

COPY

SECRET

G-2, GHQ

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

PSD FILES

(For use within G-2 only)

Security Surveys and Security Inspections

File No:

Subject:

Date: 25 June 1951

FROM: G-2

TO: CO, 441 CIC

PHONE: 26-8120
NAME: Maj Titus

Comment Number 1

1. The Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Detachment will conduct a Security Survey of all G2 agencies located in the NYK Building and PSYWAR and Hist Sec with advance notice.
2. Prior to this check the CO, 441st CIC Detachment, will confer with the Deputy for details of execution, with special regard to GHQ premises and to prevent improper handling.
3. In conformance with TM 30-218, a written report of this Security Survey will be submitted to the ACoFS/Theater Counter-Intelligence Officer/G-2, in triplicate, classified SECRET, to include in addition the following:
 - a. Date and time of security check.
 - b. Staff section, installation, and office receiving the security check.
 - c. Type of security check.
 - d. Result of security check.
 - e. Conclusions.
 - f. Recommendations.
4. Report covering PSYWAR and Hist Sec will be forwarded to G-3 through G-2 as a separate report.

1 Incl
List of Rooms, 23 Jun 51

-----R. F. E.-----

Public Safety Division File Copy

311.5

26

SECRET

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

COPY

TIS STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NO. 40-3)

40-3
HEADQUARTERS
Translator and Interpreter Service
APO 500

23 July 1951

SECURITY OF THE NYK BUILDING

References & Rescissions Section I
 General Section II
 Information Desk Section III
 Policy Governing Entry & Exit of
 Pers to & from NYK Bldg. Section IV
 Passes Section V
 Security Inspection Section VI

SECTION I

REFERENCES AND RESCISSIONS

1. Reference: FM 26-5, "Interior Guard Duty," December 1950
2. Rescission: TIS Staff Memorandum No. 40-3, same subject, 13 April 1950.

SECTION II

GENERAL

1. Fire regulations, General Duties of the Guard and Special Orders for Guard Posts are contained within the Officer of the Day folder.
2. The Officer of the Day will be responsible for keys to all offices in the NYK Building. The keys will be kept in the custody of the Sergeant of the Guard.
3. If the Officer of the Day is requested to open locked offices, he will make certain that authorized personnel only are permitted to enter. In cases where authority cannot be clearly established, the Officer of the Day will contact the officer responsible for the office and request instructions.
4. Sections will insure that classified waste is gathered by accredited personnel and brought to boiler room in basement of NYK Building for destruction between hours of 1645 - 1700 daily. The Security Inspection Officer will supervise the burning of waste.
5. After duty hours all classified waste baskets will be turned upside down and all file baskets will be placed on end.

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Page 2 of 8 Pages

6. Accredited military or civilian personnel will be in all offices during duty hours. Accredited personnel will also be present during lunch periods unless all classified matter has been locked and office doors secured.

7. The handling and transmission of classified matter will be in accordance with par 17, AR 380-5, dated 15 November 1949. All documents classified "SECRET" or higher will be transmitted in envelopes between offices within the NYK Building.

SECTION III

INFORMATION DESK

1. Purpose: To provide a means of quick, efficient and courteous service to persons requesting information regarding offices and personnel located in the NYK Building and to further organizational security measures by controlling the movement of non-U.S. personnel through the main (north) entrance of the NYK Building (Guard Post No. 1).

2. General:

a. The Information Desk is situated in the lobby of the main entrance of the NYK Building. Rosters of personnel employed and billeted in the NYK Building are maintained and adequate personnel are always on hand to answer inquiries and issue passes when authorized.

b. The Information Desk is staffed 24 hours a day and may be contacted at any hour by dialing 26-7845.

3. Duties of Personnel:

a. To give prompt and courteous attention to all inquiries, keeping in mind the requirements of these regulations.

b. To receive visitors passed to the desk by the entrance guard; to maintain the Visitor's Register, in accordance with Sample 1 of Appendix A; and issue guest passes, in accordance with Sample 2 of Appendix A, when authorized:

- (1) Guest passes will be issued to visitors not possessing AGO Identification Card, Eighth Army Identification Card (8A Form 59), NYK Japanese and Foreign National Civilian Pass (laminated w/picture), PIO Accredited Correspondent Pass (blue, laminated w/picture) only when counter-signed by Tokyo Provost Marshal, or CI Div Special Pass.

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(2) No passes will be issued unless guests are vouched for in person, and accompanied by a NYK military or DAC host.

c. To notify personnel within the building by telephone of the presence of a guest and have that person, or an authorized representative, sign the pass and the Visitors' Register assuming responsibility for the guest while on the premises. (CI Div Receptionist, 26-8407, will handle all visitors to CI Div Offices.)

d. To report to the Adjutant, TIS at the beginning of each working day any discrepancies of the previous day's record, giving the following information: Pass number, name of guest, name and section of host.

e. To coordinate activities with the guard on Post No. 1, as well as with the supernumerary of the guard who reinforces the personnel of the Information Desk during rush hours.

f. To call the Adjutant, TIS in all cases not covered by instructions and in event he is not present, contact the TIS Sergeant Major.

4. Visitors:

a. All visitors other than U.S. military in uniform and Department of the Army Civilians will be received from the entrance guard by the Information Desk where the visitor will indicate the name of the person he desires to visit. Visitors will be called for by authorized host at the Information Desk. When guest is ready to leave, the host will escort guest to Information Desk, initial Visitors' Register and sign Guest Pass. The guest will give this pass to the guard at the front (north) entrance to the building. The guard will not allow a guest to leave the building without surrendering this pass.

b. The guard will turn in all visitor's passes to Information Desk upon relief in order that they may be checked against Visitors' Register by Officer of the Day at 1730 and 2330 daily.

c. Japanese Nationals are permitted after duty hours -- 1700 until 2300 -- to visit military personnel billeted in the NYK Building with the following restriction:

(1) Visitors will be escorted to and from the Information Desk by the responsible host and will be restricted to the area of established clubs and Enlisted Men's Mess Hall.

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SECTION IVPOLICY GOVERNING ENTRY AND EXIT OF ALL PERSONNEL
TO AND FROM THE NYK BUILDING

1. Purpose: To establish a policy governing the entry and exit of all personnel to and from the NYK Building.

2. General:

a. The NYK Building is a G2 office building and billet. It is, therefore, imperative that close security be maintained over entrances and exits.

b. There are two (2) doors which provide normal means of entrance and exit -- the front (North) entrance and one (1) rear (South) center entrance.

c. Another door (the rear southwest) entrance may be designated for use by Japanese laborers to carry equipment and supplies in or out if it is inconvenient to receive or carry out same at the employees' entrance, but only when this activity is supervised by allied personnel.

d. Both military and Japanese National guards are employed to provide required security and administrative control.

3. Rear (South) Entrances:

a. Military guards are stationed at the rear entrances to the building. Their duties are as prescribed in Duties of the Guard and Special Orders for Posts No. 4 and No. 5.

b. The rear (South) door, designated as "Employees' Entrance" will be utilized by all Japanese employees of the NYK Building. Visitors to Administration and Service Sections located in the basement and to the Japanese Manager's Office will also use this entrance. This entrance is restricted to use by Japanese employees and visitors of TIS Administration and Services Division and of the Japanese Manager's Office, and Occupation employees in the performance of their duties.

c. Identification badges will be issued to all Japanese admitted through the Employees' Entrance, excepting those possessing a TIS Japanese and Foreign National Civilian Employee Pass.

d. One male Japanese National Guard will be stationed at the Employees' Entrance to search parcels and issue and collect employee or

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Page 5 of 8 Pages

visitor's identification badges each time Japanese Nationals enter or leave the NYK Building. Between the hours 0900 - 1800 one female Japanese National guard will be stationed here to search female Japanese. Japanese personnel employed by Administration and Services Division (with the exception of the Transportation Section) are issued badges daily. Badges are checked against the roster of employees which is furnished by the Japanese building manager.

e. Japanese Nationals will not be permitted personal visits to Japanese personnel billeted in the basement during or after duty hours, specifically, at any time.

f. Duties of Japanese Guards:

- (1) To maintain an Incident Log Book (Appendix "B"). Unusual occurrences with any pertinent remarks that may be applicable will be indicated. The Log Book is a permanent record and will be filled out clearly and neatly.
- (2) To report to Japanese Manager each morning any unusual circumstances that appear on the Incident Log Book. The Japanese Manager will report same to NYK Repairs and Utilities Section.
- (3) To issue and collect employee and visitor identification badges.
- (4) To maintain badge register.
- (5) To search Japanese employees each time they leave the building. The Japanese guards are under supervision of the military guard for purposes of this search.

g. The Japanese Manager is responsible to the NYK Repairs and Utilities Section for necessary Japanese guards and effective procedures governing the movement of Japanese through the rear (South) entrances, in accordance with provisions of this memorandum.

4. Front (North) Entrance: Only military and DAC personnel, visitors, and individuals possessing NYK Japanese & Foreign National Civilian Pass or CI Div Special Pass will utilize the front (North) entrance.

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Page 6 of 8 Pages

SECTION VPASSES

1. Only the following type passes will be used by other than Occupation personnel:

- a. Temporary Guest Pass - Sample 2, Appendix A
- b. Semi-permanent Visitor & TIS Employee Pass - Sample 3, Appendix A
- c. NYK Japanese & Foreign National Civilian Pass - Sample 4, Appendix A
- d. CI Div Special Pass

SECTION VISECURITY INSPECTION

1. The Commanding Officer, TIS, will designate a security inspection team, consisting of one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted men of the first four (4) grades daily for inspection of the NYK Building.

2. Inspections will begin one-half (1/2) hour after close of duty hours and will include all offices on the first, second, third, fourth and fifth floors. The detail will base its actions on AR 380-5. The inspection will include violations such as open safes and cabinets, unsecured classified and classified waste material, unlocked doors, open windows, lights and fans on, radiators not turned off, etc. The inspection team will also spot-check desk drawers in all offices except Psychological Warfare and Military History Sections, where no desks will be checked unless the security of the room in question has been compromised; i.e. unlocked door or window, in which case a thorough check of the room will be made and action taken as outlined in para 3 below if required.

3. In the case of open safes and cabinets containing classified material in G2 agencies, the security inspection officer will contact the appropriate division or section chief and request that he immediately inventory the contents to determine whether or not any classified material is missing. In the event no inventory is made within one (1) hour of the time of notice, the Officer of the Day will call the CO, TIS and inform him of the circumstances. The case, cabinets, or safe will be closed and locked in the meantime. In the event it cannot be locked, it will be placed under physical guard. If classified matter is found and cannot be

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placed under lock and key, it will be put in an envelope, identified by room number, and turned over to the TIS OD for return to proper section the following day. TIS OD will secure such matter in accordance with provisions of AR 380-5 or will keep the material on his person. Appropriate action as required by paragraph 10, AR 380-5 will be taken by the division or section chief and a copy of investigation will be furnished to CO, TIS. In the case of open safes and cabinets containing classified material in Psychological Warfare and Military History Section, the security inspection officer will contact the appropriate section chief inform him of the incident and request appropriate action required by para 10, AR 380-5. In the event it cannot be locked, the safe will be placed under physical guard.

