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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER

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FREEDOM

BY SIDNEY HOOK

OF FREEDOM, one can say what St. Augustine said of time. "If no one asks me what it is, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not." (*Confessions* Book XI, XIV). Yet if we know how freedom is attained we are content that we know something of what it is. He who refuses to make a quest until he has a bullet proof definition in hand from which he can *deduce* the object of his quest can never proceed far, for either he is pretending to discover what he knows already or else raises problems of how what is both novel and valid can be inferred without logical sleight-of-hand from what is familiar. But it is the method and manner of the discussion rather than its matter which lead to confusion in philosophy. The deepest source of this confusion can be traced to a tendency to convert the *distinctions* and differences we find in subject matter into *separations*, then to pose the question of how these separations can be brought together and end by hopelessly confounding the situation in an attempt to deduce one from the other. And yet our *understanding* of natural and social events overtly expressed in our empirical practices is not beset with the difficulties that oftimes attend our *explanation* of them. Despite Hegel we never really deduce categories from one another. We discover mind in an order of things and bodies, and yet we know that minds are not bodies, colors in a series of vibrations and yet colors are not vibrations, lines in points and points in lines and yet lines are not points, thoughts in an order of words and yet words are not thoughts, and so on. The world with its latencies and possibilities is given once and for all time and in its growth and movement there are revealed different dimensions and

aspects which are incommensurable and therefore irreducible. One born blind does not know what red or green is merely because he knows its vibration number. He may become a physicist but he can never paint a landscape. These dimensions, stripping the word of its spatial sense, are not created by consciousness but are objective discoveries, like the play of light and color upon a mountain peak, a temple or a scaffold, all of which have distinct organizations in stone and straw of their own. When it is said that the world is given once and for all time—a phrase of Mach's which has provoked bitter criticism—the statement is not intended as a proposition in logic, but as a presupposition of natural human behavior. It is true that a great many things have been discovered from suppositions and hypothesis of what the world is not, but these conceptions like guesses on a more homely plane, transfer and attribute the characters of the world discovered to segments and regions of the world to be explored.

These observations stated baldly may be accepted as so many commonplaces until it is understood to what use we intend to put them. For following their lead we say that freedom is a fact discovered in knowledge of an order of necessity or mechanism; or that man wins or finds freedom in a world in which he is confronted by necessity. Such a statement seems to outrage the sensibilities of the tender minded who unwarrantably conclude that an equation has been drawn between two conceptions commonly taken to be contradictory and who feel that there is something logically and ethically suspicious in locating human freedom in a mechanical order obviously indifferent to human hopes and desires. Then without further excuse we are assailed with a great deal of talk about the *will* being free, about psychic indeterminism and mental teleology.

Now the so-called 'problem' of freedom, as I understand it, is not primarily an inquiry for psychology but an inquiry for ethics. It is not a question of whether the *will* is free but whether the mind is free, or in other words, it is a question of whether man and man's *acts* in terms of which we read his mind, are free. It is very difficult to understand the view which holds that man's freedom begins where natural law ends, that the realm of freedom is outside the realm of physical necessity and law. If that were the case such freedom would be utterly unintelligible. For consider, what would freedom mean

in a world where there is no uniformity, measure or ordered sequence—what could the free will or free mind or free man effect or accomplish if the objects and things through which that freedom expressed itself had no intrinsic order in virtue of which they could be transformed, used or enjoyed? In the absence of mechanics how would what is called 'free will' differ from the fevered fancies of the delirious or the extravagant conceits of the insane? As an empirical fact it can be shown that when the mind or will—no matter whose—expresses its choice it does not intend to open the floodgates to gay disorders and chaos but intends rather to introduce additional order—to significantly determine and stabalize the flow of things so that its power might be potentialized for future use and appreciation.

Nor is the rejoinder that the will is free to choose between the necessity of one order and the necessity of another any more intelligible. First, it flies in the face of modern science which shows not only that the will can be directly controlled by suggestion but that together with our emotional life it is functionally dependent upon a certain physiological state of glands, nerves, toxins, etc. Second, if it be held that a man's acts are independent of the facts of heredity, free from motive, free from environment, free from character,—it follows that his acts must be free from his very self—for all of these factors define the self. He who denies this inference is committed to the view that the self is a spook or ghost lodged somewhere in the back of the brain playing hide and seek with the scientist's scalpel. Aristotle knew better. But at any rate the utter divorce between character and free acts gives rise to a host of absurdities and confuses the theory of responsibility and punishment in whose interest it was elaborated and defended. For if nothing about 'X' is the cause of his act how can he be said to be the author of it? Those who believe that because every volition or act can be tied down to a uniquely determined movement of brain molecules man is thereby deprived of his freedom might just as well say that a man is a slave because he undergoes an operation in order to save his life or preserve his health and that the only time he can *freely* submit to the surgeon's knife is when there is no reason in the world why he should be operated on at all. So much for the psychology of the matter entered into to remove certain preliminary misconceptions.

"Where then does freedom come in?" interject those who believe

that the discovery of structures or invariant law in nature closes the question with an emphatic negative. The answer is simple. Just because I have clear purposes and can realize them I say that freedom is a fact—a fact in social life and experience—discovered wherever knowledge of natural and emotional necessities is present. When ever there is a confusion of purposes, whenever we do not know what we want or do not know what we mean, we are unfree. This seems to be a somewhat cavalier and paradoxical solution of the problem for I am saying that just because a man's purposes, aspirations, acts or will, if you please, are meddled and inconsistent—just because they are not unambiguously *determined* man is unfree. This is not or should not be news in the realm of mind. Aristotle in Book III of his *Nicomachean Ethics* has enumerated in another connection the limitations which a man is free *from* when he is said to be free at all. They are (1) the physical compulsion of some external force and (2) ignorance of the circumstances in which an act is performed. Insofar as the first may possibly be affected by power or control which follows upon knowledge, it merges into the second.

Knowledge, then, of ourselves and of the world without is the key to freedom for it tells us what we are and that we can be no other than what we are. Freedom is the consequence of this knowledge revealed and attested to by our everyday activities. A musical virtuoso is free to play only when he has acquired a mastery of the instrument and its technique; a mechanic or artisan is free in action and in thought only when he is sufficiently familiar with the organization of his machines and the character of his problem and materials to make application effective. Self-knowledge is in so far forth freedom because he who clearly understands himself is not hampered by irresolution, doubt or indecision for like Socrates in Santayana's *Dialogues in Limbo* he "knows his own mind, and thoroughly discerns what he means and what he loves." He who knows not his own mind, the sources of his ideals and the direction in which they seek fulfillment is wasted by a torturing fever of desire, a restless fretting and striving for a past that can never be recalled and a future that can never be realized. "He who talks of freedom and excludes thought," says Hegel, "knows not what he says."

Freedom of mind implies an acceptance—an acceptance of what knowledge reveals concerning the necessary order of things. This

acceptance is not the resignation of one who baffled and bewildered in a world too complex for his wits represses his instincts and desires in a severe asceticism; it is not the acceptance of the camel or the Christian who take their burden kneeling; but it is an acceptance that is at the same time an affirmation—an affirmation not of the world's *goodness* but of the world's *necessity* an affirmation which leaves the mind sane, unperturbed by illusion and anguish. When the utter inexorableness of law comes home to one, revolt cannot stir the heart, desire for the impossible burns itself out into cold ash. We do not fume and fuss because we have no eyes in the back of our head and we do not hold meetings of protest against the summer's heat and the winter's cold. Only he who accepts the rainstorm is free to go about in it with an umbrella.

It is sometimes thought that if all of life's activities are determined by the movement of 'atoms in the void' then every counsel of wisdom is vain and every increase in knowledge is superfluous, availing little to influence the course of events. This clearly does not follow. My health at any moment is completely determined by the state of my body and yet the knowledge of medicine may enable me to develop a stronger and healthier body. We may be so built that emotions of one sort or another continually affect the mind. But by understanding the mechanism which conditions the disturbance we may cause a particular emotion to be displaced by another by submitting ourselves to an external stimulus which sets up within us a stronger reaction. By substituting one stimulus for another we succeed in making emotions yield to others in modifying their particular expressions. Pugnacity for instance, can never be argued or beaten out of a man. But the situation may be so presented as to make it give way to stronger emotions of pity or love. As a form of emotional disturbance pugnacity is neither good nor bad, but becomes such as its definite expressions affect interests and desires. Knowledge of how these irrepressible pugnacious tendencies operate may lead us to find different fields for them to assert themselves and suggest different ends to set before them. Its operation, however, is none the less chemically determined whether we find it good or bad. Knowledge enables us to rule our passions by guiding them not by suppressing them. A great deal of the psychology of sublimation taken as a rational therapeutic and not as a psychoanolytic myth is

contained in Parts 3-5 of Spinoza's *Ethics*. But, as we shall see, because all of our acts and emotions are determined it does not mean that they are *predestined* or fated. Of course the difference between a free act and an act that is not free does not necessarily lie in a difference between the kinds of action performed. A wise man and a fool may vote the same ticket or go to the same church. Some have therefore argued that since every choice is a value judgment, existence being neutral to *all* values, every chooser is equally free in the realm in which that choosing goes on. If this is what is meant by freedom, one may very well grant it and stop to ask what important distinction is clarified besides that of fact and value. To close the question here is surely to overlook the tremendous difference which *judgments* of fact or the possession of knowledge make in their manifold effects upon the judgments of value.

Freedom, then, like personality, virtue, honor and most other things worth having, is not a natural endowment but a conventional or ethical acquisition—something won through knowledge and analysis. If we may reverse the traditional interpretation of the Bible story we should say that Adam in his ignorance and innocence could not have performed a free moral act in eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Only after having partaken of the fruit and acquired knowledge can Adam in any significant sense be said to have become free—as free as his Creator for whom the possession of knowledge is the sceptre and writ of divinity and hence of freedom. "And the Lord God said, 'Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil."

At this point those who fear that every use of the word freedom conceals a hidden theology interpose with a final and 'crushing' objection. Granted, they say, that so-called freedom is knowledge of the union of the temper and pulse of our life with the nature of things is it not true that that knowledge itself is determined by the movement of 'atoms in the void' and therefore is no more an expression of freedom than ignorance and error which are also the result of matter in motion? It is foolish to respond that knowledge of the dependence of knowledge upon some kind of molecular change is freedom for it is promptly pointed out that knowledge of such dependence is itself conditioned by a brain state. And so the game of shuttlecock and battledore so popular in contemporary discussion of

the problem, is on. It can only proceed because of the fruitless and self-defeating practice of calling one another's subject matter into question instead of following an empirical lead. In one case a certain physiological state or configuration of atoms is called into question by being reduced to terms of structure instead of being examined in respect to purport. A picture may be defined in terms of pigments and oils but it is not thereby understood. Perception of the conditions of knowledge is not perception of its meaning.

Therefore to those who affirm in the discussion of freedom that knowledge itself is determined by certain physical characters and chemical secretions we say, "Quite true but you are shifting the issue and calling subject matter into question by investigating the *antecedents* of knowledge instead of its *consequences*. And in the consequences of knowledge lies *freedom*." Knowledge of ourselves and of nature—of its fixities and uncertainties, enables us to control and predict. Where we can control and guide and renounce—even if it be no more than putting on a new face before necessity, there is freedom found. When joy is consequent upon the complete understanding of necessity then freedom is intensified. Once knowledge is present and the impossibility or uncertainty of volition or choice between any two alternatives is not to be attributed to a freedom of indifference, better called paralysis, of will and impulse but either to physical constraint or to the objective indeterminateness of the situation. as when we say "We do not *know* what to do," or "We *can* not do what we know should be done." As knowledge gives out the rational will falters and becomes free again only as we act on the presumptive probabilities of knowledge relations which hold of the past.

This is not denying that the antecedents of knowledge are the conditions of freedom. It is maintaining, however, to return to the argument of the opening paragraph, that freedom is not its conditions any more than color is its vibrations. It may very well be that knowledge may not be completely attainable because of some physical or physiological lack or defect, yet striving for it will develop to the full those potentialities for knowledge within us. Reaching rock bottom we say that he whose 'bodily complexion' makes impossible the attainment of knowledge is not free and can never become free. He is enslaved by nature.

We can put this another way and gladden the hearts of those

who pride themselves on their scientific bias. A life of human freedom is one determined by knowledge; a life of human bondage is one not so determined. But it must be borne in mind that we have not destroyed the distinction although we have made it more difficult to understand, for the significance shifts from the word 'determined' which is the same in both cases, to the different phrases which qualify it. Whenever we limit ourselves to fundamental description—and this is our business as metaphysicians—no explanation can wipe out distinctions in subject matter discovered as a matter of fact.

Although human freedom depends upon a natural order, the natural order does not determine or confer upon itself significance. That is to say, the values which arise in the possession and exercise of freedom can never be derived from the order of the domain in which that freedom is a fact. He who sees the whole of things may idly watch its play as a spectator, may participate with zest in its movement as an actor, or may with the power of a divine playwright pull down the curtain upon the living. For the free man there is no cosmic compulsion to live or die, to be a saint or a scoundrel, to pray or to scoff. But in whatever he will do he will be true to his own nature. For him the compulsion follows *after* a basic choice but follows *from* the consequences of the choice in an ordered world. If he chooses to live in society then the compulsion arises from the nature of society. But the foresight of the free man marks out and accepts these compulsions as conditions so that although their full force is felt they do not chafe or sting. Unless as life is dear to us there is nothing to prevent us from taking fire as a patch of sunlight or as a raiment of many colors. And when we embrace illusions and hug our dreams to our heart we know that we do so only on nature's suffrance hedged in and confined by its laws and humors.

It was said above that the human freedom we have discovered is in no sense a fatalism. The *means* which a free man selects or adopts to realize his aims and ends follow from his character, from his working *materials* and *environment*. But from the viewpoint of fatalism—whether it be the popular or classical conception, no matter what a man's character is, no matter what he does or how much or how little he knows, the end to which he is predestined will be fulfilled, 'will-he nill-he'. Fatalism involves the same negation of an order in nature and in man as does radical indeterminism.

