

Doc. #2016

Vol. 16

5

Congress of the United States

---

Report of Proceedings

---

Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

---

December 5, 1945

Washington, D. C.

---

Pages: 2587 to 2761

NATIONAL {4266  
4267  
4268

WARD & PAUL  
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)  
OFFICIAL REPORTERS  
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.



SHACK (1)  
AL-1

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Wednesday, December 5, 1945

- - -

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Brewster and Ferguson

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 General Gerow, will you be sworn, please.

4 TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW

5 (Having been duly sworn by the Chairman)

6 The Chairman: Is counsel ready to proceed?

7 Mr. Mitchell: I want to make a short statement to the  
8 committee which I think may help it in connection with the  
9 next two or three witnesses, including General Marshall.

10 Calling General Marshall out of turn of course upset our  
11 order of proof, and we are bringing up some matters now which  
12 we had not intended to present to the committee until sometime  
13 later.

14 One, I think, is the story of the so-called "Winds"  
15 message, and the other is the detailed record in handling,  
16 analytically, and so on, what is known as the 14th part of the  
17 message which came in on December 6th and 7th.

18 Our order of proof originally was for taking those things  
19 up as a special order of proceeding. We intended to call all  
20 our witnesses on that at one time, and in advance of General  
21 Marshall's testimony.

22 Now that he is coming on he will have to be asked about  
23 that.

24 My statement is intended to sort of orient the committee  
25 as to what we know about the situation, so that they will

1  
2 understand the testimony and be better equipped to do something  
3 about it until General Marshall comes in.

4 Now the first thing is this "Winds" message. That is a  
5 sort of a romantic term I want to report now just generally  
6 what the state of the inquiry is in regard to the "Winds"  
7 message, so the committee will understand.

8 The winds message, originally the winds code, which is  
9 found on page 154 of the diplomatic intercepts, Exhibit 1, I  
10 want to call the attention of the committee to the fact at  
11 the start that if the Japanese had used that method of communi-  
12 cation and we had intercepted their diplomatic message what  
13 you would have learned was that the diplomatic relations be-  
14 tween the United States and Japan were in danger, and that  
15 instructions had to be given to burn the code.

16 My first reaction to the winds message was, if we had  
17 intercepted it, we would have had little more than we had  
18 already, because we knew our diplomatic relations were in  
19 danger and we knew they had given orders to burn the code.  
20 So my original reaction was there was much ado about nothing  
21 in the winds message.

22 But passing that I want to also call to the attention of  
23 the committee the fact that the code, as set up by its very  
24 terms, provides:

25 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our

1  
2 diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of inter-  
3 national communications, the following warning will be  
4 added in the middle of the daily Japanese language  
5 shortwave news broadcast:"

6 That shows on its face that the Japs only set this method  
7 up for an emergency system, in case they could not use the  
8 ordinary means of communication.

9 Now the proof already shows that they were using the ordi-  
10 nary means of communication right up to the attack on Pearl  
11 Harbor. So the question arises at once whether they did send  
12 out those messages.

13 Heretofore all the assumptions have been that they did,  
14 and there has been an inquiry by the other Boards as to who  
15 received them and what was done with them

16 Now we have made a plan to dig out all the facts on that,  
17 and I just want to report the present status of that.

18 In the first place, in our effort to find out whether the  
19 message ever was sent we have already the FCC report from one  
20 of the best monitoring stations, we have the exact report from  
21 them as to just what they picked up. That report was that one  
22 of the messages picked up on the 4th of December by the Japanese  
23 listener on the FCC station, which he picked up because it  
24 resembled, - did not exactly comply with the code but resembled  
25 the code, had the statement in it, "North wind cloudy", which

1  
2 meant war with Russia and not with the United States and  
3 Great Britain, and that we can talk about as the false winds  
4 message, which was probably a real broadcast and not a code  
5 broadcast, and caused, of course, confusion among witnesses  
6 as to whether they ever saw the message or not.

7 We also had from the FCC the report that on the afternoon  
8 of December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the  
9 ordinary means of international communication had been closed,  
10 a winds message was received. That message said nothing about  
11 "East wind rain", which meant war with the United States, be-  
12 cause that was already known all over the world, but it did  
13 use the expression which meant war with England.

14 That is the message received by the FCC after the attack  
15 on Pearl Harbor, and was an implementing message to warn the  
16 Japanese people abroad that they were about to have war with  
17 Great Britain.

18 The next thing we did was to inquire from the Dutch and  
19 British and Australia, through the State Department, as to  
20 whether either of those nations had any record of intercepting,  
21 prior to December 7, an implementing message which said "East  
22 wind rain", which meant war with the United States. We heard  
23 from the Australians and they say no, they did not. We have  
24 not yet had our report from the Dutch and British.

25 Now we also had sent to General MacArthur some time ago

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

a request that he endeavor to find from the Japanese, from their records, whether they ever sent a winds implementing message prior to December 7. The report from General MacArthur is that the Japs say they sent none out until the afternoon of December 7, which covers this implementing message they sent out which we intercepted, the FCC intercepted, showing a warning of war with Great Britain.

That report, for whatever it is worth, did not indicate that the Japs sent out any messages other than those picked up by the FCC.

Now we also have had communications from and have been busy bringing here witnesses from every one of the monitoring stations, witnesses who were in the stations during the critical period November 28 to December 7, and witnesses who were present at the stations at the time, and those witnesses will be here and we will find out all they know about the situation.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1

hl  
fls  
AL

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Larry  
fls

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, there is just one other point about the winds message. There has been a statement to the effect that there was a message numbered 7001 in the Navy files. The tab in it shows the number is cancelled, and there is no message in there. It has been thought that this missing 7001 was a winds message. The Navy reports, which are quite voluminous, in their search and effort to find what 7001 was, shows, among other things, that if the winds message had ever been received, it is not the type of message that would have been put in the file with the serial numbers which 7001 would require, for the simple reason that they filed under 7001 only coded intercepts.

Of course, this was in Japanese broadcasting language and would not have been put in that file, if it had ever been received.

Now, that is as far as we have gone up to date with the winds message, and as long as we are to have General Marshall, I thought we ought to have a review of the situation.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I don't understand, do I, from counsel that he is intending this morning to determine what the evidence will show, or what his opinion of certain evidence in other hearings is?

Do I understand that you are passing upon what the evidence will be?

h2

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I am trying to explain to the  
3 committee what kind of witnesses we are going to call, and  
4 what the result of our present inquiry has been. If I have  
5 expressed any opinion about the weight of the evidence, I  
6 didn't intend to.

7 Senator Ferguson: You don't wish to convey to the  
8 committee the weight of any of this evidence?

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I have my opinion about the weight  
10 of the evidence, and if it has crept out in this hearing,  
11 why, I don't think I need to apologize.

12 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, you do not wish  
13 to express to the committee what you think about the weight  
14 of the evidence?

15 Mr. Mitchell: I don't know what you understand. My  
16 words speak for themselves. As I stated, I am trying to  
17 report to the committee what the situation is. That is my  
18 only object.

19 The Chairman: As the Chair understands, counsel is,  
20 in a sense, forecasting for the benefit of the committee  
21 what the testimony will be.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

23 Now, I want to turn to the 1 p.m., and 14th part  
24 messages.

25 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire

1  
2 whether there will be any conflict on this winds message,  
3 that it did come in?

4 Mr. Mitchell: There was a great deal of conflict, as you  
5 know, among various witnesses called before the other Boards  
6 of Inquiry as to whether they saw a message of that kind. Great  
7 conflict with it. And that is one reason I was anxious to get  
8 at the root of the matter and find out whether the message was  
9 really sent or not. I don't understand that there is any con-  
10 flict about anything I have told you except I haven't yet  
11 talked to the witnesses who had charge of the monitoring stations  
12 and I don't know what they are going to say about ever having  
13 received it, or anything they have to say about the destruction  
14 of their records.

15 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel when it is  
16 contemplated that the testimony with respect to the winds  
17 message will be submitted to the committee?

18 Mr. Mitchell: As soon as this inquiry is complete. Our  
19 original plan, Mr. Congressman, as our record shows, submitted  
20 on November 2, called for the story of the winds message pretty  
21 well down the line, and a great many witnesses before it, and  
22 the only reason I bring it up now out of order is because  
23 General Marshall has been advanced and that has upset our  
24 schedule. But it is hard for me to predict with certainty  
25 when the witnesses will be called because I can't tell how

1  
2 long the examination of each witness is going to be.

3 We intend to, as soon as we can get around to it, and  
4 just as soon as it is ready, we will bring in all the witnesses  
5 that bear on the winds message and make a special order of it  
6 and give you everything we have. The only reason I am bringing  
7 it up today is to report on the extent and direction of our  
8 inquiry and what it relates to. And the things I stated as  
9 to what the record shows that we have already got are not in  
10 dispute so far as I can see.

11 Mr. Keefe: Of course, Mr. Chairman, you would expect a  
12 member of the committee to give consideration to the testimony  
13 when it comes in and the weight to be given to it is a matter  
14 for determination when the testimony is in.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Of course.

16 Mr. Keefe: Any conclusions to be drawn must necessarily  
17 await the conclusion of the introduction of all of the testimony  
18 relating to this subject.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, have I said anything to  
20 the contrary this morning?

21 Mr. Keefe: I make that statement because there seems to  
22 be an impression that your own conclusions are already formed  
23 in certain aspects of the situation, and while that may be  
24 proper, yet I think you would concede that as a member of this  
25 committee I should be compelled to await any conclusions on it

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

until the testimony is all in. That would be proper, would it not?

Mr. Mitchell: I haven't any question about it. If you really want to know what my present impression is, for what it is worth, I confess that on the state of the inquiry up to date I have very, very grave doubts whether the Japs ever sent out a winds implementing message prior to the afternoon of December 7, but that is a matter for the committee to decide when they hear all of the proof, and I didn't intend to express an opinion that the committee would have to accept. I was just trying to give you a picture of our inquiry up to date so you would know.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Mr. Keefe: So it will not be necessary to cross-examine General Miles or General Gerow, or anybody else, with respect to their knowledge of this winds message now. The whole subject, if they have any testimony to give on the subject, or were in any way interested and can produce any proof, that will be submitted at the time you take up the winds message?

Mr. Mitchell: That is the way I would like to have it, but General Miles was already asked about the winds message, as I understand it, yesterday morning, although I wasn't here.

Mr. Keefe: I think only just a few questions.

Mr. Mitchell: Was that all?

Mr. Keefe: At the end of his testimony, yes.

Mr. Mitchell: It is quite agreeable to me to leave the winds message out of the picture as far as these two Generals are concerned, but not General Marshall, because we won't have him back. So what he knows about it the committee will want to ask him about. That is the reason I made this statement, so you would be able to frame your questions in the light of the report as to how far our investigation has gone and what questions we have sought to resolve.