4. The security inspection officer will submit report on "Security Inspection Report" Form (TIS Form #99 dated 29 Sep 49) and will turn it in to TIS Officer of the Day. The OD will turn the report in to the TIS Adjutant when reporting for relief from tour of duty.

5. After the security inspection officer submits his report, he will be relieved by the OD, and will then dismiss his enlisted detail. The exact time of relief by the OD will be entered in the Guard Book.

6. Chiefs of divisions to be contacted in compliance with par 3 above are: Military History Section, Public Safety Division, Geographic Branch, G2 Fiscal, Psychological Warfare Section and Targets Branch. Senior duty officer of TIS, MIS Div and CI Div will be contacted for compliance with par 3 as pertains to their divisions.

7. TIS Adjutant will maintain a roster for the Security Officer and CO, Troop Detachment will maintain the enlisted roster.

8. The security inspection officer will report to the TIS Adjutant's office for instructions not later than one-half (1/2) hour before the close of duty each day. In the event the Adjutant's office is closed,

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Page 8 of 8 Pages

security instructions and pass key may be obtained from the DAC typist on duty in Room 215.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL SVENSSON:

A. S. AUGUSTAUSKAS
Major Inf
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

A. S. Augustauskas

A. S. AUGUSTAUSKAS
Maj Inf
Adjutant

2 Appendices:

- A - Sample 1 - Japanese Visitors' Register
- Sample 2 - Temporary Guest Pass
- Sample 3 - Semi-permanent Visitor & TIS Employee Pass
- Sample 4 - NYK Japanese & Foreign National Civilian Pass

B - Log Book

APPENDIX "A"

SAMPLE 3 - SEMI-PERMANENT VISITOR & TIS EMPLOYEE PASS

(Facsimile)

JAPANESE & FOREIGN NATIONAL
 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE PASS
 NYK BLDG., TOKYO
 EXPIRES: 31 Jan 1950

TIS

(NAME)
 is an authorized employee of the _____
 Section

TIS, GHQ, FEC, APO 500

(Chief, Civilian Personnel Section)
 TIS Form No. 50 (Rev.) 6 Jan 48

SAMPLE 4 - NYK JAPANESE & FOREIGN NAT'L CIVILIAN PASS

(Facsimile)

JAPANESE & FOREIGN NATIONAL
 CIVILIAN PASS
 NYK BLDG., TOKYO

Photo

(NAME)
 is an authorized (employee)-
 (official visitor) of the _____
 Section

NYK Bldg

Chief, TIS Civilian Personnel Section

APPENDIX "A"

TIS STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 40-3

23 July 1951

SAMPLE 1 - JAPANESE VISITORS REGISTER

Date: 23 February 1950

<u>Pass No.</u>	<u>Guest's Name</u>	<u>Signature of Host</u>	<u>Time In</u>	<u>Time Out</u>	<u>Initials of Host</u>
1.	Mr. S. Matsumoto	Capt. Tom K. Jones	0800	0830	T.K.J.
2.	Mr. R. Suzuki	Lt. John A. Smith	0815	0845	J.A.S.
3.	Miss G. Aoki	Richard Carlton, DAC	0910	0925	R.C.
4.	Mrs. No. Mori	Sgt. Sam T. Doe	0920	1005	S.T.D.

SAMPLE 2 - GUEST PASS

GUEST PASS - # _____

Date: _____ Time In: _____ Time Out: _____

I ACCEPT ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR _____ WHILE HE/SHE IS IN THE NYK BUILDING.

POSSESSION OF * _____ PACKAGES IS/IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

* CONTENTS: _____ Incoming: _____ (Host's Signature)

TIS Form No. 4 (Rev) _____ Outgoing: _____ (Host's Signature)

6 Jan 50

APPENDIX "B"

TIS STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 40-3

23 July 1951

INCIDENT LOG BOOK

Date: 10 April 1950

- 0900----- Contractor T. Sato entered through Sv. Entrance to visit Japanese Building Manager; issued visitor's badge #67.
- 0915----- Room Maid, badge #431, observed carrying package in hallway near Post #4; was stopped, searched and the following American goods found on her person:
- 3 bars of candy
1 package of cigarettes
- 0930----- Mr. Tanaka entered Sv. Entrance to visit Lt Johnson. Issued badge #43.
- 1000----- Employee, (Suzuki, Fusao) badge #46, leaving building; searched. Found following items of American goods:
- 3 packages of cigarettes
1 pair military trousers
- Guard was informed. Guard called Corporal of Guard who took offender into custody.
- 1015----- Japanese visitor requested entrance to visit Japanese employee in basement. Refused permission.
- 1020----- Japanese visitor requested permission to visit Maj Doe, Translation Section. Visitor told to enter by main (North) entrance.
- 1040----- Contractor T. Sato, visitor's badge #67, departed.

APPENDIX "B"

14 Aug 50

Col Pulliam:

Maj. Maykovick telephoned information that G-2 has issued clearance on yourself as indicated in par 5 of attached Office Memo.

Also stated will distribute clearance certificates to PSD as soon as G-2 receives the forms.

GTS

↙
Capt. Milstead:

1. Keep prodding G-2 Admin for these forms.
2. If you will give me a list by name, roster of personnel by branches will be OK, I will list what each person will be cleared for in advance of blank forms.

HEP

Restricted

PSD

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 380.01 (7 Aug 50)GB

APO 500
10 August 1950

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NO.....43)

(SCAP & FEC)

MILITARY SECURITY

1. a. Rescission. Paragraph 2b and e, Staff Memorandum 20, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, 1950.

b. Reference. Special Regulations 380-160-1, 17 July 1950.

2. The attention of chiefs of staff sections is invited to the GENERAL CRITERIA, paragraph 10 of referenced regulations, established to protect classified material or information.

3. Authority to clear personnel for access to TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL material and information is hereby delegated to chiefs of all staff sections who may further delegate this authority, as provided in paragraph 8 of referenced regulations, to chiefs of subdivisions or commanders of units under their operational control.


4. Pertinent data contained in the official civilian personnel folder, military 201 file, and DA AGO Form 20 or WD AGO Form 66 will be used in preparing the certificates required by paragraph 7 of referenced regulations. Requests to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for requisite information should be made only if the desired information cannot be obtained from the above sources. In addition to the copies prepared for distribution as listed in the referenced regulations, one copy of the executed final certificate, or any subsequent revocation, will be prepared and forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for information.

5. The provisions of this directive will be fully implemented not later than 12 September 1950.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

EDWARD M. ALMOND,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:



K. B. BUSH,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

Restricted

Restricted

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO-500

19

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the following-named individual has been cleared
* (under the provisions of SR 380-160-1) (under Department of the Army Policy)
for access to classified material and information as indicated below:

_____	_____
(Full Name)	(Military rank or civilian grade)
_____	_____
(Civilian job title)	(Army serial number or social security number)
_____	_____
(Birthplace)	(Date of birth)
_____	_____
(Date of completion of investigation)	(Type of investigation conducted)
_____	_____
(Agency or command which conducted investigation)	(Location of investigative file)
_____	_____
(Date clearance granted)	(Highest classification to which access is authorized)

	(Signature of certifying officer)

	(Rank) _____ (ASN)

Distribution:

* Strike out inapplicable phrase. The latter phrase is to be used in the case of clearances granted under DA policy in effect prior to 12 September 1950.

Restricted

PSD personnel cleared by the Director, PSD to have access to the following classified material:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Cleared for:</u>
<u>Executive Office:</u>	
Miss Sara Morimoto	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Lt Col George F. Spiegel	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Captain Ezekiel B. Russell	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
<u>Liaison Officers:</u>	
Captain Raymond C. Graves	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
1st Lt Eugene H. Hattori	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
<u>Administrative Branch:</u>	
Captain Earl L. Milstead	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Sgt Glen A. Barrineau	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Cpl Charles E. Andes	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Pfc Mickey W. Coskey	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Pfc Frank W. Osman	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Pvt Roger A. Albright	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Mr Peter J. Blamey	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Mr Masao Fukunaga	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Mr Shingo G. Kinoshita	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Mr Ralph M. Mori	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
<u>Fire Branch:</u>	
Mr George W. Angell	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Mr Franklin C. Ankrom	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
<u>Police Branch:</u>	
Mr Harold F. Mulbar	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret
Lt Col Roland P. Desonier	() Confidential () Secret () T. Secret

Police Branch: (cont'd)

Mr	Byron Engle	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	William G. Fritz	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Paul E. Harrison	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Johnson F. Munroe	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Joe B. C. Williams	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Edward R. Bishop	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Philip F. Cheles	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Virgil D. Kilgore	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Dermot M. O'Neill	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Harry Shupak	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Dale Phillips	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Miss	Sophia Dolinar	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret

Statistical & Analysis Branch:

Dr	William G. Piersel	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Edward M. Ruttkay	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mrs	E. Y. Konishi	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Miss	Lois Washburn	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret

Maritime Branch:

Mr	Gilbert H. Rettew	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Orvil L. Driver	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Robert B. Janus	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Major	Robert M. Lantz	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Frej L. Sabel	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Miss	Geneva L. Irvine	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret

Prison Branch:

Dr	Burdett G. Lewis	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Lt Col	William A. Drowns	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Major	Charles O. Reed	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Mr	Ernie L. Maxwell	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
1st Lt	George W. Cornelius	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret
Miss	Dorothea Hanabury	()Confidential ()Secret ()T. Secret

Restricted
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

11 August 1950

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)
:
NUMBER 43)

MILITARY SECURITY

- 1. Reference : a. SR 380-160-1, 17 July 50.
b. Staff Memorandum 43, GHQ SCAP & FEC, 10 Aug 50.

2. In accordance with paragraph 2, SM 43, authority is hereby delegated to the following individuals to clear personnel for access to TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL material and execute certificates for military and civilian personnel in G-2, CIS, and affiliates:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CLEARs</u>
a. Deputy G-2	Directors of G-2 Sub-Divs, COs, and personnel asgd to Exec Gp.
b. Dir, Theater/Intel Div	Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel
c. Dir, CI Div	Personnel asgd to CI Div
d. Dir, MIS Div	Personnel asgd to MIS Div, Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.
e. CO, TIS	Personnel asgd to TIS
f. CO, 441 CIC Det	Personnel asgd to 441 CIC Det and 319th MI Co
g. Dir, PSD	Personnel asgd to PSD

3. All certificates will be prepared and signed in quadruplicate on forms being procured by G-2, which will be distributed upon receipt.