Freedom as a way of life finally is not unrelated to the metaphysics of nature. If the whole of existence is an absolute mechanism, completely and irreversibly ordered, then conplete and absolute freedom is within human reach for freedom becomes a direct function of understanding and insight into nature and human nature. However in a world which seems to present a cross grained pattern of law and chance, freedom although more precious is more difficult to attain. Unpredictable leaps and jumps in nature set at nought calculations based upon the assumption of unbroken continuous law. Says Santayana " . . . the most visionary of mystics . . . knows how invisibly fly the shafts of Apollo: let but the lightest of them cut the knot of the heart, and suddenly there is an end of eloquence and policy and mighty determination. He knows that it suffices for the wind to change and all the fleets of thought will forget their errand and sail for another haven."

Therefore in an open universe, spiced with chance and alive with possibilities, a life of human freedom is not only an organized enterprise, it is a spirited adventure as well.

A SINGULAR, INADEQUATE CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

SOME time ago the present writer discussed in an article in *The Open Court* the status of philosophy in our own day—or the respective views of several eminent and influential thinkers regarding the mission, province and function of philosophy. It was clearly shown among other things, that those views diverge widely; that while some adhere to the opinion of Spencer as to the synthetic character and task of philosophy, others are satisfied that philosophy will decay and die unless it finds and cultivates, in scientific fashion, *a field of its own*,—unless, that is, it takes up real and vital problems *not covered by any other branch of knowledge* or discipline and contrives to deal with them fruitfully and effectively.

It is somewhat surprising to note that Prof. Will Durant, in his fascinating and on the whole deservedly popular though here and there superficial *Story of Philosophy*, a much-needed volume that supplements and in a sense supersedes George Henry Lewes' once well known and widely read scholarly *Biographical History of Philosophy*, advances a conception of philosophy that is strangely unmodern, humble, not to say mean, and certain to be rejected with scorn by most of the scholars who work in the philosophic field and are endeavoring to bring forth solid and wholesome fruit.

Prof. Durant naturally felt that he could not treat philosophy historically and analytically without giving a tolerably exact definition of the term descriptive of his subject matter. Here is his definition of philosophy:

"Science seems always to advance, while philosophy seems always to lose ground. Yet this is only because philosophy accepts the hard and hazardous task of dealing with problems not yet open to the

methods of science—problems like good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and freedom, life and death; so soon as a field of inquiry yields knowledge susceptible of exact formulation, it is called science. Every science begins as philosophy and ends as art; it arises in hypothesis and grows into achievement. Philosophy is a hypothetical interpretation of the unknown (as in metaphysics), or of the inexactly known (as in ethics or political philosophy); it is in the front trench in the siege of truth. Science is the captured territory; and behind it are those secure regions in which knowledge and art build our imperfect and marvelous world. Philosophy seems to stand still—perplexed; but only because she leaves the fruits of victory to her daughters, the sciences, and herself passes on, divinely discontent, to the uncertain and unexplored."

Very fine rhetoric, that; but it is even approximately true? Let us see. In the first place, the sciences are not free, and never will be, from "hypothetical interpretations." Any given science, in addition to "laws", gives us theories and suppositions. No science is static. No science is "content," or proud of the far from "secure" regions behind it.

In the second place, no science "ends" in art. We apply science and use it in industry, art and all sorts of practical activities. But no *end* is ever reached. Science continues its researches, frames new theories, modifies old ones, and points the way to new applications and utilities.

In the third place, philosophy is not the *mother* of the sciences. Huxley called science "organized common sense," which implies, quite correctly, that the sciences are the daughters of observation and experimentation, controlled and uncontrolled. No facts, no science. No sufficient body of facts, no theory worthy of the adjective "scientific." No repeated and verified conclusions, no definitely and thoroughly established uniformities, no scientific law.

With the foregoing reservations and amendments in mind—and they are almost self-evident—what becomes of Prof. Durant's definition and characterization of philosophy?

If philosophy is not scientific and knows not the methods and procedure of science, how *does* it frame its guesses or theories? If philosophy is not organized common sense, what is it? Where does it find its premises, and how does it verify its tentative conclusions?

It is true that in the past philosophy has concerned itself with many problems of which several sciences have calmly and cruelly

robbed it. When philosophy was a rag bag, a strange compound, with theology, metaphysics, history, ethics, logic, psychology and other branches of knowledge as its ingredients, it did deal, after a fashion, with scientific theories and scientific laws. Today no science, whether exact or inexact, is in the least dependent upon or in partnership with philosophy. Each science works in its own field and seeks to solve its own problems. If philosophy has problems peculiar to itself, and hopes to solve them, then it follows that philosophy is employing the methods of science and aspires to the position of a tolerably exact science. If its problems are either unreal or insoluble, then it is merely wasting time and energy, churning wind, spoiling ink and paper.

The philosophy that stands still does so because it is lifeless and incapable of movement. The philosophy that *seems* to lose ground always, *does* lose ground always. The philosophy that has been neglected and scorned by men of science and by common sense has deserved neglect and scorn, because it had no beginning, no middle and no goal. Today many philosophers realize that they cannot redeem their corner in the sun unless they make satisfactory progress and accept the canons and tests of science.

Let us take the supposedly philosophical problems mentioned by Prof. Durant. There is first the problem of good and evil. That is not a *philosophical* problem at all. Good and evil are *ethical* conceptions; they imply a human standard, an ideal. There are good economic arrangements and bad, good political institutions and bad, good citizens and bad, good books and bad, good diplomacy and bad. If the golden rule be our social ideal and standard, then we know what we mean when we talk of good and evil. There can be no philosophical formula embracing all the good and all evil in the universe and beyond. Philosophers as such will do nothing with the problem; economists, ethicists, statesmen, diplomats, employers, workmen, neighbors can do much with it and are, in fact, doing something with it all the time.

Or take the problem of order and freedom. The problem is empty unless we ask order and freedom *where, in what sense, in relation to what purpose*. Jurisprudence, political science, economics, art are severally interested in that problem. Society needs order, but the individual needs freedom as well as order. How are these needs to be reconciled? Men must be free to engage in business, to join parties, to remain outside of parties, to study and read, to amuse

themselves, to marry and bring up children. At the same time men must refrain from crime, aggression, nuisances. Here are real problems to be solved by real sciences. Prohibition, punishment, control of certain industries, prevention of monopoly and fraud, regulation of external conduct in accordance with decency and taste—here are significant problems of order and freedom. The philosopher on the other hand may discuss order and freedom in the abstract till doomsday without getting anywhere.

The same observations may be made concerning ugliness and beauty, life and death. Psychical research professes to throw some light on death, but it takes great care to adopt scientific methods. It asks us to examine certain evidence, to study and observe certain alleged phenomena. It does not claim exemption from scientific criticism. It will stand or fall, in the end, by the kind and quality of proof it manages to offer. As to ugliness and beauty, it is clear that psychology, physiology, physics, anthropology and sociology will have to cooperate in solving that problem. Conceptions of beauty and ugliness vary with space and time, with climate and race. Music and painting sufficiently illustrate this truth.

Prof. Durant ought not to have missed the fact that some of the contemporary philosophers long for, but dare not avow frankly that they long for the role which Herbert Spencer claimed for them—that of builders of synthetic systems of thought. The melancholy fate of Spencer's own alleged system does not encourage hopes of other would be synthetic philosophers. Systems are unpopular today, and the revolutionary changes in science are well calculated to make them unpopular. Still, the philosopher vaguely feels that he *must* build systems on the foundations furnished by the various sciences or lose his occupation and function. Prof. Dewey hints at a synthetic philosophy when he says that philosophy deals with human values and is in a sense a branch of ethics. Some of his followers have said that the philosopher is a sort of super-mediator and arbitrator by reason of his detachment, broad culture, insight and wisdom. These utterances point to system building, though, as already intimated, it requires rigorous cross-examination to bring out the claim and the dream. The alternative to synthetic system building, to repeat, is the policy advocated by Bertrand Russell—namely, the selection of some real and important questions and problems *not studied or reserved for study by the several sciences* and the treatment of them, under the label of philosophy, in a strictly scientific manner. If no such prob-

lems exist, according to Mr. Russell, then philosophy had better put up its shutters and go out of business. At any rate, Prof. Durant's idea of philosophy is sadly out of date and out of harmony with recent and current developments in thought.

For nothing that has happened to philosophy, as formerly understood, could have been avoided. Certainly it would have been idle and puerile to ask the several sciences—psychology, ethics, physics, mathematics, history, etc.—to "respect" philosophy by refraining from the study and discussion of such of its supposed elements as severally fell, naturally and inevitably, within their own respective fields. Mr. Durant says in a popular and flippant magazine article that philosophy is unpopular and has had to submit to serious successive losses. The losses are gains to science and to human progress; and, as a matter of fact, philosophy is not unpopular when it attempts to compete with exact sciences in their own domains—a task for which, as Prof. Dewey said, it is woefully unfit.

It has become impossible today for any thinker to take all knowledge for his province. Specialization is inevitable, though it has its recognized dangers. The philosopher cannot permit himself to be ignorant of the science of his time, but he cannot be at home in all the sciences. He must consult the experts and be guided by them. The experts and specialists, on the other hand, are quite disposed nowadays to acknowledge their limitations and to consult the philosophers who evince comprehension of and regard for truly scientific methods.

We may note here that Prof. A. Whitehead, the eminent British mathematician and physicist, who is also a metaphysician and a philosopher, does not share Mr. Durant's notion of the function of philosophy. Although the chapter and paragraphs on philosophy to be found in Mr. Whitehead's new and most timely work, *Science in the Modern World,"* leave not a little to be desired, it is not difficult to gather that the author believes in the strictest use of the methods and tests of science by the philosophers. What is valuable in Kant and in Bergson, for example, Mr. Whitehead attributes to the scientific knowledge possessed by those great thinkers. As to the type of problems to be dealt with by philosophers, Mr. Whitehead apparently takes it for granted that no serious controversy is possible over that question. He does not consider it necessary to throw overboard the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume and others. The relation between object and subject, the nature of

reality, the validity of human reasoning, the ultimate principles of being, the emergence of value in a world of incessant change and flux—these are the essential philosophical problems to be studied and restudied, according to Mr. Whitehead, in the light of the laws and theories of the exact sciences. This is a tenable position, and it implies at least, that philosophy is *not* a branch of ethics, nor an adjunct to theology, nor a set of mere conjectures incapable of verification, but an independent discipline possessed of a good title to the field it cultivates.

AMERICAN INDIAN COMPOSITIONS REFLECTING THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE TRIBES

BY GEORGE H. DAUGHERTY, JR.

ONE OF THE MOST important factors influencing the Indian's point of view was the social and political organization of the tribes. It was also a circumstance productive of several notable pieces of literature. The egocentric or individualistic point of view of the redskin has already been illustrated through selections quoted in the preceding articles of this series. Nevertheless, the Indian was not a solitary; nor in spite of all his wood craft was he able to survive alone in the wilderness. The hostile environment, especially in the winter, the uncertain food supply (particularly among those tribes which depended most on hunting), and the continual warfare with enemy bands forced him to lead a communal existence. He was therefore gregarious in the extreme, always herding with his kind in villages or settlements, for protection, shelter, warmth, and food. No member of the group, whether it was large or small, was economically independent of the rest; nor could a few individuals remain safe and prosperous when others were in hard circumstances. There were, it is true, plutocratic tribesmen, noted for their ability to collect scalps and steal horses; but these riches mostly served to lend distinction. In such important matters as food and skins or blankets for winter, all shared to a large extent alike.

The existence of the individual tribesman was generally uncomfortable and often extremely hazardous. Let anyone who has experienced even an average winter in the lake region of the Middle West imagine himself living in a draughty tipi in a ten-below-zero spell, and dependent for his entire food supply on his ability to shoot with a bow and arrow—always with the hazard of being toma-

hawked from behind by members of a hostile tribe. The thought of returning to find his whole village in ashes, and a few bloody rags the only remaining traces of his family and friends occasionally rendered thoughtful even the toughest savage. The following songs are indicative of his state of mind on such occasions.

"The *Haethuka* are dead,
I weep,
I walk around the village."[1]
"The odor of death,
I discern the odor of death
In the front of my body."[2]

The obvious result of such conditions was the communal system, whereby the food supply and other necessities of life were apportioned to each family. In many cases a large part of the food was obtained in great tribal or village "hunts", in which all available members took part. The plains Indians, especially, followed the herds of buffalo, and moved back and forth in large groups as they drove the neighboring tribes before them, or were in turn defeated.[3] Within villages of the more sedentary tribes there were often communal houses where several families lived together.[4] This close relation of the individual to the economic and social life of the whole group is characteristic of primitive society, and becomes even closer in the smaller groups down to the single family.

The interior organization of the Indian tribes led into the production of notable pieces of tribal literature, of which the most remarkable is the famous Iroquois "Book of Rites", a ritual of important ceremonies. An explanation of the leading features of Indian social and political organization is necessary, however, to the proper understanding of this piece of Indian literature. The basis for the government of all or most Indian tribes was the clan and council system. The clan or gens was a group of people inside the tribe, actually or theoretically related by blood. The organization was both social and political in its nature, and was usually named after some tutelary animal deity.[5] In the *clan*, lineal descent, inheritance of personal property, and the hereditary right to public

[1]Fletcher "Omaha Music", p. 258-9.
[2]Densmore, "Chippewa Music", II, p. 114.
[3]McGee, "The Siouan Indians", p. 186.
[4]*Ibid.*, p. 172. See also accounts cited of the Iroquois tribes.
[5]See J. R. Swanton, "Names and Naming", *Hodge* II, pp. 16-18, and Appendix G.

office are traced through the female line, while in the *gens* they devolve through the male line. The laws and privileges of the clan or gens, which of course had its own council, were numerous and well defined. They related to marriage,[6] voting for chiefs and other leaders, obligations of mutual help, and re-dress of injuries.[7] All the clans in a tribe, varying in number from two or three to ten or fifteen, were interlocked by marriage.

