

Dec. 1984

(60)

A F F I D A V I T.

TOMINAGA Kyoji was born on Goto Island in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1894.

He is a Japanese, a graduate of the Military Staff College and of the rank of Lt.-General.

He was interrogated in Moscow on 21 Feb., 1946, by Col. S. Y. Rosenblit, the Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Q. Tell all your posts, which you have had, ever since you entered in the Japanese Army in addition to your affidavit dated 11 Feb., 1946.

A. After graduation from the Military Academy in 1913, I began my service in the Japanese Army as a platoon leader of 23rd Infantry Regiment of 6th Division and was in service of this regiment till 1921. This division was situated in Kumamoto, Japan. I learned in the Military Staff College from 1921 to 1923. After the graduation, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.

In 1924 - a company commander in 23rd Infantry Regiment.

In 1925 - an officer attached to General Affair Department of General Staff Headquarters.

1926-1927 - the Chief of Special Service Agency at Manchuli Station.

1928 - Again an officer attached to General Affair Department (Captain, later Major).

1929-1930 - the Assistant of Military Attache in Moscow (Major).

1931 - became a member of the Preparatory Committee for Disarmament Conference of League of Nations.

In 1932, I attended at the Conference of League of Nations at Geneva and after that I attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and then to General Affair Department (Major and promoted to the rank of Lt.-Col. in 1932).

In 1935, by the order of General Staff I was sent abroad to France to investigate the state of Russian emigrants at the aim of utilizing them against U.S.S.R. in the future.

In autumn of 1935, I became an officer of the rank of Lt.-Col., attached to 2nd Imperial Guard Inf. Regiment.

At the end of 1936, I became an acting chief of a section of General Affairs Department of General Staff Headquarters.

From March of 1937, I became the Chief of 2nd Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

In October of 1937, I became the Chief of 1st Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

(In 1936 I was promoted to the rank of colonel.)

From March of 1938, I became the Commander of 2nd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo.

In March of 1939, I was promoted to the rank of major-general and appointed Chief of 4th Department of General Staff Headquarters.

In September of 1939, I was appointed Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and remained with this post till September of 1940.

In December of the same year, I was appointed Director of Tank School.

In 1941, I was appointed Chief of Personnel Bureau of War Ministry and promoted to the rank of Lt.-General in November of the same year.

In March of 1943, holding the post of the Chief of Personnel Bureau, I was appointed Vice-Minister of War.

At the end of August of 1944, I was appointed Commander of 4th Air Force.

In January of 1945, I was ordered to await further orders, owing to my illness, and was placed in the first reserve list in April of the same year.

In July of 1945, being called out by the Army, I started for my post in Kwantung Army and was appointed Commander of 139th Division.

- Q. Who was War Minister at the time when you were Vice-Minister of War?
- A. When I was Vice-Minister of War, the War Minister was TOJO.
- Q. Tell how and by whom the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was organized.
- A. At that time the Kwantung Army was under the command of Lt.-General HONJO Shigeru. By HONJO's orders the Japanese troops invaded in Manchuria without declaration of war. Among the officers of the Kwantung Army, those who played the most active roles in Manchurian occupation were Col. ITAGAKI and Lt.-Col. ISHIHARA attached to Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. In a few years after the invasion of

the Japanese troops in Manchuria, the Japanese Government took all kinds of measures in order to convert Manchuria into the military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.; the number of the Japanese troops in Manchuria was continually increased; new railways and auto-roads leading to Soviet borders were constructed; munition factories were built and managed; a large number of farmers were transmigrated in Manchuria from Japan for the recruitment of the Kwantung Army; there were also constructed new ammunition dumps, barracks, hospitals, etc.

Q. Can you tell concretely how many troops there were in Manchuria in the past and how they gradually were increased?

A. By the Manchurian incident in 1931, there were one division and 6 infantry battalions. During the occupation a vast number of troops were sent into Manchuria from Korea and Japan. Before the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan (by 1941), the Kwantung Army had 400,000 soldiers and, at the beginning of the war with U.S.S.R., had more than 700,000.

Q. How many aerodromes were constructed?

A. There were more than 100 aerodromes only along the borders of the U.S.S.R.

Q. How many railways were there in 1931?

A. In 1931 there were only 2 railways in Manchuria. Since 1931 more than 10 railways leading to U.S.S.R. borders have been constructed. Auto-roads were also constructed along the directions of these railways.

Q. What was the purpose of Manchurian occupation?

A. First, for the purpose of transmigration of surplus population. Second, for the purpose of aggression against the U.S.S.R. As an outbreak of conflict was expected sooner or later, it was prepared to utilize Manchuria as a military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.

Q. Did you yourself take part in Nomonkhan incident and who was the projector of these military actions?

- A. I myself did not take part in Nomonkhan incident, but I investigated the incident as the Chief of 4th Department (War history) of General Staff Headquarters. The military actions were begun by the Japanese troops and had the purpose to provoke a war against Mongolia.
- Q. Being clear that Mongolian National Republic formed an alliance with U.S.S.R., Nomonkhan aggression was also a provocation of war against U.S.S.R. You knew it, did not you?
- A. Yes, I did. The Japanese Government manufactured a public opinion, as if Outer Mongolia had occupied the Manchurian territory in Nomonkhan area, namely, Mongolia had begun the war, in consequence the military actions of the Kwantung Army were carried on only for the sake of recovering Manchurian right on the occupied territory. And they expressed in that way.
- Q. Do you think who was personally responsible for Nomonkhan incident?
- A. I think that Commander of the Kwantung Army Ueda and Chief of Staff Headquarters Isogaya were responsible for Nomonkhan incident. Immediately after this incident, both were ordered to await further orders.
- Q. Did you yourself take part in drawing military operation plans against U.S.S.R. at General Staff Headquarters?
- A. I, as the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, drew an ~~aggression~~ **attack** plan against U.S.S.R. in 1940. According to this plan, the main attack should be operated from Lake Hanka area in the direction of Khabarovsk to separate the Maritime Province from U.S.S.R. For this purpose 12 infantry divisions, as main forces, and 2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments, 2 cavalry brigades and 5 bombardment groups, as auxiliary forces, were to be applied. After attacking Khabarovsk and occupying Vladivostok plain, the Northern Front Forces, formed from 7 divisions; an artillery brigade and other units were to begin attack. In case of success, the Western Front Forces were also to open their attack, having a main attack in direction of Chita, with the attention to occupy Soviet territory extending to Lake Baikal.

Q. To whom did you report this plan?

A. I reported it to Prince KANIN, the Chief of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. Was there anybody else to whom you reported this plan?

A. I, myself, reported this plan to His Majesty the Emperor in company with Prince KANIN.

Q. Did the Emperor sanction the plan?

A. After a few days the sanction to this plan was given by the Emperor.

Q. How did you know that the plan was approved by the Emperor?

A. The plan was returned to 1st Department, after obtaining the Imperial sanction.

Q. When was the time of aggression against U.S.S.R. by the plan?

A. In this plan the time of opening War was not indicated, because it should be decided by the Emperor, after discussion in the Supreme Council.

Q. Where was the plan preserved after the Imperial sanction?

A. It was preserved in Operation Section of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. To whom was the copy of the plan sent?

A. The copy of the plan was sent to the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kinds of measures were taken to carry this plan into practice?

A. A senior officer (whose name I forgot) went with this plan and handed it over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to put it into practice.

Q. In what month was the plan sanctioned?

A. It was in March of 1940.

- Q. When was it sent to the Kwantung Army to put into practice?
- A. At the beginning of April of 1940.
- Q. When did you leave the post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters?
- A. In September of 1940.
- Q. You said that the number of the Kwantung Army was remarkably increased, especially after the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan. What do you know about this plan?
- A. Kan-Toku-En plan was formed by Major General TANAKA Shinichi, the successor of my post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters in the middle of 1941. (I don't know exactly in what month it was.) About September of 1941, I knew about this plan at the time, when I was ordered by War Minister TOJO to appoint the committee for setting up the way of governing of the Soviet territory to be occupied by the Japanese army.
- Q. Explain why Kan-Toku-En plan was formed especially in 1941?
- A. The Kan-Toku-En plan was elaborated in the middle of 1941, as war broke out between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. The war situation was not favorable for the Red Army and we expected that the U.S.S.R. would transfer her troops from the Soviet Far East to the western front. On account of this, we supposed that we could easily occupy the Far East.
- Q. What were the basic contents of this plan?
- A. The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was based upon the operation plan of the Army General Staff drawn out by me in 1940. As I have mentioned before, according to the former plan, the attacks on all fronts were supposed to be brought about in turn with rather long intervals between them; but according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan all the blows were to be dealt simultaneously.
- Q. In what work did you take part in connection with "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
- A. In the connection mainly I took part in formation of the committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied Soviet territory, recruitment of the unit officer staff to

the Kwantung Army and formation of 2 front army staff Headquarters.

Q. What role did TOJO play in the matters of "Kan-Toku-En" plan?

A. TOJO approved the plan and he was its central figure.

Q. How did TOJO explain to you about enforcement of preparation of the war against U.S.S.R.?

A. In 1941, TOJO said to me in a conversation: "The present time is very suitable for an aggression against the U.S.S.R. because we can carry on war without encountering any strong resistance from the Soviet Army." He further said, "The Japanese Army would gain a great prestige by attacking the U.S.S.R. at a time when it is ready to fall to the ground, like a ripe persimmon." TOJO also said that it was necessary to increase the number of present units in Manchuria, as a way of prompt mobilization of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Do you confirm that TOJO had a strong intention of aggression against the U.S.S.R. at that time?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You stated that you formed the Committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied territory. Tell the organization of that Committee.

