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THE TRUTH CONCERNING  
THE UNITED STATES ARMY

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER



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# THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES ARMY.\*

By FRÉDÉRIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

NOTE.—*This article was originally published by the holders of the copyright without the footnotes, and as published was read on the floor of Congress and printed in the Congressional Record of March 3, 1911. The attention attracted to it at the time led to criticism by members of Congress, both in set speeches and in general debate, and to question, implied or direct, concerning the accuracy of the data upon which Mr. Huidekoper's conclusions were founded. The footnotes which accompanied the article in its original form, and which are here printed for the first time, show how far the critics were from understanding the research that had preceded the publication of the body of the article. Had these notes been available at the time the paper was under consideration it appears doubtful whether any member of Congress would have felt competent to question statements established by such indisputable authority.*—EDITOR.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE should know that their Army is in a lamentable state and that our means of defense, except the Navy, † are virtually nil. ‡

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†The United States Navy ranks third among the navies of the world. *Vide* Brassey's Naval Annual for 1910, pages 69 to 78.

‡For the following reasons:

1. Seacoast fortifications have been authorized and built, but there are not enough men in the present Coast Artillery Corps to man them; nor has Congress thus far voted all the necessary accessories, without which the guns will be of no more use in defense than so many dummies.

*Vide* Annual report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A. (General Arthur Murray), to the Chief of Staff, September 1, 1910, pages 5 to 15, and especially page 17.

2. The present number of infantry in the Army and Organized Militia is insufficient for the field armies deemed necessary for national defense.

Annual report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army (General Leonard Wood), to the Secretary of War, dated October 1, 1910, pages 8 and 10.

3. The United States has not enough small-arm ammunition on hand to meet the requirements of our Field Service Regulations for an army of 150,000 infantry.

According to the Field Service Regulations, the United States Army, for 1910, Article VII, section 225, pages 144-145, mobile forces should be supplied with 330 rounds per rifle; 330 rounds should be kept at or near the advance supply depot; and 660 rounds "should be available at the base of operations or other depots"—a total of 1,320 rounds per rifle.

An army of 150,000 infantry and cavalry would therefore need 198,000,000 rounds; but Brigadier General William Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, testified before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 13, 1910, that "We expect to have on hand on June 30th next 152,000,000 rounds."

The recent report of the Secretary of War was made in consequence of a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives by the Hon. James McLachlan, a member from California.\* It disclosed a condition of affairs so disgraceful that it has been suppressed, under the excuse that it was purely "confidential."† Mr. Dickinson's report probably did not contain one single thing which is not known to well-informed military men both in the United States and all over the world.‡

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*Vide* Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1911-12, page 313.

4. There is not enough field artillery or field artillery ammunition to go into a campaign.

Testimony of Major General Leonard Wood before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, on December 14, 1910. *Vide* Hearing on the Army Appropriation Bill, page 335.

5. We have no reserve for the Regular Army like that possessed by almost every European nation.

Statement of existing fact. For the European armies which have reserves, *vide* the Statesman's Year Book for 1910 and Hazell's Annual for 1911.

6. The present laws are inadequate to deal with the situation at the outbreak of war without additional legislation.

The last law relating to the increase of the Regular Army to a maximum of 100,000 men was the Act of February 2, 1901 (*vide* U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 31, pages 748-758); the last law relating to the Volunteers in operation at the present time, is the Act of April 22, 1898. There were twelve supplemental or amendatory bills and within one year, on March 2, 1899, another law organizing the Volunteers on an entirely different principle, but "these acts are no longer in effect." *Vide* General Wood's report as Chief of Staff, pages 15 and 16.) The last law relating to the Militia is the Act of January 21, 1903, known as "the Dick Bill."

The defects of the bills of April 22, 1898, and January 21, 1903, are set forth by General Wood in his report, pages 7, 9, 10 and 14 to 24.

7. The history of our past wars has demonstrated that such hasty measures cannot be expected to provide for the necessities which only time and thorough preparation could properly and economically meet.

*Vide* General Emory Upton's "The Military Policy of the United States;" Mr. Frederic L. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" (North American Review for February and March, 1906); and President (then Secretary of War) Taft's introduction to the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's article which was published in May, 1907.

8. Our present condition is one of unpreparedness for war with any first-class power, and, obviously, there is reason for apprehension concerning our military forces.

*Vide* General Wood's report as Chief of Staff, page 11; and also his testimony before the Military Affairs Committee, page 344.

\*On May 19, 1910.

†According to the accounts in the newspapers.

