

# UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE on FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### **FULL COMMITTEE HEARING**

## "From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship"

Tuesday, May 5, 2009 12:15pm Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building

## **TESTIMONY**

**OF** 

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#### **STATEMENT**

Thank you, Mr Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, for making my remarks a part of the record today. I come before you as an American-born citizen whose Pakistani immigrant parents exemplified the best qualities of what Pakistan once was and can still be as a contributor to growth and stability in our world. Much has happened to my parents' homeland in the intervening 49 years since they landed on our shores – not all of it good – and the US-Pakistan relationship has endured many inflection points during this period, a key one of which we are addressing in this hearing today.

Pakistan, for all its travails, is an important country, and we must do everything in our power to help save it. It occupies an important geostrategic location at the crossroads of South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Its citizens and expatriates are important contributors to science and technology, philosophy and sport, and law and medicine. Pakistan's press is still largely vibrant and free, its armed forces are supremely disciplined and its 170 million Muslim people are mostly moderate and want peace in their daily lives. Most of all, Pakistan has a brilliant intellectual capability that can sustain its society if we can help it excise the cancerous lesions – Al Qaeda and the Taliban – killing its national identity.

Increasingly, Pakistani soil is used to plan terrorist attacks against its own citizens, its army and its civil servants. In fact, while no Pakistani or American government official would like to admit it, Pakistan is already engulfed in civil war. Terrorists carrying Pakistani identification have attacked India's citizens on their territory and have aided and abetted attacks on NATO and US convoys in Afghanistan. Two of history's most notorious terrorists – Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (who masterminded the 9-11 attacks upon the United States) and Ramzi Yousef (who masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in 1993) – drew sustenance from Pakistan.

Images today of a 17-year old girl being savagely beaten in one of Pakistan's most beautiful vacation spots – the Swat Valley – by bearded, black-turbaned Taliban mercenaries in the name of preserving Islamic values is an abhorrent reminder of an agenda the American people can never allow their taxpayer dollars to be used for. When adolescent children are held in prison for crimes without any proof of their involvement in the name of abstract blasphemy laws that have no place in civil society, it should serve as a clarion call for the American people to rise up and use our collective will to compel change in the thinking, behavior and actions of those in Pakistan who seek our money to survive. We must arrest Pakistan's slide toward infamy, but we must do it on principles that matter to us.

As members of this Committee and the full Congress prepare to earnestly debate how American taxpayer dollars are best spent in revitalizing our important ally, we will need to shelve old formulas of incremental aid given mostly in the form of military assistance in favor of much larger and more concentrated doses of aid mostly in support of civil society if we are to fix Pakistan's complex problems. What we do give in military assistance will need to in no small part go to rebuild police forces that maintain law and order and preserve public safety, for anti-terror equipment that enables Pakistan's military, national guard and army reservists to cleanse its frontiers of the Taliban scourge, and not for F-16s that are never likely to see combat duty.

For its part, Pakistan must understand that the patience and goodwill of the American people are running out, and that it is time for Islamabad's civilian government to take responsibility for the future of its citizens and use American aid to insure government can provide for the basic needs of its people. Most of all, Islamabad has to resolve politically to stamp out the scourge of radicalism that engulfs its existence as a nation. Eliminating – not co-opting or compromising with – but eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pakistani soil must remain the key condition for continued American financial support.

Our legislative aid prescriptions should be aimed at engaging the vast majority of the Pakistani people who are moderate in as direct a manner as possible. We should be buying the goods and services Pakistanis need and making sure they get them rather than relying on a broken civilian system to deliver our aid. A day will come soon when Pakistan's civilian government can take over this task, but I suggest respectfully Mr Chairman that we need to do the job ourselves in the meantime, and legislatively require Pakistan to accept our help in a manner that directly assists its citizens – with our respect and humility.

