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D. D. 1500-2-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01705

SECRET

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

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5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

- (a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands are in strength superior to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area.

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, denote that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

- (b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.
- (c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the

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necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this Base forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

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- (d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPP-14 and throughout the O-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

- (e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge

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of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;
- (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:
 - (1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;

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- (2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;
- (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;
- (4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.

12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. O. RICHARDSON



原文一頁

一九四〇年十月二十二日「ジェー、オー、リチャードソン」(J. R. Richardson)提督ヨ
リ「エイチ、アール、ヌターク」(H. A. Nutter)提督へ宛テタル書翰

司令長官文書綴第

號

A 一六〇一七〇五

秘

米國合衆國艦隊

旗艦、米國軍艦「ニューメキシコ」(New Mexico)

一九四〇年十月二十二日

ワシントン州 (Washington) プレマートン (Pomeroy) 合衆國海軍工廠

發信者 合衆國艦隊司令長官

宛先 海軍作戰部長

題目 戦争計畫、現下ノ國際情勢ニ鑑ミテソノ現況ト準備

一、米國合衆國艦隊司令長官ガ最近「ワシントン」(Washington) デ開カレタ會
議ヨリ歸任以來、同會議ニ於ケル論議ニ鑑ミ米國艦隊ノ作戰ニ對スル

現況ト準備ニ對シテ更ニ構想ヲ練リ且ツ研究ヲ行ツタ。コノ研究ノ結果、米國艦隊司令長官ハ、現在ノ情勢、取分ケ太平洋ニ於ケル現狀ノ認識ニ就キ上級當路者ノ腦裡ニ何等ノ疑懼ナカラシムルタメニ海軍作戰部長ニ御参考ノタメ、若干ノ事實ト結論ヲ申上ゲ御考慮ヲ煩ハスコトヲソノ嚴肅ナル義務ト考ヘルモノデアアル。

ニ現況ノ諸相ヲ尚ホ一層明瞭ニ説明スルタメニハ、之ニ影響ヲ與ヘテ居ル若干ノ要因ニ考察ヲ加ヘ、且ツ是等要因ヲ現在ノ出來事ニ照シテ論ズルコトが必要デアアル。

三、七月、最初ニ「ワシントン」Washingtonニ赴イタ際海軍作戰部長宛ノ私言ニ於テ、司令長官ハ海軍トシテモ國家トシテモ日本國トノ戰爭ニ何等備ヘテ居ル所ガナイト云フ信念ヲ力説シタ。本官ハ假ニカカル不測ノ變ガ起キタトスレバ、確タル終局ノ勝利ノ見込ミモナイ、長期ノ高價ナ戰爭ニナラザルヲ得ナイコトヲ指摘シタ。本官ハ三ツノ明瞭ナ印象ヲ受ケテ「ワシントン」ヲ去ツタノデアアル。即チ第一、艦隊ハ唯ダ外交上ノ主張ヲ支援シ旁々日本ノ侵略行動ヲ防碍スルタメニ「ハ

ワイ「Warrior」ニ 海域ニ留メラシテ居ツタコト。第二、日本ニ對シテ現實ニ戰端ヲ開ク意思ハ何等ナカッタコト。

第三、艦隊ノ當面ノ急務ハ訓練ノ促進ト新兵員ノ増強及ビ「ハワイ」海域ニ碇泊シテ居ルニ適合シタ最大限度ノ物的準備ヲ達成スルコトデアッタ。四、然ルニ一九四〇年十月、二度目ノ「ワシントン」訪問ノ際ハ全然異ツタ印象ヲ受ケタ。事實コノ二回ノ訪問ノ間ニ國際情勢ハ實質的ニ變化シテ居タ。ソノ主ナ點ハ、英本土侵攻ノ危険ガ著シク緩和セラレ、爲ニ英國艦隊ガ損害ヲ蒙リ又ハ妥協スル如キ惧レガ少クナツタト云フコト。合衆國ハ大英帝國ト一層緊密ニ提携スル様ニナツテ居タコト。日本ノ進攻ハ印度支那ヲソノ支配下ニ置ク迄ニ進展シテ居リ更ニ和蘭領東印度ノ方面ニ進ム徴候ガ現ハレタコト。及公式ノ日獨伊同盟ハ傳ヘラレルトコロデハ合衆國ヲ目指スルモノデアッタコト。等デアアル

