

From  $\frac{110}{24}$  to  $\frac{2471}{115}$   
 $\frac{24}{24}$

Personal History (1)  
~~Curriculum Vitae~~

Name: MIYO Tatsukichi  
 Date of Birth: January 12 1902  
 Permanent Residence: No. 5762 Kujimachi, Kuji-gun,  
 Ibaragi Prefecture.  
 Social status: Heimin (Commoner)

Family Members

<del>Name</del>	Name	Date of Birth
Father	MIYO Sutejiro	Nov. 4 1872
Mother	" Sute	May 5 1874
Wife	" Keiko (divorced March 16 1945)	
Elders Son	" Yoshihito	Feb. 24 1930
Elders Daughter	" Yuko	July 1 1933
Second Son	Shinta	Aug. 6 1937
Second Daughter	Hiroko	Oct. 19 1941
Elder Brother	Shoji (deceased, Aug. 21 1940)	
Younger Brother	Kanzaburo	Jan. 25 1905
Younger Sister	Sui	July 12 1908

DATE	RECORD	(2)	GOVERNMENT OFFICE
Aug. 26	1920	<del>Was</del> Ordered <del>to become</del> a midshipman <sup>at</sup> of the	Naval Academy.
		Naval Academy.	
July 14	1923	<del>Was</del> Graduated from the Naval Academy	"
"	"	<del>Was</del> Ordered to become a naval cadet	Naval Ministry
"	"	<del>Was</del> Ordered <sup>to duty on</sup> to join the Iwate. <del>of the</del>	Naval Ministry
		<del>of the war ship Iwate.</del>	
Aug. 19	"	Left <sup>Departed</sup> <del>the port of</del> Jochuan <del>and went on a cruise</del>	
		along the north China coast <del>for</del> (guard)	
Sept. 3	"	Returned to Sasebo.	
April 12	1924	<del>Was</del> Transferred from the Iwate to the Mutsu (the First Fleet)	Naval Ministry
Oct. 20	"	<del>Was</del> Transferred from the Mutsu to the Nagato (the First Fleet)	Naval Ministry
Dec. 1	"	<del>Was</del> Appointed Ensign.	CABINET
"	"	<del>Was</del> ordered to be attached to the First	
		Destroyer Division.	NAVAL MINISTRY

Dec. 4	1924	<del>was</del> Ordered to <sup>Duty on</sup> join the Numakaze	1st Destroyer Division.
Dec. 27	"	<del>was</del> conferred <sup>with</sup> the Senior <sup>COURT RANK</sup> Grade of the Eighth Grade	Imp. Household Dept.
		<del>class of the Court Rank.</del>	
Dec. 1	1925	<del>was</del> Relieved of the current post and was ordered to become an officer trainee of the <del>normal</del> <sup>normal</sup> course of the Naval Gunnery School	Naval Ministry.
May 28	1926	<del>was</del> Ordered to become an officer trainee of the <del>ordinary</del> <sup>normal</sup> course of the Naval Torpedo School	Naval Ministry
Dec. 1	1926	<del>was</del> Ordered to <sup>Duty on</sup> join the Ume	Naval Ministry
"	"	Promoted to <del>was</del> appointed Sub-Lieutenant, (Jag) class	CABINET
Dec. 28	"	<del>was</del> conferred <sup>with</sup> the Junior <sup>COURT RANK, Seventh Grade</sup> Grade of the Seventh	Imp. Household Dept.
		<del>class of the Court Rank</del>	
July 29	1927	<del>was</del> Relieved of the current post and was attached to the Kasumi-ga-ura Naval Air	Naval Ministry

		<del>Capt</del>	
Sept 1	1927	<del>was</del> Ordered to become a flight officer trainee of the Kasumi gaura Naval Air <sup>UNIT</sup> <del>Corps</del>	Naval Ministry
Dec. 1	"	<del>was</del> Granted the first <sup>58/204</sup> grade	Naval Ministry
May 29	1928	<del>was</del> Attached to the Yokosuka Naval Air <sup>UNIT</sup> <del>Corps</del>	Naval Ministry
Dec. 10	1928	<del>was</del> Promoted to Lieutenant	CABINET
March 15	1929	<del>was</del> Conferred with <sup>COURT RANK, SEVENTH</sup> promoted to the Senior Grade of the Seventh class of the Court Rank Grade	Imp. Household Dept.
Jan. 28	1929	Applied for marriage permission <del>and</del> <sup>Authorized</sup> got official license $\rightarrow$ 25th Feb. 1929	
Nov. 16	1928	<del>was</del> Conferred the Medal in Commemoration of the Imperial Enthronement in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 188 of 1928.	Bd. of Decorations

Sept 15	1929	was Attached to the Specially established Air <sup>UNIT</sup> Corps at Misuzu, during <sup>THE ORGANIZATION</sup> the time of air groups being organized for the small naval manœuvres <sup>FORCES</sup> for 1929	NAVAL MINISTRY
Nov. 30	"	was Entrusted with the <sup> duty</sup> business of the Standing Consultative Committee regarding problems on army, navy and air force, un- der the League of Nations	CABINET
"	"	<del>was</del> Ordered to Paris	Foreign Ministry
"	"	was Appointed Staff Officer of the Naval General Staff.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Jan. 2	1930	Left Tokyo Station, and Sailed from Misuzu <sup>ON</sup> <del>by</del> the Freshimi-maru on 4th of the same month.	

Feb. 28 1930 Was Ordered <sup>to</sup> ~~to follow~~ <sup>The entourage of</sup> the Imperial Naval Delegates at the Standing Consultative Committee dealing with problems on army, navy and air force, under the League of Nations. CABINET

" " Was Ordered to <sup>The entourage of</sup> ~~follow~~ the Imperial Air Force Delegates at the Standing Consultative Committee dealing with problems on army, navy ~~at~~ air force, under the League of Nations. CABINET

" " Was Ordered to <sup>The entourage of</sup> ~~follow~~ the Imperial Delegates at the Preliminary Committee for ~~Reduction of~~ <sup>Reductions</sup> Armaments under the League of Nations. CABINET

" " Was ordered to <sup>The entourage of</sup> ~~follow~~ the Imperial Delegates at the International Aero-nautic Committee. CABINET

Dec. 1 " Was granted the second <sup>sole</sup> ~~grade~~ grade. NAVAL MINISTRY

Nov. 2	1931	<del>was Relieved of the membership</del> <sup>from entourage</sup> of the Imperial
		Naval Delegation at the Standing Consultative
		Committee regarding problems on army, navy
		and air force, under the League of Nations.
		<del>was Relieved of the membership</del> <sup>from entourage</sup> of the Imperial
		Air Force at the Standing Consultative Com-
		mittee regarding problems on army, navy
		and air force, under the League of Nations.
		<del>was Relieved of the membership</del> <sup>from entourage</sup> of the Imperial
		Delegation at the Preliminary Committee
		for Reduction of Armaments, under the
		League of Nations.
		<del>was Relieved of the membership</del> <sup>from entourage</sup> of the Imperial

		delegation at the International Aero-nautic	
		Committee.	CABINET
Feb. 1	1932	was Appointed Division Commander of the	
		Omura Naval Air Group.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Feb. 23	"	was Concurrently appointed Inspector in	
		the Air Craft Section of the Hiro Navy Yard.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Sept. 12	"	was Ordered <del>to become</del> Division Commander	
		of the Second Air Group, during the time	
		ORGANIZATION OF of air groups being organized for the	
		small scaled naval manœuvre <sup>FORCES</sup> for 1932	NAVAL MINISTRY
Nov. 15	"	was Appointed Division Commander of the	
		Hosho, aircraft carrier, attached to the <sup>Combined</sup> <del>United</del>	
		Fleet.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Nov. 1	1933	was Ordered <del>to become</del> an officer trainee	



		<sup>A CLASS</sup> of the Ordinary Course of the Naval War	
		College.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Dec. 1	1933	was granted the first <sup>SOLDIER</sup> pay grade.	NAVAL MINISTRY
May 1	1934	was <del>promoted to</del> <sup>conferred with</sup> the junior <sup>COURT RANK</sup> grade of the Sixth	
		<sup>Grade</sup> <del>class of the Court Rank,</del>	Imp. Household Dept.
Aug. 1	"	was Ordered to become Umpire to the Naval	
		Grand Manoeuvre for 1933.	NAVAL MINISTRY
Nov. 15	"	was <del>appointed</del> <sup>Promoted to</sup> Lieutenant Commander.	CABINET
Dec. 20	"	was Ordered to <sup>CHINA</sup> make an official trip to	NAVAL MINISTRY
		<del>China.</del>	
July 10	1935	was Ordered to become Division Commander	
		of the First Air Group during the <sup>Organization</sup> <del>time</del> of	
		<del>air groups being organized for the Naval</del>	
		Grand Manoeuvre for 1935.	NAVAL MINISTRY

April 20	1934	<p>was Granted a sum of one hundred and forty yen in recognition of distinguished services rendered in the 1931-1934 Incident.</p>	<p>BOARD OF Decorations</p>
"	"	<p>Decorated with <del>was conferred</del> the War Medal in memory of the 1931-1934 Incident. (238,389)</p>	<p>BOARD OF Decorations</p>
Oct. 31	1935	<p>was Appointed Commander of the Air group on the Carrier Kaga, first reserve ship, attached to the Second Fleet.</p>	<p>NAVAL MINISTRY</p>
Nov. 2	"	<p>Decorated with the Imperial <del>was conferred</del> the <del>Sacred</del> Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th class</p>	<p>BOARD OF Decorations</p>
June 1	1936	<p>was Appointed Staff Officer of the Third Air Fleet. (Combined United Fleet)</p>	<p>NAVAL MINISTRY</p>
June 6	"	<p>was Assigned <sup>on</sup> the Kamoi.</p>	
Nov. 16	"	<p>was Appointed Instructor at <del>the</del> KASUMIGAIKA</p>	

		Air Group.	NAVAL ministry
March 13	1937	<del>was</del> Appointed Instructor <sup>at the Yokosuka</sup> in <del>the Kasuga</del> Naval	
		Air Group, <sup>concurrently instructor of the</sup> with additional post of Instructor	
		in the Naval Gunnery School, the Naval Tor-	
		pedo School, the Naval Navigation School	
		and in the Naval Communications School.	NAVAL ministry
May 1	"	<del>was</del> Concurrently appointed Instructor <sup>at</sup> in	
		the Kasumiya Iwa Naval Air Group.	NAVAL ministry
Dec. 1	"	<del>was</del> Appointed Staff Officer of the Fourth	
		Air Fleet.	NAVAL ministry
Dec. 5	"	<del>was</del> Assigned <sup>on</sup> to the Natoro, in the	
Jan. 31	1938	<del>was</del> Assigned <sup>on</sup> to the Kinukasa-maru, <sup>due</sup> because	
		<sup>to</sup> change of the flagship	4th AIR FLEET HQ B

Feb. 5	1938	was assigned <sup>ON</sup> to the Notoro, <sup>due to</sup> because of the	4 <sup>th</sup> Air Fleet Hq.
		change of the flagship.	
March 3	"	was assigned <sup>ON</sup> to the Kinukasa-maru, <sup>due to</sup> because	
		of the change of the flagship.	" "
March 14	"	was assigned <sup>ON</sup> to the Notoro, <sup>due to</sup> because of the	
		change of the flagship.	" "
April 29	"	was appointed Staff Officer of the Second	
		Combined United Air Group	NAVAL ministry
Nov. 15	"	was appointed Staff Officer of the Second	
		Fleet.	NAVAL ministry
Oct. 13	"	was decorated with the Imperial <del>was conferred the Fifth</del> Order of the Sacred	
		Treasure, 5 <sup>th</sup> CLASS	BOARD OF DECORATIONS
June 1	1939	was promoted with <sup>OFFICER</sup> to the Senior Grade of the	