The specter of the big American bully doling out cash to Pakistan's army brass and robber baron politicians has to be removed from the US-Pakistan equation. America's overt presence – whether in the form of Drone attacks that meet critical US national security objectives or in the frequency of high-profile American visits where our senior US officials publicly chew out and privately scold Pakistan's political and military leaders – is strengthening purveyors of extremist ideologies who claim Pakistan is under America's thumb and manipulated by the US Government for its own narrow objectives in the region. America is blamed for Pakistan's ills because Americans aren't paying attention to where their tax dollars go, and when those tax dollars disappear in places that are not in the best interests of either Pakistan or the United States, no one is questioning what happened. We need to get smart about how we spend our money, and compel the change we seek over there by giving it to the people who share our values so they can rebuild the fabric of Pakistan's civil society.

One of the most important ways this needs to happen is the creation of gainful employment for the growing population of unemployed teenage boys and young men who survive the brainwashing of Madrassa schools only to be seconded into the Taliban's militias when they have nowhere left to turn to feed their families. The Taliban have very effectively filled a void created by the failure of Pakistan's civilian government to create jobs for a growing segment of men 20 to 40 years old by using drug money obtained in the Afghan opium trade as well as the petrodollars of wahhabist clerics seeking influence over untrained Muslim minds to commandeer an entire generation of Pakistani men.

My colleague, Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council recently told me that in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) Region of Pakistan, for example, 50% of its 3.5 million residents are men. Of these, 20% are angry, frustrated young men who have nothing better to do all day than pick up Kalashnikovs and go wage jihad against some imaginary infidels, Americans at the top of their list. 20% of 1.75 million men needing 300-350,000 jobs – that's how manageable this problem really is.

We need to help Pakistan's civilian government create a major new jobs initiative for the areas of Pakistan that are most affected by the Taliban's ability to provide low-grade, lower cost civil services to men, women and children who turn away from their citizenship responsibilities because finding ways to obtain the basic necessities of daily life overtakes them.

The Pakistani government needs to create an equivalent of the Works Progress Administration (I would call it the "Benazir Development Authority" in honor of the slain leader who was Pakistan's promise personified in her early years and gave her life in search of a democratic solution for Pakistan's future). For example, Pakistan could propose to build a major rail line from Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea to Peshawar, the capital city of the Northwest Frontier Province, thereby linking together two otherwise disenfranchised provinces and giving a large enough economic incentive for Baluchistan's equivalent of the Hatfields (the Bugti Tribe) and the McCoys (the Marri Tribe) to make peace while building a major part of the national infrastructure. A major trunk could connect this rail line to Karachi, the country's commercial hub.

While theoretically a megaproject in terms of planning, railways are constructed in segments, and each segment is labor intensive. Men would have jobs, be able to take care of their families and have a hand in rebuilding their country. We should require that as much as 20% of our funding commitments to Pakistan

are used to create wage-earning jobs. The US Army Corps of Engineers could help Pakistan's Army Corps of Engineers plan such projects. Similarly, other small projects commissioned for the FATA region, like roads, bridges, mini and micro-dams, and other labor intensive work that would link FATA to the outside world could be formulated by the Pakistani government and funded by US taxpayer dollars. Our money could never be spent better than to give a young Pakistani man reason to make something out of himself more than a fanatic with a gun in his hand and anger in his heart.

Jobs that create economic opportunity and increase prosperity make it easier for societies to trust each other. This is the great lesson of India's economic rise as it built unprecedented bridges of cooperation with China. Building bridges of trust between Pakistan and India is of critical importance to US policy in the region. Greater trust leads to less reliance on expensive military hardware, which in turn allows more foreign aid to be spent on rebuilding the shattered lives of Pakistan's people.

Pakistan's army has for too long relied on an ambivalent policy of co-opting Islamist radicals to do its dirty work along indeterminate borders on its eastern front in Kashmir (against India) and on its western front in the FATA Region (against Afghanistan). But while jihad thrived along these borders during two decades of Pakistani military rule, India surpassed Pakistan economically, militarily, culturally and geopolitically.

