

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown; Mr. Dunigan

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Araki  
Tojo

WITNESS

Ueda, Kenkichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

| <u>Record</u> | <u>Man Sum</u> |
|---------------|----------------|
| 5119-5182     | Pg 80          |

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Ueda, Kenkichi

Record  
5119-5182

Manchurian  
Summary  
Pg 80

Title: General, Kwantung Army

Source: Interrogatories of Hoshino, Naoki

Was Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Army during a period between 1932-1936.

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. A. Conyns-Carr; Mr. W. Glanville Brown;  
Mr. Lester C. Dunigan ✓

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

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DEFENDANT - ARAKI, Sadao  
TOJO, Hideki

WITNESS

Ueda, Kenkichi

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Record

Manchurian Summary

2944-2947  
2949-2957  
5119-5183  
5114-5116

Page 80  
Page 80

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EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: UEDA, Kenkichi

Record  
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Man. Sun.

Title: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo, June 10, 1936.

Source: Not shown - Probably Japanese Foreign Office.

Negotiated and signed the treaty of June 10, 1936 and the agreement between Manchuria and Japan of the same date granting special privileges to Japanese nationals in Manchuria.

Name: Uyeda, Kenkichi

Record  
5114-5118

Manchurian Summary  
Pg 80

Title: General, Twantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo, 1936.

Source: Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939.

Became Ambassador and General succeeding Minami in 1936.

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lester C. Dunigan

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

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DEFENDANT

ARAKI, Sadao,  
TOJO, Hideki

WITNESS

UEDA, Kenichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

1. Curriculum Vitae
2. Memorandum
3. Inf. from CIS, G-2,
4. Subpoena

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(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

E. P. M.

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS  
13 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: UEDA, Kenkichi

Address: Resident of Oiso, Kanagawa-Ku.

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

File 281, Serial 17: Commander of Army garrison in Tientsin.

File 225, Serial 23:

File 247, Serial 17: Asst to Prince KANIN who was head General Staff at time of proposed Anti-Comintern Pact.

File 200, Serial 15: Former Commanding Officer Kwantung Army.

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File 440, Serial 2: AIKAWA stated that while he was only nominally in command.

File 214, Serial 42: Contains same information.

File 214, Serial 8:

File 378, Serial 101: Report for interrogation to Mr. Leonidov, Room 352, War Ministry Building.

File 300, Serial 109: Was Commander-in-Chief of the Army during the time that the Five-Year Plan for Manchukuo was put in effect, which was May 9, 1937.

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COPIES: 3 File  
1 Mr. Newbill

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Operations, CIS, G-2  
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: UEDA, Kenkichi

1943 Member of the General Staff; former Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo in 1931.

1932 Wounded in Shanghai by bombs together with Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA, Ambassador Mamoru SHIGEMITSU and others;

Subject was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. (His chief of staff was Lt. -Gen. Seishiro ITAGAKI). His successor was General Yoshijiro UMEZU.

SOURCE: OSS FE

Mar. 1936 Commander of Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchuria.

SOURCE: CIO



16 April 1947

UEDA, Kenichi

In connection with this witness, attention is called to IPS Document #724B which was introduced as Prosecution Exhibit #212 at page 2,705 of the Record. Document is a cable dispatched on 7 May 1936 by Ambassador UEDA to Foreign Minister ARITA. Cable deals with plan to set up the Mongolian state and sets forth the details of such plan.

(NOTE: It will be noted from the positions held by UEDA that he was Ambassador to Manchuria in 1936 and that he concurrently held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.)

File 393 serial 12 contain  
same information as  
300 serial 109.

File 247 serial 17  
interception of Okhina  
p 20 says he addressed  
communications to Prince  
Kawan head of General  
Staff and that his assistant  
was General Ueda,  
Kerikichi - was talking  
about Anti-Comintern  
Pack.

COPY

Doc. No. 2971

Page 108

UNDA, Kenkichi

| <u>Date</u>      | <u>Class of<br/>Decoration</u>                  | <u>Achievement</u>              | <u>Recommending<br/>Ministry</u>  |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 29 Aprl.<br>1934 | Military Order of the Golden<br>Kite, 3rd Class | Manchurian<br>Incident          | Imperial<br>Household<br>Ministry |
| 29 Apr.<br>1934  | Grand Gorden of the Order of<br>the Rising Sun  | "                               | "                                 |
| 25 June<br>1940  | Grand Croix, Sant Maurice<br>et Lazar (Italy)   | Japan-Italy<br>Amity            | Foreign<br>Office                 |
| 1 Dec.<br>1937   | First Class, Sungkuang-Chang<br>(Manchukuo)     | Japan and<br>Manchukuo<br>Amity | "                                 |
| 9 Dec.<br>1941   | Grand Order, Collar of Lanhua<br>(Manchukuo)    | "                               | "                                 |

UEDA, Kenkichi

| <u>Date</u>     | <u>Class of Decoration</u>                   | <u>Achievement</u>        | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
|-----------------|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 29 Apr.<br>1934 | Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class | Manchurian Incident       | Imperial Household Ministry  |
| 29 Apr.<br>1934 | Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun  | "                         | "                            |
| 25 June<br>1940 | Grand Croix, Sant Maurice et Lazar (Italy)   | Japan-Italy Amity         | Foreign Office               |
| 1 Dec.<br>1937  | First Class, Sungkuang-Chang (Manchukuo)     | Japan and Manchukuo Amity | "                            |
| 9 Dec.<br>1941  | Grand Order, Collar of Lanhua (Manchukuo)    | "                         | "                            |

12 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner  
FROM: L. C. Dunigan  
RE: OKADA, Kikusaburo

There is no file on the above named person in the office but I have run across the following while preparing for another witness:

One TAKEUCHI, Ayoski was interviewed on May 6, 1946 by Joe B. Williams in connection with the Manchurian Incident. Takeuchi was formerly a correspondent for the Tokyo-Osaka News from 1917-1940 and from July 1941 to January 4, 1946 was Secretary to the Japanese Chamber of Economics in Shanghai; in connection with the 5-year plan for Manchukuo Takeuchi stated the following:

That the instigators of the plan were Hoshina, Nioki, and Kishi, Shinsuke; Hoshina at the time being Director of the General Affairs Board for Manchukuo; Kishi Vice-Minister for Manchurian Industries Board and later Assistant Director of General Affairs Board in Manchukuo, and later Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry in Japan. In 1941, he, Kishi was Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet. At the time the plan was put into effect the Commander in Chief of the army in Manchuria was General UEDA, Kenkichi and he was also Ambassador.

Takeuchi stated that the plan was sponsored by the army and that that fact was common knowledge. Takeuchi did not want to be a witness because Hoshina and Kishi were his personal friends.

(Note: After Okada, the present witness, has testified about the 5-year plan he should be asked about Hoshina, Kishi and Ueda. Hoshina, is, of course, a defendant, and Kishi and Ueda have been subpoenaed by Tojo as his witness in addition to developing evidence against Hoshina an attempt should be made through Okada to discredit Kishi and Ueda as much as possible before they take the stand as witness for Tojo.

UEDA, Kenkichi

Request by Tojo, Hideki

Address: Oiso Kanagawa Prefecture

Former Commander-in-Chief of Kwangtung Army and  
concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo.

He will be able to testify to relationship between  
Manchukuo and Kwangtung Army.

REPORT BY: LT. JOHN A. CURTIS  
13 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: UEDA, Kenkichi

Address: Resident of Oiso, Kanagawa-Ku.

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1 Mr. Newbill

UEDA, Kenkichi

20 Feb 47

Gave copy of curriculum vitae and memo for the file dated 13 Jan 47  
to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.



1st. Hand

UEDA, Kentichi

Request by: Tojo, Hideki

Address: Oiso Kanagawa Prefecture

Former chief of Kwangtung Army and  
concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo.

<sup>be able to</sup>  
He will testify to relationship between  
Manchukuo and Kwangtung Army.

ARAKI, Sadao

18 apr

TOJO, Hidiki

for Comyns - Carr, Brown, Quigley

re: b V, memo for file, information  
from c IS, H-2 and subpoena

and please make 5 copies of  
each of attached instruments  
except subpoena

UEDA, Kenkichi

Request by Araki, Sadao

Address: May be located in Tokyo.

He was formerly a general in the Japanese Army.

(1st branch)

WEDA, Kentichi

Request by: Araki, Sadao.

address: may be located in Tokyo.

