

DEF. DOC. #266

Translated by Defense Language
Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Affidavit (No.1) of Kawabe, Torashiro

I, KAWABE, Torashiro, being first duly sworn according
to the customary formality in this country
and I understand the contents of the foregoing.

Exhibit 2408

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I, KAWABE, Torashiro, was a member of the Second (operations) Section of the General Staff from December, 1922 (11th year of Taisho) till 1925 (14th year of Taisho) I was again a member of the same Section from April, 1929 (4th year of Showa) till January, 1932 (7th year of Showa) and during this period, encountered the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in September, 1931 (6th year of Showa). Later my duties were changed to those of troop disposition at the Central Command, so I shall make a statement about matters concerning troop disposition at the Central Command from the time previous to the incident to the time of my leaving office, according to what I remember

I. Outlook of the Central Command on a world-wide Basis on the International Situation prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

The Central Command, due to its appointed task of working out of troop disposition for national defense, had to keep constant observation of the current international situation in order to decide upon their national defense outlook. Moreover, since there was a military and naval disarmament problem of world-wide scope, at the time I was on duty with the General Staff, the Central Command was keenly investigating the international situation to determine a basis for Japanese armaments.

The general outlook of the Central Command on the world situation around 1930 (5th year of Showa) was as follows:

1.) The competition for world-domination among the Western peoples, especially the European powers, was brought to a conclusion with the First World War. As a result of this, their energy which had been directed towards East Asia on a world-wide policy basis, whether by pushing forward through the continent or along the coast, had largely diminished, at least

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for the time.

2.) Among the western peoples, this one group which crossed the Atlantic and established a strong solid foundation in North America, has been strengthening by leaps and bounds its world-controlling activities, as a result of the First World War, towards the Asiatic mainland crossing the Pacific and, moreover, is continuing to do so more and more.

3.) China, who from the middle of the 19th century, had been forced to place the greater part of her national rights at the disposal of foreign countries with slight or almost no resistance, is now disposed, in response to the actual situation mentioned in (1), to resist foreign advance and is developing an enthusiastic tendency to recover her national rights. Although she is now abstaining from such unqualified anti-foreign activities as were resorted to in some areas of Middle and South China in 1926, this tendency is by no means diminishing, but is increasing especially in Manchuria, where it is being followed by the local war-lords.

4.) Japan, who gained a powerful position in the International scene at comparatively small cost in the First World War, is now laboring under active reactionary pressure from the respective powers.

II. The Central Command's National Defense Outlook at the time.

The Central Command, taking a general view of the international situation as previously mentioned, took consideration of Japan's national defense outlook and position based on this as follows:

1.) As indicated in # 1 of the previous section, there was no danger of a direct clash between Japan and Russia in the immediate future in connection with the latter's policy towards East Asia, which has traditionally

been a great threat to Japanese national defense.

2.) The inter-relation of (3) and (4) of the previously given estimation would have made it probable that Japan would be reduced to a passive status difficult to bear. If, however, relations between Japan and China were to become complicated and if Japan's position were to affect too adversely the policy of the United States towards China or in the Pacific, there would be a possibility of this developing into a war with both China and the United States.

3.) If such a war as the above were to break out, Japan, from the standpoint of national strength, would have very little prospect of seeing it through.

4.) The Soviet Union of the time was a young nation and was maintaining a passive attitude in her foreign policy, but it was necessary to consider the possibility that such a war as mentioned above should break out and bring Japan to bay, Soviet Russia might participate in the war with the opposite side in order to gain international prominence with the least effort and at the slightest costs. This is evidenced in the history of the development of the Russian race and again from the standpoint of her national feeling, one can think of the probability of her having not gotten rid of her spirit of vengeance for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. If, in this manner, it becomes a war where we have these three nations as opponents, Japan's chance prospects of seeing the war through would become increasingly slim.

5.) That above conclusions having been reached, we had to anticipate a war which would spread without a doubt to several nations, leading to a situation beyond our control if a large-scale military clash should arise

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between Japan and China.

As the Central Command had arrived at the above conclusion, we made plans for national defense aiming at the maintenance of our existing rights and put the minimum of our defense power on the continent of Asia. Moreover, within the limits of my knowledge, I can not recollect a single person in a responsible position in the Central Command who advocated positively the adoption of active militaristic measures against other countries or to claim any new rights from China. On the contrary, every one had a restrained attitude even towards the fervent trend on the part of China to recover her rights.

III. Troop Disposition Plans of the Central Command at the time.

As the Central Command had taken a national defense outlook, as stated in the previous section, their troop disposition plans were fundamentally very passive. They did not have any plans made to fight against several countries at the same time, but only a plan of troop disposition to fight singly with China, the U.S.A. or with the U.S.S.R. respectively, based on the fact that if, in the event that war should break out for one reason or another, they had expected their opponents to be limited to but one nation by the use of political or diplomatic measures.

And the so-called war plans against China were but plans for a temporary expedition to China to meet the situations arising from special relations between China and Japan and were not plans based on an idea of total war.

As for the U.S. war, although it is true that we made a tentative plan of tactical offensive movements against the Philippines and Guam to be carried out by a part of our armed forces for the purpose of strategic defense, we con

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sidered it necessary that we make a strategic defense stand in various other areas. For this reason I planned General Staff manoeuvres in order to study realistically a way of defense to stop U.S. troops from invading Formosa and HOKKAIDO and this was carried out in May, 1930 (5th year of Showa) and June, 1931 (6th year of Showa) with the then Chief of the 1st Section, Major General HATA, Shunroku as Commander-in-Chief. And as for the operations plan against Russia, these were of a very abstract nature in those days. We planned only a basic plan in anticipation of encounters on the frontiers of South and North Manchuria and we were thinking of making a defensive stand in northern Korea.

IV. The Outbreak of the So-Called "Manchurian Incident" and the Central Command's Counter-Measures. Not long after my taking office for the second time with General Staff Headquarters, it was a fact that circumstances in Manchuria had developed to a situation where they were gradually arousing the concern of the Central Command. The anti-Japanese policy in Manchuria, the center of which was the Mukden Regime, was getting more and more open and this situation made us fear that our acquired rights in Manchuria might disappear and our minimum defensive means on the continent might become destroyed. What especially strongly irritated the Central Command was the true existence of complications between the Soviet Union and the Mukden Regime since the summer of 1929 (4th year of Showa). Accordingly, this fact gave the Central Command an uneasy feeling that the Mukden Regime might, imposing upon the patient attitude of other parties (T.N. i.e., Japan), take up some direct steps and might not hesitate to even resort to arms. Thereupon the Central Command

did strengthen their attention and vigilance towards Manchuria than heretofore, but this neither included any amendments in their troop disposition plans against China nor in their relations towards Manchuria too did it differ from heretofore, but to protect the rights of the South Manchurian Railway and those in the adjoining areas, and to safeguard the Japanese residents in these and other important areas such as the Chinntao district or the city of Harbin, where many Japanese resided. And in order to fulfil this program, the Central Command set a basic plan to the Kwantung and Korean Armies, and ordered the two armies to make detailed plans according to it. There was included the consideration of reinforcing the former army by the latter.

V. Duties Imposed Upon the Kwantung Army and Its troop Strength etc.

The duty given the Kwantung Army by the Central Command at the time was "to defend our leased territory of Kwantung-Chow and to protect the South Manchurian Railroad which belonged to our country." The Central Command from the days of peace had ordered the Commander of the Kwantung Army to set up a plan to cope with any emergencies, and to have our troops occupy and defend the important areas along the South Manchurian Railroad, in the event that it becomes necessary for Japan to resort to arms in Manchuria.

Moreover, it is said that for the purpose of protecting the South Manchurian Railroad 15 men per 1 kilometer were allowed for disposition. This right which Russia previously held was succeeded to by Japan on the basis of the Sino-Japanese treaty, and for protection of the approximate 1000 kilometer length of the railway Japan had the right to station 15,000 men. In 1931, however, our troop strength in Manchuria was the "Independent Garrison Force" under

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Major-General MORI, which was exclusively assigned to guarding of the railway, having the strength of 6 battallions totalling 4 thousand and several hundred men, and also the 2nd Division having approximately 5,500 men under Lieutenant General TAMON which was stationed in Kwantung-Chow, south of Liaoyang. The total of these two, amounting^{to} an approximate strength of 10,000, was under the command of Lieutenant-General HONJO, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

VI. The Situation in the Central Command at the Time of the Outbreak of the MUKDEN Incident.

From spring to Autumn of 1931 (the 6th year of Showa), disagreeable incidents between Japan and China such as the WANCHOW Incident and the Captain NAKAMURA Incident had occurred one after another in Manchuria and the Central Command foresaw that the situation was going from bad to worse, but they did not have a presentiment that in the near future such a great incident would break out as would require momentous activity on the part of the Central Command. On the night of Sept. 18 however the MUKDEN Incident suddenly broke out.

I shall mention the situation that existed in the Central Command (for three or four days about the time of the outbreak of this incident) based on my memory and according mainly with my own activities as follows:

(1) Early in the morning of Sept. 19, I myself learned of the outbreak of the incident in the vicinity of MUKDEN from the morning newspapers at home at the time. I had no telephone^e at home and living in the suburbs of Tokyo I was not able to catch a taxi so early in the morning, so I went

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to the office by tram car the same as usual only somewhat earlier. It was a little past 7 o'clock when I arrived at General Staff Headquarters. The office was quiet as there were few persons who had arrived but I knew that my Section Chief, Colonel IMAMURA had already come but was not able to find him. A little later since, I learned that the chief was conferring with some person in the reception room for the use of the Chief of the General Staff. I knocked at the door of the room to see him, but he came out and said, "Wait awhile" and then closed the door, without listening to what I had to say. I returned to my room and was preparing for urgent business but we were short-handed as some of my junior officers were absent on leave for personal reasons. Around 9 o'clock Section Chief IMAMURA came to me with a happy look and showed me a slip of paper on which several lines of characters were written in pencil and said, "The Vice-Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General NINGMIYA, Harushige), Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army (Lieut.-General KOISO, Kuniaki) and others reached this resolution after a deliberate investigation from this morning." The slip of paper read: Actuated by this incident, the army expects to solve the Manchurian problem. By "solving the Manchurian problem" it is meant that CHANG Hsueh-liang shall be expected to fulfil present treaties to the letter.

At this time Colonel IMAMURA explained to me that at the foregoing conference, the leaders fell in with the view that the actions of the KWANTUNG army were admissible as exercising the right of self-defence, but utmost care should be taken not to spread out to the extreme within the realm of exercise of military power. He told me further that since Lieut.-General

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SUGIYAMA, Gen, the Vice War Minister, was absent due to temporary illness
Lt.-General KOISO had come in his place.

(2) At the time Section Chief IWAMURA came out of the Conference room, I think at about 9 o'clock. I read the telegraphic report addressed to the Chief of the General Staff from General HATAHSHI, Senjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, and learned that a step had been taken to dispatch to Manchuria a unit led by a brigade commander chiefly consisting of 5 infantry battalions in order to relieve the KWANTUNG army near MUKDEN. I personally know that the KWANTUNG Unit near MUKDEN was a small force and felt that the step taken by the commander of the Korean Army should be approved, and expressed my opinion regarding this to my senior officer, but by the leaders of the General Staff, reinforcement of troops in Manchuria was looked upon as an immediate occasion to widen the incident and it was decided to order the Commander of the Korean Army to stop such action. They immediately took measures to send a telegram to that effect. Moreover, taking into account the time that would be required for the commander's new order to be transmitted to the troops under his command, acting on the intention of the Central Command, the Vice Chief of the General Staff issued the following order by telegram to the Commander of the Military Police Unit at HSINICHOW on the South bank of the YALU River: "If any Korean Army Units should attempt to cross the YALU River, not knowing the orders prohibiting the expedition, the intention of the Central Command shall be conveyed in order to prevent any advance to the north of HSINICHOW."

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By these steps on the part of the Central Command, the dispatch of expeditionary forces from Korea to Manchuria was prohibited.

(3) As stated above the Central Command was determined to prevent the incident from spreading. Moreover at 10:00a.m. the Government held an emergency Cabinet Council and decided on a policy of not allowing the incident to spread beyond its present proportions. The evening of the same day, the 19th, the Central Command issued an order to stop the spreading of the incident to the Commanders of the KWANTUNG and Korean Armies.

(4) On Sept. 20, the Central Command was watching the situation without taking any special steps. In the evening of the 21st, however, the KWANTUNG Army reported that they had dispatched a part of their force to KIRIN in order to rescue our nationals resident there who were being suddenly oppressed by the Chinese authorities there and were in imminent danger. At the time, another report came from the Commander of the Korean Army that as he knew that the force near MUKDEN was close to nothing with the dispatch of forces to KIRIN, he judged that he should help the KWANTUNG Army out of danger as soon as possible, and ordered the detachment which had been ordered to stay put, to be transported to MUKDEN at his own discretion crossing the frontier.

The Central Command recognized the steps taken by the two armies in view of the actual state of affairs in the districts affected as unavoidable and requested the War Minister to have the expenditure for the Korean Army's expedition sanctioned by the Cabinet Council on the following day, the 22nd. On the 22nd, since the Cabinet under Premier WAKATSHKI at its morning session, approved the expenditure, the Chief of the General Staff submitted it to the Emperor for an exposito facto approval. I remember this petitioning to the Emperor by the Chief of the General Staff as to have been made at about 10:30 a.m. of the 22nd and I heard it was to have taken

place immediately after Premier WAKATSUKI's report to the Emperor on the Cabinet's decision.

