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- Q. Tell us about your association with Stahmer. Did you see him often? Did you work with him or just what took place between you and Stahmer?
- A. Stahmer was simply a go-between and carried Ribbentrop's messages and brought his ideas to me and he very seldom ever put forth any of his own ideas or worked independently.
- Q. I want to go back to the Anti-Comintern Pact for a little bit. At the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was being discussed SHIRATORI was Minister to Sweden from Japan. Was he not?
- A. Yes, he was there during that period, but I am pretty sure that he returned to Japan prior to the time that the treaty was actually consummated.
- Q. But while the negotiations were going on, looking to the ultimate signing of the pact, you have indicated that you did have some conversations with SHIRATORI regarding the pact?
- A. Yes, that is true. However, newspaper stories to the effect that he had anything whatsoever to do with the actual drawing up or consummating of the pact are lies.
- Q. General, I want you now to tell us, as best you can remember, everything that you know of, that SHIRATORI had to do with the proposed Anti-Comintern Pact.
- A. SHIRATORI had nothing whatsoever to do with the actual negotiations. I simply told him that such a pact was being negotiated, but as far as his lending a hand or taking an active part, he remained entirely out of the picture.
- Q. General, you have indicated to us that you had some conversations with him relative to this pact on occasions when he came to Berlin from Sweden. Will you tell us about those conversations?
- A. I told him nothing beyond the fact that we were carrying out negotiations of this nature.
- Q. Well, what did he tell you?
- A. If you mean, did he approve or disapprove, he did approve.
- Q. Did he give you any encouragement in the negotiations; did he give you any suggestions?
- A. Nothing at all. Newspapers seem to think that he did, but this is untrue.
- Q. Well, why did you talk to him about it?
- A. He is a man that has parallel ideas to mine in matters of this sort and so I spoke to him as a friend, but as for asking him to lend a hand, it would be impossible for him to operate in any

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case, and secondly, I never contemplated such an idea. Please ask SHIRATORI.

- Q. But, since he was your friend, and since he had parallel ideas, I would like to know just what you said to each other when you talked this matter over as friends.
- A. Nothing beyond the fact that the treaty would be negotiated and the draft had been drawn up. SHIRATORI first came to Berlin in May 1936, and I believe only about twice after that.
- Q. General, yesterday, at the time we concluded we had arrived at the point in our story when you were back in Japan and were no longer Ambassador to Germany. Now, will you pick up your story from there and tell us what happened after that.
- A. After I returned to Japan in December 1939, I had no occupation and led an inactive life until I was named Ambassador in 1940 - as a reserve officer I had no connection whatsoever with the Army either.
- Q. General, can you tell us when in 1940, you were again named Ambassador to Germany?
- A. It was in the beginning of December 1940, and around the end of January 1941, I left Japan for Germany, and I believe that it was the 16th of February 1941, that I arrived in Berlin, although I am not absolutely certain of this date.
- Q. During that period of time that you were out of the public service and were in Japan, did you take any part in the affairs of the Japanese-German Society in this country?
- A. I was asked to join many associations, but I did not enter any of them. My connection with the German-Japanese Society was as before and as explained, this was an extremely inactive group, which met socially perhaps once a year and that was all.
- Q. During this same period of time, did you write any articles for newspapers or magazines or other publications?
- A. On the whole I refused all offers from publications, but I have written two or three articles.
- Q. And where were they published?
- A. The only ones I recall are one for the BUNGEI SHUNJU and one for the YOMIURI newspaper - Tokyo.
- Q. General, what was the subject of these articles you have just mentioned?

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- A. I believe it was on the overall conditions in Germany and I have no recollection of it being on any specific matters.
- Q. Would it be possible for us to obtain copies of those articles?
- A. Yes, I believe so.
- Q. Can you help us by telling us how we might find them?
- A. You should be able to obtain them through the Central Liaison Office.
- Q. Can you tell us about the dates these articles appeared?
- A. The first one in the BUNGEI SHUNJU was around the beginning of the year 1940, I believe, and the YOMIURI article sometime during the summer of the same year, I think.
- Q. General, did you ever contribute any articles to any newspapers or magazine publishers in Osaka?
- A. I do not believe so - there might have been some write-up of something I said, but I do not recall writing any articles.
- Q. General, did you ever contribute any writings to the Osaka MAINICHI?
- A. I do not believe so, although I am not absolutely certain.
- Q. Will you think about that and let me know next time I come back?
- A. Yes, I shall, but right now, thinking of it, I have no recollection. The only ones I remember are the aforementioned two.
- Q. General, if I understood right yesterday, Mr. SHIRATORI returned to Japan around somewhere the same time you did, and that Mr. SHIRATORI continued to work in the Foreign Office as an advisor and was there in that capacity while you were experiencing this period of unemployment you told us about?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. During the period of time between the date you returned to Tokyo and the date that you thereafter again proceeded to Berlin as the Japanese Ambassador, did you ever meet with Mr. SHIRATORI in a friendly capacity, or any other capacity?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Inasmuch as you were personally very much interested in the proposed Tripartite Pact and since also with the collapse of negotiations in 1939, at the time the Russian-German non-aggression pact was signed, you saw fit to resign, it

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would seem that your interest in this proposed pact must have carried on in your own mind even after you returned to Tokyo, and I am wondering if you now can tell us in so far as you know, what happened with respect to the proposed Tripartite Pact, after you returned to Tokyo.

- A. After I returned to Japan I wanted to retire completely from public life and in order to realize this ambition I built a small villa at Chigasaki and retired there; and I refused to have any part in various activities or to make any public speeches. However, I did speak to small groups from various societies, such as the Gaiko Kyokai and the Yuko Club and others. These talks were about conditions in Germany and were not specifically concerned with the Tripartite Pact. Of course, I was not against the Tripartite Pact and hence may have spoken on the overall plans and negotiations regarding it, but did not concern myself with any specific talks on this subject, but rather kept the scope of my remarks in a wider field.
- Q. General, are there any copies of these addresses available so that we could see them?
- A. I doubt it. I had no idea of having any addresses published. I repeat that I do not believe that I spoke specifically at any time about the Tripartite Pact. People were very interested in Japan at that time regarding Germany and the progress of the European War and other matters, and I confined myself to these subjects. I do not believe that I ever openly made an address advocating the consummation of the Tripartite Pact. I would like to add here that while many societies asked me to join I had nothing whatsoever to do with them.
- Q. General, my real question was to find the necessary steps in the progress of events that ultimately led to the final signing of the Tripartite Pact.
- A. I held no official position and hence did not know how the Government felt, but I believe that for a time all thought of the pact died completely. As you know, Japan decided not to have any part in the European War, and for a period there was a good deal of Anti-German writings in the newspapers. It is my belief that after Germany's successes in France and the Western Front in general the Japanese Government began to feel again that such a pact would be desirable.
- Q. At this point, let us adjourn until tomorrow and we will pick the story up here.

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 10 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 day of February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section,  
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 13th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 16, 1946  
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 14 February 1946, 1345-1415 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- A. In regard to our talk yesterday you asked me about whether I had contributed anything to the Mainichi newspaper. I have thought it over during the night and I still can not recall any instance. I am pretty sure that I never did contribute anything to this paper.
- Q. General, I was just going to ask you whether you had thought about that since we were here yesterday.
- A. I would also like to explain here what I told you of yesterday: I have been away from Japan for some five years and hence was not well-versed in current internal politics and, therefore, felt that I should divorce myself entirely from such matters. My talks in regard to Germany were mainly about wartime conditions there, progress of the war, and the German internal structure and were given to such educational groups as teachers from the Military Academy, etc.
- Q. General, explain a little further what you mean by the German internal structure?
- A. On the whole, such matters as state-controlled economy, German military tactics and such matters as their assault upon the Maginot Line.
- Q. General, you were particularly interested, were you not, in their state-controlled economy?
- A. As a soldier I am not well-versed in economy, but I did speak of the special characteristics of a state-controlled economy as I knew them.

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- Q. General, did not you think that the German method of state-controlled economy, as it then existed in Germany, might have been a pretty good idea to adopt in Japan?
- A. A modified form might be good, but in its entirety the German method could not be used in Japan, I felt.
- Q. General, in your talks with your countrymen in Japan, did you suggest that possibly in a modified form that this method of German controlled economy would be a good thing to adopt in Japan?
- A. I never went so far as to advocate such a thing.
- Q. Then what was the purpose of a talk on the subject?
- A. In my talks on this subject I spoke of such matters as a certain degree of state-controlled economy being necessary in a nation which had poor natural resources, but that to bring this about excellent statistics were required. Further, that in order to bring this about, rich and poor alike must feel that such a state-controlled economy is desirable. I did not go into further small details.
- Q. Approximately how many addresses of this character did you make?
- A. About five or six times, I believe.
- Q. You did in your talks lay before your listeners a full explanation how from your observations in Germany this thing could work providing they had a proper statistical information, did you not?
- A. Not being an expert on economics I was unable to give any suggestions, but because my listeners were interested in the subject and asked me of it, I told them as much as I knew from my observations in Germany.
- Q. Who sponsored these meetings and arranged for your lectures?
- A. I went upon requests, such as, for example, if the principals of normal schools stated that there was going to be a meeting and would I speak upon Germany. I never urged anybody to listen to my addresses, nor did I make any effort to hold any meetings.
- Q. Do I understand then the invitation came to you from sources that you have indicated with the request that you speak about Germany?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Before the meeting and after the invitation had been extended to you would they advertise the fact that you were going to make

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the address?

A. Not that I know of. These were more closed meetings and not generally open to the public.

Q. Looking at the opportunity from your point of view, at that time did you not welcome the opportunities to make these addresses on this subject?

A. On the contrary, I wished to not have anything to do with speaking at meetings or making addresses of any kind.

Q. Why did you do it then?

A. I found it very difficult to refuse when they came especially to request that I speak, and these were the only meetings at which I made any addresses. I have refused many invitations from political societies to join or to speak to them; for example, if you will ask Professor Kanokogi, who is here now, I am sure that he can tell you of one instance at least where I definitely refused to speak at a public meeting.

Q. Do you know anyone or all of these three: Shingo TSUDA, Mr. TAKASHI or Mr. FURUTA?

A. Of the three you named I know only TSUDA and I have met him but twice.

Q. Tell us who he is and the circumstances under which you met him on these two occasions?

A. This man was a textile manufacturer who during the war also manufactured aircraft. I met him in 1940 in Tokyo, when he was interested in contacting some airplane company in Germany. Later, on my way back to Germany we met in Kyoto again and spoke of the same matter.

Q. Did you by any chance on those occasions of speaking about the matters you have just indicated talk to him about activities by the German-Japanese Society in this country?

A. No.

Q. Now, you know, do you not, that the three names I gave you, two of whom you say you do not know, and Mr. TSUDA, whom you say you do know, were all three active in the German-Japanese Society in this country?

A. I was not aware of that. The other two names I do not know at all. There might be an error in that name TAKASHI. There was a man named TAKAISHI in the Osaka Mainichi.

Q. Do you know a gentleman by the name of TANI?

A. Yes.



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Q. Will you tell us who he is?

A. I believe he was named TANI, Masayuki and was Ambassador to Nanking at the time of the termination of the war. Before this, I think, that he was Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet.

Q. Do you know him very well?

A. No.

Q. During the time you were Military Attache and Ambassador to Berlin, did you ever at any time have any discussions with this man or receive any communications from him?

A. No. He was Minister to Vienna at the time I was Military Attache to Germany.

Q. At the time TANI was Minister to Vienna and you were Military Attache to Berlin you then were working part of that time on the Anti-Comintern Pact. Did you during those days have any discussions with TANI regarding the proposed Anti-Comintern Pact?

A. Never.

Q. I believe you told us during the first days that we talked with you, you made a trip to Vienna while you were on the staff of the Military Attache in Berlin.

A. Yes.

Q. Was TANI in Vienna at that time?

A. No. Much later.

Q. Do you know whether he took any active part in the discussions either in Tokyo or in Europe at the time the proposed Tripartite Pact was being discussed by Germany and Japan?

A. I do not believe he had anything to do with it.

(Interpreter: General OSHIMA indicates that he desires to say something about the German-Japanese Society if you desire to hear it.)

Q. You may make your statement.

A. I want to point out that this German-Japanese Society was strictly a social organization and had nothing whatsoever to do with propagandizing or political matters. I would like to have you examine the set-up of this society in order to see the truth of my words.

Q. The other day when I asked you who outside of the military in Japan wanted you named as Ambassador to Germany you stated that you believed Mr. GODO, Takuo, wanted your appointment, but you

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said you had not heard it from the man himself. Will you tell us now who Mr. GODO is and when and where you have ever met him?

A. He was connected with steel works in Manchuria and when he came to Germany to buy military equipment I met him, as the Army was also interested in purchasing the same sort of equipment.

Q. You know, do you not, General, that he was a Director of the South Manchurian Railway Company?

A. I do not believe he had any connection with the South Manchurian Railway. He was Managing Director of the Showa Steel Works, I think.

Q. I have read in a book "Who's Who in Japan" that GODO was Director of the South Manchurian Railway Company also he was President of the Showa Steel Works, the latter in 1929. You do not mean to suggest that he had no connection with the South Manchurian Railway, do you?

A. He held many positions prior to the time I knew him, and he might have been Director of the South Manchurian Railway for all I know. In addition he has held such positions as Director of the Sasebo Naval Arsenal and later he was Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Q. You know, of course, that he was very much interested in Manchuria and its development.

A. Naturally.

Q. He was in Germany, was he not, in November 1937, and remained there for several months as a non-official envoy from your Government to represent Japan's side in a discussion of the Chinese incident?

A. That is true; he was called something like the People's representative, and while he had no official capacity, was interested in what you mentioned. However, what he actually accomplished I do not know.

Q. While he was there for that purpose you had some conversations with him, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And in those conversations did you not talk about such matters as being able to obtain German technical assistance, materials, etc., to be used for the further development of industries in Manchuria?

A. No.

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Q. Now, General, what did you mean the other day when I asked you why GODO wanted you named Ambassador, when you said in reply to my question that "he was one of those who wished to bring German technical developments to Japan and wished me to work toward that end."

A. What I mean is that when he first came to Germany I helped him in purchasing the Renn Steel Refining Process from the Krupp organization. In this regard I loaned him the services of the Embassy's Army technological expert, a man by the name of DOGANE. I want you to understand that that statement of the other day is based simply upon my impressions and there is nothing concrete to back up the fact that GODO wanted me as Ambassador for the reasons that I gave. I believe he must have thought that I would be willing to go further in getting technical aid from Germany to Japan because of my past association with him in this regard.

Q. GODO was the Minister of Commerce and Industry in the HAYASHI Cabinet. That is correct, is it not?

A. That is correct.

Q. That was during the period from February 1937 to June 1937?

A. I am not certain of the dates, but I do know that he was Minister in this Cabinet.

Q. And you know, do you not, that at that time GODO was concerned with respect to your country's industry and economy in the event an emergency should arise?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do know, do you not, that while he was in that Government position he urged that the natural resources at home, that is, in Japan, be developed and that he was very much interested in pushing such a program?

A. I do not know; I was not in Japan at the time.

Q. He was interested in you, however, by reason of your long-time service in Germany and your very able performance of your duties from the point of view of your Government, and he felt that you could help him probably to obtain assistance of a technical nature in order to advance the industrial development of Japan and Manchuria?

A. I did not hear that from GODO personally. It is only what I surmised.

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- Q. While you did not hear that from him personally you would surmise that that would be true, would you not?
- A. It is possible.
- Q. Now let us return to the story that you have been relating to us and pick it up at the point where you left it yesterday.
- A. I know, of course, of Stahmer's coming to Japan and of the final culmination of the Tripartite Pact, but I know nothing whatsoever of whether he was called to Japan or whether he came on Germany's instigation or any of the events leading up to the pact itself. Therefore, I do not feel qualified to speak on this subject.
- Q. Yesterday you told us that during this period of time to which we are now addressing ourselves that SHIRATORI was in the Foreign Office in Japan, and that you met him on occasions. Now, when you met this man who had been working with you in Europe on the earlier negotiations, did you not on such occasions discuss with him what may have been going on with respect to this proposed pact on which you had been working during your stay in Europe?
- A. I had met SHIRATORI, but I can definitely state that we did not talk of the three-power pact or formulate plans to revive it again.
- Q. Did not he on any of those occasions tell you what others were doing with respect to the revival of these negotiations?
- A. No. I have heard many rumors, of course, on why Stahmer came to Japan, but I have never heard anything official from anybody in a responsible position.
- Q. Did you ever hear anything unofficial? I would say your conversations with SHIRATORI would not be official, but they would be conversations between two friends who had been very much interested in this proposition during the years that you were each serving as Ambassador in Europe?
- A. To the best of my knowledge SHIRATORI had very little to do with the pact; also that Stahmer's conversations were mainly with Foreign Minister Matsuoka.
- Q. Who succeeded you as Ambassador to Berlin?
- A. KURUSU.

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Q. And who succeeded KURUSU?

A. I did once more.

Q. Do you know if KURUSU resigned or if he was recalled?

A. I have heard that he resigned, but perhaps the answer to this question had better be "I don't know."

Q. When you heard he resigned, what did you hear was the reason for his resignation?

A. This is not a matter directly concerning me and I do not feel that I should make any statements based on purely my own thoughts because it deals with somebody else entirely. At this time that Matsuoka was Foreign Minister he recalled practically all the Ambassadors and perhaps KURUSU was among this group, although after I arrived in Berlin I heard from some member of the Embassy Staff that he had resigned. I know nothing further.

