

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS
13 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM OF THE FILE

SUBJECT: SAKURAI, Takutaro

Address: Resident of Tsuno-Machi, Koyu-Gun, Miyazaki
Prefecture.

Advisor to the Chinese Army at the time of the China
Incident.

✓ File 200, Serial 18: Maj Gen SAKURAI, Special Service Officer in
China, now returned to Kyushu.

✓ File 33, Serial 1:

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr Newbill

September 17, 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan
SUBJECT : SAKURAI, Tokutaro

1. The above-named person testified on April 22, 1947 (Exh. 2480). That testimony is included in pp. 20,550 to 20,567, inclusive. This has to do primarily with events surrounding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and I can find no conflict with the contents of his new affidavit, Def. Dec. No. 1485.

2. He testified again briefly on May 8, 1947, and that testimony is included in pp. 21,793, 21,794. That testimony in part at least covers some of the testimony in the present affidavit, particularly with respect to those portions thereof which relate to the treatment of the Chinese people.

3. In par. 4 on p. 3 of Def. Dec. 1485, SAKURAI beginning with the words "arriving there" and ending with the words "and the protection, of house from fire", apparently refers to documents. These are not produced and their absence not accounted for in the affidavit. This failure, it would seem to me, comes within the ruling of the Tribunal in such matters. That portion of par. 4, in my opinion, is therefore objectionable.

4. The affidavit on the whole would appear to me to be in the nature of character testimony on behalf of the defendant DOIHARA. I have talked to the Chinese Section with reference to SAKURAI's new affidavit which is solely in behalf of DOIHARA, and have been informed by Mr. Liu of that Section that they are working on it. Of course they are familiar with the matters referred to in SAKURAI's new affidavit.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM: Lester C. Dunigan
Subj: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

3 September 1947

The above named person has previously testified and his testimony is included in R. 20,550-20,567 and R. 21,792-21,794. I have examined that testimony and there appears to be no conflict with the contents of his new affidavit, Def. Doc. 1871.

With respect to the new affidavit I can see no relevancy to any of the charges set forth in the indictment. He does not speak of prisoners of war unless the last paragraph of the indictment could be construed as such. My only suggestion is that an objection be made upon the ground that the contents of the affidavit have no bearing upon any of the issues involved in the trial.

Lester C. Dunigan

There should be in your files copies of an original report on this witness dated April 1, 1947. I have re-examined it and find no information therein which would be of value in connection with the contents of the present affidavit. However, a copy of that report is attached to the original of this memorandum.

DIRECT EXAMINATION of SAKURAI, Tokutaro,
without presenting the witness.

21792

* Exhibit No. 2571, his affidavit, was offered and received in evidence. The affidavit stated that the deponent lived in Miyazaki Prefecture, and he was formerly a soldier. From August 1, 1942, to July 31, 1943, he was at Satzo, Kianglingsian, as Commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment of the 13th Division.

21793

* The Governor of the Province was Chang Tsu-to, who conducted all administration for the area. The army was not concerned with this, and the witness was told nothing about troubles among the Chinese. As to troubles between the Japanese and the Chinese, he received information from the governor and passed judgement in the cases. If the soldiers committed any unlawful acts they were punished sternly according to military criminal law, and damage done was repaid through the governor. Obeying his orders, he never failed to treat the people benevolently, and tried to maintain peace and order, and encouraged industry.

21794

He heard nothing of any affair of platoon commander NAKAGAWA, under his command, burning a house and stealing a cow on March 5, 1943. With other interested people, the deponent built a mass tower * for the dead in a park, and held a mass for the souls of all soldiers on the place. He never heard any people speak of unlawful deeds committed by Japanese troops.

*What date of this
testimony*

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, ex-major general, was born June 21, 1897. My present address is Tsuno-machi Koyu-gun, Miyazaki Prefecture. I was in charge of defense of the Akyab area on the India and Burma border as commander of the Infantry of the 55th Division from September, 1943 to February, 1945. Then I served as chief advisor to the Burmese National Defense Army. Immediately after the Burmese National Defense Army rose in revolt, I was ordered to be attached to the Infantry School on 5 April 1945. Later, I became divisional commander and remained so until the end of hostilities.

2. It was after the military operation of Imphal which ended in failure, in mid-September 1944 that General KIMURA came into office. As the commander of the SAKURA Detachment, I took command of a force numbering about 3,700 consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one cavalry regiment as its nucleus and was in charge of the frontal defense of Akyab, while the main force of the 55th Division moved to the Bassein area.

3. General KIMURA, after he assumed office, especially stressed and advised that we should strive to win the confidence of the people, to enforce strict military discipline and to raise the morale of the men. Later he delivered instructions several times to the same effect. In compliance with his instructions, we brought it home to our subordinates that very strict military discipline was the best way to win the confidence of the people. We did our utmost to behave as prudently as possible, so military discipline was very strictly maintained.

4. General KIMURA was so earnest about the promotion of friendship and harmony between the Japanese army and the Burmese and the stabilization of the latter's livelihood that he had his subordinates compile a pamphlet entitled "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and distributed them to the members of units under his command.

We guided our subordinates on the basis of this pamphlet. Because of this, all the men in my garrison area behaved themselves well, adhering rigidly to "The Attitude to Take Towards the Burmese", and there was not a single case in which the Burmese were persecuted or maltreated. In addition, in order to raise the standard of the people's living, we made and gave agricultural implements, hatchets and boats to them, so that they were extremely grateful to us. Friendly relations between the Japanese and Burmese was very strong. Therefore, they were willing to help us with transportation in the rear areas and in the transportation of provisions and the sick even at the front voluntarily.

The Japanese Army particularly respected and protected the religion of the Burmese, so that they were very much in harmony with the inhabitants. The Burmese said that so far as the seashore was concerned they themselves would defend it and they did guard duty along the beach. When the enemy landed, they reported it to us by means of signals and the like. Once the village headman in the neighborhood of Inten (TN: phonetic) was killed in action while obstructing the landing of the enemy.

5. In February 1945, I left Akyab for Rangoon to become the chief advisor to the Burmese National Defense Army. Circumstances in the Rangoon area were different and public peace was not as good as in the Akyab area. At that time the main forces of the Burmese National Defense Army were located in Henzada, while powerful units were stationed in the vicinity of Toungoo, Pegu and Thaton.

On 15 March 1945, our army and the Burmese National Defense Army concluded an operational agreement and our army celebrated, holding a ceremony for their going out into the field. However, Burmese National Defense Army suddenly rose in revolt against us, at the end of March 1945, as the conditions of our Army became worse and worse day by day, not to mention the propaganda of the Anglo-Indian Army. With the sudden change of situation, I called on the Commander in Chief of the Burma Area Army, KIMURA, immediately, and talked it over with him regarding how to handle it. General KIMURA, after considering the former friendly cooperation between the Japanese Army and the Burmese and their standpoint, ordered me that our Army absolutely must not take any revengeful action against them. Furthermore, he ordered that we must protect all those who would pledge allegiance without regard to their past and carry out only the minimum punitive action necessary from the standpoint of operations.

Defense Doc. 1871

On this 14th day of June 1947

At Tsuno-machi, Koyu-gun
Miyazaki Prefecture

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro, (Seal)

I, KORETSUNE, Tatsumi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KORETSUNE, Tatsumi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAKURAI, Tokutaro (seal)

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION of SAKURAI, TOKUTARO,
by Mr. Levin.

20550 * The witness stated he lived at Miyazaki Prefecture. He identified exhibit No. 2480 as his affidavit, and but for certain minor corrections he stated it was true and correct.

20552 * The affidavit stated that he was in the headquarters of the Garrison Troops in China from May, 1936, to August, 1937, and was adviser to the Hopei-Chahar Political Committee and military adviser to the 29th Army. He was on the scene when the Marco Polo Incident broke out, and was engaged in mediating between the Japanese and Chinese Army, and was injured at the Kwangan Gate when the Incident occurred.

20553 Japan's attitude towards China was to realize * a close relationship. The Japanese commander of the garrison troops in China and other officers often admonished the army never to cause a disturbance, but to try to realize a close relationship with the Chinese Army as a friendly army. He served as the wedge between these two armies and became an adviser to the Chinese army.

His only duty was to assist in instruction and training of the Chinese 29th army, while also serving as a conciliator for the two armies. He tried his best to inform the Chinese Army of conditions in Japan and to bring about mutual inspection and exchange of courtesies.

The witness, from his experience in China, was well acquainted with the state of affairs in China. Some of the Chinese commanders had been his students in the Chinese Military College at Peiping.

20554 * In carrying out his business, it had been decided that Col. MATSUI, head of a special service agency in Peiping, should take the measures. Higher officers of the Chinese Army were amicable and friendly, especially the commander, Sung Che-yuan. The lower officers and soldiers of the Chinese Army were not all friendly toward Japan. Quite a few were anti-Japanese. The witness tried to enlighten these soldiers.

Page

After the Hsian Accident, the attitude seemed to grow worse. There were even communists in the army who instigated anti-Japanese ideas.

20555 The witness was in the official residence in Peiping on the night of July 7, 1937. At 11 p. m. * he received a telephone call from Peiping special service agency saying that trouble had broken out and he was to come quickly. He went to the special service agency and was informed of the conditions. He then went to vice-commander Chin Te-Chun of the 29th Army, to determine the actual situation and orders of the head of the agency. While he was there it was decided to send a joint committee for mediation, and the witness was appointed a member of the committee. He started in advance of the Chinese general to the site of the Japanese army on the north side of Mt. Ichimoji. Battalion commander ICHIKI was about to take the unit to its post, having received an order from JUTAGUCHI that he might return the fire because of repeated illegal firing.

20556 The witness asked ICHIKI to give up the attack against Yuanping castle. He agreed to this and seemed to have decided to attack only Lungwangmiao, the actual point of firing. The witness then went into the castle and met a Chinese battalion commander and asked why * fire had been opened on the Japanese Army. This commander answered that since he had no soldiers at Lungwangmiao, the firing must have come from bandits. This was reported to ICHIKI.

About 5.40 a. m. they heard loud gun reports from Lungwangmiao. At that time the battalion commander confessed that he had his men at Lungwangmiao. The witness inspected the situation with the battalion commander. By this time the Japanese attack had been stopped. ICHIKI did not attack the castle.

20557 Since the Chinese Army on the west bank of the Yungting opened fire when the Japanese army reached Lungwangmiao, the witness went to the left bank and stopped their firing. He then returned to the castle and met the Chinese regimental commander. They consulted on how to prevent the spread of the Incident, and * decided to report to their superiors.

Page

A truce agreement was concluded on July 9. The witness went to Lingwang-miao with a Chinese staff member. There were many dead Chinese, with bullets and cartridges in all directions. He was convinced that the Chinese had been occupying Lungwangmiao. There he talked with a Japanese captain and non-coms who had taken part in the Incident, and learned of the circumstances when they were attacked.

After this there were gun reports at night when he was staying inside the castle with Chinese security units. After inquiries he found out that the Japanese Army did not fire, but the Chinese Army did, saying the Japanese had shot at them.