Mr. Keefe: You referred to a communication from General MacArthur this morning.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: I understand you have such a communication.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Has the committee been supplied with it?

Mr. Mitchell: No, we haven't given you any of those documents, I have been told, but we were planning to do that well in advance of our proof about the winds message. You see, General Marshall is coming and I wanted you to know what we had. If you want to look at anything we have up to date before General Marshall is called you may.

Mr. Keefe: Will the committee be furnished copies of this before tomorrow?

Mr. Mitchell: Well, you see General Marshall's inquiry has been advanced so rapidly, it has so disarranged it, that we haven't had time to have these reports mimeographed. I have only one copy. If you would like to have the information up to date on it I will try and have it mimeographed. But I tried to tell you in a general way what these documents consist of.

The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask counsel whether after General Marshall's testimony, and such information as we may get from him with reference to the winds message, in view of his early departure and his probable absence during the rest of the hearings, is it then planned to go back as far as possible on to the original schedule and deal with the winds message, subject to, of course, General Marshall's testimony?

Mr. Mitchell: Precisely. Of course, our winds message

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

inquiry isn't complete. When I get reports from the British and the Dutch as to whether they received the message or not, why, if they say they did I would recast my doubts about it ever having been sent. I am not in a position to express any opinion on it as yet.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Mitchell: The other thing I wanted to call attention to was the so-called 14 part and 1:00 p.m. messages. Before General Marshall was supposed to be called we had intended to call all the basic witnesses to show the exact routing of those messages and how they were handled and the hours it was done and what was done. That might take us a week, to call those witnesses, or more. So we have to go on with General Marshall leading up to that subject and we haven't had an opportunity to present that proof.

Now, there are one or two things I have which I hoped would aid the committee. One of those things is the document which has been distributed this morning in mimeograph entitled "Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages No. 901, 902, 907, 910." That is the 14 part and 1:00 p.m. messages. The pilot message that came in. And the code burning message afterward.

This document which I am going to offer in evidence now, for whatever use the committee wants to make of it, will be



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Exhibit 41.

The Vice Chairman: It is this one (indicating)?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. Prepared by the Army and Navy and is understood to state in detail all the information as to the handling of these messages. That is a matter of documentary proof, of course. They haven't attempted to put in any information that depended on recollection or memory of a witness.

So you find the history of the detailed handling of the 14th part message and the 1:00 p.m. message as far as documentary support of the routing is contained in this exhibit. And as to each part of the message.

The committee will remember that 13 parts were discussions by the Japs as to our position and the 14th part was the part of the message in which they said they had broken off negotiations. And the 1:00 p.m. message which followed was the message requiring or directing Ambassadors to deliver their message at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 7.

Hook  
follows

hl  
fls  
al

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Also, on this Exhibit 41 you will find there are references on the margin to exhibit pages on which the text of the parts, various parts appear.

The Chairman: That refers to the pages in Exhibit 1?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry about that of counsel?

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: On page 6, at the top of the page, page 6 of Exhibit 41, at the top, will you have a witness, or will you supply the information as to when each of those processes was completed?

Mr. Mitchell: Wherever there is a gap in the information shown on this, it means that there are no documents, and we will have to call witnesses. So that whenever you find a gap, and there are gaps, which you would like to fill, you will know we haven't the documents, but have to call witnesses and depend on their memory and recollection.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

The Chairman: This will be No. 41, and it is now before the committee as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, I just offered it.

The Chairman: All right.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2

(The document referred to was  
marked Exhibit No. 41.)

The Chairman: Thank you, counsel, for your explanation.

Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, will you state your present  
rank and station?

General Gerow: Leonard T. Gerow, Lieutenant General,  
station Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Mr. Mitchell: What are your duties at Fort Leavenworth?

General Gerow: I am in command of the post and also  
Commandant of the Command, and General Staff School.

Mr. Mitchell: Is that the principal general staff  
instruction point of the Army?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Were you in the War Plans Division in  
the War Department in 1941?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: When did you receive that assignment?

General Gerow: I reported, sir, in November, 1940,  
and left the War Plans Division in February, 1942.

Mr. Mitchell: You were head of the War Plans Division  
during that period?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, Assistant Chief of Staff of  
War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell: Had you had experience prior to that  
time in War Plans work?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h3

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

General Gerow: Yes, sir. I had served previously in the War Plans Division as Executive for War Plans Division, during the period, as I recall, the early part of 1935 to the early part of 1939, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: When you left the War Plans Division, what was your next command?

General Gerow: I was assigned to command the 29th Division, sir, at Fort Meade, Maryland.

Mr. Mitchell: And you had charge of training and the preparation of that division?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Infantry division?

General Gerow: I had complete command and trained the division as an infantry division.

Mr. Mitchell: What was your next move?

General Gerow: I took the division to England in October of 1942, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And remained in command how long?

General Gerow: Until approximately June 1943 when I was assigned to command the Fifth Corps.

Mr. Mitchell: The Fifth Corps?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: How many divisions in the Fifth Corps?

General Gerow: The number of divisions varied from

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 time to time. The average, I should say, was three divi-  
3 sions at that time, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Did you take your Fifth Corps into  
5 France?

6 General Gerow: Yes, sir. The Fifth Corps was one  
7 of the corps that was designated to assault the Normandy  
8 Beaches and the Fifth Corps landed on the Omaha Beach on  
9 D-Day, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: And how long did you remain in command  
11 of the Fifth Corps?

12 General Gerow: I remained in command of the Fifth  
13 Corps until January 16, as I recall, 1944, shortly after  
14 the Von Rünstedt break-through, when we started the counter-  
15 offensive. I was then assigned to command the 15th Army.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Have you ever been stationed in the  
17 Hawaiian Islands?

18 General Gerow: No, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: What were the functions of the War Plans  
20 Division in 1941.

21 General Gerow: Those functions, sir, are as stated  
22 in Army Regulations No. 10-15. If I may, I would like to  
23 read those.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. You may. Just a part of the  
25 regulations relating to the War Plans Division.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

1  
2 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3 I quote paragraph 12:

4 "War Plans Division, general duties:

5 "a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general,  
6 with those duties of the War Department General Staff which  
7 relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre  
8 of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction  
9 with the naval forces, in the national defense.

10 "b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged  
11 with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervi-  
12 sion of activities concerning --

13 "(1) Location and armament of coast and land  
14 fortifications;

15 "(2) Estimate of forces required and times at  
16 which they may be needed under the various possible  
17 conditions necessitating the use of troops in the  
18 national defense;

19 "(3) The initial strategical deployment (plans  
20 and orders for the movement of troops to execute the  
21 initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and  
22 Training Division);

23 "(4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;

24 "(5) Consultation with the Operations and Train-  
25 ing Division and the Supply Division on major items of

h6

equipment."

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division,  
1941, sir.

shf fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: I would like to offer in evidence now  
3 as exhibit 42 a copy of Army Regulations No. 10-15 dated  
4 August 18, 1936, which includes all amendments up to De-  
5 cember 7, 1941.

6 The Chairman: All amendments did you say?

7 Mr. Mitchell: It includes all amendments. It is an  
8 up-to-date copy of the Army Regulations, defining the War  
9 Department General Staff duties, each department. It not  
10 only relates to War Plans but to G-2 and gives a short pic-  
11 ture of the complete setup.

12 The Chairman: It will be filed as exhibit 42.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Each member of the committee has it.

14 The Chairman: Yes.

15 (The document referred to was  
16 marked Exhibit No. 42.)

17 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, do you remember that  
18 during the time you were in the War Plans Division there were  
19 certain conversations with the British with respect to a  
20 joint war plan in case the two nations were drawn into the  
21 war?

22 General Gerow: I do, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: That is called the ABC, which means  
24 American-British Conversations, does it?

25 General Gerow: That is correct, sir; ABC-1.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: ABC-1?

3 General Gerow: And there was an ABC-2.

4 Mr. Mitchell: That was also a British staff plan, was  
5 it, a joint plan with Britain?

6 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember whether during that time  
8 there were conversations between military officers of the  
9 United States and Canada with respect to a joint operation  
10 with Canada in case we were drawn into the war?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir, there were such conversations  
12 conducted.

13 Mr. Mitchell: And do you remember also that there was a  
14 similar conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far  
15 East between officers of the Army and Navy of the United  
16 States and with the British and Dutch, which resulted in a  
17 plan or recommendations made by that conference out there?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir, there was such a conference  
19 conducted.

20 Mr. Mitchell: I show you a document here which is en-  
21 titled, "American-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore,  
22 April 1941." You have seen that document, have you?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have seen this document.  
24 It is a report of the conversations at Singapore, sir, be-  
25 tween the Americans, Dutch and British.

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: Is that exhibit 43?

3 Mr. Mitchell: I haven't had it reproduced. If the  
4 committee want it, we can do it. It is an elaborate staff  
5 plan.

6 These plans, I might say, the British-Canadian and the  
7 one with the Dutch, Americans and British are brought up now  
8 with a view to ascertaining whether we can ascertain from  
9 them whether there was any commitment by the United States  
10 to engage in war with Japan, that is the purpose of it, but  
11 if the committee want it reproduced we will have that done.

12 Did you have anything to do with setting up the per-  
13 sonnel --

14 Mr. Keefe: Before you finish I personally would very  
15 much like, in view of General Marshall's previous testimony,  
16 I would like to have that exhibit made available.

17 Mr. Mitchell: We will have it mimeographed. You mean  
18 copies to each member of the committee?

19 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

21 The Chairman: Will the Congressman yield to his col-  
22 league?

23 Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if it would not be better  
24 to defer your request that it be reproduced until we see  
25 what significance there is to it and how much of it you might

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 need? Maybe only a portion of it would be necessary for  
3 the examination of General Marshall or maybe we could use  
4 the original.

5 Mr. Mitchell: The exhibit has been available for some  
6 time and it has been loaned out to one member of the commit-  
7 tee or another off and on, but we never have had it re-  
8 produced for all of them.

9 Mr. Keefe: That has always been the trouble, Mr.  
10 Counsellor, that when you ask for a thing it is always in  
11 the hands of some other member of the committee. Now, I  
12 would like to see that.

13 The Chairman: Well, if it is possible to have it all  
14 mimeographed the chair would suggest that it be done so that  
15 each member can be furnished a copy.

16 Mr. Mitchell: We will do that.

17 The Chairman: It is rather difficult to see it when  
18 any member gets it and keeps it for a while.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, my question, General, was whether  
20 you had anything to do with the assignment of United States  
21 Army or Navy officers to attend that conference at Singapore  
22 in April 1941?

