


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THE LIFE,
CAMPAIGNS & PUBLIC SERVICES
OF
MAJOR GENERAL
GEO. B. M'CLELLAN



The Democratic Candidate for President.


WITH A FULL HISTORY OF HIS GREAT BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS,
AND HIS REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
WAR DEPARTMENT AND PRESIDENT.

WRITTEN BY A GENTLEMAN WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM THROUGH HIS CAMPAIGNS.

Philadelphia :

MARTIN & RANDALL, Publishers.

29 South Sixth Street.



THE
LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL M^CCLELLAN.

WHICH INCLUDES A

COMPLETE SUMMARY

OF

HIS REPORT.

WRITTEN BY A GENTLEMAN WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM THROUGH HIS CAMPAIGNS.

PHILADELPHIA:
MARTIN & RANDALL.
NO. 29 SOUTH SIXTH STREET.

1864.

FOR THE

LIBRARY AND PUBLIC SERVICES

MAYOR-GENERAL McCLINTON

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1864

LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL M^CCLELLAN.

It is no easy task to write the life of a distinguished man ; especially one whose great services have been so recent as General McClellan's. But when a public servant who has done all in his power for his country, has been badly treated by the men who, for the time, are at the head of the government ; when every sacrifice and effort he made was only misrepresented and ridiculed ; he deserves, at the hands of his fellow-citizens, not only an appreciation of his merit, but a reward for his high virtues. We think the American people are inclined to give it. General McClellan has labored long and well ; he did the best that was possible, whilst at the head of the army. He never led his troops to certain defeat, as Hooker and Burnside did ; he never got so tangled up as to be unable to unravel his struggling ranks, as Pope did ; he never bragged or blustered or promised what could not be performed ; and more than all, whilst at the head of affairs, he carried on war as a Christian and true soldier—neither fighting with women and children, nor interfering with any domestic institution of the country in which he fought. He secured the love of his soldiers and the praise of his country. We think we are right in saying that that country and those soldiers still love their old commander.

General McClellan's Early Life.

General McClellan is a native of the city of Philadelphia. He is the son of Dr. George McClellan, a distinguished physician whose reputation extended all over the Union. GEORGE BRINTON M^CCLELLAN was born on December 3d 1826. His early education was given him in Philadelphia, and he spent a short time at the Pennsylvania University, leaving it at the age of sixteen to enter the Military Academy at

West Point. On July 1st 1846, he graduated from the academy, standing number two in his class, and at once received a commission as brevet second lieutenant of engineers.

He goes to Mexico.

He had just graduated, when the Mexican War broke out, and with scarcely time to bid good-bye to his friends, he was off for the battlefield. His bravery and ability in that war are well known. For gallantry at Vera Cruz, he was highly commended in official reports. At Cerro Gordo, he also received the praise of his commanding officers. For bravery at Contreras and Churubusco, he was made a brevet first lieutenant; and at Molino del Rey was offered the additional brevet of captain, which was at first declined, but subsequently, having at Chepultepec won the admiration of all, he was again offered the brevet, and accepted it. He came out of that war a captain. His gallant conduct well foreshadowed his subsequent celebrity.

When peace was declared, he returned to West Point, to instruct the cadets in the bayonet exercise, and whilst there he translated from the French the "Manual of Bayonet Exercise," which at once became the text-book of the service. He was afterwards continually sent upon important missions. In 1851, he superintended the construction of Fort Delaware; in 1852, explored the Red River; and in 1853, was in Washington Territory, where he surveyed a route for the Pacific Railway, for which he was highly complimented by the Secretary of War. The next year he spent in thoroughly investigating the railway system of the United States, with a view to the construction of the Pacific Railroad. Full reports of these investigations were published by him.

In March 1855, McClellan received his commission as a captain of cavalry, and the next year made his famous trip to Europe, in company with Majors Delafield and Mordecai, to watch the operations in the Crimean War. The report of this mission was also published, and has had a wide circulation. It added not a little to his increasing fame.

On January 16th 1857, however, McClellan, tired of a military life in which there was no prospect of any active operations, resigned his commission, and at once was made vice-president and executive officer of the Illinois Central Railroad, then in process of construction. For three years he filled this responsible position; completing the railroad, and then giving up his place, was made general superintendent, and subsequently president, of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, running between Cincinnati and St. Louis. In all of these positions, he showed that remarkable tact as a disciplinarian and commander which subsequently distinguished him on a larger field.

The War breaks out.

The war broke out in 1861, and found McClellan residing at Cincinnati, in a comfortable home, and with a salary of ten thousand dollars a year. His country called him, however, and he obeyed. Sacrificing home, comforts, everything, he returned to a military life. Governor Curtin offered him the chief command in Pennsylvania, but before McClellan heard of the offer, he was given a commission as major-general of Ohio troops, which he promptly accepted, and with scarcely a day's notice, proceeded to organize the nine months' troops of that state, then rendezvousing at Cincinnati. On May 10th, 1861, Mr. Lincoln created a department in the West, and gave General McClellan chief command of the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. This reinstated McClellan into the army, and the people began to look to him as their leader. It was but a little while before the public danger was so imminent that in him alone was any reliance placed.

His Services in Western Virginia.

On May 26th, 1861, the Confederates in Western Virginia burned two bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and threatened others. General McClellan acted promptly, and at once ordered an advance into Virginia. One column moved upon Parkersburg, the other upon Bellair. As he advanced, General McClellan issued a proclamation to the people of Western Virginia, which at once marked out that course of humane warfare which he has adhered to ever since. To fight only against the enemy, and not to injure the country through which he passed, and to allow no interference with slaves, were his maxims. In this proclamation, dated on May 26th, he says to the Union men of that section:—

“The General Government cannot close its ears to the demands you have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the river. They come as your friends and your brothers—as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families, and your property are safe under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected.

“Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly—not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part.”

At the same time, he issued an address to his troops, characterized by the same humane spirit exhibited in all his actions. It was the first of the series of addresses which, for pure patriotism and manly language, have won the admiration of his fellow-citizens.

"ADDRESS TO THE VOLUNTEER ARMY.

"HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
"CINCINNATI, *May 26th, 1861.*

"SOLDIERS:—You are ordered to cross the frontier, and enter upon the soil of Virginia. Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to protect the majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in concert with the Virginia troops, and to support their advance.

"I place under the safeguard of your honor the persons and property of the Virginians. I know that you will respect their feelings and all their rights. Preserve the strictest discipline; remember that each one of you holds in his keeping the honor of Ohio and of the Union.

"If you are called upon to overcome armed opposition, I know that your courage is equal to the task; but remember that your only foes are the armed traitors,—and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided. When, under your protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return to your homes, with the proud satisfaction of having preserved a gallant people from destruction.

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
"Major-General Commanding."

The Battle of Philippi.

On May 30th, General McClellan's advance reached Grafton, the enemy evacuating it without opposition. On June 2d, McClellan advanced beyond Grafton, and approached Philippi. Here he fought a short but decisive battle, in which the enemy was defeated and driven from the field. It was the first victory of the war. So gratifying was it to the people of Western Virginia, that the state convention, then in session at Wheeling, passed an unanimous resolution, thanking General McClellan for his gallant action.

On June 20th, General McClellan assumed personal command of his forces in Western Virginia, and on the 23d issued a second proclamation from his head-quarters at Grafton. It breathes the same spirit as the first one:—

"The army of this department, headed by Virginia troops, is rapidly occupying all Western Virginia. This is done in co-operation with and in support of such civil authorities of the state as are faithful to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The proclamation issued by me, under date of May 26th 1861, will be strictly maintained. Your houses, families, property, and all your rights will be religiously respected. We are enemies to none but armed rebels, and those voluntarily giving them aid. All officers of this army will be held responsible for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing disorder and punishing aggression by those under their command."

And in an address to his soldiers at the same time, he pursues the same idea:—

“You are here to support the government of your country, and to protect the lives and liberties of your brethren, threatened by a rebellious and traitorous foe. No higher or nobler duty could devolve on you, and I expect you to bring to its performance the highest and noblest qualities of soldiers, discipline, courage, and mercy.

“I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce the highest discipline, and I know that those of all grades, privates and officers, will display in battle cool heroic courage, and will know how to show mercy to a disarmed enemy. Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies—that you are here to protect, not to destroy. Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do so by your general officers. Remember that I have pledged my word to the people of Western Virginia that their rights in person and property shall be respected. I ask every one of you to make good this promise in its broadest sense.

“We have come here to save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear of punishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of the cause in which we are engaged. Carry into battle the conviction that you are right and that God is on our side. Your enemies have violated every moral law; neither God nor man can sustain them. They have without cause rebelled against a mild and paternal government; they have seized upon public and private property; they have outraged the persons of Northern men, merely because they came from the North, and of Southern Union men, merely because they loved the Union; they have placed themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve some honor on the field of battle.

“You will pursue a different course; you will be honest, brave, and merciful; you will respect the right of private opinion; you will punish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the world that you differ from our enemies in these points of honor, honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that we inaugurate no reign of terror wherever we go.”

The Battle of Rich Mountain.

Immediately upon issuing these addresses, General McClellan ordered an advance of his troops, driving the enemy before him. They numbered two thousand men, under Colonel Pegram, and took refuge in a range of mountains known as the “Laurel Hills.” Here they entrenched themselves upon the precipitous side of Rich Mountain. McClellan attacked them on July 11th, and after a short engagement, by a gallant charge carried their works. The enemy fled, leaving their dead and wounded, all their camp equipage and guns, behind them, and another force at Beverly, a town near by, who were outflanked by this manœuvre, at once abandoned that place. Pegram afterwards surrendered unconditionally to General McClellan, finding he could not elude the vigilance of the Federal pursuit. McClellan's loss in this contest was but twenty killed and fifty wounded, and he captured.

one thousand prisoners and several cannon. Generals Rosecrans and Kelley gave him efficient aid in this battle. This was the second victory of the war.

On July 14th, General Garnett, who still kept up an opposition in Western Virginia, was attacked and routed at Carrick's Ford, his baggage and one gun captured, and he killed. This completed the destruction of the enemy in that section, and never since then have they appeared there. These brilliant victories were not unappreciated by the people. Everywhere the newspapers were filled with the highest praise of McClellan's ability and promptness. His successes had been the only ones in the war. His pacification of Western Virginia was complete. On July 19th, he closed his campaign, with a third address to his soldiers, in which their successes are thus summed up:—

“I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses and fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers. One of the second commanders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of but twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part.”

Three days after this, the disastrous battle of Bull Run was fought. General McDowell was sent out from Washington at the head of all the troops there, to drive the enemy under Beauregard from Manassas Junction. As usual with the Administration, they hurried and pressed McDowell until he consented to go before he was prepared. His columns marched from Alexandria. At the very outset, the plan, owing to some unforeseen occurrences, had to be changed. The columns got entangled on the road. At Blackburne's Ford, across Bull Run, the enemy were found. One of the highest Federal officers was so intoxicated as to be unable to perform his duty. The enemy were stronger than supposed, and were found in unexpected positions. Several miles beyond Centreville, the battle began; for a while all seemed well. The enemy retreated before the Federal advance, but it was only to allure them into an ambush, where masked batteries opened upon them, and their fate was sealed. A panic ensued. All efforts to rally the troops were vain. A few stood firm, but such was the confusion caused by the rushing to and fro of frightened horses and teams over which the teamsters had no control, that all discipline was broken up. The ranks fell back. Rumor added to rumor made the retreat a rout. Everything was lost in the great idea of safety. A rushing tide of

wagons, horses, cannon, and troops set towards Centreville. There was no checking it, and pell-mell into the town it rushed, where the panic was only checked by some brave Germans drawn up in line across the road, who stopped the fugitives, and made them turn their faces once more against the enemy. The Confederates did not expect this retreat. They were astonished at it, and gained no advantage from it. The Federal army, however, was broken up. All organization was gone. An undisciplined crowd of soldiers roaming about Centreville, and a huge park of broken wagons, frightened horses, and disabled cannon outside, was all that was left. A few short hours had shattered a magnificent army. The North was in consternation, and the President knew of but one man to whom to turn for rescue. All eyes pointed to the hero of Western Virginia, whose recent victories were filling so large a space in the public mind, as the only general fitted for the task. The Administration was not long in availing itself of him.

General McClellan ordered to Washington and given command of the Army.

Bull Run was fought on the 21st of July. On the 22d General McClellan received an order to proceed at once to Washington, and give General Rosecrans command of his column in Western Virginia. He did so, and, having made the necessary orders for earthworks and fortifications necessary to hold the conquered territory in that section, bade his brave little army good-bye, and early on the morning of the 23d left for Washington. On his way he passed through Philadelphia, where a spontaneous reception awaited him at the railroad depot. After a very brief speech, however, counselling action not words, General McClellan hurried to Washington. He arrived there on the afternoon of the 26th. Early the next morning he was given command of all the troops forming the Army of the Potomac. The condition in which he found the army is best told by himself. He says:—

“When I assumed command in Washington, on the 27th of July 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty pieces.

“On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyan, Roach’s Mills, Cole’s Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theological Seminary.

“There were no troops south of Hunting creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom in the best positions for defence, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria.

“On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of each other.

“There were no troops on the important Talleytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south.

“The camps were located without regard to purposes of defence or instruction, the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into brigades.

“In no quarter were the dispositions for defence such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position and numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earthworks, in the nature of *têtes de pont*, looked upon the approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge and Alexandria, by the Little River turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a single defensive work had been commenced on the Maryland side.