20558 One night there was violent bombardment from the Chinese Army, started by the shooting of firecrackers. * He thought this was a serious incident, as it seemed to be a stratagem of someone who was between the armies, belonging to neither. Many illegal actions were committed by the Chinese Army, and the witness was shot at by Chinese sentries. He knew personally of an incident when the Japanese soldiers were shot at and killed. He went to claim the bodies.

The Chinese side was instigating anti-Japanese ideas actively through newspapers and radio, and the communist party in Peiping became conspicuous for their anti-Japanism.

20559 While there were only three thousand residents inside Peiping castle, there were only fifty of them left after the Japanese had gone to the Fengtai district. It was decided to move a battalion back inside from Fengtai, since it was dangerous * to have only fifty people there. To avoid misunderstanding, they asked consent from the Chinese beforehand. The witness went to the Kwangan gate and waited on the wall for the Japanese Army, in case an incident occurred. About 7 p. m. the army was approaching in vehicles. When they had passed the first gate and approached the second, the Chinese Army on the wall suddenly attacked by opening fire and throwing grenades. About half of the Japanese troops passed through the second gate under fire.

Page

The shooting was stopped after great difficulty by the witness and the Chinese company commander. The witness then advised sending Col. Chang Tsu-to to Sung Che-yuan to report on the circumstances.

20560 While he was on the scene trying to mediate, the witness' interpreter was killed and the witness was wounded. * While he was resting in a private home, Chou, a member of the staff, came for him. He was taken to the special service agency and then removed, after making a report, to a military hospital. The witness wrote a report and presented it to MATSUI on July 26. He was presenting this report with his affidavit.

20561 The report stated that on the morning of July 27, on receipt of a telegram that the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment was to enter Peiping to protect Japanese in the city. MARAJIMA and SAITO went forth with the battalion on a liaison mission. The telegram stated that the battalion would enter from the Kwanganmen gate about 4 p. m. * Since it was thought unwise to give the Chinese enough time to excite suspicion by informing them of the entry too early, they telephoned Chang Wuo-chin, to come to the special service agency by 3.30 p. m., but he did not come. At that time, MATSUI, Chief of special service, had gone to hand over the ultimatum on the Langfang Incident to Sung in Chin-teh she. The witness, with a civilian employee, went to the Kwangan Gate in MATSUI's place.

20562 Through negotiations by the interpreter, the Chinese arranged to open the gate. When they were about to order the interpreter to contact the battalion, a tall man called up the company commander and had him close the gate and prepare for fighting, saying that the order was from Mayor Chin. At this the witness ordered the interpreter to contact the battalion * and the witness went to the Chinese Military Government Headquarters. He found that Brigade Commander Liu and Chief of Staff Hsu had gone to Chin-teh She. He came back to the agency and tried to negotiate about opening the gate. About 5.30 p. m. there was a telephone call from Hopei-Chahar about opening of the gate, and they informed him that certain people would witness the Japanese Army passing the gate. The witness returned to the castle.

Page

The witness had an interview with the Brigade Commander at the gate, and received information that the order for opening the gate had been already issued from Hopei-Chahar. The witness went up on the wall with the Brigade Commander, and made the Chinese soldiers thoroughly understand that they were absolutely forbidden to fire at the Japanese Army and made them lay down and cover up their guns.

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* After a while contact was made by the interpreter. The witness had the Chinese Brigade Commander again explain the situation to the Chinese soldiers so that there would be no misunderstanding and had them open the gate half way.

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A few minutes past 6 p. m. the Japanese motor transport troops came. As they were about to enter the gate, a few guns were fired fifty meters south of the gate. Following this, the Chinese soldiers on the wall began to fire without permission. The witness immediately gave strict orders to the light machine guns on the north to cease fire and ordered the light machine guns * sweeping the road to cease fire. The Chinese Brigade Commander went to stop the firing on the east side. About ten of the Japanese trucks had passed the gate, but the Chinese soldiers continued firing and throwing hand grenades. The witness saw the main body of the Japanese troops stop and begin to get off the trucks. As a result of efforts and giving a strict command to stop firing, they were able to stop the firing on the wall. He immediately made Chang to go and make contact with Sung Che-yuan. Strict orders were given to the Chinese that contact had been made with Sun, and that they were absolutely forbidden to fire.

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* About 7 p. m. the Chinese began to fire from the wall at the Japanese on both sides. Meanwhile, some Chinese, infuriated by a few casualties inflicted on them, began crying "Kill the Japanese". The witness tried to control them, but in vain.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
(April 22, 1947)
(DEFENSE - Division III - China)
(SAKURAI - Direct)

Page 3099

Page

20566 They began to fire. One of the Chinese was hit by several bullets, and several Chinese rushed toward them with Chinese halberds and pistols. The witness was then hit in the leg. * He grappled with the Chinese Brigade Commander, knocked him down, and jumped to the yard.

As he was fired on and the Chinese were throwing hand grenades, he entered the barn. At this time the firing was very intense, and he presumed that the Japanese were attacking both within and without the gate.

At sunset it became calm for a while, but during the night there was some firing heard, and he could not tell who was doing the firing.

20567 * After several hours, with the aid of the Chinese police, the witness went to the Kwangan Gate Branch of Police, met the Chinese Staff Officer, and then went to the Special Service Agency and entered the army hospital.

The strength of the enemy at the gate was sixty soldiers under the 37th Brigade, and sixty soldiers of the 132nd Division.

30 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan:
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

TOJO

WITNESS

SAKURAI, Tokutaro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

An analysis of book, "A Great Principle of Establishing New East Asia," written by the witness.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Title and Nature: A Book entitled "A Great Principle of establishing New East Asia", By SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Lt-Col. Infantry, Japanese Army and Instructor of Military Staff College), Published by Genkaisha on August 22, 1938.

Preface:

Since the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, started on 7 July last, fighting front spread almost all over China and the Japanese soldiers are still fighting for the downfall of Chiang Regime and for the thorough extermination of this Anti-Japanese Government. He says that it is a big mistake to think that the object of Japan is only to win the hostilities and crush the Anti-Japanese government, but should go still further to lay the foundation of great 100 year plan for the East Asia, namely, the releasing of Asia for Asiatic races.

Therefore, the re-capturing of Asia from the aggressive nations of Europe and America, saving of Asia from the wicked hands of the Red Soviet and the establishing of eternal paradise in East Asia should be the task of the Japanese people.

(Dated July 25, 1938).

"Sudden turn of Chinese Government to Anti-Japanese Principle".
(PP 7-13)

Summary:

The policy of Chiang Kai-shek before the Manchurian Incident was that in order to tackle matters outside the country, the stabilization of the domestic affairs was deemed necessary and his government was heading to its realization. But as soon as the Manchurian Incident started, Chiang's main policy suddenly changed to anti-Japanese. The Chinese did not turn anti-Japanese with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, but several years before that, the Chinese People had such feeling towards the Japanese and the number of happenings of incidents of Anti-Japanese nature was on the upward trend close to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Thus the author explains the circumstance leading to why Chinese government began to take up Anti-Japanese policy.

(PP 13 - 36)

Summary:

In the above pages, the author relates the unpleasant and uneasy conditions prevailing around Peking just before the Incident. The atmosphere prevailing in North China and Manchuria then was just like that of lull before a storm. Then the storm of Manchurian Incident began with the outbreak of Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Then he goes to explain in detail the local hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces. From this chapter we can gather the information that the author (SAKURAI) took the task of reconciliation with the Chinese troops at the gate of Peking, but in spite of his efforts, it ended in failure and he was injured by Chinese bullets. After recovery he was appointed an army staff and stationed in North China and experienced and saw the actual warfare in that region.

(PP 37 - 43)

Summary:

This chapter deals with description of Commander of the 29th Army and once Governor of Chakhar Province, Sung Che-Yuan. He was the person who had the spirit of cooperation with the Japanese, but due to Anti-Japanese feelings in the general man and other reasons, he could not succeed. To certain extent he was afraid of the Nanking Government. SAKURAI was with him for about one year as the military advisor to his troop (the 29th Army).

(PP 43-54)

Summary:

These pages cover the circumstances before and after the Tung-Chao Massacre. This town near Peking was the seat of a newly formed pro-Japanese government, but on July 28, 1937, suddenly the 29th Army started hostilities in North China and Tung-Chao was the first to be attacked. The blood thirty Chinese soldiers rushed into this town with shout of "kill the Japanese, don't let ever one of them escape!" As the result over 170 Japanese people were brutally massacred. SAKURAI says that this incident had given the Japanese a good lesson and reflection.

(pp 55-59)

Summary:

Under these pages, the author gives briefly the steps trodder by Chiang Kai-Shek is struggle with Japan and especially on how he will fight through the last sphere of his Regime. The author says that after the fall of Nanking, he removed his seat of government as well as other installments vitally necessary for war into the interior and still continuing his resistance against Japan and it is widely expected that he would be crushed in very near future. But the author says that it is still too early to form such expectation and we cannot hope it, so far as European and American powers' support is behind Chiang.

Those nations think as if they have rights and interests in China and they think China as their colony. And the time he really surrenders Japan would be when all European and American nations abandoned China.

"Britain, America, Soviet and France want China"
(PP 60-78)

Summary:

The reason why China could set herself against Japan by unifying the nation with anti-Japanese sentiment was due to strong support of China by various powers and especially the ambitions Britain. When seen historically, Britain is the forerunner of aggression in China, the author states and he goes on to relate by substantiating the above. He says there is a connection between Britain's aggressions in China and India. But the attitude of America is solely concentrated on uniformity and safety of U.S. goods in China markets.

Besides Britain, Soviet is the next nation which is giving positive sympathy and support to China. To lead China to prolonged war and to stop Japan's advance into China is the same motive of both Britain and Soviet. That is, Britain would like to maintain her rights and interests in China by all means and Soviet too is very ambitious to turn China red and menace Japan. Though their measures are different, get their objects are the same and it can be understood if one observe closely the actions of such nations in China Affair.

(PP 76 - 99)

Summary:

The author stresses that the time has come for Asia to be liberated and the preparation for realizing "Asia for Asiatics" should be taken up at once. As the result of receiving advices and suggestions from European nations, China is writhing in agony and Japan is fighting in China to save her out from such suffering. What Japan really wants China to do is to abolish anti-Japanese attitude and co-operate with Japan for making peaceful and better Asia.

Soviet and Britain are doing their utmost to have China to their sides. It is no easy job to be hand in hand with China, because during the last two decades the Chinese mass had been taught to be Anti-Japanese, therefore to be in complete friendly

relation with her, a considerable time is required. To make China stand on her feet and to let her tackle her own affair correctly, Japan has to be by her to give advices and co-operation on every matter. Japan has to protect China until such time, otherwise she would again rely on Britain, Soviet and other powers for aid.

The author goes on to narrate that every Japanese should be determined to fight any nation which interferes with any Asiatic country for the purpose of disturbing peace and order in EAST ASIA. It is never intended to stress the desire to get rid of European powers from Asia completely, but would like such powers to open the Asiatic soil to the Asiatics and recognize independence of Asiatics and to go hand in hand with such European powers on equal footing.

SAKURAI compares the China Affair to a surgical operation. China is the patient, Japan, the doctor and other powers interested in China as nurses and attendants. At the operation, the patient cries with pain so the attendants around say to the doctor to be more lenient, but the doctor insists on complete surgical operation. If it is stopped at halfway, there will be another trouble and operation has to be performed again. In this way, Japan is determined to reform China completely and this, the author says is for the eternal peace of Asia.

