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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

EXCERPTS OF INTERVIEWS FROM SURVIVAL FACTORS GROUP FIELD NOTES

By: Lawrence Roman (7 pages)

Assistant Chief Taylor - Airport Fire Department - August 13, 1997

He and 11 other firemen departed the Station about 0332 and arrived on site about 0356. They departed in a Pathfinder/rescue vehicle and 1 person used his car. He said that while they offered their services, they basically just sat around and no one on scene asked anything of them regarding aircraft crash and rescue. At 0804, two Captains were sent to the scene to feed back information on the crash scene. Some fireman did assist in the rescue of 3 females, 1 male and 1 child from an area near the cockpit. Four were unconscious and 1 female was conscious. They used the jaws-of-life to complete the extrications.

In his view, there were no attempts to put out the fire. He acknowledged that there were problems getting equipment up to the accident scene. While at the accident scene, he noticed that there was, "fuel all over the place" and when he noticed several civilian and military rescue workers smoking, he left the area. He said that he became disgusted with the disorganization. During a table-top exercise conducted during April 1997, he noted that there were no representatives from the Guam Police Department nor the USN hospital present.

Chief Felix Sablan August 13, 1997

Chief Sablan said that the Government of Guam was the first on scene and that Mr. Rosario was running the command post. He and the Fire Chief of the Air Force and Anderson, as well as the Chief (acting) of the GAA went to the command post at 0245 to ask what they could do. They received no guidance. There was no accountability at the accident site. Someone made a suggestion to use an H-46 and conduct an aerial water drop, however, he stopped that from occurring because he knew that rescue-workers might get hurt and that this action would only compress the smoke down.

There were no agents used. Although engine 5 was on scene it could not get through because of traffic congestion on the road. His people had to walk in. He said that because the road was blocked, nothing could get in. When asked if there were any attempts to clear the road, he said that several suggestions were made to Mr. Rosario, but none were acted on. He said that the Civil Defense just let everyone in. He noted that Guam Police cars were blocking the road. He thought that eventually the closed point that any fire fighting equipment got to the crash scene was 1,000 feet. He noted that there was only 250 feet of hose on this pumper.

LT CMDR Lehner

Wasn't sure that the accident site was on Navy property; however, when it was determined it was, he directed that extensive security logs be maintained, He noted that when he got on scene, the road to the crash site was blocked by a fire truck that

was stuck in the mud and police cars. There was significant rain during the entire rescue efforts.

Chief Gil Reyes Guam Fire Chief

He said that the road became blocked because Guam police cars did not want to go around debris and some ruts that had been made by the accident airplane. The pumper truck attempted to go around them to the left side of the road and became stuck. He said that at some point hoses were run to the crash scene. The pumper was stuck about 1 mile from the crash site. The truck was operational and had 1,000 feet of hose.

Jordan Kaye

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Mr. Jordan Kaye from the Guam Environmental Protection Authority said that he was a member of the Civil Defense organization. He learned about the B747 crash from a member of the Public Health a little before 0200. As he was preparing to travel to the Civil Defense control center he confirmed that the call was genuine with the 911 dispatcher. When he arrived at the Civil Defense bunker, the fire chief and the deputy director of Civil Defense were already there.

There was a period of uncertainty about whose land the crash had occurred on and there was a shortage of maps for the area. (EPA eventually supplied maps to Civil Defense for use in the emergency.) There were a number of agencies which did not have representatives report to the bunker. He said that there was no police representative to provide security and he did not see anyone from Public Works.

He said that it was late morning before the EPA vehicles could get access to the site.

He knew that there had been an exercise within the last year as part of the airport certification process. He thought that there was a requirement for an exercise each three years. He could not remember the last time that there was an off-airport exercise.

Juan Rosario

In a follow-up discussion, Juan said that he was in the Command Post between 0235 and 1100 and was controlling the operation from that point. He said that he was not sure who was in control of the on-scene post. He said that the Navy was using its own communications network from the crash scene to organize its support and was by-passing his Command Post. He said that there was a lot happening outside the Civil

Defense as the Navy did its own thing. The government agencies worked through him and things flowed smoothly. He said that at about 1100 the Admiral came to him and said that the Navy was assuming control. He added that there was no Memorandum of Understanding with the Navy.

He said that the Civil Defense organization conducts one tabletop exercise each year and one full scale exercise each three years as part of the airport certification requirements. The last full scale exercise was held about 2 months ago on the airport. He said that in the two and a half years that he has been Director, there has been one full scale exercise (2 months ago) and one tabletop exercise. These are the only aircraft crash exercises that he has seen in that time. The exercises tend to be on the airport at Guam.

