

~~Hold~~
BC
S/CR

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THE COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

SECRET

NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S. URGENT

AMEMBASSY,
LONDON.

Please inquire whether the British Government would have any objections to making public a British aide memoire dated May 8, 1941 (repeat 1941), reporting the views of the Defense Committee of the British Cabinet on the transfer of part of the U.S. Pacific fleet to the Atlantic (DEPTEL 9745). This document has not been found in the State Department files, but apparently was given to our Navy Department.

*Mr. Ballantine:
Mr. Poole says
if cable is written
to contain more
of the aide
memoire
& the
information
contained
in the
letter of transmittal
from Mr. Knox
that may do the
trick.
Horn.*

SA/B:JPATTERSON:VJ:VMC
10/13/45
JNB

BC

S/CR

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: SA
INFO:
S
U
C
A -D
SA
EUR

AMN-1803-Z
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Canberra
Dated November 16, 1945
Rec'd 6:11 a.m., 16th

SLA
D/R

Secretary of State
Washington

file
SH/B

Rec'd in SA/B
11/21/45
re 21 - sent
to Pearl Harbor Committee
11/21. J.P.

168, November 16, 3 p.m.

External Affairs states exhaustive search by monitoring service of its records has revealed nothing (Dept's 113 November 6, 5 p.m.) However they state that they may have missed code signals since their monitoring service at that time only followed trends and did not take down Japanese broadcasts verbatim.

711.94/11-645
SA W BC not SICR

711.94/11-1645

MINTER

DM
RESTRICTED

SHIPPING DIVISION
NOV 19 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 30 1946
Confidential File

FILED

EUR
DCR - Per. Unit
Anal. [Signature]
[Signature]

file
DC/R

November 16, 1945

SA/B
9/19/46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Subject: Army Release of ABC and ADB
Plans to Pearl Harbor
Investigating Committee

I telephoned Colonel Duncombe to discuss the recommendation made by the Acting Secretary of War in a letter of November 10, 1945 to the President which had been referred to us. In Colonel Duncombe's absence I talked to Captain Digges of his office.

I said that I had just conferred with the Political Officers on the British, Dutch and Canadian desks, and that we had concluded that it was inadvisable for the State Department to carry out the War Department's recommendation without first securing additional facts. The recommendation was that the other governments be notified that the ABC and the ADB documents were being released to the Pearl Harbor Committee by the War Department. I explained that we thought it inadvisable to give such notice without our having seen the documents and without being satisfied that the War Department had considered the possible consequences of merely giving such notice. I explained the rule against making communications from other governments public without the consent of the other government. The manner of release contemplated by the War Department would disregard this rule. I asked whether the War Department had considered the possible adverse effect of such action on future negotiations.

Captain Digges stated that he did not know the answers to these questions but that he would talk the matter over with Colonel Duncombe and possibly others in the Department, and communicate with me later in the day.

I told him that I would be glad to get together with him and with the Pearl Harbor Committee Counsel in order to try to decide what to do, but that as things now stood the State Department wasn't in a position to determine what action should be taken.

Captain Digges
9/19/46

FILED

711.94/11-1645

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

711.94/11-1645

ms
D. *M*

-2-

Captain Digges then told me of a second letter from the War Department to the President dated November 14, which, like the first one, had evidently been sent without any consultation with State. This letter which he read to me states that the documents in question have now actually been released to the Committee, and that the Committee has been advised that the other governments "are being notified", that pending receipt of replies the War Department makes no recommendation to the Committee as to how the documents should be used and that the Department recommends to the President that any objections received from the other governments should be communicated to the Committee. This information which I reported at once to Mr. Pool and Mr. Parsons (BC) and Mr. Morgan (NOE) is rather confusing to everyone inasmuch as nobody has yet notified the British, Dutch and Canadians.

U:HSMarks:lmm

November 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Subject: Army Release of ABC and ADB
Plans to Pearl Harbor
Investigating Committee

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Captain

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

NOV 17 1945

-2-

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U:HSMarks:lmm

W
LBC
PL
DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 11/17/45

14 NOV 1945

SUBJECT: Release to Pearl Harbor Committee of ABC and ADB Plans.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Thomas Stone, Counselor,
Canadian Embassy.
H. S. Marks

COPIES TO: U - Mr. Acheson ✓
BC - Mr. Parsons
PL - Mr. Patterson

UNDER SECRETARY
1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FW 711.94/11-1845

1-1408

At the suggestion of Mr. Acheson, I called Mr. Stone late yesterday to discuss the problem of releasing the Joint Canadian-US Staff plans (ABC 22) which the counsel for the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee had requested be produced for the Committee. Mr. Stone came to see me during the evening and I explained how necessary it was for all the Departments to make fully available to the Committee all papers it requested. I also said that production for the Committee was tantamount to publication and that in the case of these documents, if any attempt were made to withhold them the resulting publicity would be as unfavorable for them as for us.

I indicated that the matter was very urgent and we hoped to have his Government's consent but that in any case in view of the special circumstances we could probably do nothing to prevent production and publication of the documents.

Mr. Stone examined the paper, telephoned Ambassador Pearson while with me, and then stated that he would have to take the matter up with Ottawa.

CS/D
FW 711.94/11-1845

Mr. Acheson has now advised me that Mr. Stone called him today to say that he had consulted Ottawa and had been advised that Canada would interpose no objection to the release of the document to the Committee.

DCR - NE Unit
Anal. *ms*
Re. *ms*
Cat. *ms*
Dist. *ms*

HSM
Herbert S. Marks

DEC 1 1945

Dck files

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 11/19/45

SUBJECT: Release to Pearl Harbor Committee of ABC and ADB Plans.

PARTICIPANTS: Commander Richard Coleridge,
Deputy Secretary, British Joint Staff.
H. S. Marks

COPIES TO: U - Mr. Acheson ✓
BC - Mr. Pool
PL - Mr. Patterson

FORM 1-1493

Commander Coleridge came to see me last evening at his request. He gave me the attached memorandum dated November 18, from the British Ambassador to Mr. Acheson concerning the release to the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee of the US-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the report of American-Dutch-British Conversations at Singapore (ADB).

I told him there would be no difficulty in complying with all the conditions stated in the memorandum except 1(a), that is "Every effort will be made [by US Government] to avoid publication without the express consent of" UK. We therefore went together to see Mr. Acheson who stated that since any effort to avoid publication would be misunderstood and result in unfortunate publicity for us as well as the British, we could not accept the condition. Commander Coleridge stated he would cable the Imperial Staff to that effect and ask for their immediate unqualified consent.

Mr. Acheson explained to Commander Coleridge that he had already told Lord Halifax that while we hoped the British would interpose no objection to release of the documents, the papers were already in the hands of counsel for the Committee, that he had been advised by Mr. Acheson of the desirability of not making the documents public until the other Governments

FW 711.94/11-1845

OS/D FW 711.94/11-1845

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

Anal *ml*.....
 Rm *ml*.....
 C. L.
 D.


ms

had

-2-

had been consulted but that the actual production of the documents for the Committee was now entirely in the hands of its counsel.

Mr. Acheson advised me this morning that he had received word from the British Embassy that the British would interpose no objection to production of the documents subject only to withholding the cypher telegram, Appendix IV of ADB, publication of which the British feared would break their code. I told him that since this was merely a telegraphic summary of the plans themselves I was sure there would be no difficulty in observing that condition.



U:HSMarks:lmm

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

18th November, 1945.

MR. DEAN ACHESON,
STATE DEPARTMENT

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to the release to the Pearl Harbour Committee of both the report of the U.S.-British Staff Conversations, January-April, 1941 (short title A.B.C.-1) and the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations at Singapore, 21st-27th April, 1941 (short title A.D.B.) on the following understandings:-

(a) Every effort will be made to avoid publication without the express consent of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

(b) In any event, the cypher telegram attached as Appendix IV to A.D.B. is not published. This is essential in the interests of the security of British cyphers.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that the State Department will obtain Dutch concurrence to the release of A.D.B. to the Committee. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are informing Australia, New Zealand and India who are interested, but there is unfortunately no time to consult them.

3. His Majesty's Government assume that the State Department is alive to the danger that the second of these two documents, if published, might well be represented by hostile propagandists as showing that we were preparing for war against Japan and that Japan had some justification for taking the first step. Although this, of course, would be a complete travesty of the facts, parts of the document might be twisted in this way.

711.94/11-1845

CS/D

711.94/11-1845

DCF NE Unit	
Anal	<i>md</i>
Rev.	<i>md</i>
Dist.	<i>md</i>

4. The two documents in question are, of course, of equal interest to the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is assumed that the State Department will inform the United States Chiefs of Staff of the request that has been made to the British Chiefs of Staff and the reply that the latter have given.

Halifax
—

K

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department:
Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State
Washington

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

~~RESTRICTED~~
Plan LRB

No Distribution

NOV 20 1945

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

10118

TWENTIETH

TWENTIETH, FOR ACHILLES

Everson has given permission to use the nine documents. We now urgently need reply on the three referred to in our tels ^{711.94} 9698, ^{711.94} 9904 and ^{711.94} 9947. Pressure very heavy. Can you possibly give answer by tomorrow?

re making public a British aide memoire dated may 7, 1941.

Regarding forthcoming Congressional Pearl Harbor investigation

Byrne (JCP)

SENT

711.94/11-2045 OS/LE

J
BC:J.C. Pool:mrh
(11-20-45)

DOR - EUR Unit	
Adm	<i>ad</i>
Rev	<i>ad</i>
Int	<i>fl</i>
Dist	

711.94/11-2045

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: BC
INFO:
S JH-1354-Z
U
C
EUR

PLAIN
London
November 20, 1945
Rec'd 4:05 p.m.

~~BC~~
DC/R

Secretary of State
Washington

12198, Twentieth
Your 10118
FOR POOL FROM ACHILLES

711.94/11-2045
BC

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 26 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File

Messages on BEVAN's desk. Problem is still
likelihood of demand for publication of other messages
in series. Will try to get you answer in morning.