23 General Gerow: The assignment was made, sir, by the  
24 Chief of Staff as I recall now, sir. The War Plans Division  
25 did make certain recommendations to the Chief of Staff with

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 regard to such assignment.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I notice that the document states that  
4 the representatives of the United States were Captain W. F.  
5 Purnell, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the Asiatic Fleet;  
6 Colonel A. C. McBride, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff of  
7 the United States Military Forces in the Philippines; Cap-  
8 tain A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy, United States Naval Observer  
9 at Singapore and Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Brink, U.S.A.,  
10 U. S. Military Observer at Singapore.

11 You think they were selected by the staff here, by the  
12 Navy and Army?

13 General Gerow: No, sir. I would like to change my  
14 statement with regard to that. I think the commanders out  
15 there were instructed to furnish suitable representatives for  
16 this conference; that is, the Naval and Army commanders out  
17 there, sir, the Commanding General of the Far East and the  
18 Commanding Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet. That is my recollec-  
19 tion at the moment.

20 Mr. Mitchell: On page 6 of this document I find under  
21 the head of "Introduction" the following statement:

22 "The following conditions apply:

23 "(a) State of war between Germany, Italy and  
24 Japan on one hand and British empire with its present  
25 allies and the United States of America, referred to

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 herein as associated powers, on the other.

3 "(b) No political commitment is implied.

4 "(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by  
5 the government concerned."

6 Now, is that the usual system that our Staff Plans  
7 had of making certain assumptions?

8 General Gerow: That is correct, sir. Practically all  
9 staff plans have as one of their initial provisions the as-  
10 sumptions under which the plan is drawn.

11 Mr. Mitchell: You called this "Conditions". Was  
12 that a British or American term?

13 General Gerow: That was a British term, sir. This  
14 paper was apparently handled largely by a British secretar-  
15 iat.

16 Mr. Mitchell: "Terms of Reference", it says. (Read-  
17 ing)

18 "(2) Prepare plan for conduct of military oper-  
19 ations in the Far East on the basis of report of Wash-  
20 ington conversation.

21 "(3) Particular points for agreement are:  
22 plan for employment and disposition of forces in the  
23 whole area Indian Ocean, Pacific, Australian and New  
24 Zealand waters before and after arrival of the Far East  
25 Fleet as agreed in Washington conversations and sum-

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 marized in Admiralty telegram 1848, of 4th of April.

3 "(b) Details of arrangements for cooperation,  
4 eg. communications, exchange of liaison officers."

5 You have examined this document thoroughly, have  
6 you?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, from your knowledge of War Plans  
9 and the system of getting up war plans, how would you char-  
10 acterize this? What is it?

11 General Gerow: It is a technical agreement between  
12 military personnel for the conduct of operations in the event  
13 that the powers referred to should become engaged in war.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did you find anything in the document to  
15 the effect that Captain Purnell or any of his associates  
16 had attempted to commit the United States to engage in war?

17 General Gerow: They had no authority to commit the  
18 United States to engage in war, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: What is meant by this term, "No poli-  
20 tical commitments and any agreement is subject to ratifica-  
21 tion by the government concerned"? Does that mean what it  
22 says?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir, exactly what it says.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Now, this document refers to British-  
25 American conversations and I will ask you to refer to an-

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 other staff plan I have here which is labeled "ABC- 1 and  
3 2." Have you examined this document?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: You are quite familiar with it, are you?

6 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: I notice this document, the first part  
8 of it, is dated March 27, 1941. That was prior to the Singa-  
9 pore meeting?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: It states that:

12 "The staff conversations were held in Washington  
13 from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941 between the  
14 United States staff committee representing the Chief of  
15 Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army  
16 and the United Kingdom delegation representing the  
17 Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff  
18 of the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand  
19 were associated with United Kingdom delegates during  
20 the course of these conversations but were not present  
21 at joint meetings."

22 It says that the United States representatives were  
23 Major General S. D. Embick; Brigadier General Sherman Miles;  
24 Brigadier General L. T. Gerow; Colonel J. T. McNarney; Rear  
25 Admiral R. L. Ghormley; Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; Captain

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 A. G. Kirk; Captain DeWitt C. Ramsey; Lieutenant Colonel  
3 C. T. Pfeiffer.

4 You yourself were a member of that delegation?

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: And took part in those conferences?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: And in framing this document?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: I notice that under the head of "Purpose"

11 it says:

12 "(a) To determine the best methods by which the  
13 armed forces of the United States and the British Com-  
14 monwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Ger-  
15 many and the powers allied with it should the United  
16 States be compelled to resort to war."

17 Without going through the details of this staff  
18 plan, is there anything in it, or was there any understand-  
19 ing reached or attempted to be reached that the United States  
20 would engage in war?

21 General Gerow: No, sir. Those were purely staff dis-  
22 cussions.

23 Mr. Mitchell: On assumptions that she might be drawn  
24 into war?

25 General Gerow: She might be compelled to resort to war,



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 yes, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have any authority on behalf of  
4 the United States to make any commitment that the United  
5 States would engage in war under any conditions?

6 General Gerow: We did not have such authority, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: This document then is entitled a "Re-  
8 port." To go to whom, - the Chiefs of Staff?

9 General Gerow: To be submitted initially to the Chiefs  
10 of Staff, yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Do you know whether this ABC-1 and 2  
12 were ever approved by higher authority in the United States?

13 General Gerow: My recollection, sir, is it was approved  
14 by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of War and the Sec-  
15 retary of the Navy.

16 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit an  
17 inquiry at that point, as to whether or not the question  
18 which you now relate, as I understand it, to the ABC agree-  
19 ments Nos. 1 and 2 having been approved by the Chiefs of Staff  
20 and the Secretaries of War and Navy, have you asked or will  
21 you ask the same question with respect to the other agreement,  
22 the ABCD agreement?

23 Mr. Mitchell: I should have done it before, but I was  
24 now getting to that.

25 I show you, General Gerow, copy of a memorandum taken

1911

Witness Geroa:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 from the files of the War Department, dated June 9, 1941,  
3 which appears to be signed by W. P. Scooby, Lieutenant Col-  
4 onel, General Staff Corps, Secretary of the Joint Board, and  
5 a letter dated June 2, 1941 preceding that, addressed to the  
6 President at the White House by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary  
7 of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.

8 I had better read those. They ought to go into the  
9 record.

10 The letter from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox to the Presi-  
11 dent, dated June 2, 1941, is as follows: (Reading)

12 "Dear Mr. President:

13 "The Joint Board has prepared Joint Army and Navy  
14 Basic War Plan -- Rainbow No. 5 which with the report  
15 of United States-British Staff Conversations concluded  
16 on March 27, 1941, we have approved, and now transmit  
17 them for your consideration, recommending your approval.  
18 Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan -- Rainbow No. 5  
19 is based upon agreements contained in the Report of  
20 United States-British Staff Conversations.

21 "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan -- Rainbow No.  
22 5 states the concept of war and provides for initial  
23 dispositions and operations of United States forces,  
24 should the United States associate in war with the  
25 Democracies against the totalitarian powers. As such

1812

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 it constitutes the basic directive for United States  
3 Army and Naval Forces in a war effort.

4 "The War and Navy Departments have been advised  
5 that the Report of United States-British Staff Conver-  
6 sations has been agreed to provisionally by the British  
7 Chiefs of Staff and that it has been submitted to the  
8 British Government for approval."

9 Now, the second document, a letter of June 9, 1941,  
10 or memorandum for the Chief of Staff, signed by Colonel  
11 Scobey, reads as follows:

12 "Subject: J.B. No. 325 (Serial 642-5) -- Joint  
13 Army and Navy Basic War Plan -- Rainbow  
14 No. 5 and Report of United States-  
15 British Staff Conversations -- ABC-1.

16 "The President on June 7, 1941 returned the two  
17 subject plans without approval. In explanation of the  
18 President's failure to approve or disapprove the plans,  
19 his Military Aide, Major General E. M. Watson, stated  
20 to the Undersigned in substance as follows:

21 "The President has familiarized himself with the  
22 two papers; but since the report of the United States  
23 British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been ap-  
24 proved by the British Government, he would not approve  
25 the report at this time; neither would he now give ap-

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2       proval to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan -- Rainbow  
3       No. 5, which is based upon the report ABC-1. However,  
4       in case of war the papers would be returned to The  
5       President for his approval.

6                               (Signed) W. P. SCOBEEY."

7               Now, you said that this ABC-1 had been approved  
8       by the two Secretaries. Did it ever get any farther than  
9       that, do you recollect, in the way of approval?

10       General Gerow: To the best of my knowledge and belief  
11       it was never approved by the President.

12       Mr. Mitchell: Well, I notice that this document says  
13       not only ABC-1 but ABC-2. I should have asked you what  
14       ABC-2 is.

15       General Gerow: ABC-2 was a report of a special commit-  
16       tee that was set up to consider air collaboration only.

17       Mr. Mitchell: Air?

18       General Gerow: Air collaboration only, yes, sir.

19       The Chairman: Air what?

20       Mr. Mitchell: Air collaboration.

21       The Chairman: I see, air collaboration. All right.

22       Mr. Mitchell: That was the same type of document as  
23       ABC-1, a staff plan for a proposed plan of joint operations  
24       in case the nation should be drawn into war?

25       General Gerow: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Now I would like to ask you whether you  
3 know whether the Singapore report, the Dutch-British-and  
4 American joint report from Singapore about joint military  
5 plans, was ever approved?

6 General Gerow: That document was never approved either  
7 by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations.

8 Mr. Mitchell: So if it was not approved by them it  
9 never went to the President for approval, I suppose.

10 General Gerow: As far as I know it never went to the  
11 President, sir, and I do not believe it was submitted to  
12 either the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy for  
13 formal approval, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Now, let us turn to the Canadian docu-  
15 ment.

16 There were certain other staff conferences with Canada  
17 at about that time, were there not?

18 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Which one of these documents would con-  
20 tain that report?

21 General Gerow: That would be ABC-22, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: ABC-22?

23 General Gerow: Yes.

24 Mr. Mitchell: You have that before you, have you, and  
25 have you examined it?

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have examined it and I have  
3 a copy.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I notice on the first page of that under  
5 date of August 12, 1941 is a memorandum from the Joint  
6 Planning Committee to the Joint Board. (Reading)

7 "Subject: Joint Canadian -- United States Basic  
8 Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title -- ABC-22).

9 "Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July  
10 1941) with permanent Joint Board on Defense letter of  
11 transmittal, dated: Montreal, 30th July, 1941.

12 "The subject plan, which was prepared in collabor-  
13 ation with the War Plans Division of the War and Navy  
14 Departments, is transmitted herewith with recommenda-  
15 tion that it be approved."

16 (Signed) L. T. Gerow."

