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
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
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
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


The Democratic Party



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The Democratic Party

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A HISTORY

By

WALTER W. SPOONER

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
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CHAPTER I THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE

1791-1801

THE Democratic party has had an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred and thirty years.

Founded in 1791 with Thomas Jefferson as its chief sponsor, it attracted immediately the enthusiastic and affectionate support of the masses of the people, who were determined that the institutions and government of the United States should have the character of a democracy and not an aristocratic system based upon the superior presumptions and pretensions of a few. Its development was so rapid that at the national elections of 1792 it secured control of the popular branch of Congress and cast 55 of the total 132 Electoral votes for President and Vice-President. In 1796 it lacked but two votes of the number required to decide the result in the Electoral College; and in 1800 it won a triumphant victory, electing the President and Vice-President and also a marked majority of the members of each house of Congress. Thus established as the ruling power of the nation, it was so maintained by the people, nearly always by overwhelming majorities, for an unbroken period of forty years, when it experienced a temporary reverse without, however, any abatement of its vitality or deviation from its original principles or character. Those principles and that character, distinguishing it as the party of the masses of the people in composition, instincts, action, and general acceptation, it has since preserved through all the vicissitudes of its fortunes.

Such are the outstanding facts of the origin, rise, and position of the Democratic party. Without the addition of another word, they might well explain its great part in shaping the institutions and directing the destinies of the country, and its continuance in full vigor and prestige to the present day as an affirmative and aggressive force of politics and government. On account of its popular nature and following it spontaneously rose, flourished, still flour-

ishes, and, its adherents on principle firmly believe, will continue to flourish so long as the American nation endures.

In this discussion of the record and claims of the Democratic party it is believed the reader will discover no illiberal spirit toward other parties, past or present, and especially none toward its successive great competitors, the Federalist, National Republican, Whig, and Republican parties. It is no derogation from any of these parties to say that without exception they had their beginnings in certain proposals of specific policy more or less circumscribed in capabilities of popular appeal, and either attended or in time reinforced by pronounced class tendencies with reciprocal class predominance in their control. The essential virtues of the Democratic party are that it sprang from no extemporization of particular policies, but from the elemental and embracing conception of the equal rights of all; that this has uniformly been its cardinal doctrine; and that its course respecting public conditions and questions has characteristically been so independent of class control or favor as to render the party peculiarly unattractive to selfish special interests, as well as to those individuals who incline to the ancient theory of government as the rightful possession of "the rich, the well-born, and the able"—that is to say, the rich and well-born, with whom the able, according to that theory, are necessarily identified.

"The rich, the well-born, and the able." These were words used by John Adams (Works, Boston ed., 1851, IV, 290) in designating the proper sorts of people to be entrusted with the responsible powers of government. It was in complete harmony with their spirit that the Federalist party was established and always conducted. This organization was the first, and, for a time, the only national party of the United States. As indicated by its name, it claimed to be the embodiment of the forces that had fought so strenuously, and, in the end, successfully, for the replacement of the old feeble Confederation of the States by a Federal government with a coördinated and solid system of central administration headed by a national executive, the Presi-

dent. But the original Federalists of the Constitutional convention of 1787 comprised diverse elements representing conflicting principles of political thought, opposed views concerning the practical details of the national institutions to be created, and varying local interests and preferences. Of these diverse elements, some were extremely conservative, almost monarchical, in their opinions and proposals; others were of differing degrees of liberalism, tending, in the main, to the idea of decided reservations of rights to the States and the people at large. The contest resulted in a variety of compromises; without them the Constitution could neither have been adopted by the convention nor ratified by the required number of States. The more liberal elements of the convention succeeded in impressing their ideas upon the Constitution; and the tendency of that instrument toward thoroughly satisfying popular desires was emphasized by the prompt addition to it of the first ten amendments, collectively known as the "national bill of rights."

After the ratification of the Constitution, accomplished in the summer of 1788 by the votes of all the States except North Carolina and Rhode Island (both of which ratified later), the differences of opinion that had marked the struggle were quickly composed, and even those who had actively opposed the Constitution, known as anti-Federalists, became its loyal supporters. The anti-Federalists never constituted a formal party, but were a potent factor in their brief day. Patriotically accepting the issue of the contest, they merged into the unanimous constituency that elected Washington to the Presidency in the early part of 1789 and that stood ready to participate, to the fullest extent permitted by the institutions of the time, in political action for the welfare of the united country and the happiness of its inhabitants.

It was natural that those who had been positively concerned in framing the Constitution and securing its adoption should assume the responsibility of launching and administering the national government, and become the dominant

force in the resulting party development. Washington desired to avoid all party associations and favor, and accordingly chose as his chief advisers two men of diametrically opposed views—Thomas Jefferson, whom he appointed Secretary of State, and Alexander Hamilton, who was given the post of Secretary of the Treasury. But the Federalist political organization, in entering upon its career as the party of the government, adjusted itself automatically and immovably to ideas that repelled not only the great body of the former anti-Federalists, but also many of the sincerest and ablest of the original Federalists of the formative constitutional period—including James Madison, who had exerted the unquestioned predominating influence in constructing the Constitution.

These distasteful ideas upon which the Federalist party laid its foundations centered in the belief that a controlling aristocratic element was inseparable from any effective and stable scheme of government. The founders and leaders of that party, while agreed upon the general conception of a republic as the only possible system for the American commonwealth, favored a strictly aristocratic republic—one conducted by “the most important people.” They desired and expected the Executive administration, the Senate, and the judiciary to be invariably constituted from the more “select” classes, and thus together to present an impregnable front to all attempted intrusions by the masses into the sphere of government proper. Admitting to the full, however, the justice, and, indeed, the need of a certain popular balance as a check upon possible despotism and as a general preservative of active liberty, they conceded the lower house of Congress to the public at large. It was their firm understanding and express contention that a formally selective—amounting to an aristocratic—character for the Executive, Senate, and judiciary was wholly intended, and practically in terms prescribed, by the constitutional provisions which kept the choice of those branches remote from popular action; while they held that the contrariety of the arrangement for electing the House of

Representatives only accentuated the fundamental nature of the Federal institutions as aristocratic in all potent respects but with a "democratical mixture" for necessary dilution.

The reader will observe that the Federalist party's proposed application of the American governmental system was an approximation to the underlying plan of the British constitution—notably in the particular of a rigid exclusion of the ordinary people from association with the more dignified and authoritative stations of power.

Alexander Hamilton, undoubtedly the strongest intellectual force of the Federalist organization, and also the most masterful personality in formulating and directing its basic principles and early policies, was deeply enamored of the British system, and regarded democracy as an unmixed evil. As a member of the Constitutional convention he submitted a plan of government which proposed life tenure of office (subject to good behavior) for the President and Senators, appointment of the Governors of the States by the national administration, and an absolute veto power for each Governor. He was troubled by the thought that inherently the Constitution and government were too weak. After the downfall of the Federalist party he wrote (1802): "I am still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric (the Constitution). . . . Every day proves to me more and more that this American world was not made for me." Horrified at the excesses of the French Revolution, he apprehended their repetition in America by the triumphant democracy. In one of his last letters (July 10, 1804) he referred to democracy as "our real disease"—the manifestation of a virulent poison.

John Adams, another of the preëminent Federalist fathers, maintained that democracy should be admitted to participation in affairs only with great caution and severe constriction. An erudite scholar, he reinforced his arguments by an elaborate array of historic precedents and deductions, demonstrating that pure democracy had ever been incapable of becoming the foundation or inspiration of a

powerful state. Descanting upon this theme in one of his ablest political treatises ("A Defence of the Constitutions of the Government of the United States of America"), he says: "It is no wonder then that democracies and democratical mixtures are annihilated all over (the continent of) Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inaccessible mountain, or an impenetrable forest." Yet he considered it creditable and beneficial to England and America that they received and utilized democracy as a "mixture." This expressed the limit of Adams's condescension to democracy.

It expressed moreover the limit of the Federalist party's condescension. Condescension is the proper word; for in spirit the course of concession to democracy was purely expedient and never marked by tolerant recognition. The natural right of a few favorites of fortune, and their satellites, to be the controlling persons, was the supreme idea of all true Federalist partisans. Distrust and scorn of the masses of the people, in their political capacity, as "the vulgar," "the rabble," "the mob," and—most abhorrent name of all—"the democracy," were instinctive to the Federalist nature. To "curb the unruly democracy" was esteemed by the Federalists a primary necessity of sound and orderly government.

But the material out of which the American state was to be fashioned for the satisfaction and power of the superior classes as presumed by the Federalists, was exceedingly ill adapted to that undertaking. Traditions and precedents of government were quite incapable of practically interesting the populace or its many brilliant leaders, except as they were considered good or bad from previous actual experience in America itself. Aristocratic administration under the crown of England by royal Governors and Councils, with the merely nominal limitation of republican Legislative Assemblies, had been the uniform system in the colonies, and had produced nothing but grievances, which finally became so many and extreme that the whole American people revolted, fought a successful war against its

masters, and established liberty upon the principles of the Declaration of Independence. The improvisation of a national government so regulated in practice as to reproduce and perpetuate the most objectionable feature of the old discarded institutions, did not and could not appeal to general public sentiment.

It was also considered that while the plan of the British constitution was an admirable one for England, the arguments for its automatic imitation by the United States were not convincing. The measurable development of British liberty had been the tedious and difficult process of centuries, continually hampered by king, nobles, and that formidable number of the underlings and adorers of the great who exhibited the strange tendency, common to kindred spirits in all countries (not excepting the America of 1790 or 1920), of being more royal than the king and more aristocratic than the aristocrats. But American national institutions were merely in formation—they were not under the compulsion of ages of custom and constraint as to their character either presently or potentially. Was it desirable to have them rooted in the principle of slow and painful progression to larger popular rights after strenuous contests to wrest from a hostile central government one "privilege" after another? That was the question when Jefferson founded the Democratic party in 1791.

During the entire period of the developments culminating in the organization of the government under Washington's Presidency—in fact, ever since 1784,—Jefferson had been absent from the country as minister to France. His observations and reflections derived from his contact with the tyrannical French monarchy and his constant personal investigations concerning the appalling distresses of its oppressed subjects, had intensified his hatred of all arbitrary rule and his passionate devotion to every principle and method of government calculated to be of advantage to the ordinary people. In letters written to friends he remarked that the people of France were "ground to powder by the vices of the form of government"; that such a gov-

ernment was one "of wolves over sheep, or kites over pigeons"; that the exalted persons who administered it were of the most astonishing vulgarity and incapacity; that the destiny of nineteen-twentieths of the people was utterly hopeless, etc., etc. He was in Paris throughout the prodigious events that ushered in the French Revolution, including the fall of the Bastille. Returning to the United States in the fall of 1789, he was called by Washington to become the head of the cabinet, and in the spring of the following year he entered upon his new office.

Differences between Jefferson and Hamilton on account of the aggressive policies of the latter, all of which tended toward rigorous consolidation of the powers of the general government and amplification of its pretensions, led soon to a complete rupture. Both of those great statesmen, however, were far less concerned about immediate than permanent matters; and Jefferson was too powerful an intellectual leader, as well as too wise a politician, to consume any energy or time in the small diversions of factious opposition. He knew that the popular forces of resistance to the spirit and designs of the Federalist party stood ready, and, indeed, were impatient, to be moulded into an affirmative and compact political entity. There was no ceremony, there were practically no preliminaries, in the formation of the Democratic party. It sprang into being around the personality of Jefferson, on the aggressive and unalterable proposition that the government, in all its composition, scope, and business, was most certainly to be subject to the direct concern, scrutiny, approbation, and participation of the American people without distinction of class or calculation of favor. It was one of Jefferson's most characteristic traits that he was unimpressed by superficial personal fortune, and to him in that respect the Democratic party conformed its whole character and texture, refusing utterly to accept pretensions of superior political right, with the sufficient and sole explanation that it did not want to and did not have to.

At its beginning the new organization took the title of

“The Democratic and Republican Party,” which was presently shortened to Republican party. The preference for the name Republican was due to the circumstances and emotions of the times. The French Revolution was at its height, and sentiment on behalf of Republican France was extremely pronounced among the American masses. Republicanism, from the French association, was at that day synonymous with ultraism. This first settled name of the Jeffersonian organization was preserved throughout the existence of the Federalist party, and for some time after. But the mighty element that it represented was always styled the Democracy—affectionately by its members, derisively by its antagonists; and it will so be called in our various mentions of the party for the period of its early career, extending to about the year 1828, when it assumed the name of the Democratic party, by which it has since been known.

The principles and doctrines upon which the Jeffersonian Democracy was constructed were of such irrefutable truth and resistless appeal that many of them have become axiomatic sayings. Perhaps the most famous of these is, “Equal and exact justice to all, and special privileges to none.” Another is, “Implicit confidence in the capacity of the people to govern themselves.” A republic was defined by Jefferson as “A government by citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority.” He declared the will of the majority to be “the natural law of every society, and the only sure guardian of the rights of man”; and, explicating this precept, added, “Perhaps even this may sometimes err; but its errors are honest, solitary, and short-lived. Let us, then, forever bow down to the general reason of society. We are safe with that, even in its deviations, for it soon returns again to the right way.”

Jefferson’s formulation of the purposes, extent, and limitations of government, which became the accepted creed of the Democracy, has been epitomized as follows:¹

¹ Edward M. Shepard, “The Democratic Party,” 1892.

“ First—Just government is a mere instrument for accomplishing certain useful and practical purposes which citizens in their other relations cannot accomplish, and primarily and chiefly, to protect men as, without trespassing upon others, they pursue happiness in their own way. Every effort, by ceremonial or otherwise, to ascribe to government virtue or intelligence or invite to it honor, not belonging to the men who compose it, is an effort against the public welfare.

“ Second—The less the government does, the more it leaves to individual citizens to do, the better. Every grant of power to government ought, therefore, to be strictly and jealously construed as impairing to some extent the natural rights of men.

“ Third—There should be the maximum of local self-government. Where it is doubtful between the Federal government and a State, or between a State and a lesser community, which should exercise a power, the doubt ought to be solved in favor of the government nearer the home, and more closely under the eye, of the individual citizen.

“ Fourth—It follows that the expenditure of money by the government ought to be the least possible; the collection and disbursement by public officials of money earned by other men tends to corruption not only in the jobbery and thievery more or less attending irresponsible expenditures of money, but perhaps more seriously in its tendency to create in the minds of citizens a sense of dependence upon government.

“ Fifth—To sum up all the rest, the government should make the least possible demand upon the citizen, and the citizen the least possible demand upon the government. The citizen should never suppose that he can be made virtuous or kept virtuous by law, or that he ought to be helped to wealth or ease by those of his fellows who happen to hold the offices, and for that reason to be collectively called ‘the government.’”

These declarations constituted the foundations of the

Democracy in its bitter contest against Federalism. Considered as practical propositions of government, they were startling innovations at that time; to-day most people are disposed to regard them as mild generalizations illustrative of the elementary nature of early American political verities. Discussion of them would involve mainly theoretical questions that have long ceased to be subjects of difference between parties. It is sufficient to say that they defined the original position of the Democracy, led the party to success, and set it forward on its career with a character for identification with the masses of the people which was certain not only to prove its main reliance for the future, but to be insisted on as the permanent test of its merit in both prosperity and adversity.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTER AND ABILITY

1801-1809

THE late Carl Schurz, certainly not a prejudiced witness on behalf of the Democratic party, referring to the change accomplished by the election of Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, wrote ("Life of Henry Clay"): "The American people for the first time became fully conscious of the fact that the government really belonged to them, and not to a limited circle of important gentlemen." The result of that great contest was as lasting in its effects as it was revolutionary in its immediate decision. Federalism, as a governing establishment, never came back. Its complete and permanent collapse was due to two overwhelming facts: First, the stubborn and studied refusal of the Federalist party either to adapt itself in spirit to popular ideas and aspirations, or to become reconciled for prudent reasons to the manifest invincibility of popular power and accordingly compete with the Democracy for the favor of the ordinary public; and Second, the patriotism, energy, sound sense, and superb efficiency at once and always demonstrated by the Democracy in administering the government—virtues

and qualities to which were associated an entire popular predisposition and action.

Concerning the impossible situation in which the Federalist party elected to place itself by overweening pride and curious misconception of its capacity to successfully contend with the Democracy, it would be very unjust to animadvert in terms of stricture merely. The Federalist party is entitled to the everlasting respect of all Americans, and moreover to their gratitude to no small degree. It was conspicuously able in its distinctive membership, and singly and passionately devoted to the honor and welfare of the country. Its leaders—Hamilton, President Adams, John Jay, Rufus King, Fisher Ames, the Pinckneys, and a host of others—were illustrious statesmen and pure patriots. The revered Washington gave it his undoubted preference, and, after the failure of his attempt to maintain a biparty cabinet, surrounded himself with Federalist advisers exclusively. Under Federalist auspices the government was from its earliest organization distinguished by a masterly grasp of great questions and affairs, and conducted and sustained with distinction and dignity. By steadfast neutrality toward both France and England in the tremendous European struggle at that time raging; by the courageous negotiation of the Jay treaty with England and unwavering adherence to it in spite of terrific public clamor; by the vigorous suppression of domestic insurrection; and by firm, just, and successful insistence upon our chosen national policy in exceedingly serious disputes arising with France, the administrations of Washington and Adams signally illustrated the governing ability of the Federalists in directive respects.

The direction of government, however, is secondary to the basis of government, and the basis of government rests upon the spirit and course of parties in their declared relations to public institutions and policy. It is no conclusive recommendation of a government or party to say that it is competent. In the case of a party, even the virtue of competence cannot safely be awarded until it is seen whether

the party has the ability to react from defeat and maintain an intelligent and efficient opposition. As a recent example, the late Progressive party of Theodore Roosevelt was supposed to be preëminently competent until it failed to win the first and only election that it contested, when it died out almost as quickly as it had risen—entirely because it had not the power of endurance in opposition. The Federalists, with their undeniable merits, could not have failed to prove themselves continually valuable to the country if they had been content to assume the function of a true opposition; and it is impossible to revert to their melancholy history without regretting the stagnation into which their organization fell, and always languished, after its defeat in 1800. The services of its numerous excellent men were consequently either lost to the public or concerned with the merest futilities, such as detraction and invective, efforts to sow discord among the Democracy, fusions for temporary purposes with factional elements of the latter, resistance to the prosecution of the War of 1812, and general dissidence and obstruction unregulated by any important original conceptions of policy. Thoroughly disliked by the people at large on account of its exclusive character, the Federalist party had become still further discredited by its enactment of the intolerant Alien and Sedition laws during Adams's administration. Those measures authorized the summary deportation of all foreigners and the punishment of all citizens considered politically objectionable by the government, and were especially aimed at French republicans and the aggressive newspaper writers of the opposed party. Unjustified by either the existence of a state of war or any other public necessity appealing to reasonable minds, they were felt to be not only despotic, but symptomatic of an ultimate unbridled assumption of dictatorial authority by the central government if the Federalists should be continued in power. The Democracy responded by adopting the famous Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798 in assertion of the rights of the States and the liberties of the people.

Following the victory of Jefferson, and the installation of the Democracy in complete control of the government in 1801, it was expected by the Federalists that the interloping and inexpert new party would so misdirect and bungle affairs, confound public order, and dislocate approved institutions that the country would soon be eager to get rid of it. None of those results happened, but precisely contrary ones. The two administrations of Jefferson (1801-9) were of immense value to the country for their firm and enterprising statesmanship with its accomplishments of magnificent territorial development by the Louisiana purchase, dispatch of the Lewis and Clark expedition to the Pacific, and enforcement of the honor and power of the nation by the war on the piratical states of the Mediterranean. But of even greater—ineestimably greater—consequence, benefit, and blessing was the complete success of the democratic principle and system of government which these administrations established beyond all possibility of further dispute. The venerable conception of the indispensability of a superior governing element based upon social selectness and class egotism and solidarity, was thus made incapable of any continuing maintenance in the sphere of practical politics and dismissed forever to the private enjoyment of its only proper protagonists, that "limited circle of important gentlemen" referred to by Mr. Schurz. Its place was substituted, confirmed, and permanently guaranteed the principle of Character and Ability as the sole recognizable qualifications and attributes for acceptable public service or permissible public authority.

Character and Ability. Not Character, Ability, and formal "Importance." Character and Ability, enough. These include all the rightful importance that can be ascribed to any one, and they exclude all the superficial pretensions of importance that are arrogated or presumed on account of mere fortunate personal elevation. They are to be found in every variety and condition of men and women, and they alone are pertinent to a claim to position or influence under popular government. They always assume the concomi-

tants of training, information, and judgment, of course in varying degrees, as also is the case among the formally well-born, rich, and "important." They generally assume personal success, and frequently personal wealth—of which the Democracy hoped to perceive, and in truth has ever perceived, an abundant share among its loving supporters.

The favor of the Democracy for "the masses of the people" was never designed, and has never been practically directed, toward setting up a distinction. This favor was designed to obliterate a distinction in the body politic, at once functioned successfully to that end, and has since continually operated to politically neutralize, so far as possible, those factors demanding distinctions on behalf of special interests which, as everyone knows, have always persisted and were never more self-conscious, more highly organized, or more active than at this present day. Representative of such special interests have been and are, on the one hand, the miscellaneous aggregations of theorists and particularists, and, on the other, the great and powerful forces by some called "predatory," by others "reactionary," that perpetuate the spirit of Federalism though by no means its blundering methods. Arrayed against all these interests—theoretical, particular, and predatory—has stood, and stands now, the Democratic party as the party of the masses of the people, and therefore, considered in its permanent capacity, the major political constituency of the nation.

Again, the Democracy's inclination to the masses has at no time signified a superior preference for that particular division of the public, any more than for any other division. The masses were rejected by the Federalists as not to be seriously considered in connection with the essential organization and business of government; but they were accepted and encouraged by the Democracy, the same as all other elements—not more, not less,—in the spirit of the words of the Declaration of Independence, "All men are created equal." So created in the respect of natural rights, and so to be recognized and treated by government; what they make of themselves privately and for public value is

another matter, dependent partly upon their individual natures and capacities, partly upon varied conditions. It became at once, and remained, a fixed determination of the Democracy to give and hold for the masses an equal place at the foundation of government, specifically as to the right of suffrage; to deny them nothing in the respect of preferment that they were qualified, by character and ability, to acquire; to have a favorable impulse toward them uniformly; but to expect them, equally with all others, to work out their own salvation.