A. The Chief of the Committee was Lt.-General IKEDA, the former Assistant Chief of the Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army and its members were Col. ARAO, attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, Lt.-Col. OGOSHI, attached to 2nd Department, and 2 others, names of whom I can not remember.

Q. Do you know OSHIMA?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. What role did he play in the matters of aggression against U.S.S.R.?

A. I myself, as the Vice-Minister of War, read OSHIMA's telegram from Berlin dated December of 1941. In this telegram reporting about his conversation with Hitler, OSHIMA said

that Hitler stated to him in conversation, "As U.S.S.R. troops were already demoralized, if Japan should not take up this chance for aggression against U.S.S.R., she would be regretted about it later." In Spring of 1943, OSHIMA telegraphed, "The German Government wishes Japan to quicken opening the military actions against U.S.S.R." In this telegram bravery of the Japanese Army was praised and they sympathized with Japan in difficulty of the military actions in China and Burma. In conclusion of this telegram, they hoped that Japan would immediately open aggression against U.S.S.R. in the Far East and at the same time would enforce the military operations against India.

- Q. What role did you play in workers' supply of Muniton industry in Japan?
- A. I reported to War Minister TOJO that it was necessary to mobilize school boys as workers of muniton industry, having closed middle and higher schools. This proposal was approved by the Cabinet Council and brought into practice.
- Q. Tell what role you played in preparation and performance of the warfare against U.S.A., Great Britain and China.
- A. In the first period of military actions in China, I was the Chief of 2nd Section of Kwantung Staff Headquarters. My main work was the intelligence service against U.S.S.R., but I myself began to command operations, taking part in the military actions in North China, when the incident broke out in North China in 1937. I conducted by the orders of UEDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. UEDA ordered me to command operations with TOJO, the Chief of Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. I took part in the operations of capturing Changchiakon and other areas in North China. As for the military operations against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, I played the role, mainly, in formation of new units, which acted in the Southern Areas, in recruitment of their members and in establishment of Armies' Headquarters. I, as Vice-Minister of War, prepared and formed so-called forlorn hope staff, amounting 4,000 persons, who blew up American warships and transports in Pacific Ocean by means of specially equipped machines (controlled mines). Then I commanded 4th Air Force, acted on Philippines for 4 months of 1944. My Force acted against U.S. air forces and float. 3 divisions out of my Force were consisted of so-called forlorn

hope members, who had a task to annihilate the enemy by thunder crashing themselves to him. Consequently, both pilots and aircrafts perished and pilots, who died during execution of their operation tasks amounted to 1,000.

- Q. How many U. S. warships and transports did they sink?
- A. I think they sunk a great many of them. But I can not tell how many, because my pilots did not return, having started with their tasks.
- Q. Why were you dismissed from the post of Vice-Minister of War?
- A. I was released from the post in connection with TOJO's resignation from the post of War-Minister. In Japan it is very often that in case of resignation of War Minister, Vice-Minister of War also resigns. I resigned from the post of Vice-Minister nearly a month later then TOJO left his post.

I wrote the answers to the above questions in my own handwriting and signed them.

Signature /Lt. General TOMINAGA/

Questioned by the Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Col. S. Y. Rosenblit.

Signature /Rosenblit/

Army Interpreter Lt. Zlomanov

Signature /Zlomanov/

Japanese

1984-1

訊問調書

富永恭次 明治廿五年長崎縣五島ニ生ル國籍日本人

陸軍大學卒業 日本陸軍中將

一九四六年二月廿一日モスコイ市ニ於ケル訊問ヲシタルモノハ東京ニ於ケル國際法會議ノソヴィエツト聯邦側次席檢察エス。ヤ・ロゼンブリート大佐ナ

リ

問、一九四六年二月十一日附貴殿ノ陳述書ノ補足トシテ貴殿ハ日本軍隊ニ於ケル職務ノ初期ヨリ如何ナル職務ニ從事シタルカラ話シナサイ。

答、私ハ一九一三年陸軍士官學校卒業後日本軍第六師團ノ歩兵第二十三聯隊ノ小隊長トシテ勤務ヲ始メマシタ。此ノ聯隊ニ私ハ一九二一年迄勤メマシタ。此ノ師團ハ内地ノ熊本市ニアリマシタ。一九二一年カラ一九二三年迄陸軍大學校ニ學ビ其ノ卒業後大尉ニ進級シマシタ。

一九二四年ニ同歩兵第二十三聯隊ノ中隊長デアリマシタ

一九二五年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ

一九二六年―二七年滿洲里總務機關長ニ

一九二八年再ビ參謀本部總務部附將校ニハ階級ハ

大尉後ニ少佐ニ進級

一九二九年―三〇年モスコイニ於ケル陸軍武官

1984-2

補佐官三（階級ハ少佐）

一九三一年國際聯盟軍縮會議準備委員會々員ニ
ナリマシタ

一九三二年壽府ニ於ケル國際聯盟會議ニ參加シ
マシタ其後參謀本部第一部附ニ次ニ總務部附ニ
ナリマシタ（階級ハ少佐一九三二年ニ中佐ニ進級）

一九三五年參謀本部ノ任務ヲ又ケ「ソ」聯ニ對
スル將來ノ利用ノ目的ヲ以テ諸國移民狀態ノ研
究ノタメ佛國ニ派遣セラレマシタ

一九三五年秋近衛歩兵第二聯隊附中佐ニナリマ
シタ

一九三六年未參謀本部總務部ノ課長代理ニナリ
マシタ

一九三七年三月ヨリ關東軍司令部第二課長ニナ
リマシタ

一九三七年十月ニ關東軍司令部第一課長ニナリ
マシタ（一九三六年ニ大佐ニ進級）

一九三八年三月カラ東京近衛歩兵第二聯隊長ニ
ナリマシタ

一九三九年三月ニ小將ニ進級シテ參謀本部第四部長ニ任
セラレマシタ

一九三九年ニ參謀本部第一部長ニ任セラレマシタ ソシテ
一九四〇年九月迄其職務ヲ帶ビマシタ 同年十二月ニ戰車學校
長ニ任セラレマシタ

1984-3

一九四一年ニ陸軍省人事局長ニ任セラレ同年十一月ニ中將ニ進級シマシタ

一九四三年三月ニ人事局長ヲ兼務シテ陸軍次官ニ任セラレマシタ

一九四四年八月未第四航空軍司令官ニ任セラレマシタ

一九四五年一月ニ病氣ニ罹リ特命仰付ケラレマシタ 同年四月豫備ニ編入サレマシタ

一九四五年七月召集セラレテ關東軍ニ赴任シ第一百三十九師團長ニ任セラレマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿が陸軍次官デアツタ時ニハ誰ガ陸軍大臣デアリマシタカ。

答、私ガ陸軍次官ノ時ニハ陸軍大臣ハ東條デアリマシタ。

問、一九三十一年ノ滿洲占領ハドンナ風ニシテ誰ニヨツテ組織サレタカラ話シナサイ。

答、此ノ時ニ關東軍ハ本庄集中將ガ指揮シテ居リマシタソシテ本庄ノ命令ニヨツテ宣戰ヲ布告セズニ日本軍ヲ滿洲ニ進入サセマシタ 關東軍ノ將校中滿洲占領ニ最モ積極的ノ役割ヲ演ジタノハ關東軍司令部ノ板垣大佐及石原中佐デアリマシタ

日本軍ヲ滿洲ニ進入サセテカラ數年ノ間ニ日本

1984-4

政府ハ滿洲ヲ以テ對「ソ」聯攻撃ノ足場ニサセ
ルタメ諸種ノ處置ヲトリマシタ 在滿日本兵數
ハ間斷ナク増加サレマシタ「ソ」聯國境ニ向フ
新ラシキ鐵道及自動車道ガ建設サレマシタ 軍
需工場ガ建設サレ經營セラレマシタ 日本カラ
滿洲ニ關東軍ノ兵員補充ノタメニ莫大ナル數ノ
農民ヲ移住サセマシタ 新タナル倉庫兵車病院
等ガ建設サレマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ以前滿洲ニ幾何ノ軍隊カアツテソレガ如
何ニ逐次増加サレテイツタカフ具體的ニ話ス事
カ出來マスカ。

答、一九三一年滿洲事變ノ時迄ハ一ヶ師團ト六ヶ歩
兵大隊ガアリマシタ 占領ノ期間ニ朝鮮及内地
カラ滿洲ヘ莫大ナル數ノ軍隊ガ送ラレマシタ
關特演ノ計畫ヲ作ル前ハ即チ一九四一年迄「關
東軍兵數ハ四十萬人デアツテ「ソ」聯トノ開戰
頭初ニ於テハ七十萬以上ニ達シマシタ。(富永中將
印)

問、飛行場ハ幾ツ作ラレマシタカ。

答、「ソ」聯國境ニ沿フタモノノミテ百以上ノ飛行
場ガアリマス。(富永中將印)

問、一九三一年ニ於テ鐵道ハ幾ツアリマシタカ。

答、一九三一年滿洲ニハ二ヶ鐵道カアツタノミデア

1984-5

リマス 一九三一年以後「ソ」國境ニ向フ鐵道ノ十ヶ以上ヲ建設シマシタ マタ鐵道ニ沿フテ自動車道路ヲ敷設シマシタ (富永中將印)

問、滿洲占領ノ目的ハ何デスカ
答、第一ニ過剩人口ヲ移住セシムルケメ、第二ニ「ソ」聯攻撃ノタメデアリマス 結局衝突ヲ惹起スルコトガ豫想セラレテ居リマシタノデ「ソ」聯ニ對スル攻撃ノ足場トシテ滿洲ヲ利用スルコトヲ準備シマシタ (富永中將印)

