


GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents



- (1) Box no. 2239
- (2) Folder title/number: (8)
Incoming Radios

(3) Date: Nov. 1946

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
020	n

(5) Item description and comment:
Secret


(6) Reproduction: Yes No

(7) Film no. _____ Sheet no. _____

NOV 1 to 15
1946

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

15 Nov 46

FROM : STATE DEPT LONDON
TO : CINCAFPAC
NR : 141750 Z (SENT STATE AS 9503 RELAYED TOKYO 4XX)

Following digest special article by Sir Paul Butler Far Eastern expert Royal Institute International Affairs appearing today's Manchester Guardian.

Belief Brit and US authorities that Jap nation would seek refuge in throne from humiliation of defeat and Govt in name of Emperor would provide only effective instrument through which Allies could administer Japan held well founded by developments in Japan to date. Pattern new Japan essentially American. Jap leaders steering unfamiliar course with obvious misgivings and reluctance but they cannot turn back. MacArthur has carried out with much ability instructions his Govt to use presurrender form of govt while at same time giving encouragement such democratic inclination as Jap people may acquire through such measures as Jap Bill of Rights.

Renunciation by Emperor of divine attributes purging of exponents of Militarist Nationalism and enactment new constitution. Re constitution which probably drafted MacArthurs Headquarters difficult share MacArthurs enthusiasm for article 9 for history last peace suggests renunciation sovereign rights by defeated nation unlikely be observed when victors no longer in position apply compulsion. Nevertheless constitution has merits of being charter on which Japs may lay foundations Democratic State. High praise due MacArthur for campaign political reeducation resulting in first free election Japan's history. Although Yoshida Cabinet probably fails satisfy confused aspirations Jap people new govt making all required gestures democratic reform and seems enjoy confidence Allied Headquarters.

30723

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

FROM: STATE DEPT LONDON NR: 141750 Z 15 Nov 46 CONT'D

On surface therefore political regeneration and Military Occupation Japan proceeding well as could be expected and MacArthur enjoys popularity among Japs such as few Occupation Military Commanders have experienced. But there portents in Jap political firmament which may have disquieting implications. Most disquieting is recent tendency representatives Allied Council Japan take sides in Jap Internal Politics should be DIATROU if ideological differences afforded Japs opportunity play off 1 great power against another.

Secondly practical democracy yet to take root method forced culture effective only if adequate controls remain until strongly developed. Finally several Jap Editorials have advocated new approach SINOJAP cooperation. SINOJAP goodwill is vital For Eastern security but in view disruption in China and Japans past record difficult to feel any confidence reestablishment Jap influence in China would not be used for subversive ends. Text being pouched Dept Tokyo.

GALLMAN

ACTION: DIPLOMATIC SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG, GOVT
SECT, CIV I & E OFF

30723

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO: 141750 Z
MCN: YA 75/14

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

14 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON)
TO : SCAP (PLEASE PASS TO STATE DEPT)
NR : TFGBI 515

"Summary conditions Korea Oct 16 through Oct 31.
1. Political. Following police and tactical troops dispositions one patrolling to restore order and guard against new disorders, and ominous quiet reigned throughout the Provinces at the beginning of the period, but as the month drew to its end further attacks on police and Korean officials of Mil Govt and sabotage of transport and communications occurred in widely separated areas, with many killed and injured on both sides and heavy damage to property. The centers of disorders were in the Kaeson area at the western end of the 38 parallel, in the nearby area southwest of Seoul, and in the Mokpo-Naju area in the southwest corner of the peninsula. At the same time stock was taken of the losses in the Taegu and Pusan areas at the beginning of the month.

With regard to the first area, the National Police Director was quoted as saying that some 40 police and 40 rioters had been killed and that property losses to the people were estimated at yen 120,000,000 to police installation at 110,000,000 and to Mil Govt Agencies 160,000,000 also that 3,782 people had been apprehended. Casualties in the Pusan area were put as 7 policemen killed and 34 wounded, 29 rioters killed and 84 wounded and Mil Govt personnel 10 wounded. Serious riots were no doubt averted in Seoul on 22 by the precautionary measures, including tank patrols, taken by the tactical forces and police acting on warning from friendly leftists that big scale riots were planned for that day.

30171

PRIORITY
Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 28

196

091.1X

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY



FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI (515)
14 NOV 46 COND'T

Thus when a mob of some 2,000 collected in the heart of the city bent on violent demonstration, they were easily dispersed.

While the animosity toward the police and certain elements in Mil Govt and the opposition to the rice collection are unquestionably the agitating elements of the trouble, there seems to be no doubt that the shaping of this discontent into violence and political hatreds has been the work of the Implacable Pak Heun Yung's gangs. Unrelated to the disturbances, but probably connected with recent administrative changes in Seoul National University, was a crippling strike of 150 doctors in the University Hospital on the 21. By the 24, 40 had returned to their duties, and defections from the strike continued, but the difficulty was still unsettled at the end of the month. Another strike of an economic nature was a short lived strike of ship Captains at Pusan on 17th.

The general reaction to the disorders has been shame and condemnation and a feeling of urgency for remedial measures, with different political blocs proposing to make their own investigations of the origins of the trouble. Acting on the suggestion of the Coalition Committee headed by Doctor MCXREM Kiu Sik and Lyuh Woon Hsung, General Hodge on the 23 invited the Committee to sit with an American Board composed of Generals Brown and Lerch, Doctor Unce and 3 others to look into the causes of the disturbances and make recommendations for corrective action.

The first action taken by this group, known as the joint American-Korean Conference, was an appeal on the 25th to the people, over the signatures of Doctor Kimm Lyuhand, Gen Brown, for reason, pcalo, mistrust of agitators and cooperation with the authorities to improve the situation. General Hodge issued a prior special release along the same lines on the 23.

30171

PRIORITY


Secret
-2-

Handling and transmission of literal plain text of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 16-C, 18-E, 53-A, 53-D (1) (2) (3), and 60-A (1) (2) (3) (4), AR 380-5, 6 March 1946.

COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR IANGDON) NR: TFGBI 515
14 NOV 46 COND'T

The conference next on the 26th drew up the topics into which it would inquire and on which it would make recommendations. These topics were presented by the Korean members as the causes of the disturbances, namely: (1) Enmity against the police, the presence of former Jap collaborators and of "interpreters" in Mil Govt, corruption of some Korean officials, and agitators against the welfare of Southern Korea;

(2) The rice collection and distribution programs, inflation and high prices, refugee problems and the slowness of economic recovery;

(3) Delay in information of Provisional Govt, discontent with administration of former Jap property, party influences and how to improve the govt.

The conference has been sitting daily, with qualified persons making reports and submitting evidence to it (a full report on the conference will be made when it completes its findings).

In this confused atmosphere Mil Govt went ahead with its schedule (October 17 to 29) elections for the 45 elective members of the Interim Legislature, and the full returns were in by the end of the period. Out side of 2 Letfists from Cheju Do and 12 Independents, all the successful candidates were members of the Rightist Bloc, among them several alleged former Jap Collaborators.

