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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 4 March 1946, 1345 - 1615 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred H. Uyehara, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by: Mr. Sackett

Oath of Interpreter

Do you solemnly swear by Almighty God that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Uyehara: I do.

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- Q Let us look at July 24 in your diary, Marquis. On that occasion you indicated that you had a conference with the Emperor and he had some comments to make about French Indo-China. What did he say at that time?
- A The impression that was given to various nations concerning French Indo-China was not very good and the Emperor was worried about that. The Emperor was opposed to the penetration of the Army into those territories.

Q Did he mention any particular nations that he thought were offended by the landing of troops or negotiations in French Indo-China?

A I do not remember that.

Q You say you presented your opinion on the matter. What did you have to say? Do you recall?

A I gave my opinion along the same line saying that my impression was the same as the Emperor's.

Q Leaving the diary for a moment, I want to talk a little about the July 2 conference we discussed the other day. As I remember, you indicated that the main things that were decided at the Conference were (1) that Japan for the time being would not attack Russia; also that Japan would adopt as her policy the establishment of this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Likewise, Japan would lend all her efforts to settle the China War and also she would embark upon the policy of expanding her influence to the South. Those things were decided, were they not?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other things of major importance that were decided that you recall? Do you recall any other important decisions?

A I do not remember concretely of any other topics discussed.

Q I have some notes here made by Prince KONOYE wherein he set forth what took place at that particular Imperial Conference. They are not very long and I would like to go through them with you and see if you can verify these things which were decided upon at that Conference. One of the things he said was this: "The Empire will continue diplomatic negotiations which are necessary from the standpoint of self-existence and self-defense in the Southern zone and will hasten various other plans". That was decided at that Conference, was it not? Does that sound like a fair statement?

A Yes.

- Q "For that reason, she will make preparations for war against Britain and the United States". Was that decided at that particular conference?
- A I believe that if that was what was in KONOYE's statement, there is no mistake.
- Q What I want to ask is do you personally recall it having been discussed and decided at the July 2 Imperial Conference that plans for war against the United States were made. They did make plans. Do you remember that to be true?
- A I do not remember whether that was discussed at that meeting of July 2. As I was not at that Conference what I have heard is hearsay so I can't say whether that was discussed.
- Q But the following day or the same day, you would have talked to the Emperor or various ministers and you would know what took place, would you not?
- A Yes.
- Q "Due to the policy to be enforced against French Indo-China and Thailand and the matters regarding hastening of the policy in the south, various plans will be completed in regards to Indo-China and Thailand and thus strengthen our position for expansion to the south". Does that sound like one of the decisions?
- A Yes.
- Q "The Empire will not avoid war against Britain and the United States in order to achieve the objective of this issue." Would you say that at this Conference, it was decided that plans should be made for use in case of war with the United; that Japan would thereafter embark on a program of Southern expansion and they would not avoid war with the United States if the United States decided to interfere with that foreign policy?
- A I believe that the KONOYE statement is a positive, true statement.
- Q It sounds like KONOYE's language and the way he would say it, does it?

A It might not have been KONOYE's true feelings but since he was held down by the Army, that statement could have been made by him.

Q I don't mean this was his personal opinion. Does this reflect what was decided at the Conference by all those present?

A Yes, that is true.

Q In order to give you the rest of the picture so you won't have just part of it, I am going to read the rest of it.

"Besides reporting to the Emperor, the Foreign Minister made similar explanations to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and to all the citizens and caused considerable discussions. From the various inquiries made by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and I, it seemed that the assertion of the Foreign Minister was that 'first, we must strike Russia. Although we should avoid war against the United States, in the event the United States does enter we must fight her.'

"Although that was the opinion of the Foreign Minister, I consulted both the War and Navy Ministers in order to determine the attitude of the Government and, in particular, I opened a liaison conference starting June 25 and held continuously on the 26th, 27th, 28th, 30th and July 1. Finally on July 2, I petitioned the Emperor for a council in his presence and for the present decided not to start any movement against Soviet Russia."

From all I read you from his notes, would you say they reflected a true and fair statement of the things that took place at that Imperial Conference?

A Yes.

Q And it was true then, was it not, as early as July 2, 1941, at the Imperial Conference it was concluded to make plans for a war against the United States to be put into effect in the event the United States saw fit to interfere with the announced foreign policy of Japan which involved southern expansion. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Would you say that the July 2nd Imperial Conference was the earliest moment in point of time that the Japanese Government officially decided to make plans for a war with the United States on certain contingencies?

A I believe that there was no official decision pertaining to that before that.

Q In other words, although there had been negotiations with the United States during the spring and summer, and talk of possible war with the United States, the first time the Government officially decided that war would be conducted against the United States if she interfered with Japan's foreign policy was July 2, 1941?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall talking with the Emperor immediately after the July 2nd Conference with reference to these plans to fight the United States if she interfered with Japan's foreign policy?

A The Emperor was not in favor of this expansion to the South and I believe that when I did talk with the Emperor, that was the impression that I received. It was the Emperor's opinion that this matter of southern expansion must be handled very delicately.

Q But did he give any expression to the feeling that he would not be willing to have Japan engage in a war with the United States if she interfered with that policy?

A The Emperor was very worried about this war - the possibility of war with the United States on the pretext of interference on the part of the United States - and he cautioned quite strenuously on that point.

