

No. 2762

Ex 2762

Def. Doc. No. 1662

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)

- AGAINST -)

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Joachim V. RIBBENTROP, being that sworn on oath do hereby depose and say that I was appointed by the Fuehrer the Ambassador at Large and the Plenipotentiary for Disarmament in April _____. Before that time I was a foreign political advisor to Hitler in non-official capacity. I was the German Ambassador to Great Britain from the summer of 1936 to 4 February 1938, when I was appointed the Foreign Minister of Germany

I met OSHIMA, Hiroshi for the first time in the summer of 1935. At that time OSHIMA was the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin. Thereafter we had several meetings at which German-Japanese relations were discussed principally. When OSHIMA was appointed the Ambassador to Germany in October 1938 I was the Foreign Minister. He resigned his post and went home in November 1939 and returned again as Ambassador in February 1941.

I. Anti-Comintern Pact

The Anti-Comintern Pact was primarily an ideological pact. We Germans did not want to let Communism spread.

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V. Tripartite Pact

I can definitely say that our view in concluding the Tripartite Pact was to keep the United States out of the war. At the same time I may perhaps point out that we always wanted to be friendly with Japan. I wanted to get Russia to join the pact, but she did not succeed.

VI. German-British War

In the early part of 1941 I urged OSHIMA to ask that Japan go to war with Great Britain, but I wanted it done in such a way as not to include the United States. This conversation was merely diplomatic talking, but not planning. In Germany the right to plan such things was only held by the Fuhrer. I myself could not plan. OSHIMA, of course, as Ambassador, could do it still less than I.

I cannot imagine that OSHIMA told me that in February 1941 that the plan to attack Singapore would be ready by the end of May 1941. In the first place OSHIMA would hardly know. If OSHIMA had known, he most certainly would not have told me because the Japanese never tell such things. If this was said it was for propaganda purposes and was not proposed by OSHIMA.

VII. German-Russian War

After the Russian war broke out, I tried to get Japan against Soviet Russia. I told OSHIMA that it would be

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Of course, there was also a political weight against Soviet Russia that was more or less the background of the pact. It is not true that this pact was directed against the democratic countries of the world. On the contrary, I tried hard after the conclusion of the pact to get Great Britain to join it, but was unsuccessful. I never had an impression that Japan might use the pact in her policy toward China or the South Sea area.

II. China Incident

When in 1937 the China Incident broke out, I was in London and did not follow it very closely. Afterwards, I tried repeatedly to settle the dispute. I urged several times the Japanese to try to come to terms with China; I contacted the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin for that purpose. I remember also talking quite frequently to OSHIMA about the attempts to make peace with China, and OSHIMA showed a desire in the same direction.

III. German-Italian Military Alliance

OSHIMA did not in any way contribute to the German-Italian Military Alliance in 1939.

V. OSHIMA'S Resignation

OSHIMA resigned his post as Ambassador in 1939 after the Russo-German non-aggression pact was signed. No special reason was given by him to me official for doing so.

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field; move discussed between us.

X. Relation Between Germany and Japan

The relation of Germany with Japan was never very close. Japan was very far away and we never were really away of everything which was going on over there.

So far as I became aware of the relationship between German and Japanese forces during the war I believe that little or no collaboration was practical or possible; at least none existed so far as I know. When General Marshall said that there was no actual collaboration between Germany and Japan, it is exact.

XI. Miscellaneous

No agreement was ever suggested between OSHIMA and me concerning division of spoils of the war. Such matters are completely beyond the pale of all diplomatic discussions.

It has been charged that Japan and Germany, together with Italy, planned to dominate the world. Such a claim

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is as ridiculous as it is untrue, because such a thing has never been dreamed of by the three Powers.

/S/ Joachim V. Ribbentrop
Ri

sworn to and subscribed by the above-named RIBBENTROP, Joachim V. before the undersigned officer at Nurnberg Germany 15 Oct. 46

/S/ Robert B. Starnes

Capt. Inf. 0-1234783

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

OFFICE OF
THE GENERAL SECRETARY

October 13, 1946

Mrs. Owen Cunningham
Hq., GHQ SCAP IMTFE
APO 500
c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:

Inclosed find one signed copy of affidavit of Ribbentrop with annotations initialed by Ribbentrop.

It may interest you to know that this affidavit was received and accomplished the day before the execution.

Respectfully,

JOHN E. RAY
Colonel, FA
General Secretary

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