

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
27 March 1946

p. 3 - 7

Q What was the purpose of your visit to the Philippines, that you have referred to, when you spoke to the Chief of Staff in connection with the "Bataan March"?

A Let's see, the independence of the Philippines was on 14 October 1943. It was in connection with the independence of the Philippines and conditions in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of it was chiefly in regard to matters related to the independence of the Philippines. I principally wanted to talk to important Filipinos in connection with independence matters.

Q How long were you in the Philippine Islands at this time?

A About three days, I think.

Q During the war, that is, from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war, was that your only visit, or were you there on other occasions?

A No, I went twice during the war.

Q What was the approximate date and purpose of that visit?

A I arrived in Thai on 4 July 1943, I believe, and stayed there, I think, for three days - the 4th, 5th and 6th. That was the principal objective of the visit, but on the way back, I spent two or three days in Malaya, one night in Sumatra, one night in Java, and one night in Manila; then I came back by plane via Formosa to Japan.

Q How many times were you in Formosa and Thai from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war?

A I was only in Thai the one time that I have mentioned. I was in Formosa twice, that is, going and coming, on the trip to the Philippines in May 1943; and again twice going and coming on the trip to Thai in July 1943.

Q What was your purpose in speaking to the Chief of Staff, on your visit in May to the Philippines, about the "Bataan March"?

A There were various matters in connection with the independence of the Philippines. They were the principal

things. I spoke to the Chief of Staff about this other matter, but it was not a principal matter of discussion.

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A As I said before, there were various rumors of the sufferings that prisoners had experienced and I inquired of the Chief of Staff because I wanted to find out the facts about it.

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A I said, "I have heard these rumors about the sufferings of the prisoners. What are the facts?" He replied that it was in the broiling sun, and that means of transport were lacking and so they walked them a long ways, and that it was a fact.

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Q Do you know how far it is from Bataan to San Fernando?

A I don't remember.

Q Do you recall whether you learned from the Chief of Staff how many men had either fallen out, being unable to finish, or died during the March?

A No, I don't remember details like that, but I got the impression that the responsible commander, who was Lieutenant General HOMMA, did what he could under the circumstances then prevailing.

Q What led to your belief that General HOMMA had done what he could under the circumstances prevailing?

- A It is a problem of responsibility. As Supreme Commander in the Philippines at that time, he had a great responsibility to the Emperor. This responsibility was, on the one hand, to conduct the fighting and, on the other, to establish peace and order; as to prisoners, I think that, as the responsible commander, he did what he could. It is Japanese custom [tatemaie] for a commander of an expeditionary army in the field to be given a mission in the performance of which he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo, but has considerable autonomy. (This is called the heavy responsibility of an expeditionary force commander [kongai no junin]).
(Hearing 300-10.)
- Q The protest of the United States Government, which was made to Japan, charged that the prisoners in the "Bataan March" were beaten, bayoneted, and shot. Did you discuss that with the Chief of Staff during your visit?
- A No, I didn't talk to him about those things. I thought that if the responsible army commander knew about those things, he would take proper action. I thought that the responsible army commander would take appropriate measures if things contrary to international law had happened.
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- Q During your visits to Thai and Formosa, did you visit any prison camps at which American and British prisoners were interned?
- A No, I didn't. In Formosa, I stopped at Taihoku. I think the prison camp was at Karenko, which was a long distance away. But I went to Taihoku.

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Attachment: Partial translation of booklet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" [Senjin Kun.]

NOTE: The witness produced a 32-page pamphlet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" Senjin Kun issued on 8 January 1941, over his own name, several passages of which were underlined. The underlined passages are translated as follows:

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Page 2 and 3. "When within the surroundings of the battlefield, one is apt to be absorbed by what is immediately before one's eyes and stray from principles and occasionally these acts may be contrary to one's duty as a soldier. Much discretion is needed."

Page 5 and 6. "To obey Imperial commands, to be brave as well as just, to be humane as well as brave, and to realize the grand harmony of the world - such is the spirit of the Emperor Jimmu, first Emperor of Japan. Bravery must be stern and charity must be far-reaching. If there is any enemy resisting the Imperial troops, we must destroy him with our tempestuous military power. Even if we succeed in subduing our enemy with our unrelenting power, if we lack the grace of refraining from attacking those who have laid down their arms and of treating kindly those who obey us, we can hardly be called perfect soldiers."