Q. Who signed the Tripartite Pact for Japan?

A. KURUSU.

Q. So that you know as a fact then that KURUSU was not recalled immediately when MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister?

A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Q. You are aware also of the fact that it was after KURUSU signed the Tripartite Pact for Japan that he returned to Japan from Berlin?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know if his attitude toward the Tripartite Pact that he had signed in Berlin for Japan had anything to do with his reason for returning to Japan?

A. It is too difficult for me to make any statement upon that.

Q. What is difficult about that?

A. In the first place I am not certain whether he resigned or was recalled and in the second place, being about somebody else, I could make all kinds of conjectures, but I have no way of knowing what the facts are. I suggest that he be asked about this.

Q. When were you named Ambassador to Germany the second time?

A. Around the beginning of December 1940.

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- Q. How long before you were named Ambassador from Japan to Germany the second time were you approached on the subject of your proposed appointment to that post?
- A. Immediately prior to my appointment.
- Q. One day, or one week, or one month prior?
- A. About one week.
- Q. Then you were in a very receptive mood for the appointment at that time?
- A. No. Actually, I was not too keen on it.
- Q. You made your mind up in a rather big hurry, did you not?
- A. I personally did not wish to go, but the Army and Navy urged me very strongly.
- Q. Who in the Army and who in the Navy urged you to go?
- A. Army, General SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff, and Navy, OIKAWA, Navy Minister. In addition, Tojo, and others.
- Q. What position did TOJO hold then?
- A. War Minister.
- Q. It is not clear to me why the Army and the Navy and the War Ministry should assume the right to select the Ambassador to Germany. It seems to me that is a prerogative of the Foreign Minister.
- A. Naturally, I mean the Foreign Office was the principal sponsor; in addition, there were the Army and the Navy.
- Q. Why should the Army and the Navy have any part in your selection?
- A. I believe it is natural that they would want to have a man who understood military matters so long as the Tripartite Pact was in effect.
- Q. Actually the Army and the Navy and the War Ministry selected you as Ambassador and asked the Foreign Ministry to name you?
- A. No. The Foreign Office instituted proceedings.
- Q. Who talked to you first?
- A. The Foreign Minister.
- Q. The Foreign Minister personally?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. And that was MATSUOKO?  
A. Yes.
- Q. And what did you tell him?  
A. I told him that I did not wish to particularly, as it was my desire to further study Japanese conditions. The five-year absence from Japan had made me ignorant of Japanese policy.
- Q. The fact that you were not familiar with Japanese policy did not seem to affect your willingness to accept your first appointment as Ambassador?  
A. I believe I told you at that time also I was not keen on taking the appointment.
- Q. But you did not advance the reason you have just advanced against your second appointment for not being keen on accepting the first appointment.  
A. The first time my objections were based on the fact that I did not wish to take up the ambassadorial position because as a military man I was not well-versed in diplomatic matters. The second time my objections were based on the reasons I have already listed.
- Q. When you indicated to the Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, that you did not want to accept this appointment what understanding did you have with him when you concluded the conference?  
A. He simply asked me to think it over and try and change my views.
- Q. And then what happened?  
A. He then asked for the Army and Navy's assistance and they came to me and urged me to take the position.
- Q. Did they come to you at your home or did you go to their office?  
A. I was called.
- Q. How many days between your conference with MATSUOKA, at which you indicated no desire for the position, and the time you conferred with the Army and Navy and the War Ministry relative to your proposed appointment?  
A. Two or three days.
- Q. Who did you talk to first, Chief of Staff, representative of the Navy, or the War Minister?  
A. The War Minister and the Chief of Staff were together at the first meeting and on my way back from that meeting I stopped

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in to see the Navy Minister.

Q. What did the War Minister and the Chief of Staff say to you?

A. In substance that it was a critical period and so would I please take the post.

Q. And what did you say to them?

A. I told them I would think it over and returned home.

Q. And from there you went to the Navy Ministry?

A. The Navy Minister also stated that the Navy desired my appointment and so please reconsider.

Q. Other than the fact that they said that this was a critical time, what reasons did they advance that were sufficient to persuade you from the view that you had at first expressed to MATSUOKA when you told him you did not wish to accept the position.

A. As a former military man it becomes very difficult for me to refuse when the Army asks me to do a thing of this sort. If it were MATSUOKA and the Foreign Office alone I could easily refuse, but because of my long career with the Army and because of my obligation and responsibility as a soldier it became virtually impossible for me to not accede to their request.

Q. In addition to that feeling of loyalty or of necessity to respect the wishes of the military authorities they must have said something to you that would persuade you to change your mind in the face of your refusal when the Foreign Minister asked you to accept the position. Now, tell us what it was they said to you.

A. Nothing over and beyond the fact that they were particularly desirous of having me as Ambassador.

Q. Did they not say something to you relative to the Tripartite Pact?

A. No. Of course, they did mention that it should be followed to the letter, but as for details, there were none.

Q. It is a strange coincidence that you, General OSHIMA, who worked so hard on the early negotiations looking to the formation of this pact, now, after it has come into being, should be sent back to the field where you worked so hard in years gone by, and that nothing should be said to you by these men with respect to this document. That is difficult for me to understand.



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- A. No, I did not feel so. If I can get on further with my story it my explain some of the points that are puzzling you.
- Q. Before you go ahead with your story I want to know did TOJO say anything to you about the Tripartite Pact when he was persuading you to accept the position as Ambassador to Berlin.
- A. No, definitely not.
- Q. Before we go to the story, how long have you known KURUSU?
- A. I have only met him twice in 1939.
- Q. Now a while ago you told us that, if I remember correctly, you do not know anything about the circumstances under which Stahmer came to Tokyo relative to the Tripartite Pact.
- A. There are rumors to the effect that he was called to Japan and other rumors that he was sent from Germany. Which is correct, I do not know.
- Q. Do I understand you to say that you personally do not know anything of the circumstances under which he came?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Not so long ago KURUSU made the statement and it was published in the press that reads as follows: "Shortly after MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister he and SHIRATORI and OSHIMA contrived to bring Stahmer over my head to Tokyo." What do you say about that?
- A. That is a definite lie. I will commit hara kiri if that is the truth.
- Q. You may proceed with your story.
- A. I do not know for sure how you wish me to proceed; whether you want me to deal particularly with treaties or whether it should be a running narrative, and, if so, I can go on with my story and the treaties will enter into that at the point in the narrative where they belong.
- Q. Before you start your narrative, tell us the terms of the Tripartite Pact that was actually signed on September 27, 1940, and point out wherein the terms of the pact actually signed were in accord, or were stronger than the proposal that you were discussing at the time negotiations collapsed in 1939.
- A. It is difficult for me here to give you the full and complete text of the treaty, as I do not remember it that well. However,

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as I gather it, the Government in Japan, when it explained the provisions of the treaty to the Privy Council, stated that there were many changes from that one which had originally been planned. In the main, this was the provision which formerly named Russia as the principal subject and the other countries as secondary - although no details on this had been entered into. This time this pact was principally aimed at the United States, as Russia and England were both at war and it did not apply to them. In other words, this treaty was promulgated in order to keep the United States in a neutral status.

- Q. They abandoned then the idea of including as secondary nations those nations that had adopted Communism?
- A. I believe so, although I do not know the text of the treaty very well, even though I have read it after I became Ambassador.
- Q. Is there anything else you want to say about the differences?
- A. Naturally, there are minor changes, but the major change is so all-sweeping in its scope that I believe further details in so far as changes go are not too important.
- Q. Was there any separate secret pact signed at or about the same time by the same nations?
- A. There are secret memoranda between the two nations.
- Q. General, we will go into these matters tomorrow and then we will pick up your narrative because I am anxious to have you recite your entire narrative in the way you want to tell it to us.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 13 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20 day of  
February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde  
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP  
-108-

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CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 14th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 20, 1946  
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 18 February 1946, 1345-1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- A. In regard to my statement about meeting Ribbentrop, which you (the interpreter) translated as five or six times, I feel that as this might not be absolutely accurate, and that it might be a few times more than five or six, the record should be amended in this regard.
- Q. The other day I asked you this question: "So that, General, it would appear, would it not, that the Axis Pact of May 1939, in fact, grew out of the conversations that in the beginning contemplated the Tripartite Pact?" During the course of your reply to that question, which is a lengthy reply, you said, among other things, the following: "In this connection I feel that they may have thought that the three-power pact negotiations were a hindrance to signing the other pact, for I recall speaking to Ribbentrop and saying that it seemed rather inopportune for them to sign a separate pact with Italy when we were still in the stage of negotiations on the other." Will you tell us when and where this conversation with Ribbentrop took place and the circumstances under which it occurred?
- A. My meeting with Ribbentrop was following his return from Italy in May 1939. Prior to this he had not spoken either to SHIRATORI or me in regard to any such treaty as was consummated between Germany and Italy. Naturally, after the treaty was drawn up it became necessary for Ribbentrop to

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tell me about it, and, therefore, he asked me to come and see him - which I did. At this meeting he stated that, (1) this treaty had been drawn up on the repeated urgings of Italy, and (2) that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the negotiations then being carried on in regard to the contemplated Tripartite alliance. Also, while this is not particularly important, he told me that it was first decided to hold the meeting at Como, but that because of some British propaganda to the effect that there were troubles in Milan at the time they decided to hold the meeting in Milan on purpose to squelch these rumors. This, that I have told you, is in substance the story of this meeting.

Q. Why did you think that it seemed rather inopportune for Italy and Germany to sign that pact while Italy, Germany and Japan were still in the stage of negotiations on the proposed Tripartite Pact?

A. From the point of view in Japan it seemed rather bad manners to not let us know beforehand that such a pact was contemplated.

Q. But your statement the other day does not indicate any concern over the fact that they did not let you know, but you said that "it seemed rather inopportune for them to sign a separate pact with Italy when we were still in the stage of negotiations on the other."

A. On the surface it certainly did not seem to be the time to sign a separate treaty when negotiations were going on in regard to another one. Looking at it from another point of view, they should, if they contemplated such a pact, have let Japan know about it and received Japan's approval, or at least had Japan's understanding. As a simple example, if the three of us are discussing going to some spot and all of a sudden two of the members trip off, that does not seem to be very good manners.

Q. Who was the War Minister when the Tripartite Pact was signed?

A. TOJO. The Navy Minister was OIKAWA.

Q. And the Prime Minister was Prince KONOYE?

A. Yes.

Q. The Foreign Minister?

A. MATSUOKA.

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Q. Who was the Chief of Staff?

A. General SUGIYAMA.

Q. What influences or what groups actually pushed this Tripartite Pact through? Was it the military?

A. At the time that it was finally signed conditions in Japan were such as to make it difficult for me to state definitely that one group or another pushed for its consummation. However, the Army and the Navy in conjunction with the Foreign Office certainly were for it.

Q. Don't you think that the Army probably was exercising the greatest pressure of any one for the pact?

A. The second time - that is to say, when it was finally signed - I do not believe you can name any special group as having pushed it. Rather than my saying this - I feel that if you look into the matter you will find it to be so.

Q. Some days ago, in reply to my question as to why you resigned as Ambassador to Germany from Japan, you stated in substance that you were extremely displeased with the way Germany had behaved and saw no way of carrying out your duties in Germany, and then you added a little later that you did not desire to continue dealing with people who could not be trusted. In view of that reason for your resignation I am wondering why it was that you elected to go back to Germany later, as the Japanese Ambassador, when the same people were in power there as when you formed the opinion that I have just read to you.

A. The argument you put forth is entirely correct; however, as conditions change, it is not up to the individual to press his own views all the time.

Q. What do you mean by that statement?

A. If, as it happened, the Army and Navy pressed me to return I could not very well continue to refuse for personal reasons.

Q. Now, the Army prevailed upon you to accept the original appointment as Ambassador. If I remember correctly, I think you said that the Chief of Staff took it up with you on three different occasions before you decided to change your status from Military Attache to that of Ambassador in Germany. Then later, notwithstanding what I have just recited about the Army, when you found yourself in the state of mind that your reasons for resigning would indicate, you did not inquire of

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the Army whether you should quit or not. You told us you sent a telegram to the Foreign Office resigning and went back to Japan. Now, with those same people in power in Germany, with whom before the Tripartite Pact was signed you found difficulty in getting along and whom you mistrusted, according to your own statement, you elected to go back. I want to know why you elected to go back.

- A. The logic is as you set it forth. However, a man's nature is not such as to always act logically, and in so far as my resigning goes, it was not necessary for me to consult with the military. After returning to Japan a year had passed, and, illogical as it may be, I finally had a change of mind about returning.
- Q. What caused that change of mind?
- A. As I told you, the Foreign Office had first requested me to return as Ambassador and they later obtained the support of the Army in urging me to take the appointment. After speaking to TOJO and SUGIYAMA, I could not very well, as a former officer in the Japanese Army and as a man who had, after all, been a soldier since the age of 12, refuse to do as they wished. If you will examine the matter you will see that both the above-mentioned generals proselytized me for over an hour.
- Q. Why did these generals want you to go?
- A. As a military man and as one who had worked for the Tripartite Pact originally, I feel that the military wished to have someone in Germany who understood their position well.
- Q. And who would be able to cooperate with Germany?
- A. Yes. Naturally, from the point of view of the Army and the Navy, if they are to work with Germany, they would want to have a man who was either a military man, or who knew a great deal about the military.
- Q. Now, let us pick up your story at the point at which you left off last Friday.
- A. As I recall it, the other day, without going into details, I spoke to you of the overall picture of German-Japanese negotiations following my return to Germany. I would like to talk to you now about events that transpired between the time I returned and up until the Pacific War broke out. Before I go any further I should like to relate to you an event

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that occurred in January 1941, prior to my departure for Germany.

Q. You may proceed.

A. The Navy Minister, Admiral OIKAWA, asked me to lunch, and before the meal I spoke with him, Vice Admiral KONDO, the Assistant Chief of Staff; Vice Admiral TOYODA, Vice Minister of the Navy; General Staff Department Head; Rear or Vice Admiral UGAKI; and Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs, Rear Admiral or Vice Admiral OKA. At this meeting they told me that the Navy had not perfected plans in case of a United States-Japanese war and hence they did not wish to get dragged into such a conflict. Also in January 1941, there was one more meeting of which I would like to speak.

Q. You may proceed.

A. At a farewell party for Admiral NOMURA, the Ambassador-designate to the United States, and me, which was given by the Premier, Prince KONOYE, the following people were present, among others: HIRANUMA, Minister without portfolio; TOJO; Admiral OIKAWA; Foreign Minister MATSUOKA; Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA; and Vice Admiral KONDO, the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff - the Navy at this time had an Imperial Prince as Chief of Staff and that was the reason that the Assistant Chief of Staff was generally at the front of all negotiations.

Q. Who was that Imperial Prince?

A. Prince FUSHIMI. At this meeting, which incidentally was a breakfast, - these early affairs being popular because of stress of work at the time - the Premier gave an explanation of the Government's stand regarding the Tripartite Pact. He stated that it was Japan's desire to maintain the peace and that even in case of a German-United States war, which was always imminent, Japan did not wish to enter the conflict unless it was definitely proven that Germany had been attacked, and in this regard all these people particularly cautioned the two of us to be careful.

Q. The other day when we first discussed your reappointment as Ambassador to Germany you indicated then that you did have some conferences with TOJO and others before you left for your post in Germany. I wonder if you could tell us about



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- those conferences now. They seem to fit into the story here.
- A. There were no special conferences with the Army alone; these were the meetings that I referred to.
- Q. You may proceed with your story.
- A. Of course, in regard to these meetings there were farewell parties and things, but no official meeting with the Army alone.
- Q. Are we to understand, General, that you received no instructions whatsoever from the Army relative to what you were to do after you returned to Germany as Ambassador?
- A. No. Officially, of course, the Army does not have this right. Unofficially, they could ask me to do such and such, or so and so, but this, too, they did not do.
- Q. It seems very strange to me that TOJO and the other General you named a while ago, both of whom insisted you take the position of Ambassador, should desire you to take that post without any kind of suggestion from them as to what you were to do when you got there?
- A. I am not hiding anything. There were no instructions given.
- Q. Let me ask you this. Did MATSUOKA give you any instructions that may have emanated from the War Department or the military?
- A. No.
- Q. Did MATSUOKA give you any instructions from him as Foreign Minister relative to what you were to do regarding the Tripartite Pact?
- A. I asked MATSUOKA if he had any instructions for me and he stated he did not. So that I went to Germany without any specific instructions.
- Q. Other than the warning from the Navy of their inability to then wage war on the United States, to which you referred a few minutes ago?
- A. That and the point that Japan had no wish to participate in the war unless Germany had actually been attacked.
- Q. You may proceed.
- A. Point number one that comes up now in so far as important events go was MATSUOKA's proposed trip to Germany.

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Q. What date?

