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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

AL QAEDA AS A CHARISMATIC PHENOMENON

by

Dushyant Singh

June 2009

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Nancy Roberts
Erik Jansen

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AL QAEDA AS A CHARISMATIC PHENOMENON

Dushyant Singh
Colonel, Infantry, Indian Army
Master of Management Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2009**

Author: Dushyant Singh

Approved by: Nancy Roberts
Thesis Advisor

Erik Jansen
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The study establishes that the presence of charismatic effect in terrorist or insurgent groups tends to make them more violent. Bradley's theory forms the backbone of the study; it focuses on identifying a charismatic effect in a group, measuring the level of the charismatic effect, and analyzing how the dimensions of the effect relate to the survivability or viability of the led groups. The theory envisages that endogenous interaction between two relational elements in a social group, "flux or communion" and "control or power structure" are responsible for the creation and sustenance of charismatic effect. The theory also discovers that an imbalance in the presence of flux and control leads to charismatic instability. Based on theoretical dimensions, as well as an exploratory analytic technique involving quantitative ratings, the study has estimated Al Qaeda's systemic state on two key theoretical variables and has suggested possible counter-strategies to negate the undesirable effects of charisma in Al Qaeda. The study concludes that there is a strong presence of charismatic effect in Al Qaeda and suggests that by manipulating the level of the flux and control of Al Qaeda, we may be able to reduce its ability to cause violence or disruption.

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I. AL QAEDA AS A CHARISMATIC PHENOMENON

A. INTRODUCTION

“God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable point. ... I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, may God’s peace and blessing be upon him.”¹ The most wanted man on the world terror list, Osama bin Laden, was referring to nineteen men, well educated in Western institutions from the Middle East (ME) and other Muslim nations, unquestioningly hurling themselves along with their abducted aircrafts into the two majestic towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building. The attack was in a series of many others believed to have been perpetuated by the “bin Laden brotherhood,” but without any parallel in the past. Most would term the attacks an act committed by religious bigots or fanatics. However, is that the only rational explanation for their act, or is there more than what meets the eye? Many scholars, such as Post and Ingram, explain this act as a result of a charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden.”²

While the awesome power of charisma is well established, its association with radical social movements such as terrorism and insurgencies is underexplored and needs further academic inquiry. This study attempts to establish the relationship between charisma and radical social movements such as terrorism and insurgencies in general, and Al Qaeda in particular, drawing on theories of charisma and social movements.

¹ Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 1st pbk ed. (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2003), ix.

² H. J. Ingram, "Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy," (2008), 516; Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda* Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 220, http://isbndb.com/d/book/the_mind_of_the_terrorist_a01 (accessed December 26, 2008).

B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This exploratory thesis has selected a definition and framework of charisma as it applies to radical social movements, in general, and terrorist organizations, in particular. It then examines the relationship between charisma and the growth of the radical movement, "Al Qaeda." More specifically, it explores whether charisma may be responsible for the exponential increase in violence perpetuated by Al Qaeda. If this can be established, it then seeks to identify strategies that security forces of the United States and other armies of the world could use to combat charisma-induced terrorism.

C. BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP OF CHARISMA WITH TERRORISM AND INSURGENCIES

1. Definition by Weber

Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm was the first person to propose the idea of charisma.³ However, Max Weber popularized the concept. He viewed charisma as one of three forms of authority, the other two being traditional (feudal) authority and legal or rational authority.⁴ A number of scholars suggest that leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Martin Luther King, Winston Churchill, Benito Mussolini, Fidel Castro, Nelson Mandela, Jack Kennedy, and Eva Peron are examples of charismatic leaders.⁵

2. Approaches to Charisma

Scholars since Weber have developed an understanding of the concept of charisma based on two broad approaches as follows:

³ P. Haley, *The Journal of Religion* 60, no. 2 (April 1980), 185, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1202395> (accessed August 26, 2008).

⁴ Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press; Falcon's Wing Press, 1947), 57–65.

⁵ Greenway, H.D.S., "The Power of Charisma," <http://www.boston.com/> (accessed August 25, 2008).

a. Leadership and Management Approach

There are two lines of inquiry in the leadership-management approach. The first views charisma to be the result of personal traits, behaviors, and situations, but gives primacy to personality traits. This approach looks at qualities that can define a charismatic leader, such as whether he or she is visionary, energetic, unconventional, and exemplary, and it looks at observable behavior in the followership, such as loyalty, devotion, or personal identification with the leader.⁶ The second line of inquiry builds on the leader-behavior theory by combining it with Weber's concept of charisma. Trice and Beyer proposed that charisma requires the presence, to some unknown degree of: (1) a crisis; (2) a person of extraordinary qualities and gifts (leader); (3) a radical vision for solution to the crisis (possible solution to the situation); (4) a set of followers attracted to the leader (group); and (5) validation through success.⁷ For Trice and Beyer, the presence of a crisis is essential, which is unlike the approach taken in the first line of inquiry, where a crisis need not be present.

b. Social Sciences Approach

The second approach was developed by Weber and subsequently built upon by Shills, Wilson, Wolfgang, and Eisenstadt. It looks at charisma as a

⁶ R.J. House, "A Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Leadership: The Cutting Edge* (1977), 206; Jay Alden Conger and Rabindra Nath Kanungo, *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, c1998., 1998), 57–58, http://isbndb.com/d/book/charismatic_leadership_in_organizations_a01 (February 21, 2009); Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (New York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1985), 53–55; D. Boje, "CHARISMA," <http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/teaching/338/charisma.htm> (accessed August 26, 2008).

⁷ H. M. Trice and J. M. Beyer, "Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 8, (1986), 113; John. N. Davis, "How is Charisma Routinized? A New Look at an Old Question" (PhD, Texas Tech University), 40, <http://repositories.tdl.org/tldl/handle/2346/1011> (accessed August 26, 2008).

social phenomenon that brings about a radical change in a society's status quo.⁸ Bradley (1987) empirically tested this approach by examining the relational structure of charisma in communes.⁹ The salient difference between Weber's formulation of charisma and that of Bradley is that while Weber gave causal primacy for change to charismatic beliefs only, Bradley ascribes charisma to a particular relational structure among group members.

3. Relationship between Charisma and Terrorism

My research suggests a possible relationship between charisma and terrorism on the following grounds: firstly, scholars such as Gurr, Kornhauser, Smelser, Turner and Killian have associated the exceptional growth of radical social movements and revolutions, such as the Cultural Revolution in China and Black Resistance in the U.S., to the presence of a charismatic authority.¹⁰ Secondly, a number of scholars have speculated about the existence of charisma in various terrorist or insurgent movements, which have led to the radicalization and rapid growth of the movement. For example, Michael Scheuer notes that many scholars have suggested a linkage between the charisma of Osama bin

⁸ Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, ed. S. N. Eisenstaedt, 1968), 313; Bryan Wilson, *The Noble Savages: The Primitive Origins of Charisma and its Contemporary Survival*, Berkeley: University of California Press, c1975., 1975), 131 (accessed February 21, 2009); Wolfgang Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 595; William H. Swatos Jr., "The Disenchantment of Charisma: A Weberian Assessment of Revolution in a Rationalized World," *Sociological Analysis* 42, no. 2 (Summer 1981), 125, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710590>. Swatos cites Shils as extending the concept of Weber to a new dimension where in the modern world charisma has become dispersed as participation in the center has extended to more and more of the population.

⁹ Raymond Trevor Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation* (New York, N.Y: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 71–72.

¹⁰ As cited in Joel Andreas, "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 72, no. 3 (June, 2007), 435, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1283032391&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed August 22, 2008).

Laden and the growth of al Qaeda.¹¹ Thirdly, other scholars make specific references linking charisma and terrorist or insurgent movements. Cynthia Mehmood described Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a charismatic leader.¹² Similarly, Christopher C. Harmon's analysis suggests that the charismatic authority of its supreme leader, Prabhakaran, heavily influences the Tamil Tigers terrorist movement.¹³

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Scholars' frequent use of the concept of charisma in the study of social revolutions, terrorist, and insurgent movements gives rise to the thesis question: Is there a relationship between charisma and the heightened violence caused by terrorist or insurgent movements? A series of secondary questions follow:

- Is there an association between charisma and the development of Al Qaeda and the intense violence caused by it?
- If so, what is the nature of charisma in al Qaeda?
- If a charismatic effect is shown to be associated with heightened violence caused by terrorism, are there strategies or approaches to reduce the power of charisma-induced terrorism and the intensity of violence?

¹¹ Reviewed by Michael Scheuer, "The Plotters Against America; Two New Books Disagree Sharply about How Big a Threat Osama Bin Laden and His Allies Pose." *The Washington Post* November 26, 2006, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1168281161&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹² Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 77.

¹³ Christopher C. Harmon, "The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist," *Policy Review*, no. 142 (April/May 2007), 57, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1278577581&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

E. METHODOLOGY

During the course of the study, it came across very sketchy investigations on the impact of charisma or charismatic leadership on a terrorist movement's growth and popularity. Therefore, this thesis is exploratory in nature and the major goals are to:

- Provide a brief overview of the literature on charisma. I have selected a framework that combines all the approaches. However, Bradley's theory forms the backbone of the study to identify a charismatic effect in a group and measure the level of the charismatic effect.
- Identify the various dimensions of charisma as they apply to terrorist organizations, and then examine the relationship between charisma and violence caused by various terrorist groups.
- Identify counter-strategies to negate the undesirable effects of charisma in Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter I provides an introduction to the topic of terrorism, presents the research questions, and introduces the methodology of the thesis. Chapter II reviews the literature on charisma. Charisma is defined, and concepts and types of charisma are discussed. Chapter III examines charisma as a catalytic agent of insurgencies and terrorism. It studies charisma and its impact on the rise of violence caused by insurgencies and terrorist movements. It then suggests strategies to reduce the violence caused by such groups. It examines charisma and radical social movement, the preconditions for the emergence of charisma and the indicators of charisma, the concept of charismatic stability, strategies to reduce charismatic effects and terrorist violence, and the operability of strategies. Chapter IV views Al Qaeda as "The charming-headed Hydra." It provides an overview of Al Qaeda, discusses the presence of charisma in Al Qaeda and the

present level of charisma in Al Qaeda. Chapter V suggests strategies to counter the effects of charisma in Al Qaeda. Chapter VI presents the thesis's conclusions and recommendations. Appendix A and B contain the quantitative assessment details to arrive at the measure of two variables, "flux" and "control," currently present in Al Qaeda and responsible for the creation and sustenance of charisma in a social group.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF CHARISMA

A. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF CHARISMA

A number of scholars such as Nettler, Schelesinger, Etzioni, and Worsley, have dismissed the concept of charisma as confused and hopelessly useless.¹⁴ Similarly, Joel Andreas states that the charismatic authority concept disappeared from the social movement theory as it relied on a socio-psychological explanation whereas the new paradigm in social movement relied more on rational and logical explanations for radicalism and revolutions in social settings.¹⁵ Weber, himself, thought of charisma as a primordial phenomenon.

However, after reviewing the research of Andreas,¹⁶ Bradley,¹⁷ Conger and Kanungo,¹⁸ Trice and Beyer,¹⁹ and House,²⁰ it is clear that this position needs revision. Bradley, for example, argues that without the concept of charisma, we are unable to account for the dramatic births and rapid development of modern Russia and China, or understand Germany's awakening following the First World War and the Nazi invasion of Europe.²¹ Similarly, Joel Andreas maintains that "by neglecting charisma, scholars have relinquished a valuable tool with which to analyze these movements and have lost half of a conceptual framework that might profitably be used to understand the twists and

¹⁴ As cited in Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 29.

¹⁵ Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 435.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 365.

¹⁸ Conger and Kanungo, *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*, 288.

¹⁹ Trice and Beyer, *Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations*, 113-164.

²⁰ R.J. House, *A Theory of Charismatic Leadership*, 305-357.

²¹ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 30.

turns of all social movements.”²² Given these arguments, understanding charisma as a social construct may be very useful in explaining the occurrence of radical events and terrorist movements and potentially enable us to identify measures to contain their adverse impacts.

1 Weber’s Definition of Charisma

Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm was the first person to propose the idea of charisma.²³ However, Max Weber popularized the concept. He viewed charisma as one of three forms of authority, the other two being traditional (feudal) authority, and legal or rational authority. Weber says that charismatic authority is based on the devotion to a specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.”²⁴ This form of authority depends upon the recognition of the charismatic qualities (“the gift of grace”) that the leader is believed to possess and which have to be repeatedly “proved” to the followers. Therefore, legitimacy lasts only as long as the followers’ belief in charismatic inspirations remain.²⁵ Weber defined charisma as:

.... A certain quality of an individual personality of which she or he is “set apart” from ordinary people and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These as such are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as divine in origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.²⁶

²² Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 435.

²³ Peter Haley, "Rudolph Sohm on Charisma," *The Journal of Religion* 60, no. 2 (April 1980) 185, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1202395> (accessed August 26, 2008).

²⁴ Weber and Parsons, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 328.

²⁵ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 32-33.

²⁶ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 48.

Many consider leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Martin Luther King, Winston Churchill, Benito Mussolini, Tony Blair, Fidel Castro, Nelson Mandela, Jack Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt, Joan of Arc, and Eva Peron as examples of charismatic leaders.²⁷

2. Weber's Types of Charisma

a. Pure Charisma

Describing the varieties of charismatic experience, Weber spoke of a continuum ranging from "pure" to "routinized" charisma. Pure charisma is creative, revolutionary, and rare. It usually emerges in the very beginning of a social movement when a "charismatic community" coalesces around a leader.²⁸ Weber puts the Prophets in this category and includes war heroes such as Napoleon. Since this form of charisma necessarily resides in the leader, it is also referred to as "charisma of person."²⁹

b. Routinized Charisma

Weber says that as a revolutionary force, charismatic authority is an instrument for social change. The unstable and temporary nature of the charismatic phenomenon creates a problem of leadership succession, which requires the transformation of charismatic authority into either a traditional or a rational legal type. Routinized charisma describes the transformation of a leader's charisma into either traditionalized or rationalized form or a combination of both. By traditionalization and rationalization, Weber implied that the new order established by a charismatic leader is transformed into one that functions by rules and regulations. The administrative staffs around the charismatic personality or his followers generally carry out this transformation to preserve their personal interests and power. This happens when a leader's charisma

²⁷ H.D.S Greenway, "The Power of Charisma," <http://www.boston.com/> (accessed August 25, 2008).

²⁸ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 54.

²⁹ Weber and Parsons, Max Weber: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 76.

disappears or after he has died. In this category, Weber gives examples of the selection of the Dalai Lama and filling up of Roman magistracies.³⁰ Oftentimes, this form of charisma resides in the office or position; therefore, it is also referred to as charisma of office.³¹ Figuratively we can depict Weber's model of charisma as shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Weber's Model of Charisma in Social Group

c. Approaches to the Concept of Charisma

After Weber, scholars developed the concept of charisma from two broad approaches. The first approach is from a management and leadership perspective and the second from the social sciences perspective. The management perspective accords causal primacy for the emergence of charismatic effects to the personality attributes of the leader of a group; the social sciences perspective considers the emergence of charisma to be the sum total effect of the social group, leader, and the social context.

d. Leadership and Management Approach

As highlighted above, the leadership theory proponents consider traits as the primary cause for the emergence of a charismatic phenomenon. There are two lines of inquiry in the leadership-management approach.

- The first views charisma as the result of personal traits, behaviors, and situations but gives primacy to personality traits. This approach

³⁰Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 54–55.

³¹Weber and Parsons, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 76.

looks at qualities that can define a charismatic leader such as having visionary, energetic, unconventional, and exemplary characteristics, or by observing behaviors in the followership, such as loyalty and devotion, personal identification with the leader, desire to be like the leader, self-esteem based on relationship with the leader, and trust in the leader.³² Kanungo and Conger have even developed a model to measure these attributes in a leader to categorize him as charismatic or non-charismatic.³³

- The second builds on leader–behavior theory by combining it with Weber’s concept of charisma. Trice and Beyer proposed that charisma requires the presence, to some unknown degree of: (1) a crisis; (2) a person of extraordinary qualities and gifts (leader); (3) a radical vision for solution to the crisis (possible solution of the situation); (4) a set of followers attracted to the leader (group); and (5) validation through success.³⁴ Interestingly, Trice and Beyer also looked at the process of routinization of charisma. They empirically observed data collected over a twenty year period, comparing the success of charismatic leaders where charisma was routinized as indicated by: (1) administrative apparatuses developed for putting missions into practice; (2) rites and ceremonials that transferred and transformed the charisma to others; (3) messages and missions that were incorporated into written and/or oral traditions; and, (4) where the organization had selected a successor to serve as a reincarnation of the charismatic and to support the charismatic's mission³⁵

³² R.J. House, *A Theory of Charismatic Leadership*, 206; Conger and Kanungo, *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*, 57–58; Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, 53-55; D. Boje, *CHARISMA*.

³³ Jay A. Conger and others, "Measuring Charisma: Dimensionality and Validity of the Conger-Kanungo Scale of Charismatic Leadership," *Revue Canadienne Des Sciences De l'Administration* 14, no. 3 (September 1997), 290, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=23208196&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed August 22, 2008).

³⁴ As cited in John. N. Davis, *How is Charisma Routinized? A New Look at an Old Question*.

³⁵ Trice and Beyer, *Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations*, summarized.

e. Social Sciences Approach to Charisma

The debate over the existence and the exact nature of charisma in a social setting has taken place in academia from Sohm and then Weber to current scholars such as Wilson, Shils, Schluchter, and Bradley. Wilson, in his essay, "The Noble Savages," contends that charisma is an attribute of a traditional social organization. He argues that it emerges under primitive psychological and social conditions and dies out as modernization takes place.³⁶ However, his position stands on a weak pedestal as charismatic personalities are emerging even in the modern era. Charles P. Cell categorizes thirty-four heads of states as charismatic personalities, the prominent ones being Roosevelt, Tito, Nehru, Jinnah, Khrushchev, Castro, and Nasser.³⁷ Shils provides yet another perspective by arguing that "... charismatic sensitivity can slumber within the rational-legal and traditional legitimations of authority."³⁸ What he implies is that charisma does exist in the modern world but in a routinized form as charisma of office. The sheer size, complexity, and power of a modern, bureaucratic organization engender, in the individual, a sense of mystical wonder and awe toward omnipotent systems.³⁹

Schluchter is another social science scholar who explains charisma from a theory of action perspective and accords primacy to charismatically relevant situations for the emergence of charisma. These situations are those of an inner crisis, in which life loses meaning. In short, they are situations of existential threat in a society.⁴⁰

³⁶ As cited in Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 41.

³⁷ Charles P. Cell, "Charismatic Heads of State: The Social Context," *Cross-Cultural Research* 9, no. 4 (1974), 255 (accessed November 10, 2008).

³⁸ As cited in Swatos, *The Disenchantment of Charisma: A Weberian Assessment of Revolution in a Rationalized World*, 124.

³⁹ As cited in Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 41.

⁴⁰ Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective*, 595.

While the above scholars were largely elaborating on Weber's formulation of charisma, Bradley observed certain theoretical contradictions in Weber's concept of charisma. Weber had postulated that charismatic phenomenon in a social group is an unstable state, tending towards bureaucratization, institutionalization, and/or traditionalization, since it does not depend upon rationalization and routine means for sustenance of the group.⁴¹ However, Bradley says that this is theoretically untenable since an organization cannot survive without a rationalized and efficient organizational foundation that not only provides for basic needs, but can also withstand problems and challenges from outside. In addition, charisma needs to respond not only to the status quo (i.e., a response in the past), but may also emerge as the future poses new needs in a social setting or society or an organization.⁴² The salient difference between Weber's formulation of charisma and Bradley's is that while Weber gave causal primacy for change to charismatic beliefs only, Bradley ascribes charisma to a particular relational structure among group members. The relational structure in a collectivity creates power, which leads to influence over the social group, causing the group to undertake a social transformation as shown in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. Relationship of Charisma and Social Change

B. PERSPECTIVE ON CHARISMA FOR THE STUDY

Bradley's concept of charisma differs slightly from Weber's and other scholars. Because it rests on strong empirical evidence, the study discusses his concept in slightly more detail and uses it as the foundation for this study. First,

⁴¹ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 38.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 47.

the study provides a brief overview of Bradley's theory of charisma and then selects a definition for various important terms associated with charisma.

1. **Bradley's Theory of Charisma**

a. ***Relational Approach to Study of Charisma***

Weber's model of charisma accords causal primacy to the charismatic belief. Bradley challenges this and says that although charismatic belief does play a part in the emergence of charisma, it is the relationship between the members of the group that holds the key to the charismatic phenomenon. Two relational patterns involved in this process became evident as the reason for the emergence of charismatic effect in a group. These relational patterns are, first, "a system of communion in the group" and second, "a strong collective power." Bradley empirically tested both these variables in his research.

b. ***Love and Power—The Relational Variables of Charisma***

Communion in a charismatic group creates an intense emotional bond that fuses the group into an undifferentiated whole and liberates the energy previously locked up as structure."⁴³ Communion builds strong bonds of attachment and commitment among the group members. Empirically, a densely interlocking pattern of highly charged bonds of positive affect was found in his study of charismatic communes, varying directly with the intensity of charismatic leadership. This communion is built from *fraternal love*, *optimism*, and, for the resident charismatic groups, an element of *euphoria*. Fraternal love is experienced as an intense bond of brotherhood.⁴⁴ Optimism is a strong, positive feeling about the future. This follows from the belief in the efficacy of charismatic leadership as the means to achieve the desired utopia, which can remain even

⁴³ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 70.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 111.

after the failure of a charismatic leader to deliver.⁴⁵ The third element of communion is an exuberant bond of euphoria. This reflects the awe and excitement over the direct experience of the energizing power of the charismatic leader. This sense of euphoria is relatively less in absentee charismatic groups. All three relational elements of communion fuse individual members into a cohesive, collective unity. However, the communion forged by these three relational bonds is highly unstable, likely to destabilize the group, even leading to its demise. To survive under these conditions, a charismatic group requires a strong *Power Structure*,⁴⁶ which tends to manifest itself as a transitive hierarchy of densely interlocking relations. For example, the power structure in a charismatic group tends to be more coherent: a single non-disjointed, multileveled, transitive hierarchy of direct and indirect ties, with virtually everyone connected to the charismatic leader.⁴⁷ Bradley says, “the power structure not only provides a means for controlling communion, but also as a key element in the economic and routine organization that meets every day sustenance needs, it (power) is an imperative for long term survival.”⁴⁸ Power also caters to the material, emotional, and social needs of the members on a regular basis by creating structure in the form of differentiation of social positions and roles organized around the fulfillment of these needs. Thus, we tend to find clearly articulated power structures in charismatic systems. Bradley also refers to this as a “collective power structure,” the purpose of which is to harness the energy, aligning and channeling it to achieve collective ends.⁴⁹ Ultimately, the relational elements of power translate into unquestioning obedience to the holder of charisma by the members of the group resulting in relatively less inter-member

⁴⁵ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 112.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 280–81.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 281.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 70, 71.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 72, 281–282.

rivalry in a charismatic group. Similarly, the relational element of love translate to a sense of reverence and devotion to the holder of charisma by the members of the group.