India, in short, outgrew its role as Pakistan's mortal enemy.

It is time for American aid to encourage a change in Pakistani military thinking about who the real enemies of Pakistan are. US military aid to Pakistan should be used in part (5% of the total is a good starting point) to build institutional bridges of trust between the Indian and Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services. For example, the US could offer funding for and encourage the creation of bilateral counter-terrorism squads that train together and share intelligence data – simple stuff initially and more complex and sensitive data later on as trust builds – perhaps even with American counter-terrorism teams pitching in on training exercises. Reduced tensions with India would allow the Pakistani army to move troops away from the eastern border and reallocate them to areas inside Pakistan infested by the Taliban.

Ultimately, a stronger political infrastructure in Pakistan could engage in serious political dialogue with India to resolve the Kashmir dispute – resolution that would eliminate the army's need for jihadist mercenaries who currently sustain its Kashmiri front. Ending the flow of arms, munitions and other logistical support to these jihadists would prevent their militias from recoiling to act against Pakistan.

Placing excessive conditions on aid to Pakistan, whether in the form of placating other US allies in the region on narrow constituency topics or trying to force Pakistan to behave in ways it may not yet be flexible enough to follow represents a key hurdle that must be overcome as this Committee seeks to craft legislation. Conditioning Pakistani aid on Islamabad preventing ever again another terrorist attack on India, for example, is the perfect wall against which Taliban, Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations can lean on to blackmail the Pakistani military and civilian government almost at will.

Imagine a scenario six months from now where Pakistan's president, now firmly in control of his domestic situation, receives a message from Mullah Fazalullah, the leader of Pakistan's Taliban who would in this hypothetical scenario be exiled to living in Iran, that if Islamabad does not cede the NWFP districts of Dir and Chitral to Taliban control, his forces will launch another Mumbai-style attack on Calcutta, India. If Islamabad concedes to Fazalullah, it violates its commitment to the United States not to deal with terrorist groups, in which case US aid must cease. If Islamabad does not concede, and the Taliban attack on India proceeds having been planned on Pakistani soil, US aid must cease because the India condition has been violated. What would have been achieved by giving the Taliban such a gift that leaves them untouched while it shuts down funding to our ally?

Mr Chairman, I would like to now turn to the most sensitive area in which American policy toward Pakistan needs to mature and deal with ground realities there – nuclear security. Rather than concentrating on individuals whose past misdeeds may or may not yield material information that can help formulate future policy, American aid must focus on the real threats at hand.

Safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not the principal threat to Pakistani, regional or global security because the weapons are stored largely disassembled in discreetly separate locations with only a handful of senior officials holding the essential knowledge that could ever make them operational. Loose nuclear waste materials or nuclear weapons grade materials being hijacked in transport, however, are another matter and that is where US policy should focus its energies.

For several years, the work of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has been critical in securing Pakistan's nuclear materials. Together with the US Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency, PNRA has worked diligently to develop and fund a Nuclear Safety and Security Training Center to train its personnel, to staff and equip a Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center, to train personnel and equip them to locate and secure orphan radioactive sources and to build an

inventory of the most modern detection equipment that improves Pakistan's internal management procedures of its nuclear arsenals and radiation materials. But much remains to be done and US funding should be significantly increased to support the PNRA's important work on a much larger scale.

Finally, Mr Chairman, I would like to comment on Pakistan's dismal human rights policies. Perhaps if fundamental rights envisioned by Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had been upheld throughout its life as a nation, the Taliban wouldn't have a chance today to occupy a street much less a district. But I dare say America has not done enough with its aid to compel a change in Pakistan's human rights record, and we need to urgently reconsider how fundamental freedoms fit in the equation of our national security interests over the intermediate and long term.