Many if not most communities were organized by a further development of the clan and council system, the fratry or group of clans. These frateries, of which there were any number from one to four in any given community, seem to have been political and ceremonial units. Occasionally they were exogamic; so that a man was compelled to marry outside his fratery.[8] Among some tribes the fratery organization was temporary, and resorted to only on special occasions such as war or a buffalo hunt;[9] among the more advanced and best organized tribes the fratery was the controlling political unit. A typical fratery organization of a village might divide the people into two halves, "the summer people" and "the winter people", each having charge of certain functions peculiar to their season.[10]

Tribes were made up of any number of communities or bands, either sedentary or migratory; and their organization showed every degree of complexity. Where there was any tribal government at all, it was based on the council system. The clans held their councils and elected chiefs who in turn formed the tribal council to assist the tribal chief. In most tribal governments the civil and military functions were carefully discriminatel. "The civil government was lodged in a chosen body of men usually called chiefs, of whom there were commonly several grades. Usually the chiefs were organized in a council exercising legislative, judicial, and executive functions in matters pertaining to the welfare of the tribe. The civil chief was not by virtue of his office a military leader. Among

[6]Most clans or gens were exogamic, *i. e.* allowed no members to marry within the group. A few were endogamic, to the exclusion of outside marriages. See Clark Wissler, *The American Indians*, p. 157. Horatio Hale, *The Iroquois Book of Rites*, and Appendix H.

[7]Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London 1877, p. 71.

[8]Wissler, *The American Indians*, p. 158.

[9]Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology", pp. 221-2.

[10]Wissler, *op. cit.*, p. 158. See also J. O. Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology", pp. 238-239; Francs La Flesche, "The Osage Tribe", *36th Ann. Rep. B. A. E.* 1914-15. J. R. Swanton, "Osage", *Hodge* II, pp. 156-7. J. O. Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology", pp. 226.

the Iroquois a civil chief in order to go to war had to resign his civil function during his absence on the war path."[11] The manner in which a chief was chosen varied considerably. In some loosely organized California villages the richest man was chief. Among the Sioux, leaders were chosen because of bravery and generosity, and Sious, leaders were chosen because of bravery and generosity, and were deposed when incompetent.[12] It is notable that the war chief was by some tribes considered second in rank to the civil chief, whose office was hereditary.[13] In a few cases the civil chieftainship was hereditary in some leading clan; but the rest of the tribe had the right to veto the candidate proposed by this clan, and cause it to nominate another.[14]

The largest organization of Indian government, usually within the linguistic family, was the confederacy or alliance of whole tribes. At the time of the discovery, tribal government was the usual form; confederacies were temporary, and were resorted to only for war emergencies. Most Indians had not yet attained the power of largely extended and cohesive organization.[15] One outstanding exception to the above statement must nevertheless be remarked. The five Iroquoian tribes inhabiting New York,— the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca, later (1722) reinforced by the Tuscarora—succeeded sometime between the years 1570 and 1600 in forming a powerful political and military league.[16] It was this league which was the occasion for the famous *Iroquois Book of Rites*, perhaps the most notable work in all the literature of the North American Indians.[17]

Only the main features of the League need be mentioned here. Its basic unit was the organized tribe. The governing body was a supreme council composed of representatives elected from the constituent tribes. The individual chiefs, members of the supreme

[11]Hewitt, "Government", *Hodge* I, p. 498.

[12]Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology", pp. 223-4.

[13]Warren, "History of the Ojibways", p. 319.

[14]Hewitt, "Iroquois", *Hodge* I, p. 617.

[15]Wissler, *The American Indians*, pp. 150 ff. Hewitt, "Government, *Hodge* I, p. 498, and "Confederation", pp. 337 ff.

[16]Wm. Beauchamp, "A History of the New York Iroquois", *N. Y. State Museum, Bulletin* 78, p. 153. See also the accounts in, Horatio Hale, *The Iroquois Book of Rites*, Lewis H. Morgan, *The League of the Iroquois*. New York, 1904, and *Ancient Society*. London, 1877.

[17]Dr. Brinton declares the *Iroquois Book of Rites* to be "one of the most remarkable native productions north of Mexico. Its authenticity and antiquity are indisputable."—*Aboriginal American Authors*, p. 21.

federal council and the sub-chiefs of each tribe constituted the local council of the tribe. Both local and supreme councils were conducted in accordance with long established rituals, and had regularly appointed officers; namely, a speaker, a fire-keeper, door-keeper, and wampum-keeper or annalist. The supreme council acting as a court without a jury, heard and determined causes according to precedent, decided the policy of the confederacy, declared war and peace.[18]

The Book of Rites is really a set of traditional rituals by which the civil, and mourning councils of the confederacy were conducted. It represents the Indian's highest expression of his social and political organization. Since the political organization of the Iroquois was superior to that of any other group north of Mexico, the *Book of Rites* is quite complete, and is even meritorious from the literary point of view. Composed by a chief or chiefs now unknown, the *Rites* were first recorded on wampum belts.[19] Later they were reduced to writing in the early eighteenth century by chief David of Schoharie. Many people attended these "condoling councils", which were affairs of the greatest importance.[20] The only surviving rites are the ceremonials incident to the death of a chief of the grand confederacy council and the installation of his successor.

The "mourning council", at which the new chief was to be installed in the grand council, was called by the councilors of the "elder brother" tribes of Mohawks, Onondagos, and Senecas, Members of these tribes then assembled on the appointed day to wait for the arrival of the representatives of the "younger brother" tribes (Oneidas, Cayugas, Tuscaroras). The first ceremony of the council is a song called "At the Wood's Edge", sung by the "elder" councilors while the "younger" tribesmen were approaching the council fire. The song expresses gratitude that the visitors have escaped every peril while on their mission of love, and ends with a long recital of the early villages of the three principal Iroquoian clans. When the song is ended at the fire, all the councilors form a procession and go to the council house, the members of the elder tribe as hosts leading the way.

[18]J. N. B. Hewitt, "Confederation", *Hodge* I, p. 337.

[19]Wampum belts were strings of vari-colored shells whose arrangement constituted a mnemonic devise. See Beauchamp, "Civil, Religious, and Mourning Councils", pp. 350 ff.

[20]For complete account of manuscripts and proof of their authenticy, see Horatio Hale, *The Iroquois Book of Rites*, pp. 39 ff.

Inside the council house each party takes its proper end, while one member of the visiting ("younger") tribes paces back and forth chanting a ritual called "The Old Way of Greeting". In this chant the visitors express their sympathy for the loss of the chief who is dead, and attempt to restore the grief stricken "elder" members to a sound condition. Many of the songs composing the ritual recall the history of the Iroquois league, and the laws established by its founder. The original fifty chiefs of the league are named, and reference is made to the three great clans (Bear, Wolf, and Turtle), and to some of their early towns.[21]

Since the ritual is long and monotonous, only a few of the more striking and significant passages will be reproduced here as specimens.

The Preliminary Ceremony Called, "At the Wood's Edge".

"Greatly startled have I been today
By your voice coming through the woods to this clearing.
With troubled mind you have come
Through obstacles of every kind.
. . . . . .
Great thanks, therefore, we give, that safely
You have arrived. Now then together
Let both of us smoke. For all around indeed
Are hostile powers, which are thinking thus:
'I will frustrate their plans.' Here are many thorns,
And here falling trees, and here the wild beasts wait.
Either by these you might have died, my children;
Or here by floods might you have been destroyed,
My children; or here by the hatchet,
Raised in the dark, outside the house.
Every day by these we are wasting away.
Or by a deadly and invisible
Disease might you have been destroyed,
My children. Great thanks, therefore now,
That safely you have traversed the forests.
. . . . . .
Now these are the words of the mutual greeting,
The opening ceremony, called the old way
Of mutual greeting .. . . .
. . . . Now this day

[21]Beauchamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-3.

We are met, because of the solemn event
Which is now our lot. Now into the earth
Has he been borne to whom we always looked.
Even in our tears then together let us smoke.
. . . . . .
. . . . Every day
You are losing your great men. Into the earth
They are borne; also the warriors,
Also your women, and your grandchildren as well;
So that in the midst of blood
You are sitting. Now therefore, we say,
We wash the blood stains from your seat,
So that it may be for a time
That happily the place may be clean
For a few days, where pleasantly
You rest and are looking all around.
. . . . . .
Hail, my grandsires! Thus ye have said:
Those are to be pitied who in later days
Shall pass through this life.
. . . . . .
Hail, my grandsires! This they said
. . . . . .
'As soon as a chief is dead,
Even then shall the horns be taken off."[22]
. . . . . .
We might all die, if invested with horns
He is borne away to the grave."

The "condoling" ceremonies in the council house were ended by a consoling address by a representative of the visiting "younger brothers".

Speech of Consolation by the "Younger Brothers",

"Now—now this day—now I come to your door when you are mourning in great darkness, prostrate with grief. For this reason we have come here to mourn with you. I will enter your door, and

[22]An Iroquois chief's insignia of office were horns, which were placed on his grave when he was buried, and then later removed to be given to his successor in office. The horns were significant of power to the Iroquois as to the ancient Hebrews, the Iroquois belief being that if the chiefs were buried with insignia of office, and if the offices in the council were not filled, the structure of the League would perish.—Beauchamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-385 *passim*.

come before the ashes, and mourn with you there; and I will speak these words to comfort you.

Now our uncle has passed away, he who used to work for all that they might see the brighter days to come. . . . . He who has worked for us has gone afar off; and he will also in time take all these—the whole body of warriors, and also the whole body of women—all these will go with him. But it is still harder when the woman shall die, because with her the line of descent is lost.[23] And also the grandchildren and the little ones who are running around—these he will take away; and also those who are creeping on the ground, and also those that are on the cradle boards; all these he will take away with him. . . . .

Now another thing we say, we younger brothers. You are mourning in deep darkness. I will make the sky clear for you, so that you will not see a cloud. And also I will cause the sun to shine upon you, so that you can look upon it peacefully when it goes down. . . . . Now I have hope that you will yet see pleasant days. . . . . Now we will open your ears, and also your throat, for there is something that has been choking you, and we will also give you water which shall wash down all the troubles you have in your throat. We shall hope that then your mind will recover its cheerfulness. . . . . .

Now I have finished. Now show me the man!" (The newly elected chief.)[24]

Another interesting speech, part of the Onondaga council ceremonies, deserves to be considered along with the *Rites*. This speech or sermon forms a part of a manuscript book in the Onondaga dialect, discovered by Hale, and printed in the *Book of Rites*.

"Now the smoke of the council fire rises and ascends to the sky, that everybody may see it. The tribes of the different nations where the smoke appeared shall come directly where the smoke arises, if, perhaps, they have any business to consider. . . . .

"What is the purpose of the smoke? It is this—that the chiefs must all be honest; that they must all love one another; and that they must have regard for their people,—including the women, and

[23] This is a reference to the peculiarly important place held by women in the political system of the Iroquois, and also to the custom of tracing descent through the female line.

[24] Beauchamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-385. I have used Beauchamp's version of the *Rites* rather than Brinton's, because the former is a later edition, and because the text is not buried under so much critical matter.

also our children, and also those children whom we have not yet seen; so much they must care for, that all may be in peace, even the whole nation. It is the duty of the chiefs to do this, and they have the power to govern their people. If there is anything to be done for the good of the people, it is their duty to do it."[25]

These speeches and chants have been solemnly delivered at the council fires for centuries, and occasionally are revived even to this day.[26] They represent a high standard of pagan morality and ethics. They reveal strong patriotic respect for history, tradition, and the Iroquois national organization. There is stoical recognition of the hardships and perils of life and the inevitability of death. There is also a spirit of grim and fearless resolution, together with a courageous cheerfulness not obtained through glittering and ephermeal religious hopes. Indeed "a moral tone may be said to run through all, but there is no religious instruction, nor does religious feeling go beyond a mere expression of thankfulness. There is no act of worship from beginning to end."[27]

A few incidental references to the natural environment might be noted; but in this respect other works, to be cited in succeeding chapters, will prove more fruitful subjects for analysis.

Besides the League of the Iroquois there were other Indian confederacies. These were all of a more temporary and causal nature. Most notable among them were: the Powhatan and Pawnee groups, the "Seven Fireplaces" league of the Dakotas, and the informal alliance of the Blackfeet, Gross Ventres, and Sarsi.[28] All these no doubt had traditional ceremonies by which they conducted their councils. Certainly there exist historical and religious rituals among many of the separate tribes; but none in all probability were so notable as the *Rites* of the Iroquois.

It is therefore evident that although the Indians north of Mexioc were all, roughly speaking, under tribal government, yet they represent a very wide range of development, from a mere collection of families in a village, to a widely extended, closely organized state, with a senate, a feudal army, and definite peace policy of "war to end wars." Nevertheless, all Indian organizations were evolved according to environment and were varied in much the same way to meet

[25]Hale, *Book of Rites*, p. 169.
[26]Beauchamp, *op. cit.*, pp. 389 and 393.
[27]Beauchamp, *op. cit.*, p. 379.
[28]Wissler, *The American Indians*, p. 151; Hewitt, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

analogous conditions. Small and isolated groups, such as prevailed in California developed but little from the simple family stage; tribes of the plains, such as the Dakotas, occupying widely extended areas, yet subject to pressure from surrounding enemies, occasionally achieved a confederacy; the Iroquois, in a more favorable environment, but compelled to combat most fiercely for their existence, had begun a governmental system not unlike that of the early Roman tribes in similar circumstances.

In no case was the Indian a social unit by himself; in all stages he belonged to a group with definite rules, to which he conformed. It is curious that the social organization of these groups in the lower stages of culture is no less definite—in fact is often more definite than that of the more advanced peoples.[29] Thus, the Indian occupying a definite place in a social scheme, was constrained to think of the rules under which he lived, and to voice his thoughts in compositions concerning his society, as well as of the other circumstances governing his existence.