Bradley cautions that a fine balance between love and power is necessary to achieve stability in a charismatic group. If there is balance between love and power, then the group displays extreme cohesion and has the capacity to sustain itself and accomplish its goals and objectives. On the other hand, a lack of balance between love and power in the group renders the group unstable and leads to its dissolution. Bradley identifies low survival rates in the short term for charismatic groups but a high rate of survival in the long term, if the group crosses a critical point in its lifecycle.⁵⁰ This point occurs because, in the initial stages of a charismatic group's existence, it struggles to master the technique of harnessing the high amount of energy produced due to the communion, which leads to a high rate of failure. However, if the group manages to master the art of controlling this energy by developing a collective power structure, then the group manages to survive. The point in the lifecycle of a group when it achieves this form of love—power balance is critical for its survival and stability. As a corollary to this, if we somehow disrupt this balance, then the group would dissolve or self-destruct. Figure 3 depicts Bradley's model of charisma.

⁵⁰ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 174.




Figure 3. Model Showing Social Organization of Charisma

c. The Details of the Study

Bradley validated his theory through empirical tests on fifty-seven charismatic and non-charismatic communes in the United States extending over a period of two years from 1974 to 1975, utilizing the methodology of a social network analysis. Altogether, a total of 566 adults, fifteen years and older, formed communes ranging in size from five to sixty-seven members.. The communes were comprised of both men and women, with men being slightly more in number than the women. To measure charisma, a qualitative procedure was developed comprising ethnographic data collection, sociometric questionnaires, interviews, and independent validation through field workers. This procedure led to twenty-eight communes being classified as charismatic and twenty-nine as non-charismatic.⁵¹

d. Structural Basis of Charismatic Group and Its Typologies

Bradley says that there are two normative elements of the social relationships that help locate the structural base of charisma in a social group. This structural base helps in classifying a group as either charismatic or non-

⁵¹ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 14–15.

charismatic. The first is the collective belief that a particular individual possesses talents, powers, or abilities that are regarded as truly outstanding or extraordinary. Attribution of charisma can be based on almost any human capability; talent in leadership does not seem to be a necessary condition. The followers must regard the ability as “exceptional.” The second condition is that the special talents or qualities are derived from a supernatural source, unlike that of a “virtuoso” or expert.⁵²

Building on Weber, Bradley then further clarifies that the existence of beliefs attributing charismatic qualities to an individual is not sufficient to establish a relationship of charismatic leadership between a collectivity and an individual. It is only when leadership is based directly on the exceptional non-worldly powers attributed to an individual that charisma exists. He uses Bendix to underscore the point that charismatic rule is of two types. One is Weber’s pure type of charismatic domination in which “the exercise of power is bound up with a concrete person and his distinctive qualities.” Thus, the charisma is not transferable to anyone else and is known as *charismatic leadership*. The second is when charisma is “routinized” and transformed into a “depersonalized” quality. Bendix terms it as *charismatic authority*, which adheres to any incumbent of a position or rule that is regarded as charismatic.⁵³

Collapsing the two normative dimensions into one (extraordinary powers and the gift of grace or supernatural) and adding two relational dimensions (whether the rule over the collective has been instituted and whether the rule has been routinized), Bradley has developed two non-charismatic group

⁵² Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 279–280. Fifty-nine percent of his respondents cited at least one supernatural quality; only 24 percent and 17 percent said “no one” has special talents.” On the other hand, in the non-charismatic group; only 7 percent responded that an individual had extraordinary or supernatural abilities. The virtuoso has no relationship with the supernatural. Examples of virtuoso are Newton, Einstein, Shakespeare, Henry Ford, Thomas Edison.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 56.

types (referred to as low and high charismatic potential groups) and two charismatic group types.⁵⁴ See Figure 4 below.




Figure 4. Typology of Charismatic Leadership

A low charismatic group, or *type 1* group, is one whose members do not believe that anyone in their group possesses charismatic qualities. A *High charismatic potential* or *type 2* group is one whose members believe that there is a need for a charismatic personality in the group. The “*charismatic leadership group*” or *type 3* group is one whose members believe that their leader possesses charismatic qualities, and his rule is established over the group. It is also termed “charisma of person.” Based on his analysis, he further classified the charismatic leadership communes into “*resident charismatic groups*” (i.e. where the leader was staying with the commune) and “*absentee charismatic groups*” (i.e. where the leader was not staying with the group). He found that the charismatic effect is less in an absentee charismatic group.⁵⁵ (Seventy-one

⁵⁴ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 57.

⁵⁵ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 58.

percent of the people in resident charismatic leadership groups, and 41 percent in absentee charismatic groups, attributed both charismatic powers and sought leadership from the person they had named in the resident and absentee charismatic communes or groups as the leader.)⁵⁶ *Charismatic authority* or type 4 groups are ones in which the charismatic leadership's rule undergoes routinization and is transformed into a depersonalized quality. Bradley was able to study the charismatic effect in all types of groups except the "*charismatic authority*" group, since no group had reached the point where the charisma had been depersonalized and thus could be held by any incumbent of the leadership position.

C. DEFINITIONS OF VARIOUS TERMINOLOGIES FOR THE STUDY

Based on the above discussions, the following terms would assist in the study of charisma from the perspective of Bradley, Weber, and other scholars referred to in the literature review:

- **Charismatic Group:** Bradley defines a charismatic group as one in which there exists a collective belief that a particular individual possesses talents, powers, or abilities that are regarded as truly outstanding or extraordinary and that these qualities are derived from a supernatural source.⁵⁷
- **Charismatic Rule:** Bradley defines charismatic rule to be when the leadership of a group is based directly on the exceptional non-worldly powers attributed to an individual.⁵⁸
- **Charismatic Leadership or Charisma of Person:** Bendix defines charismatic leadership as a personal relationship between the leader and the led, based on their recognition of the leader's quality as a unique individual. Thus, charisma is not transferable. The

⁵⁶ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 58.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 279–280.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 56 .

exercise of charismatic rule is bound up with a concrete person.⁵⁹ Hereafter, to represent this type of charismatic leadership, this study uses the term “charisma of person.”

- **Charismatic Authority or Charisma of Position:** Bendix defines charismatic authority as existing when charisma of person is “routinized” and transformed into a “depersonalized” quality. This form of charisma adheres to any incumbent of a position of rule that is regarded as charismatic.⁶⁰ Hereafter, to represent this type of charismatic leadership, the study uses the term “charisma of position.”
- **Charisma:** “Charisma as a **system of social transformation** uses **communion** to liberate **energy** from existing structure, and **power** to channel and mold the energy into a **new social form**. Stability, during this delicate process, requires that these two (power and love) relational patterns be complementary.”⁶¹

D. APPLICABILITY OF BRADLEY’S FORMULATION FOR THE STUDY

Bradley’s model seems logical and workable for analyzing a charismatic effect in a group. However, since he validated his propositions on small communes (minimum of five to a maximum of sixty-seven), all located in the United States, its applicability for larger groupings such as terrorist and insurgent organizations operating in different regions of the world, and comprised of people of different religious and cultural origins, remains unknown. In addition, the communes under investigation were primarily urban, which may not be compatible with current international terrorist profiles. Many groups hail from remote areas and villages. Finally, because there were no groups with charisma

⁵⁹ Bendix as cited in Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 56.

⁶⁰ Bendix as cited in *Ibid.* (56) A point to note is that even in routinized groups, charisma does not disappear.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 295.

of position in his research, charismatic characteristics of such groups could not be identified. Therefore, there is a need to broaden the theory of charisma to make it relevant for studying terrorism and radical mass movements. This is done by incorporating essential aspects of Weber's formulation related to routinized charisma and personal traits attributed to charismatic leaders and by incorporating Bradley's theory of charisma that examines the relational structures of charismatic groups. In the next chapter, the impact of charisma on terrorism is explored using the Weber—Bradley framework of charisma.

III. CHARISMA: THE CATALYTIC AGENT OF INSURGENCIES AND TERRORISM

A. CHARISMA IN RADICAL MASS MOVEMENTS

In our quest to arrive at a rational explanation of extraordinary events, we have almost abandoned some essential aspects of our past studies and theories of collective action based on charismatic phenomena carried out by scholars such as Weber, Gurr, Kornhauser, Smelser, Turner and Killian, Downton, Friedland, Marcus, and Wallace.⁶² Many modern social scientists have dismissed Weber's concept of charisma in social movements on the grounds of irrationality. But there are still others who hold to earlier beliefs that charismatic personalities act as pied pipers of radical social movements who heighten the violence levels in such movements. For example, charismatics such as Abdullah Ocalan (PKK, Kurdistan), Bhindranwale (Sikh, India), and Khomeini generated unprecedented levels of violence while they were at the helm of their movements.⁶³

The frequent use of charisma to explain collective behavior in the study of social revolutions, terrorist, and insurgent movements gives rise to the thesis question. What is the relationship between charisma and terrorism or insurgencies? The question is important because a number of terrorist and insurgent movements worldwide are being termed charismatic or led by charismatic personalities. Despite the fact that there are no focused studies that explore the relationship of charisma in terrorism or insurgencies, the preliminary survey of the literature suggests that charisma acts as a catalytic agent in terrorist or insurgent movements causing heightened levels of violence. This

⁶² As cited in Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 435.

⁶³ Hacaoglu Selcan, "Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan: Turkey's no. 1 Enemy," | Article from *AP Online | HighBeam Research*, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-19416124.html> (accessed August 26, 2008); James Francis Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 300, http://isbndb.com/d/book/vanguard_revolutionaries_in_latin_america_a01 (accessed August 26, 2008); Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants*, 314; H.D.S Greenway, *The Power of Charisma*.

observation implies that if one were able to reduce or minimize a charismatic effect, then one would also be able to reduce the intensity of violence in the movement. This leads to the next question. Is it possible to minimize the disruptive power of charisma in a terrorist or insurgent movement? To address these questions, this chapter first examines the association between charisma and the rise of terrorist and insurgent movements including their heightened disruptive impact. Secondly, it identifies the preconditions for emergence and indicators of charisma. Thirdly, it identifies the key elements that go into ensuring the survivability of charismatic effects in a group. Finally, the study identifies key intervening points to arrive at possible strategies to minimize the catalytic power of charisma and thereby reduce the violence level in a radical group.

1. The Relationship between Charisma and Social Movements

Some scholars argue that it is difficult to explain the role of charisma in radical social movements because it is rooted in socio-psychological reasoning. They offer reasons based on “rational choice theory” for why people participate in highly risky and violent radical movements such as terrorism and insurgencies. For example, Crenshaw, while not denying a psychological explanation for collective behavior, argues, based on surveys conducted in New York and West Germany, that individuals can be collectively rational. She says, “People realize that their participation is important and group size and cohesion matter.”⁶⁴ Similarly, Theobald says, “The notion of charisma, of charismatic leadership has, on numerous occasions, been utilized to explain the upsurge and development of social movements of various kinds and even to explain cohesion in societies at large. But despite this widespread usage, there exists in the minds of some, strong doubts about whether the term (charisma) has any real explanatory

⁶⁴ Walter Reich, *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 1998., 1998), 8–9, http://isbndb.com/d/book/origins_of_terrorism_a01 (accessed March 14, 2009).

value.”⁶⁵ Likewise, Worsley concluded that charisma is no more than a "sponge word" and is virtually useless in an analytical sense.⁶⁶ Another sociologist, Johnson, expresses similar reservations and states, “Wherever the concept of revolutionary charisma is applicable, it raises a sociological problem: it merely identifies a phenomenon; it does not explain why certain personal qualities and certain “new” ideas should be so attractive and why the revolutionary movements succeed.”⁶⁷

Citing the example of the Cultural Revolution (CR), Mac Farquhar also disagrees with the commonly prevailing view that Mao’s charisma played a major role in the Cultural Revolution. He has argued that, “Even without Mao, the peculiar nature of Chinese Communism would have brought the country to CR or a similar calamity. The result might not have been quite as debilitating, but it still would have been a calamity.”⁶⁸ Another political scientist, Wang, denies any role of charisma in CR and says, “It was essentially the fear of reprisal that led people to join the CR.”⁶⁹ In addition, Wang identifies a lack of rigorous empirical testing as another difficulty with a charismatic explanation of social movements. He says, “It seems that something must be wrong with the conventional wisdom about the charismatic relationship. ..., discussions of charisma have been

⁶⁵ Robin Theobald, "The Role of Charisma in the Development of Social Movements / Le Rôle Du Charisme Dans Le Développement Des Mouvements Sociaux," *Archives Des Sciences Sociales Des Religions* 49, no. 1 (1980), 83 (accessed March 14, 2009).

⁶⁶ As cited in *Ibid.*, 84 and Peter M. Worsley, "Cargo Cults" In *Ritual and Belief Readings in the Anthropology of Religion*, ed. David Hick, McGraw-Hill, 2001), 469-473 (accessed March 15, 2009).

⁶⁷ Harry M. Johnson, *Sociology; A Systematic Introduction*, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004), 316, http://isbndb.com/d/book/sociology_a_systematic_introduction (accessed March 14, 2009).

⁶⁸ MacFarquhar, Roderick. Reviewed by Yongyi Song, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/journal_of_cold_war_studies/v004/4.2song.html ed. President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002), 125–127 (accessed September 1, 2008).

⁶⁹ Wang Shaoguang, "Failure of Charisma: An Interpretation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," Yale University, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Charisma.pdf. (accessed January 14, 2009).

speculative in nature and almost exclusively theoretical. A notion such as "blind faith"—what the charismatic leader supposedly generates in his followers—has rarely been subjected to empirical testing."⁷⁰

The views expressed above may give the impression that charisma has no relationship with radical social movements. However, there is ample and contemporary evidence to suggest otherwise. Three reasons in particular suggest a relationship between charisma and radical social movements. First, scholars have associated the exceptional growth of radical social movements and revolutions such as the Cultural Revolution in China and the Black Resistance in the U.S. to the presence of a charismatic leadership.⁷¹ This association suggests a *conceptual linkage* between charisma and terrorism because a number of features of terrorism or insurgency bear similarities to those of charisma. For example, charisma emerges in opposition to the existing authority or order;⁷² as do terrorist or insurgent movements whose motives are usually to oppose the existing political setup for creating a new order.⁷³ Also, like charisma, which generally emerges in small, closed cult-like social settings, terrorist and insurgent movements also initially emerge in a similar manner. Byman says, "These groups began as small bands of terrorists who, over time, took on the trappings of guerrilla armies. Still other groups try to avoid relying

⁷⁰ Wang Shaoguang, "Failure of Charisma: An Interpretation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," Yale University, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Charisma.pdf. (accessed January 14, 2009).

⁷¹ Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 435.

⁷² Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective*, 395; Robert C. Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly* 92, no. 3 (Autumn 1977), 387, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148499>; Trice and Beyer, "Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations," 113-164; Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 437.

⁷³ Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, "The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1988," *RAND Corporation*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/R4180.pdf> (accessed February 25, 2009); Michael Freeman, "Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 1 (January 2008), 40, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1412901181&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

exclusively on terrorism at any stage in their development, employing small-group guerrilla tactics in the hopes of sparking a broader rebellion.”⁷⁴ In the context of charisma, Weber refers to this initial group as the “corporate group.”⁷⁵

The second reason is the existence of a number of *speculative linkages* between charisma and radical social movements by various scholars. Selcan Hacaoglu, writing in AP, refers to Abdullah Ocalan a PKK terror group leader as a charismatic person.⁷⁶ Similarly, Rochlin refers to Guzman, the terrorist leader of the Shining Path in Peru, as charismatic.⁷⁷ The founding head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, states that many scholars have suggested a linkage between the charisma of Osama bin Laden and the growth of al Qaeda.⁷⁸ David Gompert states that, “Leaders of the global jihad are charismatic and gifted at strategy and unifying ideology.”⁷⁹

The third reason is the existence of *focused references* of charisma-engendered terrorist or insurgent movements by some scholars. Cynthia Mehmood described Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a charismatic leader because the Sikh militancy in India grew into a strong movement.⁸⁰ Similarly, Christopher C. Harmon has analyzed the Tamil Tigers' terrorist movement and argued that it is heavily influenced by the charismatic authority of its supreme

⁷⁴ Daniel Byman, "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Paper 3," *RAND Corporation*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178/ (accessed March 19, 2009).

⁷⁵ Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Daedalus* 97, no. 3, *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (Summer 1968), 739, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20023840>; Weber and Parsons, Max Weber: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 360.

⁷⁶ Selcan, *Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan: Turkey's no. 1 Enemy*.

⁷⁷ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, 300.

⁷⁸ Scheuer, *The Plotters Against America; Two New Books Disagree Sharply about how Big a Threat Osama Bin Laden and His Allies Pose.*, T.4.

⁷⁹ David C. Gompert, "Heads we Win -- the Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Paper 1," *Rand Corporation*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP168/ (accessed August 27, 2008).

⁸⁰ Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants*, 77.

leader, Prabhakaran.⁸¹ Likewise, Hughes and Johnson have carried out a detailed analysis of Abimael Guzman and concluded that Guzman was able to spread the myth of his charisma to mobilize the Shining Path insurgency.⁸²

2. Charisma and Level of Violence

The evidence above suggests a strong relationship between charisma and radical movements, which leads to the next issue. What is the impact of charisma on such movements? Cole, through an empirical study, established that the presence of charisma leads to a heightened level of violence in a radical movement. He drew a list of sixty-seven conflicts observed by the International Crisis Group in its monthly *Crisis Watch* publication to study the impact of the charismatic state and non-state actors involved in a conflict. The data covers the period from the end of the Cold War in 1990 to the present. After having identified the key players, each actor was searched in open source databases and the Internet to make a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of whether the leaders involved in the conflict were charismatic or not. The qualitative assessment, which was inherently subjective, involved certain keywords used by the media to describe the leaders or the use of language that the leaders made in their press conferences, speeches, and writings. The frequency of descriptions in the media as “charismatic” formed the basis of quantitative assessment. An “armed conflict” was defined as a political conflict involving the killing of at least 1,000 people, or violence leading to a substantial refugee outflow or population displacement.

The important findings of the study were that, “90.3 percent (28 out of 31) of armed conflicts had one or more charismatic leader; and nearly 50 percent (15 out of 31) of armed conflicts involved an interaction between a Charismatic State Leader (CSL) and a Charismatic Non State Leader (CNSL). Of the twenty-one conflicts involving CSL and CNSL, 71.4 percent (15 out of 21) were violent. Only

⁸¹ Harmon, *The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist*, 57.

⁸² Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, 300.

36.8 percent (7 out of 19) of the conflicts involving a CSL only were violent; and 54.5 percent (6 out of 11) of the conflicts involving a CNSL only were violent.”⁸³ The findings highlight that twice as many conflicts involving CSL and CNSL were violent than when there was only one form or the other present in a conflict. Very few conflicts are violent in the absence of either type of charismatic leadership. As such, analysts seeking to “predict” when a protracted conflict is likely to turn violent should note that it (the conflict) turns violent when grievances long held intersect with charismatic leadership.




Figure 5. Impact of Charisma on Terrorism and Insurgencies and Suggested Approach to Deal with the Impact

The Cole study clearly establishes that charisma *acts as a catalyst and magnifies the violence level in a movement*. Figure 5 depicts the impact of charisma on terrorism. Since the presence of a charismatic effect leads to increases in the violence level, then a reduction of charismatic effect should lead

⁸³ Michael J. Cole, "The Kurtz Factor: Charismatic Leadership in War and Terrorism," <http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:BzWFenjqoJ:www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2005/Cole.pdf+The+Kurtz+Factor:Charismatic+Leadership+in+War+and+Terrorism&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us> (accessed January 7, 2009).

to a reduction in the intensity of violence by the movement. Traditionally, we focus on terrorism to reduce violence, but based on this observation, this study suggests that we address the charismatic effect in the movement to reduce the increased level of violence. See Figure 5.

B. PRECONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCE AND INDICATORS OF CHARISMA

In order to address the charismatic effect, we need to identify the points of intervention in a charismatic phenomenon, but to identify the points of interventions, we need to understand how is it created and sustained in a terrorist group. For the creation of charisma in a radical movement, certain preconditions are essential.

Preconditions that favor the emergence of charisma in terrorist movements are firstly, the presence of a severe crisis or prolonged undesirable status quo within both the individual and collective identities of a group.⁸⁴ Secondly, the presence of a leader with charismatic attributes that the followers recognize as exceptional and consequently inspire them to follow him with a sense of awe, hope, and faith.⁸⁵ Divine power and not virtuosity provides miraculous abilities to the charismatic.⁸⁶ In addition, some personality attributes commonly associated with a charismatic are that he or she is visionary, persuasive, has mesmerizing oratory, and has a prophetic appearance.⁸⁷ Thirdly,

⁸⁴ Ingram, *Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy*, 506; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 313; Weber and Parsons, Max Weber: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*; Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 365.

⁸⁵ Ingram, *Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy*, 505; Michael Freeman, "The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Targeting" (Research in Leadership Targeting in Terrorist Movements, The Author is Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and Conduct Programme on International Terrorism and Terrorist Operations and Financing, Submitted for Publication, 2009) (accessed August 24, 2008).

⁸⁶ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 74–75.

⁸⁷ Tucker, *Personality and Political Leadership*, 383-393; Conger and others, *Measuring Charisma: Dimensionality and Validity of the Conger-Kanungo Scale of Charismatic Leadership*, 290; D. Boje, CHARISMA.

the leader offers a compelling solution to the crisis, usually rooted in religion or culture or a customized ideology, or all of these, which may call upon the followers to resort to increased violence.⁸⁸ When these preconditions interact with each other in a radical social movement, a charismatic effect may emerge. The next issue would be to identify the indicators of the charismatic effect in the group.

The indicators of charismatic effect in a group include the presence of a strong communion effect and power structure. As highlighted in Chapter II, the thesis uses Bradley's theory to analyze the charismatic effect in a group, and states that at a relational level, charisma means the generation of a state of communion in which individuals are bonded by highly charged, interlocking relations of positive effect. But, the communion cannot be attained without complete unity among group members. Consequently, close, intimate relationships between pairs or among cliques are seen as undesirable; the charismatic group will take action to prevent or closely control such bonds, which leads to the emergence of the power of the charismatic rule.⁸⁹ Bradley says, "Communion and collective power are most closely linked to charismatic beliefs; they are not explained by any other collective or individual factors."⁹⁰ Elements that indicate the effect of communion are, one, extreme cohesion; two, presence of love and affection; and, three, a sense of optimism and euphoria.⁹¹

1. Communion

The first factor that contributes to communion is the presence of strong "cohesion," indicated by the members surrendering all that belongs to them to the group. Collective commitment denotes cohesion, which Coser has described as

⁸⁸ Ingram, *Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy*, 506.