Although the elections were orderly and represented several weeks spade work by Mil Govt, dissatisfaction with them was voiced by the Coalition Committee and by the left. The latter claimed that insufficient time had been granted them for campaigning and that a campaign was out of the question in the circumstances, with all likely candidates under arrest or suspicion for alleged participation in the disorders.

30171

PRIORITY

Secret
-3-

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 515
14 NVO 46 COND'T

Confirmation by General Hodge of the elections was thus held in abeyance pending investigation of charges of unfairness and possible consideration of the reports of the elections prepared by the unofficial supes lakas despatched by the Coalition Committee.

The committee has also failed up the present to submit to General Hodge its recommendations for appointive members. On the 18th General Lerch defined the legislative measures he would veto: Matters affecting the American High Command, laws putting the burden of collecting rice on Mil Govt but the distribution of rice in Korean hands, and laws endangering Korean economy.

Party politics were relatively inactive during the period. However, the consolidation of the moderate and Nationalistic Leftists Groups into a single "Socialist Labor Party" under Lyuh and supporting the Coalition Committee continued. By this connection it is interesting to note that Professor Paik Nam Ury, Chairman of the new Democratic Party, and Kang Jip, Chairman of the Disident Communist Party (the Cleansed Peoples Party is the 3rd component of the merger), went to Pyongyang on the 18 possibly to get the approval of their action from the North Korean Democrat Kim Il Saong and Kim Doo Borg, who are said by Lyuh, Woon Hyung to be Nationalist-minded and opposed to the subversive anti-American Communist represented by Pak Heun Ying in the South and Kim Moo Chong in the North.

Following his discharge from the Hospital, Lyuh again took refuge from positive action at a country retreat, taking part in the Korean American conference only by proxy (he however attended the conference for the 1st time on November 8). Reports were apparent that a political group was gathering around Doctor Kim, Chief of Coalition Committee supporters, but there was no concrete evidence of this.

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 515
14 NOV 46 COND'T

The Committee, however, is unmistakably developing into a group of personalities of the same mind in national affairs which might be the nucleus of a strong new party, and this mind would seem to be definitely left of center. Desertions from the Rightist Hankook Democratic Party continued, 54 officials having resigned en Bloc on the 22.

The prosecution of the Communist party counterfeiting case rested its case on the 21, demanding life imprisonment for 4 and long prison terms for 6 defendants.

2. North Korea. Unconfirmed and obviously exaggerated reports tell of the presence and political utilization in North Korea of large bodies of 8th Route Army Troops who fled across the Yalu following the capture of Antung by the Nationalist Chinese Forces. The disposition of these troops by the Soviet Command would seem to warrant the attention of both Chinese and American Govts, the American Govt only because of its legal responsibility for bands or individuals who might drift into South Korea. Reliable reports indicate that a large Korean Armed Force, perhaps as high as 300,000, loyal to the Communist Party is in process of being organized in North Korea. A special Peoples Tribunal was reported to have begun the trial of Pro-Japs at Shongjin (Saisin). The party of distinguished Koreans sent on a sightseeing tour of the Sov Union was reported to have returned to Pyongyang on the 21. There were two quite heavy exchanges of mail between the 2 zones in the period, with the Northbound mail 3 times as large as the Southbound. The latter indicated close censorship and its guarded nature revealed nothing important.

3. Military Government and Economic. The food ration in Seoul for the period October 16 to 26 was 120 grams flour and 3-tenths hops barley; for October 26 to November 6 the same flour, 1 hop wheat and 3-tenths hop rice.


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PRIORITY
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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 515
14 NOV 46 CONT'D

The period during which individuals might transport rice for personal consumption was extended through Nov and until the normal rice ration could be distributed.

Price of black market rice was down 50%. Reports of crops indicated good upland grain harvests, estimated 10% above normal, and rice harvest 15 to 20% below normal. The flow of Jap refugees from the North dwindled, only 3761 being in our camps at the end of the month. During Oct 24,000 tons wheat under the Civilian Supply Program arrived in South Korea, bringing the total of such food-stuffs since May to 124,508 metric tons. Six more ship-loads are expected soon.

Mail between South Korea and the Philippines was inaugurated on the 20th. Ordinance 116 of Oct 8 revising the customs laws and reducing import tariffs to a maximum of 10% advalorem was promulgated.

On the 17th the French Govt requested and was granted clearance for a 3 man Consular Staff of Seoul to arrive before the end of the year.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to WASHINGTON (State Dept).

30171

PRIORITY
Secret
-6-

TOO : 130101 Z
MCN : TJC 65/13

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY

14 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : CINCPAC (PASS TO WG-2 FOR PASSING TO STATE
DEPT WITH INFO COPY TO UNITED STATES EMBASSY
MOSCOW)
NR : TFGPI 516

Cite W 86548 DFG 022003/Z May.

Korean press analysis for period 041800 to 101800 Nov. Many were the speculations and comments that filled the press this period after the official announcement from Department of Public Information Chosun Ilbo (Korean Daily News-Right) 6 Nov that the opening of the Legislative body would be postponed until possibly the 1st of December.

Dong A Ilbo (Oriental Daily News-Extreme Right) 6 Nov came out with the sure tip that a new election would take place with an elaborate system of selecting 10 members from the collision committee, 5 from repatriate groups, 2 from right and left womens groups, and several from different political organizations.

Dr Rhee, Syng Mand and his Hankuk Democratic Party 6 Nov in Dai Dong Shinmun (Great Eastern News-Extreme Right) offered the only expression of faith and cooperation with the elected members as Dr Kim, Kuu Gick same day sent his criticism, printed in Han Sung Ilbo (Seoul Daily-Right), suggesting a new election and Minju Ilbo (Democratic Daily-Right) 7 Nov reported the new progressive partys statement of agreement.

The Leftist peoples front and communist party in Diklip Sinbo (Independence News-Left) 5 and 6 Nov continued to attack the Legislative Body and the elected

30160

PRIORITY
Restricted

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COPY NO.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY



FROM: CG USAFIK NR: TFGBI 516 14 Nov 46 CONTD

members while the Rightist Dong A Ilbo 9 Nov printed Dr Kims report on "The specific illegal aspects of the election in Seoul" and also the election supervisors reports that in the Kangwon Do Province at least, the National Association for the rapid realization of Korean Independence completely managed the election in a most illegal manner according to Ordinance 118. Mr Lyuh, Woon Hyung announced in Cha Yoo Shinmun (Korean Free Press-Left) 7 Nov that until political prisoners are released and a police reform takes place a successful Legislative organ cannot be established.