(PP 99 - 126)

Summary:

In conclusion, the author calls out to the Japanese public that as far as the powers assist Anti-Japanese Chiang Regime with funds and munitions, Japan has to resist until its downfall.

Testified April 22

DEF. DOC. #1342

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

RAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was born at No. 462-3, HARUYOSHI, Fukuoka-City, and am at the age of 51. I am now living at TSUNO-Machi, KOYU-Gun, Miyazaki-Prefecture, and was formerly a soldier.
2. From August 1st of 1942 till July 31st of 1943, I stayed at Satze, Kianglingsien, while holding the post of Commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment of the 13th Division. At that time the Governor of Kianglingsien was a man called Chang Tsu-te, who conducted all administration concerning that area. The Army was not directly concerned with this. I was therefore told nothing about troubles among the Chinese people. As to troubles which had occurred between the Japanese troops and them, I received information from the Governor, and passed fair judgments in these cases.

DEF. DOC. #1342

If our soldiers committed any unlawful deeds, they were sternly punished by the Gendarmerie according to military criminal law, and damage, if done to the people, was to be repaid through the Governor. Obeying orders of my superior, I never failed to treat the people benevolently, and endeavored to maintain peace and order and to encourage industry. Therefore no treacherous deed was ever committed.

While in my post, I heard nothing concerning the affair of platoon commander NAKAGAWA, Seichiro under my command burning a house and stealing a cow at Lingkan on March 5th, 1943.

With interested persons such as the chief-priest of the Changhua Temple (or the Kukan Temple), an old one at Shatze', the Governor, and others, I built a mass tower for the dead in a park and held a mass for the souls of the Japanese and Chinese soldiers and of the people. I never heard these interested persons speak of any unlawful deeds committed by the Japanese troops.

On this 21st day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro (seal)

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1342

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) SAKURAI, Tokutaro (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify
that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to
the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near
as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 29 April, 1947

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

- against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



Sworn Deposition; SAKURAI, Tokusaburo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Affidavit

1. While I was serving as a staff officer of the 5th Division, from May, 1932, to July, 1934, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, belonging to the same Division.
2. I was appointed a staff officer of the 1st Army Corps immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident in August, 1937, and remained in this position until November, 1938. In the meantime, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 14th Division, belonging to the 1st Army Corps.
From 15 April to 12 June, 1938, while I was thus serving as a staff officer of the First Army Corps, the 14th Division

that his orders were actually carried out, and so, all members of the Division thoroughly observed his orders. Consequently, whatever region the DOHIMARA Division occupied its inhabitants, who had taken refuge elsewhere would come back to their homes in a day or two and resumed their work as peacefully as before. As for the degree of General DOHIMARA's love towards his subordinates, there was among the officers and men of supply units such saying as Chinese civilians first, then the 14th Division, and then units directly attached to the 1st Army Corps."

4. On 13, April 1938, I was transferred to SINSIANG to serve in the 14th Division as a staff officer in charge of operations. Arriving there, I at once looked over the file of directions, instructions, and operational orders issued by the Divisional Commander. In these instructions and orders, there were many passages in which the Commander gave strict orders as to the protection of Chinese civilians, the prohibition of plunders and outrages, and the protection, of houses from fire. Besides, he explained concretely and in detail how to carry out these orders. While I was serving in the H. Q. of the First Army Corps in the rear, I used to hear people say that the officers and men of the 14th Division loved and protected the Chinese masses. I now realized that it was true. This was, I thought at

not produced

once, because the Divisional Commander on all occasions gave such prudent and thorough instructions and orders to his subordinates that they came to observe them thoroughly. According to these directions, instructions, and orders, the views of the Divisional Commander as regards the protection of the Chinese masses, were as follows:

(1) The aim of the Imperial Army is to exterminate only the armed forces engaged in hostile actions; therefore, Japanese officers and men shall love and protect the Chinese masses.

(2) The key to the maintenance of public peace is, not to resort to arms, but to "temper justice with mercy" in treating the Chinese masses so that they will come to place hearty confidence in the Japanese Army. Needless to say, the Japanese soldiers shall by no means commit blunders, outrages, and so on, nor shall they steal even a single chicken or a single piece of vegetable from the Chinese. Subsequently I served as staff officer in charge of operations from the time of the operation of crossing the Yellow River up to the capture of the walled city of KAIFENG. General DOHIMURA always paid much attention to the protection of the Chinese masses, and his orders for that purpose were strictly observed. There were almost no cases of plunders.

5 Early in May, 1938, in order to carry out the operation of crossing the Yellow River, my division had to leave SINSIANG, site of the Divisional H.Q. for PUYANGHSIEN, to the east of SINSIANG, where we were to begin our preparations for that crossing operation. The people of SINSIANG had such great confidence in General DOHIFARA that we could not leave the place without bidding farewell to the President of the Business Club and all others. However, a river crossing operation required, first of all, to be kept secret, and to tell them that we were moving to the east would have revealed the movements of our division. Therefore, although we were in reality moving to the east, I told the President of the Business Club that we were going westwards. Thereupon the President of the Business Club said that he was sorry to part from General DOHIFARA, whom he loved and admired from the bottom of his heart, that the SINSIANG inhabitants would like to give a grand farewell banquet in his honor, and all men and women, both young and old would line the streets and when we started. As a staff officer in charge of operations, however, I had to dissuade him from doing anything of the sort because it was sure to reveal the movement of the division. Thus, on May 5, 1938, the H.Q. of the Division started by train from a small station, over five miles distant from SINSIANG, instead of starting from SINSIANG station, which was more

Material

Def. Doc. No. 1485

likely to attract public attention. Once the people of SINSIANG gave to General DOHIBARA a piece of a red hunting with letters in gold, in praise of his high moral character.

6. On the night of 11 May, 1938, in the face of the enemy, the 14th Division under the command of General DOHIBARA resolutely carried out the operation of crossing the Yellow River in the vicinity of PUYANG-HSIEN, and the enemy by surprise by virtue of thorough preparations and the bravery of the officers and men, dealing the opposing forces a severe blow and succeeding in the extremely difficult operation of crossing a river in the face of the enemy. Then a chase started on the following 12th. When marching, I always rode on a horse and proceeded immediately behind General DOHIBARA. On the evening of the 12th, we caught sight of the war-stricken Chinese, young and old, with quilts on their backs, fleeing southwards across a vast plain and taking cover in the immense expansion of barley-fields. Noticing this, General DOHIBARA ordered his interpreter TAKEDA, the chief guard, and some others, who were marching beside him, to tell the Chinese as follows:

"The Japanese Army have not the slightest intention of attacking anyone but the Chinese forces who oppose us. The people at large had better return to their homes and resume their work." In addition, General DOHIBARA himself, speaking in Chinese, told men, women, and children hurrying by

with quilts on their backs to return to their homes. Although the villagers fled at first from their homes, they relying on the words of the General and his men, returned afterwards to their village. After they returned home, they served tea and refreshments to the officers and men of the Japanese Army.

7. Our Division launched an attack on the walled city of KAIFENG in the afternoon of June 5. It was customary in those days, before launching an attack on any city, for us to be given by the high command a large-scale map on which were marked in red ink positions of churches, hospitals, and establishments that were within the rights and interest of the United States, Great Britain France, etc. We were under strict orders not to direct shall fire or launch attack against them. In the walled city of KAIFENG were also such churches, hospitals, and other buildings belonging to America and England. Laying particular stress on this point, therefore, General DOHIMARA repeatedly warned his men, giving additional orders to be cautious in their assault, especially in artillery attack.

8. On the night of the 5th of June, our Division captured the walled city of KAIFENG. A section of our forces mopped up enemy remnants in the city, while other units pursued the retreating enemy far in the direction of CHUNGMOU. Soon after the occupation, in the evening of the 6th of

June, General DOHIMARA accompanied by his staff officers, inspected the walled city, lest looting and similar acts should be committed. The inhabitants had all fled because of the previous day's bombardment, and there was hardly a soul seen in the streets. When General DOHIMARA turned a street corner, he saw a Japanese soldier coming out of a Chinese house with a chicken in his right hand; whereupon, he spoke directly to the soldier, "You should not have looted a Chinese civilian, disobeying my every day instructions. What if its owner upon his return should think that Japanese soldiers had stolen his chicken? Return it at once to where it came from!" The Divisional Commander personally setting good examples, even the rank and file came to observe thoroughly his instructions. In due course, the name of "the DOHIMARA Unit" became the equivalent of "doing no harm to Chinese civilians." As it gradually became known to the refugee Chinese civilians that that very DOHIMARA Unit captured the walled city of KAI-FENG, two days later they came back to resume their daily work.

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commenced this rescue operation a large number of Chinese civilians also were suffering damages. The Chinese who were rescued from drowning expressed their hearty thanks to the Unit:

10. For this operation action, General DOHIMARA praised Colone IWAKURA, of the Engineers who commanded the Engineers Unit.

11. While our Division was on the southward march for the purpose of intercepting the LUNGSHAI Railway at night, we often saw fire burning far in the distance. On such occasions, General DOHIMARA looked back at me and urged me to take all possible precautions lest Chinese houses shall be burnt. He said, "Warn my subordinates repeatedly to put fire out completely whenever they leave camping grounds, so that no fire may break out." General DOHIMARA continuously enforced strict discipline among his men in regard to fire, so that not a single house was burnt in the Divisions operational and garrison area.

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Being a man of noble character he always taught me to be sincere, himself acting likewise. Above all, he guided his subordinates in all matters with such benevolence that I can not but respect him.

When I, as a staff officer in charge of operations, came in to close contact with General DOHIMARA, the then Divisional

Def. Doc. No. 1485

Commander, I became deeply impressed by with his noble and sincere character I always felt it to be my highest honour to be serving such a commander as he. That General DOHARA used to put stress upon the protection of the Chinese masses was one manifestation of his noble character. Especially throughout various operations, he would say habitually, "Japan has to strive for the promotion of friendly relations with china." Along the CHING-PAN Railway line, SHUNTE, SZUNSIAN, CHUNGPE, and CHIHKIACHANG, where the 14th Division under command of General DOHARA had marched through and maintained public place after the outbreak of the China Incident, the residents of villages were greatly influenced by his virtue, and placed hearty confidence in him. Thus, peace and order were well maintained in these districts. In fact, whenever the DOHARA Unit left these communities the villagers one and all praise him for his noble character and regreted that he was leaving them.

On this 30th day of December, 1946.
at the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.

Deponent: SAKURAI Tokusaburo (seal)

I, OSA, Kinjiro, hereby certify that the above statement

Def. Doc. No. 1485

was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
at the same place.

Witness: (signed) Ōta Kinjiro (seal)

ORPH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAKURAI, Tokusaburo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, HONGO, Tameo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of SAKURAI, Tokusaburo is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tameo Hongo

Tokyo, Japan

Date 6th March, 1947

Def. Doc. No. 1485

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that his orders were actually carried out, and so, all members of the Division thoroughly observed his orders. Consequently, whatever region the DOHIHARA Division occupied its inhabitants, who had taken refuge elsewhere would come back to their homes in a day or two and resumed their work as peacefully as before. As for the degree of General DOHIHARA's love towards his subordinates, there was among the officers and men of supply units such as Chinese civilians first, then the 14th Division, and then units directly attached to the 1st Army Corps."