17 Did you personally represent the United States at  
18 that conference in Montreal?

19 General Gerow: No, sir, I did not.

20 Mr. Mitchell: I notice the signatures of our repre-  
21 sentatives are S. D. Embick, Major General, U.S. Army; H.  
22 W. Hill, Captain, U.S. Navy; Forrest Sherman, Commander,  
23 U.S. Navy; Clayton Bissell, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army.

24 Did you have anything to do with the selection or ap-  
25 pointment of our representatives?

1816

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

General Gerow: I cannot recall specifically that War Plans did make such a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, but I imagine that it did recommend to the Chief of Staff who our representatives should be.

Mr. Mitchell: The Section 1 of this document under the title, "Purpose of this plan", says: (Reading)

"1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title 'ABC-1', includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

"2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a

1817

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 war against Germany and her allies.

3 "3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action  
4 by Canadian and United States Forces will be required  
5 primarily for purposes connected with:

6 "(a) the protection of overseas shipping within  
7 the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and  
8 Pacific Areas;

9 "(b) the protection of sea communications within  
10 the coastal zones;

11 "(c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland  
12 (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion  
13 of the United States."

14 You have examined this document and, of course, know  
15 its general tenor and purpose?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Was it anything different in scope or  
18 nature than any other United States or Joint Staff plan for  
19 joint operations in case of war?

20 General Gerow: No, sir. It followed generally the  
21 other war plans.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Was this Canadian-United States joint  
23 plan approved?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir, it was approved by the Chief  
25 of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the Presi-  
3 dent.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I have here a document obtained from  
5 the War Department, dated August 20, 1941, signed by Sec-  
6 retary Stimson and Secretary Knox, addressed to the Presi-  
7 dent at the White House as follows: (Reading)

8 "Dear Mr. President:

9 "The Joint United States-Canadian Permanent De-  
10 fense Board has prepared Joint United States-Canadian  
11 Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22) providing for  
12 common action in war against Germany and her allies in  
13 the defense of contiguous territories, including New-  
14 foundland and Alaska, and adjacent waters.

15 "This plan has been examined and approved by The  
16 Joint Board, and we also have approved it. It is trans-  
17 mitted herewith for your consideration with recommenda-  
18 tion that it be approved."

19 Following that is the other document from the War De-  
20 partment, dated August 29, 1941, as follows: (Reading)

21 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

22 Subject: Joint Canadian - United States  
23 Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short  
24 Title - ABC-22), J.B. No. 325  
25 (Serial 717).

1819

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 "1. You are advised that The President has, on  
3 August 29, 1941, given approval to the subject serial  
4 by indorsing the Joint Planning Committee report as  
5 follows:

6 "OK,

7 F.D.R."

8 (Signed) "W. P. SCOBEEY,

9 Lieut. Colonel, G.S.C.,

10 Secretary."

11 And bears the endorsement:

12 "Sep. 4 1941

13 "NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF

14 "NOTED - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF."

15 So that of these three plans the Canadian was the only  
16 one that ever was finally approved by the President?

17 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: I have here a document which we will  
19 mark exhibit 43, - the committee has this, - captioned:  
20 "STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CHIEF OF  
21 STAFF."

22 Have you a copy of that?

23 General Gerow: I have a copy, yes, sir.

24 (The document referred to was  
25 marked Exhibit No. 43.)

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: This document is a document of instruc-  
3 tions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the representatives  
4 of the United States at the American-British Staff conferences  
5 that resulted in the report which has been marked ABC-1 and 2?

6 General Gerow: Yes, sir, these are the instructions to  
7 the U.S. delegation, sir. It is a joint statement that was  
8 to be made by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Opera-  
9 tions before a meeting of the Joint Committee, both U.S. and  
10 British.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you mean it was prepared and not  
12 given to the representatives, or wouldn't you know about  
13 that?

14 General Gerow: Well, sir, it was furnished the U.S.  
15 representatives and I think it was presented verbally at a  
16 joint meeting to the combined British and U. S. represent-  
17 atives.

18 Mr. Mitchell: I see. That document offered as exhibit  
19 43 I think ought to be read into the record. I will read  
20 it.

21 "1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief  
22 of Staff of the Army of the United States are aware of  
23 the advantages that will accrue to both nations in the  
24 prosecution of any war in which the United States and  
25 the British Commonwealth may participate as associates,

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 should tentative understandings be reached in advance  
3 concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have  
4 prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear  
5 the way for the discussions which are to follow.

6 "2. As understood by these two officers, the pur-  
7 pose of these staff conversations is to determine the  
8 best methods by which the armed forces of the United  
9 States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany  
10 and the powers allied with her, should the United States  
11 be compelled to resort to war.

12 "3. The American people as a whole desire now to  
13 remain out of war" --

14 The date of the document, I should have read, is  
15 January 27, 1941. Is that right?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: (Continuing Reading):

18 "--and to provide only material and economic aid to  
19 Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained,  
20 it must be supported by their responsible military and  
21 naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments  
22 can now be made except as to technical methods of co-  
23 operation. Military plans which may be envisaged must,  
24 for the present, remain contingent upon the future  
25 political action of both nations. All such plans are

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 subject to eventual official approval by the two Govern-  
3 ments.

4 "4. The present national position of the United  
5 States is as follows:

6 "(a) A fundamental principle of United States pol-  
7 icy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure  
8 against the extension in it of non-American mili-  
9 tary and political control.

10 "(b) The United States has adopted the policy of  
11 affording material and diplomatic assistance to the  
12 British Commonwealth in that nation's war against  
13 Germany.

14 "(c) The United States by diplomatic means has  
15 opposed any extension of Japanese rule over addi-  
16 tional territory.

17 "5. If the United States Government decides to  
18 make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is  
19 the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and  
20 the Chief of Staff that:

21 "(a) The broad military objective of United  
22 States operations will be the defeat of Germany and  
23 her allies, but the United States necessarily must  
24 also maintain dispositions which, under all eventual-  
25 ities, will prevent the extension in the Western

1823

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and  
3 military power.

4 "(b) The objective of the war will be most effec-  
5 tively attained by the United States exerting its  
6 principal military effort in the Atlantic or naval-  
7 ly in the Mediterranean regions.

8 "(c) The United States and British Commonwealth  
9 should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war  
10 or from attacking the Dutch.

11 "(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States'  
12 operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East  
13 would be conducted in such a manner as to facili-  
14 tate the exertion of its principal military effort  
15 in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.

16 "(e) As a general rule, United States forces  
17 should operate in their own areas of responsibility,  
18 under their own commanders, and in accordance with  
19 plans derived from United States-British joint  
20 plans.

21 "(f) The United States will continue to furnish  
22 material aid to Great Britian, but will retain for  
23 building up its own forces material in such pro-  
24 portion as to provide for future security and best  
25 to effectuate United States-British joint plans for

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

defeating Germany.

"6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

"7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions."

Now, General Gerow, do you know of any other Joint Staff

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 conversations between the United States and Great Britain and  
3 the Dutch and the Canadians and the Australians or anybody  
4 else during that period in 1941, other than those I have ad-  
5 duced?

6  
7 General Gerow: No, sir, other than informal conversa-  
8 tions between members of our own staff and the members of the  
9 British mission and the missions of other nations that were  
10 assembled in Washington at that time.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I mean conversations of a more  
12 formal character that would produce some kind of a Joint Staff  
13 plan for possible future operations.

14 General Gerow: To the best of my knowledge and belief  
15 there were no such conferences.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Did you at any time during your service  
17 in the War Plans Division see or hear of any agreement which  
18 had been entered into by anybody, any executive officer of  
19 the United States, War and Navy, or anybody else, including  
20 the President, which assumed to bind the United States to  
21 engage in war against Japan before Japan attacked the United  
22 States?

23 General Gerow: No, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: There have been discussions here in the  
25 committee based on memoranda, I think, including this Singa-  
pore plan and memoranda by General Marshall and Admiral



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Stark, in which they recommended that no military operations  
3 should be conducted against Japan unless certain eventualities  
4 occurred, such as an attack by the Japs on the Philip-  
5 pines, and one of the eventualities was said to be "or un-  
6 less the Japs should cross a certain latitude and longitude  
7 line." Do you remember that?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: That was a recommendation and report  
10 based on the Singapore report, carried on forward to the Sec-  
11 retary of War and Secretary of the Navy by the Marshall  
12 memorandum, is that right?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I think that statement ap-  
14 peared initially in the Singapore conversations, in the re-  
15 commendation of the conferees at that conference.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 17 has already been offered in  
17 evidence. It is a memorandum dated November 27, 1941.

18 (Reading):

19 "SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation."

20 Signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and ad-  
21 dressed to the President. On the second page the report  
22 says:

23 "It is recommended that:

24 "prior to the completion of the Philippines rein-  
25 forcement, military counter-action be considered only

1827

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States,  
British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

"in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand,  
Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and  
the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines in-  
dicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint  
military opposition be undertaken;

"steps be taken at once to consummate agreements  
with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such  
warning."

Do you know or did you know at the time whether the  
President took any action on that recommendation?

General Gerow: I do not know whether the President  
took any action on it or not, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shel-16  
Shack  
fls 17

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Shack  
fls  
Shf  
hl

1  
2           Mr. Mitchell: There was offered in evidence yester-  
3 day as Exhibit 40, a message from the Commander in Chief  
4 of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations,  
6 marked "Information to the Commander in Chief of the  
0 Pacific Fleet," dated December 7, Eastern Time, I suppose,  
7 Philippine time, 1941, which reads as follows:

8           "Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed  
9 support under three or four eventualities. Have received  
10 no corresponding instructions from you."

11           Do you know of any assurances that we had given the  
12 British at Singapore of armed support under three or four  
13 eventualities?

14           General Gerow: I know of no such assurances, sir.

15           Mr. Mitchell: May this report, that has been obtained  
16 from Singapore, have been founded on this Dutch-American-  
17 British conference report to which we referred?

18           General Gerow: It may have been, yes, sir.

19           Senator Ferguson: May I have the last answer?

20           Mr. Mitchell: I asked him if it was possible that  
21 this report that Admiral Hart had might have referred to.  
22 this Singapore plan. He said he does not know; it might.

23           We have tried to get Admiral Stark's reply to this  
24 message, but we have not succeeded in doing it up to this  
25 morning.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: I might help counsel on the  
3 Admiralty report --

4 Mr. Mitchell: I would be glad to get any help I  
5 can.

6 Senator Ferguson: We ask that we have the Admiralty  
7 reports cleared up with the British.

8 Mr. Mitchell: You mean the messages from the British  
9 Admiralty?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes, to our Navy. .

11 Mr. Mitchell: Well, those, as I told you in our  
12 conversation yesterday, Senator, ought to go through clear-  
13 ance.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is what I say. I ask you now  
15 to get them cleared so we can clear up this point.