NO
1-copy to PSD file
1-G-2 file
1-G-2/D/A

4. (All) completed certificates will be sent to the G-2 Message Center for distribution. Certificates will be marked for distribution to all agencies listed in SR 380-160-1 and in addition, one copy for G-2, GHQ.

- a. Deputy G-2
- b. Dir, Theater/Intel Div
- c. Dir, CI Div
- d. Dir, MIS Div
- e. CO, TIS
- f. CO, 441 CIC Det
- g. Dir, PSD

Directors of G-2 Sub-Divs, COs,
and personnel asgd to Exec Gp.

Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel

Personnel asgd to CI Div

Personnel asgd to MIS Div,
Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.

Personnel asgd to TIS

Personnel asgd to 441 CIC Det
and 319th MI Co

Personnel asgd to PSD

3. All certificates will be prepared and signed in quadruplicate on forms being procured by G-2, which will be distributed upon receipt.

4. All completed certificates will be sent to the G-2 Message Center for distribution. Certificates will be marked for distribution to all agencies listed in SR 380-160-1 and in addition, one copy for G-2, GHQ.

5. Prior to implementation of delegated authority in par 2 above, G-2 will issue clearance certificates on the individuals to whom such authority is delegated.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Washington M. Ives, Jr.

WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
Colonel, GSC
Executive

Cap & Melstons

1. Note.

2. I want to see all certificates when completed before forwarding to G-2 Adm.

HEP

NO
1-copy to PSD
1-G-2 file
1-G-2 D/A
1-AG Army

PSD
10

Restricted
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

11 August 1950

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)
:
NUMBER 43)

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<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CLEARs</u>
a. Deputy G-2	Directors of G-2 Sub-Divs, COs, and personnel asgd to Exec Gp.
b. Dir, Theater/Intel Div	Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel
c. Dir, CI Div	Personnel asgd to CI Div
d. Dir, MIS Div	Personnel asgd to MIS Div, Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.
e. CO, TIS	Personnel asgd to TIS
f. CO, 441 CIC Det	Personnel asgd to 441 CIC Det and 319th MI Co
g. Dir, PSD	Personnel asgd to PSD

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b. Dir, Theater/Intel Div

c. Dir, CI Div

d. Dir, MIS Div

e. CO, TIS

f. CO, 441 CIC Det

g. Dir, PSD

and personnel asgd to Exec Gp.

Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel

Personnel asgd to CI Div

Personnel asgd to MIS Div,
Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.

Personnel asgd to TIS

Personnel asgd to 441 CIC Det
and 319th MI Co

Personnel asgd to PSD

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5. Prior to implementation of delegated authority in par 2 above, G-2 will issue clearance certificates on the individuals to whom such authority is delegated.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Washington M. Ives, Jr.

WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.

Colonel, GSC

Executive

Restricted

Restricted
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

11 August 1950

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)
 :
NUMBER 43)

MILITARY SECURITY

1. Reference : a. SR 380-160-1, 17 July 50.
 b. Staff Memorandum 43, GHQ SCAP & FEC, 10 Aug 50.

2. In accordance with paragraph 2, SM 43, authority is hereby delegated to the following individuals to clear personnel for access to TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL material and execute certificates for military and civilian personnel in G-2, CIS, and affiliates:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CLEARs</u>
a. Deputy G-2	Directors of G-2 Sub-Divs, COs, and personnel asgd to Exec Gp.
b. Dir, Theater/Intel Div	Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel
c. Dir, CI Div	Personnel asgd to CI Div
d. Dir, MIS Div	Personnel asgd to MIS Div, Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.
e. CO, TIS	Personnel asgd to TIS
f. CO, 441 CIC Det	Personnel asgd to 441 CIC Det and 319th MI Co
g. Dir, PSD	Personnel asgd to PSD

3. All certificates will be prepared and signed in quadruplicate on forms being procured by G-2, which will be distributed upon receipt.

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| d. Dir, MIS Div | Personnel asgd to MIS Div,
Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div. |
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For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Washington M. Ives, Jr.

WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
Colonel, GSC
Executive

Restricted

Restricted
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

11 August 1950

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)
 :
NUMBER 43)

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and personnel asgd to Exec Cp.

Personnel asgd to Theater/Intel

c. Dir, CI Div

Personnel asgd to CI Div

d. Dir, MIS Div

Personnel asgd to MIS Div,
Sp Projects, TID, Hist Div.

e. CO, TIS

Personnel asgd to TIS

f. CO, 441 CIC Det

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Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

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WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
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Executive

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FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

11 August 1950

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1987.5

G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

MISD/TNS/ac

File No: _____ **Subject:** NYK Bldg Security **Date:** 10 Jul 51

FROM: MIS Div	TO: Geo Br CI Div Targets Br JSOB PSD	PHONE: 26-8459 NAME: Maj Augustauskas	Comment Number 1
----------------------	--	--	--------------------------------

1. It is requested that names of all company grade officers assigned to your section and on duty in the NYK Bldg be reported to this office for inclusion on the NYK Bldg Security Officer Roster.
2. This duty consists of witnessing the destruction of classified waste at 1645 to 1700 hours and making a security check of all offices on the first through fifth floors commencing at 1730 hours daily.
3. The duty roster is maintained by the ATIS Adjutant who will furnish the schedule to your section in sufficient time to incorporate this duty into any extra duty schedule provided for by your section. ATIS Adjutant will furnish necessary instructions to security officers for the performance of this detail.
4. It is requested that names be submitted not later than 12 Jul 51 and that changes be reported as they occur in the future.

PSD FILE COPY
GIS/PSD/HM/df

-----T. N. S.-----

FROM: PSD	TO: MIS Div	GIS/PSD/HM/df PHONE: 26-5915 NAME: Mr. Mulbar DATE: 12 July 51
------------------	--------------------	---

In compliance with above the following is a list of company grade officers assigned PSD: 2

- Captain E. B. Russell
- 1st Lt. E. H. Hattori

-----H. M.-----

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3637 PSD
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Confidential
G2, GHC
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
(For use within G2 only)

File No:	Subject: Security	Date: 15 June 1951
FROM: G2	TO: Ex Group Theater/Int CI Div MIS Div PSD JSOB 441st CIC 442d CIC	Geog Br Historical J/L Fn Ln TIS TID Spec Projects
	Phone: 26-6168	Comment
	Name: Col Ives/jp	Number

1. The need for constant vigilance and watchfulness in all aspects of security continues to be of paramount importance in this critical period.
2. The CinC has expressed concern over the security of communications, with particular emphasis on the proper handling of Top Secret matter, as shown in the following extract from the Staff Briefing of 12 Jun: "The CinC discussed the security of communications and said that he expected heads of General Staff sections to pass on to the administrative and technical services under their general staff supervision the necessity for vigorous and continuing supervision over the control of Top Secret documents."
3. Chiefs of all sub-sections, G2, will cause all personnel under their jurisdiction to review and become thoroughly familiar with all provisions of AR 380-5 and will emphasize the necessity for vigorous and continuing supervision over the control of Top Secret documents.
4. In conformity with the above, and in an effort to tighten up and improve all security measures, Chiefs of sub-sections will direct an immediate and thorough security inspection of their respective installations, to be made by their duly appointed security officer, and submit a report thereof to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, by 1 July 1951.
5. In reporting the results of this security inspection, the attached form can be used.

1

1 Incl:
Cy Certificate of
Inspection Form

R. F. E.

Confidential

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DO NOT DETACH
G2 GHQ FEC

8 June 1951

SUBJECT: Cleaning of G2 Offices on the 5th Floor of the Dai Ichi Bldg

FROM: G2 Admin

TO: PSD

- | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| * C of S, G-2 _____ () | Theater Intelligence Div _____ () |
| Deputy _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Secretariat _____ () | PDM _____ () |
| Deputy for Adm _____ () | Fm Mil Ln _____ () |
| Ex Adm _____ () | Plans & Estimates _____ () |
| Ex MIS Div _____ () | Special Intel _____ () |
| Ex CI Div _____ () | Geog Branch _____ () |
| Ex T/Intell _____ () | CI Division _____ () |
| Sp Asst MIS Div _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Sp Asst 441st CIC _____ () | Coll & Pub _____ () |
| Sp Asst Fiscal _____ () | 441st CIC _____ () |
| Sp Asst Radio _____ () | JSOB _____ () |
| Sp Asst Historical _____ () | SIA _____ () |
| Sp Asst PSE _____ () | MIS Division _____ () |
| Sp Asst JSOB _____ () | ATIS _____ () |
| Admin Officer _____ () | TID _____ () |
| Personnel (Mil) (Civ) _____ () | Special Projects _____ () |
| Jap Liaison _____ () | Historical Division _____ () |
| _____ () | Public Safety Branch _____ (/) |

Info _____ (/)	Approval _____ ()	Signature _____ ()	Draft Reply _____ ()
Action _____ ()	Concur _____ ()	Initials _____ ()	Info for Reply _____ ()
File _____ ()	Comment _____ ()	Dispatch _____ ()	Brief _____ ()

DATE ALL COMMENTS

311.5

CAPT CORNELIUS - PSD

G2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
(For use within G2 only)

File No: _____
Subject: Cleaning of G2 offices on the 5th Floor of the Dai Ichi Bldg Date: 7 Jun 51

From: Deputy for Admin To: All G2 Jr Dy Officers Phone: 26-6168
Name: Col Ives/jp Comment Number

1. Effective 8 June 1951, all G2 offices on the 5th floor of the Dai Ichi Bldg will be cleaned beginning at 2100. The Junior Duty Officer will accompany the cleaning detail until cleaning has been completed. At the completion of the cleaning of the offices the Junior Duty Officer will insure that all windows, safes and doors are locked. 1

2. It has been noticed by officers of the G2 Ex Group, that someone is tampering with the desks and filing cabinets after duty hours. It is the responsibility of the G2 Junior Duty Officer to insure that no personnel, except those authorized, will enter any offices on the 5th floor and that no unauthorized personnel will be allowed to tamper with desks and filing cabinets. Personnel not assigned to the G2 Ex Group will be kept from going into any office unless authorized by the Junior Duty Officer.