4. On 13, April 1938, I was transferred to SINSIANG to serve in the 14th Division as a staff officer in charge of operations. Arriving there, I at once looked over the file of directions, instructions, and operational orders issued by the Divisional Commander. In these instructions and orders there were many passages in which the Commander gave strict orders as to the protection of Chinese civilians, the prohibition of plunders and outrages, and the protection of houses from fire. Besides, he explained concretely and in detail how to carry out these orders. While I was serving in the H. Q. of the First Army Corps in the rear, I used to hear people say that the officers and men of the 14th Division loved and protected the Chinese masses. I now realized that it was true. This was, I thought at

carried out the following operations simulataneously with the battle of HSUCHOW: the crossing of the Yellow River, the interception of the LUNG-HAI Railway and the capture of positions around LANGFENG and of the walled city of KAIFENG. In the course of these operations, I was attached to the 14th Division as an additional staff officer in charge of operations. Serving on the staff of General DOHIMARU, and receiving practical training from him night and day in the thick of battle, I performed my duties as a staff officer responsible for operations, while fierce fightings went on.

3. Early in 1939, the H.Q. of the 1st Army Corps was in SHIHKIACHWANG (now called SHIMMEN), and the H.Q. of the 14th Division in SINSIANG (about two hundred and fifty miles to the south of SHIHKIACHWANG). I was chiefly engaged in the service of supply, as a staff officer of the Third Section in the H. Q. of the 1st Army Corps. A part of the Supply Unit with Motor-lorries of the Transport Unit, and of the Communication Unit, under the direct command of the 1st Army Corps, were temporarily attached to the 14th Division stationed at SINSIANG. Officers and men of these units who, either having been relieved of their duties or having served their time in the garrison area of the 14th Division, and returning to the 1st Army Corps, unanimously told me as follow:

General DOHIMARU had such deep concern over the protection of the Chinese masses that he always issued strict orders. At the same time, he, taking the lead personally saw to it

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition; SAKURAI, Tokusaburo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Affidavit

1. While I was serving as a staff officer of the 5th Division, from May, 1932, to July, 1934, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, belonging to the same Division.
2. I was appointed a staff officer of the 1st Army Corps immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident in August, 1937, and remained in this position until November, 1938. In the meantime, General DOHIHARA was Commander of the 14th Division, belonging to the 1st Army Corps. From 15 April to 12 June, 1938, while I was thus serving as a staff officer of the First Army Corps, the 14th Division

with quilts on their backs to return to their homes.

Although the villagers fled at first from their homes, they relying on the words of the General and his men, returned afterwards to their village. After they returned home, they served tea and refreshments to the officers and men of the Japanese Army.

7. Our Division launched an attack on the walled city of KAIFENG in the afternoon of June 5. It was customary in those days, before launching an attack on any city, for us to be given by the high command a large-scale map on which were marked in red ink positions of churches, hospitals, and establishments that were within the rights and interest of the United States, Great Britain France, etc. We were under strict orders not to direct shell fire or launch attack against them. In the walled city of KAIFENG were also such churches, hospitals, and other buildings belonging to America and England. Laying particular stress on this point, therefore, General DOHIRARA repeatedly warned his men, giving additional orders to be cautious in their assault, especially in artillery attack.

8. On the night of the 5th of June, our Division captured the walled city of KAIFENG. A section of our forces mopped up enemy remnants in the city, while other units pursued the retreating enemy far in the direction of CHUNGMOU.

Soon after the occupation, in the evening of the 6th of

June, General DOHIMARA accompanied by his staff officers, inspected the walled city, lest looting and similar acts should be committed. The inhabitants had all fled because of the previous day's bombardment, and there was hardly a soul seen in the streets. When General DOHIMARA turned a street corner, he saw a Japanese soldier coming out of a Chinese house with a chicken in his right hand; whereupon, he spoke directly to the soldier, "You should not have looted a Chinese civilian, disobeying my every day instructions. What if its owner upon his return should think that Japanese soldiers had stolen his chicken? Return it at once to where it came from!" The Divisional Commander personally setting good examples, even the rank and file came to observe thoroughly his instructions. In due course, the name of "the DOHIMARA Unit" became the equivalent of "doing no harm to Chinese civilians." As it gradually became known to the refugee Chinese civilians that that very DOHIMARA Unit captured the walled city of KAI-FENG, two days later they came back to resume their daily work.

9. Just when the Toshima Brigade pursued the enemy to the vicinity of CHUNGKOW, the enemy broke open the Yellow River embankment, instantly the district was flooded over. The IMAKURA Engineers Unit was engaged in the rescue work with the help of their collapsible boats. When the unit

commenced this rescue operation a large number of Chinese civilians also were suffering damages. The Chinese who were rescued from drowning expressed their hearty thanks to the Unit:

10. For this operation action, General DOHIMARA praised Colonel IWAKURA, of the Engineers, who commanded the Engineers Unit.

11. While our Division was on the southward march for the purpose of intercepting the LUNGSHAI Railway at night, we often saw fire burning far in the distance. On such occasions, General DOHIMARA looked back at me and urged me to take all possible precautions lest Chinese houses shall be burnt. He said, "Warn my subordinates repeatedly to put fire out completely whenever they leave camping grounds, so that no fire may break out." General DOHIMARA continuously enforced strict discipline among his men in regard to fire, so that not a single house was burnt in the Divisions operational and garrison area.

12. I had been personally acquainted with, and trained by, General DOHIMARA from the time I was captain till the time I became Lieutenant Colonel.

Being a man of noble character he always taught me to be sincere, himself acting likewise. Above all, he guided his subordinates in all matters with such benevolence that I cannot but respect him.

When I, as a staff officer in charge of operations, came into close contact with General DOHIMARA, the then Divisional

Def. Doc. No. 1485

Commander, I became deeply impressed by with his noble and sincere character I always felt it to be my highest honour to be serving such a commander as he. That General DOHARA used to put stress upon the protection of the Chinese masses was one manifestation of his noble character. Especially throughout various operations, he would say habitually, "Japan has to strive for the promotion of friendly relations with china." Along the CHING-PAN Railway line, SHUNTE, SZUNSIEN, CHINGTE, and CHIHKIANGWANG, where the 14th Division under command of General DOHARA had marched through and maintained public place after the outbreak of the China Incident, the residents of villages were greatly influenced by his virtue, and placed hearty confidence in him. Thus, peace and order were well maintained in these districts. In fact, whenever the DOHARA Unit left these communities the villagers one and all praise him for his noble character and regreted that he was leaving them.

On this 30th day of December, 1946.

At the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.

Deponent: SAKURAI Tokusaburo (seal)

I, OSA, Kinjiro, hereby certify that the above statement

Def. Doc. No. 1485

was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
at the same place.

Witness: (signed) ŌTA Kinjiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAKURAI, Tokusaburo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, HONGO, Tameo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of SAKURAI, Tokusaburo is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tameo Hongo

Tokyo, Japan

Date 6th March, 1947

SAKURI, TOKUTARO

The attached resume of information in the IPS Files was prepared prior to the receipt of SAKURI's affidavit, Defense Document #969.

In connection with statements contained in the affidavit, I would suggest that the person cross-examining SAKURI read, if possible, a portion of the testimony of Wang Len-ch'ai, beginning at page 3315 of the Record, with particular emphasis upon pages 3320-3332. The witness SAKURI is mentioned on pages 3327 and 3328 by Wang as an advisor to the Japanese Army. The LUKOUSHIAO and LUNGWANGMIAO episodes are discussed in Wang's testimony.

The testimony of Ching Teh-chun beginning at page 2311 of the Record also discusses the episodes mentioned in SAKURI's affidavit. Particular reference should be made to pages 2311-2333. Excerpts from those pages are set forth on the attached report.

The affidavit of Colonel David B. Barrett, contained on pages 3355-3361, relate in part to the subject matter of SAKURI's affidavit.

Resume by: L. C. Danigan

Date: 1 April 1947

SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Application for this witness states that he was advisor to Chinese Army at the time of the Marco Polo Incident and that he will testify to facts concerning the "Incident" and the results of the incident and the developments thereafter.

Major positions held by SAKURAI:

1916 Graduated from Central Military Preparatory School.

1916-1927 Various assignments in the Army.

July 1927 Promoted to Infantry Captain.

1933 Promoted to Infantry Major.

1935 Appointed as instructor at Army Infantry School and member of the Research Department of the School.

May 1936 Attached to the headquarters of the Expeditional Force in China.

August 1937 Promoted to Infantry Lt. Colonel.

Sept. 1937 Relieved of the duty on the staff of the Expeditional Force in North China, and appointed to the staff of the First Army.

August 1939 Promoted to Infantry Colonel.

March 1940 Attached to the General Headquarters of the Expeditional Forces in China.

1943 Promoted to Major General.

Decorations received:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29-4-34	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29-4-34	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29-4-40	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class	China Incident	War Ministry

SAKURAI, Tokutaro - continued
SAKURAI, Tokutaro - continued

Decorations received (continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29-4-40	Intermediate Gordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	War Ministry
9-5-34	4th Class Chingyuan-chang (Manchukuo)	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

Information from IPS Files:

File #303, Serial #1, page 1, contains the copy of a letter from MUTAGUCHI, Kenya, dated 6 February 1946, addressed to Chief of Legation (Liaison) HAKAMURA wherein MUTAGUCHI speaks of his trial and requests the addressee to get in touch with Colonel OGISHI and try to have Lt. General SAKURAI, Tokutaro, available in Tokyo as a witness. MUTAGUCHI's letter continues in part as follows:

"Lt. General SAKURAI was attached to the 29th Army in China and had a hand in the 'HODAI' incident, one year previous to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and I would like to have him to be present as a witness."

(NOTE: MUTAGUCHI has been subpoenaed as a witness for TOJO to testify to the measures taken on the part of the Japanese Army at the commencement of the China Incident.)

Case #200, Serial #18, is an interrogation of General KAWABE, Masakazu, on 26 June 1946 referring to the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the actual shooting on 7 July 1937. The maneuvers and the number of troops in China, he said on page 7 "There was a Special Service Organization at Peking in connection with the troops there."

KAWABE said that the duties of the Special Service Organization "were to deal with the Chinese on political, economical, and other matters outside the scope of the military, but it (Special Service Organization) was under the command of the headquarters at Tientsin."

The Special Service people were under the command of General KATSUKI (page 7).

KAWABE did not know how many Special Service people were in the organization. He "only knew the officers and I think there were five or six." (page 7)

KAWABE listed Major General MATSUI, Tokuro, Lt. Colonel NAKASHINA, Major SAKURAI, Tokutaro, and Major HAMADA, Hiroshi.

SAKURAI, Tokutaro - continued

KAWABE said the incident (Marco Polo) "was immediately reported to the Special Service Organization as they were acting in a liaison capacity." (page 7)

KAWABE said he discussed the incident with Major SAKURAI "two or three days after the incident at which time this incident had been localized and the matter seemed to have been peacefully settled." (page 8)

KAWABE said "Major SURAKAI did not make any investigation as the Special Service Organization had been fully informed of developments" (page 8).