Further political news includes the reports in Han Sung Ilbo 8 Nov and other papers 7 Nov of Paik, Nam Uns return and from North Korea and his immediate activity toward merging the Leftist Social Labor Party, already a merger of 3 Leftist Parties, with the South Korean Labor Party, a merger of the extreme Leftists of the mentioned 3 parties. Seoul Shinmun (Seoul Daily News-Left) 10 Nov reported both Paik and Lyuhs efforts toward a single Leftist element. A new surge toward independence was evident with the reports of 2 unofficial Korean women representatives to the United Nations General Assembly, Mrs Pak, Ir Duk and Louis Im, both presenting Koreas desire for independence and abolishment of the 38 parallel division in Dong A Ilbo 10 Nov. This trend was furthered by rumor that Russia has been making overtures for reconvening on the US-USSR joint commission as reported in Seoul Shinmun 5 Nov and Doklip Sinbo 10 Nov printed both Lyuhs statement and the Korean Communist Party statement regarding their determination to work for fulfilment of the Moscow decision through a successful joint commission. The joint US-Korean

30160

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY



FROM: CG USAFIK NR: TFGBI 516 14 Nov 46

conferences regarding the causes and preventative measures for the disturbances in South Korea have been concentrating on police reforms according to reports in Seoul Shinmun 7 and 6 Nov. Same date same days commented on the statements made by the Metropolitan Police Chief telling the police to be courteous and cooperative toward the people and not to assault them or mistreat them. The police also reported investigation of policemen with the Department who have been guilty of crimes. More disturbances were reported in Chosun Ilbo 5 Nov at Kangwang at Yongok Police Station and the Jesan Taiuk Bo (3rd Topic News-Neutral) 6 Nov reported a student-police clash at Kwangju while Wangsung Ilbo report Martial Law was declared in Mokpo 5 Nov.

Kyeng Hwang Shinmu (Urban and Rural News-Right) 7 Nov and other papers reported on that day as celebrating the Red Revolution Day with Dobkil Sinbo pointing out connection of the Glorious Red Revolution to ultimate Korean liberation.

Miscellaneous news included an editorial in Chosun Ilbo 5 Nov regretting the lack of a diplomatic organ in Korea to deal with Korean-Chinese relations and other foreign relations. Dai Dong Shinmu (Great Eastern News-Extreme Right) reported 5 Nov that 10 Young Mens Organization of the rapid relaxation of Korean independence had joined together to form the General Youth League.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, STAT & RPTS SECT, DIPLOMATIC
SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to WAR (G-2 for passing to State Dept with Info copy to US Embassy Moscow.)

30160

PRIORITY

Restricted

TOO: 130437

MCN: TJC 63/13

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

14 Nov 46



FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSPR) (WILLOUGHBY)
TO : CINCPAC (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE),
(PASS TO USAFIK)
NR : WCL 28937

UP Seoul 11 Nov: Lt Gen Hodge, American Commander in Korea, denied today "Propagandists" charges that the United States was attempting to turn Korea into an American Colony. In a statement to Koreans analyzing "Recent propaganda documents originating from subversive elements and agitators," he commented on 7 "Basic lies being told by agitators in your midst." The 7 lies were statements that the United States was colonizing Korea, that it was building bases in Korea, that it was protecting "Pro-Japanese" policy, that the American Occupation was blighting a future Korean Government with debt, that occupation authorities were building up trade and resources monopolies, that the United States was hoarding and/or shipping grain from Korea and that the Interim Legislative Assembly would be a tool of the Military Government.

Mark Gyan, Chicago Sun correspondent, Tokyo 11 Nov: It will surprise few Americans in Seoul if Gen Hodge this week voids, partly or wholly, Korea's first "Free and Democratic" election. If it comes, his action will be prompted by a wave of protests which maintain that last week's American sponsored election had been a travesty on Democratic procedure . . . the most vigorous of the protests came from Dr Kimm, chosen by the United States Army as the mainstay of the Interim Legislature . . . and of any future Government that Korea might have . . . according to Kimm, in Seoul 2 of the 3 men elected helped to whip up Korean support for the Japanese war effort . . . the election was rushed through in such haste that in some villages visited by this correspondent election notices were not posted

30205

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

-1-


192

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY



FROM: WASH (WDSPR) NR: WCL 28937 14 NOV 46 CONT'D

until the day before the election. In other cases no notices had been posted at all, the head men merely consulting friends on the village choice. By coincidence, the village head men were usually elected.

PARKS

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG,
GOVT SECT, CIV I & E OFF, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to CG USAFIK (PERSONAL FOR HODGE) for information.

30205

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-

TOO: 131533 Z
MCN: SA-130-13

*970
700
Circulate
7/26*

19

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
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INCOMING MESSAGE



UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

14 Nov 46

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA RO)
TO : CINCPAC (PASS TO C I&E FOR NUGENT)
NR : WCL 28971

Reourts Oct 7271, 7121, and 7209 and Sept TT 7079.
Re AFPAC item 25, TT 7271, 31 Oct resume of action
to date as fol: Our WD-1 TT 7079, 25 Sept, gave synopsis
of "This is America " series of shorts we wish to adapt.

Your reply AFPAC item 1, TT 7121, 3 Oct, and 2
pictures, wanted scripts and dupe negative on rest. Our
reply presumably not recd by you, was "There Seems To Be
A Misunderstanding." These pictures are to be adapted here
and English pilot prints fwded to you, including the ne-
gative and scripts.

Re AFPAC item 39, TT 7209, 18 Oct, "Power Unlimited"
and "Port of New York" already in work. Assumed you want
remaining 4 pictures adapted. Please confirm priority.

NO SIG

ACTION: CIV I & E OFF
INFORMATION: GOVT SECT

30198

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED


TOO: 131848 Z
MCN: YA-96-13

191

3.2.1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC BBS
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

14 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (WDSPR)
TO : CINCPAC (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE) (PASS TO USAFIK)
NR : WCL 29190

W H Chamberlin, in todays Wall Street Journal said:
A prolonged deadlock has prevailed in the administration
of Korea. We hold the southern part, the Russians the
northern part. A Far Eastern expert with whom I recently
discussed the Korean situation remarked with a smile that
the American showing had not been overly brilliant, but
that the Russians had been so much worse that we came
out fairly well on a comparative basis. Over half a
million Koreans have fled from the Soviet sector into
the American part of Korea. Some difficulties of American
Military administration have grown out of Korean inexpe-
rience in self-govt. Others are a result of conspicuous
understaffing. The assumption in the beginning had been
that both we and the Russians would pull out fairly quickly,
leaving the Koreans to manage their own affairs. This
assumption has not been justified. One of many examples
of understaffing was the placing of large corporations
administering perhaps \$100,000,000 worth of
sequestered Japanese assets, under the charge of an Officer
and 2 sergeants. Unless the outlook for an agreed mutual
withdrawal from Korea improves, we should strengthen our
Military Govt in numbers and in quality.

WILLOUGHBY PARKS

30439

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO: 140139 Z
MCN: SA 105/14


184

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

BBS
CS

INCOMING MESSAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE



FROM : WAR (WDSPR) NR: WCL 29190 14 NOV 46 CONT'D

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG,
GOVT SECT, CIV I & E OFF, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to CG USAFIK (Personal to Hodge) for
information.

30439

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO: 140139 Z
MCN: SA 105/14

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

970
BBS
cs
EJR

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

13 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : CINCPAC (PASS TO WARCOS)
NR : TFYMG 3067

With increasing participation by Korean officials in programs incident to the objectives of the occupation and establishment of a sound Korean economy, as directed by SWCC, it will be necessary and desirable from time to time to have a Korean accompany WD personnel to Wash for consultation with War and State Dept and other Govt agencies on official business of USAMGIK. Request such Korean personnel be authorized to use available military transportation on Army travel orders on same basis as civilian employees of WD. Further request allocation to this command of \$10,000 to cover necessary living expenses of Korean officials of USAMGIK on temporary duty in US. Prompt approval of this request is urged. It is understood that prior clearance for travel of Korean official will be obtained in each case.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1,
G-2, G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to WARCOS for Action.

