

I. The Branch Organs of the Imperial Army.

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The existing advisors are not employed by the Manchoukuan Army, nor does their appointment need this Army's sanction, nor is an ex post facto approval of their appointment necessary, they are simply dispatched to the Manchoukuan Army by the Kwantung Army in accordance with a military order; in short, the advisors are organs of the Imperial Army and the systematic networks for controlling the Manchoukuan Army are, in reality, nothing but branch organs of the Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors' Consciousness of their being Members of the Imperial Army.

Though in the Manchoukuan Army, the advisors are in service on the standpoint that they are all officers of the Japanese Imperial Army and burn with the patriotic spirit of those who are at the front to accomplish our national policy. It is certain that they will never place the Manchoukuan Army in opposition to the Japanese Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors Hold Real Power in the Manchoukuan Army.

1) The Manchoukuan leaders who were picked out by the advisors to take post in the Department of the Military Government established by the advisors were naturally under the advisors' perfect control; and besides, as they had never been in service in this kind of government office, they could not do anything without the advisors' guidance. Such being the situation, the Department of the Military Government naturally held perfect control of the advisors.

2) In provinces, chiefs of the Military Intelligence Bureaus being generally appointed as advisors, past circumstances naturally caused them to come in power.

3) At the front line, they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ realized that they could obtain facilities in connection with the Imperial Army through the advisors and this caused them to make friends with the advisors; the advisors' footing was raised as they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ thought it wise to rely upon them in matters concerning negotiations with the Dept. of the Military Government; they began to revere and rely upon the advisors after they had known the advisors' ability in matters concerning subjugation; and they also realized that a word from an advisor to the Central Government authorities would concern their position and merit, and this naturally induced them to be ruled by the advisors.

In short, the advisors are now practical rulers of both local and central governments.

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----- In short, what makes the pivot of guidance is practical grasp of the Manchoukuan Army. And for this purpose, it is essential that we should establish control attended with real power with strong and systematic guiding networks and also firmly control soldiers' minds by the spirit of harmony, various measures to be taken and facilities to be established should all be based on the aforesaid.

Now I will dwell upon some concrete problems. I think it necessary to consolidate the relations between the guiding networks and the cells of the Japanese-Manchoukuan officials related to them. And we should pay most attention to the establishment of gendarmerie /Kenpei-tai/ and to the reform of training stations; we should exert our utmost in the matters that would affect the inner workings of the human nature of the Manchoukuan people such as personnel affairs, allowances, rewards, and relief; as for various equipment, we should be satisfied by only fulfilling the minimum necessity and aim at the immediate maintenance of public peace and order; but as for the equipment and facilities which will be used by the Imperial Army in wartime, they should be completely equipped from a different point of view.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.
I.P.S. No. 612 (Supp.)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yozo, Miyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chef of the Archives and Document Section of 1st Demob. Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of numerous pages, dated 1 August, 1934, and described as follows: Excerpt (Pages 1, 2, 13, 18, 37, 38, 39, 40, 60 of Report by Major-General T.D.A. Shun, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Ministry, Archives and Records Section.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Yozo Miyama (Seal)
Signature of Official

/s/
Witness: Torakichi Nakamura (Seal) Chef of the Archives and Document S. of 1. Demob. Bureau

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHNSON F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Johnson F. Munroe
NJE

Witness: /s/ Henry L. Dolan, Jr.

Investigator, IPS.
Official Capacity

IPS DOC. NO. 1302

Ex. 3379A Page 1.

Q. 157
Special Service Division Dispatch No. 700

The notification for sending documents re Manchurian Economic Control.

Date: December 29, 1932

To Vice-War Minister, YANAGAWA, Heisuke

From Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, KOISO, Kuniaki

I hereby notify you regarding a definite plan as per separate text, concerning matters of Manchurian economic control that has been obtained as the result of research in the Army.

If you have any comments, please advise us immediately.

The separate text: The Outline re the General Policy for Manchukuo customs duty.

/T.N.: Seals on this letter are shown on the attached paper./

Seals on Document No. 700
despatched from the Special
Affairs Division, KWANTUNG Army

Riku-Man-Mitsu (Military Manchuria-Secret) No. 10
received by the War Ministry

War Ministry
Jan. 31st, 1933
No. 19
Mobilization
Section

War Ministry
Jan. 17th, 1933
No. 6
Control Section

Seal of the
Chief of Staff,
Kwantung Army

Secret
Report

War Ministry
Jan. 6th, 1933
Received
Minister's
Secretariate

Vice
Minister
sighted

Concluded

Inspected
Sighted

Control

War
Affairs

War Ministry
Jan. 9th, 1933
No. 11
War Affairs
Section

IIDA

TOFUKU

CHIBA

OKAZAKI

YAMAMOTO

YAMADA

NAKAYAMA (This is written with pencil)

IKEDA

UTSUKI? (This one is illegible)

Top Secret /stamp/
Now in study

Army decision draft /stamp/

Measure 1, No. 5.

Draft of Outline of General Measures regarding Customs Duties in Manchukuo, 12 December 1932, The Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

1. To decide on a customs policy so as to make Japan and Manchukuo one economic unit shall be the final aim, but for the time being, the following policy shall be adopted.
2. The customs of Manchukuo shall be based on the statutory tariff in principle, but towards Japan the tariff on certain specified articles shall be decided by an agreement. Manchukuo shall be persuaded to keep away as much as possible from making any tariff agreement with any Powers other than Japan. She shall not unconditionally allow other powers to share in the tariff agreed between her and Japan.
3. The statutory tariff of Manchukuo shall be decided, for the time being, through the reasonable revision of the present tariff. Later the general tariff shall be entirely altered.
4. In revising the present tariff, certain articles shall be specified as free goods or those the duties on which shall be reduced, according to the principle of the control over the Japanese-Manchurian economic relations. On the other hand, to make up for the subsequent decrease of revenue, duties on such articles that will not hinder the Japanese-Manchurian trade shall be increased.
5. In the revision of the present tariff, a legitimate consideration shall be taken to prevent the third Powers, especially China and Russia, from making an economic advance towards Manchukuo to the disadvantage of the economic relations between Japan and Manchukuo.
6. A system shall be considered whereby discrimination may be made between the exports and imports of countries friendly to Manchukuo and those unfriendly to it.
7. Consideration shall be taken to devise a system to reduce the customs duties at the border of Manchuria and Korea.
8. Special treatment shall be given to the duties of the special articles necessary for the execution of the common defense of Japan and Manchukuo.
9. The rights already acquired in accordance with the treaties or agreements shall be independent from the statutory and the stipulated tariffs.
10. Regarding the revision and abolition of the Manchurian Customs Law and the Tariff Law, close connection between the Japanese and the Manchurian authorities shall be maintained.

11. The customs system in Kwantung Province shall remain in general as it is now.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. NO. _____
I.P.S. NO. 1302

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shinaji, Kobayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Document and Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated Dec. 12, 1932, and described as follows: Excerpt from "The Great Diary of Manchuria", being an outline of a draft of General Customs policy for Manchukuo, by KOISO, Kuniaki, Chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of War, dated Dec. 12, 1932 to V. Minister of War YANAGAWA, Heisuke. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____

Signed at Tokyo on this
4 day of June, 1947

Shinaji Kobayashi
Signature of Official SEAL
Secretary of the Document and Archives
Section of the 1st Demobilization
Bureau

Witness: Tarakichi Nakamura

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Johnson F. Munroe, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
4 day of June, 1947

Johnson F. Munroe
NAME

Witness: Henry A. Dolan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

4 3380 (3)

Q. 159

Item 7
(Military)

43380A

Copy sent to the General Staff. ITO /seal/

24 January 1934

Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army/ KOISO appears in pencil/ to the Vice War Minister.

Despatched: 00:20 P.M. January 24.
Received: 01:33 P.M.

/TOP SECRET/ Urgent

KWAN-SAN-MAN (No. 1)

Reply to RIKU MAN 44.

Although I am informed of your views concerning various acts and ordinances, each of the following points seem to have been decided as follows as a result of putting together the opinions from all quarters expressed at the meeting of the committee held on the 23rd and of negotiation with Councillor TSUTOMI. /marginal note: "agreeable"/

I. The tile "Government Organization Law" is not suitable, for it contains a chapter on the Sovereign who does not belong to any government organ. However, it is also unsuitable to call it the "State Organization Law" because it has no regulations concerning rights and duties of the people. It is to be renamed "Basic Law of the MANCHURIAN Empire", or something similar. /marginal note: "not agreeable"/

II. The succession to the Throne, prescribed in the first Article of the said Law, constitutes a problem which naturally arises from a monarchical system, regardless of whether a hereditary system is assumed or not. Therefore, it will not only not interfere with the other articles, but will be retained as proof of the establishment of a monarchical system. (Continued) /marginal note: "not agreeable"/

KWAN-SAN-MAN 119 (No. 2)

III. As to the responsibility for assistance of the Chiefs of Departments, it is apparently helpful, in intensifying the principle of making the General-Affairs Board the axis, to have only the Premier assist. However, viewed from the practical application and considering transitions in the future, the selection of the Premier will not always cater to the opinion of the army commander, and a stubborn man may be sometimes selected for that post. Then there will be a danger of delay and standstill of all sorts of political affairs owing to the

attitude of the Premier alone. In such cases, if the Chief of each Department is responsible for assistance in matters in his charge, the army commander will be able to carry through his opinion by controlling one man or the other. Therefore, it is appropriate to divide part of the responsibility for assistance among the Chiefs of Departments. That is to be prescribed clearly in the Organization Law.
/marginal note: "agreeable"/

IV. The names "Premier of State Affairs" and "Chief of Department" will be changed to "Minister".

The reason for the above is that the names "Premier" and "Chief" appeared with the establishment of the Republic and are the suitable Chinese names for a republic. However, in the new empire, since it is ruled by a sovereign, everyone shall call himself a subject, and it is appropriate at this stage to make the whole nation fully aware of this fact; it is also necessary to sweep away the trappings of a democratic system. /marginal note: "agreeable"/

V. Although I hear that there seems to be a belief that there is no need specially to establish the Office of the Privy Seal, it will be established, for the Chief Executive has already made up his mind /to set it up/ since he particularly considers it necessary.

I beg you to give your consideration so that most of the opinions mentioned in the above clauses may meet with your approval, and to reply by wire by the afternoon of the 25th.

(Special)

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shinaji Kobayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Document and Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 24 Jan. 1934, and described as follows: Telegram #7 from Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to Vice War Minister re Organization Law of Manchukuo. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____

Signed at Tokyo on this
4 day of June, 1947

/sgd/ Shinaji Kobayashi (seal)
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/ Torakichi Nakamura (Seal)

Secretary of the Document and
Archives Section of the 1st
Demobilization Bureau.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Johnson F. Munroe, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
4 day of June, 1947.

/SGD/ Johnson F. Munroe
NAME

Witness: Henry A. Dolan, Jr. /sgd/

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

4-3381A

IPS DOC. NO. 989

Q. 129

/p. 30/

3,000,000 + secret funds

/Right side of the outline/

Parliamentary Vice-Minister)
Councillor State)

sent to

Decision before)
after) Joint Section (Military Affairs)

Name of Section circulated after enforcement (decision):

/Purple stamp/ War Ministry, January 25, 1933.

Afternoon o'clock
Finance Section

/Above the outline/

Term of Keeping: three years
Decision designated: entrusted to the Vice-Minister
Enforcement designated: IIDA

/Inside the outline/
Receipt Number:

Received by War Ministry
Army-MAN. - Secret - Receipt No. 101

Name of Drafting Office (Section):
Finance Section, Intendance Bureau, War Ministry

Subject Matter:
Granting of MANCHURIAN Incident Expenditure
Secret Service Funds

Minister: entrusted
Parliamentary Vice-Minister:
Councillor of State:

Secretary:
Vice Minister: YANAGAWA
Senior Adjutant: IIDA

Adjutant in Charge)
Paymaster attending on the Secretariat) CHIBA
Bureau Chief in Charge:)

OUCHI on behalf of the Chief

IPS DOC. NO. 989

Section Chief in Charge: OUCHI
Section Staff Member in Charge: KIMURA
Copyist of the draft: YAMASHINA
Bureau of Section in Charge:
Number: Intendance Secret No. 1
Received: Showa Year Month Day
Proposed: January 25, 1933.
Minister's Secretariate:
Received: January 25
Finished: February 1
T.N. filed

Joint:
Bureau Chief: YAMASHITA on behalf of the Chief
Section Chief: YAMASHITA

Circulated after enforcement (decision):
Bureau Chief:
Section Chief:

/back of p. 30/

Draft of Notification
to the Chief of the Finance
Section of the Intendance Bureau
(MAN - Secret)

Disburse three million yen as MANCHURIAN Incident Expenditure Secret Service Funds and deliver same to Kuniaki KOISO, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

Army Man-Secret No. 33. January 25, 1933
/seal of/ KASHIMA

Draft of Code Telegram from the Vice-Minister
to the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army. "Army MAN"

Three million yen is being granted for your Army's needs as the MANCHURIAN Incident Expenditure Secret Service Funds.

Army MAN No. 85 - January 25, 1933
/seal of/ SATO

C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shinaji KOBAYASHI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Document and Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 11 Feb. 1933, and described as follows: Vol. 24 (3) Report of "Manchurian Daily Confidential Report" showing receipt of Y 3,000,000 by Koiso, Kuniaki as C/S of Kwantung Army from War Ministry, on 25 January 1933. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____.

Signed at Tokyo on this4 day of June, 1947./sgd/ Shinaji Kobayashi (seal)
Signature of OfficialWitness: Torakichi Nakamura (seal)Secretary of the Document and
Archives Section of the 1st
Demobilization Bureau
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Johnson F. Munroe, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this4 day of June, 1947/sgd/ Johnson F. Munroe
NAMEWitness: /sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

273382

Q. 201

Meeting of the Budget Committee on
17 Feb 40 in the House of Representa-
tives, 75th Session of the Imperial
Diet.

Minister of State KOISO:

Just now, we heard Mr. SHINOHARA's speech which was very rich in content and invaluable. In his conclusion, he presented two questions. I think that the first; the problem as to whether we should advance northward or southward is of considerable importance. To what I am now going to say, you might say that it is somewhat a departure from reality or tell me not to speak so fanatically. However, I cannot positively say that I will not make this departure. Therefore, I think that I should like to make my speech brief.