‡Why do nations send to the United States clever military attachés who can find almost anything they wish to know printed in the reports of War

During the War of 1812 our legislators did a lot of boasting that Canada could easily "be captured without soldiers and that a few volunteers and militia could do the business."\* What happened? In 1814 the United States called out no less than 235,839 troops, but, notwithstanding the size of these forces, Americans suffered the humiliation of seeing their much-vaunted plan of conquest vanish in the smoke of a burning capital.† There is no man so blind as the man who refuses to see. True patriotism does not consist in bragging about one's own perfection, but in ascertaining the real condition of affairs and in rectifying the mistakes so far as lies within one's power.

President Taft in his speech at the dinner given by the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, on December 17th, emphasized strongly the fact that some nations are beginning to be threatened with bankruptcy by their tremendous armaments, but that the United States, being confronted by the existing conditions, must maintain its military and naval strength. This constantly increasing preparation for war will probably never cease until the nations of the world are willing to submit their differences to an International Arbitration Court and abide by its decision, he declared.

Lasting peace is desirable above all other things, but to be weak when others are strong is to invite destruction. Might still makes right among nations, and it is high time that Americans knew the real value of their powers of defense.

On October 15, 1910, the United States Army consisted of 4,476 officers and 72,559 men, a total of 77,035.‡ In this country there are 59,687 troops; in the Philippines 17,000; and in Honolulu

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Department officials and in their testimony before Congressional committees? Even the amount of ammunition can be deduced to a nicety from these reports. The actual construction of our fortifications alone is one of the few, if not the only, thing they cannot find in print.

\*General Emory Upton, "The Military Policy of the United States," page 133.

†Upton, page 133.

‡According to the report of the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary of War, dated October 31, 1910, it is stated, on page 7, that, as in previous years, telegraphic reports were obtained showing that, the actual strength of the Army, on October 15, 1910, was "4,476 officers and 72,559 enlisted men, not including 3,486 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, but including 197 first lieutenants of the Medical Reserve Corps on active duty."

*Vide* also the Report of the Secretary of War to the President, dated December 5, 1910.

1,400.\* The Militia numbers about 110,000 men.† In time of war the Regular Army could be increased to 100,000.‡ It would then contain no less than 30 per cent. of recruits and, consequently, be far below the fighting efficiency it ought to possess.§ That is bad enough in itself.

\*According to the Report of the Adjutant General, page 9, the geographical distribution of the Army on October 15, 1910—including the Philippine Scouts—was as follows:

In the United States: 3,366 officers and 56,321 men.....	59,687
In the Philippines:	
Regular Army:	
719 officers and 10,884 enlisted men .....	11,603
Philippine Scouts:	
166 officers and 5,100 enlisted men.....	5,266
	16,869
In Hawaii:—72 officers and 1,334 enlisted men.....	1,406
In Alaska:—50 officers and 1,128 enlisted men.....	1,178
	79,140

*Vide* also the Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, page 6, with a slightly different grouping.

†According to the Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, page 46, the "strength of the Organized Militia, as reported at the annual inspections, is 9,155 officers and 110,505 men, a net increase of 734 over last year. This includes 140 regiments, 9 separate battalions, 7 separate companies of infantry, 69 troops of cavalry, 51 batteries of field artillery and 122 companies of coast artillery."

*Vide* also Report of the Chief of Staff for 1910, pages 7 and 8.

‡According to the Act approved on February 2, 1901, and entitled "An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Permanent Military Establishment of the United States." *Vide* U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 31, pages 748-758.

§The Regular Army numbered, on October 15, 1910, 72,559, exclusive of 3,486 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps (*vide* report of the Adjutant General for 1910, page 7), and also omitting the 5,572 in the Philippine Scouts. Adding to 72,559 the 3,486, the total would be 76,045 enlisted men. To raise this force to 100,000, its full war strength according to the present law, 23,955 enlisted men would be needed.

According to General Murray's report for 1910 (page 5), the authorized maximum strength of the Coast Artillery Corps is 19,321 enlisted men. According to the Adjutant General's report for 1910 (page 7), on October 15, 1910, there were 17,930 of this corps with the colors. The Coast Artillery is therefore only 1,391 short of what it is allowed by the present law for war strength. Deducting this number from 23,955 leaves 22,564 to be distributed among the rest of the U. S. Army.