[29] McGee "The Siouan Indians", 15*th Rep. B. A. E.*, pp. 200-201.

DETERMINISTIC PRESUPPOSITION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER

ONE of the difficulties, in the way of an intelligent reading of psycho-analytic hypotheses, is that the reader does not coordinate that which is being read with the various presuppositions which, in some form and with some considerable degree of consciousness, of clarity and of consistency, are sure to be held by the psychoanalytic author. These presuppositions and their experiencial background, are the subjective context, without an approximate duplication of which the words that are used cannot be properly interpreted. Without such contextual coordination, it is impossible to read psychoanalytic literature empathically. Without its empathic reading,[1] psycho-analytic literature is not being understood. Therefore it seems to be important that there should be published some formulation of these presuppositions. Here I limit myself to making, a brief formulation of one of these, namely: a psycho-analysts attitude toward the hypothesis of a complete and rigid psychologic determinism. Those who attach any affect-value and its moralistic rationalization, to the free-will dogma, cannot be expected to adequately coordinate a deterministic theory with their reading, even if they intellectually grasp that theory as an abstraction.

In one sense there is nothing wholly new in the attitude which I will formulate. And yet this attitude will not be adequately empathized, unless it is also coordinated with an organismic view of man as such, and as in organic unity with the whole of the universe. This organismic view carries with it the hypothesis of an omtogenetic recapitulation of the psychologic evolution of the race. It is also necessary to coordinate my statement with other related modern

[1]"Psycho-analytic method of observation," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*. Vol.6, (No. 2) pp. 155-170, 1925.

concepts of some philosophers.[2] Such ideas are a part of the subjective context of my formulation. The only novelty to be found herein, is that some of these attitudes are here formulated with special reference to the psycho-analyst's use of the deterministic approach to psycho-genetic problems. Usually the word "determinants" is referred only to the objective physical aspect of the sum total of our psychologic determinants. Psycho-analysts emphasize the subjective contribution to the sum total of our psychologic determinants, as these were developed in the course of our racial and personal psychologic past. Again, this description will differ from some other descriptions in that for logical argument I will substitute deterministic explanations. I am not arguing in support of a deterministic concept of psychology. I am merely describing one such concept in mechanistic and psycho-analytic terms.

Origin of "Free-will" Concept

As our unconscious automatic impulses evolve to conscious desires, the foundation is being laid for the conflict of theory as between explanations that involve respectively freedom of the will and psychologic determinism. We knowingly distinguish anything only by contrast with its opposite. Either the free-will or the deterministic hypothesis could come to a conscious expression, only in contrast with a more or less latent, and perhaps a less conscious and a less imperative urge, toward the contrary hypothesis. A more or less temporary accretion, of more or less of unconsciously determined preponderance of affect value, will force one or the other of the conflicting urges to find conscious expression and rationalization.

In these earlier stages of development, man is still unaware of his dependence upon nature's processes as a whole. With such very large ignorance, he would be compelled to unconsciously abstract from the rest of the universe, the first seeming causal relationship between his desires, his conscious planning and the later approximate realization of his preconceived ends. By ignoring all the rest of the universe, and remaining unconscious of the present influence of even his own psychologic past, man must see his few abstractions as if being in the relationship of cause and effect. Again because of

[2]Here I have in mind hypotheses *somewhat* like the following: Vaihinger H. *The Philosophy of As If*, 1924 (translated from the 6th German Edition Also: G. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning;* Alfred Latka, *Elements of Physical Biology*.

ignorance, and the subjective dissociation of interest and the resultant abstraction, many are impelled to formulate their experience as if their own "uncaused" desire and "uncaused" planning had been the *sole* cause of the seeming effect.

Thus the concept of a "free-will," as being the chief or only determinant for some few subsequent objective events, had its natural understandable origin, in the psychologic imperatives of our ignorance, and immaturity. In time there came an enlargement of the human contemplation of nature, far beyond that which could be thought of as bearing any possible relation as an effect from the self-determined, relatively omnipotent "free-will" of the human animal. In order to explain the behavior of such more remote parts of the environment as were obviously beyond human control, man made an animistic projection. By thus projecting into objective nature, a delusionally magnified and exalted "designing" self, with the limited potency of his human free-will universalized, man created his absolutely free-willed, omnipotent, designing Gods.[3]

The occasional man's obsession with unconventional human behavior found its earlier explanation in harmony with the projected ideas of theology. Accordingly eccentric compulsions would induce an explanation, in terms of either demonic possession or spiritual regeneration. Again there was conflict, as to whether or not either of such conditions were in some sense the product of an unconditioned human choice, or were they predetermined by some super-human power, for weal or woe. The peculiarly personal need of self-exaltation, or for an excuse for delinquency, sometimes determined the choice of theory. Out of such subjective conflicts came the elaboration of theories of predestination, fore-ordination, fatalism, demonic possession, oneness with God, determinism and freedom of the will, each with many variations of details, conditions and subjective context.

When the unknown determinants of our psychologic imperatives expressed themselves in conventionally approved form, there was little temptation to think of, or look for any but flattering super-human controls, such as an intimate guidance by or unity with the divine, all accepted as being achieved through a self-glorifying free choice of the personal "free-will". The contrast between the obviously very different behavior of those alleged to be "demonically possessed", and the "spiritually regenerated," and just average

[3]Fauerbach, Ludwig., *Essence of Christianity.*

healthy minded persons, found a comforting, self-glorifying explanation for the super-righteous ones, in the doctrine of divinely approved conduct, initiated and achieved by their own unaided, inherent morally superior freedom of will. These self-righteousness ones, working under the illusion of being spiritually reborn, with a close approximation to divine perfection, had need for a free-will theory of explanation, probably because of some discredited past. Without some free-will theory the delusionally achieved exaltation would lose its glory, and its power to neutralize a guilty feeling of inadequacy. A feeling of inadequacy, or of inferiority, could get no compensatory or neutralizing, glorified exaltation from a naturalistic, rigidly determined state, such as is contracted with and delusionally characterized as "spiritual perfection". Because of this, the feeling of inadequacy quite inevitably expresses itself in emotionally determined resistance to a deterministic hypothesis. All such deluded, even though unconscious pietists, must have a "free-will", since without that none of the much needed comforting delusion of moral superiority could be maintained. Likewise they must project a "free-will" choice into those other unconventional persons, who are accused of being the children or emissaries of the devil. It would minimize the relative value of the moralistic self-glorification of the "spiritually reborn," if the others had not out of their own inherent wickedness, deliberately and freely rejected "the only true god."

Toward the Deterministic Hypothesis

Some persons fail to achieve conventional delusions of grandeur, adequate for neutralizing their feeling of guilt. However, these persons still need some superhuman excuse, which will so explain their condition and conduct as to minimize the self-reproaches. Under this impulse some who were accused of witchcraft actually admitted a satanic control. Others, less abnormal perhaps, can be content with a more naturalistic excuse. These will be predisposed to emotionally accept a theory that their "deplorable" compulsions are determined by the immediate environmental factor, or by heredity. In modern times, insanity may be added among the permissable determinants of disapproved behavior. Out of such need and such material many come to be obsessed by emotionally determined one hundred percent absolutetistic concept of psychologic determinism. This however must be distinguished from the more objective, and inductively derived and more tentatively held concept of psychologic

determinism.

In recent times there has come to consciousness, from an ever widening range in time and space, increasing data of regularly recurring sequences, all suggestive of ever widening range in the uniformity of "law" in causal relationships. With the increasing use of tools, and the quite-conscious human manipulation (by conscious reconditioning) of nature's forces, there has also come the larger understanding of the potency of natural conditions, as determining influences in nature's yield to human comfort. The more conscious investigations of scientists, over an ever widening field in time and space, tends to promote the generalization of the observed repetitions in sequence as if existing in all of the unknown as well as known parts of nature. At least within the known parts of the material aspects of the uiverse, this induced the mental constructs of "natural law," and "cause and effect." This modern, more scientific concept of determinism is being ever more objectively conditioned.

With a growing consciousness of the limitations of our thinking faculties, a new element became coordinated with this previously limited concept of causation, under natural law. After some development of these concepts, some humans became aware that the natural limitations of our thinking faculties are such that we can no longer imagine any limitations beyond which "causation" and "natural law" are not supreme. So came a new formulation and valuation of the deterministic hypotheses as a conscious intellectual construct, rather than an unconsciously generalized projection.

By means of such verbal symbols as the word "infinite," we enlarge our concepts into elaborate philosophic (and theologic?) speculations without knowing anything about, or being able to conceive, that which is supposedly being represented by the verbal symbols which we are using.

This practice was at first limited to the whole of the *material* aspects of the universe. But, because we cannot *conceive* of spacial or temporal limitlessness of "causation" any more than the limitedness thereof, we simply substitute a fictive mental (logical?) construct and its verbal symbolization, in lieu of any actual concept of universal infinite determinism.

This fictive assumption, of a rigid and universal determinism, is *logically* (not experiencially or conceptually) warranted by the fact that, given a certain temperament and a considerabe amount of scientific training some of us can no longer postulate a time or place

beyond which the "Natural Law" and "causation" do not work. This limitation of our thinking faculties compels us to logically construct a formula of universal "causation," and of "universal natural law." All psychologic investigation not only presupposes but confirms the undemonstratable hypothesis of such a complete and absolutely rigid determinism. The "cause of causation" we ignore, together with all other alleged experiencial ultimates and absolutes, as being something beyond the limited capacity of humans. So long as any thought of universal "causation" is recognized as being a pure construction of our mind, made necessary by the minds own limitations, the quest for an ultimate cause of such fictive absolute "causation" begins to look silly.

However, some of us find ourselves in a stage of development which is such that we must abide by, and act in harmony with such a deterministic presupposition, even about psychology, and in spite of the fact that an absolute determinism can never be proven to be absoluely true.

Now the dynamics behind our logical necessity compelled, in many persons, a reconstruction of the older "absolutely true" concept, concerning the theologic and demonic determinants of thought and conduct. The revision has brought many of us to the generalized hypothesis of an undesigned, undesigning, natural, mechanistic, rigidly determined, unconscious universe. However, the divided interests of most psychologic personalities still compells an adherence to the dissociation of the physical universe and the human psyche. Thus many are compelled to project and rationalize their internal conflict of impulse by affirming both the freedom of the human will and the complete determinism in all non-psychologic relations.

Concerning Evolution in Intellectual Methods

If however, the psyche is quite thoroughly unified, and if with this is integrated the more inclusive view of natural causation, coupled with, or perhaps inducing an organismic view of man in an organic unity with the whole of the universe, there will result a more rigorous and all inclusive generalization of the deterministic hypothesis. Thus, sooner or later, will come the organismic view of the whole of man, in an indissoluble organic unity with the whole of a rigidly determined universe. Now, for such persons, a rigorously determined, logical necessity, will impel toward the inclusion of the human psyche, as a mere unimportant aspect of a small part of the force-aspect a rigidly

determined universe. So comes a more mature and a more tentatively held hypothesis of universal, rigidly determined, psychologic imperatives, which now takes the place of the older notions of fatalism, predestination, fore-ordination, demonic possession, identification with God, etc., etc. Likewise, at this stage of development, of a thoroughly unified personality, the old moral valuations and judgments approximate to being wholly outgrown. In their stead we make a more objective classification of thought and conduct, according to an evolutionary concept of psychologic maturing, in our intellectual methods.

I believe such objective standards exist, for roughly measuring several degrees of relative approaches to an unascertainable absolute truth of one's convictions. In general I would say that this should be decided by the relative maturity of our intellectual methods. But this again resolves itself into a number of different factors. Among these we may name: (1) the relative maturity of our impulses, both before and after becoming conscious as desires; (2) the relative maturity of the mental mechanism by which our impulses make themselves effective in thought and action; (3) the relative degrees to which we are conscious of the determinants (especially the usually unconscious and other subjective determinants coming from out of our psychologic past) for the precise quality of our mpulses or desires; (4) the relative quantity, variety, and complexity of experiencial and cultural material and scientific data available, and which is actually and consciously coordinated into any particular judgment; (5) the relative degrees of thoroughness with which the available data are all coordinated into a single judgment; (6) the manner of their use, as to whether or not they are selectively grouped so as to rationalize and confirm, or to check and correct our probably, subconsciously determined and less mature predispositions; (7) the relative degrees of thoroughness to which we are conscious of all these processes, especially as they eventuate in the rationalizations of the determining and usually unconscious impulses, in combination with the usually more conscious desires.

Determinism Indispensible to Psychologists

Any scientific investigation, of nature's processes, can have meaning or value, only on the more or less conscious assumption of approximate uniformity in the behavior of nature's force aspect, so long as the conditions remain substantially the same. All scientific research

has among its main objects, the discovery of even more of the innumerable conditioning factors of change, in the manifestations of nature's habitual behaviour-processes. All this is but aother way of saying that all physical scientists work upon the more or less conscious assumption of a rigid and universal determinism. The psychoanalyst believes that all scientists in the field of psychology must do the same, if their investigations are to have any meaning. This deterministic hypothesis has been measurably confirmed by all psychological observation.

As I see psycho-analytic investigation, it is an attempt to more rigorously apply this scientific spirit and approach to problems of psycho-genetics, mental mechanisms, psychologic evolution, and mental hygiene. This means that, as in all the rest of nature, we must even though it will ever remain undemonstrable, act as if presupposing the human psyche, to be operating according to some discoverable "laws" and discoverable conditioning factors of its own, quite beyond or different from the more known bio-chemical factors. In other words, the psychanalyst's fundamental hypothesis must be deterministic, and not moralistic, if his research is to have meaning or value for him. In so far this scientific spirit dominates our psychologic research, it will help humanity to outgrow its emotional conflicts, and so to outgrow the resultant moralistic values and dogmas. In so far as moralistic presuppositions influence our research, even though the moral values and the effect both remain unconscious, our research-work will be relatively unreliable. Like the other scientists, psychanalysts are coming to investigate the actual subjective aspect of the psychologic processes of human nature, as distinguished from its symptomatic objectivization or its abstracted social products. Accordingly they are quite heedless of what will be the effect of their researches upon their own or other people's preconceptions and valuations, either teliologic, theologic or moralistic. Instead of being dominated by the hysterical fears, or the subjectively determined valuation of moral dogmas, labelled conscience, we study its genesis and growth, through all its varied manifestations, with the hope of outgrowing every factor of a subjectively and unconsciously determined conscience.