(5) Thus this problem of dispatching troops from Korea was settled for the time being and the Central Command deemed that this action of the KWANTUNG Army of sending troops to KIRIN had brought military actions in Manchuria to a close. They further ordered that the military force dispatched to KIRIN should be evacuated to the zone along the lines of the South Manchurian Railway as soon as the situation subsided. In order to check any further action of the KWANTUNG Army, on the evening of Sept. 22, they sent the following telegram to the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army: "We now deem military action in Manchuria to have for the most part fulfilled its purpose and to have now reached a conclusion. Any further action will have a close relationship with our domestic and foreign policies, so be careful in considering matters and do not start new actions until instructions from the Central Command are received and then execute them."

VII. The Relationship of the Central Command with the Intermittent Military Movements in Manchuria. From the Above Time to the End of January 1932 (7th year of Showa).

I resigned my position with General Staff Headquarters at the end of January, 1932 (7th year of Showa). I shall relate the relationship of the Central Command with the military movements within Manchuria up to that time.

(1) Following the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, the situation was threatening in the territories of Chientao and Harbin, where many Japanese people lived. The head of the Japanese Residents Association in Chientao

and the Chief of Special Service Agencies in Harbin telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff demanding the dispatch of troops for their self-defence several times, but the latter did not respond to the above request for troops, holding fast to the principle of not utilizing military force on a wide spread basis outside of the adjoining areas of the Manchurian Railway. At the same time, the Commanders of the Kwantung and Korean Armies were notified of this main point. Regarding Harbin and the ardent demands of the Vice-consul there, the Commander of the Kwantung Army who was then preparing to dispatch troops thereupon severely restrained and put a stop to the matter.

(2) Around the beginning of October, Generals Ma Chan-Shan and Chang Hai-Pong of Manchuria and China began to dispute over the rights of the Amur River Province. Their forces confronted one another along the Tao-Anganchi Railway over which we possess influential rights. Ma's Army then destroyed the railway bridge at Nonni-River to stop Chang's northward advance. For this reason the Manchurian Railway Company commenced repairs on the bridge under the protection of a small unit from the Kwantung Army. At this time our troops received a sudden attack from Ma's army and our troops had to fight bitterly in the vicinity of Tahin. Thereafter the two armies took the position of squaring off. The Central Command gave the Kwantung Army certain concrete stipulations and began peaceful negotiations to have Ma's army withdraw within a 10 day deadline but learning that General Ma Chan-Shan was not willing to consent, on Nov. 17th the Central Command ordered the Commander of the Kwantung Army to destroy Ma's army and on accomplishing

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this mission to quickly withdraw to the south. accordingly after November 18th, several battles took place in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and the troops were swept away.

(3) After the conclusion of the above hostilities and while the Kwantung Army was assuming a course of Pacific action, several clashes occurred between Sino-Japanese forces around Tientsin in North China from around the 20th of Nov. and on the night of the 26th the two forces clashed again. The garrison troops in China were extremely few in number, and lacking in strength to defend itself, requested reinforcements from the Kwantung Army. The Commander of the Kwantung Army who received this request fortunately felt inclined to take this opportunity to settle the matter in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and decided to rescue our troops in distress and took the cause of having troops, who were in South Manchuria, advance to a position west of the Liao River, and, also, of having the troops in the vicinity of Tsitsihar sent west of the Liao River. The Central Command, however, who deemed the situation at Tientsin as not so important and at the same time in accordance with the policy of not allowing incidents to spread, gave strict orders to the Commander of the Kwantung Army on the afternoon of 27 November. "Irrespective of however the immediate situation may be, withdraw completely the unit advanced to west of the Liao River to a point east of the same river." Complying with these orders, the Commander of the Kwantung Army had the entire strength of the dispatched troops returned and assembled at Mukden during the night of the 23th.

(4) Prior to this and after the outbreak of the Mukden incident,

General Chang Hsueh-Liang who was in North China had his military base set up in Chinchou, had established there also, and in October, the Provisional Government of Mukden-Province successively concentrated his troops in the same area. The Kwantung Army who received this information had the air reconnaissance unit attached to them reconnoiter this area on October 8th. In the midst of their reconnoitering action, however, they received fire from the ground and the air unit which was carrying bombs of 10 Kilogram or thereabouts, (about the caliber of mountain artillery shells) for self-defense purposes, dropped several scores of these bombs on the Chinese military barracks, the buildings of the Chinese Provisional Government, and the like.

Receiving the report relating to this incident, the Central-Command gave strict warning to the Commander of the Kwantung Army, "Even though it may have been an inevitable action of self-defence at the instant, extreme care shall be required in aircraft activity at least over unarmed residential areas."

(5) After the actions in the vicinity of Tsitsihar and the withdrawal of the dispatched unit from the western side of the Liao-River, the Kwantung Army was concentrating its efforts for securing peace and order in all South Manchuria. For the reason that the Chinchou bombing incident of the previous section was propagandized way beyond actual facts to the world, the military Government of Chinchou gained power from this and began active operations, and, furthermore, successively concentrated large number of troops in Chinchou. It became quite clear that they were

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utilizing bandits incessantly in South Manchuria scheming to disrupt peace and order along the Manchurian Railway.

When I actually went to Manchuria in the latter part of December, I heard at the Headquarters of the Kwantung-Army that the Commander and his staff-officers were extremely concerned by the repeated violence along the South Manchurian Railroad by bandits who maintained their base at Chinchou.

I heard that the Japanese Government was negotiating with the Nanking Government and also with the Administrative Authority of Chang Hsueh-Liang through diplomatic channels at Peiping to have the Military Government at Chinchou withdraw to within the Great wall, but did not see the results of this revealed.

Furthermore, since the middle of December, the regular army (TN: of Chang) came out of the vicinity of Chinchou to a place near the South Manchurian Railroad and took a course of action in cooperation with the bandits. With this, the Central Command, in order effectively to carry out the subjugation of bandits which was recognized as necessary at a conference of directors of the League of Nations on December 10 previously, had the Kwantung Army reinforced with the basic troop strength of two brigades under the command of the Division Commander of the 20th Division newly arrived from Korea from mid-December to later December, and allowed the Kwantung Army to carry out the ^othrough subjugation of bandits from all South Manchuria to the west of the Liao River.

Thereupon the Kwantung-Army dispatched forces to subjugate the bandits

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west of the Liao-River. This punitive force began its operations on December 23 and on the 31st was advancing to an area eastward of Chinchou and on the left bank of the Taling River when the ChinChou Military Government evacuated this same area and our army entered the City of ChinChou on January 3, 1932 (7th year of Showa) truly without bloodshed. Thereafter the Kwantung-Army deployed its forces far and wide from the vicinity of ChinChou to all of South Manchuria and gave its undivided attention to the securing and maintenance of peace and order.

(6) In the manner indicated above, conditions in South Manchuria now indicated stability. In the north, however, in the vicinity of Kirin and Harbin from around the beginning of 1932 (7th year of Showa) dissension in ranks of the troops (TN: Chinese) in Kirin occurred and the anti-Japanese elements among them plundered Harbin: committed outrageous acts such as killing a Japanese and three Koreans, putting under arrest a great number of Koreans etc. Thus a total of 5,500 Japanese and Korean residents were exposed to extreme danger. At this time, on January 27, an incident occurred, where a military plane of ours which was reconnoitering this same area, received fire from the anti-Japanese forces and had to make an emergency landing. Furthermore, the officer on board was killed and the plane burned. Thereupon the Kwantung Army, for the purpose of protecting the residents in Harbin and deeming it necessary for some forces to be dispatched to this area, sought permission from the Central Command. The Central Command approved this. According to this, our forces entered Harbin at the beginning of February, 1932 (2nd year of Showa) and pursued their task of maintaining peace and order in the area.

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The above are the general highlights of the relation of our military movements within Manchuria with the Central Command over a period of four months from the time following the Mukden Incident up to the time I left General Staff Headquarters towards the end of January, 1932 (7th year of Showa). During this period following the Mukden Incident, our military movements were not consistent with a plan but unavoidable to meet successive occurring incidental circumstances despite the Central Command's policy of not allowing incidents to spread. Giving new orders for military movements to the Kwantung Army could not be avoided.

VIII. Change of Personnel in Key Positions of the Central Command.

From around December, 1931 (6th year of Showa), as to military movements in Manchuria it was no longer expected that any new movements would be required and we saw successive changes of personnel in the key positions of the Central Command. From my position at the time I did not know of the reasons for these changes of personnel in the key positions. All I know is that at the time of my leaving General Staff Headquarters at the end of January, 1932 the changes made were as follows;

1. General KANAYAMA, Hanzo left the position of the Chief of the General Staff, and Prince KOTOHIKO assumed the post.
2. Lt.-General NINOMIYA, Juji left the position of Assistant Chief of the General Staff and Lt.-General MASAKI, Jinzaburo assumed the position.
3. Major-General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu left the position of Chief of the First Section of the General Staff, and Major-General FURUSHO, Mikiro assumed the position.
4. Colonel IIMURA, Hitoshi left the position of chief of the second Branch of the General Staff, and Colonel OBATA, Toshishiro assumed

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the position.

Because of this, on December 11th, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet resigned, and General MINAMI, Jiro who was the War Minister left his position. On the 13th of the same month the INUKAI Cabinet which was formed had Lt.-General ARAKI, Sadao assuming the position of War Minister.

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This 12th day of November, 1946, at the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East,

KAWABE, Torashiro, deponent

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above mentioned
date and at the above mentioned place.

Signed and sealed:

BANNO, Junkichi, witness

OATH

I hereby swear according to my conscience to state
the whole truth, adding nothing

Signed and sealed:

KAWABE, Torashiro

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby
certify that the foregoing translation described in the above cer-
tificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct
translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the
original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

date 28 December 1946

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.

VERSUS

ARAKI, SADA0 ET AL.

AFFIDAVIT UNDER OATH (No. 2)

Exhibit 2489

In accordance with the formula employed in our country,
I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accom-
panying paper, hereby depose as follows:

KAWABE, Torashiro,
Affiant.

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Language Section

AFFIDAVIT
OF
KAWABE, TORASHIRO

As I, KAWABE Torashiro, was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August 1934 to March 1936, I shall state what I know about the position of the Kwantung Army in regard to various problems which arose in North China and Inner Mongolia resultant from the then prevailing conditions of Manchuria.

1. General Condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time

As the problems of North China and Inner Mongolia, of which I shall speak later on, are related to the condition of the Kwantung Army and Manchuria at the time, I shall first summarize the conditions which prevailed during my term of office.

(1) Leading officers of the Kwantung Army and the business in my charge.

In August 1934, when I arrived at my post, Commander of the Kwantung Army was General HISHIKARI, Takashi; Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General NISHIO, Toshizo; and Vice-Chief of Staff, Major-General OKAMURA, Yasuji. But in December the same year General MINAMI, Jiro was appointed Commander and Major-General ITAGAKI, Seishiro became Vice-Chief of Staff.

For a year after taking up my post (when I was Lieutenant-Colonel) I was chiefly in charge of affairs relating to operations and defense, and for about eight months (when I was Colonel) until I left the office was a sectional chief in charge of information.

(2) Condition of Manchoukuo.

A. Foreign relations.

At that time there were some foreign countries which gave official, or at least de facto, recognition of

Manchoukuo as an independent state. For instance, the Vatican recognized her in September 1934, and the Dominica Republic in April 1935, while the transfer of the North Manchurian Railway was signed between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo in March 1935.

As for the relations with China, the Tangku Truce Pact had been concluded between the Kwantung Army and the military regime in North China in May 1933, the year preceding my arrival at my post, and all-round diplomatic relations had not yet been established between China and Manchoukuo. However, at the so-called Dairen Conference held in July 1933 a mutual agreement was reached as to the means to avoid Sino-Japanese clash in North China, and since then agreements were concluded in succession between China and Manchoukuo, e.g. in regard to railways in July 1934, concerning customs tariff in December⁺ the same year, and regarding mail in February 1935, while with the rise of the tendency to restoration and enhancement of friendship between Japan and China the relations between China and Manchoukuo also gradually improved and China showed an attitude to virtually recognize the independence of Manchoukuo in large measure.

B. Internal condition of Manchoukuo.

After the declaration of independence of Manchoukuo in March 1932, the pseudo-troop bandits who numbered near 300,000 under the command of former war-lords in various provinces were for a time rampant throughout her territory but they were for the most part suppressed in the course

of 1933. Just as in many parts of China, Manchuria was infested by bandits before the founding of Manchoukuo and even after the suppression, the remnants were still active in some localities. Their number was estimated at about 30,000 at the time when I arrived at my post. Those bandits may be classified into several groups, e.g. gangs of regular robbers, those of a political nature resisting Japanese and new Manchurian power, and bandits imbued with communist ideas. Moreover, not all of those bandits were natives of Manchuria. There were many who made their way from North China, Shantung Province or Korea, while some Koreans and Manchurians living in the districts of the Russian Littoral Province adjacent to Manchoukuo stole in across the border. Among the above classified bandits those who were imbued with some ideology, especially those who had their bases of activity outside Manchuria were most difficult to deal with.