He was formerly a general in the Jap Army

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: UEDA, Kenkichi

Date of Birth: 8 March 1875

Permanent Domicile: No. 58 Oaza Ikejiri Sayama-mura  
Minami-Kohchi-gun Osaka-fu

- |                             |                |   |
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| 27 April                    | 1904:          | Appointed Member of Cavalry Inspection Office   |
| 2 August                    | 1904:          | Promoted to Cavalry Captain   |
| from 1 May<br>to 16 October | 1904:<br>1905: | Ex-Mar Service Department of<br>Military Education                                      |
| 3 December 1906             | 1906:          | Assigned to 12th Cavalry Regiment   |
| 3 December                  | 1909:          | Graduated from Military University  |
| 10 December                 | 1909:          | Appointed Staff-Officer of 8th Division   |
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| 19 August                   | 1912:          | Appointed Staff-Officer of 16th Division  |
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMLAND  
Operations, CIS, G-2  
Compilation Branch

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1 Mr. Newbill

Name: Ueda, Kenkichi

Record  
5119-5182

Manchurian  
Summary  
Pg 80

Title: General, Kwantung Army

Source: Interrogatories of Hoshino, Naoki

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Name: UEDA, Kenkichi

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Pg 80

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Permanent Domicile: No. 58 Oaza Ikejiri Sayama-mura  
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21 April 1947

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13 Jan 47

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FAR EAST COMMAND  
Operations, CIS, G-2  
Compilation Branch

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Subject was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. (His chief of staff was Lt. -Gen. Seishiro ITAGAKI). His successor was General Yoshijiro UMEZU.

**SOURCE:** OSS FE

Mar. 1936 Commander of Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchuria.

**SOURCE:** CLO

See File 393

UEDA, Kenkichi

Request by Araki, Sadao

Address: May be located in Tokyo.

He was formerly a general in the Japanese Army.

See Interrogation  
" Doc 102-11

See Exhibits 212, 237, 670, 493, 762, 835  
2438, 2476

UEDA, Kenkichi

Request by Tojo, Hideki

Address: Oiso Kanagawa Prefecture

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File 214, Serial 8:

File 378, Serial 101: Report for interrogation to Mr. Leonidov, Room 352, War Ministry Building.

File 300, Serial 109: Was Commander-in-Chief of the Army during the time that the Five-Year Plan for Manchukuo was put in effect, which was May 9, 1937.

File 393, Serial 12:

File 77, Serial 16:

File 69, Serial 94: Contains some information.

COPIES: 3 File  
1 Mr. Newbill

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: UEDA, Kenkichi

Date of Birth: 8 March 1875

Permanent Domicile: No. 58 Oaza Ikejiri Sayama-mura  
Minami-Konchi-gun Osaka-fu

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 1 Dec. 1896                         | Appointed Officer Candidate  |
| 25 Nov. 1898                        | Graduated from Military Academy  |
| 27 June 1899                        | Appointed Cavalry Sublieutenant  |
| 3 Nov. 1901                         | Promoted to Cavalry Lieutenant   |
| 25 Oct. 1902                        | Graduated from Military Riding School  |
| 27 Apr. 1904                        | Appointed Member of Cavalry Inspection Office.                                 |
| 2 Aug. 1904                         | Promoted to Cavalry Captain.   |
| From 1 May 1904<br>to 16 Oct. 1905  | Ex-Mar Service Department of Military Education                                |
| 3 Dec. 1906                         | Assigned to 12th Cavalry Regiment  |
| 3 Dec. 1909                         | Graduated from Military University   |
| 10 Dec. 1909                        | Appointed Staff-Officer of 8th Division  |
| 22 Apr. 1911                        | Promoted Cavalry Major and assigned to 9th Cavalry Regiment                    |
| 19 Aug. 1912                        | Appointed Staff-Officer of 16th Division                                       |
| 15 July 1912                        | Appointed Member of Military Affairs Bureau (Gunmu-Kyoku)<br>of War Department |
| 2 May 1916                          | Promoted to Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel and Assigned to<br>General Staff Office |
| 6 June 1916                         | Ordered to make Inspection Tour in Europe                                      |
| 6 Aug. 1917                         | Appointed Member of Cavalry Inspection Office                                  |
| 30 Aug. 1917                        | Concurrently appointed Member of Deliberation Bureau on<br>Military Technique  |
| From 2 Aug. 1918<br>to 12 Dec. 1918 | Ex-War Service in Department of Military Education                             |

13 Dec. 1918 Appointed Staff-Officer of Expedition Corps in Vladivostok

25 July 1919 Appointed to Cavalry Colonel and assigned to Headquarters of Expedition Corps in Vladivostok

14 Oct. 1919 Appointed Staff Officer of Expedition Corps in Vladivostok

From 2 Sept. 1923 Assigned to Matters pertaining to Martial Law in  
to 16 Nov. 1923 Military Air Force Headquarters

17 Mar. 1923 Appointed Commander of 1st Cavalry Regiment

6 Aug. 1923 Promoted Major General and assigned to Military Air Force Headquarters

4 Feb. 1924 Appointed Commander of 3rd Cavalry Brigade

1 May 1925 Assigned to Headquarters of Supplement Office of Military Horses

2 Mar. 1926 Appointed Chief of Headquarters above

16 Mar. 1929 Appointed Commander-in-Chief Japanese Forces stationed in China.

22 Dec. 1932 Appointed Commander of 9th Division

2 Feb. 1932 Ordered by Urgent Mobilization Regulation to proceed to Shanghai to participate in Landing

29 Apr. 1932 Injured by Bomb thrown by some Assaulters at Shanghai New Park and hospitalized

6 June 1932 Returned to Osaka

1 Sept. 1932 Appointed Member of General Staff Office.

19 June 1933 Appointed Vice Chief of General Staff

12 May 1934 Ordered to attend Prince Chichibu on Journey in Manchoukuo

1 Aug. 1934 Resigned from Vice Chief of General Staff and appointed Commander-in-Chief of Japanese Army Forces in Korea.

UEDA, Kenkichi

| <u>Date</u>     | <u>Class of Decoration</u>                   | <u>Achievement</u>        | <u>Recommending Ministry</u> |
|-----------------|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 29 Apr.<br>1934 | Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class | Manchurian Incident       | Imperial Household Ministry  |
| 29 Apr.<br>1934 | Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun  | "                         | "                            |
| 25 June<br>1940 | Grand Croix, Sant Maurice et Lazar (Italy)   | Japan-Italy Amity         | Foreign Office               |
| 1 Dec.<br>1937  | First Class, Sungkuang-Chang (Manchukuo)     | Japan and Manchukuo Amity | "                            |
| 9 Dec.<br>1941  | Grand Order, Collar of Lanhua (Manchukuo)    | "                         | "                            |

UEDA

Interrogation of HOSHINO

p/5,123

Q. Who was chief of the Kwantung Army during the period 1932-36?

A. At first it was Lt. General HONJO, followed by Generals MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA - these four Generals.

Q. Can you give me an example of any time when you took any matters up with these Generals or heads of the army?

A. For instance I discussed with General UEDA the question of the abolition of extra-territoriality.

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p/5,128

Q. Who had the final say so far as the Kwantung Army was concerned? What officer? That is in making decisions on matters that were put in the five year plan or left out of it?

A. The Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did the Chief of Staff have the final say in most matters?

A. I don't think so. I think the Commander of the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Commander had been serving for a long time, so he knew the actual conditions and the situations and therefore, he had the final say.

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p/5,139

Q. Was the Kwantung Army separate from the railroad zone?

A. It was separate but the Kwantung Army head was the Governor of the Kwantung territory.

Q. The consulates also had their separate functions at that time, did they not?

A. Yes.

Q. After you went there in 1932 was a change made?

A. Yes, a change was made.

Q. And what did they have then?

A. The Kwantung Army Commander is the Ambassador to Manchukuo and the Ambassador controlled the consulate, the Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung Government.

Q. When did that take place? Was that after you went to Manchukuo? -  
In 1932?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any change in this arrangement in 1934.

A. There were some changes made.

Q. What were the changes? Maybe I can help you by asking you whether in 1934 the Commander of the Army and the Ambassador were combined into one man so that the Ambassador represented the Japanese Government in the carrying on of the functions of Government as far as the Kwantung leased territory and the South Manchurian Railway company zone were concerned. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When they combined the Commander of the Army with the Ambassadorship it became necessary that they always have a military man as the Ambassador to Manchukuo?

A. Yes.

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p/ 5.159

Q. How closely did you, when you were head of the 'Manchukuo' General Affairs Board, keep contact with the Kwantung Army?

A. I kept a very close connection with that Army.

Q. How often did you meet with the Commander of the Kwantung Army?

A. There were no regular meetings, although we did meet together often. I suppose I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army once or twice a month, but I met oftener than that with other officials.

Q. What was the normal range of subjects that you discussed with the Commander of the Kwantung Army? Were they strategic subjects or were they largely economic?

A. There were no discussions along strategic lines at all. We took up certain economic affairs and civil administrative affairs largely.

Q. What questions did you normally discuss?

A. We took up practically all types of economic questions, particularly some of those involving development, i.e. the economic development of Manchuria.

Q. Did that include careful discussion of the progress of such a thing as the Five Year Plan?

A. Yes, of course.

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p/5,166

Q. When he speaks of 'Manchuria wanting things' and 'Manchuria's so and so' you mean, of course, the Kwantung Army?

A. When I said the Manchurians, I meant the Manchurian Government. Of course, there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the army.