Inconsistency of Theory and Conduct

Those who were dominated by an unconsciously determined need for a "free-will" easily found abundant material for a special plea in

justification of their unconsciously pre-determined conclusion. Some were induced to make the larger coordinations, into a more inclusive concept of cause and effect. Even now avowed determinists very often fail to act consistently with our deterministic hypothesis. When this inconsistency becomes obvious or somehow conscious, we are sure that even that inconsistency can be explained on a psychogenetic and deterministic basis. On the surface, it seems to imply that the inconsistency manifests two aspects of a divided interest ("double personality"). In searching for the determining causes of our inconsistency, we naturally expect to find two factors; the one environmental, and the other subjective.

The most obvious ignoring of the deterministic hypothesis is to be found in our relative quiesence in the presence of punishment for "criminals". The great crowd is too ignorant, too impatient, too much the victim of irreconcilable impulses (especially unconscious sado-masochism) within its individual members, to deal intelligently with "delinquents". As a vent to its own suppressed anti-social and sadistic impulses, the crowd must enact legalized and moralized hate toward the offender. To justify punishment it must also rationalize its underlying unconscious (perhaps sadistic) impulses by the other fellows "free-will" and "moral duty." Accordingly those who have the conscious attitude of a deterministic psychologist, and can approximately live it, as yet find themselves in such a hopeless minority, that for a long time to come it will be useless to insist that our jails be converted into hospital-schools. Here the environment compels the small minority of scientific determinists to act inconsistent with their deterministic hypothesis. In this we see the environmental contribution to the determinants of such inconsistency.

But a differently troublesome situation arises when those who profess adherence to a deterministic hypothesis are so often impelled even quite unconsciously impelled, toward the expression of moral values, and moral judgments, which are in many ways inconsistent with their professed determinism. Often this inconsistency is quite obviously the product of a subjective conflict of impulses. Those who are still the victims of a "divided personality," may at times find it convenient to excuse their own mal-adjustment in terms of determinism. Not having outgrown the subjective moral conflict and its affect-values, and yet being compelled to violate their own morbid conscience, such persons often find solace and defense in the zealous advocacy of an excusing deterministic hypothesis. But precisely be-

cause it is a mere rationalization of one among divided interests, such determinists cannot limit their more overt acts even to an approximate harmony with it. Sometimes this conflict is unconsciously revealed by a subconsciously determined gesture, a moralistic vocabulary, or by intonations of the voice which imply moral values and judgments. So then, although perhaps at times vociferously proclaiming a psychologic determinism, yet in their social activities, such persons will quite as persistently act upon the hypothesis of freedom of will, and its accompanying moral judgments.[4]

Only those who have reached a high degree of psychologic (as distinguished from social) sublimation, and its high maturity of intellectual methods, have approximately outgrown the subjective conflict. Only such can act in conscious, comfortable approximate harmony with a clear vision of the organic and mechanistic unity of man and his universe. These few have almost accomplished within themselves the transference of the whole of their libido to the psycho-evolutionary process and to its implied deterministic hypothesis. Those who can thus harmonize their interest and their conduct, let us say to the extent of 90% thereof, on the deterministic, psycho-evolutionary hypothesis, will seldom betray, even by unconsciously determined gesture, vocabulary, or intonations of voice, any evidence of even the unconscious influences of a moral values or judgments.

The advocates of a free-will hypothesis also find themselves unable to live in complete harmony with that theory. If the human will is wholly free, in the sense of being wholly dissociated from any psychologic chain of "cause and effect," then in human relations nothing would be predictable, everything would be chaos. And yet, even free-willites must act as if psychologic functioning was a matter of "cause and effect" and human impulses could be consciously and effectively reconditioned. To some persons our human relations and institutions really seem chaotic, or insane. Under a complete freedom of the will, training, discipline, education would all be useless. Even criminal puishment ceases to have any sense in it, if the human will or desire is wholly immune from disciplinary influence, which is deterministic. So one may prolong indefinitely a useless logical discussion.

[4]See: Jennings, Prof. H. S. in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology & Scientific Method*, 16:180-3; Mch. 17, 1919; and my comment in "Determinism Conduct and Fear Psychology." *Psychoanalytic Review* 6 (No. 4): 379-390; Oct. 1919, Reviewed in: *Psyche & Eros* 1 (No. 2) 126; Sept.-Oct. 1920.

The determinist's objection to the punishment of crime is based on the view that judicial punishment takes no *intelligent* account of psychologic determinism, nor of any causation for the anti-social behavior, except extreme insanity. Therefore our whole system of criminology is a most crassly ignorant method of reconditioning the anti-social impulses. Accordingly it is inadequate and often promotes the very conduct which it pretends to improve, if not cure.

Out of the impossibility for either free-willites or determinists to live *wholly* consistent with their respective theories, has come a sort of compromise. Some (conventional) conduct is self-determined and other (unconventional) conduct is not. In every such judgment I am sure a genetic psychologist would have little trouble in finding the compromise to be conditioned, by the unconscious experiencial factor, which determine the fear-psychology, or by the need for rationalizing a subjective conflict of impulse.

Our psyche is so unconsciously fluid and so variously multifariously and complexly conditioned, as not to leave conduct easily predictable, except in cases of morbid compulsions which are limited to a relative few simple and obsessing reaction-patterns, which are marked deviations from the conventional normal. Accordingly all those who must have moral value, and have any affective need for a free-will hypothesis, can find much to confirm their predisposition. Likewise those who concentrate their attention sufficiently upon unusual psychologic compulsions can find equally cogent evidence for a universal psychologic determinism. If either of these feel the need of making logical special pleas in support of their tempermental need, we are quite certain that they are still the victims of a subjective conflict, and have not yet arrived at the calm acceptance of mature intellectual methods.

The chaos, of a complete absense of deterministic control, would mean a condition in which freedom of action for the attainment of preconceived ends would be impossible. Under complete psychologic determinism, if accompanied by a very large understanding of it, there can be achieved a maximum of freedom from the more painful social maladjustments.

In Conclusion

In the material sciences this change, from free-will-moralistic concept to a deterministic one, was achieved only when we had completely abandoned all metaphysical preconceptions, all teliologic

interpretations, and all moralistic valuations of every part or theory of the physical universe. Now the material scientists, as such, concern themselves not at all with such matters. In all branches of research involving the material aspects of the universe, scientists concern themselves quite exclusively with the study of nature's *processes*. They wish to know *how* things behave and of the determining *conditions* of their varied behavioristic manifestations. So the material scientists tend to ignore all the former moralistic preconceptions and valuations, for those parts of nature's processes which were formerly viewed and rated morally because of their being deemed of personal, social or religious importance. In the physicist's laboratory method conscience has been wholly dethroned or outgrown. Also, scientists have come to ignore divine design and teliology. They are always ambitious to learn how more consciously to rearrange (recondition) parts of the cosmic stuff, for greater certainty of human welfare—that is for the better human adjustments to the physical environment. That is only another way of saying that the best of scientists are concerned only with understanding nature's processes. Such conspicuous exceptions as Sir Oliver Lodge, are so rare as to suggest a morbidly determined compulsion behind their pronounced spiritistic predisposition. In the domain of psychologic research, those who aspire to the rank of scientists must show their capacity to pursue the scientific method, free from interference by emotion and conscience.

When seemingly undetermined experiences or psychologic events come to us, all of our very limited understanding impels us, as under like conditions it impels the physicist, to search for new, and hitherto undiscovered natural determinants rather than to assume unconditined, undetermined psychologic occurrences, or a supernatural causation. All scientists do this, although probably most of them understand quite well that the concept of a hypothetical universal determinism under "natural law", (especially as that may be applied to the psyche) is largely, perhaps wholly, a fictive construction of the human intellect. We realize that other persons have their psychologic imperatives differently conditioned than we do, and that therefore they will be differently predisposed toward a new problem. We remind such that they will have special difficulty in reading psychoanalytic literature empathically. Psychanalysts go so far as to try to discover and explain all of these differences, even in the psychologic imperative and the resultant difference in psychologic theory, in terms of a different psychologic preparedness (predisposition), to

be once more explained by the varying antecedent experiencial factors that conditioned our separate and different development, during our respective psychologic pasts. Thus we sooer or later arrive at a place where such differences of presupposition are seen in relation to the quality of the underlying impulses, and their resultant, or associated mental mechanisms, and all this classified according to a psycho-evolutionary concept. However tentatively the deterministic hypothesis is held, we treat it as the best working fiction that our experience permits and our psychologic imperatives compel us to construct, and therefore we hope to be able to work in close and quite rigid harmony with it. We succeed to the same degree that our emotional trends are united, and our other limitations permit.

Neither are we temperamentally predisposed to find in this hypothetical rigid and universal psychologic determinism, any explanatory justification for a despondency which often accompanies fatalism. Water is still composed of oxygen and hydrogen, but in the special form of combination known as water, it has new properties and exerts a new and different influence upon many substances, with which it may come in contact. So, in mind, illuminated by the larger and more penetrating psycho-analytic understanding of psychologic behavior has, by the very fact, a larger capacity for measurably and consciously reconditioning the human energy (the desires and mental mechanisms) of some other persons. Also some of us are thereby being impelled to discipline ourselves, so as to develop different automatic reaction toward the human stimulii of the environment, and thereby insure more comfortable social adjustment.

In such efforts we will be efficient, just to the degree of perfection to which we are able to live consistently with our deterministic hypothesis. In this new and increasingly efficient compulsion to manipulate the human psyche, we find an abundant compensation for relinquishing the delusional joys of our former free-will hypothesis.

JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, INTERPRETER OF THE NEGRO SOUL

BY J. V. NASH

THE most enduring of all literature springs from popular folklore. It is more than poetry or prose; it is philosophy, science, psychology, religion, history, ethics. It reflects the groping and aspiring soul of a people, in all its manifold reactions to its environment. It is the key which long generations of humble folk have been painfully forging, with which to unlock the mysterious door which opens into the Unseen.

This unpretending folklore is usually kept alive by word of mouth for many generations before a literary genius discovers it, gathers it together, separates the chaff from the wheat, and gives to the world the harvest of golden grain.

For many years there had been lying unrecognized in America a rich accumulation of folklore in the traditions, the songs, the tales, the proverbs, and the quaint philosophy of the plantation Negroes of the South. With the breaking up of the old patriarchal life and the advent of modern industrialism, this unique folklore was threatened with a speedy extinction. Doubtless it would have largely faded into oblivion, were it not for the fact that during the 'Seventies and 'Eighties there happened to be sitting at a desk in the office of the *Atlanta Constitution* the one man who possessed the tempermental qualifications to interpret this folklore, and the ability as a writer to mold it into literature of universal appeal.

So it came to pass that this neglected store of plantation folklore was given at last to the world in a series of inimitable stories which for more than forty years have been the delight of children, and of all who are youthful in spirit, wherever the English language is spoken.

These were the immortal "Uncle Remus" tales, which have

been recognized as perhaps the most vital literary productions springing out of American soil; and their creator, Joel Chandler Harris, lives on in the hearts of his readers.

Probably there never was a shyer author, or one who cared less for fame than did Harris. Martin Amorous, of Marietta, Ga., who knew him well, tells me: "'Uncle Remus' Harris was never a mixer among men or in society. I once took Mr. W. B. Judson, then owner and editor of the *Northwestern Lumberman*, of Chicago, at his request, to see and meet my friend, Joel Chandler Harris. We sat alongside of him in the *Constitution* office for upwards of an hour, and never got a word more than 'Yes' or 'No' from him. In taking leave, I couldn't help expressing my disappointment that he did not 'show himself off' to his caller, and I resolved that I should never introduce another to him. In his writing he was rich in philosophy and brilliancy, but in visitors' company he was a ruminator."

Yet this unresponsive exterior—which in such cases is often but a kind of defensive armor—concealed one of the kindliest of natures and the heart of a little child. There was an underlying pathos in all of Harris's writings, traceable no doubt in part to the domestic circumstances of his babyhood, the loneliness of his life in the little village of Eatonton, where he was born December 8, 1848, and the cruel shock of war, which devastated his beloved South during the most impressionable years of his childhood. It has been said that only those who have tasted sorrow know the human heart. Harris knew the human heart.

Opportunities for formal schooling were scanty during Harris's youth. He has told in his own words of the incident that turned his life into the channel of journalism:

"It happened that I was in the post-office at Eatonton, reading the Milledgeville papers, when the first number of *The Countryman* was deposited on the counter where all the papers were kept. I read it through and came upon an advertisement which announced that the editor wanted a boy to learn the printer's trade. This was my opportunity, and I seized it with both hands."

He seems to have secured the position largely because of the excellent quality of his letter of application. The editor of this journal—which, by the way, was the only newspaper ever published on a plantation—was a certain J. A. Turner, owner of the Turnwold

plantation, nine miles away. He was a man of versatile talents. Besides managing a large plantation with over a hundred slaves, he was an accomplished scholar, an orator whose voice was known in the halls of the State Legislature, a writer of the literary school of Dr. Samuel Johnson, an omniverous reader and a book-lover whose library of 4,000 volumes was one of the finest in the South.

It was on this plantation, where he saw slavery as a kindly, patriarchal institution, that Harris absorbed his extraordinary first-hand acquaintance with Negro lore. In the little printing office he learned to set type, and during his leisure time he was free to browse in the well-stocked Turner library. From time to time he slipped into the columns of the paper little contributions of his own, signed "The Countryman's Devil." Under the friendly guidance of his employer, who directed his reading and criticised his first attempts at writing, he began his apprenticeship in literature.