As 76,045, the present strength of the Army, is 76 per cent of the 100,000 war strength, and, as the numbers of the staff corps and departments, the engineers and miscellaneous troops amount—according to the report of the Adjutant General for 1910, page 7—to 10,043, about 2,400 would be needed to bring



But the American Army to-day has only enough infantry ammunition for one single campaign.\* At this instant the field artillery does not possess enough manufactured ammunition to fight so much as one battle.† At the end of the Civil War the

these troops to their war strength. Deducting 2,400 from the above-mentioned 22,564 leaves 20,164 to be distributed to the fighting arms—that is, the infantry, cavalry and artillery.

The Adjutant General (Report, page 7) gives their figures on October 15, 1910, as follows:

Infantry.....	23,666
Cavalry.....	11,003
Field Artillery.....	4,807

Total..... 39,476 enlisted men.

20,164 is slightly more than 51 per cent of 39,476. The statement made in the text that the Regular Army would then contain no less than 30 per cent of recruits is therefore correct. Certainly, so far as concerns the fighting arms, it is considerably exceeded, and, needless to say, a force so constituted would be far below the fighting efficiency it ought to possess.

\*In determining what small-arm ammunition would be used in a modern campaign, needless to say we shall take the last great war, the Russo-Japanese War, as the criterion.

Colonel Monkevitz of the Russian General Staff has stated officially that "The total number of rifle cartridges shot during the last war amounts to about 170,000,000" rounds.

In the "*Étude sur les Caractères Généraux de la Guerre d'Extrême-Orient*" by Capt. F. Culman, on page 47, is the following assertion:

"The Russian Army used 155,000,000 rounds of infantry ammunition during the whole campaign."

On December 13, 1910, Brig.-Gen. William Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, U. S. Army, stated in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives that "We expect to have on hand on June 30th next [June 30, 1911], 152,000,000 rounds" of small-arm ammunition. (*Vide* Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1911-12, page 313.)

As the United States has not yet on hand these 152,000,000 rounds, it follows that it has not enough infantry ammunition for one campaign.

†General Wood, in his report as Chief of Staff, page 6, stated that "we are sadly deficient in the reserve supply of field artillery and field artillery ammunition" and that "at the present rate of appropriation, it is estimated to take over fifty years to secure a reasonable supply of ammunition"—assertions which were emphasized by the Secretary of War in his report for 1910, page 41.

In further corroboration, General Wood, in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 14, 1910, declared that "in the way of field artillery ammunition we have for the guns already made less than one-third the field service allowance per gun; and this is all we have."

"Now the field service regulations—the campaign regulations—provide for something over 1,350 rounds of ammunition per gun, and they provide for 4½ guns per 1,000 rifles and sabres, so that you can see the condition of unpreparedness as to this ammunition we are in. We are in a situation now where we have not enough field artillery ammunition to go into a campaign."

(*Vide* Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill, 1911-1912, page 335.)

General Wood went on to testify that "Reports indicate that one European army [*i. e.*, the German] carries 2,800 rounds per gun. We do not contemplate asking for a reserve of that size per gun. We ask for 1,350 rounds per gun."

". . . We ought to have 1,350 rounds per gun, and we ought to have of field artillery 3-inch pieces at least 1,000 guns, whereas we have only 432 now. That would give us artillery for only 250,000 rifles; the very minimum we should consider."

According to General Wood's statement, it appears that the United States has less than one-third of 1,350 rounds per each 3-inch gun—*i. e.*, about 450 rounds. Moreover he asserted (Testimony, page 335) that we have only 432 3-inch guns. Multiplying 450 by 432 gives 194,400 rounds as the maximum amount of field artillery ammunition on December 14, 1910—the date when he testified.

That 194,400 rounds is insufficient to fight one modern battle such as the great battles in the Russo-Japanese War is apparent from some of the evidence collected by Mr. Huidekoper.

In the work, entitled "Étude sur les Caractères Généraux de la Guerre d'Étrême-Orient," by Capt. F. Culman (page 46), the statement is made by General Rohne of the Germany Army—the leading expert on data relating to field artillery—that at Mukden the Russians expended 250,000 rounds of field artillery ammunition.

Colonel Monkevitz, of the Russian General Staff, has stated officially that the total quantity of ammunition fired during the ten days' battle of Mukden equals about 400,000 rounds.

According to General Wood, the United States has less than 450 rounds per 3-inch gun at the present time. That this would be insufficient for a modern battle is borne out by the following data:

General Rohne writes, in the "Jahrbucher für die deutsche Armee und Marine" for January-June, 1906, pages 2 and 3, that "in the battle of Tashichao, July 11-24, one battery of 8 guns fired 4,178 rounds, that is 522 rounds per gun . . . At Liao Yang the artillery of the 1st and 3d Siberian Corps fired 108,000 rounds on two days, that is at the rate of 6,750 rounds for each battery, 840 rounds for each gun and 420 rounds for each gun for each day of the battle . . ."