16 Mr. Mitchell: You were going to give me a list of  
17 those you wanted cleared so we could narrow it down as  
18 much as possible.

19 It is quite a job to send messages to England and to  
20 get the British Government to clear the message.

21 Senator Ferguson: I think you can clear that up later.

22 Mr. Mitchell: All right, we will try.

23 Now, General Gerow, getting back to another subject,  
24 I show you a document dated December 30, 1940, signed by  
25 Admiral Bloch, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h3

1  
2 which is already introduced in evidence here, which is  
3 a report by Admiral Bloch on the problem of aircraft raids  
4 on Hawaii. It bears the endorsement of Admiral Richardson,  
5 who forwarded it under date of January 7.

6 Do you remember whether you ever saw that? It went  
7 to the Chief of Naval Operations and not to the War Depart-  
8 ment.

9 General Gerow: I do not recall having seen that at  
10 the time, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: The record shows that the document I  
12 referred to is part of Exhibit 9.

13 I call your attention now to Exhibit 10, which is a  
14 letter from Secretary Knox to the Secretary of War, dated  
15 January 24, 1941, and part of the same exhibit, a letter  
16 dated February 7, 1941, from the Secretary of War Stimson  
17 to the Secretary of the Navy, in which, to refresh your  
18 memory, Secretary Knox said that the dangers at Pearl Harbor  
19 in the order of their probability, were:

- 20 1. Air bombing attack;  
21 2. Air torpedo plane attack;  
22 3. Sabotage.

23 Do you remember having seen that correspondence?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I did see it.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember whether, as the result

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of the correspondence so instituted and during the year  
3 1941, following this correspondence, various reports and  
4 plans were made dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor?

5 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: There has been offered in evidence  
7 here, a book containing extracts from various plans, not  
8 joint plans, but United States Army and Navy plans having  
9 to do with the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack.

10 I think this document itself, which the committee has  
11 was not offered as an exhibit, but extracts of it were  
12 read into the record.

13 I think it advisable at this time to mark as Exhibit  
14 44, this document which is entitled "Copies of Defense Plans"  
15 and contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy  
16 plans dealing directly with the question of defense against  
17 air attack.

18 The Chairman: Let it be filed as Exhibit 44.

19 (The document referred to was  
20 marked Exhibit No. 44.)

21 Mr. Mitchell: Have you a copy of this document before  
22 you?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Have you produced here the various plans  
25 on which this document, Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in

h4

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

1  
2 the index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part  
3 of it?

4 General Gerow: I do not understand the question, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Have you checked these basic plans  
6 that have been produced here against the index?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Of Exhibit 44?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: There are 13 items in the list of  
11 contents. Have you checked these documents against that  
12 index?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Are all the documents that are listed  
15 in this index present here? You have checked them,  
16 haven't you?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: I will ask you to look at them and  
19 just state generally, as you go over each item, what they  
20 are. The first is extracts from joint Army and Navy basic  
21 war plan -- orange (1938); is that right?

22 General Gerow: This is the joint Army and Navy basic  
23 war plan -- orange, 1938, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: What does that mean?

25 General Gerow: That means it is a war plan that per-

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 tains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan  
3 was known as "orange."

4 Mr. Mitchell: And item 2, extracts from joint Army  
5 and Navy basic war plan -- Rainbow No. 1, what is that?

6 General Gerow: This document is the joint Army and  
7 Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 1.

8 Mr. Mitchell: What is Rainbow No. 1? Can you tell  
9 us what the relation of it is to the other plans, or some-  
10 thing of that kind?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir. If I might refer to the  
12 document, I can give the scope of the plan rather than from  
13 memory.

14 Mr. Mitchell: That is what I want you to do.

15 Mr. Keefe: Why not do the same thing with respect to  
16 the orange plan?

17 Mr. Mitchell: Start with orange, and tell the committee,  
18 in a general way, so we can orient these various plans and  
19 understand what they were and what their relations were to  
20 each other.

21 General Gerow: This joint Army and Navy basic war  
22 plan, orange, 1938, constitutes the basis upon which all  
23 Army plans, orange, and all Navy plans, orange, and all  
24 joint plans, orange and all supporting allocations for an  
25 orange war shall be formulated and developed.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan.  
3 The document contains assumptions with regard to such a  
4 war, the concept of the war, the means assigned jointly  
5 to the Army and Navy and means assigned to each of the  
6 Army and Navy forces; joint decisions that were made by  
7 the Joint Board approving this plan; categories of defense.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that plan covered any sort of  
9 operations in that area in a war with Japan?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir, limited to the Pacific  
11 area.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Limited to the Pacific?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: And that, of course, included Hawaii?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: As part of the area?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Now, give us the same information about  
19 Rainbow No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date  
20 of Rainbow No. 1?

21 General Gerow: Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on  
22 August 14, by the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

23 The Vice Chairman: August 14, what year?

24 General Gerow: 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the  
25 Acting Secretary of War. This document was prepared prior

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 to my assignment to duty in the War Plans Division.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I understand that. I am asking you,  
4 as a War Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general  
5 way, what that plan dealt with, and what its relation was  
6 to orange, 1938.

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 The general situation on which this plan was based,  
9 was that at the time this directive was issued, the European  
10 war was in progress, which may involve other nations, and  
11 expand the field of military action.

12 "There is an ever present possibility of the United  
13 States being drawn into this war. There is also the possi-  
14 bility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation  
15 in which the United States will be forced to defend without  
16 allies the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest  
17 in the Pacific."

18 Mr. Mitchell: Does that plan cover operations in the  
19 Atlantic and Pacific?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Does it assume a possible engagement  
22 with Japan?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I should like to read the  
24 reference to the special situation on which it was based,  
25 sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: All right.

4 General Gerow: Special situation for Rainbow No. 1:

5 "The termination of the war in Europe is followed by  
6 a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine  
7 in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled  
8 with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest  
9 in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

10 "The purpose of the plan was 'to provide for the most  
11 effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy  
12 objectives, particularly those in the territory and waters  
13 of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude  
14 13 degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the  
15 projection of U. S. armed forces to the American Continents  
16 and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees south lati-  
17 tude, and to United States possessions in the Pacific west-  
18 ward to include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will  
19 visualize the subsequent extension of United States control  
20 into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, consistent  
21 with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the  
22 Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of opera-  
23 tions will be prepared at this time.'"

24 Mr. Mitchell: Go to the third item in the joint Army  
25 and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h10

1  
2 and give us the date of that and briefly just what the  
3 scope of that plan is, or was?

4 General Gerow: This plan was approved on November  
5 19, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval  
6 operations. I think I can best describe this plan by  
7 reading from the plan the general assumptions on which it  
8 was based, and that is:

9 "That the associated powers, comprising initially  
10 the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire),  
11 China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis  
12 powers, comprising either:

13 "a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

14 "b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,  
15 Indochina, and Thailand.

16 "That the associated powers will conduct the war in  
17 accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

18 "That even if Japan, Indochina and Thailand are not  
19 initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention  
20 must be taken into account.

21 "That United States forces which might base in the  
22 Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements  
23 other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials,  
24 from sources in that general region.

25 "That Latin American republics will take measures to

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

h11

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere defense."

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War Department Operation Plan - Rainbow No. 5. What is that?

General Gerow: After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was prepared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan - Rainbow No. 5. It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under which the war will be fought, the means of allotment of forces, the directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, the coordination that must be had with other departments of the Government.

Mr. Mitchell: It includes in its scope, the area of the Hawaiian Islands, does it?

General Gerow: It does, yes, sir.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h12

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Mitchell: Did you give the date of that?

General Gerow: This document does not contain on it the date of approval, but I am sure it was in August, 1941, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief of Staff, August, 1941."

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I think I have that somewhere in my documents.

Mr. Mitchell: Never mind. That is near enough.

General Gerow: I know it was sent out to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell: The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us the scope and nature of that document, and the date?

General Gerow: Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan which I have just discussed.

Mr. Mitchell: A plan worked out by the local commanders in 1940?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell  
The Chairman

h13

1  
2 General Gerow: By the Commanding General of the  
3 Hawaiian Department.

4 Mr. Mitchell: And the Commander of the 14th Naval  
5 District?

6 General Gerow: No, sir, this is not a joint plan.  
7 This is an Army plan. It is a little different from a plan,  
8 sir. It is what we call a defense project.

9 Mr. Mitchell: I see.

10 General Gerow: It contains the objective to be accom-  
11 plished, but is primarily directed towards setting up the  
12 means that are required to carry out that war mission in  
13 considerable detail.

14 The Chairman: May I ask of the General: You say this  
15 was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you  
16 have just discussed which seems to have been approved in  
17 August, 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?

18 General Gerow: This defense project is prepared  
19 annually and revised annually. This is the 1940 edition.  
20 The 1941 edition had not been completed at that time, but  
21 the orange plan of 1938 and the rainbow plan No. 1, contained  
22 the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans were taken  
23 together with the other data with which to revise the defense  
24 project which was in existence at that time, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: The next item is joint coastal frontier

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

3 General Gerow: This is a joint plan that is prepared  
4 by the local commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based  
5 on the joint plans, Army and Navy plans furnished by the  
6 War Department.

7 Mr. Mitchell: What is the date of it?

8 General Gerow: This document was approved at the  
9 Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April,  
10 1941, and Headquarters 14th Naval District, 11th of April,  
11 1941.

12 Mr. Mitchell: I will state that that document is in  
13 Exhibit 44, set forth in full, not a mere extract of it.  
14 The whole thing is in this Exhibit 44.

15 The next item is No. 7, Annex No. VII, to joint coastal  
16 frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that,  
17 and what is it?

18 General Gerow: Will you repeat that question, sir?

19 Mr. Mitchell: The next item is Annex No. VII to  
20 joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that  
21 document, the nature of it, and the date of it?

22 General Gerow: Annex No. VII, sir, to that document is  
23 a local plan prepared by the 14th Naval District and the  
24 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. It is dated the 28th of  
25 March, 1941, and covers joint security measures, protection  
of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

Larry fls



LaCharity  
follows  
Shack  
AL-1

2649

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: The next item in the same volume, No. 8,  
3 is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement).

4 What exhibit is that?

5 Mr. Gesell: Forty-four.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Did you ever see the report dated August  
7 20, 1941 entitled a Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii?

8 Mr. Keefe: What is the date of that, please?

9 Mr. Mitchell: August 20, 1941.

10 It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii",  
11 addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces,  
12 Washington, D. C., through Commanding General of the Hawaiian  
13 Department, Fort Shafter, TH, which has heretofore been marked  
14 Exhibit 13. Did you ever see that report?