A. MATSUOKA arrived in Berlin sometime around the very beginning of April 1941, having come via Russia. Of course, he met Hitler, but his talks were mainly with Ribbentrop. How many times they met I am not absolutely sure, but I think it was not over three or four times. I was at the first meeting with Ribbentrop, but did not attend thereafter. This was partly based on the German desire to have only the two men present at these meetings, so that they might further their personal relationship and speak on matters close to their respective hearts. MATSUOKA did speak to me later about his meetings with Ribbentrop, but in the main he told me nothing of any promises that he had made or of specific details in regard to one thing or another. Prior to his return he told me that he wished to stop over in Moscow on his way back and speak with the Russians regarding the non-aggression pact - this I remember.

Q. On his way to Germany he did not go to Moscow, did he?

A. MATSUOKA came through Moscow on his way to Berlin and then went down to Italy, returned to Berlin and then went back to Japan via Moscow.

Q. Now, on MATSUOKA's way from Tokyo to Berlin, did he confer with any of the Russian Government representatives in Moscow?

A. I believe he did speak with Russian officials, but to what degree the talks progressed, or who he met with, I do not know.

Q. I was under the impression that MATSUOKA wanted to have such conversations with the officials in Moscow before he proceeded on to Berlin; that he inquired of the German Government through you, as Ambassador, to find out if it would be agreeable for them to have such discussions, and that he was informed through your office in Berlin that the German Government did not desire him to have such conversations. Now, am I correct in that?

A. That is not true.

Q. You may pick up your story at the point where I interrupted you.

A. MATSUOKA spoke to me of his meetings, but the matters on which he spoke were of such a general nature that I do not

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recall them. He did tell me how on his way to Germany he had spoken with Ambassador Steinhardt, the American representative in Moscow regarding United States and Japanese relations. Whether he told the Germans about this or not, I do not know. As I have already stated MATSUOKA's conversations with me were of a general nature and the gist of his talks with Ribbentrop were related to me, but I can not recall anything specific or binding that was decided upon by either party.

- Q. What was the reason for MATSUOKA's visit to Germany?
- A. MATSUOKA told me that he had come in order to further his relations with the German Foreign Minister, as between the countries that had signed the Tripartite Pact it seemed only fitting and proper that the Foreign Ministers should be acquainted with each other.
- Q. He was there for more than just getting acquainted, was he not?
- A. It is only natural to feel there must have been something beyond that. However, at this time in Japan there was a good deal of feeling, I believe, as to why he should go abroad simply to get acquainted with the other Foreign Ministers. This is my own opinion, but I feel that he must have been very interested in doing something about the non-aggression pact.
- Q. That was the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia?
- A. I mean that he <sup>was</sup> interested in making a non-aggression pact with Russia.
- Q. But he went to Berlin. Why did he go to Berlin?
- A. Ostensibly he was going abroad to see the Foreign Ministers of the Axis countries, but it is my own opinion that he went abroad to bring about a non-aggression pact with Russia - which he did.
- Q. Did he not go to Germany for the purpose of ascertaining to what extent Japan might further fit in or commit herself to the German scheme and also see to what extent Germany could fit into the Japanese plans? Is not that the real reason he went to Berlin?
- A. I do not believe so. If he had done something like that it should certainly have become public knowledge.

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- Q. General, I seriously doubt that would be public knowledge; it would be some more of those secret diplomatic negotiations and matters.
- A. I mean it should have become known to me, which it did not.
- Q. Are we to understand from you that you do not know why MATSUOKA went to Berlin?
- A. I am telling you all I know, and to the best of my knowledge and belief MATSUOKA came for no other purpose than that which I have stated.
- Q. What was the date of that meeting with Ribbentrop, at which you were present, as well as MATSUOKA?
- A. Right after he came, so that it must have been around the 3d or 4th of April.
- Q. Will you tell us as best you remember everything that was discussed and said at that meeting by each of the three of you, you, Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA?
- A. That is something that happened sometime ago and I am not able to recall.
- Q. General, you and I have for a period now of over two weeks been discussing matters that have gone back several years beyond the time that MATSUOKA went to Berlin. You have been able to remember in great detail events and conversations that took place during those years prior to the time that MATSUOKA went to Berlin. I want to know now why it is that you can not remember what was said when MATSUOKA and you and Ribbentrop held that first meeting.
- A. I am not trying to hide anything from you. It is only that they spoke only of the most overall matters. I have read in the newspapers where KONOYE in his memoirs states that MATSUOKA probably made some promise to attack Singapore - no, I believe it was stated that he made an important promise - but to the best of my knowledge and belief no such promise was made, nor have I heard anything about it. This was the first time that I knew of it or heard anything of it when I read about it in the newspapers.
- Q. This meeting between Ribbentrop, MATSUOKA and you took place very soon after you returned to Germany as Ambassador for the second time. It took place on the occasion your own Foreign Minister was in the country. It seems to me the cir-

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cumstances were most unusual, and inasmuch as they were most unusual, it seems to me that you should be better able to remember what was said under such circumstances than would be true if it was just some minor affair.

- A. As I recall it, there was nothing of any great importance discussed at this meeting. The Germans kept a record of the meeting, I believe, and of meetings in general, so that if you can procure these records I am sure you will be able to find out what was said. As I thought it over in preparing my notes for my narrative I realized that it was somewhat rough at this point, but I honestly do not recall that they spoke about any important matters.
- Q. You may proceed with your narrative.
- A. One last point in regard to MATSUOKA's trip: he could not have made any promises without having had the approval of the Army and Navy, and I am sure that he did not have this approval.
- Q. Why are you so sure of that?
- A. He had men from the Army and Navy along with him, who, when they came to see me, I asked if they had brought any specific instructions from the military, and they said definitely not.
- Q. Maybe they did not have any specific instructions, but maybe the Foreign Minister met with the top military people in Japan before he left and he himself knew what to talk about in that regard, and how do you know he did not have such an agreement?
- A. Having received the approval of the Government to proceed on this trip and having Army and Navy men along with him, it would be impossible for them not to know if there had been such an agreement.
- Q. Yes, but you told us a while ago that in most of the meetings with Ribbentrop/<sup>there</sup>were just Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA present. It is not clear to me then why they could not talk over matters that were not known to his advisors and that were not known to you?
- A. I was/<sup>not</sup>at the meeting so that I do not know what they spoke about, so it is true they could have spoken about things that I know nothing of. However, I am saying that the Foreign Minister could not discuss, say, joint military operations, as it was not within his ken.

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- Q. You may proceed.
- A. One further point in regard to MATSUOKA's visit is that the Army was particularly desirous of having a non-aggression pact with Russia and had he come for this express purpose it became wise to pay a visit to the countries who had been signatory to the three-power pact.
- Q. Am I to understand from that that he went to Berlin and to Rome for the purpose of notifying the heads of the Governments in Germany and Italy of the fact that Japan was going to attempt to enter into a non-aggression pact with Russia?
- A. This is not anything that MATSUOKA told me himself, but I feel that had the binding of the non-aggression pact been the prime motive and had it failed then, it would have looked better on the surface if he had paid a visit to the nations of the tripartite alliance.
- Q. It does not seem clear to me why MATSUOKA should follow such a course under the conditions that you have outlined when Germany never discussed with Japan the subject before Germany entered into a non-aggression pact with Russia.
- A. I mean that it was not necessary for him to do so - that is, speak to Germany and Italy about it;- point one, is that he came abroad for the purpose of meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy; this was the official reason. Point two is that, I believe, the real reason was to attempt to make a non-aggression pact with Russia, and point three is that, had this mission failed, it would not have looked very good in Germany and Italy; therefore, while he was about it, he told the Germans and Italians of the matter.
- Q. That brings us right back where we started. His official reason was to meet with the Foreign Ministers and I have been trying to find out what he wanted with them, for I have great difficulty in making myself feel that he came all that distance during such perilous times for Japan and the European countries for the sole and only purpose to have a get-acquainted party with the Foreign Ministers. I think there is something else back of it, and I think you ought to tell us what it is.
- A. I believe from the beginning that his real reason for coming was to bind the non-aggression pact.

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- Q. General, I want you to think this over. I want you to think over that first meeting between MATSUOKA, Ribbentrop and yourself, and maybe after you think about it a while you may be able to give us a little more assistance. I am not through with the subject. We will come back to it another day. You may proceed with the narrative.
- A. That being that, as far as MATSUOKA is concerned, I will go on to the matter of United States-Japanese relations.
- Q. That will be point number two.
- A. In so far as it concerns Germany. In regard to MATSUOKA's visit to Europe, I think that there are many other people in Japan who felt that his real reason was to make a non-aggression pact with Russia, so that I wish you would look into the matter. Sometime in May 1941, word came to the German Foreign Office that United States-Japanese talks had started. This news did not come to me direct, but I received the same notice sometime later. The first thing here that I will discuss is what did Germany think about these talks. To put it briefly, I believe that Germany understood Japan's position in this regard. When I spoke to Ribbentrop I explained to him that the Japanese Government wished to maintain the peace in the Pacific and that they were discussing matters with the United States relative to this. Ribbentrop said that he approved of the negotiations and that it was his desire that the United States stay strictly neutral, and in this regard stop sending United States arms to Great Britain - that he wished Japan to bring up this matter in the course of talks with the United States. However, following this, Ribbentrop spoke to Hitler and Hitler said that it was too much to expect the United States to cease sending arms and, hence, he was not particularly interested in this regard, but that he did wish the United States to stay absolutely neutral. I then sent a communication to Japan telling them of Germany's thoughts about the matter and how they had no objection to the talks.
- Q. What objection could Germany have to the talks?
- A. Naturally, they could have no objections, but as a partner in the tripartite alliance, it was only proper to let them know about it. Also, it becomes necessary to have them understand, as there might be some objection if the talks were being carried on secretly.
- Q. I have difficulty in understanding that, General, because the Tripartite Pact was a pact whereby the parties to the pact would give aid, military, economic, and otherwise, in the event of

OSHIMA, Hiroshi 2/18/46

- an attack upon one of the three. Now, I don't know what that has to do with these discussions.
- A. That is a point of view as to whether they should be told or not, but looking at it from the point of view of diplomacy, I believe it was desirable. There is no necessity of receiving their approval, but simply of notifying them. I agree with you that there is entirely no necessity of notifying them in so far as it is the right of an independent nation to carry on any type of negotiations it wishes; however, from the point of view of the two countries being in an alliance it is diplomatically wise and proper to notify them that negotiations are being carried on with a third party.
- Q. I am wondering, General, if you had any separate secret diplomatic document that necessitated such close liaison, should I say, with Germany by Japan, at the time Japan started these negotiations with the United States.
- A. No, notification from Japan of talks with the United States did not come at the beginning and there was some feeling when the Germans were notified that these talks had started; that perhaps Japan was trying to squirm out of the Tripartite Pact. I do not say these were any official manifestations, but it being my job as Ambassador to see that relations between the two countries were kept on a friendly basis, I simply felt that such thoughts might have been in the minds of some Germans. From my own point of view I feel that Germany at the time was sincere in her desire to keep the United States neutral. MATSUOKA either before or after United States-Japanese talks had started sent a message to Ribbentrop via me, in which he said that he thought the preservation of peace was very necessary and that he wished to work towards that end. I recall that when I took this message to Ribbentrop that he showed great understanding of MATSUOKA's views. I do not mind how long we continue, but following this, matters get rather lengthy in my narrative, and so this would be an opportune place to stop for today, if you wish.
- Q. What is the next subject?
- A. It is about what Germany felt regarding Japanese-United States relations leading up to the time the war started.
- Q. We will not start on that today. I want to remind you, General, that the other day you indicated to us that there was a secret military agreement between Germany and Japan that came into being after the Tripartite Pact was signed. I do not want to overlook that as you recite your story.



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- A. There was no such pact following the tripartite alliance.  
This was after the no-separate peace pact had been signed.
- Q. We will come to that in your story?
- A. Yes, that pact was in December 1941.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 14 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27 day of  
February 1946.

G. Raymond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section,  
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

OSHIMA, Hiroshi 2/18/46

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 18th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 27, 1946

Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 19 February 1946, 1345-1630 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, yesterday I suggested that you give some thought to the reasons for MATSUOKA's trip to Berlin in April 1941, to which you referred. I suggested to you that it is difficult for me to understand why under the then serious conditions confronting both Japan and Germany the Foreign Minister would see fit to travel all the way from Tokyo to Berlin for the sole purpose of holding a get-acquainted visit with Ribbentrop. I urged you to give further thought to your answer and I am wondering if today you would desire to add anything to what you said yesterday.
- A. I am trying to tell you everything I know in a veracious manner. As far as MATSUOKA's visit is concerned, it is my belief that he did not come to Berlin to carry on any special negotiations with the German Government. I quite understand how it seems strange to you, and the fact that you seem to doubt my statements is in a sense only natural. I repeat, none the less, that to the best of my knowledge MATSUOKA's visit did not result in any promises or secret treaties.
- Q. Did it result in a formulation of any plans with respect to the future?
- A. To the best of my knowledge none. I would like to have you question the Army and Navy Ministers of the period. I believe they would substantiate my statements.
- Q. I am hoping that you will see fit to make a full disclosure of everything you know about this because under the circum-

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stances it would appear an advisable thing to do. I want to give you every opportunity to make every explanation of these things and to tell us of others who may have been involved in the formulation of any plans. I am mindful of the fact that you were Ambassador and that you had others over you in Tokyo, from whom you took orders, and that you were discharging your duties. I just don't want you to hold back anything. It would be advisable under the circumstances, I should think, not to. I just want to be sure you have told us everything you can or want to tell us about this matter.

A. I can definitely state that in so far as I know, no agreements on the joint operations or matters of this type were discussed by the two Foreign Ministers.

Q. When you use that word "agreements", are you limiting yourself to something in writing or do you include understandings that have been arrived at that were not reduced to writing?

A. In saying that there were no agreements I include verbal agreements. In Japan, the Foreign Minister can not go ahead on his own and make any agreements concerning military operations.

Q. Is there any reason why under the circumstances the Foreign Minister could not discuss with Ribbentrop, Hitler, and other German leaders proposed plans for the future with the understanding that he was not then committing the Japanese Government, but rather subject to his ability to obtain the approval of these plans after he returned to Tokyo?

A. I do not believe he did. There are a great many rumors flying about in this connection and I would like to speak to you about them.

Q. Proceed.

A. When I spoke to you yesterday I told you of how I was present at the initial meeting between Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA; I wish to add today, as it does not seem to be in the record, although I was under the impression it was, that I was also present at the initial meeting between Hitler and MATSUOKA.

Q. How many meetings did MATSUOKA have with Hitler and how many meetings did MATSUOKA have with Ribbentrop?

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A. With Ribbentrop, I believe, I told you yesterday, MATSUOKA met three or four times. I believe he met Hitler once more after the initial meeting, but this, I think, was a reception.

Q. Were you present at any of the meetings between MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop that took place after their first meeting?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any information regarding what MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop talked about at those meetings?

A. I never heard anything from Ribbentrop, but MATSUOKA did tell me that he had spoken to the German Foreign Minister about this or that matter.

Q. What I want to know is what were those matters referred to by you as this or that?

A. As your questions were interjected as I was about to recite some of the rumors connected with this meeting, I believe that if I went on at this point it might clear up some of this.

Q. You may proceed.

A. In the first place, I recall that at the initial meeting with Ribbentrop he, that is, the German Foreign Minister, was called away very shortly after we met to attend an important meeting with Hitler, so that, to the best of my remembrance, our meeting did not last for long. Although I have a bit more to add to the following statement I would like to just say this at this point: at the meeting with Hitler the talk was mainly regarding the three-power pact and of whether it was popular in Japan and whether it was intended that it be followed to the letter, and things of this sort. Also talk of Singapore came up at one time during the meeting but in so far as I remember no promises of any sort were made by MATSUOKA. In fact, I have no clear remembrance of how the matter was brought up and there was to the best of my knowledge no talk about an attack or anything of the sort. I had intended to speak to you a little more fully regarding thoughts held by a certain group among the Germans in regard to Singapore.

Q. Was there any discussion in that meeting about the Philippines?

A. No.

Q. Are you sure about that?

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- A. To the best of my remembrance.
- Q. Proceed.
- A. Before I go any further I wish to say here that I do not believe that MATSUOKA had the sanction of the Japanese Government to make any promises concerning future plans.
- Q. I understand that, but there was no reason why MATSUOKA could not discuss proposed future plans that he might take back to the Government in Tokyo and later perhaps obtain the approval of the Government in Tokyo of those plans, was there?
- A. I intend to speak to you more fully on that matter, so I request that you hear me out a little further.
- Q. I will be glad to hear you out, but I do not want you to eliminate it from your statement.
- A. (Remark to interpreter: I shall go on with my story until such a point as I think is opportune for you to make an interpretation and then advise you in that respect.)  
I shall proceed further from this point, but please get this much down in the record. I repeat that MATSUOKA did not have the permission of the Japanese Government to make any promises. Also, I heard from the members of his staff including the military and naval aides that as far as they knew he had no such permission. I had not heard that he was vested with any such rights, nor did any of the members of my own Embassy staff hear anything to this effect. That is point number one. We now come to whether MATSUOKA on his own initiative made any promises - that, I believe, is what you are particularly interested in. The first point here is, when MATSUOKA was with me at these meetings, did he make any promises about Singapore or joint future operations or anything else of an important nature? To this I can answer that he did not. We then come to the meetings he held, at which I was not present.  
Following the publication of Prince KONOY's memoirs, in which he states, I believe, that he, that is Prince KONOY, believed that MATSUOKA had made some promises in Germany, there arose much talk and conjecture as to what these promises might have been. I can definitely state that MATSUOKA never told me of any promises, which he might have made. Further, it is my belief that any talk of future attacks or the starting of a war or matters of this sort is too all-embracing and important to be discussed by one man, particularly as

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war plans and military operations in Japan are the strict field of the military alone, which is the Supreme Prerogative.

