

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

USSBS
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APO 234, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

24 October 1945

Interview with Mr. KOIZUMI Chief, Police Bureau, Home Office.

(Mr. Koizumi has been Chief of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry only since October the 11th.)

Time: 23 October, Tuesday morning, 9:30 - 12:00 a.m.
Place: Mr. Koizumi's office in the Home Office Building.
Interrogators: Lt. Commander Leighton, USNR, and Major Arensberg AUS.
Recorder: Major Arensberg.
Interpreter: Lt. McCoy, USNR.
All US Personnel from Morale Division USSBS except McCoy, who is from G-2 USSBS.

The interview began with a review of Mr. KOIZUMI's career. There has been a complete reshuffle in administration during the months since the war, and Mr. Koizumi has just come to his post. He has had the following main posts:

1. Director of the Social Bureau (before 35) Shakaikyoku
2. Director of the Economic Police Bureau - for five years from 1935.
3. 1940 - 42 head of or in the Spiritual Mobilization Headquarters and in IRRA (sic. ?).
4. Governor of Shimane Prefecture - 1942 - 43.
5. 1944 to July 1945 Governor of Okayama Prefecture.
6. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture (1943-44).
7. In July 1945 director of the National Highways Bureau, Home Ministry (Kokudookyoku)
8. Thence in October to Director Police Bureau.

Mr. Koizumi asked if he might read a prepared statement, which he had had made up for the occasion. He was asked through the interpreter how he understood the objective of the interview, for which he had prepared the statement, and the reply was that the statement covered effect of air raids, changes in morale, the factors causing them, the effect of American propoganda, and measures taken by the Japanese Government to control morale. If any of these subjects interested us further, he could bring up to a next meeting the persons who had been responsible for such matters and who had made up the report from which he would read. He then read the report, hesitating at times as if it were for the first time, and expatiated on it as he went along, sometimes in answer to questions sometimes of his own accord.

P: will stand for the matter presented by Mr. KOIZUMI from the prepared statement. Q: will indicate USSBS personnel's questions.
A: Specific answers by Mr. Koizumi through the interpreter, Lt. McCoy.

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P: The Japanese people began the war - as a first stage in the development of their morale - in a serious mood, a mood of high confidence, in which victory seemed to them assured. At the beginning, in fact during the early victorious stages of the war, public morale increased, though seriousness and effort on the part of the public relaxed. Indeed it was difficult to combat such relaxation in view of the success of Japanese arms and continued announcements of victory.

This condition continued up until Guadalcanal fell. Till that turn of events there was no detectable anti-army or anti-war feeling at least on the surface.

With withdrawal from Guadalcanal however there came the first criticisms of the army's strategy. Soon after there was discomfort and dissatisfaction over the holding out of Stalingrad, and the failure of the Axis-allies to win. But generally there was no falling off in the public support of the army and the government or in the efforts of the public in war work. The turn began with the loss of the Marianas. Thereupon certainty of victory began to fall off, and the possibility of defeat grew up for the first time, optimism of ultimate success gave way to fear of the outcome, and the first evacuations took place. At the same time the trend in production took a fall, and prices in the black market took a rise.

With Leyte's fall, and then with the loss first of Iwo Jima, and then of Okinawa, the feeling was that each of these places was last stand, or rather that in each of them a good stand could be made, and that that good stand was a last hope. As last hope succeeded last hope, anti-military feeling became ever more obvious.

During this period, especially from November 1944 on and during early 1945, morale fell, but the government took continual measures to stir up public determination.

Q: What measures did it take?

A: In general the government stressed the policy of persuading the people that probable success awaited the strategy of enticing the enemy within Japan's inner defense lines and annihilating them there.

Q: What specific means?

A: Radio and lectures were the best methods. Q. Neighborhood associations? The government efforts didn't reach down as far as neighborhoods. (Then laughter:) It wasn't possible to use the tonarigumi because by that time they were entirely preoccupied with rationing problems (were just ration boards?).

P: But even so far, however, the drop in morale was not great. True national feeling was maintained fairly well; there was a continuing striving for increase in production; and there was a great gratitude for the services of the soldiers who had died.

