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MISSION #20 KAWASAKI "FRUITCAKE 1"  
19 JANUARY 1945

2-5234-103

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

MISSION NUMBER 26  
 FIELD ORDER NUMBER 41  
 19 JANUARY 1945

**XXI Bomber Command,  
 Mission No 20.**

2-5239-103

HEADQUARTERS  
 73RD BOMBARDMENT WING  
 APO #237, % POSTMASTER  
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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S E C R E T

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing  
APO #237, % Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

Mission Number 20  
Field Order Number 41  
Date of Mission:  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

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Headquarters  
~~XXI~~ Bomber Com'd

Mission # 20

S E C R E T

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing  
APO #237, % Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

S E C R E T

Mission No. 20  
Field Order 41  
Date of Mission  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

TACTICAL NARRATIVE

1. The Target

The 73rd Bombardment Wing directed that two Squadrons from each of its four Groups bomb the Kawasaki A/C Plant in Akashi (90.25-1547) as a primary target, or any industrial city as a target of last resort. No secondary target was designated.

It further directed that a diversionary force of three A/C dispense rope, bomb Hamamatsu, and obtain terrain and scope photos of Miyake Jima, Mikura Jima, and Hachijo Jima.

2. Take-off

The 77 A/C in the principal force were airborne at Isely Airfield, Saipan, from 182045Z to 182132Z. The three diversionary A/C took off at the same time as the 1st Squadron of the strike force.

3. Bomb Loading

Each plane in the principal force carried 10 x 500-lb GP bombs fused 0.10 sec nose and 0.025 sec tail. Each diversionary A/C carried 6 x 500-lb GP bombs fused in the same manner.

4. Route Out

The A/C assembled into Combat Groups at Saipan, flew the prescribed course without incident, and turned at the IP (34°30'N-135°24'E) with the exception of the 1st Squadron which made IP east of Osaka and flew directly over that city to the target. Six planes returned early because of mechanical malfunctions.

The three diversionary A/C assembled at Marpi Point and departed on course with the 1st Combat Group. One plane returned early because of fuel transfer malfunction. The other two planes left the main force at approximately 330N and proceeded to landfall at 34°05'N-136°15'E, west of their briefed course. A point over the ocean (34°23'N-137°15'E) was selected as an IP for a south-westerly approach to the diversionary target.


5. Bombing Data

Sixty-two (62) A/C dropped 152.5 tons of bombs on the Kawasaki Plant. Last resort and opportunity targets received 16.25 tons from seven planes. The two diversionary A/C bombed Hamamatsu. Eight planes jettisoned and one returned bombs to base. All bombs were dropped visually from 190450Z to 190524Z at altitudes ranging from 25,100 to 27,400 feet.

6. Enemy Opposition

It is estimated that our A/C encountered 11 attacks from TONYs, IRVINGs, OSCARs, and ZEKEs in the Hamamatsu area.

Between the IP and the coast on course of departure, the principal force encountered 148 attacks from TONYs, ZEKEs, IRVINGs, TOJOs, ZEKE 32's, OSCARs, and NICKs.



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Tactical Narrative, page 2

7. Enemy Attack Data

Of the 159 attacks, 74 came from above, predominantly from 12 to 3 o'clock; 49 level attacks from 10 to 6 o'clock; and 36 low attacks from all quarters. Six attacks were coordinated and few were closely pressed. There were no unusual tactics reported on the part of either E/A or B-29's.

8. Antiaircraft Fire

In general, antiaircraft fire of all types was meager to moderate and inaccurate from landfall to IP, moderate from IP to target, and meager to moderate and inaccurate on withdrawal. The one Squadron that flew over Osaka encountered intense and accurate fire. Some fire came from ships in the harbor of Osaka and Kobe. No air-to-air bombing, rocket fire, or phosphorus shells were observed.

9. Route Back

All A/C returned to home base by individual navigation, the first landing at 191055Z and the last at 191304Z.

10. Damage Assessment

It is estimated that the 129 hits on the engine and assembly plants damaged or destroyed 39% of the total roof area. Direct hits were received by 31 out of 42 buildings. The greatest concentration of hits was observed in the buildings of the engine plant where 58% of the roof area was damaged or destroyed. The A/C assembly plant shows damage to 21% of its roof area.

11. Our Losses

No A/C were lost on this mission, and two men were injured. Three planes received damage from E/A, eight from AA fire, and one from both these causes.

12. Claims

Our gunners claim the destruction of four E/A, the probable destruction of four, and the damaging of eight.

13. Weather

Favored by excellent visibility and only scattered high clouds at take-off, the A/C encountered a weak front at 17°N. A second frontal area at 27°N, a gradual increase of alto-stratus at 10,000 feet, and lower swelling cumulus accompanied by light showers and haze reduced visibility to 5 miles (occasionally to 1 mile) as the A/C approached the Empire.

Over the target, 2 to 3/10 strato-cumulus, very low and near the mountains, left the target clear for visual bombing. Visibility was 20 miles.

On the return trip, considerably more middle clouds were observed. Moderate to severe turbulence was experienced in clear air at 25,000 feet at 31°N.

*Kenneth P. Bergqvist*

KENNETH P. BERGQVIST  
Colonel, Air Corps  
DC/S, Opns and Trng

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
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Mission No. 20  
 Field Order No. 41  
 Date of Mission  
 19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

VERTICAL CHART

73rd Bomb Wing  
 23 January 1945  
 Capt J.T. Davis



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Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 20  
Field Order No. 41  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BASIC DATA

1. TIME OF TAKE OFF:

Gp No	Sq No	Place	First A/C	Last A/C	No of A/C
498	1	Saipan	182045Z	182057Z	10
498	2	Saipan	182045Z	182054Z	9
499	3	Saipan	182058Z	182103Z	9*
499	4	Saipan	182101Z	182107Z	6
499	5	Saipan	182103Z	182109Z	6
500	6	Saipan	182110Z	182119Z	10
500	7	Saipan	182110Z	182120Z	11
497	8	Saipan	182121Z	182131Z	11
497	9	Saipan	182121Z	182132Z	8
Overall			182045Z	182132Z	80

\*Includes 3 diversionary a/c.

2. TIME OF LANDING:\*\*

Gp No	Sq No	Place	First A/C	Last A/C	No of A/C
498	1	Saipan	191100Z	191156Z	9
498	2	Saipan	191117Z	191209Z	8
499	3	Saipan	191103Z	191142Z	8
499	4	Saipan	191055Z	191150Z	6
499	5	Saipan	191108Z	191154Z	6
500	6	Saipan	191201Z	191219Z	10
500	7	Saipan	191105Z	191304Z	9
497	8	Saipan	191106Z	191220Z	10
497	9	Saipan	191108Z	191228Z	7
Overall			191055Z	191304Z	73

\*\*Excludes a/c returning early.

3. SQUADRON ASSEMBLY:

See paragraph 4.

4. GROUP ASSEMBLY:

Gp No	Place	Time	Altitude
498	Group Assembly Was Never Completed*		
499	15°06'N, 145°40'E	182122Z	1,000'
500	15°15'N, 145°37'E	182128Z	1,300'
497	15°08'N, 145°30'E	182144Z	1,000'

\*498th Group a/c flew to target in two squadrons. The first of these assembled at Marpi Point at 182105Z at 1,000'. The second assembled at Marpi Point at 182108Z at 1,300'.

5. WING ASSEMBLY:

None ordered.

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S E C R E T

Basic Data, Page 2

6. AIRCRAFT RETURNING EARLY:\*\*\*

A/C No	Gp No	Time	Reason
T10(4767)*	498	190540Z	#4 engine severe oil leak because push rod housing blown off.
T32(4749)*	498	190944Z	Blown cylinder #1 engine.
V23(4644)**	499	190313Z	Fuel transfer system failure.
Z 4(4672)*	500	190936Z	#2 turbo out - turbo governor found to be defective.
Z 5(4643)*	500	190207Z	Fuel transfer failure. A piece of carbon vane from previous failure jammed a selector valve.
A10(4597)*	497	182332Z	#2 engine #1 cylinder swallowed valve.
A24(4604)*	497	182358Z	#2 engine bad oil leak. Flight indicators out.
Total no. of a/c returning early -- 7			
*A/C jettisoning bombs.			
**A/C returning bombs to Base.			
***All a/c returning early landed at Saipan.			

7. ROUTE OUT:

Information submitted to XXI Bomber Command by Wing Navigator.

8. ROUTE BACK:

Information submitted to XXI Bomber Command by Wing Navigator.

9. INITIAL POINTS: (34°30'N, 135°24'E)

Gp No	Place	Time	Altitude
498*	34°30'N, 135°23'E	190440Z	25,000'
499	34°29'N, 135°25'E	190459Z	27,500'
500	34°30'N, 135°24'E	190515Z	27,000'
497	34°30'N, 135°24'E	190517Z	26,400'

\*The first squadron of 498th Group flew on past the briefed IP to a point east of the city of Osaka. Making a left turn, the squadron flew directly over Osaka to the target.