W. M. I.

----- W. M. I. -----

Restricted

PSD
FILES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do Not Remove From Attached Sheets)

Colonel Ives
26-6168

File No: _____ Subject: Pass System for GHQ War Room

From: G2 To: All Staff Sections Date: 11 June 1951
GHQ, SCAP, FEC & UNC

Note
No.
1

1. Reference Check Sheet from Chief of Staff (ROK) to all Staff Sections, subject as above, dated 2 July 1950.

2. Since establishing the present pass system on 3 July 1950, Staff Sections have requested large numbers of passes to the GHQ War Room. Many of these passes are believed to be in the hands of personnel who are no longer assigned to this Headquarters or whose official duties may not actually require passes.

3. G2 plans to issue new passes which will become effective 15 July 1951.

4 a. Staff Sections are requested to submit prior to 20 June 1951 a Check Sheet listing the names, rank, service number, and branch of personnel for whom passes are desired. G2 will prepare the passes and return them to the requesting Section together with consolidated receipts to be signed by the pass holders.

b. Subsequent to 15 July 1951, G2 will issue passes only upon receipt of a Check Sheet from the Section concerned.

4. Section Chiefs are requested to insure that the issuance of passes within the Section be held to a minimum on a "need to know" basis and that passes be returned when the bearer's official duties no longer necessitate the use of the pass.

[Signature]
for R.F.E.

Restricted

311.5

SECRET

G-2, GHQ

PSD FILES

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Revision of Internal Factors as Security

Problems for Occupation Forces Date:

File No:

Subject:

FROM: CI Div

TO: Research Branch
PSD
JSO

PHONE: 26-5655

NAME: Lt Col Bochnowski

Comment Number
1

1. For your information the following plate numbers have been assigned for the revision, subject above:

- Plate 1 Official Organization of JCP Central Headquarters
- Plate 2 Regional Divisions of JCP
- Plate 3 Japanese Labor Unions
- Plate 4 Location of Korean Nationals by Prefectures as of 15 May 51
- Plate 5 Organization Chart of Union of Greater Korean Republic in Japan
- Plate 6 Major Korean Organization in Japan
- Plate 7 Comparison of Korean Nationals and Law Enforcement Agencies by Prefectures
- Plate 8 Reported Korean Guerrilla Corps Strength by Prefectures
- Plate 9 Distribution of Foreign Nationals by Prefectures in Japan
- Plate 10 Distribution of Foreign Nationals in Tokyo-to
- Plate 11 Labor Unions under Communist Influence
- Plate 12 Relationship of Japanese Youth and Student Organizations with the Cominform and Japan Communist Party
- Plate 13 Ratio between Demobilized Military Personnel and Population by Prefecture
- Plate 14 Analysis of Population, Military and Japanese Police
- Plate 15 Distribution of CIC, MP and CAS Detachments in Japan
- Plate 16 Ratio of Japanese Police to Population
- Plate 17 Distribution of Police Stations
- Plate 18 Crimes 1924-1950
- Plate 19 Criminal Code Arrests by Nationality 1947-50
- Plate 20 Various Crimes as Percentage 1947-50
- Plate 21 Offenses Against the Occupation

PSD Copy

----- E. C. E. -----

J.S.O. 4 1 24

22. 4. 17

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SECRET

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

20

20729

SECRET
G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** GHQ Courier Flights to Korea **Date:** 25 April 1951

FROM: G2 Admin	TO: Exec Gp T/Intel CI Div MIS Div Hist Sec JSOB PSD J/L	PHONE: NAME:	Comment Number
-----------------------	--	-------------------------------	-----------------------

For your information.

1

1 Incl:
C/N 1 Fr Trans O, to CofS Sec,
subj as abv, dtd 19 Apr 51.

----- *W. M. I.* -----

PSD

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SECRET

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

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SECRET

COPY

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND**

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Lt Col Grace
20-7265

File No:

Subject: **GHQ Courier Flights to Korea**

Note
No.

From: **Trans O**

To: **Chiefs of Staff Sections
GHQ, SCAP & FSC**

Date: **19 April 1961**

1.

1. Effective immediately the reporting time for passengers traveling on the GHQ Courier flights to Korea is reduced to one hour prior to the scheduled departure of the flight.

2. It is requested that personnel traveling on these flights report promptly at the appointed hours.

-----/s/ H. T. H.-----

SECRET

COPY

G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No:	Subject: PSD Security Officer	Date: ^{CIS/PSD/HM/sm} 25 April 1951	Comment Number
FROM: PSD	TO: G-2 Admin	PHONE: 26-5915 NAME: Mr. Mulbar	

1. Reference MIS, G-2, FEC, Office Memorandum No. 33, dtd 30 Jun 50. 1
2. Request that Earl L. Milstead, Capt, Inf, be deleted and that Ezekiel B. Russell, Capt, FA, O-1167607, be added.

-----H. M.-----

PSD File Copy *EM* CIS/PSD/HM/sm

311-5

10360
PSD
FILES

G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
(For use within G-2 only)

SUBJECT: Security Violations of DATE:
13 April 1951 14 April 51

File No:

FROM: MIS Div

TO: PSD

PHONE:
NAME:

Comment
Number

1. Forwarded as a matter pertaining to your division are the security violations found by the NYK Security detail.

1

1 Incl:
TIS Form #99

CGP
fr T.N.S.

311.5

10360

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SERVICE

Date 13 A

SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT

Room No.	Section	Window Open	Door Unlocked	Lights On	Fan On	Radiator On	Safe Open	Classfd Waste Not Destroyed	Classfd Matter Not Locked	Cabinet Unlocked	Remarks
405	PSD								x		Confidential in desk of by security security in Material to Milstead, 1755.

* Under "Remarks" enter action taken.

TIS Form No. 99
 29 Sept 1949

A. S. AUGUST
 Signature
 Security
 A. S. AUGUST
 Major,

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SERVICE

Date 13 April 1951

SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT

Unlocked	Lights On	Fan On	Radiator On	Safe Open	Clasfd Waste Not Destroyed	Clasfd Matter Not Locked	Cabinet Unlocked			*Remarks
						X				Confidential material found in desk of Lt Col De Donier by security officer during security inspection 13 Apr 51. Material turned over to Capt. Milstead, PSD Duty Officer at 1755.

action taken.

A. S. Augustauskas
 Signature and Rank
 Security ~~Inspection~~ Officer
 A. S. AUGUSTAUSKAS
 Major, Infantry

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APC 500
14 April 1951

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Safeguarding Military Information

TO : All Personnel, PSD

1. Your attention is invited to AR 380-5 governing handling of classified material.
2. General Information:
 - a. All classified material above restricted must be kept in a safe or locked cabinet.
 - b. The keys to safe, locked cabinets or drawers should not be left where they can be found.
 - c. A security team of one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted men make an inspection of the rooms in the building at the close of each day. This team is also supposed to check each desk for classified material. Therefore, your key is not safe in your desk.
 - d. All classified material above restricted should be returned to the Administrative Office during the noon hour and at the close of each day.

For the Chief of Division:

E L M
E. L. MILSTEAD
Captain, Inf
Administrative Officer

311.5

file

RESTRICTED

G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

PSD
FILES
0409

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Discussion of Atomic Weapons Data **Date:** 10 April 1951

FROM: G2 Admin	TO: G-2 Group Theater/Intel CI Div JSOB MIS Div PSD Historical J/L	PHONE: 26-6169 NAME: Captain M.H. Crank/jp	Comment Number
-----------------------	---	---	-----------------------

For information and necessary action.

1 Incl
C/S fr Cofs to All Staff Sections,
Subject: as above, dated 6 April 51.

[Signature]
W.M.I.

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PSD

RESTRICTED

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

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Discussion of Atomic Weapons Data

CofS

All Staff Sections
GHQ, FEC and SCAP

6 Apr 51

1 The following DA directive (DA 87686 DTG 015750Z Apr 51) is quoted for compliance:

"1. During the course of the espionage trial in New York City (US versus Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, Morton Sobell and Anatoli Yakovlev) which began about 6 Mar 51, certain tech info concerning atomic wpns may have been disclosed in the court room. This info may concern certain aspects of the Los Alamos Prog during 1944 and 1945.

"2. Great care should be exercised to avoid confirmation, denial, supplementing of, or elaboration on the tech info which may have been revealed in the court room. So long as all those who have had access to info involved, restrict their discussion to non technical matters, there is little likelihood that the National Security will be adversely affected.

"3. It is desired that the above statement be brought to the attn of key pers in your comd who are associated with the Atomic Energy Program."

/s/D. O. H.

D. O. H.

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DO NOT DETACH
G-2 GHQ FEC

MAR 26 1951 1951

SUBJECT: *Importation of Foreign made Radar Equipment for*
Navigational Purposes
FROM: **G-2 ADMIN**
TO:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| AC of S, G-2 _____ () | Theater Intelligence Div _____ () |
| Deputy _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Secretariat _____ () | PDM _____ () |
| ADC _____ () | Fm Mil In _____ () |
| Deputy for Adm _____ () | Plans & Estimates _____ () |
| Ex Adm _____ () | Special Intel _____ () |
| Ex MIS Div _____ () | Geog Branch _____ () |
| Ex CI Div _____ () | CI Division _____ () |
| Ex T/ Intel _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Sp Asst MIS Div _____ () | Coll & Pub _____ () |
| Sp Asst 411st CIC Det _____ () | 441st CIC _____ () |
| Sp Asst Fiscal _____ () | JSOB _____ () |
| Sp Asst Radio _____ () | MIS Division _____ () |
| Sp Asst Historical _____ () | ATIS _____ () |
| Sp Asst PSB _____ () | TID _____ () |
| Sp Asst JSOB _____ () | Special Projects _____ () |
| Admin Officer _____ () | Historical Division _____ () |
| Personnel (Mil) (Civ) _____ () | Public Safety Branch _____ (<u>2</u>) |
| Jap Liaison _____ () | |

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| Info _____ (<u>2</u>) | Approval _____ () | Signature _____ () | Draft Reply _____ () |
| Action _____ () | Concur _____ () | Initials _____ () | Info for Reply _____ () |
| File _____ (<u>2</u>) | Comment _____ () | Dispatch _____ () | Brief _____ () |

DATE ALL COMMENTS

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Communications Section**

8 February 1951

**SUBJECT: Importation of Foreign Made Radar Equipment for
Navigational Purposes**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

1. In accordance with instruction of Director of Telecommunications Affairs, information on the number and types of foreign made radar equipment imported into Japan, since the importation relaxation of this equipment in January 1950, was obtained from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The MITI reports that a total of 96 sets of foreign type radar equipment amounting to approximately \$1,028,400 has been approved for import as of 31 January 1951. Eighty-six sets have been reported for use by the Japanese and 10 sets for installation on ships that have been exported. The types of sets that have been imported are those manufactured in the United States and England. The following manufacturers have supplied the indicated number of sets at prices listed below:

<u>Manufacturers</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>
Sperry (USA)	38 sets	\$12,000
RCA (USA)		
Console	4 sets	12,000
Junior	14 sets	6,000
Raytheon (USA)	8 sets	12,000
Westinghouse (USA)	16 sets	12,000
Kelvin-Hughes (England)	3 sets	9,000
Cossor (England)	13 sets	9,000

2. The radar sets that have been imported for use in Japan for navigational purposes are being utilized by the National Rural Police, the Marine Safety Agency, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The sets that have been imported for ships scheduled for exports were for installation in oil tankers which were exported to Brazil.