15 General Gerow: I cannot recall at this time as having  
16 ever seen that report, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: That is the report which considered the  
18 vulnerability of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it  
19 would likely come, in the morning, from carriers, and things  
20 of that kind, and then went on to estimate the ways of defeating  
21 it, and the number of planes that would be required to run a  
22 360 degree long range reconnaissance to detect the Jap carriers  
23 the evening before.

24 General Gerow: I have read the document since, just  
25 prior to this investigation.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

Mr. Mitchell: You didn't see it at the time?

2

General Gerow: At the time I don't recall having seen it,

3

4 sir.

4

Mr. Mitchell: No. 9, the next item in the index, "5 November  
1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department".

5

6

Will you look at that and tell us what it is?

7

General Gerow: That document, sir, is contained in the  
operation orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir.

8

9

It is, as stated, a standing operating procedure.

10

Mr. Mitchell: Promulgated by whom?

11

General Gerow: By the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-  
partment.

12

13

Mr. Mitchell: On his own, not a direction from Washington?

14

General Gerow: No, sir; on his own.

15

Mr. Mitchell: Is that the document in which General  
Short directed his air alerts 1, 2, 3, or am I wrong about that?

16

17

General Gerow: Yes, sir, they are included in this  
document.

18

19

Mr. Mitchell: Alert 1, sabotage without threat from  
without, and so on?

20

21

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22

Mr. Mitchell: Did you see that document before December 7,  
1941?

23

24

General Gerow: I don't recall ever having seen it before

25

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 December 7. I think the records of the War Department show  
3 it came in later in 1942.

4 Mr. Mitchell: The 10th item is "Field Order No. 1",  
5 and 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan". 12, "Pacific  
6 Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41".

7 Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can describe  
8 them more fully, but just to complete the story here will you  
9 look at them and tell us in a general way what the nature of  
10 them is?

11 General Gerow: That is number 10, sir?

12 Mr. Mitchell: 10, 11 and 12. 10 is the first, "Field  
13 Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department". Give  
14 the date of it and, if you can from inspection, the general  
15 nature of it.

16 General Gerow: Number 10, sir, "Field Order No. 1 (Naval  
17 Security)", is an Army document.

18 Mr. Mitchell: It is?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir. And it is the operations order  
20 as gotten out by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-  
21 partment. It has no date. It is intended as an order to be  
22 put into effect when the emergency arrives.

23 Mr. Mitchell: What is No. 11? 11, 12 and 13, they are  
24 Navy documents?

25 General Gerow: No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

2

this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5.

3

4

Mr. Mitchell: It would be a corresponding document to the Army operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar?

5

6

7

General Gerow: Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir.

8

9

10

Mr. Mitchell: The next item is 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

11

What is the date of that?

12

General Gerow: That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941.

13

Mr. Mitchell: By whom is that issued or authorized?

14

General Gerow: The heading shows that it is issued by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

15

16

Mr. Mitchell: The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District."

17

18

What is the date of that and by whom issued or authorized?

19

20

21

General Gerow: That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor.

22

23

24

25

Mr. Mitchell: Now, General Gerow, you have gone over these documents and also you have gone over Exhibit 44 which contains either extracts or complete copies of them, have you not?

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Mitchell: And I asked you to prepare on the basis of your study of all these plans a condensed statement giving, as a War Plans man, your analysis and conclusions as to the respective functions of the Army and the Navy or the 14th Naval District or the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Have you done that?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you coordinate that with Admiral Turner who was War Plans Officer in the Navy when you were in the War Plans in the War Department? Did you submit the matter to him and get his consideration of your memorandum, your conclusions?

General Gerow: Yes, sir. I took this paper, after I prepared it, over to Admiral Turner and informally discussed it with him and asked him if he concurred, and he said he did, sir, and I furnished him a copy.

Mr. Mitchell: Will you give to the committee the answer to the question I submitted to you. That is, the question is to present to the committee a brief statement of your analysis and conclusions of all these plans with a view to stating what the respective functions of the Army and the Navy were against an air attack in the defense of Oahu.

General Gerow: Yes, sir. May I read from this paper that I have already prepared?

## Witness Gerow

1  
2           Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could the record show  
3 the date of the request and whether the instrument was written  
4 recently?

5           Mr. Gesell: It has been distributed to all members.

6           Senator Ferguson: Yes, Mr. Chairman, but that brings up  
7 the question of distributing these papers on the morning. It  
8 is just impossible to go through and read these papers while  
9 we are listening to a witness. Is it possible to get these  
10 papers in the evening and not have them put before us in the  
11 morning? This is an example. I have been trying to read  
12 these papers and listen to witnesses.

13           The Chairman: The Chair can't answer the question.

14           Senator Ferguson: Can we get an answer from counsel right  
15 now?

16           Mr. Mitchell: We got this document late last evening.  
17 We have had the mimeographing agencies of about every department  
18 of the Government chasing up and down getting these copies out,  
19 we have been running them ragged about it, and we are doing  
20 the very best we can.

21           I didn't get this summary, or even a draft of it, from  
22 General Gerow until a day or two ago, and then we had to have  
23 it mimeographed, and we got it last night.

24           Senator Ferguson: How long has counsel had these other  
25 papers that were put before us?

## Witness Gerow

1  
2       The Chairman: Might the Chair suggest that we go into  
3 other papers at a different time from a time when we are on  
4 the verge of hearing General Gerow read the paper that he  
5 prepared. You asked when it was prepared and I think that is  
6 proper. But let's not go to the other papers.

7       Senator Ferguson: We will go back to this one. Did we  
8 not have a rule, or at least a semblance of a rule, that we  
9 were to get any statements read by a witness 24 hours in  
10 advance?

11       The Chairman: We had an understanding that where a witness  
12 testified from a manuscript we would attempt to get the manu-  
13 script at least 24 hours in advance. The Chair does not under-  
14 stand that that applies to a mere memorandum that a witness  
15 would use during his testimony which is oral. If the Chair  
16 misunderstood he is subject to correction.

17       Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, this is an answer  
18 to a direct question that was given to this witness sometime  
19 ago. Why could the committee not have had this answer in  
20 advance?

21       Mr. Mitchell: I have answered that question. I have  
22 stated that I asked the witness to give us his estimate. I  
23 didn't know that he wanted to write it out, necessarily, but  
24 to come here and testify to it. When he got to work on it he  
25 found he could do it better if he put it in memorandum form

1 Witness Gerow

2 and consulted Admiral Turner about it. He did that within  
3 the last day or two and we didn't get the statement until late  
4 last night. If the committee wants him to state his conclusions  
5 orally he will do it. He has asked permission to read this  
6 document and comment on it so that his statement may be more  
7 accurate and better organized.

(3) 8 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, as I understood counsel,  
9 the statement was received a day or two ago and then it had  
10 to be mimeographed. Did I understand correctly?

11 Mr. Mitchell: I don't remember of having seen it at all  
12 until yesterday. Yesterday was Tuesday, wasn't it?

13 The Chairman: Yes.

14 Senator Brewster: Don't you have a record --

15 Mr. Mitchell: I would like to know whether we are examin-  
16 ing this witness or cross-examining counsel. I stated we have  
17 done our best in this matter and I don't see that counsel's  
18 office is under any criticism, proper criticism, in a case  
19 like this. You understand the facts fully. The witness was  
20 asked to prepare his conclusions and an analysis of those  
21 plans as to the respective responsibilities of the Army and  
22 Navy. He went to work on it. At the last minute he wanted  
23 to put it in writing so that he could read it. He having put  
24 it in that shape we wanted to have it mimeographed so that  
25 the committee could follow it. It was done late last evening



Witness Gerow

1  
2 and delivered last night.

3 The Chairman: The Chair suggests that General Gerow  
4 proceed to read his statement.

5 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman --

6 The Chairman: The Senator from Maine.

7 Senator Brewster: I think this thing should be clarified.  
8 I gather from what has been said that it may be that additional  
9 help is required to enable counsel to perform what the committee  
10 agreed was most desirable.

11 I have followed the practice with every document which  
12 I have received from counsel of noting not only the date but  
13 the hour. That practice is followed in all Government depart-  
14 ments. I would like to know the day and hour when this  
15 document was received. And then, if counsel has not adequate  
16 mimeographing assistance, with all the facilities of the Govern-  
17 ment at his disposal, we ought to see that he gets more.

18 This is an illustration of what can be found in connection  
19 with Pearl Harbor, that they didn't have adequate help. We  
20 agreed we needed these things in advance. I see no reason why  
21 the committee shouldn't provide whatever facilities are nec-  
22 essary to do that in this matter.

23 The Chairman: The Chair does not know how many mimeograph-  
24 ing outfits there are in Washington. All those that are available  
25 for our use are being utilized, I understand, for that purpose.

1           Witness Gerow

2           The Chair does not think that a memorandum, in the midst  
3 of oral testimony, comes within the rule that we provided for  
4 that in advance manuscript testimony should be furnished to  
5 the committee 24 hours in advance, or any other length of time  
6 in advance.

7           General Miles the other day read a memorandum which he  
8 wanted to read in the midst of his oral testimony and no question  
9 was raised about it. The Chair thinks General Gerow should be  
10 permitted to read this memorandum if he thinks it is more  
11 accurate than he could give it orally.

12           The Vice Chairman: As a suggestion, it is now five minutes  
13 to 12. I suggest that we recess at this point and that will  
14 give the members two hours to read this memorandum which is  
15 now before them and we can meet at 2:00 o'clock and hear General  
16 Gerow read it.

17           Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Gesell reminds me also that one of  
18 the difficulties we are up against right now is, as indicated  
19 by this situation, due to the complete disarrangement of our  
20 order of proof.

21           General Gerow was not on the list until we got through  
22 with General Miles. Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner also  
23 came ahead of him. We had to jam him on the stand today in  
24 order to give some basic material as a basis for General  
25 Marshall's testimony.

Witness Gerow

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

If General Gerow had come in his regular order we would not have this situation. We must take that into account.

The Chairman: The committee undoubtedly understands that it has been necessary to improvise due to the change of schedule, which is due to General Marshall's appearance this week.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: The statement about which so much fuss is being made is 6-1/2 pages. Substantially all of what the witness has covered has been in the hands of the committee for over two weeks.

The Vice Chairman: I suggest that we recess.

The Chairman: The committee will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

- - - - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Gerow

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Counsel will proceed with General Gerow.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW

(Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to my statement this morning. Since the noon recess, at half past twelve I received a report from the State Department. They heard from the British and Dutch about the intercept messages.

I reported this morning the Australians reported they did not get any such message, and that the British reported they haven't, but that report was not quite complete. They say some message got into Singapore six hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, and we are taking steps to get the text of that, to see what kind of message it was.

The Dutch said they haven't.

I also should have said this morning that the FBI have reported to us they have no trace of ever having had it, and having it in their file.

