what I am asking you is throughout the late 1920s to 1941, wasn't there an aggressive revival on the part of representatives of the military and other public representatives of the teachings of Shintoism? That can be answered yes or no.
- A. I don't think so about Shintoism.
- Q. Well, how do you account for the numerous public statements and public utterances made by the Japanese military leaders and government representatives expounding the principles of Shintoism during that period?
- A. I have doubt about the American opinion about Shintoism. Shintoism is a very poor idea; it is only ancestor worship, and at the same time we pray a blessing, especially for the lower people in the present time; as you know, in China many people go to the shrines to pray a blessing. It may be true that the leaders made such statements, but that is not the idea of Shintoism; therefore, I have doubt about the American opinion about Shintoism.
- Q. Then I gather what you are saying now is that many public leaders, representatives of the military, representatives of the government, and others, made many public statements and public utterances concerning principles which might formerly have been associated with Shintoism during this period that I spoke about, but that they were not talking about the original concept of Shintoism. Is that what you mean to say?
- A. I don't think so strictly speaking, because what they said had the origin in Japanese history. For example, Hakko Ichiu, the philosophy of the 8 corners of the universe coming under one roof, came down through history from Emperor Jimmu, but that is not the idea of Shintoism.
- Q. Explain as briefly as possible what you consider Hakko Ichiu to mean.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 67 -

- A. (Witness consults dictionary). I think it means what it says here: universal benevolence and good-will.
- Q. In other words, you say that these leaders, when they were making these public utterances during that period, were talking about the philosophy of universal benevolence and good-will. Is that right?
- A. The leaders who spoke during the late '20s misused the word Hakko Ichiu, and instead of using it in the strictest sense, they made up and stretched the philosophy to a broader meaning; they misused the true meaning, and misconstrued it to the public, and people.
- Q. But these public leaders did take the philosophy of Hakko Ichiu and used it for their purposes and as the basis for their public utterances in an effort to sway public thought into supporting their public programs during that era, didn't they?
- A. For their purposes, yes.
- Q. And that campaign to have the public become conscious of what they were construing as the old Hakko Ichiu philosophy and principles was intensified by the public leaders all through the period of 1930-1941, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think so. For myself I don't like Hakko Ichiu as they said it; there were many people who did not like the word as they used it. It was very bad.
- Q. I am not asking you about what you believed, nor am I asking you if they truly represented Hakko Ichiu. What I am asking you about is didn't they intensify their program by talking in public and expounding what they say was the philosophy of Hakko Ichiu during that period for their purposes? Didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You say you don't like the teaching of the philosophy of Hakko Ichiu. Which spiritual concept of life have you adhered to?
- A. I disliked the Hakko Ichiu in the way it was misused, but the true original word I liked, which means good-will and benevolence of the universe.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 68 -

- Q. Do you agree with the statement of policy by the Japanese Envoy which was presented to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in December of 1941, breaking off diplomatic relations with the United States to this effect: "It is the immutable policy of the Japanese government to enable all nations to find its proper place in the world, and that is the Heavenly task of the Japanese Empire."
- A. Yes.
- Q. That principle was the very foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which Japan adopted as a national policy, in previous years, was it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I believe if I understand you correctly that the true Hakko Ichiu philosophy and principles were the very foundation and basis for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the policy which I have just quoted to you as contained in the note to Secretary Hull; is that right?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that public policy was the basis for the international policy on the part of Japan which remained throughout the period 1929 through 1941, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know about the public policy, because I was not in a public position to know. I was not interested in politics.
- Q. But you believe it was, don't you?
- A. It may be so.
- Q. You know/<sup>when</sup> you were performing in your official capacity in the Operations Branch of the Navy that it was such a philosophy that it inspired your public service, don't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did that policy emphasize the principle "embrace the eight corners of the world under one roof"?