10. TARGETS ATTACK DATA:

a. No of A/C Attacking Targets:

Gp No	Primary	Last Resort	Opportunity
498	16	0	0
499*	17	1	0
500	16	2	1
497	13	3	0
Total	62	6	1

\*Two diversionary a/c bombed Hamamatsu

Last Resort Targets:

Gp No	No of A/C	Target	Time	Altitude	Heading (Deg)
499	1	Shingu	190515Z	25,000'	165
500	1	Shingu	190459Z	26,700'	270
500	1	Kanton Saki	190504Z	26,700'	272
497	2	Shingu	190503-190505Z	25,900-29,000'	50-150
497	1	Shio-wo-Misaki	190502Z	19,200'	35
Targets of Opportunity:					
500	1	Harbor at Kuki	190510Z	26,400'	150

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S E C R E T

Basic Data, Page 3  
Par 10, cont'd

b. Times over Targets:\*\*

Gp No	First A/C	Last A/C
498	190450Z	190458Z
499	190506Z	190507Z
500	190524Z	190524Z
497	190524Z	190524Z

\*For times over last resort and targets of opportunity, see section 10 a.

c. Heading and Altitude from IP to Target:

Gp No	Heading (Deg)	Altitude
498	297	25,300' to 25,600'
499	210 - 280	26,000' to 27,400'
500	266 - 292	26,800' to 27,200'
497	291	25,350' to 26,900'

d. Heading and Altitude over Target:\*\*

Gp No	Heading	Altitude
498	297	25,100' to 26,500'
499	210 - 280	26,000' to 27,400'
500	266 - 292	26,700' to 27,200'
497	300	25,350' to 26,900'

\*For heading and altitude over last resort and targets of opportunity, see section 10 a.

e. Breakaway:

498 - Left turn to a heading of 1560 M.  
499 - Left turn to departure course.  
500 - Turn to heading of 200°  
497 - Left turn away from target

f. Rally Point:

None ordered

g. Extra Runs over Target:

None

h. Reasons for Failure to Attack:

Gp No	A/C No	Reason
497	A 7(4593)*	Bomb bay door malfunction over primary target.
497	A 6(4594)	#1 & 3 engines bad oil leaks at altitude-Bombed Shingu (LR)
497	A12(3485)	#3 engine no turbo boost. Bombed Shio-No-Misaki (LR).
497	A25(3412)	Fluctuating manifold pressure and RPM all engines at altitude. Bombed Shingu (LR).
498	T 9(4629)*	#4 turbo malfunction.
499	V28(3465)	Gas leak on take-off. #4 engine malfunction on Japanese coast. Bombed Shingu (LR).
500	Z21(4652)	#1 engine ran away. Bombed Kantori Saki (LR).
500	Z31(3494)	#4 engine malfunction at altitude. Bombed Shingu (LR).
500	Z46(4721)	#3 engine failed at altitude. Ran hot and fluctuated, followed by fluctuation of manifold pressure and finally complete loss of manifold pressure. Bombed harbor at Kuki (TO)

\*Jettisoned bombs.

11. ESCORT DATA:

No escort ordered.

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S E C R E T

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 20  
Field Order No. 41  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

LOSS AND DAMAGE

12. CASUALTIES -- PERSONNEL:  
See Consolidated Statistical Summary, Table X, Casualties.
13. AIRCRAFT LOST:  
None
14. AIRCRAFT MISSING:  
None
15. TOTAL AIRCRAFT FAILING TO RETURN:  
None
16. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT:  
See Report of Battle Damage, next page.

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REPORT OF BATTLE DAMAGE

MISSION #20  
19 Jan 1945

TO BE READY FOR  
COMBAT WITHIN

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE

SERIAL NO.

<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>TO BE READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE</u>
42-24855	3 days	Hole in left aileron.
Total Damaged - 497th Bomb Group: 1 Aircraft - 1 within 3 days		
<u>498TH BOMB GROUP</u>		
42-24544	4 days	Flak tore vertical stabilizer.
42-63501	2 days	Flak hole in fuselage under stabilizer.
42-24614	2 days	One bullet hole in horizontal stabilizer and one bullet hole in right wing.
42-24777	2 days	Flak holes in left wing, flak holes in bombay, bullet hole in left blister.
Total Damaged - 498th Bomb Group: 4 Aircraft • 3 within 2 days 1 within 4 days		
<u>499TH BOMB GROUP</u>		
42-63483	3 days	One bullet hole in vertical stabilizer.
Total Damaged - 499th Bomb Group: 1 Aircraft - 1 within 3 days		
<u>500TH BOMB GROUP</u>		
42-63497	7 days	20MM hole through right sighting blister, bombay tanks salvaged.
42-24694	3 days	Hole in prop blade #4 engine.
42-63486	4 days	Hole in leading edge of right wing.
42-63489	Indef	Hole in outer left wing panel, left flap, right flap.
42-63435	Indef	Hole in prop blade #1 engine, right and left outboard nacelle panels.
Total Damaged - 500th Bomb Group: 5 Aircraft - 1 within 3 days 1 within 4 days 1 within 7 days 2 indefinite		
<u>TOTAL DAMAGED - 73RD BOMB WING:</u>		
11 Aircraft - 3 within 2 days 3 within 3 days 2 within 4 days 1 within 7 days 2 indefinite		

S-E-C-R-E-T

-73rd Wing Stat-

S E C R E T

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 20  
Field Order No. 41  
19 January 1945.

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

AA AND AIR TO AIR BOMBING

17. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE:

Our a/c, flying between 25,000 and 27,500 feet, were fired upon by anti-aircraft guns from the point of landfall over Honshu to the point of leaving land. Some of the fire was from naval craft in the harbors at Osaka and Kobe.

In general the anti-aircraft fire was meager to moderate and inaccurate from landfall to IP, moderate from IP to target, and meager to moderate, inaccurate on the withdrawal. Predicted concentration, continuously pointed and barrage fire were noted. One fairly concentrated barrage was observed as a/c of our 497th Group passed over the target, but most of it arrived late, after the formation had passed over the spot. However, the Jap gunners continued to fire, but at no evident target.

During this mission, black, brown and white bursts were seen. Eight a/c were slightly damaged by anti-aircraft fire but all returned safely to base.

18. OUR TACTICS VERSUS AA:

No evasive tactics by our a/c were reported.

19. AIR TO AIR BOMBING AND ROCKETS:

No air-to-air bombing, rocket fire, or phosphorus shells were observed.

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Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing  
APO #237, % Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

Mission No. 20  
Field Order No. 41  
Date of Mission  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

COMBAT DATA

20. ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT


LEGEND

ATTACKS

Level From ———  
Above From - - -  
Below From ·····

ENEMY A/C

Destroyed x  
Prob x  
Destr'd Δ  
Damaged □



<u>TOTALS</u>	
<u>ATTACKS</u>	159
Level From	49
Above High From	74
Below Low	36
E/A Dest'd	4
E/A Prob Dest'd	4
E/A Damaged	8

NOTE: The number of E/A attacking is shown at the outside end of each line. Attacks made by twin-engine enemy aircraft are indicated by "o" interruption in attack line, and when more than one T/E attack is made, the total is shown inside the "o".

21. YARDS AT WHICH E/A OPENED FIRE

Yards	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000 or more
No. A/C Firing		1	2	1	8	23	17	22	31	41

It is not determined at what distance 13 E/A opened fire.

COMMENTS: (See following page)

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Combat Data, page 2

21. (Contd)

COMMENTS:

The average distances at which E/A are estimated to have opened fire, correlated with the directions and angles of attack, are shown below:

<u>Direction</u>	<u>Above</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Below</u> (yards)
10:30 to 1:30	800	1000	900
1:30 to 4:30	900	900	850
4:30 to 7:30	650	800	800
7:30 to 10:30	900	850	1000

22. TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACKING

It is estimated that approximately 60 enemy aircraft were encountered. The 159 attacks were reported to have been made by the following types of E/A at locations and altitudes indicated.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>No. &amp; Type E/A</u>
Over Hamamatsu	29,000'	4 TONY
	30,000'	5 TONY, 1 ZEKE
SE of Hamamatsu	30,000'	1 IRVING
At IP	29,000'	1 OSCAR
Between IP and bomb run	27,000'	10 ZEKE, 1 Unident T/E twin-boom
	28,000'	18 IRVING, 28 TONY
	"	12 ZEKE, 3 Unident T/E
	"	2 Unident S/E, 1 TOJO
	"	1 OSCAR
On bomb run	26,000'	2 ZEKE, 3 ZEKE 32
	27,000'	7 TOJO, 8 OSCAR
	"	1 ZEKE 32
Over target	26,000'	1 ZEKE, 1 OSCAR
	"	1 ZEKE 32, 1 TOJO
	"	1 TONY
	28,000'	3 IRVING, 1 TONY
	"	1 Unident S/E, 2 ZEKE
	"	8 ZEKE 32, 1 NICK
	"	2 TOJO
	29,000'	1 ZEKE, 1 OSCAR
Target to coast	26,000'	9 TONY, 9 TOJO
	"	1 ZEKE, 2 IRVING
	"	2 Unident S/E, 1 ZEKE 32
At coast - returning	28,000'	1 JACK

In addition to the types of E/A listed above as making attacks, one BETTY and one VAL were observed, neither of which is known to have attempted interception. One unidentified S/E E/A with fixed landing gear was also observed.

Two IRVINGS dove through the formation in the target area without opening fire. Eight unidentified S/E E/A followed the formation out to sea for five minutes on return, but stayed well out of range and did not attack.

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Combat Data, page 3

23. TYPE AND ACCURACY OF ENEMY FIRE AND TYPE OF PROJECTILE

All Groups participating in the mission reported enemy fire to be generally inaccurate. One A/C pressed the attack to 40 yards without damaging the B-29 at which it was firing. A 20-mm explosive shell came through a blister and struck a gunner over his breast flak suit but did not explode and was deflected by the flak suit with no injury to the gunner. Types of fire reported were 12.7-mm, 7.7-mm machine gun and 20-mm cannon. The following armament arrangements were reported:

IRVING	-	50 cal and 20-mm
3 IRVINGS	-	20-mm and MG on right wing
IRVING	-	20-mm outboard of engines
IRVING	-	3 guns
IRVING	-	nose guns
IRVING	-	20-mm
TONY	-	.50 cal and 20-mm
2 TONYs	-	7.7-mm MG
TONY	-	20-mm and small machine guns
3 TONYs	-	light MG and cannon fire
5 ZEKE 32	-	2 x 12.7-mm MG each wing
ZEKE 32	-	1 x 20-mm cannon each side of fuselage
2 ZEKE 32	-	20-mm and MG fire
ZEKE 32	-	MGs in wings
TOJO	-	20-mm and 12.7 guns
TOJO	-	20-mm cannon in each wing
OSCAR	-	Guns in wings and nose
OSCAR	-	Guns in wings only
ZEKE	-	20-mm fire

The average distances to which enemy fighters pressed their attack, correlated with direction and angle, are shown below.