30011

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOO: 130420 Z
MCN: TJC 33/13

Secret

EJR
7/11
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COPY NO. 37

176

230

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

12 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : SCAP (PASS TO WAR AND STATE DEPT)

NR : TFYMG 3062

This message in 3 parts.

Part 1: Urgently request that WD give immediate attention to a budget allocation for the implementation of the tuition-free scholarships obtained by the Korean Educational Commission for Korean students. Budget must provide for travel and maintenance grants for at least 50 Korean students and technicians to enter American Institutions on a Govt student program to commence Sept 47. Program will be administered by International Exchange of Persons Div, State Dept, on a reimbursable basis as per agreement with Assistant to Sec State Hiesdding and WD.

Part 2: If provisions of full rights bill for use of Foreign Liquidation Commission loan can be applied Korea, allocation for Korean student program desired request you obtain interpretation and inform regarding legal qualifications for use Foreign Liquidation Commission funds.

Part 3: Widespread publicity already given to activities of the Korean Educational Commission in the US and Korea will cause great embarrassment to USAMGIK if no funds are allocated for use of Korean students by Sept 47. In view of known progress of Russian student program in North Korea failure of WD to allocate funds will prove doubly serious since American good faith and cultural good will may be challenged.

NO SIG

29596

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 20

172

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFYMG 3062 12 Nov 46 CONT



INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1,
G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to WAR AND STATE DEPT.

29596

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOO : 120645 Z
MCN : TJC 35/12

Secret
-2-

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the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs
16-C, 18-E, 53-A, 53-D (1) (2) (3), and 60-A (1) (2) (3) (4), AR
380-5, 6 March 1946.

COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



Confidential
ROUTINE

11 Nov 46

FROM : WASHINGTON (STATE DEPT)
TO : CINCPAC (POLAD)
NR : WAR SVC 7046 (TOO: 11101730 Z)

As indicated in embtel 4096 Nov 8, Zhdanov's speech Nov 6 is one of most revealing pronouncements made by Soviet leader re present economic plight of country despite its obvious sophistry and Bolshevik doubletalk.

Audience at Bolshoi Theater received speech with marked lack of enthusiasm which gave impression they fully realized real significance black picture as painted directly or between lines. General tenor of speech in text as well as emphasis given by speaker may be summed up as follows: You may think that life is most difficult here but you ought to see how bad life is in capitalist countries and how much the people are suffering in those countries; your govt doing something to help, others are not.

Zhdanov emphasized the "Political and economic crises" in US, UK and other capitalist countries and claimed that in contrast Soviet Union had no such crises. In order to prove this point he used such tricks as a false comparison between production in US and USSR, stating that total US production 1946 was 1/3 less than total production 1943, while in USSR civilian production for first 3/4 1946 compared to same period 1945 had increased 19% and average daily carloadings during same period had risen by 12%. It will be noted

29396

ROUTINE
Confidential
-1-

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COPY NO.

167

092

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



Confidential
ROUTINE

FROM: WASHINGTON, NR: WAR SVC 7046, DTD 11 NOV 46, CONT'D

that for American figures total production is used and that cited for USSR is only civilian production.

Despite Zhdanov's effort to prove that crises only arise in capitalist states, entire speech is admission of grave economic, political and ideological crises now taking place in Soviet Union.

He makes it clear that severe hardships face Soviet people in overcoming difficulties brought about by the war, that they all must tighten belts for indeterminate time, all must work harder, and makes it clear that tens of thousands of people who are either not now working or have white collar jobs will be forced into factory work in order to try fulfill 5-year capital investment plans. While Zhdanov did not say so, it was clearly implied that recent measures of depriving various categories of adults, particularly women, of ration cards unless they were engaged in useful work were measures taken to force these persons into factories. Furthermore, his reference to redistribution of manpower was confirmation of fact that many white collar workers in bureaucracy, including that of collective farms, are being dismissed, thereby deprived of ration cards, and thus forced to seek employment in factories. These admissions tend confirm low productivity of labor, failure of production in many industries to come up to plan, and lack of enthusiasm on part of masses to enter factories and get behind five year plan to produce goods which in general will not alleviate their individual plights.

As indication of hard pull ahead, he reiterated

29396


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Confidential
-2-

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



Confidential
ROUTINE

FROM: WASHINGTON, NR: WAR SVC 7046, DTD 11 NOV 46, CONT'D

grown up in recent years and how, despite 29 years of Marxian inoculations, the serum has not cured basic trait of human nature to look out for oneself first.

Speech as regards internal economic situation was most defensive in tone and was obviously given for purpose of trying to quell discontent and disillusionment of masses caused by recent decrees and actions of govt by trying to give them some solace in thought that despite hard times they were better off than anybody else in world. Despite explanations given, it is not felt that speech which emphasized sacrifices ahead will raise morale to any extent.

In the international section of speech, the principal economic fabrication was the reiteration of Soviet opposition to the internationalization of Danube and "Unjust principle of equal opportunity" which Zhdanov stated signified in reality desire of economically powerful countries to enslave small countries. He, of course, made no mention of heavy Soviet reparations or establishment of 50-50 Soviet-sattelite companies which in fact are endeavoring to monopolize principle industries and "Enslave" former enemy countries.

ACHESON

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

29396

ROUTINE

Confidential
-4-

TOO: 102021 Z
MCN: USFA 11/11

EO Circulate

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
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

BBS
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE

9 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO WAR G-2 FOR PASSING TO STATE
DEPT WITH INFO COPY US EMB MOSCOW)

NR : TFGBI 509

Cite W 86548 DTG 022003 Z May. Korean Press analysis for period 281800 Oct 031800 Nov. The election results were in and all papers 31 Oct reported the names of 3 candidates elected from Seoul with Dai Dong Shinmun (Great Eastern News-extreme right) stating all 3 belonged to extreme rightist Hankuk Democratic Party. Seoul Shinmun (Seoul Daily News-right) 3 Nov printed the names and party affiliations of all 45 members elected to the legislature from South Korea, extreme right political thinkers in the majority. Cha Yoo Shinmun (Korean Free Press-left) 30 Oct, Han Sung Ilbo (Seoul Daily-right) same day, and Je Sen Teuk Bo (3rd Topic News-neutral) 1 Nov all commented on inferior quality of members elected, expressed regrets that the majority were a political extreme, and put great hopes on the 45 members to be appointed by Mil Govt with assistance of Unification Committee as announced in Minju Ilbo (Democratic Daily-right) 31 Oct. Kyeng Hyang Shinmun (Urban and Rural News-right) 1 Nov printed the Socialist Democratic Party criticism of the elected members which stated that there were many pro-Jap and National traitors among the candidates and also printed the Unifications Committees clarification of the facts that qualifications of elected members will be reconsidered by the legislature when it convenes and that any persons with pro-Jap taint will not be permitted to sit in the legislature according to ordinance 118.