Moreover, the Democracy, in its influence with the masses, has invariably been a zealous and strict conservator of traditional American institutions. Of course we all know that in the inflamed imaginations of some of its persistent detractors, the Democracy seethes with diabolical instincts and designs contemplating the disruption and annihilation of the treasured system of the fathers. This is assuredly the very strangest of all strange obsessions, worthy of serious notice only in a History of Great Slanders and Defamations—a work that it is to be hoped will some day be written. From the outset of the government there never has been a moment when the Democracy could not, if so disposed, have led a powerful attack upon that time-honored system both in particular and general. And there never has been a moment when the Democracy has not been heart and soul, to the uttermost extremity, its defender and guarantor. All historians have observed that a generally strict, as against a latitudinarian, construction of the Constitution was from the earliest days advocated by the democracy in order to prevent not only arbitrary infractions of its terms but loose political actions in contempt of them. During the sixty consecutive years when, with but two brief intervals, the party exercised national power, only one amendment to the Constitution (reforming the manner of electing the President and Vice-President) was adopted. Both in office and in opposition the Democracy's performance of its responsibilities has been characterized most of all by a steadying influence because of its

assured possession, in all circumstances, of a concentrated vote, which, while not invulnerable to onslaughts by extremist opponents of one kind or other, has nevertheless been of such homogeneous character as to give it at least the equilibrium. Subject frequently to energetic pressure as to matters of policy, the party has at times shown divisions in its councils, naturally to be expected in the career of a great and intensely virile popular organization. But these divisions, so far as they have affected its course, have marked only conflicting opinions among its own elements, opinions in time reconciled by the rule of the majority, whereupon the party has gathered new vigor, not as the resultant of any interaction with it by external forces, but by virtue of its indestructible vitality and positive position and leadership, which, appealing to dispassionate minds, have drawn to it new accessions.

The foregoing reflections, fundamental to a general view, description, and estimate of the Democratic party, pertain equally to its earliest character and action in control of the government under Jefferson. One of the most conspicuous facts about the Democracy is, that it was not a gradual growth, but attained substantially its perfect development immediately.

In his first inagural (March 4, 1801) Jefferson said: "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated when reason is left free to combat it. . . . Some honest men fear that a republican government cannot be strong—that this government is not strong enough. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest on earth. I believe it is the only one where every man, at the call of the laws, would fly to the standard of the law and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern."

The conduct of the government by Jefferson, his very able cabinet, and a Congress at all times heavily Democratic in

both houses, gave such satisfaction to the country that the Federalist opposition shrank to insignificance. Commenting upon this result he expressed serious concern, as he believed that a primary requirement of our institutions was a balanced party system, with vigilant and unrelaxing criticism of the party in power. In the interest of his own party, the Democracy, he took no means and sought no ends except those of service to the nation altogether uninfluenced by prejudice or passion and free from mere experiments and expedients. While abolishing the pomp and solemnity with which the Presidential office had been invested, and introducing simplicity into all the departments of administration, he left the constructive work of the Federalists undisturbed.

At the Presidential election of 1804 he was chosen for a second term by 162 Electoral votes to 14 for the Federalist candidate, Charles C. Pinckney.

The great question of those times centered in the embarrassments and difficulties of the national government consequent upon violations of our neutral rights by the belligerents in the Napoleonic wars. American maritime commerce was continually interfered with, especially by England, and there was an unprovoked attack on an American frigate by a British ship of war. Jefferson, disinclined to the extremity of hostilities, sought, with the support of Congress, a solution of the trouble by suspending intercourse with the warring European nations, and the noted embargo of 1807 was the result. Without reference to the question of the merits of that measure as a substitute for war in the circumstances, its adoption by the administration established a new and highly interesting principle of Democratic policy—the principle of fearless assumption of responsibility and unhesitating action by the President and Congress in great emergencies. Under the doctrine of strict construction of the Constitution, resort to the embargo, involving complete paralysis of foreign commerce, was certainly a matter of questionable “granted power.” But the administration felt that a resolute government, adequate to the prompt decision

of novel questions critically affecting the country, was more important than the refinements of caution. The people expect every efficiency on the part of the government; the one thing they will never endure is timidity. In case of over-exercise of authority by the government, or any responsible branch of it—Executive, House, or Senate,—they have a sure remedy at the next election.

Despite the unpopularity of the embargo, the Democracy's supremacy had become so firmly established that at the expiration of Jefferson's second term it was returned to power by a vote of nearly three to one in the Electoral College—James Madison, of Virginia, its regular nominee, receiving 122 votes; George Clinton, of New York, also a Democrat, 6; and Charles C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, Federalist, 47.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTIONARY PHASES

1809-1825

MADISON, like his predecessor, was given two terms in the Presidential office, throughout which both the Senate and House of Representatives continued Democratic by great majorities. At his second election, in 1812, the Federalists refrained from making a party nomination for President and endorsed the candidacy of DeWitt Clinton, of New York (nephew of Vice-President George Clinton), who represented a wing of the Democracy that in no way diverged from the Madisonians in principle, or even in course concerning emergent matters, but sought power on the strength of its leader's claims and the argument that as Virginia had been honored with the Presidency for twenty out of the twenty-four years since the government was founded, it was time for her to step aside in favor of the great State of New York. Owing to the coalition of the Clintonians and Federalists, Madison was reelected by a much diminished majority; his Electoral vote was 128 and Clinton had 89.

At that period the modern system of nominating conventions, platforms, letters of acceptance by candidates, national party committees, etc., had not been devised. Originally the Presidential nominees were selected by the "general agreement" of a few party leaders, and that plan was always pursued by the Federalists except when they took up Clinton with the hope of defeating Madison. The Democracy introduced the method of nominating the President and Vice-President by a Congressional caucus, composed of the party members of the House and Senate and coming together in the early part of each Presidential year. This was the nearest approximation to a representative and responsible national assemblage that was adapted to the early political conditions of the country. The suffrage was limited by property and other qualifications; it was the settled custom for the people to leave all current details to their qualified men who had been chosen to office; and as the facilities of travel were still primitive the holding of national conventions directly representative of the people would in practice have presented little attraction except to certain persons of more or less factious disposition, defeated or disappointed aspirants to office, and the like. The Democracy, however, desired to keep in as close touch as possible with the people of the country at large, and on the great question of the Presidency the quadrennial Congressional caucus was the best practical agency to that end. The caucus, moreover, completely represented the States, and its members were under the continual scrutiny and instruction of their constituents.

To enlarge the scope of popular participation in the government at its source was one of the foremost aims of the early Democracy. It was the Democracy that initiated and continually prosecuted the great and prolonged struggle in the States for extending the suffrage to all adult male citizens, subject only to local regulations as to residence, etc. Collateral to that struggle was the cause of free public education. Universal suffrage and the common school system were twin developments of the spirit of the Ameri-

can Democracy. In saying this, of course no exclusive claim is made in favor of the Democratic party. The advance of education, in particular, was an object dear to good citizens in general; universal suffrage was long held to be a quite different matter, but by the constant and uncompromising insistence of the Democracy it won its way to complete acceptance, and in the end had no stronger supporters than those who by both natural and party inclination had little in common with the masses. As universal suffrage meant more votes to be cast, it was for the highest interest of all politically active to put themselves in a receptive attitude toward the voters.

It was wisely recognized by the framers of the Constitution that the basis of suffrage was not a proper subject of stipulation by the national government. But the democratic influences in the Constitutional convention insisted on and obtained a very important concession to the principle of a widely extended popular suffrage. In return for their consent to the choice of the President, Vice-President, and Senators by select bodies instead of popular vote, it was provided that the electors in each State for members of the national House of Representatives should have "the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." Thus the sanction of national authority was given to any desired liberality of suffrage permission, no matter how extreme. This was purely a democratic measure, and upon its foundation the Democracy as a party, against strenuous opposition, fought for the abolition of property and similar artificial distinctions in the electorate until not a vestige of them remained. The contest lasted for fifty years. (For a dispassionate account of the various phases of the suffrage question, from colonial times to the present, the reader is referred to the "Cyclopedia of American Government," article on Suffrage.)

Without discussing in this place the movements for further suffrage extension that have since developed, with results of commanding importance and interest, it may be remarked that none of them would have been to the slight-

est degree possible without the foundation of universal manhood suffrage for citizens that was secured by the persistent efforts of the Democratic party in State after State until every resistance was overcome. The great principle upon which the struggle was fought was that of the obligation of government to guarantee equal rights to all—that is, all possessing free citizenship and exercising it as an active personal function unimpaired by offenses against the law or by other disqualifications specified by competent authority. The question of citizenship for people not free, of course did not exist; and the question of the entrance of women upon the theater of political action had hardly been propounded. With the changes of later times it came to pass, first, that there were no longer people not free; and second, that the women increasingly demanded the ballot. Each of these situations involved not merely peculiar, but extraordinary, special questions, considerations, and conditions as related to the grant of suffrage. In the case of the people formerly not free, a favorable decision was promptly made by the substantially imperative direction of a tremendously powerful political party actuated largely by the expectation of great advantage for itself; in the case of the women, the conclusion was approached very gradually, as in the case of the Democracy's struggle to fully establish equal manhood suffrage—a result which, because of the principle concerned, marks the starting-point of the whole practical claim to "Votes for Women."

Of high importance also in the list of popular reforms that attended the rise and progress of the Democracy, was the transfer to the individual voters of the real power in the election of the President and Vice-President. This power was at first exercised in a number of the States by the Legislatures, which reserved to themselves the appointment of the Presidential Electors and tenaciously refused to surrender the privilege. The pressure of public demand, however, brought a slow but sure change, and in 1828, when Jackson won his first election and the modern Democratic party entered upon its career, only one State, South Caro-

lina, adhered to the old plan of legislative choice of the Electors.

With the entire popular success of the Democracy and the disproof of all the prejudiced arguments against it on supposed practical and prudential grounds, the surviving opposition of the Federalists became more and more narrowed to the older generation of irreconcilables. The young men, of whatever antecedents and associations, upon engaging in political activity, arrayed themselves, with but very few exceptions, on the side of the Democracy. Eminently representative of these were John Quincy Adams, son of President John Adams, and Henry Clay—both of whom, in full accord with the spirit and course of the Democracy, were among its vigorous and valuable champions and were by its power elevated to the most distinguished positions that they attained in their long and ceaselessly active public careers.

Certain celebrated acts of the government during the Madison administrations (1809-17) evidenced the bold and independent attitude of the Democracy in the treatment of questions decidedly complex from the early constitutional point of view. In those days the determination of most large matters of policy was necessarily experimental. The important things were not such slight precedent as obtained after only some twenty years of experience, or studious applications of doctrine to realities for mere doctrine's sake, but freedom from rigidity and readiness to grapple with problems despite sharp divergence of opinion in the party. Marshall, the great Chief-Justice, was interpreting the Constitution along enterprising lines; and the Democratic government showed a comparable spirit of breadth, which, moreover, was undisturbed by apprehensions as to involvement in heresies to be pointed out and analyzed by surprised future commentators.

For in that Madisonian era the Democracy favored and established a United States government bank; aye, it favored and established a protective tariff. Both of these actions were taken in 1816. Five years before (likewise

under Madison), Congress, after an exciting controversy and by a close vote, had refused to recharter the Bank of the United States which Hamilton founded in 1791 pursuant to his plans for centralization; but that Congressional action was now reversed, the bank was recreated for a term of twenty years, and the Democratic President signed the bill. Regarding the tariff, a law was passed which also followed Hamiltonian conceptions; for the first time protective duties, as such, were laid. Thus the Democracy, in two particular matters of great moment, took a course very distinctly showing that it did not limit its scope of practical action by any set rule—not even the set rule of “strict construction.”

The bank and tariff acts of 1816 were measures incidental to the endeavors of the country to recover from the financial and commercial prostration caused by the war with Great Britain. They were believed to be on the whole wise and necessary in the prevailing conditions, and likely to prove sound in policy and effects provided the encouragement that they extended to special interests was not abused or made a pretext for undue future demands. They were in the same class with the two outstanding acts of Jefferson's administrations—the Louisiana purchase and the embargo. Assuming the desirability of acquiring Louisiana in 1803, the necessity of meeting the dangerous foreign emergency of 1807, and the wisdom of some positive remedies for the domestic ills of 1816, either prompt and conclusive governmental action had to be taken in each case, or the empowerment of a constitutional amendment, involving long drawn-out proceedings and therefore not available for the specific object, had to be awaited.

In the matter of the government bank, the Democratic party later found cause to terminate its sanction, and in consequence was emphatically sustained by the country at the Presidential elections of 1832 and 1836. As for the tariff, it consistently held to the protectionist idea for a number of years, strengthening its original legislation on the subject from time to time, particularly in 1824 and

1828; but in the end, regarding the previously "infant" industries as having been sufficiently cared for, it promulgated the historic doctrine of "tariff for revenue only," which received the general concurrence of the people until the Civil War.

Third in the line of Democratic Presidents was James Monroe, of Virginia, elected in 1816 by 183 Electoral votes to 34 for Rufus King, Federalist, of New York, and reelected in 1820 by 231 to 1 for John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts. The Federalist party, always decrepit nationally since 1800, now gave up the ghost, and there ensued the famed "era of good feeling"—making a living reality of Jefferson's words, "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," because the formative work of the party of Democracy was completed and unanimously accepted.

That work, it cannot too frequently be remembered and emphasized, consisted in, First, the organization, development, and firm establishment of the American nation as a successful, harmonious, orderly, and absolutely efficient democracy—a comprehensive result never paralleled in any other powerful country in the history of the world; Second, the administration of the government and the direction of all political action conformably to the principle of equal rights for all, with loving sympathy for the masses of the people and practical inclination toward them because of their much greater need for a champion than the classes enjoying a strong economic position and its associated advantages—in other words, for every reason and consideration of eternal justice; and Third, and chiefest accomplishment of all because it guaranteed the security of every other, the advancement of the party of Democracy itself to a position of predominating and ultimately supreme influence and power by the virtue and force of its character and principles, its splendid record under the guidance of its statesmen, and its adequacy to that most responsible business of government, vigorous and fearless action on public questions.

Neither can it too frequently be remembered and em-

phasized that what the party of Democracy was in fundamental respects upon completing its evolution in Monroe's time, the Democratic party has continuously been since and is now. From the very nature of its original composition, precepts, and declared purposes its character was permanently fixed, and the successful substitution of a reverse nature was made permanently prohibitive. Casting its lot with the unpretentious elements of the public—the merely normal average elements,—not for their artificial or forced exaltation, but for their equal right and welfare, a controlling support for it from contrary elements actuated by class consciousness became necessarily forever impossible:—such elements instinctively and passionately want a different kind of party, have always chosen one, and will always have one. Yet the broad impartiality and comprehensive justice of the position taken and maintained by the Democracy secured and have preserved for it the whole-hearted coöperation of thoughtful and forceful people in all ranks of society. Its leaders have ever been strong, able, and noted for the most convinced belief in the plain truths that it proclaims. Upon the fundamental matters referred to there never has been the slightest division in the Democratic party

Monroe's administrations (1817-25) were marked by several great events, foremost of which, for its lasting effects, was the declaration of the Monroe doctrine in his annual message to Congress dated December 2, 1823. Florida, embracing not only the present State of that name but the Gulf coast running west to the Sabine River, was acquired from Spain by treaty (1819). The Missouri Compromise, which settled the political slavery question for a quarter of a century, was adopted (1820).

At the Presidential election of 1824, the Federalist party having become extinct and no new organization having arisen, the Democracy in the various States divided in support of four candidates, all of whom were men of eminent repute as leaders of the party—Andrew Jackson, of Tennessee; John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts; William H.

Crawford, of Georgia; and Henry Clay, of Kentucky. The Electoral result was as follows: Jackson, 99; Adams, 84; Crawford, 41; Clay, 37. As no one had a majority the decision was made by the House of Representatives, which, voting by States, chose Adams. This result was obtained by a combination of the Adams and Clay States.

CHAPTER IV THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1825-1844

NOTWITHSTANDING the great excitement attending the Presidential contest of 1824, it was not fought on any questions or question of policy, but was altogether a personal competitive affair to decide for the immediate future the leadership of the Democracy, and therefore of the united political constituency of the nation. The result was indeed for the passing time only. Popular support had favored General Jackson more than any other of the contestants; and his character, traits, record, and well-known views combined to make him increasingly a popular hero, especially as he had been deprived of the Presidency by a union of the Adams and Clay forces, both of which, it was well understood, were likely to incline to programs and tendencies, and be susceptible to influences, differentiated from those that distinguished and controlled the radical Democracy. It was hence inevitable that the Jacksonians would insist upon the election of their leader in 1828. On the other hand, the one positive political idea marked out by the Adams administration (1825-29) was that of its own supposed title to the succession in 1828 and again in 1832; for Adams expected a second term, and, recognizing Clay as his heir, appointed him Secretary of State. All the previous Democratic Executives had been reelected, and, after serving out their eight years, had been followed in the Presidency by their Secretaries of State.

But there is no dependable rule of succession in a democracy, or even of secure traditions or arrangements for personal aims—as numerous ambitious men have found to their grief. Jackson overwhelmingly defeated Adams in 1828, and won an even greater victory over Clay in 1832. The Electoral vote in 1828 stood:—Jackson, 178; Adams, 83. In 1832 Jackson received 219 Electoral votes; Clay, 49; John Floyd, of Virginia (South Carolina nullification candidate), 11; and William Wirt, of Maryland (Anti-Masonic party), 7.

With the first administration of Jackson (1829-33) the country again, and this time permanently, came under a two-party system. The ascendant Jacksonians discarded the old redundant title of Democratic-Republican party, and took that of Democratic party. Their opponents, the Adams-Clay following, organized under the name of National Republican party, which was retained until after the campaign of 1832, when that of Whig party was substituted. Both the Democratic party and the National Republican or Whig party were absolutely and at all times non-sectional; no great sectional party, dividing the north and south, existed until the establishment of the modern Republican organization in 1854. A critical situation between the north and south, imperiling the Union, had supervened in 1819-20, when the proposal to admit the Territory of Missouri to statehood with permission to retain the institution of slavery was under debate in Congress. The north strenuously objected, and the south as strenuously insisted. By the efforts of great and patriotic men, the famous Missouri Compromise of 1820 was the result. Under that settlement Missouri was admitted with the permission of slavery, but slavery was thenceforth prohibited in all the rest of the as yet unorganized national domain lying north of Missouri's southern boundary, the parallel 36 deg. 30 min. The prescribed domain comprehended all the non-organized western territory (excepting Arkansas and what is now Oklahoma) which the United States owned at that time and, indeed, until the annexation of Texas (1845). Both

the north and south (so far as the political leaders were concerned) being satisfied with the Missouri Compromise, the sectional excitement totally ceased, and in the reconstruction of parties that eventuated from the schism in the Democracy in 1824 not a trace of sectional feeling, in the political regard, remained.

The National Republican-Whig party began its career with much confidence, which apparently had every justification. In the first place, its leader was the great Henry Clay, and many of the most powerful intellectual characters, including Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, Rufus Choate, Thomas Ewing, and John M. Clayton were conspicuous in its councils. Next, while enjoying the favor of those who had formerly been Federalists or who were Federalistically predisposed, it rejected the discredited notions and avoided the strategic errors of the Federalist party, and, obedient in good faith to the popular will, was received and treated by the public with recognition accordingly. Withal, it prided itself upon being select in every creditable sense, and select it certainly was—even the majestic Republican party of our day is not one whit more so; it was accorded devoted support from among the honored families of the north and the aristocratic planters of the south, and its ordinary membership showed a shining array of the talented and efficient. And finally it possessed issues, very important and appealing issues, for which it fought with intense conviction and splendid ability.

But it did not have the votes. Except on rare occasions, when the Democratic party temporarily suffered popular discipline or defeated itself by scattering its forces.

Jackson launched forth upon an aggressively partisan rule. Everything had to be Democratic, and notably the incumbency of the offices, down to the postmasterships and clerkships. He introduced the spoils system, and, like everything else introduced by that mighty man, it lasted. When the Whigs came into power the spoils seemed good to them; and the Republicans in their time, as we all know, have never been happy without the spoils. We shall not

concern ourselves with an exculpation of Jackson for his startling performances in the matter of the spoils (about which, truth to tell, most Democrats are now a bit sensitive), further than to remark that they represented primordial impulses of human nature that were singularly strong in him—to be kind to one's friends, and as for one's foes, "treat 'em rough." We have happily lived to see the development of a more discriminating policy regarding the ordinary offices of the civil service—a policy with which, in its establishment, the name of another great Democratic President, Cleveland, is preëminently identified.

At an early period Jackson took a positive stand against renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States, on the grounds of the incompatibility with free institutions of the consolidation with the government of a great private moneyed corporation, the extra-constitutionality of such a policy, and the exercise by the bank of sinister power and corrupting influences in connection with politics. A tremendous struggle was precipitated. Clay made the bank question the chief issue in his Presidential campaign of 1832, and was crushingly beaten, as already noted; whereupon Jackson, soon after the beginning of his second term, went to the extremity of removing the government deposits from the bank, although its charter was not to expire until 1836. The discussion continued to rage, but Jackson and the Democratic party stood immovable. The final results will be noticed in due order.