		Sixth Class of the Court Rank Grade.	Imp. Use hold DEPT.
Nov. 1	1939	<del>was</del> Ordered to <del>serve</del> <sup>Duty with AT</sup> in the Naval General Staff and attached to the First Section of the 1st Division.	
Nov. 15	"	<del>was</del> Promoted to <sup>Commander</sup> Commander.	NAVAL MINISTRY CABINET
	"	<del>was</del> Appointed Member of the Naval General Staff <sup>concurrently</sup> with an additional post of a member of the Navy Technical Council.	NAVAL MINISTRY
	"	<del>was</del> Ordered to <del>become</del> Naval Staff Officer of the Imperial Headquarters.	NAVAL MINISTRY
	"	<del>was</del> Ordered to <del>become</del> <sup>a</sup> member of the Technical Council of the Naval Air Headquarters.	"
	"	<del>was</del> Ordered to <del>become</del> a member of the Technical Council of the Naval Technical	

		Department	NAVAL MINISTRY
"	"	was <sup>Ordered to duty with</sup> attached to the First <sup>SECTION</sup> and the Second	
		Section <sup>DIVISION</sup> concurrently of the First Department -	
		concurrently the 2nd SECTION of same	NAVAL GEN'L STAFF
		<sup>DIVISION</sup>	
"	"	was <sup>Ordered to duty with</sup> attached to the First <sup>SECTION</sup> of Imperial	Headquarters
		<sup>DIVISION OF NAVAL STAFF</sup> the First Section under the Imperial Head	navy section.
		<sup>→</sup> The operative dept.	
		quarters of Navy Department	
Dec. 22	1939	was <sup>ON</sup> Ordered to make an official trip to	
		China	NAVAL MINISTRY
Dec. 12	"	was <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>ordered</del> to become a member of the	
		Army and Navy <sup>JOINT</sup> Co-ordinated Operation	
		Research Board.	" "
"	"	was <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>ordered</del> to become a member of the	

		Third Sectional Committee for <sup>15</sup> <del>armament</del> Economization	NAVAL MINISTRY
		<del>of Armaments</del>	
"	"	was <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>ordered</del> to become a member of the	
		Fifth Sectional Committee for <sup>Armament</sup> Economization	" "
		<del>of Armaments</del>	
Jan. 23	1940	was Relieved of <del>the</del> membership of the Third	
		Sectional Committee for <sup>Armament</sup> Economization of	" "
		<del>Armaments</del>	
"	"	was Relieved of <del>the</del> membership of the Fifth	
		Sectional Committee for <sup>Armament</sup> Economization of	" "
		<del>Armaments</del>	
Jan. 20	"	was Relieved of the membership of the	
		Technical Council of the Naval Technical	

NAVAL  
MINISTRY

		Department.	
Jan. 23	"	<del>Was ordered to become nominator of re-</del> <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>ipients</del>	
		<del>ipients</del> <del>of the Imperial grant as fund</del>	
		for pursuing study.	" "
July 19	1940	<del>Was</del> <sup>ordered</sup> to China.	" "
Aug. 1	"	<del>Was ordered to act as umpire to the first</del> <sup>Appointed</sup>	
		<del>and the second</del> <sup>term</sup> manoeuvre (excluding	
		the first and second special manoeuvre)	
		of the special grand manoeuvre	
		for 1940.	" "
Sept. 10	1940	<del>Was ordered to act as umpire to the second</del> <sup>Appointed</sup>	
		<del>special manoeuvre of the second term of the</del>	
		<del>special grand manoeuvre</del>	" "



Nov. 21	1940	was Ordered to French Indo-China and	
<del>Nov. 21</del>			
		Blutch East Indies. ST/25	70104 MINISTRY
Jan. 25	1941	was Relieved of the <sup>DUTY</sup> <del>post</del> of nominator of	
		<sup>recipient</sup> <del>recipient</del> of the Imperial grant as fund	
		for pursuing study.	" "
"	"	was Ordered <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>to assume</del> the post of nomi-	
		nator of <sup>recipient</sup> <del>recipient</del> of the Imperial grant as	
		fund for pursuing study for 1941	" "
Feb. 2	"	was ordered to <sup>Appointed</sup> <del>act</del> as umpire to the first	
		term manoeuvre of the special grand ma-	
		noeuve for 1941	" "
May 9	"	<del>was</del> Ordered to China	" "
Nov. 13	"	was Ordered to French Indo-China	" "

Jan. 15 1942 ~~was~~ <sup>Appointed</sup> ~~to~~ become temporary nomina-  
 tor of <sup>recipients</sup> ~~recipients~~ of the Imperial grant  
 as fund for pursuing study for  
 1942.

NAVAL  
MINISTRY

April 29 1940 In recognition of the distinguished services  
 rendered in the Chinese Incident, was  
~~Decorated with~~ <sup>Decorated with</sup> ~~conferred~~ the Fourth Imperial military  
 Order of the Golden Kite <sup>4th class</sup> / the Small  
 Cordon of the Imperial Order of the  
 Rising Sun and a sum of four thousand  
 yen.

BOARD OF  
DECORATIONS

" " ~~was~~ <sup>Decorated with</sup> ~~conferred~~ the War Medal <sup>1st class</sup> of the Chinese  
 Incident of the China Incident

BOARD OF  
DECORATIONS

April 21 1942	<del>was</del> Ordered to <sup>the</sup> Philippines, French Indo-China, Thai, Malay <sup>Peninsula,</sup> and Dutch East Indies.	Naval ministry
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Oct. 10	<del>was</del> <sup>Assigned</sup> concurrently <sup>duty with</sup> attached to the Twelfth Section of the First Department (the Naval General Staff)	naval general staff
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"	<del>was</del> <sup>Assigned</sup> concurrently <sup>duty with</sup> attached to the Twelfth Section of the First Section of the Imperial Headquarters Navy Department	Imperial Headquarters Navy Section
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Dec. 24	<del>was</del> Attached to the Headquarters of the South-Eastern Area Fleet	navy ministry
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"	<del>was</del> Relieved of <del>the</del> <sup>post</sup> of naval staff officer in the Imperial Headquarters	"
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Jan. 4 1943	<del>was</del> Appointed Staff Officer of the South-Eastern Area Fleet <sup>concurrently</sup> and at the same time	"
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Staff Officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet.

NAVY  
MINISTRY

Dec. 21 1942 Was <sup>Appointed</sup> ~~ordered to become~~ a member of the ~~Se-~~ " "

SECOND

~~and~~ Sectional Committee of the Defensive

Preparations Investigation <sup>& Research</sup> Committee " "

" " Was <sup>Appointed a</sup> ~~ordered to become~~ member of the Third " "

Sectional Committee of the Defensive

Preparations Investigation <sup>& Research</sup> Committee

Sept. 9 1943 ~~Was~~ Attached to the Yokosuka Naval " "

Station

Oct. 1 " "

Oct. 1 " Was ~~Appointed~~ Commander of the 732 Cabinet

naval air group.

Dec. 1 " Was ~~Concurrently~~ appointed Assistant navy

Chief of the 732 naval air group. ministry

May 1	1944	Was Promoted To Captain.	CABINET
Nov. 10	1940	Was Conferred <del>a</del> Medal in Commemoration of the Two Thousand and Six Hundredth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Empire in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 488 of 1940.	BOARD of allocations
July 10	1944	Was Appointed Assistant Chief <sup>of the</sup> <del>and of the</del> <del>some time Head Instructor of the</del> Yokosuka Naval Air Group and member of the Naval Technical Council	naval ministry
"	"	Was Appointed member of the Naval Technical Department.	"
"	"	Was Appointed member of the Naval Technical Department,	"

June 15	"	Was <sup>Conferred with</sup> <del>promoted</del> to the junior <sup>COURT RANK</sup> Grade of the Fifth <sup>Grade.</sup> Class of the Court Rank.	Imperial Household Department
July 23	"	Left <sup>UNIT / T.N. Pasig</sup> <del>for</del> 32 Naval Air Group.	23 <sup>rd</sup> AIR FLIGHT
Oct. 19	"	Was <sup>the</sup> Ordered to Philippines	Naval Ministry
July 7	1945	Assigned duty with <del>was</del> attached to the Naval General Staff.	Naval Ministry
"	"	Was Ordered <del>to be</del> on duty <del>s</del> under the command of Vice Admiral KUSAKA.	Naval general Staff
Aug. 25	"	Was Ordered <del>to be</del> on duty <del>s</del> under the command of Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff.	"
July 15	"	Was Concurrently appointed member of the Naval General Staff and <sup>naval</sup> Staff	"

		Officer in the Imperial Headquarters.	
July 25	1945	<del>was</del> Concurrently appointed attached to the Headquarters of the Navy Combined Air Group for <sup>Training</sup> <del>Education</del> .	Naval Ministry
Sept. 15	"	Was Relieved of <del>con-</del> current <del>addi-</del> tional posts and <del>was</del> <sup>concurrently assigned</sup> <del>attached</del> additionally <sup>To duty with</sup> the Navy Ministry.	"
"	"	was Ordered to <del>duty with</del> <sup>duty with</sup> The Bureau <del>navy minister</del> of Naval Affairs Bureau.	"
Aug. 28	1945	Was Appointed member of the Kanoya Liaison <sup>Committee</sup> Office.	Naval Ministry
June. 13	1944	Decorated with <sup>Imperial</sup> <del>the</del> Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3 <sup>rd</sup> Class	Imperial Household Department

Nov. 30	1945	was Placed on the <del>retired</del> <sup>Reserve</sup> list	Naval ministry
"	"	was <del>appointed</del> <sup>Called for General Mobilization</sup> <del>for filling up</del> <del>personnel.</del>	"
Sept. 13	"	was Relieved of <del>the</del> <sup>with</sup> membership of the Kanoya Liaison <del>Office</del> <sup>Committee</sup>	"
Dec. 1	"	was Appointed Demobilization Officer Equivalents (Third Rank of the Higher Civil Service) of the Second Demobilization Bureau in accordance with <del>the</del> <sup>No. 686 of the</sup> Ministry of Imperial Ordinances <del>No. 686</del> <sup>No. 686</sup>	
"	"	was <del>attached</del> <sup>Appointed member</sup> <del>to</del> <sup>Temporary</sup> the Investigation section of the Second Demobilization minister's Secretariate.	Second Demobilization ministry
Feb. 15	1946	was released <sup>Discharged from Service</sup> <del>from the active service</del>	"



## NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

August 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
 Naval Relations  
 MIYO - Direct

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## DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MIYO, TATSUKICHI.

26908 \* The witness identified exhibit No. 3020 as his affidavit,  
 and after making certain corrections verified it. The affidavit stated  
 26910 \* that from November 1939 to December 1942, the witness was in the  
 Operations Section, Navy General Staff, in charge of affairs relating  
 to aerial operation, and he learned the following information about the  
 advance of Japanese forces to South FIC.

At the time he took office, it was the consistent policy of  
 the Navy and the nation to try to affect the speediest possible settlement  
 of the China Affair. Japan's deadlocked land operations in China required  
 enforcement of an economic blockade as an important factor in solving the  
 Incident.

26911 The advance to South FIC was prompted by economic and political  
 necessity. To those concerned with military operations, the most  
 \* imperative reason was to avert a collapse of Japan's national defense  
 and to bring the China Affair to an early end by an over-all economic  
 blockade.