問、貴族ハ自身デ「ノモンハン」事件ニ參加シマシタカソシテ誰ガ此ノ軍事行動ノ發起者デアリマシタカ
答、私自身ハ「ノモンハン」事件ニハ參加シマセンデシタ ケレドモ參謀本部第四部(戰史)長トシテソノ事件ヲ研究シマシタ

軍事行動ハ日本軍ガ始メマシタ其行動ハ蒙古ニ對スル戰爭ヲ洗發スル目的ヲ有シマシタ (富永中將印)

問、蒙古民族共和國ハ「ソ」聯トハ同盟ノ關係ニア
ルコトハ明瞭デアルカラ「ノモンハン」攻撃ハ
マダ「ソ」聯ニ對スル戰爭ノ洗發デアルコトハ
分ツテ居ソウデセウ

答、ハイソウデス
日本政府ニ於テハ外蒙古ガ「ノモンハン」地方

1984-6

ニ於テ滿洲領土ヲ占領シタノデ、從ツテ蒙古ガ
戰爭ヲ始メ 關東軍ノ軍事行動ハ單ニ占領セラ
レタ領土ノ滿洲ノ權利ヲ回復スル目的ヲ有シタ
ル如クニ輿論ヲ作製シテソノヨソナ言ヒ廻シヲ
シマシタ。ハ富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ「ノモンハン」事件ノ個人的責任者トシ
テ誰ヲ思ヒマスカ。

答、「ノモンハン」事件ノ責任者ヲ私ハ關東軍司令官
植田及參謀長磯谷ト思ヒマス。コノ事件後速ニ二
人共待命ニナリマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ自身デ參謀本部ノ對「ソ」作戰計畫ノ立
案ニ參加シマシタカ。

答、**□**參謀本部第一部長ノ資格ニ於テ一九四〇年對
「ソ」攻撃計畫ヲ立案シマシタ

此ノ計畫ニヨレバ「ソ」聯ト沿海洲トヲ分斷ス
ルタメ主攻撃ヲ「ハンカ」湖地區ヨリ哈府方向
ニ指向セラレナケレバナリマセンデシタ
之レガタメ充當セラレル兵力ハ十二ヶ步兵師團
ヲ主力トシ補助兵力トシテ二ヶ砲兵旅團三ヶ戰
車聯隊二ヶ騎兵旅團五ヶ爆撃飛行聯隊ヲ用ヒラ
レマシタ

哈府攻撃及浦鹽平地占領後 七ヶ師團及砲兵旅
團及他ノ部隊ヨリ編成セラレタル北方面ハ攻

1984-7

開始スル筈デアリマシタ

成功ノ場合ニハ西方正面へ「テタ」方向ニ主攻
撃ヲ指向シ「バイカル」湖ニ至ル「ソ」聯領土
ヲ占領スル目的ヲ以テ攻撃ヲ開始スル筈デアリ
マシタ。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ此ノ計畫ヲ報告シマシタカ。

答、參謀總長閑院宮殿下ニ報告シマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、其外尙誰ニ計畫ヲ報告シマシタカ。

答、私自身コノ計畫ヲ 閑院宮殿下御同席ノ下ニ

天皇(裕仁)陛下ニ上奏致シマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、天皇ハ計畫ヲ可決シマシタカ。

答、數日後 コノ計畫ハ 天皇陛下ニヨツテ御

裁可セラレマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ如何シテコノ計畫カ天皇ニヨツテ可決セ
ラレタカヲ知リマシタカ。

答、計畫ハ 天皇陛下ノ御裁下ヲ經ニ第一部ニ
返戻セラレマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、此ノ計畫ニヨツテ「ソ」聯ニ對スル攻撃ノ時期
ハ何時デアリマシタカ。

答、計畫ニ於テハ開戦ノ時期ハ示シテアリマセンソ
レハ最高會議ヲ審議ヲシテ 天皇陛下ガ御

決定ニナルカラデアリマス。(富永中將印)

問、天皇可決後何處ニコノ計畫ハ保存セラレマシタカ。

答、參謀本部第一部ノ作戰課ニ保存セラレマシタ。

問、コノ計畫ノ騰本ヲ誰ニ送リマシタカ。

答、コノ計畫ノ騰本ヲ關東軍ニ送リマシタ。

問、コノ計畫ノ實現ノタメニ如何ナル處置ヲトリマシタカ。

答、一人ノ上級將校（氏名ヲ忘レマシタ）ガ實現ノタメニコノ計畫ヲ持ツテ關東軍司令官ニ届ケマシタ。

（富永中將印）

問、コノ計畫ハ何月ニ可決サレマシタカ。

答、一九四〇年三月デアリマス。

問、實現ノタメ何時關東軍ニ送リマシタカ。

答、一九四〇年四月ノ始メデアリマス。

問、貴殿ハ何時參謀本部第一部長職務ヲ去リマシタカ。

答、一九四〇年九月デアリマス。

問、貴殿ハ關東軍兵數ハ關特演計畫立案後特ニ著シク増大シタト云ツタガ此ノ計畫ニ就テ貴殿ハ何ヲ知ツテ居マスカ。

答、關特演ノ計畫ハ私ノ後任者タル參謀本部第一部長田中新一少將ニヨツテ一九四一年ノ中頃（何

月カハ正確ニ知リマセン）立案セラレマシタ

私ハ一九四一年九月頃日本軍隊ガ「ソ」聯領土占領後ノ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ設定スルタメノ

1984-9

委員會ヲ任命スベク東條陸軍大臣カラ命ゼラレ
タ時ニコノ計畫ニ就テ知リマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、關特演ガ計畫セラレタノハ何故ニ時ニ一九四一
年デアルカヲ説明シナサイ。

答、
「關特演ノ計畫ハ一九四一年ノ中頃ニ立案セラ
レマシタ。ソレハ「ソ」聯ト對逸トノ戦争ガ始
マリ赤軍ハ戰勢ガ悪イノデ私共へ「ソ」聯ガ極
東カラ其ノ軍隊ヲ西方正面ニ輸送スルコトヲ豫
想シマシタ。ソレデ容易ニ極東ヲ占領シ得ルト
思ヒマシタ。」(富永中將印)

問、此ノ計畫ノ基礎的内容ハ何テスカ。

答、
「關特演計畫ノ基礎ハ一九四〇年私ニヨツテ立
テラレタル參謀本部ノ作戰計畫ニ存シマス私ガ
陳述シマシタ通り前ノ計畫ニヨレバ各方面ノ攻
撃ノタメ相當ノ順序ガ豫想セラレテ居リマシタ
ガ關特演ノ計畫デハコノ攻撃ノ時期ガ凡テ同時
デアルノガ變ツテ居リマス。」(富永中將印)

問、關特演計畫ニ關聯シテ貴殿ノ參加シタル仕事ハ
何デスカ。

答、此ノ仕事ハ主トシテ「ソ」聯占領地統治ノ方法
設定ノ委員會ノ編成、關東軍部隊將校定員ノ充
實、滿洲ニ於ケルニケ方面軍司令部ノ編成デア
リマシタ。(富永中將印)

1984-10

問、東條ハ關特演ニ關係アル仕事ニ就テ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。

答、東條ハコノ計畫ヲ是認シマシタ。東條ハ關特演計畫ノ核心デアリマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、東條ハ「ソ」聯ニ對スル戦争準備ノ増強ニ就テ貴殿ニ如何ニ説明シマシタカ。

答、一九四一年東條ハ私トノ會談ニ於テ「目下ハ「ソ」聯ヲ攻撃スルタメニ好過ナル時期デアラウソレハ「ソ」軍側ノ大ナル抵抗ニ遭遇セズシテ戦争シ得ルカラデアルト私ニ話シマシタマタ東條ハ恰モ柿ガ既ニ熟シテ曰ラ地上ニ落テルヨウナ時期ニ「ソ」聯ヲ攻撃スルコトニヨツテ日本軍ハ名譽ヲ得ルデアラウト話シマシタ。」
東條ハ關東軍ヲ速ニ動員スル方法トシテ在滿既存部隊ノ人員ヲ増加スルヲ要スル旨ヲ述べマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、「東條ハコノ期間ニ「ソ」聯ニ對シテ攻撃スル強イ企圖ガアツタコトヲ貴殿ハ確證シマスカ。

答、ハイ、確證シマス。(富永中將印)

問、貴殿ハ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ設定スル委員會ヲ創設シタコトヲ陳述シタガ委員會ノ編成ヲ示シナサイ。

答、委員長ハ舊關東軍參謀副長池田中將、委員ハ參

謀本部第一部荒尾大佐、參謀本部第二部大越中
佐其他二名氏名ハ記憶シマセン。(富永中將印)

問、大島ヲ賞殿ハ知ツテ居マスカ。

答、ハイ知ツテ居マス。(富永中將印)

問、彼ハ對「ソ」攻撃ニ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタ
カ。

登、私ハ陸軍次官トシテ一九四一年十二月附柏林カ
ラノ大島電報ヲ自身ニ讀ミマシタソレニヨルト
「ヒットラー」トノ會談ノ内容ヲ傳ヘテ大島ハ
「ヒ」トノ會見ノ際「ソ」聯軍隊ハ志氣沮喪シ
テ了ツタカラ若シ日本ガ「ソ」聯ニ對スル攻撃
ノタメニ此ノ機會ヲ利用セヌナラバソレニ就テ
後テ残念ガルデアラウト聲明シタ旨ヲ打電シマ
シタ