As the original recognized national policy of Japan, we have been firmly handed down from generation to generation, what is called HAKKO-ICHIU, TENGYO-KAIKO /TN: An interpretation of this is: the resumption of the mission handed down to the Emperors by the Goddess AMATERA/, or RIKIGO KENTO /TN: An interpretation of this is: making the universe the Emperor's Capitol/. Although this is expressed in various words, it means after all, world wide expansion with the truly magnificent spirit and culture of Japan which we firmly believe. Emperor MEIJI said in the first year of his succession, "I will govern this country myself, give all you subjects freedom from care and finally cross the seas and spread our national glory throughout the four corners of the world." I believe that this great sentence expressed in such a manner, did after all, place its underlying note on this belief. In explaining what this means, it means that in our recognized national policy, advancement in any one direction was not considered in our advance to the north, south, east or west. In other words, Japan's destiny is advancement in all four directions. However, the question as to which direction should be emphasized in the successive generations is, I think, the problem in this generation. If that is the case, what is best in this present generation is as stated in Mr. SHINOHARA's speech. I might be somewhat dogmatic, but the Japanese race is surely a divine race. However, I think that there is a mixture of Eskimoo, Ainu, Indonesians and the MIAO of China. I think that the present YAMATO /Japanese/ race, which controlled and unified these many races, has the quality to advance in any direction and to grasp and assimilate any culture whether this fact is known or not. As to the larger portion of the lineage of the YAMATO race, if we say that it is undoubtedly a divine race, or that it is the TAKAMAGAHARA Race, it is within the province of scholars to say that it can endure the hot zone or the cold zone. Therefore, I think that we should hesitate to make a positive statement. I am one person who agrees entirely with Mr. SHINOHARA on that point. Fortunately, however, I believe that we must consider that because we possess Indonesian blood, we also have the capacity to progress towards the south. Therefore, I believe that at present, it is indeed a natural tendency for us to proceed towards the north and the continent because of the main feature of our racial composition. However, a nation cannot stand without defense, just as administration cannot stand without economy. It has clearly been proven

by ancient history of civilization, that if we are to quickly and readily obtain economic rights and interests, it would be more convenient to do so by sea transportation rather than by overland routes. Therefore, I again believe that just as Mr. SHINOHARA stated, we must proceed bravely towards economic development in the south where resources are thought to be in abundance. Therefore, at the present, we should follow the increased tendency of the race towards the continent and the north with more than ample economic development and at the same time, we shall extend our economic rights and interests towards the south with all our might. In this, I think that the necessary movement of the race is absolutely indispensable. In short, I believe that after all, since we should not emphasize any one direction in our northward or southward advancement, we should advance as indicated in Mr. SHINOHARA's talk.

The second question was: "Then what would you do with the cultural system of Japan which is rapidly advancing towards her world policy? Although I might sound very impertinent, I am one of those who become indignant just to think that there are so few fellow countrymen who completely understand the spirit and culture of Imperial Japan. Japan has been rapidly absorbing Western culture and products for seventy years since the early MEIJI Era, and at present, in the Imperial University which are called the highest seat of learning, what does Article I of the University Ordinance say? It says, "The university shall teach the theories in the arts and sciences and their application which are important to the state as well as to inquire into the most profound mysteries as its object". Up to this point, it is all right but it only says further that, "Simultaneously, it should consider the building up of the character of the people and cultivate national thought". The graduates of the said highest seat of learning are leading all the cultural systems in the Empire of Japan.

I think that we must stand more firmly on the spirit that dates back to the very beginning, reflect back to the days of the founding of Imperial Japan and then begin our investigation from the Three Great Oracles handed down by the Sun Goddess AMATERA. With the Emperor revered as the nucleus of the entire nation, and with the attitude of complete national unity, that is, with the moral principles of God as the main principle, and by adding to this oracle, which refers to rice, and important material, we must support the Emperor's destiny which is as everlasting as heaven and earth. I think that this is the underlying principle of the Japanese Spirit. In other words, I think it is the very source of the spirit and culture of Japan. I further think that this is the way of God and also the way of the Emperor. It is commonly said that there is unity between ancestral worship and government. I believe ancestral worship means that God and man enter the same mental frame of mind. And I think that administration is the deciding of all matters with this frame of mind. If the spirit and culture of Imperial Japan which has such an underlying thought, is carried forth, it will spread throughout the world and some day might naturally become the main current of thought in all parts of the world. Speaking from this

point of view, China's rule of righteousness such as Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity are all derogatorily speaking, inferior, and I believe that they must all be fostered in the Imperial Way, and the spirit and culture of Japan. Then as to the second question, where should the cultural system of Japan, necessary for world policy, be placed? I believe that this is a question which can be solved by seeking the very origin of Japanese spirit and culture, and judging all our actions, by standing on this source.

I am very sorry that I was so wordy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, SATOW, Tomoo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document attached hereto consisting of 2 pages, dated 17 Feb 1940, and described as follows: Speech of the Minister of State KOISO at the Meeting of Budget Committee on 17 Feb. 1940 in the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 Day of September, 1947.

/sgd/ T. Satow
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/ K. Makimura

Secretary of the Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of Sept., 1947

/sgd/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: /sgd/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Re: KOISO

- A. (1) Were there anti-British demonstrations in Japan in July 1939?
(2) Were not these demonstrations widespread and severe?
(3) Did you attend a dinner party given for MATSUOKA, Yosuke by IKEDA, Seihin on 12 July 1939 at which General MATSUI and Admiral NOMURA were present?
(4) Was not severity of the anti-British demonstrations one of the topics discussed at this dinner party?
(5) Did you not in the early part of July 1939 discuss with KIDO the billboards used and speeches made in the anti-British demonstrations?
(6) Is it not a fact that the KEMPEI was leading these demonstrations?
(7) Is it not a fact that the Army was financing these demonstrations?

(HARADA's Memoirs, Vol. XX, page 2578)

- B. (1) When you were Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, did you not send the KEMPEI to China and to Manchuria disguised as laborers?

(HARADA's Memoirs, Vol. XX, page 2597)

Court copy

al Fixel for the Prosecution desires to cross-examine the defen

Were you a director at one time of the Kokuhonsha Society?

When did you hold such office and for how long?

Became a member 1924

3. Is it not true that HIRANUMA, one of the defendants, was a President of Kokuhonsha? (Ex. 164, R. 1636)

4. Was not ARAKI a director?

5. Were not the purposes of the Kokuhonsha mainly to foster the spirit of nationalism, to bolster the foundations of the State and to exalt the national spirit?

6. Was it not the aim of the Kokuhonsha to accomplish its purposes in part by political measures?

7. Were you present at a meeting of this organization July 31, 1931 which was attended by MINAMI? (Ex. 164, p. 4)

8. While you were Vice Minister of War in May 1932 did you not express yourself in favor of HIRANUMA as Premier? (R. 16,215)

8 1/2

9. Were you a member of the Sakura Kai?

10. Is it not true that the Sakura Kai had as its main objective the renovation of the government of Japan by force if necessary and also the extension of Japan's territory by use of military force?

10 1/2. And isn't it true that the Sakura Kai planned active participation in the March incident? (IPS 1402A)

11. In the early part of January 1931, did you discuss ways and means concerning measures for reforming Japan with Gen. UGAKI, Gen. SUGIYAMA, Gen. YAMAWAKI, Gen. NINOMYA, Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. NEMOTO?

11 1/2

12. Did you favor the use of military force in connection with the appearance of Gen. UGAKI in the political field?

probably at 4/18/49.
Kido's
draft
without question

13. You have mentioned in your affidavit something concerning a plan OKAWA proposed you take up with UGAKI, but you have not described the plan in any detail. Is it not a fact that in a voluntary written statement you gave to Major Hummel you fully stated OKAWA's plan to be as follows:

"The plan is to confuse the Imperial Diet by hurling bombs at it; to attack the Metropolitan Police Board and bring about such a situation as the public peace in Tokyo cannot be maintained except by military force; then to guide the situation to such a state that the enforcement of martial law will be necessitated; to make the Cabinet responsible for it and resign en bloc; to let Minister UGAKI offer to save the situation; and to take some measures so as to make it possible that the Imperial Order will be given to Minister UGAKI to organize the next Cabinet. As for the measures to save the situation, it is enough that they are to be planned after the Imperial Order is given."

J.P.S. 2905

14. Was the statement you gave Major Hummel in your own handwriting?
15. Did you mention anything in that statement about firecrackers being used in connection with OKAWA's plan?
- 15¹. On the contrary you referred to them seven times as bombs or shells, did you not?
16. You mention in your affidavit that firecrackers had been given OKAWA by the General Staff so that he could carry out his plan.
17. ~~Were firecrackers used by~~ the Japanese Army in 1931 in artillery practise? *use firecrackers*
18. When you speak of firecrackers you mean bombs do you not?
a. Who delivered these bombs to OKAWA or to his henchmen?
b. Were they not delivered by the defendant HASHIMOTO or by his direction? (R. 1418)
c. Was HASHIMOTO one of the young officers to whom you requested OKAWA to return the bombs which you now call firecrackers?
19. Did you learn the names of the officers involved in the plot?
20. Didn't you consider the proposed bombing of the Diet a serious matter?
- 20¹. Did you take ~~any~~ action to have OKAWA arrested as a dangerous person?
21. Didn't you know that if this plot was carried out it would result in loss of lives?
22. What action was taken against those officers *who were* involved *in the plot*.

23. Did you file any charges against them?
24. You say you examined OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet.
25. What did you conclude as to OKAWA's plan?
26. You showed OKAWA's plan to Col. NAGATA, Tetsuzn, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau and ordered him to examine the plan for its consistency, did you not? ✓
27. Did you consider OKAWA's plan adoptable?
28. If you opposed the plan, why did you want to have the consistency of the plan determined by Col. NAGATA?
29. Was a plan to bomb the Diet a proper matter of business to be presented by you to the War Minister?
30. Was such a plan a proper matter to be considered for consistency or adoptability by subordinates in your Bureau?
31. Was OKAWA's plan to overthrow the Cabinet in March 1931 within the scope of work assigned to you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?
- ✓ 32. Prior to receiving Col. NAGATA's opinion on OKAWA's plan, did you discuss the OKAWA plan with Gen. UGAKI?
33. When did such discussion take place?
- ✓ 34. Did you give UGAKI your original pencil notations outlining the plan?
- ✓ 35. Did you deliver those pencil notations to Gen. UGAKI?
- ✓ 36. Did you tell Gen. UGAKI that you had directed Col. NAGATA to examine the consistency of the OKAWA plan and that you had not yet received Col. NAGATA's answer?

37. *document not written* You have said in your affidavit that Gen. UGAKI flatly rejected the plan. Did he not say, "Who on earth can adopt such an absurd plan?" (P. 6)

38. Why did you pay further attention to the plan if Gen. UGAKI considered the plan ~~reckless (or disapproved OKAWA's plan)?~~ *absurd*

39. Did you believe that the plan might be adaptable if it could be made consistent?

40. After your visit with Gen. UGAKI did you have Col. NAGATA continue work on the plan so as to give it consistency?

41. Why did you want Col. NAGATA to give the OKAWA plan consistency if ~~you did not consider the plan adaptable?~~ *you were absolutely terrified!*

42. If the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet had been consistent and adoptable would you have favored its execution?

43. *you say in your affidavit that you ask OKAWA to return them* ~~In connection with the bombs which the OKAWA faction received, did you ask OKAWA to return them?~~ *the bombs*

44. *no more questions that time?*
45. *you asked, did you not, that you interviewed with someone who was in contact with the bombs?*

49 $\frac{1}{2}$. You had authority, did you not, to send out an army truck with military personnel, and seize the bombs.

49 $\frac{3}{4}$. If you were so afraid the prestige of the army was to suffer if the bombs were not recaptured, why did you fail to take direct, positive action to secure their return?

What were the bombs returned?

Dec 1931

49. Why didn't you recover the bombs by using military authority?

50. Did you have to call this Tribunal that you had to virtually beg a division of the War Ministry to secure the return of ~~the~~ *artillery shells*, which were War Department property?

51. As to KOISO's connection with the March and October incidents, the Prosecution refers the Tribunal to prosecution evidence in the record, pages 1402, 1406, 1417, 1418, 1441, 1553, 1558, 1627, 1926, 15560, 15674, 16051.

Omit

52. I shd' the truth of the matter you wanted to conceal the ~~whole~~ ^{real} fact because you yourself were a part to plot -

52. You knew, did you not, that the matter of disposing of Manchuria and Mongolia, and the question of how to rule them was undergoing studies prior to July 1931, by appropriate Japanese organs.
53. You knew, did you not, that complete occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia was also under study by organs of the War Ministry during the same period?
54. You knew, did you not, that in July 1931 MINE, Yukimatsu, the Commander of the Military Police, submitted to the War Ministry an estimate of 5000 Military Police and 20,000 assistant Military Police as his requirements in connection with the occupation of Manchuria-Mongolia.
55. Was SHIMANUKI, an officer, one of your subordinates in the Military Affairs Bureau in July 1931, serving in the Military Service Section?
56. You had knowledge, did you not, that the plans for the furnishing of large numbers of Kempetai in Manchuria and Mongolia in connection with the disposition of the problem of taking over control of Manchuria were considered in the Military Affairs Bureau in July 1931.
57. May the witness be shown Exhibit 3038B, which has been previously marked for identification, and will the witness refer to the marked portion thereof, being letter dated 25 July 1931 from the Commander of the Military Affairs Bureau to the War Minister in reference to a study

62 $\frac{1}{2}$. If he denies he asked MINAMI's consent to take the matter up with the General Staff - ask:

- a. Isn't it a fact, that in IPS Doc. 2965, being the document you gave Maj. Hummel as set forth by you on p. 26 of your affidavit, you stated as follows on p. 7 of the Japanese text and p. 9 of the English text:

"Since I realized the necessity of preventing the outbreak of an incident, I set forth my opinion to the Army General Staff Office, after having obtained the consent of the Minister and the Vice Minister of War."

- b. Does the foregoing refresh your recollection and is the quotation from IPS Doc. 2965 true?

63. ~~What suggestions did Gen. MINAMI make as to action to be taken?~~

64. ^{you ask} Did Gen. MINAMI ^{consent} authorize you to take the matter up with the General Staff?


65. Did Gen. MINAMI have authority to issue an order to the Kwantung Army to desist from aggressive action, or ^{was} he required to secure consent of the Army General Staff ~~or~~ was this a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the General Staff. 3(?)


66. Did you mention to Gen. MINAMI that Gen. TAKEKAWA was a suitable person to prevent an outbreak of war in Manchuria?

67. If so, what did you say concerning TAKEKAWA?

68. Did you confer with the General Staff regarding action to be taken to prevent an incident in Manchuria?

69. How long before September 18, 1931 did this conference take place?

70. With whom did you discuss the matter at the General Staff? 

71. ^{mention or} Did you recommend Maj. Gen. TAKEKAWA as the person to go to Mukden to prevent the outbreak of an incident; ~~or did you mention him as a candidate for this assignment?~~ ✓ 

72. You knew, did you not, that TAKEKAWA was responsible for releasing bombs to OKAWA in order to effect a plan to blow up the Diet in March 1931. (P. 7 of 2965)

73. How long before the Manchurian incident did TAKEKAWA leave for Manchuria on his mission to prevent the outbreak of the incident? (P. 9 of 2965)

74. ^{7 3/2 was it not expected that Takekawa would arrive at Mukden by Sept. 15, 1931 at the latest.} From your long experience in military affairs, would you say that a mission such as Gen. TAKEKAWA had would require him to pass many days in headquarters discussing the same after his arrival in Port Arthur or in Mukden?

74. you know did you not that Takekawa delayed his arrival in Mukden by remaining at Port Arthur for several days.

- is it not found that having this exceedingly important order
directions from the Gen Staff*
75. ~~If TATEKAWA was instructed merely to notify the Kwantung Army of the General Staff decision to adhere to a policy of patience and forbearance, could TATEKAWA have delivered such instructions immediately on his arrival at Mukden.~~
76. Was there telegraph communications between Tokyo and Port Arthur at that time; and between Port Arthur and Mukden?
77. Why ^{was} ~~could~~ not the instructions of the General Staff ~~have been~~ dispatched by telegram?
78. Why was it ~~necessary to send~~ ^{sent} a personal emissary to deliver instructions to the Kwantung Army to prevent an outbreak of an incident?
79. If the situation was considered so urgent as to call for a joint War Department and General Staff decision, why was an uncertain and slow method of communicating the decision adopted?
80. Did TATEKAWA fail to report to Tokyo for a considerable period of time after his departure, preceding the outbreak of the incident? (P. 9 of 2965)
81. If you and the General Staff were so concerned about the outbreak of an incident in Manchuria, did you or they take any steps to find out why TATEKAWA failed to carry out his instructions diligently?
82. Was any action taken against TATEKAWA for failing to report to Tokyo after his departure?
83. Isn't the truth of the matter that TATEKAWA failed to ^{proceed} ~~act~~ expeditiously ^{& handle} and failed to deliver the orders received by him upon his arrival in Mukden because you and he had a pre-arranged plan to permit the matter to be handled that way so that the Manchurian Incident would occur? (SAIONJI Diary, Vol. II, 1, p. 75)

See page

you say on p. 17 you affiant end of p. 17 that

you were only responsible for administrative matters in the K Army Hqs is it

92 84. As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, did you have the responsibility to present to the Commanding General matters requiring final action by Him?