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 69 -

- A. There may have been some people who may have thought of Hakko Ichiu as part of the policy, such as General Araki, or Matsuoka, but the people in general did not think of it in that way.
- Q. But in any event you are sure that it was the public policy of Japan during those years that each nation should find its proper place and sphere in the world?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And it was that philosophy and belief which was the foundation of the so-called "new world order" movement which Japan began to sponsor in the late 1920s, 1929 through 1941, wasn't it?
- A. I think there was a new order sponsored by Prince Konoze in 1938. I am not sure because I don't have the proper material here.
- Q. Now, it was that philosophy that each nation should find its proper place in the world which was the basis of Japan adhering to the Tripartite agreement with Germany and Italy, wasn't it?
- A. I don't remember quite well. There may be such wording in the treaty, but I don't know quite well now.
- Q. Now, in the late '20s Japan had acquired special rights and privileges by virtue of peace settlements and treaties in Manchuria and Mongolia, had it not?
- A. I don't remember quite well; it may be so.
- Q. Don't you know you haven't enjoyed filling positions of public responsibility in Japanese affairs throughout the past decade without learning as a matter of fact that Japan had acquired special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia, in that time, by virtue of peace settlements and treaties?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Haven't you learned that?
- A. I don't remember anything before the Manchurian Incident, but after that I do know.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 70 -

- Q. Now, you have just spoken about the Manchurian Incident. Do you mean by that the war which broke out in Manchuria in September of 1931?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, at that time the population of Japan was increasing by about a million per year, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And Japan had long since found itself short of supplies, of raw materials, and food for its population, had it not?
- A. Yes, we had this problem all the time, not especially at this time.
- Q. And it was a matter of grave concern to those having to do with the formation of public policy as to how Japan should cope with that condition of scarcity, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think so. We always had the problem of an increase in population. Therefore, we always had some program about food, but it was not a great matter of concern. We were developing and finding sources of supply in Formosa, Korea, Hokkaido, etc.
- Q. Not at this particular time?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. Isn't it a fact it has been a matter of grave concern for many, many years?
- A. Yes, always we had such a problem, because the population was always increasing.
- Q. Do you recall a special conference which was held from June 27 to July 7 in 1927, and which was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia?
- A. No, I don't know.
- Q. What position did you occupy then?
- A. I was a Captain; Commanding officer of a submarine flotilla.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 71 -

- Q. What was the special assignment of that unit at that time?
- A. It belonged to the combined fleet for training.
- Q. Where was it based?
- A. The combined fleet was all around the Japanese bases, every naval port.
- Q. You did not attend this meeting?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you ever learn anything about it?
- A. No, I don't know.
- Q. During that period Manchuria and Mongolia embraced an area about three times as large as that of Japan, didn't it?
- A. But that did not count.
- Q. It was much larger than Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And it was inhabited by only one-third as many people as inhabited Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, but there were desert lands.
- Q. Now, its attractiveness didn't arise alone from the scarcity of its population, did it? It was a very fertile land also, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know well about this place, but I have heard that for Japan it was not so good, because the water was not sufficient for cultivation, although for beans it was very nice.
- Q. In any event, millions of Japanese people subsequently migrated to that area, have they not?
- A. Afterwards, yes. But they did not willingly go. Many were forced to go. The territory is not so good.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 72 -

- Q. They had to go somewhere, didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. As a matter of fact the area of Manchuria and Mongolia during that period was unrivaled elsewhere in the world in its wealth of forestry, minerals and agriculture, was it not?
- A. Yes, but transportation was not easy. There were many materials to be made useful.
- Q. In an effort to make them useful and accessible to Japan hadn't it developed the South Manchuria Railway Company a number of years before 1931?
- A. Yes, many years before. We took this over from the Russians in 1905.
- Q. By virtue of treaty rights?
- A. Yes, peace treaties.
- Q. The South Manchuria Railway Company pursuant to those treaty rights became the virtual government of Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. The railway company used to take care of the district rights near the railway property.
- Q. Now, Japan made quite a large investment in the development of the South Manchuria Railway Company? Did she not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And on the promise that it would be materially beneficial to China and Japan it made the largest single investment that the Country had ever made for the development of shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacturing, agriculture, and cattle raising, didn't it, namely- 4 million yen.
- A. Yes.
- Q. The South Manchuria Railway Company became the strongest organization in Japan, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, insofar as the South Manchuria Railway Company was empowered to undertake the administration of diplomatic policies and ordinary administrative functions in carrying out the policies of Japan, the company formed an organization which had exactly the same powers as the Governor General of Korea. Didn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 73 -

- A. In that point, I don't think so. We didn't have a Governor General in Manchuria itself, but we had one at Pt. Arthur. The Manchuria Railway Company was within the Kwantung State, which had a Governor General in charge of them, who was stationed at Port Arthur.
- Q. In any event, the railway company was empowered to undertake the administration of diplomatic functions, was it not?
- A. I think it may have had some influence on governmental matters, but they did not have the full power when they had the Governor General.
- Q. It was empowered to administer police functions, and ordinary administrative functions, was it not?
- A. They had police supervision in the very small districts near the railway stations, and they had small groups who were mostly Japanese, and they had their own police supervision.
- Q. In short, the railway company represented the interests of Japan in the territory over which it had jurisdiction, didn't it?
- A. Yes.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)

(Shimada, cont'd) 30 January 1946, 1250-1650 P. M.