⁸⁹ Raymond Trevor Bradley, "Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization" In *The Transformative Power of Dialogue*, ed. Nancy L. Roberts, First Edition ed., Vol. Volume 12 (Amsterdam, Boston, London, New York, Oxford, Paris, San Diego, San Francisco, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo: JAI, 2002), 80-81 (accessed March 2, 2009).

⁹⁰ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 281.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 111–113.

the state in a group when members replace their personal identity with unquestioning loyalty and commitment to the collective.⁹² Scholars call this state the de-individuation of the members.⁹³ Kanter further says that ego loss and ego merging leads to de-individuation.⁹⁴ Bradley describes ego loss as the process by which an individual renounces all his previous economic and social independence and pledges personal and material commitment to the group.⁹⁵ The second indicator of communion is the presence of a “sense of love and affection,” which normally translates to the formation of brotherhood groups based on social and religious ties. The group would indulge in rites and rituals such as congregations, collective prayers, and collective oath-taking to develop love and affection in the group. The third indicator of communion is the presence of a strong feeling of “optimism and euphoria” about the future, which follows from the belief in the efficacy of a charismatic leadership as the means to achieve the desired utopia. However, the euphoria varies with the presence or absence of the charismatic person in the group.⁹⁶ To overcome the loss of personal contact with the followers, the current charismatic personalities make use of modern means of communications to replace their physical absence by virtual presence.⁹⁷

2. Power Structure

The existence of a strong power structure between the leader and his followers is the second indicator of charismatic effect in a radical group. The

⁹² Lewis A. Coser, "Greedy Institutions; Patterns of Undivided Commitment," Free Press, New York.

⁹³ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 108.

⁹⁴ Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1972), 110–111 (accessed March 4, 2009).

⁹⁵ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 109-110.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 111–116.

⁹⁷ Ingram, *Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy*, 506.

presence of a strong and centralized hierarchical organizational structure and an organized means of economic activity in the group indicate the presence of a strong power structure in a group.⁹⁸ Rules, regulations, and their enforcement, socialization process, workflow, punishments, and rewards would indicate the presence of an effective power structure.⁹⁹

The mere presence of communion and power would not lead to a group becoming charismatic. Since the study is using Bradley's theory of charisma to identify and measure charisma in a group, the two relational orders of communion and power structure must satisfy certain conditions for a charismatic effect to take place. Bradley's theory states that a greater degree of consensus over the relationship of positive effect (communion) and power structure needs to be present in a charismatic group.¹⁰⁰ This implies that until a minimum threshold is reached for the values of the two relational orders (communion and power), charisma will not emerge and sustain itself in a group. This in turn leads to the next issue: What is the right balance to sustain the charismatic effect in the group?

C. CHARISMATIC STABILITY

Sustaining a charismatic effect requires that it be stable, which means that it is survivable over time. Pribram and Bradley have empirically developed a theory of charismatic stability (measured in terms of its survivability over time) using the two relational orders of charisma in a group, communion and power. Using the existing data from a study of forty-six social collectives, they established that the interaction between flux and control is a strong predictor of stability, while measures of the collective's normative and structural organizations

⁹⁸ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 35–38.

⁹⁹ Henry Mintzberg, "Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization Design," *Management Science* 26, no. 3 (March, 1980), summarized, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2630506>.

¹⁰⁰ Bradley, *Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and Transformation*, 82.

and of the members' social characteristics have no predictive power.¹⁰¹ They replaced the term “communion” and “power” with “flux” and “control” respectively. Hereafter, this study refers to the two relational orders of charisma as “flux” and “control.”

The Bradley-Pribam theory states that interactions between the two relational orders (flux and control) affects stability by gathering and communicating information about internal organization throughout the collective. The scatter plot of flux and control, with respect to the forty-six communes shows that most communes scatter along the axis of the main diagonal of the field formed by “flux” and “control.”¹⁰² Survivability over time measured the stability of the groups. The hollow dots represent unstable or dissolved groups. See Figure 6.

¹⁰¹ K. H. Pribam and Raymond Trevor Bradley, "Communication and Stability in Social Collectives," *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems* 21, no. 1 (1998), summarized (accessed March 2, 2009); Bradley, Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization, 249. The data used for validation of the theory was the same as that used by Bradley in the 1987 experiments; however, the term communion effect was replaced by flux to denote the energy produced as a result of the affective impact of the communion and “social control” replaced the term “power structure.

¹⁰² Pribam and Bradley, Communication and Stability in Social Collectives, summarized; Bradley, Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization, 249–253. The Figure has been reproduced from the article.




Figure 6. Scatter Plot of Communes on Flux (Affective Attachment) and Control (Power) at Time 1, by Stability (Survival Status) 24 Months Later

The region in Figure 7 depicted by grey and black shades along the diagonal represents the combination of flux and control that produced stable organizations. The base of this zone comprises routine organizations with minimum charismatic effect and at the upper end of the grey zone comprises maximally efficient, dynamic, adaptable, stable, novel, innovative, and highly charismatic organizations. At the extreme end of the diagonal, marked in black and separated by a region marked as turbulent, are the groups that contain maximum flux and maximum control. Such groups are transformational if they survive or else they implode due to “turbulence” caused by the high socio-psychological energy produced due to extremely high levels of “flux.”¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Pribam and Bradley, *Communication and Stability in Social Collectives*, summarized; Bradley, *Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization*, 267-272. The Figure has been reproduced from the article.

D. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE CHARISMATIC EFFECT FOR MINIMIZING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

1. The Concept and Strategies

The Bradley-Pribam theory of charismatic stability describes various combinations of “flux” and “control,” which may result in a group becoming dysfunctional. Figure 8 depicts these combinations. The first type of dysfunctional combination is termed “insufficiency” and comprises groups with very low values of flux and control. The second dysfunctional combination is named “ossification,” and comprises groups with a very high value of control but a low value of flux. The third dysfunctional combination is known as “volatility” and comprises groups with a very high value of “flux” but low value of “control.”¹⁰⁴




Figure 7. Relationship between Flux and Control and Action States of Collective Organization

Since we are interested in charisma-induced terrorist groups that would be in existence for some time, we can safely assume that they would be charismatically stable; hence their prevailing values of flux and control would

¹⁰⁴ The figure has been reproduced from the article, Pribam and Bradley, Communication and Stability in Social Collectives, summarized; Bradley, Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization, 267–272 (summarized).

either be in the grey or black zones. See Figure 7. We had earlier concluded that if we reduce the charismatic effect of terrorist groups, then we can minimize the violence caused by them, which from the above model implies rendering their charismatic effect dysfunctional. Hence, the idea is to intervene in terrorist groups to change the existing levels of flux and control in order to reduce the power of charisma. Bradley's model suggests some possibilities for interventions. For example, one strategy could be to push a group towards the "ossification dysfunctional zone." Alternatively, other strategies would be to force a group to move towards volatility, insufficiency, or turbulence dysfunctional zones. For ease of reference, the study terms these strategies as "ossification strategy," "volatility strategy," "insufficiency strategy," and "turbulence strategy." The following sections discuss the process and implementation of the proposed strategies.

2. The Process of Rendering Charisma Dysfunctional

The study suggests a three-step process to render the charismatic effect in a radical group dysfunctional. The first step is to identify the existing level of flux and "control" in the group. The second step is to identify the nearest dysfunctional zone in comparison to the prevailing values of flux and control. The third step is to identify ways to effect the desired variations in the level of flux and control, to reduce the charismatic effect or render it dysfunctional. Figure 8 schematically represents this process.




Figure 8. Process to Render Charismatic Stability Dysfunctional

E. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE “STRATEGIES”

1. Assessment of the Existing Level of Flux and Control

The first step in the implementation process is to identify the existing level of flux and control in the terrorist group. Since terrorist groups would always be in conflict with the state, assessing their values of flux and control objectively and quantitatively would not be feasible. However, we can identify the approximate values by qualitatively assessing the degree of “flux” and “control” through the indicators discussed earlier. For the purpose of this study, indicators such as instances of unquestioning loyalty, commitment to perform tasks for the collective, even at grave personal cost, quantity of dissensions, internal rifts, level of consensus, and the rhetoric of leaders and followers would form the basis for assessing the existing flux level in a group. Assessments would remain subjective and be categorized as low, medium, or high.

Similarly, the study would assess the level of control based on the nature of the organizational structure (developed or undeveloped; hierarchical or flat; centralized or decentralized), delegation or non-delegation of authority, degree of economic controls to exercise power, and the system of reward and punishment prevailing in the group. Speeches and the public statements of leaders and followers related to exercising control would also help in assessing the level of control. Like flux, the assessment of control would also remain subjective and be categorized as low, medium, or high.

2. Identification of the Right Dysfunctional Zone

Once we have identified the existing level of flux and control in a group, then we need to compare the level of flux and control pattern closest to a dysfunctional zone and attempt to vary the values in that zone. For example, if we identify that pattern of flux and control in a terrorist group such as Hamas as “low flux and high control,” then we compare these values with the flux-control pattern of various dysfunctional zones. The pattern quoted in the example matches the flux pattern of the ossification zone (low flux, high control).

Therefore, we should attempt to further reduce the flux and increase the control to force the group into the ossification zone. Based on this methodology, Table 1 contains the possible pattern of “flux and control” that we may encounter in terrorist groups and the corresponding dysfunctional zone to identify the right strategy to reduce or render its charismatic effect dysfunctional. Groups with medium and high values of flux and control mentioned at serial 4 and 5 would pose a slight decision dilemma in selection of a strategy. However, we can overcome this by selecting between any one of the available options based on the associated risk factors in adopting a strategy. For example, attempting to implode a group through turbulence has the maximum risk since the group may become transformational instead of imploding. This may occur because as the level of flux and control keeps increasing, a group becomes more and more stable, maximally efficient, and gives rise to a highly dynamic and adaptable organization. As we are aware from Bradley’s charismatic stability theory, after a certain level, flux and control stability is problematic as it requires an equally high amount of control. However, should the level of control witness an almost one-to-one relationship between flux and control, then such an arousal may cause a sudden collective spasm making the transformation, reorganized and qualitatively different.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, increasing or enhancing flux and control to force a group into the three dysfunctional zones (turbulence, volatility, and ossification) is fraught with danger and risky.

¹⁰⁵ Pribam and Bradley, *Communication and Stability in Social Collectives*, summarized; Bradley, *Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization*, 272–273 (summarized).

Table 1. Conditions for Application of a Particular Strategy to Reduce Charisma

| No | Level of existing Flux and Control | Strategy to Render Group Dysfunctional |
|----|------------------------------------|--|
| 1 | Low flux and low control | Insufficiency strategy i.e., further reduce the level of “flux and control” in the group. |
| 2 | Low / medium flux but high control | Ossification strategy, i.e., endeavor to further reduce flux and simultaneously increase power. |
| 3 | Low / medium control but high flux | Volatility strategy, i.e., endeavor to further reduce power and simultaneously increase flux. |
| 4 | Medium flux and medium control | Any of the three i.e., insufficiency, ossification, or volatility strategies may be adopted. In turbulence strategy, both power and flux would have to be increased. However, while attempting to do so, there is an equal chance of the group moving into the transformational zone Therefore, to avoid risk we should avoid the turbulence strategy. |
| 5 | High flux and high control | We may adopt either the ossification or volatility strategies. It is not advisable to adopt the turbulence strategy because by increasing both flux and control chances of further making the group charismatic and virulent would be very high. |

3. Means to Vary Flux and Control

The key to reducing or minimizing the charismatic effect in a terrorist group revolves around our ability to vary the group’s level of flux and control. The best way to vary the level of flux and control is from within the group, but that

would be an unrealistic and extremely risky method. However, it is feasible to change the flux and control levels of a group externally through some military and non-military means.

a. Varying the Flux

The first method to vary the flux could be by *manipulating the cohesion* level of the charismatic radical group. As discussed earlier, ego loss and ego merging lead to cohesion. Normally, social groups achieve ego loss and ego merging through the process of oath-taking in the name of the leader or the group, collective rituals, practices, ceremonies, and training activities.¹⁰⁶ Charismatic terrorist groups also resort to similar processes. For example, “Shining Path”¹⁰⁷ and “PKK”¹⁰⁸ have reported practices of oath-taking, indoctrination, and collective training. To carry out such practices, the groups require space and resources. Therefore, if we intend to increase or decrease the cohesion, we could deny or clandestinely provide the resources required to conduct such activities. Practically, this amounts to varying the degree of freedom of terrorist groups to operate in their safe havens.

A second method to vary flux could be to either isolate or bring together the *leader and the followers* of the movement through information operations or direct operations. Isolation of Öcalan, the charismatic leader of the PKK terrorist movement by the Turkish security forces and Guzman, the charismatic leader of the Shining Path terrorist movement by the Peruvian security forces, led to reduced communion with their respective followers in their movements. As a result, both groups lost the flux very rapidly and are now mere

¹⁰⁶ Pribam and Bradley, *Communication and Stability in Social Collectives*, summarized; Bradley, *Dialogue, Information, and Psychological Organization*, 109-110 (summarized).

¹⁰⁷ The video, *State of Fear: The Truth About Terrorism* further confirms this perception in the organization.

¹⁰⁸ The videos, *PKK and their leader – Syria*, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMfJRnWu52Y>; and *PKK Fighters – Kurdistan*, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hd3A39Dnq_I&NR=1 (accessed on March 3, 2009).

caricatures of their original form. Paul White says, "Abdullah Öcalan's capture posed a tricky problem for the PKK Central Committee for deciding his successor.

However, subsequent leadership of PKK could not recreate the magic of Öcalan. Its current strength has declined from over 90,000 under Öcalan to just around 6000."¹⁰⁹ Similarly, after the capture of Guzman, the Shining Path rapidly declined and became almost extinct.¹¹⁰ Besides direct operations to separate the leader from the followers, use of information operations could also be used; the themes could focus on projecting stories either enhancing or reducing the cohesion of a group based on the requirement of the strategy selected.

A third method to vary the flux could be by *tampering the sense of brotherhood* and affection through a media campaign by spreading a myth of solidarity amongst the members of the terror movement and thereby revving them up to generate flux. Likewise, intelligently spreading stories of rifts and conflicts amongst the leaders and members may lead to reduced flux in the group. My suggestion is that the security forces could clandestinely generate such messages to vary the flux in a movement. Many leaders of radical movements have adopted such an approach. For example, Amir Taheri says that during the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, while in exile praised the emerging leaders like Rafsanjani and Barghani including secular leaders and their ability to manage the revolution against the Shah, which led to masses cohering together and rising against the Shah.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ "Turkish soldiers killed by rebels," BBC News (2007-10-07), (accessed on January 22, 2009); Katzman, Kenneth (1998-08-27) "Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1998 August 27,"; GlobalSecurity.org, (accessed on January, 22, 2009); "Bir dönemin acı bilançosu" (in Turkish), Hürriyet (2008-09-16), (accessed on January 22, 2009).

¹¹⁰ Harmon, *The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist*, 57.

¹¹¹ Taheri Amir, *Review of the Spirit of Allah*, 1985th ed., Vol. 2008Adler & Adler, 1985., 349 (accessed September 14, 2008).

A fourth method to vary the flux could be by *tampering with the Social Bonds* of a terrorist movement. Sageman has said that 83 percent of the individuals who joined the jihad joined through some sort of social tie with the core group.¹¹² It is a known fact that pre-existing family and friendly ties enhance the sense of love and brotherhood. Therefore, disrupting the social network of the terrorists by targeting the hubs would prevent communion and reduce the flux. Similarly, by relaxing the disruption operations directed against the social network, we could further strengthen the social ties amongst the group and increase flux.

A fifth, and probably the safest way to vary the flux, would be by tampering the *leader's abilities to deliver the solution*, which can be achieved by either enhancing or reducing the perception of his divine powers or supernatural abilities. One method to achieve this would be through a well-planned information operation campaign to either de-legitimize or enhance the image of the charismatic leader. Clandestinely either releasing fake stories of his achievements to increase his charismatic effect or de-legitimizing him to reduce the charismatic effect is a specific example of this approach. While there may not be many examples of security forces resorting to this technique, Mao used the print and audio media very effectively during the Chinese Cultural Revolution to enhance the flux in the revolution.¹¹³ Similarly, Guzman mystified his image using the student and university networks by spreading rumors and myths about himself to increase the flux in the Shining Path movement.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, the security forces in Peru were also able to delegitimize by shattering the

¹¹² Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, c2004., 2004), 220, http://isbndb.com/d/book/understanding_terror_networks (accessed January 30, 2009).

¹¹³ Andreas, *The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 434.

¹¹⁴ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, 300 The Times report also states, "Here was the mysterious man who billed himself as the "Fourth Sword" of communism — the successor to Marx, Lenin and Mao. "Presidente Gonzalo," or Guzman fashioned himself into a demigod of a cult-like political movement. As far as his supporters were concerned, Guzman's mythic aura of brilliance, charisma, and invincibility shielded him from comparisons with other mortals."

demigod image of Guzman and thereby reduce the flux, which led to the rapid decline of the Shining Path movement. The “Times” report on Guzman makes this point abundantly clear, “The first pictures of the captive Abimael Guzman were startling: an obese, bespectacled man obeying police orders to put on his shirt. Could this dumpy, bewildered fellow, last seen publicly in 1979, really be Shining Path's shining light?”¹¹⁵

Finally, we may be able to change the flux level by tampering with the *ideology* of the group. The charismatic leader more often than not offers a customized ideology. For example, Guzman offered a compelling prognostic framework, to the majority Peruvian population, of solutions to the ills of Peru through the communist ideology fused in the promise of resurrecting the old glory of the Incan Civilization.¹¹⁶ Similarly, Osama bin Laden has customized Salafism by changing its focus from the near enemy to the far enemy.¹¹⁷ Ideology has a binding effect on a group; thus, it increases the communion effect. If we want to reduce the flux, we could delegitimize the ideology through information operations, and if we want to increase the flux, we could promote the ideology. However, if we want to achieve a lasting reduction in flux then we could go in for the long-term solution of changing their ideology. Brafman et al., suggest some simple but effective techniques. Brafman and Beckstrom give examples from the real world such as starting a small bank for the poor in Kenya, which prevents many youths from the slums of Kenya from taking up the ideology of Al Qaeda. Similarly, they (Brafman et al.) give another example of a social entrepreneur whose efforts in community rebuilding in the town of Bamian in Afghanistan, after the vandalism of statues of Buddha by the Taliban, is gradually changing the ideology of the youth.¹¹⁸ Bornstein also gives examples of silent but determined

¹¹⁵ The Time in Partnership with CNN, "The Myth of Guzman," The Time, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,976603,00.html> (accessed August 31, 2008).

¹¹⁶ Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, 72-73.

¹¹⁷ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 220; Freeman, *The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Targeting*.

¹¹⁸ Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 146-147.

social entrepreneurs who are taking up ideological issues to change the society despite heavy odds.¹¹⁹ Efforts of this nature would lead to a lasting reduction in flux.

b. Varying the Control

Direct actions to weaken or strengthen the organizational structure of a group could be the first method to change the level of control in a group. Mintzberg says that an organization regulates its functions through an organizational structure (hierarchy, leaders, managers, workers, and departments), resource management, man management, workflow, rules, and regulations.¹²⁰ These elements ultimately help control the functioning of an organization or a social collective; thus, if we somehow manage to control the ability of a terrorist group to exercise the above functions, disrupting their organizational structure, management system, and resource control systems we would be able to degrade the ability of the group to exercise control. Similarly, if we relax our operations, we can increase the level of control in the group.

Indirectly empowering or disempowering a terrorist leader could be the second method to increase or decrease the level of control in a group. The study is referring to the cow approach suggested by Brafman and Beckstorm. He says that when the Apaches were proving difficult to contain, the Americans gave them cattle. Once the Nant'ans had possession of a resource — cows — their power shifted from symbolic to material.¹²¹ Radical groups thrive on power through symbolism, especially if led by charismatic personalities. Similarly, the Government of India resorted to an approach of this type. Mr. Laldenga, a highly charismatic leader of the Mizoram National Front, a dreaded guerilla group, when

¹¹⁹ David Bornstein, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹²⁰ Mintzberg, *Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization Design*, summarized; D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson and C. R. Hinings, "An Empirical Taxonomy of Structures of Work Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (March, 1969), 117, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391367>.

¹²¹ Brafman and Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations*, 151–154.

offered the opportunity to be the chief minister (metaphorically the cow) of the state of Mizoram, reduced his power level in the group. Consequently, he lost control in the group and as a result, his charisma faded.¹²² The group since then has lost its capacity to carry out violence. Similarly, exercising restrictions on the fund flow or clandestinely providing funds to alternate power centers would reduce the power and consequently the control of the charismatic leader.

The difference between the traditional and the suggested anti-terrorism approach is that in the traditional approach, we only focus on degrading terrorism, whereas in the anti-charisma approach, we have to focus on both degradation and enhancement of the two relational orders, “flux and control.” By doing so, we expect to render charisma either dysfunctional or reduce its effect so that the level of violence is reduced. The next chapter, focuses on studying the presence of charisma in Al Qaeda, and if charisma is present, then exploring the possibility of reducing its disruptive capabilities by reducing its charismatic effect.

¹²² South Asia Terrorism Portal, "The Timeline Mizoram Insurgency 1967–1986," http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/mizoram/timeline/1966_86.htm (accessed January 14, 2009).

IV. AL QAEDA THE CHARMING HEADED HYDRA

Osama bin Laden is the prophet of fundamentalist movements in Saudi Arabia. And Osama bin Laden is much more interesting than most of them because Osama belongs to a family that is part of the ruling establishment and therefore it [bin Laden's popularity] is an indication of how bad things have got in Saudi Arabia.

Sa'id Aburish, Palestinian Journalist

No other terrorist organization in the history of terrorism has ever been able to create an effect in a single incident similar to 9/11 in which over 3,000 lives were lost. Al Qaeda is a unique organization designed to beat traditional anti-terrorism efforts and has cleverly avoided the trappings of seeking political power or territorial control. Avoiding territory and focusing on goals that extend to people across national boundaries makes it a global terrorist organization, with global alliances, and helps it survive. Its members see in their leader the unique capability to oppose the only super power, an entity many in the Islamic world view as a major source of the problems that the Islamic world is facing. For a large cross-section of the Muslim population, this attribute of Osama bin Laden makes him a hero. Scheuer says, "We've moved from Bin Laden and al-Qaeda being a man in an organization to a position where it is now a movement or a philosophy, and he is a heroic leadership symbol. For better or worse, Bin Laden is the only credible Islamic leader of international stature. Nobody wears an "I Love Mubarak" T-shirt or a "We Love the Al Sauds." He has filled the leadership vacuum very nicely."¹²³

¹²³ Daniel Byman and others, "Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror," *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 1, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=814022111&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=P> QD. These remarks were made in a symposium on ME by Michael Scheuer the former head of the CIA unit looking after bin Laden operations.