<u>Direction</u>	<u>Above</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Below (yds)</u>
10:30 to 1:30	450	250	600
1:30 to 4:30	525	450	500
4:30 to 7:30	425	455	600
7:30 to 10:30	500	690	700

24. ENEMY AIRCRAFT MARKINGS

Markings on enemy aircraft were reported as follows:

IRVING	-	Green
7 IRVINGS	-	Black
7 IRVINGS	-	Grey
2 IRVINGS	-	Forest green
IRVING	-	Sand color
8 TONYs	-	Black
2 TONYs	-	Yellow
TONY	-	Dark green
6 TONYs	-	Grey
2 TONYs	-	Brown
11 TONYs	-	Camouflaged tan filled with yellow

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Combat Data, page 4

24. (Contd)

SECRET

ZEKE - Camouflaged all colors  
6 ZEKES - Grey  
2 ZEKES - Black  
ZEKE - Yellow with red diagonal stripes  
ZEKE - Yellow and green with gun metal wings  
ZEKE - Blue-grey  
ZEKE - White  
4 ZEKES - Dark OD, blue rings around red roundels  
5 ZEKES - Yellow grey and grey camouflage beneath, with green, yellow and brown on top; red roundels  
Same markings as above; black square around the red roundels

8 ZEKE 32 - Black  
ZEKE 32 - Forest green  
ZEKE 32 - OD  
ZEKE 32 - Light orange  
ZEKE 32 - Yellow wings; underside of fuselage silver

NICK - Black

TOJO - Black  
TOJO - Grey  
TOJO - Forest Green  
TOJO - OD

3 TOJOs - Dark  
TOJO - Dark brown, yellow stripes at wing roots  
TOJO - OD; red roundels

OSCAR - Silver  
OSCAR - Black

26 Unidentified - OD

25. ENEMY TACTICS

a. General Employment of E/A: Fighter attacks were reported to have begun at the IP (Ostomura), and reached maximum intensity between the bomb run and the target, and immediately after bombs away. Of the two Groups whose Squadrons were over the target at approximately the same time (500th and 497th), one received 88 attacks while the other reported none. There were only six reports of coordinated attacks, three of which were made against our A/C participating in the diversionary strike. Our 3 B-29's in the diversionary effort received 10 attacks over Hamamatsu, which were closely pressed. In addition, these same 3 A/C sighted 11 enemy fighters -- 3 before IP going in, 6 north of Hamamatsu, and 2 near coast going out. Remainder of attacks for both principal and diversionary A/C were single, and in general were not considered aggressive by our crews.

b. Coordinated Attacks

(1) Over IP, at 28,000', a ZEKE came in from 11 o'clock above, while another approached from 11 o'clock level, both turning into the formation pressing their attacks to 100 yards.

(2) Over the PT, at 28,000', three IRVINGS, flying V formation, overtook our B-29's. Each started to turn in at 4 o'clock level about 800 yards out, but none pressed closer than 400 yards.

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S E C R E T

Combat Data, page 5

25. (Contd)

(3) In the diversionary attack over Hamamatsu, three TONYs made passes from ahead level at 11 o'clock, 11 and 2 o'clock. These fighters opened fire at 1200 yards and made a fly-through attack, two of these pressing to 40 yards and the third to 270 yards. The two which pressed attack dove and came back to re-attack.

(4) Over target, two TONYs attacked a Group leader from above at 1 o'clock, opened fire at 600 yards, and pressed their attack to 50 yards.

c. Individual Attacks

(1) Over bomb run at 30,000 feet an IRVING made an attack from 1 o'clock high, closing to about 500 yards and breaking down and out over the formation. Approximately 3 minutes later, this IRVING made a second pass from 5 o'clock low and broke away at 500 yards in a Split-S. Tracers were seen being deflected off the nose.

(2) On the bomb run, at approximately 29,000 feet, one OSCAR attacked a B-29 from above at 2 o'clock, dived, then attacked another B-29 from above at 6 o'clock.

(3) Over target area, at approximately 29,000 feet, a TOJO and ZEKE (not coordinated) strafed our entire formation from above rather than the individual B-29's, from a distance estimated to be 1000 yards, and then breaking away by diving under our aircraft.

d. Breakaways: In the majority of instances, E/A broke off their attacks with turns to left or right about equally divided. Approximately 25 percent of the enemy fighters flew straight through the bomber formation. A few executed dives through the formation, completed their pursuit curves, or used the Split-S.

26. ENEMY FORMATIONS

There were no formations reported other than those listed under "Coordinated Attack" in paragraph 25.

27. OUR TACTICS AND FIREPOWER VERSUS ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Our gunners opened fire at the usual extreme range of 1200 to 1500 yards. However, unlike previous missions, 50 percent of the attacking E/A were not deterred until they had reached within 600 yards of our fire, at which point breakaways were effected. The other 50 percent of the attacks apparently found our B-29 fire effective at extreme range. There were no unusual tactics by B-29 A/C reported on this mission.

28. RESULTS OF HITS ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT

ZEKE 32	- Appeared to be hit; fell off; no visible damage
ZEKE 32	- Tracers appeared to hit; no noticeable damage
OSCAR	- Hit in engine
OSCAR	- Tracers in belly; flames behind engine; stalled out; apparently out of control

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Combat Data, page 6

28. (Contd)

ZEKE	- Hit in underside of fuselage; slight damage
ZEKE	- Tracers in wings and fuselage; smoke around cowlings; pieces of wing flying off
ZEKE	- Tracers seen raking through plane from nose to back of fuselage; white smoke turning to black; dived straight down.
ZEKE	- Pieces seen flying off; smoking and afire
ZEKE	- Came in to 40 yards; tracers seen hitting all over aircraft
ZEKE	- Three bursts in center of fuselage
IRVING	- Smoke from right wing
IRVING	- Went down smoking; no claim
IRVING	- Tracers seen to enter fuselage and wing; pieces seen to fall off
IRVING	- Tracers in fuselage and cockpit; fell into a spin smoking
IRVING	- Tracers seen to deflect from underside of plane; thin black smoke appeared; winged over and went into a spin
TONY	- Hit in engine and right wing; pieces of engine fell off; down on fire in flat spin
TONY	- Enveloped in flame
TONY	- Came in to 400 yards; tracers in cowlings and fuselage
TONY	- Came in to 200 yards; tail gunner fired all the way from 800 yards; engine smoking then went into inverted dive; enveloped in flames
TOJO	- Went 6000 feet in inverted spin
TOJO	- Tracers and incendiaries exploding in cowlings
TOJO	- Hit by three gunners; tracers in fuselage

28A. CLAIMS BY GUN POSITION AND TYPE ENEMY AIRCRAFT:

<u>Destroyed</u>	- 2 RSG, 1 TG, and 1 Bombardier destroyed
	- 3 TONYs and 1 TOJO. Total: 4.
<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	- 3 RSG and 1 LG probably destroyed 3 ZEKES and 1 OSCAR. Total: 4.
<u>Damaged</u>	- 1 RG, 3 TG, 1 R and TG, 1 RSG, 1 Bomb-RSG-RG, and 1 Bomb damaged 3 IRVINGS, 1 TONY, 2 ZEKES, and 2 TOJOs. Total: 8.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BOMBING DATA

39. Bombing Data: See Consolidated Statistical Report.  
40. Target Attack Data: See Consolidated Statistical Report.

41. Conditions over the Target: (90.25 - 1547, Kawasaki A/C Engine and Assembly Plant, Akashi, Japan) The wind was approximately 130 MPH from 270°. Cloud coverage on the bombing run varied from 0 to .4 but in all cases visual bombing was possible. Visibility reported by bombardiers was unrestricted in the absence of clouds. Some aircraft flying north of the briefed axis of attack flew over Osaka and Kobe and suffered some damage from AA but no losses. There were no losses due to fighter opposition, which was generally light. An attempt at camouflage by mottled painting started by the squadron preceeding them but the smoke did not interfere with the bombing run.

42. IP and AP: The Initial Point (Otsomura) was easily identified both visually and by radar and provided a bombing run of suitable length. The AP was easily identified.

43. Reasons for Failure to Bomb: One aircraft failed to bomb the target due to a burned out solenoid in the bomb bay door circuit relay. One aircraft released only six bombs on primary target due to intervalometer malfunctions. The other four were dropped on the airfield beyond the target. One aircraft released only six bombs on target due to a rack malfunction. The other four were eater jettisoned.

44. Results of Bombing Observed: The majority of bombs hit the primary target. Preliminary estimates indicate extensive damage. Bombing results were good.

45. Possible Sources of Error in Bombing: None. (The briefed plan was followed, the weather was good, the airplane commanders used automatic Pilot, and the bombs hit the target. The target was easily identified and the formations over the target were generally compact. The enemy opposition was light and all aircraft were over the target in a short period of time.

46. Use of Radar and Efficiency: The radar performance improved on this mission and was a valuable aid in obtaining wind values. Radar was not needed for bombing due to satisfactory conditions for a visual run. Radar was reported as unsatisfactory in one lead aircraft.

47. Comments and Suggestions: Recommend that bombardiers be provided with type of helmet similar to that used by ring sight gunners as present helmet interferes with operation of the bombsight.

**S E C R E T**

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 20  
Field Order No. 41  
19 January 1945.

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BOMB IMPACT DATA

Paragraphs 48 through 51:

No of A/C over Target: 62 A/C bombed primary target. 6 A/C attacked targets of last resort (4-Shingu, 1 Shio-No-Mesaki, 1-Kantori Saki). 1 A/C attacked target of opportunity (Harbor at Kaki) 2 A/C on diversionary raid attacked Hamamatsu.