3. The current proposal being established by the Japanese for the importation of foreign made radar equipment for the coming year will amount to approximately 150 sets of equipment similar to the types that were imported during 1950.

**H. T. MASUOKA
Procurement & Liaison Specialist**

NOTED:

**H. R. CHERRIGAN
Acting Director, Telecom Affairs**

**COL. R. N. KUNE
Assistant Chief, CCS**

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 413.684 (18 Jan 50) CCS
SCAPIN 2075

18 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Radar Policy

1. Radar is permitted to the Japanese as a mechanical aid to navigation and where only commercial applications are involved. Radar is prohibited as a military device or as an adjunct to a military device.

2. The following activities in this field are considered in the permitted category:

a. Research, development, design, manufacture, importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of:

- (1) Radio equipment to operate in any part of the frequency spectrum allocated for such purposes and utilizing pulse, frequency, amplitude or other form of modulation, for communications purposes.
- (2) Electronic equipment employing frequencies in any part of the spectrum allocated for such purposes, for industrial applications such as heating, killing of silkworms, chemical analysis, etc.
- (3) Ionospheric measuring and other radio propagation measuring equipment utilizing the pulsed radio principle.
- (4) Crude forms of pulse operated devices for meteorological purposes not employing a motor driven rotating antenna or plan position indicator.

b. Importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of:

- (1) Foreign made radar required for marine navigational use.

3. The following activities in the field are considered in the prohibited category:

a. Research, development, design and manufacture of any form

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AG 413.684 (18 Jan 50)CCS
SCAPIN 2075

of radar and the importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of radar intended for fire control, fighter director and air search and including radar employing altitude determining features, rapid position calculating devices for directing fire power and such features which permit radar to be used in aircraft.

4. The uses of radar as outlined in 2a and b above are subject to the provisions of SCAPIN 1744 as amended.

5. Direct communication in furtherance of this matter is authorized the Japanese Government with Civil Communications Section, and other interested staff sections, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

K. B. Bush

K. B. BUSH,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
28 March 1951

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I certify that I have read and understand AR 380-5 dated 15 November 1949, with change 1, 14 July 1950, and change 2, dated 22 November 1950. (Subject: "Safeguarding Military Information"):

OFFICERS:

- Lt Col R. P. Desonier
- Lt Col W. A. Downs
- Lt Col R. M. Lantz
- Lt Col C. O. Reed
- Lt Col G. F. Spiegel
- Capt G. W. Cornelius
- Capt ~~R. G. Graves~~
- Capt E. L. Milstead
- Capt E. B. Russell
- 1st Lt E. H. Hattori

R.P.D.
W.A.D.
R.M.L.
C.O.R.
G.F.S.
G.W.C.
G-2 Adm.
E.L.M.
E.B.R.
E.H.H.

CIVILIANS: (cont'd)

- Mr. R. Mori
- Miss S. Morimoto
- Mr. H. F. Mulbar
- Mr. J. F. Munroe
- Mr. D. M. O'Neill
- Mr. D. A. Phillips
- Dr. W. G. Piersel
- Mr. G. H. Rettew
- Mrs G. L. Rogers
- Mr. F. L. Sabel
- Mr. H. Shupak
- Mr. G. B. Stahly
- Miss L. Washburn

R.M.M.
S.M.
H.F.M.
J.F.M.
D.M.O.
D.A.P.
W.G.P.
G.H.R.
G.L.R.
F.L.S.
H.S.
G.B.S.
L.W.

L.V. 115

ENLISTED MEN:

- Sgt G. A. Barrineau
- Cpl C. E. Andes
- Cpl M. W. Coskey
- Cpl F. W. Osman
- Pfc R. A. Albright

G.A.B.
C.E.A.
M.W.C.
F.W.O.
R.A.A.

CIVILIANS:

- Mr. G. W. Angell
- Mr. F. C. Ankrom
- Mr. E. R. Bishop
- Mr. P. J. Blamey
- Mr. P. F. Cheles
- Miss S. J. Dolinar
- Mr. O. L. Driver
- Mr. M. Fukunaga
- Mr. P. E. Harrison
- Mr. R. B. Janus
- Mr. V. D. Kilgore
- Mrs E. Y. Konishi
- Dr. B. G. Lewis
- Mr. E. L. Maxwell

G.W.A.
F.C.A.
E.R.B.
P.J.B.
P.F.C.
S.J.D.
O.L.D.
M.F.
P.E.H.
R.B.J.
V.D.K.
E.Y.K.
B.G.L.
E.L.M.

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G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

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File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2

To: Ex Gp
Theater Intel
CI Division
JSO Division
ATIS
TID
Public Safety
MIS Div
Mil Historical
Jap Ln
441st CIC Det
442d CIC Det

Phone: 26-5749
Name: Mr Carusi

Comment
Number
1

1. The attached report, "The Case of SFC Ernest Martin," is forwarded for your information. This report should serve as an object lesson, deterrent, and warning of the consequences attendant on the mishandling of classified material to those individuals whose proclivities and inclinations tend towards such security violations.

2. It will be brought to the attention of every individual within your section.

1 Incl
Rept a/s

C. A. W.

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Capt E. L. Milstead	<u><i>ELM</i></u>
Sgt G. A. Barrineau	<u><i>GB</i></u>
Cpl C. E. Andes	<u><i>CEA</i></u>
Cpl M. W. Coskey	<u><i>MC</i></u>
Cpl F. W. Osman	<u><i>FWO</i></u>
Pfc R. A. Albright	<u><i>RAA</i></u>
Mr. P. J. Blamey	<u><i>PJB</i></u>

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The Case of SFC Ernest Martin, a Former CIC Agent

1. SFC Ernest Martin, a former CIC Agent, was employed with Joint Special Operations Branch, G-2, GHQ, as a typist from 26 September 1949 to 1 December 1950. His duties included typing reports bearing SECRET and lower classification and exhibits destined for inclusion in TOP SECRET reports.

2. Late in July 1950, through pure accident and coincidence, one of the officers in JSOB discovered several classified documents in Martin's room concealed between pages of magazines.

3. Martin was placed under surveillance to discover:

- a. What disposition he intended making of the documents.
- b. The methods employed by him in obtaining the documents.

4. The surveillance continued until 5 November 1950, during which time it was discovered that Martin had acquired possession of a great variety of documents classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET AND TOP SECRET through the following sources:

a. Direct theft before documents were filed and still in the "in-coming" basket.

b. Typing of an unauthorized fourth copy instead of three copies as prescribed by JSOB SOP and retaining said fourth copy.

c. Unauthorized retention and theft of rough drafts of reports he typed and such other drafts of reports as he retrieved from classified waste baskets.

5. On 5 November 1950, Martin's room was searched. The search disclosed 24 documents, of which 13 were SECRET and 9 TOP SECRET. These were found secreted in a guitar case. A strong box was noticed in Martin's room at the time. This was locked and since Martin claimed to have lost the key, a fact later disproven, it was left undisturbed on the assurance by Martin that it contained no documents.

6. Martin was placed under administrative restriction and his movements closely watched.

7. On 28 November 1950, due to Martin's suspicious actions, it was decided to make a thorough search of Martin's personal effects. The strong box in his room was broken open and found to contain 145 documents. Of these 14 were TOP SECRET, 126 SECRET and 5 unclassified. A search of his wallet produced the combination of the office TOP SECRET safe.

8. Charges and specifications were prepared against Martin. This was an arduous task because the classification of the documents involved and the sensitivity of their contents precluded reference to them even by short title.

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9. Martin could well have been charged with violation of AW 96 in 170 counts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, felt however that stern justice tempered with mercy should be meted out to Martin if guilty. He was therefore charged with violation of the 96th AW in 25 specifications rather than 170 specifications. The specifications included:

- a. Theft of 10 documents (6 TOP SECRET and 4 SECRET).
- b. Wrongful and unauthorized possession of 23 documents (13 TOP SECRET and 10 SECRET).
- c. Unlawful possession and theft of the combination to TOP SECRET safe.

10. The trial lasted three days; was fraught with many obstacles and pitfalls; and was bitterly contested throughout by the Defense Counsel.

11. The Court deliberated for more than five hours before reaching its decision.

12. Martin was found guilty and sentenced to:

- a. Dishonorable Discharge
- b. Six years and four months penal servitude

(The "odd" 4 months represent the maximum penalty for unlawful possession and theft of the combination to the TOP SECRET safe charged in one of the specifications.)

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G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2	To: Ex Gp Theater Intel CI Division JSO Division ATIS TID Public Safety MIS Div Mil Historical Jap Ln 441st CIC Det 442d CIC Det	Phone: 26-5749 Name: Mr Carusi	Comment Number 1
-----------	---	-----------------------------------	----------------------------

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2. It will be brought to the attention of every individual within your section.

1 Incl
Rept a/s

E. A. W.

PRISON BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Dr. B. G. Lewis
Lt Col W. A. Drowns
Lt Col R. Desonier
Capt G. W. Cornelius
Lt C. F. Scott
Mr. E. L. Maxwell
Mr. G. B. Stahly
Miss D. Hanabury

B.G.L.
W.A.D.
R.D.
G.W.C.
C.F.S.
E.L.M.
G.B.S.
D.H.

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5. On 5 November 1950, Martin's room was searched. The search disclosed 24 documents, of which 13 were SECRET and 9 TOP SECRET. These were found secreted in a guitar case. A strong box was noticed in Martin's room at the time. This was locked and since Martin claimed to have lost the key, a fact later disproven, it was left undisturbed on the assurance by Martin that it contained no documents.

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8. Charges and specifications were prepared against Martin. This was an arduous task because the classification of the documents involved and the sensitivity of their contents precluded reference to them even by short title.

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9. Martin could well have been charged with violation of AW 96 in 170 counts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, felt however that stern justice tempered with mercy should be meted out to Martin if guilty. He was therefore charged with violation of the 96th AW in 25 specifications rather than 170 specifications. The specifications included:

- a. Theft of 10 documents (6 TOP SECRET and 4 SECRET).
- b. Wrongful and unauthorized possession of 23 documents (13 TOP SECRET and 10 SECRET).
- c. Unlawful possession and theft of the combination to TOP SECRET safe.

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11. The Court deliberated for more than five hours before reaching its decision.