The capability to launch strategic violence on the most powerful nation in the world, heroic and visionary leadership, unique operating style, and customized ideology suggest a charismatic effect in Al Qaeda. This leads to the question, is there the presence of charismatic effect in Al Qaeda? And if it is present, then what is the current state of its charismatic effect (i.e., the level of flux and control)? This leads to the final question, what is the best strategy to render the charisma of Al Qaeda dysfunctional or reduce the charismatic effect so that we can reduce its (Al Qaeda's) disruptive power to cause violence? In this chapter, the study answers these questions by first providing an overview of Al Qaeda. Second, it analyzes the presence or absence of charisma in Al Qaeda. In particular, it identifies the presence or absence of preconditions that facilitate the emergence of charisma and indicators of charisma in the context of Al Qaeda. Finally, in the event of charismatic indicators (i.e., the two relational orders, flux and control) being present in Al Qaeda, the study attempts to establish their present levels to identify the best strategy to render its charisma dysfunctional or reduce the charismatic effect. The aim of doing so is to reduce the violence-causing capability of Al Qaeda.

A. AL QAEDA, AN OVERVIEW

AL QAEDA is an international terrorist network that was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988. It is the offshoot of an erstwhile terrorist organization, Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK) or the Afghan Service Bureau led by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. The primary role of MAK during the Afghanistan war with the Soviet Union was to provide financial and logistical support and recruit Arab fighters to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union.¹²⁴ After the

¹²⁴ Global Security, "Al-Qaida an Overview," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm> (accessed February 4, 2009). This section of the chapter is heavily drawn from the overview available on Al Qaeda at the site of Global Security. The facts mentioned in the site have also been corroborated from books on Al Qaeda such as *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden*, Roland Jacquard, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002; *Holy War, Inc*, Peter Bergen, 2001, The Free Press, New York; *Inside Al Qaeda*, Rohan Gunaratna, Columbia Press, New York, 2002; *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, Anonymous, Brassey's Inc, Virginia, 2002.

successful action against the Soviet Union, Osama wanted to change the mission of MAK from a regional organization into a global network of terrorists, which was contrary to the views of the then leader, Abdullah Azzam.¹²⁵ Due to the differences in opinion on the future course of MAK, Osama left MAK along with Al Zawahiri, and formed a new group called the Islamic Army. However, due to the death of Azzam, the founding leader of MAK in a car bomb attack in Peshawar, Pakistan, Osama managed to merge MAK with the Islamic Army and rechristened the organization “al Qaeda” or “the Base.”¹²⁶

1. Goals and Objective

AL QAEDA's goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.¹²⁷ In February 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens—civilian or military—and their allies anywhere in the world.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 2.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 23-25.

¹²⁷ Global Security, Al-Qaida an Overview; Musharbash Yassin, "What Al Qaeda really Wants: An Islamic Caliphate in Seven Easy Steps – e Baum's World Forum," <http://forum.ebaumsworld.com/showthread.php?t=144027> (accessed February 4, 2009); Gartenstein-Ross Daveed, "Osama's Big Lie," *Front Page Magazine*, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=45EDC923-C4E2-4AE6-B756-439932B3C57C> (accessed February 4, 2009). Daveed is a senior terrorism analyst at the Investigative Project, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism research center and Yaseen quotes a Jordanian journalist who spent time with Zaraqawi in prison as his source of the seven-phase plan of Al Qaeda to establish a caliphate.

¹²⁸ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 44; Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, Rev. and updated ed. (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2002), 89; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 46–47.

2. AL QAEDA's Organization

Al Qaeda has an organic structure with three distinct layers or divisions. Figure 9 depicts the conceptualization of its organizational structure. It maintains this organizational design primarily due to three factors. Firstly, the size of the organization precludes direct physical control by the charismatic. Secondly, the need to ensure security of the leadership and the core group from the threat of the global war on terror has forced the group to transform itself into a multilayered organization. The core group of the organization is comprised mostly of people from the ME and close associates of Osama bin Laden and Al Zawahiri.¹²⁹




Figure 9. Broad Organization of Al Qaeda

¹²⁹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 56; Global Security, Al-Qaida an Overview; Peter L. Bergen, "Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008); Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 13, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1155964101&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

Al Qaeda has a well-organized economic activity to generate funds and other resources required to maintain a global terrorist organization. Bin Laden is a member of a billionaire family that owns the Bin Laden Group's construction empire. He has invested his inheritance to generate funds to help the group. In addition, Al-Qaida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.¹³⁰ Figure 9 depicts the broad organization of Al Qaeda, as it existed in 1998.¹³¹ This organizational structure has undergone considerable change in the wake of the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, it has become more cyber-dependent having considerable presence on the internet, fighting ideologically rather than directly. However, both Cronin and Bergen argue that while it may have lost its original strength, it has emerged more resilient, robust, and cellularly structured. The organization still appears to be driven by its charismatic founder, Osama bin Laden, but with an even, more loose command and control structure, and a good leadership succession plan.¹³²

3. Strength

It is impossible to know precisely the exact strength of the organization due to its decentralized structure. Al Qaida may have several thousand members and associates. The estimates range from 60,000 to 20,000.¹³³ On the other hand, some believe that the core group is very closed and small in strength. For example, B. Raman, former additional secretary in the Government of India,

¹³⁰ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*; Global Security, "Al-Qaida an Overview"; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*.

¹³¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 57–60; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 122–123.

¹³² Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict: Open CRS Network – CRS Reports for the People" (2008), <http://opencrs.com/document/RS21529> (accessed February 5, 2009); Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups"; Peter L. Bergen, "Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast."

¹³³ Global Security, "Al-Qaida an Overview," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.html> (accessed February 4, 2009); Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict: Open CRS Network – CRS Reports for the People" (2008), <http://opencrs.com/document/RS21529> (accessed February 5, 2009).

responsible for security and intelligence, has estimated that in order to keep the security of its cadre failsafe, Al Qaeda has kept its core group strength just over 500 personnel and mostly coming from the Arab world. However, they have an extremely vibrant and strong social and material support network.¹³⁴ Even Byman confirms this view that close supporters of Osama may be just a few hundred.¹³⁵ Given the intensity of current U.S. operations, Al Qaeda's core group might have a smaller profile. The organizational structure suggests that the center of gravity (CG) of the movement is the core group. Thus, by impairing the core group or reducing its ability to function effectively, the entire movement could be expected to become severely degraded, at least for a while. Hence, this study hereafter focuses on the core group because its continued relevance is viewed as the reason why others are indulging in transnational terrorism.

4. Ideology

David Rapport says that we are experiencing a fourth wave of terrorism known as religious terrorism, which is built on the belief that the world has decayed into a morass of greed and moral depravity.¹³⁶ Similarly, Sageman says that the Islamic version of this revivalist ideology—so termed because it calls for a revival of what people believe the original community was like—is known as Salafism, from the Arabic word *salaf*, the ancient ones.¹³⁷ However, he further goes on to clarify that Salafism is currently associated with global jihad conducted primarily by Al Qaeda against the far enemy—the U.S., UK, France, and the West. Michael Freeman also says that Al Qaeda is Islamic in its ideology

¹³⁴ B. Raman, "The Threat to India," <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/may/21raman.htm> (accessed March 9, 2009). The Author was the former Additional Secretary Government of India and presently a Senior Fellow at East West Center, Honolulu, HI.

¹³⁵ Byman and others, *Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on "Terror,"* 1

¹³⁶ David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History* 100, no. 650 (December 2001), 419, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=93356663&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹³⁷ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 33.

but Sunni, and not Shi'a, and more narrowly part of the Salafi community within Sunni Islam, which seeks to return to a purer, stricter, and more fundamentalist implementation of Quran and Hadith (Prophet's words).¹³⁸ Scheuer, too, agrees with this viewpoint.¹³⁹ Osama, by changing the enemy within the pre-existing salafi ideology, has customized a unique solution against the perceived or real threat to the Islamic world from the West. A uniquely customized ideology is a common feature of many charismatic radical movements. He calls for jihad by every Muslim youth against the far enemy (U.S.) rather than the near enemy (national governments in the Islamic world) because salafi rule cannot be established as long as the U.S. continues to support the local corrupt Muslim governments in the region. In the view of Salafists, the local governments of the Islamic world have strayed from the path of the God under the influence of western culture and ideologies such as democracy.

5. Strategy and Tactics

At the strategic level, according to the former CIA Director, George J. Tenet, "Osama Bin Laden's organization and other terrorist groups are placing increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection."¹⁴⁰(Anonymous 2003; Global Security 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Bergen 2001) The Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC) Sentinel, January 2009 issue states that from 2003 to 2007, the Al Qaeda aligned itself with groups in nineteen additional countries.¹⁴¹ The trend may have slowed down due the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it seems to have regained its strength

¹³⁸ Michael Freeman, "Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 1 (January 2008), 41, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1412901181&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 271; Global Security, Al-Qaida an Overview; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 394; Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), 283.

¹⁴¹ Combating Terrorism Center, "Al Qaeda's Five Aspects of Power," *CTC Sentinel*, <http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/> (accessed February 8, 2009).

and ability to pose a viable threat to the United States and other non-Muslim countries. In fact, Gunaratna, Bergen, and many others conclusively confirm the efforts of Laden to obtain and utilize biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to achieve their goals and objectives,¹⁴² and should this happen, Al Qaeda would become a truly global non-state actor with genuine strategic capabilities.

The tactics of Al Qaeda include assassination, bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, and suicide attacks. In recent times, due to the increased pressure from the allies, Al Qaeda has turned to the excessive use of suicide bombings, especially by women, as it is lot easier to access high security zones by female operatives. The initial hesitation due to restrictions imposed in the Quran on the use of women fighters for jihad has given way to operational imperatives.

6. Current State of Al Qaeda

Many believe that the intensity of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan has made Al Qaeda ineffective. However, this is far from the reality. For example, Peter Bergen says, "They mounted suicide attacks in London in July 2005, plotted to blow up a huge fertilizer bomb in the London area in 2004, carried out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv that killed four in 2003, attempted two separate suicide operations against U.S. airliners in 2001 and 2006, and participated in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002."¹⁴³ Similarly, Fernando Reinares says that in Barcelona the Spanish security forces arrested twelve Pakistanis and two Indians during a counter-terrorist operation on January 19, 2008. Spanish authorities accused the suspects of involvement in a plot to carry out multiple suicide bombings on the city's public transportation system.¹⁴⁴ Even the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, although carried out by Lashkar ei

¹⁴² Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 93; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 124–125.

¹⁴³ Peter L. Bergen, "Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008), 20 (accessed February 5, 2009).

¹⁴⁴ Reinares Fernando, "A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona," <http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/> (accessed February 8, 2009).

Toiba (LeT), were motivated by and executed at the behest of Al Qaeda. A video tape received by the BBC of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, believed to be Al Qaeda's military commander in Afghanistan and ranked number three in Al Qaeda, confirms this assessment. In the video, Mustafa has warned India of more Mumbai style attacks if India attacks Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ The tactics of the attack and targets selected—a Jewish family, westerners, Mumbai, a symbol of capitalism, suggest direct or inspirational linkage to Al Qaeda.

7. Centrality of Osama bin Laden

How has Al Qaeda been transformed into such a potent force? Is it because its star performer remains alive and free to act as he wishes somewhere in the Hindu Kush Mountains? What is so special about Osama bin Laden that he has withstood the onslaught of the world's strongest armed forces? Since the prevailing worldview is that Al Qaeda is charismatic, the study hypothesizes *that Al Qaeda has created a charismatic effect and this effect is primarily responsible for Al Qaeda's robustness and resilience*. It leads to the power of its core group, which facilitates the functioning of the various global cells and associate groups comprising the intermediate and outer core groups of the movement. If one were able to reduce the charisma of the core group, then the other layers of the organizations, such as the regional associates and outer core supporters, would revert to their original role of opposing the "near enemy." The following section specifically examines the presence of charisma in the core group of Al Qaeda.

B. PRESENCE OF CHARISMA IN AL QAEDA

1. Preconditions for Emergence of Charisma

The *presence of a severe crisis* in a socio-political setting is a sure recipe for the emergence of charisma in a group. People of the Middle East (ME), in particular, and most of the Islamic nations of the world, in general, consider that

¹⁴⁵ Press Trust of India – London, "Al Qaeda Warns India of More Mumbai-Style Attacks," <http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/feb/10mumterror-al-qaeda-warns-india-of-more-mumbai-style-attacks.htm> (accessed March 21, 2009).

their countries face an existential crisis due to the threat of the crusaders led by the U.S. and Israel on their culture and sovereignty. For example, Khalid Khalil Ahmed says, "The current generation of Muslims in the Arab world are the "young sons of that era with severe defeats— defeat of the Arabs in 1948, 1967, and 1973 on the hands of Israel."¹⁴⁶ Even the countries that have remained pro U.S., such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have severe internal tensions due to poor governance. A large section of the Islamic world feels threatened because firstly, the Islamic world is attributing decadence in the Muslim society to the imposition of the Western culture.¹⁴⁷ Secondly, radical Muslims blame the U.S., Israel, and other western nations for the misery of Muslims all over the world. For example, Laden states in his 1996 fatwa:

It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre in Lebanon are still fresh in our memory. Massacres that took place in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Ogden, Somalia, Eretria, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, send shivers in the body, and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch and hear, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its' allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves.¹⁴⁸ [Sic]

¹⁴⁶ Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 85.

¹⁴⁷ Freeman, Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy, 40–54; Sayyid, Qutub, *Milestones*, written in 1965, and translated by Muhammad, al Amrani, in 2004, 6; and Esposito, John L., *Islamic Violence and the Crusades: A study in Contrast Myth or Reality?*, Oxford University Press, New York, (Second Edition), 1992, 120. Esposito mentions that the current revival of Islamic Jihad, conceptually originated from the writings of Mawdudi (India and Pakistan: 1903–79) and Hassan Al Banna (Egypt: 1903–46) in the early twentieth century, who feared threat to the Islamic world due to increasing westernization. Qutub, Azzam, and Osama have just continued to move the baton forward of Islamic fundamentalism.

¹⁴⁸ Laden B. Osama, "Online NewsHour: Bin Laden's Fatwa," http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed February 9, 2009).

Thirdly, the occupation of the Al Aqsa mosque by the Israelis, the occupation of the holy city of Mecca by the crusaders (U.S. troops), and the holy city in Iraq add to the humiliation of the Muslim world. The occupation of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, is considered a direct violation of the Prophet's wishes that no foreign presence of non-believers be allowed in Mecca or Medina. Western presence in these two cities plays heavily into the religious psyche of the Muslims.¹⁴⁹ Fourthly, the local governments in the region have failed to deliver on their promises and good governance.¹⁵⁰ Fifthly, and probably most importantly, the occupation of the Palestinian lands by the Israelis undercuts all other crises in the region. The occupation of Iraq post 2003 by the U.S. has further aggravated the situation.¹⁵¹ To summarize, many people in the Arab world and other Muslim nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and India perceive that their very existence is at stake due to the threat of the U.S., its allies, and other non-Muslim nations.¹⁵²

The presence of a leader with attributes such as divine powers to perform the impossible, or even miracles, is the most important precondition for a charismatic phenomenon to occur. In addition, charismatic personalities are visionary, master orators, persuasive, heroic, and prophetic in appearance. A literature review on Osama reveals that all these forms of superlatives and attributes are associated with him. Almost all the authors describe him as a

¹⁴⁹ As cited in Byman and others, *Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on "Terror,"* 1; Michael Scheuer, "Inside Out," *The Atlantic Monthly* 295, no. 3 (April 2005), 30, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=810334121&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>; Michael Scheuer and others, "November 9, 2006: Five Years on: A Symposium," *The National Interest*, no. 85 (Sep/Oct 2006), 20, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1137666451&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁵⁰ Osama, *Online NewsHour: Bin Laden's Fatwa* and Sayyid, Qutub, *Milestones*, written in 1965, and translated by Muhammad, al Amrani, in 2004.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*; Scheuer, *Inside Out*, 30; Byman and others, *Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on "Terror,"* 1; Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 271.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 95–220 Similarly Bergen, Post, Cronin, Roland Jacquard, and Michael Scheuer also talk of Muslim world holding the US, its allies like Israel and European countries and non-Muslim countries responsible for all their problems. A clear sense of the "us vs. them" mentality, commonly known as the Manichean divide, persists amongst the Muslims of the world, especially from Asia and Africa.

visionary in his field. Until he founded the Al Qaeda, jihad had focused only on the near enemy. However, Osama pointed the finger at the West for all the misfortunes of the Muslim world, and since then the far enemy (the U.S.) occupies the center stage for various Islamic terrorist groups, be they from the ME, Algeria, Europe, Afghanistan, or Indonesia.¹⁵³ As far as his physical profile is concerned, almost all experts and scholars describe him as prophetic. In addition, Osama also makes a special endeavor to project a prophet-like image in all his public appearances, videos, and internet-based images.¹⁵⁴ Some of his close associates describe him as extremely popular among his men, who love him deeply, because he is not domineering. He does not inspire terror in his followers. He participates with the young men in all their activities and lives mostly with his disciples.¹⁵⁵ Bergen, who personally met him, described him as “A tall man, over six feet, his face dominated by an aquiline nose. Dressed in a turban, white robes, and a green camouflage jacket, he walked with a cane and seemed tired, less like a swaggering revolutionary than a Muslim ascetic.”¹⁵⁶ People also describe him as a gifted engineer who can create constructions that could resist the bombs of the Russians. Such tales provide the necessary divine origin to his abilities. In addition, most of his followers consider him extremely brave and capable of miraculously escaping death. Bergen, Roland, and the author of *Through our Enemies' Eyes*, recount a number of such instances, including escaping certain death at the battle of Jaji in Afghanistan, surviving the

¹⁵³ Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 102 Similarly, Bergen, Gunaratana, and Roland all attribute such personality traits to Osama.

¹⁵⁴ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 41 Gunaratana says that in several posters he is depicted as a saint riding a white horse. Moreover, bin Laden also tries to reinforce this notion of his religious authority by dressing appropriately. The use of Palestinian keffiyeh, or headdress, relates to Jerusalem's Al Aqsa mosque, one of Islam's holiest sites: and when Osama chooses to be filmed or photographed wearing a plain turban, this, too, signifies his near clerical status. He, however, does not wear a black turban, which would identify him as belonging to the Prophet's family. He wears a ring with black stone signifying Ka'aba, and a dagger around the waist to signify his position of authority and historical legitimacy. These symbols somehow also tie up with his demands and therefore could be used to neutralize him and all that he stands for.

¹⁵⁵ Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, 168.

¹⁵⁶ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 18.

1998 U.S. missile attacks, poisoning attempts, and assassination attempts; these escapes make him mythical, legendary, a hero, and gifted with divine power in the eyes of his followers.¹⁵⁷ In addition, the author of *Through Our Enemy's Eyes* associates qualities such as piety, professionalism (Osama always seeks religious legitimization for his actions), patience, and being a slave of Allah rather than being considered a Prophet himself as some of the other characteristics of his personality.¹⁵⁸ Thus, a personality surrounded by so many mythical stories, rumors and legends can very easily be viewed as charismatic to his followers and inspire the highest commitments from them. This may explain the occurrence of high intensity, socio-psychological, energy-driven incidents such as the 9/11 attacks, the suicide bombings of the USS Cole, the U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya, and bombings of public places in London.

Presenting a unique solution by the leader to the perceived crisis of the social collective is the third pre-condition for emergence of charisma. Until the advent of Osama, radical thinkers such as Mawdudi, Hassan Al Banna, Qutub, and Azzam were offering an existing ideology, the purer and stricter form of Islam known as Salafism, as the solution to various problems and misfortunes of the Islamic world.¹⁵⁹ However, Osama customized a new ideology within the overall framework of Salafism by changing the locus of the problem from “non adherence to Islam” to the “actions of the far enemy.”¹⁶⁰ This new orientation of an existing ideology has added yet another dimension to Osama’s personality of a man possessed of visionary thought and ideas, at least in the eyes of the radical Muslim population. Scheuer says, “For better or worse, Bin Laden is the

¹⁵⁷ Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, 293; Bergen, *Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast*, 14; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 394.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 69–73.

¹⁵⁹ Esposito, John L., *Islamic Violence and the Crusades: A study in Contrast Myth or Reality?*, 1992, 120–128; and Sheikh, Abdullah, Azzam, *The Building Blocks of Nations*, www.azzam.com, (accessed on December 2001).

¹⁶⁰ Laden, bin, Osama, “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on American,” *Al- Islah*, London, September 2, 1996, 1–12.

only credible Islamic leader of international stature. ... He has filled the leadership vacuum very nicely.”¹⁶¹ Bergen and Byman have echoed similar feelings.¹⁶²

2. Indicators of the Charismatic Effect in Al Qaeda

As discussed in Chapter III, there are two indicators of presence of charisma in a terrorist/insurgent group or an organization. These are, firstly, the presence of flux, and secondly, the presence of control. Bradley operationalized flux with measurements of group cohesion, love (brotherly love), and a strong sense of optimism and euphoria. Bradley operationalized control as a strong power structure between the leader and the followers. In addition, the existence of rules, regulations and their enforcement, a socialization process, workflow, punishments, and rewards also indicate the presence of an effective control mechanism in a group. The following sections discuss Bradley’s two indicators of charisma in a group in greater detail.

a. Presence of Flux

The Al Qaeda has a multilayered organization, but the core group remains the most crucial for the existence and functioning of the other layers. We analyze the core group only for this study. The most important factor that creates flux in a group is cohesion. Cohesion in a group primarily occurs due to a strong bonding between the members of a group. *This translates into the unquestioning loyalty of each member to the group. It also amounts to surrendering all that belongs to an individual to the group and its cause.* Many instances indicate a strong presence of cohesion in Al Qaeda. Dr al-Fagih (a surgeon who provided

¹⁶¹ Michael Scheuer, "The State of the Jihad, as He might See it," *The Washington Post* February 17, 2008, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1430845571&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁶² As cited by Max Rodenbeck, "Review of "the OBL I Know" in the New York Review of Books." <http://www.peterbergen.com/bergen/articles/details.aspx?id=245> (accessed April 8, 2009); Byman and others, *Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on "Terror,"* 1. Although these authors do not state that he is actually the leader of the Muslim World, they allude that the impression in many people’s mind in the Muslim world is along those lines.

services to the Afghan jihadis) says that of the fifteen thousand men who served with bin Laden in the war in Afghanistan, nearly four thousand are now committed to bin Laden by chain of command (inner core).¹⁶³ Similarly, while travelling through Afghanistan, when Bergen saw the barren and rocky terrain devoid of any cover where the Arabs (inner core of Al Qaeda) fought the Soviets, he commented, “The bravery of the Arabs who had fought under bin Laden’s command was lunatic, but impressive.”¹⁶⁴ Such an act of bravado only comes from a very cohesive group. Similarly, the ease of inter group cooperation between associate groups of Al Qaeda such as the Lashkar-ei-Taiba and Chechen Terrorist groups is possible due only to the erstwhile bonds between the members of the two groups who had been part of the Al Qaeda’s core group during the Soviet jihad. The cooperation is further unique because it takes place even without the specific direction of its Emir, or Director, as people sometimes commonly address Laden.¹⁶⁵ These instances of unquestioning loyalty to Al Qaeda and to one another by the members of the core group clearly indicate strong cohesion.