Q. Are you telling us now that MATSUOKA did not discuss any proposed war plans with Ribbentrop or Hitler or anyone else in Germany?

A. That is what I think.

Q. What makes you say you think that?

A. I base this on the fact that in Japan it is absolutely impossible for somebody not connected with the General Staff of the Army or Navy to discuss such matters as war plans. It might be possible in Europe and I believe that Churchill and Roosevelt were able to discuss these matters, but in Japan this is the absolute Prerogative of the General Staffs.

Q. General, you have been giving me that type of answer every time I have asked you anything about this. Instead of admitting that he did talk about these things, you tell me that he could not talk about them. It is not reasonable for me to believe that MATSUOKA during these serious times when the affairs of your nation and the affairs of Germany were in such a critical condition that he would go all the way to Germany and just hope to be better acquainted with Ribbentrop when he returned. Frankly, that does not smack of truth to me and I think you know more than you are telling us, and I think it is to your own advantage not to hold anything back. Do not try to cover up with that type of answer.

A. I realize that it is to my advantage to speak of matters that I know at this moment. However, I definitely state that I am telling you everything I know and everything that I believe to the best of my knowledge. It is my intention and conviction to speak of everything that I know truthfully.

Q. Now, you are not trying to tell us that MATSUOKA did not talk about these military matters at meetings at which you were not present?

A. The point that arises is that as I see it, did MATSUOKA discuss any of these matters with the Germans at any meetings he had when I was not present. I can definitely state he never told me that he had had any such discussions. The question then arises did he talk of these matters and not tell me about them, and I can only say that to the best of my belief he did not.

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- Q. Did he tell you what he talked about at those meetings?
- A. Beyond what I told you yesterday he did not tell me anything of such importance that remains in my memory.
- Q. Proceed.
- A. That is about all in so far as this question is concerned.
- Q. Now, referring to your initial meeting with Hitler, at which Ribbentrop, MATSUOKA and you were present, you stated a while ago that they talked about the three-power pact and Hitler wanted to know whether it was popular in Japan. What was the reply to Hitler to that question and who gave it?
- A. I meant in my last answer that he had spoken about overall matters concerning the three-power pact, such as its popularity in Japan. I can not definitely say whether he asked that specific question or not.
- Q. Well, evidently, the subject of the popularity of the pact in Japan was discussed at that meeting with Hitler. Now, I want to know what was said at that meeting regarding that particular subject.
- A. I have no remembrance of specific matters that were discussed. I included that question of popularity as being one of the subjects that was possibly discussed at this meeting.
- Q. It seems to me that at such an important meeting and so comparatively recent in point of time, and among such important people in world affairs of that day, that you should be able to remember what was said there equally as well as you have demonstrated already that you can remember with respect to meetings with other people that took place years before.
- A. This was not a meeting at which I was one of the principal members and it was not necessary for me to enter into the discussions, so that differing from other meetings in which I was one of the negotiators, it is natural for me not to be able to recall as many specific details as I might have if I had been directly concerned with it.
- Q. Now, General, the subject matter of the popularity of the Tripartite Pact in Japan must have been foremost in your own mind at that time, for you had then only recently returned to Germany from Japan and you, yourself, knew how the people in Japan felt about it. Now, I am not satisfied with this type of reason for not remembering what you said to Hitler, for



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if you were honest in what you said, you must have told him what the conditions actually were and you knew what they were.

- A. I can honestly say that I do not recall any concrete matters being discussed.
- Q. Let us try another one. You said that some talk about Singapore came up. You remembered that a while ago. Now, tell us what was said at that meeting about Singapore.
- A. I am certain that MATSUOKA made no promises about an attack on Singapore. To the best of my recollection the discussion about Singapore arose as to what preparations Japan had made regarding Singapore in case a United States-German war broke out, under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact Japan being obliged to wage war in case of an attack by the United States upon Germany.
- Q. Just what was said about that and who said it?
- A. I do not recall who first brought up the matter. In the second place I can definitely state that there was no talk of an attack upon Singapore and whether Japan would make such an attack or would not make such an attack. The last point is that MATSUOKA's answer, although I am not certain of exactly what he said, was that preparations regarding Singapore, in the event that the provisions of the Tripartite Pact would have to be effected, were in the process of realization in Japan - I do not say this is exactly what MATSUOKA said, but it was roughly what he meant.
- Q. What did MATSUOKA say those preparations regarding Singapore that were then in the process of realization in Japan were?
- A. Nothing at all was said about what these preparations were.
- Q. Do you mean to say that the Germans were not even curious as to what those preparations were?
- A. This came up in an overall discussion and it was not the intention of either party to go into a discussion of any specific point.
- Q. Then are we to understand that the discussion of specific points was to take place later.
- A. No. Japan even if she had any specific plans would not discuss them with Germany.

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- Q. Now, General, I do not understand your previous answer when you say that these matters came up in an overall discussion and it was not the intention of the parties to go into any specific item unless you mean that after meeting with Hitler and the overall matters were mentioned that it was the intention of the conferees later among the experts and among the Department heads to discuss the details of this overall matter concerning which you had talked with the head of the Government?
- A. MATSUOKA had not come to discuss any plans and therefore it was only when, for example, the matter of Singapore came up in the discussions that he made any statement upon it.
- Q. As a matter of fact, General, this subject of Singapore had been discussed with you by Ribbentrop even before MATSUOKA made that trip to Germany, had it not?
- A. There was no discussion but he did bring up the matter. I had intended to speak to you about that.
- Q. I want you to speak to me about that fully a little later, but right now I want to direct your attention to this, that inasmuch as the subject of Singapore had been mentioned to you by Ribbentrop before MATSUOKA ever made this trip, it is difficult for me to understand how the question would be dropped and no further discussion on it after the overall Singapore subject had been mentioned in this meeting with Hitler. It seems to me that since they talked to you about it, since it was mentioned to Hitler, that it must have been mentioned again at some subsequent meetings.
- A. I can only say that it was not within the sphere of our duty or right to discuss any specific matters concerning Singapore, as this was strictly up to the military. At this time, May 1941, or around there, I do not believe that war plans had ever ~~either~~ been drawn up in Tokyo, and even if there had been we would not have known about it. If there were to be such talks these are not things that would be discussed by the Foreign Office, but by the military.
- Q. Who were the members of the staff that accompanied MATSUOKA?
- A. The senior member was SAKAMOTO, Tamao, a section head in the Foreign Office. In addition there was a man named KASE, Shunichi, from the Foreign Office, and another named HOGEM.

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The Army Aide was Lt. Col. NAGAI, and as I told you the other day I do not recall the name of the Navy man. There are two KASE, Shunichi, in the Foreign Office. This KASE is the one who was the Japanese Minister to Switzerland. This statement that I am writing up here is something that I would like to have included in the record, particularly, as it is something that concerns not myself alone, but another individual, MATSUOKA.

(Statement is hereto attached.) (Interrogation was suspended while witness wrote statement, which was later translated by interpreter.)

Q. Were any of the men whose names you have given us as members of the staff that accompanied MATSUOKA to Berlin on this trip present at this first meeting with Hitler, about which we have been talking this afternoon

A. No.

Q. You stated that at this meeting with Hitler, among other things, that the matter of whether Japan would follow the three-power pact was discussed. What did you mean by that?

A. It was naturally of interest to Germany at this time as to whether Japan would abide by the pact or not, and it is my recollection that a general exchange of assurances on this matter was made, but that is all.

Q. But what did they mean in this meeting when they discussed the question of whether the pact would be followed; just what does it mean, would the pact be followed?

A. I do not recall exactly what was said. It is of interest to the parties in a treaty of this sort to know whether the other member is going to follow through with it, and that is about all.

Q. Tell us how the trip of MATSUOKA to Germany came about and by that I want to know this - was this trip initiated by MATSUOKA or was it initiated by someone in Germany, and what were the circumstances under which it came about.

A. I think this was MATSUOKA's own idea.

Q. I had been under the impression that Hitler had invited MATSUOKA to come over to Germany.

A. Not so far as I know.

Q. If the invitation to MATSUOKA came from Germany would it have been extended through you as Ambassador?

A. Rather than that - MATSUOKA had been saying that he would like to go abroad even before I had left Japan.

Q. Were these arrangements for MATSUOKA's trip made before you

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returned to Germany as Ambassador or after you returned?

- A. There are not a great many preparations to be made anyway, but as far as notifying Germany that he was coming, I believe that was done before I was named Ambassador.
- Q. Do you know what your predecessor as Ambassador indicated to the German Government was the reason for the proposed trip by MATSUOKA?
- A. I had nothing to do with these negotiations. I believe the plans were made in Tokyo.
- Q. But you arrived in Berlin several weeks before MATSUOKA came over, and didn't you find out what was given as the official purpose of his trip?
- A. There was no communication to me of what his reasons were to be for the trip. I was simply notified of his day of arrival.
- Q. Do you know the date that Germany commenced war against Russia?
- A. I had thought of speaking to you about Russo-German relations and so I have the dates, etc., written down here.
- Q. I have one question I want to ask you before we leave this point, relative to <sup>the</sup> non-aggression pact which was entered into between Japan and Russia. Before I ask you that question I want to know the date of the commencement of the German-Russian war, if you know what it is.
- A. June 22, 1941.
- Q. General, did you have any advance information from the German Government that they were going to attack Russia?
- A. I shall speak to you more fully on this as we go along, but around the 10th of June, I received word of this from Hitler.
- Q. Are you certain that you did not know about it at the time MATSUOKA was in Berlin?
- A. I did not know about it.
- Q. Tell me, why did Japan want this non-aggression pact with Russia?
- A. Japan's wish, I believe, was to solidify relations in the North, as she was <sup>not</sup> sure what would subsequently occur to the South.
- Q. What do you mean by that when you say that Japan was not sure of what might subsequently take place to the South. What did you have in mind?
- A. I believe it arose from the desire to protect the North in case Japan were dragged into the war with the advent of a German-

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United States conflict.

- Q. In other words, Japan was anxious to have some understanding with Russia so that in the event of hostilities between Japan and the United States Japan would be relieved from the possibility of any attack or other pressure from Russia. Is that right?
- A. Yes, but this is only my own opinion and belief.
- Q. What did MATSUOKA indicate to you while he was with you in Europe as his reason for desiring to obtain this non-aggression pact with Russia?
- A. He did not tell me his reasons, but I believe they were somewhat along the lines I have just recounted.
- Q. General, while MATSUOKA was in Europe did you at any time attempt to dissuade him from seeking this non-aggression pact with Russia?
- A. No. But I did speak to him about how he should be very careful in giving out any large concessions in return for this pact.
- Q. Why? What was your reason for that?
- A. I will speak to you fully about this tomorrow if you wish, but to put it briefly I felt that changing conditions of the times would perhaps not make it a wise move to hurriedly consummate such a pact. Hitler himself had pressed Japan to make such a treaty - you will find this in his writings, I believe. But I felt that it was a time when we should think it over a little further in case we should be forced to make any concessions, such as giving up Sakhalin or parts of Manchuria.
- Q. All right, General, we will be back tomorrow and I want you to continue with your narrative from the point at which we left off yesterday, and as you narrate these events to us that you have in mind I will expect you, of course, to cover the matters that we referred to today with respect to which you have stated that you had planned to speak fully in the course of your narrative.

Translation of Written Statement by

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi

The Hitler-Matsuoka conference dealt mostly with items of a general nature. There was no promise of importance made. For this reason, though it is regrettable, I have no clear recollection of the meeting; it is not a case of being cognizant and not revealing what I know. Although I recall that the conversation touched casually upon Singapore, I have no definite recollection as to whether the subject was introduced by the Germans or Matsuoka. Of course, there never was any agreement (on Japan's part) to attack Singapore. Matsuoka's answer was based on the following principle: that if and when a situation arose that necessitated the fulfilling of obligations relative to the provisions of the TRI-PARTITE Pact, Japan has the necessary preparations to prove that she will not evade the obligations accruing thereof. (I do not today recall the actual conversation.)

「ヒトラー」松岡氏、會話の一般的事項  
多ク重要ナル約束ナリ為レテ遺  
憾今日確實ナル記憶ナシ決シテ云  
ハサルニアラズ談偶々新嘉坡ニ及ヒシ  
記憶凡レ拙側ヨリ話出シタルヤ松  
岡氏ヨリ話出シタルヤ確實ナル記憶  
ナシ勿論新嘉坡ヲ攻撃スル約束  
ナトハ全クナシ唯松岡氏ハ三子  
同盟ノ義務ヲ遂行セサルハカラハレ  
會話ノ一立ヲ回避スルニアラハレ立前  
ヨリ必要ノ準備ヲナシタル事自ラ  
ナシ舊來セシヨリ記憶スル具持的  
「問答」今日記憶也

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27 day of February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section,  
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 19th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 27, 1946  
Date

G. Osmond Hyde



INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 20 February 1946, 1345-1530 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, you have indicated that you want to make a statement before we proceed with our interrogation.
- A. Before MATSUOKA left Berlin he put in a request to the German authorities to hand over to him a copy of the record that they had made of his conversations with German leaders. The reply came after he had left and was transmitted to me by Stahmer, and in substance stated that because they had not prepared an official transcript of the conversations that they were not in a position to let MATSUOKA have the copy. I feel personally that the Germans had not taken down the stenographic record of the conversations, but had simply put down on paper their remembrance of the meetings. I would like included in the record the fact that the Germans often made it a habit to have only the two parties concerned present at a meeting and later the German representative would dictate his remembrance of the events which transpired. I have personally had several experiences of this sort and I believe this was the case in the conversations which MATSUOKA took part in.
- Q. The last time we heard anything about Stahmer during the course of this interrogation he was in Tokyo, during those days when the final negotiations with respect to the Tripartite Pact were taking place. Now, tell us, if you know, when he left Tokyo upon his return trip to Berlin?

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- A. I am not absolutely certain of the date, but as the three-power pact was concluded in September, I believe that he left soon after, probably early in October.
- Q. After Stahmer returned to Germany upon the occasion to which you have just referred, when did he thereafter go back to Tokyo and in what capacity did he then serve?
- A. He returned as Ambassador to China sometime around the end of 1941.
- Q. To what Government in China did he go?
- A. The Wang Ching Wei.
- Q. And thereafter did he go to Tokyo in some capacity?
- A. He went to take Ott's place in Tokyo as Ambassador.
- Q. About what date was that?
- A. It was either toward the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943, I am not sure which.
- Q. Tell us the period of time during which MATSUOKA was in Berlin on this visit we have been talking about - this 1941 visit.
- A. I do not recall the exact dates, but I believe it was somewhere around the second, third or fourth of April that he arrived in Berlin. He spent five or six days in Berlin and then proceeded to Italy where, I believe, he stayed for only two or three days, then returned to Berlin again and spent another two or three days before returning to Japan via Moscow.
- Q. So in all he spent approximately seven to nine days in Germany and approximately three days in Italy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did he have to stay in Germany such a long period of time?
- A. In all things in general concerning the tripartite alliance Italy took a rather secondary position, so that in all discussions Germany was at the front.
- Q. So that during those days then he was discussing the tripartite agreement in Germany, mainly with German officials?
- A. As I told you the other day, I do not know the subject of the conversations he held, but I imagine the three-power pact entered into it. In addition he spent sometime in Germany touring around factories and was entertained considerably, including such things as a trip to the Palace at Potsdam.

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- Q. Who entertained him besides Ribbentrop and Hitler?
- A. About four receptions: once by Hitler, twice by Ribbentrop, and once by the Japanese Embassy - no, Ribbentrop was three times.
- Q. How many conversations did MATSUOKA have with Ribbentrop while he was there?
- A. Three or four times, I believe, in addition to meeting at dinners and receptions.
- Q. When MATSUOKA left Berlin on his way back to Japan, how did he travel?
- A. He went directly to Moscow and back to Japan from there.
- Q. Did he, for example, have a special train when he left Berlin?
- A. He had a special train as far as the border in any case.
- Q. And did you go with him to the border?
- A. I went as far as Frankfurt on the Oder with him.
- Q. You knew that he was then enroute to Moscow for the purpose of trying to obtain a non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And while you were on this train with him you had some discussion with him relative to that proposed proposition?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Tell us what you said and what MATSUOKA said during those conversations on that train.
- A. If you particularly desire me to speak about this at this moment, I shall do so, but I believe the narrative would go better if I include it where I was intending to include it.
- Q. I want you to repeat it in your narrative as you had originally planned, but for my purposes at this time I would like just a brief statement in the record now relative to and in explanation of the conversation to which I have just referred.
- A. Although I wish to go back and explain more fully about these matters which have a direct bearing upon what I said to MATSUOKA in the train, in substance it was that while Germany had seemed to desire Japanese-Russian friendly relations, conditions at the time were changing in regard to German-Russian relations and so

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it would be best to think things over carefully before making a non-aggression pact with Russia if it entailed the granting of heavy concessions.

Q. We will drop this matter at this point and allow you to recite everything about it that you care to tell us in the course of the narrative.