“There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations, without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization.”

His Plans.

General McClellan's first object, therefore, was to completely reorganize this army. This he at once set about, and his triumphant success is one of the greatest laurels of his fame. He found the city of Washington in the wildest disorder. He changed it to one of the quietest cities on the continent. Day and night he labored, and at length gradually saw order emerging from the chaos in which Bull Run had left everything. On August 4th he was able to prepare his plan of future operations, and, at the urgent solicitation of the President, he committed it to writing. It begins with some ideas of the state of civil war, which should have been noticed by the party now misruling us. His plans are thoroughly developed in it, and it may be regarded as the basis of all his subsequent operations. The document, though rather long, is well worthy a perusal.

“The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are engaged, mainly in this: that the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms; in this contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expense of a great effort.

“Now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class, now it is with a people—our military success can alone restore the former issue.

“By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private property and unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance the authority of the Government must be supported by overwhelming physical force.

“Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the military action of the Government should be prompt and irresistible.

“The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements on other points, both by land and water.

“Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri.

“As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement through that state into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the East.

“The possession of those roads by us, in connection with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all the passes into Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from that quarter towards Richmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that state. Every effort should, however, be made to organize, equip, and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations.

“At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession.

“The importance of Harper’s Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be very materially diminished, so soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong, and efficient, because no capable general will cross the river north of this city, when we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat.

“To revert to the West. It is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secure that state.

“I presume that the force required for the movement down the Mississippi will be determined by its commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more than 20,000 will be needed, together with those that can be raised in that state and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville.

“The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper management, suffice for its protection.

“When we have reorganized our main army here, 10,000 men ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac; 5000 will garrison Baltimore; 3000 Fort Monroe; and not more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the utmost, for the defence of Washington.

“For the main army of operations I urge the following composition:

250 regiments of infantry, say	225,000 men.
100 field batteries, 600 guns	15,000 “
28 regiments of cavalry	25,500 “
5 regiments engineer troops	7,500 “

Total	<u>273,000</u> “
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“The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the movement of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also co-operate with the main army in its efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels.

“It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations.

“It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such others as the particular case may require. We must endeavor to seize places on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each state may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Confederate army.

“The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce important results in this connection. That advance and the progress of the main army at the East will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be encountered by each.

“The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions connected with cotton is too well understood by the President and cabinet to need any illustration from me.

“There is another independent movement that has often been suggested, and which has always recommended itself to my judgment; I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian territory upon Red river and Western Texas, for the purpose of protecting and developing the latent Union and free-state sentiment well

known to predominate in Western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a free state. How far it will be possible to support this movement by an advance through New Mexico from California, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific states, as well as identifying them with our cause, and connecting the bond of Union between them and the General Government.

“If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico; their sympathies and interests are with us—their antipathies exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican Government the right to use, at least during the present contest, the road from Guaymas to New Mexico; this concession would very materially reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific; a similar permission to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and the Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot.

“To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to take into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which I do not venture to offer an opinion.

“The force I have recommended is large; the expense is great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view, but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish the power of its Government, and restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time.

“The question to be decided is simply this: Shall we crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, or shall we leave it as a legacy for our descendants?

“When the extent of the possible line of operation is considered, the force asked for for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly large; every mile we advance carries us further from our base of operations, and renders detachments necessary to cover our communications, while the enemy will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's country, and crush the rebellion in its very heart.

“By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur.

“In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such supplies as may there be obtained.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
“Major-General.”

In this document is found General McClellan's plan of operations. Had the Administration given him what he desired, instead of meanly higgling about it; had they allowed him to control his subordinates; and had they adopted his ideas on the negro and other vexed questions, who can say that General McClellan would not have been successful?

As soon as the fright occasioned by Bull Run had worn off, the Administration began urging a second forward movement. McClellan was asked how many men he required, and in the latter part of October he gave his answer, specifying the number necessary for the column of active operations, and the number required to garrison Washington and its neighboring defences. These numbers were as follows:—

Column of active operations	150,000 men,	400 guns.
Garrison of the city of Washington	35,000 “	40 “
To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry	5000 “	12 “
To guard the lower Potomac	8000 “	24 “
Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis,	10,000 “	12 “
Total effective force required	208,000 men,	488 guns.

Or, making allowances for sickness, the total number required was in round numbers two hundred and forty thousand. The enemy were known to have concentrated one hundred and fifty thousand men around Richmond and at Manassas.

The forward movement was not pressed, however, the army being notoriously too weak in October to attempt it. General McClellan still labored on at the organization of his forces. As fast as new regiments arrived from the North, they were sent to camps of instruction. When sufficiently advanced, they were brigaded, and sent to the south bank of the river. He also built a line of earthworks around Washington, which made it almost impregnable. The latter months of 1861 were among the busiest of his life. During that time his army steadily increased in efficiency and numbers. Its effective strength for different periods is given below:—

October 15th 1861	133,201
December 1st 1861	169,452
January 1st 1862	191,480
February 1st 1862	190,806
March 1st 1862	193,142

Organization of the Army.

The organization of the army was first into brigades of four or five regiments each, and then into divisions, each of three brigades. The artillery was in the proportion of two and one-half pieces to a thou

sand infantry soldiers. The cavalry was one regiment to each division of infantry, and in addition an independent force of from eight to ten thousand.

On October 15th, the different divisions were as follows:—

Cavalry under General George Stoneman.

Artillery under General H. J. Hunt.

Infantry. General Porter's City Guard, acting as the provost-marshal's force of Washington.

Banks's Division of three brigades, commanded by Generals Ambercrombie, Stiles, and Gordon.

McDowell's Division—Generals Keyes, Wadsworth, and King.

Heintzelman's Division—Generals Richardson, Sedgwick, and Jameson.

Fitz-John Porter's Division—Generals Morell, Martindale, and Butterfield.

Franklin's Division—Generals Kearney, Slocum, and Newton.

Stone's Division—Generals Gorman, Lander, and Baker.

Buell's Division—Generals Couch, Graham, and Peck.

McCall's Division—Generals Meade, Seymour, and Reynolds.

Hooker's Division of two brigades, under Generals Birney and Sickles.

Smith's Division—Generals Stevens, Hancock, and Brooks.

Blenker's Independent German Brigade.

Dix's Division of ten regiments, at Baltimore.

On March 8th, 1862, these divisions were made up into *army corps*.

The First Corps, under McDowell, consisted of the divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King.

The Second Corps, under Sumner, consisted of the divisions of Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick.

The Third Corps, under Heintzelman, consisted of the divisions of Fitz-John Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton.

The Fourth Corps, under Keyes, consisted of the divisions of Couch, Smith, and Casey.

The Fifth Corps, under Banks, had two divisions under Williams and Shields.

[The casualties of the service between October and March made many changes in the commanders of the divisions, hence the discrepancies between this latter list and the first one.]

The Position of the Army of the Potomac.

The military history of the Army of the Potomac, after General McClellan assumed its command, begins about the middle of October 1861.

The main body was then in the immediate vicinity of Washington, with detachments on the north bank of the Potomac, as far down as Liverpool Point and as far up as Williamsport. On October 19th General McCall, who was posted at Langley, on the south side of the river above Washington, was ordered to make a reconnoissance to Drainsville. He did so, and occupied the town. This frightened the enemy on the Potomac above, and they at once withdrew from Leesburg. On the 20th, their retreat being rumored, General McClellan's adjutant-general sent the following telegram to General Stone at Poolesville:—

“General McClellan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied Drainsville yesterday, and is still there. Will send out heavy reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that point. The general desires that you will keep a good look-out upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them.”

McClellan not responsible for the Defeat at Ball's Bluff.

By this request, McClellan merely wished General Stone to make some display of an intention to cross the Potomac, and also to watch the enemy more closely than usual. McClellan says in his report: “I did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he should cross the river in force for the purpose of fighting.” At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th General Stone received the order, and in the evening he sent an answer which indicated that he had done what was expected. Stone telegraphed: “I made a feint of crossing at this place (Poolesville) this afternoon, and at the same time started a reconnoitring party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island.” McClellan of course thought the movement was over, and recalled McCall from Drainsville. What was his surprise to hear from General Stone on the morning of the 21st, “The enemy have been engaged opposite Harrison's Island; our men are behaving admirably;” and in the evening the startling announcement, “I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and trying to get into a position to redeem. We have lost some of our best commanders—Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted.”

McClellan at once ordered McCall to be in readiness to march back to Drainsville, and Banks to send aid to Stone from Harper's Ferry, and on the 22d he went himself to Poolesville, and did everything possible to rescue the remnants of Baker's brave troops. McClellan clearly is not to blame for this disaster, and the manly testimony of General Stone before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, on January 5th

1862, fully exonerates him. He was asked various questions about the reconnoissance to Ball's Bluff, which resulted in the disaster.

Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had you orders from the general-in chief to make it?"

To which he replied: "It originated with myself—the reconnoissance."

Question. "The order did not proceed from General McClellan?"

Answer. "I was directed the day before to make a demonstration; that demonstration was made the day previous."

Question. "Did you receive an order from the general-in-chief to make the reconnoissance?"

Answer. "No, sir."

General McClellan made Commander-in-chief.

On November 1st 1861, Lieutenant-General Scott retired from the command of the Federal armies, and General McClellan was at once made Commander-in-chief. This gave him a more enlarged sphere of action, and he speedily formed his plans for carrying on the war on an extensive scale all over the Union. He suggested and put in execution the famous Burnside expedition to North Carolina, which early in 1862 effected a landing on the coast and captured the eastern section of the state. General Butler's expedition was sent to New Orleans at his instance, and the capture of that city was owing to the full and explicit instructions given by McClellan in a letter dated February 23d 1862. General Halleck was ordered to the West, and the brilliant victories at Forts Donelson and Henry, early in 1862, were planned by McClellan and achieved almost under his supervision. Everywhere, whilst he was at the head of the army, the Federal arms were successful. Whilst he controlled matters in his own way, and the Administration did not interfere with his plans, General McClellan secured victory after victory, and was rapidly conquering the enemy. Partisan jealousy, however, prompted by envy of his successes, and opposition to his humane plans of warfare, soon drove him from the command—with what sad results the people well know.

General McClellan's Mode of treating the Enemy.

In his instructions to all of these high officers on assigning them their duties, General McClellan still adhered to his original ideas about slaves and private property. On January 7th 1862 he wrote to Burnside, then about sailing for North Carolina:—

"I would urge great caution in regard to proclamations. In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the General Go-

vernment, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property."

To General Halleck, at St. Louis, he wrote on November 11th 1861:—

"In regard to the political conduct of affairs, you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent states that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our National Government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order."

On November 7th 1861, he wrote to General Buell, at Louisville, commanding the department of the Ohio:—

"You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the General Government over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this rebellion, and restore the authority of the Government, by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinion of the President when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the General Government.

"The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions."

And again, on November 11th, he wrote about military arrests to Buell:—

"Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energy in military movements, be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels.

"I mean by this that it is the desire of the Government to avoid unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to believe that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or information to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them; but I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrests shall be made except by your order or that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Union."

Had these principles been adhered to by the Administration afterward, there would not now have been that rancor in the South which leads to reprisals and raids.

The Potomac Blockade.

During the latter part of 1861, various newspapers and a large party in the North had been urging another forward movement, and by January 1862 they had won the Administration over to their views. Simon Cameron ceased to be Secretary of War, and was succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him none of the requirements of the position, but who continually overruled the conduct of military men. The Confederates had blockaded the lower Potomac, and there was great anxiety on General McClellan's part to have them driven away. The army could not do it, except by great loss; the navy easily could. As early as August 12th 1861, before the enemy had planted their batteries there, McClellan wrote to Secretary Welles that they intended to erect batteries on the lower Potomac, and urging "that the strongest possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night." The navy department, however, with that tardiness which characterizes all its movements, failed to send the force, and the enemy erected the batteries unopposed. The army was powerless to prevent it. General Barnard, the chief engineer, after a reconnoissance made by him in September, reported that the erection of batteries "cannot be prevented" by the army; and it was the opinion of high naval officers, as cited in General McClellan's report, that "had an adequate force of strong and well-armed vessels been acting on the Potomac from the beginning of August, it would have been next to impossible for the rebels to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of the river." If the navy department did not clear the river, the only way for the army to do it was by manœuvring. It did so. The movement out to Manassas early in 1862, caused the enemy hastily to abandon their works, and the Potomac was opened without the loss of a man.

A Forward Movement.

Scarcely had 1862 begun, when the Administration urged upon General McClellan to push forward. He cheerfully complied with the President's request for a plan of operations, and very soon after Mr. Stanton's entrance to office, McClellan communicated to him his written plan: To proceed to the lower Chesapeake, land at Urbanna, on the south bank of the Rappahannock, push across the country to West Point, at the head of York river, and thence towards Richmond. This began the disagreement between McClellan and the Administration. Mr. Lincoln had a different plan, and on January 31st he issued his *order*, which was this:—

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

This order to advance against Manassas Junction was issued without consultation with General McClellan. That it would have involved a great loss of life, and probably a defeat, no one can doubt. McClellan wished to go around Manassas. He could secure its evacuation far easier and with less loss of life in that way. The subsequent evacuation on his march to the Peninsula, proved the wisdom of his plan, and the failures of all subsequent commanders of the Army of the Potomac to make any impression upon the enemy at Richmond, by that route, and the defeats of Pope, Hooker, and Burnside when they attempted it, prove, more than any argument can do, the justice of the remonstrance which McClellan at once made against the President's order.