Al Qaeda’s leadership also pays special attention to the process of deindividuation through a process of religious, social, and political indoctrination military training, and the oath-taking of each individual. The de-individuation process starts with a religious ceremony called *bayat*, a quasi-medieval oath of allegiance to the emir or leader (note the emphasis on the leader and not Osama bin Laden).¹⁶⁶ Even Scheuer says, “Career advancement in al-Qaeda tends to wash away much of the mercenary hypocrisy found at the entry level.” Commenting on the de-individuation process Gunaratna says, “The process of de-individuation in Al Qaeda is both moral and physical, which explains why a

¹⁶³ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 5.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.

high percentage of its attacks are suicide operations.¹⁶⁷ However, a point to note is that many members are also paid, which does not disqualify the group from being charismatic because Bradley's theory of charisma considers the existence of such activity in charismatic groups as normal for sustenance and survival.

A strong sense of a "love" affect towards the leader and the group is the second factor that contributes to the creation of flux in a group. Bergen described this sense of love, affect, and brotherhood in Al Qaeda when he was interviewing Osama bin Laden at his hiding place somewhere in the Hindu Kush Mountains. Bin Laden's followers treated him with the utmost deference, referring to him with the honorific "sheikh," a homage he seemed to take as his due. When Laden spoke, his followers listened in rapt attention as he went on to clarify that the presence of the U.S. armed forces in the Saudi Kingdom had led to the call for jihad.¹⁶⁸ Gunaratna goes further and states categorically that, based on his research, Osama is viewed as fearless and unrelenting among his followers and admirers. Neither he nor Al Qaeda will ever compromise.¹⁶⁹ The orders of bin Laden were followed during the Afghanistan campaign as the word of God. For example, the mere mention of an action by Osama led fighters like Atef and Abu Ubayadah to spur into action even without thinking about the likely cost and dangers involved in the action.

Numerous other instances that strongly confirm the presence of love and affect are:

- In a small and remote village of Yemen, a small boy carrying a Koran told Peter Bergen, "We love him. He fights for God's sake and he is in Afghanistan." Similar adulations could be heard

¹⁶⁷ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 94.

¹⁶⁸ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 18, 19.

¹⁶⁹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 53.

elsewhere including places such as London, where a keynote speaker in a conference lauded Osama as “the man who sacrificed his life for Islam.”¹⁷⁰

- Rolland describes the feelings of one of the followers of Osama as, “He not only gave his money, but he also gave himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and the Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. This is bin Laden’s way.”¹⁷¹
- Hamid Mir a journalist from Pakistan says, “The unidentified terrorists represented only a small percentage of those willing to defend bin Laden: he enjoys a cult-like status. I think he is more popular than any political leader in Pakistan.”¹⁷²
- Umer Farooq, leader of Lashkar e Taiba, says, “Mujahideen would sacrifice their lives to defend the hero of Islam.”¹⁷³
- The lure of Osama is so great that people volunteer to carry out high-risk tasks just to get an audience with Osama. For example, a Hijbul member Md Iqhlaque went to India to carry out reconnaissance of Indian cities on the promise that he would be given a personal audience with Osama.¹⁷⁴

The presence of optimism and euphoria is the third indicator of flux in a group. It stems from a number of factors such as the perceived capability of the group members to deliver, previous instances of success achieved by the group, and the actual or perceived abilities of the leader to find a solution. As Weber noted, in charismatic groups, this also depends upon the ability of the

¹⁷⁰ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 31.

¹⁷¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 20; Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, 24.

¹⁷² Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 148.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 208.

leader to perform miracles or at least actions that members perceive as miracles. Even Bradley says that optimism and euphoria are due to the catalytic effect of the leader in delivering the ends. Osama, as the Emir of Al Qaeda, creates a similar effect on the members of Al Qaeda. A sense of optimism has always prevailed throughout the lifespan of Al Qaeda. The following instances, events, and documents support the presence of euphoria and optimism in Al Qaeda:

- Several witnesses of the battle of Jaji (1986) and Shaban (1987) recount that Osama was engaged in a bloody hand-to-hand combat against soldiers of the Red Army, and despite suffering an injury, won all the early battles against the communist defense forces. Until then, the Arab World had considered the Communist defense invincible.¹⁷⁵ This ability of Osama to win against one of the best military troops instilled in his followers the optimism that he had the wherewithal to deal with any other military power of the world.
- A number of Osama's declarations contain the promise of solution to the problems of the Muslims. One such declaration reads, "We, my group, and I, have suffered from their injustices. ... By the grace of Allah, we have a secure base in the high mountains of the Hindu Kush, where ... the world's largest army [Soviet Union] was destroyed. ... From these same mountains, we are now working to put an end to the injustice that has been imposed on the Muslim community by the alliance of the crusaders and the Zionists. We ask Allah to grant us victory. He is our benefactor and the powerful one."¹⁷⁶ The message quite

¹⁷⁵ Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, 23 In the same breath, Roland also reports that there were occasions when Osama conducted himself like a ridiculous mad man, and Afghan mujahedeen had to shoot some of the men of Osama.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

clearly contains hope, optimism, and solutions to the problems of the Muslims through the defeat of the remaining super power, the USA.

- On the issue of “optimism and euphoria,” Bergen says, “As a practical matter, the restoration of the Khalifa has about as much chance as the Holy Roman Empire suddenly reappearing in Europe, but as a rhetorical device. the call for its return exercises a powerful grip on bin Laden’s followers.”¹⁷⁷
- Many scholars believe that Al Qaeda is now a redundant and spent force, but a more critical analysis would reveal that they have in fact become more resilient and robust. In a recent article (February 2008), Scheuer describes the current state of jihad from Osama’s perspective as, “By God's grace, al-Qaeda's incitement has met with wondrous success; Western polls show that hundreds of millions of Muslims now believe that U.S. foreign policy aims to undermine or destroy Islam. ... Thanks be to God, brothers, America is hemorrhaging money and ruining its military by trying to fight al-Qaeda's mujahidin wherever they appear — or, more accurately, wherever U.S. officials imagine they appear. Our military and media operations have advanced the ultimate goal of our grand strategy -- restoring Islamic rule to the Muslim world. We have a winning formula: Driving the United States from the Middle East; Destroying Israel and the region's Arab tyrannies; and settling scores with the heretical Shiites.”¹⁷⁸

These instances validate the presence of cohesion, a love affect, and optimism in Al Qaeda. The combined effect of these factors leads to the

¹⁷⁷ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 21.

¹⁷⁸ Scheuer, *The State of the Jihad, as He might See it*, B.3.

creation of “flux” or socio-psychological, potential energy in a group. However, flux alone is incapable of creating a true charismatic effect in a group. The presence of control is necessary to create a charismatic effect.

b. Presence of Control

The presence of a strong power structure is mandatory in a group for the social control to be effective. Although in the initial stages, a leader exercises power through personal control, subsequently, an organized hierarchy, group of lieutenants, rules, regulations, and socialization processes become necessary to establish and exercise control. An examination of Al Qaeda’s core group reveals the presence of all these factors. Instances that indicate the presence of control in the group are:

- Membership rules are very strict, for a person to be part of the core group; he must possess fourteen essential qualities. Some of these qualities include: knowledge of Islam, ideological commitment, maturity, self-sacrifice, the ability to maintain secrecy and conceal information, good health, patience, unflappability, intelligence, insight, caution, prudence, truthfulness, wisdom, the ability to observe and analyze, and the ability to act decisively.¹⁷⁹
- Each member has to undergo a strong induction program or socialization process,¹⁸⁰ and finally, all are bound by the oath to the Emir General Osama bin Laden.¹⁸¹
- The performance of each individual is reprimanded or rewarded based on the success or failure achieved by the member. The rules and regimes are strict.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 73.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁸¹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 28.

¹⁸² Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 75.

- The presence of a well-defined formal organizational structure with a clear hierarchy, as described earlier in this chapter, exists in the inner core. See Figure 10.
- Al Qaeda also has a strong mechanism of economic resource generation. It uses its economic power to exercise control over its members, components, and associate groups.¹⁸³
- The unquestioning nature of Al Qaeda followership is due to the presence of very strong control mechanisms, even over groups and cells not in direct contact with Osama. For example, Laden's media information officer in Kenya had noted in his document on the computer, "We knew that the cell's mission was to attack the Americans, but we the East Africa cell members, do not want to know about the operational plan since we are just implementers. In fact, many of his followers have not even met their hero. They simply follow orders."¹⁸⁴ There can be no higher degree of control present in an organization.

While the above instances establish without doubt the hierarchical and strong presence of control in Al Qaeda, some reports of inadequate control also exist. For example, some say that Al Qaeda manages to control its components due to its monetary power and not due to charisma. However, we

¹⁸³ Hawke Chris, "U.S: Terror Funding Stymied, Official Says \$147 Million Frozen Under U.N. Sanctions – CBS News," <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/11/terror/main666168.shtml> (accessed February 11, 2009); Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 37, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1155964101&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. Although Cronin argues that since the terrorist groups do not need much funding, Al Qaeda may still be a formidable force. However, given the fact that between 2003 and 2008 Al Qaeda has attracted groups from 19 countries (see CTC Sentinel January 2009) sparing money and resources to all these groups is a big ask, even for Al Qaeda, especially since they are trapped in the Hindu Kush mountains.

¹⁸⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 30.

must not forget that post 9/11, Al Qaeda's resources and monetary power have been severely degraded. Still, it manages to control its operations fairly well.¹⁸⁵

Thus, we can conclude from the above discussions that there is a large amount of flux and a considerable amount of control present in the inner core of Al Qaeda. The combined effect of the two relational orders, "flux and control" creates a charismatic effect as Bradley has empirically demonstrated. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that Al Qaeda does have the presence of charisma, especially in its core group. The process of creation is an output of a high amount of energy that provides the capacity for the group to perform seemingly difficult and spectacular tasks; control regulates that energy or aligns that energy to perform the task. One may equate flux to potential energy and control as the tool that converts the potential energy efficiently and effectively into kinetic energy or dynamic form. The implication of this theory is that outcomes such as the suicide bombing of USS Cole and 9/11 attacks are the end products of such effects. The following incident also illustrates, to some extent, the combined effect of flux and control, which we term charismatic effect:

Force of a fatwa depends upon who pronounces it, and none of the recognized Islamic authorities (Sunni or Shia) regards Osama bin Laden as a person capable legitimately of issuing one. Despite this fact, the motivation of Al Qaeda members to kill and their supreme indifference to death points to the fact that the forces that energize and propel the people of Al Qaeda to undertake spectacular tasks even at the supreme cost to their life, goes beyond the religious and ideological attraction.¹⁸⁶

In the above case, the flux is generated by Al Qaeda's message and its leader's personality, and the control is provided by the fatwa, which has the legitimacy of the personal power of Osama bin Laden. However, a relatively different result is seen in the intermediate and outer groups. This is due firstly, to a lack of control, and secondly, to the absence of Osama from the intermediate and outer layers of the organization. This also confirms the results of Bradley's

¹⁸⁵ Scheuer, *The State of the Jihad, as He might See it*, B.3.

¹⁸⁶ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 7.

observations about reduced charismatic effect on absentee charismatic groups. Some instances confirming this observation are:

- Al Qaeda is pragmatic while maintaining its association with groups that commit excessive and undesirable activities such as GIA in Algeria.¹⁸⁷ They have not been able to exercise very effective control over associate groups.
- Al Qaeda was also not able to exercise effective control over Zaraqawi the commander of AQ in Iraq. Reports suggest that Al Qaeda's leadership was not in favor of starting anti Shia violence in Iraq and advised Zarqawi to refrain from it. However, the Al Qaeda (Iraqi) leader did not heed the advice. Osama grudgingly acceded to Zarqawi's request to start a civil war because Osama himself was under grave threat, trapped in the FATA region of Pakistan.¹⁸⁸

The perception that the Islamic world is undergoing severe crisis, the presence of a leader perceived to possess divine powers, oath-taking in the name of the emir of Al Qaeda, an effective indoctrination process, organized economic activity to facilitate sustenance, and an effective power structure to control the group indicate that Al Qaeda definitely contains the charismatic phenomenon. This also explains the relatively high levels of violence perpetuated by Al Qaeda. Therefore, as suggested earlier, if we have to reduce the violence level, then we need to reduce its charismatic effect and, if possible, render it dysfunctional. This leads to the next issue of finding out the current level of flux and control in Al Qaeda so that we can identify the right strategy to reduce the charismatic effect or even render it dysfunctional.

¹⁸⁷ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 125–139.

¹⁸⁸ Loretta Napoleoni, *Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and the New Generation* Seven Stories Press, 2005), 169 -180, http://isbndb.com/d/book/insurgent_iraq (accessed 2/11/2009); Scheuer, *The State of the Jihad, as He might See it*, B.3. Napoleoni has described, in detail, the conflict between Osama and Zarqawi in the civil war in Iraq, which demonstrated the lack of power of the Al Qaeda central or inner core over its franchise groups.

C. PRESENT LEVEL OF “FLUX” AND “CONTROL” IN AL QAEDA

As we discussed earlier, an appropriate strategy to reduce the charismatic effect can only be identified if we are able to establish the current levels of flux and control in a group or an organization. In order to identify the current levels of flux and control in Al Qaeda’s core group correctly and precisely, we would need to have access to the various members of Al Qaeda who could then be administered the sociometric questions developed by Bradley for his research with various groups in the U.S. However, such an approach is neither feasible nor suitable for terrorist groups, and since our aim is to counter their charismatic effect, it is unlikely that even if we somehow managed access to Al Qaeda members, for example, recent prisoners of Al Qaeda from Afghanistan or FATA, Pakistan, they would respond honestly to the questionnaires. To overcome these difficulties, the study suggests two strategies for measuring the level of flux and control in Al Qaeda. These strategies, although not the best option, would provide some amount of objectivity in assessment of the flux and control in Al Qaeda. These strategies are:

- Strategy 1: The Delphi Technique. In the field of terrorism, we have a number of well established experts who are specifically either engaged in combating Al Qaeda or studying Al Qaeda. We could apply the Delphi technique to seek their estimates of the prevailing levels of flux and control. The experts could be senior military officers who are serving or have served in Afghanistan, serving or retired officers of the CIA and other intelligence agencies dealing with Al Qaeda, and academic scholars involved in studying Al Qaeda, such as Scheuer, Bergen, Roland, Byman, Hoffman, and Sagemen. As part of the Delphi process, we need to send a small write-up on the role of flux and control in the creation of charisma in a group. Having explained the attributes of flux and control, we need to ask for their assessment of the prevailing level of flux and control based on their experience of dealing with Al Qaeda. We can

then apply the Delphi process to arrive at a consensus value for the two variables essential for the creation of charisma. While this may not be the most accurate method to assess charisma, under the constraints of dealing with terrorist and insurgent groups it is probably the best technique.

- Strategy 2: Quantitative Ratings. Another alternative is quantitatively rating the views of scholars and experts on Al Qaeda by a panel of people involved in either combating Al Qaeda or studying about Al Qaeda in masters and PhD programs. We could also include some professors who are teaching terrorism and/or international security- related issues in South Asian, Central Asian regions, and the ME. As part of this strategy, we need to do a thorough search of the literature and the Internet to extract the assessments of various experts on Al Qaeda from journal articles and books. We need to take care to include only scholarly work and the assessments of renowned experts on Al Qaeda. These assessments convey the degree of presence of flux or control. Before proceeding further, it is highlighted that this is not the best method and suffers from certain shortcomings. These shortcomings include: firstly,, since the process depends on searching for and extracting the flux and control-related views of various experts and scholars on Al Qaeda, there would always remain a sense of incompleteness to all the views in the environment about Al Qaeda. Secondly, it would also depend upon the honesty of the researcher, as he may become selective in gathering assessments from the literature that conflict with his views. Finally, since it is an indirect assessment, the result would always remain suspect. However, we can minimize these shortcomings with an unbiased and exhaustive effort to search for expert opinions from all available sources and

by drawing a realistic and a balanced panel of raters with authentic knowledge of Al Qaeda. In addition, the second strategy is easier and quicker to execute.

For this study, Strategy 2 to was selected to identify and quantify the current level of flux and control in Al Qaeda. As part of the strategy, the opinion of experts on Al Qaeda was selected from the available literature on the Internet and in books. In order to maintain the currency of the ratings, the study considered views related to the presence of the level of flux and control in Al Qaeda from 2005 onwards only. Some of the scholars include: Michael Scheuer, author of *Imperial Hubris*; Gunaratna, author of *Inside Al Qaeda*; Peter Bergen, the CNN expert on Al Qaeda and the author of *Holy War Inc.*, a report published in *Al Ahram journal of strategic studies* Egypt; Abdul Hameed from *Terrorism Monitor*; General Haq from the Pakistan Army; and Rich Lawry, author of *An Islamist Backlash*. For full details, see appendices A and B. To quantify these assessments and incidents, the study drew a panel of fifteen raters. These raters were comprised of military officers attending the postgraduate program at the Naval Postgraduate School, from the defense forces of the U.S., Romania, Ukraine, Pakistan, Kenya, and the ME, including a former Indian Army Colonel, who was a former faculty member in the department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School who was involved in combating Islamic terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Panel members were advised to code firm attributions of the presence of flux or control in Al Qaeda by an expert as 1 and the absence of cohesion as -1, and any opinion or incident suggesting the intensity of flux or control in between these two extremes by values within this range such as + 0.5, +0.60 0.75, -0.5, -0.60, -0.75. The process of quantifying each opinion or incident quoted by various scholars was based purely on the perception formed by the rater after reading a particular assessment of a scholar contained in Appendix A and B prepared by me. Appendix A also contains the details of the calculation of the quantum of flux and control in Appendix B. *The range of the current value of flux, by adopting this process, is 0.5979 +/- 0.0959,*

(upper range 0.6938 and lower range 0.5020: one standard deviation) see Appendix A. Control is 0.6536 +/- 0.0758, (upper range 0.7294 and lower range 0.5778: one standard deviation) see Appendix B. These values of flux and control, currently prevailing in Al Qaeda, place Al Qaeda somewhere in the centre of the charismatic stability model of Bradley. See Figure 10.




Figure 10. Prevailing Levels of Flux and Control in Al Qaeda

Before proceeding any further, it is cautioned that although an honest effort was made to search for the available opinions of acknowledged experts on Al Qaeda from the Internet and other sources, the list is just a random sample limited by the time and resources that were available for the study. More exhaustive research would produce a more valid set of assessments and incidents indicating the quantum of flux and control present in Al Qaeda. Thus, the above findings should be viewed as rough *approximations* based on the opinions *that were found* on the Internet, both positive and negative. The *sample statistics are not a 100 percent true representation* of the opinion of the *population on the present state* of Al Qaeda.

The medium values of flux and control suggests that we can apply any of the three strategies evolved from Bradley's model to disrupt charismatic stability and reduce the charisma in Al Qaeda. These strategies are, firstly, the volatility strategy (increase flux and reduce control); secondly, the ossification strategy (increasing control and reducing flux), and thirdly, the insufficiency strategy (reducing both flux and control). However, the safest strategy to nullify or reduce the charismatic effect of Al Qaeda would be through the "insufficiency strategy," because the first two strategies would involve increasing either flux or control, a clever opponent could exploit it to move the group into generating a transformative charismatic effect, making the group even more destructive. Hence, a much safer approach would be to apply the insufficiency strategy to reduce both the flux and control. The next chapter specifically looks into implementing the "insufficiency strategy" with a view to reduce its charismatic effect and thereby reduce its capability to undertake violent acts.

V. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE VIOLENCE OF AL QAEDA

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun by word and bullet and by tongue and teeth.

Al Qaeda Training Manual

The transformational power of charisma provides an organization with the capacity to perform spectacular feats. A series of suicide attacks, bombing huge war-fighting ships such as the USS Cole by a small boat laden with explosives, and ramming jets into the World Trade Center are a few examples of this manifestation in Al Qaeda. As noted earlier, it is hypothesized that if we can reduce the charismatic effect, the capacity of a group to perpetuate violence should also be reduced. We argued earlier that endogenous interactions between two relational orders in a group, namely “flux” and “control,” creates the charismatic effect, which in turn affects the task performance of a group. We also saw that to identify an appropriate strategy to reduce the effect of charisma we need to assess the prevailing levels of flux and control present in a group as per Bradley’s model. In the previous chapter, we estimated that the core group of Al Qaeda currently has a medium level of flux (between 0.6746 – 0.4962) and control (between 0.7357 – 0.5730), based on which the safest strategy to reduce the charismatic effect would be to adopt the *“insufficiency strategy.” This strategy involves reducing both the flux and control, to such levels that the group chokes due to lack of energy earlier provided by flux and the ability to control provided by its power structure and other control mechanisms.* Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to identify means to further reduce a) the level of flux and b) the level of control in Al Qaeda, thus bringing the organization into an insufficiency zone, as per the Bradley’s model. The means so identified could then form policy guidelines in dealing with core Al Qaeda and reducing the charismatic effect.

A. MEANS TO REDUCE THE FLUX IN AL QAEDA

As indicated earlier in Chapter III, we can vary the flux in a group by manipulating the cohesion, the social network, the leader's ability to deliver, and the ideology of the group. The means by which we can achieve these are: firstly, direct action, secondly, information operations, and thirdly, counter social movements propagating an alternate ideology. Figure 11 schematically depicts this approach. The strategies suggested below could target both flux and control. However, the specific theme implemented by the strategies would suggest whether they are meant for varying flux or control. For example, if direct action just focuses on restricting the operating space of Al Qaeda, it would be flux related; however, should the direct action focus on targeting the organizational structure or the financial resources it would be control related.




Figure 11. Strategies to Reduce the Flux in Al Qaeda

1. Direct Action—Anti-cohesion

Direct action implies denying safe havens for the group that facilitate its conduct of cohesion-building activities such as training, indoctrination, congregation, and other socialization processes. Simply put, keep the group on the run. The coalition forces are already undertaking such an action, which also

explains why the current flux level in Al Qaeda is relatively low. However, the continued availability of safe havens in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) probably explains the current level of flux in the group. We need to continue our efforts to squeeze the operating space of Al Qaeda in FATA, even if it involves joint operations with Pakistan. This would help reduce the flux in the group. However, we need to avoid collateral damage in this process as it would enhance the flux, because causing collateral damage provides validity to the terrorist cause and thereby justifies the argument of its leader, which directly affects group cohesion. The group would cohere more in line with its leader's wishes.