The State of South Carolina in those strenuous Jacksonian times harbored a serious grievance against the national government. The trouble had nothing to do with the slavery question, but was purely economic, about the homely matters of opportunity to get on in the world and the price to pay accordingly. Owing to high protective excesses in the interests of northern manufacturers that had been perpetrated for some years, particularly under the tariff of 1828—the historic "tariff of abominations"—the agricultural south was suffering. It was conceived by the South Carolinians that the proper thing was to "nullify" the Fed-

eral tariff laws—to refuse to permit them to be enforced so far as their State was concerned. Such a proceeding, if carried to its logical result, of course meant liberty of secession by South Carolina, or any other refractory State at its pleasure. The idea was at first put forth tentatively by means of certain intimations, with the hope that the Democratic President would consider it all right, or at least would not interfere. He was a stern and pragmatist man, and it was well to know what he would do. At a public dinner on Jefferson's birthday, April 2, 1830, Jackson, after listening to several regular toasts in approbation of nullification, or with that tendency, arose and gave the company a volunteer toast: "Our Federal Union: it must be preserved." This left no doubt as to his attitude. Nevertheless, South Carolina nullified (1832), trusting, it was afterward explained by John C. Calhoun (at that time Vice-President) that Jackson would tolerate a "peaceable secession." But the President at once issued a proclamation (December 16) declaring that the tariff laws of the nation, like all others, must be obeyed, sent a naval force to Charleston harbor, and ordered General Scott to be ready to move the army if necessary. In his proclamation were these immortal words: "I consider the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed."

There was of course no armed conflict, although South Carolina took the result with no good grace. Calhoun, in protest, resigned as Vice-President, and in 1836 the State, still resentful, voted against the Democratic national ticket.

By this action Jackson coerced a sovereign State, as in the instance of the bank he annihilated a powerful and entrenched government institution. The principle in each case was the same—the superiority of the common welfare to special interest.

The National Republican-Whig party was founded on

two great issues: First, thorough maintenance and application of the principle and system of tariff protection; Second, assumption and prosecution by the Federal government of internal improvements—i. e., important works not undertaken, or likely to be, by the individual States, especially the building of avenues of interstate communication. In view of the logical sources of principal support for these two issues—the special classes who believed in governmental favors, benevolences, and stimulative initiatives in financial and commercial matters so long as these were devised and operated in certain directions of sufficient dignity and importance,—it was natural that the National Republicans and their successors, the Whigs, should welcome with great satisfaction the new issue presented to them by Jackson, that of the government bank, and become ardent partisans of the menaced institution.

On the subject of the tariff, the Whig party (we will now drop the National Republican name, which obtained only temporarily) was originally without any real argument except that of the resolve to defend the protective policy against all possible future acts of retrogression by the Democrats. A strong, in fact an ultra, protective system was in force, and the Jackson administration passed another protective law in 1832, which proved the last straw for South Carolina and precipitated the nullification. Then came a new embarrassment for the protectionist Whigs. A troublesome surplus revenue had accumulated from the tariff duties. The surplusage had to be stopped by tariff reductions and readjustments, and Clay and the other Whig statesmen joined in the necessary proceedings while cherishing in their hearts the principle of protection. In due time the Democratic party did the expected, totally reverted from the protective idea, declared for a revenue tariff, established the law of the land accordingly, and on that basis the government was conducted and the country prospered until the Civil War. The Whigs never accomplished anything with their protectionist doctrine, and the people were never aware of loss or hardship resulting from

their failure to do so. Yet it cannot be doubted that the people would have been heard from in any such case. There was at one time, as we have seen, an actual rebellion on account of a too high, and especially too discriminative tariff. But who ever heard of any popular uprising, rage, or disgust coinciding with or corresponding to deprivation of those protective largesses which in some quarters are considered so promotive of success and happiness?

Respecting internal improvements on a program of Federal assumptions and acts, the Whigs were equally unsuccessful. The Democratic party had by this time gone as far as it would permit itself to go in enactments presumptive of central authority concerning proposals and details that involved constitutional questions. Both Monroe and Madison, while favoring, on general principle, schemes of internal improvement by government action and at government expense, had considered such schemes improper practically unless authorized by a constitutional amendment. The balanced arrangement of Federal and State powers, responsibility, and obligations which was the distinguishing virtue of the Constitution, made it inexpedient for the national government to go into the States with improvement projects of its own. The States and the people locally, with the private business interests, were expected to be watchful over internal matters, to exert corresponding enterprise, and to take care of the expense and administration. State rights, for which the Democratic party stood, implied State duties. Against the Democratic opposition to internal improvements the Whigs were unable to make any headway, and there never was the slightest indication that the people were with them on that issue. Their two successes at Presidential elections (1840 and 1848) were followed by no positive results of any kind for their party policies. The first Whig President, William Henry Harrison, died after only a month in office; his successor, John Tyler, was recreant to the party; and the third, Zachary Taylor (who also died while serving), and fourth, Millard Fillmore, had to devote themselves to much more grave

affairs than those of either internal improvements or tariff, and, moreover, never had the advantage of party control of Congress. It is interesting to speculate as to the probable results in relation to internal improvements if the Whig, instead of the Democratic, party had been dominant for the period, say, from 1833 to 1861. What would then have been the national policy about interstate railroad and telegraph construction, development, and control? Could the Whigs, with any consistency, have left those functions and operations altogether to private enterprise? It is a curious question.

With their third issue, favoring the government bank, the Whigs were no more successful than with their programs of protection and internal improvements. At the beginning of the great controversy about the bank (1829) they appeared to have the advantage so far as representative public opinion was concerned. Although the Democrats were very largely in the majority in each house of Congress, the opposition by the administration to renewal of the bank charter was so far from receiving concerted party support that when the recharter bill came up for action in the summer of 1832 it was passed. The President vetoed it, the ensuing campaign was fought on the issue which he thus made, and he was overwhelmingly sustained by the people. This decided the fate of the bank, which, however, still had four years to run under its existing charter. But Jackson had not ended with his war on the institution. By removing the government deposits (1833) he revived the dispute, and it now became even more bitter. He was charged with persecution of the bank, and also with exercising dictatorial power. The Senate passed a resolution of censure against him, but after acrimonious debate lasting through still another Presidential contest, that body voted to expunge the resolution from its records (January, 1837), and he accordingly retired to private life completely vindicated.

At the election of 1836 the stormy events of the preceding eight years, though attended by much agitation and dissen-

sion among the Democrats, left the Whigs quite spiritless. Unable to unite on a national ticket, they distributed their votes, according to State preferences, among three Presidential nominees of their party. (William Henry Harrison, of Ohio; Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts; and Willie P. Mangum, of North Carolina), and in a portion of the south they adopted as their own a fourth candidate, Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, an anti-administration Democrat. In the Democratic party the personality and record of Jackson, conjoined with the strong position of the great majority in support of his course and policies, brought an end to the differences, except among some of the southern elements;—it may be remarked that as long as the Whig party lasted the Democrats had but an uncertain tenure in a number of the southern States. Martin Van Buren, of New York, Secretary of State under Jackson and a most sagacious and forceful leader of the party, was unanimously nominated for President by the national convention. The Electoral vote stood: Van Buren, 170; Harrison, 73; White, 26; Webster, 14; Mangum, 11. For Vice-President, Richard M. Johnson (Democrat), of Kentucky, had 147 Electoral votes, just half of the whole number; he was afterward chosen to the office by the Senate—this being the only instance of failure by the people to elect the Vice-President.

While failing to show any approach to success on the Presidential result, the Whigs made gains in the Senate and House of Representatives, lacking only a few votes of enough to control the latter. The panic of 1837 followed, and a decided reaction on the subject of financial policy set in against the Democratic party. This, however, brought no reversal, so far as the bank was concerned, during Van Buren's administration (1837-41). The bank had been abolished for sufficient reasons; its resuscitation would mean simply a revival, in undoubtedly aggravated form, of the evil of a privileged central monopoly as a "regulator" of finance and politics; and neither Van Buren nor any subsequent Democratic Executive gave the slightest consideration to the appeals in its favor. Moreover, the Van Buren

administration rejected all the importunate requests for loans to private citizens and interests during the panic, on the ground that in no emergency could the government, responsible to the people, permit itself to be used as a means of special support for individuals or their enterprises. An objection to Jackson's course with the bank was that, while destroying the old system, he substituted only the tentative one of placing the government deposits with selected banking concerns. Van Buren set forth without delay to perfect an affirmative measure concerning the deposits, and devised the plan of the "Independent Treasury," making the government itself the sole depository and thereby carrying to its logical conclusion the Jacksonian policy of the divorcement of the government from private financial and trade affairs and influences. In that effort he did not immediately have the coöperation of Congress, but an act was finally passed which he had the pleasure of signing on July 4, 1840, describing it as a new Declaration of Independence. This was repealed by the Whigs in 1841, but was reëstablished by the great Democratic administration of Polk in 1846—since which time the Independent Treasury with its Sub-Treasury ramifications has been retained without change by every successive administration and unqualifiedly commended by writers of all political beliefs as one of the splendid inheritances of the government and country from Democratic initiative and rule.

In 1840 the Democratic party met its first national defeat, William Henry Harrison, Whig, being chosen President by 234 Electoral votes to 60 for Van Buren, and the Whigs obtaining a substantial majority in each house of Congress. Before any legislative results could be accomplished by the Whig administration, President Harrison died (April 4, 1841), and the Vice-President, John Tyler, of Virginia, took his place. Tyler throughout his term (1841-45) went counter to all the plans of the Whig party: hence the familiar verb, tylerize—"to act against the party that has elected one to office" (Standard Dictionary). Though signing the bill for doing away with the Independent Treasury, he

vetoed two measures designed to institute a government-controlled central bank. After he had finished with the bank scheme, the situation in which that whole ambitious project stood needed but a single word for its description—*Finis*. The people returned promptly to emphatic approval of the Jacksonian financial position, giving the Democratic party a majority of 71 in the House at the Congressional elections of 1842. Even the great Whig leaders who had most positively advocated the bank's cause never ventured to renew the agitation. When Clay made his next race for the Presidency, in 1844, his platform was absolutely silent on the bank subject.

The official position of the Democratic party concerning the bank was continually expressed in the following words in its national platforms: "That Congress has no power to charter a national bank; that we believe such an institution one of deadly hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a concentrated money power and above the laws and the will of the people; and that the results of Democratic legislation in this and all other financial measures upon which issues have been made between the two political parties of the country, have demonstrated to candid and practical men of all parties their soundness, safety, and utility in all business pursuits."

In this declaration the words "national bank" meant, of course, a central privileged institution similar in organization, powers, and tendencies to the old discarded establishment.

During the period reviewed in this chapter there was a radical change from the original ideas and methods of party organization, control, nominations, and operations. In preparation for the campaign of 1824 a Congressional caucus was called, mainly in the interest of Crawford, one of the Presidential aspirants, but the attendance was small and the action taken received no recognition from the Democracy at large; this was the last of the nominating caucuses.

Four years later the personal issue between Jackson and Adams was squarely defined, and no national nominating ceremonies were necessary. But in 1832, with two great parties in the field and actively competing for general support, it was decided by the leaders of both to refer the nominations of President and Vice-President directly to the people through their representatives in special assemblages.

The first Democratic national convention was held in Baltimore, May 21, 1832, Robert Lucas, of Ohio, presiding. As Jackson's renomination unanimously was a foregone conclusion, no rule was adopted to govern the choice of the Presidential candidate, but it was decided that a two-thirds vote should be required for the Vice-Presidential selection. At the next national convention the two-thirds rule was applied to both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominations; and it has since been adhered to in every national convention of the party.

From the national nominating system was evolved the plan of precise formulation and declaration of party principles and issues in platforms, and in 1840 the Democrats presented to the public their first national platform. The first national committee of the party was established in 1848.

The inception of minor parties, undertaking to compete on certain questions with the two powerful political organizations, dates from the campaign of 1832, when the Anti-Masonic party made its appearance on the fantastic issue of suppression of all secret oath-bound orders, and actually carried a State, Vermont, for its Presidential ticket.

In 1840 the Abolition, or Liberty, party, representing the radical sentiment of opposition to slavery, was instituted.

Concerning these and the numerous other sporadic parties that have since sprung up, it is needless to comment with any particularity. All of them have proved utterly futile, and their annals belong merely to the miscellanies, marginalia, and curiosities of politics. The genius of our institutions has required from the beginning, and requires to-day, a two-party system, and a two-party system only.

The American people believe in positive politics conducted by two major forces, each of them strong enough to fairly balance the other, and each broad enough, from the viewpoint of inherited American standards and principles of government, to appeal powerfully to the comprehensive public. It has happened that a major party has become decadent and defunct; this may occur again. But no major party has gone into dissolution as the consequence of minor party pressure or pretension; and no minor party has risen to the dignity of a major party or even a permanently weighty third party. There have been serious splits in the great parties, which have presented certainly the most favorable situations possible to be imagined for hopeful third party development; but in that direction nothing, absolutely nothing, has resulted except for the campaigns immediately in prospect. No teaching of American political history is more persistent or striking than that of the futility of minor party voting.

CHAPTER V

THE MEXICAN WAR AND THE WILMOT PROVISIO

1844-1848

“**T**HE American Democracy place their trust in the intelligence, the patriotism, and the discriminating justice of the American people. We regard this as a distinctive feature of our political creed, which we are proud to maintain before the world as the great moral element in a form of government springing from and upheld by the popular will.”

With these words all the early national platforms of the Democratic party began. In keeping with their spirit was an unflinching and consistent course, with which the characteristic disposition and action of the Whigs sharply contrasted. The inconsistencies of Henry Clay are proverbial. Resembling them were the frequent embarrassments and hesitations of his party. Neither the Whig party nor Clay

lacked aggressiveness in maintaining an issue when once decided upon. But finding it impossible to make progress with the people on their issues after due endeavors, the Whigs had recourse to circumspection and expediency, hoping thus to win popular favor away from the positive Democrats. Such has never proved the method of good politics in the long run.

In the latter part of Tyler's administration the Texas question became acute. Texas, adjoining the Louisiana Purchase at the southwest and belonging first to Spain and then, after the successful Mexican Revolution, to the republic of Mexico, had been largely penetrated and settled by citizens of our southern States, who, as was the custom of those times among southern Americans, owned negro slaves. These settlers revolted against Mexico and set up a separate Texan republic (1836). They next sought admission to the United States by annexation, which meant the addition of another slave State to the Union, and also war with Mexico on account of the claim of the Texans to a vast territory still in Mexican possession, extending to the Rio Grande River from its mouth to its source. Some years elapsed before the annexation proposal was definitely formulated. President Tyler favored it, and early in 1844 an annexation treaty was presented to the Senate, which that body rejected—the Whig members and a few northern Democrats voting against it.

Coinciding with the discussion about Texas was that in relation to settling the northwestern (Oregon) boundary dispute with Great Britain. The Oregon Country, so called (comprising the present States of Oregon and Washington), had long been under "joint occupation" by the United States and Great Britain, pending diplomatic adjustment of the boundary. Diplomatic negotiations were still in progress throughout Tyler's administration. There was no indication as to the probable outcome. The people were impatient for a decision, and a large element demanded the full amount of the American territorial claim, reaching to the parallel of 54 deg. 40 min.

Therefore at the opening of the Presidential campaign of 1844 two immensely important territorial questions, affecting the destiny of the nation, were under consideration. The Oregon controversy, no matter what boundary line should ultimately be drawn, would necessarily result in our acquiring title to a new domain at the north, from which slavery would be excluded. The Texas dispute involved the acceptance or refusal of a new domain at the south, in which slavery had already been established by its inhabitants. In both matters the rights and fortunes of enterprising and brave American pioneers and home-builders, who were looking to our government for sympathy and support, were at stake.

On May 27, 1844, six weeks after the defeat of the Texas treaty in the Senate, the Democratic national convention met in Baltimore. The platform declared for both annexation of Texas and insistence upon our claim to the whole of Oregon. It had been expected that Van Buren would again be nominated for President, and he had a majority on the first ballot, though far from the necessary two-thirds. He was known to be opposed to immediate Texan annexation, and his selection was therefore impossible. James K. Polk, of Tennessee, was nominated unanimously on the ninth ballot. The Whigs in their platform were silent on the Texas question, besides ignoring the subjects of the bank and internal improvements, and even referring to the tariff in only evasive terms. Their candidate, Clay, endeavored during the canvass to accommodate himself to various views concerning Texas, with the result that while many people were glad to credit him with "statesmanlike" intentions it was not clear how he would act if elected. It was generally understood, however, that the Whig policy was against war with Mexico. The election was decided by the vote of New York, which gave Polk a plurality of about 5,000—Clay's defeat being attributed to the action of the third party Abolitionists, who polled in that State 15,812 votes for their Presidential nominee, James G. Birney. The Electoral vote of the nation was, Polk, 170; Clay, 105. The

Democrats elected a majority in each branch of Congress.

Following this decisive result there was no longer any question about Texas. Resistance in Congress to the Democratic program ceased to be of any avail, and when the Tyler administration went out of office (March 4, 1845) the annexation had been made an accomplished fact. The expected war with Mexico ensued, terminating with the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was proclaimed by President Polk on July 4, 1848, the United States acquiring all the huge territory westward from the Louisiana Purchase, with the Pacific coast from the south to the north line of California. Five years afterward the Gadsden Purchase, enlarging the southern bounds of Arizona and New Mexico, was added as the result of peaceful negotiation with Mexico by the Democratic administration of Pierce.

As for Oregon, the aggressive attitude that had been expressed in 1844 by the Democratic campaign cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight!" gave way to a more moderate disposition under the responsibilities involved in the final treaty arrangements with England. The boundary was fixed at the forty-ninth parallel, in conformity to the irreducible claims of both countries. No dispassionate American writer has ever taken exception to that adjustment, except by way of regret that the Polk administration was debarred by the previous diplomatic course of our government from urging a claim to Vancouver Island. An admirable review of the whole dispute may be found in Clinton A. Snowden's "History of Washington" (Century History Company, 1909).

It was under Democratic initiative and action that the United States secured the entire portion of its territory extending from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, as well as the valuable Florida cession.

The Mexican War led directly and instantly to a revival of the political slavery question, which, as we have seen, had been originally settled by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. That Compromise, based on the admission of Missouri as a slave State but the exclusion of slavery from all other western territory (as existing in 1820) north of 36 deg.

30 min., was of course inapplicable, except by new Congressional act, to the tremendous expanse added to the national possessions in the years 1845-48. Anti-slavery sentiment had greatly increased at the north, and was sternly opposed to any farther spread of the slave system; while at the south there was an unalterable resolve not only to maintain the slavery institution, but to extend it into the new western regions so as to assure the erection of more slave States and preserve the south's relative political strength in the Union.

The south considered itself to have rightful opportunities and expectations of slavery development in the Union. But the great majority of the northern people refused to recognize any slavery rights except those that for necessary reasons could not be contradicted. It was not proposed to disturb or limit slavery in the States where it existed, but all the projects to extend it caused instant trouble.

The reasons for absolute non-interference with slavery in the States where it then existed were constitutional. They could not possibly be overcome save by forcibly disrupting the Union, which none wanted to do except the extreme abolitionists of the Garrisonian school, who regarded the Constitution as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell." As a matter of fact, when finally slavery was abolished in the southern States, the Union had already been disrupted by force, and the only question respecting it was whether it could be restored by the same agency.

Moreover, the most essential and precious guarantee of our whole political system, that of the exclusive and inviolable right of the several States to the control of their local affairs, so far as powers had not been expressly surrendered to the Federal government, required that the Federal government should let slavery strictly alone in the States where it was an established institution. It was the separation of State rights and functions from national powers and pretensions, that alone had made democracy successful and ultimately given it such supremacy that any other institutional plan was unimaginable. Interference

with slavery in the States that chose to have it was incompatible with guaranteed State rights; the matter was simply undebatable, except on the conjectural basis of a constitutional amendment nationally prohibiting or discriminating against slavery—and how could such an amendment, needing three-fourths of the States for its ratification, be procured with half the States surely against it?

But the positiveness and total irreconcilability of the conflicting opinions and preferences on the fundamental question of slavery made it imperative to find a political solution in relation to the future States at the west. Civil war was at that time not thought of; the idea was too monstrous; both sections were unanimously for the Union. The only solution was an agreement of some kind. Pending the official termination of the Mexican War there was much discussion in Congress, and various proposals were introduced. The only substantive results were the admission of Texas as a slave State (1845) and the organization of Oregon as a free Territory (1848).

From the Congressional debate, however, there was evolved an exceedingly striking measure of policy, the Wilmot Proviso, which, though abortive in the end, had a profound influence upon politics. This was a northern Democratic measure in its origin, but received substantial support also from the northern wing of the Whig party. Introduced in the House (1846) by David Wilmot, a Democratic member from Pennsylvania, it passed by 87 to 64 and was many times reaffirmed by that body, but was defeated in the Senate. It was intended to be a joint resolution, authorized President Polk to initiate peace negotiations with Mexico, and added:

“ Provided, That as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any

part of the said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall be first duly convicted."

The rival Presidential candidates in 1848 were Lewis Cass, of Michigan, Democrat, and General Zachary Taylor, of Louisiana, Whig. On the new slavery questions neither party had as yet a program of exact measures. Consistently with the indecisive results in Congress, party attitudes were still subject to deliberation, and every latitude was allowed to diverse views.

In previous Democratic platforms the general principles had been laid down that the Federal government was "one of limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution"; that it was "inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers"; that Congress had "no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States"; and that such States were "the sole and proper judges of everything pertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the Constitution." These declarations were now renewed, and their implications in relation to the slavery discussion were given increased significance by announcing that the party proposed to maintain, as a high and sacred duty, "a vigilant and constant adherence to those principles and compromises of the Constitution which are broad enough and strong enough to embrace and uphold the Union as it was, the Union as it is, and the Union as it shall be, in the full expansion of the energies and capacity of this great and progressive people." In other words, the Democratic party declared itself to be strictly, absolutely, and unconditionally a Union party; and though the sectional subject was not specified in that connection, everyone knew it was the sectional subject that was the occasion for the pronouncement.

Besides deciding to leave the details of the slavery question to the future, the Democratic convention of 1848 declined to enter into condemnations of particular propositions and party elements that were regarded with disfavor in certain quarters. It voted down a resolution that denounced the Wilmot Proviso as bad Democratic doctrine.

and it also took an impartial course as between two contesting delegations from New York, one of which favored the Wilmot Proviso and the other opposed it—offering seats to both on equal terms. But neither of the factions was willing to accept such an arrangement, and New York was consequently unrepresented in the convention. The New York supporters of the Proviso—popularly known as Barnburners because it was said they were like the wrathful Dutchman who burned his barn to exterminate the rats and mice that infested it—bolted the Democratic national ticket, and from that action resulted the call for the celebrated Buffalo convention which established the Free Soil, or Free Democratic, party and nominated Van Buren as a separate Presidential candidate on a platform of intense and comprehensive antagonism to slavery.