WINANT

DU
PLAIN

711.94/11-2045

EUR
ad
ai

NOV 27 1945
FILED

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Please return to Pool - BC
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

Plain

London

Dated Nov 20, 1945.

Rec'd 403pm

bc/r

Secretary of State

Washington

12198 twentieth.

Your 10118

For Poole from Achilles.

Messages on Bevin's desk. Problem is still
likelihood of demand for publication of other messages in
series. Will try to get you answer in morning.

Winant.

DOR Per Unit	
Anal.
Rev.
Out.
Dist.

Fw 711.94/11-2045

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PLAIN

London

Dated November 21, 1945

Rec'd 9:10 a.m., 21st

~~BC~~
DCIR

ACM-1585-J

ACTION:BC
INFC:
S
U
C
EUR

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

12207, Twenty-first

FOR PCCL

711.94
RC

Your 10118. Ambassador has again talked to Bevin and been promised reply at earliest possible moment, will try to give you answer later today.

WINANT

BB

PLAIN



711.94/11-2145

ed

DCR - EUR Unit	
Anal	<i>ad</i>
	<i>ai</i>
Dist.	

NOV 23 1945

FILED

Mr. Marks
SS

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE

OC/R
file
SA/B/8
9/19/46

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the Secretary of State's note of the 13th November, 1945, (740.0011 P.W.) has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government give their consent to the production of the documents referred to in the Secretary of State's Note at the forthcoming public hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate Pearl Harbour. It is understood that, if the Committee requires production of the two following documents, they would be handed to it in a paraphrased form.

Telegram from the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Office, dated April 13th, 1941.
Memorandum handed to Dr. Hornbeck by Mr. Dening on November 14th, 1941, regarding Thailand.

2. The remaining documents which may be produced to the Committee without restriction are:

Letter of February 11th, 1941, from Lord Halifax to the Secretary of State, enclosing the substance of telegrams "A" and "B" received at the British Embassy from the Foreign Office.
Memorandum from the British Embassy, dated November 11th, 1941, reporting a conversation between the British Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Memorandum of October 16, 1941, of a conversation which Lord Halifax had with the Japanese Ambassador.

/Telegram

Handwritten signature and initials in a box, with the text "Unit" and "Ambassador" visible.

711.94/11-2145

711.94/11-2145
CONFIDENTIAL FILE

- 2 -

Telegram of November 30th, 1941, concerning Thailand.

Letter of November 29th, 1941, from Sir Ronald
Campbell to Mr. Hull.

Memorandum handed to Mr. Hull by Lord Halifax on
November 25th, 1941, beginning "Japanese proposal
is clearly unacceptable."

"Most Secret" memorandum handed to Mr. Hull on
November 30th, 1941, by Lord Halifax regarding
prospective Japanese attack on Thailand.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
November 21st, 1945.

JA

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY., CHAIRMAN
WALTER F. GEORGE, GA.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
HOMER FERGUSON, MICH.

JERE COOPER, TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
J. BAYARD CLARK, N. C.
JOHN W. MURPHY, PA.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, CALIF.
FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DC/R

file
SA/R-80

November 23, 1945 *8/12/46*

Herbert Marks, Esquire,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Marks:

I am attaching copy of letter dated November 20th from Senator Ferguson, requesting copy of memoranda from Stanley Hornbeck to Secretary Hull of September 5, November 27, November 19 and December 1, and any other memoranda pertinent to this investigation.

only one found - copy supplied to Committee
Jo

Sincerely yours,

WDM

William D. Mitchell.

711.94/11-2345

WDM/CBN
Enclosure

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 27 1945	
FBI - WASH DC	
<i>WDM</i>	
and	
Re	
Col	
Dist	

AUG 29 1946

FILED

Confidential File

711.94/11-2345

COPY

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY., CHAIRMAN
WALTER F. GEORGE, GA.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
HOMER FERGUSON, MICH.

JERE COOPER, TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
J. BAYARD CLARK, N. C.
JOHN W. MURPHY, PA.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, CALIF.
FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

November 20, 1945.

Honorable William D. Mitchell,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

I would like to secure a copy of the memoranda from Stanley Hornbeck to Secretary Hull of September 5, November 27, November 19, and December 1, and any other memoranda pertinent to our investigation. It is our understanding that copies of these exist in the Navy Department.

Sincerely,

(signed) Homer Ferguson.

HF:rg

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: SA-B
INFO:
S
U
C
A-D
EUR
SA/B

JM-331-H
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated November 23, 1945

Rec'd 3:03 p. m., 23rd

~~SA-B~~

Secretary of State,
Washington.

file
SA/B-8
9/19/46

DGR

US URGENT

NIACT 12281, November 23, 4 p. m.

Foreign Office has just informed us that British Government has no objection to making public the messages from Mr. Churchill to the President mentioned in Department's 9698 of November 5 and 9904 of November 10. Foreign Office hopes very soon now to give us favorable reply on request made in Department's 9947 of November 14.

711.94/11-545

711.94/11-1045
EUR

711.94/11-1445
u

711.94/11-2345

WINANT

EDA

SECRET

DCR - EUR Unit	
Rev	
Dist	
Chgt	

AUG 29 1946

FILED

Confidential File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICE TELEGRAPH SECTIC

ACTION:U
INFO:
S
U
A-D
EUR

JM-204 -11
No paraphrase necessary.
(SECRET)

Vienna
Dated November 23, 1945
Rec'd 9:30 a. m., 23rd

u

For Mark

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DC/R

URGENT

475, November 23, 11 a. m.


FROM GRAY

Regret unable furnish information pertaining to Department's 288, November 21. Have you asked Stone?

ERHARDT

Re watch officer log book.

EDA



file SA/B-8 8/12/46

note 11.11 Hull, Cordell

711.94/11-2345 CS/HH

Stamp with handwritten initials and dates: *NOV 23 1945*

AUG 29 1946

FILED

Confidential File 711.94/11-2345

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

Mr. Marks

ACTION:U
INFC:
S
U

LFG-215 -W
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

Baghdad via War

Dated November 23, 1945

Rec'd 10:35 a.m., 23rd

IC/R


Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

444, November 23

FROM MORELAND



*file
SA/B-8
8/12/46*

I do not recall date of commencement of log book system.
I believe it began early in 1940. I know positively system
operated throughout 1941. (REDEPTEL 344, November 21, 8 p.m.)

I made entries in log book from midnight December 6 to 9 a.m.
December 7.

When each book filled it was turned over to Stone. On
one or more occasions old books were thrown away after a
period of time.

I retrieved and have in my possession two books
covering period February 26 to August 1, 1941.

MOOSE

EDA

SECRET

Routing slip with handwritten initials and a signature.

711.94/11-2345

Confidential File

711.94/11-2345

*not
11.11 Hull,
Cordell*

C.P.F.
8/23

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

Department of State

Washington, SECRET

NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

NOV 23 1945

6 PM

AMEMBASSY,

The Hague.

146

Rush for the Ambassador.

In connection with the Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor, the Committee has requested of the Department your memoranda bearing upon the investigation, including memoranda said to have been written by you to Secretary Hull dated respectively September 5, November 19, November 27 and December 1, probably either 1940 or 1941. Under executive order the Department is obliged to make available all documents on the subject. The documents specifically cited have not been found in the Department's files. Committee has also requested any memoranda you prepared on conversations with Admiral Richardson as well as other papers of yours pertinent to the Pearl Harbor investigation. We have been unable to find any such papers in files except your memo of September 20, 1940 to Welles on proposed Panama fleet maneuvers. Insofar as your name has figured in the testimony, it has been primarily in connection with location of the fleet. Please telegraph urgently whether any of these papers may be found in the packing cases left by you in the Department with any indications you can give which might assist in finding them.

711.94/11-2345

CS ME 711.94/11-2345

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator *JMB* M., _____, 19 *NOV 23 1945 P.M.*

SA7B:Ballantine:VMC

11/23/45

Byrnes (JMB)

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION SA/B
INFO:
S
U
C
SA /B
EUR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

*File
NND
1-7-46
DCR*

WHC-1327 W
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

The Hague
Dated November 25, 1945
Rec'd 10:35 p.m., 26

Secretary of State

Washington

238, November 25, Midnight

Indicated memo and papers are available only if
and as in files of Dept or of War, Navy, or persons
who cite them (URTEL 146, November 23, 6 p.m. received
today). For memo of November 27, 1944, together with
an attached memo in comment thereon written by me in
autum 1944, see Dept's confidential files. I well
recollect views exchanged in conversations with Admiral
Richardson, I, advocating continue to base in Hawaiian
waters US naval forces there, (but with no suggestion
how dispose or operate them there); believe prepared
no (repeat no) memo in record thereof but gave or sent
Richardson copies of one or more contemporary memo
containing expression of views on disposal of forces.
No (repeat no) official documents among effects left
by me in packing cases in Dept or in my possession.

HORNBECK

WMB
SECRET

DCR - NE Unit	
nal.	<i>ms</i>
Re	<i>ms</i>
Get.	
Dist.	

711.94/11-2545

FILED

JAN 7 - 1946
Confidential File

711.94/11-2545

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHEN

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

CLEAR

AIRGRAM

SECRET

NO STENCIL - NO DISTRIBUTION

NOV 26 1945

US Urgent
AMEMBASSY,

8pm

THE HAGUE.

149

RUSH FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

711.94/11-23
act

Please expedite reply to DEPTTEL 146 regarding documents for the Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor.

711.94/11-2645

CS/IE

Confidential File

711.94/11-2645

Byrnes
(J.W.B.)

TO	DCR NE Unit
FROM	<i>[Handwritten]</i>
REV.	<i>[Handwritten]</i>
CAT.	<i>[Handwritten]</i>
NOV 26 1945 P.M.	