Bomb Load: 10 X 500-lb GP.

Direction of Attack: Varied from 210°T to 300°T. 3 a/c attacked individually from 35°T, 50°T and 150°T. (See Basic Data for complete information on direction of attack.)

Photographic Coverage: and Quality: Photographs of excellent quality were taken by four squadrons. Due to cloud cover photographs of poor quality were taken by 2 squadrons. No photographs were taken by a/c bombing Hamamatsu.

SUMMARY

Strike and Post - Strike photography indicates that the Hawaski Aircraft Engine and Assembly Plants at Akashi received major damage. It is estimated that the 129 hits observed on the two plants damaged or destroyed 39% of the total roof area. 31 out of 42 buildings in these plants received one or more direct hits. All main buildings of both the engine plant and the aircraft assembly plant were destroyed or damaged to some extent. The greatest concentration of hits was observed in the engine assembly buildings in the northern half of the target area. These resulted in damage or destruction to 58% of the roof area in the engine plant. The U-shaped building received approximately 35 hits and near misses while 2 buildings were completely gutted and 3 other buildings suffered at least 75% damage or destruction. Several small buildings in the engine plant area were damaged or destroyed.


21 % of the total roof area of the a/c assembly plant was damaged. 8 hits are visible on the largest of the final assembly buildings while 30% of the smaller assembly building immediately to the east was gutted by 6 direct hits. One of the sub assembly buildings was completely gutted. 30% of the other sub assembly building was gutted and an additional 30% damaged. At the eastern edge of the target one of the two large buildings with sawtooth roofs had 9% of its roof damaged. The other building has several clusters of holes. 8 hits destroyed or damaged at least 4 aircraft in the area adjoining the final assembly plant. (Note: dark shadows make final assessment of damaged aircraft impossible) (Note: Percentage of destruction are taken from Hq, XXI BC CIU Damage Assessment Report No. 4.)

CONCLUSION


39% of the total roof area was damaged or destroyed resulting in severe damage to the target. As 138 (40%) out of 340 bombs scored fell within 1000 feet of the AP results of the bombing are considered to be good.

**S E C R E T**

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



DIRECTION OF ATTACK  
1 SQDN

DIRECTION OF ATTACK  
3 SQDNS

DIRECTION OF ATTACK  
4 SQDNS





DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 760063*  
By *SPJ* NARA Date *9/21/05*



DIRECTION OF ATTACK  
3 SQDNS

DIRECTION OF ATTACK  
4 SQDNS

# BOMB PLOT - MISSION 20

TARGET INTELLIGENCE SECTION  
73 RD BOMB WING

AKASHI PLANT  
KAWASAKI A/C COMPANY

19 JANUARY 1945



BOMB PLOT -

TARGET IN  
73 RD



**AKASHI PLANT**  
KAWASAKI CO. COMPANY

TARGET INTELLIGENCE SECTION 73 BU  
19 JAN 45

**DURING**

**BEFORE**

**AFTER**

SECRET

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

NAVIGATOR

1. Navigation on mission number 20, flown 19 January 1945 to Akashi, was flown very close to the briefed plan. Winds were not as strong as previously experienced during the climb and in the target area. All navigators were left of the land-fall point, but were able to get on the proper axis of attack from initial point to the target. The route back from the target was navigated with out incident.
2. Radar, AN/APQ-13 was used to a great advantage for wind determination and precision navigation in the target area.
3. Loran equipment was used satisfactory in over 90% of the aircraft flown.
4. The navigation on this mission can be considered excellent.

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 760063  
By SP4 NARA Date 9/2/05

SECRET

Headquarters  
79th Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

DC BARDIER

See Par. 39 through 47.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 760063  
By SP4 NARA Date 9/21/05

HEADQUARTERS 73RD BOMBARDMENT WING  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

25 January 1945  
J. G. H.  
WEATHER SUMMARY

FO #41  
Mission #20  
19 Jan. 1945

Scattered cumulus at 1500 ft with scattered higher clouds and excellent visibility prevailed at the base during takeoff.

Enroute, scattered cumulus were observed at 17°N where a weak front with slightly builtup cumulus and moderate showers were encountered.

Altostratus at 10000 ft gradually increased north of this front with a corresponding decrease of lower cumulus to 4/10 coverage.

At 24°N, a second slight buildup of low clouds and light showers and haze reducing the visibility to 5 miles was encountered.

Near 27°N, the most active frontal area was encountered. Moderate rain from swelling cumulus and from the altostratus (see cross-section) reduced the visibility to one mile at times.

Beyond 29°N, the cloud cover gradually decreased to 4/10 altocumulus at the south coast of the Empire. Dense contrails were observed at 27-28000 ft just prior to the bomb run.

Over the target, 2-3/10 stratocumulus, very low and near the mountains left the target clear for visual bomb runs. A few altocumulus were visible in the distance, mostly to the south. Some cirrostratus at 27000 ft were observed over the target. Slight haze limited the visibility to 20 miles. Only faint non-persistent contrails were observed over the target.

On the return route, which was about 80 miles to the east of the outgoing leg, considerably more middle clouds were observed. This was probably due to the route being closer to the end of the secondary cold fronts shown on the map. Moderate to severe turbulence was experienced in clear air at 25000 ft at 31°N just prior to descending through the clouds on return. Moderate rime icing was experienced in the middle clouds between 12-17000 ft.


Base conditions on return were scattered clouds and visibility 15 mi.

The winds enroute were quite close to those forecast and over the target were exactly as forecast.

There were considerably more middle clouds encountered than forecast although the frontal positions were close to those forecast and apparently were more active than anticipated.

The light showers forecast for the base on return did not occur.


The weather encountered on this mission did not interfere with its completion.



TOP MAP  
 002 19 Jan 1945


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Altim	29.83						30.31	
Turb	Light				Light			
Vis	15 mi.		12 mi 1 mi in rain.		12 mi 2 mi in rain.		15 mi.	
35	300° 25 K -45°C.	280° 60K -47° C.	280° 105 K -50°C.	260° 140K -54°C	270° 140K -63°C			
30	300 20 -32	280 50 -34	280 85 -37	260 130 -44	270 135 -52			
25	320 15 -21	280 40 -22	280 70 -25	260 100 -32	270 105 -44			
20	340 10 -10	290 35 -12	280 55 -15	260 75 -21	280 80 -29			
15	350 15 -00	300 30 -02	280 40 -05	270 60 -10	290 60 -19			
10	30 20 10	300 25 8	290 30 5	270 40 -02	290 40 -12			
05	70 20 17	40 25 14	40 25 10	320 30 5	310 30 -06			
02	70 18 22	70 25 19	70 20 17	10 20 11	330 18 00			
Sfc	80 14 27	80 18 24	80 16 21	40 12 15	340 10 4			

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Altin							
Turb	Light	None	None	moderate	Light	Severe	None
Vis	15 mi.	5 mi.	20 mi.	5 mi.	1-5 mi.	15 mi.	20 mi.
35							
30							
25							270°-110K
20							290°-80K
15						280°-80K	
10			280°-35K		280°-60K		
05							
02	40°-20K	10°-15K		360°-23K		350°-18K	
Surf.	60°-20K	20°-25K					

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SECRET

Headquarters  
79th Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

CFC GALLERY

1. Mission number 20 encountered relatively light and no aggressive enemy fighter opposition.
2. Operation of equipment was very satisfactory as indicated below:
  - a. Cal. 50 ammunition (all types) expended----- 68,447 rds
  - b. 20 mm ammunition (all types) expended----- 69 rds
  - c. Complete CFC system (no total failures), operative-----100%
  - d. Individual used turrets, operative----- 99.75%
  - e. Used Cal. 50 machine guns, operative----- 97.5%
  - f. Used 20 mm cannons, operative----- 100%

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

SECRET

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

FLIGHT ENGINEER

A. Summary of Malfunctions

	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Power Plant	7
a. Engine running rough and backfiring	1
b. Excessive cylinder head temp	1
c. Cylinder failure	2
d. Short stack	2
e. Carburetor	
2. Oil System	14
a. Oil leaks	5
b. Oil cooler regulator	
3. Propellor	4
a. Propellor governor	2
b. Switch sticking	2
c. Failure to go to take off RPM	3
4. Supercharger	5
a. Surging at altitude	3
b. Torching	1
c. No boost	1
5. Fuel System	3
a. Pressure	1
b. Fuel transfer lights	1
c. Booster Pumps	1
6. Electrical	8
a. Voltage regulator	1
b. Inverter	1
7. Instrument Failure	2
a. Fuel gage	4
b. Carburetor ait temperature	4
c. Cylinder head temperature	1
d. Outside air temperature	1
e. Cowl flap position indicator	5
f. Flight indicator	4
g. Tachometer	
8. Miscellaneous	2
a. Oxygen System	2
(1) Leaks	2
(2) Regulator failure	1
b. Cabin air valves	4
c. Bomb bay doors	1
d. Recognition lights	2
e. Vacuum pumps	3
f. Cabin heater	1
g. Starter sticking	1
h. Pilot heat	1
i. Hydraulic leaks	1
j. Nacelle door	1
k. Cabin leaks	3

SECRET

## B. Suggested Changes in Equipment

1. RPM switches be installed on engineers panel.
2. Emergency means of operating fuel transfer valves be installed:
  - a. A secondary cable control at the center wing section.
  - b. Locate valves in a more accessible position.
3. A study be made of the boiling oil at altitude and the feathering standpipe be lengthened accordingly.

## C. Battle Damage

Refer to par. 16 this report.