原文二頁

五、斯ル變化ノ結果トシテ、現在ハ日本ヲ目指ス一層活發デ明ラサ

マナ措置が真剣ニ考慮セラレテ居リ、又若シ今斯カル措ウル措置が採ラレルナラバ、積極的ナ戦闘行爲が始マル様ナ情勢ニアルト思ハレル。司令長官が本意見ヲ具申シナケレバナラナクナツタノハ、斯カル不測ノ事變ニ關連シテイルノデアアル。

六、現下ノ國際情勢ニ鑑ミルトキハ、現在ノWPIS¹、²及³PUSEYS⁴計畫（オレンヂ⁵Orange）ハ、合衆國艦隊ノ現勢力、合衆國海軍ノ現有資力ヲ超エルモノト信ゼラレル。コレハ以下ノ諸理由デ間違ヒノナイモノト信ゼラレル。

(イ) 現在ノ合衆國艦隊ノ勢力ハ、實施シ得ベキ最初ノ機會ニ於テ、オレンヂOrange 計畫ニ於ケルヨリ優勢ナル合衆國聯合アジア艦隊ヲ「マシーナル、カロリン」⁶ Marshall-Caroline 水域ニ配置スルニ足リズ又更ニ西太平洋⁷ Western Pacific⁸テ攻撃的作戰ヲナスタメ同地域ニ進攻シ得ル程度ニ準備スルニモ不足デアアル。

『吾々ハ實施シ得ベキ最初ノ機會ニ於テ』ト云フ限定句ヲ認メハスルガ、英帝國ガ太西洋ノ吾國ノ利益ニ對シ責任ヲ執ツテ居ルトハ云へ、

現在ノ所吾々ハ、吾國ノ沿岸貿易ヲ保護シ南米ニ於ケル一層重要ナル吾國ノ利益ヲ保全スルタメノ所要ノ勢力ヲ大西洋カラ移シ去ルコトハデキナイト確ク信ズル。更ニ吾々ハ吾々自身ノ貿易ノ保護ト、南太平洋Southern Pacificニ於ケル日本ノ貿易ヲ抑止スルコトヲ怠ルコトモ出來ナイ。斯カル使命ニ十分ナ考慮ヲ拂フトキハ、吾ガ殘ル勢力ハ西方ヘノ行動ノ當初ニ於テ既ニ殆ンド「オレンヂ」Orange 計畫ヨリ大デハナイ。コレハ疑ヒモナク途次ニ於テ消耗ヲ蒙ムルコトナル。

(ロ) 陸軍ハ吾々ノ西攻ヲ支援スル準備ハ現在モナイシ、極ク近イ將來ニ於テモナカロウ。艦隊ノ海兵兵力ノミヲ以テシテハ所要ノ作戰行動ヲススメルニ不十分デアル。

(ハ) 第一基地ノ占領ハ、其ノ地域ノ詳細ナル知識ヲ必要トシ、其ノ知識ヲ基礎ニ詳細ニ計畫セラレソシテ多數ノ商船ヲ入手シ、改装シ、乗組員ヲ配置訓練シ、又是等ヲ編成スルヲ要スル軍ノ重大作戰デアル。占領後コノ基地ヲ建設スルニ必要ナコトハ、

(a) 大量ノ物資ノ輸送

(b) 所要ノ展開ヲ遂行シ得ル

原文三頁

施設部隊ノ編成、輸送及其ノ維持及(9)其ノ基地建設期間中ノ防禦、補給デアアル。同計畫ハ、資材ガ最初其ノ敷地ニ着イテカラ四十五日後ニハコノ基地ガ完成スベキコトヲ要求シテ居ル。