On February 3d, General McClellan sent a long communication to Mr. Lincoln, which embodied his reasons for the route by Urbanna and his objections to the attack upon Manassas Junction. In this he makes some remarks upon the great labors performed since he assumed command of the army, which can well be pardoned when every one was crying at him to move forward. He says:—

“I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27th 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run.

“I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat.

“Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac.

“The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited; they were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry.

“Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will be best shown by the past and the present.

“The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous army, the enemy have been held in check, the state of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July. More than

all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed. This army is young and untried in battle; but is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable of great deeds.

“That so much has been accomplished and such an army created in so short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the Administration and the nation.”

He then goes on with his argument, which is conclusive against the Manassas route and in favor of the one by Urbanna. A third one by Fortress Monroe (the route ultimately taken) had been suggested, but General McClellan objected to it on the ground that it would not permit the same celerity and brilliancy of results as the one by Urbanna. Still if ordered to go to Fortress Monroe he would do so, although he preferred the Urbanna route. This communication produced some effect on the President. He gave up the Manassas route, but ordered the movement up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe.

Previous to making the movement, General McClellan went to Harper's Ferry, and on the 8th and 9th of March made such dispositions of troops as compelled the enemy to abandon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and that road was at once opened to traffic, remaining so until Pope, by his mismanagement in the summer of 1862, allowed the enemy to seize it. On General McClellan's return from Harper's Ferry, the President sent for him and renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction at the route by the lower Chesapeake. Somebody outside had been at work, but a conversation with McClellan again made Mr. Lincoln apparently acquiesce in the choice.

General McClellan trammelled.

Mr. Lincoln did it but apparently, however, for without consultation with General McClellan, he very soon afterwards issued an order for the formation of army corps, and another in which he commanded that no more than fifty thousand troops should be moved to the lower Potomac until the blockade of the Potomac was raised, and that the movement should be made in ten days, or by the 18th of March. There is but little use of commenting upon these orders. They certainly showed Mr. Lincoln's ignorance of military matters. General McClellan was in favor of forming army corps, and intended to do so, as he says himself, as soon as the movements in the field familiarized men sufficiently with the evolutions of large bodies. There were no officers in the army experienced enough to have taken command of so large a force as an army corps, and McClellan wished some little time to choose those most competent. But army corps were at once formed, however. The other order needs little comment, as we know that the enemy hastily abandoned

the Potomac blockade, as soon as the movement to the Peninsula began. To go with fifty thousand troops to Fortress Monroe, and begin offensive operations, would have been useless. These were not the only interferences with McClellan's plans. They became more and more frequent, as we shall quickly see.

The Confederates evacuate Manassas.

On March 9th, information was brought to Washington, from various sources, that the Confederates were abandoning all their positions at Manassas, Centreville, and the upper and lower Potomac. Their withdrawal so quickly was anticipated by no one, and at that time the roads between Alexandria and Manassas were in such bad condition that General McClellan was deprived of the opportunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary. As McClellan intended soon to embark his troops for the Peninsula, he saw no advantage to be gained by following the enemy from Manassas, but as a march from Alexandria to that place and back would not delay the movement, and would familiarize the troops with the rigors of an active campaign, new to all of them, and possibly be of use in harassing the enemy's rear, on the evening of March 9th he ordered an advance. At noon on March 10th, the cavalry entered the enemy's works, and found the stores and barracks still burning. McClellan denies the stories of quaker guns and weak defences at Manassas, which were so extensively circulated at that time. These falsehoods have long since been refuted, but his remarks upon them are so dignified and manly that the reader must pardon their insertion:—

“Summaries showing the character and results of the secret service force accompany this report, and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time and persons in high office unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude the country with quaker gun stories of the defences and gross understatements of the numbers of the enemy.”

From the reports of the secret service force, on March 8th, the strength of the enemy on that day was estimated at 115,500 men, with 300 field-guns, and 26 to 30 siege-guns. This was exclusive of the forces at Richmond and Yorktown. Of the strength of the defences around Manassas, there can be no doubt. A close examination of them made by the engineers after the evacuation, developed the following facts:—

“The works at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, viz.: one

bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries; all containing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets and double caponnières. It extended along the crest of the ridge, a mile and three-quarters from its junction with the northern front to ground thickly wooded, and impassable to an attacking column.

“The northern front extended about one and one-fourth miles to Great Rocky run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thickly-wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a *cremaillère* line with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures.

“Manassas station was defended in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system was rendered complete by a very large work, with sixteen embrasures, which commanded the highest of the other works by about fifty feet.

“From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impassable streams and broken ground, affording ample protection for their flanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available approaches.”

There have been enough defeats at heavy works since the evacuation of Manassas, to prove McClellan's wisdom in not attacking these, but compelling their evacuation by a flank movement. Ever since McClellan, by his turning Manassas Junction, compelled its evacuation, it has been in possession of the Federal troops. For a few days Pope lost it, but McClellan, replaced in command, quickly regained it. The people very well know all these facts.

The reconnoissances sent to Manassas Junction did not stop there, however. They followed the enemy all the way to the Rappahannock, harassing the rear. As the Confederates retired across the stream, they blew up the bridge after them. They never recrossed until bad management in the summer of 1862 enticed them over.

The Army embarks for the Peninsula.

On the 15th of March, the main body of the Army of the Potomac returned from Manassas to Alexandria, preparatory to embarking for Fortress Monroe. The route by Urbanna was given up, but the Peninsula was only selected by a council of war of the commanders of army corps, and accepted by General McClellan because the authorities guaranteed that certain conditions would be complied with. These conditions were,

“1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized.

“2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate

transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

“3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had, to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy’s batteries on York river.

“That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.”

Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell thought that, for the protection of Washington, “with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force, in front of the Virginia line, of 25,000 men would suffice;” and General Sumner was of opinion that “a total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice.”

The President having guaranteed these conditions, General McClellan at once began his movement, and with it commenced new difficulties with the Administration. On March 19th, he wrote to the Secretary of War:—

“It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which, by their aid, could be turned without serious loss of either time or men.”

That the navy did not co-operate, that it failed to neutralize the Merrimac, rendered no assistance at Yorktown, and did not open the James river, will be seen as we progress.

General McClellan then embarked his troops for Fort Monroe. The transports came to Alexandria slowly, and instead of being able to carry the army *en masse*, it had to go by divisions. It was two weeks before all had sailed.

General McClellan’s Force curtailed.

The President had promised McClellan *all* his army. But scarcely had any of it sailed to the Peninsula, when he began to curtail it. On March 31st, Mr. Lincoln wrote to McClellan: “This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker’s division to General Fremont.” This, at one stroke, cut off ten thousand men, and of it McClellan says:—

“To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thousand troops which had been counted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy, I would yield, and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with the President, a few hours afterwards, I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker’s division had been given to General Fremont from any pressure other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President’s positive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that

no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command."

"The President's positive and emphatic assurance" amounted to nothing, however. Five days afterward, when at Fortress Monroe, his troops marching to attack Yorktown, and he anxiously awaiting the arrival of General McDowell's corps to assist in the attack, McClellan received the following despatch, dated April 4th, and signed by Adjutant-General Thomas:—

"By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War."

Of this order General McClellan remarks in his report:—

"The President having promised, in an interview following his order of March 31st, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated—that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned—I may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one-third, after its task had been assigned; its operations planned; its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error."

Even this was not enough. General Wool had been ordered to give General McClellan a division of ten thousand troops. But how it was complied with, the following extract from McClellan's report tells:—

"During the night of April 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant-General of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction.

"This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it."

It is no wonder that, after these troops had been withdrawn, General McClellan wrote a little tartly, and to Secretary Stanton telegraphed, on April 7th, with some irony:—

"I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the Government will be as fully and as speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created.

"Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least fifty thousand men have been taken from my command."

To the President, on the same day, he telegraphed that he could muster but eighty-five thousand men.

The Defences of Washington.

The reasons given for the withdrawal of so large a body of troops were that Washington was endangered. We will briefly examine this assertion, for we think General McClellan left it amply protected. Not only did his advance up the Peninsula keep the enemy so much engaged that they could detach no force against Washington, but had they done so, there were enough men in the intrenchments to resist any assault. General McClellan, when he sailed for the Peninsula, left at Washington, exclusive of any force which he intended to take with him, 67,428 men and 85 cannon. This is reported in a letter from him to the adjutant-general, dated April 1st 1862. The matter had previously been referred to a military commission, who reported that fifty-five thousand men were amply sufficient to defend the capital. A correspondence upon the subject has already been made public, which fully exonerates McClellan, and shows that the President had no reason for withdrawing McDowell and Blenker from the Peninsular expedition.

The Advance begins.

General McClellan, as quickly as possible, landed his troops at Fortress Monroe, and began the advance against Yorktown. New difficulties, however, interposed. He had been promised that the navy would co-operate, and that the Merrimac would be neutralized. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "General McClellan expected the navy to neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised that it should be done." And General Keyes testified, that before he would consent to the Peninsula line of operations, he asked two questions of the navy department: First, whether the Merrimac was neutralized; and second, whether the navy could co-operate efficiently with the army to break through the enemy's lines at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. General Keyes says: "To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative."

The navy, however, did not co-operate at Yorktown. General McClellan says in his report:—

"On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac; and

as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially affected my plans.

“At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works.

Yorktown captured.

Unaided by the navy, and deprived of one-third of his command, he sat down to the siege of Yorktown. On April 17th he began his approaches, and with such success that on May 4th the enemy evacuated all their works and retreated up the Peninsula, leaving their heavy guns and camp equipage behind them. In seventeen days General McClellan overcame one of the strongest lines of fortifications ever built on this continent, and did so with little loss of men or material.

During and previous to the siege, a correspondence was kept up between McClellan and President Lincoln, and Lincoln at last consented to detach one of McDowell's divisions to reinforce him. General Franklin's division of ten thousand men was ordered to embark and join the army in front of Yorktown. It arrived too late, however, to be of any service in the siege.

Early on the morning of May 4th 1862, the enemy abandoned their works at Yorktown, and hastily retreated up the Peninsula. The army was at once ordered to follow, and then began the famous advance on Richmond by which General McClellan penetrated to within four miles of the city. Great difficulties were encountered in the march. General McClellan says:—

“In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the state of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information.”

Besides this, the roads were narrow and tortuous; the country thickly wooded; the soil of such a character that a few hours' rain

produced such deep mud that no carriages could be dragged through it; and altogether the obstacles were so great that no one unacquainted with that section can conceive of them.

Battle of Williamsburg.

Still the enemy were pursued from Yorktown. Early on the 4th of May, General Stoneman, with the advance, marched after them. He was closely followed by the divisions of Hooker, Casey, Couch, and Kearney, and Generals Sumner and Heintzelman were sent to the front to take charge of the operations, whilst General McClellan embarked Franklin's, Porter's, Richardson's, and Sedgwick's divisions from Yorktown, to sail up the river and flank the enemy.

The land forces caught up with the retreating columns at Williamsburg. Here there were heavy intrenchments commanding all the roads. General Stoneman reached Williamsburg at noon on the 4th, and began the attack at once. Smith, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes soon arrived and became engaged. The battle was kept up all day. During the night Generals Hooker and Kearney arrived, and the contest was again begun early on the morning of the 5th. General Hancock, who commanded a brigade of Smith's corps, made a most brilliant charge. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited the onset of the enemy, and then turned upon them. After some terrific volleys of musketry, he charged with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he himself losing only 31 men. After fighting all day, night again put an end to the operations, and the troops slept upon their arms. Under cover of the darkness the enemy abandoned their works at Williamsburg, leaving their wounded and numerous cannon behind them. The Federal army at once marched in and took possession. The loss at this battle was, killed, 456, wounded, 1400, missing, 372, total, 2228.

The Victory at West Point.

Whilst the battle at Williamsburg was raging, the division of General Franklin was sent up the York river to West Point. Here the enemy appeared in force, and endeavored to prevent a landing, but after a short contest they were driven off. The Federal loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing: total, 194. Sedgwick, Richardson, and Porter immediately landed and joined Franklin, and a junction was at once effected with the victorious troops at Williamsburg.

These brilliant victories following so closely the evacuation of Yorktown, won the admiration of the entire country. Praises for General

McClellan were upon every tongue. With less force than the enemy, he had repeatedly defeated them. Shorn of part of his army, his plans interfered with, and his actions trammelled, he had been most successful. A discomfited enemy was retreating before him, and he was rapidly hastening forward to shut them up in their capital. Nothing he could do, however, could satisfy the powers at Washington. Success only inflamed the jealousies which rankled in the hearts of those who saw a young and brave commander winning such great fame. Instead of trusting in McClellan's ability, the Administration continued to thwart his plans.

The Pursuit up the Peninsula.

The army at once advanced up the Peninsula in pursuit of the enemy. On May 10th the head-quarters were at Roper's Church, nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg, and almost at the same time, General Stoneman, with the advance, captured White House, on the Pamunkey. On May 16th the head-quarters reached White House, and a permanent supply depot was at once established. On the 19th the head-quarters moved to Tunstall's Station, nineteen miles from Richmond, and the advance guard reached the Chickahominy river at a point but ten miles from Richmond. The enemy quickly retreated before these rapid advances, and on May 21st the entire army was marching towards the Chickahominy: General Sumner in the centre, with one corps; Generals Heintzelman and Keyes on the left, with two corps; and Generals Porter and Franklin with two corps on the right.