## D. Cruise Control Analysis.

## 1. Narrative Report

a. This mission was the most successful mission that this unit has had since arrival in this theatre both from the stand point of operation and bombs on the target. There were two primary factors which attributed to the operational success (1) Reduction in weight (2) Reduction in bombing altitude.

b. Reduction in Weight: Prior to this mission airplanes had been grossing approximately 197,500 lbs, which included 5000 lbs of bombs and 8000 gallons of fuel. For this mission airplanes grossed approximately 192,000 lbs. This reduction in weight was accomplished by removal of certain pieces of armor plate, 20 mm cannons, de-icer boots, on bomb bay tank and 640 gals of fuel. The bomb bay tank which remained was transferred to the rear bay thus giving a definite forward C. G. which resulted in increased performance during cruise and in climb

c. Reduction in Bombing Altitude: The bombing altitudes were reduced three to four thousand feet. With this reduction in altitude combined with reduction in weight, formations remained on the deck for a minimum of 6 hours. It was possible for some airplanes to reduce power to as low as 1950 RPM and 30" MP and still remain in formation at 195 CAS. The rate of climb to altitude was greatly increased by having the C.G. forward and it was necessary for only approximately 5% of the airplane to maintain rated power during the climb. The cruise at altitude necessitated only seven airplanes use rated power.

d. Fuel Consumption: There was no appreciable variation in fuel consumption between groups as can be seen in table XI of the Consolidated Statistical Report. The average fuel remaining on this mission was slightly higher than on previous missions.

## 2. Summary of Cruise Control

- a. Fuel aboard 7400 gal. for light planes, 8050 gal. for heavy planes.
- b. Bomb Load 5000 lbs.
- c. Ammunition 6000 rds. Cal. 50
- d. Approximately gross weight 192000 lbs for light planes 197000 lbs for heavy planes.
- e. Average fuel used 6950 for light planes 6600 for heavy planes (Refer to Table VI of Consolidated Statistical Report.
- f. Average time of flight 14 hrs 44 min.

SECRET

S E C R E T

g. Analysis  
Average to target

- (1) Fuel 4457 for heavy planes 4178 for light planes  
 (2) Time 8:08  
 (3) Time in auto rich during 1000' cruise

	Heavy Planes	Light Planes
Maximum	:50	2:36
Minimum	:00	:05
Average	:20	:27

- (4) The following analysis is for the 45 planes which climbed to bombing altitude without using a step.

ALTITUDE	CAS	POWER	NO OF PLANES USING POWER	TIME
Cruise at 1000'	195	2150-34	9	6:29
		2100-2	17	
		2125-32	15	
		2175-34	4	
Climb to Bomb Alt.	195	2275-37	4	1:05
		2300-39	30	
		2350-39	8	
		2400-43	3	
Cruise at Bomb. Alt.	195	2150-34	2	:34
		2250-37	18	
		2300-39	15	
		2350-40	4	
		2400-43	6	

Powers given for operation at 1000' are average power.

- (5) The following analysis is for the 25 planes using a step, in the climb, at 18000'. 10 of the planes were heavy (Gross Wt. 137500) 15 were light (Gross Wt. 132500).

WEIGHT	ALTITUDE	CAS	POWER	NO OF SHIPS USING POWER	TIME
Light	Cruise at 1000'	195	2000-31	1	5:58
			2100-31	5	
			2125-32	4	
			2075-31	5	
Heavy	Cruise at 1000'	195	2100-31	3	5:46
			2125-33	4	
			2150-34	4	
			2175-34	2	
Light	Climb to 18000'	200	2100-31	1	:31
			2250-37	2	
			2300-35	11	
			2400-43	1	
Heavy	Climb to 18000'	195	2325-40	1	:35
			2300-39	7	
			2350-41	2	
Light	Cruise on step	195	2100-31	5	:20
			2150-34	1	
			2175-34	2	
			2200-35	7	
Heavy	Cruise on step	195	2050-31	1	:22
			2125-31	1	
			2150-32	1	
			2200-35	7	

S E C R E T

SECRET

<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>NO OF SHIPS USING POWER</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Light	Climb to Bomb. Alt	195	2250-37	2	:33
			2300-39	10	
			2400-43	2	
Heavy	Climb to Bomb. Alt	195	2150-30	1	:34
			2200-35	1	
			2300-39	3	
			2350-40	3	
			2375-41	2	
Light	Cruise at Bomb Alt	195	2150-32	3	:42
			2200-35	1	
			2250-37	1	
			2275-38	1	
			2300-39	7	
			2350-40	1	
			2400-43	1	
Heavy	Cruise at Bomb. Alt.	195	2175-34	2	:42
			2200-35	1	
			2250-37	3	
			2300-39	4	

SECRET

Group HQ-73 BW  
 Date 31 Jan 45  
 BY Wing Photo 9

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT  
 PHOTOGRAPHIC

F. O. No. 41  
 Mission No. -20  
 Date of Mission  
 19 January 1945

1.		70					Total
		K-18	K-19	K-20	K-22	K-95 K-	
a.	Cameras installed	7	0	21	24	28	80
b.	Cameras in aborting A/C	3	0	3	2	2	10
c.	Cameras in lost A/C	0	0	0	0	0	0
d.	Camera in A/C not lost but returning.	0	0	0	0	0	0
e.	Cameras with malfunctions	1	0	0	5	1	7
f.	Cameras in operating condition not taking photos	1	0	12	1	8	22
g.	Camera taking photos	2	0	6	17	17	42

2. Breakdown of cameras taking photos by A/C Number:

A/C No.	Vertical camera		altitude	Number of photos taken				
	f. stop	shutter interval		K-18	K-19	K-20	K-22	K-
4741	6.3	1/150	29000		2	11		
3431	8	1/150	26900			32		
4857	6.3	1/150	25700			14		21
5231	6.3	1/150	25900			15		
4627	6.3	1/150	26220			25		10
3469	8	1/150	25750			8		
4650	5	1/150	27000			10		23
4698	5	1/150	27400			7		5
3256	5	1/150	26400			7		
4661	5	1/150	26100			7		
3487	8	1/150	27000			20		
3875	8	1/150	27000					
4696	8	1/150	27000					15
3486	8	1/150	27000					1
4614	6	1/150	25250	14				2
4629	5.6	1/150	24290					
4755	5	1/150	25300			23		18
4695	5	1/150	25400					
5284	6.3	1/150				10		10
4593								3
3485								26
4625								3
4651								21
3483								11
3477								18
3491								13
3493								20
4675								17
4668								21
4664								5
4671								
4749								
4544								

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Incl 8



CONFIDENTIAL

3. Breakdown of cameras not taking photos by cause:

Cause	No. of Cameras	Explanation
a. Mechanical failure		
b. Installation error	3	Shutter Spring Stuck
c. Processing error		
d. Camera doors not open		
e. M/Switch not on		
f. Vacuum failure		
g. Power failure		
h. Light failure (Target)		
i. Enemy action		
j. Others	17	16 Photos taken
k.	5	Radar cameras not used
l.	1	Shutter failure
m.	1	Camera fell from mount
n.	1	Photos taken but not on strike
o. Total	1	Case drive worn
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	

4. Remarks and suggestions:

5. Instructions for preparing this form:

a. This report will be prepared by Photo Lab Commander and certified by Group S-3:

b. Items:

1a, b, c, d, are self explanatory.

1e - The number of malfunctions due to installation or processing.

1f - Number of non-effective cameras due to camera m/switch not turned on, failure of vacuum to the extent of rendering pictures void, Intervalometer or camera fuze blown, tampering with intervalometer or camera, light conditions over target, enemy action, etc.

1g. g is equal to a minus b, c, d, e, and f.

Item 2 - The f. stop, shutter speed, interval between exposures, altitude will be given for only the vertical cameras by A/C number.

Item 3 - Give a definite explanation of the reason for any malfunction.

Certified by \_\_\_\_\_

Group S-3

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by \_\_\_\_\_

Photo Lab Commander

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters  
734 Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 40  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

~~SECRET~~

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Strike Reports: In a period of approximately one and one-half (1 1/2) hours the Ground Station received eleven (11) bombs away reports and eight (8) amplified strike reports. Slight case of jamming made reception of a few reports difficult, however all reports were received and receipted for by the Ground Station.
2. For Transmissions: Scheduled broadcasts of weather and time tions on the half hour and hour respectively was adhered to, traffic permitting. Retransmission of the first primary target bombs away report as a "For" message was made by the Ground Station on all strike frequencies.
3. Interceptions: All bombs away and amplified strike reports were received on 11080 KC with the exception of one bombs away report received on 3145 KC. Sporadic interference from unknown stations and incidents of jamming were noted on all strike frequencies. Heavy voice interference from an unknown station blocked out all traffic on 7275 KC during final hours of mission. In a percentage breakdown of all the traffic during this mission, 32 percent was carried out on 3145 KC, 50 percent on 11080 KC, and 18 percent on 7275 KC.
4. Navigation Aids: The Ground Station received 49 requests for bearings; 41 of these were obtained. Extensive interference, jamming, and aircraft weak signals prevented the D/F Station from obtaining the 8 remaining bearings. In a breakdown of all bearings, 22 were obtained on 3145 KC, 10 were obtained on 7275 KC, and 9 on 11080 KC. Condor base reported that eight (8) VHF bearings were requested; all were obtained. Extensive use was made of Radio Range. Several aircraft used Homer and OMI Broadcasting Station and reported satisfactory results.
5. Net Discipline and Security: Aircraft operators showed slight improvement over the previous mission in maintaining net discipline during heavy traffic period. One aircraft broke in on an urgent message being transmitted by another plane. Radio silence was maintained by all operators on the way to the target. No violations of security were noted during the mission.
6. Enemy Transmission: Aircraft radio operators report the following incidents of interference and jamming: Heavy CW interference on 11080 KC blocked out Ground Station over target at different intervals; CW and tone signals on 7275 KC caused heavy interference over the target; Jap CW and tone transmissions jammed 3145 KC in the vicinity of

-1-

~~SECRET~~  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
NND 740 130  
By SP3/B3 NARS, Date Oct 21, 1976

**S E C R E T**

the target. Ground station operators recorded the following cases of jamming and interference: Unknown station on 7275 KC sending three letter code groups blocked frequency at different intervals, bearing 345 degrees; voice transmissions on 7275 KC blocked this frequency during final hours of mission; CW signals on 11080 KC caused moderate interference to aircraft signals.