While the Democrats in 1848 were torn by factional differences, due to the bold maintenance of anti-slavery principles by an important part of their following, the Whigs were extremely, indeed minutely, careful to keep from even the appearance of being concerned about principles or disturbed by discordant elements of any kind. Their national convention adopted no platform. Although they had every hope of winning the election, they refused to do justice to their tried leader, Clay, denying him the nomination because they thought it safer to have a perfectly colorless candidate, General Taylor.

The Wilmot Proviso defeated the Democrats. In the pivotal State of New York their regular nominee, Cass, had only 114,318 votes; Van Buren, Free Democrat, had 120,510; and Taylor, Whig, had 218,603. New York had up to that time been a reliably Democratic State. So had Pennsylvania, which also went against Cass. Taylor carried seven northern and eight southern States, with a total Electoral vote of 163; Cass won in eight States of the north and seven of the south, and had 127 votes.

CHAPTER VI
THE PARTY OF THE UNION
1849-1857

A GREAT event brought to an end the mere experimental discussion and inconclusive Congressional treatment of the various phases of the slavery question, and inaugurated those positive measures which, with the constantly increasing embitterment of feeling that they produced, resulted in the Civil War. Gold was discovered in California in 1848, and that region of formerly sparse population and inconsequential development and enterprise was rapidly settled by as energetic and masterful a people as have ever wrought mighty and beneficent changes. In little more than a year California showed a sufficient number of inhabitants to be indisputably entitled to admission as a State of the Union. Without resorting to the dignified and leisurely preliminary of Territorial organization under Federal auspices, the people, in October, 1849, held a convention which adopted a State Constitution. This Constitution excluded slavery from the proposed State. It was popularly approved at a special election, the vote being 12,066 to 811, and application was made to Congress for admission.

At once it was seen that the granting of California's application would involve two startling consequences: First, it would give the north sixteen States as against the south's fifteen, and therefore destroy the balance of the sections; and Second, it would make impossible the projection of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific, a proceeding favored by many statesmen of that day, and strongly urged by the south, as an ideal solution of the sectional problem. Thus the proposed admission would enhance the political power and prestige of the north and doubtless stimulate that section to seek still further gains against slavery. The south understood that the wish of California could not be denied consistently with democratic principles, yet was in no mood to yield advantages to

the north without equivalents. The situation was full of danger for the Union. Although thoroughly desiring to stay in the Union on equal terms for slavery, or at least terms guaranteeing the future security and influential position of the institution, the south unalterably preferred disunion to sacrifice or imperilment of its own political power and fundamental domestic system.

The Compromise measures of 1850 were accordingly conceived, agreed to by the leaders of both political parties, and after long and strenuous debate passed by the two branches of Congress and signed by the Whig President, Millard Fillmore (formerly Vice-President, who had succeeded to the chief magistracy upon the death of President Taylor, July 9, 1850). In brief, the Compromises provided as follows: 1. Admission of California without slavery and without reduction or division of its territory. 2. Organization of two new Territories, Utah and New Mexico, out of the remaining part of the domain ceded by Mexico; these Territories, and the States later rising from them, to have the right to establish or exclude slavery without interposition by Congress. 3. A more effective Fugitive Slave law, to be strictly enforced by the Federal officials and courts, and requiring all the inhabitants of every State and Territory to assist slaveowners in recovering their escaped negroes. 4. Addition of a large part of Texas to New Mexico upon payment of a money indemnity by the Federal government to Texas. 5. Abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, but no disturbance of the existing status of that institution.

The gains for the south of the Fugitive Slave law and the right to an equal chance for slavery in the new Territories were regarded, so far as active anti-slavery opinion was concerned, as the commanding feature of the Compromises; and it was active anti-slavery opinion, incessantly opposing all gains for the south and insisting on Charles Sumner's dictum, "Freedom national, slavery sectional," that was to dominate the political situation ultimately. But in 1850 the overmastering desire of the country was

for sectional harmony within and for the Union. Clay and Webster, the great leaders of the Whigs, were wholeheartedly for the Compromises, inclusive of the Fugitive Slave and Utah-New Mexico bills:—Clay was indeed the chief originator and foremost champion of the measures as a whole, and Webster, as the head of the cabinet, fully approved President Fillmore's signature of all the acts.

Nevertheless, the Whig party, by its vacillating, timid, and scrupulously expedient course had become a very uncertain factor; the only unquestionable thing about it was its relative weakness with the people. It had never really led the country, and all the successive events demonstrated that it never could. The Compromises were accepted by the general public, north and south, as settling the slavery controversy, and a consistent policy and administration for the future were therefore expected. The preservation of the Union was believed to be assured by the accommodations that had been made, provided there should be no re-opening of the slavery question in a manner to provoke secessionist action at the south; and as the Democratic party had the complete confidence of the country for its representative position and effective strength in support of the Union, its triumph over the Whigs at the Presidential election of 1852 was so great as to resemble its early successes against the Federalists.

Yet the official attitude of the Whigs on slavery in the 1852 campaign was wholly identical with that of the Democrats. Both parties declared unqualifiedly for the Compromises as affording a final settlement of the controversy, and against all attempts to revive sectional differences; and the Whig platform added: "We will maintain the system (of the settlement) as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union." The people, however, as had always been the case save under certain peculiar temporary conditions, were much more strongly inclined toward the Democrats than the Whigs on the principal issues of government. Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, the Democratic candidate, received 254

Electoral votes, against 42 for the Whig nominee, General Winfield Scott, of New Jersey. The only States carried by Scott were Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Vermont—two northern and two southern. The Democrats retained the Senate by a very large majority and elected more than two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives.

This result was not a sectional victory in any sense. The sectional question, on account of the absolute Unionism of both the great parties, was not at issue. It was a victory, of overwhelming proportions, for the Democratic party, after calm and fair consideration by the country of the relative merits of the rival organizations in view of the lack of any difference between them on the sectional question. The Free Democratic, or Free Soil, party declined greatly in strength. Its candidate, John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, received in the nation only 156,149 votes, as against 291,263 cast for Van Buren in 1848. If there had been a marked sectional spirit popularly, the Free Soilers would have benefited, as they were the only political sectionalists of that time.

The outstanding event of Pierce's administration (1853-57) was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the early part of 1854. This measure was introduced and championed by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, and was supported by the administration Democrats and the conservative Whigs. It was maintained that as the Compromise legislation of 1850 had given the south an equal chance for slavery in the Territories of New Mexico and Utah, a new national principle governing the question of slavery in the Territories had consequently been established—the principle of "popular sovereignty," or decision by vote of the people concerned; and that the same principle should be applied to the still unorganized portion of the old Louisiana Purchase north of 36° 30'—an extensive country lying west of Missouri, Iowa, and Minnesota, and stretching to the crest of the Rocky Mountains. It had become of urgent importance to extinguish the Indian titles

and erect Territories in the Louisiana Purchase, not only as a matter of satisfaction to American settlers who wished the lands, but also for the security and advantage of the many emigrants crossing the plains to California and Oregon, who were entitled to the protection of organized government and the benefit of civilized settlement along their routes of travel.

An effort had been made at the Congressional session of 1852-53 (before the coming in of the Pierce administration) to institute a new Territory west of Missouri under the anti-slavery guarantee of the Missouri Compromise, but it had failed because of southern opposition in the Senate. The establishment of such a Territory could not be delayed, and it was certain the south would agree to its organization if the ban against slavery should be lifted. Altogether, the arguments for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise seemed convincing to Douglas, and the great influence that he exercised, combined with the active favor of the south, carried the repeal measure through. The bill provided for creating two new Territories, Kansas and Nebraska, and was therefore known as the Kansas-Nebraska bill.

Strong opposition to the policy thus entered upon was at once developed at the north, and the issue was taken into all the State and Congressional elections of 1854. The movement resulted in the inception and organization of the Republican party, although for some time the opponents of the act were slow to assume the name of Republicans, preferring to be called anti-Nebraskans. There was as yet no concerted plan of the diverse elements represented to combine themselves into a compact new party. The political situation just at that time was vastly complicated by the appearance of the Know-Nothing, or so-styled "American" party, on a program of comprehensive antagonism to the foreign-born elements of the population and to the Catholic church. This organization had not as yet formally entered the political field; and as it operated on the basis of a strictly secret "order" it remained an un-

certain quantity throughout the upheaval that immediately followed the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act. At the fall elections of 1854 the Know-Nothings polled a formidable vote, carrying several States and electing a large number of members of Congress. Meantime the Whig party, while here and there making a valorous fight for life, fell into a state of general collapse that presaged its early end. It did not have the votes to maintain an effective existence for itself after parting with its many members who decided to join, variously, the Republican or other Anti-Nebraska aggregations or the Know-Nothing movement.

Into this confused condition of politics simplicity was gradually introduced as the result of the overshadowing interest in the great Kansas issue and the practical developments arising from it. The south was determined to secure Kansas for slavery, and northern sentiment was grimly resolved to not permit that outcome. A decision could be reached only by the weight of popular preference in Kansas itself after settlement had advanced sufficiently to admit of conclusive action by vote. For there was no possible question, in the existing political circumstances, of repealing the Kansas-Nebraska act or of summarily awarding Kansas to one side or the other by national intervention of any kind. Southern and northern emigrants consequently thronged to Kansas, and with them, of course, went interested politicians and agitators who stoutly maintained the claims of their respective sides and were ready at all times to seek and seize every advantage. The southern partisans were mostly from the adjacent State of Missouri, and, as rough frontiersmen who had thoroughly convinced themselves that they had a superior right to the Kansas soil, they did not hesitate to take high-handed measures. Neither did the northern settlers, for that matter, after duly experiencing the difficulties and dangers of the proposition before them. The natural results were premature and one-sided elections, rival governments, armed conflicts (the celebrated "Border Ruffian" wars), neigh-

borhood feuds, murders both unprovoked and retaliatory, and villainies of all varieties.

It should be always borne in mind that the Kansas issue and situation originated from the irreconcilable nature of the opposed views of the sections on the slavery question, which had never been a party question and which the Democratic party, as the responsible party of the Union, passionately desired should not be. On this point the most distinguished northern historians—notably that preëminent authority concerning the period in question, James F. Rhodes—have done justice to the Democratic party. The south and north equally made the issue—the south's contribution being its insistence upon a position of political equality in the Union, and the north's its refusal to concede national equality to slavery. Suppose the Missouri Compromise had not been repealed—what then? Would the south have then consented to the opening of a new free Territory in the Louisiana Purchase without the compensatory arrangement of a new slave Territory somewhere else? Certainly not. Moreover, and this is a still more interesting point, if the south had been debarred from a chance in Kansas, would it not have elected to adhere to its favorite project, at that time ready for execution, of annexing Cuba? It is the opinion of many historical students that the move to annex Cuba after an indispensable war with Spain in that connection, was stopped only by the concession to the south of the Missouri Compromise repeal.

In the clear light of history it is easy to see that the repeal was nevertheless a great mistake, especially so on expedient grounds, and most particularly on the ground of the interest of non-sectionalism, which the Democratic party had earnestly at heart. It was an experiment which appeared logical, but of which the consequences could not be foreseen, any more than the results to flow from the formation of the sectional Republican party could be predicted by even the most sagacious participants in that epochal enterprise.

The House of Representatives of the Thirty-fourth Con-

gress (1855-56) was organized by the Republicans, Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, being elected Speaker. A consolidation of all the Anti-Nebraska members was necessary to accomplish the result after unsuccessful balloting for two months. Not a single southern vote was given to Banks. Thus in its first national success the Republican party took on the sectional character that has always distinguished it.

At their first national nominating convention, held in Philadelphia on June 17, 1856, the Republicans selected as their candidates two northern men—John C. Fremont, of California, for President, and William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, for Vice-President. Their platform was mainly a presentation of the issue of non-extension of slavery as related to the Territories, and the immediate admission of Kansas as a free State was demanded. One of the resolutions asserted it to be “both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery”; and there were other references to slavery which signified condemnation of it as a system. Disunionism, however, was utterly and of course with the greatest sincerity opposed, the declaration being made that “the Federal Constitution, the rights of the States, and union of the States shall be preserved”; and the extreme anti-slavery proposals that previously had been urged by the Free Soil and Abolition parties were disregarded on account of the practical considerations against them.

Yet under the conditions that then existed a tendency of disunion was marked out for the Republican party as inseparable from the nature of its organization and policy. Political sectionalism meant disunionism. It was so construed to mean by all the opponents of the Republicans in the canvass—the Democrats, the conservative Whigs, and the Know-Nothings. “The Union in danger” was a warning continually heard. Rufus Choate, the distinguished lawyer, wrote that the first duty was “to unite and dissolve the new geographical party calling itself Repub-

lican, to prevent the madness of the times from working its maddest act—the very ecstasy of its madness,—the permanent formation and the actual present triumph of a party which knows one-half of America only to hate and dread it. . . . The triumph of such a party puts the Union in danger.” And Mr. Choate prophetically added: “If the Republican party accomplishes its objects and gives the government to the north I turn my eyes from the consequences. To the fifteen States of the south that government will appear an alien government. It will appear worse. It will appear a hostile government.”

We shall not dwell on this subject; our sole purpose in discussing it is to dispassionately, and in as brief words as possible, present the historical facts and the opposed points of view of those distressed times. There was a divided responsibility for the rupture of the Union, and neither the Democratic nor the Republican party knew or could estimate the actual bearings or consequences of its attitude. The responsibility of the sectional Republicans for the ultimate result was positive, so was that of the sectional south; while the Democratic responsibility was purely incidental and negative. In the case of the Republicans the fact of positive responsibility is not changed by saying that their party zeal prevented them from taking the menace of secession seriously—that indeed they were wholly of the opinion, as expressed by one of their chief leaders, Henry Wilson, that the southerners could not be kicked out of the Union; for a great party is as directly to be charged with responsibility for its misconceptions and miscalculations as it is to be credited for its wise or fortunate judgments and acts. On the other hand, the Democrats had no zeal of party for any sectional principle or course; their zeal was altogether for the Union; and their connection with the eventuality of disunion was solely that of physical inability to control the powerful and irreconcilable forces operating for the Union's inevitable destruction.

Regarding this matter of responsibility there remains the question of right and wrong on the slavery issue. That

question, on moral grounds, admits of no argument; and on practical grounds it has long since, and everlastingly, been settled. At the period referred to it was, for the north, morally just as easy a question as it is now. The north, having no slaves, could with perfect convenience take the one impregnable moral position—that the pretended right of any man to have a slave was simply unthinkable. But the south had slaves, hundreds of thousands of them, inherited from past generations, multiplying by natural increase, constituting the entire foundation of her economic and social structure. It was impossible for the south to even consider the proposal of emancipation—and there was no alternative proposal save that of retention of slavery that was practical. And to what substantial use would be the noble altruism of liberation? To this question, however attentively considered, there had been no answer, and none seemed possible. Henry Clay, residing in Kentucky, was a slaveowner. A man of more lofty, humane, and generous character never lived. Addressing a political meeting at Richmond, Indiana, during his 1844 campaign, he was interrupted by a Quaker, a Mr. Mendenhall, who asked him why he did not free his slaves. Mr. Clay replied that he had about fifty of them. Some were old and infirm, others infants—should he abandon them to the cold charities of the world? Others would not leave him—should he drive them away? He estimated his slaves to be worth \$15,000. If he would agree to lose that sum by liberating them, would Mendenhall and his friends agree to provide for them to the amount of \$15,000 after they had been given their freedom?

Hence the question of right and wrong had more than one side in practice. And no one at the north had any definite program for helping the south to a solution.

But as regarded by northern sentiment, slavery was intolerable. That was sufficient. The question of responsibility and consequences involved in the Republican sectional attitude became insignificant when slavery reached out to northern soil, as it was doing under the Fugitive

Slave and Kansas-Nebraska laws. Such, stated with perfect dispassionateness, was the true Republican position. The Democratic position was, that the Union was all important.

In its platform of 1856 the Democratic party announced that, "claiming fellowship with and desiring the coöperation of all who regard the preservation of the Union under the Constitution as the paramount issue," it repudiated "all sectional parties and platforms concerning domestic slavery which seek to embroil the States and incite to treason and armed resistance to law in the Territories, and whose avowed purposes, if consummated, must end in civil war and disunion." James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, and John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, were nominated for President and Vice-President.

The Know-Nothings nominated former President Millard Fillmore, of New York, and Andrew J. Donelson, of Tennessee, on a platform asserting their special ideas and adhering to conservative views on the slavery question. An anti-slavery faction of the Know-Nothings sought to effect a fusion with the Republicans, but its offer was declined, although no condemnation of Know-Nothingism was embodied in the Republican platform. The Democrats, however, adopted a very strong plank in opposition to the Know-Nothing demands for discriminations against the foreign-born and Catholics.

A national convention was held by the Whigs, which endorsed the Know-Nothing nominees.

Buchanan won, receiving 174 Electoral votes to 114 for Fremont and 8 for Fillmore. (In the whole south the Republican popular vote was only 1,194.) Buchanan carried fourteen southern and five northern States, Fremont eleven northern States, and Fillmore one southern State, Maryland.

CHAPTER VII
THE ISSUES AND ELECTION OF 1860
1857-1860

THE immediate events that brought on the Civil War were the natural developments of the irreconcilable political positions and sectional antagonisms which have been briefly reviewed in the last chapter. Probably the chiefest of these events, in the respect of intensifying feelings, was the decision in the Dred Scott case by the United States Supreme Court (March 6, 1857), declaring that Congress had no constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, and also practically affirming slavery to be a legitimate institution on fundamental grounds. Thus all for which the south had contended on the broad basis of asserted right was made the law of the land. It was impossible that the south could thenceforth fail to insist upon results to its own advantage; and equally it was impossible that northern anti-slavery sentiment could fail to increasingly seek the power of unhampered political action—a power transcending every other, and therefore able to find ways for effectively dealing with slavery in spite of technical difficulties on certain points.

Another outstanding development was the contest over the celebrated pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution of Kansas, an instrument which, from the circumstances of its inception and subsequent submission to the people of the Territory (1857), had excited the bitter opposition of the free State party. President Buchanan regarded the Lecompton Constitution as the result of competent action taken under due legal authority; but many of the northern Democrats, headed by Douglas, condemned and repudiated it because they believed it was not representative of the popular will. The controversy was with reference to the admission of Kansas on the basis of this Constitution. At the national election of 1856 the Democrats had recovered control of the House of Representatives, besides retaining the Senate; they consequently had the power to enact the Lecompton bill and admit Kansas as a slave State. Douglas

and his followers, however, prevented that consummation. A compromise measure, the English bill (introduced by William H. English, an anti-Lecompton Democratic member of the House from Indiana, who afterward, 1880, ran on the Democratic ticket for Vice-President), was passed and signed by the President (1858), which directed that the Lecompton Constitution be resubmitted to the Kansas voters, together with certain propositions concerning the public lands. The Kansans thereupon rejected the proposed Constitution by a majority of ten thousand. And so the final decision against slavery in Kansas was reached under a Congressional act of Democratic origin and Democratic administrative approval. It is true the measure embodied details unacceptable to Republican leaders; but it brought the main issue before the people of Kansas in a manner creating a situation practically very different from that upon which the pro-slavery partisans had previously taken their stand.

With Kansas irrevocably lost to the south, the whole idea of popular sovereignty as a practical device for implanting slavery at the west was seen to be a delusion. It is indeed strange that the south could ever have seriously expected to be able to outvote the anti-slavery people on a great competitive effort in the Territories; and stranger still is it that the southern leaders could have taken the position of resting their case for the future upon the outcome in the single Territory of Kansas. In its last reduction the question of the political control of Kansas was a question of establishing on the soil the major number of settlers; and for economic reasons the unencumbered northerners were certain to outdo the slave-ridden southerners in the settlement contest. According to the historian Rhodes, there was at no time in Kansas a slave population of more than three hundred—this notwithstanding the proximity of the slave States of Missouri and Arkansas. Pro-slavery sympathizers of course went in large numbers; but the successful competitive taking up of Kansas lands for either immediate or future cultivation by slave labor

was not a practical matter in the emergent case made by the inrush of homeseekers from the north.

And even if the south had won Kansas previously to 1858 the desired balance of the States, sixteen to sixteen, would have obtained only temporarily. For in 1858 Minnesota was admitted as a free State, and in 1859 Oregon, also free, was admitted. It is worthy of remark that both these admissions, giving the north eighteen States to the south's fifteen, occurred during the Democratic administration of Buchanan, when the sectional situation had reached its most critical stage. As both Minnesota and Oregon were deemed to have sufficient population, as their inhabitants unanimously desired admission, and as there were no complicating conditions locally on the subject of slavery, the national government welcomed them to statehood notwithstanding the aggravated political position as between the sections and the consequent menace to the Democratic party.

The uselessness of any further struggle for slavery extension by the means of popular vote in the Territories had at last become perfectly plain. Yet there remained the facts of slavery's right to enter the Territories under the Supreme Court decision, the south's determination to yield nothing, and the certainty of a crisis in the event that the Republican party should come into full control nationally. Thus the fateful issue was made up for the campaign of 1860. Meantime there was an unmistakable growth in Republican strength. The elections of 1858 gave the Republicans a plurality over the Democrats in the House of Representatives, with the Know-Nothings holding the balance; and when the new House organized a Republican, William Pennington, of New Jersey, was chosen Speaker. This was the period of the rise of Abraham Lincoln to a conspicuous position in the national political field as the result of his debates with Douglas in Illinois in 1858, followed by his remarkable address in Cooper Institute, New York City, on February 27, 1860. Thoughtful people began to realize that there could be but one logical conclusion to

Republican success—that of progressive and in the end decisive action regardless of southern opposition and of the necessary consequences, along the line of Lincoln's declaration made at Springfield, Illinois, June 17, 1858, "This government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free"; a declaration paraphrased by William H. Seward in his "Irrepressible Conflict" speech delivered at Rochester, New York, October 25, 1858.