93 85. Is it not true that when such matters were presented to the Commanding General for his favorable action such matters had already been approved by you?

94 86. ^{as chief of staff you also referred} Were you not advised by all staff officers of the Kwantung Army concerning their plans, operations, and policies? ^{in all cases} did you not.

95 87. And was it not part of your duties to coordinate such plans and policies when they affected the policy of the Command, and approve them before they became effective.

96 88. And when you would sign a document in your own name, such signature carried with it not only the General's approval, but your own action. ^{did it not}

97 89. Did the functions of the Kwantung Army include the control of the local and central organs of government of Manchukuo? ^(?)

90. As Chief of Staff were you desirous of assuring independence to the Manchukuoan Government?

84 91. ^{while you were chief of staff of the K Army did you know what action was taken in Manchukuo} Did the Kwantung Army exert itself to help Manchukuo achieve such independence?

85 92. Is it not true that the establishment of Manchukuo was brought about through guidance and active interference by the Kwantung Army?

86 93. I show you Exhibit 3038G which has previously been accepted for identification by the Tribunal. Will you examine an excerpt thereof, being Serial No. 149 thereof, and being a report dated 5 December 1931, from the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to the Vice Minister of War, pertaining to the temporary system being carried out until the establishment of the New Regime. Did this document pass through your office while you were Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and do you admit the truth of the contents of this document? (R. 31,506)

87 94. I hereby offer the above excerpt which has been given IPS Doc. No. 3204 in evidence.

- 88 95. Prosecution desires to read from Exhibit _____ only that portion commencing with the heading "Explanation of the Temporary Expedient System," in the lower third of page 2 of the English translation.
- 89 96. ^{As I will do part} ~~Is it not perfectly clear from the document just read~~ that the Kwantung Army was taking a very active part in the preliminary arrangements for establishing the new regime of Manchukuo?
- 90 97. And is it not a fact that MIYAKE, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, desired to keep secret the guiding of the independence movement by the Kwantung Army, so that Japan could secure such rights and interests as it desired.
- 91 98. And did he not therefore desire a small autocratic organ for the giving of orders to the Chinese regimes which were to be used in setting up a new regime?
99. Was there a staff section in the Kwantung Army known as the Counselling Section?
100. What were its functions?
101. Who supervised its activities?
102. Was Gen. TADA, Shun, advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo while you were Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army?
103. Was Gen. TADA the Chief of the Counselling Section of the Kwantung Army?
104. Did you believe Gen. TADA to be a man whose veracity was unquestioned? (7)
105. Was Gen. TADA a man who could be depended upon to truthfully report the results of his work? (2)
106. Were you familiar with the policies pursued by Gen. TADA in guiding the Military Government of Manchukuo?

revised from 1.9

Criticism
elaborate

107. Did you know the results accomplished by Gen. TADA ^{by the way} ~~by means of a~~ system of advisors and instructors ~~of which he was in charge?~~
108. ^{is it not a fact} You knew, did you not, that the Manchukuoan Army coordinated matters relating to its personnel, finance and munitions with the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army?
109. ^{is it not a fact} You knew, did you not, that Kwantung Army advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school.
110. Did not this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese?
111. You knew, did you not, that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol?
112. Was not this system of advisors a subterfuge or pretext used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army?
113. Were not the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo?
114. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 612 for identification.
115. May the witness be shown Exhibit _____.
116. Will you examine an excerpt from Exhibit _____ being Gen. TADA's report as advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo, to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, dated 1 August 1934, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration".
117. Do you admit the ~~truth of the contents of said document?~~ ^{that the document is a correct ^{or genuine} copy of the report it is entitled}
118. Exhibit _____ is offered in evidence.
119. Prosecution with permission of the Tribunal will read Exhibit _____ in full.

Did you in Jan 1932 receive 300,000 ¥ from the War Ministry of Secret

120. You mention in your affidavit the receipt by you of various sums of money out of secret official funds. Do you recall receiving during your incumbency as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, an item of ¥3,000,000 from the War Ministry for the Kwantung Army Service Fund?

121. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 989 for identification.

122. Witness, will you examine the marked portion of Exhibit _____ and state whether it shows the allotment to you of ¥3,000,000 by the War Ministry?

123. Prosecution offers Exhibit _____ in evidence.

124. With permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will read Exhibit _____.

125. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, receive the funds mentioned in Exhibit _____.

126. Is it not true that ordinarily funds were transmitted to the Finance Officer?

127. Was not the transfer of these funds to you an extraordinary transaction?

(?)

128. *Did you forward a substantial part of these other secret funds that were received by him for actual activities in Jp.*
Prior to becoming Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army were you Vice Minister of War of the Japanese War Ministry?

129. Which was the more important position - Vice Minister of War, or Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army?

130. Was not the real reason you were relieved as Vice War Minister and made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army so that you could carry out the conquest of Jehol?

131. Were not military operations of the Kwantung Army in Jehol accelerated shortly after your arrival as Chief of Staff?

132. Were you the Executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army? ✓

133. What were your *duties* as Executive of the Special Service Department?
134. Was Gen. DOIHARA connected with the Special Service Department during the time you were Chief of Staff?
135. Was the Special Service Department in charge of opium traffic in Manchukuo? *if no what diff had control of opium*
136. Was the ~~control of its commerce~~ by Manchukuo of great importance to Manchukuoan independence?
- and (?)* 137. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, have the view that the international commerce of Manchukuo should be subjected to outside control? *control*
138. Did you, on 12 December 1932, while Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, recommend to the Vice War Minister a customs policy for Manchukuo, providing that no other country except Japan should be permitted to participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs?
139. Did you also recommend special tariff concessions for Japan pertaining to goods needed for defense by Japan?
140. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. ¹³⁰²~~1320~~ for identification. ✓
141. Does the marked portion of Exhibit _____ which is a letter from you to Vice War Minister YONAGAWA, dated 29 December 1932, state your recommendations concerning Manchukuoan tariffs and customs?
142. Prosecution offers excerpt from Exhibit _____ in evidence.
143. With permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will read Exhibit _____.
144. Did you on 24 January 1934 while Chief of Staff recommend to the Vice Army War Minister changes in the proposed terms of the Manchukuoan constitution?

145. Did you recommend that power be divided between the Premier and the several department heads?
146. What was your motive in suggesting such a charge?
147. ^{reply did} What was the ~~Vice Army War Minister's~~ ^{not} answer?
148. Was your recommendation to provide divided control carried out?
149. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 624 for identification.
150. Witness, does excerpt from Exhibit _____ which is dated 24 January 1934 contain recommendations you made to the Vice War Minister in reference to the Manchukuoan constitution?
151. Prosecution offers in evidence excerpt from Exhibit _____.
152. Prosecution desires to read Exhibit _____.
153. Was not your ~~real~~ interest in participating in these measures relating to Manchukuo the disintegration of that part of China in disregard of the Nine Power Pact?
154. Is it not true that after military action in North China Provinces had been completed, you were relieved from further service in Manchukuo?

155. As Minister of Overseas Affairs were you familiar with the decisions of the China Affairs Board?

156. ~~Were you familiar with a decision of the China Affairs Board on 7 April 1939 that Japan was to secure economic superiority in North China, and that Third Powers were to be permitted economic activity in Central China as long as such activity did not interfere with Japan's vital economic demands? (IPS Doc. 2178-D)~~

157. Were you in accord with that decision?

158. ~~Was not the decision of the China Affairs Board referred to inconsistent with the Open Door Policy in China?~~

159. And were you familiar with the decision of the China Affairs Board in 1939, that North China and Mengkiang (Mongolian Border) were to supply Japan's national defense and economic demands? (IPS Doc. 2178-D)

160. And did you know that in order to secure a firm grasp on the labor and materials in North China and Mengkiang it was decided by the China Affairs Board that substantial directions by Japan would be applied to aviation and railways in North China, to important marine transportation and water transportation on the Yangtze River, and communications in North China and the lower basin of the Yangtze River? (IPS Doc. 2178-D)

161. ^{160's you mean to say that as a cabinet member you failed to regulate your own} While you were a Cabinet member as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, did you know what HIRANUMA's policies were?

162. You knew did you not that HIRANUMA as Prime Minister had determined to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact to secure closer cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy.

163. Did you know of the so-called "HIRANUMA Declaration" made by HIRANUMA on or about 4 May 1939, directed to Hitler and the German Chancellor?

^{the if you recall the matter when I refer you recall} 164. Did you know that in that declaration HIRANUMA stated that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy? (R 6105)

165. Did you not know that HIRANUMA in the statement referred to, praised Hitler's "lofty wisdom", his "iron will" and told Hitler that he greatly admired the "noble task" of reconstruction in which Hitler was engaged? (R. 6104-5)
166. As a member of the HIRANUMA Cabinet did you subscribe to HIRANUMA's views as indicated in the foregoing questions?
167. Did you ever in your official capacity as a Cabinet member oppose such views?
168. If KOISO does not admit this, as: Did HIRANUMA keep such an important matter a secret from his Cabinet?
169. Were you acquainted with Baron HARADA in 1939?
170. Did you not complain to Baron HARADA, on or about 24 April 1939, that lack of unity in the Army was a hindrance to the successful conclusion of the Tripartite Pact? (SAIONJI Diary, Vol. xix, p. 2503)
171. Did you not visit the Navy Minister in early May 1939 in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude (SAIONJI Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2508)?
172. Do you recall that you and ITAGAKI took part in a radio interview on Domei Radio in May 1939, and that you spoke on the Tri-Lateral Anti Pact and took the view that the negotiations for the Pact would be successful if Germany and Italy understood Japan's point of view and power in the East, and that it was suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of Japan's policies? (R. 15817)
173. Did Japan's policies include a southward movement?
174. Did you not also discuss with Baron HARADA on or about 9 May 1940 the conclusion of a Tripartite alliance?
175. Did you not state to Baron HARADA that a Tripartite Alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front? (SAIONJI, Vol. XIX, p. 2517-8)

If such need of yours with respect to alien was provided by Harada in the S. diary

176. If he denies this, ask: "Do you want this Tribunal to believe that HARADA was dreaming that he had such a conversation with you?"
177. Can you ^{say what} think of any motive HARADA might have had in making such an entry if it was not true?
178. You state in your affidavit that while you were Overseas Minister in 1940 Ott, the German Ambassador, sought an interview with you and told you that a Japan-German Alliance would benefit Japan in the economic development of the Southwest Pacific. What did you say to that? *but*
179. Precisely for what reason was Japan required to ally itself with Germany, if Japan was seeking only fair trade in the international markets in the South Pacific? *argument*
180. Is it not true that it was intended at that time by Japan that she would get what she needed out of the South Pacific, by force if necessary, and is that not the reason ~~that~~ there was discussion of an alliance with Germany? *+*
181. In this conversation with Ott, if you did not promise to tie the U.S. down in the Pacific, as you say in your affidavit, just what did you tell Ott after he gave you that strong sales talk on the advantage ^{to Japan} ~~to be derived from being allied with the Hitler gangsters?~~ *Zemmy*
of an alliance
182. If Ott reported to Germany after his interview with you that you asked him what Germany's views would be in case Japan made military advances in the South Pacific, do you think he also just imagined you said this?
183. Did you know that the Foreign Office of Japan at or about the same time you were talking with Ott was announcing its view that the status quo of the Netherlands Indies would be preserved? (R. 11671-3, 11685-6)
184. Is it not true that the economic demands then being made by Japan on the Netherlands Indies, if accepted by the Netherlands Indies, would have disturbed the status quo in that region of the Pacific, and would have seriously interfered with the sovereignty of the Netherlands? *(?)*

185. You knew, did you not, that under a declaration dated 14 February 1922, following the Four-Power Treaty of 13 December 1921, Japan agreed to respect the rights of the Netherlands in its insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean? (R. 11635, 11674)
186. Did you as Minister of Overseas Affairs learn of the decision on 12 and 16 July 1940, of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities under which Japan was to dominate the southern areas? (R. 11699)
187. What did you understand domination of the southern regions to mean? *Don't know*
188. Did not domination by Japan also include military and political domination or control?
189. Your personal views were that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions; north, south, east and west, were they not? (IPS Doc. 3030-N, R. 15819)
190. Did you also have the view that the religious beliefs of Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians would have to conform to the spirit and culture of Japan? (IPS Doc. 3030-N)
191. Did you not also urge the spread throughout the world of the spirit and culture represented by Imperial Japan? (IPS Doc. 3030-N)
192. Were you not of the opinion that as the spirit, culture and economic interests of Japan extended to new territories, such territories would be dominated by Japan, and converted to the Imperial Way?
193. How did you expect to convert to the Imperial Way those who were unwilling to be converted, except by force? (3)
194. Prosecution offers for identification IPS Doc. 3030-N, an excerpt from Exhibit 3201 which has previously been marked for identification.
- 194½ May witness be shown Exhibit _____?
195. State whether the marked portion is a record of speech you made before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940.
196. Prosecution offers in evidence excerpt from Exhibit _____.
197. With permission of the Tribunal, I will read Exhibit _____.

197(a) (b) e

197a. Did Prime Minister KONOYE consider sending you as a special envoy to the Dutch East Indies in August 1940?

b. Did you ^{agree to go subject to certain conditions.} ~~not qualify your acceptance of this appointment by certain conditions?~~

c. Was not one of the conditions that you should go on a battleship?

d. Was not another condition that in case of emergency you could fire and destroy them?

e. If KOISO denies this, ask: If there is an entry in the SAIONJI Diary to the effect that KONOYE had such a conversation with you, would you say that KONOYE was only imagining that you told him you insisted on making this trip as envoy on a battleship, and wanted the privilege of firing, in case of emergency?

f. What motive would KONOYE ^{at Handa} have in fabricating such a story in connection with you?

(Vol. 24, SAIONJI, p. 2907)

198. *omit* When you accepted the office of Prime Minister in July 1944, had you come to a conclusion as to the reason why Japan was at war with the United States, Great Britain and other countries? (9)
199. *omit* State what you believed was the reason Japan entered the war against the United States and Britain. (?)
200. ~~If he says that the war was for self-defense, ask:~~ Was not the real intention of Japan in engaging in the war her desire to expel Anglo-American influence from China and the Asiatic Pacific regions, and to reconstruct a Greater East Asia?
201. Were you in accord with such views? (R. 3704, Exhibit 277)
202. Did you act as a member of the Committee for the establishment of Greater East Asia in April 1942? (R. 735, Exhibit 114)
203. Was it not Japan's intention to close the door of the Asiatic countries to others except on her own terms?
204. In connection with a ^{you made} speech before the 85th session of the Diet, 7 September 1944, ~~did you promise~~ future independence to the Netherlands East Indies? (R. 11666)
205. Were you familiar with the announcement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corps made in the same month you made the promise of East Indies independence, that "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government"? (R. 12217)
206. ~~If you knew of this, state whether such statement had your concurrence.~~
207. At the time the promise of independence to the East Indies was made, were not the agricultural enterprises, the sugar industries, the public utilities, the private railways, the gas and power companies and the newspaper plants under Japanese control? (R. 12150-56)
208. Was it your intention to return the enterprises mentioned to the original owners?