Q Well, can we say that the Emperor's attitude as of July 2, 1941 was that Japan should not take the position that she would fight a war with the United States if she interfered with the policy of expansion to the South but after full discussion was had, it was officially decided that would be the policy and the Emperor, by not pursuing his objections further, ratified and confirmed that to be the foreign policy of Japan. Is that a fair statement?

- A Since that was the unanimous decision of everybody, the Emperor sanctioned that rule.
- Q Even though he personally advocated a different solution of the Japanese-United States difficulties, he did ratify that foreign policy and agreed that the country should be bound by it in the event the United States interfered with the southern expansion?
- A KONOYE was more or less forced by the Army to come out with those policies but with the settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations, he believed that the fear of war might be dispelled.
- Q But as a plan or as a foreign policy, something had to be determined at that meeting and it was determined that would be the foreign policy from that date on?
- A Yes.
- Q At that Imperial Conference, were there not those, such as the War Minister, who in the discussions with reference to expansion to the South advocated the use of force of arms to accomplish that purpose?
- A I don't remember hearing about that. That is one of the things that was giving a headache to the Cabinet at that period - the use of force by the Army.
- Q By that you mean the threatened use of force by the Army?
- A Yes.
- Q In your talks with War Minister TOJO, did he not say things to you to indicate that in this policy of expansion toward the South, he and the Army group proposed to use force, if necessary?
- A TOJO did not express his feelings in such an open-hearted way to me at that time.
- Q Who, in the military group, did make statements as strong as that?
- A That feeling was strongest among the staff officers - the younger elements of the Army.

Q You said that on other occasions. Tell me how you know that was their feeling. Where did you get such information in those days that the younger staff officers were advocating the use of force? You mentioned several times that was true. How did you know that is true?

A Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA, in his daily contacts with newspaper men, and some of the personnel of the Army, and some of the politicians, got that knowledge that the younger element of the Army was advocating the use of force.

Q Of course, that younger element had advocated the use of force all the way through from the Manchurian and China days, didn't they?

A Yes.

Q Were there not any occasions when you personally talked with that element of the Army and had direct knowledge they were advocating the use of force?

A I have not met even one of those younger elements in the Army.

Q Is it not true that all Japanese leaders, by that I mean the military, Government, and even the Emperor, himself, were wholeheartedly in favor of this foreign policy of southern expansion, the only difference between the various elements being as to the method by which it should be accomplished? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q The Emperor, himself, was not opposed to Japan expanding her influence to the South, was he?

A Yes, as long as it was peaceful, the Emperor was not opposed to that expansion of influence. Japan was so pitifully lacking in natural resources and if they could be obtained through peaceful means, the Emperor was all for it.

Q There were no differences between anyone present on July 2 with reference to the fact that the foreign policy of Japan should be to the South, without deciding whether it should be by peace or force of arms?

A Yes.

Q But the Emperor, I think you said, and others in the Government, were fearful that because of pressure being brought from time to time by the younger Army officers, military force might be resorted to if that policy were pursued?

A With the adoption of that policy of southern expansion, it was feared that force might be used so the Emperor cautioned very much on that point.

Q But whether force was used in southern expansion or not, in carrying out this foreign policy, it was decided at that conference that Japan would prepare for war against the United States and would not shy away from war if she interfered with the carrying out of that policy.

A Yes.

Q Can we say that if Japan had followed strictly peaceful means of expanding influence in the Pacific and the United States had interfered substantially with the carrying out of this foreign policy, it was determined on July 2 that Japan would fight the United States for the right to carry out her peaceful expansion into the South.

A I believe that was how it was decided upon at that meeting.

Q It was also decided that in the event Japan had embarked upon a southern expansion program and in the course thereof used force of arms, if the United States likewise used force of arms to stop that expansion, Japan would be prepared to fight the United States in order to carry out her program.

A Yes.

Q In this whole discussion we have been having on Japan's foreign policy, isn't it true that all the responsible leaders of Japan in those days were in favor of Japan acquiring a dominant position in the Far East and forcing out the British and American influence from the Far East, the only disputes between the Government officials being as to the method by which that was to be accomplished.

- A I don't believe that is quite true. Many of the officials in the Cabinet thought that it would be a good thing if Japan took a leading step in the guidance of those nations but they did not advocate the forcing out of American or British interests. The ultra-nationalists and the Army personnel advocated dominating those southern countries but among the intelligent people, I believe there were no such thoughts.
- Q Well, back in the days of the First KONOYE Cabinet, Prince KONOYE, himself, was in favor of and announced a policy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the leadership of Japan in China and Manchuria, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q He favored the leadership of Japan on the continent even though he may not have favored the use of force to bring about that result, isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q And later on in 1941, that sphere was broadened out to include French Indo-China and Thailand and the Dutch East Indies, was it not?
- A Yes.
- Q The main fight between the various factions in the Government was with reference to the method of how that would be brought about. Isn't that true?
- A That matter of using force or peaceful means was the controversial point during those days. Among the civilians, the expulsion of British and American interests were not even thought of.
- Q Were the military group, as such, in favor of ^{the}expulsion of American and British interests, would you say?
- A I am not positive there were men in the military clique who advocated the expulsion of American and British interests.
- Q But it was definitely the policy of all the leaders in Japan that a change in the status quo of the Far East should be brought about, the difference being as to how to bring it about. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q But Japan came to that point in her foreign policy when her leaders agreed that the status quo should be changed and Japan should take a more dominant position in the Far East than ever before?