NOV 26

PM 8 09

RELEASE DESK

SA/R:JWB:VMC
11/26/45

NOE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 27 1945

S - Mr. Byrnes

Subject: Release of ABC and ADB
Military Plans of 1941
to the Joint Committee
Investigating the Pearl
Harbor Attack.

I attach a proposed memorandum from you to
the President reporting our action in accordance
with his suggestion of November 13 on the above
subject.

I am also attaching a proposed draft of
a letter from you to the Secretary of War transmitting
a copy of the memorandum to the President. I
think it important that you write the War Department
in this way so that in the future they will consult
us directly on such matters.

AA

file
UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 27 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 11 1946

FW 711.94/11-2745

ES/LE
711.94/11-2745

Anal.
Rec.
Dist.


DCH - *YK*

S - Mr. Byrnes

Subject: Release of ABC and ADB
Military Plans of 1941
to the Joint Committee
Investigating the Pearl
Harbor Attack.

I attach a proposed memorandum from you to the President reporting our action in accordance with his suggestion of November 13 on the above subject.

I am also attaching a proposed draft of a letter from you to the Secretary of War transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President. I think it important that you write the War Department in this way so that in the future they will consult us directly on such matters.


U:HSM:mjo 11/26/45

NOV 27 1945

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The President referred to me a letter of November 10 from the Acting Secretary of War recommending that the British, Canadian and Dutch governments should be informed of the release of the so-called ABC and ADB documents of 1941 to the Joint Committee investigating Pearl Harbor. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have sent the President reporting the results of our subsequent discussions with these governments about the matter.

I hope that in the event of any future requests for such documents, the War Department will find it possible to consult the Department of State in advance of delivery so that we can accord any other governments concerned the customary courtesy of consultation prior to release.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes

The Honorable,
Robert F. Patterson,
Secretary of War.

Enclosure

U:HSM:mj 11/26/45

DCR - EUR Unit

CR
NOV 26 1945 P.M.

711.94/11-2745

CS/VJ

711.94/11-2745

XR
740.00119 P.W.

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

~~SA/B~~

ACTION: SA/B
INFO:
S
U
C
SA/B
EUR

RMS-70 -C
Paraphrase before com-
municating to anyone.

The Hague

Dated November 28, 1945

Rec'd 7:30 p.m.

DC/R

file

SECRET

Secretary of State
Washington

SA-B-J
9/19/46

US URGENT.

245, November 28, 5 p.m.

DEPTEL 149 November 26.

Please see EMBTEL 238 November 25.

7 11.94/11.2545

HORNBECK

SW

SECRET

Note: Re-documents Pearl Harbor investigation.

7-711.94/11-2845

OCR - NE Unit	
na	_____
Re	_____
Cat	_____
Dist	_____

AUG 29 1946

FILED

ATTENTION

711.94/11.28

ALBERT V. BARKLEY, KY., CHAIRMAN
WALTER F. GEORGE, GA.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
HOMER FERGUSON, MICH.

JERE COOPER, TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
J. BAYARD CLARK, N. C.
JOHN W. MURPHY, PA.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, CALIF.
FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

file
SAB-80
8/12/46

November 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO MR. MARKS:

Attached is a request made by Congressman Keefe at open session of the Committee today. Will you kindly assemble the documents requested insofar as they relate to your files, and have the necessary certificate prepared covering the same.

711.94/11-2845

WDM

William D. Mitchell

WDM/CBN
Enclosure

*Handled by conference
of Mr. Acheson with
Rep. Keefe, Jan. 21, 1946.
See memorandum attached*

J.P.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

WDM

AUG 29 1946

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Confidential File

711.94/11-2845

COPY

Statement for the Record

There is in evidence before the Committee as a part of Exhibit 18, a document which contains a draft of a message from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister dated November 24, 1941. This draft message was prepared by Mr. Hull. It contains a description of the so-called Modus Vivendi proposal for Japan. The draft message is accompanied by a memorandum for the President signed by Mr. Hull, which states: "If you approve of this draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded." The same document contains the notation: "OK - see addition. PDR," and it also contains an addition to the draft message of Mr. Hull suggested by the President.

It appears that this draft telegram prepared by Mr. Hull describing the Modus Vivendi proposal, as approved by the President and with the President's additional paragraph added, was actually sent to the British Prime Minister. We have also in evidence a message from American Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State, dated November 26, 1941, which bears the title "Most Secret for the President from the former Naval Person." This message from Mr. Churchill acknowledges the President's message about Japan, presumably his description of the Modus Vivendi proposal, and raises the question whether Chiang Kai Shek was "not having a very thin diet." It appears from the evidence that the Modus Vivendi proposal was thereafter discarded by the Secretary of State and the so-called ten-point note of November 26 was handed to the Japanese government.

It seems entirely probable that the President of the United States, having described at some length the Modus Vivendi proposal to the British Prime Minister in a personal message, and having received Mr. Churchill's views thereon, would also have described the American note of November 26, which was actually handed to the Japanese representatives, to the British Prime Minister.

Moreover, it seems equally probable that the President of the United States would acknowledge the British Prime Minister's message as contained in the telegram of Ambassador Winant to the State Department of November 26.

No such acknowledgement of the British Prime Minister's message of November 26 by the President has been introduced before us, nor do we have in evidence any message from the President to the British Prime Minister, describing the American note of November 26 in the same manner in which he described the Modus Vivendi proposal in an earlier message.

1
acknowledge to
Churchill
note of Nov. 26

2
Reply to
Churchill
Nov. 26

COPY

Again on November 30 we have in evidence before us a communication to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, containing a message from the British Prime Minister to the President of the United States, outlining what Mr. Churchill described as "an important method remaining unused to avert war between Japan and our two countries."

It seems most probable that the President forwarded some reply to Mr. Churchill's message of November 30. It now clearly appears from the evidence before us that the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States communicated messages directly to each other. It is also obvious that we have no complete file of such communications before us. We have no evidence or statement from counsel that the messages from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt and the messages from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill which have been introduced in evidence constitutes the only communications between those two parties in this critical period of American-Japanese relationship. Consequently, I feel obliged to make the following request of counsel: (1) Will counsel produce from the files of the State Department all communications from Mr. Winant, American Ambassador to Great Britain, to the State Department and from the State Department to Mr. Winant for the period from November 24, 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files in the State Department that the communications presented to the committee constitute all the communications from the State Department to Mr. Winant or from Mr. Winant to the State Department for the period specified.

I observe that the British Prime Minister in communicating with the President described himself as the former Naval person. This description and the British Prime Minister's previous affiliation with the Admiralty suggests the probability that the President may have communicated with the British Prime Minister through the medium of the communication system of the Navy Department or the War Department, and that the British Prime Minister may have communicated with the President through the medium of the British Admiralty and the Navy Department. Consequently, I feel obliged to make the following request of counsel: Will counsel produce from the files of the War or Navy Department all communications from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister or to any intermediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British Admiralty, for the period from November 24, 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files, if any exists, in the War and Navy Departments that the files presented to the committee contain all communications from the President to Mr. Churchill or from Mr. Churchill to the President, transmitted via the War or Navy Department communication system as the case may be, for the period from November 24 to and including December 7, 1941. If either Department informs counsel that there are no such files in existence in such Department, will counsel produce for the committee a certificate to that effect from the custodian of the files of the Department.

3
by Churchill
Nov 30

(1)
all
Winant - State
11/24 - 12/7
1941

11/29/45
Gessell says
refer this
pending his
further advice

War
Navy

COPY

*Roosevelt
Estate*

Will counsel also produce all records and copies of communications to and from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill for the period from November 24, 1941 to December 7, 1941, which exist among the papers in the custody of the Roosevelt Estate, together with a certificate from the custodian of such papers that they constitute all of such papers relating to the period specified in his or her custody and possession.

We are now examining important officials of the State Department, dealing with the critical phase of Japanese-American negotiations in the year 1941. We have affirmative evidence before us of direct communications from the British Prime Minister to the President and from the President to the British Prime Minister. The communications which we have before us indicate the likelihood of other communications, not only in reply to certain of the communications which we have before us, but on the same general topics covered by such communications. Now knowing this situation, I do not see how the committee or counsel can completely and adequately discharge their duties without presenting the complete files from whatever source, War, Navy, or State Department, or the personal files of Mr. Roosevelt of all communications between him and the British Prime Minister for the period from November 24 to December 7, 1941.

W. Patterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 21, 1946

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin
Mr. Richardson, Counsel for Pearl Harbor Committee

Mr. Acheson, Acting Secretary
Mr. Herbert S. Marks

COPIES TO:

GPO 1-1403

Mr. Acheson and Mr. Marks met with Congressman Keefe and Mr. Richardson in the office of the Counsel for the Pearl Harbor Committee this afternoon. Mr. Acheson said that he had with him the forty-page memorandum which Mr. Salisbury had sent to Secretary Hull and which Mr. Mitchell in his letter of January 4, 1946 had requested the Department to produce for the Committee. Mr. Richardson explained that he had suggested this informal meeting because if the memorandum proved to be completely irrelevant as Mr. Acheson thought, then it might suffice if Congressman Keefe merely examined the document and satisfied himself that it was of no value to the Committee.

Congressman Keefe read through the document and said that it clearly had nothing whatever to do with the Pearl Harbor investigation and therefore he would withdraw his request for it.

Mr. Acheson then said that he had in addition the certificate of custodian of the Department's files which Congressman Keefe had requested in his memorandum transmitted to the Department with Mr. Mitchell's letter of November 28, 1945.

This

-2-

This certificate stated that the Department had assembled for examination all communications between the Department and the American Ambassador in Great Britain during the period from November 24 to and including December 7, 1941. Mr. Acheson also said that he understood what Mr. Keefe was interested in were communications between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill during this period. He had therefore brought with him and he gave to the Congressman to examine a telegram from Mr. Churchill dated November 24, one from the President to Mr. Churchill dated November 25, and one from Mr. Churchill to the President dated November 27. He said that these were the only communications between these men, for the period in question, other than communications which had already been turned over to the Committee. Congressman Keefe examined the three telegrams and said that he was not interested in them. He also said that in as much as the exchanges between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were the only papers with which his memorandum was really concerned, we needed do nothing further about that request.