In June, 1941, the First Department Chief of the Staff, while  
 ordering them to prepare for the proposed move, told them the reason  
 why the step was inevitable. He stated that Anglo-American aid to Chiang  
 Kai-shek in southwest China was growing. The U. S., Britain, China, and  
 Holland had formed the so-called A B C D Line, and were pushing on with  
 steady war preparations and hardening economic pressure. The failure of  
 the NEI negotiations was one of the outstanding cases.

26912 \* He further stated that this evil influence was now reaching  
 FIC and Thailand, and that there were signs that DeGaullist and other  
 Anti-Japanese elements in FIC, together with the British, were inducing  
 all FIC to go over to the U. S.-British camp. This might become another  
 Syria, and it was ten to one that Thailand would be won over to that  
 group, in view of her domestic and foreign relations. If this happens  
 the A B C D front would be invincibly fortified, completely isolating  
 Japan and shattering the blockade of China. If this happened, with  
 Japan excluded from U. S. and British trade and the negotiations having  
 failed, Japan would suffer an economic collapse and be forced to fall  
 on her knees before this pressure, to say nothing of settling the China  
 Affair.

26913 \* If the British and others move into FIC, the DeGaullist and  
 other anti-Japanese would likely work together and provoke Japanese  
 forces in North FIC to a clash which would lead to serious consequences.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
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DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
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To prevent this, the only possible, although not desirable way, is to get ahead of the other powers by sending troops to South FIC. There is no alternative. France will surely welcome the idea of defending her possession in East Asia jointly with Japan, to prevent it from becoming a second Syria.

26914

When the witness took office, he found that the Navy was on guard against Japan being involved in World War II. It was consistently opposed to the German-Italian Alliance, \* lest it would cause friction with the U. S. and Britain and imply danger of being embroiled in war. After the conclusion of the pact, the Navy took special care so it would not unnecessarily impose fighting obligations. It refrained from referring to any idea of joint military operations with Germany and Italy, for it dreaded that if it talked about such a possible agreement with Germany and Italy would take the Navy to be disposed to join in the war, and would try to compel them to fight Germany's battle.

26915

This precautionous attitude was kept up to the time immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Before the opening of the war, there was no joint operational agreement between Germany, Japan, and Italy. \* When the military move to south FIC was launched, the responsible staff officers had no mention for war in the Pacific, or any plans or operations prepared for it. It can thus be seen that the Japanese advance was not a preliminary step for the Pacific War.

When the witness first made arrangements for the advance, he was annoyed to find there was no adequate military information about the place. There was no data about the airfield other than that collected by civilian interests, and it was from such data that he got general ideas. The subsequent fact-finding survey on the spot revealed numerous errors.

26916

Immediately before the advance to South FIC, U. S., Britain, and Holland, almost simultaneously, \* cut off economic relations and banned oil exports. Japan tried to ease the situation, but there was no prospect of success. Things went from bad to worse. The outcome was the September 6 decision of national policy.

Following this decision, his Section Chief ordered that the government had decided to prepare for war that might break out any moment with the A B C D front, and that the operation officers should without delay begin study to formulate plans of campaign. This appeared a sheer absurdity to the witness, to try to fight against the four powers when the single China Affair was too much. He told his Section Chief that with the poorly equipped air force they could not wage war on the four powers with confidence of success.

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26917 His chief stated it was not a question of going to war because they were sure of success or staying out of it because they were not.  
\* They had to be ready for any eventuality for the sake of self-defense. They were not prepared for a war of their choice.

Following this warning, they prepared military operational plans for a self-defensive war, assuming it might occur. About the beginning of September, a month after occupation of South FIC, they began to formulate plans with a view to a possibility of conflict with the four powers, which ultimately developed into the Pacific War.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOCHI,  
Counsel for OSHIMA.

26919 \* Asked whether he was connected with drafting operations plans of the Navy General Staff, the witness said he was principally in charge of air operations, but in modern warfare there were hardly any operations that did not include air operations, and he was therefore associated with all operations of every type.

26920 \* He stated that between January and May, 1941, the Operations Section of the Navy Staff did not draft plans for soon carrying out attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, and was not making preparations for them.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS-CARR.

26921 The attention of the Tribunal was called to exhibits 527 and 528, 552, 576, 536, 537, and 809. \* The witness stated that it was not until after the Imperial Conference of December 6 that plans for preparations were made against the U. S., Britain, and the NEI.

26922 \* He had no clear recollection that in January, 1941, there was an aerial reconnaissance and map prepared of the coast of northeast Malaya, including Kotabharu. His recollection was a very faint one, about some aerial reconnaissance having been conducted, but he did not recollect any map being made. In the past, the Navy had no operation plans for defense against Britain, and for that reason data for such operations were extremely incomplete. Peacetime defense plans against Britain were studied from about November 1940, as part of an over-all defense plan. \* Asked whether he called invasion of a distant country a defensive plan, he stated that if the British establish a super naval base close to Japan and come into Japanese home waters and that if Japan's line of communications with the south were cut off, that would be a very serious question.

26923

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Asked whether it was a coincidence that the place of reconnaissance was the precise spot of invasion on December 8, 1941, he stated that there were not many appropriate points for landing operations, and if an aerial reconnaissance was conducted over the east coast of Malaya then there would be in that place an appropriate place for landing.

26924

\* He did not mean to state that they had the reconnaissance because they thought it an appropriate place for landing. The purpose of the reconnaissance was to find out if there were any appropriate places, and it so happened that in the particular area over which the reconnaissance was conducted an appropriate landing place was found, and that could occur as a natural matter. He did not know whether after the reconnaissance, the hydrographic office set to work to make a complete map that was completed in July 1941, because he was not connected with such matters.

26925

Asked whether if the results did not come to him in the Staff and thus enable him to issue a detailed map in October, 1941, he stated that they in their operational studies would ask for necessary data from the Third Division, Naval General Staff, handling intelligence. \* Any such demand or order might have been issued, but he did not know how the Third Division placed its orders or requests.

26926

He stated that with respect to naval personnel in the invasion of the Philippines, the personnel did not come from Manchuria. He did not know whether the navy convoyed the troops from Manchuria, because he was not in direct association with the matter. He did not know the training for the operation took place in Manchuria since July 27, 1941.

26927

\* He stated his recollection was very faint with regard to the war games in July and August, 1941. He stated he knew nothing about them. He had not participated in the War Games at Saiki and Kagoshima. He stated that war games were not held in the Naval War College after transfer from Tokyo. During the month of August, chart maneuvers were conducted at the Naval War College, and the witness did participate in those games.

\* Asked whether these included a complete rehearsal of the Pearl Harbor Operation, he stated whether it could be called complete would be difficult to say, but a private draft plan of such operations was incorporated. He denied that the maneuvers took place in August and the final stage began on September 2. It was conducted in the middle of September. It was attended by umpires from the Staff and Navy Ministry. He thought the commander of the games was the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet. He had no recollection that one team was called the "N" team. He had the feeling that it might have been called the "Blue".

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26928

\* Generally, he thought there was another team supposed to represent the British Commonwealth. He did not know who commanded this force. He thought there was a third team representing the U. S. He stated he did not believe there was any elaborate plans in the games for the invasion, with carefully worked out schedules, for occupying Malaya, Burma, NEI, Philippines, Solomons, the Central Pacific Islands and Hawaii. The purpose was generally to study fleet movements. There was nothing included in them about landing operations or ground fighting.

The fleet does play an important part in landing operations. It was difficult to umpire anything pertaining to ground fighting. Landing operations is considered to be unnecessary in the study. They were only concerned with operations at the time up to the point of landing operations and where they would take place. After that the navy officers were not familiar with the matter, and they did not consider it necessary to go into details. He did not recollect ever stating that they went into detail on the naval part of the operations. At that time the witness was one of the umpires for aerial operations, and there were two or three besides himself. He definitely umpired the Pearl Harbor Operations. He was asked to umpire certain phases of other operations, \* but did not remember ever serving as umpire for over-all operations.

26930

He thought he was connected with the Philippine Area Operation. He did not know how long before the games the preparations had been going on. He did not think it was for a long time. The plans for the games were drawn up by the Combined Fleet, and he was unable to give a clear answer. He had no particular basis for making his statement that the Tokyo games began in the middle of September instead of the 2nd of September. He spoke only from memory.

26931

\* He denied that in the middle of September the staff officers went to Iwakuni to report results to the army staff. It is a fact that they went to Iwakuni, but they did not report results of the games. They met the army staff officers, but he had no recollection who headed them. The Pearl Harbor Operations were not discussed at that time.

26932

He decided to make a correction by stating that they met at Iwakuni on November 15, \* and not in the middle of September.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLEWETT.

26933

\* The witness stated he acted as umpire in the naval maneuvers after September 6.

26,705  
26,710

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo. He identified Exhibit 3007 as his affidavit and verified it. \* The affidavit stated that the witness was a former captain in the Navy and served in the operations section of the General Staff from November 1, 1939 to December 27, 1942 as a commander. He was in charge of air operations and helped plan the Pearl Harbor operations and others in the Pacific. His assignment involved coordination between the General Staff and Combined Fleet. The Pearl Harbor attack was decided only a short time before war.

26,714

Around May 1941, Headquarters Combined Fleet submitted to the General Staff a plan of operations in case they were drawn into war with the United States, based on the assumption that the United States fleet would be at Hawaii and that Japan could deal an initial blow through air raids by carrier-borne planes. This was a radical departure from the naval defense plans of the Navy General Staff. It was viewed with great skepticism. It appeared definitely impractical because Japan's air strength was not adequate and it would be difficult to maintain the degree of secrecy needed. Also, the United States fleet might not be in Pearl Harbor and it was difficult to secure proper intelligence. Both the Army and the Navy were in complete accord that the Chinese war must be brought to a speedy end and all other matters involving national policy in the south and elsewhere should be left to diplomacy for solution. The Navy felt strongly that a United States war could be averted. The Staff therefore considered the Pearl Harbor attack rather fanciful \* and did not take it seriously. In view of this, the Combined Fleet did not press the subject.

In July 1941 the United States, Britain and Holland took severe economic steps with the result that oil supplies were cut off. Japan also knew of the preparations by these three against Japan and it was felt that Japan was steadily being encircled. The Navy, having the primary duty of defense in the Pacific faced a situation which could not be ignored.

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In September, the witness and his colleagues received orders from their superiors to begin preparing to formulate potential plans of operations against the United States, Britain and Holland. In the early part of September the Combined Fleet resubmitted an opinion to the General Staff that an air attack was a requisite operation in case of war. The plan was scheduled to be studied at a chart maneuver of the Navy in the middle of September. The Staff agreed that if the results of the maneuvers were successful the Hawaii operation would be considered and studied.

After the maneuvers opinions were exchanged between the Staff, the Combined Fleet and the First Air Force Fleet as to whether the plan was plausible. There was recognition of serious technical difficulties. The First Air Force opposed it, having to take the most active role, and the General Staff was opposed. It was decided to make further studies.

26,715

Headquarters First Air Fleet later reversed its former position and in the latter part of September 1941 Captain KUROSHIMA of the Combined Fleet reported to the Naval Staff the strong opinion of the commander of the Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO, in favor of the plan. His opinion was that the attack against Pearl Harbor was the only hope of successful naval operations. It was pointed out by the General Staff that in the event of war Japan would have to secure the main southern regions, such as the Philippines, NEI and Malaya at an early date for self-existence and self-protection. In view of the steadily increasing preparedness of the United States, Britain and Holland, Japan's attempt to secure the south would be difficult, even if her whole air strength was used.