辯護圖書類一五〇〇一〇一

吾々ハ今ノ處是等多種多様ノ行動ヲ適切ニ計畫スルタメニ必要ナルソノ地域ニ關スル詳細ナ知識ヲ有シテ居ラヌ。作戰ノ開始及攻撃ヲ行フタメノ一般的計畫ニハ充分ト思ハレル若干ノ知識ハ戦闘開始後偵察ニ依リ得ラルベキコト及該計畫ガ斯卡ル作戰ニ對スル準備ナルコトハ間違ナキコトデアアル。然シナガラ其ノ地域ノ水理ガ艦隊ノ碇泊ニ適スルヤ否ヤ、問題ノ地區ノ陸上ニ如何ナル施設ヲナシ得ルヤ、又十分ナ防禦施設、特ニ陸上機用飛行場ノ建設ガナシ得ルヤ否ヤハ現在ハ不明デアリ又實際ニ

占領スル迄ハ決定スルコトモ出来ナイ。

假令占據シタ根據地ガ是等施設ノ建設ヲ可能ナラシムルトシテモ、材料ノ集積、及建設ノタメノ編成ヲ行フコトハ實際占領シタ後デナケレバ出来ナイト云フコトハ確實ダト思ハレル。司令長官ノ知ル限リデハ此ノ目的ノタメニ從來何等ノ材料モ蒐集サレテ居ラズ、又此ノ目的ヲ徹底的ニ遂行スルタメニ漠然トシタ考ヘノ外如何ナル考案モ進メラレテハ居ナイ。

現在ノ艦隊計畫ハ主トシテ基礎トナルベキ知識ガ不充分デアルタメト又追ハレテイルタメトニ依リ、其ノ内容ハ極ク一般ノ事ニ止マリ、且ツ主トシテ任務及部隊ノ割當ノ範圍ニ止マツテ居ル。此等ノ目的ノ實際ノ遂行ニ對シテハ、試験的考案（大部分ハ不適確ナ假令ニ基ケルモノ）ノミガ進メラレテ來テ居ル。(a)現在ノ同計畫デハ時間トイフ要素ガ遂行スベキ任務ト非常ニ不適合ニナツテ居ルト考ヘラレル。

實際ニハ一定ノ期限ト云フモノガ現ハサレテキナイノニ上述ノ四十五日トイフ期限ハ別トシテ第一ノ根據地ノ建設ニ至ルマデノ具体的ナ

作戰ガ動員後六十日乃至九十日位ノ期間中ニ完遂出來ルト云フコトガ第十四ノ第二附録中ノ記表、及ピオーリ計畫ソノモノ全体ヲ通ジテ強ク示サレテ居ル。

タトヒ該計畫ノ第一目的（第一根據地）ニ向ツテ強力ナソレノミヲ目的トスル手段ヲ直チニ取ツタトシテモ、其ノ完成ニハ六ヶ月乃至一ケ年位ヲ要スルダロウト云フノガ米國艦隊司令長官ノ堅ク信ズル所デアアル。現在ノ知識ヲ以テシテハ其後ノ作戰ニ幾何ノ時日ヲ要スルカハ豫想スラ出來ナイ。其ノ作戰ハ月トイフヨリモ寧ろ年ヲ單位トシテ數ヘル期間ダト信ゼラレル。(b)私ハ現在ノオレンヂ計畫 (Orange Plan)ヲ眞ニ心カラ是認スル將官ヲ知ラナイ。元來該計畫ノ發端ハ海軍施設ニ影響ヲ及ボス如何ナル國際情勢ニモ應ズル様ナ海軍施設擴張ニ對シ指導的方針ヲ與ヘテ置クコトガ望マシイト云フニアツタコトハ一般的概念デアアル。

オレンヂ計畫 Orange Planノ實行出來ヌ性質ノモノデアアルコトヲ、是ニ勝ル計畫ナキタメ豫算上ノ目的ト國會提出トノタメニ、海軍省ガ必要ナル海軍擴張ヲ最大限度ニ正當化セントスル目的デシバラクノ間看過シテ來

タモノト私ハ信ジテ居ル。私ノ考ヘデハ艦船建造ハ未ダ該計畫ヲ満足ニ遂行シ得ル程度迄モ進捗シ居ラザルモノト思フ。

七、オレンヂ計畫 *Orange Plans* 以外ニ司令長官ハ既ニ承認済ノ海軍基礎的作戰計畫即チ、レインボー第一號 *Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1* 及未ダ承認サレザル陸海軍連合作戰計畫ニ關スル試案、即チ、レインボー第二號 *Joint Army & Navy Plan, Rainbow No. 2* ヲ有シテ居ル。