7. Messages: No distress messages were received by the ground station. Two urgent bearings were requested by aircraft; only one of these was obtained. Heavy interference from a voice station prevented D/Y from obtaining the other urgent bearing.

8. Equipment Malfunctions:

SET	MALFUNCTION	497	498	499	500
AM/AWT-13	Trailing wire malfunctions		4		
	Trailing antenna reel inoperative	3			1
	Trailing antenna sticking or inoperative	7			1
	Trailing antenna tangled				3
AM/AWT-7	Inoperative				1
	Needle hunting	1		1	
	Control switch inoperative			1	
	Antenna broken			1	
EC-348	Fuse burned out (replaced)			2	
	Noisy when radar on	1			
SCR-522 (VHF)	Weak output				1
KC-36 (Interphone)	Leakage between "Jolson" and interphone position	1			
	Pilots jack-box inoperative	1			
	Pilots mike button inoperative			1	
	Q-30, microphone out			1	

Decrease in equipment malfunctions for this mission indicate that preflight and preventive maintenance are being stressed in the squadrons. At a meeting, Group and Squadron Communications officers discussed possible modification and ideas to eliminate the more outstanding malfunctions.

**S E C R E T**

SECRET

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MIS'ION REPORT  
RADAR EFFICIENCY AND RADAR EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE

1. Employment

a. AN/APQ-13 (Blind Bombing)

Bombing was visual with radar as an aid to navigation and target identification.

b. SCR-718 (Altimeter)

Employment was normal.

c. SCR-695 (IFF)

Employment was normal.

2. Equipment Performance

a. AN/APQ-13

Reversal of the downward trend in AN/APQ-13 performance was noted. The improvement is attributed in part to the influx of badly needed replacement parts.

(1) 82 A/C were radar equipped.

(2) 42 A/C operated AN/APQ-13 in the target area.

(3) 66 A/C reported performance satisfactory for bombing.

(4) 81% of the AN/APQ-13 equipment were operational in the target area.

b. SCR-718

One (1) SCR-718 altimeter failure was reported.

c. SCR-695

No SCR-695 IFF equipment failures were reported.

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SECRET

Headquarters  
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 41  
Mission No. 20  
19 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

RCM REPORT

1. Number of Radar Observers participating 4
2. Number of Radar Observers completed mission 4
3. Equipment employed:

<u>SETS</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>AV IERS ON</u>	<u>MAIFUNCTION'S</u>
AN/APR4	4	17	Poor sensitivity. Probably due to icing of antenna.
AN/APR5A	0	--	-----
AN/APR5	4	9.5	-----
AN/APA6X	4	17	Sine wave calibration seems to be incorrect
AN/ANQ-2	4	8	-----

4. Signals logged:

<u>DAID</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FRF RANGE</u>	<u>PULSE WIDTH RANGE</u>
A-60-85	25	636.3	33.4 u sec.
B-85-120	34	765.3	29.8 u sec.
C-120-170	26	638.6	8.6 u sec.
D-170-220	11	1420.5	8.5 u sec.
E-220-300	2	1500.0	---
F-300-1000	0	---	---
Above, Specify Frequency	7	CU & Voice	---

5. Remarks.

- a. One record of Jap VHF 48 mc. being submitted for translation. Relatively few R/T transmissions were heard except for the 4475 to 4900 band.
- b. Two out of three A/C dispensed rope in accordance with the plan. Initial landfall was made west of the specified point. Numerous fighters were observed by the diversionary force south-west and south-east of Nagoya. Possible effect of this diversion will be studied when complete reports are in.
- c. The main strike reported numerous fighters east of the I.F. Visibility was generally excellent.
- d. Communications jamming was reported on the following frequencies: 11080 Kcs, 7275 Kcs, 3145 Kcs. Further efforts will be made to determine how much of this is intentional.
- e. Extensive Jap R/T was logged between 4450 and 4900 Kcs. Several common A/C seen to be included in the band.
- f. Use is still being made of VHF frequencies altho fewer signals were heard than was anticipated.
- g. One recording of three Jap VHF signals is useless for translation. The ANQ-2 control-box was not correctly used.

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
h. A test record was made to determine the possibility of successfully transcribing foreign broadcasts with this equipment. The initial test indicates that the equipment is not capable of sufficiently faithful reproduction. Additional tests including a frequency curve are being undertaken. The results and test records will be forwarded.

i. In two cases, Flak was encountered in the vicinity of naval vessels, a flak boat and a battleship. Radar signals at 190 and 188 mes. were logged in the vicinity.

j. Considerable radar activity was observed in the vicinity of the Volcano Islands.

k. Relatively few fighters were observed in the target area, although the diversionary flight sighted and was attacked by fighters south-east and south-west of Nagoya. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of this effort as the planned route to the primary was in itself a diversionary tactic. The fighters in the Nagoya area were airted and airborne although the excellent conditions of visibility which existed would tend to limit the effectiveness of rope in this case. The A/C dispensing rope were obviously under radar observation during the time in question. Furthermore, it would appear that the two plane formation could be seen visually at all times.

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SECRET

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73RD BOMB WING  
19 January 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41  
MISSION NO. 20

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Primary Target - KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT PLANT, AKASHI, JAPAN.

Table I Aircraft Participating

	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT			
	TOTAL	G R O U P		
WING	497	498	499	500
A/C Scheduled to Take-Off	83	20	21	21
A/C Failing to Take-Off	3	1 a	2 b	0
A/C Airborne	80	19	19	21
A/C Bombing Primary Target	62	13	16	17
% of Airborne A/C Bombing Primary Target	81%	68%	84%	94% c
A/C Bombing Diversionary Target	2	--	--	2
A/C Bombing Last Resort Targets	6	3	0	1
A/C Bombing Targets of Opportunity	1	0	0	0
A/C Not Bombing	9	3	3	1
Time of Take-Off:	18 Jan	18 Jan	18 Jan	18 Jan
Earliest	2045Z	2121Z	2045Z	2058Z
Latest	2132Z	2132Z	2057Z	2109Z
Time of Return:	19 Jan	19 Jan	19 Jan	19 Jan
Earliest	1055Z	1106Z	1100Z	1055Z
Latest	1304Z	1228Z	1209Z	1304Z

a A30 (3858) Burned out fuel shut-off valve.

b T35 (3478) #4 engine oversped & MP went to 54" - #1 fuel pressure fell to 5 degrees.  
T44 (4624) #1 engine oil leak due to oil intake line coming loose.

c Based on A/C Airborne on main strike

S-E-C-R-E-T

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73RD BOMB WING

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41

19 January 1945

MISSION NO. 20

## Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table II Breakdown of Aircraft Failing to Bomb Primary Target

C A U S E	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT				
	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500
Mechanical Failure	16	6 a	3 b	2 c	5 d
Personnel Failure					
Flight Conditions					
Enemy Action					
Unknown					
Other					
Total	16	6	3	2	5

- a A7 (4593) Bomb bay door malfunction over primary target. Jettisoned.  
 A10 (4597) #2 engine #1 cylinder swallowed valve. Jettisoned.  
 A24 (4604) #2 engine bad oil leak. Flight indicators out. Jettisoned.  
 A6 (4594) #1 & 3 engines bad oil leaks at altitude. Bombed Shingu (LR)  
 A12 (3485) #3 engine no turbo boost. Bombed Shio-Ho-Misaki (LR)  
 A25 (3412) Fluctuating manifold pressure & RPM all engines at altitude. Bombed Shingu (LR)
- b T32 (4749) Blown cylinder #1 engine. Jettisoned  
 T9 (4629) #4 Turbo malfunction. Jettisoned  
 T10 (4767) #4 engine severe oil leak due to push rod housing blown off. Jettisoned.
- c V23 (4644) Fuel transfer system failure. Returned bombs.  
 V28 (3465) Gas leak on take off. Leak stopped while circling to land and A/C joined 500th Gp formation. #4 engine malfunction on reaching Japanese coast forced A/C to leave formation. Bombed Shingu (LR)
- d Z5 (4643) Fuel transfer failure. A piece of carbon vane from previous failure jammed a selector valve. Jettisoned.  
 Z4 (4672) #2 turbo out - turbo governor found to be defective. Jettisoned.  
 Z21 (4652) #1 engine ran away, could not keep up with formation. Bombed Kanteri Saki (LR)  
 Z31 (3494) #4 engine malfunction at altitude could not keep up with formation. Bombed Shingu (LR)  
 Z46 (4721) #3 engine failed at altitude. Ran hot & fluctuated, followed by fluctuation of manifold pressure & finally complete loss of manifold pressure. Bombed Harbor at Kuki (TO)

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73RD BOMB WING

Consolidated Statistical Summary

FIELD ORDER NO. 41

19 January 1945

Table III Bombing Run

MISSION NO. 20

GROUP	T A R G E T	TYPE OF TARGET	NO. AIRCRAFT		TIME OF RELEASE		ALTITUDE OF RELEASE		VISUAL BOMBING A/C SIGHTING FOR:			RADAR BOMBING		A/C OPERATED BY:	
			REACHING TARGET	BOMBING	EARLIEST	LATEST	LOWEST	HIGHEST	R & D	RANGE	DROP ON LEADER	A/C SIGHTING	A/C DROPPING ON LEADER	C - 1	MANUAL
497	KAWASAKI A/C PLANT SHINGU SHIO-NO-MISAKI	P	14	13	0524Z		25350	26900	1	2	10			1	12
		LR	2	2	0503Z	0505Z	25900	29000	2						2
		LR	1	1	0502Z		19,200		1						1
498	KAWASAKI A/C PLANT	P	16	16	0450Z	0458Z	25100	26500	2		14			2	14
499	KAWASAKI A/C PLANT HAMAMATSU SHINGU	P	17	17	0506Z	0507Z	26000	27400	3	3	11			2	15
		P *	2	2	0450Z	0450Z	30000	30000	1	1				1	1
		LR	1	1	0515Z		25,000		1						1
500	KAWASAKI A/C PLANT KANTORI SAKI HARBOR at KUKI SHINGU	P	16	16	0524Z	0524Z	26700	27200	2	2	12 *			2	14
		LR	1	1	0504Z		26,700		1					1	
		TO	1	1	0510Z		26,400		1					1	
		LR	1	1	0459Z		26,700		1					1	
WING	KAWASAKI A/C PLANT	P	63	62	0450Z	0524Z	25100	27400	8	7	47			7	55

\* Diversionary Target

\* 1 A/C accidentally dropping early included.