Lieutenant Ulrich, of the German Army, who was with the Russian Army, gives on page 187 of the "Jahrbucher für die deutsche Armee und Marine," for January-June, 1906, his data from the four days' action at the Shaho, September 29 to October 2, both inclusive, showing that the minimum number of rounds fired by the Russian guns was 100 rounds per day and the maximum 364½ per day.

In the "Sweigersche Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie" for June, 1910, is a table showing that the Russians used the following field artillery ammunition:

At the battle of Tashichao on July 24, 1904, the 2d Battery of the 9th

Union Army had 1,800 pieces of artillery.\* The United States Army today possesses but 572 guns of all calibers.†

The American officers rank with any in the world, and our Army has more technical troops proportionately than are to be found in almost any other army of 450,000 men.‡ The backbone of any army is always the infantry. The brunt of the fighting falls on the infantry. When the reserves are called into action, the infantry is the only arm which has every man engaged in a battle.§

Our Army today has only 30 regiments of infantry. Eight of

East Siberian Artillery Brigade fired 4,178 rounds, which is at the rate of 522 rounds per gun per day.

At the battle of Liao-Yang on August 30, 1904, 16 batteries of the 1st and 3d East Siberian Corps fired 100,000 rounds or 422 rounds per gun per day.

At Mukden on March 3, 1905, the 1st Battery of the 9th Artillery Brigade fired 4,034 rounds or 504 rounds per gun per day.

Could the American Field Artillery do the work which it ought to do in a modern battle lasting several days with only 450 rounds per gun?

\*General Wood's testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, December 14, 1910, pages 335 and 345.

General Wood's authority was undoubtedly the "Statement of Ordnance, Arms, Ammunition, and other Ordnance Stores procured and Supplies to the Army and the Quantity remaining on hand at the close of the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1865.

Field guns of different calibers. . . . . 1,736

(Signed) A. B. DYER,  
Brigadier-General,  
Chief of Ordnance.

Ordnance Office, October 20, 1865."

This statement will be found in the Report of the Secretary of War to the President, dated November 22, 1865, Volume II, page 998.

†General Wood's testimony before the Military Affairs Committee. (Hearing, etc., page 335.)

‡Country.	Peace Strength.	Sanitary Troops.
France. . . . .	634,638	6,123
Germany. . . . .	634,320	6,615
Austria-Hungary. . . . .	327,580	4,307
Italy. . . . .	288,409	3,729
Great Britain. . . . .	255,438	5,069
Japan. . . . .	230,000	3,484
United States. . . . .	81,361	4,117

The percentage of Sanitary Troops to the peace strength is: France, 0.96; Germany, 1.04; Austria, 1.31; Italy, 1.29; Great Britain, 1.98; Japan, 1.51; and the United States, 5.06.

§*Vide* statement made by General Kuropatkin, "The Russian Army and the Japanese War," (translated by Capt. A. B. Lindsay. Edited by Maj. E. D. Swinton, Distinguished Service Order, Royal Engineers, 2 vols., New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909), vol. II, p. 155.

these are in the Philippines, and one in Alaska and Honolulu, leaving only 21 in the United States. Granting that all of these 21 regiments could be utilized, how long would they stand against the 200,000 troops which every military man knows that Germany could land within our territorial limits on the Atlantic coast or Japan on the Pacific coast within five weeks after the declaration of war?\* There certainly ought to be fully 54 regiments or six infantry divisions in the United States.†

The very best that we can do at present would be to put 40,000 to 50,000 men on our western coast in two weeks.‡ Owing to the absence of proper laws, no plan exists by which any large force could be placed in the field completely equipped for war.§ Even if the President were to call for 400,000 volunteers at the outbreak of hostilities, the existing laws are so defective that these troops could not be properly organized without additional legislation.|| Even such legislation, if enacted at the last minute, could scarcely fail to reproduce the conditions which marked the beginning of the Spanish-American War.¶ As a matter of fact, the United States cannot today put on shipboard in 24 hours one regiment fully ready for war, as some of the European armies can easily do with an entire army corps.

We Americans think our militia a wonderful force. Nothing could be farther from the truth from a military standpoint.\*\* Read the history of our past wars and see for yourself how much value they have often been as a purely military asset.†† Our militia has run away or mutinied in no less than thirty battles or marches

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\*Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" *North American Review* for March, 1906, and reprint of this article (May, 1907), pages 42 and 43.

†Compare General Wood's Report as Chief of Staff for 1910, page 10.