一九四三年春大島ハ「獨逸政府ハ對「ソ」聯ノ
軍事行動ノ開始ヲ促進スルコトヲ乞フ旨」ヲ打
電シマシタ 電報ハ日本軍ノ勇敢ヲ賞讃シ支那
及ビ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル戦争ノ困難ニ同情シ、
極東ニ於ケル「ソ」聯攻撃ヲ即時開始シ、同時
ニ印度ニ對スル作戰ヲ強化スルコトヲ希望スル
旨結論シテアリマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、日本軍事工業勞働力ノ補給ニ就テ賞殿ハ如何ナ
ル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。

1984-12

答、私ハ東條陸軍大臣ニ中等及高等学校ヲ閉鎖シテ
軍事工業従事者ニ動員スル必キヲ報告シマシタ
此ノ提案ハ閣議デ可決セラレ實現シマシタ。
問、對米對英對支戦争ノ準備及實行ニ就テ(富永中將印
役割ヲ 話シナサイ。

答、支那ニ於ケル軍事行動ノ初期ニ於テ私ハ關東軍
司令部第二隊長デアリマシタ 私ノ主ナル仕事
ハ對「ソ」諜報勤務デアリマシタガ一九三七年
北支ニ於ケル事件ガ始マリマシタ時私ハ自身、
北支ニ於ケル軍事行動ニ參加シテ作戰ヲ指導ス
ルコトニナリマシタ私ハ關東軍司令官植田ノ指
示ニヨツテ行動シマシタ植田ハ關東軍參謀長タ
リシ東條ト共ニ作戰ヲ指導ヘルコトヲ私ニ命ジ
マシタ 私ハ北支ニ於ケル張家口其他ノ諸地方
攻略ニ參加シマシタ

對米英作戦行動參加ニ關シテハ私ノ役割ハ主ト
シテ南方ニ行動シタル新部隊ノ編成、編制人員
ノ充實及軍隊司令部創設ニアリマシタ
關東軍次官トシテ私ハ四千人ノ所謂決死要員ヲ準
備組成シマシタ此等ノ要員ハ特別ノ機關ハ操縦
セラレタル水雷ヲ以テ太平洋ニ米國艦船ヲ爆
破セシメマシタ

ソノ後一九四四年ノ四ヶ月間比島ニ行動シタル

1984-13

第四航空軍ヲ指揮シマシヨタル私ノ軍ハ米國航空及ビ艦隊ニ對シテ行動シマシタ。此ノ軍ノ三ヶ師團ハ敵ヲ殲滅スルタメニ誠突自爆スル任務ヲ有スル所謂決死要員カラ成リマシタ其結果飛行士飛行機相共ニ滅ビマシタ。ソレデ作戰任務遂行ニ際シ戰死シタル全飛行士ハ千人ニ達シマシタ。(富永中將印)

問、米國艦船ヲ何隻沈メマシタカ。

答、私ハ澤山沈メタト思ヒマス。然シ私ノ軍ノ飛行士ハ任務ヲ受ケタマ、歸還セムノデ何隻カハ申シ上げラレマセン。(富永中將印)

問、何故ニ貴殿ハ陸軍次官ヲ免ジラレマシタカ。

答、私ハ東條陸軍大臣ノ離任ニ伴ヒソノ職ヲ免ゼラレマシタ日本デハ陸軍大臣カヤメルト之ニ伴ヒ次官ニヤメルコトガ度々アリマス私ハ東條ノ離任後約一ヶ月經テ次官ノ職ヲ去リマシタ。

(富永中將印)

問ニ對スル答ハ私ノ自筆デ認メ署名シマシタ。

(富永中將印)

訊問シタルモノハ東京ニ於ケル國際軍法會議ノソヴイエツト聯邦側

次席檢察官エス・ヤ・ロゼンブリート大佐

陸軍通譯官ゾロマノフ中尉

48-1 Wb
DEPOSITION

Kyoji TOMINAGA was born at Goto-in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1894; he is a Japanese national, a Graduate of the Staff College, and his rank is that of a Lieutenant-General.

He was interrogated in Moscow on 21 February 1946, by Col. S. T. ROSENBLIT, who is an associate procurator at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Page 6

A I planned the attack against Soviet Russia in 1940 in my capacity of the Chief of No. 1 Section of General Staff Headquarters. According to this plan the main attack should be operated from Lake HANKA in the direction of Khabarovsk so as to separate Soviet Russia from the Maritime Provinces of Siberia. The main force assigned to carry this out consisted of 12 infantry divisions, with auxiliary forces consisting of 2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments, 2 cavalry brigades and 5 bomber squadrons. The north front forces consisting of 7 divisions, an artillery brigade and other units were to open the attack after making an assault on Khabarovsk and occupying the plain near Vladivostok.

In case of success, the western front forces were to open their main attack in the direction of CHITA with a view to occupying the territory of Soviet Russia extending to Lake Baikal.

Q To whom did you report this plan?

A I reported it to Prince KANIN, the Chief of the General Staff.

Q Was there anybody else to whom you reported it?

A I myself reported my plan to His Majesty, HIROHITO, in company with Prince KANIN.

Q Did you get Imperial sanction?

A The Emperor gave sanction to it after a few days.

Page 7

Q When was it sanctioned?

A In March, 1940.

Page 8

A The Kan-Toku-En plan was drawn up in the middle of 1941, because when war broke out between Soviet Russia and Germany, we supposed that Soviet Russia would move her army to the western front as the war situation was not favorable for her there; consequently we thought we could easily occupy the Far East.

Pages 8-9

A The Kan-Toku-En plan was in the main dependent upon the plan of operations of the General Staff which I drew up in 1940. According to the former plan, as I have mentioned before, some suitable order of attack was anticipated in order to bring about an assault from all quarters, but according to Kan-Toku-En the time of attack was to be simultaneous in all quarters at some suitable opportunity.

Page 9

A In 1941, TOJO said to me in conversation, "The present time is very suitable for an attack on Soviet Russia, because we can engage her without encountering strong resistance." He said also, "The Japanese army should gain great prestige by attacking Soviet Russia at a time when it is ready to fall to the ground like a ripe persimmon."

Page 10

Q Do you affirm that TOJO had an inflexible intention of attacking Soviet Russia at that time?

A Yes, I do.

Page 12

I have written the answers to the above questions in my own handwriting and have signed them.

My interrogators were Col. S. T. Rosenblit, who is an associate Russian procurator at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, and Army Interpreter Lt. Zoromanof.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel Taranenko G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the minutes of interrogation of witness Lt.-General Tominaga Kiodzi, February 21, 1946, was delivered to me by Colonel of Judicial Corps Rosenblit S. J., Moscow, on or about 23.3., 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in _____

I do further certify _____

(signed) Lt. Col. Taranenko
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

22 May, 1946.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1984

Date: 14 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: Affidavit of Lt. Gen. TOMINAGA, Kioji,
re Japanese plans of aggression against U.S.S.R.

Date: 21 Feb 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Russian Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Japanese General Headquarters,
KWANTUNG Army

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggression against Russia.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Affidavit lays claim to following points:

1. During 1940-41, Japanese General Headquarters was preparing for attack against U.S.S.R.
2. "KAN-TOKU-EN" planned sudden attack against U.S.S.R. after defeat with Germany.
3. MANCHURIA was being converted into strong military base against U.S.S.R.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blunhagen

Doc. No. 1984

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Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blunhagen

Doc. No. 1984

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

1984

Date 14 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

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against U.S.S.R.

Date: 21 Feb. 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Russian Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Jap. Gen. Hdqrs, KWANTUNG Army.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression against Russia

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Affidavit lays claim to following points:

1. During 1940-1, Japanese General Hdqrs was preparing for attack against U.S.S.R.
2. "KAN-TOKU-EN" planned sudden attack against U.S.S.R. after defeat with Germany.
3. MANCHURIA was being converted into strong military base against U.S.S.R.

Analyst: Lt. Blumbagen.

Doc. No.

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Jaramenko?

①

Page 1

Deposition

1

Kyoji TOMINAGA

A was born at ~~birth place~~: Goto, Nagasaki Prefecture, on 1894; he is a Japanese national, and

Birthday: 25th year of Meiji
~~Japanese national.~~

a Graduate of the Staff College, and ^{his} ~~my~~

rank is that of a ~~Japanese~~ Lt.-General

He was

~~A person who~~ interrogated

~~him~~ in Moscow on 21 Feb., 1946,

by Col. S. T. ROSENBLIT
~~227. 04. 22-1~~ ?

who is an associate procurator

at the International Military Tribunal

in Tokyo.

1984

(2)

2

Page 6

Answer planned the attack

against Soviet Russia in 1940

in my capacity of the chief of

No. 1 Section

~~the 1st division of the~~ General

Headquarters,

Staff Office. According to this plan

the main attack should be

operated ~~take~~ ~~the~~ ~~in~~
~~turned~~ from ~~the~~ HANKA ~~to~~ the

direction of ~~Hankin~~ ~~in order~~ ^{so as} to

separate Soviet Russia from the

Maritime Provinces of Siberia

~~in that district~~. The main force

assigned to carry this out consisted of
~~perform it was~~ 12

1984

③

with auxiliary forces³

infantry divisions, ~~and~~ consisting of

2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments,

2 cavalry brigades and 5

bomber ~~air~~ ^{squadrons} ~~forces~~ were used

~~as an assistant military force.~~

The north front forces ~~which~~

consisting of 7 divisions, ^{an} ~~an~~ artillery

brigades and other units were

to open the attack after ~~the~~ ^{making an}

assault on ~~attacked~~ Harbin and occupying

the plain near Vladivostok.

1984

(4)

4

In case of success, the western front forces were to open their main attack in the direction of CHITA with the view ~~of~~^a occupying the territory of Soviet Russia extending ~~which extends~~ to the Lake of Baikal.