A. I shall speak to you fully about it when the time comes.

Q. When the Tripartite Pact was being considered, was there not a time during your discussions and negotiations when there was some consideration given to the idea of inviting Russia to be a party to the pact and making it a four-party pact instead of a three-party pact?

A. There was no such discussion.

Q. I have heard from various sources that there were such discussions and that at one time there was a rather strong feeling among the negotiators to the effect that such a pact should include Russia. Are you sure that no such consideration was given to that whatsoever?

A. As far as I know, there was no such talk, although it might have arisen after the German-Russian non-aggression pact had come into being.

Q. What makes you say that such conversations might have arisen after the German-Russian non-aggression pact came into being?

A. I have never heard from people in a responsible position, but I heard after the non-aggression pact had been signed that there was some talk that Russia should have been included in the tripartite pact negotiations from the beginning.

Q. From whom did you hear that?

A. It was not of any particular importance and not from anyone who was in an official capacity, so that I can not recall who it was. You asked me just now whether I had known about this or whether such talk had ever come up, so that I simply mention this in passing.

Q. It is a strange thing to me, General, that in a conversation of this type with someone on a matter of such importance that it is not possible for you to remember who it is might have said that to you.

A. I did not think it important - it is something like people who say that a war should not have been fought after they had lost it.

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Q. You may proceed with your narrative.

A. In regard to where I left off the other day, which was where I was speaking of German thoughts in so far as United States-Japanese relations went, I stated then, and I wish to repeat now, that I firmly believe that Germany wished to stay neutral in case of a war between Japan and the United States, and, in general, simply wanted the United States to remain strictly neutral. This was what she felt at the time. To go a little further, Germany felt that she had lost the First World War because of the United States entry into it and, therefore, was particularly keen on keeping the United States strictly neutral,-- the one they were then fighting. In regard to this neutrality of the United States Germany felt that the three-power pact would have a strong influence upon the United States in making her preserve her neutrality. Now, in so far as Singapore goes, Ribbentrop first spoke to me in March 1941, I believe it was, regarding the possibility of Japan launching a sudden attack upon Singapore without drawing the United States into the conflict. This conversation in March was not official and the talk about Singapore simply came up in the course of the conversation. However, it can be seen by this conversation that Germany had two wishes at the time, to wit, (1) keep the United States strictly neutral, and (2) get Japan into the war against Britain without involving the United States in the conflict. Now, to take on the third point: while this is only my idea on the matter, as I told you yesterday, I believe that Germany was very keen to know whether Japan would carry out her obligations under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact in case she, that is to say, Germany, were attacked by the United States. In this regard I heard from Germany later that during the initial negotiations for the Tripartite Pact that certain secrets, the nature of which I do not know, got into the hands of the British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie. Therefore, it appeared to me as Ambassador to Germany - and it is important for me to know about these matters and to keep my finger on the pulse of German official thoughts - that the Germans were generally suspicious of whether Japan actually meant to carry out her treaty obligations or whether she did not intend to get out of them when the time came - that is to say, that there was a certain group in Japan which did not wish to or intend to follow through with her obligations.

Q. From whom did you hear this in Germany?

A. This sort of information would not be told me officially. I heard it from some of the members of my staff who had in turn probably heard it from somebody in the German Foreign Office.

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Q. You may proceed.

A. Now, what was Japan's position at this time? Of course, I can not state definitely that such was the case, but I am sure that the Army and Navy were making plans to be used in the event that it became necessary to carry out treaty obligations. Also she was entering into United States-Japanese talks. In this regard a Colonel IWAKURO was sent to the United States to work along with Admiral NOMURA. There was also some talk in Japan of whether it would not be possible to bring to a close the European War through the efforts of the United States and Japan. I shall continue from here and speak to you about Singapore, among other things. Kindly include in the record the fact that when I say that the Army and Navy were making plans in regard to attacking Singapore or anything else that they were based simply upon the premise that they would be used in case it became necessary to carry out the provisions of the Tripartite Pact. Following my talk with Ribbentrop, of which I have told you, it was sometime either in May or June 1941 - I am not sure of the exact date - that Hitler asked me to bring him a map of Singapore if we had such a thing in our possession. I procured this map from our Military Attache and took it to Hitler. There were no specific statements or requests made by Hitler as to attacking Singapore, but he did ask whether I thought an attack on Singapore would be easy or difficult. As it was not up to me as a non-military man to deal in tactical matters, and, further, because I did not have such information, I made no definite answer, but I did state that so far as I could see it would not be an easy matter, and would probably take all of six months. I made this statement principally because Ribbentrop had been under the impression, and it was his idea, that Singapore could be attacked suddenly and captured with ease. If such an idea or plans for the attack on Singapore had been perfected by the General Staff and had they wished to discuss the matter with Germany, some communication should have been made to the Military Attache in Berlin, as this was his affair. However, I know that he had no such communication, as I had asked him about it. Further, as no individual in Japan has the right to discuss military tactics without the express permission of the Emperor I can definitely state that no discussions regarding the attack or proposed attack were entered into by me.

Q. I am not clear on what you mean by that last - you say because in Japan no one can talk about military tactics without the permission of the Emperor, you are certain that you did not have

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such discussions. Now, you either know that you did or did not, and I don't see where the permission of the Emperor has anything to do with it.

A. I mean that I can not discuss on my own the fact that Japan had certain specific plans or did not have them. That is to say, I can make a comment on my own, but it is not up to me to go into details officially or to commit the Japanese military to any course of action, as I do not know in the first place what the military intended to do and in the second place it was not my right as I did not possess the Supreme Prerogative.

Q. This interrogation certainly has not been confined to matters that you did officially. It is my observation that you accomplished much that you have indicated to us was being done in an unofficial capacity. Now, in the light of what you said as the reasons for your inability to discuss these matters officially with the Germans, I want to know what you said to them on these occasions unofficially.

A. In so far as Singapore is concerned, this is as far as I went in my discussions. Some minor points will come up later, but it is my belief that Germany was more interested later in having us attack Russia than anything else.

Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you had this talk with Ribbentrop in March 1941 when he discussed the subject of Japan launching a sudden attack upon Singapore.

A. It was at Fuschl, I believe.

Q. What was the occasion of the talk - how did it come about?

A. I am not certain and I can not state definitely on what occasion it was, but I believe it was either when I went to present my credentials or at the time when Bulgaria entered into the Tripartite Alliance.

Q. This was sometime after you had arrived in Germany the second time as Ambassador? You arrived there, you told us yesterday, the 16th day of February 1941. Now, this meeting, you said, took place in March, so it seems to me unlikely that it was the occasion of the presentation of your credentials.

A. It always takes quite a time in Germany before presentation of credentials.

Q. But you had had conferences with Ribbentrop before this date?

A. Yes.

Q. What date did MATSUOKA arrive in Germany?

A. Around the beginning of April, as I said before.

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Q. Are you sure that it was not the latter part of March?

A. I am pretty sure that it was April. Sometime around the end of March Yugo-Slavia entered the Alliance and I am fairly certain that it was after this that MATSUOKA arrived.

Q. Now, was not this meeting actually a meeting between you and Ribbentrop with respect to arranging plans relative to the coming visit of MATSUOKA?

A. No, I do not believe so.

Q. You are not absolutely sure about that, are you?

A. As I recall it, arrangements for MATSUOKA's visit were discussed at the time when Yugo-Slavia entered the Alliance late in March.

Q. But what I want to know is this - this meeting in March of 1941, to which you have been addressing yourself this afternoon, was not that meeting in fact a meeting between you and Ribbentrop, at which you were discussing matters to be taken up when your superior, the Foreign Minister of Japan, arrived in Germany, which would then be in the very near future?

A. Definitely not.

Q. I am having difficulty understanding how you can be so sure when you are not able to tell us definitely when this meeting was held.

A. I definitely had no instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to make certain preparations or discuss certain matters prior to MATSUOKA's visit and, therefore, while I may not definitely remember the date I can state positively that I did not discuss matters relative to his coming.

Q. You have demonstrated time and again that you have held discussions with the German officials without any instructions from your Foreign Office. I did not ask you whether you had instructions from your Foreign Office. I want to know if without instructions from your Foreign Office you did not sit down with Ribbentrop and discuss some of the things that would be the subject of conversations when MATSUOKA arrived. It seems to me that it would be the logical thing to do. Certainly Ribbentrop would want to take full advantage of MATSUOKA's presence and that it was only to be expected that he would sit down with you and discuss these things that later would be the subject of some conversation with the Chief of your Foreign Office, namely, MATSUOKA.

A. I had no instructions from Japan, nor did we discuss anything relative to what would be discussed when MATSUOKA came to Germany.



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As a matter of fact, I was of the opinion at the time that MATSUOKA's visit would accomplish nothing, and had my doubts as to the worth of it.

- Q. I have information, reliable information, to the effect that you did have some such discussions with Ribbentrop. Now, I want you to think it over, and when we come back tomorrow I want you to be prepared to discuss with us a little more, because I feel reasonably certain that you are not making a full disclosure on this particular point.
- A. I do not believe we did discuss anything further, but I shall think it over.

INTERROGATION OF  
General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 21 February 1946, 1340-1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

Q. General, you have indicated that you want to put a statement in the record at this time. You may do so.

A. (Written statement is hereto attached with translation by interpreter.)

Q. Have you anything further to add to this written statement?

A. Further, I did not speak to you about this before because I did not feel it was of any particular importance, but following your interrogation I realize that you are placing great stress upon this meeting. I know that had I the intention of hiding the true facts you, in your investigations, should be able to discover that I was not telling the truth. However, this is not the case, and, therefore, I welcome any investigation on your part in regard to this meeting. There is something further I should like to say on this subject, so, whenever you feel that it is the right time please let me know.

Q. You may proceed with the further statement you have indicated you desire to make.

A. This goes ahead a bit in my story, but had we wanted to discuss an attack on Singapore with the Germans, it is only natural that they give us something in return, that is to say, some agreement should have been reached. While I shall speak more fully on this matter when we come to it, even at the time Japan entered the war, you will see that there was absolutely no agreement whatsoever regarding Singapore. This,

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I am sure you can discover to be the truth if you will examine the records of the time. One other point: I recall reading in the newspapers after the start of the Nuernberg trials, where some statement was made to the effect that I had discussed the division of spoils with Germany. This is definitely not so. Incorporated in the secret treaty or agreement which was consummated at the time of the three-power pact and of which, I believe, I told you something the other day, the limits of Greater East Asia are clearly defined. Also the question of the mandated islands was decided upon. There was, therefore, no need to talk further on matters of territory in any case and as a matter of fact no such discussions were carried on. So I recall once having talked with Ribbentrop and the discussion we had during that meeting may be what you are referring to when you question. At this meeting, the exact date of which I do not recall, but I believe was around March 1941, Ribbentrop spoke of what Germany would do in regard to colonies if she won the war. He said that Hitler was against the idea of having a great many colonies, and that while they intended to take back the pre-First World War colonies that belonged to Germany in Africa, she would not do more than to leave an administrator there, and did not intend to send large numbers of German immigrants. This was all that was discussed at the time and we did not enlarge upon it, nor talk about what Japan might do in this regard. When I come to the point in my narrative I believe it will be possible for me to explain to you more fully how it is a fact that Japan entered the war without having had any higher agreements with Germany. For this reason it follows that had Japan discussed plans relative to Singapore it would have been her loss and not her gain.

Q. Yesterday you mentioned a talk that you had with Ribbentrop in March 1941. You have just now referred to a talk you had with Ribbentrop in March 1941. Which of these talks came first in point of time?

A. I believe it was the same time.

Q. Yesterday you indicated that this talk was about Japan launching a sudden attack on Singapore without bringing the United States into the war. Now, at that time Japan was not in the war, so I am wondering why this discussion about a sudden attack upon Singapore by Japan ever came up.

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- A. I believe he had two reasons for bringing this up: (1) to sound me out as to whether there would be any possibility of Japan entering the war against England without involving the United States, and (2) whether Japan would launch such an attack in case the provisions of the Tripartite Pact would have to be followed.
- Q. But the Tripartite Pact specifically states that its provisions have no application to the nations that were then engaged in the war in Europe, and England was one of them?
- A. Naturally, Japan has no obligations under the terms of the treaty. Germany, on the other hand, would desire Japan's entry into the war against England and it was only natural for him to sound me out as to what that possibility might be.
- Q. But then what you were telling us is that you were being sounded out by the Germans with a view to coming into the war against England, notwithstanding the provisions of the pact and that the pact has nothing to do with it.
- A. That is correct. Further, he did speak to me at another time about the possibility of going to war against Russia, although this is not within the provisions of the pact.
- Q. When was this?
- A. I do not recall the date exactly, but it was after Russia was in the war.
- Q. Now, when you were discussing with Ribbentrop the question of a sudden attack upon Singapore by Japan, did not you also discuss with him the question of the Philippines and Manila?
- A. We did not speak of the Philippines at the time, but I do recall Ribbentrop once stating that should the Philippines be taken American prestige would drop immeasurably.
- Q. And on that occasion did not you suggest to Ribbentrop that Japan could take the Philippines and the United States would not be able to do anything about it?
- A. No.
- Q. You have constantly in our conversations referred to your treaty obligations with Germany. What treaty obligations could you possibly have had prior to an attack upon one of the three signatories to the treaty?
- A. None.

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- Q. Then why have you so often in your answers to my questions indicated your justification for these military discussions to be your probable obligations under the treaty?
- A. I feel that Germany felt that it was necessary to sound me out to see whether Japan would actually abide by her obligations.
- Q. It seems to me that you attempt to justify all of your war planning by the suggestion of probable treaty obligations. The only justification that you have offered for such planning seems to be possible obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Now, since you have been doing that, I ask you, did Japan enter into this treaty so that your country would be able to offer some sort of excuse to the world, legitimate or otherwise, for its war planning and its then foreign policy?
- A. That is not so. Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact, as she has stated, in order to keep the European War from spreading any further.
- Q. You said you had a meeting with Hitler in May or June 1941. You mentioned this yesterday, and at that time Hitler asked you to bring him a map of Singapore. Can you fix the date of that meeting a little more definitely than May or June 1941?
- A. As I have met Hitler about three times, as I told you, I can not be sure of which occasion it was that I took him this map.
- Q. At this particular time you have two meetings, one at which Hitler asked you to obtain the map, and the second when you brought the map to him?
- A. No, the request for the map came through the German Foreign Office and it was requested that if I had one I bring it to the next meeting.
- Q. Can you tell us what the occasion of this meeting with Hitler was other than to deliver a map?
- A. As I have recounted to you, I generally met Hitler about three times a year and these meetings were upon occasions when world conditions had taken a different turn and he spoke to me in this regard.
- Q. On the occasion of this meeting, at which you were requested to bring a map, what world conditions had taken a turn that made it necessary for such a meeting?
- A. I shall tell you of this later, but I recall that sometime around the beginning of June 1941, Hitler spoke to me of what he felt was the inevitability of war with Russia. I do not

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believe that it was at this meeting that I took the Singapore map to him, and I have no clear recollection of what we spoke about on that occasion, particularly as I did not consider it to be of much importance, and also because I never even dreamed that I would ever be required to dig back into my memory regarding it.

- Q. I can not help but observe that in your meetings with men like Ribbentrop and Hitler your memory is exceedingly poor, while in your meetings with men like Hack and others that took place way back in the days when you were working on the Anti-Comintern Pact, your memory is exceedingly good. It is very strange to me that your memory should be so very good with respect to matters of lesser importance than your meeting with the head of one of the most powerful nations of the world at that time.
- A. Your question is quite natural. However, it happens that the early meetings with Hack and others I told you about were matters directly concerning me as the negotiator, whereas these meetings of which we now speak were not initiated by me and consisted mostly of my listening to what they had to say. As such, I naturally recall some important statements they made, such as the one I have just recounted in regard to Russia, but it is very difficult for me to remember when, where, and what was discussed at any specific meeting. Once again, immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities with the United States, I was one of the principal negotiators and I can recall these meetings vividly. I had intended to speak to you about them shortly.
- Q. General, this comment astounds me. You have indicated that you had probably three meetings a year with Hitler, and I only asked you to tell me what world events necessitated one of those three in 1941. You did not answer that one. You told me of another meeting with Hitler that came about because Hitler contemplated attacking Russia. You have not yet told me what world event made it advisable for Hitler to meet with you on the occasion that he asked you for this map of Singapore.
- A. I definitely do not recall when the meeting was or what was the prime subject of discussion. I believe it was before the Russo-German war started, but over and beyond that I do not remember.
- Q. General, you have already told us that when you held a meeting with Hitler, it was because there was some turn in world events

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that made it advisable for such a meeting. Now, you have told us that you had about three meetings a year with Hitler. It seems to me that looking back but these few years that it ought not to be difficult for you to know what was going on in the early months of 1941, in world affairs that would necessitate this meeting. I am afraid you are holding back on us, and what we expect from you is a full disclosure. It is to your advantage to make a full disclosure.

A. It did not necessarily follow that the so-called change in world events had to be grave for Hitler to speak to me and, hence, I can truthfully answer that I do not recall what was the occasion for the meeting. You may look into all the records you wish, but I am sure you will not find that we discussed plans for attack upon Singapore or anything of this sort.

Q. Now, yesterday you indicated that you obtained a map of Singapore from the Military Attache and that you delivered that map to Hitler on the occasion of this meeting. Why did he send to you to obtain such a map? Why did he not send some other place for a map of Singapore?