28221

ROUTINE
Restricted
-1-

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143


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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE



FROM: CG USAFIK NR: TFGBI 509 DTD: 9 NOV 46 CONT'D

Doctor Rhee, Syng man exploded a new idea upon the international scene in his speech printed in all papers 29 Oct demanding that the Yalta Pact and Moscow Decision be ignored as they violated the spirit of the Cairo Pact. This theme was picked up by other Korean grps and 30 Oct Kyeng Hyang Shinmun reported that the Korean Laborers and Farmers Party issued the same demand, Chsun Ilbo 2 Nov reported the telegram sent to the four powers by the Hankuk Democratic Party requesting the cancellation of the Yalta Pact and Moscow Decision. Dong Ilbo (Oriental Daily News-extreme right) 29 Oct " Doctor Rhee as further stating that General Hodge was having difficulty in fighting the Communists here for fear of offending Soviet Russia and all papers printed Rhees statement of refusal to participate in the legislature but desire to serve Korea as a common man.

The economy of Korea was commented upon in Han Sung Ilbo 31 October as it was HUGWTED that all breweries were forbidden to make sake due the rice shortage and Kyeng Hyang Shinmun reported General Lerch's press conference 29 Oct dealing with the rice problem. Dai Dong Shinmun 31 October editorialized on the Korean problem of more imports than exports and the fact that many of the imports are not the necessities guaranteed by Mil Govt and Chosum Ilbo (Korean Daily News-right) 30 Oct commented upon the notorious illegal trade between China and Korea off Inchon.

The riots in South Korea continued to receive much comment in the press as Han Sung Ilbo 29 Oct printed a letter sent to Sec Byrnes from the Korean-Chinese Commission in United States reporting that many rioters were escaping punishment. Soklip Shinbo (Independence News-left) printed National Police Chief Cho, Byong Oks report on deaths and other facts of the riots in the South and same paper 1 Nov printed the report of the Peoples Party Investigating Committee that spent 10 days in Taegu investigating causes of the riots and concluded than the reasons lay with peoples deep rooted hatred of the police and Military Govt and the lack of rice among the people.

28221

ROUTINE
Restricted


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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE



Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM: CG USAFIK NR: TFGBI 509 9 NOV 46 CONT'D

Seoul Shinmun 2 November and 3 November reported more attacks on police stations in Cholla-Namdo Province by thousands of people.

30 October all papers printed General MacArthur's annual report on Korea with favorable comment regarding the parts pertaining to the desire of all Koreans for independence and abolishment of the 38 parallel.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG,
GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to WAR (G-2 FOR PASSING TO STATE DEPT WITH INFO COPY US EMB MOSCOW).

NOTE: This message delayed due to service.

28221

ROUTINE
Restricted
-3-

TOO: 060510 Z
MCN: TJC 35/06

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

JLR
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Earl Spief

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
ROUTINE

8 Nov



FROM : WASHINGTON
TO : CINCAFPAC
NR : WAR 85091

Reurads ZX 05427 and ZX 09684 and ourads WX 95711 and WX 96076. Acquisition of sites for permanent construction is subject. Reference para C of ZX 05427, what action is to be taken on islands formerly Japanese mandates or former portions of Japanese Empire, the following action may be taken:

In those areas where Chief of Engineers has real estate responsibility, Div Engineer, Western Ocean Div will perform real estate functions. Theater Commander will perform same functions in other areas. Acquisition procedure will be as follows:

A. Fee title should be obtained to land where construction is permanent.

B. Where temporary construction is contemplated, renewable 1 year leases with right of cancellation by US will be obtained.

C. Diligent search will be made to determine persons having interests in land, appraisal of realty made, and negotiations instituted with proper parties. The highest form of conveyance will be obtained.

D. Payments for activities and acquisitions connected with occupation will be made by Japanese Govt as occupation costs. Payments for lands acquired, other than in connection with occupation, will not be made until necessary license therefor is obtained from Treasury Dept. WD endeavoring to secure license at this time.

28693

ROUTINE
Confidential
(1)

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COPY NO.

3

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
ROUTINE

FROM WASHINGTON NR WAR 85091 9 NOV 46 CONT'D

Further advice in regard to letter will be furnished you in the near future.

E. If deemed necessary, Theater Commander may, under general powers as Commander of Occupation Forces, cause the local enemy Govt to make available such interest in its sovereign or owned lands as may be required, or cause it to procure land and transfer title to same to the US, subject US Govt policy, including possible US commitments to allied or other Govts respecting such matters. In such cases, prior to occupancy, detailed appraisal reports should be made for use if and when claim is presented or ownership disputed.

F. Established procedures for acquisitions of land will be followed so far as practicable.

G. The ultimate disposition of the land and any Military installations thereon will depend upon the terms of any international agreement or treaty of peace.

H. For purposes of permanent construction, it may be presumed that any former Japanese mandates or possessions listed in US Overall Base Plan will come under the exclusive and permanent control of the US.

I. The Ryukyus are not considered in the above discussion, being handled separately.

J. The Division Engineer, Western Ocean Division or Theater Commander authorized to proceed with negotiations for acquisitions of necessary lands.

NO SIG

28693

ROUTINE
Confidential
(2)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
ROUTINE

FROM : WASHINGTON NR : WAR 85091 9 NOV 46

ACTION: ENGR OFF

INFORMATION: G-4

ADDED DIST : COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3,
GOVT SECT, GEN PROC SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT,
CIV PROP CUST

28693

ROUTINE
Confidential
(3)

TOO: 081950/Z
MCW: YFB 5/09

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
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INCOMING MESSAGE



Restricted
ROUTINE

8 Nov 46

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA ES)
TO : CINCPAC
NR : W 85003

Japanese agrarian reform is subj.
Fol are questions raised at recent meeting
of FEC subcommittee. Would appreciate answers here-
to for use by US members of said subcommittee.

1. Why is the limit on land to be retained
by a landlord in Hokkaido 12 cho as compared with
3 cho outside of Hokkaido when, according to Japan-
ese statistics, land outside of Hokkaido is only
about twice as productive per acre as land in
Hokkaido?

2. Will the govt subsidy be paid on all
land purchased from landlords under the land reform
program, in excess of the 3 or 12 cho to be re-
tained by such landlords? If not, on how many cho
of land will the subsidy be paid?

3. How were the average prices to be paid
per cho of land by cultivator to the landlord
arrived at? Is there any statistical basis for these
figures?

4. Why was it decided that, in any future
renegotiation of purchase contracts, purchasers
payments should be allowed to go as high as 1/3
of the gross yield of land, when the present purchase
prices, authorized over 30 years, would appear,
at present crop prices, to constitute about 3 per-
cent of the gross yield of the land?

28144

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380-5, 6 March 1946.

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
133

FEC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RLJ
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Restricted
ROUTINE

WASHINGTON RADIO NER W 85003 OF 8 NOV 46 CONTINUED:

5. Does not the provision allowing landlords to retain land in excess of 3 or 12 cho under certain circumstances constitute a substantial escape clause? How will SCAP prevent the Japanese Govt from allowing landlords to frustrate the intent of the land reform plan as a result of the provision?