26,716

If they considered that the air power would have to be divided if the Hawaii operation was to take place, there was a very difficult situation. Since a large portion of the fleet would be involved at Hawaii, a blunder would be disastrous. It was suggested that the unprotected Mandated Islands be defended with what available force there was, based on a plan that if the United States attacked in the midst of southern operations, the Southern Region Operation forces could be diverted to meet it. The most advantageous use of forces would be to concentrate the main strength in the southern regions in the beginning and smash the bulk of enemy strength as quickly as possible. They would therefore shift the greatest part of their strength to prepare a counter-attack against the United States fleet.

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26,717

However, the Combined Fleet maintained that since the Mandated Islands were unprotected, even if the Southern Forces were diverted \* it might be unavailing and the islands easily occupied. The Mandated areas would then be occupied one after another and the lines of communication with the southern regions severed. It was deemed vital to stop the United States fleet before it began operations against Japan.

The Hawaii plan was so strongly advanced by YAMAMOTO that he threatened to resign if it was not accepted. The Staff was therefore compelled to give tentative consent to a complete study.

26,718

With respect to the aircraft carrier forces taking part at Pearl Harbor, on September 25th the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU and the ZUIKAKU made up the Fifth Air Force Squadron, which was assigned to the First Air Force Fleet. The First Air Force Fleet had four squadrons \* the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th, composed of 8 carriers. The carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were small ships of low speed and short radius of action and could carry only a small number of old type planes and were unfit for the Hawaii Operation, which taxed the cruising capacity of the new carriers.

The personnel and airplanes on each of the carriers were less than the prescribed number for war-time operations. The Combined Fleet requested that the air personnel of the 4th squadron be diverted to fill vacancies in the 1st and 2nd squadron, and they requested that aviators trained in aircraft carrier experience be supplied from the Flying Corps to the 5th squadron and requested an increase of planes to war-time standards.

To provide trained personnel it was necessary to use Naval Air Corps instructors, which created an additional problem since they lacked sufficient instructors to meet the demand of training badly needed new pilots. However, on the insistence of YAMAMOTO the request could not be denied although the Staff was reluctant in complying since it affected the training plan.

The air crew members so mobilized were assembled in the middle of October with only one month for warming up before the date of departure for Hawaii in the middle of November. The hurried training restricted the personnel to daylight attack technique and daylight landing and taking off practice. For



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this reason the units conducting the attack had to avoid night operations and take off after daybreak.

26720

The question of extending carrier radius was important. Due to Japanese naval policy warships were so constructed that their cruising ranges were limited to home waters and were shorter than those of the United States. Three of the carriers taking part in the Hawaii operation did not have sufficient radius. During the winter there was a strong northeasterly monsoon over the northern Pacific with rough sea. There was a serious problem of refueling under such conditions. It was decided to carry fuel in the double bottom of each vessel and load fuel drums in every available space. With these loadings they felt that the fleet could operate so as to return \* to the 160 degree east longitude, even if refueling on the way was impossible.

26721

There was a problem in the use of aerial torpedoes. Previously, to attain dead accuracy with aircraft borne torpedoes one needed to open fire at close range and make sure that the torpedoes did not pass under the target. To answer these technical requirements research studies were started in 1939 relative to use of aerial torpedoes against ships at sea. Satisfactory results were not obtained until they discovered that the torpedo could be kept from submerging too deeply by attaching a special balancing instrument in September 1941.

26722

These studies were not made for the purpose of attacking Pearl Harbor. The shallow waters of that area introduced the problem involving the use of the torpedo in an even more shallow water approach than had been studied. Hurried experiments were begun early in October. The work of remodeling torpedoes \* and re-equipping them was not completed before the carriers left to rendezvous at Hitokappu-wan.

The Navy, with the hope of restoring peace as soon as possible was trying for a speedy settlement of the China Incident and the 11th Air Force Fleet had been diverted for operations in China, but in early September it was recalled to Japan to practice preparation training to cope with new problems. Its task in China had been mainly bombing land targets and aerial combat, and to prepare for naval operations the personnel had to be trained anew in bombing mobile vessels, torpedo attacks, and other things. This required considerable time and even highly experienced flyers had to endure long hours of rigid training.

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26,724

It took a whole month for the ground crew with all basic equipment to withdraw from China. And it took another whole month for preparation to proceed to new bases where they were to await orders for the next operation. Their period of training was limited to one month or so. Various problems arose. According to the original plan the fighter planes in the Philippine operations were to take off from carriers due to their short cruising range. However, there was not sufficient time to practice take-off and landing from carriers. Special study and training was introduced to lessen the rate of fuel consumption of these planes and the Fleet Headquarters modified the plan so that the fighter planes would load as much fuel as possible and operate directly from Formosa. In case of forced landings due to lack of fuel \* rescue would be made by the fleet.

26,725

Since they were to leave Formosa before dawn they had to practice night flying. The Air Fleet therefore had to suspend training of its less experienced flyers and concentrate all efforts on training experienced flyers. As a result the inexperienced members did not fly until the operations in the south reached a definite stage while the experienced flyers were almost exhausted in the continuous operations.

The Navy was unprepared for war as was seen from the fact that the air base construction corps was not organized until November. The Navy Ministry did not consent to the draft and organization of this corps until too late to properly train them and the corps boarded ships with practically no training just before the war broke. They lacked necessary machinery and other equipment for hurried construction of air bases.

26,726

Imperial Headquarters Naval Directive No. 5 was issued on November 21, 1941. The directive was destroyed by fire but he had reconstructed it from memory. It ordered that the commander of the Combined Fleet should immediately recall all operating forces and return home if the negotiations reached an agreement. When YAMAMOTO visited Tokyo on December 2, 1941 the Deputy Chief of Staff told him that NAGANO verbally instructed YAMAMOTO that if the United States negotiations became certain of being amicably settled before the opening of hostilities, all forces would be recalled from deployment home.

Combined Fleet Order No. 1 also stated that in the event there was a great change in the situation Preparedness Status Number 2 might be retracted to Status Number 1. The great

Page

26,727 change in situation referred to the negotiations. \* By going back to Status Number 1 meant retirement of fleet forces to a set position from the operational theater of opening hostilities to waiting positions as shown in Order Number 1. The naval forces were so arranged that in the event of an amicable settlement they could return to Status Number 1. The task force would retire to the position of the evening of December 3 at 42° north latitude and 170° west longitude. Status Number 2 took effect when the task force moved to Hawaiian waters after December 3.

The Combined Fleet Order of November 22 stipulated that the task force would operate so that immediate recall would be possible if negotiations reached a settlement.

Task Force Group Order No. 1 of November 23 stated that operations might be suspended in the middle and the group returned to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido, or Mutsu Bay.

26,728 After the task force left Japan weather forecasts and other information was sent to them by the General Staff. The \* witness drafted this information. On the evening of the 6th Operations Section Chief Captain TOMIOKA told the witness that since the task force group might be under strain it would be better to advise them that there was no prospect of the negotiations reaching a settlement and the witness added a sentence to the telegram he was then drafting to that effect. He later learned from Admiral KUSAKA, Chief of Staff of the task force, that they were worried about receiving the message too late to be effective and because of the distance involved were alarmed that they might not receive it at all.

26,729 The submarines in the operation were ordered to refrain from attack until they knew the aerial offensive had been launched. They were afraid that the submerged submarines would miss reception of a telegram \* ordering cessation because of last minute successful negotiations.

They did not expect that the operation would be entirely undetected but anticipated the possibility of detection about 30 or 40 minutes before attack. The submarines were to reach water near Hawaii one day before the attack to observe. It was thought they might be discovered prior to the air attack. He did learn that one midget submarine was discovered and sunk one hour before

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26,730

operations started. They judged that radar was installed to about 90% in Hawaii and that the air forces would be detected at least 30 to 40 minutes before arrival. There were also scouting sea planes scheduled to operate approximately 30 minutes ahead of the attacking units. If they were caught by radar they thought it possible that detection would be made more than an hour before opening attack. If detected visually the attacking attempt would be discovered at least 30 minutes before. \* It was their firm conviction that all the necessary diplomatic steps would be taken and that the United States before hostilities began would know that a state of war existed.

There was no cross-examination of this witness.

*Order mentioned but not in detail*

Def. Doc. No. 2097

Exh. No.

*Reasons assigned by 1st Dept Chief of Naval Gen Staff why*  
*Japan must occupy French Indo-China - p. 2-3*

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: MIYO, Tatsukichi

Residence: No. 36, Taira-machi,  
Meguro-Ku, Tokyo-to

Born: January 12, 1902

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was formerly a navy captain.

During the period from November 1939 to December 1942, I served as a commander in the Operations Section of the Navy General Staff in the capacity of a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters, taking charge of affairs relative to aerial operations.

The following is what I was enabled to learn, at that time by virtue of my official position, concerning the advance of Japanese forces to South French Indo-China, which took place while I was on duty in the Navy General Staff.

1. At the time of my assumption of office in the Navy General Staff, it was a consistent policy pursued not only by the Navy, but by the entire nation, to try and effect a speediest possible settlement of the China affair.

Now, Japan's deadlocked land operations in China had created such a situation as requiring the enforcement of economic blockade against China as an all-important factor in the solution of the Incident.

Our advance to South French Indo-China was prompted by various economic and political necessities, but what we, as parties directly concerned in military operations,

felt most imperative of all reasons for this action was the necessity to avert a collapse of our national defense for one thing, and, for another, to bring the China affair to an early conclusion by means of an over-all economic blockade of our hostile neighbor.

It was about the beginning of July, 1941, if I remember right, that the First Department Chief of the Navy General Staff, while ordering us operation officers to make preparations for the proposed move to French Indo-China, initiated us into the reason briefly in the following terms why such a step was inevitable.

(17) Much to the obstruction to our intended conclusion of the China affair, the Anglo-American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime through the southwestern part of China is growing increasingly vigorous. Worse still, the United States, Britain, China and the Netherlands are acting in concert, forming against our country the so-call "A B C D Line". They are pushing on with their steady war-preparations and at the same time hardening their economic pressure upon us. Here, in illustration of this fact, we may take the failure of the Japan-Dutch-India negotiations as one of the most outstanding cases.

"What is more, their evil influence is now reaching for French Indo-China and Thailand; and in fact, there are indications that the de Gaullist Partisans and other anti-Japanese elements in French Indo-China are, in collusion with the Britishers, inducing all French Indo-China to go over to the Anglo-American camp. There is indeed an unmistakable possibility of its becoming another Syria. If so, it is ten to one that Thailand will allow herself to be won over to the Anglo-American group in view of her prevailing domestic and foreign relations.

Should such a situation be created, the ABCD front would be invincibly fortified, forcing Japan to be completely isolated and shattering our project of blockading China whereby early to settle the Incident. Suppose we had our economic relations with Thailand and French Indo-China broken off, what would be the result? Excluded from Anglo-American trade as we actually are and with the economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies ending in failure, Japan would now suffer an economic collapse and be forced to fall on her knees before the joint ABCD pressure, to speak nothing of a successful settlement of the China affair.

"Suppose that British and some other allied forces made a move into French Indo-China, it would be very probable that the de Gaullist elements and other anti-Japanese groups, would work together with these occupation troops, and provoke our forces stationed in North French Indo-China to a clash with them, which would ultimately lead to serious consequences.

"If we wish to prevent such an unhappy event to occur, the only possible way for us, though not a desirable one, is to get ahead of other powers by ourselves dispatching troops to South French Indo-China. There is no alternative.

"Speaking from the French standpoint, she will surely welcome the idea of defending her possession in East Asia conjointly with Japan, with a view to preventing it from becoming a second Syria."

2. Relative to the advance of Japanese troops to South French Indo-China, I will mention two facts.

(1) When I took office in the Navy General Staff, I found that the Navy had already been on its guard against Japan being involved in World War II.