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- b. Six years and four months penal servitude

(The "odd" 4 months represent the maximum penalty for unlawful possession and theft of the combination to the TOP SECRET safe charged in one of the specifications.)

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CONFIDENTIAL

G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2

To: Ex Gp
Theater Intel
CI Division
JSO Division
ATIS
TID
Public Safety
MIS Div
Mil Historical
Jap Ln
441st CIC Det
442d CIC Det

Phone: 26-5749
Name: Mr Carusi

Comment
Number
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Rept a/s

[Handwritten signature]
C. A. W.

S & A BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Dr. W. G. Piersel
Mrs. E. Y. Konishi
Miss L. Washburn

[Handwritten initials: WGP, EYK, LW]

[Handwritten number: 345]

CONFIDENTIAL

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2. Late in July 1950, through pure accident and coincidence, one of the officers in JSOB discovered several classified documents in Martin's room concealed between pages of magazines.
3. Martin was placed under surveillance to discover:
 - a. What disposition he intended making of the documents.
 - b. The methods employed by him in obtaining the documents.
4. The surveillance continued until 5 November 1950, during which time it was discovered that Martin had acquired possession of a great variety of documents classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET AND TOP SECRET through the following sources:
 - a. Direct theft before documents were filed and still in the "in-coming" basket.
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 - c. Unauthorized retention and theft of rough drafts of reports he typed and such other drafts of reports as he retrieved from classified waste baskets.
5. On 5 November 1950, Martin's room was searched. The search disclosed 24 documents, of which 13 were SECRET and 9 TOP SECRET. These were found secreted in a guitar case. A strong box was noticed in Martin's room at the time. This was locked and since Martin claimed to have lost the key, a fact later disproven, it was left undisturbed on the assurance by Martin that it contained no documents.
6. Martin was placed under administrative restriction and his movements closely watched.
7. On 28 November 1950, due to Martin's suspicious actions, it was decided to make a thorough search of Martin's personal effects. The strong box in his room was broken open and found to contain 145 documents. Of these 14 were TOP SECRET, 126 SECRET and 5 unclassified. A search of his wallet produced the combination of the office TOP SECRET safe.
8. Charges and specifications were prepared against Martin. This was an arduous task because the classification of the documents involved and the sensitivity of their contents precluded reference to them even by short title.

CONFIDENTIAL

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9. Martin could well have been charged with violation of AW 96 in 170 counts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, felt however that stern justice tempered with mercy should be meted out to Martin if guilty. He was therefore charged with violation of the 96th AW in 25 specifications rather than 170 specifications. The specifications included:

- a. Theft of 10 documents (6 TOP SECRET and 4 SECRET).
- b. Wrongful and unauthorized possession of 23 documents (13 TOP SECRET and 10 SECRET).
- c. Unlawful possession and theft of the combination to TOP SECRET safe.

10. The trial lasted three days; was fraught with many obstacles and pitfalls; and was bitterly contested throughout by the Defense Counsel.

11. The Court deliberated for more than five hours before reaching its decision.

12. Martin was found guilty and sentenced to:

- a. Dishonorable Discharge
- b. Six years and four months penal servitude

(The "odd" 4 months represent the maximum penalty for unlawful possession and theft of the combination to the TOP SECRET safe charged in one of the specifications.)

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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9. Martin could well have been charged with violation of AW 96 in 170 counts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, felt however that stern justice tempered with mercy should be meted out to Martin if guilty. He was therefore charged with violation of the 96th AW in 25 specifications rather than 170 specifications. The specifications included:

- a. Theft of 10 documents (6 TOP SECRET and 4 SECRET).
- b. Wrongful and unauthorized possession of 23 documents (13 TOP SECRET and 10 SECRET).
- c. Unlawful possession and theft of the combination to TOP SECRET safe.

10. The trial lasted three days; was fraught with many obstacles and pitfalls; and was bitterly contested throughout by the Defense Counsel.

11. The Court deliberated for more than five hours before reaching its decision.

12. Martin was found guilty and sentenced to:

- a. Dishonorable Discharge
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(The "odd" 4 months represent the maximum penalty for unlawful possession and theft of the combination to the TOP SECRET safe charged in one of the specifications.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. _____ Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2

To: Ex Gp
Theater Intel
CI Division
JSO Division
ATIS
TID
Public Safety
MIS Div
Mil Historical
Jap Ln
441st CIC Det
442d CIC Det

Phone: 26-5749
Name: Mr Carusi

Comment
Number

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2. It will be brought to the attention of every individual within your section.

1 Incl
Rept a/s

[Handwritten signature]
E. A. W.

POLICE BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Mr. J. F. Munroe	<u>J.F.M.</u>
Mr. D. Phillips	<u>D.P.</u>
Miss S. Dolinar	<u>S.D.</u>
Mr. E. R. Bishop	<u>E.R.B.</u>
Mr. D. M. O'Neil	<u>D.M.O.</u>
Mr. H. Shupak	<u>H.S.</u>
Mr. P. Cheles	<u>P.C.</u>
Mr. P. Harrison	<u>P.H.</u>
Mr. V. Kilgore	<u>V.K.</u>
Mrs. G. L. Rogers	<u>G.L.R.</u>
Mr. M. Fukunaga	<u>M.F.</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

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5. On 5 November 1950, Martin's room was searched. The search disclosed 24 documents, of which 13 were SECRET and 9 TOP SECRET. These were found secreted in a guitar case. A strong box was noticed in Martin's room at the time. This was locked and since Martin claimed to have lost the key, a fact later disproven, it was left undisturbed on the assurance by Martin that it contained no documents.

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7. On 28 November 1950, due to Martin's suspicious actions, it was decided to make a thorough search of Martin's personal effects. The strong box in his room was broken open and found to contain 145 documents. Of these 14 were TOP SECRET, 126 SECRET and 5 unclassified. A search of his wallet produced the combination of the office TOP SECRET safe.

8. Charges and specifications were prepared against Martin. This was an arduous task because the classification of the documents involved and the sensitivity of their contents precluded reference to them even by short title.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

9. Martin could well have been charged with violation of AW 96 in 170 counts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, felt however that stern justice tempered with mercy should be meted out to Martin if guilty. He was therefore charged with violation of the 96th AW in 25 specifications rather than 170 specifications. The specifications included:

- a. Theft of 10 documents (6 TOP SECRET and 4 SECRET).
- b. Wrongful and unauthorized possession of 23 documents (13 TOP SECRET and 10 SECRET).
- c. Unlawful possession and theft of the combination to TOP SECRET safe.

10. The trial lasted three days; was fraught with many obstacles and pitfalls; and was bitterly contested throughout by the Defense Counsel.

11. The Court deliberated for more than five hours before reaching its decision.

12. Martin was found guilty and sentenced to:

- a. Dishonorable Discharge
- b. Six years and four months penal servitude

(The "odd" 4 months represent the maximum penalty for unlawful possession and theft of the combination to the TOP SECRET safe charged in one of the specifications.)

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0345

G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From:	To:	Phone:	Name:	Comment Number
G-2	Ex Gp Theater Intel CI Division JSO Division ATIS TID Public Safety MIS Div Mil Historical Jap Ln 441st CIC Det 442d CIC Det	26-5749	Mr Carusi	1

1. The attached report, "The Case of SFC Ernest Martin," is forwarded for your information. This report should serve as an object lesson, deterrent, and warning of the consequences attendant on the mishandling of classified material to those individuals whose proclivities and inclinations tend towards such security violations.

2. It will be brought to the attention of every individual within your section.

1 Incl
Rept a/s

[Handwritten signature]
C. A. W.

FIRE BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Mr. G. W. Angell	<u>S.W.A.</u>
Mr. F. C. Ankrom	<u>F.C.A.</u>
Mr. R. M. Mori	<u>[Handwritten Initial]</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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1. SFC Ernest Martin, a former CIC Agent, was employed with Joint Special Operations Branch, G-2, GHQ, as a typist from 26 September 1949 to 1 December 1950. His duties included typing reports bearing SECRET and lower classification and exhibits destined for inclusion in TOP SECRET reports.

2. Late in July 1950, through pure accident and coincidence, one of the officers in JSOB discovered several classified documents in Martin's room concealed between pages of magazines.

3. Martin was placed under surveillance to discover:

- a. What disposition he intended making of the documents.
- b. The methods employed by him in obtaining the documents.

4. The surveillance continued until 5 November 1950, during which time it was discovered that Martin had acquired possession of a great variety of documents classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET AND TOP SECRET through the following sources:

- a. Direct theft before documents were filed and still in the "in-coming" basket.
- b. Typing of an unauthorized fourth copy instead of three copies as prescribed by JSOB SOP and retaining said fourth copy.
- c. Unauthorized retention and theft of rough drafts of reports he typed and such other drafts of reports as he retrieved from classified waste baskets.

5. On 5 November 1950, Martin's room was searched. The search disclosed 24 documents, of which 13 were SECRET and 9 TOP SECRET. These were found secreted in a guitar case. A strong box was noticed in Martin's room at the time. This was locked and since Martin claimed to have lost the key, a fact later disproven, it was left undisturbed on the assurance by Martin that it contained no documents.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2	To: Ex Gp Theater Intel CI Division JSO Division ATIS TID Public Safety MIS Div Mil Historical Jap Ln 441st CIC Det 442d CIC Det	Phone: 26-5749 Name: Mr Carusi	Comment Number 1
-----------	---	-----------------------------------	----------------------------

1. The attached report, "The Case of SFC Ernest Martin," is forwarded for your information. This report should serve as an object lesson, deterrent, and warning of the consequences attendant on the mishandling of classified material to those individuals whose proclivities and inclinations tend towards such security violations.

2. It will be brought to the attention of every individual within your section.

1 Incl
Rept a/s

C. A. W.

MARITIME BRANCH - READ AND INITIAL

Mr. G. H. Rettew	<u><i>GR</i></u>
Mr. O. L. Driver	<u><i>OLD</i></u>
Lt Col R. M. Lantz	<u><i>RML</i></u>
Mr. R. B. Janus	<u><i>RB</i></u>
Mr. F. L. Sabel	<u> </u>

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G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/JSC/vvm
Date: 22 Mar 51

File No. Subject: Consequences Attendant on Mishandling
of Classified Information

From: G-2	To: Ex Gp Theater Intel CI Division JSO Division ATIS TID Public Safety ✓ MIS Div Mil Historical Jap Ln 441st CIC Det 442d CIC Det	Phone: 26-5749 Name: Mr Carusi	Comment Number 1
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Rept a/s

C. A. W.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
EMEC ROUTING SLIP

FROM: _____ DATE: _____

A.M. *16 Mar 51*

	Lt. Col. Spiegel	
	Capt. Graves	
	Capt. Milstead	
	Capt. Russell	
	Draft File	
<i>3</i>	PSD Central File	
<i>1</i>	<i>Mr. Mulholland</i>	<i>JM</i>

REMARKS:

2 *Maritime Bv* *Rm L*

CONFIDENTIAL

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Col Pulliam 26-5915

SCAP Radar Policy

16 March 1951

G-2

G-3
G-4
ESS
DS
CTS (In Turn)

2

1. PSD/G-2 concurs in the proposed SCAPIN 2075/1.
2. Marine radar is standard equipment on most merchant marine vessels and is used primarily for decreasing the casualty incident rate caused by undetected hazards to navigation.
3. The tremendous intra-island commerce of Japan in hazardous waters, where permanent navigational aids are not completely reliable and where protracted periods of poor visibility are the rule, the use of radar on Japanese ships is highly desirable.
4. In view of present world conditions and the shortage in foreign exchange, sources of imported radar may be curtailed or completely cut off at any time. PSD/G-2 believes that the Japanese should be permitted access to this scientific field of research, manufacture and development of radar navigational aids.