2. Information Operations (IO): Anti-cohesion Anti-leadership Anti-ideology

A second means to reduce the flux would be through sustained information operations. The information operations (IO) need to target firstly, stories related to rifts in the Al Qaeda leadership; secondly, stories delegitimizing the leaders (Osama and Zawahiri) or stories creating a gulf between the leaders and the followers; and thirdly, anti-ideology. While all the security forces are undertaking such activities, they are not meeting with success because the methodology needs refinement. The IO campaign should appear to emerge from the Islamic world. Any amount of IO campaign from the West will only worsen the matter. As Crenshaw says, "US intentions will always be doubted and its activities are a lightning rod for terrorism."¹⁸⁹ For example, Maghraoui is recommending the creation of a "Muslim World Foundation," funded through an act of the U.S. congress to target moderate Islam as a counter to the radical Islamic groups like Al Qaeda.¹⁹⁰ The initiative is a wonderful suggestion, but care and caution are required so that the Muslims should not see the initiative as a

¹⁸⁹ Martha Crenshaw, *"The "Terrorism Studies" Community and the UN Role in Counter-terrorism,"* Columbia University Press, 2002, 5, <http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/cio/cio/projects/crenshaw.pdf> (accessed on December 7, 2008).

¹⁹⁰ Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal," *Special Report, United States Institute for Peace*, Washington, DC, July 2006, www.isip.org, 1.

Western agenda. However, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) or NGOs from the region should only sponsor such initiatives; U.S. involvement could be tacit.

The proposed NGO must focus on all aspects connected with terrorism, which delegitimize the story of AQ. It should highlight AQ's nexus with drug trafficking, human smuggling, and money laundering. The method should, however, take the form of Itjihad (public debate) either online or during the face-to-face meetings at the proposed World Muslim Foundation meetings. This way we would more effectively reduce the flux level in Al Qaeda. Some other ways to target the ideology of Al Qaeda to reduce the flux are:

- **Incorporating alternate but moderate Muslim voices** in the IO campaign. This would reduce the effect of Osama and Al Qaeda's message. Esposito says that because acts of violence grab headlines, most of us know a lot more about advocates of a "clash," militant jihadists, than about those who are working toward a peaceful revolution and civilized dialogue. Esposito goes on to give examples of modern Muslim thinkers such as Abdurahman Wahid Indonesia, Dr. Amien Rais, a University of Chicago-trained political scientist and former leader of Indonesia, Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, Dr. Ecmettin Erbakan of Turkey, and Muhammead Khatami of Iran who all went on to become presidents, prime ministers, speakers and leaders of moderate and modernist Islamic movements in their respective countries.¹⁹¹ Personalities such as Drs. Tariq Ramdan, the grandson of Hassan al Banna (the founder of one of the most radical organizations in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), and Md Arkoun from Sweden, Abdulaziz Sachedin, Fathi Osman, and Sulayman Nyang, from the USA are a few examples of

¹⁹¹ John L. Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2002, 65.

increasingly moderate voices in the Muslim world. Incorporating such personalities as counter to Osama and Al Qaeda in the information campaigns would contribute to diverting the members of Al Qaeda towards moderate ideologies and thus reduce its flux effect. Similarly, Sagemen suggests that promoting Islamic heroes who promote and fight for peace must form part of the counter theme to win the battle for the hearts and minds. Worldwide media should give far more play to the prominent Muslim leaders. Muslims who reject violence should join the battle online and confront the terrorists sympathizers with horrors perpetuated in their name.¹⁹²

- **Countering Salafi jihad by demilitarizing**¹⁹³ the conflict except for sanctuary denial and by reducing the terrorists to common criminals. Sagemen says this would take the glory out of Al Qaeda and Osama's message of Salafism. Demilitarizing implies calling the current campaign against Al Qaeda not a war but a police action. He suggests motivating the Muslim world by the U.S. walking the walk and taking the moral high ground; the U.S. should always seem to favor the right cause.¹⁹⁴ Incorporating such themes in the IO campaign would help lower the flux among the members of Al Qaeda as their ideology would lose the binding force and thus further lower the cohesion or the flux in the group.

3. Social Entrepreneurship: Creating an Alternate Ideology

Ideology is an important component for producing flux in a group. While we can pick holes in the ideology of the group and the leader through an information campaign, and reduce the flux by making the members disillusioned

¹⁹² Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2008, 177.

¹⁹³ By demilitarization, Sageman implies converting the operations against AQ into a non-military (police type) to steal the honor of war hero from the terrorists.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

with the ideology of the leader, a more enduring solution would be to promote an alternate ideology through social entrepreneurship. This would divert the members of the group more comprehensively in a totally new direction and would result in an alternative flux. However, to start an alternate ideology requires dedicated social entrepreneurs who can wean away the support base of Al Qaeda. Brafman and Beckstrom give examples from the real world such as starting a small bank for the poor in Kenya, which prevents many youths from the slums of Kenya from joining Al Qaeda. Similarly, he gives another example of a social entrepreneur whose efforts in community rebuilding in the town of Bamian in Afghanistan, after the vandalism of statues of Buddha by the Taliban, is gradually changing the ideology of the youth and weaning them away from joining Al Qaeda or the Taliban.¹⁹⁵ Bornstein also gives examples of silent but determined social entrepreneurs who are taking up ideological issues to change the society despite heavy odds.¹⁹⁶ Based on this concept, the study suggests starting a counter Al Qaeda Network by connecting and coalescing social entrepreneurs who focus on civic action, reconstruction, and development with the purpose of weaning away the Al Qaeda support base from FATA and the border areas of Afghanistan. To achieve this, we need independent social and economic entrepreneurs born in the operating areas of Al Qaeda, rooted in the culture, but modern in outlook. There may be very few enterprising souls, but even networking the few who are there would have the potential to generate a collective flux that may encourage others to join the movement. One may even have hope that the process starts a counter social movement; we will never find out if this might work unless we try.

There is a strong likelihood of the above initiative succeeding because there are signs of a movement emerging in the Muslim world to promote moderate Islam. Maghraoui, in his report on American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal, argues that the problem of “religious extremism” in the Muslim world is

¹⁹⁵ Brafman and Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations*, 146–147

¹⁹⁶ Bornstein, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*.

an ideological challenge best confronted by drawing on Islam's humanist and progressive traditions. He refers to this process as "*Islamic Renewal*" and defines it as *the systemic reconsideration and rationalization of Islamic doctrines, institutions, beliefs, and practices*. Many individuals and institutions are involved today in this movement. Although they are not formally connected, their efforts coalesce around research centers, individual scholars, modernist religious figures, moderated religious organizations, political parties, and activist Web sites scattered throughout the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora in the West.¹⁹⁷ He advocates encouraging the mobilization of this emerging moderate Muslim social movement by broadening the societal support for modernist Islam around a coherent vision and translating that vision into enduring pacts, viable institutions, and concrete policies. The initiative should include the collection of a database on Islamic modernist networks across the globe and networking them to meet online and face to face by organizing periodic regional and global level workshops held in predominantly Muslim countries and countries where Muslims constitute significant minorities.¹⁹⁸ The initiative must leverage events such as the Fatwa, issued by over 5,000 Islamic clerics of the Deobandi sect, a militant Islamic ideology in India decrying terrorist acts and calling upon the Muslim populations to oppose terrorism.¹⁹⁹ This event had its first positive impact when the Muslim Council of India refused to accept the bodies of the terrorists involved in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks because of their non-Godly act.²⁰⁰ These incidents clearly indicate the rise of moderate Muslims, even if it is currently a minority movement against terrorism.

¹⁹⁷ Bornstein, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*, 6.

¹⁹⁸ Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal," *Special Report, United States Institute for Peace*, Washington, DC, July 2006, www.isip.org, 1.

¹⁹⁹ Blakely, Rhys, "Darool-Uloom Deoband issues fatwa against terrorism," *Times Online, U.K.*, Jun 02, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4045862.ece> (accessed on December 9, 2008).

²⁰⁰ "Muslim Council: Don't Bury Mumbai Terrorists in Indian Cemeteries," *Fox News*, December 1, 2008, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,459427,00.html> (accessed on December 7, 2008).

Mobilizing such a network is a challenging task, especially in failing and developing nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the security environment further imposes constraints on such movements, more often stifling them even before they see the light of day. Who would risk operating in a terrorist infested country? It is for this reason that the study proposes a UN facilitated network of local social entrepreneurs along the lines of Bill Drayton's Asoka Fellows organization.²⁰¹ The purpose of the social movement would be to evolve a network of entrepreneurs within the region where Al Qaeda operates today. These social entrepreneurs should work on themes such as education, rural health, village level development, social harmony, reconstruction, development, and civic action. The proposed network should be self-organizing, scale free, with UN working as the hub and the entrepreneurs as the spokes to begin with; later, independent hubs may also emerge and should be encouraged. Disciplines such as health, child education, religion, agriculture development, and crime fighting should form sub-hubs as the movement grows. The network would do wonders if it emerges through citizen group initiative.²⁰² To begin with, UN agencies could take on the establishment and management of the network. However, it needs to move into the private entrepreneurship domain as soon as the critical mass builds up to sustain the network on its own through self-organization and volunteers who believe in the development of Afghanistan and FATA.

²⁰¹ For more details, see Bornstein, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*.

²⁰² Don Tapscott, and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, Penguin Group, New York, Expanded Edition, 2008, 97.



Figure 12. Ways to Reduce the Control

B. MEANS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONTROL IN AL QAEDA

As discussed in Chapter III, we can reduce the level of control by disrupting the organizational structure of the group and directly or indirectly empowering the leader of the group. Figure 12 depicts the concept to reduce the level of control in Al Qaeda. In the following sections, we will discuss the viability of applying this concept with respect to Al Qaeda's core group.

1. Direct Kinetic Action

Kinetic action to disrupt the organizational structure of Al Qaeda is already in progress. However, what is lacking is the ability to identify and locate the elements of the organizational structure of Al Qaeda, which is primarily due to a lack of sound human intelligence. Without undermining the current effort, the fact that we have still not been able to locate the core organizational structure of Al Qaeda entails changing the approach to gathering intelligence. In order to overcome the current impasse on obtaining real time intelligence on locating the Al Qaeda leadership and its organizational structure, the study suggests the creation of *intelligence resource control and war of ideas network*. *The details of the initiative follow:*

- Intelligence networks have traditionally remained closed and bounded amongst the actors. The study proposes a more open-ended intelligence sharing mechanism with civilian administrative agencies, local bodies, and willing local headmen incorporated in it. Currently, most of the agencies work independently and share information on an as needed basis. This is a discretionary process and depends upon the willingness and attitude of the intelligence providing agencies. The web platform-based networked organization would focus on the dual tasks of intelligence gathering, sharing, and problem solving. The intelligence gathering and sharing function may remain relatively closed with controlled access; however, the problem-solving network should be scale-free and open to all. The problem-solving network should focus on identifying solutions through public participation on issues related to combating radical ideologies, intelligence gathering techniques, civic action, and development. The working of the problem-solving network would resemble a Wikipedia type of network. Conceptually, the proposed network would look like Figure 13.




Figure 13. Intelligence Network Concept

- The network would have two distinct divisions: internal and external. The internal security intelligence and resource control network would function with the direct support of the coalition forces in providing actionable intelligence for operations and resource control. Its primary function would be intelligence gathering and sharing the intelligence internally and with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) elements deployed in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the external component would be open to the common public, like Wikipedia, with the function of generating ideas related to gathering intelligence, ideas for peace, reconstruction, and development. Although a networked organization, it would have a certain amount of hierarchy. The design would look like a mix of mesh and clusters.²⁰³ See Figure 14 below. The actors would be military intelligence units, coalition forces' operational units, police intelligence units, NGOs, citizen groups, headmen, and the operational headquarters of ISAF at all levels. The network would have to organize itself to meet periodically at various levels and at

²⁰³ Patti Anklam, *Net Work*, Butterworth – Heinemann, Burlington, USA, 2007, 54–57.

varying frequencies. The bottom up approach involving the jirga, tribal chiefs and village heads is likely to provide useful results.




Figure 14. Intelligence Network

- Afghanistan and Pakistan Police (FATA) should provide the management staff for the network; coalition military intelligence units may provide the technological support until the indigenous structures achieve proficiency. Web-based meetings should form the backbone of intelligence sharing. Any agency/entity may post a problem related to an intelligence issue on the web platform seeking solutions from the net participants. With respect to usability and participation, since there will be local village headmen also incorporated in the net, I propose a local icon-based functioning of the net. Icon based functioning refers to using the net through symbols and duplicating it in local languages. As far as the participation of the civilian elements are concerned, jirga and tribal chiefs need encouragement, even negotiation to induce well-meaning people from their communities to take part in the network.

- Possible outcomes of this form of network would be real time intelligence sharing and the tapping of realistic and genuine sources of intelligence. Finally, such a collaborative process would create secondary effects such as building trust with locals; it would help tremendously in resource control of materials such as arms, ammunition, funds, and poppy money. This may also prevent a diversion of resources to the terrorists. The net is also likely to emerge as an effective platform for waging the war of ideas through the locals and village headmen being present in the net. The challenges remain the same: willingness and motivation of civilians to join such a network and the security arrangements against possible infiltration by sympathizers of Al Qaeda and Taliban.

It is felt that kinetic action backed by sound intelligence would effectively target the organizational structure, its means of communications, and specific sources of financing that provide the necessary means to the organization to exercise control over the group and its operations. Systematic degradation of means of control, but without causing collateral damage (as it causes flux to increase in terrorist groups by bonding them together), would effectively reduce the level of control in the organization. The low level of control in combination with a low level of flux would push the group into a charismatically insufficient zone. This in turn would reduce the capacity of Al Qaeda to cause violence.

2. Disempowering the Leader and the Group

As discussed in Chapter III, a leader often uses the economic resources at his command to exercise control in a group. Many scholars such as Gunaratna, Bergen, Scheuer, and Rolland also confirm that Osama bin Laden has used his ability to finance or bankroll terrorist operations as a means to exercise control in Al Qaeda.²⁰⁴ In fact, Rolland says that Osama also inherited the title of “the

²⁰⁴ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 60–66; Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 29–30.

financier of international Islamic terrorism.”²⁰⁵ Scheuer says that money is the key to the power of Osama bin Laden.²⁰⁶ Giraldo and Trinkunas state that prior to 9/11, the annual budget of Al Qaeda was approximately \$30 million, however, due to the restrictions and countermeasures imposed by the U.S., the estimates of its spending have dropped to almost \$3 million.²⁰⁷ This also explains the relative inability of Al Qaeda to exercise control over its cells and operatives. Osama, being a businessman, successful fundraiser, and international terrorism financier, finds himself acutely handicapped in the current scenario due to lack of access to money, which drastically affects the level of control in Al Qaeda. His desperation can be understood by the following fatwa issued by him to the various operators and cells of Al Qaeda, “Muslims could steal money from “the infidel” so long as 20 percent of criminal earnings went to the jihadists.” The inability of Osama to exercise control through non-availability of funds must continue so that the capability to exercise control further diminishes. While restricting the economic resources, we need to take care that we jointly target the Taliban and Al Qaeda since they enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Al Qaeda and Taliban generate their funds through Muslim charities, opium trafficking, and criminal activities. These sources need blocking by an integrated national and international effort. The problem, however, lies in achieving international cooperation between diverse internal and external agencies dealing with financial regulations, such as the banking structure, anti narcotics agencies, police, military, and customs of the U.S. and other countries involved in tracking and disrupting the fund flow to various terrorist organizations. Globalization of terrorism and the variety of ways in which money can be transferred, such as online banking, shady banking systems in certain countries, and the hawala

²⁰⁵ Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, 127.

²⁰⁶ Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 29.

²⁰⁷ Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007), 29, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip073/2006035059.html>.

system (informal banking especially popular in South Asia and the ME) make it extremely difficult to follow the money trail leading to terror groups. A globally integrated effort co-opting the various agencies appears to be the only answer to the problem. However, the fact that the U.S. has been able to achieve some success in this area should offer hope of regulating the fund flow to Al Qaeda. If we are able to block the fund flow, we would effectively reduce the level of control in the group.

3. Disempowering by Denying the Medium of Control

Bergen said after the January 14, 2009 video of Osama after the Israeli attacks on Gaza,

Sometimes he makes specific calls for attacks on particular places. For instance, he called for attacks on Spain, and there were attacks in Madrid in 2004. He called for a response to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and there was an attack by al Qaeda on the Danish Embassy in Pakistan last year. And I can give you several other examples. That's the way he maintains operational control.²⁰⁸

So, if that is the way Al Qaeda exercises control, we should somehow restrict this ability of Osama and the senior leadership of Al Qaeda to communicate with its followers and cell members. This implies putting an iron curtain over the FATA/Afghanistan border areas, the Hindu Kush Mountains, and Chitral, the places where we believe that Osama may be hiding. The moral correctness of such a step should not come in the way of eliminating a disruptive force with the potential to cause mass casualties. Similarly, Osama and Zawahiri release periodic videos and audio cassettes. In order for these cassettes to reach Al Jazeera, they first need to be prepared and then transferred to Al Jazeera. A more focused approach to following the trail of video and audio clips could, a) lead to identifying the leader's locations, and b) prevent its release, which would seriously hamper the release of the operational message of the group to its

²⁰⁸ Peter L. Bergen, "Tape shows Gaza Conflict 'Big Deal' to Bin Laden," <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/14/bin.laden.bergen/index.html> (accessed February 9, 2009).

cadre that are now not in direct contact with its core group. This would definitely reduce the level of control and thus contribute to reduction of the charismatic effect in Al Qaeda. Establishing virtual presence by Osama not only provides him with the ability to control his followers but also inject flux by virtual contact as an alternative to physical contact (overcoming the absentee charismatic effect, see Chapter III).

C. SYNTHESIS OF FLUX AND CONTROL

We surmised that applying the insufficiency strategy in the currently prevailing flux—control milieu in Al Qaeda’s core would reduce the charismatic effect. The endogenous interaction within the group of these two relational orders creates the necessary charismatic effect and stability. The study recommends a simultaneous and integrated implementation of various measures to reduce the flux and control in the core group of Al Qaeda. The essential elements of the strategy are:

- Use focused direct action to deny safe havens to prevent Al Qaeda from undertaking activities that promote cohesion, such as collective training and religious indoctrination. We need to continue our efforts to squeeze the operating space of Al Qaeda in FATA, even if it involves joint operations with Pakistan. This would help reduce the flux in the group. However, we must avoid collateral damage in this process as it enhances the flux. Similarly, we should take focused direct action to degrade the organizational structures and financial resources of Al Qaeda. For better direct action to disrupt the power and control structure of Al Qaeda, we need to establish an intelligence resource control and a war of ideas network. The purpose of the network would be to provide better actionable human intelligence. This would help avoid collateral damage besides providing ideas for an anti-ideological campaign. Similarly, for choking the diversified fund resources of Al Qaeda, as Osama is known to draw his power through funding, we need to

integrate all agencies that deal with national (Pakistan–Afghanistan based agencies) and international financing regulations, such as anti–narcotics, anti–money laundering, anti–criminal agencies. The simultaneous reduction of flux and control through direct action in a focused manner would lower the current values of flux and control. The new values would interact with each other resulting in lower charisma in Al Qaeda as per Bradley’s theory of charismatic stability. This would in turn result in less violence, as identified earlier in Chapter III.

- Undertake sustained information operations focusing on stories related to rifts in the Al Qaeda leadership; de-legitimization of the leaders (Osama and Zawahiri) or creating a gulf between the leaders and the followers; and anti-ideology. Spreading stories of rift, internal conflict, demilitarizing the salafi jihad, and encouraging alternate but modern Islamic thinkers amongst the Islamic world should form the core of this campaign. The campaign should focus on anti-cohesion, anti- leadership (de-legitimization), and anti-ideology themes.
- We need to encourage social entrepreneurs who focus on bottom-up social movements that promote alternate ideologies, social harmony, civic action, reconstruction, development, and micro-financing. Bill Drayton, a social entrepreneur, runs a worldwide organization called Asoka fellows in the under-developed and developing countries of Latin America, South Asia (especially India and Bangladesh), and SE Asia; it has some presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, too. We need to transform such movements into a revolutionary phenomenon only then we can create an alternate collective flux to counter the flux of Al Qaeda.

- Osama and the Al Qaeda senior leadership are attempting to overcome the lack of control over its cadre by exploiting virtual means such as the internet, satellite radio, and the release of video and audio cassettes from TV stations such as Al Jazeera. We need effective blocking of these channels of communications over areas where Osama and his core group are suspected to be holed up or hiding. Establishing virtual presence by Osama not only provides him with the ability to control his followers, but also inject flux by virtual contact as an alternative to physical contact (overcoming the absentee charismatic effect, see Chapter III).

In the foregoing discussions, the study has made an effort to identify the structure of charisma in a radical movement. Since charisma-induced movements produce intense violence, reducing the charismatic effect would reduce the level of violence. I applied Bradley's theory of charisma to analyze Al Qaeda because Bradley's theory also provides the scope to manipulate the charismatic effect in a group. The study found that Al Qaeda has a significant presence of charisma, especially in its core group, and that applying the "insufficiency strategy" would help reduce the charismatic effect in Al Qaeda.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

No person in the world has earned as many superlatives to describe his personality as Osama bin Laden. The attribution of charismatic qualities to Osama by various scholars prompted me to analyze Al Qaeda and its emir Osama bin Laden, from the perspective of charismatic theory. The thesis first examined the relationship between charisma and radical social movements. It was able to establish through a study carried out by “cell” and other available evidence in literature on charisma-induced terrorist movements, such as the Shining Path, the Cultural Revolution, the PKK (Kurdish Rebels), Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, and PIRA that the presence of charisma makes a radical movement excessively violent and disruptive. This implies that we can reduce the level of violence by reducing the level of the charismatic effect in a group. Pursuing this deduction, the thesis used Bradley’s theory of charisma to study Al Qaeda.

Bradley’s theory states that for the creation of charisma, a group interaction between two relational orders of the group, namely “flux” and “control” is essential. Flux represents collective energy produced due to cohesion, a sense of brotherhood, love, affection, euphoria, and optimism in the group. A strong hierarchical organizational structure, rules, regulations, and financial means create the capacity to exercise control in a group. These two relational factors endogenously react in a group to create a charisma. However, a certain minimum level of flux and control is also necessary. The study used the evidence available in literature to establish that Al Qaeda does contain a charismatic effect.