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P: Koizumi now turned to the part of the prepared statement dealing with measures of control:

The police and the government generally kept close watch upon rumors. The rumors fell into several classes.

1. Those dealing with the US armed forces, or the relative strength of Jap and US forces, the reverses of the war, and the development of new weapons by the enemy US.

2. Rumors expressing the ills of the people and dealing with bad living conditions especially as they turned that expression into dissatisfaction with the government.

3. Rumors (particularly in 1945) as to the extent of air raid damage.

4. Rumors expressing general dissatisfaction.

Control measures laid great stress on stopping such rumors, of all the classes. They were traced to their sources, and persons (starting? circulating?) them were subject to imprisonment and fine, or more often, to visits from the police, who lectured and corrected them. The latter method was far more often used and was quite effective.

Q: Are there any documents here which would give a picture of these rumors and the methods of controlling them, or give cases and measures taken?

A: There were documents on such matters but they are now with the US forces, and are frozen by the United States.

Q: Who in US forces?

A: We aren't sure. In any event such documents are to be found in the ^{Peace} Preservation Section (Hoanka) of the Police Bureau - where they make a special file.

P: Rumors were all checked. They fell roughly into those before and those after the air raids. Those after the air raids often dealt with the extent of damage. The rumors that contained sentiments against the government were most severely punished.

Q: Were these latter confined to any one class? How were they distributed?

A: Political rumors were to be found mostly among government officials and among the intelligence and commercial people of the big cities.

P: Now to discuss changes since the raids:
In November 1944 when the raids first began there was little damage, and a strong determination to repulse the enemy prevailed. The great raid of March 10 produced great loss and left many dead. Fear arose then,

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and evacuations began. It was after that with the continuation of raids day and night, and on the smaller cities as well as upon the larger ones, that a serious feeling developed. At the same time production fell off, transport difficulties mounted, and the result was a general worsening of living conditions. Rescue and aid to the victims grew ever more difficult and great dissatisfaction over air defense grew into disaffection with the army and with the government. Criticism of the military and dissatisfaction with the way the government was handling relief appeared.

Leaflets

P: Now let's turn to the subject of US leaflets. The police kept estimates of the numbers involved. They estimate we scattered about 4,584,000 of which 47% were recovered by the Japanese. The first pamphlets were scattered in the Kanto region and in Nagoya February 16th and 17th, 1945. They then were spread to Kyushu, Osaka, and all Honshu between Kyushu and Kansai, that is, the Chubu region. After that they were scattered even more widely. Totals scattered increased through February up until June 45, a period of 145 days. 33% were scattered before June, 42% at the height, between June and July, and 23% in the 16 days between July and August to the end of the war.

At first they were expected, and they were heavily discounted. Perhaps they increased defiance. They were quite poor and inappropriate at first. They were met with by a considerable ignorance of real conditions on the part of the Jap people. Soon, however, quality and choice of subject matter improved, and with defeat and the growth of doubt, they met better acceptance on the part of the Jap people. This was so especially from June on. The proof of it is in the figures of the estimated proportion of leaflets turned in. The police estimate that at first 70 to 80 percent were turned in. Toward the end, they estimate, the number turned in did not top 50% of those dispersed by us.

The police listed some 74 types of leaflet. The best of them (most effective upon the Japs) were the Marianas news (Mariana jiho). and the Rakkasa news. They showed conditions under US occupation, pictures of conditions outside Japan, and particularly effective were such things as showing children being schooled, and Japanese being well treated, and Jap PW's. The most fear inspiring however, were the pamphlets which were the forewarnings of bombings of particular cities. As they were actually followed up by such bombings they were by far the most feared. Another particularly effective bit of propoganda (and here the Bureau Chief laughed, and seemed to indicate that it told on him too) was the ten yen note, printed exactly in copy of ten yen notes of Japan on one side, and with text on the other showing what it used to be able to buy and what it would buy now, thus highlighting inflation. In fact this

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sort of note made quite a commotion in Japanese financial circles because they feared that it would be followed by notes perfectly counterfeited and thus ruin Japanese finances and money.