Q. To whom did you report this plan?

A. I reported ^{it} to Prince KANIN, the chief of the General Staff.

1984

(5)

Q. Was there anybody ^{else} to whom
you reported ^{it}?

A. I myself reported ^{my plan} to His
Majesty, Hiroshito, [↑]

in company with Prince KANIN.

Q. Did you get Imperial sanction?

A. The Emperor gave sanction to it
after a few days.

Page 7 Q. When was it sanctioned?

A. In March, 1940.

1984

(6)

6

Page 8.

A. X Special maneuvers

of the KANTO army ~~was~~ ^{were} planned

in the middle of 1941. When

War broke out between Soviet Russia

and Germany, ~~and~~ we supposed

that Soviet Russia would ~~turn~~ ^{move}

her army to the western front

as the war situation was not

favourable for her ^{there;} consequently

we thought we could easily

occupy the Far East.

1984

(7)

Pages 8-9

A. The basic plan of the special maneuvers of the KANTO army was dependent upon the plan of operations of the General Staff which I ^{drew up} ~~planned~~ in 1940.

According to the former plan, as I ^{have} mentioned before, the some suitable order of attack was anticipated ~~proper procedures~~ was expected in order to bring about an assault ~~to be done by turns in order to~~.

~~attack~~ from all quarters, but

according to the plan ^{for the} of special maneuvers, the time of attack

1984

(8)

was ^{to be} simultaneous in all quarters.
at some suitable opportunity.
~~This point was different.~~

~~that of the farmer.~~

Page 9.

A. In 1941, Tojo said to me in
~~a~~ conversation, "The present time
is very suitable for ^{an} attacking on
Soviet Russia, because we can
~~engage~~ ^{engage} ~~fight with~~ her without ^{encountering} ~~serious~~
strong resistance". He said also,
"The Japanese army ^{should} ~~will~~ ^{gain} ~~get~~ great

1984

(9)

9

prestige
~~his honor~~ by attacking
Soviet Russia at ~~the~~ a time when
it is ready to fall to the ground like
~~as if a ripe persimmon~~
a ripe persimmon "
~~ready to fall on the ground."~~

Page 10 Q. Do you affirm
~~recognize~~ that
Tojo had an inflexible
~~his strong~~ intention of
attacking Soviet Russia at that
time?

A. Yes, I do.

訊問調書

富永恭次 明治廿五年長崎縣五島生ル 國籍日本人 陸軍大學卒業
日本陸軍中將

一九四六年二月廿一日 モスコイ市ニ於ケル訊問ヲシタルモノハ
東京ニ於ケル 國際軍法會議ノノウイエット 聯邦側 次席 檢事
エス・サ・ロゼンブリート大佐ナリ

本

問 一九四六年三月十一日附 貴殿ノ陳述書ノ補足トシテ 貴殿ハ日本軍隊ニ於ケル勤務ノ初期
ヨリ如何ナル職務ニ從事シタルカヲ話シナサイ。

答 一八九一三年陸軍士官學校卒業後 日本軍第六師團ノ步兵第三聯隊ノ小隊長トシテ勤務
ヲ始メタリ 此ノ聯隊ハ一八九二一年迄勤ムルヲ 此ノ師團ハ内地ノ熊本市アリタリ
一九二一年カラ一九二三年迄 陸軍大學校ニ學ビ 其ノ卒業後大尉ニ進級シタリ
富永中將為

一九二四年二月步兵第二十三聯隊、中隊長ヲアリシ

一九二五年、參謀本部總務部附將校、

一九二六年一月、滿洲里驛、特務機關長、

一九二八年、再々參謀本部總務部附將校、(階級、大尉後、少佐、進級)

一九二九年一月、エヌエー、於名陸軍武官補佐官、(階級、少佐)

一九三一年、國際聯盟軍縮會議準備委員會委員、(有リ)

一九三二年、壽府、於名國際聯盟會議、參加シ、其後參謀本部第一附、次、

總務部附、(階級、少佐、一九三二年、中佐、進級)

一九三五年、參謀本部、任務ヲ受ケ、シ、對シテ將來ノ利用ノ目的、以テ露國移民

狀態、研究、シ、佛國ニ派遣、セシメタ

一九三五年秋、近衛步兵第二聯隊附、中佐、(有リ)

一九三六年末、參謀本部總務部、課長代理、(有リ)

一九三七年三月、關東軍司令部第二課長、(有リ)

一九三七年十月、關東軍司令部第一課長、(一九三六年、大佐、進級)

一九三八年三月、東京近衛步兵第二聯隊長、(有リ)

一九三九年三月、少將、進級、シ、參謀本部第四部長、任、セシメタ

富永中將

答問 答問

一九三九年九月、參謀本部第一部長に任じられたり、ソシテ一九四〇年九月迄其職務ヲ

帯びたり、同年十一月、戰車學校長に任じられたり

一九四一年、陸軍省人事局長に任じ、同年十月、中將に進級せられたり

一九四三年三月、人事局長ヲ兼務シテ陸軍次官に任じられたり

一九四四年八月末、第四航空軍司令官に任じられたり

一九四五年一月、病氣に罹リ、待命仰ぐに及ぶ、同年四月豫備に編入せられたり

一九四五年七月、召集せられたり、關東軍に赴任シ、第一百九師團長に任じられたり。富永中將

貴殿が陸軍次官に就任した時、誰が陸軍大臣に就任したか。

松本陸軍次官の時、陸軍大臣は東條大将に就任した。

一九三二年、滿洲占領ハドンナ風ニシテ誰ニヨリテ組織セられたカヲ話シナサイ。

此の時、關東軍ハ本庄繁中將が指揮ヲ居りたり。ソレヲ本庄ノ命令ニヨリテ宣戦ヲ布

告せられた。日本軍ヲ滿洲ニ進入せられた。關東軍ノ將校中、滿洲占領、最も積極的ノ役

割ノ演説、ハ關東軍司令官ノ板垣大佐及石原中佐に對して

日本軍ヲ滿洲ニ進入せられた。數年前、日本政府ハ滿洲ヲ以テ對ソ聯攻撃ノ足場

ニサレルタノ諸経ノ処置ヲとりたり。在滿日本兵數ハ間斷ナク増加せられた。ソレ聯

國境ニ向テ新ラレテ、鐵道及自動車道が建設せられた。軍需工場が建設され

富永中將

(三)

經營ニシテ

日本カ多滿洲・關東軍ノ兵員補充ノタメ莫大ナル數ノ農民

ヲ移住セシメタ

新タル倉庫、兵舎、病院等ガ建設サレタ。富永中將

問 貴殿ハ以前滿洲ニ幾何ノ軍隊ガアッテシヤガ如何ニ逐次増加セテイタカヲ具體的ニ
話ス事ガ出來ヌカ。

答 一九三一年滿洲事變ノ時迄ハ一十師團ト六ヶ歩兵大隊ガアリタ。占領ノ期間ニ朝鮮及

内地カラ滿洲ヘ莫大ナル數ノ軍隊ガ送ラレタ

關特演ノ計畫ヲ作ル前(即チ一九四一年迄)關東軍兵數ハ四十萬人ヲアツテソソ聯ト

ノ間戰頭初ニ於テハ七十萬以上ニ達シタ。富永中將

問 飛行場ハ幾ソ作ラレモシタカ。

答 ソソ聯國境沿フタメノミニテ百以上ノ飛行場ガアリス。富永中將

問 一九三一年ニ於テ鐵道ハ幾ソアジモシタカ

答 一九三一年滿洲ニテ鐵道ガアツテアリス。一九三一年以後ソソ聯國境ニツキ鐵道ノ十ヶ

以上ヲ建設シタ。マタ鐵道沿フテ自動車道路ヲ敷設シタ。富永中將

問 滿洲占領ノ目的ハ何デスカ

答 第一ニ過剩人口ヲ移住セシムル。第二ニソソ聯攻撃ノタメデアリス。結局衝突ヲ惹起スルコ

トガ豫想ヲシ居ル。ソソ聯對ニ攻撃ノ足場トシテ滿洲ヲ利用スルヲ準備シタ。富永中將

富永中將

(六)

問 貴殿ハ自身ヲ參謀本部ノ對シテ作戰計畫ノ立案ニ參加シタカ。

答 參謀本部第一部長ノ資格ニ於テ一九四〇年對シテ攻撃計畫ヲ立案シタカ。此ノ計畫ニヨリバソノ聯ト沿海州トテ分斷スルコト。主攻撃ヲハシカシ湖地區ヨリ哈府方向、指向セラルトイハルナリ。