When asked who had kept the Special Service Organization informed, he said as he was not there the matter was attended to by Colonel MUTAGUCHI. (page 8)

He said it was the duty of the Special Service Organization to deal with Chinese authorities and it was not their duty to make any investigation. (page 8)

Further, KAWABE said, "As soon as the firing broke out, Colonel MUTAGUCHI was notified by telephone and he in turn immediately notified the Special Service Organization, who again in turn contacted the Chinese authorities. As a result, Lt. Colonel MORITA, a subordinate of Colonel MUTAGUCHI, the Captain of the Special Service Organization, whose name I do not remember, and Chinese representatives proceeded immediately to the scene of the incident and attempted to stop the firing." (page 8)

The Chinese representatives, KAWABE said, were from the civil government of China. (page 8)

KAWABE said that he did not know of it officially, but after the incident it was possible that the Chinese authorities did apologize. (page 9)

Referring to further hostilities, subsequent to 7 July 1937, KAWABE said:

"About this time I was ordered to supervise the withdrawal of the Chinese troops west of the river spanned by the Marco Polo Bridge, to conform with the terms of the agreement made with the Chinese. In spite of the agreement with the Chinese, a sporadic firing was encountered over night from the Chinese troops to the north of the Japanese. On the 19th a unit of my command, east of the Marco Polo bridge, was fired on in broad daylight and a company commander was wounded. On the 25th of July two or three Japanese soldiers attending to communication repairs were fired on by the Chinese and one man was killed. On the 27th Japanese troops proceeding to Peking

SAKURAI, Tokutaro - continued

from Tientsin were stopped at the west gate by Chinese troops who refused them entry. Rifle firing was received and some Japanese soldiers were wounded. According to interrogation reports Chinese officers located east of the river instead of withdrawing according to the terms of the agreement were reinforced by troops from the west crossing the river and were centered at Nanyen. All this information that I am giving here was also known to headquarters in Tientsin. While efforts were being made to effect a peaceful settlement of all outstanding differences, it was doubted that the Chinese were sincere in their desire to adhere to the terms of the agreement." (page 9)

KAWABE said further that "perhaps the Japanese insistence on the withdrawal of Chinese troops west of the river could be construed, or looked upon, as making aggressive action or taking an aggressive attitude." (page 9)

SAKURAI, Tokutaro

General KAWABE has stated, as indicated above, that SAKURAI, Tokutaro, was, along with MATSUI, Tokuro, a member of the Special Service Organization in China. He may, therefore, testify with respect to the activities of that organization. KAWABE has further stated, as indicated above, that the works of the Special Service Organization had to do with matters outside the scope of the military.

Therefore, the following excerpts from the Record may be helpful.

- R 2326 Exhibit #198 consisting in part of a factual account of the 7 July 1937 incident by CHING Teh-Chun. The latter states that in the evening of 7 July 1937 he received a report from the HOPEI-CHAAR Foreign Affairs Commission, which report stated that the said Commission had received a telephone call from MATSUI, Chief of the Japanese Special Service Board, which telephone call had to do with the incident. (NOTE: The Special Service Board mentioned is apparently the Special Service Organization mentioned by General KAWABE and the MATSUI mentioned in the Record is apparently Major General MATSUI, Tokuro, mentioned by KAWABE as being a member of the Special Service Organization.)
- R 2326 CHING Teh-Chun goes on to describe conversations concerning the incident, and stated on R 2327 that the Japanese Special Service Board and the Japanese troops were not satisfied. (See Record for further details.)
- R 2329 CHING Teh-Chun mentions MATSUI again in connection with the incident.
- R 2330 CHING Teh-Chun discusses negotiations with MATSUI during which an agreement was reached, the details of which appear on that page and the following page of the Record. (NOTE: This is apparently the agreement mentioned by KAWABE at the bottom of page 3 above.)
- R 2332 CHING Teh-Chun mentions KATSUKI, Seiji, as being the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in connection with events subsequent to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. (NOTE: The Special Service Organization was, according to General KAWABE, under the command of General KATSUKI) (see page 2 above).
- R 2333 KATSUKI, KAWABE, MUTAGUCHI are listed as being the leading Japanese officers who instigated the incident. (The above excerpts and comments are furnished for informational purposes so that if it is deemed advisable, SAKURAI may be questioned concerning his knowledge of them. Also if it is deemed advisable, SAKURAI should be questioned regarding the establishment of the Special Service Organization, its connection with the Japanese Government, and the Army, as it would appear that it was in fact acting on orders of the Army.)

SAKURI, Tokutaro

C O N T E N T S

Suggestions

Major Positions Held by SAKURI

Decorations Received

Information from IPS Files

Excerpts from the Record

Curriculum Vitae

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, served in the headquarters of the (Japanese) Garrison Troops in China from May 1936 to August 1937, and at the same time as an adviser to the Hopei-Chahar Political Committee and was a military adviser to the 29th Army, I was in service for the Chinese Army. I had the experience of being on the scene when the Lukouchiao Incident broke out, and was busily engaged in mediating between the Japanese and Chinese Army and was injured at last at the Kwangan Gate when the Kwanganmen Incident occurred. I shall now say a few words about circumstances at the time, chiefly about the Lukouchiao Incident.

a. Japan's attitude towards China

Japan's attitude towards China was to realize a close relationship with China. And it was often admonished by the commander of the Japanese Garrison troops in China or other commanding officers that the Japanese army should never cause a disturbance with China, but should try to realize a close relationship,

especially with the Chinese army, regarding it as a friendly army. It was for the purpose of serving as a wedge between these two armies that I became an adviser to the Chinese Army.

b. My Official Duty

My only duty was to assist the instruction and training of the Chinese 29th army while being a conciliator for the two armies. I believed that it was most important to understand each other well in order to bring about a close relationship between the two armies, so I tried my best to inform the Chinese Army as to conditions in Japan and to bring about mutual inspection of as well as the exchange of courtesies between the two armies.

Since I had been a professor of the Chinese Military College in Peipin from 1929 to 1931, I was well acquainted with the state of affairs in China, and the commander of the 37th division, Feng Chih-an, the vice-commanders, Chang Ling-yun, a brigade commander, Liu Tzu-chen and another brigade commander, Hsia were my students. These facts helped my work go smoothly.

In carrying out my business, it had been decided that Colonel MATSUI, Takuro, the head of a special service agency in Peipin should take the measures.

c. The Chinese Army's attitude Towards Japan at the Time

The attitude of the upper part of the Chinese army was amicable and friendly. Especially Sung C'e-yuan, the commander of the army was very glad to have me as an adviser and instructed me to try my best to bring about a close relationship between Japan and China, emphasizing

its necessity. But the lower officers and soldiers of the Chinese Army were not all friendly towards Japan. There were quite a few of them who were anti-Japanese. I tried under difficulties to enlighten those soldiers. Especially after the outbreak of Hsian Accident, their attitude seemed to grow worse. There were Communists even in the army, who, in touch with other communists instigated the anti-Japanese idea in the army.

d. The day of the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident

I was in the official residence in Peipin on the night of the 7th of July, 1937. At eleven P. M. I got a telephone from the Peipin special service agency saying, "Trouble between Japanese and Chinese armies has just broken out. Come quickly". I went to the special service agency at once and was informed about the conditions. Then I went to Chin Te-Chun, the vice-commander of the 29th Army to determine the actual situation by the order of the head of the agency. While I was there it was decided to dispatch a committee from both the Japanese and Chinese sides for mediation and I, being appointed a member of the committee, started in advance with Chou Yung-eh a major general of the Chinese Army, by car to the Japanese Army to the scene, the north side of Mount ICHIMOJI. There was a battalion commander ICHIKI. He was a **about to**

take the unit to its post, having received an order from the regimental commander, MUTAGUCHI, that he might return the fire because of the repeated illegal firing of the Chinese Army.

I asked the battalion commander to give up the attack against the Yuanping castle for the sake of the people inside. He approved of what I said and seemed to have decided to attack only Lungwangmiao which was the actual point of their firing. Then I went into the Yuanping castle at once and met Mr. Chin, a Chinese battalion commander and asked why they had opened fire on the Japanese army from Lungwangmiao. The battalion commander answered that since there were no soldiers of his command in Lungwangmiao, they might have been bandits or vagabonds, if there had been any firing. So I reported this to the regimental commander ICHIKI through my secretary SAITO, Hisshu.

Nevertheless we heard loud gun reports about 5:40 A. M. from the direction of Lungwangmiao. Then the battalion commander Chin confessed that he had his men at Lungwangmiao, canceling his previous words. He had deceived me.

I inspected the situation from the castle-wall with the battalion commander Chin, displaying a white flag. By this time the attack against Lungwangmiao by the Japanese army had begun. The battalion commander ICHIKI kept his promise and did not attack the Yuanping castle.

As the Chinese army on the west bank of the Yungting River opened fire when the Japanese army reached

Lungwangmiao, I ventured to go to the left bank of Yungting River and stopped their firing.

Then I returned to the Yuanping castle and met Mr. Chi, a Chinese regimental commander. We consulted regarding how to prevent the further spread of the incident and we decided to report to our superiors. I had Captain TERAHIRA on the staff of the Peipin special service agency return to Peipin to report this to Colonel MATSUI.

A truce agreement was concluded on the 9th of July. I went to Lungwangmiao with a member of the Chinese staff, CHOU. There were many dead bodies of the Chinese army, bullets and cartridges dispersed in all directions. Seeing this I was convinced that the Chinese army had been occupying Lungwangmiao.

There I talked with a Japanese Captain and non-commissioned officers who had encountered the incident on the night of the 7th of July and was informed about the circumstances of the night when they were attacked all of a sudden by the Chinese army.

e. Circumstances After the Incident

After this there were gun reports at night, when I was staying inside the Yuanping castle with Chinese security units and was watching operations. After inquiries I often found that the Japanese army did no firing but the Chinese army did, saying the Japanese had shot at them.

One night, there was a violent bombardment from the Chinese army prompted by the shooting of firecrackers in a village where there were no garrison

troops between both armies. I thought it to be a very serious incident as it seemed to me to be a stratagem of somebody who was between the armies without belonging to either one.

After this many illegal actions were committed by the Chinese army.

I myself was often shot at by Chinese sentries.

Among many illegal actions I know personally particularly of an incident in which a Japanese soldier (TN: or soldiers) was shot at the outside of the Yungting gate and another of a Japanese cavalryman (TN: or cavalrymen) being shot at Tuanchia, south of Nanyuan. I myself went to claim the bodies.

In those days the Chinese side instigated the anti-Japanese idea very actively through newspapers and radio and the communist party in Peiping as well as students from North-eastern China became conspicuous by their anti-Japanese speeches and actions.

f. The Kwanganmen Accident

Although there were three thousand residents inside the Peiping castle, there were only fifty of them left after the Japanese army had been to the Fengtai districts. It was decided then to move a battalion back inside from Fengtai, for it was very dangerous to have only fifty people there if worse came to worse.