The peace and order of new Manchuria was considerably disturbed by those bandits and its healthy growth as a state was much hampered. But as a result of the strenuous efforts on the part of the Manchoukuo Government and people and the assistance extended by the Kwantung Army in accordance with the principle of joint defence as stipulated in the Protocol between Japan and Manchoukuo, the independence of Manchoukuo gradually took definite shape, particularly as her relations with China and other countries were more and more improved. On the frontiers, however, troubles still occurred frequently.

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(3) General policy of the Kwantung Army at the time.

Under the principles set forth in the Protocol, it was the duty of the Kwantung Army to undertake the defence of Manchuria in cooperation with the Manchoukuo Government. In view of the existing condition of the country, the Kwantung Army, especially after the commander, General MINAMI's arrival at his post, adopted as the two main objects of its policy, (1) establishment of public order in the interior of Manchoukuo and (2) maintenance of peace and quiet in the border regions. In order to accomplish the first object, the entire strength of the Army was dispersed widely over the country so as to contribute to the maintenance of local peace and order, even at the disadvantage and inconvenience that might be caused thereby to the training in proficiency essential to an army. For the second object, the Army made it its principle to avoid the use of armed force as much as possible and to ensure the enjoyment of mutual benefit through prudent measures taken by neighboring countries among themselves, through parleys and negotiations held by the Manchoukuo Government or the Kwantung Army at its discretion with China, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and others.

II. Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement.

It was in the regions on the border between Manchuria and Chahar Province, China, that the troubles referred to above occurred most frequently. Among them may be mentioned the insult to the Japanese military officers and Foreign Office clerks at Changpei by Sung Che-yuan troops on October 16 1934, intrusion into Manchoukuo of a unit of Sung Che-yuan troops on January 24 1935,

second intrusion and firing of a Sung Che-yuan unit upon the Japanese border garrison. Fearing that such frequent troubles on the borders might lead to more untoward affairs between China and Manchoukuo or Japan, the Commander of the Kwantung Army deemed it proper to enlarge the scope of application of the Tangku Truce Agreement, and under instructions from the highest military authorities at home despatched Major-General DOIHARA, Kenji, who was on the staff of the Kwantung Army and Chief of the Special Service Agency at Mukden, to carry on negotiations with the Chahar Province authorities in China. The reason why Major-General DOIHARA was entrusted with this mission was (1) because those troubles had arisen within the area for which he was in charge of information and DOIHARA was well versed in the actual facts of the affairs, and (2) because his character was best suited for negotiating with the Chinese on those sundry affairs and settling them in a friendly, peaceful way.

As a result of his negotiations the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement was signed on June 27, 1935. It stipulates the dealing with the responsible persons and the units concerned, the suppression of anti-Japanese agitations in Chahar Province, the area where cessation of hostilities was to be effected, etc. By this agreement the Chinese demilitarized zone was extended to part of Chahar Province, and peace and order could be anticipated in this part of the borders.

A few days after the conclusion of the agreement, when Major-General DOIHARA came to the Kwantung Army Headquarters to make a verbal report on the negotiations to the Commander, I was in

attendance and could listen to it. From his report and also from what was told by a member of the staff who accompanied the Major-General, I gathered that the negotiations had been carried on in a very friendly manner.

III. The Kwantung Army's Concern about Inner Mongolia.

A considerable part of the western borders of Manchoukuo abuts on Inner Mongolia, while in Hsingan Province and the Jehol area in Manchoukuo there lived many Mongolians who constantly intercommunicated with similar tribes in Inner Mongolia. To the Kwantung Army which was responsible for the defence of Manchuria, therefore, it was a matter of grave concern as well as an important focus of attention in collecting information about the condition of Inner Mongolia, how it would affect Manchuria, and in particular whether Red influence would be exerted on Manchuria. The Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, who had harbored antipathy against the Chinese, were given impetus from the independence of Manchoukuo and were striving to establish a self-governing machinery of their own with Prince TE, an influential figure among them, as the leading spirit. The Kwantung Army was aware that Prince TE made it an important aim in his policy to prevent Inner Mongolia from turning Red. While I was at my post in the Kwantung Army, the relations between Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were amicable with no trouble arising between them. In December 1935 a skirmish occurred near Manchoukuo borders between a unit under Prince TE's command and Chinese troops. We feared lest it should lead to some trouble in Manchoukuo, but it was settled in a short space of time before it developed into a serious matter.

IV. The Kwantung Army's Concern about the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council.

Under the Tangku Truce Agreement, an area of North China adjoining the Manchoukuo borders had been designated as a demilitarized zone, where the Kwantung Army held the right of carrying out inspection as occasion demanded.

And after the conclusion of the said truce pact, Mr. YIN Ju-keng of China, on the recommendation of Mr. HUANG Fu, Chairman of the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, became administrative inspector for 23 counties in the above-said demilitarized zone.

To the Kwantung Army it was naturally a matter of important concern whether the condition of the area was consistent with the objects of the truce pact, and whether the demilitarized zone would turn Red. Especially in the Jehol area, which adjoined the area in question, the activity of communist bandits had been incessant from former times, and so the Kwantung Army was making special efforts in collecting information about conditions in East Hopei. Mr. YIN Ju-keng, just referred to above, dissatisfied with the financial policy of the Nanking Government and in view of the fact that in the district under his control a peasants' agitation for self-government was started at the communists' instigation in October 1935, deemed it necessary to establish his political authority and carry out financial autonomy and anti-communism in the area. At last, in November 1935, he organized the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council under his chairmanship and declared the establishment of an autonomous

Previous to the declaration, about November 20, 1935 if I remember rightly, I had at the Kwantung Army Headquarters a visit from Mr. YIN's two envoys, who, revealing Mr. YIN's intentions, told me that as the area was one which under the Tangku Truce Pact had an important bearing on the Kwantung Army, they were desirous to learn the opinions of the leading officers of the Army regarding Mr. YIN's project. To this I replied that it was their own affair and none that the Kwantung Army should meddle in. I did not introduce them to my superior officers, nor take the trouble to ascertain the latter's views upon the matter.

About a week after the interview. I learnt by ^{the} newspaper report of the declaration of the East Hopei Autonomous Government.

V. Position of the Kwantung Army in regard to the Formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

After the conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement, there came into existence in North China a political machinery called the North China Political Affairs Adjustment Commission, with Mr. HUANG Fu as chairman and exercising control over the five provinces of North China. Such Chinese political machinery in North China had since undergone some changes. And with the growing improvement in the relations between Japan and China as well as between China and Manchoukuo as mentioned above, especially after the signing of the Doihara-Chin Te-chun Agreement in June 1935, which made wider arrangements for the maintenance of peace and order on the China-Manchoukuo borders, the Kwantung Army became aware of the fact that among the war-lords in North

China there was an inclination to form a new political structure as a bond between China and Manchoukuo, and hoped that it might take advantage of the inclination to devise some anti-communistic measures between China and Manchoukuo, promote intimate relations between the two countries, and secure the national defence of Manchoukuo. Deeming it a proper opportunity to despatch some envoy to explain to the war-lords in North China the position of Manchoukuo as well as of the Kwantung Army and quicken the realization of their intentions, the Kwantung Army, with the approval of the highest military authorities at home and after consultation with the command of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China, sent Major-General DOIHARA again to Peiping in November 1935, for he was regarded as best suited for such negotiations.

The position of the Kwantung Army with regard to the political machinery in North China and the reasons for the despatch of Major-General DOIHARA were as stated above. Pending the negotiations, the Major-General once returned to the Kwantung Army Headquarters towards the end of 1935. From what the Major-General himself and the staff officer who accompanied him told me at that time, I learnt that during his weeks' stay in Peiping, Major-General DOIHARA had held friendly talks with war-lords of North China, especially with Sung Che-yuan, and that well aware of the fact that Sung Che-yuan and others were keeping in close touch with the Nanking Government, the Major-General had been proceeding with the negotiations in a very friendly and peaceful manner.

In witness whereof I have hereunder set my seal and hand
this 21st day of November, 1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) KAWABE, Torashiro,
Affiant.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of November,
1946, at Tokyo.

(Signed and sealed) BANNO, Junkichi,
Witness.

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WRITTEN OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
trust-adding nothing and withholding nothing.

(Signed and sealed) KAWABE, Torashiro.

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 13 Jan 1947

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent ; -- KAWABE, Torashirō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KAWABE, Torashirō, was on duty from March, 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) to the end of February of the next year, as a section chief of the General Staff, taking charge of the affairs relative to tactics in the Central Military Supreme Command. During this term, I met with the outbreak of China Incident. I, therefore, depose on the problem concerning tactics of the Central Supreme Command, during the period from the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident to its early stages.

1. General survey by the Central Military Supreme Command of the world situation at the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident.

The Central Supreme Command, in order to draw up various plans of national defence and tactics, had to make, as a matter of course, a survey of the international situation of the time. In the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) when I took office as a section chief of the General Staff, the Central Supreme Command passed general judgement on the world situation of the time as roughly mentioned below:

"A. The European Powers are indicating their recovery at length from their exhaustion and debility from world War 1. Especially, the vivid foreign policies of Germany and Italy have been creating various causes which might give rise to new situations in the world. Various Western nations of the whole world are divided into two opposing groups of great influence. Such circumstances foreshadow that the time will come when both groups must be brought into a large-scale clash ultimately."

"B. The Soviet Union has step by step increased her national power by effecting the Industrial Five year Plan. She, at the same time, is making her stand clear, setting focus upon the international problem of interests rather than upon ideology or principles with which she has actively propagandized in the early period of foundation.

On the other hand, the military establishments in the eastern part of the Union have rapidly been strengthened of late and the parallel tracking of the Siberian Railway has been completed which has markedly increased its military value,

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"C. Although such is the general situation of the Western Powers, any country would not be desirous of bringing about a great war and statesmen of the Powers will make great efforts to prevent a war.

Accordingly, no incident will probably occur in the immediate future, of such magnitude where the various Powers would be willing to stake their existence."

"D. In China, the real controlling power of the Nationalist Regime has grown more and more strong. They, however, refrain for the present as ever from making various sorts of direct anti-alien operations for restoring national rights. They have gradually come to realize the true intention of Japan on the Manchurian problem and have shown a tendency to bring about friendly relations with Japan, trying to make various agreements with Manchuria. Nevertheless, racial consciousness is inclined to become stronger among the intellectual people, students, etc.; anti-Japanese sentiment has gradually permeated students, soldiers, etc. and thus the anti-Japanese measures taken by the Chinese Communists are gaining ground."

11. Views of the Central Supreme Command of the time on national defence.

The Central Supreme Command, on the above judgment relative to the international situation, has the following view concerning the Japanese position in point of national defence:

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"A. With a great international struggle which, is sooner or later to be expected to break out among various Western nations, Japan has no moral or interested relations to be drawn into its vortex. Japan, therefore, ought to keep aloof from it."

"B. Steady progress of Manchoukuo as well as friendly and co-existent relations among the three states of Japan, China and Manchoukuo are what secure our national defence, maintaining the peace in the Orient. Either anti-Japanese sentiment or contemptuous feeling towards Japan on the part of China will naturally disappear if the Japanese will reflect on their attitude and be prudent; and if the national strength of Japan becomes replete. As a result, true friendship and mutual respect among the aforementioned three states shall come into existence, by which any of these states can insure the security of national defence."

"C. When we reflect upon the actual conditions of Japanese national strength from the standpoint of national defence, we acknowledge that her strength is extremely inferior in various sorts of material factors necessary for self-defence and self-existence as a modern state. So long as the status quo remains as is, it cannot be guaranteed that the purposes of both first and second items mentioned above will be achieved."

With such a view of national defense, the Central Supreme Command had established the following principle since about half a year before March, 1937, when I took office. When I assumed my office, the chief of the First Division, a senior in office, fully explained the purport of this principle, which was as follows:

"In order to insure the country's peace and security in point of national defense at this moment when the new situation of the world has begun to show a delicate world move, the Army should make special efforts to improve itself in quality and efficiency. The military forces stationed in foreign territories should be very cautious in everything and restrain themselves and endeavor not to commit any faults that they might not occasion any international trouble. The Central Supreme Command, in cooperation with the military administrative authorities, should help them, directly or indirectly, in carrying out various national policies to promote our national power." This was at that time the principle and creed which all the personnel of the Central Supreme Command observed in unity.

3. The measures taken for the purpose of having the military forces understand completely the policy of the Central Supreme Command.

The aforementioned principle and policy were shown and explained by the Central Supreme Command's authorities at "the Conference of the Divisional and Army Commander's" which was held

in May, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa). Moreover the Central Supreme Command, on consulting with the War Ministry, sent Lt. Col. OKAMOTO, a competent officer, of the War Ministry to North China about June, 1937, for making an investigation of actual conditions of the Japanese forces in China which were in close contact with the Chinese forces in North China which seemed to be especially permeated with anti-Japanese sentiment, and, at the same time, to have the Japanese forces understand completely the purpose of the Central Supreme Command.