17 April 1947

MEMO TO: Brigadier Quilliam  
Mr. David N. Sutton  
Judge C.C. Hsiang

FROM: James T. C. Liu

SUBJECT: Cross-Examination of UEDA, Kenkichi

From the Chinese point of view, a person like the witness UEDA, Kenkichi should not be let by without any cross-examination. He was the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces fighting in Shanghai in 1932, and later the all important post of the Commander in Chief, Kwantung Army, March 1936 to Sept 1939. Although he did not mention the Shanghai Incident in his affidavit, and we have already abundant evidence with regard to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, nevertheless, UEDA, being the Commander to succeed the accused MINAMI and replaced by the accused UMEZU, should be cross-examined on events which occurred in Manchuria during the time of his office.

The following is only a few points drawn up in a hurry and by no means complete. It is hoped, however, that it will be sufficient to show why UEDA should be cross-examined.

1. Independent Manchukuo and its foreign policy.

Page 3 of his Affidavit:

"The guiding principles of his cooperation and assistance towards Manchukuo remained to the last that he should respect its independence and responsibilities and that the primary duties of the Kwantung Army should be its national defense and establishment of peace and order within the country, strictly in line with the spirit of the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Defense Agreement."

It seems to be apparent that he, as Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, should not be concerned with the foreign policy of Manchukuo. Moreover, never has it been suggested that he should assist Manchukuo in its foreign policy, being the Ambassador of another foreign country himself, nor has this been provided in any secret treaty between Japan and Manchukuo. Yet, we have the following evidences:

Exh. 242, three telegrams exchanged between UEDA and the accused UMEZU, then vice-minister of War, with regard to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Kwantung Army, or UEDA, asked the permission "to make Manchukuo enter" the Pact, to which UMEZU consented.



## 2. The Special Service Board and others

Page 4 of the Affidavit:

(carried over from Page 3)

"In Jan 1935, however, the Special Service Department was abolished, and, in its place, was created the Advisory Department composed of 6 civilian officials, which was also abolished after my arrival in Dec 1937. ..."

It should be noted with great concern that it was the accused MINAMI who established the Advisory Department and which he failed to mention during his recent testimony. Questions should be put to UEDA as to what was the concrete and exact function of this ADVISORY DEPARTMENT ( a controlling organ of Manchuria over Manchukuo). As a side issue, with regard to the accused DOHIHARA, questions should be directed to UEDA whether the Special Service Organs, not to be confused with Special Service Department, were permitted to remain functioning. This would lay a foundation for the eventual cross-examination of DOHIHARA himself.

## 3. Japanese Officials in Manchukuo

Page 5 of the Affidavit:

"...this function of the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army was strictly limited to giving recommendations and therefore the appointments and dismissals of government officials were carried out solely on the responsibility of the Manchukuo Government.."

Although I have not yet located the exact passage in the Court Record, yet in Judge McKenzie's Summary of the evidences, he clearly stated "The selection of these officials ~~was~~ was to be made upon the recommendation of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and their ~~dismissals~~ were subject to his approval." (page 43 of the summary) I am still trying to locate the evidence upon which the above quotation from the summary is based.

## 4. Economic development

Page 11 of the Affidavit

"Tying with the establishment of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Co.,...."

Edch. 239, cabinet decision, 22 Oct 1937, reorganizing the ~~heavy~~ heavy industries in Manchuria. On Record Page 2,963:

"The Manchurian government will invest half the amount, and the other half will be invested by the privates. The privates mentioned in the above article is scheduled for the Nissan at present."

## 5. ChinaWar

Page 11 of the Affidavit:

"...the Kwantung

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KENKICHI UEDA.

- 20109 \* The witness stated that he lived in Kanagawa-kan, and he identified exhibit No. 2438 as his affidavit, and stated that the contents were true.
- 20110 \* The affidavit stated that from March 1936 to September, 1939, the witness was commander of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo. The fundamental principle of Japan's attitude of assistance in developing Manchukuo during his tenure was the wholesome development of Manchukuo be attained
- 20111 \* by bring about a harmonious unity among the various races, securing domestically a peaceful and healthy livelihood of the people and promoting cultures and maintaining internationally the principles of peaceful frontiers and co-existence and co-prosperity. They would thus establish a Utopia.

It was natural for Japan, closely related in all areas of Manchukuo with similar ideals, to contribute to Manchukuo's development. Such aids and contributions were carried out to respect and safeguard the basic principles.

- 20112 The Commander of the Kwantung Army was appointed personally by the Emperor of Japan. He commanded his subordinates and took charge of the defense of Manchukuo under the chief of staff for operational and strategic matters, and under the War Minister \* for military administration. Concurrently he was Ambassador under the direction and supervision of the Foreign Minister for diplomatic matters, and by Imperial order was under the direction of the Prime Minister for administration of matters of the Kwantung Bureau.

- 20113 So that Manchukuo might develop, it was essential to promote peace and order within the country and establish its national defense. The Commander of the Kwantung Army was therefore made to cooperate for its development. His guiding principles remained to the last, that he should respect its independence and that the primary duty of the Kwantung Army was national defense and establishment of peace and order, in line \* with the Joint Defense Agreement.

Page

The assistance extended to Manchukuo was in the form of advice, encouragement, suggestions, expressions of hope, and was never given by order or direction from the army. As Manchukuo developed the assistance was gradually reduced to cover only fundamental policy. By August, 1939, extra-territoriality had been relinquished, and Manchukuo was principally governed at its own initiative.

20114

When Manchukuo was founded, the special service department was created outside the staff, to assist the commander of the army in his task. In January, 1935, this was abolished \* and in its place was created the Advisory Department of six civilians, which was also abolished in December 1937 due to the state of Manchukuo's advance after extra-territoriality was abolished. At the same time Sec. 4 of the Staff was reorganized and its personnel was reduced to nine, consisting of three staff officers and six other members, primarily to handle liaison business between Tokyo and Manchukuo authorities.

The Joint Economic Commission was established in June, 1935, by an agreement, to discuss and study important economic problems of the two countries. The Commission for the Development and Exploitation of Manchukuo was created in August, 1936, to join the efforts of all experts, both officer and civilians, in determining policy for exploitation of Manchukuo.

20115

\* In accordance with the request of Pu-Yi under the protocol, the commander of the army was given the task of recommending Japanese as officials of Manchukuo and was to be consulted in case of dismissal. During his tenure, recommendations were given only when officials of the KANNIN, equivalent to the Japanese CHOKUNIN rank, were appointed, particularly to those who were to occupy important positions. Practically, these choices were made after primarily considering the wishes of Manchukuoans, and the witness' duty was merely conveying these wishes to the circles in Japan. There never was a case where the Kwantung Army forcibly recommended particular persons or had them discharged.

Page

20116 The Commander's function was strictly limited to giving recommendations, and appointments and dismissals was carried out solely by the Manchukuo Government \* in accordance with its laws and decrees, and its own rights.

20117 The policy of the OKADA Cabinet to gradually abolish extra-territoriality was decided in August, 1935, and began partially in June, 1936, after the witness took command. Some concern was felt regarding this because of the conditions of law and order in 1935. It was observed that once the policy to relinquish had been decided on, the people and its government were all extremely grateful for Japan's good will and were full of hope and fervor. A certain Japanese circle was dissatisfied with this step, since it would deprive Japanese in Manchukuo of privileges \* which they had enjoyed, particularly tax exemption.

The witness exhorted them in stating his belief that equality and harmony among the races was necessary, and that the Japanese in Manchukuo should discard all privileges to give full play to their real ability by working hand in hand with the other races that these ideals be attained. It was later considered that an immediate settlement of extra-territoriality would be more profitable than gradual relinquishment, due to conditions of law and order in Manchuria. Total relinquishment was decided on, and a treaty for this was concluded November 30, 1937.

20118 \* Since taking command of the army, he saw Pu-Yi now and then and reported to him on various matters to consolidate the confidence which Pu-Yi placed in the commanders of the army. During the witness' tenure, Manchukuo had various external and internal events and was gradually accorded recognition by certain powers. Pu-Yi trusted Prime Minister Chang at all times, and on his advice personally attended to affairs of state. Pu-Yi held supreme command of the Manchukuo Army on counsel of the Minister of War. He was deeply friendly toward the Emperor of Japan. Chang served Pu-Yi well and understood Japan's true intention.

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20119

He had known Pu-Yi since he had been the commander of the Garrison in Tientsin, and had occasion to safeguard his person. He knew YOSHIOKA, Masanao, \* who served for a long time as liaison officer in the Imperial Household and was on intimate terms with Pu-Yi. He stayed there on the strong desire of Pu-Yi.

Since the outstanding characteristic of Manchukuo was realization of racial harmony, it was necessary to unite the leaders of the various races in harmony and initiate other popular movements. The people had to be organized because of the menace of Communism and feudalistic ideas of the militarists.

20120

When he came to Manchukuo he was convinced of the necessity for racial harmony in politics, for cooperative administration, and harmony between capital and labor, and between \* financial interests of various races.