Page 24 and 25. "Care must be taken in the protection of property and materials owned by the enemy. Requisition, confiscation and destruction of materials, etc., must always be effected in accordance with regulations and invariably in conformity with orders by commanding officers. In view of the basic principles of the Imperial Army, we must be magnanimous of heart and treat innocent inhabitants with kindness."

Interv. To Jo (27 March 46)

DOC

4181

(24)

(24)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

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27 March 1946

p. 1

Q Did you have an opportunity to talk with General HOMMA while you were at Omori Prison?

A Yes, there were many opportunities.

Q Did you at any time discuss with him the charges which had been made in connection with the inhumane treatment of American soldiers in the "Bataan March", which we have referred to?

A No, I didn't talk to him much about that at Omori.

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Q How long were you in the Philippine Islands at this time?

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文書第四一八一B号

EXHIBIT 1982A

東條英機訪問披露

一九四六年/昭和二十一年/二月二十七日
第三一七頁

Doc 4181B

問 前二連バタバーン行進関して貴方から謀長ト話シタ時トシテ此
島訪問自目的何デシタカ

答 ソレデスネト 比島、海軍が九四三年船中八号ノ一ノ四日ニシテ
比島、独立ト比島ノ状態ニ関フルフトデアリマシタ。ソレハ比島ノ

主トシテ比島ノ独立ニ関スル事情ニ就キテデアリマシタ。比島ノ主トシテ
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問 其際比島ノ主トシテ何ノ位滞在シタカ
答 約三日間デアラウト思ヒマス

問 戦争期間即チ九四年船中八号ノ一ノ七日ヨリ終戦マデ貴方
ソレ時唯一回訪問シタダテデシタカ、ソレトモ更ニ別ノ機会ニモ
行キマシタカ。

答 否、私ハ戦争中ニ回参リマシタ。
問 訪問ハ凡ソ何時デ、其ノ目的ハ何デシタカ

答 比島確カ一九四三年ノ船中八号ノ一ノ七月四日参リ到着シタ。ソレ
ソレテ三日間即チ四五六日ト滞在シタト思ヒマス。ソレノ其時
問 主トシテ目的デシタカ歸途ニ私ハ「マニラ」ニ三日間、

三夜、マニラニ一夜、而シテ「マニラ」ニ一夜ヲ送リマシタ。ソレ
比島經由ニ飛行機デ日本ニ歸リマシタ。

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問 主トシテ目的デシタカ歸途ニ私ハ「マニラ」ニ三日間、三夜、マニラニ一夜、而シテ「マニラ」ニ一夜ヲ送リマシタ。ソレ比島經由ニ飛行機デ日本ニ歸リマシタ。

No 1

REFURNA INTO ROOM 361

REFURNA INTO ROOM 361

比島ノ行キマシタカ。

往復ニ立寄リ更ニ二回目ハ一九四三年船中八月泰行ノ旅行
往復ニ立寄リマシタ。

問貴方ノ五月中ハ島訪問時ニバターン行進ニ就テ参謀長ト話ラシク目的ハ
何デシタカ。

答此島独立關シテ種マン問題カアリマシタ。ソレガ主要ナル用件デシタ。ソレ以
外ノ件ニ就テ参謀長ニ話ラレマシタカソレハ主要ナル話題デハアリ
アセニテシタ。

問一休何故貴方ハ此ノ件ヲ参謀長ト討議シタノデスカ。
答前ニ申シ上ゲタ様ニ倅虜ガ虐待ヲ受ケタト言フ種
クノ評判ガ有リマシタ。ソレデ私ハソレニ就イテ真相ヲ
知リタイト思ツタムデ参謀長ニ質問シマシタ。