The Navy had been consistently opposed to our country entering into an alliance with Germany and Italy, for fear that such a move on our part would cause increasing friction with the United States and Britain, and, moreover, would imply a danger for our country being embroiled in war.

Our Navy, after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, took special caution so that the Pact might not unnecessarily impose fighting obligations on Japan. It absolutely refrained from referring to any idea of concerted military operations with Germany and Italy or similar courses of action; for we were in dread that if we should unwittingly talk about such as any possible agreement among the three nations for joint military operations. Germany and Italy would at once take the Japanese Navy to be disposed to join in the war, and would even try to compell us under the terms of the Pact to fight their battles.

Such was the precaution that was adopted by the Japanese Navy at the time of Japan's occupation of South French Indo-China, and this precautions attitude on the part of our Navy was kept up to the time

*Navy and  
Tripartite  
Pact*

immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War. It is obvious from this fact that before the opening of the Pacific War there had been no joint operation agreement existing among Japan, Germany, and Italy.

(2) When the Japanese military move to South French Indo-China was launched, we staff officers who were responsible for the formulation of war plans had no mention whatsoever for war in the Pacific area, nor had we any plans or preparations under such intention. It may clearly be seen from this that the Japanese advance to South French Indo-China was no preliminary step that had been taken in readiness for the Pacific War.

When I first came to make arrangements for the advance to South French Indo-China of our troops, I was much annoyed to find that there was no adequate military information available concerning the place. For instance, when I wanted to know about it, I found there was no data to work upon other than those materials collected by civilian interests, and it was from these meager materials that I managed somehow to get general ideas. The fact-finding survey that was conducted on the spot after our entry into the region revealed numerous errors in our previous calculation.



Immediately before the advance of our troops to South French Indo-China the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands almost simultaneously cut off economic relations with us and placed a ban on their oil exports to Japan. Japan, thus taken by surprise, endeavored to get the strained situation eased in any way, but there was no prospect of her efforts meeting with success; on the contrary things continued to go from bad to worse, with dark clouds hovering overhead. The outcome of all this was the September 6 decision of our National policy.

Immediately following the above decision came orders from our Section Chief in which he said that the Government had decided to make preparations for war that might break out any moment at the A B C D front, and that we operations officers should begin without delay to study and formulate plans of campaign in line with the government policy. To me, as one of the officers in charge of military operations, it appeared, a sheer absurdity to try to fight against the four Powers when we were finding the single China affair too much for us. So I said to the Section Chief; "With our air force so poorly equipped, we can't expect to wage war on the four Powers with confidence of success." Thereupon the chief said admonishingly: "It is not the question of our going into war because we are sure of success, or staying out of it because we are not sure of it. We are simply forced to be ready for any eventuality of war for the sake of self-defense. It is not for a war of our choice that we now stage preparations!"

Faithfully following this admonition of our Section Chief's, we now set to work on the preparation of military operational plans for a self-defensive war in assumption that such might occur and it was with this intention that we pushed on with our undertakings. It was about the beginning of September, that is more than a month after the Japanese military occupation of South French Indo-China that we started to formulate plans with a view to the possibility of a conflict with the four powers which ultimately developed into the Pacific War.

On this 15th day of August, 1947.  
At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ MIYO, TATSUKICHI

I, YASUDA, SHIGEO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo

Witness: /S/ YASUDA, SHIGEO.

Def. Doc. # 2097

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth  
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ MIYO, TATSUKICHI

12 July 1940: Joint Conference of War, Navy + Foreign Ministry  
re: plan for intensifying Japan-German coalition  
[Ex 527, p. 6190]

16 July 1940: Conference, unifying the opinions of Army, Navy +  
Foreign Ministry  
[Ex 528, p. 6213]

20 July 1940: Kurogane, building his Cabinet, first laid down  
fundamentals of future foreign policy in discussion  
with Matsuoaka (FM), Tojo (WM), <sup>and</sup> Yoshida (Navy).  
[Ex 536, p. 6262]  
their foreign policy being rapprochement with  
Germany)  
[Ex 537, p. 6263]

Sep 4, 1940 } Five Ministers Conference and  
Sep 19, 1940 } Liaison Conference (Navy Minister participating)  
Containing the plans for the negotiations leading  
to the Tripartite Pact

Sep 26, 1940: Investing Committee, Navy Council, re Tripartite  
Pact:  
Oikawa (Navy Minister) states, preparations of ships  
for battle has been completed. War materials all lost for

quite a while.

[Ex 552, p. 6354]

and, if the war is protracted for 5 or 10 years, the frequency of battles will drop and steps would be taken to adjust consumption over an extended period.

[Ex 552, p. 6366]

He felt no concern over the manpower problem in a war against U.S.

[Ex 552, p. 6367]

If the U.S. challenges to a short war, he had full confidence of Jap. victory.

[Ex 552, p. 6376]

March 25, 1941: His reports to Ribbentrop that according to the Jap. Chief of Navy General Staff the Navy is preparing for an attack on Singapore and will be finished before the end of May.

[Ex 576, p. 6478]

End of Nov. 1941: Jap. Navy approached Wennecker whether Germany would assist Japan in case of war against U.S.:

(?)

(Not in evidence - (Kretschmer statement))

Ambassador OTT

576

R 6476

Note on situation of Japan

for Reich Foreign Minister.

According to inquiries with the Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral KONDO, the Navy is vigorously preparing for an attack on Singapore. Preparations were expected to be concluded by the end of May. He expressed misgivings re:

- a) American guerrilla warfare by means of submarines and aircraft from the Philippine Archipelago against the long route for raw materials from Netherland East Indies and the Malay States to Japan;
- b) The threat of two-fleet warfare, should British fleet be able to transfer from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

According to inquiries with Chief of the General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, the Army was also making preparations for an attack. Conclusion presumably also end of May.

Condition for accomplishment of this is a free rear towards Russia. /Rueckenfreiheit/

Ambassador SHIRATORI stressed also the necessity to tie up the English fleet.

Summarizing: The will to attack is present in the Army and Navy, preparations for attack are in progress, accomplishment possible if the Army's and Navy's objections could be eliminated. Military prospects favorable. Type of attack was not by a naval attack from the sea, but by creation of a base on shore, from where the air forces could smoke out /ausraeuchern/ Singapore. In this way a first, quick result can be achieved. Then the time needed for the actual capture of the fortress would play a minor part. The effectiveness of the air forces is to be enhanced by the allocation of a few experienced German dive bomber specialists to the Japanese naval air forces. The need for her rear to be left free by Russia, plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia. The possibility of creating this free rear by other means is to be suggested to MATSUOKA. By this means it could be avoided that, should the occasion arise, the decision of an action against Singapore would be put in the background, and that prominence be given to the Russian question. As the rapprochement with Russia is also sought in the interest of new creation of commercial relations with Germany, the despatch of the economic mission of WOHLTAT is quickly to be carried out, in order to show Germany's good will in economic relations.

Apart from this it might be recommended to place German specialists for putting in working order enterprises connected with war economy in conquered areas, at the disposal of Japan, in order to maintain uninterruptedly the supply of raw materials from Netherland East Indies and the Malay States, should Japan occupy these areas.

In the train, 25 March 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

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CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

Subject: Conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

The Investigation Committee

The President and the Vice-President of the Privy Council and its members met on September 26 (Thursday) Showa 15 /1940/ at 10 A.M. in the ante-chamber East-3 in the Imperial Palace, and soon after the introduction by His Majesty of the draft pact for review, President HARA opened the conference, designating the set-up of the plenary session of the Committee. The persons who attended are:

President HARA

Vice-President SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Investigation Committee

Privy Councillors: KAWAI, ISHII, ARIMA, KUBOTA, ISHIZUKA, SHIMIZU, MINAMI, NARA, ARAKI, MATSUI, SUGAWARA, MATSUURA, USHIO, HAYASHI, FUKAI, FUTAGAMI, MANO, OSHIMA, OBATA, TAKEKOSHI, MITSUCHI

State Ministers:

Premier KONOYE

War Minister TOJO

Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs MATSUOKA

Finance Minister KAWADA

Navy Minister OIKAWA

Explainers:

Chief of the Planning Board HOSHINO

Chief of the Legislation Board MURASE

Councillor of the Legislation Board MORIYAMA

Director of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUMOTO

Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry Major-General MUTO

Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry Rear-Admiral ABE

Director of the Supervisory Affairs Bureau of the Commerce and Industry Ministry TSUJI

Director of the Finance and Management Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry AIDA

Director of the Banking Bureau of the Finance Ministry MATSUKUMA

Director of the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Finance Ministry HARAGUCHI

Privy Council Secretary General HORIYE

Privy Council Secretary MOROHASHI

Privy Council Secretary TAKATSUJI

(The meeting came to order at 10:10 A.M.)

SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Committee, called the meeting to order.

Premier KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA delivered explanations respectively as on separate leaf, following which interpellations and answers were exchanged between the members of the Committee and State Ministers the gist of which is as follows:

Councillor KAWAI: "The supplementary documents accompanying the treaty which has been exchanged concerns the relations between our empire and the State of Germany but they do not touch upon Italy. What is the reason for this?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "The German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP previously advised us that, as far as Italy is concerned, he himself

will take care of everything, and he desired that we refrain from even having an interview with the Italian Ambassador for the time being. That is why I had an interview with him for the first time yesterday (the 25th). On that occasion, he stated that all affairs pertaining to Italo-Japanese relations had so far been entrusted to Germany, and that the conclusion of a treaty such as the present one was what Italy had been looking forward to for some time. Moreover, in the documents exchanged between the German Ambassador and myself, we touched upon our relations with Italy to the effect that Italy in all probability would fall in line with Japan and Germany."

Councillor KAWAY: "How about our preparations to meet the situations when the worst turns up?"

War Minister TOJO: "As far as the Army is concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in case of war with the United States. Therefore, there is nothing to be worried about. Relations with Russia in such case, I believe, would be advantageous to us because the present Treaty acts as a check. But as long as Russo-Japanese relations are not satisfactorily adjusted, we of course cannot afford to delay preparations. Concerning the China Incident, it is necessary that we bring a speedy end to it and prepare ourselves for the worst.

"Moreover, as regards supplies, we have enough reserved to last for quite a while."

Navy Minister OKAWA: "Preparations of our ships for battle have already been completed. Regarding war materials, crude oil in particular, we have enough to last us for quite awhile. If, however, the war becomes prolonged, we may be faced with a major difficulty in the way of replenishment. In order to meet such possibilities, we will take the best means possible to expand facilities for the production of synthetic oil."

Chief of the Planning Board, HOSHINO: "We are as yet not complete in the matter of self-supply and self-sufficiency of resources. According to our resources mobilization plan for this year, out of the total amount of ¥5,000,000,000 worth of material necessary, we must depend on ¥2,600,000,000 from abroad out of which we must depend on the United States and Britain for ¥1,900,000,000 worth. However, we are already quite prepared. Regarding petroleum, particularly gasoline for airplanes with which we were most acutely concerned in the past, we have done a great deal in securing them from various countries with the result that we have a considerable amount in stock. In case the war becomes prolonged, the prospect of obtaining supplies from the Dutch Indies, Saghalien, etc., are quite good."

(Recess from noon to 1:10 p.m.)

Councillor ISHII: "(1) The treaty under review does not contain a clause for non-separate peace. What is the reason for this? (2) What is the meaning of New Order in Europe referred to in Article 1 of the treaty?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "With regard to the clause for non-separate peace, we did not touch upon it at all since the treaty under review aims, in principle, at prevention of war. If war should break out we would immediately come to an agreement on this subject between the three countries."