‡That is, fully prepared for war. Statement of common knowledge among Army officers. Compare statement made by Hon. James McLachlan in his speech in the House of Representatives, on May 19, 1910.

§General's Wood report, pages 7, 8, 11, and 14 to 24.

||*Vide* President Taft's introduction to the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's article.

¶These facts are too well known to require further authority. The shortcomings in the present Volunteer and Militia bills are set forth by General Wood in his report, pages 14 to 24.

¶President Taft's introduction to Mr. Huidekoper's article.

\*\*Compare Washington's letter to the President of Congress, September 15, 1780. Sparks's Writings of Washington, Vol. VII, pages 205-206.

††This fact is abundantly proved by General Upton's "The Military Policy of the United States."



between 1776 and 1861.\* The militia must not be blamed for the defective system which has been permitted to remain in force so long. They have always done splendidly when given an opportunity to learn war in actual fighting.†

War used to last 100 years.‡ Now it lasts one year or less, and preparation must be made beforehand.§ All things considered Pennsylvania possesses the best State Militia.¶ Its training is confined to one week in camp and about seventy hours of drill

*\*The Militia Ran Away or Deserted.*

Long Island . . . . .	August 27, 1776.
Evacuation of New York . . . . .	September 15, 1776.
Brandywine . . . . .	September 11, 1777.
Camden, S. C. . . . .	August 16, 1780.
Guilford Court House, N. C. . . . .	March 15, 1781.
Indian Village near Fort Wayne, Ind. . . . .	October 22, 1790.
Darke County, Ohio . . . . .	November 4, 1791.
Frenchtown and Raisin River, Ind. . . . .	January 18 to 22, 1813.
Sackett's Harbor . . . . .	May 29, 1813.
French Creek, N. Y. . . . .	November 1 to 5, 1813.
Chrystler's Field, Canada . . . . .	November 11, 1813.
Evacuation of Fort George, Niagara River . . . . .	December 10, 1813.
Burning of Buffalo and Black Rock, N. Y. . . . .	December 30, 1813.
Bladensburg, Maryland . . . . .	August 24, 1814.
New Orleans, La. . . . .	January 8, 1815.
Lake Okeechobee, Fla. . . . .	December 25, 1837.
Bull Run, Va. . . . .	July 21, 1861.

*The Militia Mutinied.*

Morristown, N. J. . . . .	January 1, 1781.
Pompton, N. J. . . . .	January 24 to 28, 1781.
Lancaster, Pa. . . . .	June, 1783.
On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, Mich. . . . .	June, 1812.
Detroit, Mich. . . . .	July, 1812.
On the march from Fort Harrison, Ind., to the Wabash and Illinois Rivers . . . . .	October 19, 1812.
En route to the rapids of the Maumee River . . . . .	October, 1812.
En route from Plattsburg, N. Y., to Canada . . . . .	November, 1812.
Battle of Queenstown . . . . .	October 13, 1813.
Fort Strother, Fla. . . . .	November, 1813.
Retreat to Buffalo after the evacuation of Fort George. . . . .	December, 1813.
Withlacoochee River, Fla. . . . .	December 31, 1835.
Charlestown, W. Va. . . . .	July 16 to 18, 1861.

These tables and the authorities for every statement in them will be found in the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's article, pages 33, 34 and 35.

†Mr. Huidekoper's article, pages 15, 36, 37 and 41.

‡For example, "The Hundred Years War" which lasted from 1339 to 1453.

§President Taft's introduction to Mr. Huidekoper's article.

¶*Vide* report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs for 1910, especially pages 203 to 207.

a year.\* How long would they stand against German regulars or Japan's veterans? How much faith would the officials of any corporation place in an agent or employee whose training was limited to one week and seventy hours of work a year?†

Even the Dick Bill‡ leaves it to the Governors of the States to call out the Militia, and no Governor is compelled to obey.§ The result is that many military men think it easier at the outbreak of war to form civilians into United States Volunteers.||

The Act of 1792¶ is practically still in force, having been embodied in effect into all subsequent bills, and Governors can refuse to call out their Militia,\*\* as did the Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont in 1812, 1813 and 1814.†† The "Extra Officers Bill," lately before Congress, provides for the creation of 612 additional officers, 300 as instructors and inspectors of Militia.‡‡ All of them would be available in war for volunteer commissions. It is to be hoped most earnestly that Congress will eventually provide all these much-needed extra officers.