According to his report made on his return after having investigated thoroughly the conditions of the Japanese forces there, the principle of the Central Supreme Command was thoroughly understood by the Headquarters in China and every unit under its command, and ^{delete} we did not need to worry about the matter so far as the Japanese forces were concerned.

4. The program for operations in China at the time prior to the China Incident.

Japan, who had special relations with China, was often compelled to make a temporary despatch of forces on a small scale to China.

Accordingly, in the program for tactics in China for the year of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), there was what corresponded to the case of calling for the sending of a part of the forces in order to secure our interests and to protect residents there.

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But it was never intended to use military forces on a large scale in China, much less to draw out an overall operation plan over the broader range of the whole Chinese territory.

Only a plan was drawn out, for the time being, concerning the estimated number of despatched forces, the name of the home division which shall take charge of despatching the forces, the measure for transporting the forces, the points of embarkation, etc., in case of need of sending forces for the purpose of protecting our interests and residents at every locality such as Tientsin-Peiping Province, Tsintao, Shanghai, Swatow, Amoi, etc., which were closely connected with our country.

5. The duty of the Japanese garrison
in China and its special character

The duty of the Japanese garrison in China, equal to that of the Military forces of the Powers according to the Treaty of the Boxer's Rebellion in 1900 (the 33 year of Meiji), was in "guarding the legation quarters, securing the communication line from Peiping to the Sea port and protecting the residents." And the strength of the garrison in 1937 numbered about 7,000 in all. Of all troops stationed in foreign territory, this garrison had a special character as follows:

- A. It was absolutely a unit for guarding in a place, which had no military supplies and was hardly provided with ammunitions and equipments for military operation.
- B. It was not authorized to draw up a plan for military ^{delete} operation of itself in consideration of war.
- C. Notwithstanding the fact that it was a unit for guarding, stationed in Chinese territory, it was prohibited by the special order of the Central Supreme Command to do training, with the Chinese Army as its object.

6. The attitude of the Central Military
Supreme Command at the time the
Lu-kow-chiao Incident broke out.

The first report, relating to the Lu-kow-chiao Incident, which

broke out on the night of July 7th, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), was received by the Central Supreme Command on the morning of July 8th, and I was notified as soon as I came to the office. The Central Supreme Command, on the whole, was calm. While I was thinking about it as an unpleasant event brought about by the Chinese, I did not take it as a grave matter; for there had so often been such similar trouble in the past that I simply considered that the matter, would, as usual be settled soon by mutual negotiation between the authorities of the Japanese and Chinese forces' there.

At the Central Supreme Command, we, the responsible persons, without holding any conferences in particular to deliberate on counter-measures for it, kept ourselves in touch with one another on the case as we were accustomed to for ordinary business. All concerned concurred in the opinion that we, in accordance with the aforementioned Central Supreme Command's policy and without any objections among ourselves, would prevent the incident from becoming enlarged, and to have the authorities at the spot settle the matter as soon as possible.

But the report which arrived on the 8th from the armed forces on the spot showed that the Chinese attitude was not necessarily so compromising that it would immediately put an end to the tense situation. Therefore, at about 6:30 p. m. on the same day, the Chief of General Staff gave, before anything else, a telegraphic order saying, "In order to prevent enlargement of the incident, you shall take more positive steps to avoid using military force and required prudence of the

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Commander of the Garrison in China.

On the following 9th, the central Command's instructions which were necessary for negotiations between both the Japanese and the Chinese forces at the spot to settle the incident was given by telegram to the Commander of the Garrison in China by the Vice Chief of the General Staff-- namely, "For the settlement of the Lukowchiao Bridge Incident, refrain from concerning yourselves in any political problem on this occasion and propose, in the main, the following requests to arrange for having the Hopei-Chahar authorities approve and execute them in the shortest time:

(1) Suspension of the stationing of Chinese forces near the Lukowchiao Bridge on the left bank of the Yungting River.

(2) Security necessary for the future

(3) Punishment of those directly responsible for the Incident

(4) Apology

VI. Arrangements made by the central Command in conformity with the change of situation following that of the preceding paragraph.

1. Informed by the report of our forces at the spot of the situation in which uncontrolled defiant actions were committed intermittently by the Chinese, (T.N. Hisenteki is a miswriting of, chosenteki) up to the morning of July 10th, the Central Command considered it necessary to reinforce to the Garrison in China, and on the evening of the 10th it was unofficially decided to reinforce it with two brigades from the Kwantung Army, with one division from Korea, and with three divisions and other units from Japan proper, and preparation lasted until the following 11th. But on the evening of the 11th, as the Garrison in China reported that the Chinese forces approved all our demands which had been under negotiation since yesterday, the Central Command determined immediately to stop the plan of mobilization of the divisions in Japan proper. Whereas the report of our attache to the Embassy at Nanking reported that the Chinese Central Command ordered the calling of air units and the concentration of four divisions in the northern provincial border regions of Honan Province. The Central Command then could not take an optimistic view regarding the situation in North China and was not confident of the Chinese forces in North China in carrying out their duties based on the conditions:

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Therefore it was decided that only the above-mentioned forces from Korea and Manchuria preparing for expedition should take action as already arranged until the execution of the ^{conditions} ~~was~~ was confirmed, and this order was issued at about 6:30 on the evening of the 11th.

2. Since then, while observing the situation, the central Command came to know various things from reports from various quarters up to the evening of July 13th, ~~delete~~ the outline of which were as follows:

(1) In North China, the Chinese forces have been not only making such preparations for war as building positions, transporting forces, etc. but also had fired on our forces who were passing in the suburbs south of Peking today.

(2) The Chinese Central Command ordered armed forces in every Province north of the Yangtze river to mobilize and to concentrate in regions along both the Lunghai and the Peiping-Hankow Railways.

Facing the situation as mentioned above, the Central Command decided on the policy for dealing with these matters concerning the incident at 8 P.M. on the 13th. It was as follows:

(1) Our Army will adhere closely to the policy of non-enlargement of the situation or to settle locally and to make the utmost effort to avoid such actions that will lead to a full-scale war. Therefore, our Army will approve the conditions for settlement proposed by the representative of the 29th Army and signed at 8 P.M. on the 10th and watch for the fulfilment of these conditions. Thus the mobilization of armed forces in Japan proper will be subject to a change of situation for the time being.

(2) However, in case the Chinese forces ignore the conditions for

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settlement referred to in the preceding item and not fulfil them with sincerity, or if the Nanking Government attempts to attack our forces by having the Central Army move northward without any due reason, our Army will take decisive measures. In such a case, however, the Garrison in China will receive approval of the Central Command first.

The above-mentioned policy for dealing with matters concerning the Incident was communicated by telegram to the Garrison in China.

(c) Thus, in the further observation of the changes of the situation the Central Supreme Command learned by the evening of July 16th the following facts from reports from various quarters.

(1) The Chinese Army in North China has been actively making preparation for a war since then and her soldiers have fired on Japanese soldiers on the 14th and on this day the 16th.

(2) The Chinese Central Supreme Command ordered out the air-forces stationed at Kwangtung on the 14th.

(3) On July 15th, the Chinese military strength concentrated in an area stretching to the north of the Lung-Hai rail-way and to the east of the border of the Shansi Province was estimated at approximately thirty divisions including her peace-time units.

(4) Some units of the Chinese Central Army marched into Hopei Province

Under these circumstances, considering the possible danger that we might be hampered by this intentional dragging-out policy of the Chinese authorities and miss the chance of mobilization and dispatch of troops, our Central Supreme Command decided upon a settlement measure to the following effect and instructed our Garrison in China.

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"The Garrison should have Sung Che-yuan Affix ^{delete} another signature upon the settlement terms which were signed on July 10th and each term should be shown him concretely (the apology must be made by Sung Che-yuan himself, the punishment of the responsible persons must go as far as the Commander of the 37th Division and the units to withdraw shall be specified) and the fulfilment of these terms must be made by July 19th. In case the Chinese authorities neglect to fulfil our demands, the Garrison shall chastise the Twenty-ninth Army. As the Japanese Government holds to the last the intention to limit the scope of trouble to North China and expects a local settlement, she demands the Nanking Government to draw back the Central Army to the old condition, stop defiant activities towards Japan and not to interfere with the local settlement."

In line with the settlement measures decided in such a way, our Garrison in China has been negotiating with the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army, in North China since the following 17th day, and our diplomatic officials with the Chinese Central Government at Nanking also while the Central Supreme Command proceeded again with preparations for the mobilization of the divisions in Japan Proper which was stopped on July 11th.

(d) On July 18th our Central Supreme Command had a report from the Garrison in China that General Sung Che-yuan of China came to Tientsin to see Lieutenant-general KOZUKI, the Commander of our Garrison in China, and expressed his regret. Yet according to the information which came from the Foreign office on the following day, the 19th, the Nanking Government showed no sincerity in its reply. Such being the case, the Central Supreme Command considered that it was unavoidable to chastise the Twenty-ninth Army, for, despite the apology made by Sung Che-yuan in North China, not only had the fulfilment of other terms

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become quite doubtful judging from the Chinese way of doing things shown for more than ten days up to that time, but also the Chinese Central Government had not changed their above-mentioned attitude. So we pushed forward again on the preparation for mobilization orders to the divisions in Japan Proper. But on July 21st we learned from a report from the garrison in China that the Chinese authorities had punished her responsible persons, and her units began to transfer. Thereupon we decided to put off the mobilization orders again.

Thus while expecting the situation at the spot to improve, the Central Supreme Command got reports of the Laugfong Incident on July 25th and those of the Peiping Kuanganmen Gate Incident on the following day of the 26th. On the 27th, the Commander of the Garrison in China reported to us that, having exhausted every means for peaceful settlement, he was determined to start using force for chastising the Twenty-Ninth Army on ^{OR} after the 29th, and at the same time requested the Central Supreme Command to approve the operation. So the Central Supreme Command gave approval to his plan, but stipulated that the Garrison not carry out operations across the Yungting River.

As the situation changed, as has been mentioned above, during the twenty days following the night of July 7th, the Central Supreme Command on July 27th took measures to issue orders for the mobilization of the 5th, 6th and 10th Division, and other required troops. In order to meet the present situation, moreover, the

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Central Supreme Command on July 27th formulated its own first outline of program of operations in China to the following effect:

For the purpose of security stability in Peiping and Tientsin province, about four divisions are to be moved, and their operation areas are roughly restricted to the north of a line between Paoting and Chuoliuchen. In preparation for cases where unavoidable circumstances may make it necessary to protect the residents in Tsintao and Shanghai, one division is to be reserved for each city.

And then the Central Supreme Command, after generalizing all reports, estimated the Chinese strength in the North of the Lunghai Railway (except Shansi province) to amount to approximately 340,000 by the end of July. On the other hand, all the strength sent to Northern China from Japan Proper was expected to concentrate at the front about the end of August, amounting in the aggregate to less than 100,000.

3) The Japanese operation-progresses during the first eight months of the China Incident.

Having passed through a process of circumstances mentioned in the preceding Articles, the Japanese and Chinese came at last to exchange fire with each other in Peiping and Tientsin provinces. After that, the situation gradually became more serious on an unexpectedly enlarging scale. By the end of February in 1938 (the 13th of Showa) when I resigned my post in the General Staff, hostilities came to extend throughout the whole area of Northern China and in the vicinities of Shanghai and Nanking.

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I do not mention the reason why hostilities extended to those areas and what measures the Central Supreme Command took concerning its extension during the above-mentioned period. Through the Japanese operation progresses during the first eight months of this Incident, however, I can positively say that the Japanese Army's tactics were not carried out on a strategically thorough and systematic program.

On August 9th, a Japanese naval officer was shot down in Shanghai, which led to fighting there between the Japanese and Chinese Armies. On account of the hard fighting on the part of our Army, our Settlements nearly got into danger. So, under the necessity of promptly relieving them, two divisions in Japan Proper were prepared for mobilization on the 13th of the same month. On the next day, except for one, the Chinese Central Supreme Command issued orders for the mobilization of all the armies, making ready for an overall war. On the other hand, the Japanese Central Supreme Command had not yet thought of such a thing as an overall war. With the Chinese Central Army in Northern China reinforced, our military strength became inadequate, and so the sending of three more divisions was decided on August 31st.

As can be seen above, the Japanese Central Supreme Command sent the required minimum strength for the purpose of coping with the danger of the situation in each field. Not only was this so, but also for the want of munitions which should have been prepared for a possible outbreak of a great war, prevented the Central

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Supreme Command from freely manipulating troops and made our military commanders at the front get into great difficulties, too. From the middle of September in 1937 (the 12th of Showa), for example, our army under command of General MATSUI in the vicinity of Shanghai had to fight, limiting the number of shells to be used daily by each gun to only several a day.

In fear of a case where, contrary to our own one-sided principle, fighting might enlarge to an unexpected extent, at the beginning of August I submitted to the War Ministry a proposal that the mobilization of munitions required for approximately 15 divisions to fight about half a year should be carried out. However, the leaders at the War Ministry, especially Lieutenant General UMEZU, Yoshijiro, the Vice-Minister of war, maintained the non-enlargement principle so firmly that, they regarded the above figures as excessive and interpreting the possible issue of mobilization-order of those munitions as being a further step to a national war, did not give prompt consent to the proposal.