之ハカクテ充當セラル兵カハ十ニヤ歩兵師團ヲ主力トシ、補助兵カトシテニヤ砲兵旅團、三ニヤ戰車聯隊、ニヤ騎兵旅團、五ニヤ爆撃飛行聯隊ヲ用ヒラセタカ。

哈府攻撃及津塩平地台領領 七ニヤ師團及砲兵旅團及他ノ部隊ヨリ編成セラル。北方正面ノ攻勢ヲ開始スル答アリタカ。

成功ノ場合ハ西方正面ハチノ方向、主攻撃ヲ指向シ、バイカル湖ニ至ルソノ聯領土ヲ台領領ニ目的ヲ以テ攻撃ヲ開始スル答アリタカ。富永中將

問 貴殿ハ誰ニ此ノ計畫ヲ報告シタカ。

答 參謀總長 閑院宮殿下、報告シタカ。富永中將

問 其外尚誰ニ計畫ヲ報告シタカ。

答 其自身ヨリ計畫ヲ 閑院宮殿下御同席ノ下ニ 敷シタカ。富永中將

天皇(裕仁)陛下ニ上奏

富永中將

天皇ハ計画ヲ可決セシメタカ。

問 數日後 コノ計画ハ 天皇陛下ニヨリテ 御裁可セシメタカ。富永中將

員殿ハ如何シテコノ計画ガ天皇ニヨリテ可決セラレタカヲ知リマシタカ。

問 計画ハ 天皇陛下ノ御裁可ノ後 第一部迄及セラレタカ。富永中將

問 此ノ計画ニヨリテ 閣下ノ討テル攻撃ノ時期ハ何時デアリマシタカ。

答 計画ニ於テ 閣下ノ時期ハ示シテ置キ 最高會議ヲ審議シテ

決定ニ付カセテアラス。富永中將

天皇陛下ガ後

天皇可決後 何處ニヨリ計画ハ保存セラレマシタカ。

問 參謀本部第一節ノ作戰課ニ保存セラレタカ。富永中將

コノ計画ハ 艦本ヲ誰ニ送リマシタカ。

問 コノ計画ノ艦本ヲ 關東軍ニ送リタカ。富永中將

コノ計画ノ實現ノタメニ如何ナル處置ヲトリマシタカ。

問 一人ノ上級將校(氏名ヲ忘レタカ)ガ實現ノタメニコノ計画ヲ持ツテ 關東軍司令官ニ出テ

タカ。富永中將

コノ計画ハ何時ニ可決セラレマシタカ。

問 一九四〇年三月デアラス。富永中將

富永中將

問

實現ノ多ク何時關東軍ニ送りマシカ。

答

一九四〇年四月一始デアラス。富永中將

問

貴殿ハ何時參謀本部第一部長職務ヲ去リマシタカ。

答

一九四〇年九月デアラス。富永中將

問

貴殿ハ關東軍兵數ハ關特演計畫立案後特ニ著シク増大シタト云ツタガ此ノ計畫ニ就テ貴殿ハ如何ヲ知リ居マスカ。

答

關特演ノ計畫ハ私ノ後任者參謀本部第一部長田中新一少將ヨリ一九四一年ノ中頃

問

(何月カ)正確ニ知リタシ)立案セラレタカ

答

私ハ一九四一年九月頃 日本軍隊ガソ聯領土占領後ノ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ設定スルヲ

問

ノ委員會ヲ任命スヘク東條陸軍大臣ヨリ命ジタ時。ソノ計畫ニ就テ知リタシ

答

富永中將

問

關特演ガ計畫セラレタノハ何故。特ニ一九四一年デテルカヲ説明シナサイ。

答

關特演ノ計畫ハ一九四一年ノ中頃立案セラレタ。ソレハソ聯ノ獨逸トノ戦争が始マリ

問

赤軍ノ戦勢ガ悪イデ私共ハソ聯ガ極東カラノ集ノ軍隊ヲ西方正面ニ轉送スルニテ

答

豫想シタリ。ソレヲ容易ニ極東ヲ占領シ得ルト思ヒタカ。富永中將

問

此ノ計畫ノ基礎的內容ハ何デスカ。

答

關特演計畫ノ基礎ハ一九四〇年私ヨリ立案セラレタル參謀本部ノ作戰計畫ニ存シマス

富永中將

私が陳述した通り前ノ計画は各方面ノ攻撃ノ順序が豫想を以テ居リマスが關特演ノ計画は二ノ攻撃ノ時期が凡テ同時であるが變ワラ居リマス。富永中將

關特演計畫ニ關聯シテ貴殿ノ参加セタル仕事ハ何デスカ

此ノ仕事ハ主としてソノ聯占領地統治ノ方法決定ノ委員會ノ編成。關東軍部隊將校

定員ノ充實。滿洲ニ於テ各方面軍司令部ノ編成等アリマス。富永中將

東條ハ關特演ニ關係スル仕事ニ就テ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。

東條ハ關特演計畫ノ核心ヲアツマス。富永中將

東條ハソノ計畫ヲ是認シマシタ。東條ハ關特演計畫ノ核心ヲアツマス。富永中將

東條ハソノ聯對スル戦争準備ノ増強ニ就テ貴殿ニ如何ニ説明シマシタカ。

一九四一年東條ハ私トノ會談。於テハ目下ハソノ聯ヲ攻撃スルニ好適ナル時期デアロウ

ソレハソノ軍例ノ大ニ抵抗。遭遇セムシテ戦争ヲ得ルカラデシト私ニ話シマシタ。ソレ

東條ハ恰ニ柿が既ニ熟チ自ラ地上ニ落ルルノ時期。ソレ聯ヲ攻撃スルニ好適ナル時期

日本軍ハ為譽ヲ得ルカオト話シマシタ

東條ハ關東軍ヲ遣。却員スル方法トシテ在滿既存部隊ノ人員ヲ増加スル要スル旨

ヲ述ビマス。富永中將

富永中將

問 東條ハコノ期間ニシテ聯ニ對シテ攻撃スル強イ企圖ガアツタコトヲ貴殿ハ確認シマスカ。
 答 ハイ、確認シマス。富永中將
 問 貴殿ハ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ認定スル委員會ヲ創設シタコトヲ陳述シタカ、委員會ノ編成ヲ示シナサイ。

答 委員長ハ旧關東軍參謀副長池田中將、委員ハ參謀本部第一部長荒尾大佐、參謀本部第二部長越中佐、其他ニ友民名ハ記憶シマス。富永中將

大島ヲ貴殿ハ知テ居マスカ。
 答 ハイ、知テ居マス。富永中將
 彼ハ對シテ攻撃ニ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。
 答 陸軍次官トシテ一九四一年十月廿日柏林カラ大島電報ヲ自身ニ讀ミシタカ
 此ニヨリトヒトラストノ會談ノ内容ニ對シテ大島ハヒトノ會見ノ際ソノ聯軍隊ハ志氣沮喪シテ了ラタカラ若シ日本ガソノ聯ニ對シテ攻撃ノ案ニ此ノ機會ヲ利用トス

トス。此ニ就テ後ヲ残念ガルデハトト聲明シタコトヲ打電シマス
 一九四三年春大島ハ福邊政府ニ對シテ聯軍行動ノ開始ヲ促進スルコトヲ乞フ旨ヲ打電シマス
 電報ハ日本軍勇將ヲ賞讃シ友邦ニビルマニ於テ戰爭ノ困難ニ同情シ、極東ニ於テソノ聯軍攻撃ヲ即時開始シ、同時ニ印支。

富永中將

對スル作戰ヲ強化スルヲ希望スル旨結語アリタリ。富永中將

問 日本軍事工業労働力ノ補給ニ就テ貴殿ハ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジタカ。

答 東條陸軍大臣中等及高等學校ヲ閉鎖シテ軍事工業従事者ノ動員スル必要ヲ報告シタリ

此ノ提案ハ閣議ヲ可決セシメ實現シタリ。富永中將

問 對米對英對支戰局ノ準備及實行ニ就テノ貴殿ノ役割ヲ詳述シテ

答 支那於テ軍事行動ノ初期於テ私ハ關東軍司令部第三課長デアリタリ。私ノ主ナル

仕事ハ對ソ諜報勤務デアリタリ。一九三七年北支ニ於テ事件が始リタリ時私ハ

自身北支ニ於テ軍事行動ニ参加シテ作戰ヲ指導スルコトヲ為シタリ。私ハ關東軍司令部

植田ノ指示ニヨリテ行動シタリ。植田ハ關東軍參謀長トシテ東條ト共ニ作戰ヲ指導

スルコトヲ命ジタリ。私ハ北支ニ於テ張家口其他ノ諸地方攻勢ニ参加シタリ

對米英作戰行動ニ参加シタリ。私ノ役割ハ主トシテ南方ニ行動シテ新部隊ノ

編成、編制人員ノ充實及軍隊司令部創設ニアリタリ

陸軍次官トシテ私ハ四人ノ所謂決死要員ヲ準備組成シタリ。此等ノ要員ハ特

別ノ機関(掃蕩トシテ水雷)ヲ以テ太平洋ニ本國艦船ヲ爆發セシメタリ

富永中將

ソノ後一九四四年四月間 比島ニ行動シタリ。此ノ時ハ米國航空機隊ニ對シテ行動シタリ。此ノ軍ニテ敵ヲ殲滅スルニ激突自爆スル任務ヲ有ル。其結果飛行士ノ飛行機相共ニ滅ビタリ。シテ作戰任務進行ノ際ニ戦死スル全飛行士ハ千人ニ達シタリ。富永中將也

問 米國艦船ヲ向隻沈メマシタカ。
答 私人深山沈メタト思ヒマス。然レ私ノ軍ノ飛行士ハ任務ヲ受ケタリ、歸還セタリテ有隻ヲ申シ上ケラセマス。富永中將也

問 向故ニ貴殿ハ陸軍次官ヲ免ジラマシタカ。
答 私人東條陸軍大臣ノ離任ニ伴ヒテ職ヲ免ジラセタリ。日本テ陸軍大臣ガマレルト之ニ伴ヒ次官ニマレルトカ度アリマス。私人東條ノ離任後約一月經テ次官職ヲ去リマス。富永中將也

問ニ對スル答ハ私ノ自筆ヲ認メ署名シタリ。富永中將也
訊問シタルモノハ東京ニ於ケル國際軍法會議ノソウイェット聯邦側
次席秘書 エス・ヤ・ロゼンブリット大佐
陸軍通譯官 ゴロマンフ中尉
A. Rosenberg
A. Rosenberg

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I ~~to~~ ^{to} my answers for the above
questions ~~with~~ ⁱⁿ my own handwriting
and ^{have} signed them.

My ~~present~~ interrogators ~~were~~

is Col. S. T. ROSENBLIT, who

is an ^{Russian} associate procurator

at the International Military

Tribunal in Tokyo, and

Army interpreter Lt. ZOROMANOF.