? 208 1/2 Was such intention ever ^{carried out} expressed by you?

209. How could this be accomplished in view of the statement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corps?
210. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council, on 1 February 1945, to place all military and armed police forces of French Indo-China under the joint command of the Japanese Army, subject however to the orders of the Japanese Army in matters of organization, allotment and movement? (R. 7165) 4661
- (7) 211. Specifically what matters would remain for the joint Indo-China Japanese command to act upon, if exclusive authority over the military forces as to organization, allotment and movement was vested in the Japanese Army?
212. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council on 1 February 1945 to place all railways, shipping and communications in French Indo-China under the control of the Japanese Army.
213. Were you familiar with the 6-hour ultimatum given by the Japanese to the Governor-General of Indo-China to bring about the surrender of the agencies mentioned in my previous questions?
214. Did you set yourself on record, or lodge any complaint in any official body, against such high-handed procedure?
215. Was such arbitrary action substantial evidence of what members of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might expect, as proof of Japan's real intention in spreading the Imperial Way and the spirit and culture of Japan to the four corners of the world?
216. When you assumed the premiership in 1944, were you well acquainted with the policies of the preceding cabinets with regard to the disposal of the China Incident?
217. You say in your affidavit that you made attempts to settle the China affair but you were frustrated. Did you know that the first KONOYE Cabinet had decided and declared to the effect that there would be no more dealings with the National Government of China under General Chiang Kai-shek?

216. Did you know that the Five Ministers' Conference had decided on 8 July 1938 the Measures to be Taken by Japan in case the Chinese Government Surrendered?
what & no
219. Was it not decided that in such eventuality Japan would treat the Government of China as one of the local regimes which might be permitted to participate in the setting up of a new pro-Japanese Government?
220. Was it not decided that the Chinese surrender would be accepted on certain conditions, one of which was the retirement from public life of General Chiang Kai-shek?
221. Did you know that the Five Ministers' Conference on the same day (8 July 1938) decided upon the Measures to be Taken by Japan in case the Chinese Government refused to Surrender?
what & no
222. Was it not decided on that occasion that in such eventuality Japan should concentrate her national power to bring about the total destruction and surrender of the Chinese Government?
223. Was it not decided that in such eventuality, Japan should occupy all strategic points in China, including Canton and Hankow?
224. Was it not decided that in case the Chinese Government refused to surrender, the pro-Japanese governments should be made to combine so as to set up a pro-Japanese Central Government?
225. Did you know that the Five Ministers' Conference decided on 15 July 1938 the Guiding Policy for the Establishment of a New Central Government in China?
what & no
226. Was it decided on that occasion that a new Central Government would be set up after the occupation of Canton and Hankow when the Chiang Kai-shek Government would have been reduced to a mere local regime?
227. Is it not a fact that the Five Ministers' Conference of 15 July 1938 approved a detailed plan providing for the Japanese supervision of military affairs, foreign relations, economic affairs, religion and education in China?

228. Is it not a fact that the above mentioned decisions of the Five Ministers Conference were later approved or confirmed by the Cabinet meeting on 16 August 1938?
229. You know, do you not, that the above mentioned decisions had not been changed, modified or substituted by new measures or policies.
230. Is it not correct to say that these policies continued to be the guiding policies for the disposal of the China Incident when you assumed premiership?
231. If the Accused denies any knowledge of the above mentioned decisions or policies, ask him: Do you mean to tell the Tribunal that you knew nothing about the policies of your predecessors when you assumed such an important post as Premier of Japan?
232. Did you do anything while you were Premier to suggest or insist on the revision of policies with regard to the disposal of the China Incident in any of the cabinet meetings, Five Ministers Conferences, or Imperial Conferences which you attended or over which you presided?
233. ~~If no such revision was suggested or effected, what help did you expect from such a small fry politician as Miu Pin, whose name appears in your affidavit?~~
234. ~~Did you not know that Miu Pin was an outcast in Chinese officialdom?~~
235. Did you put up a fight against those who advocated the continuance of the policies/laid down by your predecessors?
as to China
236. Is it not a fact that in the winter of 1944 when you were Premier the Japanese army thrust into the interior provinces of Kwangsi and Kweichow within immediate reach of China's wartime capital, Chungking?
237. Did you advocate such a move?
238. Did you ever voice your opposition to such a move in the meetings of the Liaison Conference of the Government and Supreme Command or in the Supreme War Direction Council?
239. Since the Supreme Command also had the will to end the war and make peace, as you state in the second paragraph on page 28 of your affidavit, why were military activities intensified and spread to such interior districts of China in the winter of 1944?
240. ~~As to the witness's connection with Prisoners of War refer the Tribunal to the record, p. 14882-85.~~

7
241. An examination of your affidavit discloses that you claim you opposed the March 1931 incident; you tried to prevent the Manchurian incident; you opposed the China adventure; you opposed the Tri-Partite Pact; you opposed going into a war against the United States; and you tried to settle the China war when you became Premier, and in all of these important matters you were frustrated and prevented from having your ideas and desires prevail. If you honestly and conscientiously disagreed with these events and policies and actually were opposed to them, why did you accept one important position in the government after another, whereby you became one of the protagonists of the very matters you now say you so strenuously objected to?

242. If you so earnestly desired peace with the United States, why did you not, upon becoming Premier, take action to terminate the war then going on, instead of urging greater exertion on the part of Japan and greater mobilization and a stronger and more unified effort for an all out victory?

243. If you ^{objected} detested the Tri-Partite Alliance with Germany and Italy, why did you not, upon coming into a position of power, demand that Japan disengage itself from this unholy alliance?

244. Is it not true that if you did in fact oppose all of the measures that ultimately were Japan's undoing, you waived such objections in return for the power, prestige and position you gained by holding the important posts of Vice War Minister, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Minister of Overseas Affairs and Premier, and that you cast your lot with those who opposed as you claim the very principles which you espoused.

Final

Ans. notes

K O I S O

I

The point I desire to make is that KOISO at the time of the March incident, by reason of his background, experience, and official position, knew or should have known that OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet in March 1931 was not a proper matter to be brought before him in his official capacity and was likewise not a proper matter to be examined by any of KOISO's subordinates, or by the Minister of War, and KOISO's action in connection with OKAWA's plan indicates a close connection between KOISO and the conspirators.

Colonel Fixel for the Prosecution desires to cross-examine the defendant KOISO.

1. You have stated in your affidavit (1st Par of Par. 3) that officers on the active list of the Army and Navy were prohibited as a matter of policy from engaging in political activities in connection with internal political practices. When did that policy go into effect? ✓
2. Did you know in January 1931, that Gen. UGAKI had made a decision to launch into the political world and organize a Cabinet?
3. *over* Was that policy prohibiting Army officers from engaging in politics in effect when Gen. UGAKI decided to enter the political arena in 1931?
4. Was it in effect when officers of the General Staff were collaborating with Dr. OKAWA in the March Incident?
5. Were you a director at one time of the Kokuhonsha Society?
6. When did you hold such office and for how long?
7. Is it not true that HIRANUMA one of the defendants was a President of Kokuhonsha? *Official Record of this society 4/16/4 R 1636 not seen*
8. Was not ARAKI a director?
9. Were not the purposes of the Kokuhonsha mainly to foster the spirit of nationalism, to bolster the foundations of the State and to exalt the national spirit.
10. Was it not the aim of the Kokuhonsha to accomplish its aim in part by political measures?
not
11. ~~Was this organization in close touch with military circles?~~
12. Were you present at a meeting of this organization July 31 at which MINAMI was present? *1931 A*
13. What was the reason ranking members of the Army affiliated with the Kokuhonsha?
13th was not the purpose, to least military support to the program of the organization.
14. Were you not also a member of the Sakura Kai?
15. Is it not true that the Sakura Kai had as its main objective the renovation of the government of Japan by force if necessary and also the extension of Japan's territory by use of military force? *our ev? to Sakura Kai 1/18/37*
16. Did you yourself not maintain that a war condition outside Japan was necessary to the accomplishment of internal reform (Brocade Banner p. 66).

17. In the early part of January 1931, did you discuss ways and means concerning measures for reforming Japan with Gen. UGAKI, Gen. SUGIYAMA, Gen. YAMAWAKI, Gen. NINOMYA, Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. NEMOTO?
18. Did you assist in making, or agree to a decision by the supporters of Gen. UGAKI, that military force might be used in connection with the appearance of Gen. UGAKI in the political field?
19. Did you know that senior officers were to draw a program and policies for the future state and that lesser grade officers were to make plans to seize the reins of the government?
20. Did you know of a plan in March 1931 to bomb the headquarters of the Seiyu and Minsei parties and the official residence of the Prime Minister, and that Dr. OKAWA would mobilize 10,000 persons in a demonstration towards the Parliament, after which, troops were to encircle the Parliament by making an emergency call on the pretext of protecting the Diet, after which you or Gen. TATEKAWA and another general were to enter the House and declare that the nation did not confide in the present cabinet, but only confided in a Cabinet with Gen. UGAKI as its Premier (IPS Doc. 1402-A) (Vol. 1 Saionji, p. 25-26)?
21. You state in your affidavit that OKAWA presented a plan to you early in March 1931. Did not such plan contemplate the overthrow of the Cabinet by bombing the Diet?
22. You say you examined OKAWA'S plan to bomb the Diet.
23. Did you object to OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet?
24. What did you consider objectionable in his plan?
25. Did you tell OKAWA that the execution of an improper plan always requires a good many unnecessary victims?
26. Did you believe that OKAWA's plan lacked consistency?
27. Did you show OKAWA's plan to Col. HAGATA, Tetsuzo, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau?
28. Did you not know or realize that the objective of OKAWA's plan was political in its nature?
29. Did you direct Col. HAGATA to examine OKAWA's plan for its consistency?
30. Did you consider OKAWA's plan adoptable?
31. If you did not approve the adoptability or the execution of OKAWA's plan, why did you desire to have the consistency of the plan determined by Col. HAGATA?
32. Was a plan to bomb the Diet a proper matter of business to be presented by you to the War Minister?

33. Was such a plan a proper matter to be considered for consistency or adaptability by subordinates in your Bureau?
34. Was OKAWA's plan to create an incident in March 1931, within the scope of work assigned to you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?
35. Prior to receiving Col. NAGATA's opinion on OKAWA's plan, did you discuss the OKAWA plan with Gen. UGAKI?
36. Where did such discussion take place?
37. Did you go to Gen. UGAKI's residence solely for the purpose of discussing OKAWA's plan to overthrow the Cabinet?
38. Did you take along with you your original pencil notations outlining the plan?
39. Did you deliver those pencil notations to Gen. UGAKI?
40. Did you tell Gen. UGAKI that you had directed Col. NAGATA to examine the consistency of the OKAWA plan and that you had not yet received Col. NAGATA's answer?
41. Did you and Gen. UGAKI discuss any other matters at that time pertaining to the overthrow of the Cabinet, besides OKAWA's plan?
42. You have said in your affidavit that Gen. UGAKI flatly rejected the plan.
43. Did Gen. UGAKI mention to you the reasons why he rejected the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet?
44. Did Gen. UGAKI make his decision immediately or did he ponder on it and if so for how long a time?
45. Why was further attention paid to the plan if Gen. UGAKI considered the plan reckless (or disapproved OKAWA's plan)?
46. Did you or Gen. UGAKI believe that the plan might be adaptable if it could be made consistent?
47. After your visit with Gen. UGAKI did you permit Col. NAGATA to continue work on the plan so as to give it consistency?
48. Why did you desire Col. NAGATA to give the OKAWA plan consistency if you did not consider the plan adaptable?
49. In the purport of your testimony that if the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet had been consistent and adaptable you would have favored its execution?

from whom did ~~Okawa~~ Shimizu receive the bombs?
We Col Washmori

50. In connection with the bombs which the OKAWA faction received did you ask OKAWA to return them?
51. Was OKAWA a civilian?
52. What did you tell OKAWA to do regarding the return of the bombs?
53. Did you act in a private or military capacity when you requested OKAWA to return the bombs?
54. Was there any military authority on which the bombs could have been recaptured?
55. Why did you or the General Staff not use military authority to recapture the bombs?
56. You say that you intervened with Marquis TOKUGAWA to secure the return of the bombs?
57. Why was intervention with Marquis TOKUGAWA necessary in order to recapture property belonging to the War Department?
58. Is it not a fact that after it was ascertained at the General Staff office that Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA was instrumental in passing the bombs over to the OKAWA faction that TATEKAWA continued to serve on the General Staff?
59. As to KOISO's connection with the March and October incidents, the Prosecution refers the Tribunal to prosecution evidence in the record, pages 1402; 1406; 1417; 1418; 1441; 1553; 1558; 16051; 1627; 1926; 15560; 15674.

Ugaki 1604-1635

Shimizu 1399-1438

Tokugawa 1440-1449

II

The point I desire to make in the questioning regarding TATEKAWA's trip to Mukden, is that KOISO had a hand in the selection of TATEKAWA, and that this hand-picked representative, who was to prevent an outbreak, arranged matters so that his mission failed completely, thus permitting the Manchurian incident to occur.

60. In reference to the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, you say that you knew that a strained situation had developed between the Japanese and Chinese and you were anxious to avoid a war. Did you speak with Prince HIGASHIKUNI at the Palace on 8 August 1931 on the Manchurian-Mongolian areas and the preparedness of the Army in connection with discharging its duties in that region (Saionji Diary, Vol. 1, p. 22). why 29
61. You knew, did you not, that the matter of disposing of Manchuria and Mongolia, and the question of how to rule them was undergoing studies prior to July 1931, by appropriate Japanese organs.
62. You knew, did you not, that complete occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia was also under study during the same period. *by organs of the Japanese Ministry*
63. You knew, did you not, that in July 1931, NINE, Yukimatsu, the Commander of the Kempetai in Manchuria submitted to the War Ministry an estimate of 5000 Military Police and 20,000 assistant Military Police as his requirements in connection with the occupation of Manchuria-Mongolia.
64. Was SHIMANUKI, an officer, one of your subordinates in the Military Affairs Bureau in July 1931.
65. You had knowledge, did you not, that the plans for the furnishing of large numbers of Kempetai in Manchuria and Mongolia in connection with the disposition of the problem of taking over control of Manchuria were considered in the Military Affairs Bureau in July 1931.
66. Prosecution offers for identification IPS Doc. 3203.
67. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 3203 marked Exhibit _____ for identification and will the witness refer to the marked portion thereof being letter dated 25 July 1931 from the Commander of the Military Police to the War Minister in reference to a study on the reorganization of Military Police forces in Manchuria.
68. Will you admit the truth of the contents of this document. []
69. Excerpt from Exhibit _____ is offered in evidence.
70. Prosecution desires to read from Exhibit _____.
71. You discussed the possibility of a Manchurian Incident with General MINAMI early in September 1931, did you not. (IPS Doc. 2965)
72. What suggestions did Gen. MINAMI make as to action to be taken.
73. Did Gen. MINAMI authorize you to take the matter up with the General Staff.
74. Did Gen. MINAMI have authority to issue an order to the Kwantung Army to desist from aggressive action, or was he required to secure consent

of the Army General Staff or was this a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the General Staff.