Officially, however, it was no part of announced Republican policy to take overt measures for putting an end to the half-slave status of the Union. Lincoln expressly disavowed any such radical design, saying in his Cooper Institute address that he did not mean to assert that the power of emancipation was possessed by the Federal government, and adding, "As to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States only. . . . Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation." He gave it as his understanding and conviction that the issue as to a Union either all slave or all free was wholly made by the aggressive and uncompromising attitude of the south; that the south would ultimately be satisfied with nothing short of abolition of all the free State Constitutions, so that slavery could become national; and therefore that the responsibility for sectionalism, for the Republican party's position, and for the apprehended eventualities was altogether upon the south.

But this view was hotly resented by the south and totally rejected by the more conservative northern people, especially the Democratic leaders who maintained above all things the practicability of a peaceable and harmonious final arrangement. In the historic Lincoln-Douglas debate at Freeport, Illinois, August 27, 1858, Lincoln propounded to his antagonist several categorical questions, one of which was: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that *States* cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following

such decision as a rule of political conduct?" Douglas with great warmth answered that he considered the interrogatory amazing; that there was "not one man, woman, or child south of the Potomac, in any slave State, who did not repudiate any such pretension"; and that the suggested Supreme Court decision, infringing upon State rights, would simply be a patent violation of the Federal Constitution. "Such a thing," he exclaimed, "is not possible. It would be an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could ever descend to." With equal intensity Douglas might have added that in the surmised case no northern Democrat of any influence would for a moment have tolerated the intrusion of slavery into the free States in contempt of the established and unanimous local public sentiment against that institution, and he might with great pertinence have reminded Mr. Lincoln of the sincerity, reliability, and enormous power and value of the northern Democracy as a factor for maintaining the integrity of the anti-slavery position of every northern State and moreover every Territory. Throughout all the exciting events incidental to the formation of the new commonwealths west of the Mississippi, the northern Democrats who had become settlers in them had not only been active participants on behalf of freedom, but had usually formed the predominating element of the electorate. California had up to 1858 been uniformly Democratic. Iowa, Oregon, and Minnesota had begun their careers with Democratic popular majorities. Even among the free settlers of Kansas the supporters of the Democratic party originally outnumbered every other political element; at the noted free State Constitutional convention held in Topeka in October, 1855, the roll of delegates showed that 19 were Democrats, 6 Whigs, and 9 Independents, Free Soilers, and Republicans.

Lincoln's doctrine of the impossibility of the government's permanent endurance half slave and half free was perfectly expressive, however, of the sentimental conviction of an undoubted majority of the northern people that the country's destiny was bound up in the cause of resistance

to slavery—resistance to such an extent and such a conclusion, at least, as to fully satisfy his demand that “the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and *place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction.*” This was a far different matter than the declared necessity of safeguarding the no-slavery system and rights of the northern States against the alleged menace of southern aggression. There was in fact no incertitude in the public mind, especially at the south, respecting the subsequent steps likely to be taken after slavery should be successfully placed and held in the positively restricted position desired by Lincoln. Every important Republican leader disclaimed any intention of prescribing limitations for the final program of the party. This significantly non-committal attitude was stated as follows by Seward in his Rochester speech: “One class say that they cannot trust the Republican party, that it has not avowed its hostility to slavery boldly enough or its affection for freedom earnestly enough. . . . Others cannot support the Republican party because it has not sufficiently exposed its platform and determined what it will do, and what it will not do, when triumphant. It may prove too progressive for some, and too conservative for others. As if any party ever foresaw so clearly the course of events as to plan a universal scheme for future action, adapted to all possible emergencies. . . . I know, and you know, that a revolution has begun. I know, and all the world knows, that revolutions never go backward.”

The national party conventions of 1860 were confronted with the tremendous responsibility of dealing with the sectional problem in terms of finality. It was impossible that the uncertainty could continue through another Presidential administration. The commanding feature of the situation was the south's demand that the country should accept unequivocally the dogma that the Constitution of its own force carried slavery into the Territories, and hence that slaveowners were fully entitled to locate with their

“property” in any Territory without having their rights impaired by either Congressional or Territorial legislation, and that it was the duty of the Federal government to afford them ample protection accordingly. In that demand the northern Democrats refused to concur, asserting that there were differences of opinion in the party “as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, over the institution of slavery within the Territories,” and that the whole subject was one of constitutional law for the decision of the Supreme Court. These conflicting views dividing the southern and northern Democracy represented, on the one hand, the interest of the south in maintaining to the utmost the right of slavery, and, on the other, the firm adherence of the northern Democrats to constitutional principles and processes without presumptions either for or against slavery claims.

It was inevitable that the south would stand by its interest. At the Democratic national convention which assembled in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 23, 1860, resolutions were adopted (April 30) in accord with the position of the northern wing of the party as above stated. Many of the southern delegates then withdrew. The convention proceeded to the nomination of a candidate for President, but after fifty-seven ballots was unable to make a choice under the two-thirds rule, and on May 3 adjourned to meet again in Baltimore June 18. After it reassembled there was another split. The regular convention nominated Douglas for President and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, for Vice-President; the latter declined, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was named in his place by the national committee. A separate convention was held by the bolters (Baltimore, June 28), which nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon—candidates who were promptly endorsed by the original Charleston seceders in their adjourned convention held in Richmond, Virginia

The differences in the Democratic party thus resulting were neither composed nor in any manner moderated during the campaign. No man in the country knew better than Douglas the terrible earnestness of the southern leaders on the slavery issue or understood more clearly the imminence by the Union's dissolution in the now expected event of the election of a Republican President. Though in former Presidential years ambitious for the honor of his party's nomination, he had on this occasion regarded the prospect of his elevation with entire diffidence, caring only for the maintenance by the platform of a middle course concerning slavery—a course which, he was perfectly convinced, would, if sustained by the people, appeal in the end to the practical judgment of the southerners and so save the Union. He had the support of the immense majority of the northern Democracy and some following in the southern States, but unfortunately for his cause had incurred the strong disfavor of the Buchanan administration. President Buchanan never forgave him for his action on the Lecompton question, and disapproved his divergence from the views of the southerners on the issue of 1860. The President had been brought up in and always had adhered to the early school of extreme conservatism, was punctilious respecting his authority as the head of the party, and, in addition to his great temperamental rigidity, had the fixity of mental habit and predilection that usually attends advanced age and a life-long austerity of character. The whole influence of the administration was exerted in the interest of the southern candidate, Breckinridge. The south, on its part, continued uncompromising in its rejection of Douglas as the party spokesman. His popular sovereignty plan had not worked for its advantage, and his constant allusion to the institution of slavery as rightly subject to popular action was repugnant to southern feeling. The south also resented his frank declaration that "unfriendly legislation" could properly be brought to bear against slavery in the Territories whenever the people locally should object to its presence among them.

The Republican national convention of 1860 (Chicago, May 16-18) nominated Lincoln for President and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and in its platform repeated the declarations on the slavery question adopted by the party in 1856, with several additional expressions condemning the Democratic party, and particularly the national administration, in very severe language. The indiscriminating accusation was made that Democratic members of Congress had often uttered or countenanced threats of disunion "without rebuke and with applause from their political associates"; this charge being manifestly intended to cultivate the impression that the Democracy in its responsible capacity (including the intensely and exclusively Unionist northern Democracy) was disposed to be indifferent, if not opposed, to the Union's continuance! Use was made of the word "sectional," as if the south alone, and by no means the Republican party, was sectional. (It may be noted as one of the most interesting facts in the history of politics that the Republican party, without the hope of a single southern Electoral vote at that day or the present, has throughout its career been excessively sensitive on the sectional topic and meticulously denunciatory of all sectionalism.) There was a plank advertising to "the recent reopening of the African slave trade." No such reopening had occurred under affirmative or consenting action by the government, and the Republican party and every informed person knew none could occur because no administration or party would ever take the responsibility. There had been certain incidents showing that the damnable trade was still being carried on by piratical villains for the sake of profit, and that southern sentiment was opposed to enforcement of the laws against it. But no party issue could be justly made on the subject as against the northern Democracy. Douglas had declared his unalterable opposition to the trade. During the canvass he wrote: "I am irreconcilably opposed to the revival of the African slave trade in any form and under any circumstances."

It was still deemed important by the Republicans to observe discretion on certain points so as to do no injury to the prospects of party success. So far as the election chances in the fifteen southern States¹ were concerned, it would of course be immaterial how "sufficiently" (to use Seward's expression) the party "exposed its platform"; for the vote of every one of those States was already lost. But the Republicans well knew that independently thinking people of the north cherished deep in their hearts the sentiment of national harmony, and that while they were thoroughly in sympathy with the cause of non-extension of slavery a generally provocative attitude toward the fiery southerners would not appeal to them. The warning voiced by the Democratic national platform of 1856 against "civil war and disunion" was not taken seriously by active partisan Republicans in the respect of suggesting obligations of actual concession on their part; but it had great weight with conservative voters, and moderation for discretionary reasons was therefore a Republican necessity.

The Chicago platform practically advocated nothing more on the slavery subject than preservation of the territorial status quo, confinement of slavery to the southern States as a "local interest," admission of Kansas as a free State, and the country's rejection of all the pretensions of slavery to an established footing in the Territories. The platform embodied several expressions and references of a general character designed to encourage the more positive anti-slavery people; but on a number of particular matters deemed very important at that period it showed great caution so as not to repel the conservatives. John Brown's raid of October, 1859, was condemned by the declaration that "we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes." There was no demand for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, no approval

¹ Before the Civil War "the south" was understood to consist of all the slave States, including Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri in addition to the eleven States of the subsequent Confederacy. West Virginia had not as yet been detached from Virginia.

of the "Personal Liberty" measures that had been enacted in northern States to make difficult the recovery of escaped slaves, and no objection to the proposed acquisition of Cuba. Those were matters that had long been before the country. It was not because of reluctance to further antagonize the south that the Republican party refrained from taking a position concerning them. It was because of the political inexpediency of intensifying the already strong belief among northern voters that the south could be antagonized too far.

Northern Democrats have never denied that their organization was controlled in 1860 by expediency for the sake of the Union. It is a historical fact that the Republican organization also was expedient—expedient, however, for a different desideratum, that of judiciously limiting the "exposure" of its platform.

In addition to the Douglas Democracy, the Breckinridge Democracy, and the Republican party, there was a consolidation of the old-line Whigs and the conservative Know-Nothings under the name of the Constitutional Union party. This organization was improvised by a convention held in Baltimore May 9, which adopted a brief declaration disapproving "geographical and sectional parties" and asserting that it was "both the part of patriotism and of duty to recognize no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws," and which nominated for President John Bell, of Tennessee, and for Vice-President Edward Everett, of Massachusetts.

The contest was hopeless for both branches of the Democracy, as well as for the Constitutional Unionists, except upon the chance that enough northern votes could be carried against the Republicans to prevent a decision by the Electoral College and accordingly throw the result into the House of Representatives—in which eventuality the party differences represented by the opposed candidacies of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell would still exist and render it very doubtful whether a successful combination of

States could be effected against Lincoln. Therefore the Republicans alone occupied a confident position in the campaign. Yet Douglas waged a most aggressive fight, which he carried into the south. Everywhere he maintained the supremacy and inviolability of the Union as the true Democratic doctrine. At one of his meetings he was asked: "If the southern States secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before he commits an overt act against their constitutional rights, will you advise or vindicate resistance by force to their secession?" Douglas replied: "I answer emphatically that it is the duty of the President of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States as passed by Congress and as the courts expound them. And I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President of the United States, whoever he may be, should treat all attempts to break up the Union by resistance to its laws as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers of 1832."

The result of the Presidential election was as follows: Electoral vote—Lincoln, 180 (all the votes of the free States, except 3 in New Jersey); Douglas, 12 (9 in Missouri and 3 in New Jersey); Breckinridge, 72 (all the votes of the eleven slave States of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas); Bell, 39 (the votes of the slave States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia). Popular vote—Lincoln, 1,866,352; Douglas, 1,375,157; Breckinridge, 847,514; Bell, 587,830.

In the fourteen slave States that chose their Electors by popular vote (South Carolina still held to the practice of choice by the Legislature), Lincoln had 26,430, Douglas 163,525, Breckinridge 570,686, and Bell 515,923—the combined vote of Bell and Douglas being 679,448, or 108,762 more than the Breckinridge vote, a fact of peculiar interest.

On the paramount issue of the Union as against the policy of exclusive southern sectionalism maintained by the Breckinridge men there was an undoubted affinity between the Douglas and Bell followers, who proved themselves to be in a considerable majority in the south itself. The inference is plain that up to the election the south was far from agreed—to state the case moderately—upon a disposition of hostility to the Union. It was made measurably united by the national victory of the Republican party.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS OUTCOME

1860-1865

AFTER the Presidential election (November 6, 1860) a period of four months was to elapse before the change of administration. South Carolina took the lead in the southern secession movement, withdrawing from the Union on December 20, and was followed in January by Mississippi (9th), Florida (10th), Alabama (11th), Georgia (19th), and Louisiana (26th), and on February 1 by Texas. The Confederate government was organized in February at Montgomery, Alabama, with Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, as its head. Arkansas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee joined the Confederacy after the breaking out of the Civil War, and the southern capital was established at Richmond, Virginia. The border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri remained loyal to the Union throughout the war.

Preceding the beginning of hostilities it was the earnest desire of the northern political leaders, without distinction of party, to avert, if possible, the threatened conflict. At first there was a very general disinclination to form presumptions unfavorable to an ultimate accommodation, and it was even hoped that Union counsels might yet prevail in the southern States with the exception of South Carolina. President Buchanan was desirous of giving no provocation. His circumspect course during the months of November and

December, particularly in reserving decision as to reinforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor, has been the subject of much criticism. No doubt can be entertained of his preference for leaving to his successor, so soon to be inaugurated, the responsibility of a positive policy. He believed it was not incumbent on his expiring administration to take measures likely to either initiate war or accelerate secession. Assuming the probability of ultimate disunion and war, he was persuaded that the most important service he could render the national cause would be that of adding nothing to the incitements to separatism during the critical time of the labors of the secessionist leaders to consolidate southern support for their schemes and secure the more doubtful States for their Confederacy. It was well known, and was a fact that stimulated ardent hope at the north, that the States of Georgia, Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, absolutely indispensable to a powerful Confederacy, were in the balance on account of the Union sentiment with which they were permeated. Would it not, therefore, be the course of wisdom to not only stay the hand of the Federal government but abstain from any proceedings calculated to exacerbate southern feeling? Moreover, Congress was to be considered, and it was unquestionable that Congress, responsive to the general desire of the northern people, would make strong efforts toward conciliation. These were some of the considerations that influenced Buchanan in the first few weeks after the election. As against the rigid view that the authority and prestige of the government ought to be maintained at all hazards, they were of course at best only specious; but few thinking people would have approved rigorous measures in conformity to that exclusive view, except on the question of the forts, in the terrible crisis that was upon the country.

In his annual message to Congress (December 4) Buchanan denied unqualifiedly the right of secession. On the subject of the forts he asserted the unquestioned authority of the United States, adding that the officer in command, Major Anderson, had received orders to act strictly on the

defensive, and that in case of attack "the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the assailants." The ultimate course and spirit of the administration were wholly in accord with northern sentiment. At the end of December three commissioners from South Carolina arrived in Washington to "treat" for relinquishment to their commonwealth of the "real estate" within its bounds which was occupied by the national government. The President refused to give them any official recognition. The real aims of the commissioners were, First, to procure practical admission by the Democratic Executive of the right of South Carolina (and therefore any other State) to peaceably secede with all its territory including harbors and islands; and Second, to accomplish the greatly desired result of peaceable expulsion of the United States military forces from Charleston harbor. Realization of these aims would have established the whole claim of legal secession and relieved the south of the necessity of military aggression. But Buchanan was firm in his Union principles and attitude. Upon the points of the impossibility of lawful dismemberment of the Union and the sole responsibility of the south for aggression, he never yielded to the slightest degree.

One of his most notable acts was his reconstruction of the cabinet. The names of his principal advisers—eminent Union Democrats—during the last two months of his Presidency are among the most illustrious in the history of the struggle against the Confederacy. Jeremiah S. Black, of Pennsylvania, was Secretary of State; John A. Dix, of New York, Secretary of the Treasury; Edwin M. Stanton, of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General; and Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, Secretary of War.

Black was the dominating personality and the President's mainstay. Inflexible on the principle of resolute maintenance of the Union's integrity and pursuance of the government's duty, he was the embodiment of the administration's final policy—a policy which not only was irreproachable from every point of view, but was continued without essential change by Lincoln so long as peace with the south remained possible.

Stanton was afterward the celebrated War Secretary of the Lincoln administration.

Dix it was—acting in performance of his official duty under Buchanan—who wrote and sent the immortal dispatch to New Orleans: “If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot.”

Early in January the administration undertook to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Sumter. The President was in favor of dispatching a powerful naval vessel, but was dissuaded by General Scott, commander of the army, and a merchant steamer, the “Star of the West,” was sent instead. It did not reach its destination, being fired on by the shore batteries and forced to put back to sea. Although Major Anderson at the fort was a spectator of the affair, he kept his guns silent. The sentiment of the country approved his forbearance, and there was no general demand either for practical notice by the government of the South Carolina flourish of war or for repetition of the hazardous experiment in Charleston harbor pending Republican assumption of national control.

We have endeavored to write an unprejudiced account of the course of the Executive in the crucial period from the election until Lincoln’s inauguration. This is due an administration so extraordinarily beset with difficulties. The facts are little understood generally. In broad respects they have been much misrepresented for partisan objects. Buchanan was not a great President. He made marked mistakes, which operated for the grievous injury of the Democratic party. But he was a devoted Union man, and he transmitted the government to his successor without blemish upon its honor or prejudice to its interest in principle, and moreover without any occasion existing to either reverse its position or undo its transactions.

It was from the country at large and Congress that all the noteworthy offers of compromise proceeded.

A national Peace convention was held, under the chairmanship of former President John Tyler, which adopted a series of recommendations. More important than the

measures of that unofficial body were several undertakings and propositions directly on behalf of the controlling influences of political power at the north.

First, there was the Thurlow Weed Compromise, which proposed to extend the Missouri line to the Pacific, all territory south of the line to be open to slavery. The same arrangement was made the leading feature of the Crittenden Compromise, a Senate non-partisan measure that received strong support but failed to pass. The fact of its introduction and serious consideration after the plan that it represented had for twelve years been supposed dead, is a remarkable evidence of the anxiety for reconciliation.

By general Republican agreement, especially as expressed by a House committee headed by Thomas Corwin and by a caucus of Republican Governors held in New York, a movement was started and successfully prosecuted to repeal the State Personal Liberty laws which had been enacted in the interest of fugitive slaves. Thus the local measures of the north directed against the slave institution were sacrificed in order to propitiate the seceders.

The following proposed constitutional amendment was passed by two-thirds in each house: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." In other words, the right of undisturbed existence for slavery at the south was perpetually guaranteed. For this measure the Republicans were responsible, as at the time of its adoption they were in undisputed control of both the Senate and House owing to the resignations of southern members. A southern commentator¹ wrote: "This proposition, if carried out by the States, will remove the only real ground of apprehension in the slave States. It blows the Irrepressible Conflict doctrine moon-high, and received the sanction of the author of that doctrine him-

¹ Thomas A. R. Nelson, at that time a member of Congress from Tennessee.

self." Lincoln gave his approval to the principle of the amendment in his first inaugural.

In addition, the right of slavery to enter New Mexico Territory was substantially conceded by the Republican Congress, and the new Territories of Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota were organized without slavery interdiction—a cardinal principle of the Republican party being waived in all these cases.

The striking measures to which we have referred were of course without fundamental party significance except as they illustrated, to the honor of all concerned, the suspension of party and sectional spirit in the great national emergency. None of them in any manner represented Republican policy as such, or could have engaged the smallest Republican support before the election.

The Republicans simply came, at a late day, to the identical position in relation to inexorable facts in which the Democratic party had long stood on account of conditions and circumstances and their logical requirements that, as the result now proved, it had correctly estimated from the viewpoint of the Union's preservation.

Lincoln, assuming the Presidency on the 4th of March, 1861, announced in his inaugural address his adherence to the principle of an indivisible and indestructible Union and asserted the belief of the north in the moral wrong of slavery, but declared his purpose of impartially enforcing the laws inclusive of the Fugitive Slave law, his resolve to in no way interfere with slavery in the States, and his determination that there should be "no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere" beyond what should be "necessary to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts." In no respect of immediate treatment did his policy for the situation diverge from that of his predecessor. But there was the necessary difference that it was for Lincoln, and Lincoln alone, to speak the words of final decision for the government and point out to the seceders what they had to expect. His allusion to

conditional force was construed at the south to imply eventual war; and at the north, notwithstanding all his generous moderation, none could doubt that he would pursue an active course against attack. Douglas, the great leader of the northern Democracy, occupied a conspicuous place at the inaugural ceremony. By all his declarations and acts until his untimely death (June 3, 1861) he thoroughly and ardently sustained the national administration.

When the crash came (April 12) it was the result of Lincoln's firm continuation, despite Confederate threats, of the occupation of Fort Sumter and his decision accordingly (which he caused to be communicated to the South Carolina Confederate Governor) to provision, though not militarily reinforce, its garrison. This time the fire was on the fort itself, an aggression against which both the retiring and incoming Presidents had given solemn warning. No longer was the issue of war to be compromised, and a united north rallied to the flag of the country for the mighty conflict.

The connection of the Democratic party with the question of slavery and the beginnings of the Civil War has for more than half a century been a favorite theme with its foes. Innumerable have been the prejudiced versions, condemnatory judgments, and rancorous denunciations. We have treated the subject with some particularity. The history is very extensive and intricate, and owing to the limitation of space for this little book many details have been omitted; but it is believed the essential elements have been set forth with precision and reasonable proportion.

No Democrat need be ashamed of the record.