But soon the peaceful life at Turnwold was rudely shattered and destroyed forever, for the plantation lay directly in the path of Sherman's devasting army. Cast adrift, on his own resources, while a boy in his teens, he became a struggling journalist. He worked for varying periods on newspapers and periodicals at New Orleans, at Macon, and at Forsythe, Ga. In 1879, at twenty-one, we find him filling the position of assistant editor and humorous columnist on the Savannah *Morning News*. The editor of this paper was an individual of some local importance, a Col. W. T. Thompson, noted at the time as the author of "Major Jones Courtship."

In Savannah several happy years were spent. Here he married, and here his family began growing up about him. Then, in the summer of 1876, the yellow fever broke out in the city. To save the lives of his two little children, he was faced with the necessity of leaving the pest-riden sea-port and seeking refuge in the "high country." The young father's financial resources were slender, but even in such a tragic situation his saving sense of humor did not desert him. Humor and pathos are twins of Irish blood—and Harris was half Irish. On arriving in Atlanta he registered at the Kimball House as follows: "J. C. Harris, one wife, two bow-legged children, and a billious nurse."

In Atlanta, which was to become the scene of his life work, he renewed a youthful friendship with a rising young newspaper man,

the later well-known Henry W. Grady, at that time connected with the *Atlanta Herald*. About this time it happened that Capt. Evan P. Howell bought the controlling interest in the *Atlanta Constitution*, and engaged the services of Grady. Just before beginning work on the *Constitution*, Grady had encountered Harris on the streets of Atlanta. The result of the meeting was that almost immediately Harris was offered a position on the staff of the *Constitution* and accepted it.

Grady and Harris proved to be an admirable combination, in that they supplemented each other. As a contemporary wrote at the time: "On the *Constitution* we have two opposites—Harris and Grady. Harris is retiring, never speaking unless spoken to, but the words flow as freely from his pen as is possible. Grady, on the other hand, is gifted with extraordinary conversational powers; his tongue moves with the rapidity of a needle on a sewing machine. But when he attempts to write, he is less facile, and sometimes the words stick."

These two men loved the South with all the strength of their being; they dedicated their labors to the healing of the bitter wounds of war and reconstruction, and to the ushering in of a new and better era. Through the editorial columns of the *Constitution* they preached the gospel of progress and good-will, and they did much to win for the *Constitution* a national reputation as the leading mouthpiece of "The New South."

In the late 'Seventies, Sam. W. Ball was writing for the *Constitution* a series of Negro dialect sketches introducing a character known as Uncle Si. Upon Small's leaving the paper, Capt. Howell suggested to Harris that he try his hand at carrying on the series. But the character called Uncle Si did not appeal to Harris. He began casting about for another, and turned in memory to his old days on the Turnwold plantation. A magazine article which he read at this time apparently gave him some hints. He ruminated much, and out of his ruminations there gradually evolved "Uncle Remus, His Songs, Sayings and Fables."

The files of the *Constitution* show that under date of July 6, 1879, there appeared in its columns a short sketch by Harris, under the title "Uncle Remus and the Fourth." This was the humble and unheralded beginning of the "Uncle Remus" series. It was

followed in the course of the next few months by others in the same vein. On November 16 there appeared "Brer Rabbit, Brer Fox, and the Tar Baby." This made an extraordinary hit, and nation-wide interest began to be aroused in the series.

Harris now began to write a weekly "Uncle Remus" column in the *Constitution*. The popular response was instantaneous. It is said that "the reaction in the North was electric in its suddenness." In December, 1880, Harris brought out his first "Uncle Remus" book, which at once attained a wide sale and was recognized as a classic.

In an article which he contributed to Lippincott's magazine, entitled "An Accidental Author," Harris gives us in his own words the genesis of "Uncle Remus":

"*The Countryman* was published on a plantation, and it was on this and neighboring plantations that I became familiar with the curious myths and animal stories that form the basis of the volumes accredited to 'Uncle Remus.' I absorbed the stories, songs and myths that I heard, but I had no idea of their literary value until, some time in the 'Seventies, Lippincott's magazine published an article on the subject of Negro folklore, containing some rough outlines of some of the stories. This article gave me my clue, and the legends told by 'Uncle Remus' are the result."

Again, in a contribution to the London *Folklore Journal*, he said, regarding the stories:

"Not one of them is cooked, and not one, nor any part of one, is an invention of mine. They are all genuine folklore tales."

As to "Uncle Remus" himself, he was, according to Harris, "a human syndicate, I might say, of three or four old darkies whom I had known. I just whalloped them together into one person and called him 'Uncle Remus'." He added: "You must remember that sometimes the Negro is a genuine and an original philosopher."

The first book of "Uncle Remus" stories was brought out by D. Appleton & Co., the well known publishers of New York. "The representative of a New York publisher came to see me," Harris tells us, "and suggested an 'Uncle Remus' book. I was astonished, but he seemed to be in earnest, and so we picked out of the files of the *Constitution* enough matter for a little volume, and it was printed. To my surprise, it was successful."

The "Uncle Remus" stories, written over a period of many years, have been collected into five volumes. The famous "Tar Baby" story possibly had the widest appeal of any. It was translated into many foreign languages.

It has been said of Harris's stories that they were "simple enough to point a telling moral to a child, humorous enough to demand genuine laughter from middle age, and philosophical enough to please the jaded palate of those of advancing years."

Undoubtedly the secret power of these stories lies to a great extent in their keen analysis of character, the revelation of motives underlying life and action, and the homely philosophy which they embody. Through the veil of animal psychology many an illuminating sidelight on human foibles is given us.

Brer Rabbit is throughout the hero of the "Uncle Remus" stories. Though the rabbit is a shy, small, and humble creature, the Negro imagination finds no difficulty in transforming him into a personage of importance, shrewdness, and wit, which makes him the sovereign of his little world.

And Brer Rabbit is, in essence, the Negro himself, acting, talking, and thinking as a Negro. Why so timid an animal as the rabbit should have been selected for the chief role in the play is explained by Harris himself;

"It needs no scientific investigation to show why he (the Negro) selects as his hero the weakest and most harmless of all animals and brings him out victorious in contests with the bear, the wolf, and the fox. It is not virtue that triumphs, but helplessness; it is not malice, but mischievousness. Indeed, the parallel between the 'weakest' of all animals, who must, perforce, triumph through his shrewdness, and the humble condition of the slave raconteur, is not without its pathos and its poetry."

Harris declared that his object in writing the stories was not literary perfection, but rather to invest his characters "with a certain nobility of purpose, a certain pathos that shall relate them to human nature, or to a series of incidents that belong to human nature." The very artlessness of the story-teller proves his consummate art, for he produces such a convincing atmosphere, his pictures of plantation life are so vivid, and the character touches so real, that the reader finds himself transported into a world which has such a reality of its

own that on closing the book he awakes to his actual surroundings with a start.

True, too, to the Negro's dramatic instinct, is the manner in which the story leads up to its startling climax.

One of Harris's warmest admirers was the late Theodore Roosevelt, who, while President, was determined to get "Uncle Remus" to visit him. Thanks to skillful strategy on the part of Harris's son, Julian, "Uncle Remus" was actually one day delivered at the door of the White House. Once he was inside, the habitual shyness seems to have been conquered by his irrepressible and admiring host. A thoroughly "bully" time was had, and it was noted that the lights in the President's library burned far into the night.

Roosevelt later wrote, with reference to "Uncle Remus":

"Where Mr. Harris seems to me to have done one of the greatest services is that he has written what exalts the South in the mind of every man who reads it, and yet what has not a flavor of bitterness toward any other part of the Union. There is not an American anywhere who, on reading his writings, does not rise up with a more earnest desire to do his part in solving American problems right."

And of Harris literary art he said:

"The writings of Joel Chandler Harris gave me as they gave to so many thousands of others, something that I got nowhere else . . . . I certainly do not care for books that do not have what I regard as literary worth, the quality which entitles them to a place in literature proper, but neither do I care for them greatly, as a rule, unless they have in them something else also; unless one feels moved by something high and fine, so that one feels braver and gentler, with keener indignation against wrong, and more sensitive sympathy for suffering, because of having read them . . . .

"Aside from the immortal Brer Rabbit stories, and the children's stories, many of his sketches were among the most striking and powerful contributions to literature that have been produced on this side of the ocean. And not one leaves a bad taste in the mouth! Not one teaches us to admire success unworthily achieved, nor triumphant evil, nor anything that is base or hard."

Admiring letters poured in on Harris from all over the world. Of children he was particularly fond, and up to the last year of his life we find him carrying on a delightful correspondence with some

of his little readers. Again and again he insisted upon the duty of preserving childhood's beautiful visions from the killing blight of a cold and sordid materialism.

In the fullness of his powers, and surrounded by an adoring family circle, Joel Chandler Harris, after a brief illness, laid away his pen forever on July 3, 1908. He sleeps in beautiful Westview cemetery, beneath a huge boulder of Georgia granite, on which are inscribed, beneath the simple name and dates, these charming words from the dedication of one of the editions of "Uncle Remus":

"I seem to see before me the smiling faces of thousands of children—some young and fresh, and some wearing the friendly marks of age, but all children at heart—and not an unfriendly face among them! And while I am trying hard to speak the right word, I seem to hear a voice lifted above the rest, saying: 'You have made some of us happy.' And so I feel my heart fluttering and my lips trembling, and I have to bow silently, and turn away and hurry into the obscurity that fits me best."

A fitting epitaph is this for Joel Chandler Harris, the writer and the man.

WHAT IS RELIGION?

BY FLETCHER HARPER SWIFT

WHAT is religion? To assert, as has been frequently done, that religion is life, is not to define it. With equal accuracy and truth might it be asserted that labor, grief or educaton is life, yet, no one would consider such assertions definitions. Many attempts have been made to define religion in terms of its historical, anthropological or philogical origin. Some of these definitions have become classic, few are adequate. Cicero, nearly a hundred years before Christ (77 B. C.), wrote: *Qui omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent tamquam relegerent, religiosi ex relegendo dicti sunt.* (Men were called religious, from *relegere*, because they reconsidered carefully, and as it were, went over in thought all that appertained to the worship of the gods.)[1] A perhaps more general view, and one accepted by Lactantius, Servius, and St. Augustine, traces the origin to *religere* (to bind) and considers that the essence of the underlying idea is that of "an obligation by which man is bound to an invisible God."[2]

The complexity of religion as it appears today amid a multiplicity of rites, ceremonies, creeds and beliefs, has led many in their efforts to define it, to go to an earlier and simpler stage. What was religion at its birth. If this can be determined, it would seem reasonable to hope to explain its fundamental character, meaning and significance. Is religion an instinct imbedded alike in the physical and spiritual nature of man, or is it the offspring of ignorance and fear. Is the race nature eternally, incurably inoculated with religion, or is religion an appendage useful, even necessary, in earlier stages but something to be sluffed off in a later stage when philosophy sum-

[1] *De Deorum Natura*, II, 28.

[2] Liddon, Henry Parry. *Some Elements of Religion*, Lecture I, 19 and footnotes 2 and 3.

moned by the race in its hour of dire need, as Joseph by Pharaoh, has interpreted the fearbearing vision, and science has shown how the tricks of nature may be forestalled.

Philologist, historian, philosopher, anthropologist, and theologian, each in turn has undertaken to approach a definition of religion by solving the mystery of its origin. Hegel found this origin in magic; Herbert Spencer in the worship of the dead; Crawley in instinct: anthropologists in animism.

Definitions of religion have been ever more numerous than the hypotheses concerning its origin; Max Muller in his *Natural Religion* writes: "Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man."[3] Cardinal Newman, 1870, in his *Grammar of Assent,* defined religion as "the knowledge of God, of His will, and of our duties toward Him."[4] This definition fails to include religious emotions and acts which are perhaps ever more fundamental in religion than knowledge. On similar grounds of inadequacy must be rejected Matthew Arnold's definition that "religion.....is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling."[5] Moreover, the premise implied in this definition that religion is an outgrowth of ethics is insupportable from every standpoint.

No one has done more to furnish the material for the basis of a broad definition of religion than the anthropologists. The two definitions formulated by Tylor and Frazer attracted wide attention and have been much discussed. However, Tylor's definition of religion as "the belief in spiritual beings,"[6] ignores the fundamental element in primitive religion, namely, ritual, and Frazer's definition of religion as "A propitiation or concilation of powers superior to men which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life,"[7] tho superior to Tylor's in that it recognizes the essential element in religion, namely worship, nevertheless is defective in its assumption that the powers worshipped are always regarded as personal and as superior to man.

[3]Muller, Max *Natural Religion,* 1899. p. 188.

[4]Newman, J. H. *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,* p. 378.

[5]Arnold, Matthew, *Literature and Dogma, An Essay Towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible,* pp. 45-46.

[6]Tylor, E. B., *Primitive Culture,* Vol. I, p. 424.

[7]Frazer, J. G., *The Golden Bough,* 1911, 3rd edition, Vol. I, p. 222.

Whoever would attempt to answer today the question: "What is religion," must view religion as a continuous element in human experience. His conception of religion and his definition must be broad enough to include religion in its earliest and most primitive as well as in its latest and highest forms of expression; the paroxyms of the devil-dancer are as much his concern as the fastings of the Christian saint. Such a conception must include not merely rites, sacrifices, but thoughts, emotions and deeds.