75. Did you mention the name of Gen. TATEKAWA to Gen. MINAMI as a suitable person to prevent an outbreak of war in Manchuria in discussing this matter with him.
76. If so, what did you say concerning TATEKAWA.
77. Did you have a conference at the General Staff regarding action to be taken to prevent an incident in Manchuria.
78. How long before September 18, 1931, did you confer at the General Staff Office in reference to a possible Manchurian Incident.
79. With whom did you discuss the matter at the General Staff.
80. Did you recommend Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA as the person to go to Mukden to prevent the outbreak of an incident; or did you mention him as a candidate for this assignment.
81. You knew at that time, did you not, that Gen. TATEKAWA had been accused of, or at least was under suspicion of, having planned the March 15th Incident.
82. You knew, did you not, that TATEKAWA was responsible for releasing bombs to OKAWA in order to effectuate a plan to blow up the Diet in March 1931.
83. Do you know why TATEKAWA rather than some one else was selected to go to Mukden.
84. How long before the Manchurian incident did TATEKAWA leave for Manchuria on his mission to prevent the outbreak of the incident.
85. Did you confer with him before he left, and if so, did you discuss his mission with him. If so, what was said.
86. From your long experience in military affairs, would you say that a mission such as Gen. TATEKAWA had, would require him to pass many days in headquarters discussing the same after his arrival in Port Arthur or in Mukden.
87. Did you know what TATEKAWA's instructions were.
88. If TATEKAWA was instructed merely to ^{advise} the Kwantung Army, (instructions from) the General Staff, to adhere to a policy of patience and forbearance, could TATEKAWA have delivered such instructions immediately on his arrival at Mukden.
89. Was there telegraph communications between Tokyo and Port Arthur at that time; and between Port Arthur and Mukden.

90. Do you know why the instructions of the General Staff could not have been dispatched by telegram.
91. Why was it necessary to send a personal emissary to deliver instructions to the Kwantung Army to prevent an outbreak of an incident.
92. If the situation was considered so urgent as to call for a joint War Department and General Staff decision, why was an uncertain and slow method of communicating the decision adopted.
93. Did TATEKAWA fail to report to Tokyo for a considerable period of time after his departure, preceding the outbreak of the incident.
94. If you were so concerned about a possible outbreak of an incident in Manchuria, and the General Staff was also so concerned about the same matter, did you or they take any steps to find out why TATEKAWA failed to carry out his instructions diligently, and why he failed to report to Tokyo after his departure.
95. Did TATEKAWA fail to act expeditiously and fail to deliver the orders received by him upon his arrival in Mukden because you and he had a pre-arranged plan to permit the matter to be handled that way so that the Manchurian Incident would occur. (Saionji Diary, Vol. II, 1, p. 75)

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III

Questioning of KOISO on his work as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army develops that KOISO, while advocating the independence of Manchukuo, in reality was implicated in the operation of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army which vested control of the local and general governments in the Japanese; also that KOISO recommended control of the customs of Manchukuo, also the control of virtually all agencies of industry and commerce; and the passing of rescripts, ordinances and enactments; also that he was concerned in the aggressive warfare in Jehol and the North China provinces.

96. What were the functions of the Kwantung Army in relation to the government of Manchukuo.
97. Did such functions include the control of the local and central organs of government of Manchukuo.
98. Was it your aim as Chief of Staff to assure independence to the Manchukuan Government.
99. Did the Kwantung Army exert itself to help Manchukuo achieve such independence.
100. Is it not true that the establishment of Manchukuo was brought about through guidance and active interference by the Kwantung Army.
101. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 3204 for identification.
102. I show you Exh. _____. Will you examine an excerpt thereof, being a report dated 5 December 1931, from the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to the Vice Minister of War, pertaining to the temporary system being carried out until the establishment of the New Regime. Did this document pass through your office while you were Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and do you admit the truth of the contents of this document. (R 31506)
103. Excerpt from Exh. _____ is offered in evidence.
104. Prosecution desires to read from Exhibit _____ only that portion commencing with the heading "Explanation of the Temporary Expedient System", in the lower third of page 2 of the English translation.
105. Is it not perfectly clear from the document just read that the Kwantung Army was taking a very active part in the preliminary arrangements for establishing the new regime of Manchukuo.
106. And is it not a fact that MIYAKE, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army desired to keep secret the guiding of the independence movement by the Kwantung Army, so that Japan could secure such rights and interests as it desired.
107. And did he not therefore desire a small autocratic organ for the giving of orders to the Chinese regimes which were to be used in setting up a new regime.
108. Was there a staff section in the Kwantung Army known as the Counselling Section.
109. What were its functions.
110. Who supervised its activities.
111. Did you devise the work to be performed by the Counselling Section.

Just the facts

112. Was Gen. TADA, Shun, advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo while you were Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
113. Was Gen. TADA the Chief of the Counselling Section.
114. Did you believe Gen. TADA to be a man whose veracity was unquestioned.
115. Was Gen. TADA a man who could be depended upon to truthfully report the results of his work.
116. Were you familiar with the policies pursued by Gen. TADA in guiding the Military Government of Manchukuo.
117. Did you know what Gen. TADA had accomplished by means of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army, which had been established by the Kwantung Army.
118. You knew, did you not, that the Manchukuoan Army coordinated matters relating to its personnel, finance and munitions with the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army.
119. You knew, did you not, that Kwantung Army advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school and that this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.
120. You knew, did you not, that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol.
121. Was not this system of advisors a subterfuge or pretense that the Kwantung Army was furnishing advisors to the Manchukuoans whereas such advisors and military instructors in reality were used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army.
122. Were not the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo.
123. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 612 for identification.
124. May the witness be shown Exh. _____.
125. Will you examine an excerpt from Exh. _____ being Gen. TADA's report as advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo, to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, dated 1 Aug. 1934, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration". Will you say whether Gen. TADA's report contained in Exh. _____ is a fair resume of the work accomplished by the system of advisors and instructors in Manchukuo, and that the procedures outlined therein pertained during the time you served as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and do you admit the truth of the contents of said document.

126. Exh. _____ is offered in evidence.
127. Prosecution with permission of the Tribunal will read Exhibit _____ in full.
128. You mention in your affidavit, the receipt by you of various sums of money out of secret of official funds. Do you recall receiving, during your incumbency as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, an item of ¥3,000,000 from the War Ministry, for the Kwantung Army Service Fund.
129. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 989 for identification.
- OK
130. Witness, you will you examine the marked portion of Exh. _____ and state whether it shows the allotment to you of ¥3,000,000 by the War Ministry.
131. Prosecution offers Exh. _____ in evidence.
132. With permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will read Exhibit _____.
133. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, receive the funds mentioned in Exh. _____.
134. Were not these funds of a part thereof, used in carrying out the conquest of Jehol.
135. Prior to becoming Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army were you Vice Minister of War of the Japanese War Ministry.
136. Which was the more important position, Vice Minister of War or Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
137. Was not the real reason you were relieved as Vice War Minister and made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army so that you could carry out the conquest of Jehol.
138. Did not the military operations of the Kwantung Army become accelerated shortly after your arrival as Chief of Staff.
139. Before the conquest of Jehol took place, did you not prepare a document entitled "Essentials of Propaganda in connection with the Occupation of Jehol". (Doc. 620-L) (?)
140. And did you in that document recommend that emphasis should be laid on Jehol so as to aid military strategical and political measures.
141. Were you the Executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
142. What were your duties as Executive of the Special Service Department.
143. Was Gen. DOIHARA connected with the Special Service Department during the time you were Chief of Staff.

144. Was the Special Service Department in charge of opium traffic in Manchukuo.
145. Were Japanese-Manchurian economic relations an important item in connection with Manchukuoan independence.
146. Would the control of its commerce by Manchukuo be one of the evidences of Manchukuoan independence.
147. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, have the view that the international commerce of Manchukuo should be subjected to outside control.
148. Did you, on 12 Dec. 1932, while Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, recommend to the Vice War Minister a customs policy for Manchukuo, providing that no other country except Japan should be permitted to participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs.
149. Did you also recommend special tariff concessions for Japan pertaining to goods needed for defense by Japan.
150. What country did you have in mind as a possible aggressor against Japan on 12 December 1932, the date you made your recommendations on such customs and tariff policy.
151. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 1320 for identification.
152. Does the marked portion of Exh. _____ which is letter from you to Vice War Minister YONAGAWA, dated 29 December 1932 state your recommendations concerning Manchukuoan tariffs and customs.
153. Prosecution offers excerpt from Exh. _____ in evidence.
154. With permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will read Exhibit _____.
155. Did you recommend, 24 Jan. 1934, while Chief of Staff, among other things, to the Vice Army War Minister, in connection with the proposed terms of the Manchukuoan constitution, that power be divided between the Premier and the several department heads.
156. What was your motive in suggesting such a change.
157. What was the Vice Army War Minister's answer.
158. Was your recommendation to provide divided control carried out.
159. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 624 for identification.
160. Witness, does excerpt from Exh. _____, which is dated 24 Jan. 1934 contain recommendations you made to the Vice War Minister in reference to the Manchukuoan constitution.
161. Prosecution offers in evidence excerpt from Exh. _____.
162. Prosecution desires to read Exhibit _____.

163. Can you reconcile the assertion which has often been made, that the establishment of Manchukuo was spontaneous and with which the Kwantung Army had nothing to do, in view of the actions taken by the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry, in dictating terms of the fundamental law of Manchukuo and (excessive) control of administration under that law.
164. Was not your real ^{exercising} interest in participating in these measures relating to Manchukuo the disintegration of that part of China in disregard of the Nine Power Pact.
165. Is it not true that after military action in North China Provinces had been completed, you were relieved from further service in Manchukuo.

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166. As Minister of Overseas Affairs, were you familiar with the decisions of the China Affairs Board.
167. Were you familiar with a decision made at the meeting of the China Affairs Board on 7 April 1939 that Japan was to secure economic superiority in North China, and that Third Powers were to be permitted economic activity in Central China as long as such activity did not interfere with Japan's vital economic demands (IPS Doc. 2178-D).
168. Were you in accord with that decision.
169. Was not the decision of the China Affairs Board referred to, inconsistent with the Open Door Policy in China.
170. And were you familiar with the decision of the China Affairs Board in 1939, that North China and Mengkiang (Mongolian Border) were to supply Japan's national defense and economic demands.
171. And did you know that in order to secure a firm grasp on the labor and materials in North China and Mengkiang, it was decided by the China Affairs Board that substantial directions by Japan would be applied to aviation and railways in North China, to important marine transportation and water transportation on the Yangtze River, and communications in North China and the lower basin of the Yangtze River.
172. While you were a Cabinet member as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, did you not know that HIRANUMA as Prime Minister had determined to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact.
173. Did you not know that during that same period HIRANUMA desired closer cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy.
174. Did you not know that on 4 May 1939 HIRANUMA gave a statement that Japan was firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy.
175. Did you not know that HIRANUMA praised Hitler's "lofty wisdom", his "iron will" and considered Hitler's work a "noble task" of reconstruction. (R. 6104-5)
176. As a member of the Hiranuma Cabinet, did you subscribe to HIRANUMA's views as indicated in the foregoing questions.
177. Did you ever in your official capacity as a Cabinet member oppose such views.
178. Did you not complain to Baron HARADA, on or about 24 April 1939, that lack of unity in the Army was a hindrance to the successful conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2503)

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179. Did you not visit the Navy Minister in early May 1939 in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2508). *why*
180. Do you recall that you and ITAGAKI took part in a radio interview on Domei Radio in May 1939, and that you spoke on the Tri-Lateral Anti Pact and took the view that the negotiations for the Pact would be successful if Germany and Italy understood Japan's point of view and power in the East, and that it was suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of Japan's policies (R. 15817)
181. What did you mean by the expression "execution of Japan's policies."
182. Did such policies include a southward movement.
183. Did you not also discuss with Baron HARADA, on or about ⁸ May 1940, the conclusion of a Tripartite alliance.
184. Did you not state to Baron HARADA that such an alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front (Saionji, Vol. XIX, p. 2517-8) *OK* *Real man fully*
185. You state in your affidavit that while you were Overseas Minister in 1940, Ott, the German Ambassador, sought an interview with you and told you that a Japan-German Alliance would benefit Japan in the economic development of the Southwest Pacific. What did you say to that.
186. Precisely for what reason was Japan required to ally itself with Germany, if Japan was seeking only fair trade in the international markets.
187. Is it not true that it was intended at that time by Japan that she would get what she needed out of the South Pacific, by force if necessary, and is that not the reason that there was discussion of an alliance with Germany.
188. In this conversation with Ott, if you did not promise to tie the U.S. down in the Pacific, as you say in your affidavit, just what did you tell Ott after he gave you that strong sales talk on the advantage to be derived from being allied with the Hitler gangsters.
189. Did you know that the Foreign Office of Japan at or about the same time you were talking with Ott was announcing its view that the status quo of the Netherlands would be preserved (R. 11671-3; 11685-6).
190. Is it not true that the economic demands then being made by Japan on the Netherlands, if accepted by the Netherlands, would have disturbed the status quo in that region of the Pacific, and would have seriously interfered with the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
191. You knew, did you not, that under a declaration dated 14 February 1922, following the Four-Power Treaty of 13 December 1921, Japan agreed to respect the rights of the Netherlands in its insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean (R. 11635; 11674).

192. Did you as Minister of Overseas Affairs learn of the decision on 12 and 16 July 1940, of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities, to have Japan dominate the southern areas (R. 11699).
193. If so, what did you understand domination of the southern regions to mean.
194. Did not domination by Japan also include political domination or control.
195. Your personal views were that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions; north, south, east, and west, were they not (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
196. You also believed that Japan should have a two-fold policy embracing the south and the north as the immediate objective, did you not (R. 15819).
197. Did you also have the view that the religious beliefs of Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians would have to conform to the spirit and culture of Japan (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
198. Did you not also urge the spread throughout the world of the spirit and culture represented by Imperial Japan (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
199. Were you not of the opinion that as the spirit, culture and economic interests of Japan extended to new territories, such territories would be administered by Japan.
200. How did you expect to convert to the Imperial Way those who were unwilling to be converted.
201. Prosecution offers for identification IPS Doc. 3030-n of witness. State whether the marked portion is a record of speech you made before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940.
202. Prosecution offers in evidence excerpt from Exhibit _____.
203. With permission of the Tribunal, I will read Exhibit _____.
204. Included in your functions as Minister of Overseas Affairs were the following matters entrusted to you, were they not, administration of the territories of the Mandated Islands (i.e., the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas), the Kwantung Leased Territory and the occupied areas in China and the South Pacific (R. 633)
205. When you accepted the office of Prime Minister in July 1944, had you come to a conclusion as to the reason why Japan was at war with the United States, Great Britain and other countries.
206. State what you believed was the reason Japan entered the war against the United States and Britain.
207. If he says that the war was for self-defense, ask: Was not the real intention of Japan in engaging in the war her desire to expel

Anglo-American influence from China and the Asiatic Pacific regions, and to reconstruct a Greater East Asia.