-74-

Q. We were talking on yesterday about the development by Japan of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the enormous investment which had been made to this end. This investment alone, together with the various activities of the railway company, demonstrates the immense interest which Japan had in Manchuria and Mongolia at that time, doesn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And it had been the policy of successive administrations since Meiji to expand and continuously develop the new continental empire in that section, hadn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Japan's efforts in this respect had been constant during these years with the exception of the interruptions that were brought about by the constant changes in the diplomatic picture, as well as domestic affairs since the European War, hadn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what is meant by the Three Eastern Provinces?

A. I have heard the name of the three provinces, but I don't know exactly where they are situated.

Q. Don't you know that in China Manchuria is always referred to as the Three Eastern Provinces because of its administrative division into three provinces of Liaoning (or Feingtian) in the South; Kirin in the East, and Heilungkian in the North?

A. I know that Kirin is in Manchuria, but I don't know the other names, for they are Chinese sounds, but I think perhaps they may be in Manchuria.

Q. And China always referred to Manchuria as the Three Eastern Provinces?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time the integrity of the Chinese Government through its control of Manchuria through these three provincial governments was recognized by Japan, was it not?

A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 75 -

Q. All during this period when Japan's policy was to develop to the fullest extent its interest in Manchuria the Governors of these Three Eastern Provinces were also conscious of their interests in Manchuria and were also active in developing Manchuria independently, were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. And the progress made by these Three Eastern Provinces to the end of developing their interests in Manchuria affected in a most serious way Japan's program of developing its interests in Manchuria, did it not?

A. The governing of the Three Eastern Provinces was very difficult for the Chinese; therefore, Japan's power at that time was most desirable for Manchuria.

Q. My question is that the effort on the part of the Three Eastern Provinces to develop for their own purposes their interest in Manchuria was in material conflict with Japan's program of developing its interest in Manchuria and materially curtailed or interfered with Japan's program; didn't it?

A. I don't think so, because at that time China had no idea of producing the materials. Japan at that time got some special iron and beans. China at that time had no interest about iron, I think, and gave full rights to Japan willingly.

Q. We are talking about the late '20s when Japan was developing the South Manchuria Railway Company, and what I am asking you is this: You previously stated that the Three Eastern Provinces became conscious of the wealth of Manchuria and its natural resources, and were seeking to develop these resources for their own purposes; you agree with that, don't you?

A. Afterwards, it may be; yes.

Q. And to the extent that the Three Eastern Provinces were successful in developing the resources in Manchuria for their own purposes, it was in conflict with Japan's efforts to develop its own program in Manchuria, was it not?

A. At that time I think China had no thought to develop this.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 76 -

- Q. Do you mean that through that period Japan was able to put its program of developing its interest in Manchuria into effect without any difficulty so far as conflict of interests between the Three Eastern Provinces and Japan was concerned?
- A. I think so. Of course, Mr. Chang, the commander of the Three Eastern Provinces, was very much helped from China, and he sustained his position by Japanese power.
- Q. When did the Three Eastern Provinces begin to develop Manchuria or begin a program for the development of Manchuria which interfered with Japan's program? What period?
- A. I don't know quite well, but Mr. Chang was taken up by Japan just after the Japanese War and he grew up by and by with the help of Japanese power, and perhaps in 1920 Chang was very strong, and it was about this time he stood up by himself, and began to resist; he had acquired sufficient power to stand up by himself.
- Q. And it was then that a conflict of interest on the part of the Three Eastern Provinces and Japan developed, was it not?
- A. And at the same time Chang grew up he went to the center of China with that power; therefore, I don't know exactly the year when he was strong enough to go against Japan. I don't know the year.
- Q. Wasn't it about 1928?
- A. I think it was before that. Perhaps 1920.
- Q. 1920 to 1927?
- A. I think something like that.
- Q. Then that progress that the Three Eastern Provinces were able to make in putting their program of developing Manchuria for their own purposes into effect placed Japan in serious difficulty and disadvantage in its dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And resulted in failure on the part of successive Japanese Governments to make their program in Manchuria effective, didn't it?