問ソノ問題ニ就テハワキリドフ言フコトヲ彼ニ尋ネタムデスカ。
答私ハ倅虜ノ苦シニダトイフコトニ就イテ是々ノ噂
ヲ聞イテ耳ルガ事實ハ何ウナリカト申シマシタ。彼

ハ災天下デアリ。且ツ又輸送機關ガ不足デ
彼等ヲ長イ間歩カセタコトガアウタガソレガ
事實ナラドト合ヘマシタ。

問事實トハドウ言フ事實ノコトデスカ。

答長イ間歩カセタトイフノガ事實デアリマシタ。

問其ノ人達ガ行進サセラレタノハ何ノ位ノ距
離デアウタカ。

問 貴方ハ参謀長ニ尋ネマシタカ又ハ自今テ分リマシタカ
 答 私人會談ノ要旨ハ覺エテ居リマスガ六レ以テ詳細
 ナコトハ記憶致シマセン。

問 貴方ハ停虜達が火大天下ニドレ程ノ距離ヲ行進サ
 セラシタカラ知ラウトハ思ハナカウタノデスカ。

答 何ノ位詳細イコト迄 語ニ合ワタカ確クナコトヲ今思
 ヒ出ヌルハ困難チアリマス。

問 貴方ハ「バスター」ニカエ「サンフェル」ニドレ程ノ位アルカ
 知ソテ居リマスカ。

答 覺エテ居リマセン。

問 貴方ハ其ノ行進中ドレ程多クノ者が落仕ニテ倒レタリ
 又ハ死セシタカラ参謀長ヨリ聞イタカ何ウカ思ヒ出シ
 マスカ。

答 否私ハ其ノ様ナ詳細ヲフトハ記憶致シマセン、然レ私ハ首
 任者ナル司令官即チ本間中將ハ當時ノ情勢下ニ
 於テ出來ル限リノコトヲシタト云フ即チ多クモ是レマシタ
 當時ノ情勢下ニ於テ本間中將が出來ル限リノコト
 ヲシタト云フ貴方ノ信念ハ何處カラ得タノデスカ。

問 夫レハ責任ノ問題チアリマセン。當時以高ニ於ケル最高
 指揮官トシテ彼ハ陛下ニ對シテ重大ナル責任チ有リ
 マシタ。此ノ責任ハ一面ニ於テ戦闘ヲ行ヒ他面ニ於テ殆
 安ヲ確立スルコトデアリマシタ。停虜ニ関シテハ責任司
 令官トシテ彼が出來ル限リノコトヲ行ワタト私ハ思ヒマ
 ス。日本ノ建前ヲハ現地派進軍司令部官ハ其ノ與ヘ
 フレタ任務ノ遂行ニ當ツテハ一々東京カラ命令ヲ仰

カフトナク、相當ノ獨斷權ヲ以テ之ヲ遂行スルコトニテ
テ居マス。コレハ「榭外ノ重任」ト稱セラレテ居リマス。

問

日本ニ對シテ行ハレタ米國政府ノ抗議ハ「バターン行進」ニ
於テ俘虜ガ打擲、サシ、銃剣ヲ突カレ、且ツ射殺カレタ
事實ヲ責メマシタ。貴方ハ訪問中參謀長ト夫レヲ
詰合セマシタカ。

答

否、私ハ夫等ノ事ニ就テ詰シマセシテシタ。私ハ責任者タル
軍司令官カ夫等ノ事ヲ知ツタナラバ、適當ナル處置
ヲ取ルカラウト思ヒマシタ。私ハ責任者タル軍司令官ハ
若シ國際法ニ及スルヤウナ事ガ起ツタトシタナラバ適當
ノ手段ヲ講ジルカラウト思ヒマシタ。

問

貴方ハ比島ヘノ何レカノ旅行ニ於テ之等ノ事件ニ就キ何等
カノ處置ガ取ラレタカ何ウカラ知ル為メニ調べマシタカ。

答

否、前ニ申シマシタ通り責任者タル司令官ガソノ權限ヲ持
ツテ居タコトデスカラ私ハ此ノ件ニ就テハ彼ヲ信賴シマシタ。
私ハ唯主要ト云フニ付テノミ尋ネタニ過ギマセシテシタ。

日本人ノ性格ハ殘虐性ノ行爲ナド許スモノデナイト誰デ
モ思ツテ居マシタ。私ガ持ツテ居ル此ノ小冊子ハ支那事變
ニ關シテ一九四一年一月八日發行サレマシタ。其ノ名稱ハ「戰
陣訓」デアリマス。夫レハ陸相タル私ニ依リ發行セラレタ東
亞戰爭ノ時ニ將卒ハ同シ教訓ヲ受ケテ居タ、デアリマス。
私ハ唯一寸カケ引用致シマセウ、本末夫レハ戰鬥ニ關スル書物
デアリマスガ若シ貴方ガ私ノ青鉛筆デ印ヲ附ケタ頁ヲ翻譯シテ
下サルナラバ有難ク存ジマス。私ハ之等ノコトガ実行サレテ居ル
ト思ツテ居マシ
タ。其ノ小冊子ハ頁ニ印ヲ附ケテ通訳者ニ渡セタルガ右個所ハ翻譯セラレ
記録ニ綴入セラル可シ。