The certificate of the Chief of the Division of Communications and Records is attached.

U:HSMarks:Lmn

January 21, 1946

The attached three papers constitute all the telegrams between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill between November 24 and December 7, 1941 which have been found in the State Department files. These three are, of course, in addition to the three documents which the Committee has already made public.

Attached:

Telegram No. 5624 from London,
November 24, 1941;
Telegram No. 5429 to London,
November 25, 1941;
Telegram No. 5708 from London,
November 27, 1941.

January 21, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

In compliance with the instructions of your office, the Division of Communications and Records has assembled its records of all communications between the Department of State and the American Ambassador in Great Britain during the period from November 24 to and including December 7, 1941.

This material comprises in excess of 800 items consisting of telegrams and mail exchanged between the Department and the Embassy.

This is to certify that these communications which have been assembled and which are now being held for examination are all of the communications between the Department and the Ambassador during the specified period which are in the Department of State files.

W. K. Scott
Chief
Division of Communications and Records

DC:BKirby:mem

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

*Despatches from London**11/24/41 to 12/7/41
inclusive*

2150 ✓

2151-811.111 Vessels - Glenwood

2152-811.111 Lyungberg, Berger

2153 ✓

2154 ✓

2155 ✓

2156 ✓

2157 ✓

2158 ✓

2159 ✓

2160 ✓

2161 ✓

2162 ✓

2163 ✓

2164 ✓

2165 ✓

2166 ✓

2167 ✓

2168 ✓

2169 ✓

2170 ✓

2171 ✓

2172 ✓

2173 N.C.

2174 ✓

2175 N.C.

2176 N.C.

2177 ✓

2178 124.416/357 *chgd to SA/B Patterson 11/30/45 On Replace Doc**This number not used*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

2179 ✓
2180 ✓
2181 ✓
2182 ✓
2183 ✓
2184 - 811.111 Boas, Wolf S.
2185 ✓
2186 ✓
2187 ✓
2188 N.C.
2189 ✓
2190 N.C.
2191 - 811.111 Davis, Archibald G.
2192 ✓
2193 ✓
2194 ✓
2195 - 894.20/274 - On Replace Documents
2196 ✓
2197 ✓
2198 ✓
2199 ✓
2200 ✓
2201 - 341.1121 Wathorn, Stanley W/11 PD Roach 11-29-44 - On Replace Document
2202 ✓
2203 - 841.2221/316 PD Shaw 8-6-45 - On replace Documents
2204 N.C.
2205 - 130 Cowan, William Jules
2206 ✓
2207 ✓
2208 ✓
2209 ✓
2210 ✓
2211 ✓
2212 N.C.
2213 N.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

2214 ✓
2215 ✓
2216 - 811.111 Vilhar, Nikola
2217 ✓
2218 ✓
2219 N.C.
2220 ✓
2221 ✓
2222 ✓
2223 ✓
2224 N.C.
2225 ✓
2226 ✓
2227 ✓
2228 ✓
2229 ✓
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2231 ✓
2232 ✓
2233 ✓
2234 ✓
2235 ✓
2236 ✓
2237 N.C.
2238 ✓
2239 ✓
2240 ✓
2241 ✓
2242 ✓
2243 ✓
2244 ✓
2245 ✓
2246 ✓
2247 ✓
2248 ✓
2249 ✓
2250 ✓
2251 N.C.
2252 ✓
2253 ✓
2254 ✓
2255 ✓
2256 N.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

2257 ✓
2258 N.C.
2259 ✓
2260 ✓
2261 N.C.
2262 ✓
2263 ✓
2264 ✓
2265 - 811.111 Vessels - British Ardour
2266 ✓
2267 ✓
2268 ✓
2269 - 740.00115 E.W./4307 - On Replace Documents
2270 N.C.
2271 ✓
2272 - 740.0011 E.W./18203 On Replace Documents
2273 ✓
2274 ✓ *This number not used*
2275 - 124.416/357 SAB Letteron 11/4/45 On Replace Doc
2276 - 811.111 Diplomatic/17513½
2277 ✓
2278 ✓

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Instructions to London

849 ✓
850 ✓
851 ✓
852 N.C.
853 - 740.00114 EW/1807
854 ✓
855 ✓
856 ✓
857 ✓
858 ✓
859 ✓
860 ✓
861 ✓
862 ✓
863 ✓
864 ✓
865 ✓
866 ✓
867 - 311. F1 Advisory Committee / 1061A TA - Thomson 12-26-41
868 ✓
869 ✓
870 ✓
871 ✓
872 ✓
873 ✓
874 ✓
875 ✓
876 ✓
877 ✓
878 - 841.857/1758 LE Hill 4-23-42
879 ✓
880 ✓
881 ✓
882 ✓
883 ✓
884 ✓
885 ✓

886 - 561.35 EIA/1321
887 ✓
888 ✓
889 ✓
890 ✓
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892 ✓
893 ✓
894 ✓

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY., CHAIRMAN
WALTER F. GEORGE, GA.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
HOMER FERGUSON, MICH.

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FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

file

November 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO MR. MARKS:

Attached is copy of letter dated November 24th from Senator Ferguson, requesting copy of any messages or memoranda of consultation sent by our government to the government of Thailand, or to American officials in Thailand, between July 25 and December 7, 1941.

Keene

William D. Mitchell

711.94/11-2845

WDM/CBN
Enclosure

material sent

AUG 30 1946

FILED

with letter - Feb. 4, 1946

TO	Mr. Juit
FROM	<i>WDM</i>
SUBJECT	<i>...</i>
DATE	<i>...</i>
DIST.	<i>...</i>

JP
Confidential File
711.94/11-2845

COPY

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SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
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WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

JERE COOPER, TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
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JOHN W. MURPHY, PA.
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, CALIF.
FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

November 24, 1945.

Honorable William D. Mitchell,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

I would like very much to secure a copy of any messages or memoranda of consultation sent by our government to the government of Thailand, or to American officials in Thailand, between July 25 and December 7, 1941.

Thanking you for your help along this line, I am

Sincerely,

(signed) Homer Ferguson

HF:rg

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY., CHAIRMAN
WALTER F. GEORGE, GA.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE
HOMER FERGUSON, MICH.

JERE COOPER, TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
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FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

DC/R

file SA/B-g

November 30, 1945 *8/12/46*

Mr. Herbert Marks,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

*Not answered
in meeting - Committee
informed orally that
statement not found
in State Dept.
J.*

Dear Mr. Marks:

Attached is copy of letter from Senator
Ferguson dated November 28th, requesting a copy of
statement read by Mr. Hornbeck at meeting of War Board
mentioned on page 4 of Exhibit 16.

*Not found
in State Dept.
files (J)*

Sincerely yours,

WDM

William D. Mitchell.

711.94/11-3045

WDM/CBN
Enclosure

DCR NF Unit	
ANS	<i>WDM</i>
R	
CR	
Dist	

AUG 25 1946

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FRANK B. KEEFE, WIS.

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

November 28, 1945

Hon. William D. Mitchell
General Counsel
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Room 201, Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

On page 4 of Exhibit 16 regarding the War Board Meeting, it indicates that a statement was read by Mr. Hornbeck at that meeting. Will you please get me a copy of that statement?

Sincerely,

(signed) Homer Ferguson.

HF/m

THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTONS E C R E TMINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p.m.

PRESENT: Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U.S.N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations;
Major General William Bryden, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air;
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics;
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U.S.A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;
Captain O.M. Read, U.S.N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and
Colonel W.P. Scobey, U.S.A., Secretary.

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT:

Major General R.C. Moore, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Colonel C. W. Bundy, U.S.A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff;
Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U.S.N., Office of Naval Operations;
Commander F. P. Sherman, U.S.N., Office of Naval Operations; and
Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U.S.N., Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 693 -- Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

S E C R E T

Serial 732 -- Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.

Serial 665-11 -- Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

Serial 725 -- Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established. - Revision requested by the British.

Discussion - Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

Discussion - Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

Serial 693 -- Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.

Serial 732 -- Revision of Paragraph 109, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.

Serial 665-11 -- Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

Serial 725 -- Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States - United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China - At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department

S E C R E T

meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

c. A U.S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.

d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the

SECRET

Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

G. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate anti-aircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented

SECRET

Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U.S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

SECRET

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S. - Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U.S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

SECRET

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the Normandie be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea trains plus the two sea trains U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and U.S.S. Hammondsport, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Alternate Route Via Canton Island for Movement of Airplanes - Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional airdromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. SCOBEEY,
Colonel, G. S. C.
Secretary.

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WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

file
SA 12-8

November 30, 1945 *8/12/46*

Mr. Herbert Marks,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Not answered in
meeting - Committee
informed orally that
no information available
in State Dept. files

Dear Mr. Marks:

For your information, I am attaching copy
of a letter from Senator Ferguson dated November 28th
and a copy of my reply of today.

Sincerely yours,

William D. Mitchell

William D. Mitchell.

711.94/11-3045

WDM/CBN
Enclosures

DCR NE Unit	
_____	<i>WJ</i>

FILED
AUG 29 1946

Confidential File

711.94/11-3045

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Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

November 28, 1945

Hon. William D. Mitchell
General Counsel
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Room 201, Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

In the memorandum for the President dated November 27, 1941, Marshall-Stark joint memorandum, Exhibit 17, I refer you to the last paragraph which is as follows: "steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning."

I would like to know what search has been made for such agreements and if they have been obtained or if any evidence of them has been found, and if so, I should like to have a copy.

Sincerely,

(signed) Homer Ferguson.