The Concordia Society had never aimed at discrimination, but it was unique in Manchukuo, being solely devoted to inviting harmony of races. It was synchronizing with the Manchukuo Government, and it was the custom for Pu-Yi to attend and issue an Imperial rescript annually.

20121

Manchukuo established a fundamental policy that Japanese, Koreans, and others who desired to stay for a long time should be dealt with equally along with its nationals. In conformity with this it was desired that a large number of Japanese, Koreans, or Chinese, should participate in construction of Manchukuo to realize the prosperity of the state and develop the country. It was desirable that Japanese \* who understood this spirit, good farmers and sincere young men, migrate to Manchukuo. This migration might involve various complicated problems, such as acquisition of land, settlement among natives, exploitation of resources. These were considered.

It was necessary to choose large areas where least friction with natives would arise, and it was inevitable to find colonizing areas in the remote regions in North Manchuria and other outlying parts. This resulted in the fact that considerable protection had to be given to colonizers.

Page

20122

The interests of Manchurians were deeply involved in utilizing the land, and therefore the Manchukuo Government, after deliberation, established a suitable plan for utilizing unused land. In November, 1936, Manchukuo established a Five Year Plan, \* for industrial development. It was a plan with an expenditure of a little over 2,400,000,000 yen, for five years. The outbreak of the China Incident in July, 1937, rendered this plan extremely difficult. Its fundamental idea was to establish a basis of development of industry of Manchukuo so as to enhance the livelihood and give security. Judging from economic conditions in Japan and Manchuria, it was contemplated to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Co. to cover over-all and multi-branched business, and inviting the participation of foreign capital, especially American capital and technique.

20123

Along with this, the South Manchuria Railway Co. was reorganized to handle mainly transportation and the rationalization of all railways in Manchuria. The living condition was \* stabilized through the system of gradual decrease of freight cars, and new railroads were constructed to colonize land and strengthen national defense. When the capital of the company was increased in 1939, a reorganization was carried out to meet the new situation by allowing Manchukuo to own part of the company shares and to appoint directors.

20124

When the Incident broke out in July, 1937, the Kwantung Army desired that it be settled as soon as possible in view of Manchukuo's progress. Because of the racial constituent of Manchukuo, the army did not wish to declare war against China and opposed words and actions which irritated the Chinese.

\* As the Incident progressed, it called for more measures for national defense. The witness believed it necessary to settle the incident to realize the ideal of race harmony with the hope for further development and prosperity. He did his best to urge self-restraint and self-reflection by the Japanese Army and civil and military officials of the various organizations in Manchuria. He cautioned the Japanese so they would not abuse their authority.

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The greater the situation, the more he exerted himself to solve pending difficulties by collaboration and mutual trust and by united efforts by Japan and Manchukuo.

DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Brooks,  
 for General MINAMI.

20125

The \* witness stated that the special service department abolishment in 1935 was done under General MINAMI. He did not know whether General MINAMI had anything to do about it.

20126

With respect to MINAMI's role in determining the policy of extra-territoriality in August, 1935, he stated that he believed that MINAMI was able to contribute \* toward formulating the policy of the central authorities by his reports from the field.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Comyns Carr.

20127

\* The witness stated he had no recollection of sending a petition to Prime Minister KONOYE with respect to peaceful frontiers in July, 1937, and could not recall that it was in support of the movement for establishing a new administration to North China.

20128

On being shown exhibit No. 762, the witness stated \* that it was a document that he sent to the War Minister on January 24, 1938. It was called, "Outline of the Policy for the Establishment of a New China". This document stated \* that although the establishment of a new China lay ultimately in organizing a central government in China and they would respect the wishes of the natives exclusively and make them contribute to preparing for the fast approaching war with Russia and at the same time make them concentrate on post-war adjustment.

20129

By adopting a positive policy accompanied by military action, they would cause the establishment in various provinces of self-governing regimes and at the same time plan to strengthen each powerful regime already existing in Mongolia-Sinkiang, and to invigorate the Central China regime now coming into existence.

Page

20130

\* The unreasonable European and American influence at Shanghai will be driven out, and they will carry on their policy so as to establish the political and economic power of the Empire.

They were preparing for a thoroughly prolonged war against the National Government, and will speed up their various policies and plan the destruction of the National Government by taking all measures politically, diplomatically, and economically.

They would carefully consider expansion of military operations.

The witness thought the facts written in this document do not agree with those written in his affidavit.

20131

\* When asked whether his statement in this document agrees with his statement in the affidavit that the Kwantung Army, in view of the racial constituent of Manchukuo, did not wish to declare war against China and opposed the words and actions which irritated the sentiment of the Chinese, the witness stated that what he stated in his affidavit was his firm belief. In looking over the document, he sees his name appears on it as well as UMEZU, and he had answered that this was his and was sent by him, but after looking over the document there is a great difference \* between what he believes in and what is written, and he is at a loss to understand where the document came from.

20132

On looking at the document signed by him and sent to UMEZU and read by UMEZU and others, he found that it was his document, but he is at a loss to know where it came from. However, on the face of it it does show that it came from him, and at the time of the outbreak of the Incident he sent to the authorities the opinions of the Kwantung Army on two occasions. The first was immediately after the outbreak of the Incident and the second time in January 1938. He realized this because January, 1938, is about the same time \* as he had mentioned in the document. He therefore recognized the document undoubtedly as his own.

20133



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20136 When it was pointed out that the date of the first document was the date mentioned with respect to the petition to Premier KONOYE which he had said he remembered nothing about, he stated that there was no such fact. \* He stated that the document shown him that morning was not an original, but a printed one. Furthermore, the phrases read to him were brief excerpts and did not express his true feeling. During the recess, certain facts have been recalled to his mind. Before this document was submitted the Konoye statement had been released. As a result of this statement, conditions had changed, \* and to meet the situation this new document was submitted. There was no change in the original idea, but because of the change in conditions the methods adopted had changed.

20137

20138 He stated that the title of the document, "The Outline of the Policy for the Establishment of the New China", explained \* the position of the Kwantung Army. According to the title and in accordance with the new conditions, the Kwantung Army was sending a separate copy with respect to the establishment of a new China. The new conditions followed the announcement of the KONOYE statement.

In this opinion it was submitted that the Kwantung Army hoped for stabilization of conditions for the border districts with China, in view of its principle of peaceful frontiers and co-prosperity. As a result of the KONOYE statement, however, it became the policy that Chiang Kai-shek would not be recognized and that a new regime would be set up. This document explained the kind of a regime the Kwantung Army desired.

20139 \* The document sent immediately after the  
20140 outbreak of the China Incident was sent \* to the  
War Minister. It was not about the establishment of  
20141 a new administration in North China. \* It was  
primarily, in view of the existing situation in  
Manchukuo, that the incident be settled as soon as  
possible. Since the Manchukuoan nation is a complex  
one, he had recommended not exciting the Chinese  
people by using hostile words. He had asked in that  
document that they use the words such as "We would  
deal or negotiate with the Nanking Government".

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He also wanted to make clear that Japan would deal with the Nanking Government only, which was treading an erroneous path as a result of its policy of admitting communism.

He had no recollection of sending any document to anyone in Tokyo concerning a new administration in North China. He sent no document which was signed by both he and MINAMI.

20142

\* Upon being shown exhibit No. 724-B and C, he stated that this was a document he signed on May 7, 1936, as Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It dealt with Inner Mongolia.

20143

When asked whether Inner Mongolia was not at that \* time a part of China, he stated it was their interpretation that China east of the West Wall was North China, and Mongolia was Mongolia. However, it was not a part of China. This document stated that the chief matters adopted at the conference were a plan to found the Mongolian state by amalgamating Mongolia and Inner and Outer Tsinghai, with a plan to adopt a monarchy, found a Mongolian Congress, to organize a military government, to conclude a mutual assistance agreement, and to make certain people head the \* military government.

20144

When asked whether this was not a plan to alter the frontiers of China, he said this work was not done at the instigation of the military. When the question was repeated, he stated he had heard that Prince Te had expressed the desire to become independent, and had been active in such movement. It was Te's plan.

20145

The telegram further stated that they must pay due respect to international relations, and he stated that military policy had been carried on with absolute secrecy. \* He continued to maintain that it was not a plan or policy of the military. He had not stated that it was, but that it was a policy by Te.

20146

\* When asked why in his telegram he had stated it was a military policy, he stated that they had been hearing rumors that Prince Te was an ambitious man and was plotting something which would have a great effect on Manchukuo.

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They were taking steps to get sufficient information to judge the situation prevailing.

20147 When asked why in his telegram he had said it was a military policy, he stated it was not a policy undertaken by the military. \* The military did not advocate any movements to this effect, and was not planning such a movement. The reason for secrecy was that the other side was observing a policy of strict secrecy, and they also adopted the policy. The telegram further stated that the army, however, intends to go as far as possible to recognize the independence of Inner Mongolia. When asked about this, he pointed out that the military did not at any time accord recognition to the independence of Inner Mongolia.