What is it that distinguishes a religious emotion, thought, or act from one which is not religious. What makes the washing of hands or of feet, marking an earthen jar with a cross, religious acts or merely hygienic or artistic acts. Is not the test in each and every case a subjective one, namely, whether or not there enters into the emotion, thought, or act, some element or recognition of a power worshipped or regarded as sacred. Moreover, is not the extent to which any such emotion, thought, or act is religious, determined by the degree to which this element of worshipful recognition enters into it or dominates it. On what other ground was it that, when the pious monk, who, before he forsook the world, had been a professional dancer, stole secretly into the sanctuary and danced before the shrine of the Virgin, the act which, at one time, had been a profane act was accepted and rewarded as a religious act. In like manner, (and many sermons have been preached on this theme) any act, no matter how sacred, ceases to be religious the moment the attitude of those performing it ceases to embody this religious element; more than this, it may become impious. Saint Paul declared that whoever partook of the Lord's supper, the holiest of all sacraments, in a state unacceptable to God, became thereby "guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.[8]

In its most advanced as well as in its most primitive form of expression, it is the subjective or inner attitude and state of the individual or group which determines whether any feeling, thought, or act is, becomes, continues, or ceases to be religious. An aesthete hangs on his study wall a cross and keeps a lamp burning beneath it day and night. If he does this simply to display the cross as a work of art or as a momento of a trip to Rome, his act has no religious value, and in truth, it may shock his deeply religious friend. On the other hand, if his motive is religious, the act is religious also.

[8] I Corinthians, xi. 27.

Marett, who approaches the subject from this point of view, writes: "We define then, the religious object as the sacred, and the corresponding religious attitude as consisting in such manifestation of feeling, thought, and action in regard to the sacred as is held to conduce to the welfare of the community or to that of individuals considered as members of the community." With these facts in mind, religion may perhaps be defined more briefly as consisting of any and all responses whatsoever, believed to be beneficial, made by an individual or a group in recognition of a power or powers worshipped.

THE SOUL OF ART

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND

IN ALL the endless tomes so generously housed by the world's ten thousand libraries, what single verse is more significant of the aims and heroism of man? Here is a question allowing scope for all the broad imagination and high anagoge we wish to exercise. There is that ambitious moral conquest prophesied in Milton's classical sonnet on Time. There is the pleasing prospect of progressive wisdom in those last lines of Bishop Berkeley's "Siris" which Sir Wm. Jones so charmingly set to rhyme. There is that piquant epigram of Martial on the reveries of men too old to share youth's frolic (which they would very likely do if they could.) There is that great Stoic exhortation of Epictetus that man must have reason and live according to Nature if he would be a happy soul free of pain and passion. There is that longing prayer of Wordsworth for God to give us *men* in the hour of civilization's need. And there is Ruskin's decision that no one can produce a work of Art having the least bit of appreciable merit or power to inspire who has not first given great thought and effort to the art of Living. Then there is also another more figurative but equally significant line: in response to R. T. House's circular letter to all the leading scholars, educators and literary men asking for their choice of the most beautiful line in the English language, Father Tabb found the following in Keats *Ode to a Nightingale*—"looking thru magic casements opening on the foam of perilous seas, in aery lands forlorn." What is more symbolic and appropriate to our time than the fine expression "foam of perilous seas" and the refuge from them promised in looking from the magic casements of our books and friends, few and choice!

Or yet again we might look further and find the former Con-

gressional Librarian C. H. A. Bjerregaard in his work of scholarly end erudite inspiration entitled, *Inner Life and the Tao-Teh-King*, quoting Marion Pruyn's famous sonnet "We sat together in the afterglow." What delightfully exquisite contrasts of light and shade, love and anguish, creative joy and numbing sorrow, all grouped up at last in the philosophic conception that "Nature's brooding peace was everywhere." What clearer clarion call to the human soul was ever given genial expression than this footnote to our intimations of immortality. So too with Edmund Waller's sonnet on the soul's light in his symposium "On the Divine Poems." Even tho life becomes battered and decadent we have recompense in knowing that new light is let in "thru chinks that time has made" here and there in the walls of the soul's dark cottage. It recalls an experience once relat ed by Tennyson that "Individuality itself thence seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being; and this not a confused state, but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words, where death was an almost laughable impossibiilty—the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction at all, but the only true life." Is there not a cheerful generous spirit of Buddhist renunciation of self about this unique vision of the overworld? No wonder Prof. Erskine views the *new* poetry as a return to the imagery and specific moralism of the *old*.

The spiritual foundation of every argument regarding the impending collapse of civilization (q. v. Bertrand Russell. Dr. Cram, Oswald Spengler or Prof. Shotwell) is the fact that man's nature is not adjectival but substantive, not acquisitive or veneered from outside but inquisitive and actuated by innate disposition within; and if the inward inclinations are not kept pure and wholesome no amount of external reformative measures will prevent both man and man's achievements from going to some ultimate destruction. This is why I believe that the notion claiming the persistence of memory after death is a doubtful hypothesis. It manifests itself in externals, in forlorn images of material existence, and thus cheats its own continuity of being, because the fleeting is not the eternal, the worldly is not the divine. Survival here or anywhere is no cheap sentimental affair, no easy stroke of the romantic imagination; it is an endurance contest, an elimination process where all the weak and lazy, incompetent and corrupt are gradually weeded out, leaving only

what is worthy and able to survive. Immortal souls are staunch and true and lovable, not ephermal whisps of grass blown here and there in the transitory world of appearance and illusory desires.

The genius of humanity being an inherent force for what is continuous and good, is ever aiming to create some tangible expression of its spiritual patterns, its inner ideals or needs. Thus are born the arts and sciences, the ever-recurrent civilizations and centers of culture which keep the world from being wholly a wilderness of brutes and fools. Just as there are innumerable cycles of reality and phases of existence unknown to man because arranged in other systems of sentiency than the one man's evolution has given him, so are there many ideals and needs of humanity that must be forced to the front and given prestige over the vain and trivial affairs which so often monopolize our attention. It is this genius for continuity and good which gives us original plans for betterment, which helps us flourish and survive because it sees into the beauties and secret charms of Nature, and from them derives its own dauntless measures of development and proficiency. Genius is forever at the brim of ambition to beautify the world and ennoble man's desires, it is eternally original, differently expressing itself in inexhaustible tolerance, feeling, vision and faith. It is this native spirituelle that always has some worthy symbol at hand to validate and justify our conception of and dutiful devotion to the Soul of Art.

Artistic genius has supplemented every great achievement and civilizing influence of man's social instinct; it has added culture to his native disposition and thereby made him less an animal and more a thinking and aspirant being. It gives us a better understanding and love of life, and makes us wonder why we were content with folly and finite interests so long; it even goes further and creates the things wherewith others, not primarily within its sanctity, may be similarly influenced and inspired to seek the higher life. And it is an enjoyable as well as provident condition of our being that the music of the other world must be translated and presented in the harmonious recitals of this one, else we have no other life than that of corrupt and worldly selfishness. With such concord of sweet sounds—nay, more, with such agreeable delights as come with the chatterie of living faith, love and friendly converse, the art of true plain living is counselled and exemplified. No grandiose discretion is required,

no adroit conduct is really ever in season to wheedle favors or beguile the hours away. Life is short enough without wilfully wasting or discounting its beauties and blessings.

No one denies, or should deny, that there can be no great art without great and noble passion. But it must be *pure* passion, not the bestial lust of sensualists nor the neurotic hysteria of Lesbaines; it must be emotionally refined and creative, not basely lewd and erotic. Art is the expression in some material form, design, surface or structure of pure intellect and emotion, of spiritual utility and moral inspiration. It may even be expressed in sensory rhythm, harmony of graceful motion as in music or the dance. In any case provided it is true Art and not a mere caricature, it is a system of expressed volitions, hopes and ideals which takes on an even higher symbolism or anagoge and thus more readily manifests its meaning and its inspiration to the chosen few who have receptive faculties. True Art, like honest religion and valid science, has no sham tricks to entertain the rabble, it works no shifty legerdemain in suave pretense of public instruction or delight. It is too busy otherwise and sensible of the fact that susceptible souls come willingly to its hospice, while the power of a thousand armies couldn't drive the vulgarian or the ignorant fool one inch closer than his own conceit might urge him.

Thus music is the highest art because it is in the clearest proportions purely intellectual and emotional, volitional and ideal in the action patterns it suggests. It is also the highest art because it is the least material, the least sensuous in its manner of expression, and demands the least physical anagoge or symbolism whereby we can understand and recognize its meaning. Only the masters themselves could so compose their works that we could read the whole trend and action of their dramas without one word of narrative or explanation. That is true Art. This is why the jazz spirit in any phase of would-be artistic expression (whether in music, painting, sculpture, architecture, drama, dancing, poesy or philosophy, it makes no difference) cannot be considered true art. And we certainly know how meagre are the really inspiring (even if occasionally accidental) productions of its scatter-brained devotees. It is indeed a "blue world" to be forever listening to the moan of off-key clarionets, fickle flutes and jazzbo saxophones.

Harold Bauer, the famous piano master, realized this when he told an audience recently at the Institute of Musical Art in New York that the only valid basis for an artistic career is an inner urge toward an ideal, an urge which stops at no obstacles to its accomplishment. Genius is the inexorable purpose to realize one's ideal concepts in some form of artistic expression, and it lets no petty umbrage, vice or woe restrict its scope or aim. It is the indefatigable industry of aesthetic love; but its love is not sensual, it is the love of beauty, of Nature, Life, justice, nobility, inspiration. If it looks on any of these with failing faculty or lack of preclusive fascination, if it gives up the race at the first few apparently useless struggles against the well-nigh overwhelming odds of a vandal and vulgarian world, we must be quite sure then that it is not genius, it is not genuinely consecrated to its prospective career, and whatever it may by chance of vacillating effort produce is not Art in its full maturity and significance. The fact is, it will not give up if there is really present that inward energy of spiritual valor, that innate urge and will for creative achievement, those *eidolons* (if you like Walt Whitman's term) which drive genius on to achieve the very pinnacles of Art.

The recent aesthetic war in Italy between Croce and Soffici on the one side as against Rossolo and Marinetti on the other in the controversy over jazz and futurism in Art has shown which of them had the true love and welfare of Art foremost in mind. The world is already more in need of virtue and validity than of mediocre and motlibriste expressions of exotic nature; there is no good excuse why the rational and romantic themes should give way to the *degage* and delinquent. With the certain amount of perseverance and effort required to realize a certain desire any fool can get there in a crass material sense, or maybe by mere accident fall upon the ever elusive theme that seems idyllic and entrancing, but it is very probable that he will not have sufficient sense or genius to develop it to maturity of symbolic power and expression. Art requires more than mere physical desire and the good offices of energy and fortune; it demands that there shall be inspiration, that there shall be creative ideals and spiritual consecration as well as romantic love and capacity for work; it requires an ideal moral energy as well as the mere desire to produce its conceptions in some tangible or symbolic form; it

puts the primary requisition on religion and righteousness rather than on mere recognition and reward. And so we find it implacably set down as both a moral and aesthetic law that without some appreciable grasp and practice of these requirements the hardest working fool in the world will remain mediocre and practically sterile of any worthwhile creative power or achievement.

The reason is that worthwhile art, verse, architectural design or musical composition cannot be dashed off in a moment's notice, in one's spare time like darning a sock or taking a week-end bath. No; rather do these expressions, provided they really intend to be artistic and fully sensitive of beauty and truth, demand the genius and power of one's whole being—and the Grace of God as well, if that holy aid and benediction ever applies to artistic works and achievements. Who is it, I should like to ask, that would make a few fickle flourishes of post-prandial strategy and, in all humble honesty of hope, expect to excel a lyric from Keats, an ode from Shelley, or a sonnet from Wordsworth? Who would assume to strike off in a few hours sonotas or symphonies or fugues more masterful than those of Beethoven, Chopin, Mozart or Bach? And who, I still ask, would take the bold conceit to use their cheap horse-hair brush to outpaint the soothing technique of Titian, the chiaroscuro of Vermeer, the love-science of Murillo, the color-balance of Rembrandt, or the facile elegance of style and chromatic nobility of Van Dyck's portraitur? No one should be so presumptuous of the ease with which they think true Art is created.

True Art is as difficult as child-birth, its conception and parturition being no simple exercise of sham emotion or superficial function. Look at the long-labored conception and vast amount of work represented in the classical frieze of the Parthenon; look at that required even to produce on the walls of the catacomb of St. Calixtus that antique style of beauty noticed by Kugler in the early Christian pictorial decoration entitled "The Dispute with the Doctors." Look also at Thorwaldsen's basrelief "Apollo and the Muses" with perfect harmony of line and rhythm of conception. There is no suggestion of what Spingarn calls "the seven confusions" here, altho the seven arts are indeed appropriately represented. And furthermore, how about those great majestic monuments of architectural skill to be seen, not only first created in Greece and Rome and

Rhiems, but copied masterfully in nearly every large modern city's public buildings!

We have our own intricacies of Art and cultural delight right here in America without going away and far removed to find example of inspiration by digging up exotic shores. Our own fancies, faiths, hopes, traditions, ideals and aspirations should make us creative of a native Art. Do we not have a soul peculiarly our own, the same as the Greeks or Romans, Byzantines or Goths? Then why in the name of heaven do we not express it in our own terms, our own vernacular if need be, but in our native moods and measures nevertheless. All that is necessary is to watch closely and with delicate moral discrimination to see that whatever we say and do and create shall not be vulgar, cheap or lewd; be very certain that we do not gradually lose hold on the eternal values and lapse into mere utility and mercenary zeal. If we guard well against these various items of delinquency, nearly anything else will at least stand a chance of being or becoming Art. But if our capacity is sterile of any native power to express itself or if it is unable to validate and justify whatever expressive power it does happen to possess, then I say by all means fly to whatever is best and noblest and of most suitable value in foreign, or even Oriental Art.