A Yes, thereby acquiring natural resources but in a peaceful way.

Q But Japan did embark upon a definite program of bringing about a change in the status quo of the Far East and it was a clash of that foreign policy and the foreign policy of the United States and Britain that brought on the war. Isn't that correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you remember on July 25 what was said in your conference with the Emperor? Does your diary refresh your memory to such an extent that you can elaborate on it?

A Due to the penetration of Japanese forces into French Indo-China, the Emperor was worried about the relations of the Japanese-American negotiations and that was what I discussed with the Emperor.

Q When it was decided on July 2 that Japan would expand into the South and would not tolerate any interference on the part of the United States with that program, those present at the Imperial Conference at that time then knew that Japan was in the process of taking the necessary steps to land troops in French Indo-China, did they not?

A I believe that those who participated in that Conference must have known about the preparations since an agreement had already been reached with the Vichy Government regarding the landing of the Japanese troops. The personnel who participated in that Conference must have known about the Army's preparations.

Q So we can say that when the Imperial Conference decided that Japan would tolerate no interference on the part of the United States, the decision was made with full knowledge of the fact that troops were going to be sent into French Indo-China?

- A Since this penetration into French Indo-China had been decided upon before July 2, it was a known fact at that meeting that the Army was prepared.
- Q Do you recall when the decision was made to send troops into French Indo-China? I might say I know they were actually landed on July 29, but do you know when it was first decided the troops would be sent?
- A On July 5, the Ambassador from Great Britain protested to the Foreign Minister regarding the landing of troops into French Indo-China so the date was forwarded five days.
- Q We can say this; that although the actual treaty or protocol or agreement with Vichy France may not have been signed by July 2, at least the negotiations with Vichy had been entered into prior to July and all those present at the Imperial Conference knew that Japan was in the process of working out the details of sending troops to French Indo-China. Isn't that correct?
- A Maybe the President of the Privy Council may not have known the details but the rest did.
- Q Do you know whether the French Indo-China troop landing was discussed at that Conference?
- A I haven't heard about it.
- Q It was something that quite likely would have been discussed at that Imperial Conference, isn't that true?
- A That Imperial Conference was just a matter of form so I believe that was not discussed.
- Q In other words, the head of the Privy Council might not have learned about it because he had not attended the liaison conference and since it was not discussed at the Imperial Conference, he, therefore, would not know about it?
- A Yes.
- Q But those who discussed the various matters at the liaison conference prior to the Imperial Conference of July 2 no doubt were fully familiar with the proposed landing of troops into French Indo-China?

A Yes.

Q So, when it was decided on July 2 to expand to the South, that decision to expand involved the sending of troops to French Indo-China, did it not?

A That decision to enter French Indo-China was decided some time in June and I have heard that step was taken to facilitate the conclusion of the China affair.

Q But when it was decided at the Imperial Conference that Japan would not tolerate interference on the part of the United States, it was then known that the United States might well resent the sending of troops to French Indo-China and in spite of that fact, it was decided as the foreign policy that Japan would fight the United States, if necessary, to maintain her program of landing those troops?

A Yes.

Q On July 26, you make some references to air raid defenses in the Palace grounds. Why was it that the Palace grounds were being armed for the defense of air raids? Who was it that Japan feared might attack the Palace ground by air?

A With the negotiations between Japan and America becoming critical, the construction of air raid shelters were discussed with the Emperor.

Q In other words, that was just one of the plans that Japan started to make in anticipation of a possible clash with the United States. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Isn't it true that immediately after July 2, 1941, all the various ministers began to develop plans as to what Japan would do in case this war with the United States broke out?

A I have not heard about that so much.

Q Well, realizing that you might not know much about the operational end of the Army and Navy and their specific plans for warfare, certainly in your talks with various ministers, such as the Home Minister, the Finance Minister and the Minister of Commerce, they disclosed to you various preparations they were making to get Japan in proper condition to be able to fight the war with the United States, did they not?

- A The Cabinet members concerned with civil affairs did not talk about those things during those days. Many of these things discussed at the Imperial Conference were not informed to the Cabinet members.
- Q Well, when Prince KONOYE says that Japan, after July 2 will make preparations for war against Great Britain and the United States, what was done, let us say in July, toward that end, to your knowledge? Certainly, something was done about an important decision such as that?
- A Even after such a decision, Prince KONOYE never dreamed of war with the United States so he did not advise his Cabinet members concerning that. He was engrossed in the Japanese-American negotiations and preparations for war were not even discussed.
- Q There isn't any question in your mind that after July 2 the Army and Navy in their operations sections, immediately went forward with the preparations of plans for use in the event of war, didn't they?
- A Yes, I believe the Army and the Navy started immediate preparations.
- Q You heard reports either from them or from the Emperor after the Chiefs of Staff talked to the Emperor to the effect that operational plans were being studied, and worked out irrespective of what the details might be?
- A Yes. I did not get any details of it but the general plans I have heard about.
- Q There isn't any doubt but what you and the Emperor in those days discussed the fact that the Army and the Navy was preparing itself so it would be ready to act in case of war. That is true, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Is it true that you noticed no signs of war preparation in July and August 1941 other than the fact that you knew the military operations branches were working on war plans? I mean in the economic life and civilian life of Japan. Did you see any signs of preparation for war in July 1941?