20148 He was commander of the army, as well as ambassador. When as ambassador, he had carefully explained and told the Foreign Minister what he intended to do as commander of the army, he stated \* that if the telegram was compared with what was actually happening, it would be understood that he assumed the position of calming down the activities of Prince Teh.

When shown Exhibit No. 731, he stated it was the first time he had seen this book on the Concordia Society. He stated that it was not true that he had used in 1937 the Concordia Society as a means of propaganda in Manchuria in favor of the action taken by Japan after the outbreak of the Incident in July.

20149 When asked whether it was true that all provincial and district headquarters of the Concordia Society conducted organizational meetings to explain the outbreak of the China Incident, \* he stated that he did not remember of any such activities taking place.

20150 \* When asked whether any commencement of Chinese activities the Concordia Society headed the movement for collecting donations for building aircraft for military purposes, the witness stated he could not recall.

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20151 He was in command of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Nomonghan Incident, and he did not believe the Concordia Society played such a large part in that matter. \* When it was pointed out that the book claimed that the Society took an active part in the defense of the state and established close relations with the government and local organs, he said it may be that it did play some part, but he didn't believe that it was influential or important.

20152 He had not heard at the time of the Nomonghan Incident that volunteer units were organized under the direction of the Concordia Society. He had not heard that they rendered great help in the defense of the city in consolidating the military, and in assisting the army. He was an honorary adviser to the Society. He stated that he attended on July 25, 1936, a review in Hsinking to celebrate the creation of a central headquarters of the Concordia Society.

He could not recall whether ITAGAKI was his chief of staff. He did not sponsor a banquet to the delegates of the Concordia Society at their annual meeting, but he did attend.

20153 When asked whether he had not used the Concordia Society as a means of strengthening the position of Japan in Manchukuo, \* he stated that it was a very good method of enhancing harmony between the people of Manchukuo and Japan. He did not believe it was used as a means of inciting the people of Manchukuo against those of China and the U.S.S.R.

16 April 1947

UEDA, Kenkichi

In connection with this witness, attention is called to IPS Document #724B which was introduced as Prosecution Exhibit #312 at page 2,705 of the Record. Document is a cable dispatched on 7 May 1936 by Ambassador UEDA to Foreign Minister ARITA. Cable deals with plan to set up the Mongolian state and sets forth the details of such plan.

(NOTE: It will be noted from the positions held by UEDA that he was Ambassador to Manchuria in 1936 and that he concurrently held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown; Mr. Dunigan

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Araki  
Tojo

WITNESS

Ueda, Kenkichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

| <u>Record</u> | <u>Man Sum</u> |
|---------------|----------------|
| 5119-5182     | Pg 80          |

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Ueda, Kenkichi

Record  
5119-5182

Manchurian  
Summary  
Pg 80

Title: General, Kwantung Army

Source: Interrogatories of Hoshino, Naoki

Was Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Army during a  
period between 1932-1936.

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

13 March 1947

NAME: UEDA, Kenkichi

Major positions held by UEDA

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 1927      | Promoted to Lt. Gen.   |
| 1929      | Commanding General North China Garrison.   |
| 1930      | Moved to China as Commanding Officer of Japanese Garrison troops at Tientsin.                                    |
| 1932      | Commanding General Japanese forces Shanghai  |
| 1933-1934 | Vice-Chief of Staff General Staff Office.  |
| 1934      | Commanding General of the Chosen Army, also became full general.   |
| 1935      | Transferred to Japan and appointed member of the Supreme War Council.  |
| 1936      | Went to Manchuria as Commander in Chief of Kwantung Army--concurrently held the post of Ambassador to Manchuria. |

UEDA was interrogated on March 1, 1946.

He stated that Manchuria was completely occupied when he became Chief of Staff in 1933--that troops which had gone into Jehol were withdrawn into Manchuria. Page 6, March 1, 1946.

Some troops were in Mongolia; that Hopei Province had been occupied; there were about 20 thousand troops in Manchuria in 1933 when he was Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

As Ambassador he gave advice to the Manchurian government which was generally accepted. Page 7.

That Manchuria was an independent state but was looked upon by Japan as a younger brother; that Japan had special interests in Manchuria. Page 8.

He was Supreme War Councillor at time of February 26 Incident. That Council had a meeting after the assassination in the palace; that Honjo was aide de camp to the Emperor. The Incident was discussed for several hours. Page 9



That soldiers were around the War Ministry. Members of the Supreme War Council were stopped by the guards.

Page 9.

He and other officers went into the War Ministry according to rank.

Araki and Masaki were in the group. He heard Araki was to be Prime Minister after the Incident.

Page 10.

Practically all of the young officers that were later tried were at the Ministry. Araki talked to them in an attempt to appease them.

Page 10.

After the Incident he learned of a plan to make Masaki Prime Minister.

After the meeting at the War Ministry he went to Army and Navy Club. The War Minister came to the club. Masaki and General Heishi went back to the troops surrounding the War Ministry because the troops had asked for them.

Page 11.

The War Minister did not request any resignations because of the Incident but members of the Council tendered resignations because the Incident made their position untenable. His resignation and that of Terauchi and Heishi were not accepted because they were younger men of the Supreme War Council and that they (referring to younger officers) needed young generals from whom to select future war ministers, etc. The resignations that were accepted were accepted by the Emperor.

UNDA was interrogated again on March 13, 1946, and portions of his statements which may be of some importance on cross-examination are as follows:

When he went to Manchuria in March 1936 as Ambassador and Commander of the Kwantung Army Fugii (Aiskin-Kakura) was Emperor of Manchuria.

Page 2. 13 March 1946

He had no secret funds for the army.

In 1936 in Manchuria there were some military activities against bandits; that in order to preserve peace he arranged soldiers in line in some villages; that bandits were mostly Chinese but some were Manchurians.

In 1937 there were some small units of the Russian Army invading Manchuria from time to time.

In 1939 the Incident which happened on the Manchurian border between Manchuria and the Soviets called Cho Ho Ho occurred; some troops from the Manchurian Army were sent; he did not send them; he did not advise them on strategy.

In 1939 Nomarhas Incident occurred at a river called Harfu, between Mongolia and Manchuria. In connection with this there was joint action of the Japanese and Manchurian armies; the expeditionary forces were under his command. Page 3.

Commander on the spot was Lt. Gen. Komatsu Barra. The fighting started in June and on November 5th an armistice took place. The Soviet troops came over the border of the river; they were driven back; they came over the river a second time and after that the Japanese troops stayed at the river. Page 3.

Before the armistice took place he came back to Japan and became attached to the General Staff at the end of August 1939.

(Note: On his return to Japan in 1939 UEDA was presented a silver watch and money on behalf of the Emperor in commendation for his work in Manchukuo. Asahi News 21 Sept. 1939).

As Ambassador to Manchuria he made reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Page 3.

While he was Ambassador there were also ambassadors or ministers in Manchuria from Germany and Italy. There were about one hundred thousand troops in the Manchurian Army. These were not under his command except when there was joint activity of Japanese and Manchurian troops.

The Manchurian Army was trained by Manchurian officers and some Japanese officers employed by the Manchurian government. These officers were from Japan proper but were volunteers. While in Manchuria he saw coal mine material at the water front being shipped to Japan. His troops guarded the people at Port Arthur and Darien. Darien was the biggest port where most of the shipping took place. Page 5.

Commercial relations between Japan and Manchuria were handled on the Japanese side by the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry for Overseas Officials. Page 5.

On the Manchurian side there were similar agencies dealing with similar affairs.

Regarding UEDA's activities in Shanghai in 1932 the following is a summary of statements made by him during his interrogatories:

Fighting had started prior to his arrival there; there were Naval landing troops there when he arrived with his division; all of these were under his command.

On May 5, 1932, the ministers from America, England, France and Italy acted as a go-between. He represented the mission on his side. In June 1932 he returned to Kanagawa.

(Note: UEDA landed in Osaka and received the Emperor's congratulations for the good showing in the battle of the Shanghai Incident. The congratulations were presented by a representative of the Chief of General Staff. Asahi News item 5 June 1932).

COPY

Doc. No. 2971

Page 108

UNDA, Kenkichi

| <u>Date</u>       | <u>Class of<br/>Decoration</u>                  | <u>Achievement</u>              | <u>Recommending<br/>Ministry</u>  |
|-------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 29 April.<br>1934 | Military Order of the Golden<br>Kite, 3rd Class | Manchurian<br>Incident          | Imperial<br>Household<br>Ministry |
| 29 Apr.<br>1934   | Grand Cordon of the Order of<br>the Rising Sun  | "                               | "                                 |
| 25 June<br>1940   | Grand Croix, Sant Maurice<br>et Lazar (Italy)   | Japan-Italy<br>Amity            | Foreign<br>Office                 |
| 1 Dec.<br>1937    | First Class, Sungkuang-Chang<br>(Manchukuo)     | Japan and<br>Manchukuo<br>Amity | "                                 |
| 9 Dec.<br>1941    | Grand Order, Collar of Lanhua<br>(Manchukuo)    | "                               | "                                 |

TO : Mr. Tavenner,  
Acting Chief of Counsel.