HF/m

COPY

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Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL
GENERAL COUNSEL

November 30, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR FERGUSON:

In reply to your note of November 28, 1945, regarding the joint recommendation of General Marshall and Admiral Stark dated November 27, 1941, we are advised that no record either of the receipt of this memorandum or any implementing agreements exists in the State Department, and that no record of any implementing agreements has been found by the War Department. I am, however, forwarding copies of your note to the War, Navy and State Departments with the request that a further search be made.

William D. Mitchell

WDM/GEN

MEMORANDUM

Subject: The following steps were taken in an ^{unsuccessful} effort to find in the State Department files the alleged agreements with the British and Dutch referred to in the Army-Navy memorandum of November 27th, 1941.

Examination was made of the so-called "Pacific War" files (740:0011 Pacific War) on which ^{was} ~~is~~ normally carried all material relating to hostilities in the Pacific area. Also card indexes of communications to and from the War and Navy Departments were searched during the period November 27th through December 7th. Card indexes were also examined of communications to and from the British and Dutch Governments during the same period.

J. P.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

TO : ~~A-Br~~
FROM : PL- John Patterson
SUBJECT :

8-19-46
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS
SEP 4 - 1946

The attached letter to Mr. Broden, and Mr. Hamilton's memorandum thereon, were found in some papers on the Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigation. Do you want it for your file? If not, I shall send it to DC/R with other Pearl Harbor papers.

SECRETARY OF STATE
SHADEN
SEP 4 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

J.P.
File DC/R
E.E.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A-A - Mr. Marks
FROM : Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton
SUBJECT:

DATE: *File DCR*
December 6, 1945

FW 711.94/12-145

Mr. Braden gave me the attached letter this morning. The writer is an anti-Nazi German who worked in secret for Mr. Braden while Mr. Braden was Ambassador to Colombia.

The writer raises the question whether there should be brought out in the Pearl Harbor hearings the existence of a German-Japanese plot to destroy the Panama Canal.

In his radio address of September 11, 1941, President Roosevelt stated, "Within the past few weeks the discovery was made of secret air-landing fields in Colombia, within easy range of the Panama Canal." Mr. Braden tells me that, according to the plot to attack the Panama Canal, Japanese carrier-based planes were to participate from the Pacific side.

The question of a German-Japanese plot has, as I see it, two angles: (1) It is useful in general to produce more evidence that Germany and Japan were working together with the ultimate objective of attacking the United States. Such evidence undermines any claim that this country could have kept peace with Japan. But considerations of time may make it not feasible to go into this. (2) The foiling of a German-Japanese plot to attack the Panama Canal may have influenced the Japanese military in deciding to attack Pearl Harbor. But, if that is true, the question still arises as to why adequate precautionary measures were not taken in reference to Pearl Harbor.

CSA

Do you think it worthwhile to go into the question raised by the writer of the attached letter?

M. M. H.

Maxwell M. Hamilton

DCR - ARA Unit

Attachment: *DC*
Letter described above.

Copy to Mr. Ballantine

MMH:CN

12-11-45
discussed with Braden & concluded nothing need be done at this time. Also mentioned to Bevell who agreed.
HSM

FW 711.94/12-145

December 6, 1945

Handed me by

Mr. Braden and

Mr. Wright today.

MMH

Hq. Co., ARTC
Fort Knox, Kentucky
1 December 1945

Mr. Spruille Braden
Assistant Secretary of State
The State Department
Washington, D. C.

711.94/12-145

Dear Mr. Braden:

According to newspaper reports the Pearl Harbor investigation has reached the conclusion, thus far, that the attack on Pearl Harbor was not a prelude to a Japanese eastward drive, but was intended to prevent the U. S. Pacific Fleet from intervening seriously with the Japanese drive to the south of Asia. This conclusion is erroneous in view of the information collected by the U. S. Embassy then under your direction. I believe that the contrary is true and could be evidenced.

Up until 1933 the Japanese Government was planning along the lines of the famed Tanaka Memorial an expansionist movement into China and Southeast Asia. The Germans, on the other hand, were working on the basis of the program originally designed by Baron Fritz von Hollstein, Ex-Secretary of the Imperial Embassy in Washington, D. C., from 1891 to 1893, which recommended a "far-reaching strike against the United States" as the decisive move for any German expansionism. This plan, although never discovered in writing, is implicitly contained in the documents of the German Naval Command presented at the Nurnberg trial by Justice Jackson just about 4 days ago.

CS/A

As soon as the transgressors came to power in Germany several of their strategic bureaus prepared studies on the eventual possibility of an effective attack on the U. S. war potentiality. Under the directorship of the now deceased General Faupel the Germans decided upon a possible attack on the Panama Canal and penetration into South America as the best decisive move on us. Several German naval and military strategists were dispatched to Latin America and they concluded that the only possible success for that move would be an air attack from the Pacific Ocean aiming to destroy the Canal.

711.94/12-145

MR. BRADEN DCR - ARA Unit
SERIAL 11945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Handwritten initials]

Mr. Spruille Braden

Germany could not reach the Canal with an air force because of the extended U. S. defense belt along the east coast of the Caribbean. But the Pacific offered a wide open funnel with possibilities of bringing Japanese carrier-based bombers within reach of the Canal. The Germans decided to move along this line some time in 1937. In order to secure Japan's cooperation German diplomacy in Japan prepared the field.

At that time the Chinese National Government was relying upon a German Military Mission under General von Reichenau to build up its resistance forces against the Japanese invaders. Abruptly that German Mission was retired thus giving Japan a free hand in China. Hitler also paid the important German investments in China as price for Japan's cooperative friendship.

Peru was an object of interest for Japan because of the large population descending from the Japanese. Germany tried to foster that interest and speculated the possible establishment of a beachhead on the South American West coast. We do know that during a conference in Berlin on Jun 12, 1939 leading German agents were informed in the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the coming attack against the Panama Canal, and of Japan's role in that plot.

The facilities of Scadta in Colombia had not been selected as bases for the attack, but as landing fields for the Japanese planes. Thus the elimination of Scadta alone in 1940 could not secure the Canal.

From late 1939 until early 1941 German and Japanese agents worked feverishly on the preparations of that plot in Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru, but avoided carefully to draw any attention inside of Panama territory proper. In the spring of 1941 the machinery for the plot was set. Japanese diplomats started to sound out the various Latin American Governments because Germany had told them that Latin America would welcome a German-Japanese move against the United States. (See reports submitted to the Pearl Harbor Committee on November 28, 1945.) Your Embassy presented a full report about the plot preparations in Colombia to the Secretary of State some time in May 1941.

In July 1941 we were informed that the attack on the Panama Canal was expected after the arrival of a special delegate from Germany, some time between early October and late November 1941. Many signs of the critical state of affairs were accumulating in the various countries of Latin America.

Mr. Spruille Braden

A Naval Intelligence Report submitted to the Pearl Harbor Committee shows that Japanese Naval Commanders assembled on September 2, 1941 in Tokyo Bay for war games. On September 11, 1941 the State Department had received a report from the U. S. Embassy at Berne, Switzerland (see evidence "Lewis" presented to the Pearl Harbor Committee November 28, 1945) which seems to support the evidence collected in the countries just south of the Canal to the effect of the coming plot. Reports published in the "New York Herald Tribune" and "Barron's Weekly" state that President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Mr. Baruch realized the danger of the coming Japanese attack and tried to gain time. I do not know whether the speech delivered by President Roosevelt in his broadcast on the evening of that same day, September 11, 1941, was intended to serve the same finality, but I am sure that the President's own words saved the Panama Canal from the planned destruction. During his speech President Roosevelt made known part of the evidence which had been collected by the State Department and your Embassy. Anyone who was planning on secrecy for that move against the Canal now realized that we were expecting that move.

The aforementioned Naval Report of the Tokyo war games states that on the next morning, on September 12, 1941, the Japanese decided to attack Pearl Harbor. In Colombia Japanese agents made loud reproaches to German agents and claimed that the Germans had broken the secrecy of the plot. Japan thus could not dare to bring its ships close to the Canal, but left no doubt that they would go their own way along lines of attack against the United States. Had the Japanese and Germans succeeded in their plot the consequences would have been very grave. A Pearl-Harbor-styled air attack would have stopped the Panama Canal at least temporarily and would have opened the way for invasion into the United States.

To date no mention has been made during the entire investigation of the Panama Canal Plot. Major General Sherman Miles, head of G-2 during 1941 claims that the Army discounted any information of an attack against Pearl Harbor and his records also show that an attack against the Panama Canal was even less considered. Nowhere in Miles' estimates of the military and related diplomatic outlook in the period from July 7, 1941 to December 6, 1941 (the day before Pearl Harbor) was there any mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii as a probable or possible point of Japanese attack, although Russian Siberia, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, The Netherlands, ^{East Indies} Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines were described as possible objectives.

Mr. Spruille Braden


The Army Board has tried to blame the State Department and President Roosevelt's Administration with the Pearl Harbor attack. The facts of the overlooked Panama Plot, however, show a very different picture. The Civil Administration has been accurate and effective in its intelligence work; the Political Security Program of the Secretary of State carried out through you and other officials of the Foreign Service avoided a catastrophe worse than Pearl Harbor, yet up to this time the American public does not know the facts, and therefore, does not know what it owes to men of the administration.

Sources for supporting evidence of these facts are:

1. The reports of the U. S. Embassy at Bogota, then under your direction.
2. Evidence gathered by the Legal Attaches in these U. S. Embassies and contained in the files of the FBI.
3. Findings of Justice Robert H. Jackson at the Nurnberg trial.
4. Evidence captured by U. S. Investigators in Japan.
5. Various documents already in hands of the Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.
6. Statements of witnesses who have contributed during the collection of evidence in the respective Latin American countries.

The President has ordered all Government Agencies to aid in the full investigation of the catastrophe and I, therefore, feel that I should submit this memorandum to you, for it was while working under your orders that I acquired knowledge of these facts. These ideas will be incorporated in my manuscript. If you or the State Department feel that I could contribute to the clearance of the investigation now under way I shall be glad either to elaborate on further details or assist the Department in doing so.