About this difficulty about mimeographing, I want to state additions to my staff would not help us any. It is a question of getting the mimeographing and photostatic equipment and the trained men. We are using now the mimeographing

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Gerow

1  
2 and photostatic equipment and personnel of the Navy Department,  
3 and that in the War Department, and the central mimeographing  
4 and photostatic equipment, and if there are any other mimeo-  
5 graphs stationed around that I could get hold of I would be  
6 glad to take possession of it.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the committee be  
8 presented with that information? I have in mind the exact  
9 information that comes in on this so-called winds message.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. I have not had it mimeographed because  
11 it is not complete. I wanted to do a complete job and hand it  
12 all to the committee in advance of our proposed arrangement  
13 to have the winds message taken up as a special order.

14 I have now one report from the FBI, and I have letters  
15 from the State Department, I have one copy, I think, and maybe  
16 more, and I think that has been mimeographed, of the report  
17 from General MacArthur. I will give you mimeographed copies  
18 as we get them.

19 The Chairman: The Chair understands that the counsel is  
20 now reporting informally but later he will give the committee  
21 the official report to which he referred.

22 Mr. Mitchell: The only reason I brought this up this  
23 morning was that once before I was criticised by allowing  
24 certain members of the committee to proceed in an examination  
25 that assumed certain facts to be so when I had information in

Witness Gerow

1  
2 my possession and kept quiet on it, so that they were pro-  
3 ceeding on a false assumption. I was merely trying to aid  
4 the committee so they can guide their own questions and not  
5 make assumptions of fact which might not turn out to be so.

6 I also did it because, as I say, before General Marshall  
7 was called we expected to give the committee the full record  
8 on the thing, and not being able to do it I thought I ought  
9 to make an attempt, at least, to show the state of the inquiry.

10 The Chairman: The committee appreciates that.

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, the thing that disturbs  
12 me, as a member of the committee, is the fact, - and it can  
13 be indicated here - that counsel has drawn certain conclusions.  
14 I am unwilling to draw any conclusions at this time, until  
15 the committee has all of the sworn testimony and evidence  
16 before it.

17 I am quite disturbed over the fact that, on this parti-  
18 cular evidence, it appears that counsel is drawing certain  
19 conclusions at this particular moment, prior to the committee  
20 getting the exact evidence upon which those conclusions are  
21 drawn.

22 The Chairman: The Chair wishes to state that he hopes,  
23 and I am sure the whole committee hopes, that the committee  
24 as a whole and as individual members will draw no conclusions  
25 about any phase of this investigation until the whole testimony

Witness Gerow

1  
2 is in. The Chair understood counsel to be merely trying to  
3 bring the committee up to date as of today, in view of the  
4 disarrangement of the program and schedule made necessary by  
5 General Marshall's earlier appearance. The Chairman did  
6 not understand that counsel was drawing any conclusions, ex-  
7 cept reporting up to this hour, or up to this morning what  
8 had been found or had not been found in regard to official  
9 records and documents.

10 Mr. Mitchell: I did say this, Senator, I said on the  
11 record as it stood up to date I had grave doubts as to whether  
12 the winds intercept messages, indicating war with the United  
13 States, had ever been sent out, and I expressly reserve the  
14 right to change my view after I have heard all the rest of  
15 the testimony on it.

16 Now I do not think a man is going to be blamed for  
17 having serious doubt, on the present state of the record,  
18 about it. I am guilty of that, I admit, for whatever it is  
19 worth. I never got this far in a lawsuit before without having  
20 some idea of what the probabilities of the case were. I do  
21 not think I would be worth anything as a lawyer if I did.

22 The Chairman: Of course the committee understands that  
23 any of our doubts, or I might say any of our preconceived  
24 notions can be subject to change in view of evidence that may  
25 be brought to the committee, and therefore we have all proceeded

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 on the theory that we are openminded on any proposition re-  
3 specting this investigation until the whole evidence is in.

4 At any stage of the hearing we may have some doubts about  
5 something that has been done up to date, but we will not make  
6 up our minds until all the evidence is completed.

7 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether  
8 or not the difficulty does not arise from somewhat the unusual  
9 relationship of the counsel in this hearing. We all more or  
10 less recognize our places. I take it that the counsel nec-  
11 essarily takes a position that this hearing is quasi-judicial,  
12 so that his expression of opinion in this fashion, before the  
13 evidence is all in, does have a little anticipatory aspect.

14 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

15 Senator Brewster: Certainly.

16 The Chairman: It will undoubtedly be overcome by evidence  
17 that any such message was received.

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, let us hear the witness.

19 The Chairman: The committee will proceed with the witness.

20 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, you were about to  
21 give a statement of your summary of the respective functions  
22 of the Army and the Navy at Oahu under the existing plans  
23 with respect to defense in an air attack.

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: That is, the plans up to December 7, 1941.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

hl

1  
2 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Will you please do that.

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 "1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy  
6 in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared  
7 and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These  
8 responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in  
9 terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions.  
10 With the exception as indicated below, these missions are  
11 stated identically in all war plans current in 1941, as  
12 follows:

13 "JOINT MISSION

14 "To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to  
15 control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

16 " NAVY MISSION

17 "To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect  
18 shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

19 "ARMY MISSION

20 "To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air  
21 forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the  
22 Naval forces.

23 "2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army  
24 mission 'to support the Naval Forces' was deleted, and the  
25 following was substituted: 'Support Naval Forces in the

1 Witness Gerow

h2

2 protection of the sea communications of the Associated  
3 Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by  
4 offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located  
5 within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

6 That is the statement of the Army mission as it appears  
7 in Rainbow 5.

8 I desire to invite the attention of the committee to:

9 "3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions  
10 called for mutual support.

11 "4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding  
12 General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in  
13 Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for de-  
14 fense against air attack. These agreements are to be found  
15 in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of  
16 the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in  
17 Hawaii on December 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier  
18 Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army  
19 and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon.  
20 These plans and agreements contain the following major pro-  
21 visions pertaining to defense against air attack:"

22 I shall discuss first anti-aircraft defense.

23 The responsibility of the Army for anti-aircraft de-  
24 fense was as follows:

25 "Army - (1) Shall provide for: a. The \* \* \* anti

1 Witness Gerow

2 aircraft defense of Oahu."

3 "(2) Army Antiaircraft, 'supported by Naval Units  
4 placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate  
5 to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft.'

6 "(3) The Army, 'Arrange for such coordination of the  
7 antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor  
8 and the Army antiaircraft defense as may be practicable.'

9 The Navy's responsibility was:

10 "The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District  
11 \* \* \* are taking certain security measures, which include:

12 "(d) The organization of four air defense groups  
13 for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire  
14 of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor. \* \* \*

15 "In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of  
16 the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-  
17 based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

18 "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District \* \* \*  
19 shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control  
20 over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the  
21 Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced.' \* \* \*

22 "(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the  
23 base defense.'

24 I have drawn some conclusions from those different  
25 agreements. They are mine.

h3

WARD 3 PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Gerow:

1  
2 I believe that the Commanders on the ground that made  
3 these agreements are in a much better position to interpret  
4 them, and say exactly what their intentions were at the time,  
5 than I am, but these are the conclusions that I have drawn  
6 from those paragraphs:

7 "The orders and agreements on the part of the local  
8 Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion primary  
9 responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army  
10 but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in connection  
11 therewith."

12 I go next to the Aircraft Warning Service.

13 The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft warning  
14 service was:

15 "(1) The Army shall provide for: \* \* \*

16 "b. An antiaircraft \* \* \* intelligence and  
17 warning service."

18 The Navy responsibility was:

19 "During the period prior to the completion of the  
20 aircraft warning service installation, the Navy, through use  
21 of RADAR, and other appropriate means will endeavor to give  
22 such warning of hostile attacks that may be practicable."

23 My conclusion with regard to the aircraft warning  
24 service is as follows:

25 "The Army had primary responsibility for the establish-

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

1  
2 ment of an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however,  
3 agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the instal-  
4 lation of the Army facilities then under construction."

5 Mr. Mitchell: Does that relate to what we have called  
6 radar, or is it broader than that?

7 General Gerow: It relates to radar, sir.

8 I might say in that connection that I understand that  
9 the radar on Navy ships is not particularly effective when  
10 there is an intervening terrain obstacle. It is all right  
11 across the water, but not so effective when close to an  
12 intervening article.

13 Aircraft Defense: I have broken it down into three  
14 phases; the reconnaissance phase, the defensive air phase,  
15 and the offensive air phase. I state first the recon-  
16 naissance phase.

17 The responsibility of the Army:

18 "(1) 'shall provide for:

19 \* \* \*

20 "Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol  
21 of the waters of the Oahu Defensive Coastal Area in coopera-  
22 tion with the Naval Inshore Patrol."

23 The responsibility of the Navy:

24 "(1) Navy 'shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol.  
25 b. An offshore patrol \* \* \* 1. Distant reconnaissance.

Witness Gerow

h6

1  
2           "(2) 'When naval forces are insufficient for long  
3 distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft  
4 are made available, these aircraft will be under the  
5 tactical control of the naval commander directing the  
6 search operations.'"

7           "Defensive Air," I shall discuss next.

8           The Army 's responsibility for defensive air operations  
9 is:

10          The Army was responsible for:

11          "b. 'Defensive air operations over and in the immediate  
12 vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command  
13 of the Army.'"

14          The Navy responsibilities were:

15          "(1) 'Each commander will \* \* \* make available without  
16 delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces  
17 at his disposal as the circumstances warrant.'

18          "(2) 'With due consideration to the tactical situation  
19 existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army  
20 control will be the maximum practicable."

21          I turn now to "Offensive Air Operations."

22          The Army will:

23          " 'g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major of-  
24 fensive operations at sea within range of Army bombers.'"

25          The Navy's responsibility --

Witness Gerow

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may we have order?

I can't hear the witness for the buzzing that is on the right.

The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

General Gerow: The Navy responsibilities. The Navy:

"(1) 'shall provide for \* \* \* j. Attacking enemy naval forces.'

"(2) 'Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy.'"

My conclusions, as to the responsibility for aircraft operations in defense of Oahu against attack from aircraft are as follows:

"The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The Army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

"To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:

"(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;

"(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 for antiaircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive  
3 air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for  
4 close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations,  
5 each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the  
6 other with the means available to them in order to provide  
7 the maximum effective defense."

8 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, returning for a moment  
9 to these three joint plans, the Singapore plan, the British  
10 conversations, and the Canadian plan that we took up this  
11 morning, were any deployments, or steps ever taken by the  
12 United States prior to December 7 to put any of those plans  
13 into operation? December 7, 1941. You told us that the  
14 British and Dutch plans were never approved and only the  
15 Canadian had been finally approved. I want to know whether  
16 approved or not approved, the United States ever put those  
17 plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the  
18 joint plans, if you know?