- A The preparation for war of the general population was almost nil in those days. The only thing was that air-raid drills were intensified, however.
- Q There was no fear at the moment of air attacks from China, was there?
- A Thinking it over later, I believe it was not the fear of air-raids from China but from American forces that the Army instigated air-raid drills. That is what I surmised later.
- Q At least you know that after July 2 there was increased activity in the country with reference to air raid drills?
- A Yes.
- Q Prior to July 2, 1941, had there been any preparation for air raids in Japan?
- A They would have frequent air raid drills even before July 2.
- Q But there was greater activity and greater preparation after July 2 with reference to air raid drills? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't there any indication of an increase of industrial activity looking towards war such as the manufacture of munitions or shipping, or things in that category?
- A Shipping did not become so very active but things that could be used by the Army, like automobiles and things of that sort increased their production.
- Q Were the field pieces, arms and guns, and Army motor vehicles more in evidence after July 1 and August than there were before?
- A I do not remember whether there was sudden increase in those Army goods right after July 2 but the civilian factories producing armaments were enlarging. Guns and ammunition were being made at the Army arsenals and the trucks and tractors and things like that were being made at the civilian factories.

- Q You would say that after July 2 and during July and August, there was an increase in the preparation for war and it was perfectly obvious to people in your position that the country was readying itself for war in case it broke out? Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q How about conscription. Was there any change in the Japanese program for conscription and procuring military personnel after July 2?
- A The increase in mobilization was not evident immediately after July 2.
- Q But after this Imperial Conference of July 2, you and other leading Government officials realized that Japan had committed herself to a program of fighting the United States, if necessary, although you still felt it was quite possible the matter could be negotiated and war averted?
- A They advocated a successful conclusion of Japanese-American negotiations. However, with the penetration of Japanese forces into French Indo-China, things became very critical and the freezing of assets was more or less a retaliatory answer of the American Government.
- Q My point was that after July 2, you and others knew that Japan had committed herself to a definite program in the South Pacific and committed herself to fight a war with the United States to accomplish that result even though you hoped that war might be averted by negotiation at that time?
- A Yes.
- Q On July 29, you talked with Mr. ABE (Genki). Was that the former Premier or is that a different ABE?
- A He is just an official in the Home Ministry.
- Q Did he have anything in particular to say in your conversation?

- A He just came over to discuss the critical situation of that time, fearing the break in relationship between Japan and the United States.
- Q What is the first name of the MATSUDAIRA who was your Chief Secretary?
- A YASUMASA
- Q What did the Chief Aide-de-Camp have to say on July 29 with reference to the attitude of the Navy Chief of Staff?
- A I am not positive whether it was this time or not but we discussed about the changeability of NAGANO regarding Navy policy. NAGANO was a very laconic man and I could never positively get his actual stand of the Navy during that period.
- Q On July 31, you write further with reference to talking with the Emperor concerning Admiral NAGANO's attitude towards the negotiations between the United States and Japan. According to what you write on that date, as I understand it, Admiral NAGANO as of July 31, 1941 was opposed to war with the United States and wanted to avoid it if possible?
- A Yes, NAGANO wanted to avoid war with the United States if that could be possible.
- Q What did he have to say about this Tripartite Alliance?
- A NAGANO was very opposed to the Tripartite agreement and he believed that if that was successfully concluded, it would be a barrier to a successful conclusion between America and Japan.
- Q It had already been concluded - the Tripartite Pact was concluded in 1940. Do you mean that he thought it was unfortunate that Japan had entered into that alliance?
- A Yes.
- Q The Army was principally the group that was in favor of that alliance and MATSUOKA who negotiated it?
- A Yes.

- Q What did the Emperor have to tell you that Admiral NAGANO had to say about the oil situation?
- A Admiral NAGANO wanted the successful conclusion of Japanese-American negotiations but if they could not acquire oil for a long period of time due to negotiations, then he advocated war with the United States.
- Q In other words, his attitude was that oil should be obtained by negotiation. If that failed, Japan should fight to obtain oil in the South Pacific?
- A If the negotiations between Japan and America continued for a long time, why the reserve supply of oil would be depleted and if that was so, then Admiral NAGANO wanted to commence war while they still had that oil. That opinion of NAGANO worried the Emperor quite a bit, saying that was a rash movement with no thought behind it.
- Q That opinion was generally the opinion of the Navy, was it not?
- A The Emperor was very worried about such statements by the Navy officers and so I talked with the Navy Minister, OIKAWA, to quell such talks among the Navy personnel
- Q Did the Emperor ask you to do that?
- A The Emperor did not ask me but I was worried about those rash talks of the Navy personnel.
- Q Then, as of July 31, 1941, there wasn't a great deal of difference in the attitude of the Army and the Navy towards the United States, was there? The Army, led by War Minister TOJO was pretty much anti-American and although it was willing to try to negotiate a settlement of differences with the United States on what they thought were the proper terms for Japan, the Army was advocating fighting the United States, if necessary, to carry out Japan's foreign policy. That is true, is it not?
- A Yes.