Taking *them* as patterns for our copying we will at least avoid our own sterility or decadence and, in the friendly counsel of their exemplary inspiration, we will perhaps some day share their gentle tastes if not their mystic and exalted genius for simplicity and faith. Even to occasionally burrow under the bland surface simplicity of Chinese painting or Japanese wood-carving is to find an utterly baffling symbolism of occult philosophy and esoteric religious devotion. Very few of these masters being wholly unmindful of the subtle influence inevitably cast upon their traditions and their mode of thinking and living by over two milleniums of Buddhst idealism, Zenist fatalism and Taoist nature-lore. If *they* can afford to be intelligent and artistically creative in face of problems of livelihood as persistent as ours and even more brutal and unmitigated by modern western invention and ingenuity, we most certainly ought to take courage and renewed hope, and try to revive ourselves out of our growing aesthetic despondency. Let us retire occasionally into our spiritual refuge of contemplation and conscientious analysis, and in

time perhaps we too can revision the reality, the true and sincere beauty, the ennobled and enlightened life which never fails to inspire the soul of Art.

From the manner of style and conception of the works that have been produced within the last half century, Modern Art is a plain syncretism of everything under the sun. All the past, present and future is given some measure of attention and an attempt is apparently made to place every shade of genius and skill on the palette of our cosmopolitan (if not strictly cultural) art. It is even more radical and emphatic in its departures than in its combinations; it is more exotic and arresting than any heretofore discriminating eclecticism would seem to warrant. Not only having a technique which dates back to Da Vinci, Rubens, Donatello, Van Dyck, Durer, Giotto, Titian, Rembrandt and Michael Angelo, but even a very specific and psychology of aesthetic situations from Aristotle and Vitruvius down to Hegel and John Stuart Mill, it has grounds for any one of its diverse manners of expression. But even without that very worthy and most estimable technical heritage, creative genius can still find means for expressing itself in a form of conception and design at once sufficiently original, moral and idealistic to meet the most exacting public taste. Nay, its sublest and most essential function is just this creative power of neology, this originality and external charm of being able to produce exquisite beauty in novel or unexpected situations. It begins with this and ends with helping to validate and ennoble the very taste which seeks to appreciate it.

The general temper of contemporary taste in aesthetic appreciation is somewhat erratic owing to the sheer variety and aggressiveness of practically every domain of artistic expression. No one, not even a recluse connoisseur, can wholly embrace and understand the complete cycle of the Arts in one grand system of conception and valuation. It is too large a field. It is certainly not wholly within the scope of any such uniform method or viewpoint as will permit of the *same form* of appreciative procedure being applied to *all forms* of artistic expression. If such were the case, or even possible, where would be that first and most essential quality of genius (creative power)? Such a prospect would indeed be taken as archaic, or at least only on the assumption that individual art is copyist and plagiaristic, conventional and mediocre (in other words, non-Art);

and that public taste is provincial and myopic, decadent and ephemeral (in other words, uncultured or vulgarian pretense rather than intelligent and sympathetic taste). And who would want to have the world groping around in such a wilderness of stagnation and death?

With the Pre-Raphaelite movement, so well initiated by Ruskin, Rossetti, Carlyle and Millais in the fifties of last century, came the explosion of a long restrained emotional conflict. Wm. Morris showed that part of it was just this assumption of habitual copyism and uncultured public taste. Beauty in Nature had been just about suffocated under the wet-blanket tactics of the analysts and theorizers, the would-be aestheticians who tied every genius they came across to this or that school, and read this or that influence into his life to account for every stroke of his brush or every whack of his chisel. Under such conditions natural beauty (not to say those who had genuine vision to see it) was in dire need of a set of champions who would restore her pristine naivete and easy naturalness, but above all someone who would forestall the sensual esthetes like Pater and the worldly utilitarians like Jeffrey and Ferguson.

No wonder then that Ruskin had more need for moralism than for history, that Carlyle had to use more rugged polemic than delicate pleasantry, that Rossetti developed more imaginative power than historical accuracy, while Millais relied more on the simple directness of example than on exotic passion for argument and eristic combat. For all their mistaken heroism these pioneers were sturdy chroniclers of a new symbol of tradition; apparently a new faith then, but really old as Nature, old as time and mind and love, for these are Nature's essence, and Nature was at the bottom of their idealistic faith. They were not seeking a pedestal for Art above Nature, but simply for the laws and purposes of Nature which were the foundations of Art. Hence, by going behind the ideal beauty which was postulated by Giotto and Raphael, they sought to paint reality as they saw it and express the truth in whatsoever form it might chance to appear.

As Miss Cobbe once showed, there are three orders in any artistic hierarchy: (1) the creative artists including painters, sculptors, architects, poets and composers of music; (2) the reproductive artists who are engravers, copyists, actors and musicians; and (3) the receptive or appreciative order made up of connoisseurs, dilettantes

and other more or less interested patrons of the Arts. This divisional distinction together with the psychological analysis of the peculiarities of their individual temperament and expression make up the four-point approach from which eligible viewpoint we can begin to understand some of the exclusive qualities as well as some of the inclusive values of Art. And any phase of modern Art cannot well be wholly appreciated if we do not seek to know whether or not its elements should be classified and validated or repudiated and ignored. We will save time and effort by ruling out the risque and pornographic, the fickle and inane, at the very start of any program of understanding and appreciation.

Nature is presented to us, not only to be observed and known directly, but also to be ideally represented and perfected indirectly in the vicary of human aspiration. Her forms are postulates of experiment and peirastic example, not laws of absolute necessity and finality on our conduct. Her interest in man's welfare and perfection is quite readily vouched for in the way she is forever trying to teach him to follow the true and righteous way. She does not exactly try to *make* him do right, but she certainly wields a wicked wallop whenever man gets smart and feels superior to her code of life. So then, if we have to swear a little by way of restoring the proper aesthetic viewpoint, our aim will not often be amiss and our efforts will not often be in vain. Artistic temperament therefore has degrees of creative and appreciative power which must be continuously developed in their proper order if one expects to be a genuine producer of Art, and they likewise must be continually looked for if we who philosophize about them expect to know what order of mind we are dealing with, whether it is creative, reproductive, or simply dilettantic and patronizing.

(To be continued.)

MISCELLANEOUS

BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEWER SPIRIT: A sociological criticism of Literature, By *V. F. Calverton.* New York, Boni & Liveright, 1925.

Although revolutions in esthetics are due to revolutions in ideas, every revolution in ideas is a consequence of a revolution in the social structure that the prevailing material conditons have produced. Mr. Calverton's book is itself a prime illustration of this, its main thesis. A sociological interpretation of literature could not have appeared until the fruits of the industrial revolution had ripened into a new social system out of which in the course of time arose the nucleus of a new conception of life and its problems, a conception characterized by a recognition of the community as primary and the individual as derivative. To say this is not to belittle the author's achievement. The mere fact that a scholar lives in the world of today, in the midst of the societal heritage of modern industrialism, does not guarantee that his mind will apprehend the flow of the social forces. Thus so bold and insurgent a spirit as Spingarn could seriously transfer to America throbbing with industrialism the attenuated criticism of Croce with his notion that the only standard of art is the question whether the artist has accomplished what he aimed to accomplish. Such a detached and uncanny critique might be considered natural enough in a country like Italy, where society is sick to death with the attempt to carry on a strutting imperialism without a base in material resources and where consequently the competent literary genius needs to be self-sufficient and self-contained and to demand that he be judged by personal standards as might a lone man sitting on a submerged rock in a hopeless sea; but the fact that a learned American critic could presume to undertake the naturalization of so effete a standard in the United States with its exuberant material basis out of which grows an overpowering social organism is an indication of the length of time it takes for the material foundation to work its way up through social institutions into the mentality of an era. The time has long seemed ripe for such an epochal work as Calverton's with its illuminating presentation of the fact that the whole significance of art consists in its correspondence to the social forces, which are, in turn, to be referred to the alterations going on in the material foundations of livelihood and life; but no critic of literature rose to the occasion, unless we give rank to such works as Francke's "History of German Literature as Determined by Social Forces", or Vide Scudder's "Social Ideals in English Letters." These works opened the field for Americans, but they were, in a sense, premature. At any rate they did not serve to create a school of sociological criticism, although they were in themselves adequate to that end. The time, however, was not ripe. Material production had to evolve decades longer, and on the basis of it social institutions and usages had to develop new forms and new qualities. Now at last it would seem that we are ready for the rise of a con-

quering school of scientific criticism, sociological criticism, and it is apparent that Calverton has struck the key-note for the emergence of such a movement of dynamic interpretation.

Certain sophisticated sociologues are saying that there is nothing novel in the principles set forth in "The Newer Spirit". Certainly there is nothing new about them, nor does the author pretend that there is. The significant thing about the book is that it paves the way for the application of principles which ought to have been common stock in trade of literary criticism for the past generation, but which did not succeed in penetrating the sacred precincts of the litterateurs until there was time enough for Calverton to be born, to grow, to get education and experience, and to write a book. Plenty of others "could have done it," but the fact is that they didn't. Either they were sociologists unversed in letters or without sufficient time to give such outlying fields as art, or else they were literary men who ought to have felt the need of a mastery of the interpretation of social forces but didn't. Calverton's distinction is not that he has originated something; for according to his own thesis the individual originates nothing. It merely happens that he is serving as the first open channel through which the social development of the times finds it possible to push its way upward into the galleries of art criticism. Needless to say that the art work of the future will be creative about in proportion as it assimilates and consciously utilizes the sociological principes which the present book makes a beginning at expressing and applying. If there has been great literature produced in the present era, it has been due to a more or less unconscious apprehension of the influences that Calverton delineates. Now, however, that the hidden forces have been brought out into the open, writers can no longer depend on unconscious or subconscious hunches. Only as they proceed open-eyed on the background of the sociological interpretation will their work be better than an abortion.

The first chapter is the key to the book. In it the author shows how his thesis emerges from a study of the evolution of literature. Feudal society is passed in review with its artistic preoccupation with "noble characters". Shakespeare is noticed "because his works so excellently illustrate how the esthetic and ethical ideas of the feudal period were expressed in literature, and stand out in such sharp and striking contrast to the changing conceptions of later centuries." It appears that "as the bourgeois class, with the steady decline of feudalism, continued to rise . . . the aristocratic conception waned." During the period of unquestioned bourgeois ascendency, "there could be but two kinds of ethical and esthetic conceptions, one dominant, the bourgeois, the other recessive or vestigial, the aristocratic." In more recent times civilization has been characterized by the rise of the proletarian, and the increase in the class-consciousness and class organization of this lowest level puts it more and more into a position to impress "itself upon the activity of a society" and to "function as a determinant of its basic conceptions." Walt Whitman illustrates this proletarian trend. A whole chapter is devoted to Sherwood Anderson as an outstanding current illustration of the same tendency, which does not imply the present maturation of a proletarian concept, a process that comes later in the development.

Chapter One indicates, further, that there exists an "indisseverable connection between the nature of literary techinque and the stage of development of society". This conception is by no means novel. It was expounded a half-century ago by Posnett in his "Comparative literature", but little has been done since to develop the conception. Perhaps the most significant recent contribution to the subject prior to Calverton was Flinders Petrie's little book on the "Revolutions of Civilization". Now in Calverton the theory comes to life and promises to take hold in America. He remarks, for instance, that "the more carefully we notice the history of fiction . . . we are immediately impressed by the evolution from the impossible to the improbable, thence to the probable and finally to the inevitable." This trend was of course a natural result of man's increasing command of the scientific resources for the mastery of the conditions of life. The lingering of some of the older tendencies illustrates the principle that "the advance of a new social system though it achieved a change in the dominant esthetic and ethical ideas cannot hope to annihilate at once, or in a generation or two, all of the remains of those conceptions that have been forced to recede into the background."

A later chapter shows that social relativity is the ruling principle not merely in respect to the substance and the forms of art but also in the matter of esthetic values. It appears "that a work of art does not possess a positive or absolute value; that its value is impermanent, depending on the continuance of the environment that created it, and varies perceptibly with each change in social structure and imperceptibly with each change in immediate environment." In this connection the reviewer is tempted to use by way of illustration a dictum put forth by a foremost American professor of Education that "great literature is that which embodies the social spirit of its age and lends inspiration for social betterment." Little discernment is required in order to determine the conditions under which such standard of valuation might arise in the minds of the more thoughtful and then become the accepted canon of criticism. The student of social forces would not necessarily have to accept without qualification the professor's critique, but he would have to accept the general principle laid down by Calverton and to demand evidence of any human validity in the notion that art can have greatness irrespective of time and place and circumstance. Undoubtedly most of those who hold to such a detached standard are, in their appraisals of art products mistaking a wonder over the outlandish and the peculiar or a zest that comes merely from novel stimulation, for esthetic appreciaton. Their criticism would have to be subjected to psychological analysis before they could prove it to be a pertinent case. Meanwhile Calverton's critique will hold.

The range of topics covered in "The Newer Spirit" leaves something to be desired in respect to unity, and yet such a remark is hardly to be taken as a criticism, any more than is recognition of the fact that the author has done no more than open the whole subject and suggest what a wealth of material lies before the prospector. It is well that the book was published at this time as an outline, a clue, a specimen, a guide. Too many scholars wait till they have rounded out a subject and put it into a formidably complete and logical arrangement before they admit the public to a view. Such practice is one of

the main explanations of the cultural lag, of the fact that it takes a generation or two for the prevalent ideas to change to fit a new material order and a new social situation. While ideas emerge and take hold so slowly, civilization is bound to be out-of-date. Consequently Calverton is to be congratulated for having the courage to publish while his ideas are still pretty general if not vague and sketchy if not crude. Reviewers who have attacked his work on this score on the ground that his selection of illustrations is sometimes inept merely betray their own scholasticism and pedantry. He has done a work that greatly needed to be done. His discussions of the points covered in this review as well as of "Morals and Determinism", "The Great Man Illusion", "The Rise of Objective Psychology" and other like topics should furnish the starting point for a galaxy of works in elaboration of his main thesis. Current articles in the "Modern Quarterly", of which Mr. Calverton is editor, give promise of forthcoming volumes of his own authorship. It is not too much to predict that he will become the founder of a school,—that we shall at last attain, in America, to a group of critics who will see art as a social product in a social setting and will uproot the naive, weird, fantastic, dilettante pedantry which characterizes the bulk of literary criticism in the United States at the present time.

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