In its relations to the waging of the war, to the associated questions, and to the political settlements that followed, the Democratic party was animated by singleness of devotion to the cause of restoring the Union and—which it deemed to be an intimately related matter—the interest of ultimately reestablishing, so far as possible, fraternity between the north and south. At the outset there was no real issue between the Republicans and Democrats. Even party

names were in a number of States discontinued, the new Union party being created and receiving cordial support from the followers of both old organizations. It was greatly due to the unselfish and fervidly patriotic spirit of the War Democrats that the splendid State administrations which contributed so much to vigorous prosecution of the struggle were elected and popularly sustained, and that the local disaffections springing up were repressed by the overpowering weight of public sentiment. At no time did any northern State waver in loyalty. In view of the extreme differences on principle concerning the sectional dispute that had previously obtained, the history of the conduct of the war presents no more notable aspect than that of the government's freedom from complicating difficulties within its own territory.

It is an indisputable fact that during the Civil War almost half the voters of the States remaining in the Union were strong, indeed uncompromising, supporters of the Democratic party on principle. Anyone taking the trouble to analyze the election returns for the four-years period will find this conclusion inescapable. At the Presidential election of 1864, when the general political conditions were more than commonly unfavorable to the Democracy and presumably only the staunchest party men voted the ticket, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans was 4 to 5. Moreover, in 1864, not counting the votes of the four border States or of the newly admitted States of Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada, the Democratic Presidential ticket received 160,000 more votes than were cast in identical northern States for Douglas and Breckinridge combined in 1860.

Regarding the questions of national policy that grew out of the contest, the position of the party in general conformed to the noted Crittenden resolution of July, 1861, adopted almost unanimously by both houses of Congress. This resolution declared that the war was not waged for conquest or subjugation, or to overthrow established institutions of the southern States, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union.

The more extreme war measures involving matters of gravely doubtful political necessity and wisdom, followed after the war by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments (providing for negro citizenship and suffrage), by the carpetbag governments, and by the long protracted military occupation of the south, were believed by the Democrats to be intolerant, oppressive, and in the interest essentially of partisan Republican control and its perpetuation by arbitrary means.

Thus the comparative concord that marked the beginning of the war gave way to an ever-growing disagreement between the parties. The great majority of the Democrats were not content to merge themselves into the Union party, and that organization was finally left to the Republicans, who in their national campaign of 1864 adopted its name in place of their own—a tactical proceeding to which they were influenced by the desire of retaining their large following of War Democrats and also by recognition of the inveterate prejudice against the Republican name among the loyal men in the border States, as well as in the States of the Confederacy that were being recovered with the progress of military operations. A further evidence of the appreciation by the Republicans of the Democracy's great popular strength and their anxiety in politic ways to gain Democratic votes, was their selection in 1864 of Andrew Johnson, a lifelong Tennessee Democrat, as the running mate of Lincoln in his second Presidential candidacy. There was no Republican party reason save that of campaign expediency for the nomination of Johnson; and if ever politicians merited embarrassing consequences from a course supposed originally to have been brightly conceived but presently found to have been a sad mistake, the Republicans fully deserved their unhappy experiences with Johnson when he became President.

It is of historical interest, illustrative of the great disturbances in political thought resulting from the Civil War, that at the opening of the campaign of 1864 a faction of Radical Republicans held a national convention which re-

pudiated Lincoln and nominated John C. Fremont for the Presidency on a platform demanding "the confiscation of the lands of the rebels and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers." General Fremont in his acceptance referred to the work of Lincoln as "politically, militarily, and financially a failure." Later he withdrew in Lincoln's favor.

The Democratic national convention met in Chicago August 29, and nominated for President General George B. McClellan, of New Jersey, and for Vice-President George H. Pendleton, of Ohio. At that time the military situation did not promise a decision, and the Democrats were no more skilled than the discontented Radical Republicans in reading the future. As is customary in political platforms, the opposing party was arraigned with many specifications, one of which instanced the "failure to restore the Union" after four years of war; and resort to amicable measures for renewing "the Federal union of the States" was advocated. Assertion was made of the party's "unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution" for "the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both northern and southern." No objection was made in the platform to the proposed Thirteenth amendment (then before Congress), providing for the complete and permanent abolition of slavery throughout the United States.

The Democratic party never stood for remorseless war against the south as a prime matter, or for vindictive and oppressive treatment of the south after the war. Neither, it should be remembered, did Lincoln. He had solemnly averred that his whole object was to save the Union. Originally he was willing to save the Union by the extreme means of retaining southern slavery if necessary. As late as February, 1865, he prepared a message to Congress proposing payment to the south of \$400,000,000 as the price of peace—his reasons being that the north was equally blameworthy with the south for the curse of slavery originally, that it was just to give an equivalent for manumission, and that cessation of war without any compromise

being made of principle or national interest was worth the money. The cabinet disapproved the message, and he reluctantly withheld it.

If the Democratic party was culpable (as so often has been vehemently alleged) for its peace desire in August, 1864, not less was Lincoln culpable in February, 1865. Both Lincoln and the Democratic party would have welcomed peace with the south in brotherhood, but only on the basis of the Union's restoration.

The Electoral College in 1864 was divided as follows: Lincoln, 212; McClellan, 21 (3 in Delaware, 11 in Kentucky, and 7 in New Jersey). The popular vote stood: Lincoln, 2,216,067; McClellan, 1,808,725. Several of the important States were close. The Republican majority in New York was 6,700; in Pennsylvania, 20,000; in Connecticut, 2,400.

On April 15, 1865, Lincoln died by an assassin's bullet and Andrew Johnson became President, his term running to March 4, 1869.

From Lincoln's death until the Civil War issues ceased to be effective in national politics, the anti-southern extremists held absolute rule in the Republican party. They not merely ruled, they were in truth the whole of the real Republican party, as since their time the special interests have been.

When Lee surrendered his remnant of 27,000 soldiers at Appomattox Court House (April 9, 1865), not only was there no more fight left in the Confederacy, but there remained no remotest possibility that the southern people could again stand up in resistance to northern will. The north could do whatever it chose with the southern people everywhere, in every respect, and for all time. It chose to regard and treat the southern people, excepting those of the colored race, as enemies and as disqualified for free political action.

Concerning the constitutional measures on behalf of the colored race—those of emancipation, citizenship, and suffrage,—all intelligent people knew from the beginning that

the ultimate results and uses (in beneficial respects) to come from the south's necessary acceptance of the measures, would depend in part upon the colored citizens themselves and in part upon the ability of the southern whites to successfully deal, in time, with the new and strange conditions and problems. Upon all grounds and considerations of fact the southern whites were the chief factor, and would inevitably so continue. And there could be no desirable permanent solution except along the line of the south's local interest as understood and directed, for certainly a long time, by the whites of the south.

But the Republican party had no friendly or tolerant spirit toward the southern whites, and never could acquire any. Because they had been "rebels," it cared nothing for their economic recovery and felt no interest in their perfectly peaceable and nobly energetic efforts to make the best of their difficult lot and rebuild their society in order, enlightenment, and industry. It dealt with them from the strict and sole point of view of successful Republican politics, forcibly imposing upon them arbitrary, ignorant, and villainously corrupt governments, which it propped up with bayonets as long as it dared in face of the growing northern revulsion against its selfish and merciless partisan course.

When finally the Federal troops were withdrawn from the southern States, in Hayes's administration, the Republican party as a national organization fell into decay in every one of them. More than forty years have passed. Two new generations of intelligent and loyal voters have grown up. Two foreign wars have been fought, in which the southerners have patriotically participated. Ten Presidential elections have been held. Not one southern Electoral vote has been given the Republican party in all the two-score years.

The southern race question has long been dropped from national politics. It is a local question for the people of the south, purely economic and social as related to their lives in association with one another. No end useful to the country could possibly be served by national political interfer-

ence. Agreeably to the south's convinced belief in the wisdom and necessity of suffrage discrimination, State laws have been adopted imposing educational and other qualifications. These have been tested in the courts and upheld. From time to time, however, Republican complaints are heard, with suggestions as to whether the conditional penalty of the Fourteenth amendment does not apply. On that point an impartial writer has said:

“Congress is not likely to take upon itself the enforcement of the penalty, for the ratification of those (Fourteenth and Fifteenth) amendments was procured only by counting the vote of States which acted under duress, and the requirement of such ratification as a prerequisite to re-admission is considered to have been of doubtful constitutionality. Moreover, serious doubt has been growing as to both the justice and the expediency of the suffrage conditions which the war forced upon the southern States. The foremost leaders among the negroes themselves have avowed their approval of both property and educational tests, if fairly administered, since each of them would serve as a spur to greater efforts on the part of the negroes in thrift and in education.”¹

¹ George W. Haynes, “Cyclopedia of American Government,” article on Suffrage.

CHAPTER IX
TRANSITION AND NEW QUESTIONS
1865-1884

THE twelve years covered by Johnson's administration and the two administrations of Grant are of party interest chiefly as constituting the period of transition from the old politics of passion and hate on the sectional subject to the modern politics concerned with economic questions, important reforms, and the general progressive tendencies and demands of the people. They were years of bitter contention and uncompromising hostility between the parties, and were marked by many dramatic events. To readers desiring a discriminative history of this famous period we recommend the very able book of William Archibald Dunning, "Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877" ("The American Nation" series, vol. 22). A brief summary must here suffice.

President Johnson, as an old-time Democrat and a southern man, was devoted to the doctrine of the sanctity of the constitutional guarantees of State rights and liberties, and was a passionate believer in reconciliation as the best national policy. In the vacation of Congress at the opening of his administration he instituted an Executive program of reconstruction, mainly conforming to Lincoln's understood ideas, which contemplated the reestablishment of local governments by the people of the south subject to their absolute acceptance of the results of the war and their submission to such Federal regulation and supervision as should be required. When Congress reassembled in December, 1865, there was at once developed a fierce and relentless opposition to the President on the part of the radical Republicans. The result was their historic "Congressional policy" for despotically dealing with the southern whites, which was made uniformly effective against the President's vetoes by their two-thirds control of both houses throughout his administration.

The Democrats upheld Johnson on the matters agreeing

with their position in favor of national reunion in both spirit and fact governed by good faith on the part of the south as well as the north; though they in no way approved those of his ideas which they regarded as more pro-southern than national and which, together with certain expressions in his public addresses, very much injured his cause. They prevented the dishonor to the nation of his impeachment. At their national convention of 1868 a resolution was adopted commending him for his patriotic efforts, and a considerable complimentary vote was given him for the Presidential nomination on the first ballot. But the convention did not regard him as a party leader and was not inclined to the defensive course that his candidacy would have necessitated. Horatio Seymour, of New York, was nominated for President, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, for Vice-President.

General Ulysses S. Grant, of Illinois, and Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, were nominated by the Republicans.

At the election all the States voted except Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, which had not as yet been reconstructed. In the other southern States, under the operation of local laws disfranchising the ex-Confederates and granting suffrage to the freedmen, which had been enacted obediently to the Congressional reconstruction measures, the Republican ticket received the Electoral votes of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The only southern States carried by Seymour were Georgia and Louisiana. New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Maryland, Delaware, and Kentucky gave him their votes. Total Electoral vote—Grant, 214; Seymour, 80. Popular vote—Grant, 3,015,068; Seymour, 2,709,633.

With a President thoroughly devoted to their policy and maintaining it by all the agencies of the government, including the power of the army, the radical Republicans now became even more aggressive in prosecuting their southern schemes. The notorious Force bills of 1870-71, with other drastic measures of southern interference, were adopted.

On account of President Grant's ill-chosen appointments and many evidences of his lack of adaptation to civil affairs, poor judgment, and proneness to be badly influenced, as well as his ready compliance with every demand of the extremists, his administration was early regarded with great dissatisfaction by many of the best men of the Republican party. The Liberal Republican movement was the outcome. It soon took on formidable proportions, but owing to the high favor in which the President stood with the all-powerful radicals there manifestly could be no hope of dislodging him in 1872 by the means of regular action within the party. The Liberal Republicans accordingly set up a separate organization, which held a national convention in Cincinnati and nominated as its Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates Horace Greeley, of New York, and B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri. The platform opposed "any reopening of the questions settled by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments," and, consistently with the policy for regarding the sectional and race controversies as ended, demanded "the supremacy of the civil over the military authority," "State self-government," and "for the nation a return to the methods of peace and the constitutional limitations of power." Resolutions were adopted strongly urging reform of the civil service and "a return to specie payments."

The Liberal Republican nominees and platform were accepted by the Democrats in their national convention held in Baltimore. At that time Democratic desires and efforts were concentrated upon securing the renewal of peaceful order, contentment, and self-government at the south, and the settlement of the race question by the processes of local arrangement immediately, since no other manner of settlement could possibly avail ultimately. It was therefore deemed both a patriotic and party duty to unite with the Liberal Republicans in the common cause. But the nomination of Greeley was unfortunate on account of his unacceptability to the Democratic party at large, and also because of the rooted disbelief on the part of most people

of normal ways of thinking in his capacity for either sound or discriminating official leadership. His selection once made by the Liberal Republicans, however, could not be repudiated by the Democrats without throwing away every chance of success for the policy of reconciliation.

A dissatisfied element of the Democratic party, known as the "Straight-outs," held a convention at Louisville, Kentucky, its nominees being Charles O'Connor, of New York, and John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts. This ticket received no support of any consequence, and polled only 30,297 votes.

President Grant was renominated by the Republicans, and for Vice-President their candidate was Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts.

The election afforded striking proof of the uselessness, and indeed folly, of ill-assorted party coalitions and illogical nominations. Notwithstanding the eminent respectability and unquestioned earnestness of the Liberal Republicans, they were only an aggregation of dissidents perfunctorily organized and engaged in a merely temporary experiment. A very slender reed for the vigorous and unterrified Democracy to lean upon. As for the Democrats, they were quite without heart in the campaign, and by tens of thousands stayed at home on election day. Greeley did not carry a northern State and was successful only in the border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri and the southern States of Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas. Grant had 3,597,070 popular votes, Greeley 2,839,079. Before the Electors met Greeley died. The result in the Electoral College for President was: Grant, 286; Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, 42; B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri, 18; Charles J. Jenkins, of Georgia, 2; David Davis, of Illinois, 1; not counted, 17.

Following this luckless adventure the Liberal Republican movement came promptly to an end. The Democratic party returned to its unaided fight against the Grant administration as if nothing discouraging had happened. Victory was not long delayed. In 1874 the Congressional

elections showed a Democratic majority of 74 in the next House of Representatives, although the then existing House (elected in 1872) had a radical Republican majority of nearly a hundred. Never had there been such an overturn. Besides, a notable gain was made by the Democrats of seats in the Senate. The immediate causes of the revolution were the country's extreme weariness of the single "Bloody Shirt" issue of the Republicans, its disapproval of further continuance of Federal tyranny over the southern whites, and its attribution to the party in power of responsibility for the terrible financial panic of 1873 and the consequent "hard times." It was moreover manifest that the laboring and agricultural masses—especially at the west,—who so long had been good-naturedly responsive to the strenuous appeals on behalf of the Republican party as possessed of superior elemental virtues and graces, were beginning to consider political questions from a new point of view, that of their own interests as regarded and treated by the two parties contrastingly. Such a disposition on the part of the laborers and farmers was excessively inconvenient for the Republican politicians, who, owing to the nature of the controlling influences in their organization, were in no position to satisfy the new expectations and much preferred the simpler politics of eternal hate of the south and traduction of the Democracy accordingly.

The perennial troubles of the Republican party with the labor and agricultural votes—troubles which at the present day appear to be approaching their climax—date from the second administration of Grant.

Although the Democratic House of Representatives (Forty-fourth Congress) was powerless to establish anything affirmative in the respect of national policy because of the disagreement of the Republican Senate and President, it did great and salutary work in another direction. Forever memorable in the country's history are its investigations and the disclosures that resulted. Corruption in the government, in the forms of prodigious and systematic frauds on the revenue with official connivance, valuable

grants of favor to special interests and individuals in return for political influence as well as for money equivalents and presents of stock in corporations, etc., was shown to be rampant and most astonishingly pervasive. Cabinet members, many subordinate officeholders, the President's private secretary, a former Vice-President, and the Speaker of the previous House were tainted by indubitable proofs. The country keenly felt the disgrace; and to the aroused public interest in the need of higher standards of government conduct and official responsibility are traceable, to no small degree, the inception and development of the reform movements of the past forty-five years.

In the Presidential campaign of 1876 the Democratic leader was Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, his associate being Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana. Their Republican opponents were Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, and William A. Wheeler, of New York. There was also a Greenback party ticket, headed by Peter Cooper, of New York, and (as had been the case in 1872) a ticket of the Prohibition party.

The Democratic platform of 1876 (adopted at St. Louis), a model of masterly but concise presentation of issues, ranks with the most famous deliverances in the records of the party. Its keynote was reform. Among other matters, reform was demanded in the treatment of the southern States; in financial measures, on the basis of a true conservatism and specifically for the interests of a sound currency, restoration of the public credit, and maintenance of the national honor; in the tariff, for correction of the abuses that had "impoverished many industries to subsidize a few," and pursuant to the general principle of duties "only for revenue"; in the national expenditures, with a view to economy; in the policy relating to the public lands, a policy that had "squandered 200,000,000 acres upon railroads alone"; and in the civil service, to the end of appointments "for approved competency" instead of as rewards for party zeal.

The election resulted in 184 undisputed votes for Tilden

—one short of a majority. These undisputed votes consisted of 70 from five northern States—Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and West Virginia; 38 from the four border States (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri); and 76 from the eight southern States of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The votes of Florida (4), Louisiana (8), and South Carolina (7) were technically disputed; but not in any just sense was Tilden's title to them disputable.

In the three States in question there obtained, at the time of the election and after, Republican governments that owed their being to the power of the Federal administration and were sustained by Federal soldiers. Without such conditions it was impossible that any one of them could have gone for the Republican party; in the circumstances of the race situation Republican success in Florida, Louisiana, or South Carolina would have been indeed as unimaginable as would be to-day the triumph of a Chinese or Japanese party in California save under the duress of irresistible external authority. This of course is not said by way of invidious allusion to any non-white race; it is merely a pertinent statement of incontrovertible American political fact.

Not only were the Republicans incapable of carrying any one of the three States except by outside force, but with all their power as conquerors they actually failed in Louisiana and Florida, while in South Carolina their majority was very small and open to legal doubt. In Louisiana the election returns gave Tilden a majority of over 6,000; in Florida the result was close, with a majority of about 100 appearing for Tilden, which was disputed by the Republicans. By "returning board" manipulations and arbitrary decisions the Electoral votes of both States were certified to Congress as having been cast for Hayes. Counter certifications on behalf of the Tilden Electors were sent from Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina, and a question was raised as to the legal qualification of a Hayes Elector in Oregon.

The two houses of Congress, unable to agree in deciding the result of the election, committed the matter to an extra-constitutional tribunal called the Electoral Commission, consisting of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. That body, though created for a purely judicial purpose, divided uniformly on party lines, eight Republicans to seven Democrats, awarded every disputed vote to Hayes, and so determined his choice as President by 185 Electoral votes to 184 for Tilden. Despite the deep-seated feeling of wrong throughout the country the Democratic House consented to the final award for the sake of national peace and the supremacy of law.

Tilden's popular vote was 4,284,757; Hayes's 4,033,950. The Greenback candidate had 81,740 votes, and the Prohibitionist 9,522.

President Hayes early in his administration ordered the soldiers out of the south. Though entirely a party man, his attitude on public questions was in general more acceptable to the Republican liberals than the old-fashioned radicals, and showed a becoming appreciation of the fact that the Republican party no longer stood in a position warranting arrogance. He was consequently regarded with much scorn by the lordly chiefs whose will had previously been supreme. Throughout his four years (1877-81) the House of Representatives remained Democratic, and in the Forty-sixth Congress (1879-81) the Senate also had a Democratic majority. No enactments on party lines were possible for either the Democrats or Republicans. The Bland-Allison Silver Purchase act, a non-partisan measure directing government purchase of silver for coinage purposes of not less than \$2,000,000 or more than \$4,000,000 monthly, was passed, vetoed, repassed over the veto, and so became a law (1878). The southern question, automatically settled by the removal of the troops, stayed settled. After securing control of the Senate the Democrats passed legislation for repealing the measures of the Grant regime that provided for Federal control of elections, but the repeal was vetoed by the President in deference to the sensitive

Republican feeling that there had been quite enough yielding to the whites of the south. The obnoxious measures were not removed from the statute-books until the Democrats obtained full power in the government under Cleveland.

It was the desire of the Democratic party to again nominate Mr. Tilden in 1880, but he declined to be a candidate. General Winfield S. Hancock, of Pennsylvania, was selected as the standard-bearer, the Vice-Presidential nomination going to William H. English, of Indiana. An eminently progressive platform was adopted, indicating the party's purpose to deal vigorously with new questions. The plank that attracted most attention was: "Home Rule; honest money, consisting of gold and silver, and paper convertible into coin on demand; the strict maintenance of the public faith, State and national; and a tariff for revenue only." "Discrimination in favor of transportation lines, corporations, or monopolies" was condemned, the interests of labor were sympathetically referred to, and declarations were made in favor of "public land for actual settlers" and against further Chinese immigration. Opposition to the inflow of Chinese laborers was at that time intense on the Pacific coast.

The platform of the Republicans, though largely devoted to glorification of their party's past, showed that they also recognized the changing conditions of the times, and embodied promises of a new basis of action in certain matters as to which their former course had been very unpopular. One of these promises was that there should be "no further" grants of the public domain to any railway or other corporation. Their reluctance to abandon hostility to the southerners was evidenced by a pompous pronouncement against "the dangers of a Solid South." The south had indeed become solid in 1880, but no dangers from that result had developed—and, as all know, none have developed in the forty years since. A cautious declaration was made on the Chinese subject. The Republican nominees

were James A. Garfield, of Ohio, and Chester A. Arthur, of New York.

The little parties of Greenbackism and Prohibition again took the field, James B. Weaver, of Iowa, being the candidate of the former, and Neal Dow, of Maine, of the latter.

Garfield was elected by the vote of New York, having in that State a plurality of about 21,000. Hancock carried New Jersey, West Virginia, Nevada, the four border States and eleven southern States, and had five of the six Electoral votes of California. The total Electoral vote was, Garfield, 214; Hancock, 155. Popular vote—Garfield, 4,449,053; Hancock, 4,442,135; Weaver, 307,426; Dow, 12,576.