Doc 4181B

添附ノ小冊子

翻譯文参照右ハ本訊問ノ一部分ヲ成スモノナリ

洵向貴方が述べた二回ノ比島訪問中貴方ハ「ホドソンネル」俘虜收容所又ハ其他ノ俘虜收容所ヲ訪問シテ視察シマシタカ

答否私ハ致シマセンデシタソノ暇カ有リマセンデシタ、私ノ訪問

シタノハ日本ノ大森收容所丈デシタ、

洵二回三日リ貴方が比島ニ居タ民間人カ柳留サシテ居ル所

シカノ收容所ヲ訪問シマシタカ

答否致シマセンデシタ餘リ確カデハアリマセンガ私ハ「マレイ」デ

シタカ一般ノ收容所ヲ何所訪問シタ様ニ思ハシマス然レモ

ハツキリ致シマセン

洵ソレ等何シカノ比島訪問ノ洵貴方ハ負傷シテキル米兵及ビ

比島人カ受テ居ル取扱ヲ質シタリ又ハ視察シタリシタコトガ

アリマスカ

答私ハ負傷シタ日本人ノ居タ病院ヲ訪問シタ事ガアリマス然レモ

ソコニ負傷シタ比島人若シクハ米人カ居タカ何ウカ知リマセン

洵貴方ノソコヘ行ツタ目的ハ日本人ノ負傷者ヲ訪問スルタメダウ

タノデスネ

答ハイ夫レガ主ナ事デシタ、

洵ソレハ貴方ハソノ病院ニ行ツテ比島人又ハ米人カ負傷者ヲ

見ヨウトハシナカウタノデスネ

答否格別ニ左様致シマセンデシタ今申シマシタ通り病院ヲ訪

問シマシタガソコニ負傷シタ米人又ハ比島人カ居タカ何ウカ知ラナ

イノデス

洵貴方ノ泰及ビ台湾訪問中米兵俘虜カ柳留サシテ居ル所

俘虜收容所ヲ何処カ訪問シマシタカ

No 5

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
27 March 1946

p. 3 - 7

Q What was the purpose of your visit to the Philippines, that you have referred to, when you spoke to the Chief of Staff in connection with the "Bataan March"?

A Let's see, the independence of the Philippines was on 14 October 1943. It was in connection with the independence of the Philippines and conditions in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of it was chiefly in regard to matters related to the independence of the Philippines. I principally wanted to talk to important Filipinos in connection with independence matters.

Q How long were you in the Philippine Islands at this time?

A About three days, I think.

Q During the war, that is, from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war, was that your only visit, or were you there on other occasions?

A No, I went twice during the war.

Q What was the approximate date and purpose of that visit?

A I arrived in ~~Thai~~ on 4 July 1943. I believe and stayed there, I think, for three days - the 5th and 6th. That was the principal objective of the visit, but on the way back, I spent two or three days in Malaya, one night in Sumatra, one night in Java, and one night in Manila; then I came back by plane via Formosa to Japan.

Q How many times were you in Formosa and Thai from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war?

A I was only in Thai the one time that I have mentioned. I was in Formosa twice, that is, going and coming, on the trip to the Philippines in May 1943; and again twice going and coming on the trip to Thai in July 1943.

Q What was your purpose in speaking to the Chief of Staff, on your visit in May to the Philippines, about the "Bataan March"?

A There were various matters in connection with the independence of the Philippines. They were the principal

things. I spoke to the Chief of Staff about this other matter, but it was not a principal matter of discussion.

Q Why did you discuss this matter at all with the Chief of Staff?

A As I said before, there were various rumors of the sufferings that prisoners had experienced and I inquired of the Chief of Staff because I wanted to find out the facts about it.

Q Just what did you ask him in this connection?

A I said, "I have heard these rumors about the sufferings of the prisoners. What are the facts?" He replied that it was in the broiling sun, and that means of transport were lacking and so they walked them a long ways, and that it was a fact.

Q What was a fact?

A That it was a fact that they had walked them this long distance.

Q Did you ask him or did you find out how long the distance was that the men were marched?

A I have an impression about the main conversation, but I don't remember the details beyond that.

Q Were you not interested in finding out what distance the men had been marched in the broiling sun?

A It is difficult for me now to recall to just what degree of detail the conversation extended.

Q Do you know how far it is from Bataan to San Fernando?

A I don't remember.

Q Do you recall whether you learned from the Chief of Staff how many men had either fallen out, being unable to finish, or died during the March?