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 77 -

- A. I think at that time Japan had no intention to set up another person, because it was very difficult to find another person to do this job, but to Chang we had always given advice.
- Q. But as Chang began to grow stronger and began to stand on his own feet, independent of support from Japan, this resulted in the failure of a number of Japanese governments in that period to successfully put their program of developing Japan's interest in Manchuria into effect, didn't it?
- A. When Chang came into power he began to take over the property and rights away from the Japanese people, especially in the Manchuria Railway area, and he oppressed the Japanese people so that they could not carry on a living.
- Q. When Chang came into power his policy which you describe as oppression and violation of Japanese rights in Manchuria resulted in Japan being placed in what it considered serious disadvantage in carrying on its program in Manchuria and Mongolia, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During this time Japan was recognizing the integrity or existence of China as a government in this area, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, during this period of 1920-1929 or '30 Japan materially increased its military force in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. In that point I don't know. I don't know the force of the army, because at that time I was on board; therefore I don't know the details.
- Q. You know that by 1930 Japan had substantially increased its military force stationed in Manchuria, don't you?
- A. I only know that Japan's troops in China should be only those troops which were agreed upon by the Japanese-Russian treaty, and I don't know of any large force of troops being landed for any special reason.
- Q. Don't you know that from the time of the Russian-Japanese treaty that Japan annually and gradually increased the number of troops it had stationed in Manchuria.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 78 -

- A. I don't think so. I think the treaty with China after they lost the Japanese War gave Japan rights to station troops there, and by the treaty we stationed troops there, but even after the Manchurian Incident we did not have many troops stationed there.
- Q. Now, during the period we have referred to when Japan was seeking to develop its program in Manchuria the policies of the Japanese Government were predicated upon the Hakko Ichiu philosophy we previously spoke about--that every nation be permitted to develop its influence in its proper field, weren't they?
- A. No, I don't think so. Hakko Ichiu was rather a new word at that time. In the time of the Manchurian Incident we did not have that philosophy. Some may have used it, but for myself I did not.
- Q. You did know, as a matter of fact, as you have previously stated, that Japan each year was confronted with the problem of balancing its food supply with its increased population of at least a million per year?
- A. Yes, but as I have said before, we also increased our cultivation in Hokkaido, Formosa and India, and we increased our production by using chemical fertilizer.
- Q. But you were concerned with finding additional food supplies constantly, weren't you?
- A. I don't know quite well at that time.
- Q. Don't you know that you had to find a place to live for this population that was increasing by a million per year?
- A. It would be better to find a place for them to live, of course, but I did not hear about a program then.
- Q. Now, it was with this background that the 9-Power Treaty, to which Japan was a party, was signed, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Japan considered this treaty materially reduced its special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia, didn't it?

(Shimada, con't)

- 79 -

- A. In that point, I don't know quite well, because when the 9-Power Treaty was settled I had no interest in politics, and I don't remember.
- Q. You know it didn't leave Japan as free to carry on its program in the development of Manchuria as it had previously been, don't you?
- A. Perhaps.
- Q. And don't you know that the military were quite displeased with this limitation which was placed on their program in Manchuria?
- A. I have no correct knowledge in that point.
- Q. Do you have any opinion about it?
- A. No, because I don't know the material facts.
- Q. Don't you know that public opinion in Japan was greatly aroused by the execution of that treaty?
- A. It may be so.
- Q. Don't you know that Japan considered that the rights which it had won in Manchuria by the Russo-Japanese War were greatly restricted by the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. As I have said I don't know the material facts; therefore I can't answer correctly, but it may be so.
- Q. You think it's so, don't you?
- A. I don't know quite well, because not knowing the facts it is not possible to answer correctly.
- Q. It is your impression that it is so from what you have learned subsequently of Japan's policies there, isn't it?
- A. At that time I was not in a high position, and didn't know the facts.
- Q. Don't you know that the Emperor called a conference of high officials of the army and navy to find a way to counteract this new situation created by the signing of the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. I don't know.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 89 -

Q. You don't remember the Emperor calling that conference?

A. I don't know.

Q. You never learned about it?

A. I don't know about it.

Q. Don't you know that by virtue of this treaty the Japanese people were precluded from migrating into Manchuria as they pleased?