Commencement of the Siege of Richmond.

Richmond is situated on the James river, and is surrounded by a country partly hilly and partly swampy and wooded. On the north and east, the Chickahominy, a deep and sluggish stream flowing through swampy bottom lands in many cases a mile wide, protects it. At Mechanicsville, north of Richmond, this river is about four miles from the town. At Bottom's Bridge, east of Richmond, it is about ten miles distant. It had been General McClellan's intention to attack Richmond from the James river, where no swamps protected it, but the failure of the navy to clear the James river until after the capture of Yorktown, and the positive instructions of the President (as will be seen below) to keep to the north and east of Richmond, to effect a junction with McDowell (who, by the way, was never sent to join him), prevented it. General McClellan was compelled, therefore, to attack the city from the Chickahominy, notwithstanding its disadvantages

His line of operations extended along that stream from Mechanicsville to Bottom's Bridge, a distance of about nine miles.

The enemy having destroyed all the bridges across the Chickahominy, General McClellan at once set to work to build others, and nearly all of his army, in the first days of the siege, was employed at that labor. On the enemy's side, precipitous hills, strongly fortified, rose up from the edge of the swamp which bordered the stream, and the artillery did all that was possible to interfere with the bridge builders.

Reinforcements asked for.

To meet the casualties of the siege, and to guard his communications, General McClellan felt more and more the need of the forces which had been withheld from him. He knew the enemy would fight desperately, and that he would need every available man to make a successful attack. He informed the authorities at Washington of his necessities, and of the consequences if they continued to withhold General McDowell's corps from him. On May 10th, he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton, from Williamsburg:—

“From the information reaching me from every source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his forces on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced our numbers, and will continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without delay with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great battle now impending, and to make it decisive.

“It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious struggle; but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defense—a life and death contest. I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall fight them whatever their force may be, but I ask for every man that the department can send me. No troops should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle, are, in my judgment badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate measures.

“I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my request. If I am not reinforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than seventy thousand men upon the field of battle.”

• On May 14th General McClellan, receiving no reply from the Secretary of War, telegraphed to the President:—

"I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs." * * * * *

"Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers." * * * *

"I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. Any commander of the re-enforcements whom your excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject."

This urgent telegram brought a reply from Washington, permitting General McDowell to join General McClellan, but so clogged was the order by conditions, that it lost half its efficiency. On May 18th Secretary Stanton telegraphed:—

"The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York river, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible *by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.*" * * * *

"He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men." * * * *

"At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city." * * * *

"The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward."

The instructions given to General McDowell were:—

"Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers.

"While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication be-

tween your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces."

Of the mode in which General McDowell was ordered to join him, General McClellan remarks:—

"The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of the campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream."

General McClellan was of course much gratified at finding General McDowell was to be sent to him, even though the movement was so clogged as to impair its usefulness. But in the last days of May, Stonewall Jackson made his famous raid into the Shenandoah Valley, driving Banks before him to Harper's Ferry, and so frightening the people at Washington that the President was afraid to send McDowell forward. The President telegraphed to General McClellan on the afternoon of May 24th:—

"In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force, and part of General McDowell's, in their rear."

He gets no Reinforcements.

This at once scattered all hopes which rested upon General McDowell's arrival, and as soon as General McClellan received the above despatch he replied to the President that he would make his calculations accordingly. Previously to being informed that General McDowell could not join him, the President (also on May 24th) telegraphed:—
"I wish you to move cautiously and safely." Commenting upon both despatches, General McClellan writes:—

"It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries to compensate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move 'cautiously and safely.' In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way approaches.

"The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chicka-

hominny immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed.

"It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations.

"Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed.

"It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore *I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach.*"

His army labored on, and the bridges approached completion. A storm came, however, and so much water fell that the Chickahominy was raised higher than had been known for twenty years before. This demolished a great part of the labor, and carried away some of the bridges. In many cases the structures had to be renewed.

The correspondence was still kept up between Washington and the camp. On May 25th, Lincoln replied to McClellan's telegraph acknowledging the receipt of the one withdrawing McDowell. McDowell had been sent off to the Shenandoah valley, where Fremont and Banks, by their mismanagement and inattention to McClellan's instructions, given them before he sailed for the Peninsula, had permitted Stonewall Jackson to do about as he pleased. The President's telegram caused McClellan to give up all hope of aid. The President said:—

"If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

"Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have."

Again, on the same day, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed:—

"I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly."

He heard from General McClellan "instantly." Mr. Lincoln was evidently too frightened to know that Jackson's real design was not to attack Washington, but to keep McDowell from going to Richmond.

Mr. Lincoln, when in his fright he withheld McDowell, had done just what Jackson wished. General McClellan's reply was:—

“Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands, agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it!”

General McClellan, at that time, had two corps across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond, and believed a battle to be imminent. The correspondence with Washington was still kept up. On May 26th, Mr. Lincoln heard that Banks was safe, and breathed more freely. Washington being out of danger, he again began to press McClellan on to Richmond, but he said nothing more about sending McDowell. On the 26th, he telegraphed:—

“Can you not cut Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?”

To which General McClellan replied at once, I “have cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places between Hanover Court House and the Chickahominy. * * * Hope soon to be in shelling distance.” And on the same day, the fright about Jackson being over, McClellan gently reminded Mr. Lincoln that a return to his original instructions about affairs in the Shenandoah valley would save future trouble. He says:—

“I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General Banks of March 16th, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability of danger.”

The Battle of Hanover Court House.

On May 26th, General McClellan received intelligence that a considerable force of the enemy was in the neighborhood of Hanover Court House, twenty miles north of Richmond, and on the right flank of the Federal army. He resolved to cut them off, and entrusted the task to General Fitz-John Porter. Early on the 27th, General Porter moved his corps, and his advance, at about noon, found the enemy near Hanover Court House. A brilliant engagement ensued, in which Porter gained a complete victory, capturing 750 prisoners and several cannon. He also cut both the railroads leading out of Richmond to Fredericksburg and the Shenandoah valley, and destroyed large quantities of supplies. On the 29th, his victorious troops returned to camp,

having lost but 53 killed and 344 wounded and missing. This was one of the most successful engagements of the war. It cut two great lines of the enemy's communications, and was a complete offset to the disasters of Banks in the Shenandoah valley.

Whilst the victory at Hanover Court House was still in abeyance, General McClellan, on the night of May 27th, telegraphed to Stanton:—

“I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court House before I can advance.”

And on the 28th, as soon as the victory was sure, he again telegraphed to Stanton:—

“It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's command. * * * The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available troops should be collected here; not raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us; if any regiments of good troops remain unemployed, it will be an irreparable fault committed.”

On the same day, Mr. Lincoln replied to these telegrams:—

“I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and will aid you all I can, consistently with my view of due regard to all points.”

The result of the battle of Hanover Court House was to entirely clear the road between Fredericksburg, where McDowell had been stationed, and the right flank of the Army of the Potomac. This information was at once communicated to the President, and the proffer of aid made on the 28th gave renewed hopes that McDowell would be sent to assist the army. He did not come, however.

The Battle of Fair Oaks.

Immediately upon the arrival of General McClellan's advance at the Chickahominy, he made preparations to cross a large force over the river. On May 23d, General Keyes's corps crossed the stream and encamped, and on the 25th it moved out and took a position at the Seven Pines, about seven miles from Richmond. General Heintzelman, with his corps, crossed on the same day, and encamped in the rear of General Keyes. On the 28th, General Casey's division, of Keyes's corps, was advanced to Fair Oaks, a short distance in front of the Seven Pines. Skirmishes were constantly had with the enemy during all of these advances. During the day and night of the 30th, a severe storm

occurred, the rain falling in torrents, and rendering labor on the rifle pits necessary to protect the advance, and on the bridges across the river, impracticable. The roads were almost impassable, and the rapidly rising river threatened the destruction of the bridges.

The enemy, taking advantage of the swelling stream, and thinking that by a sudden attack they could destroy the left wing, which was cut off by the flood from aid, and which they supposed weaker than it really was, on the 31st of May, concentrated almost their entire force for an attack on the troops at Fair Oaks. At noon, the attack was made upon Casey's division, overwhelming numbers advancing in front and on both flanks at the same time. The division fought bravely against the enemy, but was compelled to fall back upon General Couch's troops, just in the rear, at Seven Pines. Here a stand was made, and General Heintzelman hurried his men forward as quickly as the muddy roads would allow. During May 31st, the battle raged fiercely, the enemy slowly pushing back the Federal troops towards the river, but gaining each foot of ground only by a desperate contest. There was something in store for them, however, that they did not expect.

General Sumner, with his corps, as soon as the battle commenced, was ordered to cross from the other side of the Chickahominy, and aid Heintzelman and Keyes. After incredible exertions, he succeeded in crossing the swollen river, and just before dark, appeared with one division and a battery upon the field. The line of his march brought him upon the enemy's left flank, and this sudden attack, with the wounding of their commander, Jo. Johnston, brought them to a standstill.

During the night, both armies rested upon their arms, and early the next morning the Federal troops were ordered to attack. In front and flank they fell upon the enemy, who soon gave way. A charge was at once ordered, and their retreat became more and more rapid. The Excelsior Brigade and Generals French's and Heintzelman's troops gallantly charged upon the retreating enemy, who fled in confusion, throwing down their arms and clothing in the flight. They were pursued to Fair Oaks, and on the following day the enemy were driven a mile beyond it, where earthworks were constructed to protect the advance.

The enemy were completely foiled in their attempt to cut off the Federal left, and their defeat cost them 6783 killed and wounded, General McClellan captured nearly a thousand prisoners. His loss was 5737. In his report, McClellan fully exonerates General Casey's division from all blame.

The Floods.

Some enemies of McClellan have said that after the battle, had he chosen, he could easily have pursued the enemy into Richmond, and captured the town. General McClellan completely refutes this. He says:—

“On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed; but the rising waters flooded the log-way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps, and participated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced.

“On my way to head-quarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time General Sumner crossed, this was the only available bridge above Bottom’s bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom’s bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing.

“The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy’s batteries established upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured.

“The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points, on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom’s Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his intrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac.”

These floods had raised the Chickahominy higher than had been known for twenty years. Bridges were carried away, and the roads were in a horrible condition. All who accompanied that army to the Peninsula will remember the deep mud and continuous rains. On June 2d, General McClellan telegraphed to Mr. Stanton: “We have

had a terrible time with our communications—bridges and causeways built with great care having been washed away by the sudden freshets, leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose.” Mr. Lincoln, knowing the difficulties of McClellan’s position, felt equal anxiety. On the next day he answered:—

“With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so close in your rear, and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it.”

To which General McClellan at once replied: “As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days, your excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked.”

The floods continued. Almost continually for two weeks the rain fell in torrents. The men labored up to their waists in water. More superhuman exertions never were made by any army, to overcome the obstacles interposed by nature. Still, however, they progressed, and by the 25th of June, completed the bridges. General McClellan, as will be seen presently, was ready at once to move.

The battle of Fair Oaks, and the personal examination of the difficulties of the position made by various high officials who visited the field afterward, did more than all the solicitations of General McClellan could accomplish. The Administration, when it was almost too late, consented to send reinforcements. But still they did it tardily and with niggard hand. The correspondence between Washington and the camp best tells the story:—

General McClellan gets a few Reinforcements.

On June 4th McClellan telegraphed to Stanton:—

“Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe, or White House, within the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know this immediately. * * *

* * * After the losses in our last battle, I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least one more desperate battle to fight.”

On June 5th Stanton answered:—

“I will send you five *new* regiments as fast as transportation can take them; the first is to start to-morrow from Baltimore.”

On June 7th McClellan replied, no doubt pleased that Stanton appeared to be working with him. He said, “I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reinforcements so vigorously.”

On June 10th McClellan was informed that General McCall, with about 10,000 men, a part of McDowell’s corps, would be sent to him.

Acknowledging it gratefully, McClellan on that day sent the following to Stanton :—

“ I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery : almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state ; we have another rain-storm on our hands.

“ I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit ; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal.

“ In view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck’s army to strengthen this ; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military principles to strengthen this army. And even although the reinforcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack on Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements.

“ I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results.”

On June 22d, Stanton answered :—

“ McCall’s force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell’s force also, to join you as speedily as possible.

“ It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies.

“ Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met ; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms.”

This remarkable friendliness on the part of Mr. Stanton was never of much use to McClellan however. He received McCall’s troops—but that was all. It was not until the fierce contests and miraculous victories of the seven days’ fights had saved the army, that Mr. Lincoln (still too late) sent McClellan the troops he should have had before he attempted the seige of Yorktown.

On June 13th General McCall arrived in camp, and on the 14th General Stuart, with the enemy’s cavalry, made the famous raid around the army, which exposed General McClellan’s weakness and gave the enemy the information which enabled them to compel his subsequent retreat. But even with the arrival of McCall there were new difficulties. McDowell sent a telegraph to McClellan asking that

McCall be so placed that he could command him. This would at once have broken up all discipline. To have had two commanders in front of Richmond would have been certain defeat. General McClellan can therefore well be excused for sending the following to Stanton as soon as he received McDowell's request:—

“It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival.

“That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

“If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.”

The Attack on Richmond begun.