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Thus the above-mentioned plan of the China operation set by the Central Supreme Command on July 29th, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) was soon frustrated, and met up with the large scale and far-reaching Chinese resistance. For some time, we took provisional measures to reinforce soldiers in each phase of the war and obtained tactical victories to secure the front-lines. It is a plain fact that the Central Supreme Command, hoped to stop the overall hostilities every time a single operation on one field was brought to an end, and prepared in secret such a plan. Such was the case at the end of the Military operation in Tientsin districts, at the time the Chinese forces were swept away near PAO TING at the end of the Shanghai military operation, and at the end of the Nanking military operation. Especially, was this so when general peace activity was made by the offices of the German Ambassador in China, before and after the Nanking military operation, and we thoroughly cooperated with the government but unfortunately failed in attaining our object.

(8) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of dealing with the affair.

As stated in the above items, the Central Supreme Command, hoping to localize the incident and to solve it immediately in the local area, was making a study on a general stoppage of resorting to arms and the final dealing with the affair at the end of every operation.

And the opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of settling the affair was in perfect unison with the opinion expressed by the government since the beginning of the incident. Especially the

principle called "KONOE's Three Principles" which stressed morality accorded completely with that which the Central Supreme Command delivered to the government as its opinion, before it was made public.

(9) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the problems of the international agreements and the international laws. The motive for the China Incident lies only in Japan's exercising her right of self-defense in the local area. After the negotiation between the commanders of the Japanese and Chinese forces or between the authorities of both ~~states~~ in Nanking for twenty long days, we realized that China had no sincerity in a peaceful solution and we finally resorted to arms. ~~We~~, as stated above, had no intention in the fundamental policy of dealing with the incident and in the actual process of military operations to injure Chinese sovereignty and the territorial or administrative security therefore we were convinced that our activity did not violate and hurt existing international agreements and our opinion was in accord with what the government often stated to the world on necessary occasions. The Central Supreme Command often called attention to the higher commanders in the front to esteem the interests of the third States, and not to violate the safety of the peoples of third States. I do not remember the exact year and date when I gave such notices. But such notices, as far as my memory runs, were delivered sometimes by wire or sometimes by important figures who were sent from the Central Supreme Command to the front for liaison. In cases where there were damages to the third States, or the peoples of the third States, the Central Supreme Command was ready to make fair investigation on the damages and to make necessary Compensation for

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them. From the above-mentioned standpoint the 2nd division in the General Staff Office chiefly cooperated with the War Ministry in investigating such matters. The greatest of the accidents of such kind which took place while I held my post as chief was the bombardment of the "Lady Bird." According to my investigation at that time, the ship was bombarded under the orders made by Lieutenant General YANAGAWA, Army Commander, and ^{and} ~~and~~ Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, the intermediate Commander, was not responsible for this accident. I remember that I strongly insisted upon my opinion at the meeting where the leaders concerned were assembled to solve the problem. Concerning the accident itself, I remember, too, that we soon reached a settlement with Britain.

The opinion of the Central Supreme Command regarding previous Notice of appealing to arms and regarding declaration of war.

Relating to the Lukouchiao Incident that occurred on July 7, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the Japanese Government issued on the 11th of the same month following statement: "In regard to sending the Army to the North China, the Japanese Government has decided that necessary measures must be taken."

On the same date, at 6:30 P.M. the Central Supreme Command issued an order of sending a part of the Japanese troops in Korea and Manchuria to North China.

After August 9, 1937, the situation in Shanghai became so imminent that Japan was compelled to appeal to arms. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government issued on August 8 a statement saying, "Japan has now been forced to take resolute measures against China with a view of demanding reconsideration on the part of the Nanking Government.

On August 23, the head of the Japanese troops landed near Shanghai.

Earlier in the Incident, the Japanese forces stationed in China had often sent notices and negotiated with the Chinese Authorities, but at last it became evident that there was no

promise for a peaceful solution. Then, the commander of the forces, on the 27th of July, sent an ultimatum to the Chinese Authorities and at the same time made a statement.

On and from July 28 the Army initiated an offensive movement.

In the beginning of the Incident, as I mentioned above, the Central Supreme Command, in case it recognized the necessity of using force, put it into effect after a statement of the Government was issued. The Commander of the Army in North China initiated an offensive movement after a day's notice and after issuing a statement.

The subsequent situation gradually took an unforeseen development and the war situation became unexpectedly serious, so the Central Supreme Command discussed the problem whether Japan should declare war against China or not.

So far as I know at the time of my resignation, the Central Supreme Command realized the characteristics of the Incident as follows:

I. The Incident was started on the part of Japan as a selfdefensive move for what was only a local problem. Thereafter, Japan against her wish had to increase her forces in each zone of fighting as a temporary expedient. Japan had no intention to wage a war against China. If only the offensive manœuvres on the part of China would be brought to an end, the Japanese army would immediately cease taking the offensive.

II. Japan does not consider China as a whole, that is, the whole Chinese people as an enemy.

III. Japan has primarily no politico-strategic intention against China. What Japan desires is nothing more but to cease the armed conflict at once, which is rather a collision of feelings between the two nations; to realise "Friendly Relations between Neighbouring States," "Mutual Respect of the Sovereignty and Territory", and "Reciprocal Economic Cooperation," all of which are the outcome of natural and essential conditions of the two States.

IV To sum up the above four points, to declare war against China is not only to misrepresent Japan's real intention but to be against morality.

V So long as the two states are to a wider extent in a state of war, without declaration of war, Japan can not freely exercise rights based on the International Laws of War, which results in our inconvenience and disadvantage. Japan, however, being influenced by the actual interests, must not lose sight of the substance of the Incident and her basic principles of morality.

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VI With declaration of war against China, Japan may be able to justify casualties and the other losses on the part of China. If Japan, however, takes such a measure, she would come to adhere formally and distort the substance of the Incident, and after all to strengthen violence.

This goes against Japan's intention.

From the above mentioned points, the opinion of the Central Supreme Command was that Japan ought not to declare war against China.

On this 28 day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Torashiro KAWABE (Seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At The same place

Witness: (signed) Junkichi BANNO (seal)

DEF. DOC. 971

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Torashiro KAWABE (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Torashiro (Lt. Gen.)

1934 Aug-- Assigned to the KWANTUNG Army and detailed as a Staff Officer.

1936 Mar
1940 Sep-- Assigned as Commander of the 7th AIR BRIGADE in
1941 Jul Manchuria.

1941 Dec-- Subject was chief of the General Affairs Section of
1943 Apr the Army Bureau of Aeronautics. After which he was re-assigned as Commander of Air Forces in Manchuria until Aug. 1944.

1934 Apr 29 Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Middle Rising Sun in recognition of subject's participation in the MANGCHURIAN INCIDENT.

SOURCE: Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, Manchuria
Report, KAWABE, T. (Lt. General). by Inspection
Prosecution Section, 8 April 1946.

1938 HATA's Chief of Staff when commander in front immediately after MATSUI.

SOURCE: Japanese Personal Intelligence, Manchuria
Office of War Information, OSW.

1942 Manchuria
1944 Manchuria

KAWABE, Torashiro

Request by: ITAGAKI, OKAWA, MINAMI, UMEZU, HOSHINO

**Address: c/o Mr. Teizo Takano, No.2, Nichome Higashi
Sotoboricho, Higashiku, Nagoyashi, Japan.**

Facts to be proved - He was a staff officer attached to the General Staff office at Tokyo, at the time of the incident, and later served as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, and will be able to testify the attitude of the general staff office at the time of the incident, and towards North China and Inner Mongolia.

Relevancy - The reasons why Kwantung Army resorted to arms in Manchuria and their activities in North China and Inner Mongolia.

KAWABE, Torashiro

Request by: UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Address: Nagoyashi, Aichi Ken

He was formerly a Lt. General in the Japanese Army.

The facts to be proved by witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of defendant UMEZU during the period in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that UMEZU took no part in any of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment, and was not responsible for the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

Documents:

1. Principles of plans of operations of the Imperial Army 1940-1943
2. Principles for preparation of operations of Kwantung Army 1942
3. Operations plan of Kwantung Army 1940 to 1944.
4. Border Guard Regulations of Kwantung Army - Sept or Oct 1939.

Location of documents - Secret Instruction File. Headquarters of Kwantung Army, (Operations Room) Hsingking, Manchuria.

The relevance of these documents is that they will prove the character and scope of operations and other plans of the Japanese Army, and notably of the Kwantung Army, vis-a-vis the USSR.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. A. Comyns-Carr, British Division, IPS
FROM : Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, ID-IPS
DATE : 5 June 1947

Pursuant to your memorandum, dated 21 May 1947, requesting this Division to procure the Secret Operations Diary for 1931-32 of KAWABE, Torashiro, the following information is brought to your attention.

On 23 May 1947 this investigator contacted the 1st Demobilization Bureau. The Chief of the Archives and Documents Division of the 1st Demobilization Bureau stated that although the document was not available at the Demobilization Bureau, and he doubted that it could be found, he would conduct a search and notify this investigator in about a week. On 4 June 1947, Mr. KOBAYASHI, of the Archives and Documents Section stated that the search had failed to uncover the document and if it had been kept at the General Staff Headquarters from January of 1932, when KAWABE was transferred, the chances are that it was misplaced or burned, either by bombing or by fire after the surrender.

ERIC W. FLEISHER
1st Lt. Inf.
Investigator, IPS

Contents of this file
furnished to Sultan on
4 Apr. 1949 ~~at~~ upon verbal
request.

KAWABE, Torashiro

17 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae re subject to Col. Woolworth, said copy to be returned to us.

KAWABE, Torashiro

Request by: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

Address: Nagoya, Higashi-ku-, Higashi-sotobori-cho, c/o Tankano

This witness was Military attache to Germany from 1938 to 1940,
succeeding OSHIMA when he became Ambassador.

(1 of 1)

KAWABE, Terashiro

Request by: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

address: Nagoya, Higashi-ku, Higashi-satsurij-
cho, do Takano

This witness was military attaché to Germany
from 1938 to 1940, succeeding OSHIMA
when he became Ambassador.

KAWABE, Torashiro - Nagoya, Higashi-Ku, Higashi-Sotobori-Cho, c/o Takamo

Request by OSHIMA, Hiroshi

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese.
- (b) Was Military Attache to Germany from 1938 to 1940 succeeding OSHIMA when he became Ambassador. The witness will testify for the period following the testimony of KASAHARA, and will also describe the duties and responsibilities of Military Attaches under the Japanese Military System.

Page

33760

* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAWABE, Torashiro
By Mr. Shimanouchi

33761 The witness identified and verified exhibit 3495 as his affidavit. * The affidavit stated that the witness was Deputy Chief of the General Staff at the end of the war. From April 1929 until January 1932 he was the senior officer in the Operational Section of the First Division of the General Staff. The accused OSHIMA was from August 1931 chief of the Fortress Section of the First Division. The Fortress Section was in charge of international defense and not connected with offensive operations. OSHIMA was also concurrently a staff officer of the navy General Staff, as was the custom at that time.

33762 On 18 September 1931 the Mukden Incident * broke out. As OSHIMA was in the post mentioned above, he had nothing to do with it nor its continuance and the witness did not know either that OSHIMA played any part in the Incident from his individual standpoint, apart from his official duty. (The attention of the court was called to T. pgs. 28029-32 with regard to the number of persons receiving dedications in connection with the Manchurian Incident.)

33763 * The witness identified exhibit 3496 as his second af-
33764 fidavit and verified it. *The affidavit stated that the witness was in Berlin from December 1938 until February 1940 as military attache to the embassy and OSHIMA was Ambassador from October 1938 to October 1939. The witness' appointment as attache was in October 1938 and prior to his departure from Japan he was briefed by persons in the General Staff concerning his new duties. At that time he heard explanations as to intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Berlin against the Soviet from Lt. Colonel USUI, who had been in Berlin from May 1937 until January 1938 and was in charge of these matters exclusively over Military Attache OSHIMA.

33765 * USUI told the witness that from his experience, no appreciable results could be expected from these activities. After the arrival of the witness in Berlin in December 1938, he heard further explanations from Colonel MANAKI who had succeeded USUI. From USUI and MANAKI the witness learned that it was very difficult to find able Russians in Europe for this purpose. Germans were ^{not} necessarily in sympathy with the White Russians or their organizations. It was particularly difficult to prepare any White Soviet activities from Europe as a base.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
21 November 1947
DEFENSE - OSHIMA
KAWABE - Direct

Page 5461

Page Expense for intelligence organs in Berlin was no more than 300,000 yen annually. As regards intelligence activities, only planning in consideration of war time was laid down by the Chief of Staff. It was strictly forbidden to put them
33766 * into effect in peace time.

The witness, like his predecessor OSHIMA, left MANAKI entirely in charge of these matters. The witness received reports from him but never indicated them to OSHIMA because OSHIMA had no relation with this matter, did not touch upon them and never asked questions about them. The witness met several times with the White Russians concerned and found out that they were either nothing but anti-Soviet ideologists, like Bamand, or professionals who demanded money by presenting impractical anti-Soviet plans.

33767 * The witness knew that USUI had bought a house in the suburbs of Berlin, had turned it over to MANAKI, and that a few White Russians were quartered there engaged in a small scale printing of anti-Soviet pamphlets, but he did not know what became of those pamphlets. He had never heard that OSHIMA nor any other Japanese officer sent anti-Soviet pamphlets into Soviet territory by balloons from Poland, or that they bought a motorboat to bring such papers into the Crimea across the Black Sea, or that they sent Russians into the Soviet to assassinate Stalin.