A. I don't know.

Q. Don't you know that after this treaty was signed that the Chinese began to flow into Manchuria and in greater numbers than they ever had theretofore?

A. By my memory, the Chinese every year went into Manchuria, especially from the Chintow District, to cultivate or to work, and the Japanese used these Chinese for labor. Therefore, to get many Chinese was very convenient for Japan. About one million Chinese went to Manchuria to work for Japan.

Q. That was before Cheng came into power, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And after the 9-Power Treaty was signed the Chinese began to flow into the Three Eastern Provinces in greater numbers than they ever had before, didn't they?

A. I think that was because of the peaceful state in Manchuria, because before that it was very dangerous.

Q. But whatever the cause, they began to pour in in greater numbers after the 9-Power Treaty was signed?

A. I don't know. It was not the treaty, but the peaceful state of Manchuria.

Q. Whatever may have been the reason, the flow of Chinese into the Three Eastern Provinces increased annually in that period, didn't it?

A. I don't know.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 31 -

Q. But more and more Chinese came into Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, didn't they so populate Manchuria by 1929 that Japan considered that its acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia were prejudiced?

A. As I said before, it was very convenient for Japan to get many Chinese into Manchuria. The problem was the power of Chang who oppressed the Japanese. To get many people into Manchuria was not a problem.

Q. Now, let's get this straight. I am not asking you about the fact that when Japan first began to develop the South Manchuria Railway and its interests in Manchuria whether or not they may have needed Chinese labor under the circumstances. What I am asking you is this: after the Chinese began to flow into Manchuria in the numbers of several million a year during the period of 1929 to 1930, this began to cause concern to Japan about its interests in Manchuria, didn't it?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Do you mean to say that after the 9-Power Treaty was signed Japan was perfectly willing to have Chinese people over-run Manchuria?

A. Yes, because Manchuria was very much lack of labor. Japan made special arrangements to get Chinese people into our district.

Q. Do you mean Japan was willing to have the Chinese come in in numbers of three or four million a year?

A. Yes, for labor.

Q. Don't you know that Japan was quite concerned because it was not going to have any outlet for its people to migrate to if the Chinese came in and inhabited Manchuria to that extent?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 82 -

- A. At that time Japan did not want to send Japanese people to Manchuria. We had special rights there, and it was not necessary to send many people there because, as I said before, the Japanese people did not wish to go there willingly.
- Q. Do you recall being interrogated by Captain Robinson of the United States Navy in September of last year?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you recall telling him this on that occasion: "The fundamental cause of this past war I believe had roots in the Manchurian Incident. The Manchurian Incident, of course, originated from the Russo-Japanese War when we made so many sacrifices in Manchuria. This being the basis, Japan had to take Manchuria as Russia kept oppressing our army. Chosakurin's army took Manchuria but it was under Japanese orders. This was the start of the Manchurian Incident. I do not know the details but I believe that Japan was so pressed for space that she was more or less forced to take Manchuria." Did you say that?
- A. No, I did not say anything like that. I spoke in Japanese, and perhaps the translation was wrong.
- Q. Did you say this: "I don't know the details, but I believe that Japan was so pressed for space that she was more or less forced to take Manchuria?"
- A. No, I did not say anything like that. Perhaps I said that Japan is not so large a country, and perhaps it was better for us to take space, but I did not say it was forced to take Manchuria.
- Q. You didn't say that was the reason you took Manchuria?
- A. No.
- Q. But you did say you needed more space?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, didn't there come a time around 1928 or 1929 when Japan was ready to declare void the 9-Power Treaty?
- A. I don't remember.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 85 -

Q. You don't remember the arguments in government circles about Japan abandoning the 9-Power Treaty?

A. I don't remember. Isn't the 9-Power Treaty in effect?

Q. Its still in effect, yes, except of course you violated it. Do you remember when the Seiyukai Cabinet fell?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember anything about the regime of that Cabinet?

A. As I said, I was on board during this time, and I had no political interest at that time. Therefore, I don't remember.