"As regards the New Order, I interpret it as a materialization representing the preface of the treaty which embraces the spirit of 'Hakko-iu' (all the world under one roof) recommended by the Imperial Empire."

Councillor ARIMA: "If Japanese-American hostilities are at all events unavoidable, I believe it best to avail ourselves of the present opportunity. There is, however, one thing of which I cannot but



feel concern. That is the scarcity of petrol. If war is once started between Japan and America, it will not end in a year or two. Even if we are with a good supply of oil in stock at present, we may become short of it. I would like to know what measures are being considered to meet such outcome."

Navy Minister OKAWA: "The production of synthetic oil is a recent undertaking. We can hardly expect much here. I, however, believe that there is still a possibility of importing oil in quantity from the Dutch East Indies and Northern Saghalien through peaceful means. I feel we can cover our needs for a good length of time with our present stock of oil plus what we will obtain in the future. Furthermore, our production of aeroplane gasoline is now reaching a substantial volume. We are not feeling the dearth which we experienced for a time."

Councillor KUBOTA: "(1) Judging from what is stipulated in Article 3 of the treaty, the Soviet can be considered as coming under the category of 'A state which is at present moment participating neither in the European war nor the Sino-Japanese conflict.' What is the view with respect to this? (2) Are there no signs that STAHRER, the special German envoy, discussed this question with some Soviet authorities on his way to Japan? (3) The proposition in view is liable to prompt a collaboration between the United States and the Soviet. What are the views of our authorities concerned?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "Specifically for the purpose of making it clear that the treaty under review has nothing to do with the Soviet, Article 5 is provided, while it is indicated in the supplementary documents to the effect that Germany shall take the trouble of mediating Russo-Japanese relations. (2) STAHRER said that he had no talk with any of the Soviet authorities in relation to this proposition. I, however, can hardly believe it. Rather I take it that much negotiations have taken place between Germany and the Soviet. (3) With regard to the supposed collaboration between the United States and the Soviet, our Foreign Office authorities are keeping close watch. We are convinced that so far nothing has been done by them in this connection. We will continue to be on the alert and watch their doings. Rather we intend to take the initiative in adjusting Russo-Japanese relations."

Councillor ISHIZUKA: "In the light of various bygone facts, I fear that we can hardly expect due fulfillment of the treaty on the part of Germany. In putting the treaty into effect, we must prove to her our sincerity; at the same time we must also ask for sincerity on the part of Germany. I hope that our government will make due efforts especially regarding this point."

Councillor SHIMIZU: "(1) What are the facts regarding Germany's assistance to the Chungking Government? (2) What are the contents of the talks regarding the mandatory areas, the former German colonies?"

War Minister TOJO: "According to reports, German technicians have made their way into Chungking. There is another report that the Chinese Ambassador in Germany is busy in an attempt to purchase the arms which Germany seized from France in the current European warfare. However, both informations are unauthentic."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "With regard to the mandatory areas under our control, the former German colonies, I wish to dispose of it in line with the supplementary documents we exchanged in connection with this proposition. In other words, we wish to hold the former German colonies included in our Empire just as heretofore by making some compensation to her. And the word 'some' means very little, almost tantamount to nominal."

Councillor MINAMI: "What is the real meaning of Greater East Asia, which recognizes the leadership of our Empire? I fear that a lack of understanding between the three states with regard to the

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concrete demarcation of such area would give rise to an undesirable outcome in the future. (2) Who is the author of the treaty under review, Japan or Germany? According to rumors, there are some who say that the treaty was proposed by Germany, whose military operations turned out contrary to what she expected at first, for the purpose of utilizing Japan as a check upon the United States due to the fear that possibility of America's participation in the war would increase when the presidential election is over if the German-British war becomes prolonged. I wish to hear from our Foreign Minister his view in this respect.

"(3) Relations between Britain and America are very close. The latter is vitally interested in the Greater East Asia sphere; whereupon it is inevitable that relations between Japan and the United States grow worse. On the other hand, there are possibilities of improvement in relations between Germany and America. Is there no fear of Japan alone drinking from the bitter cup?"

"(4) In the event of war between Japan and America, the attitude of Russia would have a serious bearing upon us. Why did not your government make any effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet also when we negotiated with Germany? Has there been anything done between Japan and Germany with a view to cause the Soviet to drop assistance to Chiang?"

"(5) What is the meaning of so-called 'participation' contained in Article 3 of the treaty under consideration?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) By 'Greater East Asia' I mean the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the Oceanic Group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc. Regarding this sphere we have made an understanding that this sphere could be automatically broadened in the course of time. This point is already stated in the records of the treaty negotiations.

"(2) The treaty under review was proposed by Germany. The rumours in circulation contain a half truth, but nevertheless the German Foreign Minister's view as given in the documents exchanged between us is no empty word.

"(3) Our Empire should at this moment ally itself with Germany and Italy, and adjust its international relations with the Soviet Union, to bring about an international situation favorable to us, and thereby do our utmost to avoid an outbreak of hostility between Japan and America. Even if Japan and America should unfortunately come to fight against each other, I consider it advisable for us after all to maintain friendly terms with America. Also from such a viewpoint, I consider it very advantageous for us if we ally with Germany and manipulate to our interest Americans of German descent, who number in the neighborhood of 20 millions and who already hold an influential position in the United States. Further, I fear that if we do not bind us in an alliance with Germany, it would be possible that in future Britain and Germany might conclude peace between themselves, create a new situation in Europe, and attempt to rule over the South Seas area and other regions for their own purposes. It is necessary to show at this time Japan's determination.

"(4) A Soviet-Japanese Pact had been already planned by the preceding cabinet. The Soviet, however, made excessive demands which were a virtual refusal of our proposal. As the bond of tie existing between Germany and the Soviet Union is considerably strong and firm, it is difficult for us to arrive at any arrangement with the Soviet Union unless we first reach an understanding with Germany. In other words, the Pact under review forms the basis of the future foreign relations of our Empire. Further, although the German Ambassador, in the course of our negotiations, proposed to me to have the Soviet Union abandon her pro-Chiang regime policy, and to mediate between the Chungking government and Japan, I deliberately told him that

our country itself would dispose of such problems.

"(5) For instance, if our country cannot sit idle watching in case a powerful American fleet enters Singapore, I believe that we may then get help from Germany; contrariwise, a U.S.-Canadian common defense can hardly be construed as 'participation', since the present Pact aims to avoid war. I feel that everything has been decided on the basis of the relevant conditions."

Councillor MINAMI: "With regard to the situation concerning the supply of materials, petrol in particular, I wish to be given an explanation sufficient to set our minds at ease."

President HOSHINO of the Planning Board: "We have a considerable stock of petrol, but difficulty is inevitable if worst conditions prevail for a long period. We will in this connection endeavor to secure its supply by utilizing various domestic installations and also by establishing connections with oversea sources."

War Minister TOJO: "As for the Army, the supply of oil on hand would be enough to cover our operation for sometime to come, but I have no confidence in this respect if war should continue three to four years further. I feel there will be no alternative other than to strive for a way out of the desperate situation."

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "For the use of the Navy, we have sufficient stock of petrol to cover our requirements for a considerable period. Assuming that our yearly requirement equals to our estimated maximum consumption of oil for a series of full scale fleet-to-fleet clashes, I do not think that our stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year. If the war is protracted for a long period, say five to ten years, the frequency of battles would automatically drop, and it is our intention to take steps to adjust our consumption so that our stock can be consumed during an extended period."

Councillor MINAMI: "How about our finance when hostilities between Japan and the United States break out before the China Incident is ended?"

Finance Minister KAWADA: "It will be quite natural that our financial distress will increase more than ever, but I do not think that there will be no measures available with which to meet the situation. As for the source of our revenue, we may look to bonds and taxes. In either case, we have no alternative but to rely upon the savings of the people. If the situation should progress in the present state for another few years, we would possibly meet no major difficulty in finance. If the situation should grow still worse, we must try to raise funds enough to cover the war expenditures by exercising utmost economy in the general expenditures. The difficulty in the field of national finance would almost be the same as that in the domain of materials."

Councillor ARAKI: "With the development of the situation, will there be no shortage of troops? Besides, I have lately been informed that among the returnees from the battle fields there are many who are suffering from tuberculosis. What is the true state of affairs?"

War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA: "Since the manpower needed by our Army in the war against America will be comparatively small in number, while Naval personnel is by its very nature limited in size, we feel no concern in respect to number of personnel. There are among the returnees a considerable number of tuberculosis cases, but the military authorities in charge and the Ministry of Public Welfare are doing their best in the way of medical facilities for these patients."

Councillor SUGAWARA: "(1) What is the relationship between the treaty under review and the anti-Comintern Pact? Moreover, Germany seems to be the only party with whom we have negotiated this treaty, and likewise in the supplementary instruments exchanged between the contracting parties Germany appears to be the only other party. Thus, there is concern with regard to our relation with Italy. How about this point? (2) What is the resolve of our government with respect to the finance to meet with the outbreak of a Japanese-American war?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "The Anti-Comintern Pact shall be retained. As to the adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, I believe that we can consider it separately. The reasons why Germany is the only party with whom we negotiated the treaty under review and with whom we exchanged the relevant documents, are that the treaty was negotiated at the request of the German government, and also that what is being sought by our Empire is principally related to Germany. With regard to our relations with Italy, we will endeavor to leave no cause for any regrets."

Finance Minister KAWADA: "With regard to our finance, doubtless the burden on our people will grow heavier. I wish to arrange various measures so that the whole nation can bear the increasing burden."

Councillor MATSUURA: "With the conclusion of the Alliance under review, the attitude of the Soviet Union will greatly affect the future destiny of our Empire. Hence I hope that our government authorities would direct their efforts especially on this point."

Councillor USHIO: "The conclusion of the treaty under review will naturally result in increasing difficulties to our country. I feel it essential for our government authorities and also the leaders of our people to harness themselves with a renewed resolve and to arouse the people's spirit. As the dearth of civilian consumption goods will engender unrest in the people's thought, at least the supply of requisite items for sustaining the civilians' living should be given adequate consideration, so as to leave no cause for any regrets. What is the government's intention in this respect?"

President HOSHINO of the Planning Board: "In our commodity mobilization program, the center of gravity is laid on the items for military purposes. We have, however, paid a good deal of consideration to secure also the necessities for the civilians' living."

Councillor HAYASHI: "In the light of the address made by STALIN before the Communist Party members after the signing of the Soviet-German agreement, it appears that his basic policy of launching a movement to Sovietize Germany and Britain at such a moment when their strength is spent, and likewise to Sovietize Japan and China, remains unchanged. If this be the case, rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union would be a task very difficult to accomplish. What is the view of the Foreign Minister in this respect?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "In my opinion, pessimism and optimism are divided on a fifty-fifty basis. Therefore, we intend to utilize Germany to bring the situation to an optimistic view. It is still not certain to what extent Germany will work upon the Soviet to adjust Soviet-Japanese relations. If, however, the Soviet Union is afraid of Germany, the latter would make considerable efforts to mediate between Japan and the Soviet Union."

Councillor FUKAI: "(1) In what way will Germany give us military assistance in the event of a Japanese-American war? (2) I learned that a protest was made in connection with the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty on the ground that this infringes on the secret anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. How has this turned out? (3) In the preface of the treaty under review I find a passage which reads: 'This enables each nation of the world to have a proper place in the world,' but in Hitler's own language, he says 'against

other races the survival of the fittest is the grand high-road of heaven and earth. These two clearly contradict each other. Is there no cause for unrest here? (4) If a Japanese-American war is unavoidable, as Foreign Minister said, his assertions might be justified; if, on the contrary, it is not unavoidable, there must be room for maneuvering behind the scenes.