- Q While the Navy, through NAGANO as Chief of Staff, didn't desire war with the United States, if negotiations were not successful, then, like the Army they were perfectly willing to fight the United States, the only difference perhaps being the reason to fight. The Navy wanted oil and the Army wanted primarily, expansion to many regions to the South. Is that right?
- A I believe NAGANO personally did not want war with the United States but he, too, was forced into making such statements by the pressure brought upon him by the younger staff officers.
- Q By virtue of that pressure, he adopted their thinking and thereby advocated it, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q The Army was more outspoken in advocating war against the United States than the Navy was, wasn't it, generally speaking?
- A Yes.
- Q But even the Navy took the position that Japan had to have oil and if she couldn't get it peaceably or by negotiations, the Navy would be willing to go along and fight the United States in order to get it.
- A Navy Minister OIKAWA was definitely against war with the United States but since so much pressure was being put upon him by the younger Navy officers, he made the statement, saying that "everything will be left up to the Government". The Premier tried in every way to have the Navy Minister come out with the statement that the Navy does not want war but due to the pressure by the younger elements in the Navy, OIKAWA could not come out with that statement.
- Q That came to a head pretty much when the Cabinet fell in October 1941, did it not?
- A Yes.
- Q Can we say that it is your opinion that in the negotiations going on in those days between Japan and the United States, the Navy officials were inclined to be more liberal and willing to make more concessions in negotiations with the United States in order to avert war than was the case with the Army, in that the Navy was not so insistent upon the maintenance of troops in China as the Army?

A Yes.

Q The Navy would have more readily agreed to the withdrawal of troops in China to settle the matter and get oil and that might have come about if the Army had not insisted on the policy of withdrawing no troops. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q Going a little further in that same conversation with the Emperor on July 31, did the Emperor advise you that he learned from Admiral NAGANO that the Navy, itself, felt that it could win a war with the United States, although he personally was doubtful on that point?

A Admiral NAGANO, Chief of Staff, made the statement saying that he is dubious whether they can win this war or not, and the Emperor was quite worried, saying that we cannot conduct such a rash war like that.

Q Isn't it true that Admiral NAGANO reported to the Emperor that the Navy, as a whole felt it could fight a successful war with the United States, although he personally was concerned about it?

A On the paper presented to the Emperor, it had the plans whereby they could win this war. However, upon questioning by the Emperor regarding their plan, NAGANO admitted that ultimate victory was doubtful.

Q In other words, this was a written report to the Emperor?

A Yes.

Q Was it customary for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy to make periodical written reports to the Emperor as to the condition of the Army and Navy?

A It is not stipulated but they did present such reports occasionally.

Q Was this a routine report or was this a report that the Emperor requested in order to know the status of affairs?

A I do not know.

- Q You do know this was a written report that Admiral NAGANO had made to the Emperor?
- A I know it was a written report because the Emperor told that to me.
- Q Did you ever get to see the report?
- A No.
- Q Where would that report be filed, in the Imperial Household somewhere?
- A The Aide-de-Camp might have it.
- Q And the Aide-de-Camp has his office in the Imperial grounds, does he?
- A Yes.
- Q Does he have an office in the Imperial Household Ministry or outside of that Ministry?
- A The office is in the Imperial Household building but that office has been abolished.
- Q When was it abolished?
- A Abolished about the latter part of November 1945.
- Q Who was the Aide-de Camp in 1941, the period we are talking about?
- A General HASUNUMA.
- Q He more or less would retain possession of such reports and have custody of such reports that were made by the Chiefs of Staff to the Emperor?
- A I am not positive whether that was the procedure or not. It is just guesswork on my part that it might have been retained by him.
- Q No doubt, there were many reports made prior to and during the war by the Chiefs of Staff that were in writing and certainly there is some definite place where they were filed away and retained. Don't you know where they would be?

- A I don't know. It is just my surmise that those reports were kept by the Aide-de-Camp.
- Q Now, the various ministers made written reports to the Emperor on occasions, did they not?
- A Yes.
- Q Where would the reports of the ministers to the Emperor be filed away and in whose custody would they be retained?
- A I think they may be in the hands of the Grand Chamberlain.
- Q In other words, written reports from Government officials as distinguished from military officers would be presented to the Emperor and read by him and then filed away and retained in the custody of the Grand Chamberlain, while reports from military principals would be retained and preserved by the Aide-de-Camp.
- A I think that might be so.
- Q The Aide-de-Camp would preserve reports both from the Army and the Navy?
- A Yes.
- Q The Imperial Household Ministry Building was not destroyed in the war, was it?
- A No.
- Q And unless those reports had been removed or destroyed, they should be there, should they not?
- A I don't know.
- Q Would you know any other place where they might be removed to. I am interested in trying to find them and I would like to know where to look and I would like you to help me.
- A I don't know whether they were taken out of there or not. They might be there.
- Q Were they in the Imperial Household Ministry building last summer, immediately before the end of the war?
- A I don't know for sure.