Q. I would expect you to say that you don't like anything about that Cabinet or anything it did, but you don't mean to tell me now that you held the office of Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet under that Cabinet and didn't know anything about its existence?

A. No. I was on board and had no interest in politics.

Q. But you knew that cabinet was in office?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember that cabinet ever being in office in Japan? Do you know anything about its rise and fall?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You do know there was such a thing as the Seiyukai Cabinet, don't you?

A. Yes, I know the name, but when began and fell, I don't remember.

Q. Don't you know that Japan considered that it was the purpose of England and America through the 9-Power Treaty to crush Japan's influence in China?

A. I don't think that they felt that Japan would be crushed. That word is a little strong.

Q. In any event you know that Japan didn't like the 9-Power Treaty?

A. I think there was some inconvenience, because to coincide with 9 countries Japan must be sometimes inconvenienced, of course.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1630)

5 February 1946

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Rickey YAMAGUCHI, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 83 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5 day of February, 1946.

Rickey Yamaguchi

John Darsey

\*\*\*\*\*

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, EVELYN CORDELL, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Evelyn Cordell

\*\*\*\*\*

I, JOHN DARSEY, Attorney, International Prosecution Section, certify that on January 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, and February 1, 3, , 1946, personally appeared before me, SHIMADA Shigetaro, and according to Yamaguchi, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Place: Sugamo Prison

Date: 7/6/46

John Darsey



2498

Shimada  
31 Jan

36-9

CONTINUED INTERROGATION

- of -

SHIMADA, Shigetarō (Admiral)

Date and Time: 31 January 1946  
Place : Sugamo Prison  
Present : Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetarō  
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator  
T/S Rickey Yamaguchi, Interpreter  
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

(Shimada, cont'd) 31 January, 1946, 1450-1615 P. M.

- 84 -

- Q. On yesterday we were talking about the circumstances and conditions which existed in Manchuria immediately prior to September 1931. Will you tell us briefly and in your own way just what you consider to have created the Mukden Incident on the 19th of September, 1931?
- A. To begin with the Manchurian Incident, it occurred combustibly as a result of many instances of the more or less outrageous oppressions brought down on the Japanese nationals, causing an extreme irritation of feeling between the Japanese and the Manchurians. Chiang Hsueh Liang, son of Chang about which we talked on yesterday, was in power in Manchuria. It should be noted that the Japanese power in Manchuria had materiall expanded after having defeated the encroachment of Russia in Asia in Japan's self defense. In other words, it occurred when Chang Hsueh Liang thoughtlessly attempted to take away the Japanese prerogative acquired with blood-shed in war against Russia. As for Japan, it was proper and obvious that she must endeavor to maintain safety and security of the rights of Japan for her future.
- Q. Where is your diary?
- A. It was burned up by bombs in May of last year.
- Q. Have you written any memoirs?
- A. No, I have none.
- Q. Do you have any written documents, written evidence of your public career?
- A. I lost it all by fire during the war.
- Q. Everything was burned up?
- A. Everything.
- Q. You don't have any records?
- A. No, I wrote down something especially during my career as Navy Minister, but it was all burned up and I feel very inconvenienced.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 85 -

- Q. Now, you say that Japan, at the cost of serious blood-shed in the war with Russia, acquired certain rights and privileges in Manchuria; is that right?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that Japan naturally desired to develop and expand those rights?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that during the regime of Marshall Chang Tso-Lin, as he gradually grew stronger, Japan's efforts to develop its rights in Manchuria became prejudiced; is that right?
- A. In some points we coincided with Chang, although he utilized Japanese power for himself and to expand and develop himself; but we did not coincide with him when he leaned to the Central Government in China. Finally he became generalissimo of entire China and moved to Peiping.
- Q. Now, in the beginning of Chang's career in Manchuria Japan was able, because of his need for Japan's support, to keep his policies in line with the interests of Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes; also for Japan Chang was very convenient.
- Q. But as Chang began to develop strength and influence on his own and began to become sympathetic with the Central Government in China, conflict of interest developed between Chang and Japan, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the last years of Marshall Chang's regime he developed a policy which Japan considered to materially limit its rights and privileges in Manchuria, didn't he?
- A. I don't know quite well that program, but I think it was something like that.
- Q. Japan felt that Chang should have desisted from leading any support to the Central Government, didn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 86 -