This is from his speech in 1944

208. Were you in accord with such views (R. 3704, Exh. 277). *omit this question*
208. Did you act as a member of the Committee for the establishment of Greater East Asia in April 1942 (R 735, Exh. 114).
210. Was it not Japan's intention to close the door of the Asiatic countries to others except on her own terms.
211. In connection with the Dutch East Indies, did you in a speech before the 85th session of the Diet, 7 September 1944, promise future independence to the Netherlands insular possessions (R. 11666). *omit this opening address*
212. Were you familiar with the announcement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corp. made in the same month you made the promise of Dutch independence, that "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government" (R 12217).
213. If you knew of this, state whether such statement had your concurrence. ?
214. At the time the promise of independence to the Dutch East Indies was made, were not the agricultural enterprises, the sugar industries, the public utilities, the private railways, the gas and power companies, and the newspaper plants under Japanese control (R. 12216-17). *omit does not bear out the statement*
215. Was it your intention to return the enterprises mentioned to the Dutch owners. *omit*
216. Was not the real reason you failed to grant independence to the Netherlands East Indies during your Premiership, that had it been granted, Japan would have lost control and real power in that region.
217. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council, on 1 February 1945, to place all military and armed police forces of French Indo-China under the joint command of the Japanese Army, subject however to the orders of the Japanese Army in matters of organization, allotment and movement (R. 7165).
218. Specifically what matters would have remained for the joint Indo-China Japanese command to act upon, if exclusive authority over the military forces as to organization, allotment and movement was vested in the Japanese Army. *omit*
219. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council on 1 February 1945, to place all railways, shipping and communications in French Indo-China under the control of the Japanese Army.
220. Were you familiar with the 6-hour ultimatum given by the Japanese to the Governor-General of Indo-China to bring about the surrender of the agencies mentioned in my previous questions. *require compliance with its demands*

R 7165

221. Did you set yourself on record, or lodge any complaint in any official body, against such high-handed procedure.
222. Was such arbitrary action substantial evidence of what members of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might expect, as proof of Japan's real intention in spreading the Imperial Way and the spirit and culture of Japan to the four corners of the world. 17)
223. When you assumed ^{the} premiership in 1944, were you well acquainted with the policies of the preceding cabinets with regard to the disposal of the China Incident. China Incident
224. Do you know that the first KONOYE Cabinet had decided and declared to the effect that there would be no more dealings with the National Government of China under General Chiang Kai-Shek?
225. Do you know that the Five Ministers' Conference had decided on 8 July 1938 the Measures to be Taken by Japan in case the Chinese Government Surrendered.
226. Was it decided that in such eventuality Japan would treat the Government of China as one of the local regimes which might be permitted to participate in the setting up of a new pro-Japanese government.
227. Was it decided that the Chinese surrender would be accepted on certain conditions, one of which ^{being} the retirement from public life of General Chiang Kai-Shek.
228. Do you know that the Five Ministers' Conference on the same day (8 July 1938) decided upon the Measures to be Taken by Japan in case the Chinese Government refused to Surrender.
229. Was it decided on that occasion that in such eventuality Japan should concentrate her national power to bring about the total destruction and surrender of the Chinese Government.
230. Was it decided that in such eventuality, Japan should occupy all strategic points in China, including Canton and Hankow which were subsequently occupied.
231. Was it decided that in case the Chinese Government refused to surrender, the pro-Japanese governments should be made to combine so as to set up a pro-Japanese Central Government.
232. Do you know that ^{the} Five Ministers' Conference had decided on 15 July 1938 the Guiding Policy for the Establishment of a New Central Government in China.
233. Was it decided on that occasion that a new Central Government would be set up after the occupation of Canton and Hankow when the Chiang Kai-Shek Government would have been reduced to a mere local regime.
234. Was it a fact that the Five Ministers' Conference of 15 July 1938 approved a detailed plan providing for the Japanese supervision of military affairs, foreign relations, economic affairs, religion and education in China.

235. Was it a fact that the above mentioned decisions of the Five Ministers' Conference were later approved or confirmed by the cabinet meeting on 16 August 1938.
236. Do you have any knowledge that any of the above mentioned decisions had been changed, modified or substituted by some new measures or policies. If not, is it correct to say that they continued to be the guiding policies for the disposal of the China Incident when you assumed premiership.
237. If the Accused denies any knowledge of the above mentioned decisions or policies, ask him: "Do you mean to tell the Tribunal that you knew nothing about the policies of your predecessors when you assumed such an important post as Premier of Japan?"
238. Have you done anything, if at all, while you were Premier, to suggest or insist on the revision of policies with regard to the disposal of the China Incident in any of the cabinet meetings, Five Ministers' Conferences, or Imperial Conferences which you attended or presided.
239. If no such revision had been suggested or effected, what was the use of contacting such ^{small} politician like Miu Pin (whose name appears in KOISO's statement and TANAKA's affidavit) whom was known to be an outcast in the Chinese officialdom.
240. Did you put up a fight against those who advocated the continuance of the policies laid down by your predecessors.
241. Was it a fact that in the winter of 1944 (when KOISO was Premier) the Japanese army had thrust into the interior provinces of Kwangsi and Kweichow within immediate reach of China's wartime capital Chungking.
242. If you did not advocate such a move, did you ever voice your opposition to such a move in the meetings of the Liaison Conference of the Government and Supreme Command or in the Supreme War Direction Council.
243. Since the Supreme Command also had the will to end the war and make peace, as you stated in the 2nd para. on page 28 of your affidavit, ^{why} how was it possible that military activities were intensified and spread out to such interior districts of China in the winter of 1944.
244. As to the witness's connection with Prisoners of War refer the Tribunal to the record, p. 14882-85.

f-10 ~ In Part 10
no objection & having
Japan enter the
war (European)

Extracts From
SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Concerning
KOISO

Prepared by:
Col. Rowland W. Fixel

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

I P 2-5 Army Opposition to Armament Reductions - July 13, 1931.

KOISO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau was called to a Cabinet meeting to speak on Russia's Five Year Plan. He appeared there and stated Russia's estimated expenditures for that plan, but could not substantiate the figures by any data, and the result was the opinions of KOISO were considered "meaningless." The talk was ridiculed and KOISO returned to the War Ministry greatly disappointed. KOISO expressed the opinion that while the Five Year Plan of Russia might be mainly for increase of its national wealth and internal development, the Army is considering the plan from a military view and as a scheme for increasing armaments for Russia's eastward expansion.

I P 14 Young Officers' Movement - 30 July 1931.

The War Minister stated that the actions of the young army officers at the Army Club was troublesome and that he had just called in KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and cautioned him sharply about it.

I P 22 MINAMI v. SHIDEHARA.

KOISO went to the Palace 8 August 1931 and spoke at length with Prince HIGASHIKUNI. This was at a time when the War Minister had given instructions at a meeting of Army and Divisional Commanders to exert themselves in their education and training and be prepared to discharge their duties perfectly. Reference was made to the Manchuria-Mongolia areas as having a close connection with the existence and expansion of the Empire.

I P 25-26 MINAMI v. SHIDEHARA.

Deals with the March incident. States that NINOMIYA, Deputy Chief of General Staff, KOISO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau and TATEKAWA, Chief of Second Section of General Staff together with Lieutenant Colonel SHIGETO and Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO with OKAWA and TAISHITO had planned the March 15 event. The plan was to have General UGAKI become Premier. NINOMIYA, KOISO and TATEKAWA invited SUZUKI to the residence of the War Minister and told him the plan and what he was to do but SUZUKI replied "That is very insulting. Such actions are very bad and I will never go on such a mission." Because of such incidents, NINOMIYA, KOISO or TATEKAWA could not restrain their subordinates.

I P 28 - MINAMI v. SHIDEHARA.

The writer expressed the view that KOISO, NINOMIYA and TATEKAWA should resign, they being the Chief Conspirators.

I P 31-2 - TOKUGAWA Yen for Revolution.

At a meeting of KONOYE, KIDO and INOUE, the latter said that if NINOMIYA, TATEKAWA and KOISO resign now (August 31), it would not be very pleasant because it might stir up the feelings of the Army and appear to be a reprisal measure. He said that NINOMIYA, TATEKAWA and KOISO are participating in the Sakura-Kai. They also seem to be troubled as though they are regretting something.

I P 49 - Army Reorganization and the Budget - 4 September 1931.

MINAMI called in KOISO and NAKATA (Chief of Military Affairs Section) and told them of his being questioned by the Premier regarding the coup d'etat.

I P 5 - Army Reorganization and the Budget - 4 September 1931.

Story was passed on to the Army that the Foreign Minister had requested the Home Minister to have police intervene if Army speakers should criticize foreign policy of the government. SAIONJI was in room of Chief of the Asia Bureau, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, when KOISO came in and spoke of the matter and presented the document.

I P 53 - Army Indiscipline Increases - 14 September 1931.

KOISO disagreed with War Minister MINAMI on the army reorganization plan and as a result of KOISO and others of MINAMI's staff disagreeing, MINAMI had the matter revert to the starting point.

II 1 P 75 - TATEKAWA Goes to Mukden.

SAIONJI says that he believes MINAMI consulted KOISO regarding the selection of an envoy to deliver a confidential letter to the C/G Kwantung Army (14 Sept 1931); and when consulted, KOISO probably responded that in his opinion TATEKAWA was the only one who could settle the matter. He thinks KOISO recommended

TATEKAWA because he and TATEKAWA had a scheme. He probably stated to MINAMI that TATEKAWA could restrain the young reactionary elements in Manchuria. He says NINOMIYA, KOISO and TATEKAWA were in complete control of the Army at that time. And the purpose in recommending TATEKAWA was to accomplish their true intentions of starting an incident in Manchuria he believes.

II 1 P 111 - Army Criticism of the Emperor.

ABE said (5 Sept 1931) to SAIONJI, while at Osaka "KOISO and ARAKI are the ones that have the confidence and the support of the young officers."

II 2 P 135 - International Complications - 24 October 1931.

SAIONJI met KOISO at the Kyoto Station. They rode together to SHIZUOKA. KOISO told SAIONJI that the Premier was thoroughly worried over the situation and it would be dangerous for the present Cabinet to face the coming Diet session.

II 2 P 156-58 - UGAKI's Story about OKAWA and the Plot.

UGAKI said that KOISO came to him and told him OKAWA wanted to meet him. UGAKI claims he refused and had refused such a request several times. However, KOISO importuned him so he met OKAWA on 11 February 1931. At that meeting OKAWA explained his plan to overthrow the government and asked for bombs. UGAKI told OKAWA the plot was "outrageous" and refused to have anything to do with it. Later KOISO thanked UGAKI for meeting OKAWA, and KOISO then spread rumors to the effect that UGAKI had changed his mind.

II 2 P 172 - Advance to Tsitsihar - 19 November 1931.

Rear Admiral TOYODA was informed by KOISO that General Ma Chan Shan would withdraw his troops by the 25th of November 1931.

II 2 P 196 - Advance to Tsitsihar. - November 19, 1931.

KOISO denied to KONOYE the rumor that the Kwantung Army would not be withdrawn from the north and from its plan to seize Tsitsihar even though ordered to do so by the Emperor. He also denied that the military were raising a turmoil saying the Lord Keeper of the Seal should be assassinated and the government overthrown.

II 3 P 222 - Election Funds - 18 January 1932.

Diary says that last evening when I talked with INOUE and SUZUKI they said there were many supporters for ARAKI. The Military Affairs Section is supporting him. But KOISO is sly. He goes for UGAKI.

II 3 P 261 - Attack on Woosung - 24 February 1932.

ARAKI's faction is planning to back either HIRANUMA or ARAKI for Premier; then finally to put KOISO in control and put HIRANUMA in the Imperial Palace as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal for the purpose of ousting those close to the Emperor and to manipulate politics as they like.

III 1 P 276 - Politics and the Soldier - 3 March 1932.

In a conversation with SHIRATORI, KOISO it was disclosed, was sent to Baron DAN's place to warn him not to send a man like KANEKO to America and that for him to consider going to America cannot be tolerated.

III 1 P 308 - ARITA and the Foreign Office - 8 April 1932.

SUZUKI was asked whether there was any evidence that Chief of the Accounting Bureau, ONODERA or KOISO have directly or indirectly practised extortion on the MITSUI-MITSUBISHI deal. SUZUKI replied that he had been worrying very much and there is some evidence that men outside official circles are active and this is causing trouble.

III 1 P 317 - UCHIDA and the South Manchurian Railway - 24 Apr 1932.

Although KOISO is in the position of Vice Minister and ONODERA, Chief of the Intendance Bureau, they are shunned by the leaders in the Army and do not truly represent the Army. HATA, Minister of Overseas Affairs thought what KOISO and ONODERA say was the true opinion of the Army. Maj. General ATOMIYA who recently became Chief of the General Staff of Kwantung Army returned from Manchukuo and was instructed by ONODERA and KOISO.

III 1 P 320 - UCHIDA and the SMR - 24 Apr. 1932.

KOISO and the Chief of the Intendance Bureau, who were under the immediate control of the War Minister, were the cause of the resignation of EGUCHI of the SMR.

III 2 P 354 - UCHIDA Foreign Minister - 23 June 1932.

Vice Minister KOISO and Director ONODERA, with indirect support of General MINAMI and General KANAYA, started criticizing War Minister ARAKI seeking to further MINAMI's ambition as Chief of General Staff or War Minister once more.

III 2 P 376 - UCHIDA's Successor in SMR - 9 July 1932.

KOISO proposed that the Chinese Eastern Railway be purchased but some opposed it.

III 2 P 379 - UCHIDA's Successor in SMR - 9 July 1932.

KOISO approved four candidates for President of the SMR.

III 2 P 381 - UCHIDA's Successor for SMR - 9 July 1932.

Lt. Colonel SUZUKI said there were some young officials in the Finance Ministry who object to KAJIWARA as he smacks of the Minseito.

III 2 P 396 - OKAWA and TOKUGAWA - 30 July 1932.

UGAKI warned KOISO about meeting OKAWA. KOISO told UGAKI the matter was progressing rapidly and UGAKI said "That's not good." KOISO secured the return of the bombs. They were loaded on a truck from a transportation company in Shimbashi and returned to Lt. Col. Nemoto of the General Staff in the presence of HASHIMOTO and NAGATORI. Twelve pieces were missing.

VIII 3 P 1163 - North China Omens - February 25, 1935.

Two factions in the Army, the ARAKI-MAZAKI faction and the KOISO-TATEKAWA-NAGATA faction. The latter advocates the maintaining of the regulations of the Army by avoiding rash political action.

IX 2 P 1276 - National Policy Clarified - 14 August 1935.

There are stories to the effect that KOISO and TATEKAWA are to be brought to headquarters. KOISO to become Chief of the Air Service Headquarters.

X 1 P 1416 - MAZAKI v. UGAKI - 11 February 1936.

General MAZAKI in a conversation with Ambassador YOSHIDA said that the UGAKI faction claims that MAZAKI had incited the young people to check on the movements of KOISO and TATEKAWA. MAZAKI was charged with propagandizing for national socialism in the Army. The UGAKI faction desired to eliminate it.

X 1 P 1419 - MAZAKI v. UGAKI - 11 February 1936.

TANI considers both KOISO and TATEKAWA suspicious characters. TANI warned SAIONJI to be careful toward them. He considers that KOISO is even more suspicious than TATEKAWA recalling the relations KOISO maintained with MORI before and after the May 15th incident which may have been endorsed by KOISO himself.

XI 1 P 1561 - TERAUCHI, KONOYE & CO. - 13 August 1936.

When TATEKAWA resigned, the War Minister TERAUCHI said TATEKAWA told him: "If things will be settled by my resignation, I will gladly offer it. If KOISO were to resign with me, I would have something to say."

XI 1 P 1574-5 Personnel Problems - 23 August 1936.