Members of this Committee may not be aware, but recently in the province of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and prosperous, as Christians celebrated Easter Mass last month around the world, the Punjab Government sponsored an event on government property that looked a lot like the Pakistani equivalent of a Ku Klux Klan rally. The event was paid for by official Pakistani funds and was presided over by senior members of the federal and provincial government, including Pakistan's minister of religious affairs. The organizers and activists were some of Pakistan's most insidious hate-mongers and criminal terrorists, hiding behind religion as their banner of refuge while they called for the death of thousands of Pakistanis whose religious beliefs they disagreed with.

I can name names, tell you where it all happened, what they said, but that's not the point. The point is that when American taxpayer dollars go to Pakistan, we need to know these funds are not being used to systematically abuse the rights of ANY group of Pakistanis, no matter what they believe. That is the meaning of religious freedom. We need to insure the Pakistani government is not officially sanctioning the wildly out of touch behavior of a few that could then spread beyond Pakistan's borders and become America's next Al Qaeda headache.

The members of this Committee should know that the same group who organized the Punjab rally will come to Ontario, Canada on June 6, 2009 to incite hatred and fan the flames of religious intolerance right in our backyard. That is hardly in the best interests of the United States. Let us hope our taxpayer dollars are not paying for their airplane tickets and hotel rooms.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended on May 1, 2009 that the Obama Administration designate Pakistan as a "country of particular concern" for its egregious violations of

religious freedom, along with a short list of the world's other worst religious persecutors, and provided policy recommendations for it. The report and its recommendations can be found at: http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=2260&Itemid=35.

Mr Chairman, this Committee, its members and staff, and many others have worked hard to find credible ways to engage Pakistan and lift it through this difficult period in its history. As we have often sought one voice in Pakistan who could turn the light switch on or off at our command, we now must speak to the Pakistani people clearly, directly and with one voice. Pakistan's enemies would love nothing better than for us to disintegrate under the weight of our democratic debate, rather than using the debate to raise our capacity to help the Pakistani people when they need us most.

Permit me to close my remarks by offering a final thought on the recent conduct of our government in dealing with Pakistan as its president, foreign minister, intelligence chief and other senior officials arrive in Washington this week. US officials need to stop their blustery rhetoric and public demeaning of Pakistan's leaders. It's not getting us anywhere with them, quickly. Whether Asif Ali Zardari is competent or not, he was elected by a wide majority of his people, and whether that election was a reflection of sympathy for his slain wife or not, we declared Pakistan's elections to be free and fair. To then go about undercutting Pakistan's civilian credibility seems to me is a way of defeating us by fiat.

Maintaining lines of communication to Pakistan's opposition is important, but openly endorsing Nawaz Sharif as a credible replacement for President Zardari if he doesn't do what we want him to do is not the way freedom-loving governments behave. Our national interests will not be served well if two weeks from now, Gen. Kayani takes over Pakistan's civilian affairs in a military coup that we quietly sanctioned, brings in another American installation of puppeteers and then calls for elections in which it is a foregone conclusion that Nawaz Sharif wins only to find out that he was a Pandora's Box with a different batch of problems. We have seen enough of the revolving door strategy in Pakistan to last us a lifetime – let's see if we can fix the door we hung our shingle on for once.

America should seek to be counselor and conciliator, not manager of Pakistan's internal affairs. The job of our diplomats is to encourage through diplomacy, not to coerce through intimidation. If that policy prescription is needed, it is best done by the president of the United States in closed quarters with his counterpart, not on C-SPAN or Fox News Channel. The behavior of our diplomats and military officials in recent weeks came dangerously close to interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs as we began to fear a complete meltdown there. Pakistan is not quite yet at that melting point. American actions in the coming

weeks and months will carry much weight in determining whether Pakistan can stand again as a contributing member to the League of Nations, or falls into the hands of fanatics who want to take us all back to the Stone Age.

Thank you, Mr Chairman, and the members of this Committee for permitting my views to be heard.

Submitted for the record this 5<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2009 Mansoor IJAZ