The location of posts in the Army is most defective.§§ Mountain batteries have been placed several days' march from any mountains;|| cavalry garrisons are put in the North, where they are snowed up half the year;¶¶ and some infantry posts where they are useless, being far from the centers of distribution.\*\*\* The location of posts has been due to three causes: (1) Indian frontier

\*Mr. Huidekoper's article, page 41. Also letter from Gen. Thomas J. Stewart, Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, to Mr. Huidekoper, dated January 28, 1911.

†Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" page 41.

‡The Act approved January 21, 1903.

§ *Vide* General Wood's report, page 24.

||From the standpoint of the Government. The Militia must first be called into the service of the United States. A Governor can prevent the raising of Volunteers within his State by calling the Militia into active duty of that State.

*Vide* General Wood's report, page 23.

¶The Act of May 8, 1792.

\*\*General Wood's report, pages 23 and 24.

††Mr. Huidekoper's article, pages 35 and 36.

‡‡Senate bill number 1024, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, introduced by Senator Warren on April 1, 1909.

§§For example, Fort Thomas, Kentucky; Fort Assiniboine, Montana; and Fort Wingate, New Mexico.

|||For example, part of the Fourth Field Artillery at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

¶¶As at Fort Assiniboine, Montana, and at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont.

\*\*\*Such as Forts Meade, North Dakota; Assiniboine, Montana; Missoula, Montana; D. A. Russell, Wyoming; Wingate, New Mexico, and Huachuca, Arizona.

conditions in the past; (2) the opening of the West—the troops now in Alaska are there partly for that purpose;\* and (3) political influence.

Often the War Department has tried to abandon posts worthless from a military standpoint, but has been compelled to countermand the order, owing to political pressure.† The most positive step in concentration was the reduction of the Coast Artillery posts attempted by General Murray for administrative purposes and better instruction. There were 77 Coast Artillery forts in the 27 defended harbors.‡ General Murray proposed to concentrate them in 29 garrisons, but so great was the local and political opposition that in some places his plan had to be abandoned wholly.§

\**Vide* General Wood's testimony before the Military Affairs Committee of the House. Hearing, etc., page 346.

†General Wood's testimony, page 360.

‡The twenty-seven defended harbors are:

1. Kennebec River, Maine; 2. Portland, Maine; 3. Portsmouth, Maine; 4. Boston, Mass.; 5. New Bedford, Mass.; 6. Narragansett Bay, R. I.; 7. Eastern Entrance Long Island Sound; 8. Eastern New York; 9. Southern New York; 10. Delaware River; 11. Baltimore; 12. Potomac River; 13. Hampton Roads, Virginia; 14. Cape Fear River, N. C.; 15. Charleston, S. C.; 16. Savannah, Georgia; 17. Key West, Florida; 18. Tampa, Florida; 19. Pensacola, Florida; 20. Mobile, Alabama; 21. Mississippi River; 22. Galveston, Texas; 23. San Diego, California; 24. San Francisco; 25. Columbia River, Oregon; 26. Puget Sound, Washington; 27. Guantanamo, Cuba.

If the names of the 77 forts are wanted, they can be found in the Army list and Directory for January 20, 1911, pages 25 and 26.

§This opposition was encountered when two companies were taken away from Fort Mott, New Jersey. Much opposition has also been encountered with reference to the contemplated abandonment of Fort Fremont, South Carolina. So much opposition was expected in abandoning the Jackson Barracks, that two companies are still retained there for the present.

The 32 forts embraced in General Murray's scheme are as follows:

Williams and McKinley at Portland, Maine; the new post being built at Portsmouth, Maine; Strong and Andrews at Boston; Rodman at New Bedford; Greble and Adams in Narragansett Bay; Terry and H. G. Wright at New London, Conn.; Totten in Eastern New York; Hancock and Hamilton in Southern New York; Du Pont in the Delaware; Howard in Baltimore; Washington in the Potomac; Monroe in the Chesapeake; Caswell in the Cape Fear River, N. C.; Moultrie at Charleston, S. C.; Screven at Savannah; Taylor at Key West; Dade at Tampa; Barrancas at Pensacola, Florida; Morgan at Mobile; St. Philip at New Orleans; Crockett at Galveston, Texas; Rosecrans at San Diego; Baker and Winfield Scott at San Francisco; Stevens in the Columbia River; and Ward, Casey and Worden in Puget Sound.

Work was started at Guantanamo but has been discontinued, owing to a change in policy.

The American Army has no reserve, because of our defective laws. General Leonard Wood recently called the attention of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives to the fact that the Army is graduating by expiring enlistments 30,000 soldiers each year. These men have seen three years' service, but no means exist to utilize them in time of war.\*

No bill ever introduced in Congress to create them into a reserve has thus far passed. Had any such measure gone into effect ten years ago,† and had the War Department the necessary reserve supplies and ammunition, we Americans would possess today—including the Regular Army and the Organized Militia—a force of fully 450,000 trained men, all that the United States ought ever to need.