Mr. Sutton.  
Assistant prosecutor.

FROM : Col. L.N. Smirnov,  
Assistant prosecutor for USSR.

*only 1 copy from USSR  
3/31/47*

In accordance with our agreement I am sending you questions to the witness Ueda ( the former commanding general of the Kwantung Army ) in case he will be examined in the Manchurian phase.

I send you also the English translation of excerpts from some documents of exhibit N.766, which we think might be useful in the examination of Ueda.

*Col. Lew N. Smirnov.*

Col. L. N. Smirnov,  
Assistant prosecutor for USSR.

THE LINE POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY THE DEFENCE  
IN PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AS REGARDS THE  
MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE AREAS OF THE LAKE  
HASHAN AND OF THE HALHIN-GOL RIVER.

A. Staff officer, commanding general of the army, etc.

1. Are you well aware of the extent and duration  
of military actions in the Halhin-Gol river area.

1. In its nature it was no more than a frontier  
incident.

2. The initiative of opening hostilities did not  
belong to the Japanese, but to the Red Army and to the  
Army of the Mongolian People's Republic.

3. The Japanese troops received no special  
instructions from the Government or from the General  
Staff, especially in their initial stage: the inci-  
dents broke out elementally as a result of violations  
of the frontier by the Soviet or Mongolian troops.

4. The frontier was either indistinct or  
passed through in accordance with the Japanese  
contentions.

NOTE: Military maps in confirmation of the  
last point might be presented.

doesn't it?

/ the witness is given the appendix /

5. A part of that army was the 23rd infantry division  
under the command of Lieutenant General Kozatsubara?  
6. Consequently a new army was formed with regard to  
the Halhin-Gol events.

Participation in the Halhin-Gol war was the  
special task given to this army.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE HALHIN-GOL.

A. Staff officer, commanding general of the army, etc.

1. Are you well aware of the extent and duration of military actions in the Halhin-Gol river area.

/ answer -"yes" /

2. Do you know that two armies were formed in Japan with regard to the incident at the Halhin-Gol.

/ possibly -"no"/

3. When and where was the 6th army formed ?

Where was her Headquarters located?

4. You are given a copy of the 6th army commanding general's order.

This document makes obvious the fact that her task was military actions in the Halhin-Gol area, doesn't it?

/ the witness is given the appendix /

5. A part of what army was the 23rd infantry division under the command of Lieutenant General Komatsubara?

6. Consequently a new army was formed with regard to the Halhin-Gol events.

Participation in the Halhin-Gol war was the special task given to this army.

7. What forces directly participated in the Halhin-Gol incident?

( the 23d infantry division, three heavy artillery regiments, three Bargood Cavalry regiments, as well as the 14th infantry brigade coming from Manchuria, anti-tank batteries of one infantry division and heavy artillery from the Port-Arthur stronghold)

7. Did tanks participate in the fight?

( there were 120 tanks on the part of the Japanese)

8. Did the Japanese aircraft participate in the military operations? ( Only in August 1940 the Japanese had there 450 planes).

9. Then how can you contend that the military actions in which directly participated 2 divisions and numerous units of other army were no more than a mere frontier incident ?

Would it not be more accurate to call it an undeclared war on the part of Japan?

4. Do you know anything about the Yamagata detachment?

( nothing )

5. Wasn't Colonel Yamagata commander of the 64th regiment and wasn't he at the head of the independent detachment acting in the Halhin-Gol area of battle?



- operations in the Halhin-Gol river area. Are you
6. I desire to refresh your memory and to show you secret order N.1 to the Yamagata independent detachment, dated the 21st May, 1939. I believe you have recalled now who Yamagata was and the role he played in the Halhin-Gol events.
7. Now I am showing you the map of a part of Mongolia, captured by the Soviet troops in the course of fighting against the Yamagata detachment. I ask you to pay attention to the Nomongan area.

You see that the frontier is passing east of Halhin-Gol river, do you not?

8. How can this be reconciled with your statement that the frontier allegedly passed along the Halhin-Gol river. So you told the untruth.
9. If you are still insisting upon your contention I shall show you another map issued in 1919 and published in an official Chinese album. I call your attention as to how the frontier is shown on this map ( the second and the third squares). Is it not obvious that you are wrong in your contention?
10. In this case I show you one more map issued in 1934 by the administrative department of the Kwantung army which in 1939 conducted military

operations in the Halhin-Gol river area. Are you not yet convinced of the fact that the frontier lies east of the Halhin-Gol river?

/ The witness is shown exhibit N 764 /

11. How can you contention in which you state that the frontier passed along the Halhin-Gol river, be reconciled with the fact that even the Japanese troops conducting military operations allegedly to protect the state-frontier, were provided with the maps showing that the frontier <sup>lay</sup> lies in reality east of the Halhin-Gol river.

I mean the map which was captured in the course of fighting against the Yamagato independent detachment ( The witness may possibly refer to some other military maps of the area ).

12. Well, let's speak about the military-topographical maps. Do you recollect what kind of work was done in the very first days of April 1939 by a military-topographical detachment of the Kwantung Army in the area of the 64th regiment under the command of Colonel Yamagata ?
13. I show you operation order "B" N.1 to the 64th infantry regiment. What was the aim of performing this topographical survey, specially covered by the forces of the 23rd division, in April 1939 in a desert locality when according to your statement there were no military

operations in the Halhin-Gol river area yet?

✓ The witness is shown appendix N 7 to exhibit  
N 766 /

14. Let's come back to dates and facts again.

I am showing you order "a" N.2 to the 64th  
infantry regiment signed by the said Yamagata.  
I call your attention to the date of the order -  
it is the 13th of May, 1939.

In the course of fighting against the Yama-  
gato detachment the Soviet troops captured the  
Japanese maps which correctly showed the direction  
of the frontier. Can this fact be explained by  
the topographical detachment of the Kwantung Army  
not yet having succeeded ~~to~~ falsifying maps of the  
indicated part of the frontier?

15. I understand that you may be not familiar enough  
with this matter.

So, you contend that the frontier passed  
along the Halhin-Gol river. However, can you  
explain then why should the Japanese troops cross  
the Halhin-Gol river? But there was no doubt  
that this was the Mongolian territory, was it  
not?

16. You are denying this circumstance. Then I shall  
show you order N. 105 to the 23rd division dated  
30. VI. 39.

( The witness is given appendix N.10 to exhibit N 766 )

I call your attention to the 2d paragraph of this order.

It is as follows: " The Divisions will cross the Halhin-Gol river. "

Why should the divisions cross the river if they aimed only at annihilation of the enemy troops which then crossed the state-frontier?

B. The following additional questions are put to General Ueda - former commander of the Kwantung Army.

1. Do you remember what you have testified when questioned by the American interrogator in March 1946 and by the Soviet interrogator in May 1946?

2. I desire to refresh your memory.

While being questioned by the Soviet interrogator on the 30th of May, 1946, you testified that:

" for the first time two cavalry companies were sent for fighting, the second time one infantry battalion and two cavalry companies participated in fighting and, finally, the third time one division and two attached infantry battalions and from the

neighbouring division took part in fighting."

Are you not underestimating the Japanese forces which participated in fighting?

3. If you still insist upon your testimony, I shall show you one of the orders signed by you. It may possibly refer to the time which you call " the second time ". This order is dated 20.VI.39.  
( The witness is given appendix N.9 to exhibit N.766)
4. Let me read the corresponding paragraph from the order signed by you.

I start from the 3rd paragraph.

" 3. I order that soldier - reinforcement should be immediately sent to the 23rd division.

4. The units mentioned below will immediately be despatched to Hailar and on arrival will come under the commander of the 23rd division.

One regiment of the seventh division- the 26th infantry regiment with two batteries of the regimental quick-firing artillery ..... the first motor-vehicle regiment ( equipment and personnel according to the enlarged list )."

Now I pass over to the 6th paragraph.

" 6. The commanding General of the 3rd Army will despatch to Hailar the 14th field anti-air-craft artillery detachment of the 3rd division to come under the commander of the 1st tank group. On the arrival in Halun Arshan all units, except those

stationed in Tanchulin, will come under the commander of the tank group.

Headquarters of the 1st tank group.  
the 3rd tank regiment.  
the 4th tank fighting detachment  
the 1st independent field artillery regiment  
the 24th engineering regiment  
a company of the 22nd independent engineering regiment  
the 14th field anti-aircraft artillery detachment of the 5th division.

One motor-vehicle company equipped with 8-ton trucks will transfer from Auen a heavy artillery regiment."

Have I read this all correctly? Have you followed me?