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訊問調書

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1984

富永恭次

明治廿五年長崎縣五島ニ生ル國籍日本

人陸軍大子九十五歳 日本陸軍中将

一九四六年二月廿一日モスコウ市ニ於ケル訊問ヲシタル

モハ東京ニ於ケル國際軍事法會議ノソウエイット聯

邦側次席檢事エスヤロセンブリート大佐ナリ

向一九四六年二月十一日附貴殿ノ陳述書ノ補足トシテ貴

殿ハ日本軍隊ニ於ケル勤務ノ初期ヨリ如何ナル職務ニ

従事シタルカヲ話シナサイ。

答私ハ一九一五年陸軍士官学校卒業後日本軍第一師

團ノ步兵中隊ニ任ゼラルニ此ノ時ニ於テ勤務ヲ始メタル

此ノ師團ニ於テ一九二一年迄勤メタル。此ノ師團ハ内地

ノ熊本市ニアリマシタ。一九二一年カラ一九二三年迄陸軍

大子学校ニ在リシ其ノ九十歳ニ至ル迄大尉ニ進級シマシタ。

一九二四年ニ同歩兵中隊ニ任ゼラル。中隊長テアリマシタ。

一九二五年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九二六年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九二八年ニ再ビ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

後ニ少佐ニ進級

一九二九年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三〇年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三一年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三二年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三三年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三四年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三五年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三六年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三七年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三八年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九三九年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九四〇年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九四一年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

一九四二年ニ參謀本部總務部附將校ニ任ゼラル。

1984

ハ少佐)

リマシタ

一九三二年 陸軍省ニ於ケル 國際聯盟會議ニ參加シマシタ 其
後 參謀本部 一 部 附ニ次ニ 總務部 附ニマシタ
(階級ハ少佐 一九三二年ニ中佐ニ進級)

一九三五年 參謀本部ノ 任務ヲ受ケル 聯ニ對スル 將來ノ 利
用ノ 目的ヲ以テ 露モ 移民 狀態ノ 研究ヲ ナシ 佛
國ニ 派遣 セラレマシタ

一九三五年 秋 近衛 歩兵 師ニ 聯隊 附中 佐ニ ナリマシタ

一九三六年 末 參謀 本部 總務 部ノ 課長 代理ニ ナリマシタ

一九三七年 三月 ヲリ 關東 軍司令部 課長ニ ナリマシタ

一九三七年 十月ニ 關東 軍司令部 課長ニ ナリマシタ
(一九三六年ニ 大佐ニ 進級)

一九三八年 三月 カラ 東京 近衛 歩兵 師ニ 聯隊長ニ ナリマシタ

一九三九年 三月ニ 少將ニ 進級シテ 參謀 本部 四 部長ニ 任
セラレマシタ

一九三九年 九月ニ 參謀 本部 一 部長ニ 任セラレマシタ ソレテ

一九四〇年 九月 迄 其 職務ヲ 兼 帯シマシタ 同年

十二月ニ 戰車 學校 校長ニ 任セラレマシタ

一九四一年ニ 陸軍 省 人事 局長ニ 任セラレ 同年 十一月ニ 中將
ニ 進級シマシタ

一九四三年 三月ニ 人事 局長ヲ 兼 務シテ 陸軍 次官ニ 任セラレ

マシタ

1984

一九四四年八月末、第四航空軍司令部官に任せられた

一九四五年一月、二病室に在り待命仰付けられた同年

四月豫備に編入された

一九四五年七月召集せられた関東軍に赴任し、百三十九師

團長に任せられた。

同、貴殿が陸軍次官であった時、誰か陸軍大臣であった

カ

答、私が陸軍次官の時、陸軍大臣は東條であった

同、一九三一年、滿洲占領ハドンナ風ニシテ誰ニヨツテ組織サ

レタカヲ話シナサイ

答、此の時、関東軍ハ本庄繁中將が指揮シテ居りました

ソシテ本庄、命令ニヨツテ宣戰ヲ布告セズニ日本軍ヲ

滿洲ニ進入させました、関東軍、將校中、滿洲占領ニ取

モ積極的、役割ヲ演じたハ、関東軍司令部、板垣

大佐及石原中佐でありました

日本軍ヲ滿洲ニ進入させたら数年、向ニ日本政府ハ

滿洲ヲ以テ対ソ聯攻撃ノ足場ニサセルタメ、諸種ノ処置

ヲとりました、在滿日本兵數ハ向斷ナク増加されました

ソ、聯國境ニ向ッテ新ラキ鉄道及自動車道が建設サ

レました、軍需工場が建設サレ、經營セラレました、日本カラ

滿洲ニ関東軍ノ兵員補充ノタメニ莫大ナル數ノ農

民ヲ移住せました、新タナル倉庫兵舎病院等が

建設されました

1984

向貴殿ハ以前滿洲ニ幾何ノ軍隊カアツテソレカ如何ニ
逐次増加サレテイツタカラ具體的ニ話スユトガ出来
マスカ

答一九三三年滿洲事變ノ時迄ハ一ヶ師團トハケケル兵
大隊ガアリマシタ占領ノ期間ニ朝鮮及内地カラ滿洲
ヘ莫大ニ兵數ノ軍隊ガ送ラレマシタ

岡特演ノ計畫ヲ作ル前(即チ一九四一年迄)岡東軍
兵數ハ四十萬人デアツテ「ソ」聯ト、岡戦頭初ニ於テハ
七十万以上ニ達シマシタ。

向飛行場ハ幾ソ作ラレマシタカ。

答「ソ」聯ノ境界ニ沿フタモノノミニテ百以上ノ飛行場ガアリマ
ス

向一九三一年ニ於テ鉄道ハ幾ソアリマシタカ

答一九三一年滿洲ニハニヶ鉄道ガアツタノミデアリマス一九三
年以迄ソ聯ノ境界ニ向フ鉄道ノ十ヶ以上ヲ建設シマシタ
マタ鉄道ニ沿フテ自動車道路ヲ敷設シマシタ。

向滿洲占領ノ目的ハ何ヲスカ

答第一ニ過剰人口ヲ移住セシムルヲ、第二ニ「ソ」聯政權ヲ
ノタメデアリマス 結局衝突ヲ惹起スルコトガ豫想ハセ
ラレテ居リマシタ「ソ」聯ニ対スル攻撃ノ足場トシテ滿
洲ヲ利用スルコトヲ準備シマシタ。

向貴殿ハ自身「ソ」モニハンノ件ニ参加シマシタカソレテ誰

4 此ノ軍事行動ノ發起者デアリマシタカ

答私自身ハ「ソ」モニハン事件ニハ参加シマセンデシタケレトモ

1984

参謀本部第四部(戦史)長トシテソノ事件ヲ研究シタリ
軍事行動ハ日本軍が始メタリ其行動ハ蒙古ニ対
スル戦争ヲ挑発スル目的ヲ有シマシタ

向蒙古民族共和国ハソノ聯トハ同盟ノ関係ニアルコトハ
明瞭デアルカラソノモンハン攻撃ハマタソノ聯ニ対スル戦
争ノ挑発テアルコトハ分ツテ居ソウセウ

答ハイソウデス

日本政府ニ於テハ外蒙古がソノモンハン地方ニ於テ滿洲
領土ヲ占領シタリテ從ツテ蒙古が戦争ヲ始メ関東
軍ノ軍ヲ行動ハ四軍ニ占領セラレタ領土ノ滿洲ノ權
利ヲ回復スル目的ヲ有シタル如クニ輿論ヲ作製シテ
ソノヤウナ言ヒ廻シラシマシタ

向貴殿ハソノモンハン事件ノ個人的責任者トシテ誰ヲ思
ヒラヌカ

答ソノモンハン事件ノ責任者ヲ私ハ関東軍司令官植田
及参謀長磯谷ト思ヒラスコノ事件後速ニ二人共
待命ニナリマシタ

向貴殿ハ自身デ参謀本部ノ対ソノ作戰計画ノ立
案ホニムカシマシタカ

答ソノ参謀本部ホ一部长ノ次資格ニ於テ一九四〇年対ソ
攻撃計画ヲ立案シマシタ

此ノ計画ヨレバソノ聯ト沿海州トヲ分断スルタメ
五攻撃ヲハンカ湖地ニヨリ哈府方向ニ指向セラレ
ナケレバナリマセンデシタ

1984

之が為に充ち當せらるる兵カハ十一ヶ歩兵師團ヲ主力トシ補助兵カトシテニヶ砲兵旅團ニヶ戦車聯隊ニヶ騎兵旅團五ヶ爆撃機聯隊ヲ用ヒラレマシタ
哈府攻撃ヲ及浦塩平地占領後セケ師團及砲兵旅團及他部隊ヨリ編成セラレタル北方正面ハ攻勢ヲ開始スル筈デアリマシタ