1 Incl
n/c

-----C. A. W.-----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CCS by C/N 1, subj: "SCAP Radar Policy," dtd 6 Mar 51, fwds to G-2, G-3, G-4, ESS, DS and CTS for comment and/or concurrence a proposed SCAPIN 2075/1. This SCAPIN rescinds that portion of SCAPIN 2075 which prohibits research, development, etc of radar for marine navigational use. This c/n fwds proposed SCAPIN to G-3, G-4, ESS, DS and CTS and states that PSD/G-2 concurs in proposed SCAPIN and points out reasons why PSD believes the Japanese should be permitted to develop radar for marine navigational use.

HEP 26-5915

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PSD File Copy
G-2/PSD/HCP/sm
HCP

Chief, PSD:

Following comment is pertinent:

- a. ~~Marine~~ Marine radar is now standard with all merchant marines and ^{use of it} widely spread with most.
- b. Use of it has materially decreased the various casualty incident rates caused by undetected hazards to navigation.
- c. Japanese ships in international commerce will increase; their intra-island commerce is tremendous; the Japanese coastal waters abound in hazards, permanent navigational aids installations are not as extensive or completely reliable as is desirable, and protracted periods of poor visibility are the rule.
- d. The Japanese should be encouraged to use radar to the fullest extent possible and, in view of the facts that their sources of imported radar may dry up to some extent and that their foreign exchange is not unlimited, this branch recommends concurrence to proposed SCAPIN.

G. H. R.

GHR

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CHECK SHEET

COPY

NRCherrigan/26-6147

Subject: SCAP Radar Policy

From: CCS

To: G-2 ESS
G-3 DS
G-4 CTS

Date: 6 March 1951

1. Inclosed draft of check sheet to Chief of Staff recommends approval of proposed SCAPIN 2075/1 intended to permit manufacture by the Japanese of radar required for marine navigational use.
2. SCAP radar policy as set forth in SCAPIN 2075 prohibits research, development, design, and manufacture of radar required for marine navigational use but does not prohibit importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of such radar.
3. This prohibition results in expenditure of foreign exchange for importation into Japan of radar for navigational use in all cases where radar is installed in Japanese vessels.
4. Ninety-six sets necessitating the expenditure of approximately \$1,028,400.00 in foreign exchange were approved for import into Japan for the period January 1950 through January 1951.
5. One hundred fifty sets of foreign type radar will be required during the 1951 calendar year to meet expanding Japanese requirements for navigational radar.
6. Since radar for marine navigational use falls into the permitted category it is deemed appropriate to remove restrictions on such radar to permit research, development, design and manufacture by the Japanese of this type of radar.
7. It is believed that several years will elapse before Japanese technicians together with Japanese industry will produce navigational radar of the quality and quantity required for an export program.
8. Request comments or concurred in proposed policy to permit research, development, design, manufacture, importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of radar for marine navigational use.

1 Incl
Draft C/N to C/S
w/5 incls

/s/ GIB

-G. I. B.-

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SUBJECT: SCAP Radar Policy

From: CCS

To: C/S

1. SCAP radar policy as set forth in SCAPIN 2075, among other uses, permits importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of foreign made radar required for marine navigational use. (TAB A)

2. Memorandum for Record, 8 February 1951, Subj: Importation of Foreign Made Radar Equipment for Navigational Purposes, indicates that 96 sets costing approximately \$1,028,400 were approved for import into Japan through January 1951 and that the import program for the calendar year 1951 will require importation of approximately 150 sets of foreign type radar to meet increasing Japanese requirements. (TAB B)

3. Memorandum to Maj. Gen. W. F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, from Shigemi Yokoo, Minister of International Trade and Industry, Subj: Application for Removal of Restrictions on Radars for Navigational Purposes, 8 February 1951, with attachment, requests removal of restrictions on radars for navigational purposes for economic and other reasons. (TAB C)

4. Memorandum to Chief, Civil Communications Section, Subj: Evolution of SCAP Radar Policy, recapitulates events and actions leading up to the current SCAP radar policy as set forth in SCAPIN 2075. (TAB D)

5. Considering that the SCAP has placed radar as a mechanical aid to navigation, in the permitted category where only commercial applications are involved, and further considering that importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of foreign made radar required for marine navigational use also is permitted to the Japanese, it appears reasonable to permit research, development, design, manufacture, importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of radar in the permitted category. This should result in a diminishing foreign exchange requirement for importation of foreign radar.

6. The attached proposed SCAPIN (TAB E) relaxes the current SCAP radar policy to permit the Japanese to engage in research, development, design, manufacture, importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of radar in the permitted category.

7. Recommend approval of the attached proposed SCAPIN.

8. Concurrences:

- G-2 _____
- G-3 _____
- G-4 _____

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 413.684 ()CCS
SCAPIN 2075/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Radar Policy

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Japanese Government, AG 413.684 (18 Jan 50)CCS, SCAPIN 2075, Subj: Radar Policy, 18 January 1950.
2. Paragraph 2a is amended to include the following sub-paragraph:
(5) Radar required for marine navigational use.
3. Paragraph 2b is rescinded in its entirety.
4. Paragraph 3a is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - a. Research, development, design, manufacture, importation, possession, use, installation, sale and exportation of radar intended for fire control, fighter director and air search and including radar employing altitude determining features, rapid position calculating devices for directing fire power and such features which permit radar to be used in aircraft.
5. Direct communication within the scope of this memorandum is authorized between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and Civil Communications Section and other interested staff sections, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

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CG FEAF _____

5 Incls

- 1. TAB A - SCAPIN 2075
- 2. TAB B - M/R, 8 Feb 51
- 3. TAB C - Memo to ESS fm MITI
- 4. TAB D - Memo to Chief, CCS
- 5. TAB E - Proposed SCAPIN

-----G.I.B.-----

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LINGUIST DUTY OFFICER INSTRUCTIONS

1. The CO, TIS will furnish daily a Japanese linguist duty officer to G2 Section. His tours of duty and responsibilities are as follows:

a. Tour of Duty:

- (1) 1700-2200 Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday
- (2) 1200-2200 Wednesday and Saturday
- (3) 0900-2200 Sunday and Holidays

b. His principle duty will be to receive Japanese visitors, interpret and translate documents and/or telephone calls when necessary.

c. In addition to his principle duty the Linguist duty officer will perform the following duties:

- (1) Supervise the cleaning of rooms 520, 521 and 523A at 2000 hours.
- (2) Insure that all lights and heaters in the rooms indicated in par c (1) above are turned off and the doors locked after the cleaning detail has departed.
- (3) Pick up sedan drivers and press releases at the Information Desk, first floor Dai Ichi Bldg, when notified by the Adm Duty O. Sedan trip tickets will be turned over to the officer on duty at WO Lee's desk and the press releases will be turned over to the officer on duty in room 519.
- (4) Lock the fire door located on the balcony near General Willoughby's office at 2000 hours.
- (5) Be acquainted with the location of the key box and be responsible for all keys contained therein. All keys will be accounted for at all times. The linguist duty officer will notify the G2 Adm O prior to departing at 2200 hours, account for the keys and insure that he will not be required for further duty.

(2) Insure that all lights and heaters in the rooms indicated in par c (1) above are turned off and the doors locked after the cleaning detail has departed.

(3) Pick up sedan drivers and press releases at the Information Desk, first floor Dai Ichi Bldg, when notified by the Adm Duty O. Sedan trip tickets will be turned over to the officer on duty at WO Lee's desk and the press releases will be turned over to the officer on duty in room 519.

(4) Lock the fire door located on the balcony near General Willoughby's office at 2000 hours.

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OM # 12

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

3111
APO 500
14 March 1951

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)
:)
NUMBER.....12)

DUTY OFFICERS INSTRUCTIONS

1. This rescinds Office Memorandum No. 42, this Section, 1 August 1950, and all previous instructions in conflict with those herein.
2. This memorandum pertains primarily to G2 activities located on the Fifth Floor of the Dai Ichi Building.
3. The Chiefs of all major G2 sub-divisions are charged with providing adequate Security and Liaison in their respective sections.
4. Attached as Inclosures 1-6 are the duty instructions for:
 1. Air Raid Warnings.
 2. Alerts.
 3. Senior Duty Officer.
 4. Junior Duty Officer.
 5. Linguist Duty Officer.
 6. Administrative Duty Officer.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

Washington M. Ives, Jr.

WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
Colonel GSC
Deputy for Administration

- 6 Incls
1. Air Raid Warning Instructions
 2. Alert Instructions
 3. Sr. D.O. Instructions
 4. Jr. D.O. Instructions

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- 1. Air Raid Warnings.
- 2. Alerts.
- 3. Senior Duty Officer.
- 4. Junior Duty Officer.
- 5. Linguist Duty Officer.
- 6. Administrative Duty Officer.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

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Colonel GSC
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- 2. Alert Instructions
- 3. Sr. D.O. Instructions
- 4. Jr. D.O. Instructions
- 5. Linguist D.O. Instructions
- 6. Administrative D. O. Instructions

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AIR RAID WARNING INSTRUCTIONS FOR DUTY OFFICERS

1. Warnings of hostile AIR ATTACKS are accomplished by the following AIR RAID WARNING MESSAGES:

a. FLASH BLUE - Means hostile or suspicious aircraft are so located that an attack is probable.

b. FLASH RED - Means hostile or suspicious aircraft are so located that an attack is imminent or in progress.

c. FLASH WHITE - Means all clear.

d. AIRBORNE ATTACK - Means attack by paratroopers, glider or transport-borne enemy troops is imminent or in progress.