- Q Do you have any knowledge of there being a wholesale removal of papers and documents, reports and instruments, out of the Household Ministry, either prior to the war or since the war? Do you know for a fact that they were destroyed or moved out?
- A The removal of it to some outside place, I am not sure of but I remember that some documents were burned right after the end of the war.
- Q Do you know what the nature of those documents were and under whose orders they were burned?
- A I don't know.
- Q Well, in other words, at the end of the war, someone, no doubt, issued an order that certain types of documents be destroyed. What types of documents did they destroy? What category did they fall in? They didn't destroy everything in the Imperial Grounds, did they?
- A I believe that the documents burned were those concerned with the war. The Government agencies were burning their documents and in conjunction with them, I believe they burned some documents.
- Q You mean the Imperial Household?
- A Yes.
- Q The Emperor issued an order, did he not, that the documents pertaining to the war should be destroyed?
- A No, the Emperor does not give such orders.
- Q Who did give the order?
- A If the order did come out, it came out from the Minister of the Imperial Household.
- Q I meant the other Government documents. Who gave the order to destroy the Government documents as distinguished from the Imperial Household documents?
- A I believe the documents burned by the Government were burned by order of the Premier.

- Q There was such an order, was there not? You know that the Premier issued an order to burn certain documents, did he not?
- A I can only surmise it was so, I don't know for sure.
- Q You mean you never heard of any such order ?
- A I only heard that the Government agencies were burning their documents.
- Q You never saw the order that they destroy their documents?
- A No.
- Q What sort of records did you retain in your own office through your secretary? What types of documents did he keep?
- A We did not have much documents in our Department. What documents we did have might have been burned through the order of the Minister of the Imperial Household by my subordinates.
- Q You certainly know whether there was such an order or wasn't such an order to burn documents in your office. People wouldn't burn documents in your office without telling you about it, would they?
- A With the order of the Minister of the Imperial Household, the documents pertaining to the war was burned.
- Q You mean those documents in your office pertaining to the war were burned?
- A Whether all was burned or not, I don't know, since that was handled by the Chief Secretary.
- Q In other words, Mr. MATSUDAIRA would be able to give us information on what was burned and what wasn't burned and where those documents are that remain?
- A Yes.

Q I might say that I have had some word from MATSUDAIRA indicating he would like to cooperate with me and he is going to talk with me. Do you think he might well help me to locate what documents that remain and tell me about the documents destroyed?

A Why, whatever was burned to the extent of his memory, I am sure MATSUDAIRA will cooperate.

Q Do you recall any important documents that were destroyed that would be of help to me in trying to investigate this matter. I might add, as indicated once before, I feel that you can be of help to us and to your country in trying to bring out these facts. From what I have been learning about you, outside and in your diary, I think you should take the position of trying to help us find out who really was responsible, if anyone, for what took place here in Japan.

A Since the war ended so abruptly and the country was thrown into such a turmoil, many documents would have been burned indiscriminately and I do not remember exactly.

Q I realize that is hard to remember. Tell me what type of document would be filed in your office that was of sufficient importance as a war instrument that it was burned. What would be the nature of those documents? What kind of documents would they be?

A The papers that I received are Cabinet decisions and that document only came into our hands occasionally.

Q By that you mean the Cabinet would have a meeting and they would decide on some course of conduct and an original or a copy of that would be filed away with you, or what?

A The copy would be sent over to my office as a reference. Since the Government was burning all their papers, those papers from the Government were burned so as not to cause any "meiwaku".

- Q Among your files you would have had numerous written Cabinet decisions filed away? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And in addition to that you would have copies of Imperial Conference decisions that would be distributed to your office, would you not?
- A In my files, many documents pertaining to decisions reached at the Imperial Conferences was sent to my Department. We would have a few - some that I asked for and some that were sent but I believe that those documents were burned.
- Q And would you have copies of written reports made to the Emperor by various ministers?
- A Practically none. Those documents presented to the Emperor must be some place but copies of that were rarely sent over to my Department.
- Q What were the principal documents or minutes in Government affairs that were circulated to your office so that you would have copies?
- A There was no regulations saying that copies should be sent over to my Department. Just occasionally through good-will, some of the ministers sent a copy as a reference.
- Q You would have had copies in your files of Imperial Rescripts, would you not?
- A Yes.
- Q Would they have all been destroyed?
- A I don't think that was destroyed. I believe as much as possible those papers concerned with my work was not burned.
- Q Would it be helpful to you if you had an opportunity to talk with your Chief Secretary with reference to these documents? Between the two of you, do you think you can reconstruct those documents that were destroyed and locate those that were not destroyed?

- A If I can talk to my Chief Secretary, I could confer with him and tell him to aid in all possible ways to get those documents.
- Q You would be willing to tell him to do that, wouldn't you and also to try between the two of you to refresh your recollection as to what documents were destroyed?
- A Since I can't see him, I can't tell much about it.
- Q I am going to talk to him as I understand he is desirous of doing the same thing. Of course, we know you were the Keeper of the Official Seal of Japan. What type of documents was that Seal affixed to? I assume it was affixed to the Imperial Rescripts. What, in addition, was it affixed to?
- A Documents which bears the Imperial Seal is fixed by law.
- Q One type of document is the Imperial Rescript. That is right, isn't it?
- A Yes, and Imperial Edicts.
- Q What is the difference between an Edict and a Rescript?
- A It is a regulation which is not quite as strong as law. Most of these edicts were based upon law, although not all, and is issued with the signature of the Emperor and stamp.
- Q Did the Emperor originate these edicts or were they orders or regulations that were prepared in the Government and submitted to the Emperor for his signature?
- A They were all prepared by the Government and presented to the Emperor for his signature. When they award medals, they are presented with the scroll and upon that scroll is affixed these stamps. Ever since 1937, over 200,000 commendation scrolls were given when the Diet passed a law saying before it would be effective they had to be signed by the Emperor and bear the official seal of Japan. When it is made public, it is affixed with the seal.