Never in our history have we been prepared for war. A good business man cannot be made in a day or a month; neither can a good soldier.‡ To employ untrained material is always dangerous and very expensive.§ In the Revolution we used 231,771 Regulars|| and 164,087 Militia and Volunteers¶ against England's 150,605,\*\* yet it cost us \$370,000,000†† and \$70,000,000 in pensions.‡‡

In the War of 1812 we had 56,032 Regulars and 471,622 Militia§§ against the English and Canadian forces of only about

\*General Wood's testimony, pages 342 and 343. Also his report as Chief of Staff, page 11.

†General Wood's testimony, pages 342 and 343; General Wood's report, page 11.

The Chief of Staff is convinced that such a measure would create a reserve of 300,000 men in ten years.

‡President (then Secretary of War) Taft, in his introduction to the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" emphasizes that "It is a fact, whether the American citizens realize it or not, that time is indispensable to the making of good soldiers. Our own sad experience proves this proposition."

§General Upton's "The Military Policy of the United States;" Mr. Huidekoper's article, and especially the table contained on page 16 of the reprint, from which many of the figures used below are taken.

||General Upton, "The Military Power of the United States," page 58.

¶Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, vol. I, pages 14 to 19.

\*\*Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by H. B. Carrington, "Battles of the American Revolution," pages 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646.

††Upton, page 66; Ingersoll, "The Second War," vol. I, page 14.

‡‡Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11.

§§Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Also Upton, page 137.



55,000 men.\* That war cost us \$82,627,009† and \$45,808,676 in pensions.‡

In the Mexican War 31,024 Regulars§ and 73,532 Militia|| were required to conquer about 46,000 Mexicans,¶ at a cost of \$88,500,208,\*\* and the pensions have amounted to \$43,956,768.††

In the Civil War the United States employed no less than 67,000 Regulars‡‡ and 2,605,341 Militia and Volunteers§§ to defeat about 1,000,000 Confederates.¶¶ The war cost the fabulous sum of \$5,371,079,748,¶¶¶ and \$3,837,488,171 have already been paid in pensions,\*\*\* and we are a long way from the end yet.

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\*Brannan's Letters and Gleig's British Campaigns, quoted by Upton, page 138. To the above number must be added 1,810 militia and 9,825 Indians.

†Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1906, page 100 and 102. Also Upton, page 141.

‡Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, page 11.

§Upton, page 221.

||Upton, page 216.

¶Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900, pages 236-237. Compiled from official records by Newton A. Strait.

\*\*Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1906, page 100 and 102.

††Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11.

‡‡Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (Campaigns of the Civil War Series), page 11.

§§Official Records in the Office of the Military Secretary; Memorandum relative to the probable number of and ages of Army and Navy survivors of the Civil War, page 4 (published by the Military Secretary's office, May 15, 1905); Reply of the Military Secretary (General Ainsworth), dated August 28, 1905, to Mr. Huidekoper's letter of inquiry.

The total number of soldiers, both Regular and Volunteers, was 2,672,341.

¶¶Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol IV, page 768. The numbers employed by the Confederacy have been variously estimated from 700,000 to 1,500,000. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America," page 63, reckons the numbers between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These calculations are at best conjectural since, as the Military Secretary wrote, on August 28, 1905, to Mr. Huidekoper: "No compilation has ever been prepared by this (the War) Department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate Army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in possession of the Department."

¶¶¶Senate Executive Document number 206, Forty-sixth Congress, Second Session. Letter of Hon. John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, dated June 10, 1880, transmitting a statement of the "Expenditures necessarily growing out of the War of the Rebellion, July 1, 1861, to June 30, 1879," a total of not less than \$6,189,929,908.58.

\*\*\*Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11.

The Spanish-American War compelled us to use 58,688 Regulars\* and 223,235 Militia or Volunteers† to subdue 200,000 Spaniards,‡ at a cost of \$321,833,254§; while 76,416 Regulars|| and 50,052 Volunteers¶ were employed in the Philippines, at a cost of \$171,326,572,\*\* and \$30,191,725 have already been paid in pensions for them both.††

How many Americans have any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized our past wars? How long would any properly-run company or corporation tolerate any such mismanagement?

Until the last few years our annual expenditures for pensions have exceeded what it cost to maintain the German army.‡‡ Since 1791 our War Department has cost \$6,845,129,239 and our pensions no less than \$4,115,829,223.§§ The size of our present pen-

\*Report of the Adjutant General, dated November 1, 1898, in the report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pages 145, 147 and 260.