5. Now I will sum up. According to your order the following forces participated in fighting: the 23rd division, one regiment of the seventh division, engineering regiment, the whole tank group and, besides, one tank regiment, and one independent tank detachment, heavy artillery regiment and one independent field artillery regiment.

How can this order of yours be reconciled with your testimony given to the interrogator in which you stated that an infantry battalion and 2 cavalry companies only participated " for the second time " in the conflict? It means that you told the untruth, does it not?

6. In the testimony given to the interrogator you stated that:

" for the third time - a part of our troops crossed the Halhu river aiming to perform strategical manoeuvre, to annihilate the enemy troops, but very soon after that it came back."

( Record of interrogation 3, page 15 )

Are you still insisting upon this testimony?

7. Would it be correct to say that as a result of military operations of the Soviet Army your units were surrounded and annihilated. That was the reason why they could never come back.

8. I ask you to recollect whether it were you who mentioned the figure 10.000 men as the casualties which the Japanese sustained,

/ If the witness denies it, the following passage from his testimony should be quoted to him:

Question : What casualties did the Japanese and Manchurian Armies sustain?

Answer : In my opinion the Manchurian Army and units of the Kwantung Army lost over 10.000 men, the wounded included.

Question : You are considerably minimizing the figure of casualties. They were far greater in reality.

Answer : As far as I remember the figures of casualties according to my data, while I was the commanding General of the Kwantung Army, the figures were such -

those were heavy losses.

For my great regret, I went away on the 3rd of September and I am not familiar with what happened afterwards."

9. According to our data the losses of the Japanese Army 5 times exceeded those you mentioned, but I have no desire to argue with you in regard to the figures. However, even taking into consideration the figure of losses which you gave - do they not prove the fact that the Halhin-Gol events were not a mere frontier-incident, but a real undeclared war.
10. If you still insist upon your answer I shall show you the order of one of your subordinates - General Ogisu Rippo. Here it is.  
/ The witness is shown appendix N 12 to exhibit N. 766 /
11. I call your attention to some wordings in General Ogisu's order. I begin from the line ..... page 6 of the order: "realisation of the great mission regarding the protection of the north-western area proved futile. The Army was thrown into the whirlpool of a chaotic war on the Manchurian frontier."

I continue to quote paragraph 2:

"The commanding general of the Kwantung Army decided to help us this Autumn by the best seasoned troops, stationed in Manchuria. He transfers them to the supposed battleground to be under my



command and plans the emergency measures for settling the conflict.

Now the state of things is such that this event can not be considered as a mere frontier conflict."

How can your contentions be reconciled with the admission of the state of war by the commanding general of the army who personally conducted those military operations?

Def. Doc. # 921

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent : - UEDA, Kenkichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

On this 22 day of March, 1947.  
at Oiso-Machi, Kanagawa Prefecture

DEPONENT /s/ UEDA, Kenkichi (seal)

I, YAMADA, Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: (signed) YAMADA, Hanzo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ UEDA, Kenkichi (seal)

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I, UEDA, Kenkichi, am a former army general and reside at OISO, OISOMACHI, KANAGAWA Prefecture. Since I served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army <sup>and</sup> held the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchukuo from March 1936 to September 1939, I shall relate an outline of the assistance given by Japan towards the development of Manchukuo during that period.

1) Fundamental principle of Japan's assistance towards the development of Manchukuo. The Fundamental principle of Japan's attitude towards assistance in the development of Manchukuo during my tenure of office as the Commander-in-chief of Kwantung Army was as follows.

A wholesome development of Manchukuo can be attained by bringing about a harmonious unity among the various races in Manchuria, thus, domestically, securing a peaceful life and wealthy livelihood of the people as well as promoting culture and industries, and towards foreign nations, maintaining the principles of "peaceful frontiers" and "co-existence and co-prosperity". A so-called "Kingdom of utopia" which is truly a peaceful nation can thus be established. It was only natural for Japan, who is closely related to Manchukuo racially <sup>geographically</sup> and in various fields such as culture, industry, etc., and whose <sup>^</sup> interests and ideals are similar, to contribute to the development of Manchukuo.

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On the other hand, Japan carried out such aids and contributions so as to respect and safeguard the basic principles of the foundation of Manchukuo.

2) Position of the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army was appointed personally by the Emperor of Japan. He commanded his subordinates and took charge of the defence of Manchukuo, coming under the jurisdiction of the Chief of General Staff, for operational and strategic matters, and of the War Minister, for military administration matters. He concurrently fulfilled the duties of an Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and, in that capacity, was under the direction and supervision of the Foreign Minister, for diplomatic matters.

He was, by an Imperial order, under the direction and supervision of the Prime Minister for the administration of matters falling under the charge of the Kwantung Bureau.

In order that Manchukuo might achieve a wholesome development in the early stage of its foundation, it was most essential to promote peace and order within that country, consolidate its basic structure and firmly establish its national defence in accordance with the international situation. Therefore, the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, who concurrently held the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, was made, for the time being, to cooperate with

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Manchukuo for its development. The guiding principles of his cooperation and assistance towards Manchukuo remained to the last that he should respect its independence and responsibilities and that the primary duties of the Kwantung Army should be its national defense and establishment of peace and order within the country, strictly in line with the spirit of the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Defense Agreement. Efforts were to bring about harmonious coordination in this respect.

Furthermore, assistance extended to the Manchukuo Government was in the forms of advices, encouragements, suggestions, expressions of hopes and so forth, and was never given by orders or directions from the Kwantung Army. Moreover, in response to the progress of Manchukuo's growth and development, the assistance thus extended was gradually reduced to cover only the matters pertaining to its fundamental policies, and by the time I left my post there in August, 1939, Japan's extraterritoriality had already been relinquished and Manchukuo was principally governed at its government's own initiative.

3) Organs for assisting the development of Manchukuo.

At the time of Manchukuo's foundation a Special Service Department was created, aside from the Staff Department, with a view to assist the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army in his task of aiding in its development. In January, 1935,

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however, the Special Service Department was abolished, and, in its place, was created the Advisory Department composed of six civilian officials, which was also abolished after my arrival in December, 1937, in consideration of the state of Manchukuo's advance following the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. At the same time, the 4th Section of the Staff Department was reorganized and its personnel was reduced to a mere number of 9 comprising 3 staff officers including the chief and 6 other members, whose primary duties were to handle liaison business between the Japanese central authorities and Manchukuo authorities.

"The Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Commission" was established, in June, 1935, by an agreement between the two countries in order to study and discuss important economic problems of Japan and Manchukuo. "The Commission for the Development and Exploitation of Manchukuo" was also created during my tenure of office, in August 1936, with a view to join the efforts of all Japanese and Manchukuoan experts, both official and civilians, in deliberating policies for the development and exploitation of Manchukuo.

4) Recommendation of Japanese Nationals as Officials in the service of the Manchukuo Government. Upon the request of Mr. Pu-yi and in accordance with the appendix to the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, for the time being, was given the task of recommending Japanese

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nationals as officials of the Manchukuo Government and was to be consulted in the cases of their dismissal. However, during my tenure of office as Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, recommendations were given only when officials of the KANNIN Rank (equivalent to the Japanese CHOKUNIN Rank) were appointed and particularly to those who were to occupy important positions. In practice, the choice of these officials was made after having considered primarily the wishes of the Manchukuoan circles and my duties were merely to convey those wishes to the circles concerned in Japan. There had never occurred a case where the Kwantung Army forcibly recommended particular persons nor had them discharged upon its request. Furthermore, this function of the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army was strictly limited to giving recommendations

and, therefore, the appointments and dismissals of government officials were carried out solely on the responsibility of the Manchukuo Government and in accordance with its laws and decrees as well as its right to appoint or discharge its own officials.

5) Relinquishment of extraterritoriality.

The policy of the Okada Cabinet with respect to the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo was decided upon in August 1935 and its partial relinquishment was carried out in June 1936, subsequent to my assumption of the Command of the Kwantung Army. It should be admitted that some concern

particular persons nor had them discharged upon its request.

Furthermore, this function of the Commander-in-chief of the

Kwantung Army was strictly limited to giving recommendations

and, therefore, the appointments and dismissals of government

officials were carried out solely on the responsibility of the

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was felt regarding the abolition of extraterritoriality because of the state of law and order and of internal administration which prevailed in Manchukuo in 1935. However, it was observed that, once our national policy for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality had been decided upon, the Manchukuo Government and people, to say nothing of its Emperor, Prime Minister Chang and other state minister, were all feeling extremely grateful for Japan's goodwill and were full of hope and fervour, looking ahead to the prosperous future of their country. Meanwhile, a certain Japanese circle was rather dissatisfied with this step, inasmuch as it would deprive the Japanese residents in that country of the privileges which they had been enjoying under extraterritoriality and, particularly, of their right of tax exemption.