A. I do not believe that Germany had in her possession a detailed map of Singapore.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. There would be no reason for them to make the request if they had had one.

Q. What was there about this map of Singapore that was of particular interest to Hitler at that time?

A. Hitler, as you may know, was a man who was interested in geography and history and I believe he was interested in seeing a detailed topographical map of Singapore in order to satisfy himself on details.

Q. General, if he was interested in a map of Singapore purely from the point of view you have indicated, he could send down to any bookstore and get it. Now, I want to know what was on that map.

A. It was a secret map of the Japanese General Staff and had on it such things as gun positions and fortifications, etc.

Q. How did that map happen to be in the office of your Military Attache at that time?

A. Japanese Military Attaches abroad have in their possession all necessary maps.

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- Q. What do you mean by necessary maps?
- A. I believe that while it was still the period of peace that it was necessary for the Military Attaches to have in their possession maps of places that might later become one of the centers of interest.
- Q. Is that a practice that prevails among military authorities of all nations?
- A. I do not know what the practice is in other countries, but from early days it was the custom to have a good many fairly important maps in the possession of the Military Attaches, at the Embassies in London, Washington, Berlin, Moscow and Rome.
- Q. General, don't you suppose that Hitler had a map of Singapore available then in the offices of his own military people?
- A. I do not believe he did.
- Q. Do you mean to say that you did have a map of Singapore in great detail and Germany did not have any?
- A. They had no detailed map.
- Q. How do you know they did not have a detailed map?
- A. My reasons for saying this are that the request stated that because they, the Germans, did not have a detailed map in their possession, would we show them one if we had such a map.
- Q. Yesterday I believe it was or the day before, you told us that it was made known to Hitler by MATSUOKA that in Japan then preparations were in the course of being perfected with respect to possible operations against Singapore. Now, inasmuch as Hitler knew what I have just told you, wasn't he after the map that had been made as a part of these preparations?
- A. No, definitely not. The Japanese Army would not allow that in the first place.
- Q. You have told us that this was a secret map prepared by your General Staff. Why would you turn such a map over to the head of another Government?
- A. Naturally, that depends upon the degree of security. It was not of such extreme secrecy that I was not permitted on my responsibility to show it to the head of a foreign government.
- Q. Now, Hitler sent for you and he told you to bring this map, which you told us was a secret one showing the fortifications,



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gun emplacements - a map disclosing such information as you then had regarding the military precautions that had been taken by another Government at Singapore. You arrived at the meeting with the map. Now, tell us what happened, what you said and what Hitler said.

A. There were absolutely no commitments made on my part regarding attacking Singapore. Naturally, he asked me what I thought of the terrain and I said that I felt that it was an extremely difficult military operation.

Q. Was Ribbentrop at that meeting?

A. Yes. (Comment to interpreter: You have said to me that you feel that I am telling you a certain amount and hiding the rest, but after having met with you over ten times, while I understand that it is difficult for you to realize this, as I have been classed a war criminal - I would like to have you understand that I am telling you all that I know, and not only a portion.)

Q. My questions even this afternoon to you have indicated that I personally have felt that you have not been making a full disclosure and the interpreter has made that fact known to you because I have repeated such in my questions, and I am still not certain that you are making a full disclosure even now.

A. I have told you all that I know. Of course, I shall leave that up to you to question me.

Q. Now, General, at the time of this meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop about which we have been talking all the afternoon Japan was not in the war, and I am wondering what justification existed for or why you felt free to make available to Germany a map of Singapore and discuss with Hitler and Ribbentrop the problems presented by an attack upon Singapore.

A. As long as I made no promises to the effect that Japan would attack Singapore I feel that I was justified in showing them the map under the agreements made at the time of the Tripartite Pact.

Q. Tell us the names of the members of the Commission that was formed pursuant to the provisions of the Tripartite Pact.

A. I was the head of the Commission. Vice Admiral NOMURA as the senior military member was head of the Military Commission. With him was Lt. Gen. Banzai. The Economic Commissioner was Minister MATSUSHIMA. Of course, there were other lesser members, but these were the principal men.

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Q. What do you mean by lesser members?

A. They were aides.

Q. Now, do I understand that there were two sections or two divisions to the Commission, one the Military and one the Economic?

A. I do not recall the exact organization. You had better see the Foreign Office about that; however, actually the Commission had very little to do. I recall that there was another section - an overall division dealing mainly in political matters. The head of this was originally KASE. (The name is exactly the same and is written in the same manner as the other KASE who came up in the record the other day. However, the other KASE was at one time Minister to Switzerland.) Later a counsellor named KAWAHARA took over. While the organization was set up in this manner, actually its activity was nil.

Q. Now, I assume that the names you have given to us are the names of the Japanese members of the Commission and that there must also have been some German members and also some Italian members. Am I correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact provides that "with a view to implementing the present pact joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, shall meet without delay." Now, I assume that the names that you have given us are the names of the Japanese Commission.

A. While I recall the wording to be Mixed Commission, this that you have given me is probably more correct. In any case, as there was no other Commission the names that I just gave you are the names of the members of the Commission.

Q. And this Commission was established in Berlin? Is that correct?

A. The one I just told you about was set up in Berlin. There were Commissions in Rome and Tokyo also.

Q. Who were the Japanese members of the Commission that was set up in Rome?

A. The Chief of the Commission was Ambassador KORIKIRI; the head of the overall division was Counsellor ANDO, I believe, although I am not sure of this. The Military Commission members were

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Rear Admiral ABE and Major General SHIMIZU. I do not remember who the member of the Economic Commission was.

Q. Do you know when this Commission in Berlin was set up and when this Commission in Rome was set up?

A. Both around April 1941, I think.

Q. Now, you had another Commission in Tokyo. Do you know who was on that Commission?

A. The Foreign Minister was Chief of the Commission and members of the Foreign Office made up the ranks of the general or overall division. Members of the Military Commission were drawn from the War and Navy Departments, and the Army and Navy General Staffs, but who they were I do not know.

Q. Now, would the Commission in Berlin meet with a comparable Commission that was established by the Germans?

A. The set-up was that a Commission of Germans, Italians, and Japanese would meet.

Q. The Commission that you have just referred to made up of Germans, Italians and Japanese then was a joint commission. Am I correct?

A. If you mean by that, was the Commission composed of Germans, Italians, and Japanese, to meet in each of the three capitals, respectively, and that there would be three separate joint commissions - that is correct. There was no overall single commission made up of all three of these commissions. While this organizational set-up existed in so far as the actual activities of the Commission go, there was never an instance before the United States-Japan war, or after, that members of the respective divisions met with each other: that is to say, the Military with the Military, or the Economic with the Economic, etc. I believe that not more than three or four meetings of all the members together took place in Berlin. In this regard I wish to point out that Japan was particularly interested in having a Military Commission in Germany to ascertain in case of a United States-German conflict whether Germany had been actually attacked or not. The Navy in particular was very interested on that point.

Q. Now, General, earlier today we were talking about these meetings with Hitler and you told us that you had a meeting with him that was occasioned by the fact that Hitler was contemplating attacking Russia. Now, can you tell us the substance of what took place at that meeting and what was said?

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A. No detailed discussion was carried on, but Hitler who did most of the talking said that he felt that if Germany waited much longer there would be a danger of an attack by the Russians, and, hence, he felt that it would shortly be necessary to attack. I asked him if I could convey this statement to the Japanese Government and he acceded. Further, Hitler made no statements in regard to how long he thought the Russian expedition would take. Later on in my narrative there are some matters relative to this which come up again.

Q. Just one question: that was not the first time you heard that Hitler contemplated attacking Russia, was it?

A. A definite knowledge of the fact - for the first time. However, before that I had heard other things of which I had been intending to tell you.

Q. Can you tell us about when this meeting took place with Hitler? About how long before the attack was made?

A. Very early in June, about two weeks prior to the attack on Russia, although I am not absolutely certain of the date. In any case he did not state when the attack would start.

Q. How long before that was it that you heard of this possibility from some other sources?

A. Although I have it down in my notes and intend to speak to you fully about the matter of German-Soviet relations, to give you an overall picture now I can say that when MATSUOKA was in Berlin we discussed a changing trend in these relations. It was around the middle of May, I believe, that a certain Hungarian newspaperman brought a report to one of my staff that it looked very much as if Germany would attack Russia in the near future.

Q. Then we will have further details about this from you when we come to that part in your narrative?

A. Yes.

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 20 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of March 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section,  
GHQ, SCAP.

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 20th and 21st days of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

March 2, 1946

Date

G. Osmond Hyde

二月二十日訊問ヲ終ルニ方リ松岡氏獨逸訪問前予トリツヘトロツト  
 間ニ松岡氏獨逸到着後議題ニ付交渉セルコトナキヤ米側ニ  
 ハ之ニ関スル情報アリ記憶ヲ述リ置キテ次回ニ回答アリタリト事ナリ  
 而シテ歸室後考ヘタルトコロ斯カル場合ハ一予ニ對シ日本政府ヲ訓令シ  
 来リタルカニ予カ自分ノ計ヒニシク之ヲ準備セルカニリツヘントロツト提  
 議セルカノ三ヲ出テス予ハ昨日來之ニ関スル記憶ヲ喚起セルカ  
 (一) 場合ハ勿論 (二) 場合ニナカリシコトヲ確信ス若シ假斯  
 如キ場合アリタリトスレハ之ハ獨逸在勤大使トシテ當然ノ職務  
 ヲ行ヘルニ過キザルヲ以テ今日ニ於テモ壹々ト言明シ得ルトコロニシテ  
 何等秘匿ヲ要セザルナリ又若シ姑ノ如キ事實アリタリトスレハ  
 係方面ノ調査ニ依リ何レハ明白トナルコトニシテ之ヲ今秘匿スルカ  
 予ニ名譽ヲ損ズルモノニシテ尚予ノ良心ノ許サルトコロナリ

昭和二十一年(一九四六年)二月二十日

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OSHIMA, Hiroshi 2/21/46

STATEMENT

During the interrogation on February 20th, I was asked whether any preparations had been made for MATSUOKA's visit; you said, further, that you had in your possession certain intelligence to the effect that such preparations were made. After returning from the interrogation I thought it over and the following points come to mind: (1) Had the Japanese Government given any specific orders on this point? (2) Did I on my own initiative make any preparations? (3) Did Ribbentrop bring up the matter (of preparations)?

Thinking this over, following yesterday's interrogation, I can definitely state No to points (1) and (2), and also to point (3).

Even if such talks had been entered into regarding preparations for the visit, this was within my prerogatives as Ambassador, and there is no reason for me to hide the fact. Further, if such preparations had been made, your examination would reveal this, and for this reason I would have no reason to withhold the information. Should you discover I had held out on you, it would reflect upon my honor, and within the bounds of my conscience, I find it impossible to lie to you about this.

/s/ OSHIMA, Hiroshi

(Translator's note: This is not a literal translation,  
but is correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.)

*[Handwritten signature]*

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 23 February 1946, 1345-1530 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

Q. General, today we are going to depart from your narrative and ask you about Karl Haushofer. Do you know Karl Haushofer?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you known him?

A. I met him for the first time in 1922.

Q. Was that while you were in Japan?

A. I did not know him when he was in Japan. I met him after I had gone to Berlin.

Q. You know, do you not, General, that he was in Japan for sometime and he was an instructor in a military school in Japan?

A. He was not an instructor. He was over here as a military student (resident officer) and was at one time attached to a Kyoto Regiment.

Q. Do you know when he was here in that capacity?

A. I am not sure of the time, but I believe it was soon after the Russo-Japanese war.

Q. You are positive that he was not at any time an instructor in any of the Japanese military schools?

A. To the best of my knowledge he never was.

Q. Am I to understand that he was a German military man; was in the German Army?

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A. Yes, he was either a Major or Lieutenant Colonel.

Q. And during those days when he was in Japan, which was before you went to Germany as an officer in the Office of the Military Attache, you did not know Karl Haushofer?

A. I never knew him in Japan.

Q. Can you tell us anything about his activity while he was in Japan other than what you have already recited?

A. I know nothing further beyond the fact that he was attached to a Kyoto Regiment.

Q. I understood you to say that you met him in 1921 in Germany. Will you tell us the occasion upon which you first met him?

A. It was in 1922. I happened to be in Munich with the Japanese Military Attache, and as we had heard that Haushofer was a man who had connections with Japan for sometime back we invited him to dinner.

Q. I am anxious to know everything about Karl Haushofer that you know; I believe it would be helpful if you would try to recollect all of your experiences with him, and everything you know about him - and if you will recite that to us in your own way.

A. As I know him, he was a man who, because of his former connections with Japan, was greatly interested in bringing about closer relations, although as far as I know he never actually acted as an intermediary. He was, as I am sure you know, a man much interested in geopolitics and was at one time a professor or instructor at the University of Munich. At this time I believe he lectured upon geopolitics as it concerned Asia and Japan in particular; he was known as an expert on Japan. I have not heard this from either Haushofer or Hess, but it is common knowledge that Hess was one of his followers and was much influenced by his teachings. With the rise of the Nazis to power he became an influential figure and eventually rose to be President der Deutschen Akademie (I believe it was called this). He wrote a good many books dealing with geopolitics and until Hess' flight to Scotland I know that these books sold very well. What influence he had actually upon German policy I do not know, but I believe that through Hess his ideas regarding Japan were at least passed on to the German hierarchy. His books were also well read and received in Japan.

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- Q. Do you know what sort of an Akademie this was? Was it a military academy or some other type of academy he was President of?
- A. I believe this is a special research, so-called, academy, which was made up of various professors from various Universities. Originally, he was only an instructor at the University of Munich, I believe, but later - I believe it was after the Nazis came to power - he became a professor.
- Q. And after the Nazis came into power he headed this other institution that we have referred to as an academy?
- A. I am not absolutely sure when this came about, but in any case he was at one time President of this Akademie until Hess took off for Scotland. Following Haushofer the Prime Minister of Bavaria became President of the Deutschen Akademie. I know for a fact that nobody in the Military or the Foreign Office or political circles in Japan ever actually tried or made use of Haushofer in any way to advance their ideas in Germany. He was more than anything else a scholar and as such I do not know what influence or what position he had in political matters. However, I do know that through his connections with Hess he was able to at least put forth many of his ideas regarding Japan and get them to the ears of the Fuehrer.
- Q. Do you know what some of the ideas regarding Japan were that he had?
- A. I have never actually heard that he ever tried to exert his influence in such a manner as to suggest treaties of one sort or another. On the whole, I believe that he told Hess about the Japanese spirit, the Japanese Army, and such matters that he knew about.
- Q. Do you have any information regarding any concrete or specific ideas he had as between Japan and Germany? By that I don't mean necessarily they were official ideas, but what he himself thought and might have told Hess.
- A. In so far as I know he never advanced any concrete proposals. Being a friend of his, whenever I went to Munich I always invited him to any gatherings, but I have no recollection of him having ever advanced any concrete proposals. Of course, he was pleased with German-Japanese cooperation, but beyond that I do not believe you can say much more.

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- A. He has written many books and I believe that if you look at these you will find that on the whole they are scholarly tomes.
- Q. You indicated that he was looked upon in Germany as an expert on Japan. I am wondering how he began to be regarded as such an expert. Do you know?
- A. As I told you he had been in Japan and I believe that he carried on fairly serious studies while he was here. Later, following the First World War he found himself unemployed and went on further with his studies so that in due course of time through his books and otherwise he began to be known as an expert on Japan.
- Q. Did he return to Japan in 1919, or thereabouts, that was, following the last World War. Do you know what he was doing here during that time?
- A. I have no recollection of his having come to Japan at that time. He might have for all I know.
- Q. Do you know of any time that he was in Japan after World War I and before World War II started?
- A. I am not sure, but as far as I know he never came to Japan. His son was here, that I know.
- Q. Do you know the name of his son?
- A. His son was a teacher at the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin and I know that he came to Japan either just before or about the time that the Second World War started. I do not know his first name.
- Q. Do you know why he came to Japan?
- A. I believe he came to look over conditions in Japan. I do not know his son very well, having met him only two or three times.
- Q. You indicated that the academy that was headed by Karl Haushofer at or about the time the Nazi's came into power was an institution where they engaged in research work. Do you know what type of research they were making?
- A. I do not know for certain, but I do not believe that they were an outfit interested in political matters and that their studies were strictly academic.
- Q. Do you know what subjects they might have included?
- A. I do not know. However, it was a public institution and hence it should not be very difficult to get their curriculum if you want it.

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Q. Did you ever undertake any studies under the direction of Karl Haushofer?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever attend any of his lectures?

A. No.

Q. You have indicated that he was very close to Hess. As a matter of fact he at one time was a teacher of Hess, was he not?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know anything about the influence he might have had in the writing of Mein Kampf?

A. I have no way of knowing, but I believe that he did not. It is my opinion that had he had influence Hitler would not have written the way he did about Japan in Mein Kampf.

Q. Do you know how close he was to Hitler?

A. I can not say definitely, as I have no way of knowing, but it is my own personal opinion that his direct contacts with Hitler were very few and on the whole whatever influence he might have had was through Hess. I know that following Hess' flight he was called in by the police or the Gestapo, and following this he made no public appearances. I have also heard that following the attempt to assassinate Hitler Haushofer's son was taken into custody by the Gestapo.