The inauguration of Garfield (March 4, 1881) was followed at once by bitter quarrels in the Republican party consequent upon the Presidential appointments and related matters of patronage. He was shot by a crazed Republican factionist July 2, died September 19, and was succeeded by Vice-President Arthur. In spite of the hope that the new President would pursue a course with reference more to the general approbation of the country than to favor for any particular Republican element, the troubles were but little reduced except in superficial appearance; and the administration itself gave finally a signal demonstration of the prevalent spirit of willfulness by forcing the nomination of Charles J. Folger for the Governorship of New York against strong public sentiment—the consequence being the election of Folger's Democratic opponent, Grover Cleveland, by an unparalleled majority. There was a steady growth in support of the Democracy by the independents. Pennsylvania, which had become Republicanism's greatest stronghold, elected a Democratic Governor, Robert E. Pattison; and that distinguished Democrat, George Hoadly, was chosen Governor in Ohio after an exciting contest with the aspiring Foraker. In the Senate the parties were tied during the first half of Arthur's administration, with one Independent holding the balance; during the second half there were 38 Republicans, 36 Democrats, and 2 "Readjusters." The House of Representatives, Republican by a

small plurality in 1881-83, had a Democratic plurality of 79 in 1883-85.

It was in the Arthur administration that the tariff question came into prominence. From the operation of the protective system established during the Civil War and since continued by the Republicans without any attention to the needs for change in many details, serious evils had developed. These had been analyzed by the Democratic platform of 1876, which denounced the whole fabric of duties, levied upon four thousand articles, as constituting " a masterpiece of injustice, inequality, and false pretense." In addition, a large and for many reasons undesirable surplus revenue was accumulating. Congress in 1882 provided for a Tariff commission empowered to investigate and make recommendations. In the early part of 1883 (the Republicans being then in control of the House) a tariff bill was passed and signed which was remarkable for its artful construction in favor of various interests but gave no satisfaction in principle to reform demands. Thus was begun the long tariff contest.

The noted non-partisan Civil Service Reform bill was passed and became a law January 16, 1883. It will be remembered that by platform declarations made in 1872 and 1876 the Democratic party stood committed to the principle of reform in the civil service. Although without a majority in either house when the bill was brought up and acted on, and therefore not able to enjoy any part of the official credit for its enactment, Democrats in both Senate and House gave it substantial support. Probably its most active and effective promoter was George H. Pendleton, Democratic Senator from Ohio.

CHAPTER X
CLEVELAND AND AFTER
1884-1912

GROVER CLEVELAND was nominated for President by the Democratic national convention of 1884, which met in Chicago (July 8-11); and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, received the nomination for Vice-President. The presentation in the platform of the questions before the people was introduced by an admirable statement of the fundamental character and position of the party. No better statement has ever been written, or can be. As follows:

“The Democratic party of the Union recognizes that, as the nation grows older, new issues are born of time and progress, and old issues perish. But the fundamental principles of the Democracy, approved by the united voice of the people, remain, and will ever remain, as the best and only security for the continuance of free government. The preservation of personal rights; the equality of all citizens before the law; the reserved rights of the States; and the supremacy of the Federal government within the limits of the Constitution will ever form the true basis of our liberties, and can never be surrendered without destroying that balance of rights and powers which enables a continent to be developed in peace, and social order to be maintained by means of local self-government.”

The Republican party was circumstantially arraigned for its characteristic and resolute spirit of backwardness as to matters of popular demand; its subjection to special interests and degeneration into “an organization for enriching those who control its machinery”; its consequent permissions of “frauds and jobbery”; and its general preference for arbitrary government and unscrupulous political methods consistently with the nature of its representative direction and as the logical means for retaining its power.

As the exordium of the platform was a perfect expression of the spirit of the Democracy, so was this summary of the nature and tendencies of the Republican party perfect.

The Republican party had come to stand for special interests.

Special interests it has stood for since primarily and sturdily.

In this work, on account of the limited space prescribed by the publishers and our plan of exclusive consideration of outstanding aspects, it is of course an impossibility to with any formality analyze platforms, political campaigns, or Presidential administrations, except (as in the cases of the slavery and Civil War questions) where a somewhat attentive examination of details is fundamental to our historical purpose—that is, to a presentation of the Democratic party's record in at least the elements of its integrity. No distinction will be made in relation to the Cleveland or subsequent campaigns and administrations, all of which, from the general simplicity of their party history and the familiarity of the public with the essential phases, may be concisely treated.

The Republican opponents of Cleveland and Hendricks were James G. Blaine, of Maine, and John A. Logan, of Illinois. Blaine's nomination was distasteful to the reform elements of the Republican party and the large class of independent voters. Such eminent Republicans as Carl Schurz, George William Curtis, and Henry Ward Beecher came out for Cleveland, and he had the powerful support of the *New York Times* and other conspicuous newspapers that previously had upheld the Republican cause. On the other hand, Mr. Blaine was regarded as representing in a most decided manner the old-time men of his party and their undisguised intention to hold to changeless ideas; and in the respect of partisan leadership the Republicans never have had a stronger candidate. Enthusiasm on his behalf took some extravagant forms. An incident was the ceremonious call on him, at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City, by five hundred Protestant clergymen to counteract the prejudiced feeling in certain quarters occasioned by Irish Catholic activities in his interest. The spokesman of the deputation, Rev. Dr. Samuel D. Burchard, in his

fervid address alluded to the Democracy as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," and Mr. Blaine omitted to take exception to the plain insult to the Catholics. The indiscretion of Burchard was doubtless one of the causes of Republican loss of New York and the election. A much more important cause was the candidacy on the Prohibition ticket of John P. St. John, formerly Republican Governor of Kansas, to whom many thousands of Republicans displeased with Blaine but unwilling to vote the Democratic ticket gave their support. It was in the 1884 campaign that the notable Prohibition party newspaper, the *Voice*, was launched. While uncompromisingly opposed to both old parties, it made special appeal to the Republicans on account of the general indications of their growing dissatisfaction with the unchangeable position of their party on public questions.

Cleveland's Electoral vote was 219, Blaine's 182; and of the popular votes Cleveland had 4,912,696, Blaine 4,849,680, St. John 151,830, and Benjamin F. Butler (Anti-Monopoly), 133,824. Cleveland carried New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Indiana, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia, in addition to every State of the South. In New York his plurality was 1,047.

During his first four years as President (1885-89) Cleveland had the coöperation of a Democratic House of Representatives, but the Senate was Republican. His administration was distinguished for vigorous and bold leadership, intellectual force, the loftiest standards of public duty, fearlessness in dealing with all questions and conditions, and reforms and efficiency in the public service. When he left office he fully retained the confidence and affection of the Democratic party, as well as the independents.

The tariff issue on its ultimate lines was directly made by President Cleveland. It is true the Democracy was historically associated with the policy of tariff for revenue only, a policy affirmed by the platforms of 1876 and 1880; but the platform of 1884, upon which he was elected, did not pledge a specific course. It declared, however, that all

unnecessary taxation was unjust taxation, and demanded that taxation should be "exclusively for public purposes" and should not exceed "the needs of the government, economically administered." Cleveland looked with great disfavor upon the system that was responsible for the ever increasing surplus, and it was on account of the fiscal problems presented by the surplus, as well as the favoritisms and wrongs fostered by the duties, that he urged Congress to undertake reforms and finally sent his famous tariff message of December, 1887, advocating thorough reconstruction for the objects of putting a stop to public plunder and remedying financial disorders. The Democratic Mills bill of reductions was passed by the House (July, 1888) and the tariff was made the dominating issue in the Presidential campaign then opening.

One of the great results of the first Cleveland administration was the creation (1887) of the Interstate Commerce commission with important powers over the railways, especially for preventing discriminations and requiring uniformity in rates. Another valuable measure was the Presidential Succession law, which embodied provisions for preventing future dangerous disputes. The work of reforming the civil service on the basis of the merit system, and so enabling public employees to be independent of party politicians and no longer under the necessity of contributing to campaign funds, was undertaken in good faith and showed gratifying progress.

The Democratic national convention of 1888 (St. Louis, June 5-7) renominated President Cleveland unanimously and named Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, for Vice-President. Their Republican opponents were Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, and Levi P. Morton, of New York. Cleveland's attitude on the tariff, which was strongly endorsed by the Democratic convention, and the convincing proofs generally that the Democracy was altogether committed to popular ideas in resistance to political control by the "interests," caused a decided manifestation in Harrison's favor by those

powerful influences of concentrated wealth actuated by determination to own the government and use it for the suppression of all liberal tendencies, that to the present day have been the main reliance of the Republican party—or rather, as already remarked, have constituted the whole of the real Republican party. Previously to the campaign of 1888 the ancient southern issue had been the main basis of Republican appeal, but the devotion of the Republicans to the special interests had long been well understood, and particularly, as we have seen, in the contest of 1884. Not until after the tariff message of 1887, however, did the autocratic powers of special interest assume active charge of the operations.

By the lavish and corrupt use of money collected from the beneficiaries of protection, their congeners, and their admiring friends among the great public—those ever eager to follow the lead of powerful wealth as quite the correct and “refined” thing to do, and moreover the most convenient as disposing of the trouble of independent thinking,—the doubtful States were carried for Harrison. This was the campaign of the “Blocks of five” in Indiana. It was the first of the Republican “Fat-frying” and “Soap” campaigns. In New York there were local complications on the liquor question, which were turned to Harrison’s advantage by the means of sacrificing the Republican State ticket; but his plurality was only 13,000.

The Electoral vote stood: Harrison, 233; Cleveland, 168. Popular vote—Cleveland, 5,540,050; Harrison, 5,444,337; Clinton B. Fisk (Prohibition), 250,125; Alson J. Streeter (Union Labor), 146,897. Scattering votes were cast for smaller parties. The northern States that went for Cleveland were Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

Under Harrison, with both houses Republican from 1889 to 1891, policies were pursued which gave great offense to the country. As has always since been the case when the controlling directors of the genuine Republican party have come to power, temporary election success was inter-

preted to mean license to "go the limit." Civil service reform was treated with contempt and the former practices were revived; a new despotic Force act, intended to stir up race troubles, passed the House to the accompaniment of violent expressions of detestation of the southern whites; Territories with ridiculously insufficient population were admitted as States (hence the name "mining-camp States"), so as to increase the Republican power in the Senate, House, and Electoral College, and also to strengthen the silver forces in Congress; Speaker Reed established in the House his oppressive rules against the minority; there were vast wasteful expenditures, so that for the first time the country had a billion dollar Congress; and the high protective McKinley Tariff law was put into effect (October, 1890). In consequence the Democrats secured an immense majority in the House at the Congressional elections of 1890, and further Republican partisan legislation was made impossible for the rest of Harrison's term.

The radical silver movement meantime gained marked development. In this period the doctrine of silver was decidedly under Republican patronage. The President and the Republican leaders in Congress feared the silver vote—but at the same time wished to escape responsibility. That was impossible because of the strength and insistence of the silver people; and the Sherman law, ordering the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces of the metal annually and the issue of treasury notes against the bullion, was passed by a Republican Senate and House and signed by the President (July, 1890).

In 1892 Cleveland was for the third time nominated by the Democracy, the national convention assembling in Chicago on June 20; Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, was nominated for Vice-President. The Republicans were again led by Harrison, and their Vice-Presidential candidate was Whitelaw Reid, of New York.

The campaign was fought on the tariff question, with special reference to the McKinley law, which had now made

its effects felt. Mr. Cleveland's ultimate object had been greatly misrepresented by the Republicans, and they had persistently accused him and the Democratic party of free trade designs. In his letter of acceptance, while opposing the theory that revenue laws should be passed for the purpose of granting discriminating governmental aid to private ventures, he added: "We believe that the advantages of freer raw materials should be accorded to our manufacturers, and we contemplate a fair and careful distribution of necessary tariff burdens rather than the precipitation of free trade." During the canvass occurred the memorable Homestead strike, occasioned by the Carnegie Company's reduction of wages and refusal to recognize organized labor. The steel industry had been most carefully nurtured by the tariff; and its inability—or unwillingness—to maintain wages satisfactory to its employees and to live in peace with them was widely regarded as an object lesson of the purely one-sided operation of the protective system in its final reduction—that is to say, as applied to the laborer at the discretion of its enriched corporate beneficiaries. The self-evident fact that the pampered interests would necessarily take care of themselves first, and probably exclusively, was brought home to the people.

Cleveland swept the country. Harrison was the worst beaten candidate since Greeley. In the north, Cleveland received all the Electoral votes of Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; and also 8 of the 9 votes of California, 5 of the 14 of Michigan, 1 of the 3 of North Dakota, and 1 of the 23 of Ohio—total for Cleveland, 277; for Harrison, 145; for James B. Weaver (Populist), 22. Popular vote—Cleveland, 5,554,414; Harrison, 5,190,802; Weaver, 1,027,329; John Bidwell (Prohibition), 271,028; Simon Wing (Socialist-Labor), 21,164.

A significant feature was the formidable strength of the Populist party, an organization holding radical views and especially favoring the free and unlimited coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, and government ownership of

monopolies. Its principal following was in the agricultural States of the west and south. Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada were carried by its candidate, who also was voted for by one Elector in North Dakota and one in Oregon.

The election of 1892 gave the Democrats complete control of the government for the first time since 1856. Their majority in the Senate of the incoming Fifty-third Congress (1893-95) was, however, very slight—only three over the combined vote of the Republicans and Populists. Two questions, silver and tariff, engrossed attention; and the action upon each can be correctly understood and appraised only by due appreciation of the interaction of the forces in a political situation so exceedingly close mathematically and so very tense on account of positively opposed views and aims, which, however, peculiarly lent themselves to accommodations between the elements, as invariably happens when one proposition can be played off against another.

President Cleveland, on economic grounds, was unalterably opposed, and always had been, to the silver movement. He uncompromisingly and determinedly took up the issue as made by the Republican administration of Harrison, and urged the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase law, calling Congress to meet in special session in August, 1893. After a most bitter fight the repeal bill was passed by both houses, with an amendment to the effect that the government would endeavor to secure bimetallism by means of international agreement. A financial convulsion, superinduced by the problems and uncertainties, had seized the country soon after his inauguration; this has been maliciously called the "Cleveland panic"; it was really one of the inheritances from the preceding regime.

The tariff question came up in the regular session, which opened in December, 1893. It was complicated in Congress by the animosities engendered in the silver contest, the related matters as between members primarily concerned about silver and those primarily concerned about tariff, the activities of the "interests" and the reaction to Republicanism at some State elections in the fall of 1893, and the

absence of unity, or rather the growing tendency toward cleavage, in the Democratic party. The resulting measure—called the Wilson bill for its author, William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, chairman of the Ways and Means committee of the House—was greatly changed in the Senate and loaded with a rider providing for an income tax. Cleveland declined to approve it, but permitted it to become a law without his signature. The Supreme Court, after a hesitant course, pronounced the income tax unconstitutional.

In December, 1895, the country was thrilled by the President's action in vigorously asserting the accountability to the United States of the British government for violation of the Monroe doctrine in Venezuela. The matter related to territorial aggression in the interest of the British colony of Guiana, and all diplomatic efforts for settlement, particularly on the basis of arbitration, had failed. Accordingly the President notified Congress that the government's policy was to appoint a United States commission with power to fix the boundary, and to hold itself in readiness to accept the consequences if the result should prove unacceptable to Great Britain. "I am firm in my conviction," he said in his special message, "that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking people of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded a people's safety and greatness." The nation acclaimed the President's stand, and would have supported him to any extremity. Ultimately Great Britain acceded to arbitration, and the difficulty was amicably adjusted. The precedent established proved of the greatest pertinence and importance in stimulating the world movement, which before long began to

develop, for maintaining peace by international arbitration and coöperation.

The silver forces were in control of the Democratic national convention of 1896 (Chicago, July 7-11), which nominated William J. Bryan, of Nebraska, for President, and Arthur Sewall, of Maine, for Vice-President, and declared for "the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for aid and consent of any other nations." Bryan was endorsed by the Populists, who, however, named for Vice-President a candidate of their own, Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia. A National Silver party convention endorsed both Bryan and Sewall. The gold Democrats, taking the name of the National Democratic party, met at Indianapolis and nominated John M. Palmer, of Illinois, and Simon B. Buckner, of Kentucky.

William McKinley, of Ohio, and Garrett A. Hobart, of New Jersey, were the Republican nominees. A silver faction in the Republican national convention, headed by Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, bolted on account of the party's attitude for a single gold standard.

Upon the issue of the campaign McKinley was not a little embarrassed by his record in Congress. He had voted for the Bland-Allison bill in 1878, and also had advocated the Sherman bill of 1890 on the ground that it was the next-best thing to free coinage. "We cannot," he said, "have free coinage now, except in the manner as provided in the bill. To defeat this bill means to defeat all silver legislation and to leave us with two millions a month only, when by passing this bill we would have four and a half millions a month of treasury notes as good as gold." The political situation, however, had radically changed, and McKinley was a faithful representative of his party.

Bryan received 176 Electoral and 6,467,946 popular votes, being successful in the eleven southern States and in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, and having one Elector in California and one in Kentucky. He

carried twenty-two States; Mr. McKinley carried twenty-three, counting California and Kentucky. McKinley's Electoral vote was 271, and popular vote 7,035,638. Popular votes cast for other candidates were: Palmer (Gold Democrat), 131,529; Levering (Prohibition), 141,676; Matchett (Socialist-Labor), 36,454; Bentley (Nationalist), 13,968.

At the next four Presidential elections (1900, 1904, and 1908) the Democratic and Republican candidates, and the Electoral and popular votes, were as follows:

1900

Democratic—Convention met in Kansas City, July 4-6. President, William J. Bryan; Vice-President, Adlai E. Stevenson. Both candidates were endorsed by the Populists and the Silver Republicans.

Republican—President, William McKinley; Vice-President, Theodore Roosevelt, of New York.

Electoral vote—McKinley, 292; Bryan, 155 (Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada, in addition to the south).

Popular vote—McKinley, 7,219,530; Bryan, 6,358,071; Woolley (Prohibition), 209,166; Debs (Socialist), 94,768; Barker (non-fusion Populist), 50,232; and scattering.

1904

Democratic—Convention met in St. Louis, July 6-9. President, Alton B. Parker, of New York; Vice-President, Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia.

Republican—President, Theodore Roosevelt; Vice-President, Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana.

Electoral vote—Roosevelt, 336; Parker, 140 (the south, with Kentucky and 7 of the 8 in Maryland).

Popular vote—Roosevelt, 7,628,834; Parker, 5,048,491; Debs (Socialist), 402,406; Swallow (Prohibition), 259,257; Watson (Populist), 114,753; Corrigan (Socialist-Labor), 33,724.

1908

Democratic—Convention met in Denver, July 7-10. President, William J. Bryan; Vice-President, John W. Kern, of Indiana.

Republican—President, William H. Taft, of Ohio; Vice-President, James S. Sherman, of New York.

Electoral vote—Taft, 321; Bryan, 162 (the south, with Colorado, Kentucky, 6 of the 8 in Maryland, Nebraska. Nevada, and Oklahoma).

Popular vote—Taft, 7,679,006; Bryan, 6,409,106; Debs (Socialist), 420,820; Chafin (Prohibition), 252,683; Hisgen (Independent), 83,562; Watson (Populist), 28,831; Gilhaus (Socialist-Labor), 13,825.

Mr. Bryan's leadership of the Democracy, commencing with the Presidential campaign of 1896, identified the party with advanced political ideas and convictions that had come to be strongly held at the west but were not acceptable to the leading influences in the great eastern centers of population. These ideas and convictions were representative of the sympathies and aspirations of people who were not concerned about maintaining the fixed course and circumscribed arrangements of things political agreeably to old patterns, but who favored a decided amplitude with vigorous action accordingly. The great eloquence, tireless energy, ability, integrity, and sincerity of Mr. Bryan secured and held for him a most devoted following. His second nomination, in 1900, was unanimous; and it was a significant evidence of the progressive spirit of his cause that among the convention delegates on that occasion were women. In 1904 he was not a candidate for the nomination, but retained his eminence as a party champion. His third nomination, by the convention of 1908, was made on the first ballot, 892½ of the 1,008 votes being for him. He has uniformly been an uncompromising and fearless advocate of principles, to the practical end of government by party—by the Democratic party, as the one popular agency possessed of the necessary strength and endurance in the incessant struggle against privileged interest. No act of his career has been more characteristic than his recent declination (July, 1920) of a nomination offered him by a one-issue third party, because of his belief in effective as distinguished from experimental politics, his lifelong attachment

to the Democratic party, and his gratitude for the honors bestowed upon him in that association.

The silver attitude taken by the Democratic party in 1896 was reaffirmed in 1900. Financial questions in American politics have occasionally involved exciting popular agitations, which have operated sometimes against the Democrats, sometimes against the Republicans. In 1874 the general dissatisfaction with financial conditions was one of the chief reasons for the crushing Republican defeat at the Congressional elections; in 1896 and after the Democrats suffered from the unsuccessful silver movement. On the other hand, no great and responsible party has ever permitted itself to prosecute a merely schismatic course in relation to the delicate subject of the country's finances—a subject which indeed should never divide parties for any longer time than is absolutely necessary to reach a conclusive settlement. The issue most vital to the Whigs was at one period that of their dear United States Bank; but when the final decision was registered they patriotically ended the discussion. At the election of 1900 the silver question was settled unfavorably to Mr. Bryan's views, and the Democratic party at its next convention accepted the result in concord with its Presidential nominee, Judge Parker, who said: "I regard the gold standard as firmly and irrevocably established." It belongs to the nature of a powerful party, measuring up to its responsibilities and emulating the greatness and generosity of the country, to accept results. Only a little egotistical party will persist in mere contention.

While on this topic it would be ungracious not to observe that the Republican party likewise has done itself honor by accepting results. It accepted the result about government at the south—very reluctantly, it is true, yet with completeness. Even on the financial question (which it has always regarded as its specialty), it has lately accepted a result—that of the Democracy's splendid reconstruction of the nation's banking and money system under the Federal Reserve law of the first Wilson administration, a meas-

ure enacted after dismal Republican failure to accomplish urgently needed reforms.