Very Sincerely,


Eric Rath

ER:SRR

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Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*OC/R
file*

December 1, 1945

*note
123 Hornbeck, Stanley K.*

Mr. Herbert Marks,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

*file
SA/B-8
9-19-46*

Dear Mr. Marks:

This is to advise that the Committee desires the testimony of Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, formerly political adviser on Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, who, I understand, is now our Minister to the Netherlands.

It is not possible at this time to specify a definite date when Mr. Hornbeck will be reached on the schedule of witnesses, but I can say with some assurance that this point will not be reached until after Christmas. I am writing you at this time so that you may know that Mr. Hornbeck's presence will be required, and will communicate with you again on this subject as soon as the schedule is more definite.

Sincerely yours,

W.D.M.

William D. Mitchell.

obn

*copies sent
Edwin Chapman 12/3
V. H. Morgan 12/4
D. A. 12/4*

TO	Mr. Mitchell
BY	<i>[Signature]</i>
DATE	
DIST.	

AUG 30 1946

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711.94/12-145

711.94/12-145-

SCR

December 6, 1945

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

This is to acknowledge your letter of December 1, notifying the Department that the Committee desires the testimony of Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

The Department has cabled to Mr. Hornbeck the substance of your letter so that he will be prepared to return to the United States when he is needed. We shall appreciate your advising as soon as possible when he is likely to be reached on the schedule of witnesses so that the Department can inform Mr. Hornbeck and send him the necessary travel orders.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary

The Honorable
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

DCI NE Unit *[Signature]*

U:HSMarks: *[Signature]*

R
C
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711.94/12-145

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711.94/12-145

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Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DC/R

December 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARKS:

file
SA/B-8

9-19-46

Your letter to me of November 29th gives the reply from Camberra to the State Department inquiry about the "winds" execute message. We should have a copy of our inquiry to Camberra to show what the inquiry was. If we have it, I cannot find it.

711.94/12-345

WDM

William D. Mitchell

P. S. How about our inquiry to Dutch and British?

AUG 30 1946

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DCI NE Unit	
<i>mg</i>	
	<i>A</i>

Confidential File

711.94/12-345

DEK

December 6, 1945

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

In compliance with your request of December 3, 1945, I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague and Canberra inquiring about the "winds" message.

My letter of yesterday advised you of the answers we have received from London and the Hague.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Paraphrased cable.

A true copy of the signed original

The Honorable
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

NE Unit
[Signature]
U:HSMarks:lmm
Di

711.94/12-345

CS/JEC

Confidential File
711.94/12-345-

Paraphrase of Incoming Telegram

SECRET

To: London, the Hague and Canberra, November 6,
1945

From: Secretary Byrnes

The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential portion is quoted below:

"Under date of November 19, 1941, Japan advised its representatives abroad that if danger arose of a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, or Russia or the British, and the cutting off of other means of international communications, an emergency system for warning Japanese diplomatic representatives of impending break in diplomatic relations would be used, by adding in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the following:

"(1) In case Japan-United States relations were in danger, the words Higashi No Kazeame (East Wind Rain).

"(2) In case of Japan-Russian relations in danger, the words Kitanokaze Kumori (North Wind Cloudy).

"(3) In case Japan-British relations in danger, the words Nishi No Kaze Hare (West Wind Clear).

this signal to be given in the middle and at the end of the broadcast as a weather forecast, 'each sentence to be repeated twice'. This arrangement also said, 'When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc.'

"At the same time, on November 19, 1941, the Japanese sent further notice to its representatives that when their diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia or the British were in danger, there would be added at the beginning and at the end of Japanese general intelligence broadcasts words as follows:

"(1)

Confidential File

-2-

"(1) If it were Japan-United States relations, the word 'Higashi'.

"(2) If it were Japan-Russia relations, the word 'Kita'.

"(3) If it were Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and Nei), the word 'Nishi'.

these words to be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

"The Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 are trying to ascertain whether any broadcasts under this system were monitored and overheard, either by the United States or by Australia, the Dutch East Indies or the British, and, if so, on what day and at what time such a broadcast was overheard, and if so the text of the broadcast, and whether either of the three nations mentioned, having overheard the broadcast, advised the United States of the fact. We are particularly interested in the period from November 27th to December 7th inclusive, and suggest that the inquiry first cover that period and then, if time permits, work back to November 19, 1941."

You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph a report of the results.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

December 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARKS

Only the opening and closing paragraphs of the Department's telegram no. 9745 to London, no. 125 to The Hague and no. 113 to Canberra, need to be paraphrased. In view of the fact that the bulk of the message was in the first instance a direct quotation from a communication from the Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, a code had to be used which does not require paraphrasing in so far as the quoted parts of the message are concerned.

A suggested paraphrase of the first and last paragraphs of the message is given below:

"The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential portion is quoted below:"

"You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph a report of the results."

FEW
FEW

FR 711.94 / 12-345-

Confidential File

off

277

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to

NO DISTRIBUTION

~~RESERVED~~
PLAIN
DEC - 4 1945

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

10493 FOURTH

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ACHILLES FROM POOL.

Pearl Harbor Committee desires to discuss winds
message tomorrow Wednesday morning. Would it be at
all possible to get reply to ourtel 9745 of November 6?
Even a negative reply would be useful.

*Byrnes
(JCP)*

711.94/12-445

OS/LE

BC: JCPool:eh
12-4-45

CR
DEC 4 1945

DOR - NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>ms</i>
Re.	<i>ms</i>
Cat.	<i>ms</i>
Dist.	

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RECEIVED
RELEASE DESK

DEC 4 AM 10 07

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

711.94/12-445

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION-EUR

INFO:

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U Paraphrase before com-
C municating to anyone.

SA/B
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
SECRET

1217

London

Dated December 4, 1945

Rec'd



JCP
PCR

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

NIACT 12721, December 4, 9 p.m.

Action Information:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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EUR/H	<input type="checkbox"/>
EUR/X	<input type="checkbox"/>
BC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CE	<input type="checkbox"/>
NOE	<input type="checkbox"/>
SE	<input type="checkbox"/>
WE	<input type="checkbox"/>

We have just learned from FONOFF that although their inquiries not yet complete there is no present evidence of receipt of any "wind" message prior to morning of Dec 8, 1941, day after Pearl Harbor attack. (REDEPTS 9745/Nov 6 and 10493, Dec 4). FONOFF states a Jap broadcast containing code messages was relayed from Hongkong to Singapore and received at Singapore six hours after Pearl Harbor attack. Jap code text not yet available. We will press FONOFF for further details if desired.

WINANT

WVC

SECRET

711.94/12-445

DEC 6 1945



279

DO NOT ~~DISTRIBUTE~~

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to \$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
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CLEAR
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SECRET

Department of State

Washington,

NO STENCIL - NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S. URGENT

DEC - 4 1945

noon

AMEMBASSY,

THE HAGUE.

169

Pearl Harbor Committee desires to discuss winds message tomorrow Wednesday morning. Would it be at all possible to get reply to ourtel 125/ *711.94/11-645* of November 6? Even a negative reply would be useful.

Byrnes (J.W.B)

711.94/12-445

OS/LE

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
1945 DEC 4 AM 11 01
CODE ROOM
RELEASE DESK

Confidential File

711.94/12-445

✓
DEC 4 1945
SA/B:JB:C

NOE
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Re: *mt*
Dat. *mh*
Dist. _____ 19____

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____

633

Handwritten initials

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

SECRET

Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to

NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY
Secret

DEC - 5 1945
yp

U.S. URGENT

AMEMBASSY

LONDON

10544

711.94/12-445
Thank you for URTEL 12721. Would appreciate further details from FONOFF if possible.

711.94/12-445

Pearl Harbor attack

Byrnes (JCP)

CS/LE

DEC 5 1945 P.M.

na	OCB NE Unit
Key	<i>[Signature]</i>
Cat.	<i>FL</i>
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Confidential File

711.94/12-445

BC:JCFool:z
12-5-45

SECRET

November 5, 1945

SECRET

711.94/12-445

My dear Mr. Mitchell:

I enclose a paraphrased cable dated December 4, 1945, just received from London in reply to our inquiry of November 6 as to whether the British had monitored and overheard any Japanese broadcasts using the so-called "winds" code between November 19 and December 7, 1941.

As to the Netherlands, the Counselor of the American Embassy at The Hague advised us by telephone this morning that the Dutch Foreign Office has now stated in reply to our inquiry of November 6, that the most careful search has had negative results.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary

711.94/12-445 OS/LE

Enclosure:

Paraphrased cable.

A true copy of the signed original

The Honorable
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel,
DCR - NE UMC Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

Anal.	<i>m</i>
Re.	<i>m</i>
Cat.	
Dist.	

U:HSM:mce

Confidential File

711.94/12-445

SECRET

Paraphrase of Incoming Telegram

To: Secretary of State, December 4, 1945
From: American Ambassador, London

SECRET

The Foreign Office has just informed us that while their inquiries are not yet finished, up to the present no evidence has been found that any "wind" message was received before the morning of December 8, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Office says that there was relayed to Singapore from Hongkong a broadcast by the Japanese which contained messages in code and which was received in Singapore six hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The text of the Japanese code is not available yet but if desired we will ask the Foreign Office for more particulars.

SECRET

SECRET

704

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department:

Charge to

Department of State

telegrams must be closely guarded before being communicated to anyone.
Washington
SECRET

SECRET

NO DISTRIBUTION

DEC - 5 1945

6pm

US URGENT

AMEMBASSY,

THE HAGUE.

173

Dept would appreciate Embassy's repeating by telegraph message reported by Benton by telephone this morning concerning Netherlands reply to our 125 November 6.