In a discussion between SAIONJI and TERAUCHI as to the next War Minister if UGAKI became Premier, he said "WE'll make it KOISO", since there is no other person. SAIONJI suggested that would be entirely different from the way in which TERAUCHI was to renovate the Army as KOISO was more involved in the March incident than was TATEKAWA. KOISO, he said, was known as a notorious schemer and to bring him in as a successor might serve as an anti-climax. The War Minister then said: "I have also thought of that. It is not necessarily going to be KOISO."

XI 1 P 1580 - Personnel Problems - 23 August 1936.

There was talk of desiring Minister of War TERAUCHI to take a more circumspect attitude. One of his statements was: "I will make KOISO, Commander-in-chief of KOREAN forces, as my successor." ABE was told of this, he said it was "very dangerous."

XI 1 P 1583 - KOBAYASHI to Formosa - 3 September 1936.

SAIONJI and TERAUCHI talked again on TERAUCHI's successor and SAIONJI explained fully he was absolutely opposed to KOISO as his successor as renovation of the Army would be meaningless. TERAUCHI said he had been giving it considerable thought.

XII P 1812 - KONOYE and MAZAKI - 5 July 1937.

If MAZAKI is acquitted in the February 26th Incident, TERAUCHI maintained that such men as KOISO and SUGIYAMA sacrificed themselves for those who participated in the March Incident and retired from active service.

XIII P 1914 - KIDO becomes Minister - 25 October 1937.

SAIONJI had dinner on 24 October 1937 with ARITA and the War Minister. He was told that the public were saying that KOISO was coming to Tokyo and would be made a full general and would become a war councillor. In the meantime he will wait for the resignation of SUGIYAMA and then will take his place. However, there is no sign of such tendencies and the War Minister was not considering whether KOISO will take the spotlight or will become the Korean Army Commander or the Taiwan Army Commander.

XIV P 2107 - KONOYE Too Passive - 12 May 1938.

The War Minister said there was a lack of good men in the Army and he was thinking of bringing KOISO in as Vice Minister. However, he does not have the confidence of the Emperor and it would be a gamble. He is a little difficult to use.

XV P 2183 - Changkufeng Border Clash.-

SAIONJI telephoned KONOYE (16 July 1938) and asked if anything in particular had come up. KONOYE told him that War Minister ITAGAKI had visited the Emperor and made an informal report on personnel changes. "That means KOISO will be placed on the reserve list. This seems to be the only important matter and the others will be announced soon."

XVI P 2230 - Fears of Right Wing Grow - 31 August 1938.

On 23 August SAIONJI met friends of KOISO at HAKONE and was told that General KOISO is very prudent now. General ABE also told him that when KOISO returns from his trip he will tell him to be cautious.

XVIII P 2397-8 - HIRANUMA Appointed - 21 December 1938.

HARADA complimented KOISO on his prudence. KOISO said "If there is no control within the Army, the foreign policy and interval administration cannot be carried out." The foreign policy of Japan will be very weak. He wanted to do something about these matters.

XIX 2488 - Strengthening Anti-Comintern Pact - 11 April 1939.

On the 6th of April, there were rumors that General KOISO would be appointed the Minister of Overseas Affairs.

XIX 2491 - Strengthening Anti-Comintern Pact - 11 April 1939.

General KOISO had been appointed to the post of Overseas Affairs Minister two or three days previous.

XIX 2498 - Emperor Criticizes Envoys - 18 April 1939.

Colonel IWAKURO sent a man to ARITA to urge the establishment of the military alliance. ARITA told him the situation was favorable and to sit tight. IWAKURO seemed satisfied. IWAKURO always supported KOISO but IWAKURO had been told by KOISO that the situation would not progress any further and it was unavoidable. On the 18th HARADA talked with ARITA who said he had an appointment with KOISO that morning. HARADA said "It seemed as if matters are being settled the way ARITA wants."

XIX P 2503 - Emperor Opposes Army Plan - 24 April 1939.

HARADA met KOISO who said: ^{K did not express any extreme rumors about strengthening the Pact} "In the Navy, the Minister, the Vice Minister and the Bureau Chiefs are united. However, the General Staff and middle rank officers have differences of opinions with the higher echelons (of Navy). I am very envious of the unification within the Navy and we (Army) cannot do anything."

XIX P 2508 - HIRANUMA wants to Aid Axis - 5 May 1939.

KOISO worried over the same things and hurt the feelings of the Navy Minister by visiting him and the Foreign Minister. This was in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to the Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude.

XIX P 2517-18 - ARITA and HIRANUMA Disagree - 9 May 1939.

✓ KOISO told HARADA that the development of the China problem and reaching a conclusion of the war as soon as possible "will be impossible without a Tripartite Alliance." He said the men at the front were displeased with British and French aid to Chiang Kaishek and an alliance with Germany and Italy would alleviate their feelings. Then Japan could settle the China problem through the offices of England and France and unless this is done the men at the front will prove troublesome. KOISO also said there should be no objection to enter the war since the Premier said Japan is prepared to give any possible military support in the event of war. He said: "What is wrong with entering the war?" HARADA told him "If Japan enters, in the event of war between Germany-Italy and England-France, then United States will certainly join. Then, the Navy must take the whole responsibility of national defense. The Navy is moving very prudently because they are aware of the heavy responsibilities....."

XIX P 2520 - ARITA and HIRANUMA Disagree - 9 May 1939.

HARADA spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of his meeting with KOISO and of the conversation and he also spoke of the meeting to ARITA.

XX P 2564 - KONOYE's Visitors - 1 July 1939.

KONOYE told SAIONJI that at a conference of the Privy Council on 28 June 1939, KOISO supplemented a discussion on the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, but his talk was unreasonable and fantastic. He said "It seems that KOISO is trying to show off in too many of the problems and he is bungling."

XX P 2573 - Emperor Berates ITAGAKI - 11 July 1939.

On the 6th, Foreign Minister ARITA and Minister of Overseas Affairs, KOISO, asked HARADA to come about 9 o'clock to the Kuwana so he went. ARITA said: "In this connection, diplomacy and everything else is impossible ---- The attitude of the Premier is very indecisive and this too is very distressing."

XX P 2575-76 - Emperor Berates ITAGAKI - 11 July 1939.

On the 8th, KOISO and ARITA were at Kuwana and asked HARADA to come about 9 so he went. ARITA said: "This Cabinet is no good. It won't last long!" Then HARADA said: "Although public opinion favors ARAKI and KOISO, recent rumors have it that KOISO.....is trying to show his position, tries to be noticed and this is not good. It may be that the opposing party says such things as a check because they are afraid KOISO should emerge as a Cabinet leader. According to rumors, General MINAMI, the Governor-General of Korea is no longer a candidate for Premier, and all his supporters are disappointed in him and are lending support to General KOISO. We must be very careful." ARITA was asking KOISO who there was as War Minister and KOISO was saying that TOJO is probably good. Then, ARITA said that KOISO is good in front of him and HARADA said that if you were to compare now, he thought ARAKI was much more popular.

XX P 2578 - Anti-British Demonstrations - 18 July 1939.

Anti-British demonstrations have become severe in anticipation of the Anglo-Japanese Conference in Tokyo on 15 July. HARADA in talking to KIDO was told by KIDO, "The other day, KOISO was saying this and that about the billboards and speeches so I told him not to worry about such things."

KIDO said the Kempai lead the demonstrations; the Army finances them and "we can't do anything about it." There were even rumors that the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) issues orders that it is permissible to have demonstrations if done in a legal manner.

ask Kido
*was these demonstrations with British
was they financed by the army -*

XX - P 2590 - ARAKI primed for Premier - 5 August 1939.

HARADA in conversing with KONOYE was told that ARAKI was acceptable as the next Premier. He said "it would be nice if ARAKI and KOISO could get together, but there is no alternative besides leaving things as they are now."

XX - P 2597 - ARAKI Primed for Premier - 5 August 1939.

ARAKI said he knew a lot about KOISO. He said KOISO was full of tricks. For instance, recently when the problem of legal tender arose at the Cabinet meeting he boldly said that we should use counterfeit. "This is very distressing." Also, KOISO previously sent the Kempei to China and Manchuria disguised as laborers when it is the aim of Japan to establish a new order basing in the principles of virtue. His actions are contradictory and very harmful. ARAKI said KOISO has power and enthusiasm, but he is a person without a set policy and can be easily swayed by trickery. HARADA thought it futile to try to unite ARAKI and KOISO.

XX P 2600 - Army Proposals Analyzed - 14 August 1939.

According to actual stories, KOISO met Craigie and they talked of cooperating with England in all respects. On the other hand, Lt. Colonel IWAKURO and men like him, who are attempting to overthrow the Cabinet with KOISO as their leader strongly insist on a military alliance with Germany and Italy.

XX P 2602 - Army Proposals Analyzed - 14 August 1939.

KIDO told HARADA that KOISO is doing this and that and it is very troublesome.

XXIII P 2832 - ARITA Elucidates - 22 May 1940.

SAIONJI met KOBAYASHI, Governor-General of Formosa on 21 May 1940 who told him he had met KOISO, Minister of Overseas Affairs, the Premier and Foreign Minister and they all told him to stay on and "do not resign now for it will be very troublesome."

XXIV P 2907 - Four Ministers Decision and Shimpeitai Incident - 19 August 1940.

When it was proposed to send KOISO to the Dutch East Indies as a special envoy he put a condition on it. He wanted permission to go on a battleship, KONOYE said, and in case an emergency arises, can he fire and destroy them. He said he cannot accept unless this condition was recognized. Since the firing of a gun is a serious thing, both the Army and Navy hesitates in approving it.

XXIV - P 2911

KIDO said about MATSUOKA: "When MATSUOKA attempted to send KOISO as special envoy to the Netherlands East Indies, the newspapers got ahold of the story. Because it leaked out, German Ambassador OTT in grave concern, hurriedly came over. The leakage was accidental, but from OTT's action, it was a great feat in discovering Germany's counterplan regarding this. It was an accidental achievement. It was even mentioned to the Emperor but he only laughed."

XXIV P 2915 - KOISO Disagrees with MATSUOKA - 1 September 1940.

KONOYE said "It was very good that the current trip of General KOISO was cancelled. However, KOISO's attitude is very suspicious. There are numerous mysterious aspects concerning the attitude of Military Affairs Bureau Chief MUTO. I concluded that this was an all out effort to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet, ----KOISO's attitude is very queer.

XXIV P 2958 - KONOYE and State Councillors - 4 October 1940.

ARAKI told KONOYE that he had been treated well with appointments. That TATEKAWA, KOISO and others of other circles, have also been appointed ambassadors and ministers too. Therefore, he desired to have General MAZAKI appointed State Councillor instead of himself. He told KONOYE that the officials in Army circles on the whole are being engulfed in the Communist movement and to effectuate the unification of the Army "it is necessary to have someone that is from our circle."

D. N. Sutton

Koiso No 1

216.

30 October 1947

Re: Exhibit No. 2214 (R. 15,815)
Statement by Prosecution

The Prosecution has made an investigation to determine whether or not the translator's note, which appears in Exhibit No. 2214 at page 15,817 lines 14 to 16 of the transcript, was correct. The translator's note recites that the word KOISO should be substituted for ARITA.

Our investigation has disclosed that the translator's note is erroneous, that the word ARITA appearing on line 14, page 15,817 of the Record is correct and that the portion of Exhibit No. 2214 which begins on line 14, page 15,817 with the words, "Japan was convinced ARITA emphasized...." and continuing to the end of the exhibit is the report of a speech made by ARITA and no part of this portion of the exhibit should be attributed to KOISO.

KOISO - ORDER OF PROOF

FORWARD: On Exhibit 2214 and Proceedings for 21 January 1947 (R 15814)

An ^{investigation} examination has been conducted by Prosecution in connection with Exhibit 2214 to determine whether that portion of the exhibit which refers to remarks purportedly made by Arita were in fact made by Koiso, as is suggested by the translator's note. The result of this investigation conclusively shows that the portion of Exhibit 2214 which commences; "Japan was convinced, Arita emphasized" and continuing to the end of the exhibit, is material from a speech made by Arita, and the same should not be attributed to Koiso.

Koiso No 2

29 October 1947

Re: TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika
Def. Doc. #2043 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to this affidavit on the ground that it is repetitive. This witness, when he testified before the Tribunal, was cross-examined at length on the same subjects that appear in the present affidavit. His cross-examination is found at pages 1443 - 1449 of the Record.

D. N. Sutton

Koiso no 3

29 October 1947

Re: Affidavit of HIYOSHI, Takehiko
Def. Doc. No. 2560 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 3, being lines 4 and 5 on page 3, beginning with the words, "the expenditures". Objection is also made to the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph on page 3 beginning with the word, "therefore" and to the entire last paragraph of the affidavit on the grounds that these are statements of opinion and conclusions.

D. N. Sutton

Koiso No 4

29 October 1947

Re: IWAKURO, Takeo
Def. Doc. #2567 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to and moves the Tribunal to strike out the following portions of this affidavit:

- (1) All of Section 3 of the affidavit which appears on pages 2 and 3, except the first paragraph thereof.

The reference to General TATEKAWA's mission in the second paragraph of Section 3 is, we respectfully submit, repetitive and belongs in the General Phase. The statement in the rest of this section as to Japan's military equipment in 1931 is immaterial, does not prove whether or not Japan was planning aggressive war and if it were pertinent would belong in the General Phase.

- (2) Objection is made to all of Section 4, pages 3 and 4 of the affidavit on the ground that if pertinent it would belong in the General Phase and it contains nothing especially applicable to the defendant KOISO. What this witness learned from Col. Ando's address, recited in the second paragraph of Section 4, and what steps this witness took to increase funds for supplies, as recited in the last paragraph of Section 4, are quite immaterial.

- (3) All of Section 7, pages 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit, are objected to on the ground that this evidence of alleged banditry and steps taken to secure peace and order if proper would belong in the General Phase. In the last paragraph of this section, the witness gives his opinions and conclusions concerning the views of the defendant KOISO, refers to his character and then negates his discussion with the final statement that, "The Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves."

- (4) All of the last paragraph of Section 9 of the affidavit, being that portion of Section 9 which appears on page 8 beginning with the words on the first line of page 8, "who was of the opinion" and continuing to the end of Section 9. The witness purports to give the opinion of the Army Commander who succeeded KOISO and then his own opinion as to the motive for action taken.
- (5) We object to the last sentence in Section 10 of the affidavit beginning with the words, "in reply to this" and continuing to the end of the affidavit, on the ground that the letter referred to therein is not produced nor the failure to produce it properly accounted for.

Since those portions of the affidavit to which objection is not made throw such little light on the issues before the Tribunal, we respectfully submit that the affidavit should be rejected in toto.

D. N. Sutton

Koiso no 5

29 October 1947

Re: TANAKA, Takeo
Def. Doc. 2564--Objections

The Prosecution objects to the affidavit in its entirety as containing primarily the conclusions and opinions of this witness and as containing statements not within the purview of the knowledge of this witness and on the ground that it is repetitive.

We particularly object to the following:

1. Section 1, pp. 2-4, of the affidavit in which the witness seeks to elucidate Koiso's attitude toward the Tri-Partite alliance and southern expansion.

In the second paragraph of this section, at the top of p. 3, the witness recites the private opinion of Koiso.

2. In section 2 of the affidavit, p. 4, the witness purports to describe the state of mind of Koiso.

This section is written sometimes in the singular and sometimes in the plural.

Whether the parts under A and B of section 2 on pp. 5 and 6 are the statements of the witness or of Koiso or quotations from some other source it is impossible to tell.

Division A of section 2 on page 5 purports to be a quotation of principles. The source is not given.