Finally concerning finances, let it be remarked that there was an indubitable Republican panic in 1907 to offset the alleged Democratic panic in 1893.

The elimination of the silver issue from politics after the year 1900 in no way affected the Democratic party's advanced position (except to accentuate it by simplification) in relation to new questions concerning labor; the treatment of favored business aggregations in respect of their pretensions and operations; economic and social matters touching the lives of the people; humane legislation; and participation of the citizens more directly in party affairs and governmental action.

Following the famous times of the Republican return in 1897, the enactment of the Dingley tariff, and the joyous pursuit of "simple politics" (so simple as to be practically automatic) under the domination of those mighty bosses, Marcus A. Hanna, Thomas C. Platt, Matthew S. Quay, and Joseph G. Cannon, there came into the Republican party and the government a new master and a new order. Theodore Roosevelt, constitutional successor of the murdered McKinley (1901), and afterward President by his "own right" (1905), embarked upon an aggressive leadership, with the result that all direction and power were soon concentrated in his person. As long as he continued in office the Republican organization fully retained its compactness and discipline, for there was no disputing authority with him, and as an exceedingly wise and discriminating politician he ruled without repelling the old bosses, who indeed discovered no reason for dissatisfaction in such respects of detail as most substantially interested themselves. On immediate administrative matters and the large concerns of policy, however, they were not consulted, but only told,—to the great and always increasing entertainment and approbation of the country. Forward looking, his sympathies with the public at large, intimately understanding that the great and haughty "interests" had

had enough and more than enough at the hands of the government and the Republican party, and well recognizing the onward sweep of progressive sentiment in harmony with the spirit and demands of the Democracy, President Roosevelt initiated a course of decided action against the corporations that were violating the laws, and by that daring departure from his party's treasured traditions, as well as by many utterances of pith and proceedings of moment in the direction of liberalizing its character and deeds, gained enthusiastic popular support. The defeat in 1904 of the Democracy's splendid candidate, Judge Parker, was the natural result of Roosevelt's established position of leadership along the changed lines of Republicanism that he had marked out and that he expected the Republican party to follow; and the same may be said of the defeat of Bryan in 1908 by Taft, who was Roosevelt's chosen heir. Both the 1904 and 1908 results were tributes to Roosevelt personally—nothing else.

"The great fact of the Taft administration," says an able historian,¹ "was the failure of the President, of the Republican majority in Congress, and of the Republican party at large to rise to the situation by giving the country the progressive legislation which it demanded. . . . The people could not make up their minds to like a rubber-tired administration." It will live in history as the Stand-pat administration. From an early day of its succession to the strenuous Roosevelt regime, the forces of autocracy and privilege saw and embraced their opportunity to resume power; and since that day not once has their strangle hold upon the Republican party been relaxed. The enactment of the Payne-Aldrich higher tariff law (1909); the failure to give the country any financial reform measure; the arrogant attitude and transactions of the Cannon oligarchy in the House; the feebleness of the government's acts in matters under the Anti-Trust law and the final abandonment of prosecutions; the reactionary course as to conservation;

¹Frederic Austin Ogg, "National Progress, 1907-1917"; vol. 27 of "The American Nation" series.

and the conspicuous evidences of Stand-pat contempt and loathing for all progressivism, caused the great "Insurgent" action by liberal Republican members in Congress and culminated in the catastrophic defeat of the party at the country-wide elections of 1910, notwithstanding the efforts of Roosevelt himself to stem the Democratic tide in several States, notably (but unsuccessfully) in Ohio as against Governor Judson Harmon. In the House of Representatives a Republican majority of 47 was changed to a Democratic majority of 67, and the Democrats made a gain of 10 votes in the Senate.

And Woodrow Wilson and Thomas R. Marshall were elected by the Democracy as Governors in the States, respectively, of New Jersey and Indiana.

CHAPTER XI

WILSON

1912-1920

THE Presidential campaign of 1912 was ushered in by a fierce struggle for the Republican nomination between President Taft and former President Roosevelt, which terminated in the success of Taft at the national convention held in Chicago (June 18-22), after the necessary resort to "steam-roller" methods in awarding seats to contesting delegates in the latter's interest. Vice-President Sherman was renominated. In protest against the arbitrary doings most of the Roosevelt delegates withdrew from the convention upon its organization, and following its adjournment they, with numerous sympathizers, held a meeting and launched the new Progressive party, which met in Chicago in national convention August 5-7 and nominated Roosevelt for President and Hiram Johnson, of California, for Vice-President.

Woodrow Wilson received the Presidential nomination of the Democrats, forty-six ballots being taken by the convention, which met in Baltimore June 25 to July 2.

Thomas R. Marshall was made the Vice-Presidential candidate by acclamation after two ballots.

From the time of the Republican split there was no doubt as to Democratic victory at the polls. Wilson, however, was not content to bide the assured result at leisure, but made an active speaking campaign, powerfully presenting the matters at issue. While treating specific questions, particularly those of tariff, business, human interests, etc., with frankness and lucidity, his addresses were of chief note for the promise of a purposeful program, indicating comprehensive aims.

Wilson received 435 Electoral votes; Roosevelt, 88, consisting of the full votes of Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota, and 11 of the 13 in California; Taft, 8, furnished by Utah and Vermont. The popular vote was, Wilson, 6,286,214; Roosevelt, 4,126,120; Taft, 3,483,922; Debs (Socialist), 897,071; Chafin (Prohibition), 208,928; Reimer (Socialist-Labor), 29,079. On account of the peculiar nature and circumstances of the contest, with Democratic triumph a foregone conclusion and an active yet only extemporized third party in the field, the popular figures were valueless for the purpose of basic party comparison. Not so the results on members of the House and Senate. The new (Sixty-third) Congress was politically divided as follows: House—291 Democrats, 127 Republicans, 9 Progressives, 7 Progressive-Republicans, and 1 Independent; Senate—51 Democrats, 44 Republicans, and 1 Prohibitionist. It was manifest that the Roosevelt popular vote was primarily personal, and that as a factor for the future the Progressive party was insignificant compared to the old Stand-pat organization.

Corresponding to the national result was the general Democratic success on State tickets. Twenty-one of the thirty-five Governors elected were Democrats. One of these was James M. Cox in Ohio.

The Democratic purpose of instituting and carrying out a comprehensive program, as declared by Mr. Wilson in the canvass, was undertaken without delay, prosecuted

with system, diligence, and unprecedented party unity, and for both its magnitude and detailed benefits showed a wonderful record of achievement. There is in American history no other record of valuable party performance within a similar space of time that will bear comparison with it. April 7, 1913, a special session of Congress convened pursuant to the President's call, and began the great constructive work by framing and enacting the Underwood Tariff law, a measure which fully met the Democratic promises to the people and was distinguished for economic soundness and great fairness. The first Income Tax law under the newly adopted Sixteenth amendment to the Constitution was passed; and the great Federal Reserve system of banking and currency was formulated at the special session, established as law at the regular session, and put into operation on November 16, 1914. Next came the Federal Trade Commission law, in the interest of fair methods in trade competition; and the Clayton Anti-Trust law, based on just restraints with real meaning and force back of them, as well as on vital principles affecting labor, and especially on the truth that the labor of a human being is not to be regarded merely as a commodity or an article of commerce—or, as more pithily expressed by the Democratic platform of 1920, "Labor is not a commodity; it is human."

Among the numerous other domestic measures of the government under President Wilson, primarily connected with the Democratic party program and therefore separated from the exigent conditions attending the war in Europe and our later participation in it, are to be mentioned new acts on rural credit, child labor, agricultural education, highway improvement, and seaman's protection, and revisions of the statutes relating to public lands, conservation, and reclamation. At an early period of Democratic control a farm loan system with land mortgage banks was created, and following that important work attention was given to other matters for the welfare of the agricultural interests, one of the conspicuous results being the Smith-

Lever Agricultural Extension act. With a view to removing the tariff question so far as possible from politics by committing its details to the dispassionate consideration and advice of experts, the non-partisan Tariff commission was established (1917).

The country's endorsement was given the administration at the Congressional elections of 1914, 232 Democrats being returned to the House against 194 Republicans, 7 Progressives, 1 Independent, and 1 Socialist. Seats were gained by the Democrats in the Senate.

Wilson and Marshall were renominated, both by acclamation, by the Democratic national convention of 1916, held in St. Louis June 14-16.

The Republicans (Chicago, June 7-10) chose as their candidates Charles E. Hughes, of New York, and Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana. Theodore Roosevelt was nominated by the Progressives, who met in Chicago at the same time as the Republicans, and for the Vice-Presidency they named John M. Parker, of Louisiana. Mr. Roosevelt declined, advising his followers to support the Republican ticket. The Progressive national committee decided not to substitute any one in his place, whereupon the party, which had begun its career so ambitiously in 1912, came to an end.

In the contest of 1916 many new and confusing elements and questions were involved. Sympathies and considerations for and against the administration were largely determined by varying individual views concerning its treatment of the problems of the World War. The subject, on account of the President's tremendous responsibilities, the gravity of the situation for the United States in every aspect, and the solemnity of the question as to our future duty, had no relation to party; it belonged solely to the sphere of earnest and conscientious thought—except as prejudiced in certain quarters by the sinister influences of anti-Ally hate and conspiracy, with the substantial result of disloyalty in the circumstances, to which President Wilson referred in his noble retort to O'Leary. There was much intemperate declamation by individuals, but both

parties, to their honor, abstained from making any issue as against each other respecting the delicate matter that depended altogether on future events. Mr. Hughes, the Republican candidate, bore himself with eminent dignity and fairness, seeking no advantage, and thereby certainly lost no votes from intelligent and just people.

Wilson had 277 Electoral votes, Hughes 254; the deciding State was California (with 13 Electors), in which the result was considered doubtful for two days, when Wilson was seen to have a plurality of about 4,000. Notwithstanding heavy Hughes pluralities in several of the great eastern States, Wilson's national plurality was more than 590,000. Thirty States went for Wilson (including eleven of the twelve where women were admitted to the suffrage), and eighteen decided for Hughes.

Wilson States:—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming; in addition, 1 Elector in West Virginia.

Hughes States:—Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia (7 Electors of the 8), and Wisconsin.

Popular vote of the nation:—Wilson, 9,129,606; Hughes, 8,538,221; Benson (Socialist), 585,113; Hanly (Prohibition), 220,506; Progressive Electors, 41,894; Reimer (Socialist-Labor), 13,403.¹

During the first twenty months of President Wilson's second term the country had no politics in the party sense. No issue, consideration, or calculation of party was concerned in any of the matters leading up to the declaration

¹ The figures of the 1916 election are from the "World Almanac." For all previous elections (including Congressional), our authority is the "Cyclopedia of American Government," articles on Presidential Elections and Congress of the United States.

of war on Germany (April 6, 1917) or connected with the war's prosecution.

There had been a carping spirit in relation to "insufficient preparedness"—as if preparedness of the huge sort that would alone be of use were simply a matter of logical and automatic performance by the government during a state of peace and moreover without the indispensable authority of a policy actually anticipatory of war having been favored by the country, or by either of its responsible political parties, in the Presidential campaign or subsequently pending the development of events. Anticipation of war in the manner of personal conviction of its coming was easy for all of us; but to go to Congress and the people with a program of official war arrangement and the necessary colossal expense would have been a seriously different proposition under peace conditions and policy.

But when the war came it was found that the administration was ready with the most perfect plans, the most effective measures, and the most extensive and powerful organization. Moreover, the war, from the government's standpoint, was to be no little war, no mere comfortable war principally for the supply of the Allies and quite passive militarily on our part until the Germans should come over to invade us. It should be a war of absolute and entire national consecration, to which all our resources should be devoted not only, but all the mighty offensive power of our fighting men. In powerful and enthralling addresses Wilson pledged it, and every act of the government corresponded to his resolute spirit and immense energy. We did not wait to discuss conscription as Britain in deadly peril had done, but voted it at once, and as soon as the registry offices could be opened the system was put into operation. Wisely planned measures covering every possible phase of war and related activity were continually brought forward, adopted with the applause of the whole country, and administered (very often for pay of a dollar a year) by the ablest men and women. The people coöperated with exalted emotion, abounding zeal, and noble sacri-

fice. The boys thronged to the recruiting offices to have the honor of voluntary service.

In mid-autumn of 1918 the war was won. It remained only for the Allies and the United States as their associate to make preliminary stipulations to the Germans and enact peace. The President had far-seeing views respecting the basis of peace, views that all the world knew. They centered in the principle of a peace to end war. He fully understood that there would be fundamental conflicts of interest and opinion at the peace conference, and that public questions of the greatest importance would arise in the United States. In his work as the nation's leader it would be of the first consequence to have the agency of a party majority in the House and Senate, an agency without which, under our system of government, there never can be assurance of the successful functioning of administrative policy; and he therefore requested the people to choose a Democratic Congress at the elections in November. This was refused, and both houses passed out of Democratic control. The subsequent results have well justified his appeal.

The vote of 1918 was not on any defined question of the policies and measures to follow the war. There obtained at that time no war or peace question dividing the parties. It remained for the Republican party to make one. The country is hence officially still at war, and on this defined matter a vote is to be taken in the coming November. The elements are very simple. They consist of the opposed propositions, on the one hand, of completion of peace in conjunction with our Allies, and entrance into the League of Nations; and on the other, flat repudiation of the negotiated peace and of its accompanying covenant on the behalf of humanity and for the rightful claims and interests of all nations. There is no other element; for equivocations, hate, humbug, scare stuff, and bombast do not constitute one before an intelligent people.

National conventions and nominations of the parties for 1920:—

Democratic—Convention held in San Francisco, June 28 to July 6. President, James M. Cox, of Ohio, nominated on the forty-fourth ballot; Vice-President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, of New York, nominated unanimously without ballot.

Republican—Convention held in Chicago, June 8 to 12. President, Warren G. Harding, of Ohio, nominated on the tenth ballot; Vice-President, Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, nominated on the first ballot.

For the present campaign and for the nation's future there is no political aspect of more interest or consequence than that of the enfranchisement of women, completed nationally by the action of the Legislature of the Democratic State of Tennessee, August 18, 1920, in ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The certainty of early complete triumph for Woman Suffrage dates from the New York State election of 1917, at which the vote on the Suffrage amendment to the State Constitution was: yes, 674,006; no, 585,016; majority yes, 88,990. But the amendment would have failed if its fate had been left to the "up-State" counties of inveterate Republicanism. The great majority of 95,258 in the rock-ribbed Democratic City of New York carried it, every borough of the city voting favorably. After the New York result nobody of the least political acumen doubted the success of the movement nationally within a very brief period. It is of pertinence that in this year 1920 the women of New York, though possessed of equal suffrage and supposed equal title to consideration, have found causes for very serious dissatisfaction with the spirit and acts of the Republican leaders, organization, and Legislature in the State.

As every reader who has given attention to current happenings knows, the women's demand for the "thirty-sixth State" was ignored in Republican Delaware, Vermont, and Connecticut, and, though treated with reflective and admonitory observations by the national standard-bearer of the party, failed to receive his active coöperation as to those non-ratifying States.

On the Democratic side, one of the outstanding facts of the campaign is the whole-hearted reception of the women on terms of perfect political equality. In the national convention of the party at San Francisco the women delegates and alternates were very numerous, and every suggestion made by the women as to platform declarations was acted on to their satisfaction. The national committee was organized on the basis of an equal representation of women in its membership. Both President Wilson and the Democratic Presidential candidate, Governor Cox, gave unqualified support to the efforts to secure the final State for ratification of the Woman Suffrage Amendment.

When the suffrage provision on behalf of the colored race was added to the Federal Constitution (1870), the movement for Woman Suffrage had long been in progress, and appeals were made for extending the vote to women as well as to the freedmen. No action was taken; and although the Republicans at many times subsequently had full power, both nationally and in the States, to grant the requests of the women, it was not until after the great development of progressiveness among the people, springing from the advanced demands of the Democracy on public questions, that the women's cause began to show real progress.

The Republicans base very much of their expectation of woman's support upon their ingenuous belief in their own "superiority," especially in the class respect—a belief that recalls the old pretensions of the "important" Federalists. No "superior" pretension is made by the Democratic party. It is content to leave its cause to the independent scrutiny and consideration of women, as of all citizens, upon the merits of its record of one hundred and thirty years of identification with the ordinary interests of the people, intimate sympathy with them in their aspirations, and conscientious consistent performance accordingly.

In relation to the course of women as an equal element of the national electorate, one prediction may be made with

absolute certainty. They will be for things affirmative and for results that will last.

The Republican party of standpatism and special interest is wholly negative in its attitude and proposals, and the things that it seeks are the things that do not last. It recognizes no change from the "good old days of Mark Hanna," when the great power that the party held was assumed to be for the primary object of negating every progressive demand. It forgets the revolt of its liberal constituency against its narrow leaders, and remembers only that the absolute authority of those leaders as to real Republican policy has never been successfully disputed.

No affirmative proposition of importance touching national questions or interests has been put forward by the Republicans in the present campaign. All is negative, like the record of the Republican Congress. Regarding the Versailles treaty and covenant, the Republicans do not and cannot show any other than a merely negative policy inspired partly by venomous hate of the President and partly by their preference to specialize on the subjects of existing war and future peace in their own particular manner—a manner as yet, on account of their "plural leadership," not defined. Regarding the great popular measures of the Wilson administrations, the public demands for continued progressiveness, and the claims of labor, their spirit is that of the pessimist resolved to see no good, but instead of positive ideas they discreetly propound only negations.

The future of the country is with the progressives of both parties. In the Republican party progressive sentiment is sincere and strong, but is in subjection to the forces of privilege. In the Democratic party it controls wholly, with a noble record of achievement under Wilson and the certainty of continued accomplishment under Cox.

LITERATURE RECOMMENDED FOR READING AND REFERENCE

Acceptance Addresses of James M. Cox and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Democratic Campaign Text-Book. And other literature of the Democratic National Committee.

Current History. Published monthly by the New York Times. Consult for important matters of reference concerning the late war, the Peace treaty, and politics. An indispensable authority.

Standard Historical, Biographical, and Cyclopedic Books

The American Nation: A History, from Original Sources by Associated Scholars; 28 vols., brought down to 1917. Edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.

History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877; with addendum to 1896. By James Ford Rhodes.

A History of the American People. By Woodrow Wilson.

Congressional Government. By Woodrow Wilson.

The American Commonwealth. By James Bryce.

Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the United States, 1776 to 1861; also Select Statutes and Other Documents, 1861 to 1898. By William MacDonald.

The Democratic Party. By Edward M. Shepard. Monograph published by Appleton, 1892 (Evolution Series, No. 31).

American Statesmen. Standard biography, 34 vols. Edited by J. T. Morse, Jr.

Biographies of the Presidents in Appleton's Cyclopedic of American Biography. Edited by James Grant Wilson and John Fiske.

Appleton's Cyclopedic of American Government; 3 vols. By Andrew C. McLaughlin and Albert Bushnell Hart. Contains important articles on all political topics, with profuse references to standard authorities.


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
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
ELECTORAL VOTE, 1920, AND ELECTORAL AND POPULAR VOTES, 1916


	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1916				
	Electoral Vote 1920	Electoral Vote		Popular Vote	
		Wilson	Hughes	Wilson	Hughes
Alabama.....	12	12	..	99,409	22,809
Arizona.....	3	3	..	33,170	20,524
Arkansas.....	9	9	..	112,148	47,148
California.....	13	13	..	466,200	462,394
Colorado.....	6	6	..	178,816	102,308
Connecticut.....	7	..	7	99,786	106,514
Delaware.....	3	..	3	24,753	26,011
Florida.....	6	6	..	55,984	14,611
Georgia.....	14	14	..	125,845	11,225
Idaho.....	4	4	..	70,054	55,368
Illinois.....	29	..	29	950,229	1,152,549
Indiana.....	15	..	15	334,063	341,005
Iowa.....	13	..	13	221,699	280,449
Kansas.....	10	10	..	314,588	277,658
Kentucky.....	13	13	..	269,990	241,854
Louisiana.....	10	10	..	79,875	6,466
Maine.....	6	..	6	64,127	69,506
Maryland.....	8	8	..	138,359	117,347
Massachusetts.....	18	..	18	247,885	268,784
Michigan.....	15	..	15	285,151	339,097
Minnesota.....	12	..	12	179,152	179,544
Mississippi.....	10	10	..	80,422	4,253
Missouri.....	18	18	..	398,025	369,339
Montana.....	4	4	..	101,063	66,750
Nebraska.....	8	8	..	158,827	117,257
Nevada.....	3	3	..	17,776	12,127
New Hampshire.....	4	4	..	43,779	43,723
New Jersey.....	14	..	14	211,645	269,352
New Mexico.....	3	3	..	33,693	31,163
New York.....	45	..	45	759,426	869,115
North Carolina.....	12	12	..	168,383	120,988
North Dakota.....	5	5	..	55,206	53,471
Ohio.....	24	24	..	604,161	514,753
Oklahoma.....	10	10	..	148,113	97,233
Oregon.....	5	..	5	120,087	126,813
Pennsylvania.....	38	..	38	521,784	703,734
Rhode Island.....	5	..	5	40,394	44,858
South Carolina.....	9	9	..	61,846	1,550
South Dakota.....	5	..	5	59,191	64,217
Tennessee.....	12	12	..	153,282	116,223
Texas.....	20	20	..	286,514	64,999
Utah.....	4	4	..	84,025	54,137
Vermont.....	4	..	4	22,708	40,250
Virginia.....	12	12	..	102,824	49,356
Washington.....	7	7	..	183,383	167,244
Vest Virginia.....	8	1	7	140,403	143,124
Wisconsin.....	13	..	13	193,042	221,323
Wyoming.....	3	3	..	28,316	21,698
	531	277	254	9,129,606	8,538,221

Wilson's plurality of popular vote, 591,385.
 Popular vote for Benson (Socialist), 585,113; Hanley (Prohibition), 220,506;
 Progressive Electors, 41,894; Reimer (Socialist Labor), 13,403.









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