Please inquire of Netherlands authorities whether they feel all possibilities of search have been exhausted and that reply given Benton is to be considered final or whether we may expect later report of results of further search.

711.94/12-545

OS ME 711.94/12-545

SENT

DEC 5 PM 6 09

CENTRAL SERVICES
CONFIDENTIAL FILE

Byrnes
(JHM)

u
dm
mr

NOE: JHMorgan:eh
(12-5-45)

DEC 5 1945 P.M.

DOR - EUR Unit	
Anal
Rev.
Dist.
Unit

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

SA/B file

ACTION: SA/B
INFO:
S
U
C
EUR
DC/R-1

EG -R
Paraphrase before com-
municating to anyone

1530

The Hague

Dated December 5, 1945

Rec'd 11:32 a.m., 5th

SECRET

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT

271, December 5, 11 a.m.

FONOFF states that up to present (REDEPTEL 125,
November 6 and 169, December 4) careful search of
archives and inquiries of competent authorities have
produced negative results but that matter will be
pursued further.

HORNBECK

EDA

SECRET

711.94/12-545

Substance of message to Pearl Harbor Committee 12/5/45
DEC 13 1945
Confidential File
Ymm

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: S/CC

INFO:

S

OJC -DP

2575

U

PLAIN

C

A-D

Oslo

A-B

Dated December 7, 1945

SA

SA/M

SPA

EUR

DC/R-1

Rec'd 6:36 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State

Washington

747, Seventh.

Dept's 420, December 5.

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
DEC 10 1945
MR. SAVAGE

*Glee
mult.*

Text of Mr. Hull's speech will be released at 1:45 p.m. Oslo time Monday, December 10 and will doubtless be used in three o'clock editions of afternoon papers.

OSBORNE

SW

PLAIN

711.94/12-745

DEC 13 1945

FILED

SR

December 10, 1945

To: Lt. Comdr. J. F. Baecher

In compliance with Admiral Stark's request referred to in your memorandum of December 7, 1945, I enclose photostatic copies of memoranda of conversation between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax on August 9, 1941 and November 28, 1941. As I stated to you on the telephone just now, if Admiral Stark wishes to see the attachments referred to in the memorandum of August 9, we shall be glad to show them to him.

The speech requested by Admiral Stark is evidently the one which Mr. Churchill made in the House of Commons on January 27, 1942. This is readily available in Mr. Churchill's book "The End of the Beginning", published by Little, Brown and Company in 1943. The speech will be found on page eighteen.

Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Hull and Lord Halifax, August 9, 1941.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Lord Halifax and Under Secretary Welles, November 28, 1941.

U:HSMarks:lmm

711.94 / 12-10-45
Confidential File

1887

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

SECRET

Charge Department:

Department of State

Washington

Charge to

NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY
NO STENCIL
secret

DEC 11 1945
11 am

NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S.URGENT

AMEMBASSY

LONDON

10696

For possible public use by the Pearl Harbor Committee it is requested that British permission be obtained for the contents of the telegram or telegrams of Ambassador Craigie to the Foreign Office reporting his long conversation of August 11 (repeat August 11) 1941 with the Japanese Foreign Minister primarily regarding Thailand but covering as well other points in connection with the Japanese drive to the South. Ambassador Craigie gave to Ambassador Grew a copy of the telegram or telegrams (probably in paraphrase) Grew reporting it to the Department in his five section telegram No. 1235 of August 16, 3 P.M. A copy of telegram No. 1235 is being sent to you by courier arriving London Saturday, December 15. It is thought that in the meantime you may be able to take up the matter with the Foreign Office on the basis of this telegram in an effort to expedite the reply to our request.

711.94/12-1145

CS/LE
Confidential File

DEC 11 1945

Bynes (JCP)

SENT

BC:JPool:z 12-11-45

J

Hunt

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION-W

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACT INFO

INTO: INCOMING TELEGRAM IN

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
DEC 11 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/L-0 EUR-H
SPD-2 EUR-X London
FC-14 EUR-SA/R
OIC EUR-SA/M
INI EUR-INF
OPI BC
PL DC/R-LE

Dated December 11, 1945

Rec'd 12:47 a.m., 12th

PWA2 VIA PREWI

PW77 LONDON

PRESS SECSTATE WASH

12924 ELEVENTH NAVAL CORRESPONDENT OF NEWS CHRONICLE COMMA
COMMENTING ON PEARL HARBOR INQUIRY IN WASHINGTON COMMA WRITES
TODAY COLON QUOTE THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT BRITISH
NAVAL INTELEGENCE MAY HAVE SOLVED THE JAPANESE NAVAL CODE
LONG BEFORE THE U.S. IS SAID TO HAVE GIVEN US SECRET MEANS OF
BREAKING THE JAP DIPLOMATIC CODE IN 1941 PERIOD THIS WOULD
EXPLAIN WHY AS LONG AGO AS 1940 WE WERE HASTENING TO PASS OVER
TO THE US EVERY NEW INVENTION AND SECRET DEVELOPMENT
LEARNED DURING THE WAR AT SEA PERIOD THERE SEEMED NO DOUBT
AT THE ADMIRALTY AT THAT TIME THAT JAPAN HAD DECIDED TO ATTACK
PERIOD UNQUOTE CORRESPONDENT SAYS QUESTION IS RAISED BY
SENATOR FERGUSONS STATEMENT THAT HE WISHES TO KNOW WHETHER
BRITISH INTELEGENCE SERVICE MADE BETTER USE OF INTERCEPTED
JAPANESE SECRETS THAN DID UNITED STATES IN ASSESSING WHETHER
JAPAN MIGHT ATTACK COMMA AND ADDS THAT SENATOR IS
EXPECTED TO PRODUCE ADMIRALTY MESSAGE AS A BASIS FOR QUERIE
PERIOD NEWS CHRONICLE ARTICLE CONTINUES COLON QUOTE WARNING THAT
PLAIN

ACT INFO	
EUR-H	
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JCP
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12-12-45
119 (Hunt)

711.94/12-1145

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PLAIN

-2- #12984, Eleventh from London

JAPAN WAS PREPARING FOR ATTACK WERE GIVEN TO US BY BRITAIN EARLIER THAN 1941 COMMA PROMPTED BY INFORMATION FROM NAVALLINTELLIGENCE PERIOD IT WAS BRITISH INFORMATION NOT AMERICAN DASH THAT LED MR. CHURCHILL IN THE AUTUMN OF 1941 TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND TALK TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT OVER THE SUBQUOTE SCRAMBLER END SUBQUOTE ATLANTIC PHONE AND ASSURE HIM THAT IF JAPAN STRUCK BRITAIN WOULD DECLARE WAR AT ONCE PERIOD THESE CONVERSATIONS WERE EVENTUALLY INTERCEPTED BY GERMANY AND HAD TO STOP PERIOD IT IS BELIEVED THE MR. CHURCHILL WAS WELL AWARE FROM HIS OWN SOURCES OF INFORMATION WHEN JAPAN WOULD STRIKE PERIOD JAPAN STRUCK ON DECEMBER 7 1941 PERIOD THERE IS NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE ADMIRALTY COMMA BUT WHEN THE FULL STORY IS TOLD THE WORK OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE IN DECODING JAPANESE MESSAGES SHOULD PRODUCE SOME SURPRISES UNQUOTE

WINANT

CA/1246AM

PLAIN

Collect

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

3776

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

SECRET

DEC 19 1945
Sp

Charge Department:

Department

Washington

Charge to

NO STENCIL NO DISTRIBUTION

This material must be directly paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
SECRET

U.S. URGENT

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

10899

Senate Committee pressing Dept for documents referred to in Deptels 9947/^{711.94/11-1445} Nov 14 1 pm and 10696/^m Dec 11 11 am. Please endeavor expedite British clearance as matter most urgent.

Re making public British aide memoire dated May 8, 1941

Acheson Acting (TW)

711.94/12-1145 OS 11/11/94/12-1145

DEC 19 1945 P.M.

SENT

DEC 19 PM 1 56

CONFIDENTIAL
RELEASE DESK

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DIVISION OF CONFIDENTIAL FILE
CENTRAL SERVICES

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12-19-45

Anal.	<i>ms</i>
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DOR - ^{NE} Unit

VIA COURIER

DEC 11 1945

SECRET

No. 6252

To the
Officer in charge of the American Mission,
London.

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's telegram No. 10696 of December 11, 11 A.M. and encloses a copy of Ambassador Grew's telegram No. 1235 of August 16, 1941, 3 P.M., reporting the conversation of August 11, 1941, between the British Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Foreign Minister regarding Thailand and other matters connected with the Japanese drive to the South. The Embassy is requested to obtain the permission of the British Foreign Office for the possible use of this document publicly by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.

The Embassy will appreciate the urgency of the matter. The document may be handed to the Foreign Office in its present form, i.e., without being paraphrased.

Enclosure:
Copy of
Ambassador Grew's
telegram 1235 of
August 16, 1941.

BC:JCPool:z
12-11-45

CR
DEC 11 1945 P.M.

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711.94/12-1145
CS/LE

561 Confidential File

711.94/12-1145

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY
OFFICE OF CONTROLS
*Tel. to Stone
London 12/17/45*
DEC 14 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION: CON
INFO:

S PEM -P
U Paraphrase before com-
C municating to anyone.
SA
S-GC
A-R
DC/R

4618

Baghdad via War

Dated December 13, 1945

Rec'd 1:34 p.m.

*File
8-29-46*

Secretary of State,

Washington.

489, December 13, Noon

To best of my recollection Stone threw old log books into
wastebasket in room 212. I took the two I now have (REDEPTTEL 369,
Dec 11, 6 p.m.) out of that basket.

MORELAND

MP

SECRET

711.94/12-1345 CS/HH

Confidential File

711.94/12-1345

*note
11.11 Hull,
Cordell*

124,902/11-2345

DCS Unit
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AUG 29 1946

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RECORD COPY

The attached white copy of a telegram or airgram has been designated the record copy to replace the yellow action copy which was not returned to the central records by the action office.