Q. A while ago, General, I interrupted you while you were reciting what you knew about this man. Maybe there is something more you could tell us about him from the point at which I interrupted you.

A. I had an occasion when I received an anonymous letter stating that Haushofer's wife was Jewish and hence Haushofer should not be allowed to enter the Japanese Embassy. I do not know whether this is true or not.

Q. Is there anything else you can tell us about him?

A. That is about all. If I think of anything I shall be glad to tell you. I do not know how you look upon this, but it is my personal opinion that Haushofer was not a particularly important man.

Q. General, what part did he have in the organization end of the Youth Movement in Germany?

A. Not much.

Q. Can you tell us what he did in so far as you know?

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- A. I am not sure, but I do not believe he did much more than to give a talk now and then perhaps.
- Q. I was of the opinion that he was one of those who was foremost in the organization of that Movement in Germany.
- A. Apart from his writings it is my belief and recollection that he had nothing to do with this movement.
- Q. What about his connection with the German plan of colonization? Do you know what his ideas were in that regard?
- A. What his connection was or what his ideas were I do not know. However, the head man of the German Colony Association or Bund was a General Von \_\_\_\_\_, Reichstatthalter, whose name I do not recall at the moment, and Haushofer was employed by him in the Colony Association, so that he probably had some influence upon German colonial ideas.
- Q. General, you say you met Karl Haushofer in 1922. Will you tell us how well you had come to know him and how close your association with him had become over the years?
- A. I do not think that I have met him more than three or four times since I returned to Germany this time, and before that also I did not have occasion to meet him often. On none of these occasions did we speak about any geopolitical matters, and it was simply that he was a friend of Japan and as such I invited him to lunch or dinner and called on him if I happened to be in Munich.
- Q. There is one thing, General, that I observe in looking at some of the writings of Karl Haushofer and in what you have said to me regarding state-controlled economy, and that is this, that both of you, that is, Karl Haushofer and you, each point out the fact that in order to have state-controlled economy, from your point of view it is necessary that you have proper statistical information, and I am wondering how it is that each of you have that same view.
- A. My ideas on controlled economy are strictly my own and a good deal of these ideas rose out of my conversation with my brother-in-law, SASAKI, Yoshihiko, who was a Japanese industrialist. From my observations in Germany and from these talks with him I reached my own conclusions that excellent statistics would be necessary.
- Q. The thing that appears strange to me is that Karl Haushofer seemed to think the same thing and I am wondering if you had

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- ever talked to him about that or listened to any lectures by him or read any of his writings on the same subject.
- A. I have never read any of his writings on this subject or listened to his lectures or had conversations with him. I believe, however, that the idea of excellent statistics is basic in a controlled economy, and unless you have excellent statistics, it follows that it is impossible to have a well-working controlled economy.
- Q. Have you ever seen a book that he wrote in 1941, entitled "Japan Baut Sein Reich"?
- A. I believe I have received the book, but I have never read it.
- Q. Do you know either of these two men: KIKUCHI, Takeo, or KAMIMURA, Ryosuke?
- A. Yes, I know them.
- Q. Who are they?
- A. KIKUCHI was either a Lieutenant or Major General, and I believe he probably met Haushofer in Germany after the last World War when he visited there. KAMIMURA was on the Control Commission in Germany after the last war and in his official position probably met Haushofer at this time.
- Q. What is the subject of the book, the title of which I just gave you?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Is it entirely the usual thing for an author to give you a book and then you not read it?
- A. I was entirely too busy to read most of the books that were given me in Germany.
- Q. But you had an unusual interest in this book, did you not?
- A. I do not know what the book is about and further I did not think too much of what Haushofer wrote about Japan.
- Q. General, this book was dedicated to you and those other two gentlemen I just asked you about.
- A. I did not know it was dedicated to me. He probably gave me the book, but I have no clear recollection of it.
- Q. It seems most amazing to me that a man dedicate a book to you and you not know it.
- A. I honestly do not know about it. I am sure he gave me the book,

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just as he gave me copies of his other books, but about the dedication I do not know.

- Q. Did Karl Haushofer have a great many Japanese friends?
- A. Beyond the Japanese students at the University of Munich and some people that he met, such as KAMIMURA and KIKUCHI following the last World War, I do not believe his circle of Japanese acquaintances was very wide.
- Q. Of all of his Japanese acquaintances in this book that I have just referred to he calls KIKUCHI and KAMIMURA and yourself the most faithful among his Japanese friends. Inasmuch as he saw fit to dedicate the book to you and to classify you as one of his most faithful Japanese friends, I am wondering if you do not know him a little better than you have indicated to us.
- A. I actually did not know him any better than I have said. I believe he was very grateful for a very little service that I rendered him in 1922, when I carried his bags for him to the station when he was returning to Munich. There is no point of my hiding the truth had I read his books or know him better than I have said.
- Q. That is exactly what I think. There is nothing here to hide, General. It seems unusual though that 19 years later a man would dedicate a book to you because you once carried his bags to the station.
- A. I am sure that he felt grateful to me for the many times that I asked him to receptions when I was in Munich and further, following Hess' flight when he was in the bad graces of the Nazis, I asked him to a reception in Munich. For things like this I am sure that the old gentleman felt very friendly towards me. You may investigate the matter as much as you wish, but I am sure that you will not find that I ever had any dealings with him other than in a strictly social fashion.
- Q. General, at or about the time the Tripartite Pact came into being Karl Haushofer stated that he had been working for this sort of thing for half a century. Now, will you tell us everything you know relative to what he did with a view to bringing the Tripartite Pact into being?
- A. I do not believe that he had any actual connection with working towards such a pact. Of course, his activities in trying to bring the two nations closer together might have been what he meant. If you examine this matter in Germany, I am sure you will find that to be so. A telegram to Nuernberg should do the trick.
- Q. I don't want to have to go to Nuernberg to find out about this.

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I want to know if this man ever talked to you about the subject matter of the Tripartite Pact.

A. No. I do not mean you should not question me on this, but as far as I know Haushofer had nothing concrete to do with the drawing up of the Tripartite Pact or in the negotiations preceding it at any time. He might have been doing something within the German groups, but I personally do not think so. In any case what I meant was if you desire to get the full details they should be possible to procure in Germany.

Q. Is there anything else, General, that you know about this man that you have not told us?

A. As I remember it now, that is about all.

Q. Then for today, I think we will recess and be back to see you Monday.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 9 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~(name)~~ G. Osmond Hyde, \_\_\_\_\_,

and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 23 day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (HR) OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

March 2, 1946  
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 25 February 1946, 1420-1620 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. On Thursday we were discussing this map of Singapore that you obtained from the Military Attache and took over with you to the conference you had with Hitler. I believe you told us that this was a secret map. I am just wondering if it was proper for you to show a secret map to the head of another Government.
- A. The classification was not such that I could not show it to Hitler.
- Q. What does secret classification mean under the Japanese Army regulations?
- A. Within the Gokuhi (which corresponds to United States Confidential classification), it is up to the individual concerned in the military to decide whom it can be shown to.
- Q. Does there have to be some written authorization to show such a document to someone else?
- A. No.
- Q. General, you were not in the military at the time you took this map to Hitler?
- A. That is correct. However, I had asked the Military Attache to show it to me to take to Hitler. This was definitely not a

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tactical operations map.

- Q. But it was a secret map and would be subject to the regulations with respect to such documents under the regulations prevailing in your country, it would seem to me.
- A. It is still a matter of classification and this map I speak of had a much lower classification than tactical operation maps. There are no maps of a high classification in the offices of the Military Attaches abroad.
- Q. How much time did you spend with Hitler on the occasion that you showed him this map?
- A. Not for very long.
- Q. Would you say two hours or say, ten minutes?
- A. Ten or twenty minutes.
- Q. What did Hitler say about the map?
- A. He asked me what I thought of the difficulties of attacking Singapore and not having been a student of the problem I simply told him that I thought it would be extremely difficult undertaking.
- Q. You indicated the other day, I believe that you thought it would take at least six months.
- A. About six months.
- Q. General, do you know a Professor MOMO?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know Professor KAGEYAMA?
- A. No.
- Q. Are you sure, General, that back in 1936, you did not know either of those two men, whose names I just gave you?
- A. I have no recollection of either name.
- Q. You don't remember that back in 1936, those two men made a trip from Japan to Germany in connection with some military matters?
- A. Had they come on military matters I should have known about it. It seems to me that there might be some error.

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- Q. I don't think there is any error and I also thought that inasmuch as you were Military Attache at that time you would know about this.
- A. I shall think it over, but I have no recollection at the moment.
- Q. The other day, referring to the talks between MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop, you indicated that MATSUOKA spoke to you after he had been in the meeting with Ribbentrop, and you said that MATSUOKA told you nothing of any promises or of any specific details in regard to the matters he talked to you about with Ribbentrop. I am wondering what he did say to you then regarding the meeting he had just had with Ribbentrop.
- A. As I believe I told you the other day, he related to me how he had spoken to Ribbentrop about the non-aggression pact and other matters of general and mutual interest.
- Q. What were the/other matters of general and mutual interest to which you refer?
- A. Repeating what I believe I have told you, there were no things that he told me of, which were important enough to stick in my memory today.
- Q. General, you may continue with your narrative from the point at which we left off the other day.
- A. The other day I covered MATSUOKA's visit, so I have prepared to speak to you on our next meeting regarding Soviet relations, which, if you will permit me, I shall speak about today.
- Q. That will be all right.
- A. Regarding the questions you asked me the other day, I shall probably go over them again during the course of my narrative.
- Q. Yes, I believe I indicated to you that we would expect you to go over them a little more fully.
- A. In regard to Soviet relations these matters which I will speak to you about first are those that occurred before I became Ambassador for the second time, but which I heard of later from MATSUOKA.
- MATSUOKA told me that in 1940, around the time that the three-power pact was consummated that Germany and Japan spoke about a rapprochement with Russia and that it was decided Germany would make the first moves in such a rapprochement.

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- Q. Tell us what the occasion of this conversation with MATSUOKA relative to this subject was.
- A. I spoke with MATSUOKA before leaving Japan and after I had been named Ambassador the second time. At that meeting with MATSUOKA he also told me that the Army was in favor of this move and that in addition the Navy Department and Prince KONOYE also favored this. He then told me that Germany's plan to bring about closer relations with the Soviet was to not stand in the way of the U.S.S.R.'s expansion in the direction of Iran or India. Later, from other sources (not MATSUOKA) I heard that Molotov had gone to Germany in November 1940, to discuss these matters. Further, as far as I know from what I heard, plans had not advanced to a stage where any concrete blueprints for Russia joining the tripartite alliance had been drawn up. MATSUOKA further told me that whatever the results of this discussion with Germany regarding rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. might be, a general plan for binding a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. was definitely being contemplated by the Japanese Government. These are in general the things that I heard before I left Japan and from now on I shall tell you of what I heard after I arrived in Berlin.

I believe it was around the end of February 1941, that I saw Ribbentrop and questioned him regarding German-Soviet relations and what the possibilities were where a German-Soviet-Japanese alliance of some sort was concerned. At this time the German Foreign Minister told me, and I knew for the first time, that Molotov had come to Berlin in November 1940, to talk over these matters. However, Ribbentrop stated that nothing concrete had been decided upon and that talks were still continuing. I saw Ribbentrop again in March 1941 sometime and I asked him once more how the Soviet discussions were progressing. He said that nothing had been decided as yet, but that he believed by the time MATSUOKA came to Berlin that something definite would have been decided.

I am going to skip ahead a bit in order to retain the continuity of the narrative. When MATSUOKA came to Berlin he spoke to me about meetings that he had had with Ribbentrop when I was not present. The Japanese Foreign Minister told me that he had informed Ribbentrop that he intended making a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. As I recall it, MATSUOKA did not say that Ribbentrop had urged him to do this or had tried to dissuade him.

To jump ahead a bit I recall that in the German statement regarding their reasons for going to war with Russia he said

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that he had urged MATSUOKA to make this non-aggression pact with Russia. Whether this was so, or not, I do not know, but in any case that was what he stated.

Q. Do you know who issued that German statement?

A. The German Government.

Q. You do not know the name of the person who issued the statement, Ribbentrop, Hitler, or was it issued in some other form?

A. I believe it was just the German Government. Sometime in April 1941, it came to the notice of practically everybody in Germany that German troops were being moved in great numbers to the Eastern front. This fact was quite obvious and without having to receive news of it from any special sources one could see with one's own eyes that something was going on. There was much talk floating around Germany at the time and a good many rumors arose. The other day I went ahead of my story and answered your question regarding my talk with MATSUOKA on the train when he was leaving Berlin. This talk was the result of my observations of these troop movements, and my statement to him regarding the necessity of going slowly on this proposed non-aggression pact with Russia was based on my idea that German-Soviet relations were coming to a turning point. Of course, by this I do not mean that I felt that war was imminent, but both MATSUOKA and I felt that perhaps after Germany had cleared up matters on the Western front it was her intention to turn her thoughts to the East. I had no opposition in mind so far as the actual non-aggression pact was concerned, but I felt that no large concessions should be made in order to simply bind the pact as quickly as possible. It was my feeling that before any such concessions were made Japan should closely scrutinize the changing trend of events in so far as German Soviet relations were concerned.

Q. Why?

A. I felt that if MATSUOKA was in a hurry to consummate this pact on his return trip to Japan that he might be willing to pay too big a price in order to bring it about quickly and that, therefore, it would be better to wait before large concessions were made in order to protect Japan's Northern boundaries.

Q. Why were you concerned with the price he might be willing to pay for the non-aggression pact?

A. For example, before I left Japan Vice Admiral SAKONJI, President of the North Sakhalin Oil Company, came to me and said that

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while he favored a non-aggression pact with Russia, to please be very careful of what concessions Japan would have to make. This is one example - another is the question of fishery rights. In other words, if Russia were strong, the price would be higher and in case German-Soviet relations became strained the pact could be consummated as far as Japan went for a cheaper price. Further, while neither MATSUOKA nor I were thinking that far at the time, it would follow that a German-Soviet war would make it practically unnecessary to consummate such a non-aggression pact.

- Q. I do not follow you there. I don't understand why a German-Soviet war would make it unnecessary for Japan to be in a position whereby there would not be danger of conflict between Japan and Russia.
- A. A non-aggression pact with Russia would have as its motive the protection of Japan's Northern frontiers in Manchuria and Sakhalin - although Sakhalin is not of much importance. It follows that if the Soviet Union were involved in a war in Europe she would be too busy to attack on the Manchurian front.
- Q. It would also follow, would it not, if you had a non-aggression arrangement existing between Japan and Russia before Germany and Russia became engaged in war that there would appear no reason for Japan to become involved in such a war on the side of Germany?
- A. That would not be necessary. The Tripartite Pact already states clearly that Japan would not have to take part in a German-Soviet conflict.
- Q. I was not thinking of the Tripartite Pact. I was thinking of the friendship that existed between Germany and Japan, and therefore I was wondering if it would not be very advisable for Japan to be in a position whereby the friendship between Japan and Germany might not draw Japan into the war with Germany, should Russia be attacked by Germany.
- A. In the first place I want to make it absolutely clear that I did not oppose the non-aggression pact. Further, neither MATSUOKA nor I felt at that time that war was imminent.
- Q. General, you just got through telling me no less than an hour ago that the troops of Germany were being moved over to the

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Eastern Front and that anybody and everybody could see that that meant something in that area, and your inference to me was that everybody knew that meant trouble between Germany and Russia, and if that is true how can you now tell us that neither you nor MATSUOKA had any idea that there was likely to be a conflict between Germany and Russia?

- A. I shall go into that more fully, but to come to the conclusion that there is going to be a war, simply because of the movement of troops, is to jump at conclusions.
- Q. But you offered that to us a while ago in this record as the trend of events, and now you tell me that neither you nor MATSUOKA had any idea there was going to be a war. It is a little bit inconsistent, General.
- A. I did not say that I believed that there would be no war - that was possible. What I mean is that neither of us believed that war would start immediately or that the possibility of a war was very great at the moment. As I believe I told you a little earlier in the narrative we both thought that war might start after Germany had cleared up the Western Front - that is to say, England.
- Q. If I understand you correctly, you have indicated to us that you were fearful that the Foreign Minister might pay too big a price for the non-aggression pact and your concern seems to be with respect to the opposition voiced to it by the Vice Admiral who was President of the Oil Company that you named and then some concern with respect to fisheries. I am wondering if you offer those matters as being sufficient to overcome the attitude of MATSUOKA towards the proposition.
- A. As a matter of fact, while I do not consider this to be something to put in the record, as it is simply my own opinion, but I felt that because MATSUOKA's visit to Berlin had not produced anything of importance he might in order to take back to Japan a "present" hurry through a non-aggression pact that would cost Japan a great deal in concessions. MATSUOKA agreed with me in regard to this matter of concessions. Further, these examples of the Oil Company and the fisheries I cited are simply small examples among many that could be gone into.
- Q. It seems to me that you attempted to almost put yourself in the place of the Government in Tokyo. I can not understand, General, why if the Foreign Minister and the Government in Tokyo wanted this pact you should be concerned about it when you were just an Ambassador.