I exhorted them, however, stating my belief that, equality and harmony among the various races of Manchukuo was necessary for its wholesome development and the Japanese residing in Manchukuo should discard all the privileges that they had hitherto been enjoying in order to give full play to their real abilities by working hand in hand with the various other races, and that the ideals entertained at the time of the foundation of Manchukuo can only thus be attained. Later, it was considered that an immediate settlement of the question of extraterritoriality would be more profitable to the development



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of Manchukuo than its gradual relinquishment, in the light of the conditions which then prevailed in Manchukuo and, particularly, of the progress of the restoration of law and order and its government's administrative and judicial capabilities. A total relinquishment of extraterritoriality was therefore decided upon, and a treaty in this regard was concluded on November 30, 1937.

6) Relationship between the Emperor of Manchukuo and the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

Since my assumption of the command of the Kwantung Army, I saw the Emperor now and then and reported to him on various matters, in order to consolidate further the confidence which His Majesty had placed in the successive Commanders-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. During my tenure of office, Manchukuo was confronted with various external and internal events and was gradually being accorded recognition by the powers. His Majesty put his trust in Prime Minister Chang at all time and, upon his advice, personally attended to the affairs of the state. His Majesty personally held also the supreme command of the Manchukuo Army upon the counsel of the Minister of War. I used to be deeply moved especially, to see that he held firm confidence and friendship towards His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. Prime Minister Chang also served the Emperor most diligently and understood well the true intention on the part of Japan.

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I have known Emperor Pu-yi since my days as Commander of Japanese Garrison in Tientsin, and had occasions to contribute to safeguarding his person. I knew that YOSHIOKA, Masanao who served for a long time in the Imperial Household Ministry as a liason officer since April, 1934 and has been on intimate terms with the Emperor. He stayed in that capacity in compliance with the strong wish of the Emperor and enjoyed his confidence during the period in which he advanced from the rank of major to that of Lt-general.

7) Relationship between the Concordia society of Manchukuo and the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The outstanding characteristic of Manchukuo is the realization of racial harmony. To attain this it was necessary to unite the leaders of various races who <sup>had</sup> firm beliefs in racial harmony and to initiate their popular movements. The people had to be organized particularly in view of the looming menace <sup>of</sup> communism as well as feudalistic ideas of militarists at that time.

Observing the conditions in Manchukuo after my arrival at the post, I was convinced of the necessity of racial harmony in the political field, for cooperative administration; harmonies between capital and labor and between, financial interests of various races in the economic field; and racial cooperation in the field of labor. The Concordia Society had never aimed at discrimination since its foundation. It was a unique existence in Manchukuo solely devoted to invite a harmony of races. It

6.8 -

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was managed on the principle of synchronizing with the Manchukuo Government. It was a custom for the Emperor to attend and issue an Imperial Rescript at the national convention which was held in autumn each year.

8) Colonization policy Manchukuo established a fundamental national principle, as it is evident in the proclamation of the establishment of the state, that the Japanese, Koreans and other people who desire to stay in the country for a long time be equally treated as its nationals along with its natives such as Manchurians, Chinese, and Mongolians. In conformity with this fundamental national principle, it was desired that a large number of Japanese, Koreans or Chinese with excellent qualities participate in the Construction of Manchukuo in addition to the original Manchurians, Chinese and Mongolians in order to realize the prosperity of the state and to develop the country. Therefore it was certainly desirable that Japanese with real understanding of this spirit, especially good farmers and sincere youngmen migrate to Manchukuo. However, their migration involved various complicated problems such as problems of acquisition of land, settlement among the natives, Manchukuo's own problem of exploiting its resources and so forth. Due consideration was given in this respect.

In addition, it was necessary to choose areas where least frictions with the natives would arise. Thus it was inevitable

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to seek colonizing areas in the remote regions in North Manchuria and other out-lying parts of the country with the natural result that a considerable protection had to be given to the colonizers.

As for the utilization of land the interests of Manchurians were deeply involved, and therefore the Manchukuo Government, after a careful consideration, established a suitable plan for the utilization of unutilized lands and did its best in executing this policy smoothly.

9) The Five Year plan for industrial development of Manchuria.

In Nov. 1936 the Manchukuo Government established for the time being a Five Year Plan for industrial development of Manchukuo. It was a plan with an expenditure of merely a little over 2,400,000,000 yen, covering 5 years. The change of international situation caused by the sudden outbreak of the China Incident in July, 1937 rendered the execution of this plan extremely difficult. The fundamental idea of the plan was to establish basis of development and industry of Manchukuo so as to enhance the livelihood of people and give security which were necessary in view of the events leading to the establishment of Manchukuo. Judging from the economic conditions then prevailing both in Japan and Manchuria, it was contemplated for carrying out this idea to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Co., a Manchurian corporation, which would cover over all and multi-branched business, inviting the participation of foreign capital

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especially American capital and technique.

Tying in with the establishment of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Co., the South Manchuria Railway Company was reorganized to handle mainly transportation, inaugurating such new plans as the rationalization of the management of all railways in Manchuria. The living condition was especially stabilized through the system of gradual decrease per distance of freight rates, and new railways were constructed for the purpose of colonizing unexploited lands and strengthening of national defense and so forth. It is to be especially noticed that when the capital of the company was increased in 1939 (the 14th year of Showa), reorganization of the company was carried out to meet the new situation by allowing the Manchukuo Government to own a part of the Company shares and to appoint directors representing the Manchukuo Government.

10) Crisis created by the outbreak of the China Incident and our attitude.

When the North China Incident broke out in July, 1937, it was the wish of the Kwantung Army that the Incident be settled as soon as possible in view of the progress being made by Manchukuo and also because of the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo.

In view of the racial constituent of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army did not wish to declare war against China and

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opposed to words and actions which irritated the sentiment of the Chinese people such as "Punishment of outrageous China", etc.

As the Incident progressed, it called for more measures for national defense in response to the prevailing situations. I believed it necessary for the settlement of the China Incident to realize the ideal of race harmony with the hope for further development and prosperity of the new state. Therefore, I did my best in urging self-restraint and self-reflection on the part of the Japanese Army and the civil and military officials of various Japanese organizations in Manchuria. Particularly in order to bring about racial harmony and cooperation between Japan and Manchuria I cautioned the Japanese so that they might not abuse their authorities. The greater the situation demands the more I exerted myself to solving pending difficulties by perfect collaboration and mutual trust among various races and by united efforts on the part of Japan and Manchukuo.

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TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,  
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the  
*attached* certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,  
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning  
of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan  
Date 4 April 1947

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Ueda, Kenkichi

| <u>ITEM</u>   | <u>Partially Completed</u> | <u>Fully Completed</u> |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 3. Examination of case file, if any.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.                                 | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.  | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses. | —                          | <u>X</u>               |
| 9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.   | —                          | <u>X</u>               |

*Lester C. Durrigan*



Date: April 3<sup>rd</sup> 1947

Name of Witness: UEDA, Kenkichi

Completed as to Items Numbers: 1, 2, 4. \*

Partially completed as to Items Numbers:

If Item 9 is applicable, state briefly the nature of the investigation conducted:

\* Case file only just obtained

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

against

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN Deposition (translation)

Deponent: UEDA, Kenkichi.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is UEDA Kenkichi. Although I have had several occasions to meet the defendant DOHIHARA, we two have never had occasion to work together in the same place. However, since May, 1939 when he came over to Tung-an, Manchukuo, to stay there as Commander of the 5th Force of the Kwantung Army under my command, I came to be intimate with him.
2. The conditions of Manchukuo in those days, were such that the national defence was the primary concern of the state. As it was the basic policy of the Kwantung Army neither to invade nor to tolerate to be invaded, so far as the Russo-

Manchukuo frontier, was concerned Commander DOHIHARA was acting according to this policy.

3. I, as a superior, found him to be a soldier of Bushido (TN: Japanese chivalry) not to be driven by reckless boldness, loving foes as well as friends, Commanding but not ferocious, not to be scrupulous about trifles always taking a wide view of the things.

In a word, DOHIHARA, is a man of noble character and is absolutely trustworthy.

4. I had no occasion to talk with DOHIHARA, concerning Chinese policy. On account of our different assignments. But I was told that he was an advocate of pacifism and humanitarianism.
5. At the time of the Nomonhan Incident in the summer, 1939, he under my command, was stationed at Tung-an, East Manchuria, as Commander of the 5th Force. As that area was an entirely different part of the country from the place of the Incident it was in fact impossible for him to have any connection with the Incident.
6. By the way, I will explain a little about the Army War Councillor.

I myself have an experience in serving as an Army War councillor. During my tenure of office from December 1935 to March 36, an Army War councillor was in reality a perfect sinecure for old soldiers in the Army. Therefore the Army

War Council was nothing but an organ without any authority only to receive reports concerning matters already decided by the higher authorities of the government.

On this 7th day of February, 1947.

At No. 148, Oiso, Oisomachi, Kanagawa-ken.

Deponent: UEDA, Kenkichi (seal)

I OTA, Kinjiro, J.D.C., hereby certify that the deponent has sworn and affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date at the same place.

Witness: (signed) OTA, Kinjiro

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

UEDA, Kenkichi (seal)