是等兩計畫中ニアル假定事項ハ何レモ現在ノ情勢ニ適合セザルノミナラズ、司令長官ノ知ル限りデハ、試案レインボー第二號ニ具體的ニ示サレテ居ル連合軍カラノ援助モ恐ラク不可能ト思フ。

八、上記考察ハ、司令長官ヲシテ信ズルニ至ラシメタル事柄ガ、適當ナ指示ナクシテハ、突然危険ナ状態ニナルヤモ知レヌトイフコトヲ司令長官ガ認識シテイルトイフコトニ注意ヲ集中セシムル爲相當ニ長々ト陳述サレテイル。國策、國家ノ誓約、國家ノ目標ヲ明瞭ニ心中ニ描寫シナイ限り、司令長官ハ安全及ビ防禦ノ明瞭ナル手段並ニ將來ノ不測ノ事件ニ對スル早急ノ準備ニ對スルモノ以外ニハ自己ノ計畫ヲ明示

スルコトハ出来ナイ。彼ハ戦争ニ於ル作戦ノ成攻ハ唯健全ナル計畫、周到ナル特定ノ準備ト成功疑ナシト確信スル方針ニ基キ勇敢ニ實行シテ行クコトニノミ懸ツテイルトイフコトヲ堅ク信ジテキル。

九、司令長官ハ自己ノ正當ナ責任ヲ回避シヨウトスル意志或ハ希望ハ毛頭ナク又本書簡中ノ何物モ然ク解釋サレルコトモ望ンデイナイ。如何ナル計畫モ凡ユル有リ得ベキ事態ヲ豫知シ又ハソレニ對シ準備ヲナスコトハ出来ナイトイフコト、又實際起ツタ事態ニ適應スル様調整、再計等ヲ行ハナケレバナラヌトイフコトハ充分認識サレテイル。同時ニ司令長官ハ若シ自己ノ全任務ヲ實行スルノデアラバ海軍省ノ計畫ト意圖ニ關シ現在以上ニ良ク知ラシテモラハナケレバナラナイトイフコトヲ確ク信ズルモノデアアル。

一〇、上記ノ事柄ヲ簡單ニ概説スレバ次ノ通りデアアル。

(a) 海軍施設ノ現状並ニ現在ノ進展ノ程度ニ於テハオレンデ *Orange* ハ不適當ナルコト

(b) 合衆國艦隊司令長官ノ利用シ得ベキ他ノ案ハ適用シ得ザルモノナルコト

ト（第一、第二號虹案 Rainbow Plans）

(a) (一) 現在知レル限りニ於テ或ハ據言出來ル範圍ニ於テ現在ノ事實、國家ノ目標ト誓約ヲ基トシタ新規指示（恐ラク第三號虹案）

(二) 國策ヲ以テ現ハサレタ計畫ト國策遂行ニ取ラレル手段トノ整合ノ絕對的必要

(a) 現在司令長官ノ入手シ得ル情報ヨリ見テ、長官ハ現實的計畫ノ要素ハ次ノモノヲ當然包容スルコトヲ確信シテキル。

(一) 西半球ノ安全保障並防禦方法

(二) 長距離ニ亘ル敵通商ノ禁止

(三) 敵ニ對スル威嚇並ニ襲撃

(四) 海軍施設ノ比較戦力（同盟國、戦力ト行動ノ自由ニヨリ影響アルヤ

モ知レズ）ガ作戦支持ノ爲ニ建設サレル場合ニ作戦ヲ擴大スルコト。

一一、至急電報ニテ本書簡受領ヲ承認アリタシ

一二、發信人ハ「秘」以外ノ區別ヲ許スガ如キ方法ヲ以テ本書ヲ名狀スルコトヲ實行不能ト思料スルコトヲ茲ニ證明スル。

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一三、本書配達ハ緊急ヲ要スルモノ故次回ノ將校特使ニ托シテハ受信人
ハ合衆國大陸内ニ於テ本書ノ書留郵便發送ヲ正當ト認メル。

ジエー、オー、リチャードスン