†Statistical Exhibit of the Strength of the Volunteer forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant General on December 13, 1899. Also Strait, pages 208-209.

‡International Year Book for 1898, page 722; Henry Cabot Lodge, "History of the War with Spain," page 18.

§Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1906, pages 100 and 102.

||Report of the Adjutant General, dated November 1, 1898.

¶Report of the Adjutant General, dated November 1, 1898.

\*\*From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War on June 19, 1902.

††Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11.

‡‡The following table shows the cost of pensions to the United States and the Army to Germany during the last twenty years:

	American pensions.	German Army.		American pensions.	German Army.
1891 . . . . .	\$124,415,915	\$94,200,203	1901 . . . . .	\$139,323,621	\$166,389,750
1892 . . . . .	134,583,052	103,279,477	1902 . . . . .	138,488,559	168,414,000
1893 . . . . .	159,357,557	106,821,300	1903 . . . . .	138,425,646	163,562,400
1894 . . . . .	141,177,284	107,008,200	1904 . . . . .	142,559,266	162,093,750
1895 . . . . .	141,395,228	120,005,471	1905 . . . . .	141,773,964	161,678,250
1896 . . . . .	139,434,000	118,053,100	1906 . . . . .	141,034,561	176,438,500
1897 . . . . .	141,053,164	119,768,500	1907 . . . . .	139,309,514	188,258,750
1898 . . . . .	147,452,368	134,993,250	1908 . . . . .	153,892,467	199,846,500
1899 . . . . .	139,394,929	152,050,500	1909 . . . . .	161,710,367	213,742,500
1900 . . . . .	140,877,316	160,625,250	1910 . . . . .	160,696,415	197,687,376

The figures for the American pensions will be found in the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1910, page 112. The cost of maintenance of the German Army is taken from the Statesman's Year Books for the years 1891 to 1910, both inclusive.

§§Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1910, pages 110, 111 and 112.

sion list is a disgrace to any civilized nation, and this condition of affairs will probably continue until the name of every pensioner is published once a month in the local newspaper of the city, town, or village where he lives. Public opinion will do the rest.

Washington declared that we "ought to have a good army rather than a large one."\* Today we have neither, and the Army needs a thorough re-organization, beginning at the bottom, not the top.† The proportion of cavalry, artillery and infantry to each other in the so-called brigade posts is distinctly faulty.‡ We ought to have—exclusive of the Militia—a Regular Army of 125,000 to 150,000 troops and a Reserve of at least 250,000 men who have had former service in the Regulars or Volunteers in time of war. It is estimated that this could be done, if the proper laws were passed, for little more than the Army costs at present.§ Certainly if only the just pensions were paid, such a saving could be effected that American tax-payers would pay less than they now do for the cost of the Army and pensions.

If the United States possessed an Army and Reserve of 375,000 troops, all of whom had had three years' service in the Regulars, and an Organized Militia of 125,000 men, thoroughly equipped and organized as they ought to be, it would have nothing to fear from any other nation in the world. At the present our defensive strength is lamentably weak. Napoleon won his battles because he outnumbered his adversaries on almost every occasion;|| when he ceased to outnumber them, even he fell.

We Americans seem to have sublime faith in the truth of the remark once made by Bismarck that "the Lord takes care of babes, fools and the United States." If we were wise we would bear constantly in mind the warning uttered by Washington in his speech to Congress on December 3, 1793:

There is a rank due to these United States among nations which would be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to re-

\*Washington's letter to the President of Congress, dated September 15, 1780. *Vide* Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. VII, page 206.

†INFANTRY JOURNAL for July, 1910, pages 127 to 129.

‡Especially in the over-proportion of cavalry. *Vide* Army List and Directory, January 20, 1911.

Also General Wood's testimony, pages 360 to 362.

§General Wood's testimony, pages 340 to 343.

||Austerlitz (1805) and Leipzig (1813) were the only great battles in which he was not superior in numbers to his opponents.

pel it; if we desire to secure peace . . . it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.\*

If Congress would provide a proper organization in sufficient time to be in thorough working order before our next war and would heed what Calhoun said in 1820, "that at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing either to new model or create,"† some profit will then have been derived from our costly lessons of the past.

When will our American people awake to the facts and when will our legislators heed the handwriting on the wall?

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\*Sparks's "Writings of Washington," vol. XII, page 38; Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," vol. I, page 140.

†American State Papers, vol. II, page 189.



















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