"In the event of a war, there will be the unrest in respect to the supply of civilian necessities, and also unrest in thought. Has the government any conviction that it can tide over the situation without the occurrence of a serious state of affairs? I wish to ask the Premier's resolve on this point."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO and Premier KONOYE:

"(1) German assistance will consist of the supply of superior arms and materials. This, however, will depend upon an understanding being reached with the Soviet Union;

"(2) It is open to question whether the protest was made to Germany officially. No answer has been received from Germany;

"(3) Any race that dies out under the rule of the survival of the fittest is not worth existing on this earth. If we fail to accomplish our grand mission of spreading the Imperial way at the time it should be done, then it can't be helped even if we go out of existence. The fact that we succeeded in placing these words in the preface is a victory of our diplomacy;

"(4) As to whether we shall be able to avert a crisis by courting America, such idea is wrong. In order to avoid a crisis, we must take a firm stand and nothing else. By this we will prevent an unfortunate situation to arise. Our government has come to a decision to conclude the treaty under review with an unusual determination, by taking into consideration from all conceivable angles the conditions of our country, the living conditions of the people, red propaganda, etc., in case of the worst situation. The Emperor himself also with an unusual resolve granted us his gracious words. We were deeply impressed at this as it reminded us of the resolve of the Emperor MEIJI at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. We are now determined to lay down our lives to serve the Throne."

Councillor FUJAGAMI: "(1) Did His Majesty consult us on the treaty alone? Or are both the treaty and the exchange instruments involved? (2) Does the passage in Article 3 which reads: 'the European war or the China dispute' mean that no participation is made in either of them? (3) What is meant by the mixed expert commission? (4) There exists a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hence, does Article 5 mean that Germany will not attack the Soviet Union even when the latter assaults Japan? Further, is Japan bound to fight against the Soviet Union if a Soviet-German hostility breaks out? If this were the case, would not such an arrangement be unilateral. Does the word 'existing' mean the date of signing?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) What we had submitted to the Emperor for review was the draft for the treaty; and we have here presented to you the draft of the exchanged official documents for your reference.

"(2) Yes, that is just what it means.

"(3) It means the Economic Expert Commission and the Military Expert Commission.

"(4) Although there exists a non-aggression treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.

"With regard to the word 'existing', if you mean to ask if the present status of the Soviet Union cannot be modified, I say no; I mean that it will not be modified by the treaty under consideration. It will be well to readjust Japan's relation with the Soviet Union hereafter."

Councillor OSHIMA: "(1) To what extent does the Greater East Asia include? (2) Three or four years later, when Germany will have recovered from her scars of war she may get herself involved in hostilities with Russia. Has there been any talk about Japan and Germany combining to cope with Russia?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) This question has been mentioned before.

"(2) We do not anticipate a war with Russia. Even though the Russo-Japanese relation may be readjusted it will hardly last for three years. After two years, it will be necessary to reconsider the relations among Japan, Germany, and Russia."

Councillor OBATA: "Although we have heard explanations on the necessity of concluding the treaty in question, it does not mean that insecurity has been obliterated. Since we have decided upon this matter with great determination, unerring insight, and solemn formality, we shall hope that it will not bring about the worst situation.

"Article III, externally, seems bilateral, but the United States is about to participate in the European war, while on the other hand it does not consider Russian aid to Chiang Kai-Shek an act of participation. Therefore, in reality, is it not unilateral? It appears that Japan alone is bound to a great sacrifice, while the burden on the part of Germany is hardly conceivable."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "STAHMER maintains that the United States' participation in the war is not desirable and that there is no fear of such a possibility.

"A Japanese-American war will be fatal. There is just as much danger of a Japanese-American war, as there is in the United States' participation in the European war. The situation of the presidential election will have great influence upon it. In connection with this election we must not ignore the influence of Germans residing in the United States, as these Germans will be a potent factor in preventing the United States' participation in the war."

Councillor TAKEKOSHI: "In the event of the worst situation, will Japan be able to choose the time and place to let the Japanese Navy participate in the war?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "As it is to be decided by the three powers whether the exchanged official documents will prescribe obligations for participation in a war or not, your opinion in the case just mentioned is true."

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI: "Irrespective of whether this pact will be concluded or not the Japanese people, must realize the inevitability of a Japanese-American war. Both the Japanese and American Navies will not be able to challenge each other. If they should fight in the Western Pacific the Japanese Navy will be able to annihilate the American Navy. The Americans also may think the same way. The United States is now going through a naval-expansion program, but I believe that Japan will be able to fight with its present strength in the course of the next year or two. What is the opinion of the Navy Minister on this point?"

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "For the time being, if we presume that the United States will challenge us to a short and decisive war, I have full confidence of victory. With regard to future plans I wish

to improve the quality of our Navy and expand our armaments as much as possible."

Councillor ISHII: "I have some doubts regarding the disposal of Japan's mandated areas as stated in the exchanged official documents. May I have the opinions of the authorities?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "I wish to have it arranged, at this moment, that we shall have these mandated islands ceded to us free from Germany, to avoid any controversies in the future."

Councillor MITSUCHI: "(1) As the consequence of the signing of this pact, American economic pressure upon Japan and the internal economic difficulties to follow will be to some extent inevitable. To meet with such a situation, it will be necessary to control the various phases of economic life within our nation. As a result, some of our people will lose their power to procure their necessities of life. What are the Government's measures to cope with such a situation? (2) The Japanese people have an aptitude to look upon the signing of an alliance treaty as an assurance of perpetual amical relations, and to consider the nations who oppose it as enemies. I wish to ask our government, in making the announcement of this treaty, to emphasize that our people should be careful not to be captivated by Germany and Italy, and also not to have hostile opinions against the United States and Great Britain."

Chief of the Planning Board HOSHINO and Prime Minister KONOYE: "(1) With regard to the Anglo-American pressure, we agree with you. As a result, those concerned with export and import will have to suffer. We are now taking up this aspect with a view to obtain some adequate measure to deal with it. (2) We entirely agree with your opinion on controlling the anti-Anglo-American movements."

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI, considering this the end of interpellations, ordered the State Ministers and the explainers to leave.

(The State Ministers and explainers retire.)

Then, deliberations were started among the committee members, every member exchanging his opinion on the formality and substance of the pact.

Finally, it was decided to avoid any incitement that may develop from this proposition against the United States and Great Britain; and to smoothen Japan's relations with the Soviet Union; and moreover, demanded the government authorities not to neglect preparations for the possible worst situation. Thus, the pact was unanimously approved.

Chairman SUZUKI adjourns the session.

(Session adjourned at 8:20 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T EW.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1461Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. TAKATSUJI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 41 pages, dated Sept. 26, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes of conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council relative to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Sept. 26, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
26th day of August, 1946/s/ M. Takatsuji  
Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe

Secretary, Privy Council  
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
26th day of August, 1946/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. W. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



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Attd Defo to add

him

8/25/47

PERSONAL HISTORY

Name: MIYO Tatsukichi  
Date of Birth: Jan. 12, 1902  
Permanent Residence: No. 5762 Kujimachi, Kuji-gun, Ibaragi Prefecture.  
Social Status: Heimin (commoner)

Family Members

Father	Miyo Sutejiro	Nov. 4 1872
Mother	" Sute	May 5 1874
Wife	" Keiko (divorced	Mar 16 1945)
Eldest Son	" Yoshihiro	Feb 24 1930
"	Daughter Yuko	July 1 1933
Second Son	" Shinta	Aug 6 1937
"	Daughter Hiroko	Oct 19 1941
Elder Brother	Shoji (deceased,	Aug. 21 1940)
Younger Brother	Kanzaburo	Jan 25 1905
Younger Sister	Sui	July 12 1908

Aug 26 1920	Ordered a midshipman at the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
Jul 14 1923	Graduated from the Naval Academy.	"
"	Ordered a Naval Cadet.	Naval Ministry.
"	Ordered to duty on the Iwate.	"
Aug 19 "	Departed Jenchuan on a cruise along the North China coast. (guard)	
Sep 3 "	Returned to Sasebo.	
Apr 12 1924	Transferred from the Iwate to the Mutsu. (The First Fleet)	"
Oct 20 "	Transferred from the Mutsu to the Nagato. (The First Fleet)	"
Dec 1 "	Appointed Ensign.	Cabinet
"	Attached to the First Destroyer Division.	Naval Ministry
Dec 4 "	Ordered to Duty on the Numakaze.	1st Destroyer Div.
Dec 27 "	Conferred with the Senior Court Rank, 8th Grade.	Imp. Household Dept.
Dec 1 1925	Relieved of the current post and was ordered to become an officer trainee of the Normal course of the Naval Gunnery School.	Naval Ministry.

May 28 1926	Ordered to become an officer trainee of the Normal course of the Naval Torpedo School.	Navy Ministry
Dec 1 "	Ordered to Duty on the Ume.	"
"	Promoted to Lieutenant (j.g.)	Cabinet
Dec 28 "	Conferred with the Junior Court Rank, Senior Grade.	Imp. Household Dept.
Jul 29 1927	Relieved of the current post and was attached to the Kasumi-ga-Ura Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Sep 1 "	Ordered to become a blight officer trainee	
Dec 1 "	Granted the first salary grade.	"
May 29 1928	Attached to the Yokosuka Naval Air Unit.	"
Dec 10 "	Promoted to Lieutenant.	Cabinet
Mar 15 1929	Conferred with the Senior Court Rank, 7th Grade.	Imp. Household Dept.
Jan 28 1929	Applied for marriage permission Authorized 25th Feb 1929	
Nov 16 1928	Conferred the Medal in Commemoration of the Imperial Enthronement in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 188 of 1928.	3rd of Decorations
Sep 15 1929	Attached to the Specially Established Air Unit at Maizuru, during the Organization small naval manoeuver forces for 1929.	
Nov 30 "	Entrusted with the duty of the Standing Consultative Committee regarding problems on army, Navy and Air Force, under the League of Nations.	Cabinet
"	Ordered to Paris	Foreign Ministry
"	Appointed Staff Officer of the Naval General Staff.	Naval Ministry.
Jan 2 1930	Left Tokyo Station. Sailed from Moji on the Fushimi-maru on 4th of the same month.	
Feb 28 1930	Ordered to the entourage of the Imperial Naval Delegates at the Standing Consultative Committee	

	dealing with problems on army, navy and air force, under the League of Nations.	Cabinet
Feb 28 1930	Ordered to the entourage of the Imperial Air Force Delegates at the Standing Consultative Committee dealing with problems on army, navy air force, under the League of Nations.	Cabinet
	Ordered to the entourage of the Imperial Delegates at the International Aero-nautic Committee.	Cabinet
Dec 1 "	Granted the 2nd salary.	Navy Ministry
Nov 2 1931	Relieved from entourage of the Imperial Naval Delegation at the Standing Consultative Committee regarding problems on army, navy and air force, under the League of Nations.	
	Relieved from entourage of the Imperial Air Force at the Standing Consultative Committee regarding problems on army, navy and air force, under the League of Nations.	
	Relieved from entourage of the Imperial Delegation at the Preliminary Committee for Reduction of Armaments under the League of Nations.	
	Relieved from entourage of the Imperial Delegation at the International Aero-Nautic Committee.	Cabinet
Feb 1 1932	Appointed Division Commander of the Omura Naval Air Group.	Naval Ministry
Feb 22 "	Concurrently appointed Inspector in the Air Craft Section of the Hiro Navy Yard.	"
Sep 12 "	Ordered Division Commander of the 2nd Air Group, during the organization of the small naval manoeuvr <del>e</del> e Forces for 1932.	"
Nov 15 "	Appointed division Commander of Hosho, Aircraft carrier, attached to the Combined Fleet.	"
Nov 1 1933	Ordered an officer trainee of the A Class of the Naval War College.	"
Dec 1 "	Granted the 1st salary grade.	"
May 1 1934	Conferred with the Junior Court Rank, 6th Grade.	Imp. Household Dept.
Aug 1 "	Ordered Umpire to the Naval Grand Manoeuvr <del>e</del> e for 1933	Naval Ministry