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- A. I do not believe I was stepping out of bounds of my rights as Ambassador to speak to him of my own views. I was not telling him to do something or not to do something, but simply giving him my opinion.
- Q. The other day when you told us about riding on the train with MATSUOKA in reply to my question relative to the proposed non-aggression pact and your discussions with him at that time you indicated that there was a change in world conditions that prompted your conversation with him at that time. What did you have in mind?
- A. I meant this matter of German-Soviet relations, of which I have been speaking to you just now.
- Q. General, it seems to me in the light of all you have told us with respect to the authority of your Foreign Minister when he arrived in Germany with respect to this non-aggression pact with Russia, he must have had some instructions from the Government in Tokyo before he left. Do you know whether he had any instructions?
- A. Yes. I do not know what his instructions were, but he definitely must have had some.
- Q. Now, since the Government in Tokyo had given him some instructions relative to this Russian problem it is not clear to me why you either in your capacity as Ambassador or in an unofficial capacity should offer any opposition or any suggestions contrary to the views of the Government in Tokyo.
- A. I did not offer any concrete objections. Further, it is clearly stated in the Japanese statutes that I may offer suggestions even if there are definite orders given.
- Q. But, General, this is the thing that puzzles me. You are Ambassador from Japan to Germany and you are very greatly concerned with affairs between Japan and Russia.
- A. If the changing conditions arise from influences within Germany where I am the Japanese Ambassador, it is within my rights to speak about them. Just to clear this matter up, I want you to understand that MATSUOKA was in accord with my ideas and there was no opposition to any plan or ideas that he had.

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- Q. Your conversation on that train with him would not so indicate. I have reliable information to the effect that your purpose for taking the ride on the train with MATSUOKA was a last minute attempt to dissuade him from obtaining this non-aggression pact with Russia, and that seems inconsistent with what you have been telling me this afternoon.
- A. That is a definite lie. There are all kinds of falsehoods flying around. One is to the effect that Ribbentrop asked MATSUOKA not to sign the non-aggression pact and MATSUOKA went ahead with it anyway. This is also definitely untrue.
- Q. General, during the years that you served in Germany you became well acquainted with the German military authorities. That is true, is it not?
- A. While I was Military Attache I had many occasions on which I met them, but later, after I became Ambassador, I never met them, except at social functions.
- Q. But after you became Ambassador you had frequent conferences with Hitler and frequent conferences with Ribbentrop, and it would seem there are no other people in Germany who would be better informed with respect to prospective military action than Hitler and Ribbentrop.
- A. Hitler yes, but not Ribbentrop.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, 167619  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 9 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of March, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~us~~) G. Osmond Hyde, \_\_\_\_\_,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 25th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~us~~) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,  
and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter,  
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

March 2, 1946.  
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 26 February 1946, 1345-1620 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter  
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, the other day when you were telling us about your reasons for talking with MATSUOKA on the train regarding the proposed non-aggression pact with Russia you said that conditions at the time were changing in regard to German-Russian relations. You gave that as a reason for suggesting to MATSUOKA that he be careful. Later, you told us that Germany was more interested in having Japan attack Russia than anything else. I believe you said that that was the feeling that Germany had later. Will you explain a little more fully, if you can, what the changing conditions in regard to the German-Russian relations were that you had in mind when you talked to MATSUOKA on that occasion?
- A. Before I go any further in my explanation I would like to definitely state that your second statement regarding the German wish that Japan attack Russia was never brought up prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German war. In regard to the changing conditions I speak of, you may recall that I told you of how it had been the plan previously to even bring or attempt to bring Russia into the Tripartite Alliance. Here it was April and these talks had not progressed in any way, so that that in itself was strange, and add to this the movement of troops to the Eastern Front and it became fairly obvious to any observer that something or other was going on. MATSUOKA also was aware of this fact, and while both of us felt that it did not necessarily mean that war was

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imminent, because with Germany at war already, this movement of troops might simply be a demonstration of strength, we did feel that conditions had changed. This was the reason that I cautioned him to proceed slowly and to not rush into a pact which might cause us a great deal in concessions.

Q. Do you know German State Secretary Von Weizsaecker?

A. Yes.

Q. While MATSUOKA was in Germany on this trip we have been talking about, he talked with State Secretary Von Weizsaecker, did he not?

A. He might have spoken with him at a social gathering or some conference, but I do not believe the Japanese Foreign Minister would deal directly with a State Secretary.

Q. You do know, do you not, that MATSUOKA asked Von Weizsaecker a question regarding the German Russian relations?

A. I have not heard of it; in fact, I have not heard that they had a meeting.

Q. This was not necessarily a meeting, but Hitler and Ribbentrop evidently never made known to MATSUOKA the fact that Germany contemplated attacking Russia, but I have information to the effect that MATSUOKA then asked Von Weizsaecker about the relations and from him, that is, from Von Weizsaecker, MATSUOKA obtained information that led him to believe that war between Germany and Russia was imminent. Do you know anything about that?

A. I do not believe that MATSUOKA thought war would be imminent. In the first place I can not see how in a country like Germany, if Hitler and Ribbentrop had not spoken about it, how a man in Von Weizsaecker's position could possibly pass on such information. I believe I told you this yesterday but both MATSUOKA and I felt that perhaps Germany would attack Russia as soon as she had cleared up the Western Front.

Q. General, you indicated a while ago that around April 1941, when MATSUOKA was there, the negotiations with Russia relative to the proposed entry of Russia into the Tripartite Pact had not progressed very well. Had you had any recent conversations with Ribbentrop on the failure of that proposal immediately before MATSUOKA arrived in Berlin?

A. I believe I recounted to you yesterday how I had met Ribbentrop twice, once in February, and again in March 1941, and at these

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meetings he had declared that negotiations were proceeding and that by the time MATSUOKA arrived something concrete should have been decided upon. The only thing I did not tell you yesterday was that Ribbentrop said Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow, was carrying on these talks.

Q. General, other than what you have indicated to us regarding the circumstances and conditions that would indicate that war between Germany and Russia might be imminent, did you have any information from German officials that would indicate to you that such a conflict might break out reasonably soon after MATSUOKA had been there?

A. I have written down here in my notes a good many things pertaining to this subject, so I feel that it would be easier for you to get the full picture if I recounted them all today rather than answer this question briefly at this moment. Which do you desire I do?

Q. Will the matters you have in mind to relate reply to the question I have just asked?

A. Yes.

Q. Then proceed with the way you want to relate it.

A. As the first step in my recital: MATSUOKA returned to Moscow and carried on negotiations relative to binding a non-aggression pact with Russia. Either one day or perhaps two before leaving Moscow he sent me a telegram in which he stated that Russian demands were too heavy, and that he intended to return to Japan without consummating the pact. The next day, or perhaps two days later, I received another telegram from MATSUOKA, in which he said that Russia had the last minute given in almost entirely, and that he was delaying his departure and holding up the train on which he was to leave in order to sign the pact. On receipt of the telegram, Ribbentrop being in Berlin at the time, I immediately went to see him and told him that the non-aggression pact with Russia was to be signed. He did not oppose the consummation of the pact, nor was he particularly happy about it. I asked him at this meeting how German-Soviet relations were and while Ribbentrop did not elucidate he stated that relations were still in a nebulous state. Further, he did not say that there was going to be war, but he indicated that relations were not the same as they had been. I then told Ribbentrop that this signing of a non-aggression pact with Russia had been the Japanese plan for some time, and I was sure that the Germans

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had understood this and encouraged the idea. Ribbentrop said that he well understood Japan's policy and so I sent a telegram to MATSUOKA telling him that Ribbentrop had said that he understood. In return I received another telegram from MATSUOKA asking me to send on the same telegram I had despatched to him to the Government in Tokyo.

Q. Why did you tell Ribbentrop about this when you received the telegram from MATSUOKA telling you that he was about to sign the non-aggression pact?

A. That is definitely part of an Ambassador's duty to notify the Foreign Minister when such an event occurs.

Q. Then why did not MATSUOKA tell Ribbentrop he was going up there to obtain this non-aggression pact?

A. I believe I told you the other day that MATSUOKA had told Ribbentrop that he was going to Moscow with a view to signing a non-aggression pact.

Q. Then it is not clear to me now why Ribbentrop should register some indication of lack of enthusiasm about it when you, upon receipt of the telegram, told him it was going to be signed.

A. Of course, I do not know this for certain, but it is my opinion that with changing German-Soviet relations the Germans who had originally urged Japan to consummate such a pact no longer cared one way or the other about it. Further, this meeting in which I told Ribbentrop about the signing of the pact was one of the prime reasons for my feeling - that is strictly my own opinion - that perhaps there was going to be a war. This is simply my premise, but taking German-Soviet-Japanese relations as the basis of this opinion of mine, while it is definitely stated in the Tripartite Pact that there will be no change in Soviet-Japanese relations even in case of a break between Germany and Russia, it still seems to me that from the German point of view that a non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan would further solidify non-participation in the case of a German-Soviet conflict on the part of Japan.

Q. What was the reaction of Hitler to the non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia?

A. I have never spoken to Hitler on this point, nor did Ribbentrop ever tell me what Hitler might have said.

Q. Did you ever hear from any other source how Hitler felt about it?

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A. I have never heard from any other sources either, but as I told you the other day in the German Government's statement at the time of the outbreak of hostilities Hitler says that he urged MATSUOKA to consummate the non-aggression pact.

Q. How long was MATSUOKA in Moscow on this occasion?

A. I do not know for sure, but I believe it was a week or ten days.

Q. My question that preceded the recital that you have just made was seeking to obtain from you whether before MATSUOKA went to Moscow you had any information from German sources that would indicate to you that there was in fact going to be a conflict between Germany and Russia. I don't think you have answered that yet.

A. No.

Q. Proceed where you left off.

A. I hope that this has cleared up matters on this question for you. But in any case I want to say that I was also in favor of a non-aggression pact with Russia of the sort that was ultimately signed - that is to say, a pact with Russia which did not entail heavy concessions on Japan's part. Following this talk with Ribbentrop I began to have serious misgivings about German-Soviet relations and so I particularly told my Military and Naval Attaches and members of my staff to pay strict attention to any intelligence concerning German-Soviet matters. One major thing, of course, was the continued deployment of troops to the Eastern Front, which was a fairly obvious thing. Other intelligence indicating that relations were getting worse also was brought to me and sometime around the middle or end of May a Hungarian newspaper correspondent brought the news to one of the members of my staff that it looked like Germany was definitely going to attack the Soviet Union in the near future. At this point I went to see Ribbentrop and asked him why Germany was deploying troops to the Russian border; Ribbentrop said that Russia was doing this and so Germany was also following suit. I then asked him what had happened to German-Russian negotiations, such as the original talks with Molotov. He informed me that in these talks Russia had spoken mainly about concessions in the Dardanelles and, further, that she wanted a strong point in what was then Bulgaria. The German Foreign Minister said that as Germany could not accede to these demands, talks had been broken off. I do not say that this is the main reason for the break, but



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at least it was one of the important ones.

- Q. General, you have indicated to me now that after the non-aggression pact was signed that you had noticed the deployment of the German troops along the Eastern area and that you asked Ribbentrop the reason for sending the troops in that particular territory. You have also told us that before MATSUOKA arrived in Berlin the troops had been deployed in that area in large numbers, so much so that it was common knowledge to everyone. Did not you before MATSUOKA arrived in Berlin ask Ribbentrop why those troops were being sent into that particular area?
- A. As a matter of fact I had even seen troop trains going to the Eastern Front when I was coming from Japan in February, but at that time and even later I thought that this might still be simply an exchange of troops. However, around the time that MATSUOKA came to Berlin it was becoming fairly evident that this was not just a routine movement and so for the first time I began to think about it seriously.
- Q. When you thought about it seriously at that time, did not you say anything to Ribbentrop about it; ask him anything about it?
- A. No. Up until the time that I spoke to Ribbentrop after the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact had been consummated, I did not think about this too seriously.
- Q. General, I am somewhat surprised at you to say that, in the light of what you have already told us, you said you did not think about it too seriously, but you said everyone else thought about it seriously. You stated that it was common information; that everyone knew about it. Surely you, as Ambassador, should be impressed rather keenly by it, inasmuch as you were then in the middle of negotiations with that country. I don't understand how you suppressed your curiosity as to why this troop movement was going on until just immediately after MATSUOKA left for Moscow.
- A. I had expected as a matter of fact based on what Ribbentrop had told me regarding the clarification in Soviet-German relations, which was expected by the time MATSUOKA would arrive, that the Germans would bring up this matter of German-Soviet relations; and the fact that they did not was what

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started me wondering and led to my talking with MATSUOKA about it. This is one reason.

Q. Then are you telling us the movement of all these troops that had impressed the public generally had no effect on you?

A. That is the point, when the Germans did not speak to MATSUOKA about their relations with the Soviet, the fact that they had been deploying troops to the Eastern Front came up very strongly in my mind and led to my talk on the train with MATSUOKA.

Q. Proceed with your narrative.

A. While Ribbentrop only told me roughly about the Russian demands regarding the Dardanelles and Bulgaria, I believe that the June 22d statement by the German Government lists these demands fully. In any case following this talk with Ribbentrop I began to feel strongly that something indicating a break in German-Soviet relations was in the wind. At this point, figuring that any further study of the problem could not be made in Berlin alone, I despatched Counsellor KASE (now Minister to Switzerland) to Moscow to talk over these matters with the Japanese Ambassador, TATEKAWA. Upon KASE's return to Berlin he told me that after talking to Ambassador TATEKAWA they had both come to the conclusion that Russia was well aware of the deployment of troops to the border, but that the Russians still did not think that it would result in a war. At this time there had been a trade pact between Germany and Russia and evidently Russia had not been living up fully to the conditions therein, that is to say, she had not been supplying Germany with all that had been promised. And there was felt that this deployment of troops was more a display of strength and a threat on Germany's part, so that she would make further trade and diplomatic concessions. KASE also said that in so far as was known in the Japanese Embassy in Russia MATSUOKA had not felt at the time he left Moscow that a war would break out. Around this time there was much talk in Berlin about whether there would be a war or there would not be a war and rumors by the hundreds emanated all over the place. One was to the effect that an understanding had been reached and Stalin himself was coming to Berlin - and things of this sort. The dates that I have given might all be a little earlier as I think of it now, but I do not believe this is of too much importance. In any case, I want to tell you that I am not too certain of exact dates. Despite all these rumors, one fact stood out and that was the deploy-

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ment of troops, which led me to think that the danger of war was at least imminent. Sometime around the beginning of June, I believe it was no later than the 2d or 3d, Hitler sent for me, and at this time stated that German-Soviet problems were getting very difficult to settle and that while he had tried, his patience was becoming strained. I can not say that he definitely said that Germany would go to war, but in any case his speech was strong enough to indicate a 99% certainty. He did not ask for Japan's help in the event of such a war, but I feel that he must have had some such desire, because this revelation regarding his intention to begin hostilities was not in keeping with the usual German habit of not telling anyone about forthcoming operations. In any case I asked if it would meet with his approval if I sent a telegram to Japan regarding our conversation and he said that he had no objections.

- Q. The non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia was signed on April 13, 1941, was it not?
- A. I believe you are right. It might be a little later, but it is somewhere around that date.
- Q. And MATSUOKA had left for Tokyo around the very same day the pact was signed, did he not?
- A. Right after signing it, I believe.
- Q. How did MATSUOKA return to Japan?
- A. By rail to Manchuria and from there by air to Japan, I believe.
- Q. Do you know the date that MATSUOKA arrived back in Tokyo?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know approximately how long it took to make the trip?
- A. About ten days, I think.
- Q. You may continue.
- A. Just add one thing please - this telegram concerning what Hitler told me was <sup>not</sup> in the nature of requesting a conference on the subject, but was simply intended to be a statement of what Hitler had said.
- Q. Did you receive a reply to that telegram?
- A. No.
- Q. Continue.
- A. The war between Germany and the Soviet Union began on the 22d of June 1941, and, as you know, in so far as Germany was con-

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cerned things went well for sometime. Sometime around the end of July Ribbentrop told me that the German Army was desirous of having Japan enter the conflict. He said nothing further and he definitely stated these were the views of the German Army. Around the beginning of August for the first time we noticed that the Germany Armies were not doing as well as they had been doing previously, and in this regard I heard from my Military Attache that he had talked with members of the German General Staff, who had said that the movement of troops and the lengthening of the supply line had made the campaign very difficult. It was about this time, the beginning of August 1941, that Ribbentrop asked me to come and see him, and when I went I found that Field Marshal Keitel was there. Keitel made the statement that the German Armies would be forced to come to a standstill for about three weeks in order to look after the problems of supply and to shorten their line before advancing again.

I bring up this point because you questioned me the other day in regard to whether I had talked with high-ranking officers of the German military on various occasions. This was the one and only time in which I saw a military man.

- Q. When you met on this occasion Keitel and others, did they ask Japan to come into the Russian conflict?
- A. No.
- Q. But on the other occasion when Ribbentrop talked with you, he indicated to you that the German Army wanted Japan to come in. What did you say to Ribbentrop in reply to that suggestion from him?
- A. I told him that this was not up to me to decide and I would let the Japanese Government know of what he had said.
- Q. What was your personal feeling and attitude towards the proposition?
- A. Japan was not obligated to enter this conflict and it was something that I could not make a statement on one way or the other, so that all I conveyed to my Government was that this desire had been voiced. I received no answer to this communication.
- Q. But I want to know what your own personal attitude was, not your Government's.
- A. Even as an individual I did not feel that Japan should enter the war. To add one further thing at this point: Ribbentrop