As for other pamphlets, those directing antagonism against the Gumbatsu were not very effective, since every family had a son in the army, before Saipan. (sic.) But they were more so after it. The first ones telling of damage by air raid were not effective because the Japs had as yet no real experience of raids when they came, and second, their quality was poor. But those which contained warnings about the bombing of specific factories were very good indeed, especially when they were followed by actual bombings of the factories. In general, the ones which cast ~~about~~ ^{on} the veracity of Imperial General Headquarters war announcements and reports, were good, especially as they were dropped at the height of public dissatisfaction on that score.

~~All in all,~~ The best were the forewarners of specific raids. In general, ~~thus,~~ the two named series, Rakkasa and Marianajiho, and another, the Makoto (Truth) were very good. Police reports say they were widely read, and they created a considerable amount of doubt about the veracity of official reports. The constant telling of news which turned out to be true news, such as the case of the fall of Saipan, gave the United States face. In addition pictures about PW's helped to break down belief in Jap reports.

P: Now another topic is contained in the report, and Mr. KOIZUMI will go over it:

The effect of bombing upon manpower.

Up to November 1944 the ARP plans and policies were carried out successfully, just as they had been forecast. After November, however, the size and number of air raids far outstripped plans, and effectiveness of plans was lost.

~~Another effect:~~ Effect on factory production.

Conditions from industry to industry and from place to place were too various for quick summary but reports were made on most of them. For example let us take some of the reports from the Tokyo area. Even there there was the same difficulties of summarizing, of defining absenteeism, and of counting, but a police survey of the Tachikawa airplane manufacturing industries in November-December 1944 fixed the numbers absent during that period as 9.2%. After the raid of November 30th, that rate at Tachikawa went up to 13.7%.

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Another example ~~comes from~~ ^{is} the Murashiro Nakajima aircraft company. After a day raid there on 21 November, the first raid, 29% of employees were absent from the next shifts and were generally absent for the next seven days.

Q: Is this given as an extreme case or an average one?

A: As an average one, he believes, but it doesn't say in the document from which he is reading.

P: Another survey was made after the great March 10th raid, and the factories surveyed there (Tokyo area) showed a ten percent increase in current rate of absenteeism over the survey period earlier in November-December.

A police survey of the factories of the metropolitan area, March 16 and 18, showed 25% of males absentee. This was an increase from 18% showed in a former month (the former month?)

~~For record at this point, the interview ended, and arrangement was made to see Mr. KOBAYASHI for further interrogation on Thursday at 2:00 p.m.~~

was arranged for

K

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Tokyo

Inter. No. 204

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

This form is to be used for all written communications between divisions of the U.S.S.B.S. It will not be used in transmittal of messages to **outside** agencies.

Item No.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT:
1	G-2	Morale Division	2 Nov 45	1. For your information and files.

G. H. H. Huey
G. H. H. HUEY,
Lt., U.S.N.R.,
Executive Officer.

Primer

*suggest internal distribution
of this
RR*

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*157
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Comm

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
MORALE DIVISION
(Pacific)

This is a report submitted by Mr. S. Koizumi, Chief of the Police Bureau in the Home Ministry, to the Morale Division, USSBS, on 25 October 1945. It has been translated by USSBS language personnel.

The report is not based on official documents but was secured by Mr. Koizumi through having Mr. Ogawa, Administrator of the Police Affairs Section, contact and interview men formerly in the Air Defense Headquarters, the Foreign Affairs Office, and in the Peace Preservation Section. Mr. Koizumi said that these individuals had during the war personal experience with the matters described in this report. Should USSBS personnel desire to go more intensively into these questions, the individuals concerned could be made available for interviewing through contacting Mr. Koizumi.

Mr. Koizumi said the reason documentary sources were not used was because they had been frozen by Supreme Allied Headquarters.

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Japanese Imperial Government

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~~An Interview with Capt. Fisher of Far Eastern Air Defense Headquarters~~

Summary of the Interview.

1. Trends in Public Opinion During the War and Control of Morale, Rumors, and False Reports.

(A) At the beginning of the Greater East Asia War the morale of the people was raised to a peak by successive reports of victories; and the strengthening of production and increases in the production of food-stuffs were concentrated upon bringing the war to a conclusion. However, of late, war results have not always been favorable and there is no escaping the fact that there are those who show a slight tendency to waver and those whose faith in ultimate victory does not have a strong ideological basis. Be that as it may, up to the time of the advance on Guadalcanal, the populace in general had confidence in the military and in the government and willingly continued to devote their energies to the war, with almost no sign of anti-war, anti-military, or anti-government sentiment.