NO SIG

ACTION: NAT RES SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG,
GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

28144

ROUTINE

Restricted

T00: 072116 Z
MCN: YC 24/08

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE

7 Nov 46

FROM : CG 24TH CORPS
TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)
NR : TFGCG 524



The following press release is being made here on 7 Nov at noon: "Lt Gen John R Hodge announced today that he had received from the Soviet Commander in north Korea under date of 26 Oct an answer to the American letter of 12 August in which Gen Hodge had clarified the position of the American Delegation to the Joint US-Soviet Commission, and had invited the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul to resume negotiations under the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Commander discussed frankly the attitude of the Soviet Delegation concerning the consultation of democratic parties and organizations by the Joint Commission, and stated that the Soviet Delegation wishes to return to carry out fully the Moscow decision. His letter recognizes the right to freedom of expression by Koreans in presenting their views to the Joint Commission. However, it did not completely resolve the differences between the 2 Delegations on the matter of consulting democratic parties and organizations.

Gen Hodge stated that he answered the Soviet Commanders letter on 1 Nov, again inviting the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul to resume negotiations to carry out the Moscow decision in full. He reiterated the American position of allowing Koreans freedom of expression concerning the establishment of their own provisional

27425

ROUTINE
Restricted
-1-

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
92

092

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE



FROM: CG 24TH CORPS NR: TFGCG 524 7 NOV 46 CONT'D

Government. He agreed that the Joint Commission could exclude from consultation those individuals, parties and organizations who foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. The exclusion of such persons is in the spirit of the Joint Commission Communique number 5 issued on 17 April 1946, which required prospective consultees to agree to cooperate with the work of the Joint Commission.

In further comment on this exchange of letters, Gen Hodge pointed out that the Moscow decision is a solemn agreement between the great Allied Powers, made in the interest of an orderly restoration of Korean sovereignty and safeguarding Korean interests from encroachment by other nations. He said, "neither the Americans nor the Soviet Delegation has any power to change the Moscow Decision and both are required to live up to it in full."

Asked about the matter of objection by many Koreans to the word "trusteeship", Gen Hodge said, "based upon my observations and discussions of the subject with Koreans for almost 1 year, I am convinced that those Koreans who oppose the "trusteeship" provision in the Moscow Decision have a highly erroneous concept of what it means. They have jumped at the conclusion that it would be the same or similar to the protectorate over Korea assumed by the Japanese. Such a concept is entirely incorrect. I fear that many Koreans have never really studied the Moscow Decision and have greatly misinterpreted its terms. The Moscow Decision defines "trusteeship" in these words "...measures for helping and assisting

27425

ROUTINE
Restricted
-2-

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE



FROM: CG 24TH CORPS NR: TFGCG 524 7 NOV 46 CONT'D

(trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government and the establishment of the National Independence of Korea". When asked what the concrete terms of the "trusteeship" are, Gen Hodge said frankly he did not know. He explained, "in spite of all the discussions about "trusteeship," no one knows what the concrete terms will be. No one can possibly know, because they haven't been worked out. We must remember that the first task of the Joint Commission is to get the Korean Provisional Government established. After that, the Moscow Decision specifically provides that the measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) will be worked out by the Joint Commission "with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the Korean Democratic Organizations." The Moscow Decision further specifically provides that the proposals of the Joint Commission "concerning a four power trusteeship" shall be submitted for the consideration of the four powers 'following consultation with the Korean Provisional Government'". He added, "how can I know the specific terms: How can anyone know the specific terms? How can any of the Korean people work up a political furor over a mere word when it is impossible for them to know what specific measures may be recommended by the Joint Commission after consultation with the Korean Provisional Government? Before anyone knows the exact meaning of "trusteeship" to Korea, the Korean Provisional Government must be established, and considerable work, planning and discussion must be done by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government and Korean

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ROUTINE
Restricted
-3-

File

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE



FROM: CG 24TH CORPS NR: TFGCG 524 7 NOV 46 CONT'D

Democratic and Social Organization, and approval given by the great Allied Powers. When all of this has been done, I don't see how the helping and assisting (trusteeship) worked out by the powers and the Korean people need be anything for Koreans to fear." In conclusion, he stated: "The Americans hope the Joint Commission will soon take up its work again and complete its task set forth in the Moscow Decision, thus ending the unhappy division of Korea and the uncertainty of its people."

HODGE

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to Washington (For State Dept) for Action.

27425

ROUTINE

Restricted
-4-

TOO: 060900
MCN: TJC 34/06

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
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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

5 Nov 46



FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT)
TO : SCAP
INFO : WD (CHIEF OF STAFF)
NR : 050505 Z

Soviet Press Oct 31 devotes 2 columns to excerpts from Aug 12 letter from General Hodge to Soviet Commander in Northern Korea General Chistyakov regarding possible resumption of Joint Soviet-American Commission for Korea and to lengthy citations from Chistyakov's reply of Oct 26 article concludes that it is apparent from Hodge's letter that Americans continue to adhere to position requiring revision of Moscow decisions whereas Chistyakov made it clear that Soviet Delegation to Joint Commission will be prepared to renew its work only on basis of their precise execution.

Pravda Nov 2 carries article by P Ivanov "Elections in Northern Korea" hailing universal elections to Permanent Peoples Committees on Nov 3 as creates development in life of Korean People Provisional Committees numbering 12,000 members of which 3/5ths are peasants and remainder representatives of all social classes had arisen following liberation. During their year of existence they have accomplished enormous task in liquidating results of Jap domination this has consisted of extensive land reform as result of which land is now owned by those who cultivate it, labor law establishing 8 hour day and prohibiting child labor, grant to women of equal political and economic rights, confiscation of all enterprises belonging to "Traitors of Korean People" and reorganization of

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ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

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
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCE PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE



FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT) NR : 050505 Z 5 Nov 46 CONT'D

National education on democratic basis. These historic transformations achieved by Provisional Peoples Committees reveal democratic character of these organs. Elections to permanent Committees will be conducted on basis of universal suffrage with secret ballot. Central Committee of United Democratic Front of Northern Korea has announced platform which meets with broad approval of masses. It aims at independent Korean State characterized by land reform and naturalization of institutions belonging to "Traitors of Korean People" only. Reactionary Pro-Jap elements inspired by violent opponents of democracy Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo who have entrenched themselves in American zone are attempting to obstruct conduct of democratic elections. These traitors seek to restore state of affairs which existed under Japs and employ basest methods to this end. Article concludes that no reactionary provocations will subvert successful elections furthering "Democratization" of Northern Korea.

DURBROW

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, PUB REL OFF, GOVT SECT, STAT & RPTS
SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, CIV I & E OFF, NAT
RES SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

26830

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO: 050505 Z
ACN: YA 54/05

-2-


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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE



FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSFR)
TO : CINCPAC (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE) (PASS
TO USFIK)
NR : WCL 26910

AP New York 2 Nov:

"Korea, although not a member of the UN, was permitted today to put her case to the International Press through UN channels by a special ruling from UN Secretary General Trygve Lie.

Lie ruled that a 3 page Korean appeal--which asked that both American and Soviet troops clear out of the nation--could be issued as UN document. The ruling came after Korea, which is represented here by a Women's College President from Seoul, Miss Louisa Yim, had failed to get a consideration of Korea on the current program of the UN General Assembly.