- A. I don't know quite well in that point.
- Q. In any event Japan didn't like his leaning toward the central China government, did it?
- A. During that time Japan did not have much fear that Chang had very much leaning toward China, because during those times China was in a state of chaos, and there were few laws in central China itself and they made it very hard for Chang to go and establish himself in central China.
- Q. But after he defeated Chang Feng he became chief of the north militarists with the title of Great Marshall, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was about 1927 or 1928?
- A. Yes, something like that, but that means only in the northern part of China.
- Q. Now, it was then that Japan began to worry about Chang, his leadership and the Central Government, insofar as their rights and interests in Manchuria were concerned, wasn't it?
- A. I think by and by they did worry about Chang.
- Q. Now, in 1928 Chang suffered defeat at the hands of Kuomintang's army in the north, didn't he; that is, the army representing the government of Dr. Sun?
- A. Perhaps; there were many battles in China at that time, and this may possibly be true.
- Q. And didn't Japan advise him then to withdraw into Manchuria and to confine his efforts to the development of Manchuria?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, Marshall Chang didn't want to do this at first, did he?
- A. I don't know about that point.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 87 -

- Q. In any event, he followed Japan's advice and came to Manchuria and left Peking for Manchuria in June of 1928, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He arrived in Mukden and was killed the next day for an explosion which wrecked his train, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, it was the representatives of the very government which was urging him to leave China alone and to concentrate his efforts in Manchuria who were responsible for his death, wasn't it?
- A. I don't know in that point; I just know his death was caused by an explosion.
- Q. Don't you know that the Japanese caused the explosion?
- A. I don't think so. There were many movements in China at that time. Of course, Chang was a big man then; General Doihara knows very well about those matters in China. There were many persons who wished to kill Chang.
- Q. What is this General's name?
- A. General Doihara.
- Q. Sometimes he was advisor to Chang, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was he a Japanese advisor?
- A. Yes. Chang always had a Japanese advisor. At the time of the explosion the Japanese advisor was also killed.
- Q. Where was General Doihara at the time of this explosion?
- A. I don't know, but I think at that time he was in Japan.
- Q. From what you have learned about it, what is your opinion as to who connived to bring about this explosion in which General Chang was killed?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 88 -

A. I don't know; I think it was very skillfully planned. The train passed over the bridge, and the explosion occurred under the bridge. Therefore, it must have been very skillfully planned to have been successful, but as to who did it I don't know.

Q. Now, you have said Japan maintained advisors all through the years to Marshall Chang?

A. Yes.

Q. It was their purpose and policy to endeavor to persuade Chang to collaborate with Japan's efforts to develop Manchuria rather than to lend any support to a Central Government in China, wasn't it?

A. I think so.

Q. And you say those advisors constantly tried to persuade Chang to collaborate with Japan in its program of developing its rights in Manchuria, didn't they?

A. From the Japanese point of view it may be so, but Chang was the employer, and the advisors just worked for him. These advisors were not sent from Japan.

Q. Where did the advisors come from?

A. I think some of the advisors were from the Army as well as from civilians in Japan, and there may have also been advisors from other countries.

Q. The Japanese advisors were loyal Japanese subjects, weren't they?

A. Yes.

Q. After the death of Marshall Chang Tse-Lin his son, Chang Hsueh-Liang, became the ruler of Manchuria, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, he had the same national aspirations for a strong Central Government in China which his father had, didn't he?

A. I think so.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 89 -

Q. And he wanted to lend support of the unification of the powers in China, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when Marshall Chang's son came into power with those policies Japan became quite concerned about such influences penetrating into Manchuria, didn't it?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. You know that Japan strongly advised him not to lend support to a Central Government in China, don't you?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Anyway, his relations with the Central Government became greater and closer, didn't they?

A. It may be so; I don't know quite well.

Q. You know that in December of 1928 he accepted the national flag and declared his allegiance to the Central Government of China, don't you?

A. This is the first time I have heard about that.

Q. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Army, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And he was confirmed as Chief of the administration of Manchuria with the addition of Jehol, part of inner Manchuria, wasn't he?