On June 25th the bridges were completed across the Chickahominy, and General McClellan at once began his attack upon Richmond. His design was to march against the enemy's fortifications in front of New bridge and carry them. To do this, on June 25th, General Hooker was advanced to seize the ground in front of what is known as the “Old Tavern.” On that day he drove the enemy for some distance, although he was resisted stubbornly, and at night bivouacked in their camp, earthworks being thrown up along the entire line in order to hold it. The 26th and 27th of June were selected as the days for a grand attack upon Richmond. The failure of reinforcements and the floods, however, fated that it should be otherwise. The people at Washington had faltered so long, and had given McClellan such meagre aid, that his attack upon Richmond was destined to be baulked. On June 26th he had about 90,000 men fit for duty, whilst on the same day his secret service force reported the enemy's strength at 180,000. The enemy, knowing his weakness, had sent Stonewall Jackson to outflank him, and thus began one of the most wonderful series of battles upon record.

Jackson outflanks McClellan.

The first intimation General McClellan had of Jackson's purpose was from a deserter who came into camp on June 24th. This deserter informed McClellan that Jackson was manœuvring to get around his right wing, and intended to attack him on the 28th. At first the story was not believed, but subsequent events soon confirmed its truth. On the evening of June 25th McClellan became fully convinced that Jack-

son was coming. He at once telegraphed the news to Stanton. The attack of Richmond was over ; defence was now to be looked to :—

“I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

“I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders ; it must rest where it belongs.

“Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson’s movements and Beauregard’s arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements.”

Commenting upon this, General McClellan says in his report :—

“On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply.

“The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superior officers from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsula campaign.”

The Seven Days’ Battles begin.

The story of the siege of Richmond is over, and now begins the history of one of the grandest movements ever planned by a military leader. General McClellan’s army was threatened by double his force. How he saved it we will soon see. The people well know that jealousies at Washington endangered it, and had there been a leader of less skill than McClellan at its head, it would have been sacrificed. There is not a shadow of doubt that the administration is responsible for McClellan’s failure to take Richmond. They deprived him of the flower of his army, and defeat was the consequence.

The history of this great retreat is best told in General McClellan’s own words. In his report, he gives it as follows :—

“Up to the 26th of June, the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and north-east. The reasons (the President’s anxiety about covering Washington from Fredericksburg, McDowell’s promised co-operation, partial advance,

and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of approach, and our continuance upon it, have been alluded to above.

“Preparations to change Base.

“The superiority of the James river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation by land of General McDowell’s forces, doomed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent. But such a change of base in the presence of a powerful enemy is one of the most difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James river, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day, General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster, to the White House, as follows:—

“Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage Station, by way of Bottom’s Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself, with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James river, without delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement, so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment.’

“All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. General Stoneman’s communications with the main army being cut off, he fell back upon the White House, and then to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated. On the 26th, orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river. General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum’s division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance, without further orders. At noon on the 26th, the approach of the enemy, who had

crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 P. M., they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn.

“The Battle at Mechanicsville.

“Meade’s brigade was ordered up as a reserve, in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale’s and Griffin’s brigades, of Morell’s division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall’s division, toward Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin’s regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds’s line just at the close of the action. The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right in thick wood beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison’s Mills. Seymour’s brigade held the left of the line from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in cleared ground, and Reynolds’s the right, principally in the woods, and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek. Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed. At 3 P. M., he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making, at the same time, a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by General Reynolds. After a severe struggle, he was forced to retire with very heavy loss. A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour, with heavy slaughter. The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 P. M., the action having lasted six hours. But few, if any, of Jackson’s troops were engaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed the Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville. The information in my possession soon after the close of this action, convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam creek, although as successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan’s and Gaines’s houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many wagons of the Fifth corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed us between two fires, and enabled Jackson’s fresh troops to in-

tercept the movement to James river, by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's Bridge, before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the Fifth corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James river as our line of supplies, in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and the wagons having been moved to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam creek was commenced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed. Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground; Seymour's brigade covered the rear, with the horse batteries of Captain Robertson and Tidball; but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat slowly and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the rear line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him. About this time, General Porter, believing that General Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House, and afterward rejoin the army as best he could.

"The Battle of Gaines's Mill.

"On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, General Porter telegraphed as follows:—

"I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin's, or some other command, be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line.'

"This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed. Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege-guns were still in position at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the Fifth corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river. Morrill's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines's mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right toward New Coal Harbor. In the line, General Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still further to the right, joined the left of General Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in rear of Coal Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's division having been engaged the day before, was formed in a second line in rear of the first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds's brigade on the right covering the approaches from Coal Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the second line. Still further in the rear, General P. St. George Cooke,

with five companies of the Fifth regular cavalry, two squadrons of the First regulars, and three squadrons of the Sixth Pennsylvania cavalry (Lancers), was posted behind a hill in rear of the position and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river. The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries, there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. Shortly after noon, the enemy was discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attacked. His skirmishers advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. At two p. m. General Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's division, of the Sixth corps, was ordered to cross the left bank of the river, by Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his support. General Porter's first call for reinforcements, through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more, through the same officer. By three p. m. the engagement had become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults along our whole front. At 3.30 p. m. Slocum's division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line. On the left the combat was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy in front of Adams's house, or between that and Gaines's house; the enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars of Sykes's division on the right also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss, under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers, was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them. When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased General Porter's force to some thirty-five thousand, who were probably contending against about seventy thousand of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened. About five p. m., General Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division (Third corps), were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again, in great force, at six p. m., but failed to break our lines, although our loss was very heavy. About seven p. m., they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally regained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the Fifth cavalry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retreat from our position to the hill in the rear overlooking the bridge. French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging toward the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example as well as by the steadiness

of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that reinforcements had arrived. It was now dark. The enemy, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill, ready to repulse another attack. During the night our thinned and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about six o'clock on the morning of the 28th, crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them. Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the object sought for had been obtained. The enemy had been held at bay, our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down, and the guns captured.

“So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy, that it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them.”

The enemy, however, decided to make the attack on Gaines's Mill, as has been seen, and every available man from the front of the old tavern had been sent to reinforce Porter. General McClellan continues:—

“The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the west bank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces. This might probably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank, it is possible we might, with our entire force, have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle we would have been compelled to fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the river, operating upon our rear, and if, in the chances of war, we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fortress Monroe. And as both our flank and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part

of the army itself, might have been lost. The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and as they themselves acknowledge, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I, therefore, concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During the night of the 26th, and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were gathered there. It may be asked why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond, I did not, instead of striking for James river, fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond? It will be remembered that at this junction the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communication with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond, it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food, and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms, the enemy would have still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats and turned the disaster into victory. If on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of the attack and we had been defeated, we must, in all probability, have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James river, with the exception of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.

“The Movement to James River.

“On the evening of the 27th of June, I assembled the corps commanders at my head-quarters, and informed them of my plans, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution. General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp Bridge, and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. This was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th, I went to Savage's Station, and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army. Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported, a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. The large herd of 2500 beef cattle was, by the chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, transferred to the James river, without loss. On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's Farm, the enemy opened upon General Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterward two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be vacated; but this attack was repulsed by the Twenty-third New York and the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, on picket, and a section of Mott's battery. Porter's corps was moved

across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond toward the White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCall's division was ordered on the night of the 28th to move across the swamp, and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and the division of Smith, were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrenchments and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage's Station. General Slocum's division of Franklin's corps was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve. They were ordered to hold the position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army.

"The Letter to Secretary Stanton.

"On the night of the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
 "SAVAGE'S STATION, }
 "June 28th 1862—12.20 A. M.

"I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river—the right bank—we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank, our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most terrible battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men; those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. The regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and I think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak—I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proven. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed the battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not, and cannot, hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night—I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise, than that the

Government has not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

“G. B. McCLELLAN.

“To Hon. E. M. Stanton.

“The head-quarters camp at Savage’s Station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across the White Oak Swamp. As the essential part of the day’s operations was the passage of the trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the direction of New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of the troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains. In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James river, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank. General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James river in rear of this corps, and placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry early this day, on the Quaker road, showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary.

“Battle of Allen’s Farm.

“General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29th, at daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen’s Field, between Orchard and Savage’s Station. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond. Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman’s corps. The first line of Richardson’s division was held by General French, General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson’s division was held by Colonel Brooks, with one regiment (Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers), with Hazzard’s battery, on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of Colonel Brooks’s command. At 9 a. m., the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooks; Captain Hazzard’s battery, and Captain Pettit’s battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-third Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

“Battle of Savage’s Station.

“General Slocum arrived at Savage’s Station at an early hour on the 28th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp, and relieve General Keyes’s corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved towards James river, which he reached in safety with all his artillery

and baggage early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey Creek Bridge. During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, and advancing toward Savage's Station. He communicated this information to General Sumner, at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's Station. A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin, and assumed command. On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle, in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, and the right extending down to the railroad. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the woods to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command. General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At four p. m., the enemy commenced his attack in large force, by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General Burns's brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York Sixty-ninth. Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborne's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between eight and nine p. m., when the enemy were driven from the field. Immediately after the battle, orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which we accomplished during the night in good order. By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, General French, with his brigade, acting as rear-guard, and at five a. m., on the 30th, all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed.

"On the afternoon of the 29th, I gave to the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porter's corps was to move forward to James river, and with the corps of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, in a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the passage of the supply trains which we pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as well as the crossings of White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Richardson's division, and General Naglee's brigade, placed under his orders for the occasion. General Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road. On the morning of the 30th I again gave the corps commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion. The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the woods, had neither returned nor sent in any reports or guides, and Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed, one by losing the road, the other in repairing an old road, had not been able to send me any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains. It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road as

well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in the rear. I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of troops, and the obstructions of the roads towards Richmond; and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near James River. Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was, to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position. I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our position in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops.

“Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Captain Rodgers's gunboat lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply vessels, and the state of things on the river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of the interview, I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there till shortly before daylight.

“Battle of Nelson's Farm or Glendale.

“On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale (Nelson's farm). General McCall's division (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds's brigade, commanded by Colonel S. G. Simons, of the Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve; Randall's regular battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and Deitrich's and Kanerhun's batteries, of the Artillery reserve, on the left—all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's front was an open field, intersected toward the right by the New Market road and a small strip of timber parallel to it. The open front was about eight hundred yards; its depth about one thousand yards. On the morning of the 30th, General Heintzelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles City road. General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road. General Kearney's left to connect with General Slocum's left. General McCall's position was to the left of the Long Bridge road, in connection with General Kearney's left, and General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 and 1

o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson, and Naglee's brigade, at White Oak Swamp bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns. General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp. At 2 o'clock in the day, the enemy were reported advancing in force by the Charles City road, and at 2½ o'clock the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire.

“General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position, and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russey's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burr's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back; other troops began to return from the White Oak Swamp. Later in the day, at the call of General Kearney, General Taylor's First New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of the divisions, with General Slocum's division and a portion of General Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Franklin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of this battle:—

“‘The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About three o'clock p. m., the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points, and driven from the field.’

“The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about four p. m. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while, with his infantry, and some artillery, he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night before my aids returned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from

General Franklin before sending orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a letter from the latter that General Franklin was falling back, whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from General Franklin's headquarters, with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met their troops already *en route* to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after day-break. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity.

“Battle of Malvern Hill.

“The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backward through a wooded country toward a point below Haxall's, on James river. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau, about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually to the north and east to the woodland, giving clear range for artillery in those directions. Toward the north-west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious line of attack would be from the direction of Richmond and the White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike in upon the left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line—Sykes's division on the left, Morrell's on the right, with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting two of his siege-guns in position on the highest part of the hill. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter's; next came Kearney and Hooker; next Sedgwick and Richardson; next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes's corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left, on the low ground, to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the upper plateau, but thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This information was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon

our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber, and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gun-boats so as to protect our flanks, and to command the approaches from Richmond. Between nine and ten A. M., the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division. About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving toward our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter; but though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left. About three P. M., a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musket-range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back on their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our lines some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Shortly after four o'clock, the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the General, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack, to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space, and charged our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire, until the attacking columns, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field. About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to reinforce that part of the line, and hold the positions. These brigades relieved such portions of Porter's corps and Couch's division, as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward, to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the positions so tenaciously defended, but despite his vast numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its

fire. During the whole battle, Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shells among his reserves and advancing columns."

The losses of General McClellan's army during these severe contests were: Killed, 1582; wounded, 7709; missing, 5958. Total, 15,249. General McClellan thus gives his reasons for retiring from Malvern to Haxall's or Harrison's Landing:—

"Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further, in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gun-boat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point. Concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the transports immediately."

The army was at length saved, and communication reopened with the North. President Lincoln seemed to be truly grateful to McClellan for saving the troops; Stanton, no doubt angered at the just censure cast upon him in the letter of June 28th, never afterward corresponded with McClellan. On July 3d Mr. Lincoln telegraphed a kind despatch. He says:—

"I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say that better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."

And on July 5th he again telegraphed his congratulations:—

"A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P. M. yesterday, gave me. Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men, is and for ever will be appreciated.

"If you can hold your present position, we shall have the enemy yet."

The President was evidently aware that General McClellan could not attack the enemy from Harrison's Landing, unless he was reinforced. In a letter sent to McClellan on July 4th, he says as much, and then adds: "To reinforce you so as to enable you to assume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible."

General McClellan Writes to the President.

We now come to the famous letter which General McClellan wrote to President Lincoln, giving him some ideas of moderate and humane warfare, which will be endorsed by every conservative citizen of the Union. The letter was not written in a hurry. It was the fruit of long observation of the war, and was not sent to the President until he expressed a desire to receive it.