Miss Yim represents the "Democratic Council of South Korea"--the American Occupation Zone.

Buffalo News, 30 Oct, in an editorial comment said: "It is hard to read Supreme Commander MacArthur's report on Korea's 1st year as a liberated country without being sick at heart over the fact that the Japanese have been gone a year, and the Koreans still haven't a government of their own.

The Supreme Commander and Lt Gen Hodge, his deputy in the American Occupation of Korea south of 38th parallel, have been throwing their weight to get the Russians to resume the negotiations over the form of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Col Gen I M Christiakov, the Red Army Commander, will do this if the Americans agree to consult only those Koreans who supported the Trusteeship Decision.

26647

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

-1-

64

091.1 K

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCE PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE



FROM: WASH (WDSPR) NR: WCL 26910 5 NOV 46 CONT'D

Korea is the 1 place in the world today where Russian and American ways of life are face to face. The Russians are stepping up their Communist infiltration of our zone. We must stand firm for Korea's sake, as well as our own".

PARKS

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG,
PUB REL OFF, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispach to CG USAFIK (Personal to Hodge) for Information.


ADDED DISTRIBUTION: GOVT SECT

26647

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO: 050056 Z
MCN: USFA-52-4

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY 4 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)
NR : TFPOL 48 (POLAD SEOUL NUMBER 131)

"Dr Syngman Rhee has intimated privately to Gen Hodge he is contemplating returning to US at an early opportunity with Mrs Rhee. He has been here over a year and presumably his reentry permit, if he obtained one, has expired. Because of the very secret nature of his confidences to Gen Hodge in this matter, it would be inadvisable for me to inquire into his reentry documents and it is unlikely he will approach me in the matter. We believe it would help the current political situation here were Dr Rhee out of the picture and accordingly would like to be in position to arrange for his passage the moment his present mood crystallizes.

Please advise us whether the Dept in such event can arrange with immigration to waive visa requirements. We would of course notify the Dept in time to make such arrangements. Mrs Rhee is understood to have American Nationality.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to WAR (FOR STATE DEPT).

26509

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOO: 040800 Z

MCN: TJC 63/4

Secret

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COPY NO. 35

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE



Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

3 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON AND BUNCE)
TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)
NR : TFURC 66

"The following is the text of General Hodge's reply transmitted today to Soviet Commanders letter of Oct 26 quoted in our TFURC 65 'Dear General Chistiakov: I thank you for your letter of Oct 26, 46, and agree with you that the continuation of the div of Korea into two parts works a great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest war in history. Each added month of this div tends to make more difficult the implementation on the Moscow Decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last Dec.

For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the US and the USSR delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the Joint US-USSR Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission.

It is agreed to interpret paragraphs two and three of the declaration in communique number five of the US-USSR Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 46, to mean that such individuals, parties and Social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties, and Social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from

26218

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 28

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON AND BUNCE), NR:
TFURC 66, DTD 3 NOV 1946 CONTINUED

further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and Social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.

In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration established in Communique number five of the Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 46, both delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or Social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in joint communique number five.

In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the US at this time.

(A) The US has always favored the exact fulfillment of the Moscow decision by the Joint Commission. This decision obviously includes the preparation of proposals 'for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years' which 'shall be submitted for the Joint consideration' of the four powers 'following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government.' However, there is nothing in the Moscow Decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a four power trusteeship except that it shall be a method 'for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the National Independence of Korea' to be worked out 'with the participation of the provisional Korean Democratic Government,' and a limitation placed upon its duration.

26218

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-2-

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY



FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON AND BUNCE), NR:
TFURC 66, DTD 3 NOV 1946, CONTINUED

(B) The US has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The US believes that all Korean democratic parties and Social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the US see a great difference between (1) The instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) The proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.

On the basis of the US position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs two and three of the declaration in communique number five to the Joint Commission which is approved for the US delegation, the American Comd proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite Soviet delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations. I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected."

United Press from London on Oct 30 relayed radio Moscow report that the Soviet delegation wished Joint Commission to reconvene soonest possible and added that the broadcast quoted exchange of letters between Generals Hodge and Chistiakov. Please inform us or ascertain for us whether Chistiakov's letter of Oct 26 was released by Moscow as info urgently needed for determining our local treatment of this last exchange of letters.

HODGE

26218

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-3-

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY



FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON AND BUNCE), NR:
TFURC 66, DTD 3 NOV 1946, CONTINUED

- INFORMATION : COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to WASHINGTON (STATE DEPT).

26218

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

T00 : 020600 Z
MCN : TJC 62/2

Secret
-4-

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16-C, 18-E, 53-A, 53-D (1) (2) (3), and 60-A (1) (2) (3) (4), AR
380-5, 6 March 1946.

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

2 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON AND BUNCE)

TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)

NR : TFURC 65

The following is a translation of a letter dtd Oct 26 from Soviet Commander Chistiakov:

'In your letter of 12 Aug 46 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, you, speaking of the intentions of the American Delegation to resume the discussion to the Joint Commission, at the same time have advised the Soviet Delegation to restudy its position.

In answer to this, I must declare that the Soviet Delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the Moscow decision of the 3 Foreign Ministers on Korea and intends to steadfastly adhere to this decision.

I again assure you that the Soviet Delegation is always ready to resume the work of the Joint Commission on the basis of strict fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As far as the question of the discontinuing of the work of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you will know it was the American Delegation itself which after a time in the course of the discussions suggested that the work of the Joint Commission be suspended, and finally at its suggestion the work of the Commission was suspended 5 May 46.

25805

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 28

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFURC 65 2 NOV 46 CONTINUED

In your letter you stated that 'The exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation.'

I must however note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American Delegation did not, in fact, evidence such a readiness and many times even declared that it did not quite understand the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Your assertion that the Soviet Delegation allegedly interprets unilaterally the Moscow Decision concerning the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean Political Parties and Social Organizations is unfounded.

In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, a series of measures were laid out which aim at the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on Democratic principles and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of long Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow Decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling the Moscow Decision with those parties and those, who for tactical considerations, although declaring their support of the decision, at the same time make such stipulations which convert their statement of support of the Moscow Decision into an empty declaration.

25805

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-2-

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR: TFURC 65 2 NOV 46 CONTINUED

In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word "Democratic", the Soviet Delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announcements of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organizations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.

In as much as the Moscow Decision has outlined the necessary measures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups towards the Moscow Decision is the most important criterion of their true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a democratic State.

Thus, the position of the Soviet Delegation on the question of consultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean Democratic Parties and Organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow Decision.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word "Democracy" and the actual position which the American Delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.

It is well known that the American Delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow Decision and only 3 Democratic parties which upheld the Moscow Decision. It is completely obvious

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR: TFURC 65 2 NOV 46 CONTINUED

that the American Delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such Democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Confederation of Labor, the All-Koreans Womens Union, the All-Korean Youth Union, the All-Korean Farmers Union and a number of other organizations, guided by other than their Democratic principles.