In order to avoid misunderstandings we asked the Chinese authorities consent beforehand. But I went to the Kwangan gate and waited on the castle wall for the Japanese army with a Chinese Colonel Chang Tsu-to

Def Doc. 969

in case an incident occurred.

About 7 P. M. the Japanese army were approaching the castle gate in vehicles. When the first few vehicles had passed the first gate and approached the second, the Chinese army on the castle wall suddenly attacked the Japanese army, opening fire and throwing grenades. About half of the Japanese troops passed at high speed through the second gate, under fire.

The shooting was stopped after great difficulty as Chinese company commander Weng and I amazed at this sudden accident, ^{and} desperately tried to stop it.

Then I advised sending Colonel Chang Tsu-to who had been with us to Mr. Sung Che-yuan to report on the circumstances. He hurried to Mr. Sung at once.

Then while I was still on the scene with my interpreter trying to mediate the interpreter was shot dead and I was shot in the left thigh with a pistol by a Chinese soldier. I was taken unaware and immediately jumped down from the wall. The wall was ten metres high but fortunately, I received only a fracture of the right leg. If I had remained on the wall I would have been killed.

As I was resting in a private house, CHOU, a member of the Staff was sent for me. I was taken in his car to the special service agency and after making a detailed report was removed to the military hospital.

I wrote a report about this incident and presented it to MATSUI head of the special service agency on the 26th of July. Since this report is in my possession, I am presenting it together with affidavit for information.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)

On this 27th day of January 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)

I, SAKURAI, Tokutaro, hereby certify that the
above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed
his signature and seal thereto in the presence of
this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (Signed) IKEDA, Sumihisa (Seal)

REPORT ON THE KWANGANMEN INCIDENT (26 July 1937(12 Showa)

By SAKURAI, Tokutaro, Infantry Major attached to the
Tientsin Army Headquarters.

1. Situation Before the Affair

On the morning of 27 July upon receipt of the telegram to the effect that the 2d Battalion (minus one company), of the 2d Regiment Infantry was to enter Peiping from Fengtai to protect the Japanese residents in the city, Adviser NAKAJIMA, with Interpreter SAITO set forth with the Battalion on a liaison mission. The telegram stated that the Battalion would enter from Kwanganmen about 4 P. M. As it seemed wise to avoid giving the Chinese enough time to excite their suspicion by informing them of the entry too early consequently making the entry impossible, we telephoned to Chang Wuo-chiin, Secretary to Chin Te-chun to come to the Special Service Agency by 3:30 P. M., but he did not come. At that time, Chief of Special Service Agency MATSUI had gone to hand over the ultimatum concerning the Langfang Incident of the previous day to Sung Che-yuan in Chin-teh she. I, Adviser SAKURAI, went to the Kwangan Gate in his place with KAWAMURA, Yoshio, 1st Class Civilian employee and some military policemen at 3:50 P. M.

At that time Interpreter SAITO was there for purposes of liaison. He negotiated with Wang, 37th Regimental Commander with whom he was acquainted,

Def Doc. 969

telephoned to the Chinese Military Government Headquarters and to Brigade Commander Liu Tsu-chen, and it was arranged to open the gate. Therefore we were about to order SAITO to contact (the coming Battalion) regarding this situation when a tall man in white two-piece Chinese suit after speaking with Mayor Chin over the telephone, called up the Company Commander again and had him to close the gate and prepare for fighting on the Wall saying that was the order of Mayor Chin. At this situation, we ordered SAITO to make contact with the Battalion coming from Fengtai, while I went to the Chinese Military Government Headquarters. I found that both Brigade Commander Liu and Chief of Staff Hsu had gone to Chin-teh She and were absent, but I came back to the Agency and tried to negotiate about the opening of the Gate. About 5:30 P. M. there was a telephone from Hopei-Chahar concerning the opening of the Gate, and they informed us that Secretary Sung Che-yuan, Chang Tsu-te and a member of Diplomatic Committee Lin Keng-yu would be the witnesses of the Japanese army's passing of the Gate. Therefore I went to the Kwangan Gate again with KAWAMURA, 1st Class Civilian employee and YOSHITO M., a member of the Special Service Agency.

2. The Incident

The situation until immediately after the vanguard of the troops had passed the Gate.

I had an interview with Brigade Commander Wang at the Kwangan Gate Police Detachment and got the information that the order concerning the opening of the Gate was issued already from Hopei-Chahar. I went

up on the wall accompanying Brigade Commander Wang, made the Chinese soldiers thoroughly understand that they were absolutely forbidden to fire at the Japanese Army making the entry and made them lay aside and cover up their guns and take a rest. Then I made a Chinese policeman outside the Gate keep contact with Adviser NAKAJIMA (he was situated at a coaling station by the railway crossing 200 metres west of the Gate).

After a while contact was made by Interpreter SAITO who got out of an automobile and went outside the Gate. At this time, Secretary Chang came. After I had Brigade Commander Wang explain the situation to the Chinese soldiers again so that they should be no misunderstanding, I had them open up the gate halfway.

At that time, YOSHITOMI was under the Gate, SAITO outside the Gate by the bridge; KAWAMURA, Chang and I at the north side of the two-storied gate on the Wall Gate. At some minutes past 6 P. M., the Japanese Motor Transport Troops proceeded with Adviser NAKAJIMA's car at the head. As they were just about to enter through the gate, suddenly a few guns were fired 50 meters south of the Gate. Following this example, the Chinese soldiers on the Wall began to fire without permission. Therefore I, with KAWAMURA, immediately gave a strict command to the light machine guns at the north side of the two-storied Gate to cease fire and also ordered the light machine guns which were sweeping the road cease fire and accompanying Brigade Commander Wang went to stop the firing of the Chinese soldiers at the east side of the two storied gate and on the Wall. At this time,

about ten of the Japanese trucks had passed the Gate already but the Chinese soldiers on the east two-storied gate continued firing and throwing hand grenades. I witnessed the main body of the Japanese Motor Transportation Troops stop and begin to get off the trucks. As the result of making every effort and giving a strict command to stop firing, we were able to stop firing on the Wall. Immediately I had Chang go to make contact with Sung Che-yuan. KAWAMURA and I, holding Brigade Commander Wang, gave a strict order to the Chinese, "Secretary Chang is keeping contact with Sun. You are absolutely forbidden to fire from now".

2. The situation from the beginning of the attack by the Japanese within and without the Gate until I made escape

Until 7 A. M. some of the Chinese fired but somehow we managed to make them stop. When the Japanese within and without the Gate began their activities at some minutes past 7 P. M., the Chinese began to fire from the Wall at the Japanese on both sides. Meanwhile, some Chinese infuriated by a few casualties inflicted on the Chinese situated by the north side of the eastern two-storied gate, got close to me and KAWAMURA crying "Kill the Japanese". I, holding Brigade Commander Wang, tried to control the Chinese but in vain. First of all the Chinese of 132d Division fired from a distance of 10 metres. Then light machine guns at the north side of the west two-storied gate began to fire. Adviser KAWAMURA seemed to have been hit by several bullets trying to prevent them from firing, and from the same

direction several Chinese rushed forward towards us with Chinese halberds and pistols. At his time, also from the direction of the eastern two-storied gate, ten or more Chinese came forward and one bullet hit my left leg. Now that there was no use to fight, I grappled with Brigade Commander Wang, and knocking him down I jumped down to the yard between the Walls (the north part of the place between the eastern and western two-storied gates), struck my right leg on the concrete roof, falling down from the roof and lighting on the earth on my right shoulder.

As I was being fired upon and the Chinese on the Wall were throwing hand grenades at this time, I entered the barn seeking dead angle. About this time the firing on the Wall was very intense, and I presumed the Japanese army to be attacking from within and without the Gate. In the yard between the Gate Walls there was not a single Chinese soldier and though I was sure that they would not come to search for me during the fighting, I prepared some sticks and bricks by way of precaution. Intermittently firing was heard, but at sunset it became calm for a little while. During the night sometimes firing was heard.

I could not tell whether it was the Japanese attacking from within and without the Gate or the nervous Chinese firing wildly at random.

I took a rest for several hours leaving my fate to Heaven, then helped by a Chinese policeman who knew me and came to search for me calling my name I went to the Kwangan Gate Branch of Police, met with Staff

Def Doc. 969

Officer Chou who came there to search for me. Then I came back to the Special Service Agency and entered the Army Hospital.

3. The Numerical Strength of the Chinese Army in the fighting.

In this incident, the strength of the enemy which was at the Kwangan Gate was 60 soldiers commanded by the 37th Brigade Commander Wang and another 60 soldiers of the 132d Division which were dispatched to take the place of the former. The former were situated west of the western two-storied gate and the latter on the eastern two-storied gate and on the Wall.

This report is to Colonel MATSUI

I certify that this report was written by me.

January 27, 1947

SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Seal)

SAKURAI, Takutaro

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: Tsuno-machi, Koyu-gun, Myazaki Prefecture.

Was advisor to the Chinese Army at the time of the Marco Polo Incident.

WITNESS will testify to facts concerning the "Incident" and the results of the incident and the developments thereafter.

SAKURAI, Tokutaro

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29-4-34	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29-4-34	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29-4-40	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class	China Incident	War Ministry
29-4-40	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	War Ministry
9-5-34 7	4th Class Chingyuan- chang (Manchukuo)	Japanese- Manchurian "mity	Foreign Ministry

①

Title and Nature = A Book entitled "A Great Principle of establishing New East Asia", By SAKURAI, Tokutaro (Lt-Col. Infantry, Japanese Army and Instructor of Military Staff College), Published by Genkaisha on August 22, 1938.

Preface =

Since the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, started on 7 July last, fighting front spread almost all over China and the Japanese soldiers are still fighting for the downfall of Chiang Regime and for the thorough extermination of this anti-Japanese government. He says that it is a big mistake to think that the object of Japan is only to win the ^{hostilities} and crush the anti-Japanese government, but should go still further to lay the foundation of great 100 year plan for the East Asia, namely, the releasing of Asia for Asiatic races.

Therefore, the re-capturing of Asia from the aggressive nations of Europe and America, saving of Asia from the wicked hands of the Red Soviet, and the establishing of eternal paradise in East Asia should be the task of the Japanese people.

(Dated July 25, 1938.)

(2)

"Sudden turn of Chinese Government to Anti-Japanese Principle" (P.P 7-13).

Summary:

The policy of Chiang Kai-shek before the Manchurian Incident was that in order to tackle matters outside the country, the stabilization of the domestic affairs was deemed necessary and his government was heading to its realization. But as soon as the Manchurian Incident started, Chiang's main policy suddenly changed to anti-Japanese. The Chinese did not turn anti-Japanese with the Marco Polo bridge Incident, but several years before that, the Chinese people had such feeling towards the Japanese and the number ^{of happenings} of incidents of anti-Japanese nature was on the upward trend close to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Thus the author explains the circumstances leading to why Chinese government began to take up anti-Japanese policy.

(P.P. 13-36)

Summary:

In the above pages, the author relates the unpleasant and uneasy conditions ^{prevailing} around Peking just before the Incident. The atmosphere prevailing in North China and Manchuria then was just like that of lull before a storm. Then the

storm of Manchurian Incident began with the outbreak of Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Then he goes to explain in detail the local hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces. From this chapter we can gather the information that the author (SAKURAI) took the task of reconciliation with the Chinese troops at the gate of Peking, but in spite of his efforts, it ended in failure and he was injured by Chinese bullets. After recovery he was appointed an army staff and stationed in North China and experienced and saw the actual warfare in that region.