- Q By that, you mean to imply there were laws that were not made public; that there were secret laws, or do you mean before it became a law, the Emperor had to sign it and the seal was affixed?
- A There is no such thing as a secret law in Japan. When it passes through the Diet, before it is made public, it is affixed with the Seal.
- Q In other words, before it goes into force and effect, it must be signed by the Emperor, the seal affixed, and then, it is published?
- A Yes, unless it goes through such steps like that, it is not effective.
- Q Can you think of anything else that the Imperial Seal is affixed to? For example, would it have to be affixed to treaties?
- A There are two seals. One is the Emperor's own and one is the Nation's and I believe that the Seal of the Nation is put on the treaties.
- Q Is it the Emperor's own seal that is put on laws before they become effective?
- A Yes.
- Q What else besides treaties is the official Japanese seal used on?
- A The Seal of the Nation is also put on the credentials of the Ambassadors.
- Q These diplomatic notes that went back and forth between the United States and Japan, did they require a seal of any kind?
- A No.
- Q They were usually in the form of cables, were they, and presented by the Ambassador, usually?
- A Yes.

- Q So, you would say that the main documents that might be helpful to me in my investigation would be copies of Cabinet minutes and Imperial Rescripts and possibly Imperial edicts?
- A Imperial edicts are not in my hands. They are always returned back to the Government.
- Q But you would keep copies of all the Imperial Rescripts, wouldn't you?
- A Yes.
- Q Did you have a copy of the Imperial Rescript that was issued on December 8 to the Japanese people announcing the commencement of the war?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that destroyed to your knowledge?
- A Those things that are within my category, I believe I told them not to destroy.
- Q Do you think that your Chief Secretary would be able to find that Rescript?
- A Yes.
- Q And the so-called Declaration of War that was handed to Ambassador Grew on the 8th of December, did that bear any of the official seals of Japan?
- A No, I don't think so.
- Q Did you have a copy of that?
- A No, I have not even seen it. The Foreign Ministry handled that.
- Q Did you get copies of the minutes of the various liaison conferences that were held prior to the Imperial Conference?
- A Not even one.

- Q Do you have in existence files with reference to your personal correspondence with various ministers and branches of the Government which might contain letters from such people as Mr. MATSUDAIRA and TOJO with reference to the matter I am investigating?
- A I have never even given one letter to the ministers.
- Q Didn't you receive letters on many occasions?
- A Practically none.
- Q Those you did receive, would they be in your office files where your Secretary could find them?
- A If there is any such letter, there would be.
- Q We talked the other day about some letter you received that MATSUOKA had written. You would have a copy of that, would you not?
- A That was a private letter from MATSUOKA and I took that home and it was burned, not due to my people but due to a raid. Many documents were taken home and quite a few of them were burned at my house.
- Q You, no doubt, had quite a volume of documents in your office, did you not, over a period of quite a few years?
- A Yes.
- Q What documents do you have that might shed some light on the things we have been discussing from time to time?
- A I don't believe there are any documents that could be of much use.
- Q You think the office of the Aide-de-Camp and the Office of the Grand Chamberlain would contain many more documents than your office.
- A I believe that my office in the whole of Japan has less communications and documents than any other

- Q I can understand that, but my question was that the office of the Aide-de-Camp should have numerous documents pertaining to military affairs and the Grand Chamberlain should have many documents pertaining to Government affairs, shouldn't they?
- A Not many Government documents, but those presented by the Ministers to the Emperor might be in the hands of the Grand Chamberlain.
- Q What other offices in the Imperial Household building or in the Palace grounds would likely contain documents relating to the matters we have been talking about? Would the Imperial Household Ministry have copies of the type of documents we have been referring to?
- A There is no political connection between the Government and the Imperial Household and I don't think there is any such documents.
- Q Are there any offices in the Imperial Grounds that would contain documents of the type we have been referring to?
- A There is not many offices besides the ones mentioned so far so I don't think there is.
- Q Does the Emperor himself keep an office and have a Secretary and file away documents that are presented to him?
- A There is no other secretary. The Grand Chamberlain usually takes care of those matters.
- Q The main offices inside of the Palace grounds were yours, the Aide-de-Camp, Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Ministry. There were no others?
- A No.
- Q The complete record of Cabinet meetings would be kept by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet unless it is destroyed?
- A Yes.