On June 20th 1862, General McClellan telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln the following:—

“I would be glad to have permission to lay before your excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country.”

Lincoln, on the next day, replied:—

“If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them.”

General McClellan, however, had no opportunity to send the great letter until after the army had somewhat recovered from the fatigues of the Seven Days' battles. It was written on July 7th, and is as follows:—

“HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
“*Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7th 1862.*”

“MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every state.

“The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble.

“The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

“This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

“In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military

operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received.

“Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular state, thus working manumission in such state; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

“Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

“In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

“I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding.

The Army at Harrison's Landing.

General McClellan's army remained for about a month at Harrison's

Landing. It rapidly recovered from the effects of the Seven Days' Battles, and its commander desired to prepare for a speedy advance against Richmond by the James river route. Again his wishes were destined to be thwarted. A new idol, in the shape of General Pope, had been set up by the men at Washington, and they were bowing down at his feet with too great fascination to see that he would be their ruin. McClellan hoped again to advance to the attack of the enemy's capital; and to prepare for it, captured Malvern Hill from the enemy.

General Halleck was about this time made commander-in-chief at Washington, and nearly all the correspondence subsequent to the arrival of the army at Harrison's Landing was with him. General McClellan was sent some four thousand new troops, and was led to believe he should have additional aid to enable him to begin his advance. The current, however, set against him. General Pope was at Washington, in daily intercourse with the Administration, and the united influence of McClellan's enemies soon procured an order for his recall from the Peninsula, his virtual removal from the command, and the annexation of his army to that of General Pope.

The Army ordered to Alexandria.

On August 3d 1862, General McClellan received the following from General Halleck. Until it reached him he was in complete ignorance of the intention of the Government to withdraw his troops and give up the Peninsular attack upon Richmond.

"It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can."

General McClellan proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, but he was firm in his conviction that the withdrawal of the army at that time would have the most disastrous effect upon the Federal cause. The future proved that he was right. How earnestly he remonstrated against the order will be seen from the following, which was sent to Halleck on August 4th:—

"Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements.

"This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure.

“We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond.

“At Aquia creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

* * * * *

“It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside’s force, to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper’s Ferry; to those portions of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation.

“All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

“Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded.

“If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I can clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be—and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings—I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country.”

All General McClellan’s arguments were unavailing. Every effort he made was unsuccessful. On August 5th, he received a peremptory order from Halleck, and there was no further opportunity for remonstrance. The words of Halleck’s despatch were these:—

“You cannot regret the order of withdrawal more than I did the necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay.”

General McClellan promptly, though with a heavy heart, began his retreat. His route was across the lower Chickahominy, through Williamsburg, to Yorktown. The enemy soon found out what was going on, and made their dispositions accordingly. All happened as

McClellan had predicted. On August 9th, the following despatch from Halleck, at Washington, gave the first news of the series of disasters which ultimately engulfed not only Pope's forces, but the Army of the Potomac also:—

“I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly to Aquia creek.”

General Pope's Disasters.

The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9th, and with it began General Pope's disastrous retreat. The authorities at Washington became alarmed. Telegram after telegram was sent to McClellan, to hurry his march. Every exertion was made by him and his generals to hasten it. On August 14th the retreat down the Peninsula was begun, and on the 16th the rear-guard evacuated Harrison's Landing. General McClellan and his staff were among the last to leave, and all turned their backs upon Richmond with despondency. The march, led by Fitz-John Porter, was hurried to Yorktown, and by the 20th of August the entire force was ready to embark from Yorktown and Fortress Monroe, for Alexandria. It was at this period that the ill-will of the Administration towards McClellan appeared in the brightest colors. The following two weeks saw him first treated with contumely, but at last hailed as a savior.

Constantly, since March, the Army of the Potomac had been laboring. It had fought severe battles, and gained many victories. The troops had submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a murmur. No army ever deserved the commendation of the Government more than the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan thought that such exertions might at least be recognized by a kind word from Washington. On August 18th, he telegraphed to Halleck:—

“Please say a kind word to my army that I can repeat to them in general orders in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the seven days and the recent retreat.

“No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it.”

It would not have taken ten minutes for Halleck to have written a general order, thanking the troops for their exertions. But no! he could not do this. He issued no order, and never even replied to

McClellan's suggestion, Such are the thanks brave troops in this country get from the politicians whom they serve.

General McClellan removed from Command.

The dark days of our history came. Pope was overwhelmed by the enemy. He was attacked and defeated; almost annihilated. He sent bragging despatches to Washington announcing victories, and the deluded President believed them. McClellan arrived at Alexandria. One corps after another was detached from his army to join Pope. Telegram after telegram was sent by him to Washington, imploring the Administration to allow him to do something. He scarcely received a civil answer. On the 24th, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Please inform me exactly where Pope is and what doing. Please define my position and duties." Halleck's answer was: "You ask me for information which I cannot give."

The world moved on. A general order was issued which kept McClellan at Alexandria, to direct "that portion of the Army of the Potomac which has not been sent forward to General Pope's command." Every soldier, wagon, and horse in McClellan's camp was sent forward. He alone was not allowed to go. No wonder he chafed. He heard the roar of the artillery; knew that incompetent hands were destroying the finest army ever massed on this continent; but was chained down to Alexandria, without the liberty of sharing the dangers of his comrades. He implored permission to go out to the battle-field, and be once more with them. On the 27th, he telegraphed to Halleck:—

"I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark."

No satisfactory reply.

On the 29th, he telegraphed to Lincoln:—

"No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

Still nothing satisfactory.

On August 30th, to Halleck:—

"I have no sharpshooters, except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train, as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach."

And again, immediately afterwards:—

“I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle.”

To this he got an answer, but such an answer! It was sent at nine o'clock on the morning of the 31st. “I cannot answer,” said Halleck, “without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the department!”

General Pope utterly defeated.

A change soon came over the dream. On the morning of August 31st, all were confident of Pope's ability, but the enemy attacked and defeated him, and the poor, wearied, sacrificed soldiers, without discipline or order or thought for anything but safety, in a disorganized mass streamed back to the intrenchments at Washington. How they welcomed the brown earthworks built by McClellan a year before! How they implored once more to be placed under their old leader! They had no confidence in any one else. Pope was gone no one knew whither. Many of their beloved generals had been killed or captured. Their arms and baggage were lost. They had nothing to eat. With torn clothing and weary limbs, they gladly welcomed even the slightest rest after their severe, unrequited labors. The army was entirely defeated.

At Washington all were in consternation. Every moment the frightened politicians expected to hear the enemy's cannon booming from Arlington, or their troops thundering across the Long Bridge. There was but one hope of safety, and they knew of but one man to turn to for salvation. How could they do it after they had treated him so shamefully? But with such people nothing is easier than to salve over wrongs. Honor has no place in their souls. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 31st, Halleck had told McClellan he “could not answer.” What a change came by ten o'clock in the evening. Then a despatch was sent by Halleck: “I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out.” But thirteen months before, Lincoln had sent just such an imploring despatch to Western Virginia. And one after another, the great and little men who had before held their heads so high were bowed down with sor-

row. McClellan *did* assist Halleck. In one hour he answered his despatch, promised to assist him; but did it with a withering rebuke: "To speak frankly—and the occasion requires it—there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army."

How quickly did Halleck avail himself of the ability he once spurned, and how grandly does McClellan appear, forgetting his private wrongs, and thinking only of the salvation of the country! He thus modestly tells how he was recalled to command:—

General McClellan replaced in command.

"On the 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an interview with the general-in-chief, who instructed me, verbally, to take command of its defences, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope."

* * * * *

"On the morning of the 2d the President and General Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in a bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defences of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers; to place the works in a proper state of defence, and to go out to meet and take command of the army, when it approached the vicinity of the works, then to place the troops in the best position—committing everything to my hands.

"I immediately took steps to carry out these orders. * *

"In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front."

How the poor discomfited soldiers welcomed their old leader has become history. The shouts that rent the air on that day, as he rode out to meet them, were heard in Washington, and taught the politicians whom the soldier loved. The people throughout the country echoed it, and the fanatics were too frightened even to murmur. Their idol, Pope—the hero of a week—disappeared unnoticed.

General McClellan reorganizes the Army.

Without a moment's delay General McClellan proceeded to reorganize the army. On September 2d he took command, and from that time until the battles in Western Maryland, every one relied upon him. By superhuman exertions he collected the scattered regiments; fed and clothed the men, remounted the cavalry, and once more was ready to sally forth against the enemy. There was not a moment to be lost.

He marches to Western Maryland.

On September 3d, General McClellan received information that the enemy, emboldened by the defeat of General Pope, were making their

way to the Potomac, for an invasion of the North. He made his arrangements as quickly as possible. His troops were at once ordered to move out towards Leesburg and Frederick. On September 7th, he left Washington with his staff. Day by day, up to the 14th of September, his army was moving towards South Mountain, and on that day they were at the foot of it, with the enemy above them holding the passes.

The administration, having had a week's repose after their fright, again began to meddle. On September 10th, fearing that Colonel Miles with his garrison at Harper's Ferry would be cut off, McClellan urged Halleck to order him to withdraw. There was then ample opportunity for him to retreat in safety. But Halleck had resumed his surliness, and would not order the withdrawal. The result was that Miles's command was captured. On September 16th Halleck began to intermeddle. He telegraphed to McClellan: "I think you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river; I fear now, more than ever, that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington." Halleck had the same craven fears which produced so many disasters before.

On September 13th General McClellan intercepted an order from General Lee to General D. H. Hill, which fully disclosed the enemy's plans. Their entire force was on the north bank of the Potomac, and from the order he learned that it was their intention to capture Harper's Ferry and fight a battle in Western Maryland. Without any delay the proper dispositions were made, and the Federal troops advanced to drive the enemy from South Mountain, and, if possible, save the garrison of Harper's Ferry.

The Battle of South Mountain.

A range of high hills, known as the South Mountain, crosses Maryland, just west of Frederick, and on it the Confederates had established themselves. General McClellan determined to drive them out. He divided his army into two columns, with a third in reserve. The left, under Franklin, was to attack Crampton's Gap through the mountain, and, if possible, relieve Harper's Ferry. The right was to carry Turner's Gap on the road from Frederick to Hagerstown, and was led by Burnside, Sumner, and Hooker.

On September 14th General Franklin pushed rapidly forward with his column on the road to Crampton's Gap. The enemy were sheltered behind a stone wall at the base of the mountain. They were attacked, and steadily forced up the slope until they reached some of their batteries, where they made a stand. From here, after an engagement of three hours, they were driven by a gallant charge of portions of Smith's

and Slocum's divisions, and fled down the opposite side of the mountain. General Franklin thus gained the crest of the hill, and quickly descended into the valley on the opposite side, his advance firing minute-guns to inform the beleaguered garrison of Harper's Ferry of his approach. Night overtaking the troops, they bivouacked in the valley. At eight o'clock the next morning Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry to the enemy. He had previously withdrawn to the Virginia side of the river. Had he not withdrawn, but waited a few hours, Franklin could have released him. In this gallant battle General Franklin captured four hundred prisoners and one cannon. His loss was 115 killed and 416 wounded.

Whilst Franklin was attacking and capturing Crampton's Gap, Burnside and Hooker marched against Turner's Gap, further northward. At daylight on the 14th the movement of the troops began. Three different columns advanced up the side of the hill and soon drove the enemy, who appeared to be in small force, from the top. The Confederates brought reinforcements, however, and at two o'clock made a fierce attack to retake it. They formed columns on both of the Federal flanks. The troops resisted as well as possible, and General Meade was sent with a strong force to outflank the enemy and get in their rear. In addition to this, General McClellan brought up reinforcements. At about four o'clock he ordered a general advance of the whole line to take the enemy's batteries posted in the gaps and open gorges on the western side of the hill. It was responded to with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, but were routed everywhere. At seven o'clock they made a second effort to regain the lost ground, and until nine o'clock kept up a lively fire. They were successfully repulsed, however. In this battle General Reno was killed.

Meanwhile, Meade was not idle. He attacked the enemy at five o'clock, north of Turner's Gap, and gradually drove them up the hill. He then turned towards the Gap, and marched along the summit. The contest was very severe, but Meade soon reached the top of the hill near his companions who had attacked the Gap in front.

He was completely successful. Turner's Gap was captured, and at nine o'clock the enemy were in full retreat down the western side of the mountain. On the night of the 14th, the Federal troops bivouacked on the field, ready to renew the contest the next morning, if the enemy made any resistance. They retreated a short distance, however, and took up the position on Antietam creek, where was fought the famous battle which crowns McClellan's fame.

In the battle of South Mountain, fifteen hundred prisoners were captured. The number of troops engaged was about 30,000 on each

side. McClellan's loss was 312 killed, 1256 wounded and missing: total 1568. The news of the victory was at once sent to Washington, and Lincoln telegraphed the following answer:—

“Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you; destroy the rebel army, if possible.”

The Battle of Antietam.

The position which the enemy had taken upon their retreat from South Mountain, was a very strong one. They were on the west bank of Antietam creek, occupying high grounds with steep and difficult ascents. The creek was deep, sluggish, and with scarcely a ford. It was crossed by four bridges: one near the mouth, the second and third on roads leading to Sharpsburg, and the fourth, two and half miles above, on the road from Frederick to Williamsport. The enemy appeared to have chosen the ground leisurely, and it was well fortified and defended by batteries. Their force was 97,445. General McClellan's army numbered 87,164.