(P. P. 37 - 43).

Summary:

This chapter deals with description of Commander of the 29th Army and once Governor of Chahar Province, Sung Che-yuan. He was the person who had the spirit of cooperation with the Japanese, but due to anti-Japanese feelings in the general man and other reasons, he could not succeed. To certain extent he was afraid of the Nanking Government. SAKURAI was with him for about one year as the military advisor to his troop (the 29th Army).

(P. P. 43 - 54). Summary:

These pages cover the circumstances before and after the

Tung-Chao Massacre. This town near Peking was the seat of a newly formed pro-Japanese government, but on July 28, 1937, suddenly the 29th Army started hostilities in North China and Tung-Chao was the first to be attacked. The blood thirsty Chinese soldiers rushed into this town with shout of "kill the Japanese, don't let even one of them escape!" As the result over 170 Japanese people were brutally massacred. SAKURAI says that this incident had given the Japanese a good lesson and reflection.

(P.P. 55-59). Summary.

Under these pages, the author gives briefly the steps trodden by Chiang Kai-shek in struggle with Japan and especially how he will fight through the last sphere of his Regime. The author says that after the fall of Nanking, he removed his seat of government as well as other installations vitally necessary for war into the interior and still continuing his resistance against Japan and it is widely expected that he would be crushed in very near future. But the author says that it is still too early to form such expectation and we cannot hope it, so far as European and American powers' ~~and~~ support ~~is~~ behind Chiang. Those nations think as if they have right and interests in China and they think China as their colony. And the time

(5)

he really surrenders Japan would be when all European and American nations abandoned China.

"Britain, America, Soviet and France want China"
(P.P. 60-78)

Summary:

The reason why China could set herself against Japan by unifying the nation with anti-Japanese sentiment was due to strong support of China by various powers and especially the ambitious Britain. When seen historically, Britain is the ^{FORERUNNER} forerunner of aggression in China, the author states and he goes on to relate by ^{SUBSTANTIATING} substantiating the above. He says there is a connection between Britain's aggressions in China and India. But the attitude of America is solely concentrated on uniformity and safety of U.S. goods in China markets.

Besides Britain, Soviet is the next nation which is giving positive sympathy and support to China. To lead China to prolonged war and to stop Japan's advance into China is the same motive of both Britain and Soviet. That is, Britain would like to maintain her rights and interests in China by all means and Soviet too is very ambitious to turn China red and menace Japan. Though their measures are different, yet their objects are the same and it can be understood if one

(6)

observe closely the actions of such nations in China Affairs.

(P.P. 76-99). Summary:

The author stresses ^{that} the time has come for Asia to be liberated and the preparation for realizing "Asia for Asiatics" should be taken up at once. As the result of receiving advices and suggestions from European nations, China is withering in agony and Japan is fighting in China to save her out from such suffering. What Japan really wants China to do is to abolish anti-Japanese attitude and co-operate with Japan for making peaceful and better Asia.

Soviet and Britain are doing their utmost to have China to their sides. It is no easy job to be hand in hand with China, because during the last two decades the Chinese mass has been ~~taught~~ ^{taught} to be anti-Japanese, therefore to be in complete friendly relation with her, a considerable time is required. To make China stand on her feet and to let her tackle her own affairs correctly, Japan has to let her to give advices and co-operation on every matter. Japan has to protect China until such time, otherwise she would again rely on Britain, Soviet and other powers for aid.

The author goes on to ^{NARRATE} narrate that every Japanese

should be determined to fight any nation which interferes with any Asiatic country for the purpose of disturbing peace and order in EAST ASIA. It is never intended to stress the desire to get rid of European powers from Asia completely, but would like such powers to open the Asiatic soil to the Asiatics and recognize independence of Asiatics and to go hand in hand with such European powers on equal footing.

Sakurai compares the China Affair to a surgical operation. China is the ^{PATIENT} patient, Japan, ^{THE} doctor and other powers interested in China as nurses and attendants. At the operation, the patient cries with pain so the attendants around say to the doctor to be more lenient, but the doctor insists on complete surgical operation. If it is stopped at halfway, there will be another ^{TROUBLE} trouble and operation has to be performed again. In this way, Japan is determined to reform China completely and this, the author says is for the eternal peace of Asia.

(P. 99 - 126)

Summary:

In conclusion, the author calls out to the Japanese public that as far as the powers assist anti-Japanese

7

Sung Che-guan

Commander of 29th Army

~~Fan~~

~~Fan~~

Tsahar

$$41 \text{ kg} \quad 250 \text{ gram} = 41 \frac{1}{4} \text{ kg}$$

har
Tung-Chao

$$1 \text{ kg} = 2.2045 \text{ lb}$$

$$\therefore 41 \frac{1}{4} \text{ kg} =$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 409 \\ 2045 \\ \hline 10000 \\ 2000 \\ 2 \\ \hline 4000 \\ 400 \\ \hline 4409 \\ \hline 2000 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 4409 \\ \hline 2000 \\ 400 \\ \hline \end{array} \times \begin{array}{r} 33 \\ 165 \\ \hline 4 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 4409 \\ 33 \\ \hline 13227 \\ 13227 \\ \hline 145497 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 91 \\ \hline 1600 \overline{) 145497} \\ 14400 \\ \hline 1497 \end{array}$$

1. Steel-works at Pittsburgh.
2. Arapakia Coal Mine
3. Cotton cultivation in Texas.
4. Electrical works of G.E.C. & Westinghouse
5. Henry Ford's production capacity of 30 million cars a year.
6. 50,000 beats are butchered at Union Stock Exchange

8

Chiang Regime with funds and munitions, Japan has
to resist until its downfall.

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS
13 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: SAKURAI, Takutaro

Address: Resident of Tsuno-Machi, Koyu-Gun, Miyazaki
Prefecture.

Advisor to the Chinese Army at the time of the China
Incident.

File 200, Serial 18: Maj Gen SAKURAI, Special Service Officer in
China, now returned to Kyushu.

File 303, Serial 1:

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr Newbill

SAKURAI, Takutaro

20 Feb 47

Gave copy of Memorandum for the File, dated 13 Jan 47 to Mr. Dunigan;
to be returned to **us**.

SAKURAI, Takutaro

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: Tsuno-machi, Koyu-gun, Miyazaki Prefecture.

Was advisor to the Chinese Army at the time of the Marco Polo Incident.

WITNESS will testify to facts concerning the "Incident" and the results of the incident and the developments thereafter.

1st. ~~Witness~~

SAKURAI, Takutarō

Request by: Tojo, Hideki.

Address: Tsuno-machi, Koyu-gun, Miyazaki
prefecture.

was a advisor to the Chinese Army at the
time of the Marco Polo Incident

Witness will testify to facts concerning the
"Incident" and the results of the incident
and the developments thereafter.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: SAKURAI, Tokutaro

SEX: Male

AGE: 50 (Born June 21, 1897)

BIRTH PLACE: FUKUOKA Prefecture

1916 May 30 Graduated from the principal course of Central Military Preparatory School.

1916 May 30 Appointed Military Cadet and attached to the 36th Infantry Regiment. (The Department of War.)

1916 June 7 Entered the 36th Infantry Regiment.

1916 June 7 Granted the rank of senior private (by the 36th Infantry Regiment).

1916 August 1 Promoted to infantry corporal (ditto).

1916 September 1 Promoted to infantry sergeant (ditto).

1916 December 1 Entered Military Academy.

1918 May 27 Graduated from Military Academy.

1918 June 2 Returned to the former Regiment.

1918 June 2 Promoted to infantry sergeant-major, and ordered to serve as probational officer (by the 36th Infantry Regiment).

1918 November 15 Approved by Officer Selection Committee, according to Section 12 of Army Recruitment Ordinance to be---(as follows).

1918 December 25 Promoted to infantry second lieutenant and attached to the 36th Infantry Regiment (by the Department of War).

1919 February 28 Conferred the eighth court rank, senior grade.

1919 December 25 Relieved of the regular post and attached to the 47th Infantry Regiment.

1922 March 6 Promoted to infantry first lieutenant (by the Cabinet).

1922 March 20 Conferred the seventh court rank, junior grade.

- 1922 December 14 Ordered to enter Military Staff College (by the Department of War).
- 1927 March 15 Relieved of the regular post and appointed instructor at Military School of TOYAMA (T.N. infantry training school) and concurrently appointed member of the research dept. of the TOYAMA School (by the Department of War).
- 1927 April 15 Conferred the seventh court rank, senior grade.
- 1927 May 24 Relieved of the regular post and appointed director and instructor of the Research Department of TOYAMA School (by the Department of War).
- 1927 July 26 Promoted to infantry captain (by the Cabinet).
- 1929 September 6 Relieved of the post at TOYAMA School.
- 1929 August 1 Attached to TOYAMA School by the Imperial order (the Department of War).
- 1931 August 1 Appointed the Staff of the 10th Division (by the Department of War).
- 1932 March 14 Conferred the sixth court rank and decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 1932 April 5 Temporarily appointed the Staff of the 10th Division (by the Department of War). (This was not published in the Official Gazette.)
- 1932 May 16 Promoted to the sixth court rank, junior grade.
- 1933 August 1 Promoted to infantry major (by the Cabinet).
- 1933 December 20 Appointed battalion-commander of the 24th (Infantry) Regiment (by the Department of War).
- 1934 March 9 Conferred the fifth class of the order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 1934 April 29 Conferred the fourth class of the order of the Golden Kite and 500 yen annuity.
- 1934 April 29 Conferred the fourth class of the small-ribboned order of the Rising Sun for the services rendered for the Incident during 1931-1934.
- 1935 March 15 Appointed instructor at Army Infantry School

and member of the Research Department of the School (by the Department of War).

- 1936 February 28 Concurrently appointed the staff of the 1st Division by the Imperial order (by the Department of War). (This was not published in the Official Gazette.)
- 1936 March 11 Relieved of the post of the staff of the 1st Division (by the Department of War).
- 1936 May 5 Attached to the headquarters of the Expeditional Force in China by the Imperial order (the Department of War). (This was not published in the Official Gazette.)
- 1937 July 1 Conferred the sixth court rank, senior grade.
- 1937 August 2 Promoted to infantry lieutenant colonel (by the Cabinet).
- 1937 September 4 Relieved of the duty of the staff of the Expeditional Force in North China and appointed the staff of the First Army by the Imperial order (the Department of War). (This was not published in the Official Gazette.)
- 1939 March 23 Conferred the third class of the order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 1939 August 1 Promoted to infantry colonel (by the Cabinet).
- 1939 August 15 Promoted to the fifth court rank, junior grade.
- 1940 March 9 Attached, by the Imperial order, to the General Headquarters of the Expeditional Forces in China (by the Department of War).
- 1940 April 29 Awarded the third class of the order of the Golden Kite as well as Medium-size-ribboned order of the Rising Sun for the services rendered for China Incident.
- 1943 August 2 Promoted to major general (by the Cabinet).
- 1943 August 16 Promoted to the fifth court rank, senior grade.
- 1944 May 17 Decorated with the second class of the order of the Sacred Treasure.