When the witness arrived in Berlin as attache in December 1938, OSHIMA was engaged in negotiations regarding the Japanese-German-Italian treaty. From this time until the negotiations were terminated about August 1939, the witness, with the Naval Attache, had frequent conferences within the Embassy discussing the matter with OSHIMA as leader. During these negotiations OSHIMA always gave the matter careful consideration and often called the Embassy staff and attaches
33768 * together for consultation and study.

As to the reasons why the government and central army authorities wished to conclude the treaty, OSHIMA often told them that at the time the China Incident was expanding without prospect of early termination, and all Japanese efforts for settlement had been of no avail. Both the government and army circles felt threatened by the Soviet's powerful armament. By concluding this treaty with Germany and Italy, they wanted to improve Japan's diplomatic position with the ultimate purpose of bringing the China Incident to the earliest end and also be prepared for attack from the Soviet.

Page The witness never heard from OSHIMA that Japan intended or desired to utilize the treaty to initiate or wage aggressive war against other countries, nor heard from anyone that OSHIMA planned or desired anything of this nature. In February 1939 ITO, Nobufumi, accompanied by an officer from both the army and navy, arrived in Berlin with instructions * regarding the treaty. The witness, together with the higher Embassy staff and the Naval Attache, was present when ITO gave the explanations to OSHIMA.

33769

The purport was to limit to the Soviet the object of Japanese military assistance to be given to Germany and Italy on the basis of the treaty. This was at variance to what OSHIMA had already communicated to Germany upon instructions of the government, which was that although Japan considered the Soviet as the primary object of the treaty, Britain and France would be secondary objects. Facing this situation, OSHIMA cabled his opinion to Tokyo that in view of the progress up to that time, Germany might become distrustful if he transmitted the changed Japanese views and moreover she would never accept the proposal.

According to exhibit 2230, OSHIMA told Ribbentrop on 27 May 1939 that the War Minister requested OSHIMA by wire to hold off until later against ARITA so as not to disturb discussions among various quarters in Tokyo, and the army was firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly even at the risk of a cabinet overthrow.

33770

* According to the witness' recollection about mid May 1939, he sent a telegram from Berlin to Tokyo stating that Japan must clarify her position as to whether she was going to conclude the treaty and that to continue an ambiguous attitude would only invite foreign contempt. War Minister ITAGAKI replied that the matter of the treaty was under earnest discussion in the cabinet and as the atmosphere was turning favorable to its conclusion, they had better remain silent for the time being. ITAGAKI added he had no thought of overthrowing the cabinet. The witness told OSHIMA of the telegram.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER

33771

The witness stated that this was the sixth time he had appeared as a witness for the defense. Reference was made to the affidavit where it mentioned subversive activities directed against the USSR. * Asked how well acquainted he was with Himmler, he replied that he had heard his name but had never saw or met him. He had never heard that OSHIMA and Himmler

Page were friendly and knew of no occasions when they met. To the witness was quoted a part of his interrogation in which he was asked how friendly was OSHIMA with Himmler, and if he knew of any occasions when they met. He had answered then that they were friendly and he believed they met quite often, although perhaps not in an official capacity, but he believed they saw a great deal of one another. Asked if he did not make such a statement in answer to the question, he stated he did not know, but if it was so recorded he must have replied * to that effect.

33772

In reference to the affidavit's statements relative to OSHIMA's activities in negotiating with Germany regarding the proposed military alliance, the witness was asked if he knew before his departure for Germany that OSHIMA was engaged in negotiations for military alliance, the witness replied he did not know of OSHIMA working for a military alliance. * Asked what OSHIMA was working for, he replied that OSHIMA left Germany about four months before the witness left there. For ten months ending August 1939 from the time the witness went to Berlin and the time OSHIMA left, OSHIMA devoted his efforts mainly to strengthening the anti-Comintern Pact.

33773

Asked if he knew before he left Japan that OSHIMA was working for an alliance, he replied that on 1 September 1938 the witness was called to appear at the General Staff and notified he was to be appointed Military Attache in Berlin. He did not leave for his post until the latter part of October. When the previous question was repeated to the witness, he answered he knew before leaving Japan that OSHIMA was engaged in negotiating for an alliance in Germany. * The Chief of the Intelligence of the General Staff advised him that OSHIMA had been named Ambassador in order to bring about this alliance.

33774

The witness had frequent discussions with OSHIMA regarding the progress of the negotiations after he arrived in Germany. Asked if it was not the idea of OSHIMA and himself to have a strong pact aimed with Russia and England as the objectives, he replied the word strong was not proper but they were of the same mind in concluding an alliance directed at Russia and England. Asked if their idea was, that if Germany became involved in a war with England, Japan would participate in it, he replied that he and OSHIMA had the idea they must bear the * obligation to engage in war under those circumstances. Germany had the same view, and the witness was of the opinion that Hitler, Ribbentrop and OSHIMA saw eye to eye.

33775

21 November 1947

DEFENSE - OSHIMA

KAWABE - Cross

Page Asked if it was the view of the Japanese government that Japan would go to war in case of a German-Russian conflict but could not promise to enter into hostilities in case of a conflict between Germany and Britain, he replied that was the way he viewed it in Berlin. He became acquainted with the viewpoint of the Japanese government from explanations to that effect given at meetings within the Embassy in Berlin by the ambassador, and he also obtained that information from telegrams which came from the General Staff Office in Tokyo. He thus knew the government's attitude and that it was in opposition to the views of Ribbentrop's views.

33776

The witness recalled only two occasions in which OSHIMA and SHIRATORI met personally re these negotiations. These were once when ITO arrived in Berlin and some time later he did recall a conference in Italy between the two and thought it was in early spring of 1939. * At this meeting, besides the witness, Naval Attache ENDO, a member of the Embassy staff, and the military and naval attaches stationed in Rome were present. No one was present representing Germany or Italy.

33777

During the meeting SHIRATORI and OSHIMA talked to each other directly and his recollection was that no conclusion was reached during the discussion, but it was merely an exchange of views. * Asked if SHIRATORI and OSHIMA shared the same views with regard to the proposed pact, he replied that the two generally agreed and the witness was also in agreement with them. From the side lines it appeared as if there was a difference between the two with regard to diplomatic procedure. He was not referring to differences in fundamental ideas regarding the pact.

33778

His recollection was that this conference was after the arrival of the ITO commission. Asked if OSHIMA passed on or urged his views regarding a pact upon his government, the witness replied he had no definite recollection. * Asked what his position was at the time the witness stated that he personally desired the realization of the pact and frequently urged army circles to bring it about as soon as possible. When the witness was again asked his position at the time, he replied that he was the official military representative in Berlin, and his duties included to convey the views and opinions of the army to the ambassador, to transmit the views and opinions of the ambassador to the army in Japan, and also to report to the army the progress of negotiations.

33779

Asked if he was not in the middle of the game instead of on the side lines, he replied he had no idea of being right in the midst of the whole thing because that was not his responsibility.

Page Asked if he did not know from the nature of his position and the duties he performed that OSHIMA urged his views on the Japanese government, * he replied yes. When asked what other means did he use to bring about the adoption of this pact, he replied he did not remember the date but OSHIMA made a tour of important countries in Europe, visiting Japanese ambassadors to hear their views and took measures of this nature to establish his own views.

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33781 * The impression gained was that he thought OSHIMA took the trip to make clear his belief by meeting these ambassadors that it was proper to enter into an alliance with Germany in the light of the prevailing international situation, i.e., an alliance which would obligate Japan to participate in a European war if England became involved in war with Germany. In London OSHIMA interviewed SHIGEMITSU and in Belgium
33782 KURUSU. * But he could not recall the names of others nor could he recall if OSHIMA took the trip on his own initiative or was directed by his government.

According to the witness' recollection, OSHIMA, following his trip and the talks with the heads of Japanese missions, told the witness that most of them did not clearly express their approval and Ambassador KURUSU was among them. Asked if OSHIMA nevertheless continued to press his views for approval of the pact, the witness stated he did not interpret OSHIMA's position as being that he had pressed these ambassadors for approval.

24 November

33786 * The witness did not recall what countries OSHIMA visited in addition to England and Belgium. OSHIMA did not tell him what the ambassadors in England and Belgium would do with regard to advising the Foreign office as to the course to be followed with respect to the proposed alliance. The witness recalled that both the ambassadors were visited on the
33787 same trip * and he thought the date of the trip was in the spring of 1939 but could not recall whether it was prior to February 25, 1939. He thought it was after the arrival of the ITO mission and he did not think the mission was in Berlin at the time.

33788 He thought OSHIMA was accompanied by an embassy secretary and he didn't think OSHIMA traveled incognito. * Asked if he recalled at a later date that OSHIMA called a conference of ambassadors and ministers in Berlin, he replied he had no recollection of this. The witness stated that to the best of

- Page his ability he performed his official duty to transmit the ambassador's views to the army in Japan. Asked if it was his practice to confer with OSHIMA before sending his messages to Japan, he stated that he had never shown OSHIMA the messages. Customarily they were transmitted after study. Discussions were held in the embassy among himself, the naval attache, and staff members, and after fully understanding the * aims and intentions of the ambassadors, these messages were sent out.
- 33789
- 33790 * The messages were never sent to War Minister ITAGAKI but ITAGAKI on one occasion communicated with the witness. This was the occasion he had mentioned in his affidavit and there was no other. * Asked if OSHIMA was pro-Nazi, the witness said he could not express OSHIMA's attitude or views by the word "pro-Nazi" and he did not say he was. OSHIMA impressed the witness as having good will toward Germany but never did he express pro-Nazi sentiments. The witness was reminded of his interrogation in which, when asked if he would say that OSHIMA's attitude was pro-Nazi, he had replied "Yes."
- 33791
- 33792 * Also in his interrogation, when asked if OSHIMA expressed this pro-Nazi attitude, he had replied "Yes" that OSHIMA told them many things about the good points of Nazi ideology. OSHIMA was a man who had spent many years in Germany, knew the Germans well, and was very fond of them, and extremely pro-German in his ideas. He was very fond of Hitler, and his views and Ribbentrop's seemed to coincide. But the witness did not believe he got along with Goering.
- 33794 Asked if those answers were not made in his interrogation, the witness stated that there was some confusion in the statements said to have been made by him between Nazi and Germany. When he was asked the questions he took the word "Nazi" to mean Germany. * He did recall that such questions and answers took place but not whether the phraseology was actually that which had been just quoted him. Asked if when he made the statement in the interrogation that OSHIMA's and Ribbentrop's views seemed to coincide if he meant Nazi views, as he well knew that Ribbentrop's views were Nazi, he replied he was speaking of Ribbentrop's character as the character of the German Foreign Minister.
- 33796 * From exhibit 3497, for identification only, the interrogation of the witness, KAWABE, were read certain questions and answers. In it the witness had stated that he would say OSHIMA was pro-Nazi in attitude and expressed to the witness

Page 33797 the many good things about Nazi ideology. OSHIMA had spent * many years in Germany, knew Germany and Germans well, was very fond of them and was extremely pro-German in his ideas, he was very fond of Hitler, and his views and Ribbentrop's seemed to coincide, but didn't believe he got along very well with Goering. OSHIMA was very friendly with Himmler, and he believed they met quite often, although perhaps not officially. Under ordinary circumstances he believed they saw a great deal of one another.

33798 * CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FURNESS
Counsel for SHIGEMITSU

33799 Asked if after OSHIMA's trip to England and Belgium he heard from him or anyone that SHIGEMITSU had expressed approval of the proposed pact * the witness had not.

33800 * REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOCHI

33801 The witness stated that his affidavit, exhibit 3496, was true and correct. The witness was asked to explain the contradiction in his cross examination in which he had said that he never heard that OSHIMA ever met Himmler and his statement in his interrogation in which he replied that they had met quite often. * He stated that the answer he gave in his interrogation was based on his observations and presumptions. It was his impression that OSHIMA, being a long resident in Germany, had many friends there. At that time Himmler was an important and influential leader and naturally he supposed OSHIMA was on friendly terms with him and had opportunities to meet him quite often.

He understood the question put by the prosecution in his cross examination was whether he knew that OSHIMA and Himmler actually were friends, or that they had meetings. It was to this question he had replied and hence he believed there was no inconsistency in those two answers. He neither saw nor heard of OSHIMA meeting Himmler toward the end of January, 1939.

The witness was reminded of testimony in his cross examination in which he had stated that after reaching Berlin, he often consulted OSHIMA with regard to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty and that his views agreed with OSHIMA's. Asked if when he talked with OSHIMA on this question, he talked with him alone or if others were present, he replied that he believed OSHIMA took into consideration the views of others in regard to the question. Whenever he participated in such a discussion, the meetings were held in the embassy, or in the ambassador's official residence. Participating at all times were the consular and other staff members, the naval attache, and himself.