On September 15th, after the battle of South Mountain, General McClellan's troops crossed the mountain top, marched down into the valley, and advanced to the enemy's position at Antietam creek. They did not reach the creek until late, however, and General McClellan made a rapid examination of the enemy's position. The day was too far spent for an attack, and the supply and ammunition trains were at once ordered forward, to supply the troops for the impending contest. The different corps were also ordered to take the proper positions to make an attack the next morning. All that afternoon and night the troops were moving to their allotted places, and it was after sunrise on the 16th, before some of them were in position.

General McClellan's plan of attack was to advance his right wing across the upper Antietam, driving the enemy's flank back; the wing then turning southward to attack the enemy's centre. As soon as this was accomplished, the left wing was to advance and attack the enemy in front, carrying a high-backed country bridge which spanned the creek on one of the roads to Sharpsburg. The enemy held Sharpsburg, and the two opposing lines were formed in curves, one enclosing the other, with the Antietam flowing between. The Confederates were on the inner and smaller curve; General McClellan's troops on the larger. The right wing was composed of Generals Mansfield's, Sumner's, and Hooker's corps. General Porter's corps formed the centre. The left was held by Burnside's corps. Still further to the left, but too far distant to be engaged in the battle, though they played an important part in the contest, by holding large bodies of the enemy in

that quarter in check, were General Couch's troops. The remainder of General Franklin's corps was in reserve. Morell's and Humphrey's divisions had not yet arrived; they were marching forward from Frederick, which is east of the South Mountain.

On the morning of September 16th, the enemy began the contest by a severe cannonade, which was replied to by the Federal artillery, and continued more or less continuously during the entire day. There was very little infantry fighting, however, and the morning was spent in reconnoitring and hurrying forward the proper ammunition supplies.

The battle of South Mountain had completely exhausted the ammunition. At two o'clock in the afternoon, General McClellan found himself in readiness to move, and ordered General Hooker's corps on the right to cross the upper Antietam, at one of the bridges and a ford; attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's flank. The enemy's wing fell back before Hooker's advance, making some resistance in various places; and at night the corps bivouacked on ground won from it. General Mansfield's corps crossed the Antietam immediately after General Hooker's, and encamped a mile in his rear.

The Battle begins.

Scarcely had the 17th of September dawned, when the battle of Antietam began. General Hooker's skirmishers first became engaged, and soon the whole corps was in action, driving the enemy out of the woods in which they had taken shelter, and back towards Sharpsburg. The contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced, the opposition became more determined and the numbers of the enemy greater. General Hooker sent for Mansfield's corps, which was promptly brought to his aid; but scarcely had it fired a shot at the enemy, when its gallant leader fell mortally wounded, and the command fell upon General Williams. Many of Mansfield's regiments were new ones, but they fought like veterans.

At seven o'clock the battle raged fiercely, and a severe contest was had for a strip of woods traversed by outcropping ledges of rock. For two hours each party endeavored to drive the other out of the timber. General Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was sent for, and hastened across the Antietam. At nine o'clock his troops appeared, and relieved General Williams's exhausted regiments. At once, an assault was ordered upon the enemy's line, behind the rocks in the timber, and they were driven almost out. Sedgwick and Dana were seriously wounded, and carried from the field. But a moment afterwards, Hooker was severely wounded in the foot, and was borne to the rear. General Meade succeeded Hooker; and Howard took Sedgwick's

place. The repulse of the enemy gave an opportunity for rearranging the Federal lines, which were more or less in confusion, and for a time there was a lull.

Whilst Sedgwick was advancing to Hooker's aid, General French, with the other division of Sumner's corps, crossing after Sedgwick, attacked the enemy further to the left. One of his brigades was composed of new troops. All, new men and old, advanced steadily, however, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and encountering their infantry at a group of houses. The Confederates were soon driven from this shelter into a corn-field behind, and out of that to a sunken road, which formed a natural rifle-pit. Here the contest raged for some time. Soon the enemy endeavored to turn French's left flank, but were repulsed with a loss of three hundred prisoners. They then attempted to turn his right, but this was checked, and they made no further effort to regain their lost ground. The troops, after four hours' continuous fighting, rested on their arms, behind the crest of a hill they had won.

General Richardson, with the third division of Sumner's corps, had followed French across the Antietam, and attacked the enemy further to the left. The division formed in a ravine, and advanced up a hill some distance to the left of the group of houses General French had attacked. The enemy were met in a continuation of the corn-field in which French's men fought, and were driven into the sunken road beyond. Meagher's brave Irish brigade distinguished itself here, its leader having a horse shot under him. The ground on which these troops fought was very irregular, and the enemy several times attempted to cut Richardson off from French, but were always foiled. After some time, seeing a favorable opportunity, one of Richardson's brigades got a foothold in the sunken road, charged along it, and captured numerous prisoners. This broke up that defence, and the Confederates abandoned all parts of the road, retreating into another corn-field beyond.

The Federal troops in this quarter having driven the enemy back at all points, it was not long before they were reinforced, and advanced to recapture the lost ground. The attack was very severe, and in endeavoring to save some guns, General Richardson fell, mortally wounded. General Hancock succeeded him. The enemy, however, did not gain any ground, and Hancock, though his line was weak, was confident he could hold it. There was no other attempt made to drive Hancock back.

About one o'clock, Smith's and Slocum's divisions of Franklin's corps arrived on the field, having been sent to reinforce the right wing. This was rendered necessary by the severe losses suffered by Hooker's and Sumner's corps. As Franklin's divisions arrived, the enemy made

a severe attack upon the wearied Federal troops on the extreme right. The aid was most opportune, for it repulsed the attack, but even with Franklin's help the right wing was too weak to do much execution. General Sumner, the senior officer in command, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of Franklin would have been perilous.

Whilst these successful advances were being made on the right, General Porter, on the east bank of the Antietam, did good execution with his artillery, and also prevented the enemy from sending any flanking parties across the creek to attack the rear of the right wing. During the battle General McClellan rode to all parts of the field. He was everywhere, cheering and animating the troops, and directing the contest. In the middle of the afternoon, finding that the weakness of the right wing was extreme, he sent two brigades of Porter's corps to reinforce Sumner. Sumner, however, was opposed to making any further advance on the right. His troops were too wearied to do it, and assuring McClellan that the ground already captured could be held, the two brigades were returned to General Porter. The enemy made no further attack on the right, and the victory in that quarter was secure.

General Burnside attacks on the left.

As soon as the Federal right was sufficiently advanced, General McClellan ordered Burnside to attack and capture the high-backed bridge in his front. There was a great deal of delay in making this advance, and McClellan reflects on Burnside for it. In his report he says:—

“Early on the morning of the 17th I ordered General Burnside to form his troops, and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders.

“At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, topographical engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear.

“After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector-general, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet; and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly.

“After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania vol-

unteers. Other troops were then thrown over, and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond.

“A halt was then made by General Burnside’s advance until three P. M., upon hearing which, I directed one of my aids, Colonel Key, to inform General Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy’s position on the heights; that the movement was vital to our success; that this was a time when we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object could thereby be accomplished. That if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to inform me so at once, that his troops might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on the field. He replied that he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon this report I again immediately sent Colonel Key to General Burnside with orders to advance at once, if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry the heights; repeating that if he considered the movement impracticable, to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper’s Ferry, attacked General Burnside’s troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge.

“If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights, from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy’s line, and turned their right and rear; our victory might thus have been much more decisive.”

The bridge was captured by Crook’s and Rodman’s brigades, assisted by Wilcox’s division. The contest was severe and bloody, but the enemy were finally driven off, and the hills beyond captured. At nightfall, the Federal troops securely held all points, and the great battle was ended. Of this memorable contest, General McClellan says:—

“Night closed the long and desperately-contested battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. The Army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy.”

The losses of the Federal army in the battle were, killed, 2010; wounded, 9416; missing, 1043; total, 12,469. 2700 of the enemy’s dead were buried upon the field. The trophies of the battle captured by McClellan were, thirteen cannon, thirty-nine colors, upwards of

15,000 stand of arms, and 6000 prisoners. Not a single gun or color was lost by General McClellan's army.

The Enemy retreat across the Potomac.

The enemy, on the 18th, the day after the battle, being so severely punished, retreated across the Potomac, leaving much baggage behind them. McClellan's supplies were exhausted, and the Administration failed to send him ammunition. His regiments scarcely had a cartridge to fire. He had taken the army to Antietam so hurriedly, that even the necessary clothing had not been procured. Constant marching for two weeks, and severe fighting for three days, the last the day of the bloodiest battle which had yet occurred in the war, so wearied the troops that they were unable to pursue the enemy. As it was, they had accomplished wonders. Utterly defeated when Pope commanded them, they had poured into the intrenchments of Washington, a disorganized mass; McClellan, when no one else in the land could stay the tide of destruction, took charge of them. In two days he began his march against the enemy. In ten more days seized the South Mountain, and bore back the invader. In three more defeated him, seized his cannon, captured thousands of his army, and compelled him to flee for safety, very much as Pope's army had done scarcely three weeks before. General McClellan did all this, and now that the enemy were defeated, his gallant and victorious, though weary and exhausted, army, deserved rest.

McClellan and Halleck.

The fanatics at Washington gave McClellan very little thanks for his victory. Though he had saved them, they were only waiting to once more sting their benefactor. This crops out in every despatch. On September 19th, General McClellan thus modestly announced his victory to Halleck:—

“I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be ascertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry.”

All the thanks he got for saving the meddlers at Washington, was contained in Halleck's surly answer of the following day:—

“We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of both, so far as you know them.”

Such a despatch as this, sent to a victorious general, by those who, had he been defeated, would have been hurled from their capital, well

deserved an indignant reply. McClellan lost not an hour in answering it as it deserved:—

“Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. * * * I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch I have the honor to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them.”

The Exhaustion of the Federal Army.

General McClellan, in his report, thus describes the condition of his army after Antietam, and the great deeds it had achieved:—

“It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the defence of the national capital, on the 2d day of September 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualties, their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that “*esprit du corps*” which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out the greatest part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again.

“The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the Army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day, so that but a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize or procure supplies.

“The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam fought by this army a few days afterwards, with the reconnoissances immediately following, resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers, many regimental and company officers, and a large number of enlisted men, amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty. Two army corps had been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat demoralized in the action on the 17th.

“In General Sumner’s corps alone, forty-one commissioned officers and eight hundred and nineteen enlisted men had been killed; four general officers, eighty-nine other commissioned officers, and three thousand seven hundred and eight enlisted men had been wounded, besides five hundred and forty-eight missing; making the aggregate loss in this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, five thousand two hundred and nine.

“In General Hooker’s corps, the casualties of the same engagement amounted to two thousand six hundred and nineteen.

“The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to the last battle.

“When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day’s supply of subsistence in advance.

“Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, but the *morale* of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely contested actions, and they required time to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline.

“Under these circumstances, I did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply.

“I telegraphed on the 22d to the general-in-chief as follows:—

“‘As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer.’”

A forward Movement urged.

Notwithstanding the exhaustion of the Federal army, it had scarcely buried its honored dead upon the bloody field of Antietam, before the radicals were again hounding it on to Richmond. The same general who idled away three months before Corinth, and then allowed the enemy to escape, was unwilling that McClellan's troops, after such great achievements, should have three days' rest. The President, who subsequently allowed general after general to linger and pause as long as he pleased, when commanding the Army of the Potomac, and who permitted officer after officer in the West to move as slowly as he chose, needed no hasty footsteps from any one but McClellan. It was only McClellan's army that was to “move on.” No other.

General McClellan made the greatest exertions to prepare his army for a forward movement. His men were without clothing—his cavalry without horses. He could get neither. The people at Washington wished him to move, but would not send him the supplies. The correspondence between Washington and the camp shows plainly that the principal object of the radicals was not to make McClellan move, but to drive him from the army. When, subsequently, he did march forward, they rewarded him for his alacrity by removing him from command.

Day after day Halleck sent McClellan despatches, urging him forward, and McClellan's invariable answer was that as soon as he was sent the supplies, which were absolutely necessary for his army, he would march. The supplies did not reach him, and when he did go, he was without the greater portion of them.

On October 6th Halleck sent McClellan the following despatch:—

“I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: ‘The President directs

that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on, before orders are giving for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions."

The only thing the Administration adhered to in this despatch was the urgency for a forward movement. The promise of reinforcements was very conveniently forgotten. Of the condition of his army when urged forward, and the embarrassment about supplies, McClellan thus writes:—

"At the time I received the order of October 6, to cross the river and attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing, as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, who believed that the necessary articles could be supplied in about three days. Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already sent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps were forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washington, and I expected that the articles would reach our depots during the three days specified; but day after day elapsed, and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from the quartermasters that they might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates, sent the wagon trains for them, which, after waiting, were compelled to return empty. Several instances occurred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots as often as four or five different times, without receiving their supplies, and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had travelled over one hundred and fifty miles, to and from the depots, before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing.

"The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, and was moving into Virginia. General Reynolds's corps was delayed a day at Berlin, to complete its supplies, and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.

"I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly; and I was repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington, and that the supplies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us,

and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representations of this condition of things to the general-in-chief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the Quartermaster-General, who constantly replied that the supplies had been promptly ordered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our depots."

On October 11th McClellan telegraphed to Halleck :—

"We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that it has been forwarded by railroad; but owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly."

And the next day he telegraphed :—

"It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses."