In the first paragraph of division A the pronouns used are "we" and "us." Near the end of the second paragraph the third person "he" is used. There is no way of ascertaining to whom these pronouns refer.

In division B of section 2 on pages 5 and 6 which still appears in quotation marks the third person "he" is used and yet the paragraph begins with quotation marks.

Near the end of the first paragraph on page 6 the witness purports to give the thoughts and intentions and hopes presumably of Koiso.

3. Section 4, pp. 8-11, contains opinions and conclusions of the witness and is argumentative.

It purports to quote but the source is not given.

The last two paragraphs of the section are especially argumentative.

4. Section 5 is argumentative and irrelevant in so far as it tries to explain the meaning of a speech alleged to have been made by Koiso.

5. In section 7 the witness describes the personality of General Koiso and this is objected to as character evidence and the statements therein concerning racial discrimination are immaterial to any issue involved in this case.

It is respectfully submitted that there is so little of the affidavit which is free from substantial objection that it should be rejected in toto.

D. N. SUTTON

Koiso no 6

October 29, 1947

Re: PIGGOTT, F. S. G.
Defense Doc. #2213 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to the second sentence in the second paragraph of this affidavit which purports to give the belief of the witness as to why KOISO retired from the Army and is opinion evidence.

The Prosecution also objects to the next to the last paragraph of the affidavit as purely character evidence.

D. N. Sutton

Koiso no 7

30 October 1947

Re: Def. Doc. #22491--Objections

The Prosecution objects to this document on the ground that it is immaterial and irrelevant to any of the issues involved in this case. Had the document been pertinent, it should have been tendered in the General Phase. The Tribunal has heretofore rejected evidence tending to prove the circumstances surrounding the use of the atomic bomb, R. 17,655-17,662.

Copy
Prof. Kiyoshi's Cross-examination
Question 139
Question

十三、貴方ハ貴方ハ宣誓曰僕書ニ大川ガ貴
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I. KOISO'S ACTIVITIES AS DIRECTOR OF
MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU - 21 August
1930 to 29 February 1932

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- 21 August 1930 KOISO was assigned as Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, and as Chief Secretary of Supreme War Council. - Ex. 114; R. 733
- 15 March 1931 KOISO, TATEKAWA, OKAWA and others were implicated in the March 15th Incident. KOISO had become intimate with OKAWA whose purposes were to promote positive action by the army and to reconstruct the national life of Japan in an economic union with Manchuria. To accomplish this they planned to overthrow the Diet and set up a new political power centered around the Army. - Ex. 1908; R. 15556
Ex. 179F; R. 1926
Ex. 2177A; R. 15583-6
R. 15575-8
- July 1931 KOISO attended a meeting of the Board of Directors of South Manchurian Railway, at which MINAMI stated he desired more troops in Korea.- Ex. 2202A; R. 15752
- 1 August 1931 KOISO promoted to Lieut. Gen. - Ex. 114; R. 733
- 18 Sept 1931 Mukden Incident occurred. - R. 1693; 1719; 3018-23
TATEKAWA arrived at Mukden with instructions from the Army. - Ex. 245; R. 3018-9
- 19 Sept 1931 KOISO was appointed liaison by MINAMI to represent War Ministry in a conference with the General Staff to determine a policy re Manchurian Incident.
- Defence Ex. 2435; R. 19780
- October 1931 KOISO was implicated in the October Incident which was a conspiracy to consummate the abortive March Incident. - R. 2187; 15560-77
- 7 Nov 1931 Policy of Japanese Government was to let the Kwantung Army have its way and "set up a puppet on the post". (Telegram from OHASHI to SHIDEHARA).
- Ex. 700; R. 7505
- 30 Nov 1931 KWANTUNG Army policy was to establish a new regime in Manchuria and Mongolia and a new country under Japanese influence, overthrow the Chinchow regime and establish Japanese Government's fundamental policies in connection with the Army's movement. - Ex. 700; R. 7505
- 24 Dec 1931 KOISO was designated a representative for matters under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry in the 60th session of the Imperial Diet. - Ex. 114; R. 733
~~Ex~~

II. ACTIVITIES WHILE VICE WAR MINISTER

- 29 Feb 1932 KOISO appointed Vice War Minister. - Ex. 114; R. 733
- 9 March 1932 Pu-yi installed as Regent of Manchuria. - ~~Ex~~ R. 2795
- 11 April 1932 Cabinet action taken to secure national control over industries in Manchuria. - Ex. 223; R. 2825-7

- 15 May 1932 KOISO participated in the May Incident. - R. 15565; 15581-2
- 17 May 1932 KOISO's view that HIRANUMA be the next Premier was discussed by KIDO and KONOYE. HIRANUMA was the first President of Kokuhonsha, "Foundation-of-State Society", which was related to the "Black Dragon" in which KOISO was a member. - Ex. 164; R. 1636
- 4 July 1932 KOISO while Vice War Minister received ¥ 20,000 out of Manchurian Incident funds; also ¥ 18,500. - Ex. 2210-11; R. 15809-10

III. KOISO AS CHIEF OF STAFF, KWANTUNG ARMY - 8 August 1932

KOISO was assigned as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; he also was appointed Executive of the Special Service Department of the Kwantung Army. - Ex. 114; R. 733

- 3 Nov 1932 KOISO recommended a policy for guidance of Manchukuo to Vice War Minister, which provided that Japanese official must control the substance while Manchukuoan officials "shall outwardly assume charge of the administration as much as possible". - Ex. 230; R. 2904
- 3 Nov 1932 KOISO recommended the open door policy for Manchukuo "for the time being". - R. 2907
- 1933 At beginning of the year 1933, the battle of Shanhaikwan was started, the key points along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkow fell into Japanese hands. - Ex. 192A; R. 2269
- 22 Feb 1933 Japanese Army gave a 24-hour ultimatum to Chinese stating that Jehol was not Chinese territory and that Chinese forces be withdrawn. - ~~Ex~~ R. 2270
- 2 March 1933 Jehol fell. - R. 2270
- 1933 to 1935 Conspiracies to oust Chinese from Hopei and Chahar. - R. 2701
- Prior to 1935 when the Opium Control Board was set up, the Mukden Special Service Organization of the Kwantung Army was in charge of opium. - R. 15856-7
- 5 March 1934 KOISO received ¥ 1,970,000 out of Secret Manchurian Incident Funds as Chief of Staff for his Army. - Ex. 2213; R. 15812

IV. HIS ACTIVITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF KOREAN ARMY - 2 Dec 1935 to 15 July 1938

- 5 March 1934 KOISO was assigned as Commanding General of the 5th Division. - Ex. 114; R. 733

- 29 April 1934 Decorated for meritorious services in the 1931-1934 affair.
- KOISO was assigned as Commanding General Korean Army. While acting as such, the Japanese established Korea as a military base for an attack on the USSR. - Ex. 724-729; R. 7587-92
- 27 October 1937 KOISO was concerned with violation of the Nine Power Pact. - R. 16218
- 6 May 1939 KOISO declared that Japan was definitely bound to Germany. - Ex. 500; R. 6093
- 9 May 1939 KOISO in speaking on Domei Radio urged strengthening of the Anti Comintern Pact. - Ex. 2214; R. 15817
- 16 Jan 1940 to 22 July 1940 Overseas Minister in YONAI Cabinet. - Ex. 114; R. 734
- 11 May 1940 Japanese Foreign Office officially declared that the status quo in Netherlands should not be changed, despite the fact that war had spread to the Netherlands. - Ex. 1285; R. 11674-6
- May 1940 German Ambassador explained to Japanese Government that Germany was not interested in Netherlands Indies. This was considered as a "carte blanche" for Japan. - Ex. 517-9; R. 11698-9
- 20 May 1940 Further demands made by Japan on Netherlands. - Ex. 1309A; R. 11787-9
- 2 Feb 1940 While KOISO was overseas Minister Japan's first note containing demands on the Netherlands East Indies was delivered under which Japan would virtually have unrestricted economic privileges in Netherlands. Ex. 1309A; R. 11780-2
- 17 March 1940 KOISO spoke before Joint Conference of Committee of Accounts ~~75th Session~~ 75th Session of Diet recommending a two-fold policy of having the South Pacific as well as the North as the objective of Japan. Ex. 2215; R. 15819
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- V. KOISO AS OVERSEAS MINISTER - 7 April 1939 to 30 August 1939 and 16 June 1940 to 22 July 1940
- KOISO was Overseas Minister in HIRANUMA Cabinet. - Ex. 114; R. 734
- 15 April 1940 ARITA, Foreign Minister urged that status quo in Netherlands be preserved. - R. 11671-3
- 17 April 1940 The United States called attention to the four power treaty of 13 Dec 1921 under which all signatories were bound to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands. - R. 11674

- 10 June 1940 Japanese Foreign Minister quoted by U.S. Ambassador to Japan as asserting that Japan entertains no territorial ambitions in Netherlands and any suspicion that Japan intended to proceed against the Netherlands was entirely unjustified. Ex. 1014; R. 11685-6
- 24 June 1940 Ott, German Ambassador, reported that KOISO had inquired from him, what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies. - Ex. 523; R. 11699
- 27 June 1940 The U.S. proposed an agreement between Japan and America for maintenance of status quo in the Pacific. Japanese Foreign Minister concluded that it would "be inadvisable at this time to have Japan's activities including those in the Netherlands, restricted....." - Ex. 1294; R. 11708-9
- 12 and 16 July 1940 Army, Navy and Foreign office authorities of Japan in joint conference, discussed extensively Japan's attitude forward the southern regions and Japan's future domination of these areas. - Ex. 527-8; R. 11699

VI. KOISO AS GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KOREA -
29 May 1942 to 22 July 1944

KOISO was Governor General of Korea. - Ex. 114; R. 735

Japan's military forces had increased to about 1,000,000 in Manchuria by January 1, 1942. - Ex. 706; R. 7531

The presence of such a vast military force in Manchuria was because the North (USSR) as well as the South (the Indies and Java and other countries) were the objectives of KOISO and other controlling forces in Japan. - Ex. 2215; R. 15830

- 13 August 1942 British POW arrived in Korea and were publicly paraded and degraded. KOISO as Governor General implicitly consented to this treatment. - ~~Ex~~ R. 14522

VII. KOISO AS PREMIER FROM 22 July 1944
to 7 April 1945

- 22 July 1944* KOISO became Premier. - R. 11379
- July 1944 KOISO was instructed by the Emperor to accomplish the East Asia War and not to irritate the Soviet. - R. 11384
- 7 September 1944 KOISO in a speech before the 85th session of the Diet promised "future" independence to the Netherlands. This was a false promise made to induce utmost efforts by the Netherlands people in Japan's behalf. - R. 11666
- He also advocated destroying America and Britain. - R. 3704

The real plan of Japan was to grasp "real power in

the Dutch East Indies"; - R. 11728

Also to place the Straits Settlement under the direct control of Japan; - R. 11725

Also to compel the Netherlands to lease to Japan important places from a military standpoint; - R. 11727

Also get real power in British territories. - R. 11728

KOISO's policy was the realization of the plan agreed upon by Army and Navy Imperial HQ on 16 April 1941 "to occupy bases in the Southern part of French Indo China needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies". - R. 11753

Such action was to be taken by force if economic negotiations with the Netherlands failed. - R. 11755

Feb 1945 Japanese Government on a pretext that French Indo China was "lacking in sincerity" in respect to joint defense by Japanese military forces, divested French Indo-China of all semblance of sovereignty following a 6 hour ultimatum to place all French Indo China military forces under Japan's command jointly with French Indo China. - Ex. 661; R. 7165

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K O I S O

I

The point I desire to make is that KOISO at the time of the March incident, by reason of his background, experience, and official position, knew or should have known that OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet in March 1931 was not a proper matter to be brought before him in his official capacity and was likewise not a proper matter to be examined by any of KOISO's subordinates, or by the Minister of War, and KOISO's action in connection with OKAWA's plan indicates a close connection between KOISO and the conspirators.

1. Col. Fixel for the Prosecution desires to cross-examine the defendant KOISO.
2. Were you a director at one time of the Kokuhonsha Society. *what is our center or 2-7*
3. When did you hold such office and for how long.
4. Is it not true that HIRANUMA one of the defendants was a President of Kokuhonsha.
5. Was not ARAKI a director.
6. Were not the purposes of the Kokuhonsha mainly to foster the spirit of nationalism, to bolster the foundations of the State and to exalt the national spirit.
7. Was not this organization in close touch with military circles. (R. 1636, Exh. 164) *(?)*
8. Were you not also a member of the Sakura Kai.
9. Is it not true that the Sakura Kai had as its main objective the renovation of the government of Japan by force if necessary and also the extension of Japan's territory by use of military force. *what is our center*
10. Did you not maintain that a war condition outside Japan was necessary to the accomplishment of internal reform (Brocade Banner p. 66). *(?)*
11. In the early part of January 1931, did you discuss ways and means concerning measures for reforming Japan with Gen. UGAKI, Gen. SUGIYAMA, Gen. YAMAWAKI, Gen. NINOMYA, Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. NEMOTO. *we cannot use this*
12. Did you know in January 1931, that Gen. UGAKI had made a decision to launch into the political world and organize a Cabinet.
13. Did you assist in making, or agree to a decision by the supporters of Gen. UGAKI, that military force might be used in connection with the appearance of Gen. UGAKI in the political field.
14. Did you know that senior officers were to draw a program and policies for the future state and that lesser grade officers were to make plans to seize the reins of the government.
15. Is it true that there was a plan to bomb the headquarters of the Seiyu and Minsei parties and the official residence of the Prime Minister, and that Dr. OKAWA would mobilize 10,000 persons in a demonstration towards the Parliament, after which, troops were to encircle the Parliament by making an emergency call on the pretext of protecting the Diet, after which you or Gen. TATEKAWA and another general were to enter the House and declare that the nation did not confide in the present Cabinet, but only confided in a Cabinet with Gen. UGAKI as its Premier (IPS Doc. 1402-A) (Vol. 1 Saionji, p. 25-26).

16. Did OKAWA present a plan to you early in March 1931, contemplating the overthrow of the Cabinet by bombing the Diet.
17. Did you examine OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet.
18. Did you object to OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet.
19. What did you consider objectionable in his plan.
20. Did you tell OKAWA that the execution of an improper plan always requires a good many unnecessary victims.
21. Did you believe that OKAWA's plan lacked consistency.
22. Did you show OKAWA's plan to Col. NAGATA, Tetsuzn, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau.
23. Did you direct Col. NAGATA to examine OKAWA's plan for its consistency.
24. Did you consider OKAWA's plan adoptable.
25. If you did not approve the adoptability or the execution of OKAWA's plan, why did you desire to have the consistency of the plan determined by Col. NAGATA.
26. Was a plan to bomb the Diet a proper matter of business to be presented by you to the War Minister.
27. Was such a plan a proper matter to be considered for consistency or adoptability by subordinates in your Bureau.
28. Was OKAWA's plan to create an incident in March 1931, within the scope of work assigned to you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.
29. Prior to receiving Col. NAGATA's opinion on OKAWA's plan, did you discuss the OKAWA plan with Gen. UGAKI at his residence.
30. Did you go to Gen. UGAKI's residence solely for the purpose of discussing OKAWA's plan to overthrow the Cabinet.
31. Did you take along with you your original pencil notations outlining the plan.
32. Did you deliver those pencil notations to Gen. UGAKI.
33. Did you tell Gen. UGAKI that you had directed Col. NAGATA to examine the consistency of the OKAWA plan and that you had not yet received Col. NAGATA's answer.