2. Upon notification of actual or test warnings, for air raids, the receiving officer will take action immediately as indicated below:

a. Inform the senior officer present in Admin - (0800-2400) who will cause further action to be taken as indicated in Paragraph c immediately. (2400-0800 Jr Duty Officer acts under b and c below).

b. Inform: The ACofS, G2, Deputy and/or Senior Duty Officer, if present, and other persons as directed.

c. Upon receipt of information that a warning has arrived in the AG Radio and Cable Room (Room 243) the Senior Officer present in G2 Admin will either at once go himself or cause an officer to proceed without delay to Room 243, read the message, ascertain the source of the warning, and take further action as follows:

(1) Notify Chief, Theater Intelligence (26-6021) or Operations 26-6025.

(2) Notify Exec, 441 CIC Det (33-5414, 33-5431) who will take action to insure all CIC agencies in the Tokyo area are aware of the warning.

(3) Inform either the Chief, PSD (26-5915) or the Exec O, PSD (26-5916) who will take action to insure that proper Japanese agencies are aware of the warning.

(4) Notify TIS Duty O (26-8789) who will take action

a. Inform the senior officer present in Admin - (0800-2400) who will cause further action to be taken as indicated in Paragraph c immediately. (2400-0800 Jr Duty Officer acts under b and c below).

b. Inform: The ACofS, G2, Deputy and/or Senior Duty Officer, if present, and other persons as directed.

c. Upon receipt of information that a warning has arrived in the AG Radio and Cable Room (Room 243) the Senior Officer present in G2 Admin will either at once go himself or cause an officer to proceed without delay to Room 243, read the message, ascertain the source of the warning, and take further action as follows:

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- (2) Notify Exec, 441 CIC Det (33-5414, 33-5431) who will take action to insure all CIC agencies in the Tokyo area are aware of the warning.
- (3) Inform either the Chief, FSD (26-5915) or the Exec O, FSD (26-5916) who will take action to insure that proper Japanese agencies are aware of the warning.
- (4) Notify TIS Duty O (26-8789) who will take action to insure that all units and sections located in the NYK Bldg are aware of the warning. He will also notify TID.
- (5) Notify Japanese Liaison (26-6024).
- (6) Notify any other personnel or agencies as directed.

Incl 1
OM #12

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ALERT INSTRUCTIONS

1. Upon notification of actual or test alerts, warnings, alarms or disasters, such as tidal waves, earthquakes, etc., the Junior Duty Officer will take action immediately as indicated below:

a. The recipient of the call or warning will:

- (1) Inform the senior officer present in Admin - (0800-2400) who will cause further action to be taken as indicated in Paragraph (c) immediately. (From 2400 to 0800, Jr Duty Officer acts under (2) and (3) below.
- (2) Inform: The ACoFS, G2, Deputy and/or Senior Duty Officer, if present, or officer on duty in General Willoughby's office, and other persons as directed.
- (3) Upon receipt of information that a warning has arrived in the AG Radio and Cable Room (Room 243), the Senior Officer present in G2 Admin will, either himself or by designating an officer to proceed without delay thereto, read the message, ascertain the source of warning, and take further action as follows:
 - (a) Notify 441 CIC Det (33-5414 or 33-5431).
 - (b) Inform either the Chief, PSD (26-5915) or the Exec O, PSD (26-5916) who will take action to insure that proper Japanese agencies are aware of the warning.
 - (c) Notify any other personnel or agencies as directed.

b. During TESTS, all personnel acting in accord herewith will at all times:

- (1) Stress the fact that a TEST or PRACTICE is being conducted.
- (2) Record local times of receipt and dispatch of all calls.

c. When time permits, Admin or Senior Duty Officers will obtain additional information by calling any of the following sources:

- (1) Deputy for Intell, FFAF - 2635-502.

himself or by designating an officer to do so, without delay thereto, read the message, ascertain the source of warning, and take further action as follows:

- (a) Notify 441 CIC Det (33-5414 or 33-5431).
- (b) Inform either the Chief, PSD (26-5915) or the Exec O, PSD (26-5916) who will take action to insure that proper Japanese agencies are aware of the warning.
- (c) Notify any other personnel or agencies as directed.

b. During TESTS, all personnel acting in accord herewith will at all times:

- (1) Stress the fact that a TEST or PRACTICE is being conducted.
- (2) Record local times of receipt and dispatch of all calls.

c. When time permits, Admin or Senior Duty Officers will obtain additional information by calling any of the following sources:

- (1) Deputy for Intell, FFAF - 2635-502.
- (2) Deputy for Operations, FFAF - 2635-503 and 2635-553.
- (3) G3 Exec & Duty Officer - 26-5964
All Night Duty Clerk - 26-6257.
- (4) GHQ Signal Center - 26-5884.
- (5) AG Radio and Cable Sect - 26-5882.
- (6) Secretary of General Staff - 26-6227
- (7) G2, JLCOM - Yokohama 2-1366 or Octagon 302
After duty hours call Yokohama 2-1660 or Octagon 2.
- (8) Intelligence Officer, COMNAVFE - 26-8027

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DUTIES OF SENIOR DUTY OFFICER

1. The Senior Duty Officer will serve in Room 525 in 2 reliefs as follows:

1700-2300
2300-0800

2. The Senior Duty Officer will be responsible for:

- a. Acting in the place of the ACofS, G2, as required.
- b. Contacting the Deputy or the ACofS, G2, in that order, on all matters other than those of a purely routine matter.
- c. Contacting interested members of the Section in matters not requiring immediate attention of the Deputy or ACofS, G2, or which require preliminary action before being referred to the Deputy or ACofS, G2.
- d. Being familiar with duties of other duty officers.
- e. Being familiar with the location of combinations of all safes in the Executive and Administrative Group. These will be found in an envelope in the custody of the General's Secretary.
- f. Submitting a signed copy of the Senior Duty Officer's Report covering the important activities which occurred during his tour. This will be left at the Chief Clerk's desk.
- g. Examining and signing SPOT Intelligence Reports (except those referred to in Paragraph h and i below) in the absence of the ACofS, G2, or G2 Deputy.

(1) Spot Intelligence Reports are prepared by G2 Subdivisions in accordance with Paragraph 32, Administrative Instructions, OM #6, 15 February 1948, and such other instructions which may be issued from time to time. The Senior Duty Officer will process expeditiously the finalized SPOT Intelligence Reports to the CofS in accordance with the following:

- (a) Check to insure arrangement of copies in the following sequence:

Chief of Staff (Original)

e. Being familiar with the location of [redacted] in the Executive and Administrative Group. These will be found in an envelope in the custody of the General's Secretary.

f. Submitting a signed copy of the Senior Duty Officer's Report covering the important activities which occurred during his tour. This will be left at the Chief Clerk's desk.

g. Examining and signing SPOT Intelligence Reports (except those referred to in Paragraph h and i below) in the absence of the ACofS, G2, or G2 Deputy.

(1) Spot Intelligence Reports are prepared by G2 Subdivisions in accordance with Paragraph 32, Administrative Instructions, OM #6, 15 February 1948, and such other instructions which may be issued from time to time. The Senior Duty Officer will process expeditiously the finalized SPOT Intelligence Reports to the CofS in accordance with the following:

(a) Check to insure arrangement of copies in the following sequence:

Chief of Staff (Original)
Aide-de-Camp
Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP or FEC, or both as appropriate.
Info copies to other GHQ Sections, if appropriate.
Info copies to Theater/Intel or CI Div, if appropriate.
Info copies to operational commands.
G2 File copy.

(b) See that writer has initialled in ink above his typed initials and that Senior Officer on duty in preparing Sub-Div has initialled on the G2 file copy.

(c) See that the time of the report is approximately the time of approval by G2.

(d) See that any additional comments by G2 or the Executive Group is added to all copies.

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DUTIES OF SENIOR DUTY OFFICER (Cont'd)

- (e) Process expeditiously and withdraw appropriate copies for proper distribution.
- (f) Insure that the ACofS, G2, or the Deputy is cognizant of the report.
- (g) International Incidents:
 - (1) Definition - International incidents are those in which military personnel or others subject to military law (AW 2) become involved with military or civilian personnel of another foreign power in an incident of immediate or potential serious significance from a political, military, or public relations viewpoint.
Examples:
 - (a) Desertion of U.S. personnel to another foreign power or desertion of foreign military personnel to the U.S. Forces.
 - (b) Violations of international boundaries by U.S. or foreign aircraft or violations of foreign territorial waters by U.S. vessels.
 - (c) Firing on U.S. aircraft or vessels by foreign powers, or firing on foreign vessels or aircraft by U.S. Forces.
 - (d) Armed clashes or other serious incidents along international boundaries.
 - (2) Action - in the event a report of an international incident is received by G2 duty personnel, the Senior Duty Officer (Junior Duty Officer in his absence) will notify the Theater/Intel Division Opns Officer, 26-6025, and request disposition.
- (h) Unidentified Aircraft:
 - (1) If reports of unidentified aircraft are received by G2 duty personnel, the Senior Duty Officer will take action in the same manner prescribed for handling reports of international incidents (Para g (2) above).

power or desertion of foreign military personnel to the U.S. Forces.

- (b) Violations of international boundaries by U.S. or foreign aircraft or violations of foreign territorial waters by U.S. vessels.
 - (c) Firing on U.S. aircraft or vessels by foreign powers, or firing on foreign vessels or aircraft by U.S. Forces.
 - (d) Armed clashes or other serious incidents along international boundaries.
- (2) Action - in the event a report of an international incident is received by G2 duty personnel, the Senior Duty Officer (Junior Duty Officer in his absence) will notify the Theater/Intel Division Opns Officer, 26-6025, and request disposition.

(h) Unidentified Aircraft:

- (1) If reports of unidentified aircraft are received by G2 duty personnel, the Senior Duty Officer will take action in the same manner prescribed for handling reports of international incidents (Para g (2) above).
- (i) Special: - Cause proper action to be taken in accordance with Annex 2 and 3 (Filed in G2 Jr and Sr Duty Officers' Books only).
- (j) Take telecon at 2100. During his absence he will cause Senior Officer present on 5th Floor to occupy the desk.

3. During the absence of the ACofS, G2, the Senior Duty Officer will occupy the General's desk and handle the intercom and telephone calls.

Annex: 1

Senior Duty Officer's Report

Annex: 2

Approach of vessels to the U.S. (Sr & Jr Duty Officers books only)

Annex: 3

Point of receipt of critical information (Sr & Jr Duty Officers Books only)

Incl 3

OM # 12

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G-2 SENIOR DUTY OFFICER REPORT

DATE _____

C in C DEPARTED _____

A/C of S, G-2 ARRIVED _____ DEPARTED _____

HEADQUARTERS CLOSED _____

TIME	OCCURENCE	ACTION TAKEN

! Annex 1 to Incl #3

Senior Duty Officer

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