As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their position toward formation of the Korean Government. or the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Soviet Delegation has never anywhere made proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of Korean parties and Organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any part or group as well as any individual Korean citizen can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.

I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship because such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question, as it is known the Moscow Decision states: 'It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and of the Korean Democratic Organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (non trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the

25805

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret

-4-

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFURC 65 2 Nov 46 CONTINUED

development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.'

Thus, among the tasks of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a trusteeship in regard to Korea with the stipulation that these proposals relating to Korea for a period up to five years, will, after consultation with the Provisional Korean Government, be submitted for joint consideration to the Governments of the four powers.

From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the Democratic transformation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Conference and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement of trusteeshipment.

During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea. All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unite their country, to have a Democratic Government, and to carry out their Democratic transformation.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the delay in the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impede the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative

25805

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret
-5-

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
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY



FROM : CG USAFIK NR: TFURC 65 2 NOV 46 CONTINUED

effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is holding back the realization of Democratic transformation in all Korea.

The Soviet Delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation in May, 46, have not yet been resumed and wishes to resume those negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

If after taking this into account, along with the foregoing statement, you will express your consent to resume the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will always be ready to resume the work.'

We are presently drafting our reply and its text will be reported to the Department when it is dispatched. We are treating this exchange as secret and request the Department treat it so for the time being.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for
redispatch to WASHINGTON (WDSKA).

25805

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOO : 010730 Z

MCN : TJC 2/02


Secret
-6-

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE



Confidential
PRIORITY

2 Nov 46

FROM : CG AFMIDPAC (MPGDS)
TO : CG XXIV CORPS
INFO : CINCAFPAC
NR : RJ 77706

Subject is possible purchase of surplus equipment in Hawaii by Korea.

Refer to radiograms TFGDS 626 and CX-66661.

1. Reliable estimates on class tonnage or value of surpluses now available and to be made available for purchase by USAMGIK can not be made principally because sales are being and will be made continually by Surplus Property Office. Other important reasons are:

A. Sept, shipping strike causing critical food shortage here and resulting in application for permission to release food surpluses in Territory of Hawaii,

B. Recent revision in local surplus Property Office regulations affecting veterans eligibility to purchase as dealers,

C. Lack of definition of priority position of USAMGIK makes impossible to estimate what will remain after "senior" requirements have been satisfied.

D. Limiting factors also will undoubtedly be USAMGIKs ability to pay (see para 2C below) and ship (see para 3 below).

2. The extent to which negotiations can be carried on in Washington appears to be merely the establishing of USAMGIKs position with SPO here including,

25653

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(1)

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COPY NO.

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004.1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY

FROM: CG AFMIDPAC NR: RJ 77706 2 Nov 46 (CONT)

A. Either an arrangement for the transfer of all or a portion of the uncommitted balance of the \$25,000,000 credit established by FLC for the establishing of new credit with War Assets Administration.

B. Definition to the priority position of USAMGIK and, D.

C. Negotiations for favorable sale price somewhat comparable with that obtained in Philippines.

3. Unless he is freshly briefed Capt Butcher will not be able to present in Wash current info with regard to A. Present plans for shipping of surpluses to Korea, and B. Balance of present \$25,000,000 credit available for transfer.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1,
G-4, AG, AG PERS DIV, AG OFF BR, GOVT SECT,
ECON & SCI SECT

25653

PRIORITY
Confidential

T00: 312302 Z
YH 36/2

SiD
Dunp
Tops
G. H.

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

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FROM: CG AFMIDPAC NR: RJ 77706 2 Nov 46 (CONT)

A. Either an arrangement for the transfer of all or a portion of the uncommitted balance of the \$25,000,000 credit established by FLC for the establishing of new credit with War Assets Administration.

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NO SIG

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1,
G-4, AG, AG PERS DIV, AG OFF BR, GOVT SECT,
ECON & SCI SECT

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PRIORITY
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T00: 312302 Z
YH 36/2

EO
Dwyer
Info Gd.
GTC

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
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
vrb

File

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY



FROM : CG AFMIDPAC (MPGDS)
TO : CG 24TH CORPS
INFO : CINCAFPAC
NR : 302302/Z

Subject is possible purchase of surplus equipment in Hawaii by Korea. J 77706 refer to radiograms TFGDS 626 and CX 66661.

1. Reliable estimates of class tonnage or value of surpluses now available and to be made available for purchase by USAMGIK can not be made principally because sales are being and will be made continually by surplus property office. Other important reasons are:

A. West Coast shipping strikes causing critical food shortage here and resulting in application for permission to release food surpluses to Territory of Hawaii,

B. Recent revision in local surplus property office regulations affecting veterans eligibility to purchase as dealers,

C. Lack of definition of priority position of USAMGIK makes impossible to estimate what will remain after "Senior" requirements have been satisfied and,

D. Limiting factors also will undoubtedly be USAMGIK's ability to pay (See para 2C below) and ship (See para 3 below).

2. The extent to which negotiations can be carried in Washington appears to be merely the establishing of USAMGIK's position with SPO here including,

A. Either an arrangement for the transfer of all or a portion of the uncommitted balance of the \$25,000, 000 credit established by FLC or the establishing of new credit with War Assets Administration,

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PRIORITY
Restricted

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
vrb

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY

FROM: CG AFMIDPAC NR 302302/Z DTD: 2 NOV 46 CONTD

B. Definition of the priority position of USAM-
GIK and,

C. Negotiations for favorable sales price some-
what comparable with that obtained in Philippines.

3. Unless he is freshly briefed Capt Butcher will
not be able to present in Washington current info with
regard to:

A. Present plans for shipping of surpluses to
Korea or,

B. Balance of present \$25,000,000 credit avail-
able for transfer.

CAPT LESLIE G BUTCHER

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1,
G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT

25586

PRIORITY

-2-
Restricted

TOO: 302302/Z

MCN: YH 25

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the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs
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380-5, 6 March 1946.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

1 Nov 46



FROM : WAR

TO : CINCPAC (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE)
(PASS TO USFIK)

NR : WCL 26146

London 30 Oct: The Moscow radio said tonight that Soviet Officials in Korea want to resume "as soon as possible" joint discussions with US authorities on the establishment of democratic provisional Government for Korea under Allied Trusteeship. The broadcast quoted a lengthy exchange of letters between General Hodge and Colonel General Chistiakov, on difference of opinion between the Russian and US delegation. It charged that the resumption of negotiations had been prevented by American attempts to deviate from instructions laid down by the Big 3 Foreign Ministers meeting at Moscow in Dec 1945. During the Allied Occupation, Korea has been divided at the 38 parallel into separate Russian and American Zones with virtually no communication between the two areas since the Soviet consulate was withdrawn from Seoul last June.

Washington post today carried a 10 column inch story under heading "Korean women want freedom, says Miss Yim". Miss Yim is President of the Central Womens College in Seoul.

PARKS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY



FROM: WAR NR: WCL 26146 DTD 1 NOV 46 CONT'D

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG,
PUB REL OFF, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Message Center
for redispach to CG USAFIK (PERSONAL FOR HODGE) for
Information.

ADDED DISTRIBUTION: GOVT SECT

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TOO: 010035 Z
MCN: YB 46/01

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