Page

- 33803 * The witness was reminded that in his cross examination he had stated that OSHIMA was of the belief that in case of war between Germany and Britain, Japan should shoulder the obligation of fighting Britain, asked if OSHIMA advocated that, in case of an Anglo-German war, Japan should actually, immediately organize a war, mobilize her army, and fight Britain, he replied that OSHIMA advocated the necessity of Japan's participating as an obligation in principle, but as to participation in war, in his sense, it was vague and broad.
- 33804 He did not mean that armed forces immediately should be used to assist Germany. *Asked why OSHIMA said that Japan should shoulder the obligation of fighting Britain if an Anglo-German war should break out, he said that OSHIMA explained that it was the general contention that when Japan and Germany should conclude such an assistance pact, then Japan should shoulder the same obligations as Germany. This meant that in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war, Germany agreed to participate, in principle. The situation should not be unilateral, and if Germany, in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war should shoulder obligations to participate in principle, then in the event of such a war Japan would, in principle, recognize such obligations. This would be a very superficial and unilateral view.
- 33807 * The witness was reminded that in his cross examination he had said he knew that OSHIMA submitted his views in regard to the proposed pact to the government, but that he did not know if OSHIMA urged his views on the government. The witness was reminded that he had also testified that OSHIMA had urged the government to accept his views. Asked which reply was correct, he stated that as to the latter statement, he thought his expression was that OSHIMA urged the government to accept his views and opinions. After OSHIMA submitted his
- 33808 views, the * return instructions of the government stating whether it was acceptable then did not come for a long time.
- 33809 * When asked what he meant by "urge" he stated it was to urge the government to send a reply. During these negotiations he did not know of any occasion when OSHIMA disregarded or disobeyed the instructions of the government.

Page

32890

* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAWABE, Torashiro
BY MR. BROOKS

The witness identified and verified Exhibit 2588 as his affidavit.

32892

* The affidavit stated that the witness was the senior member of the Second Section (in charge of operations) of the General Staff from Apr. 1929 to Jan. 1932. Referring to the series of telegram copies contained in Exhibits 3422-A to P, he affirmed that B, D, F, L, M and N were correct copies drafted by his section and sent to the Kwantung Army Commander or his C/S under the name of the Chief of General Staff or Vice Chief. The telegram in "E" was received by the General Staff from the Kwantung Army and he remembered reading it at the time. * Although C, G, H, I, J and K dealt with matters not under the jurisdiction of the General Staff, he was acquainted with the fact that they were sent from the War Ministry to the Kwantung Army because of the business contact between the Ministry and General Staff.

32893

When shown Exhibit 3422-A to P, he identified them as true copies of the ones mentioned in his affidavit.

32894

* The affidavit continued and stated that the witness was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from Aug. 1934 to March 1936 and Chief of the Second Section in charge of Intelligence from Aug. 1935 within that period. Lt. Col. TANAKA, Ryukichi was his subordinate as a staff officer attached to the Second Section.

32895

In Dec. 1934 MINAMI arrived as Commander of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador plenipotentiary to Manchukuo, and gave frequent instructions, the majority of which were drafted by the witness. The two ideas which consistently ran through these instructions were respect for and assistance to independent Manchukuo, and self-reflection and elimination of the vain feeling of Japanese superiority. The witness remembered that whenever these two were contained in the draft of an instruction, he could obtain MINAMI's signature without hitch. * Not only was that the sentiment of MINAMI but all working under him that Manchukuo would secure her international status as an independent country. At that time the Kwantung Army held maintenance of peace and order within Manchukuo as the primary duty under the protocol. Troops were put in extremely dispersed positions and were inadequate for defense against danger from outside Manchukuo and even more inadequate for an offensive against the USSR or China.

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MINAMI

KAWABE - Direct and Cross

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32896 In May 1935, War Minister HAYASHI came to Manchuria to inspect army conditions. About that time the UMEZU-Ho Yin-Chin Agreement was concluded in North China. The newspaper reports on these events were full of falsehood. Regarding Exhibit 2206-A, the article to the effect that War Minister HAYASHI reiterated in Mukden that the North China problem * was to be handled by the Kwantung Army, was entirely fabrication. In view of the state systems of command and duties of the Kwantung and North China Armies, HAYASHI would never have made such a statement. The article that MINAMI issued secret instructions to the Kwantung Army to hold themselves ready to pour into China was also false. Such instructions could not be given without a Supreme Command Directive which would surely have been brought to the witness' notice. The article that the Kwantung Army moved 5000 troops from Mukden to Shanhaikwan was also false. That army was in such condition that it was inconceivable to concentrate so many troops at one spot.

32897 The article that the army requested Prince Toh of Inner Mongolia to move his capital to a place 180 miles north of Pailing-miao * was also false.

Besides these items and with regard to matters not directly connected with the Kwantung Army, he found many canards which were totally beyond his experience and knowledge of the Japanese army. While he was a Kwantung Army staff officer, that army never issued anything like an ultimatum to China or brought similar pressure to bear.

32898 Referring to TANAKA's testimony that during MINAMI's tenure as Kwantung Army Commander, two brigades were sent to the demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall (T. 20118 to 119), there was no such fact. As to his testimony that two battalions of cavalry were sent to Chahar (T. 20118) he had no recollection of such a case. * The only incidents he remembered was a small unit moving into the demilitarized zone in the beginning of the summer of 1935. About one or two companies of the 7th Division operating against a strong bandit force near the Jehol frontier crossed into the zone in pursuit but immediately withdrew.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WOOLWORTH

32899 The witness stated that in 1935 the main strength of the Kwantung Army was composed of one mixed and one mechanized brigade with a total strength of about 30,000 * under Lt. General KAWAGISHI. The witness did not recall if in May 1935 KAWAGISHI moved a part of the brigade consisting of one infantry regiment and one artillery

Page
32908

32909

32910

* The witness was quoted a part of exhibit 2207, the interrogation of MINAMI (T.15785), in which MINAMI stated that he took command of the Kwantung Army in 1934, remaining in command one year and three months, and having about sixty thousand troops under him. * The witness was asked if there were sixty thousand troops in Manchuria, as MINAMI had stated, and if it was not so that the Kwantung Army was not in such condition at the time as it was inconceivable to concentrate so many troops at one spot. The witness explained that when, in his affidavit, he spoke of the difficulty of making any troop concentration, he was not making any comparison of numerical strength. Even though the number of troops under the Kwantung Army commander at that time was sixty thousand, it was under * the circumstances extremely difficult even to concentrate combat troops to the extent of 5,000.

In pursuance of MINAMI's strong desire, troops were dispersed in North and Central Manchuria, and in the light of the circumstances a numerical strength of 5,000, about half a division, was difficult to concentrate quickly in one spot. It was not impossible if a commander made a decisive decision and took unreasonable measures to bring about such a concentration. The Kwantung Army commander could not have done it unless he abandoned the policy he had set forth.

32911

The witness stated he thought the accused UMEZU was in command of the North China garrison during 1935, but toward the end of the year he thought there was a change to General TADA. Asked if he knew what representations UMEZU made to the Chinese authorities prior to the UMEZU-Ho Agreement, he replied he did not know. He had stated that MINAMI gave instructions to his officers and men, particularly in respect to assistance to independent Manchukuo.

32912

* He had testified that MINAMI was against going beyond the Great Wall and gaining further territory in China. Asked if he was familiar with MINAMI's career after he left command of the Kwantung Army and became Governor-General of Korea, he replied only in bare outline, but could not speak with confidence. After MINAMI left the Kwantung Army and the witness was transferred from the Kwantung Army, MINAMI and he lost contact, and his knowledge of MINAMI's activities since were only through newspaper reports, etc.

(The attention of the Tribunal was called to exhibit 2437).

(1)

See no 2

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Oshima not connected with Mikelen incident



A F F I D A V I T (Translation)

I, KAWABE, Torashiro, state under oath as follows:

- 1. My present address is Jindai-mura, Kitatama-gun, Tokyo
- 2. I was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff at the

time of the termination of the war in the summer of 1945. From April 1929 until January 1932 I was the senior officer in the operational section of the First Division of the general staff with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. Mr. OSHIMA, Hiroshi, was since August 1931 the Chief of the Fortress Section of the First Division of the general staff with the rank of Colonel. The Fortress Section was in charge of internal defense only, and therefore was not connected with offensive operations. Mr. OSHIMA, who was the Chief of the Fortress Section, was also concurrently a Staff Officer of the Naval General Staff; this was because of the custom of that time that the Chief of the Fortress Section should concurrently be the Staff Officer of the Navy as the defense of the fortress was also connected with the navy.

On 18 September 1931 the Mukden Incident broke out. As OSHIMA was on a post of defensive nature as mentioned above, he had nothing to do with the Manchurian Incident with respect to its outbreak, carrying out, continuance, etc. I do not know either that OSHIMA played any part in the Manchurian Incident from his individual standpoint apart from official duty.

On this 9th day of Sept., 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)

I, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) SHIMANOUCI, Ryuki (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)



Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (translation)

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

I, KAWABE, Torashiro, state under oath as follows:

1. I was in Berlin from December 1938 until February 1940 as Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy, with the rank of Major-General. Mr. OSHIMA was Ambassador from October 1938 until October 1939.

2 - 1. In October 1938, I was appointed Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Germany succeeding Lt. General OSHIMA. Prior to my departure from Japan, I was briefed by various persons at the General Staff Office in Tokyo on various subjects concerning my new duties. At that time, I heard explanations as to intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in Berlin against Soviet Russia from Lt. Col. USUI who had been in Berlin from May 1937 until January 1938, exclusively in charge of these matters under Military Attache OSHIMA, and had returned to the General Staff in

Tokyo thereafter. He told me that from his own experience no appreciable results could be expected from these activities.

2 - 2. After my arrival in Berlin in December 1938 I heard explanations from Col. MANAKI, who succeeded Lt. Col. USUI and was exclusively in charge of this work from the summer of 1938 under Military Attache OSHIMA. Through what I heard from USUI and MANAKI I learned the following facts:

(a) It was very difficult for us Japanese to find able Russians in Europe for this purpose;

(b) The Germans were not necessarily in sympathy with the White Russians or their organizations with which the Japanese side had been maintaining contact up to that time;

(c) It was particularly difficult for us Japanese to prepare any Anti-Soviet activities from Europe as a base and prospects of useful results in the future were also slim;

(d) The expense for the Japanese intelligence organs in Berlin amounted to no more than 500,000 yen annually including personal expenses.

I might add here that as regards counter-intelligence activities, only study and planning in consideration of wartime were laid down by the Chief of the General Staff; however, it was strictly forbidden to put them actually into effect in peace time.

2 - 3. I, like my predecessor OSHIMA, left Col. MANAKI entirely in charge of these matters. I received reports from him, but never transmitted them to Ambassador OSHIMA. This was because the Ambassador had

no relation whatsoever with this matter within scope of his official duty. Furthermore Ambassador OSHIMA, in fact, did not touch upon these matters and never asked me questions about them.

2 - 4. I met several times with the White Russians concerned. I found out that they were either nothing but anti-Soviet ideologists, like Bamard who was at that time staying in Switzerland for recuperation, or professionals who used to demand money from us by presenting impractical and fantastic anti-Soviet plans.

2 - 5. I knew that Lt. Col. USUI had bought a house at Falkensee in the suburbs of Berlin, and had turned it over to Col. MAMUKI. I knew also that a few White Russians were quartered there; they were engaged in a small scale printing of anti-Soviet pamphlets, but I do not know what became of those pamphlets.

2 - 6. I have absolutely never heard from anyone that OSHIMA or any other Japanese army officers sent anti-Soviet pamphlets into Soviet territories by balloons from Poland, or that they bought a motor-boat to bring such papers into the Crimea across the Black Sea, or that they sent Russians into Soviet Russia for the purpose of assassinating Stalin. Any such matters were completely unknown to me.

3 - 1. When I arrived in Berlin as Military Attache in December 1938 Ambassador OSHIMA was engaged in negotiations with the German Government regarding a Japanese-German-Italian treaty. From this time, until the negotiations were terminated, around August 1939, I, together with the

Naval Attache participated in frequent conferences within the Japanese Embassy and discussed this matter, Ambassador OSHIMA acting as leader. During these negotiations, Ambassador OSHIMA always gave the matter most careful consideration and often called the Embassy staff, the Military and Naval attaches together for consultation and study.

3 - 2. As to the reasons why the Japanese Government and the central army authorities wished for the conclusion of this treaty, Ambassador OSHIMA often told us as follows:

At that time the China incident was unexpectedly expanding without any prospect of an early termination, and all eager Japanese efforts for settlement had been of no avail. Moreover, both the Japanese Government and the army circles felt themselves threatened by the powerful armament of Soviet Russia. They wanted, therefore, by concluding this treaty with Germany and Italy, to improve the diplomatic position of Japan with the ultimate purpose of bringing the China incident to the earliest possible end, and, at the same time, to be prepared for any attack from Soviet Russia. I never heard from OSHIMA that Japan intended or desired to utilize this treaty after its conclusion as a means of initiate or wage aggressive war against other countries. Neither have I ever heard from anyone that OSHIMA planned or desired anything of this nature.