At the time of the invasion of Guadalcanal, as the tide of war gradually turned against us, sentiment against governmental policies

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and plans gradually raised its head and in some quarters there was even opposition to waging war and careless talk of a defeatist nature. The withdrawal of the Berlin-Rome Axis forces after the battle for Stalingrad had a number of effects on the future of the Greater East Asia War. Again, there were those who believed that we must not let pass any opportunity for ending the war. The greater part of the populace, however, taking heart at the military and governmental reports believed that the time had come for a revival of public support, and moved to tears, continued giving their whole-hearted support.

At the time of the loss of the Mariana, apprehension as to the outcome of the war became somewhat greater; it was anticipated that air raids were inevitable, a careless desire to escape was brewing, and anti-government sentiment was at a high peak. Although the Tojo Cabinet finally resigned, confidence in the outcome of the war and in inevitable victory became increasingly rare in spite of the leadership of those in authority. Production dropped off slightly, difficulties in getting subsistence led to black market dealings and there was a gradual increase in anti-military, anti-government feeling, amounting to a defeatist or peace movement.

After that, even though there was a faint breath of hope regarding the enemy's campaign in Leyte and the Phillipines, with the final loss of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the above mentioned tendency became more and more apparent. Recently, starting in November of last year and the first of this year, continuous enemy air attacks on the homeland increased the misery of the people and production dropped markedly. Everyone

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took daring risks in the inevitable battle for the homeland, but it can not be said that the morale of the populace was unified and perfect.

Naturally, in spite of the fact that there were countless examples of those who, moved by the incomparably heroic deaths in battle of those on the Pacific islands, beginning with fight for Attu, and by the loyalty and sacrifice of suicide plane units, gave their all in increasing production and in the growing of food; it was inevitable that the bulk of the populace should develop the aforementioned attitude because of changes in the war situation, the lengthening of the war, the difficulties of living and the damage caused by bombing.

(B) Control of Rumors and False Reports.

The character and number of rumors and false reports corresponded to changes in public opinion. At the beginning of the Greater East Asia War, there were numerous rumors concerning our forces, especially our success in battle and the superiority of our equipment. As the tide of war turned against us, rumors of unfavorable battles or new enemy equipment cropped up. After the downfall of the Tojo Cabinet rumors and false reports concerning the government gradually increased. Last year, as the problem of subsistence became pressing, rumors concerning such matters as the rationing of food and the black market were prevalent. This year, however, as air raids increased in intensity and the war situation became worse rumors of air raid damage and a disastrous end to the war intensified. Our method of combatting such rumors and false reports was to attempt to determine their source and to concentrate our efforts on those which confused public opinion, and those

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which were especially bad because they were rebellious in tone. In other cases we went no farther than an admonition and there were comparatively few persons who were actually punished.

2. Trends in Public Opinion after the Start of Air Raids.

When the air raids on the homeland started in November of last year, damage was relatively slight and the people even had confidence in the ultimate victory of our airdefense feeling that "Air raids don't really amount to much after all." However the great night raid of 10 March this ^{year} caused so much damage and so many deaths and made the general situation so much worse that the general attitude was one of utter fear. Rather than an orderly dispersal from large, medium and small cities, the tendency was to flee in panic and when raids were increased to around the clock bombing of large cities and the raids on medium and small cities were intensified there was a complete lack of hope and a feeling of restlessness and uneasiness.

In addition the intensification of air raids had an effect on production and transportation and other fields of activity. The problem of food and clothing became an increasingly difficult one for the people and relief for the victims of fire was inadequate. Distrust of the military air defense was extended to distrust of the military in general. Difficulties in procuring the necessities of life and the failure to function smoothly of relief for the fire victims, brought dissatisfaction with those in charge of such activities. Dissatisfaction with and distrust of those in charge of the military could not be suppressed and finally a feeling of defeatism became prevalent and there was a spirit of utter depression.