Having established that Al Qaeda has a charismatic effect, the study applied Bradley’s theory of charismatic stability to identify strategies to reduce the charismatic effect in Al Qaeda, the aim being to reduce the violence perpetuated by Al Qaeda. Bradley’s theory of charismatic stability states that if there is an imbalance in the level of flux and control, the group loses its

charismatic effect and consequently the capacity to perform transformative and innovative tasks. Depending on the level of flux and control, there are four charismatically dysfunctional and unstable zones. Firstly, there is the zone of insufficiency in which the level of flux and control are extremely low. Secondly, the zone of volatility, in which the level of flux is extremely high, but the level of control is low. Thirdly, the zone of ossification in which the level of control is very high but the level of flux is very low. Fourthly, the turbulence zone, in which both the level of flux and control are very high and the group may either dissolve or become extremely transformational and innovative. Using these findings of Bradley's, we can externally manipulate the level of flux and control in Al Qaeda and make it either charismatically unstable or reduce the level of charisma. The study then extracted opinions and incidents quoted by various experts on Al Qaeda such as Bergen, Sageman, Hoffman, Bukhari, Byman, to name a few that convey the intensity of the current level of flux and control in Al Qaeda. These incidents and opinions were then rated by an independent panel of military officers involved in combating Al Qaeda or combating terrorism in masters' programs at the Naval Postgraduate School on a scale of -1 to +1. The study found that Al Qaeda currently has a medium level of flux and control.²⁰⁹ The charismatically unstable zone closest to these values of flux and control is the "insufficiency zone." To implement the insufficiency strategy, The study has recommended using all available means to reduce the flux and control so that its charismatic effect reduces, which would lead to a reduction of violence.

Following are the salient elements of the recommended strategy: Firstly, we need to undertake focused direct action to deny safe havens that prevent Al Qaeda from undertaking activities promoting cohesion such as collective training and religious indoctrination. For better direct action to disrupt the power and control structure of Al Qaeda, we also need to establish an intelligence resource control and a war of ideas network. This would help avoid collateral damage

²⁰⁹ A word of caution is in order here. This is not the best method to identify the current level of flux and control, but within the time constraints, this was a fairly satisfactory process to assess those values prevailing in Al Qaeda.

while taking direct action as well as providing ideas for an anti-ideological campaign. Similarly, since the availability of finance also provides the ability to exercise control in a group, choking the funding resources of Al Qaeda is essential. To achieve this, we need to integrate all agencies (regional and global), which oversee or regulate the sources that may provide an avenue to finance Al Qaeda, such as anti-narcotics, anti-money laundering, banking, and anti-criminal agencies. Secondly, undertake sustained information operations focusing on spreading stories related to rifts in Al Qaeda, de-legitimization of the leaders (Osama and Zawahiri), and anti-ideology. Thirdly, we need to encourage social entrepreneurs who focus on a bottoms-up social movement that promotes social harmony, civic action, reconstruction, development, and micro-financing. We need to start such counter social movements in the Islamic world promoting social harmony, moderate Islam, and development; only then we can create an alternate collective flux to counter the flux of Al Qaeda. And finally, we should effectively block the channels of communications over areas where Osama and his core group may be hiding. Establishing a virtual presence by Osama not only provides him with the ability to control his followers, but also injects flux by virtual contact as an alternative to physical contact. It is felt that these initiatives, in combination, would help push Al Qaeda into a charismatically unstable zone and thus reduce its charismatic effect. This would then reduce the violence-making abilities of Al Qaeda or even make it dysfunctional.

While the thesis collected evidence of the presence of charismatic effect in Al Qaeda and its current level of flux and control through available assessment and evidence in the literature, a more scientific approach would be by a sociometric questionnaire to former members of Al Qaeda now in custody. Of course, we would have to assume that these individuals would respond truthfully. Similarly, we could also use Delphi techniques to assess quantitative values of flux and control in Al Qaeda by directly incorporating the acknowledged experts on Al Qaeda.

Another area that the study did not explore was the effect of charisma in the associate groups of Al Qaeda and the overall effect of charisma on the entire structure of Al Qaeda, comprised of the inner core, the intermediate layer formed by the associate groups, and the outer core formed by independent operators such as the Madrid bombers. Future studies could explore the effect of charisma in these areas. Similarly, we also need to validate the recommended strategies by exploring whether certain groups in the past were contained by following these strategies before applying them to Al Qaeda. Alternatively, we could try the measures suggested on smaller, regional groups before applying them on Al Qaeda.

Finally, there also exists the option to apply the other two strategies of destabilization, i.e., ossification and volatility strategy. The study did not suggest these strategies because of the higher level of risks involved in implementing them. For example, if we were to apply the volatility strategy, it would involve increasing the level of flux and reducing the level of control in Al Qaeda. A smart opponent like Osama may take advantage of the artificial revving up and start concentrating on just focusing on preventing our efforts to reduce the level of control. The result would be a high level of flux and a high level of control; thus transforming Al Qaeda into a charismatically transformational organization once again capable of undertaking operations of the 9/11 type. However, future studies could focus on this approach and try to find mechanisms that would prevent the opponent from manipulating the changes caused by our efforts in his group. A similar risk would be involved in the implementation of the ossification strategy except that the direction of change of the two relational orders would change, i.e., flux would have to be reduced and control increased. In this case, the opponent would be at liberty to enhance the level of flux in the group and simultaneously take steps to prevent our efforts from reducing the level of flux in his group.

To conclude, this thesis has attempted to understand the relationship between terrorism and charisma and arrive at possible ways to contain the

adverse affects caused by charisma-induced groups in the society. The study has also applied Bradley's charismatic framework to analyze and manipulate the charismatic effect in a terrorist and insurgent group on one of the most wanted terror groups, Al Qaeda. The emir of Al Qaeda has the highest reward money (25 million dollars) on his head; still he evades arrest. It is likely that our inability to apprehend him is due to the extreme cohesion between the leader and the led. Should we be able to reduce the flux and control to the region of insufficiency as illustrated in Bradley's model, we might finally have some countermeasures to effectively deal with bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

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APPENDIX A. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF FLUX IN AL QAEDA

Table 2. Incidents / Events / Assessments by Experts Related to Flux

| Ser | Year | Date | Event | Rater's assessment | Source |
|-----|------|-----------------|---|--------------------|---|
| 1 | 2005 | - | People who bond tightly united by a team banner or a shared goal or belief system-feel empowered and ennobled by their membership in an exclusive club of like-minded people. Membership can be a powerful cult-like experience. Examples flood the mind: churches, Hitler's SS... terror groups like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. | | Management Secrets of the New England Patriots: Building a High-Performance Organization, By James Lavin, Edition: illustrated, Published by Pointer Press, 2005. |
| 2 | 2005 | July 28, 2005 | According to U.S. officials, Al Qaeda has lost most of its personnel and is now under siege in Pakistan and Afghanistan. | | Al Ahram journal of Security Studies Egypt, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/753/op33.htm . |
| 3 | 2006 | August 11, 2006 | The terrorist attack on Khobar, Saudi Arabia—the hub of the Saudi oil industry—by four al-Qaeda operatives on May 29, 2004, provided a significant morale boost for al-Qaeda. The attack resulted in the deaths of 22 foreigners. The jihadi | | Terrorism Monitor Volume: 4 Issue: 16 August 11, 2006 02:27 Pm Age: 3 Yrs, By: Abdul Hameed Bakier Event Took Place in 2004, However, since |

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|---|------|---------------------|---|--|---|
| | | | forums used this attack to boast about their strength and the righteousness of their cause. | | the report on Al Qaeda's is dated In 2006, It is taken as post 2006, assessment. |
| 4 | 2007 | November 14th, 2007 | Al Qaeda's resurgence is a self-fulfilling U.S. prophecy: | | General Haq Pakistan Army, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/al-qaedas-resurgence-a-self-fulfilling-us-prophecy-general-haq_1003408.html . |
| 5 | 2008 | May 29, 2008 | Al Qaeda and Taliban have regrouped, rearmed, and retrained in safe havens in the Pashtun tribal lands that straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Pakistan army's incursion into the tribal zone was defeated; the new, less-pro-U.S. government in Islamabad is suing for peace with the tribes. The Muslim world perceives that the U.S. military is being defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan. This advances each part of al-Qaeda's doctrine for fighting America – casualties, costs, and disunity – and it has been achieved without a follow-up-to-9/11 attack. | | Michael Scheuer, Antiwar.Com, http://www.antiwar.com/scheuer/?articleid=12911 . |
| 6 | 2008 | Jun 17, | Our loss in Vietnam forever shattered the domestic consensus in favor of the Cold War, | | Al-Qaeda's Vietnam - An Islamist backlash. By Rich Lowry, |

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|---|------|-------------------|---|--|---|
| | | 2008 | creating a crisis of national confidence known as the Vietnam Syndrome. Al-Qaeda's troubles in Iraq correspond with a similar unraveling of its ideological cohesion. Reports in <i>The New Yorker</i> and <i>The New Republic</i> recently have detailed an Islamist backlash against al-Qaeda's indiscriminate killing in Iraq. | | http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=zgi0ztk2zihlmtqxmza4mzkwyjhinjbiyte3mtvimta=#more . |
| 7 | 2008 | February 27 | Bhutto's death on December 27, as well as the previous attempts on her life, really exemplifies the fact that the Al Qaeda and Taliban have created the rudiments of a radical Islamic state in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, with enough power, cohesion and political reach anywhere in the region. | | David Goud, http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/27guest.htm . |
| 8 | 2008 | September 4, 2008 | U.S. Failure Breeds a Stronger al-Qaeda. A failed military strategy spawns a far more dangerous movement that could engulf Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. | | Ahmed Rashid, Asia Sentinel, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1416&Itemid=212 . |
| 9 | 2008 | December 09, 2008 | A recently intercepted communiqué consisting of a batch of subject-related letters between the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan offers an interesting window into the infighting within its | | Foundation for defense of democracies, Tony Badran, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content& |

| | | | | | |
|----|------|--------------------|--|--|---|
| | | | ranks. The main theme of this correspondence relates to AQI leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri. It details criticism of his performance, and complaints about his capability to continue in his role. | | task=view&id=11782255&itemid=353. |
| 10 | 2008 | September 12, 2008 | "The end is in sight in the sense that, it is very difficult for Al Qaeda to attack the United States right now. On the other hand, they're patient, they think god is on their side. They are going to be around for a while. Al Qaeda in Iraq is weakened. Al Qaeda on the Afghan/Pakistan border is stronger. | | Peter Bergen Discusses State of Al Qaeda at UVa Forum, http://www.charlottesvilleneplex.tv/news/headlines/28319389.html , (Accessed on March 30, 2009). |
| 11 | 2008 | July 29, 2008 | From horror, incomprehension, and the rush to conclude that "They hate us for our freedoms" – typical of the post-Sept. 11 response – there is now a shift toward viewing Al Qaeda as a fractious group that can be subverted and defeated by manipulating its internal divisions. | | "How the best and the brightest plan to fight terrorism; "A peek at how the next generation will tackle the 'Long War'."By Iason Athanasiadi, The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0729/p09s01-coop.html (accessed on March |

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|----|------|--------------------|---|--|---|
| | | | | | 30, 2009). |
| 12 | 2008 | June 28, 2008 | "There may be a wave of violence right now, but ... in five years, al-Qaida will be more isolated than ever. No one will give a toss about them," he says. And, given the religio-ideological basis of al-Qaida's jihad, the religious condemnation being offered by scholars and fighters once close to the organization is arguably the most important development. | | "Osama bin Laden is losing the fight within," Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank , The Australian, http://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1RNCN_enUS315US315&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=html (accessed on March 30, 2009). |
| 13 | 2009 | February, 12, 2009 | Al-Qaeda 'less capable and effective': U.S. intel chief. At the same time, however, Blair noted Al-Qaeda threats arising in other areas. | | AFP, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/aleqm5iydnbz_uapcqi-p_o5-o3ci6pwmpg . |
| 14 | 2009 | March 5, 2009 | By 2007 the U.S. intelligence community was publicly warning that Al Qaeda had "reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leaders." | | Excerpts from "threats, options, and risks in Pakistan," A report by centre for American progress, By Ccolin Cookman, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pakistan_strikes . |

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|---|------|---------------|---|--|--|
| 15 | 2009 | March 5, 2009 | In a testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair credited a “succession of blows” against Al Qaeda’s senior command structure for their “potential to further degrade its organizational cohesion. ” | | html , (Accessed On Mar 30, 2009). |
| 16 | 2009 | March 5, 2009 | Osama bin Laden’s terror movement has thus far proven resilient and able to adapt to these pressures. Pakistani intelligence officials have expressed fears that, in the face of punishing Predator strikes, Al Qaeda operations will diffuse “to conduct decentralized operations under small but well-organized regional groups.” | | |
| Total Positive Control Value “ + ” | | | | | |
| Total negative assessment values “ – ” | | | | | |
| Level of control = {$\sum + / \sum +$ & - } | | | | | |

Overall aggregated value of Flux in Al Qaeda

| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|
| Average Mean of 16 Raters | 0.5979 | For details see Table 3 below. |
| Standard Deviation | 0.0959 | |
| Upper Range of Control | 0.6938 | |
| Lower Range of Control | 0.5020 | |

Table 3. Calculation of the Current Level of Flux

| Ser | Incidents | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | R7 | R8 | R9 | R10 | R11 | R12 | R13 | R14 | R15 | R16 |
|-----|--|----|----|----|----|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|------|-------|-------|-----|-----|-----|
| 1 | People who bond tightly united by a team banner or a shared goal or belief system-feel empowered and ennobled by their membership in an exclusive club of like-minded people. Membership can be powerful cult like experience. Examples flood the mind: churches, Hitler's SS... terror groups like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.(p. 29) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | According to US officials, Al-Qaeda has lost most of its personnel and is now under siege in Pakistan and Afghanistan. | -1 | 0 | -1 | 1 | -0.5 | -1 | 0.75 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.75 | -0.75 | -1 | -1 | 0 |
| 3 | The terrorist attack on Khobar, Saudi Arabia—the hub of the Saudi oil industry—by four al-Qaeda operatives on May 29, 2004, provided a significant morale boost for al-Qaeda. The attack resulted in the deaths of 22 foreigners. The jihadi forums used this attack to boast about their strength and the | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | -0.5 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|----|------|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|------|----|------|----|--|
| | righteousness of their cause. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Al Qaeda's resurgence is a self-fulfilling US prophecy: | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -0.5 | 0.75 | -1 | 0.75 | -0.5 | +1 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.5 | 0 | |
| 5 | Al Qaeda and Taliban have regrouped, rearmed, and retrained in safe havens in the Pashtun tribal lands that straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Pakistan army's incursion into the tribal zone was defeated; the new, less-pro-U.S. government in Islamabad is suing for peace with the tribes. The Muslim world perceives that the U.S. military is being defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan. This advances each part of al-Qaeda's doctrine for fighting America – casualties, costs, and disunity – and it has been achieved without a follow-up-to-9/11 attack. | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| 6 | Our loss in Vietnam forever shattered the domestic consensus in favor of the Cold War, creating a crisis of national confidence known as the | -1 | 0.25 | -0.6 | 1 | -0.5 | 0.75 | -0.6 | -1 | -0.5 | -1 | -1 | -5 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | -1 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----|------|----|----|------|------|------|------|----|------|----|----|-------|----|-----|------|--|
| | Vietnam Syndrome. Al-Qaeda's troubles in Iraq correspond with a similar unraveling of its ideological cohesion. Reports in <i>The New Yorker</i> and <i>The New Republic</i> recently have detailed an Islamist backlash against al-Qaeda's indiscriminate killing in Iraq. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Her death on December 27, as well as the previous attempt on her life after she reached Karachi, really exemplifies the fact that the Taliban/Al Qaeda nexus has created the rudiments of a radical Islamic state in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, with enough power, cohesion and political reach anywhere in the region. | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | -0.5 | 0.75 | 0.6 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 1 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | |
| 8 | US Failure Breeds a Stronger al-Qaeda. A failed military strategy spawns a far more dangerous movement that could engulf Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. | 1 | 1 | 1 | -1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.6 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | +5 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 9 | A recently intercepted communiqué | -1 | -0.5 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 0.75 | -0.6 | 0.75 | -1 | 0.75 | -1 | -1 | -0.75 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|--|------|---|----|----|------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|-------|----|------|---|-----|
| | consisting of a batch of subject-related letters between the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan offers an interesting window into the infighting within its ranks. The main theme of this correspondence relates to AQI leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri. It details criticism of his performance, and complaints about his capability to continue in his role. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | "The end is in sight in the sense that, it is very difficult for Al Qaeda to attack the United States right now. On the other hand, they're patient, they think god is on their side. They are going to be around for a while. Al Qaeda in Iraq is weakened. Al Qaeda on the Afghan/Pakistan border is stronger. | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | +1 | 0.5 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0 | 0.6 | +0.75 | 1 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | From horror, incomprehension, and the rush to conclude that "They hate us for our freedoms" – typical of the | -0.5 | 0 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | 1 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -1 | -0.5 | 0.75 | -0.75 | -1 | -0.5 | 0 | 0.5 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|----|------|----|-----|--|
| | post-Sept. 11 response – there is now a shift toward viewing Al Qaeda as a fractious group that can be subverted and defeated by manipulating its internal divisions. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | "There may be a wave of violence right now, but ... in five years, al-Qaida will be more isolated than ever. No one will give a toss about them," he says. And, given the religio-ideological basis of al-Qaida's jihad, the religious condemnation being offered by scholars and fighters once close to the organization is arguably the most important development. | -0.5 | 0.75 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.6 | 0.5 | -0.5 | 0.75 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | -1 | 0.5 | |
| 13 | Al-Qaeda 'less capable and effective': US intel chief. At the same time, however, Blair noted Al-Qaeda threats arising in other areas. | -0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | -1 | -0.5 | 0.75 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -1 | -0.5 | 0 | 0 | |
| 14 | By 2007 the U.S. intelligence community was publicly warning that Al Qaeda had "reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | -1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 0.5 | +0.75 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | through replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leaders.” | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 | In a testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair credited a “succession of blows” against Al Qaeda’s senior command structure for their “potential to further degrade its organizational cohesion. ” | -1 | -1 | -1 | 1 | -0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 0.75 | -1 | -0.5 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.5 | |
| 16 | Osama bin Laden’s terror movement has thus far proven resilient and able to adapt to these pressures. Pakistani intelligence officials have expressed fears that, in the face of punishing Predator strikes, Al Qaeda operations will diffuse “to conduct decentralized operations under small but well-organized regional groups.” | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | +1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | |
| 17 | Total Positive Flux Value | 8.5 | 7.5 | 9 | 7 | 4.75 | 8.75 | 5.75 | 8.05 | 6 | 7.25 | 5.6 | 8 | 8.75 | 7.5 | 5 | 7 | |
| 18 | Total negative assessment | -5.5 | -2.5 | -5.6 | -5.5 | -4.6 | -2.5 | 4.55 | -5.6 | -7 | 4.75 | -6.1 | -5.5 | -6 | -6.5 | -4 | -2 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| 19 | Total absolute values of assessments, ignoring the negative sign | 14 | 10 | 14.6 | 12.5 | 9.35 | 1.25 | 10.3 | 3.65 | 13 | 12 | 11.7 | 13.5 | 14.75 | 14 | 9 | 9 |
| 20 | Mean Flux =Sum of All “+” /Absolute sum of all “+” and all “-”={$\sum+ / \sum(+\&-)$} | .607 | .750 | .616 | .560 | .508 | .777 | .558 | .589 | .461 | .604 | .478 | .592 | 0.593 | 0.535 | 0.555 | 0.7778 |

List of Raters R1 – R16

1. R1: Major Jason Brightman – US Air Force – Attending National Security Affairs Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
2. R2: Major Florinel – Romanian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
3. R3: Lt Col Zahid Mann – Pakistan Army – Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
4. R4: Major Mushtaq Rehan – Pakistan Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
5. R5: Wing Commander Qaiser Janjua Md. – Pakistan Air Force - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
6. R6: Major Chris Pratt – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate School
7. R7: Major Dennis Heaney – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School

8. R8: Cpt Rich Hagner – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate School
9. R9: Major Stephen Schnell – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
10. R10: Major Mark D. Metzger – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
11. R11: Major J Kennedy – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
12. R12: Major Felton Smith – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
13. R13: Lt Cdr Birech Roberts – Kenyan Navy - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
14. R14: Col Khajji Khaliffa – Tunisian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
15. R15: Mr Volodymyr Orativskyi - Security Services of Ukraine - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
16. R16: Retired Colonel (Indian Army) S Rana – Former Faculty Nsa Department – Naval Postgraduate School, and now Professor In The Defense Language School, Monterey

APPENDIX B. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CONTROL IN AL QAEDA

Table 4. Incidents / Events / Assessments by Experts Related to Level of Control in Al Qaeda

| Ser | Year | Date | Event | Rater's assessment | Source |
|-----|------|------------------|---|--------------------|--|
| 1 | 2005 | January 27, 2005 | Most would agree bin Laden's operations have been marginalized. Fearful of missile-laden drones and the crosshairs of a sniper's scope, the tall, lanky one has stopped making videos of afternoon strolls through the wastelands of Afghanistan with his convoy of dotting bodyguards. Like Hitler in his bunker, Osama has gone underground, but not far enough down to stop him from calling signals to his team players. | | January 27th, 2005 letter #7 from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden and Iraq. R.F. Burton. |
| 2 | 2005 | July 2005 | The back-to-back nature of the deadly attacks in Egypt and London, as well as similarities in the methods used, suggests that the al Qaeda leadership may have given the orders for both operations. It is a clear sign that Osama bin Laden and his deputies remain in control of the network, according to interviews with counterterrorism analysts and government officials in Europe and the Middle East. | | Al Qaeda Leaders Seen In Control, <i>By Craig Whitlock</i> Washington Post Foreign Service http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/23/ar2005072301052.html (Accessed On March 31, 2009). |

| | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------|---|--|---|
| 3 | 2005 or later | | <p>"I think its wishful thinking to think that he (Osama) isn't, in control. The one Example is the tremendous sophistication and spontaneity of his media machine. There has to be some command and control there. And to imagine that it doesn't-- that he's unable to do it is just incorrect. He's really a remarkable man, He's changed the course of history." Michael Scheuer</p> | | <p>Excerpts of meet the press interview with michael Scheuer http://www.resultsforamerica.org/calendar/files/meet the press transcript of russert i nterview of anonymous.pdf (accessed on mar 31, 2009).</p> |
| 4 | 2006 | Jul 2006 | <p>Terrorism is a real threat, but "Al Qaeda" is less of an organization than it is an impulse. And while "bin Laden" isn't the all-powerful terrorist mastermind he's often portrayed to be, the war in Iraq, Guantánamo, extraordinary renditions, and other Bush Administration brainstorms have ensured that his message is broadcast loud and clear throughout the world.</p> | | <p>Harpers Magazine "The Al Qaeda Clubhouse: Members lacking" Ken Silverstein http://www.harpers.org/archi ve/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda- new-members-badly- needed-1151963690</p> |
| 5 | 2007 | Septem ber 23, 2007 | <p>Lonely, marginalized, and suddenly suspicious that he was losing his grip over the organization he helped create, Osama bin Laden finally decided that enough was enough. At least that's the explanation sources close to him are giving for</p> | | <p>"Osama bin laden losing control of al qaeda?" Source – newsweek http://www.nationalterroralert .com/updates/2007/09/23/ne wswk-osama-bin-laden- losing-control-of-al-qaeda/ (Accessed On March 31,</p> |