Captain Mary Humphreys-Sprague, US NAVY

Captain Humphreys-Sprague was interviewed at 1630 on August 12 and 13, 1997, by telephone and at her office. Capt Humphrey-Sprague's husband is the General Manager at GIAA and he received notification of the crash at 0216. She notified Security at 0220 and they were dispatched to search at 0222. Her husband received confirmation at 0225 that an aircraft was down. While this was all happening she looked out of the back of her house and saw a red glow in the sky. At 0230 she called the Admiral and advised him of the emergency. At 0239 she called in and was advised that the emergency services were activated. At the same time the Federal Fire Fighters were enroute to the crash, She stated that her husband reported seeing the crash site as he traveled to the airport. At 0248 she received confirmation that 1 ambulance had left and a second was waiting for manning. At 0303 she received information that USAF, Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) was sending ambulances and oil spill team. She thought that Admiral Janzcak had arrived at the site at about 0310. She said that when she tried to call Civil Defense no-one answered the phones. She said that she later found out that all of the Civil Defense was at the site. She said that the first helo was airborne at 0325; the helo pilot's are on a 1 hour recall alert, therefore they would have had to receive notification, dress, and travel to the helos. She stated that the last Navy ambulance left for site at 0330, and the first helo was on scene at 0333. She said that the ambulances were held up by a GPD car blocking the road entrance (because of the broken pipeline.) The Federal Fire Dept was also blocked out by this GPD vehicle. The vehicle was not moved until after daylight. She stated that at 0447 the pipeline was reported to be secured. At 0508 the Seabees reported that bulldozers and backhoes were enroute. At 0642, 25 survivors were reported to have been extracted. At 0648 the helos were requested to use buckets to extinguish the fires, as the trucks could not put them out due to access problems. She stated that the helos do not have night lights and it was very difficult for them to see the inconsistent terrain and so instead of landing, the helos hovered the entire time the survivors were being loaded onboard. She said that some of the survivors were triaged at Adelup Point at the Governors Mansion. At 0651, winches were requested

to pull apart wreckage to get final two survivors from aft section. She said that at 0742 the final survivors were lifted out. She said that at 0804 the Admiral called and said that the Govenor wanted the military to assume control now that the survivors were out. She organized for a Commander to go to the site and relieve the Admiral and she requested that the Admiral come back to the office, but he refused to leave. The Commander left for the site at 0841. She said that Federal Fire Dept LCdr Lehner had tapes of calls made during the operations.

Admiral Janzcak, US NAVY

Admiral Janzcak was interview by telephone on August 14, 1997. Admiral Janzcak stated that he received a call from Captain Humphreys-Sprague at about 0245 and drove to the site. He stated that he met up with Lt. Jim Lehner at the intersection of Larson and Turner and they proceeded to the accident site in a police department car; on their way they passed several cars from the Guam Police Department (GPD). At the gate (where the Command Center was set up) Admiral Janzcak and Lt. Lehner got into a patrol car and proceeded along the dirt road to where two or three police cruisers were blocking the road because of the broken pipeline. He said that the police men had taken their keys and, therefore, the cars could not be moved. He and Lehner proceeded to the accident site on foot. He stated he thought he arrived at the site about 0300; they had to tear down a barbed wire fence to get to the site. He said there were no fire trucks at the site nor at the gate at that time. At the airplane he saw 6-8 survivors, all oriental along the hillside. He directed Lehner to assume the duties and he put Lehner in charge of the site while he proceeded back along the wreckage path to the VOR pad. He stated that at about 0330 a H46 helo landed on the pad and the pilots got out and he instructed them on the locations of the three triage points and they discussed Safety of Flight issues. He said that the terrain was too rough and it was too dangerous to land the helos close to the survivors on the hill so they decided to hover the helos and load the survivors through the gate in the rear of the helos. He said they considered using the helo water buckets but the Guam Fire Department advised against it because they were afraid it would spread the fire, therefore, the water buckets were not used. He said one of the fire truck hoses was used to pull the survivors in the Stokes litters up the hill to the helos. He also said he did not speak with the Command Center at the gate but he received a call on his cell phone from a Security Guard at the gate. There was a female from the Pacific Daily News that was requesting access to the site, Admiral Janzcak told the Security Guard to not let any news people through the gate. Admiral Janzcak said he coordinated with the Naval Command Center (Captain Humphrey-Sprauge) and the Navy Hospital on his cell phone. He stated that the "Civilians" (Guam Fire Depatment) were in-charge of the site. He stated that at about 0900 he saw the Governor. At 1230/1300 he and the Governor spoke with Ralph Leon Guerrero, the Guam Fire Captain, (who was in the back of a fire truck at the Command Post and the gate). And the Governor informed the Captain that the military was taking over the scene. He said he spoke to the Director of Civil Defense at before leaving the site at about 1330 and informed him

what was happening at the scene. He stated that the Lt Lehner, and Gill Chanaharo and other Civil Defense employees present during his conversation with the Director.

Lt. Commander Lehner -US NAVY

Lt. Lehner stated that a Guam Police vehicle and a Guam Fire Truck were blocking the dirt road (beyond the broken pipeline) to the accident site. He said the fire truck was stuck in the mud and police vehicles were abandoned without the keys in the ignitions. At the site Lt. Lehner set up triages and coordinated pickup locations for the survivors. Lt. Lehner said that the site was "Chaotic" and that nobody was in charge until he took charge. He said there was a significant amount of smoke and visibility was very poor. He said that it was difficult to communicate with each other He stated that he wasn't sure who's property it was. Lt. Lehner stated that nobody knew who was in charge at the accident site when he first arrived at the site.