(The End)

Wagen

Translated by
T. R. TOMISHIGE,
Room 363.

Curriculum Vitae

NAME: SAKURAI, Tokutaro.

SEX: Male.

Age: 50 (Born June 21, 1897)

Birth Place: FUKUOKA Prefecture.

1916. May 30. Graduated from the principal course of
Central Military Preparatory School.

" " " Appointed Military Cadet and attached to
the 36th Infantry Regiment. (the Depart-
ment of War)

" June 7. Entered the 36th Infantry Regiment.

" " " Granted the rank of senior private (by
the 36th Infantry Regiment)

" Aug. 1. Promoted to infantry corporal (ditto)

" Sept. 1. Promoted to infantry sergeant (ditto)

- " Dec. 1. Entered Military Academy.
1918. May 27. Graduated from Military Academy.
- " June 2. Returned to the former regiment.
- " " " Promoted to infantry sergeant-major, and ordered to serve as probational officer. (by the 36th Infantry Regiment)
- " Nov. 15. Approved by Officer Selection Committee, according to Section 12 of Army Recruitment Ordinance to be ——— (as follows)
- " Dec. 25. Promoted to infantry second lieutenant, and attached to the 36th Infantry Regiment. (by the Department of War)
- 1919 Feb. 28. Conferred the eighth court rank, senior grade.
- " Dec. 25. Relieved of the regular post, ~~in post~~

~~post~~, and attached to the 47th Infantry
Regiment.

1922. Mar. 6. Promoted to infantry first lieutenant
(by the Cabinet)

" Mar. 20. Conferred the seventh court rank, junior
grade.

" Dec. 14. Ordered to enter Military Staff College
(by the Department of War)

1927. Mar. 15. Relieved of the regular post, and
appointed instructor at Military School
of TOYAMA (T.N. infantry training school)
and concurrently appointed member
of the research dept of the TOYAMA School
(by the Department of War)

" Apr. 15. Conferred the seventh court rank,
senior grade.

" May 24. Relieved of the regular post, and appointed director and instructor of the Research Department of TOYAMA School (by the Department of War).

" July 26. Promoted to infantry captain. (by the Cabinet)

1929. Sept. 6. Relieved of the post at TOYAMA School.

1929. Aug. 1. Attached to TOYAMA School by the Imperial order (the Department of War)

1931. Aug. 1. Appointed the Staff of the 10th Division (by the Department of War)

1932. Mar. 14. Conferred the sixth court rank, and decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

" Apr. 5. Temporarily appointed the Staff of

the 10th Division (by the Department of War)
(This was not publicated in the Official Gazette)

" May 16. Promoted to the sixth court rank, junior grade.

1933. Aug. 1. Promoted to infantry major. (by the Cabinet)

" Dec. 20. Appointed battalion-commander of the 24th (Infantry) Regiment. (by the Department of War)

1934. Mar. 9. Conferred the fifth class of the order, ~~of the Sacred Treasure~~ of the Sacred Treasure.

" Apr. 29. Conferred the fourth class of the order of the Golden Kite, and 500 yen annuity.

" " " Conferred the fourth class of ~~the~~ the small-ribboned order of the Rising Sun for the services rendered

for the Incident during 1931 - 1934.

1935. Mar. 15. Appointed instructor at Army Infantry School and member of the Research Department of the School (by the Department of War)

1936. Feb. 28. Concurrently appointed the staff of the 1st Division by the Imperial order (by the Department of War) (This was not publicated in the Official Gazette)

" Mar. 11. Relieved of the post of the staff of the 1st Division (by the Department of War)

" May 5. Attached to the headquarters of the Expeditional Force in China, by the Imperial order (the Department of War) (This was not publicated in the Official Gazette)

1937. July 1. Conferred the sixth court rank, senior grade.

" Aug. 2. Promoted to infantry lieutenant colonel (by the Cabinet)

" Sept. 4. Relieved of the duty of the staff of the Expeditional Force in North China and appointed the staff of the First Army, by the Imperial order (the Department of War) (This was not publicized in the Official Gazette)

1939. Mar. 23. Conferred the third class of the order of the Sacred Treasure.

" Aug. 1. Promoted to infantry colonel (by the Cabinet)

" Aug. 15. Promoted to the fifth court rank, junior grade.

1940. Mar. 9. Attached, by the Imperial order, to the General Headquarters of the Expeditional Forces in China (by the Department of War)

" Apr. 29. Awarded the third class of the order of the Golden Kite as well as Medium-size-ribboned order of the Rising Sun, for the services rendered for China Incident.

1943. Aug. 2. Promoted to major general (by the Cabinet)

" Aug. 16. Promoted to the fifth court rank, senior grade.

1944. May 17. Decorated with the second class of the order of the Sacred Treasure.

[THE END]

✓ My SSY

Started: Feb. 18

Finished: Feb. 19

Translated by Kei Taro MURAKAMI

Personal History of SAKURAI, Tokutarō

residence:

Permanent

~~Address~~
~~Number~~

FUKUOKA Prefecture

(NAME): SAKURAI, Tokutarō

(BORN): June 21, 1897

May 30, 1916: Graduated from the Central Military

Preparatory School, regular course.

—ditto—: Appointed a cadet; assigned to

the 36th Infantry Regiment

June 7, 1916: ^{Enlisted in} Entered the service at the 36th

Infantry Regiment

—ditto—: Given the rank of Superior Private,

Infantry

Aug. 1, 1916 : Promoted to the grade of Corporal,

Infantry

Sept. 1, 1916 : Promoted to the grade of Sergeant,

Infantry

Dec. 1, 1916 : Entered ~~the~~ Military Academy,

May 27, 1918 : Graduated from the Military Academy.

June 2, 1918 : ^{joined former ~~to~~ original unit.} ~~Returned to the home regiment.~~

ditto — : Promoted to the grade of Sergeant-

Major, Infantry and appointed

Probationary ^{only} Officer.

ⁱⁿ Accordance with Article 12,
Nov. 15, 1918: According to the Army Replacement

Regulations for Personnel, Article

^{Officers Selection}
12, passed the Classification

Board.

Dec. 25, 1918: Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry;

^{assigned}
attached to the 36th Infantry

Regiment.

^{Conferred with}
Feb. 28, 1919: Raised to the Senior Grade of the

8th Court Rank

Dec. 25, 1919: Relieved of ~~the~~ present duty;

^{Assigned}
~~attached~~ to the 47th Infantry

Regiment.

March 6, 1922: Promoted To Appointed 1st Lieutenant,

Infantry.

March 20, 1922: Conferred with Raised to the Junior Grade

of the 7th Court Rank.

Dec. 14, 1922: Ordered to enter the Military Army Staff College. Staff College

March 15, 1927: Relieved of the present duty; Assigned as detailed an Instructor, ~~and~~ ^{concurrently} ~~also~~ ~~Chief of~~ Research Section member of the Laboratory member of the Army School, TOYAMA Physical Training School

School.

April 15, 1927 : ^{Unferred with} Raised to the Senior Grade of
the 7th Court Rank

May 24, 1927 : Relieved of ~~his~~ original and
additional duties; ^{Assigned} detailed as
Chief of Research Section, concurrently
~~Laboratory officer~~ and an

Instructor of the TOYAMA ^{Army} Physical
Training School.

July 26, 1927 : ^{Promoted to} Appointed Captain, Infantry

Aug. 1, 1929 : ^{Appointed} Attached to the TOYAMA Physical
^{Army} Training School.

Sept. 6, 1929: Relieved from the TOYAMA
Army
Physical Training School

Aug. 1, 1931: Detailed as Staff-officer of the
10th Division

March 14, 1932: ~~Imperial~~ Decorated
Decorated with an Order of Merit
6th Grade, the Imperial Order of

The Sacred Treasure, 6th Class

April 5, 1932: ~~Adopted~~ ^{Assigned} as a Staff-officer of
the 10th Division

May 16, 1932: ~~Ranked~~ ^{Imperial} with
Ranked to the Junior Grade
of the 6th Court Rank

Aug. 1, 1933: ^{Promoted to} Appointed Major, Infantry

Dec. 20, 1933: ^{Assigned,} Detailed ~~to~~ Battalion Commander
of the 24th Regiment

March 9, 1934: Decorated with an Order of
~~Merit~~, the Imperial Order of
Sacred Treasure, 5th class.

April 29, 1934: Decorated with an Imperial
Military Order of the Golden Kite
Class
4th ~~Grade~~; granted an Annuity
of ¥500

— ditto — : Decorated with an Order of

Merit 4th Grade, The Small
 Cordon of the Imperial Order of
 the Rising Sun ^{for merits of} ~~for achievements~~ _{(in consideration}
~~of his merit~~ ^{(for services} ~~of~~ during the Incident
 from 1931 to 1934)

March 15, 1935: ^{appointed} ~~appointed~~ an Instructor ^{of the Army} ~~in~~
 Infantry School and concurrently made a
~~Assistant~~ ^{member} of the ~~Regiment~~
 member of the Laboratory of the same School.
~~Assistant~~

Feb. 28, 1936: ^{Given the additional post of} ~~Assistant~~ ~~additional~~ ~~Assistant~~

March 18, 1936: ^{a Staff-officer of the 1st Division.} ~~Released from the additional post of~~
~~Assistant~~ ~~of~~ ~~additional~~ ~~duty~~

was a Staff-officer of the 1st Division.
 Assigned
 May 5, 1936: ~~attached~~ to the Headquarters of
 CHINA Garrison.

the ~~Warrior Army in China~~
 Conferred with
 July 1, 1937: ~~Raised to~~ the Senior Grade of the

6th Court Rank.

Promoted to
 Aug. 2, 1937: ~~Appointed~~ Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry.

Sept. 4, 1937: Relieved of ~~assignment~~ to the
 (North China Area)

Headquarters of the Army. ~~Appointed~~

Appointed ~~to the Chinese~~ detached a Staff-

officer of the 1st Army.

March 23, 1939: Decorated with an ~~Order of 4th~~

~~2nd grade~~, the Imperial Order of
The Sacred Treasure, 3rd Class.

Promoted to
Aug. 1, 1939: ~~Appointed~~ Colonel, Infantry.

Conferred with
Aug. 15, 1939: ~~Appointed~~ the Junior Grade of the
5th Court Rank.

Assigned
March 9, 1940: ~~Attached~~ to ~~the~~ General Head-
China
quarters of the Expeditionary Forces.

~~in China~~
April 29, 1940: Decorated with ~~the~~ Imperial

Military Order of the Golden Kite,
Class, the Medium Cordon
3rd ~~grade~~ and ~~an Order of~~

~~the Middle~~ of the Imperial
order of the Rising Sun ~~was awarded~~
for services in
1 ~~the~~ ~~of~~ ~~his~~ ~~merit~~ ~~during~~ the China

Incident.

Aug. 2, 1943 : Promoted to
1 ~~appointed~~ Major General.

Aug. 6, 1943 : conferred with
1 ~~Raised~~ to the Junior Grade of the

5th Court Rank.

May 17, 1944 : Decorated with ~~with~~ ~~of~~ ~~merit~~

~~with~~ the Imperial Order of
the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class.