3 - 3. In February 1939, Mr. ITO, Nobufumi, accompanied by an officer from both the Army and the Navy, arrived in Berlin bringing the instructions of the Japanese Government regarding this treaty. I, together with the higher

Embassy staff and the Naval Attache, was present when envoy ITO gave the explanations to the Ambassador. The purport of this instruction was to limit to Soviet Russia the object of Japanese Military assistance, to be given to Germany and Italy on the basis of the treaty. This was at variance to what OSHIMA had already communicated to Germany upon instructions of the Government, namely that although Japan considered Soviet Russia as the primary object of this proposed treaty, Britain and France would also be included as secondary objects. Facing this situation, OSHIMA cabled his opinion to Tokyo that, in view of the progress up to that time, Germany might become distrustful of Japan if he transmitted to Germany the changed Japanese view as instructed, and, moreover, would never accept the proposal.

3 - 4. According to Exhibit No. 2230, Ambassador OSHIMA told the German Foreign Minister on 27 May 1939 that "the War Minister requested OSHIMA by wire to hold off until later against ARITA in order not to disturb the discussions among the various quarters in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow." Concerning this I have the following recollection:

According to my memory, it was about the middle of May 1939, I dispatched a telegram from Berlin to Tokyo stating that Japan must clarify her position as to whether she was going to conclude the treaty with Germany and Italy or not, and that to continue in the ambiguous attitude of that time would only invite the contempt of foreign countries. Thereupon I received from War Minister ITAGAKI a telegram to the effect

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that: "The matter of the Japan-Germany-Italy treaty is now under earnest discussion within the cabinet, and, as the atmosphere is turning favorable to its conclusion, we had better remain silent for the time being. I have no thought whatsoever of overthrowing the cabinet." I told Ambassador OSHIMA of this telegram.

On this 27th day of Oct., 1947,
at Tokyo.

Deponent: KIMABE, Torashiro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) SHIMANOUCHI, Ryu

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) KIMABE, Torashiro (seal)

Def. Loc. # 2588

Exh. No.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I, KAWABE, Torashiro, was the senior member of the Second Section (in charge of operations) of the General Staff, Tokyo, from April, 1929 to January, 1932.

Referring to the series of telegram copies, contained in Def. Doc. # 2048 A-P, I affirm that B, D, F, L, M and N are correct copies of those telegrams which were drafted by my section (mostly by myself) and despatched to the Commander of Kwantung Army or his Chief of Staff under the name of the Chief of General Staff or the Vice-Chief of General Staff. The telegram embodied in E was received by the General Staff from the Kwantung Army and I remember that I read it at that time. C, G, H, I, J and K are copies of telegrams despatched from the War Ministry to the Kwantung Army. Although they dealt with matters not under the jurisdiction of the

General Staff, I was acquainted with the fact that these telegrams were dispatched at that time because of the business contact between the War Ministry and the General Staff.

2. I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August, 1934, to March, 1936, and the Chief of the Second Section (in charge of intelligence) from August, 1935, within that period. Lieutenant-Colonel TANAKA, Ryukichi, was my subordinate, as a staff officer attached to the Second Section.

In December, 1935, General MINAMI arrived at his post as Commander of Kwantung Army and Ambassador plenipotentiary to Manchukuo. After his arrival, the General gave officers and men frequent instructions, the majority of which were drafted by me as a matter of duty. These instructions were made naturally to serve different purposes of respective occasions, but there were two ideas consistently running through all, namely, (1) respect for and assistance to independent Manchukuo, and (2) self-reflection and elimination of the vain feeling of Japanese superiority. I remember that whenever these two were contained in the draft of an instruction, I could obtain the signature of the Commander without hitch. Not only such was the sentiment of General MINAMI, but all of us working under him believed firmly in the fact that Manchukuo would secure her international status as a perfect independent country.

3. The Kwantung Army at that time held the maintenance of peace and order within Manchukuo as the primary duty under the Japan-

Manchukuo protocol. The troops were put in dispersed positions to the extreme, suffering the inadequacy from the military point of view for the defense against dangers from outside of Manchukuo. Hence, the disposition of the Army was even more inadequate for any offensive towards U.S.S.R. or China.

In May, 1935, War Minister HAYASHI came to Manchuria to inspect the condition of the Army there. Incidentally about that time, the so-called UMEZU-Ho Yin-Chin agreement was concluded in North China. Coinciding with these events, various rumours were reported in foreign newspapers, but I regret to say that such reports were full of falsehood. For instance, I point out the following items in Exhibit # 2206 A.

(a) The article to the effect that War Minister HAYASHI reiterated in Mukden that the North China problem was to be handled by the Kwantung Army (New York Times, June 6, 1935) is entirely a fabrication. In view of distinct systems of command and duties of the Kwantung Army and the North China Army respectively, War Minister HAYASHI would absolutely never have made such a statement.

(b) The articles to the effect that General MINAMI issued secret instructions to the Kwantung Army to hold themselves ready to pour into China (Tribune, June 9, 1935; Sacramento Tribune, June 8, 1935; Oakland Tribune, June 9, 1935) are also false. Such instructions could not be given without a directive from the Central Supreme Command, a directive which, if any, would surely have been brought to my notice as a matter of function.

(c) The article to the effect that the Kwantung Army moved 5,000 troops from Mukden to Shanhaiwan (New York Times, June 13, 1935) is also false. The Kwantung Army was in such a condition at that time as it was inconceivable to concentrate so many troops at one spot.

(d) The article to the effect that the Army requested Prince Teh of Inner Mongolia to move his capital to a place 180 miles to the north of Pailingmiao (New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1935) is also false.

(e) Besides the above-mentioned items and with regard to matters not directly connected with the Kwantung Army, I find many canards which are totally beyond my experience and knowledge of the Japanese army in general.

In addition to the above comments on reports of foreign sources, I must say in conclusion that during the time when I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army there was no such fact as the Kwantung Army issued anything like an ultimatum to China or brought a similar pressure to bear upon her.

4. Referring to the testimony of Mr. TANAKA, Ryukichi, made at this Tribunal on July 8th last year, to the effect that during the tenure of office of General MINAMI as Commander of Kwantung Army two brigades were sent to the demilitarized zone, south of the Great Wall (C.R. pp. 2,118; 2,119), I state definitely that there was no such fact. As to his testimony to the effect that two

battalions of cavalry were sent to Chahar (C.R. p. 2,118), I have no recollection whatever of such a case. I can say that I have a memory, amounting to conviction, on the troop disposition which incapacitated the Kwantung Army at that time to send expeditionally any such unit of cavalry out of the border into the Chahar Province.

The only instance, which I remember as the case of a small unit of the Kwantung Army moving into the demilitarized zone of North China, occurred in the beginning of summer, 1935. A small unit (about one or two companies) of the 7th Division, which was operating against a strong bandit force near the frontier of Jehol, crossed into the demilitarized zone in pursuit, but withdrew immediately within border.

5. In this connection, I should like to state a fact as an example of the Kwantung Army's attitude of non-interference towards North China questions. In November, 1935, when I was the Chief of the Second Section, two messengers of Tin Yen-ken came to see me at the headquarters and asked me to arrange an interview with Vice-Chief of Staff, ITAGAKI, for hearing opinions of the Kwantung Army authorities upon the promotion of the East Hepoi autonomous regime. Instantly I replied to them that it was not for the Army authorities to entertain any opinion on such internal affairs of China, and flatly refused to introduce them to Lieut-Gen. ITAGAKI.

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As they went away forthwith, I did not report the matter to him nor have I done so since.

On this 16th day of September, 1947,

at Tokyo.

Deponent: /s/ KARABE, Torashiro (seal)

I, YOSHIDA, Masao, do hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in my presence on the same day and at the same place as above written.

Witness: /s/ YOSHIDA, Masao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KARABE, Torashiro (seal)

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAWABE, Torashiro,
by Mr. Warren.

- 28738 * The witness identified exhibit 3188 as his
affidavit, and after corrections verified it. The affidavit
28741 stated that the witness * became acquainted with DOIHARA
in 1934, when he was Chief of the Special Service Organ in
Mukden. At that time the witness was a staff officer of
the Kwantung Army, holding that post from August 1934 to
March 1936. During this period his work often brought him
in contact with DOIHARA, and he became familiar with the
methods he used and the administration of his official
affairs, and became intimately acquainted with him,
28742 * learning his viewpoints with reference to Japan-Chinese
relations.

- 28743 When DOIHARA was Inspector General of the Air
Force, the witness served under him as Chief of the General
Affairs Section, and DOIHARA was his immediate superior.
During this time he became familiar with the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Air Force.
* He could state that the Inspector General was under the
command of the Emperor and subordinate only to the War
Minister. The Inspector General was in charge primarily
of technical education. Although the Chief of Army Air
Command Headquarters was subordinate to the War Minister
regarding maintenance, supply, etc., neither had authority
to participate or advise on operational matters. They were
precluded from participating in the preparation of any
operational mission with reference to armed forces in the
field or in war. The Inspector General and the Chief of
Army Air Force Command Headquarters were two distinct
posts. As Inspector General, DOIHARA was under the command
of the Emperor directly.

- 28744 As Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters,
the chain of command went from the Emperor * through the
War Ministry, then to General DOIHARA. In this position
he did have duties with reference to air corps supply,
but did not participate in planning operational matters.

When DOIHARA was Inspector General of Military
Education, the witness did not serve under him, but was
fully acquainted with his office's operations and respons-
ibilities. The Inspector General of Military Education was
responsible for the administration of technical and army
service schools generally and educational matter, with the
exception of technical matters pertaining to aviation.

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He had no authority, and in practice took no part in any planning or operational matter, and had no voice in any decision in reference to planning operations in the field.

28745 The witness was fully acquainted with the Supreme War Council, of which DOIHARA was once a member. The Council is more of an honorary position than an integral part of military command. It was merely a military inquiry organ * to respond to the Emperor's questions on important military problems. It had little or no political authority and was an organ receiving reports of general affairs, and the military situation from various army leaders.

While DOIHARA was Chief of the Air Command, the witness knew of occasions when he was required to deal with civilian aircraft industry problems with political significance. When these matters came up, DOIHARA merely clarified the army's position and left concrete matters in the hands of the industrialists and refused to engage in politics with them. The witness never knew DOIHARA to offer them a hand for the sake of political artifice, but he remained aloof to the extreme.

28746

* DOIHARA became Inspector General of the Air Forces and Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters six months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, at which time the witness was his assistant as head of the General Affairs Section. From discussions with DOIHARA, the witness knew that he had scarcely any knowledge up to the war's outbreak of the essential problems of political and military significance in the country. The witness could say this, because just before the war's outbreak when he asked DOIHARA a few questions concerning the strained and gloomy prospect, DOIHARA had not the slightest idea as to the import of the witness' questions. Instead, he asked the witness what it was all about. After the discussion, DOIHARA ordered him to get information from the War Ministry and General Staff Headquarters, so he would have the necessary knowledge to discharge his duties.

28747

The decoration DOIHARA received from Germany was while he was Inspector General of the Army Air Forces, and * he and the witness was present at the time he received it. The witness recalled DOIHARA received the Grand Cross. He knew personally DOIHARA could never undertake it, any political or any action to strengthen or enlarge the triple alliance. They were surprised that he received the medal. The only reason they could attribute to his receiving

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it was the fact that he was the head of the department.
DOIHARA himself uttered words of surprise on learning of
the decoration.

THERE WAS NO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

The attention of the court was called to exhibits
2246, 1272, and 2247.

objed

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT



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B. 4.*

I, KIMABE, Torashiro, of lawful age, having been duly sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, make the following statement, of my own free will and accord:

I first became acquainted with the accused DOHIMARA, Kenji, in 1934, at which time he was Chief of the Special Service Organ in Mukden, Manchuria. At that time I held the post of Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army. I held this post from August, 1934, until March, 1936. During this period my work often brought me in contact with General DOHIMARA and I became familiar with the methods he used in the administration of his official affairs and also became intimately acquainted with him from a personal standpoint and learned his viewpoints with reference to the relationship of Japan and China.

Character

I observed that he administered his official duties in a sincere manner and did not tend to enlarge or to detract from facts which were dealt with in his official reports. He did not hesitate to speak his mind with regard to his personal feelings as to the conduct of the Japanese toward the Chinese people. On one occasion we asked him to deliver a speech on this subject, which was entitled "How to Act with the Chinese People." This speech was to be delivered to the junior officers and I distinctly recall his words to this very day, when he summed up his lecture with the following words:

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p. 4 2 sentences
- 1 -*

*Kenji's as
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"There is no distinction whatsoever between the Japanese people and the Chinese. The most important and ^{the} best way to meet people so that you can convey your thoughts fully is to be sincere." He felt, and often expressed such opinion to me, that the best interests of Japan and China lay in a mutual understanding of the people of those nations of each other. He did not believe that war between the two nations could settle any issues. On the contrary, he believed it would drive the peoples of those nations further apart. I personally know that he was opposed to the outbreak of war, or to a show of force by arms against China.

When General DOHARA was Inspector General of the Army Air Force, I served under him as Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Army Air Force. He was my immediate superior officer. During this period of time I became very familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General of the Army Air Force and desire to make the following observation with reference thereto:

The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was under the direct command of the Emperor and was subordinate only to the Minister of War, insofar as his duties were concerned. The Inspector General of the Army Air Force was in charge of the technical education, which was his primary duty, and although the Chief of the Army Air Command Headquarters was subordinate to the Minister of War with reference to maintenance, supply, etc., neither of them had authority to participate or to advise in operational matters, and were precluded from participating in the preparation or planning of any operational mission with reference