He stated that the HC 5 helos hovered about 130 yards from where they loaded the survivors. He stated that the following emergency tools were used to rescue the crash victims: jaws of life, expanders, hydraulic generators, and crow bars. Saws were not used because they could generate sparks and ignite fuel. Lt. Lehner stated he would send a written statement to the NTSB about his activities involving the accident.

Senior Chief Petty Officer Steel - US NAVY

Received call from Naval Security desk Sergeant at about 2:10 AM concerning a 911 central call stating the need for the Navy's assistance with an aircraft down near Turner road. The police had already been dispatched to the accident. He first went to the Mobile Security Command Post at the Naval base. I drove to the gate at the Command Post, pulled into the yard in front of the home to keep it out of the way. Fire fighters at the top of the hill were saying a fire truck had gone off the hill and was blocking the road. Three (3) police cars and a fire truck were blocking the road so no one could get through. He said he arrived at the airplane about 2:30 with Lt. Commander Lehner. First persons there included: Guam Police, Guam Fire Department, Military Police and the Navy. Initially, no one was in charge and everyone was on a different radio net talking to different dispatchers. The Admiral was in charge coordinating Navy resources, but no one ever took charge of the site. He said he was talking via radio to the Command Post and security dispatcher requesting litters and stretchers. He said he finally left the site at about 2000. He said that he talked to Sergeant Jacob at Andersen Air Force Base and told him they needed more rescue people and at first, Sergeant Jacob said he wouldn't let Security patrol officer help remove survivors, but he changed his mind when ordered to do so by the Admiral Janzcak. He said he was communicating with the Admiral by word of mouth, and at 0330, Lt. Burley coordinated between Lt. Lehner and the Admiral by radio from 0330 on.

5.1 Medical Response

The fist surviving passenger arrived by a Civil Defense vehicle to the Guam Memorial Hospital (GMH) at about 0420 and was admitted at 0500. According to the Administrator the survivors was taken into the trauma ward and later admitted and sent to the ICU. The 16 other survivors were taken to GMH via ambulance. The last surviving passenger admitted to GMH was at 0709.

The first surviving passenger arrived by helicopter and was admitted to the Naval Hospital at 0501. The last surviving passenger to be admitted to the Naval Hospital was at 0836. The U.S. Navy reported that the first survivor to be airlifted to the Naval Hospital was delivered at 0334, and the last survivor was delivered at 0710.

5.5 Disaster Preparedness

Mr. John Rojas is the Air Terminal Manager for the Guam International Airport Authority. Mr. Rojas said that he activated the GIAA Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) and sent the Airport Fire and Police staff to the crash site to help with the search and rescue operation. This was done under the conditions of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the airport and civil organizations involved. He said that he received information in through the communications system and then when the information was confirmed, he transferred the information to large pieces of paper and pinned it to the wall for all in the ECC to see. This saved time in subsequent briefings. The information if also transferred to a laptop computer for a permanent record.

The Civil Defense/Guam Emergency Operating Procedure states:

The Purpose of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Civil Defense/Guam Emergency Services Office (CD/GESO) is to outline and facilitate a coordinated response in dealing with emergency preparedness, emergency response, mitigation, and recovery to all aspects of any emergency, or significant disaster to the Territory of Guam. The plan also outlines organizational structure and specific assignments of responsibilities assigned to CD/GESO.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) also establishes all procedures to support the emergency undertakings dealing with the activation of the Emergency Operating Center and the assumption of duties and responsibilities assigned to the staff of CD/GESO and coordination efforts assigned to each Response Activity Coordinator (RAC).

The SOP is applicable to all employees of CD/GESO to include all Government of Guam Response Activity Coordinators, and the Village Mayors, who act as Civil Defense Wardens during time of an emergency or disaster.

Mr. Juan Rosario, the Director Civil Defense for the Guam Regional Office was interviewed on August 11, 1997. Mr. Rosario said that his job is to co-ordinate all aspects of civil emergencies; he was notified and traveled to the site and arrived at 0235 and set up his Emergency Command Post at the gate for the road leading to the crash site. He then assumed control of the operation. At the Command Post (CP) he had the Fire and Police commanders with him to help coordinate those groups activities. From the CP he activated the National Guard and other similar agencies to help with the emergency. He was in command of the operation between 0235 and about 1100 when the Admiral assumed control. He kept his staff on scene to continue to support the military with the rescue

Mr. Rosario stated that at 1500 on Thursday August 7, 1997, deactivated the Civil Defense involvement in the operation. He stated that the cooperation and coordination at the gate was excellent. The operation went smoothly with good control over who had access through the gate. The site commander passed through to the CP how many resources he needed and the people manning the CP organized to send the requirements forward.