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73RD BOMBING GROUP

19 January 1945

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table IV Loading & Disposal of Bombs

FIELD ORDER NO. L1

MISSION NO. 20

GROUP	TYPE & WEIGHT OF BOMBS	FUSE SETTING		LOADED				RELEASED ON TARGET								JETTISONED		UNKNOWN		RETURNED	
		NOSE	TAIL	ON ALL AIRCRAFT		ON AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT		PRIMARY KAWASAKI A/C PLANT		DIVERSIONARY		LAST RESORT <sup>a</sup>		OPPORTUNITY HARBOR at KUKI		No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
				No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons						
497	500 lb GP AN - M64	.1	.025	200	50	190	47.5	130	32.5			30	7.5			30	7.5				
498	500 lb GP AN - M64	.1	.025	210	52.5	190	47.5	158	39.5							31	7.75			1	.25
499	500 lb GP AN - M64	.1	.025	198	49.5	198	49.5	168	41.5	12	3	10	2.5			4	1			6	1.5
500	500 lb GP AN - M64	.1	.025	210	52.5	210	52.5	156	39			15	3.75	10	2.5	29	7.25				
WING	500 lb GP AN - M64	.1	.025	818	204.5	788	197	610	152.5	12	3	55	13.75	10	2.5	94	23.5			7	1.7

<sup>a</sup> Last Resort Targets: SHINGU; SHIO-NO-MISAKI; KANTORI SAKI

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73RD BOMB WING

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41

19 January 1945

MISSION NO. 20

## Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table V Bombing Accuracy

Target: KAWASAKI A/C PLANT  
AKASHI, JAPAN

G R O U P	BOMBS RELEASED ON TARGET		NUMBER OF HITS AND DISTANCE FROM AIMING POINT									
			0 - 500'		500'-1000'		1000'-2000'		2000'-3000'		TOTAL	
			No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
497	130	4%	5	4%	27	21%	27	21%	64	49%		
498	158	11%	32	20%	56	35%	13	8%	118	75%		
499	166	8%	22	13%	27	16%	7	4%	69	41%		
500	156	9%	30	19%	27	17%	8	5%	79	50%		
WING	610	8%	89	15%	137	22%	45	9%	330	54%		

Table VI Number of Hits on Target

GROUP	NO. OF HITS ON TARGET	% OF BOMBS RELEASED HITTING TARGET
497	5	4%
498	46	29%
499	32	19%
500	46	29%
TOTAL	129	21%

S-E-C-R-E-T

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 760063  
By SP4 NARA Date 9/21/05

73RD BOMB WING

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41

19 January 1945

MISSION NO. 20

## Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table VII Combat Data

GROUP	ENEMY AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED	ATTACKS BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT	ENEMY AIRCRAFT		
			DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
497	20 a	0	0	0	0
498	48 b	39	0	0	3 d
499	54 c	32	3 e	2 f	2 g
500	182 c	88	1 h	2 i	3 j
Wing	304 *	159	4	4	8

a In target area only

b Estimate - in target area only

c Estimate

\* Total of Group figures

d 2 Tojo, 1 Zeke  
 e 2 Tony, 1 Tojo  
 f 1 Oscar, 1 Zeke  
 g 1 Tony, 1 Zeke  
 h 1 Tony  
 i 2 Zeke  
 j 3 Irving

Table VIII Ammunition Consumption Data

	AMMUNITION EXPENDED PER GROUP					TOTAL
	497	498	499	500	TOTAL	
20 MM.						
Fired	69	0	0	0	69	
On Lost A/C	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	69	0	0	0	69	
.50 Cal.						
Fired	5720	11962	26610	24155	68447	
On Lost A/C	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	5720	11962	26610	24155	68447	

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DECLASSIFIED

 Authority NND 760063  
 By SP4 NARA Date 9/2/05

73RD BOMB WING  
19 January 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41  
MISSION NO. 20

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table IX Aircraft Lost and Damaged

C A U S E	AIRCRAFT LOST				AIRCRAFT DAMAGED					
	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500
ENEMY A/C						3	1	1	1	1
ENEMY FLAK						8	1	2		5
ENEMY A/C & FLAK						1	1			
ACCIDENT										
OWN GUNS										
UNKNOWN										
OTHER										
TOTAL	0					12	1	4	1	6
NO. A/C SUFFERING MAJOR DAMAGE										
NO. A/C SUFFERING MINOR DAMAGE										
										12

Table X Casualties

CASUALTIES	497	498	499	500	TOTAL
Killed	0	0	0	0	0
Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Wounded & Injured	0	1	0	1	2
Total Casualties	0	1	0	1	2
No. Participating	212	212	238	234	896

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73RD BOMB WING

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIELD ORDER NO. 41

19 January 1945

MISSION NO. 20

## Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table XI Fuel Consumption Data

	TOTAL WING *	G R O U P			
		497 a	498 b	499	500 e
Average Fuel Aboard	7410	7379	7400	8049 <sup>c</sup>	7440 <sup>d</sup>
Average Flying Time	14:44	14:23	14:46	14:30	14:38
Average Distance - Nautical Air Miles	2847	2796	2878	2905	2850
Fuel Used:					
Average	6373	6214	6440	6600	6192
Maximum	6941	6653	6720	7042	6588
Minimum	5700	5700	6171	6350	6041
Fuel Remaining:					
Average	1037	1123	960	1449	1244
Maximum	1660	1660	1229	1715	1545
Minimum	499	707	680	1023	878
Av. Gallons per Hour	433	432	436	455	427
Av. Gallons per Mile	2.24	2.22	2.24	2.27	2.17
Total Gasoline Consumed & Lost	475,917	109,266	118,738	116,356	131,597

a Based on 16 A/C - Approximate gross wt at take off 133,500 lbs.  
 b Based on 17 A/C - Approximate gross wt at take off 132,500 lbs.  
 c Based on 12 A/C - Approximate gross wt at take off 137,750 lbs.  
 d Based on 6 A/C - Approximate gross wt at take off 131,900 lbs.  
 e Based on 16 A/C - Approximate gross wt at take off 132,000 lbs.

\* Excludes data for A/C of approximate gross wt of 137,500 lbs.

## TIMES AT VARIOUS ALTITUDES

497	1000 ft	6:30	26000 ft	:30
498	1000 ft	6:00	26000 ft	:50
499	1500 ft	6:00	26000 ft	:40
	1000 ft	6:00	20000 ft	:15
500	1000 ft	6:27	27000 ft	:38

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SECRET

COBOMGP 497 S-3  
COBOMGP 498 S-3  
COBOMGP 499 S-3  
COBOMGP 500 S-3

GP

INFO: BOMCOM 21  
ATTN: CONTROL

73D BOMB WG  
SAIPAN  
1700330Z JAN 45

TO 41 (FRUITCAKE ONE)

MAPS: LONG RANGE NAVIGATION CHARTS JAPAN AND CAROLINE ISLANDS 1:3,000,000.

1. A. (1) HV MOD AAA TARGET AREA, KOBE AND OSAKA.

(2) MORE THAN 200 FIGHTERS IN TARGET AREA THE MAJORITY OF WHICH  
HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED IN THE DEFENSE OF NAGOYA.

B. (1) LIFE GUARD SUB AND DESTROYERS TO FOLLOW.

(2) BUMBO TO FOLLOW.

2. 73D WG ATKS JAPAN WITH TWO FORCES, A PRINCIPAL FORCE AND A DIVERSION-  
ARY FORCE. THE PRINCIPAL FORCE WILL BOMB 90.25-1547. THE DIVERSIONARY  
FORCE WILL DEPART LATITUDE 33 CON AT THE SAME TIME OF THE FIRST SQ OF  
PRINCIPAL FORCE, DISPERSE ROPE (ANNEX1) BOMB HAMAMATSU AND OBTAIN TERRAIN  
AND SCOPE PHOTOS OF MIYAKE JIMA, MIKURA JIMA AND HACHIJO JIMA.

PRIMARY TARGET: 90.25-1547

DIVERSIONARY TARGET: CITY OF HAMAMATSU.

LAST RESORT: ANY INDUSTRIAL CITY.

FORMATION: COMBAT GP WITH EACH GP USING BOTY RUNWAYS FOR TAKE OFF.

METHOD OF BOMBING: SQ PATTERN.

AIMING POINT & VISUAL, PRIMARY - SE CORNER OF MAIN BUILDING CENTER OF  
TARGET.

DIVERSIONARY - CENTER OF CITY.

AIMING POINT - RADAR: PRIMARY - 1 NM NORTH OF SHORELINE ON WEST EDGE  
OF BUILT UP AREA OF AKASHI.

DIVERSIONARY - CENTER OF CITY.