19 General Gerow: I don't believe, sir, I can answer  
20 that question offhand. We certainly made some preliminary  
21 dispositions so we would be prepared to carry out those plans  
22 but without studying the history of the orders prior to  
23 December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer that question.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

h8

AL  
fls

25



LaCharity p8  
(3)  
follows  
Hook  
AL-1

2673

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: You will kindly look that up for us so  
3 that when you return to the stand after General Marshall has  
4 testified you may be able to answer, please.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Could any of these other nations, as you  
7 read these joint plans, put them into effect without the consent  
8 of the United States, so as at any time to obligate or make  
9 necessary that the United States do likewise?

10 General Gerow: No, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Now, in this matter of preparation of war  
12 plans, whether our own plans or jointly with some other nation,  
13 has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time  
14 immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on  
15 the contingency that some day or other we might be involved  
16 in hostilities with other nations?

17 General Gerow: Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept  
18 current plans for operations against any major power or combi-  
19 nation of major powers, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: That is, you didn't make any distinction,  
21 generally, between those we were friendly with and those we  
22 were unfriendly with. Do you have plans against everybody  
23 practically?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir, at one time I think we had  
25 plans against most everybody, sir, and I think that is the

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 practice of every General Staff of every nation.

2  
3 Mr. Mitchell: It is partly a matter of training in  
4 drawing plans and partly a matter of being ready if trouble  
5 comes; is that it?

6 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: And that is especially true, of course, in  
8 the situation where our foreign relations with any particular  
9 nation are becoming tense?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir. We concentrate then on a  
11 particular plan that pertains to that nation.

12 Mr. Mitchell: If the General Staff did not do that and  
13 got caught without any plans if hostilities started, it would  
14 be a rather sickly situation for the General Staff, would it not?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir. We would be accused of neglect-  
16 ing our duty.

17 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to this pink book,  
18 telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii from  
19 July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has been offered in evidence  
20 as Exhibit 32. You have examined that, have you?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Could you tell us whether you knew about  
23 those messages or had copies available to you at or about the  
24 time they were sent, what the practice was about that?

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I knew about most of these

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

2

messages. There are one or two that I didn't know about, sir.

3

Mr. Mitchell: Can you identify those that you didn't know about?

4

5

6

General Gerow: Yes, sir. I do not believe that I had the copy of the message referred to in this document at page 19, sir, dated the 4th of December.

7

8

9

10

Mr. Mitchell: That is a dispatch from the Commanding General at Hawaii to the Chief of the Army Air Corps; is that the one you refer to?

11

General Gerow: Yes, sir, on page 19, sir.

12

13

Mr. Mitchell: How did these dispatches come to you? Some of them you participated in preparing, did you?

14

15

16

17

18

General Gerow: Yes, sir. Some of them are what might be called joint messages prepared by the War Plans of both the Army and Navy working together. Others were messages that were prepared in the War Department for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval.

19

20

21

Senator Lucas: Mr. Counsel, if I may interject, this exhibit you are now referring to, the folder I have shows December 10. That must be an error.

22

23

24

Mr. Mitchell: What page?

Senator Lucas: Page 19. Exhibit 32. Is that the correct date?

25

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Lucas: That came after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. Gesell: There is an earlier message, Senator Lucas, from General Short, which appears earlier. This one, however, I think was dated December 10.

Senator Lucas: All right. I apologize for interrupting.

The Chairman: Go ahead.

Mr. Gesell: That may have been sent somewhat earlier. I think the December 10 date is the arrival date.

Mr. Mitchell: It says on it "Received December 10".

Mr. Murphy: It says, at the beginning, "December 4, No. 1033". "No. 1033 December 4th". Right below "Chief Army Air Corps", top of the page on the left.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir. Sent on the 4th, received on the 10th.

The Chairman: All right.

Shefner follows  
2:25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, on November 21, 1941 I  
3 understand you attended a conference with Secretary Hull,  
4 Admiral Stark and Messrs. Hornbeck, Hamilton and Ballantine  
5 of the State Department and I will ask you to refer to your  
6 memorandum of November 21st to the Secretary of State, part  
7 of exhibit 18. Have you that before you?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have that exhibit, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: That was a memorandum you made of the  
10 conference that was held on the 21st, was it, at the time  
11 you made it?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: And it correctly records the proceedings  
14 at the meeting as you remembered them on the 24th of Novem-  
15 ber 1941?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: Why don't you read it?

18 Mr. Mitchell: Shall I read it? It is in evidence.

19 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

20 Mr. Mitchell: It is a memorandum to the Chief of  
21 Staff, "Subject: Far Eastern Situation", dated November  
22 21, 1941 and signed by General Gerow. It says: (Reading)

23 "A conference was held in the State Department  
24 at 9:45 a.m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary  
25 Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark and

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and  
3 Navy representatives to express their informal views  
4 from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative  
5 outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A).  
6 He explained that the outline was in a formative stage  
7 and had not been adopted by the State Department.

8 "The various provisions were discussed. Both  
9 Admiral Stark and General Gerow were of the opinion that,  
10 in general; the document was satisfactory from a mili-  
11 tary viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity  
12 to make a more detailed study of its possible effect  
13 on the military situation. It was agreed that comments  
14 would be submitted early the same afternoon.

15 "The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own  
16 (Tab C) are attached. I informed Admiral Stark verbal-  
17 ly that I regretted the reference to Army forces in the  
18 Navy comments on provisions A 1. I feel that no re-  
19 strictions should be placed on Army's preparations to  
20 make the Philippines secure.

21 "I informed the Secretary of War and General Dryden  
22 verbally of the conference.

23 (Signed) L. T. Gerow,

24 Brigadier General."

25 Do you remember what that related to?

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2           General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3           Mr. Mitchell: What was it? That is, the document that  
4 Secretary Hull said was a tentative outline of a basis for  
5 agreement with Japan?

6           General Gerow: Yes, sir, it was a proposal, a tent-  
7 ative draft proposal for delivery to Japan of a modus vi-  
8 vendi.

9           Mr. Mitchell: You got into the modus vivendi picture  
10 at that time then, did you ?

11           General Gerow: Yes, sir.

12           Mr. Mitchell: Did you make a subsequent memorandum  
13 for the Secretary of State on that subject?

14           General Gerow: Yes, sir, I did.

15           Mr. Mitchell: Or was it an earlier one?

16           General Gerow: I made one the same afternoon of the  
17 conference, November the 21st, sir.

18           Mr. Mitchell: I see. The memorandum I just read to  
19 you to the Chief of Staff was made on the 24th and related  
20 to the conference on the 21st. Now, the memorandum I am  
21 just calling your attention to was made on the same day as  
22 the conference, was it?

23           General Gerow: Yes, sir. It was agreed we would put  
24 in our views on the State Department paper that same after-  
25 noon, sir.

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: And this one I have just referred to  
3 is your view on that?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: As you made it then?

6 General Gerow: The one dated November the 21st.

7 Mr. Mitchell: That has been offered but not read. Shall  
8 I read it?

9 The Chairman: Read it, yes.

10 Mr. Keefe: What is the exhibit number?

11 Mr. Mitchell: It is part of exhibit 18. There were  
12 several documents together.

13 Mr. Keefe: All right.

14 Mr. Mitchell: It is a memorandum for the Secretary of  
15 State. Maybe you should take a shot at it.

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I will read it.

17 Senator Ferguson: May I interrupt? Both are part of  
18 exhibit 18?

19 Mr. Mitchell: That is right.

20 The Chairman: Go ahead, General.

21 General Gerow: (Reading)

22 This is a memorandum headed:

23 "WAR DEPARTMENT

24 "WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

25 "War Plans Division



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

"Washington

November 21, 1941.

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative 'Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United States and Japan,' and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives-- the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British-- both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B. - 5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geo-

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 graphical lay-out in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such  
3 that military, time and space factors are all in favor  
4 of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to  
5 reach an agreement as to what are 'equivalent forces'  
6 and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthor-  
7 ized increases are made in those forces. Such an ar-  
8 rangement would increase the vulnerability of the Rus-  
9 sian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces,  
10 and at the same time remove the very real threat to  
11 Japanese cities of the Russian Air based therein. From  
12 the U. S. viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to  
13 have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields  
14 securely guarded by a potential ally.

15 "The paper has been considered as a whole. If  
16 major changes are made in its provisions, it is re-  
17 quested that the War Department be given an opportunity  
18 to consider the military aspects of such changes.

19 "The Chief of Staff is out of the city and conse-  
20 quently this paper has not been presented for his consider-  
21 ation. War Plans Division believes that he would con-  
22 cur in the views expressed above.

23 (Signed) L. T. GEROW

24 Brigadier General,

25 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff."

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Now, you had a meeting again on November  
3 24th. General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Under Secretary  
4 Welles and yourself and possibly others were present. Have  
5 you any memorandum of that meeting? Do you have a record of  
6 such a meeting? Do you remember anything about it?

7 General Gerow: I cannot recall at this time, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, at this meeting on the 21st  
9 when this proposed modus vivendi message was under consider-  
10 ation, do you remember the discussions that took place at  
11 that meeting beyond your memorandum?

12 General Gerow: No, sir. The memorandum would be much  
13 more correct than my memory at this time, sir. I cannot re-  
14 call the details.

15 Mr. Mitchell: During your conferences with the State  
16 Department people about the modus vivendi do you recollect  
17 having had your attention called to a message from Mr.  
18 Churchill in which he said it was alright with Great Britain  
19 but how about the Chinese and it was rather thin diet for  
20 the Chinese. Do you remember having brought to your atten-  
21 tion the message from Chiang Kai-shek in which he protested  
22 against the modus vivendi because it would result in the  
23 collapse of the Chinese Army and defense? Do you remember  
24 anything about that?

25 General Gerow: I do not recall this message, no, sir.

1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 I attended this particular conference in the absence of the  
3 Chief of Staff and that may have been discussed at some  
4 other conference at which I was not present. I do not re-  
5 call that, however.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have more than one meeting that  
7 you attended with State Department people, - here was  
8 Welles of the State Department, not Mr. Hull, - that dealt  
9 with this modus vivendi? Can you recall more than the one?

10 General Gerow: I can only recall the one, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Well, did you know at the time that the  
12 modus vivendi idea was going to be abandoned?

13 General Gerow: I do not recall that I knew that, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have a part in drafting the warn-  
15 ing message sent by the War Department to General Short on  
16 November 27, 1941?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: What function had the War Plans Division  
19 in sending a message of that character?

20 General Gerow: It was the responsibility of War Plans  
21 Division to prepare such draft messages for consideration of  
22 the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, do I understand that it was  
24 not your function to send merely information messages?  
25 Weren't you confined to sending messages that had to do with