成功ノ場合ハ西方正面ハ勿レノ方向ニ主攻勢ヲ指向シバイカル湖ニ至ルヲ聯領土ヲ占領スル目的ヲ以テ攻撃ヲ開始スル筈デアリマシタ。

向貴殿ハ誰ニ此ノ計画ヲ報告シマシタカ

答 参謀總長閑院宮殿下ニ報告シマシタ

向 其外尚誰ニ計画ヲ報告シマシタカ

答 私自身ヨリ計画ヲ閑院宮殿下ヨリ同席ノ下ニ

天皇(裕仁)陛下ニ上奏致シマシタ

向 天皇ハ計画ヲ可決シマシタカ

答 教口後ヨリ計画ハ天皇陛下ニヨリテ可裁可セラレマシタ

向 貴殿ハ如何シテコノ計画が天皇ニヨリテ可決セラレタカ

ヲ知リマシタカ

答 計画ハ天皇陛下ノ可裁可ヲ経テ亦一部ニ返戻セラ

レマシタ

向 此ノ計画ニヨリテソノ聯ニ対スル攻撃ノ時期ハ何時デア

アリマシタカ

6 答 計画ニ於テハ南戦ノ時期ハ未シテアリラセンソレハ最良

會議ヲ審議ヲシテ天皇陛下ノ可決ニナルカラデ

アリマス。

1984

向 天皇可決後何處ニコノ計画ハ保存セラレマシタカ。

答 参謀本部の一部ノ作戰課ニ保存セラレマシタ。

向 コノ計画ハ藤本ヲ誰ニ送りマシタカ。

答 コノ計画ハ藤本ヲ関東軍ニ送りマシタ。

向 コノ計画ハ實現ノタメニ如何ナル處置ヲトリマシタカ

答 一人ノ上級將校(氏名ヲモシレマシタ)が實現ノタメニコノ

計画ヲ持ッテ関東軍司令官ニ届ケマシタ。

向 コノ計画ハ何月ニ可決サレマシタカ。

答 一九四〇年三月デアリマス。

向 實現ノタメ何時関東軍ニ送りマシタカ。

答 一九四〇年四月、始メデアリマス。

向 貴殿ハ何時参謀本部第一部長職務ヲ去リマシタカ。

答 一九四〇年九月デアリマス。

向 貴殿ハ関東軍兵數ハ関特演計画ニ安否後特ニ

著シク増大シタト云ツタガ此ノ計画ニ就テ貴殿ハ何

ヲ知ッテ井マスカ

答 関特演ノ計画ハ私ノ後任者タル参謀本部第一部長

田中新一少將ニヨリテ一九四一年ノ中頃(何月カハ正確

ニ知リマセン)迄安否セラレマシタ

私ハ一九四一年九月頃日本軍隊ガソノ併領土占領後

ノ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ設定スルタメノ委員会會ヲ

任命スベク東條陸軍大臣カラ命セラレタ時ニコノ

計画ニ就テ知リマシタ。

同 南特演が計画セラレタハ何故ニ特ニ一九四一年デアアル

カヲ説明シナサイ

答 南特演ノ計画ハ一九四一年ノ中頃ニ立案セラレマシタ。ソレハソノ聯ト独逸トノ戦争が始マリ赤軍ハ戦勢ガ悪イノデ私共ハソノ聯ガ極東カラ其ノ軍隊ヲ西ノ正面ニ輸送スルコトヲ豫想シマシタソレデ容易ニ極東ヲ占領シ得ルト思ヒマシタ。

同 此ノ計画ノ基礎的内容ハ何デスカ

答 南特演計画ノ基礎一九四〇年私ニヨツテ立テラシ見參謀本部ノ作戰計畫ニ存シマス私ガ陳述シマシタ通り前ノ計畫ニシレバ各方面ノ攻撃ノタメ相当ノ順序ガ想セラレテ居リマシタ南特演ノ計畫デハソノ攻撃ノ時期ガ凡テ同時デアルガ要ツテ居リマス。

同 南特演計畫南聯シテ貴殿ノ参加シテ任事ハ何デスカ

答 此ノ任事ハ主トシテソノ聯占領地統治ノ方法設定ノ委員会ノ編成・南東軍部隊將校定員ノ充實・滿洲ニ於ケルニ方面軍司令部ノ編成デアリマシタ。

同 東條ハ南特演ニ關係凡任事ニ就テ如何ニ役割ヲ演ジマシタカ

答 東條ハソノ計畫ヲ是認シマシタ東條ハ南特演計畫ノ核心デアリマシタ。

同 東條ハソノ聯ニ対スル戦争準備ノ増強ニ就テ貴

殿ニ如何ニ説明シマシタカ

答「一九四一年東條ハ私トノ会談ニ於テ「目下ハソ」聯ヲ
 攻撃スルヲナニ好適ナル時期デアロウソレハソ」軍側
 ノ大ナル抵抗ニ遭遇セズシテ戦争ニ得ルカラデア
 ルト私ニ話シマシタ。又東條ハ恰モ柿ガ既ニ熟シテ
 自ラ地上ニ落ケルヤウノ時期「ソ」聯ヲ攻撃スルコトニ
 ヲツテ日本軍ハ名譽ヲ得ルデアラウト話シマシタ。
 東條ハ南東軍ヲ運ニ動員スル方法トシテ在滿既
 存部隊ノ人員増加スルヲ要スル旨ヲ述ベマシタ。
 問「東條ハソ」期間「ソ」聯ニ対シテ攻撃スル強イ企圖
 ガアツタコトヲ貴殿ハ確認シマスカ。

答「ハイ確認シマス。」

問「貴殿ハ占領地統治ノ方法ヲ設定スル委員会ヲ創
 設シタコトヲ陳述シタカ委員会ノ編成ヲ示ササイ。」

答「委員長ハ旧南東軍參謀副長池田中將、
 委員ハ參謀本部才一部荒尾大佐參謀本
 部才二部大越中佐其他ニ名、氏名ハ記憶シマセン。」

問「大島ヲ貴殿ハ知テ居マスカ。」

答「ハイ知ツテ居ス。」

問「彼ハ対ソ」攻撃ニ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。」

答「然陸軍次官トシテ一九四一年十二月附伯林カラノ

大島電報ヲ自身ニ讀ミマシタソレニヨルト「ヒットラー」

トノ会談ノ内容ヲ傳ヘテ大島ハヒットノ会見ノ際

「ソ」聯軍隊ハ志氣沮喪シテ了ツタカラ若シ日本ガ「ソ」

聯ニ対スル攻撃ノタメニ此、機会ヲ利用セヌナラハソレニ就テ後デ残念ガ
 ルデアラウト声明シテ旨ヲ打電シマシタ。一九四三年春大島ハ「獨逸政
 府ハ対ソレ聯、軍ヲ行動ノ開始ヲ促進スルコトヲ乞フ旨」ヲ打電
 シマシタ。電報ハ日本軍ノ勇敢ヲ賞讃シ支那及「ビルマ」ニ於ケ
 ル戦争ノ困難ニ同情シ、極東ニ於ケルソレ聯攻撃ヲ即時開
 始シ、同時ニ印度ニ対スル作戰ヲ強化スルコトヲ希望スル旨結
 論シテアリマシタ。

向、日本軍ヲ工業労働力ノ補給ニ就テ貴殿ハ如何ナル役割ヲ演ジマシタカ。
 答、私ハ東條陸軍大臣ニ中等及高等学校ヲ閉鎖シテ軍ヲ工業

従事者ニ動員スル必要ヲ報告シマシタ。此提案ハ閣議テ可決セラレ

実現シマシタ。

向、対米対英対支戦争ノ準備及実行ニ就テ、貴殿ノ役割ヲ話シマシ
 答、支那ニ於ケル軍ヲ行動ノ初期ニ於テ私ハ関東軍司令部ヲ二課
 長デアリマシタ。私、主ナルはるハ対ソレ謀報勤務デアリマシタガ、

一九三七年北支ニ於ケル事件ガ始マリマシタ時私ハ自身、北支ニ於ケ
 ル軍ヲ行動ニ参加シテ作戰ヲ指導スルコトニナリマシタ。私ハ関東軍
 司令官植田ノ指示ニヨツテ行動シマシタ。植田ハ関東軍ヲ參謀長タリシ
 東條ト共ニ作戰ヲ指導スルコトヲ私ニ命ジマシタ。私ハ北支ニ於
 ケル張家口其他ノ諸地方攻略ニ参加シマシタ。対米英作戰
 行動参加ニ関シテハ私ノ役割ハ主トシテ南方ニ行動シタル新
 部隊ノ編成、編制人員ノ充實及軍隊司令部創設ニアリマ
 シタ。

1984

陸軍次官トシテ私ハ四千ノ所謂決死要員ヲ準備組成シタ。此等ノ要員ハ特別ノ機肉（操縦セラレタル水雷）ヲ以テ太平洋ニ米國艦船ヲ爆殺セシメマシタ。

ソノ後一九四四年ノ四ヶ月間比島ニ行動シタルカ四航空軍ヲ指揮シマシタ。私ノ軍ハ米國航空及艦隊ニ対シテ行動シマシタ。此ノ軍、三ヶ師團ハ敵ヲ殲滅スルタメニ激突自爆スル任務ヲ有スル所謂決死要員カラ成リマシタ。其ノ結果飛行士飛行機相共ニ滅ビマシタ。ソレデ作戰任務遂行ニ際シ戦死シタル全飛行士ハ千人ニ達シマシタ

11 向米國艦船ヲ何隻沈マシタカ、

答私ハ沈山沈メタト思ヒス然シ私ノ軍ノ飛行士ハ任務ヲ受ケタマ、歸還セヌノデ何隻カハ申シ上げラレマセン。

1984

尚何故貴殿に陸軍次官ヲ免ジラレマシタカ。

答私に東條陸軍大臣ノ離任ニ伴ヒソノ職ヲ免

ゼラレマシタ。日本デハ陸軍大臣ガヤメルト之ニ

伴ヒ次官モヤメルコトガ度々アリマス私ハ東條

ノ離任後約一ヶ月經テ次官ノ職ヲ去リマシタ

尚ニ対スル答ハ私ノ自筆デ認メ署名シマシタ

富永中一將 

訊向シタルモノハ東京ニ於ケル國際軍法會議

ノソグイエット聯邦側

次席檢事 エス・ヤ・ロゼンブリート大佐 (署名)

陸軍通訳官ゾロマノフ中尉 (署名)

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