This copy must be returned to DC/R for filing.

FILE NO.

~~124.9066/12-1345~~

711.94/12-1345

Confidential File

APR 9 1973

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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1945 DEC 14 AM 4618
9 23
Baghdad via War

DC/R
RECORDS BRANCH
Dated December 13, 1945
Rec'd 1:34 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

489, December 13, Noon

To best of my recollection Stone threw old log books into
wastebasket in room 212. I took the two I now have (REDEPTEL 369,
Dec 11, 6 p.m.) out of that basket.

MORELAND

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NEW ZEALAND LEGATION
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

DC/R

December 14, 1945

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
DEC 18 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File: Matter discussed with Mr. Reid by Mr. Blake. adp.

Dear Richards,

The White House and the State Department may have noticed, as we did, a CTPS Press message from Wellington, New Zealand, published in the issue of the Washington Times-Herald of December 6, under the heading "New Zealand Blames F.D.R. for Pearl Harbour", and an editorial in connection with the same message appearing in the Chicago Daily Tribune of December 7.

... I attach hereto copy of communications which have been addressed to the Editors of both journals as a result of enquiries made by this Legation, and hope you will bring the New Zealand Government's firm denial that it holds or ever held the views indicated to the notice of any who may be concerned.

Yours sincerely,

James Blair
First Secretary

711.94/12-1445

x/R
711.47h

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 DEC 18 AM 11 16

RECORDS BRANCH

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Anal	<i>[Signature]</i>
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Dist.	Mr. Richards, New Zealand Desk, State Department, WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEC 16 1945

FILED

711.94/12-1445

COPY

New Zealand Legation,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.
December 13, 1945

Dear Sir,

The editorial headed "New Zealand Knows" in your issue of Friday, December 7, 1945, contained what appeared to me such an astonishing mis-statement of the views of the New Zealand Government that I referred the matter by telegraph to Wellington. I am now informed by my Prime Minister (the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser) that, on behalf of the New Zealand Government, he at once and most firmly repudiates any suggestion that he or any member of the New Zealand Government holds the views attributed to them in your editorial.

The CTPS Press message from Wellington, under date December 5, upon which the editorial is apparently based, is inaccurate in several important respects, as indeed are the conclusions which the Chicago Daily Tribune draws from that message, and I hope you will allow me to make the following statement of the position which does accurately set out the facts:-

1. The "Standard" is not the organ of the New Zealand Government, but of the New Zealand Labour Movement, and the Government is in no way responsible for the material appearing therein.

2. The article in question was not, as represented, the editorial opinion of the "Standard". It contained the personal commentary of an anonymous columnist and merely purported to report information and views actually emanating from Washington.

3. The Press message from Wellington is not a textual copy of the commentary in question, and by departure from the text conveys an interpretation of the intention of the commentary which is, in an important measure, misleading.

4. The implication that the New Zealand Government holds the views attributed to it in your editorial is entirely unwarranted by the facts.

The Editor,
Chicago Daily Tribune,
Tribune Company,
Tribune Square,
CHICAGO 11, ILLINOIS

- 2 -

On behalf of the New Zealand Government, I am authorised to state that neither the Government, nor the Prime Minister, nor any other member of the Government, could possibly hold the views which are ascribed to them in the editorial; that they have never held such views; and that they do not hold them now.

In view of the publicity which the Chicago Daily Tribune's editorial has given to what is in fact a completely inaccurate exposition of the views of the New Zealand Government, I hope you will agree that equal publicity should be given to an authorised and most emphatic denial, and I trust, therefore, that you will find it possible to publish this communication accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) C.A. BERENDSEN

New Zealand Minister to the United States

COPY

New Zealand Legation,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.
December 13, 1945

Dear Sir,

A CTPS Press message from Wellington under date December 5, 1945, published in the December 6 issue of the Washington Times-Herald under the heading "New Zealand Blames F.D.R. for Pearl Harbour" contained what appeared to me such an astonishing mis-statement of the views of the New Zealand Government that I referred the matter by telegraph to Wellington. I am now informed by my Prime Minister (the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser) that, on behalf of the New Zealand Government, he at once and most firmly repudiates any suggestion that he or any member of the New Zealand Government holds the views attributed to them by implication in that message.

This message is inaccurate in several important respects, and I hope you will allow me to make the following statement of the position which does accurately set out the facts:-

1. The "Standard" is not the organ of the New Zealand Government, but of the New Zealand Labour Movement, and the Government is in no way responsible for the material appearing therein.
2. The article in question was not, as implied, the editorial opinion of the "Standard". It contained the personal commentary of an anonymous columnist and merely purported to report information and views actually emanating from Washington.
3. The message from Wellington is not a textual copy of the commentary in question, and by departure from the text conveys an interpretation of the intention of the commentary which is, in an important measure, misleading.
4. The implication that the New Zealand Government holds the views attributed to it in the message is entirely unwarranted by the facts.

The Editor,
Washington Times-Herald,
1317 H. Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2.

On behalf of the New Zealand Government, I am authorised to state that neither the Government, nor the Prime Minister, nor any other member of the Government, could possibly hold the views which are ascribed to them in the message; that they have never held such views; and that they do not hold them now; and I hope you will find it possible to publish this authorised and most emphatic denial.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) C.A. BERENDSEN

New Zealand Minister to the United States



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 15, 1945.

No. 107

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBJECT: President Roosevelt's Pre-Pearl Harbor
Message to the Japanese Emperor.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 3 - 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. H. M. Benninghoff, Foreign Service Officer en route to Korea, and Mr. H. TERASAKI, formerly First Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

According to Mr. TERASAKI, he was instrumental, in part at least, in arranging for the dispatch of the message from President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December, 1941.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation,
December 15, 1945.

Original and ozalid to the
Department.

800
HMBenninghoff:vs

OCF NE Unit
Dist

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
BY AUTHORITY OF *Am Embassy Tokyo*
DATE *5-25-60*
BY *Royce A. Gibson - RNS*

711.94/12-1545

JAN 8 - 1946

FILED

Confidential File

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Enclosure to despatch no. 107 of December 15, 1945,
from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo,
Japan, on the subject "President Roosevelt's Pre-
Pearl Harbor Message to the Japanese Emperor."

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TOP SECRET

December 15, 1945.

Participants: Mr. H. TERASAKI (formerly
First Secretary at the
Japanese Embassy in Washington).
Mr. H. M. Benninghoff (Foreign
Service Officer en route to Korea).
Subject: President Roosevelt's Pre-Pearl Harbor
Message to the Japanese Emperor.

(Note: Mr. TERASAKI is a career member of the Japanese Diplomatic Service. He spent many years in Washington, and has an American wife. He also served in Shanghai and Peiping and is well acquainted with many American Foreign Service Officers who served in those cities. Mr. TERASAKI was transferred to Washington from Peiping in the spring of 1941 and apparently was placed at the head of the Japanese intelligence organization in the Western Hemisphere. When the war broke out, he was under orders to transfer his activities to Brazil. There appears to be no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statements as recorded in the present memorandum, and in any event they can easily be checked, if necessary, through Mr. E. Stanley Jones, well-known church leader, who acted as his intermediary.)


Mr. TERASAKI stated that soon after Mr. S. KURUSU arrived in Washington on his special mission in November, 1941, he approached Mr. KURUSU with the suggestion that as the conversations then being held were not making any progress it might be a good idea for Mr. KURUSU to become a "national traitor" and approach President Roosevelt directly with a view to persuading him to send a message to the Emperor of Japan. This would, of course, have meant by-passing both the Government of Japan and the militarists; Mr. KURUSU's life would have been in danger and his usefulness to the Government would have ceased.

Mr. KURUSU thought over this suggestion for two or three days, and then informed Mr. TERASAKI that he was unable to carry out the suggestion in view of the nature of the instructions he had received from his Government and also in view of his close connection with the conversations. However, according to Mr. TERASAKI, Mr. KURUSU thought that the idea of a presidential message was a good one and he in turn suggested to Mr. TERASAKI that the latter become a "national traitor" and see what could be done about getting the President to send an appeal directly to the Emperor.

According

- 2 -

According to Mr. TERASAKI's account, he pondered the problem for a day or two and then sought out Mr. E. Stanley Jones, a Methodist church leader who was then interesting himself in America-Japan relations. Mr. Jones apparently thought the idea was a good one, and he took it to the President. Mr. Jones later informed Mr. TERASAKI that President Roosevelt stated that he had had the idea for some time but that he was in doubt as to whether such a message would change the course of the negotiations. The President, Mr. Jones informed Mr. TERASAKI, was glad to learn that Japanese "pacifists" were willing to take the personal risk of suggesting that the President send such a message. Mr. TERASAKI feels that his suggestion through Mr. Jones gave the final impetus to the sending of the message which resulted in Ambassador Grew's calling on the Foreign Minister in Tokyo at about midnight on December 7 to request an audience with the Emperor.


H. M. Benninghoff,
Foreign Service Officer.

800
HMBenninghoff:vs

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: EUR

INFO:

S

U

C

SA/B

DC/R

JWM P

Paraphrase before communicating to anyone.

5545

London

Dated December 15, 1956

Rec'd 7:26 p.m., 15th

SECRET

Secretary of State

Washington

13161, December 15, 2 p.m.

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION
 Mr Marks in
 DEC 17 1945 AA
 file informed
 TW
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JEP
DCR

We talked this morning with Foulds Jap expert in FONOFF regarding "WINDS" messages. (REDEPTS 10544, December 5). He was in FONOFF just previous to and at time of Pearl Harbor and states that from his personal knowledge no such messages were received prior to December 8, 1941. FONOFF is still investigating but has yet no information which would alter that contained in Embassy's 12721.

WINANT

DU

SECRET

	ACT	INF
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EUR-H		
EUR-X		
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DEC 18 1945

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