ROUTES - PRINCIPAL FORCE

BASE

ASSEMBLY

17 00N - 144 00E

SECRET

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SECRET

29 00N - 137 00E  
34 12N - 136 22E  
OTSOMRA (34 30N - 135 24E) IP  
AXIS OF ATK: 291 DEGS T  
TARGET

LEFT TURN TO BASE

ROUTES - DIVERSIONARY FORCE

BASE

ASSEMBLY

17 00N - 144 00E  
29 00N - 137 00E  
34 30N - 137 25E

OKAZAKI (34 57N - 137 10E) START TURN TO RIGHT TO AXIS OF ATK  
121 DEGS T.

TARGET

LEFT TURN (34 35N - 138 12E)

MIYAKE JIMA (34 07N - 139 30E)

MIKURA JIMA (33 50N - 139 38E)

MACHIJO JIMA (33 07N - 139 50E)

BASE

3. A. 498TH GP FLIES TWO SQ TAKES OFF ZERO HR BOMBS AT 25,000 and 25,000'.

B. 499TH GP FLIES TWO SQ TAKES OFF SECOND BOMBS AT 26,000 AND 26,500'.

499TH GP FLIES 3 A/C AS DIVERSIONARY FORCE TAKES OFF AFTER 498TH GP FORMS AS  
SOON AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO DEPART AT SAME TIME AS 498TH GP. BOMBS AT 29,000'.

C. 500TH GP FLIES TWO SQS TAKES OFF THIRD BOMBS AT 27,000 AND 27,500'.

D. 497TH GP FLIES TWO SQS TAKES OFF LAST BOMBS AT 26,000 AND 26,500'.

X. (1) ZERO HR: 2045Z 17 JAN 45.

(2) GASOLINE LOAD: 7400 GAL

(3) BOMB LOAD: PRINCIPAL FORCE: 10 X 500 LB GP FUSED .10 SEC NOSE  
.025 SEC TAIL.

DIVERSIONARY FORCE: 6 X 500 LB GP FUSED .10 SEC

NOSE .025 SEC TAIL.

(4) INTERVALOMETER SETTING: 150 FT

SECRET

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SECRET

- (5) STRIKE PHOTO CAMERAS WILL BE TILTED 8 DEGS TO THE REAR.
  - (6) GPS WILL COORDINATE FOR TAKE OFF. MINIMUM INTERVAL BETWEEN GPS PRESCRIBED.
  - (7) RECONNAISSANCE PHOTOS WILL BE TAKEN WITH K-7C CAMERAS.
4. NO CHANGE.
- A. (1) SOP XXI BOMCOM COMMUNICATIONS
- (2) SEE TAC SOP 30-3, 73D BOMB WG DTD 6 JAN 45.
- (3) KAMATA SAKI LIGHT IS ADDED REFERENCE POINT. OMIT SURG SAKI LIGHT.
- (4) RADIO SILENCE WILL BE ENFORCED EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY.
- (A) ABORTING A/A WILL NOT CALL GROUND STATION EXCEPT IN DISTRESS.
- (B) NO INTERPHONE OR TRAFFIC EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY.
- (5) TWO RADIO OPERATORS PER SQUADRON WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MONITOR 4475 KC TO 4900 KOS FREQUENCY BAND FROM 25 MILES OUT FROM MAINLAND TO THE TARGET AND TO 252 MILES FROM MAINLAND ON RETURN. FREQUENCY, TYPE OF MISSION AND THE TIME OF ALL SIGNALS RECEIVED WILL BE LOGGED.
- (6) ANY A/C STANDING BY ANOTHER A/C WHICH HAS DITCHED WILL NOTIFY THE GROUND STATION THAT HE IS STANDING BY AND WILL THEN CIRCLE THE SURVIVORS TRANSMITTING ON 414 KC WITH LONG DASHES AND CALL SIGN TO PERMIT RESCUE FACILITIES TO HOME ON THIS FREQUENCY.
- (D) NO CHANGE

O'DONNELL CG BW 73

OFFICIAL:

J.W. WILKINSON,  
Major, AC,  
Wq Control

SECRET

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SECRET

171030Z JAN 45

TO: CCBOMCP 497 S-3  
CCBOMCP 498 S-3  
CCBOMCP 499 S-3  
CCBOMCP 500 S-3

OP

INFO TO : BOMCOM 21  
ATTN: CONTROLLER

BW73 0-1143

AMENDMENT 1 TO FO 41

CHANGE PAR 1 B (1) TO READ

1B (1) LIFEGUARD SUBS WERE ASSIGNED FOLLOWING POSITIONS. NO ASSURANCE SUBS  
WILL BE THERE PD

- (1) 33 00 N - 197 OOE
- (2) 31 00N - 198 OOE
- (3) 31 00N - 195 OOE
- (4) 29 00N - 198 OOE
- (5) 28 00N - 196 OOE
- (6) 25 00N - 199 OOE

CHANGE PAR 1B (2) TO READ:

1B (2) ONE DUBO CALL SIGN 24V219 WILL BE LOCATED AT 22 00N 141.1 10E FROM  
0030Z TO 0900Z PD END

O'DONNELL CG BW 73

OFFICIAL:

W.W. POTTER JR.,  
1st Lt., AC,  
NS Controller

SECRET

SECRET

171552Z JAN 45

THURSDAY 03-17-22

TO: COMUSCP 497 S-3  
COMUSCP 498 S-3  
COMUSCP 499 S-3  
COMUSCP 500 S-3

CP

INFO : BGCN 21  
ATIN: CONTROLLER

BY 79 1154

ADDITION TO AMBASSMENT 1 FO-41

ADDITION TO IB (9) DESTROYER OR DESTROYER ESCORT WILL ARRIVE RESCUE SQUAD  
20 NORTH 143 20 EAST AT 180800Z PD VOICE CALL DRAKEPOOL PD CHANCE IB (2) A  
CMA ONE JUBCO CALL SIGN 24V219 WILL BE LOCATED AT 22 00 NORTH 141 10 EAST  
FROM 0030Z TO 0500Z PD IB (2) D NUMBER 2 JUBCO CALL SIGN 124V219 VICINITY  
ASUNCION ISLAND 170300Z FOR HOMING ON DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT ALAMO PD IND

O'DONNELL CG BW73

OFFICIAL:

H.W. POTTER JR.  
1st Lt., AC,  
WG Controller

SECRET

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SECRET

170440Z JAN 45

TO: CCBOMCP 497 S-3  
CCBOMCP 498 S-3  
C-BOMCP 499 S-3  
C-BOMCP 500 S-3

OP

INFO: BOMCOM 21  
ATTN: CONTROL

BT 73 0555  
ANNEX 1 TO FC 41 73D BOMB WG  
RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

1. EACH GP WILL EQUIP ONE A/C WITH SEARCH EQUIPMENT AS FOLLOWS CIN  
(1) AM/A F74 (WITH TUL6 AND 17)  
(2) AM/AMR5  
(3) AM/APA6X  
(4) AM/AMR2
2. EACH GP WILL PROVIDE ONE RADAR OBSERVER (7888) TO OPERATE THIS EQUIPMENT.
3. OPERATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TAG SOP 25-1 WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS

CIN

A. RADAR OBSERVER'S OPERATING EQUIPMENT SPECIFIED UNDER PAR 1 WILL RECORD AND JAP VOICE TRANSMISSIONS INTERCEPTED. THE FREQUENCY BAND FROM 30 TO 100 MC WILL BE CONSTANTLY MONITORED IN THE TARGET AREA (FOR THIS PURPOSE THE TARGET AREA IS DEFINED AS THAT AREA INCLUDING THE MAINLAND AND EXTENDING OUT FIFTY MILES OVER THE OCEAN). JAP VOICE TRANSMISSION HAVE BEEN HEARD BETWEEN 90 AND 95 MC. THE POSSIBLE USE OF A LOWER VHF CHANNEL BETWEEN 50 AND 60 MC FOR G.C.I. WILL BE FULLY EXPLORED. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SIGNALS THE 100, AND 200 MC RADAR BANDS WILL BE SEARCHED.

B. RECORDERS (AM/AMR2) WILL BE USED TO RECORD VOICE TRANSMISSIONS AND COMMENTS MADE BY THE OBSERVER. EVERY RADAR SIGNALS WILL NOT BE RECORDED.

4. USE OF ROPE.

- A. THREE ACFT ASSIGNED TO THE DIVERGENT EFFORT WILL DISPENSE ROPE (CIR2) AT A RATE OF TWELVE UNITS PER MINUTE FROM (35 00N - 137 25E TO 34 38N - 137 05E).
- B. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THIS DUTY WILL BE FULLY BRIEFED BY THE GROUP RADAR OBSERVER.
- C. ROPE WILL BE DISPENSED THROUGH THE CAMERA WELL TWELVE THREE ROLL UNITS PER MINUTE. CREW MEMBERS ASSIGNED TO THIS DUTY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE OXYGEN AND WINTER FLYING EQUIPMENT.
- D. THE RADAR OBSERVER SUPPLIED BY THE 499TH GP WILL OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT SPECIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

By *CCD/SB* NARS, Date *Oct 21, 1993*  
*740120*

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SECRET

UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 WHICH WILL BE INSTALLED IN ONE OF THE THREE ACFT COMPRISING THE  
DIVERSIONARY FORCE. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF THE DIVERSION  
OF THE ENEMY RADAR IN ADDITION TO SEARCH OPERATION AS SPECIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH  
3 A AND B.

O'DONNELL CG 73BW

OFFICIAL:

M.A. BERG  
1st Lt., AC,  
WG Controller

SECRET

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S E C R E T

171540Z JAN 45

OP

TO: CCBGCP 497 S-3  
CCBQCP 498 S-3  
CCBQCP 499 S-3  
CCBQCP 500 S-3

BW 79 1151

AMENDMENT NR 2 TO FC 41

CHANGE PAR 2X (1) FC HEAD:

(1) "D" DAY AND "D" HOUR 182200Z END

O'DONNELL CG BW79

OFFICIAL:

W. N. POTTER JR.  
1st Lt., AC,  
WG Controller

S E C R E T

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