Again, on October 15th :—

"I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible."

When Stuart made his raid around the army on October 11th, McClellan could mount but eight hundred men to follow him.

On October 21, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan :—

"Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant."

The Army moves forward.

Half supplied and without horses, General McClellan began his forward movement on October 26th. He gave up all hope of procuring what was necessary. His line of march was down the east side of the Blue Ridge, towards Warrenton. So quickly did he advance that he got ahead of the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and cut off their march to Richmond. On October 27th, all General McClellan's army had crossed the Potomac. On November 6th his advance reached Warrenton, and he was making every preparation to attack the enemy, who were to the west of him, and who were not only cut off from Richmond, but had a large portion of their supplies intercepted. Again, however, and for the last time, the Administration interfered with McClellan, and the country has come to the sad conclusion that it was the most unfortunate act ever done by the Lincoln government.

General McClellan removed from Command.

On November 5th, the following order was issued at Washington, and despatched by special messenger to General McClellan, reaching him at Warrenton on November 7th:—

“WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 5th 1862.

“General Orders No. 182.

“By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take command of that army.

“By order of the Secretary of War,

“E. D. TOWNSEND,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

Accompanying this order was the following direction from General Halleck:—

“On the receipt of the order of the President sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting, on your arrival at that place, by telegraph for further orders.”

The drama was ended. McClellan turned over the command to Burnside, and, like the noble Grecian, when popular tumult had for the time ostracised him, he went into exile. He did nothing which the purest patriot would not have done. He recognised the government of his country by obeying its mandate. His army was in tears, and never before parted from an officer with the regret it felt for him. McClellan went to Trenton, and reported for orders; and, conscious that he has twice been the savior of his country, he modestly wears the laurels a grateful people give him, and which no fanatical Administration can take away. He is a citizen now, and is beloved by every citizen of this land whose income is not drawn from the miseries of his country, or whose daily bread does not depend upon the nod of the men who mis-rule us.

And his army—what has been its history? Driven upon Fredericksburg in December, thousands were murdered, and Burnside was removed from command. Driven upon Chancellorsville in May, thousands were again murdered, and Hooker lost his command. Again, in 1863, it had to stem a Northern invasion, this time on Northern soil, and only by sheer good luck successfully did it; and now as we are writing (March 12th), General Meade is being rewarded for his services by cabals to drive him from command. The poor Army of the Potomac is encamped to-day upon the very spot where McClellan left it seventeen months ago! It has lost fifty thousand men, and is not an inch nearer Richmond. And what has become of the men who allowed themselves

to be ruled by the radicals? Mr. Lincoln's cabinet is divided against itself, and is the scene of the fiercest dissension. Halleck, the tool in 1862, is the spurned sycophant in 1864. Stanton, who lorded it two years ago, finds the rebellion as active and fearful as ever. The people of the North, each night and morning, send up to Heaven a fervent prayer to be rid of the wretched fanatics who have destroyed the Union, violated the Constitution, and are now leaving no effort unemployed to overthrow republicanism, and set up a despotism. General McClellan is well out of it.

Conclusion.

General McClellan, since his retirement, has lived in strict privacy near Orange, in New Jersey. Whenever he appeared at all in public, it was to be greeted with an enthusiasm and affection not even accorded to the President of the United States. Every machination of fanaticism is used to overthrow him, but all fail. He is to-day as much beloved by the people as he was when at the head of the army; and far more honored than any man, civilian or soldier, who claims any share of the popular esteem.

The character we have developed in the preceding pages has won the highest admiration not only of the patriotic in America, but of every anxious spectator of the American war in foreign lands. In organizing and combining the largest armies for the great war in which the Union was suddenly plunged, General McClellan exhibited the highest wisdom. He secured the love of his soldiers; the fear of his enemy. He was humane and tolerant, and waged war only against armed men, never against the unarmed and defenceless. He made no raids to destroy private property; burned no towns; employed no mercenaries; incited no slaves to revolt. He had the clearest perception of the magnitude of the rebellion, and of the humane warfare which alone could quell it. He displayed the highest skill in conducting the Army of the Potomac, in advance and retreat, in success or disaster. He inspired the most earnest devotion in his companions in arms. With the most exemplary patience he bore the reproaches and disfavor of the Administration. Every falsehood, invented to injure him, has recoiled upon its instigators. And now a private citizen, he is the first in the hearts of the people, for that high office—once, and we trust again to be, the reward of virtue—which, as he has neither sought it, the nation trusts he will not decline it.

APPENDIX.

What General McClellan thinks of the Army of the Potomac.

The closing pages of General McClellan's great report embrace so much sound military doctrine and good advice that we must give them. We throw them into the form of an appendix.

Of the formation and direction of armies General McClellan says:—

“ To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the absence of system in the appointment and promotion of general and other officers, and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of the army was so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course than that which was pursued; but the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide against their recurrence. I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent one, that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for life; and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an *esprit du corps* and procure efficiency, should be followed by us. All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit—that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade—will insure to them advancement in their profession, and can alone secure it for them. Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff officers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers having a military education, or who have seen actual service in the field. The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once

increased to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the institution. The regular army should be increased and maintained complete in numbers and efficiency.

“A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction should be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and supply promptly the losses arising from battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, from the beginning of the war, have rendered great services, and which have never been fully appreciated by any but their comrades. We need also large bodies of well-instructed engineer troops.

“In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more competent than a soldier to determine the political objects and direction of a campaign; but those once decided upon, everything should be left to the responsible military head, without interference from civilians. In no other manner is success probable. The meddling of individual members of committees of Congress with subjects which, from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, and which they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalculable mischief.”

Of political interference he says:—

“I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary to their success, to any want of confidence in me; and it only remains for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head of his armies—counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns.

“If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its military affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position the better will it be for its fortunes.”

Of the objects and ends of the war he speaks thus:—

“After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject—a subject which demands the closest thought on the part of every true lover of his country—I am convinced that by the proper employment of our resources it is entirely possible to bring this war to a successful military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to the re-estab-

lishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the Confederates; and that such a result should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory measures; and that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union, a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other."

And as a fitting conclusion to his great report he thus epitomizes the history of the Army of the Potomac:—

"I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife. It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters involved. This report is, in fact, the history of the Army of the Potomac.

"During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the fortifications of the capital were in progress; and under the discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sustain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to the realities of war.

"The army grew into shape but slowly; and the delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 1861-1862, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsula campaign, some of the finest regiments were without rifles; nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service.

"When, at length, the army was in condition to take the field, the Peninsula campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, and the permanent restoration of the power of the government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the revolting states. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign,

which might and would have been successful if supported with appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure of promised support at the most critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the past from the midst of peaceful days.

“ For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades were victors on every field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a single corps accomplished the object of the fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory.

“ The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my command of the division of General Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain Department, under General Fremont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a dispatch revoking a previous order giving me command at Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to take ten thousand men from that point to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire before the defences of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of General McDowell's corps of about 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire army (five divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York river, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, and when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, surrounded with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger than our own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage of the brave men who composed my command. Relying still on the support which the vastness of our undertaking and the grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather was stormy beyond precedent ; the deep soil of the Peninsula was at times one vast morass ; the Chickahominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court-house was fought, which

opened the way for the first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming disappointment, than the Army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance when they hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal man could not accomplish the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them. But one course was left—a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to another and better base—one of the most hazardous movements in war. The Army of the Potomac, holding its own safety, and almost the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The seven days are classical in American history; those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James. Richmond was still within our grasp, had the Army of the Potomac been reinforced and permitted to advance. But counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent events proved unwise, prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a nation than the Army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsula campaign, and although that meed was withheld from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they have received the applause of the American people.

“The Army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Richmond, and incorporated with the Army of Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign on the Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor diminished their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under General Pope; yet were compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demoralized.

“No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States Government, and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation's reverence than their survivors to the justice of a nation's gratitude.”

Official Tender of the Nomination to General McClellan.

“NEW YORK, September 8.

“Major-General George B. McClellan.

“SIR: The undersigned were appointed a committee by the National Democratic Convention, which met at Chicago on the 29th of August, to advise you of your unanimous nomination by that body as the candidate of the Democratic party for President of the United States, and also to present to you a copy of the proceedings and resolutions of the convention.

“It gives us great pleasure to perform this duty, and to act as the representatives of that convention whose deliberations were witnessed by a vast assemblage of citizens, who attended and watched its proceedings with intense interest. Be assured that those for whom we speak were animated with the most earnest, devoted, and prayerful desire for the salvation of the American Union and the preservation of the Constitution of the United States, and that the accomplishment of these objects was the guiding and impelling motive in every mind.

“And we may be permitted to add that their purpose to maintain that Union is manifested in their selection as their candidate of one whose life has been devoted to its cause; while it is their earnest hope and confident belief that your election will restore to our country *Union, peace, and constitutional liberty.*

“We have the honor to be,

“Your obedient servants,

HORATIO SEYMOUR, Chairman
 JOHN BIGLER, of California.
 ALFRED P. EDGERTON, of Indiana.
 ISAAC LAWRENCE, of Rhode Island.
 JOHN MERRITT, of Delaware.
 JOHN CAIN, of Vermont.
 HUGH MCCURDY, of Michigan.
 JOSEPH E. SMITH, of Maine.
 GEORGE H. CARMAN, of Maryland.
 BENJAMIN STARK, of Oregon.
 JOHN M. DOUGLAS, of Illinois.
 CHARLES NEGUS, of Iowa.
 JOHN D. STILES, of Pennsylvania.
 WILSON SHANNON, of Kansas.
 J. G. ABBOTT, of Massachusetts.
 C. H. BERRY, of Minnesota.
 JAMES GUTHRIE, of Kentucky.
 CHARLES A. WICKLIFFE, of Kentucky.
 C. G. W. HARRINGTON, of New Hampshire.
 GEO. W. MORGAN, of Ohio.
 ALFRED E. BURR, of Connecticut.
 THEODORE RUNYON, of New Jersey.
 WALTER F. BURCH, of Missouri.
 JOHN A. GREEN, Jr., of New York.
 W. T. GALLOWAY, of Wisconsin.”

General McClellan's Letter of Acceptance.

“ORANGE, N. J., September 8, 1864.

“GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate at the next election for President of the United States.

“It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought.

“I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

“The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart, the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

“These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

“The existence of more than one Government over the region which once owned our flag, is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

“The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced, and it should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

“Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefit of our many victories on land and sea.

“The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it the same spirit must prevail in our councils and in the hearts of the people. The re-establishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we should exhibit all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people—consistent with the honor and interests of the country—to secure such peace, re-establish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every state. The Union is the one condition of peace—we ask no more.

“Let me add what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent; that when any one state is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

“If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain these objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

“I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have fought in so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain, that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often perilled our lives.

“A vast majority of our people, whether in the army or navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union.

“As to the other subjects presented in the resolutions of the Convention, I need only say that I should seek in the Constitution of the United States, and the laws framed in accordance therewith, the rule of my duty and the limitations of executive power; endeavor to restore economy in public expenditure, re-establish the supremacy of law, and, by the operation of a more vigorous nationality, resume our commanding position among the nations of the earth.

“The condition of our finances, the depreciation of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system, while the rights of citizens and the rights of states, and the binding authority of law over the President, the army, and the people, are subjects of not less vital importance in war than in peace.

“Believing that the views here expressed are those of the Convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination.

“I realize the weight of the responsibility to be borne, should the people ratify your choice.

“Conscious of my own weakness, I can only seek fervently the guidance of the Ruler of the Universe, and relying on His all-powerful aid, do my best to restore Union and peace to a suffering people, and to establish and guard their liberties and rights.

“I am, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

“Hon. Horatio Seymour and others, Committee.”

THE END.

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A Brief Sketch of the Life
OF
Hon. GEORGE H. PENDLETON
The Democratic Candidate for Vice President.

Both of the candidates of the Chicago Convention are young men. General McCLELLAN has not yet completed his thirty-eighth year. The Hon. GEORGE H. PENDLETON, the Vice President, is but a few days over thirty-nine. Mr. Pendleton was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, in July, 1825. He has lived there all his life. He received a liberal education, and as soon as he became of age, was admitted to practice as an Attorney at the Cincinnati bar. He soon secured a large and lucrative practice, but after eight years of labor, wishing some change, he consented to be a candidate from the Cincinnati District, for the Ohio State Senate. He was easily elected, and served during the years 1854 and 1855 with such great credit, that in 1856 he received the Democratic nomination for Congress from his fellow-citizens of Cincinnati. In October, 1856, he was elected by a large majority, and took his seat in December, 1857. He at once made his mark in the House of Representatives, then composed of the most talented men of both North and South, and was placed on the Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Pendleton has been three times triumphantly re-elected to Congress; and when the war broke out took a decided stand against the party, who under the guise of restoring the Union, used every endeavor to destroy it. Being a man of great force of character, Mr. Pendleton became a recognized leader of the Democracy, and during the sessions of 1861, 1862 and 1863, earned a widely extended reputation by his consistent opposition to the arbitrary acts of the Administration. As a reward for his steadfast adherence to the true interests of the people during the darkest hour of our history, he has been placed beside General McClellan, on the Democratic ticket, and received the unanimous approval of his party. We cannot give him higher praise than by repeating the words of his bitterest enemy: "George H. Pendleton," says the *New York Tribune*, "the Democratic candidate for Vice President, is a gentleman of decided ability, liberal acquirements, and unstained private reputation."