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|---|------|--------------------|--|--|--|
| | | | why, after three long years of silence, the Qaeda leader has released one video and two audiotapes. According to Omar Farooqi, a Taliban liaison officer with Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned that a faction within his own organization had been conspiring to sideline him. | | 2009) |
| 6 | 2007 | September 27, 2007 | These are the masterminds of tremendous terrorist attacks against the United States. They're still important in terms of the ideological movement, if less so in terms of the operational control of al-Qaeda. Mr. Michael Sheehan (NBC News Terrorism Analyst) | | Excerpts of a panel discussion conducted by NBC correspondent David Gregory. |
| 7 | 2007 | Not Known | He accomplishes the goal of maintaining some international currency while apparently doing very little other than releasing video and/or audio tapes. ...while bin laden may still be alive, his relevance should be dying out. | | Analysis: On The (Ir)Relevance Of Osama Bin Laden By Zachary Justus Compos Journal http://Comops.Org/Journal/2007/09/11/Analysis-On-The-Irrelevance-Of-Osama-Bin-Laden/ (Accessed On March 31, 2009). |
| 8 | 2007 | | Senior U.S. intelligence officials said Bin Laden remains in control of al-Qaeda's central command and that its leadership council still reports to him. But they said Bin Laden weighs in on major management decisions less frequently than in the | | Al-Qaeda's New Leadership Craig Whitlock Washington Post http://www.Washingtonpost.Com/Wp-Srv/World/Specials/Terror/Binladen.html (Accessed On |

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|----|------|---------------------------|---|--|---|
| | | | past because of his inaccessibility. | | March 31, 2009). |
| 9 | 2008 | July / August 2008 | <p>Three or four years ago, Sageman's "bunch of guys" bottom-up thesis about the nature of the contemporary terrorist threat may have seemed compelling. But ever since the July 7, 2005, attacks in London and the plot to bomb airplanes over the Atlantic that was foiled in August 2006, evidence has continually come to light about al Qaeda Central's top-down direction of these and other operations. Al Qaeda Central has reconstituted itself in Pakistan's tribal frontier areas. It is again actively directing and initiating international terrorist operations on a grand scale.</p> <p>Bruce Hoffman</p> | | <p>"Does osama still call the shots?" "debating the containment of al qaeda's leadership," bruce hoffman and marc sagemen published by foreign affairs magazine http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots (accessed on march 31, 2009)</p> |
| 10 | 2008 | July / August 2008 | <p>Al Qaeda Central is of course not dead, but it is still contained operationally.... The surviving leaders of al Qaeda are undoubtedly still plotting to do harm to various countries in the world and have the expertise to do so, but they are hampered by the global security measures that have been put in place. Marc Sagemen</p> | | |

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| 11 | 2008 | July 2008 | In recent months, an impressive cast of terrorism experts and counterterrorism officials around the world has coalesced around the notion that al-Qaeda's leader is no longer an active threat to the West. They point out that he has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 or in Europe since the London bombings three summers ago. | | "Does Osama bin Laden still matter?" By Peter Bergen Time world http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1819903,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics (Accessed On March 31, 2009) |
| 12 | 2008 | July 2008 | But the best available evidence suggests that the threat posed by bin Laden's acolytes hasn't been extinguished — and his own influence over them is greater than many analysts acknowledge. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan militant groups have grown so aggressive that in late June they even threatened to take over a major city — Peshawar. Farther away, extremists in Europe and North Africa continue to covet bin Laden's blessing and the al-Qaeda brand name. | | "Does Osama bin Laden still matter?" Peter Bergen Time world http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1819903,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics (accessed on march 31, 2009) |
| 13 | 2008 | July 2008 | It's true that many of the "leaderless jihadis" have set up operations independently of al-Qaeda, but when they turn to bin Laden's organization, it's not just for inspiration but also for training, assistance and direction — in short, for leadership. Many are able and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; they pay | | "Does Osama bin Laden still matter?" Peter Bergen Time World, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1819903,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics (accessed on march 31, 2009). |

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| | | | <p>very careful attention to his Internet postings and follow his instructions. ... But al-Qaeda's most dangerous weapon has always been unpredictability. While he remains at large, the jihad will never be leaderless.</p> | | |
| 14 | 2008 | | <p>The Al-Qaeda leadership is responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack in history – and it is still free and at large. Except the 9-11 operational shura leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, who conceived and planned the operation, and Abu Hafs alias Mohamed Atef, the Emir of the Military Committee of al-Qaeda, most of the consultative council (Majlis shura) members are either free in tribal Pakistan or in detention in Iran.</p> <p>Gunaratna</p> | | <p>Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, Jamie Glazov, FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D5C28389-B48B-4189-B993-AB61D1B689C6 (accessed on March 31, 2009).</p> |
| 15 | 2008 | | <p>As to the relevance of al-Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL), they are as critical today as they were September 10, 2001. Many like to further the notion that AQSL is no longer important, that al-Qaeda has transformed into a 'leaderless jihad' and a global decentralized movement from a centralized controlled cadre of terrorists. To put it succinctly, it's not one or the other and it's not a</p> | | <p>Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, By Jamie Glazov, FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D5C28389-B48B-4189-B993-AB61D1B689C6 (accessed on March 31, 2009).</p> |

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| | | | <p>zero sum game. For those who would still contest that al-Qaeda is simply a decentralized movement, they must then also answer why the movements are still reactively driven by Internet propaganda communications that still come primarily via al-Qaeda's senior leadership through al-Qaeda's established - and quite centralized - production organizations, <u>such as as-Sahab</u>. Nothing is official - such as the recent death of Abu Laith al-Libi - until as-Sahab says so...because as-Sahab <i>is</i> AQSL. And AQSL has lost zero relevance. Schippert</p> | | |
| 16 | 2008 | | <p>Presently, Al-Qaeda is merely reduced to an ideological and strategic brain for the global jihad, transferring its violent ideology to like-minded previously local militant groups operating in the length and breadth of the Muslim world. The fact that AQSL has failed to conduct even a single attack in the US ... speaks amply of the degradation of the organization to merely a propaganda tool that feels intent on releasing videos and messages of hate to its audience in the Muslim world. Bukhari</p> | | <p>Bukhari, Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, By Jamie Glazov FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D5C28389-B48B-4189-B993-AB61D1B689C6 (accessed on March 31, 2009).</p> |

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| 17 | 2008 | | <p>Burke argues that the “nearest thing to ‘Al-Qaeda,’ as popularly understood,” only existed for a five-year period, and the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 showcased “the final scenes of its destruction.” Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan argued that while a few thousand people may claim to be al-Qaeda members, “the real Al Qaeda does not exercise any control over them.” In late January of this year, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey described al-Qaeda’s top leadership as isolated, saying they have “much, much less central authority and much, much less capability to reach out.”</p> | | <p>As quoted by David Ross, Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, By Jamie Glazov, FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D5C28389-B48B-4189-B993-AB61D1B689C6, (accessed on March 31, 2009).</p> |
| 18 | 2008 | | <p>The renewed importance of AQSL can be illustrated by comparing plots where it was involved (either in training or command and control) to plots whose operatives were self-financed and self-trained. The Fort Dix plotters had terrible operational security, actually taking a video of themselves firing weapons and yelling in a foreign tongue to Circuit City to be transferred to DVD. The hydrogen peroxide in the explosives used by Britain’s 7/21 bombers failed to react.”</p> | | <p>David Ross, Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, By Jamie Glazov, FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D5C28389-B48B-4189-B993-AB61D1B689C6 (accessed on March 31, 2009).</p> |

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| | | | Localized cells recognize that they need to link up with international networks. The Miami cell that allegedly wanted to destroy Chicago's Sears Tower reached out to al-Qaeda because they doubted they could succeed on their own. While AQSL's propaganda campaign has been the most noticeable facet of its operations over the past few years, the available evidence suggests that it is operationally relevant as well. A strong central leadership makes the group more formidable, with greater destructive potential. | | |
| 19 | 2008 | June 20, 2008 | Schippert refers to "al Qaeda Senior Leadership" (AQSL) to identify Osama bin Laden's group operating in FATA. It may create the wrong impression that AQSL is not a group but a few senior leaders without members directly controlled by them. AQ is very much a group. Core Al Qaeda is still capable but is investing a bulk of its operational resources to build the associated groups and its ideological resources to build the homegrown cells from its new home in FATA. | | Gunaratna, Symposium: Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership, By Jamie Glazov, FrontPageMagazine.com Friday, June 20, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/articles/read.aspx?guid=d5c28389-b48b-4189-b993-ab61d1b689c6 (accessed on March 31, 2009). |
| 20 | 2009 | January 14, 2009 | "No matter how isolated bin Laden is, [the tape shows] that he is following current events and | | "Osama to Obama: "I'm Still Here" The New foreignpolicy.com http://blog.foreignpolicy.com |

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|---|------|------------------|--|--|---|
| | | | maintains the ability to comment on them and get his message out there." | | m/posts/2009/01/14/osama to obama im still here (Accessed On March 30, 2009). |
| 21 | 2009 | January 14, 2009 | After six years of war, he (Obama) said, "it has not gotten better and things are going to get tougher in Afghanistan before they get better." | | "Obama: Osama still the no. 1 threat" Australian Associated Press http://www.livenews.com.au/article/index/167793?channel=home (accessed on march 30, 2009). |
| Total Positive Control Value " + " | | | | | |
| Total negative assessment values " - " | | | | | |
| Level of control = {$\sum + / \sum +$ & - } | | | | | |

Table 5. Calculation of Control Value From Assessment of Various Raters

| Ser | Assessments /Events/ Evidence of control | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
|----------|--|-------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| 1 | Most would agree bin Laden's operations have been marginalized. Fearful of missile-laden drones and the crosshairs of a sniper's scope, the tall, lanky one has stopped making videos of afternoon strolls through the wastelands of Afghanistan with his convoy of dotting bodyguards. Like Hitler in his bunker, Osama has gone underground, but not far enough down to stop him from calling signals to his team players. | 0.5 | -0.25 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.25 | 0.5 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.75 | 0 | -0.5 |
| 2 | The back-to-back nature of the deadly attacks in Egypt and London, as well as similarities in the methods used, suggests that the al Qaeda leadership may have given the orders for both operations. It is a clear sign that Osama bin Laden and his deputies remain in control of the network, according to interviews with counterterrorism analysts and | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.25 | 0.6 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.25 | 0.5 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----|------|-----|---|------|------|-----|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|----|
| | government officials in Europe and the Middle East. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | <p>"I think its wishful thinking to think that he (Osama) isn't, in control. The one Example is the tremendous sophistication and spontaneity of his media machine. There has to be some command and control there. And to imagine that it doesn't--that he's unable to do it is just incorrect. He's really a remarkable man, He's changed the course of history."</p> <p>Michael Scheuer</p> | 1 | 0.25 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.75 | -0.5 | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 |
| 4 | <p>Terrorism is a real threat, but "Al Qaeda" is less of an organization than it is an impulse. And while "bin Laden" isn't the all-powerful terrorist mastermind he's often portrayed to be, the war in Iraq, Guantánamo, extraordinary renditions, and other Bush Administration brainstorms have ensured that his message is broadcast loud and clear throughout the world.</p> | -1 | 0 | 0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | 0.25 | -1 | -0.75 | -0.5 | 0.25 | -0.5 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | 0.5 | -1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|------|----|-----|------|------|-------|-----|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|----|------|
| 5 | Lonely, marginalized, and suddenly suspicious that he was losing his grip over the organization he helped create, Osama bin Laden finally decided that enough was enough. At least that's the explanation sources close to him are giving for why, after three long years of silence, the Qaeda leader has released one video and two audiotapes. According to Omar Farooqi, a Taliban liaison officer with Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned that a faction within his own organization had been conspiring to sideline him. | -1 | -1 | 0.5 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.25 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -0.75 | -0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | -1 | -1 |
| 6 | These are the masterminds of tremendous terrorist attacks against the United States. They're still important in terms of the ideological movement, if less so in terms of the operational control of al-Qaeda. Mr. Michael Sheehan (NBC News Terrorism Analyst) | -0.5 | 0 | 0 | -0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | -0.25 | -0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | -0.75 | -1 | -1 | 0 | -0.5 |
| 7 | He accomplishes the goal of | -0.5 | -1 | -0 | -0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -0 | -0.5 | -0 | -0.5 | -0.75 | 0.75 | -0.7 | 1 | -1 | -0 |

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|---|---|-----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|---|------|---|---|------|---|---|
| | maintaining some international currency while apparently doing very little other than releasing video and/or audio tapes. ...while bin laden may still be alive, his relevance should be dying out. | | | 5 | 5 | | 5 | 6 | | 5 | | | | | | | 5 |
| 8 | Senior U.S. intelligence officials said Bin Laden remains in control of al-Qaeda's central command and that its leadership council still reports to him. But they said Bin Laden weighs in on major management decisions less frequently than in the past because of his inaccessibility. | 0.5 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.25 | 0.5 | 0 | -0.5 | 1 | 1 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| <p>9</p> | <p>Three or four years ago, Sageman's "bunch of guys" bottom-up thesis about the nature of the contemporary terrorist threat may have seemed compelling. But ever since the July 7, 2005, attacks in London and the plot to bomb airplanes over the Atlantic that was foiled in August 2006, evidence has continually come to light about al Qaeda Central's top-down direction of these and other operations. Al Qaeda Central has reconstituted itself in Pakistan's tribal frontier areas. It is again actively directing and initiating international terrorist operations on a grand scale. Bruce Hoffman</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>0.5</p> | <p>0.25</p> | <p>0.6</p> | <p>0.75</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>1</p> | <p>-1</p> | <p>0.5</p> | <p>1</p> |
| <p>10</p> | <p>Al Qaeda Central is of course not dead, but it is still contained operationally.... The surviving leaders of al Qaeda are undoubtedly still plotting to do harm to various countries in the world and have the expertise to do so, but they are hampered by the global security</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>- 0.75</p> | <p>0.5</p> | <p>- 0.2</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>0.5</p> | <p>0.6</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>-0.5</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | <p>-1</p> | <p>-1</p> | <p>0</p> | <p>- 0.5</p> | |

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|-----------|---|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|-----------------|
| | measures that have been put in place Marc Sagemen | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | In recent months, an impressive cast of terrorism experts and counterterrorism officials around the world has coalesced around the notion that al-Qaeda's leader is no longer an active threat to the West. They point out that he has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 or in Europe since the London bombings three summers ago. | - 0.5 | -1 | -1 | - 0.5 | -1 | - 0.75 | - 0.6 | - 0.75 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | 0.5 | - 0.5 | - 0.5 | 0 | - 0.5 |
| 12 | But the best available evidence suggests that the threat posed by bin Laden's acolytes hasn't been extinguished — and his own influence over them is greater than many analysts acknowledge. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan militant groups have grown so aggressive that in late June they even threatened to take over a major city — Peshawar. Farther away, extremists in Europe and North Africa | 0.75 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--|----------|---|--------------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|----------|--------------|-----|------|----------|----------|-----|---|---|
| | continue to covet bin Laden's blessing and the al-Qaeda brand name. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | It's true that many of the "leaderless jihadis" have set up operations independently of al-Qaeda, but when they turn to bin Laden's organization, it's not just for inspiration but also for training, assistance and direction — in short, for leadership. Many are able and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; they pay very careful attention to his Internet postings and follow his instructions. ... But al-Qaeda's most dangerous weapon has always been unpredictability. While he remains at large, the jihad will never be leaderless. | 0.7 5 | 1 | 0. 7 5 | 0. 7 5 | 0. 6 | 0. 7 5 | 0. 6 | 0.7 5 | 0. 7 5 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.7 5 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 |
| 14 | The Al-Qaeda leadership is responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack in history – and it is still free and at large. Except the 9-11 operational shura leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, who conceived and planned the operation, and Abu Hafs alias Mohamed Atef, the Emir of the | 0.7 5 | 1 | - 0. 5 | 0. 6 | 0. 5 | 0. 7 5 | 0. 6 | 1 | 0. 5 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.7 5 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|------------|-------------|----------|----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|
| | Military Committee of al-Qaeda, most of the consultative council (Majlis shura) members are either free in tribal Pakistan or in detention in Iran. Gunaratna | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 | As to the relevance of al-Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL), they are as critical today as they were September 10, 2001. Many like to further the notion that AQSL is no longer important, that al-Qaeda has transformed into a 'leaderless jihad' and a global decentralized movement from a centralized controlled cadre of terrorists. To put it succinctly, it's not one or the other and it's not a zero sum game. For those who would still contest that al-Qaeda is simply a decentralized movement, they must then also answer why the movements are still reactively driven by Internet propaganda communications that still come primarily via al-Qaeda's senior leadership through al-Qaeda's established - and quite centralized - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.25 | 0.6 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | -1 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

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|----|---|----|----|----|----|------|-------|------|-------|------|----|----|------|-------|------|------|------|--|
| | production organizations, <u>such as as-Sahab</u> . Nothing is official - such as the recent death of Abu Laith al-Libi - until as-Sahab says so...because as-Sahab <i>is</i> AQSL. And AQSL has lost zero relevance. Schippert | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16 | Presently, Al-Qaeda is merely reduced to an ideological and strategic brain for the global jihad, transferring its violent ideology to like-minded previously local militant groups operating in the length and breadth of the Muslim world. The fact that AQSL has failed to conduct even a single attack in the US ... speaks amply of the degradation of the organization to merely a propaganda tool that feels intent on releasing videos and messages of hate to its audience in the Muslim world. Bukhari | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.25 | -0.5 | -0.75 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.5 | |
| 17 | Burke argues that the “nearest thing to ‘Al-Qaeda,’ as popularly understood,” only existed for a five- | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -1 | -0.25 | -1 | -1 | -0.7 | -1 | -1 | 0.75 | -0.75 | -1 | -0.5 | -0.5 | |

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|----|---|---|------|---|---|-----|-----|-----|------|---|------|---|---|------|---|---|---|
| | <p>year period, and the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 showcased “the final scenes of its destruction.” Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan argued that while a few thousand people may claim to be al-Qaeda members, “the real Al Qaeda does not exercise any control over them.” In late January of this year, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey described al-Qaeda’s top leadership as isolated, saying they have “much, much less central authority and much, much less capability to reach out.”</p> | | | | | | 5 | | | 5 | | | | | | | |
| 18 | <p>The renewed importance of AQSL can be illustrated by comparing plots where it was involved (either in training or command and control) to plots whose operatives were self-financed and self-trained. The Fort Dix plotters had terrible operational security, actually taking a video of themselves firing weapons and yelling in a foreign tongue to Circuit City to be</p> | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|-----|------|-----|---|------|---|------|---|------|-----|-----|---|-----|-----|---|---|
| | <p>transferred to DVD. The hydrogen peroxide in the explosives used by Britain's 7/21 bombers failed to react." Localized cells recognize that they need to link up with international networks. The Miami cell that allegedly wanted to destroy Chicago's Sears Tower reached out to al-Qaeda because they doubted they could succeed on their own. While AQSL's propaganda campaign has been the most noticeable facet of its operations over the past few years, the available evidence suggests that it is operationally relevant as well. A strong central leadership makes the group more formidable, with greater destructive potential.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | <p>Schippert refers to "al Qaeda Senior Leadership" (AQSL) to identify Osama bin Laden's group operating in FATA. It may create the wrong impression that AQSL is not a group but a few senior leaders without members directly controlled by them. AQ is very</p> | 1 | 0.5 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | much a group. Core Al Qaeda is still capable but is investing a bulk of its operational resources to build the associated groups and its ideological resources to build the homegrown cells from its new home in FATA. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20 | "No matter how isolated bin Laden is, [the tape shows] that he is following current events and maintains the ability to comment on them and get his message out there." | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 21 | After six years of war, he (Obama) said, "it has not gotten better and things are going to get tougher in Afghanistan before they get better." | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 22 | Total Positive assessment | 10 | 7.25 | 9 | 9.45 | 10.05 | 8.75 | 9.08 | 9.5 | 9.75 | 7.75 | 8.3 | 10.75 | 11.25 | 8.25 | 8.5 | 10 |
| 23 | Total negative assessment | -5.5 | -6 | -5 | -4.7 | -4 | -1.5 | -4.7 | -5.5 | -5.75 | -5 | -6 | -5.75 | -5.5 | -7 | -3 | -5.5 |
| 24 | Total values of assessments (absolute values, ignoring the negative sign) | 15.5 | 13.25 | 14 | 14.15 | 14.05 | 10.25 | 14.05 | 15 | 15.5 | 12.75 | 14.3 | 16.5 | 16.75 | 15.25 | 11.5 | 15.5 |
| 22 | Mean of Each Rater =Sum of All +ve/Absolute sum of all +ve and -ve values={ $\sum + / \sum (+ \& -)$ } | 0.6452 | 0.5472 | 0.6429 | 0.6678 | 0.7241 | 0.8537 | 0.6759 | 0.6333 | 0.6290 | 0.6078 | 0.5804 | 0.6515 | 0.6737 | 0.5410 | 0.7391 | 0.6452 |

Overall aggregated value of Control in Al Qaeda

| | |
|---------------------------|--------|
| Average Mean of 16 Raters | 0.6542 |
| Standard Deviation | 0.0784 |
| Upper Range of Control | 0.7326 |
| Lower Range of Control | 0.5758 |

List of Raters R1 – R16

1. R1: Major Jason Brightman, US Air Force – Attending National Security Affairs Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
2. R2: Major Florinel – Romanian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
3. R3: Lt Col Zahid Mann – Pakistan Army – Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
4. R4: Major Mushtaq Rehan – Pakistan Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
5. R5: Wing Commander Qaiser Janjua Md. – Pakistan Air Force - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
6. R6: Major Chris Pratt – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate School

7. R7: Major Dennis Heaney – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
8. R8: Cpt Rich Hagner – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate School
9. R9: Major Stephen Schnell – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
10. R10: Major Mark D. Metzger – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
11. R11: Major J Kennedy – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
12. R12: Major Felton Smith – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
13. R13: Lt Cdr Birech Roberts – Kenyan Navy - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
14. R14: Col Khajji Khaliffa – Tunisian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
15. R15: Mr Volodymyr Orativskyi - Security Services of Ukraine - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate School
16. R16: Retired Colonel (Indian Army) S Rana – Former Faculty Nsa Department – Naval Postgraduate School, and now Professor In The Defense Language School, Monterey

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