- Q Assuming it wasn't destroyed, where was the customary place for those documents to be kept?
- A I don't know the details of it but there is a record section in the Cabinet which keeps all those documents.
- Q What building was that in?
- A I don't know.
- Q Would the records of the Ministry of War be kept in the War Ministry Building?
- A Yes.
- Q And the same is true of the Navy Ministry - in the Navy Building?
- A Yes.
- Q On the same day we are talking about, July 31, you mentioned a little while ago you had a talk with Navy Minister OIKAWA concerning Admiral NAGANO's report to the Emperor. What was that conversation? What was said?
- A I talked with Navy Minister OIKAWA regarding the report of NAGANO presented to the Emperor where NAGANO said that ultimate victory is dubious. Such an opinion by the Chief of Staff is just more worries for the Emperor and more thoughts should be given on those matters. Deeper studies should be given on those matters instead of making rash statements.
- Q By that you mean that the fact that the Chief of Staff indicated he thought the Navy could not win in a war with the United States was a rash statement?
- A Since NAGANO had presented the plan to the Emperor through the urgings of the younger officers, although it says on that paper they can win, the thoughts of NAGANO could be said as being doubtful of its outcome.
- Q You mean although the document indicated they could win the war, NAGANO's thoughts were not along that line?

- A NAGANO'S thoughts indicated doubts regarding ultimate victory and to make such a statement with such a mind is a constant source of worry to the Emperor.
- Q Were you complaining about the fact that NAGANO didn't take a definite stand that either they could win the war or they couldn't win the war? He took the stand that the Navy in general thought it could win the war but he didn't think so. Is that your complaint?
- A To have such a person as Chief of Staff make such a statement having such doubt in his mind is confusing. You cannot rely on a person like that.
- Q In other words, were you objecting to the Chief of Staff expressing his honest opinion that he didn't think Japan could win a war with the United States. What was wrong with the Chief of Staff saying what he honestly thought?
- A To have Navy Minister OIKAWA present one plan and to believe another is not the stand for any person to take. He must have a definite plan.
- Q In other words, you don't think that was helpful to the Emperor to be given two plans directly in opposition to each other?
- A I told OIKAWA that this is very important matter when such a person such as the Chief of Staff thinks we can win this war.
- Q Was it your thought that you expressed to OIKAWA that the Chief of Staff should either agree with the majority in the Navy or resign and let someone else take over that would go along with the majority of opinion?
- A I did not ask for his resignation or anything like that but I did ask for a more definite stand on the part of NAGANO.
- Q What did OIKAWA have to say?
- A OIKAWA did not make any special comments at that time, just saying this is a fine predicament.

- Q Was the Emperor disappointed in the point-of-view that NAGANO took when he said that the Navy couldn't win a war with the United States and really desired him to express more enthusiasm for really being able to win the war?
- A The Emperor upon hearing the report of the Chief of Staff said that more consideration must be given to this problem. We must not try to overdo.
- Q Who did the Emperor side in with - the Navy group as a whole or with NAGANO? Whom did he believe or whom was he inclined to believe?
- A The Emperor in the first place did not want war with the United States. He had to have more assurance of victory before he was willing to place the nation into war.
- Q The Emperor was very much concerned about the fact that the Navy said they could win the war while the Chief of Staff, himself, said they couldn't. Isn't that correct?
- A Since the positive success of the plan presented by NAGANO was so dubious, the Emperor was greatly worried.
- Q In other words, the Emperor wanted the Navy to take a stand one way or another. He didn't want two views as to whether they could win or not?
- A The fact that NAGANO presented the plan of which the outcome was victory and professed dubious doubts in his mind regarding that victory, the Emperor was very perplexed.
- Q On August 2, you refer to a tendency for the tough elements in the Navy to get stronger. What individuals did you have in mind when you referred to the tough elements gaining strength?
- A KONOYE came over and told me that due to the lack of oil, certain elements in the Navy is taking very aggressive stand regarding Japanese-American negotiations.

- Q What individuals did he mention?
- A I don't know their names but they were members of the Navy General Staff.
- Q What did your Chief Secretary have to say to you on October 4 with reference to the condition of the Navy?
- A My secretary heard from some of the Navy personnel that the advocates for war has increased quite suddenly within the Navy circle.
- Q Who is Mr. KOREMATSU?
- A KOREMATSU is my private personal secretary.
- Q What did he have to say about the Navy attitude?
- A KOREMATSU had many friends among the younger Navy personnel and he heard of the sudden strong stand of the elements of the Navy and he came over to tell me about it.
- Q So, you would say that as of this time, August 1941, you very definitely discerned a much more aggressive attitude on the part of the Navy and a swinging of the Navy attitude to the Army point of view?
- A Yes, about this time, the Army and Navy General Staff started to cooperate more closely.
- Q In other words, there was more evidence among the higher officials in the Navy as of the early part of August 1941 that they felt it would be necessary to fight a war with the United States in order to obtain oil.
- A The top men of the Navy still maintained a reserved attitude. It is the middle elements, the younger staff officers.
- Q How about the Vice Chief of Staff? Do you recall who he was in those days and what his attitude was?
- A Vice Admiral ITO.
- Q What was his attitude with reference to the relations with the United States.

A I had not talked with Vice-Admiral ITO but I think he was one of those who was trying to calm down those aggressive elements in the Navy.

Q He later on became a very strong advocate of war with the United States, did he not?

A When the final decision was made, he became a very strong advocate.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, FRED H. UYEHARA, LT. , 0-2030790
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 24 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred H. Uyehara Lt. Col. Inf.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar , hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xx~~) Henry R. Sackett , _____

~~xxx~~ _____

certify that on the 4th day of March , 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xx~~) (Marquis) Koichi Kido and according to Lt. Fred Uyehara , Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

Place

[Signature]

Date