A. It may be so.

Q. Don't you know that he was confirmed as the administrator.

A. I don't remember.

Q. You think so, don't you?

A. It may be so; I don't know quite well.



(Shimada, cont'd)

- 91 -

- Q. Now, during this period isn't it a fact that the reason Marshall Chang accepted Japan's support was because of his fear of Russia in the North?
- A. I don't remember quite well, but it may be so.
- Q. Japan resented the opening of railways by Marshall Chang in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. I don't know quite well.
- Q. Now, isn't it a fact that this difference in point of view between the China Central Government and Japan with respect to Japan's program in Manchuria brought about the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931?
- A. That was the main cause to start the anti-feeling between both countries.
- Q. And it resulted in this outbreak of hostilities on September 18, 1931, didn't it?
- A. As I said before, yes; I read in the newspaper that the Manchurian Incident was brought about like that.
- Q. All of the Japanese forces in Manchuria and some of those in Korea were brought into action simultaneously on the night of September 18, 1931, over the whole of South Manchuria Railway area from Changchung to Port Arthur?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The marshalling of troops over an area that large couldn't have been accomplished unless it had been anticipated by the leaders in charge of the troops, could it?
- A. At that time the situation was very irritated, and therefore the commanding officers must always be prepared.
- Q. Japan immediately occupied all of the principal points in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 90 -

Q. The Committee system of government was introduced and the Kuomintang Headquarters were established, weren't they?

A. Yes.

Q. The projection of the influence of the Central Government in this manner into Manchuria created a great deal of concern on the part of Japan as to its rights and privileges in Manchuria, didn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And this union of Manchuria with the Central Government resulted in publications and propaganda on the part of the China Central Government supporting a program of the recovery of lost sovereign rights and the abolition of inequitable treaties with respect to Manchuria, didn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Under these circumstances Japan began to increase its military forces in Manchuria, didn't it?

A. I don't know quite well; I think that it could not have been possible, because according to the peace treaties there should have been only a certain amount of men stationed there at that time.

Q. Japan violated every peace treaty to which it was a party in connection with Manchuria and the China Incident, didn't it?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Where was the Kwantung Army located at this time?

A. I don't know quite well, but in every station I think, and also in the Kwantung territory, Dairen, Port Arthur, and every main station along the railroad.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 22 -

- Q. Now, when hostilities broke out in Manchuria with the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, where were you stationed?
- A. I was on board as Chief of Staff of the combined fleet and we were attending to the ground maneuvers off Okinawa.
- Q. Did you take any part in supporting the hostilities in Manchuria at that time?
- A. I did not know about it at all. Not even the Chief of the General Staff knew; he was in the ground maneuvers with us.
- Q. Did you receive any orders after September 18, 1931, to support Japan's interests in the Manchurian Incident?
- A. No, we continued the same maneuvers. Only the Chief of the General Staff returned to Tokyo.
- Q. Now, how long did this war which broke out on September 18, 1931, continue?
- A. I think to the end of that year.
- Q. How was it settled?
- A. It was settled by and by. Finally the Manchurian Government was set up.
- Q. What government was that? Was that the puppet government of Japan?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then next came the Shanghai event?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Tell us about that.
- A. The Shanghai Incident broke out in January of 1932. Both Chinese and Japanese nationals were very agitated and irritated, and some Japanese nationals were killed. A naval landing force took off to protect the nationals, and the Chinese struck the landing force.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- Q. Japan welcomed a reason to occupy Shanghai, didn't it?
- A. No, it did not. We were very troubled about Manchuria at that time, and had no intention about Shanghai.
- Q. Did you participate in the Shanghai Incident?
- A. After the Incident, yes. After it broke out I received an order from the Chief of Staff and the Navy Minister to become Chief of Staff at Kure.
- Q. Do you remember the date of your orders?
- A. I think it was the first of February, or maybe the second, 1932.
- Q. What was the nature of your orders, or what did they tell you to do?
- A. There were no particular orders to send me to Shanghai; the orders designated me as Chief of Staff, and told me to go to Shanghai.
- Q. In what manner did you physically support the Shanghai engagement?
- A. Admiral Nomura, Commander of my Third Fleet, received the order to settle as soon as possible the incident, and without force; therefore we did not send armed forces at all. We just went quietly into the Waipo River.
- Q. Did you make preparations to transport forces to the territory in the event that should be required?
- A. No, we did not prepare for that. For that reason the area of the army forces was very little. It took more than one-half a month for the army to arrive in Shanghai; I think they arrived on the 18 or 19 of February.
- Q. You ultimately occupied the territory?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you drove out the Chinese?
- A. Yes.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)