A No, I don't remember details like that, but I got the impression that the responsible commander, who was Lieutenant General HOMMA, did what he could under the circumstances then prevailing.

Q What led to your belief that General HOMMA had done what he could under the circumstances prevailing?

- A It is a problem of responsibility. As Supreme Commander in the Philippines at that time, he had a great responsibility to the Emperor. This responsibility was, on the one hand, to conduct the fighting and, on the other, to establish peace and order; as to prisoners, I think that, as the responsible commander, he did what he could. It is Japanese custom [tatemae] for a commander of an expeditionary army in the field to be given a mission in the performance of which he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo, but has considerable autonomy. (This is called the heavy responsibility of an expeditionary force commander [kongai no jūnin]).
(Reference: [?])
- Q The protest of the United States Government, which was made to Japan, charged that the prisoners in the "Bataan March" were beaten, bayoneted, and shot. Did you discuss that with the Chief of Staff during your visit?
- A No, I didn't talk to him about those things. I thought that if the responsible army commander knew about those things, he would take proper action. I thought that the responsible army commander would take appropriate measures if things contrary to international law had happened.
- Q Did you inquire on either of your trips to the Philippines to find out if any action whatsoever had been taken in these matters?
- A No. As I said before, since the responsible commander had the authority I relied upon him in this matter. I only asked about the main points. Everyone thought that the Japanese character would not permit acts of an atrocious nature. This little booklet which I have here was issued on 8 January 1941 in connection with the China Incident. The title of it is "Teachings for the Battlefield" [Senjin kun]. It was issued by me as War Minister and at the time of the Greater East Asia War, officers and men had the same instructions. I will quote only briefly. Properly, it is a book on fighting, but if you will translate the pages I have marked in blue pencil, I will appreciate it. I thought that these were being carried out. [The booklet was given to the interpreter with the pages marked which will be translated and inserted in the record. See attached translation of booklet which is being made a part of this interrogation.]
- Q During your two visits to the Philippines, that you have referred to, did you visit and inspect either Camp O'Donnell, or any other prison camp?

- A No, I didn't. I had no time for it. The only one I visited was Omori Prison Camp, here in Japan.
- Q While you were in the Philippines on those two occasions, did you visit any camp where civilians were interned?
- A No, I didn't. I am not too sure, but it seems to me I visited one camp for civilians in Malaya, I think it was. I am not sure about it.
- Q During either of those visits to the Philippines, did you look into or inspect the treatment that wounded American soldiers and Filipinos were receiving?
- A I visited a hospital where there were wounded Japanese, but I don't know whether there were wounded Filipinos or Americans in it or not.
- Q And your purpose in going there was to visit the Japanese wounded, was it not?
- A Yes, that was the main thing.
- Q And you did not go to that hospital looking for either Filipinos or American wounded, did you?
- A No, not specially. As I said, I did visit the hospital, but I don't know whether there were any wounded Americans or Filipinos there or not.
- Q During your visits to Thai and Formosa, did you visit any prison camps at which American and British prisoners were interned?
- A No, I didn't. In Formosa, I stopped at Taihoku. I think the prison camp was at Karenko, which was a long distance away. But I went to Taihoku.

* * * * *

Attachment: Partial translation of booklet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" [Senjin Kun.]

NOTE: The witness produced a 32-page pamphlet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" Senjin Kun issued on 8 January 1941, over his own name, several passages of which were underlined. The underlined passages are translated as follows:

* * * * *

Page 2 and 3. "When within the surroundings of the battlefield, one is apt to be absorbed by what is immediately before one's eyes and stray from principles and occasionally these acts may be contrary to one's duty as a soldier. Much discretion is needed."

Page 5 and 6. "To obey Imperial commands, to be brave as well as just, to be humane as well as brave, and to realize the grand harmony of the world - such is the spirit of the Emperor Jimmu, first Emperor of Japan. Bravery must be stern and charity must be far-reaching. If there is any enemy resisting the Imperial troops, we must destroy him with our tempestuous military power. Even if we succeed in subduing our enemy with our unrelenting power, if we lack the grace of refraining from attacking those who have laid down their arms and of treating kindly those who obey us, we can hardly be called perfect soldiers."

Page 24 and 25. "Care must be taken in the protection of property and materials owned by the enemy. Requisition, confiscation and destruction of materials, etc., must always be effected in accordance with regulations and invariably in conformity with orders by commanding officers. In view of the basic principles of the Imperial Army, we must be magnanimous of heart and treat innocent inhabitants with kindness."