Nov 15 1934	Promoted to Lieutenant Commander.	Cabinet
Dec 20 "	Ordered to CHINA.	Naval Ministry
Jul 10 1935	Ordered Division Commander of the First Air Group during the Organization for the Naval Grand Manoeuvre for 1935.	"
Apr 20 1934	Granted a sum of one hundred and forty yen in recognition of distinguished services rendered in the 1931-1934 Incident.	Board Decoration
"	Decorated with the War Medal for the 1931-1934 Incident. (238, 389)	"
Oct 31 1935	Appointed Commander of the Air Group on the Carrier Kaga, first reserve ship, attached to the 2nd Fleet.	"
Nov 2 "	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th Class.	"
Jun 1 1936	Appointed Staff Officer of the 3rd Air Fleet. ((combined United Fleet)	Naval Ministry
Jun 6 "	Assigned on the Kamoi.	"
Nov 16 "	Appointed Instructor at the KASUMIGAURA Air Group.	"
Mar 13 1937	Appointed Instructor at the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group, concurrently instructor at the Naval Gunnery School, the Naval Torpedo School, the Naval Navigation School and in the Naval Communications School.	"
May 1 "	Concurrently appointed instructor at the Kasumigaura Naval Air Group.	"
Dec 1 "	Appointed Staff Officer of the 4th Air Fleet.	"
Dec 5 "	Assigned on the Notoro.	"
Jan 31 1938	Assigned on the Kinukasa-maru, due to change of the flagship.	4th Air Fleet HQ.
Feb 5 1938	Assigned on the Notoro, due to the change of the flagship.	"
Mar 3 "	Assigned on the Kinukasa-maru, due to change of the flagship.	"

Mar 19 1938	Assigned on the Notoro, due to change of the flagship.	4th Air Fleet Hq.
Apr 29 "	Appointed Staff Officer of the 2nd Combined Air Group.	Naval Ministry
Nov 15 "	Appointed Staff Officer of the 2nd Fleet.	"
Oct 13 "	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 5th class.	Board of Decorations
Jun 1 1939	Conferred with the Senior Court Rank 6th Grade.	Imp. Household Dept.
Nov 1 1939	Ordered duty at the Naval General Staff and attached to the 1st Section. of the 1st Division.	Naval Ministry.
Nov 15 "	Promoted to Commander.	Cabinet
"	Appointed member of the Naval General Staff Concurrently member of the Navy Technical Council.	Naval Ministry.
"	Ordered Naval Staff Officer of the Imperial Headquarters.	"
"	Ordered a member of the Technical Council of the Naval Air Headquarters.	"
"	Ordered a member of the Technical Council of the Naval Technical Department.	"
"	Ordered to duty with 1st section of the 1st division. Concurrently the 2nd section of same Division.	Naval Gen'l Staff.
"	Ordered to duty with the First section of the 1st Division of the Operations Dept.	Imp. Hqs. Navy Section.
Dec 22 1939	Ordered on official trip to China.	Naval Ministry
" 12 "	Appointed member of the Army and Navy joint Operation Research Board.	"
"	Appointed member of the 3rd Sectional Committee for armament Economization.	"
"	Appointed member of the 5th Sectional Committee for Armament Economization.	"

Jan 23 1940	Relieved of membership of the 3rd Sectional Committee for Armament Economization.	Naval Ministry
"	Relieved of membership of the 5th Sectional Committee for Armament Economization.	"
Jan 20 "	Relieved of the membership of the Technical Council of the Naval Technical Department.	"
Jan 23 "	Appointed to become nominator of re-recepients of the Imperial grant as fund for pursuing study.	"
Jul 19 1940	Ordered to China.	"
Aug 1 "	Appointed umpire to the 1st and the 2nd term manoeuvre (excluding the 1st and second special manoeuvre) of the special grand manoeuvre for 1940.	"
Sep 10 1940	Appointed umpire to the 2nd special manoeuvre of the 2nd term of the grand manoeuvre.	"
Nov 21 "	Ordered to French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies areas.	"
Jan 25 1941	Relieved of the Duty of nominator of receipients of the Imperial Grant as fund for pursuing study.	"
"	Appointed temporary nominator of receipient of the Imperial grant as fund for pursuing study for 1941.	"
Feb 2 "	Appointed umpire to the first term manoeuvre of the special grand manoeuvre for 1941.	"
May 9 "	Ordered to China.	"
Nov 13 "	Ordered to French Indo-China.	"
Jan 15 1942	Appointed temporary nominator of receipients of the Imperial grant as fund for pursuing study for 1942.	"
Apr 29 1940	In recognition of the distinguished services rendered in the Chinese Incident, was Decorated with the Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite 4th class, the Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun and a sum of four thousand yen.	Board of Decorations

Apr 29 1940	Decorated with the War Medal for the CHINESE Incident.	Board of Decorations
Apr 21 1942	Ordered to the Philippines, French Indo-China, Thai, Malay Peninsula, and Dutch East Indies.	Naval Ministry
Oct 10 "	Assigned concurrent duty with the Twelfth Section of the 1st Department (the Naval General Staff)	Naval General Staff
"	Assigned concurrent duty with the Twelfth Section of the 1st Section of the Imperial Headquarters Navy Department.	Imp. Hqs. Navy Section.
Dec 24 "	Attached to the Headquarters of the South-Eastern Area Fleet.	Navy Ministry.
"	Relieved of the post of Naval Staff Officer in the Imperial Headquarters.	"
Jan 4 1943	Appointed Staff Officer of the South-Eastern Area Fleet concurrently Staff Officer of the Eleventh Air Fleet.	Naval Ministry
Dec 21 1942	Appointed a member of the 2nd Sectional Committee of the Defensive Preparations Investigation & Research Committee.	"
"	Appointed a member of the Third Sectional Committee of the Defensive Preparations Investigation & Research Committee.	"
Sep 9 1943	Attached to the Yokosuka Naval Station.	"
Oct 1 "	Appointed Commander of the 732 Naval Air Group.	Cabinet
Dec 1 "	Concurrently appointed Assistant Chief of the 732 Naval Air Group.	Navy Ministry
May 1 1944	Promoted to Captain.	Cabinet
Nov 10 1940	Conferred a Medal in Commemoration of the Two Thousand and Six Hundredth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Empire in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 488 of 1940.	Board of Decorations.



Jul 10 1944	Appointed Assistant Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Air Group Concurrently a member of the Naval Technical Council.	Naval Ministry
"	Appointed member of the Naval Technical Department.	"
"	Appointed member of the Naval Technical Department.	"
Jun 15 "	Conferred with the Junior Court Rank, 5th Grade.	Imperial Household Dept.
Jul 23 "	Left Unit /T.N. Possibly 732 Naval Air Group/	23rd Air Flotilla
Oct 19 "	Ordered to the Philippines.	Naval Ministry
Jul 7 1945	Assigned duty with the Naval General Staff.	"
"	Ordered on dutys under the command of Vice Admiral KUSAKA.	Naval General Staff.
Aug 25 "	Ordered on duty under the command of Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff.	"
Jul 15 "	Concurrently appointed member of the Naval General Staff and Naval Staff Officer in the Imperial Headquarters.	"
Jul 25 1945	Concurrently attached to the Headquarters of the Navy Combined Air Group for Training.	Naval Ministry
Sep 15 "	Relieved of concurrent posts and concurrently assigned to duty with the Navy Ministry.	"
"	Ordered to duty with the Naval Affairs Bureau.	"
Aug 28 1945	Appointed member of the Kanoya Liaison Committee.	"
Jun 13 1944	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd class.	Imp. Household Dept.

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of the Task Force Group, that they were considerably worried about receiving such a message too late to be effective, and because of the distance involved were alarmed that they may not receive it at all.

15. The submarines participating in the Hawaiian Operation were ordered to refrain from attack until they knew the aerial offensive had been launched. The sole reason for the above order was the possibility of the submerged submarines missing reception of the telegram ordering cessation of operations because of success in the negotiations at the last minute.

16. We did not expect that our operation against Pearl Harbor would be entirely undetected by the United States Forces. Rather, we anticipated that there was a great possibility of being detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before attack. Our submarines were to reach the waters near Hawaii one day before the scheduled attack in order to observe. We thought it to be entirely possible that they might be discovered or detected prior to the air attack. And in fact I later learned ~~that~~ one midget submarine was discovered and sunk one hour before the operation started. We judged that probabilities were roughly 90% that radar equipment had been installed at Hawaii and that, if so, our air force units would surely be detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before arriving over their target. Scouting sea planes were also scheduled to operate in the vicinity of Hawaii approximately 30 minutes ahead of the attacking air units. If the two sea planes should be caught by radar we thought it possible the detection of our planes would be made more than an hour before the opening of our attack. And, if detected by visual means, the attacking attempt would be discovered at least 30 minutes before the attack.

It was always our firm conviction that all necessary diplomatic steps preceding hostilities would be taken by the proper authorities. We fully expected that before hostilities commenced the United States would know a state of war existed with Japan.

Prepared by: Capt. Robinson  
Commander Cole

Date: 18 August, 1947

MIYO, Tatsukichi

1. Information in IPS Files on Witness -

(a) Request as witness: No request for a subpoena has been received. First notice was service of deposition of witness (Def. Doc. #1976).

(b) Present Status: ex-Captain, I. J. N.

(c) Summary of Personal History:

1935 (Nov) to 1939 (Nov) - Chief of Staff of Second Fleet  
1939 (Nov) to 1942 (Dec) - Member of Navy General Staff, Operations Section  
1943 (Sept) - Appointed to Yokosuka Naval District

Curriculum Vitae will be attached as soon as obtained.

(d) Summary of Interrogations:

(1) Interrogation of Lt. Col. Sackett (IPS Case File 75-5)

This interrogation reveals substantially the same facts as set forth in the affidavit of MIYO.

2. Analysis of Affidavit -

(a) Personal

Name: MIYO, Tatsukichi

Formerly Captain IJN

1939-42 in Naval General Staff, Operations Section. In charge air operations.

In on planning Pearl Harbor operation. Coordinated work of General Staff and Combined Fleet.

Pearl Harbor attack decided only short time before 7 December, 1941. (par. 1)

(b) May, 1941 - Combined Fleet submitted to Naval General Staff Pearl Harbor plan - Naval General Staff not interested, because:

- (1) Air strength inadequate
- (2) Secrecy difficult
- (3) Pacific Fleet not sure to be in Pearl Harbor
- (4) Intelligence not certain
- (5) China must be settled
- (6) Diplomacy would solve rest of problems
- (7) Navy wanted war with U. S. averted. (Par. 2)

(MIYO, Tatsukichi - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

- (c) July 1941 - Economic action by U. S., Great Britain and Netherlands - cut off oil and planned war against Japan - (encirclement)  
  
September - Orders to make war plans. Combined Fleet resubmitted to Naval General Staff plan for Pearl Harbor. Naval General Staff and 1st Air Force opposed. (Par. 3)
- (d) September, 1941 - Combined Fleet said plan was only hope. Opposite view - smash southward, then meet counter attack. (Par. 5)
- (e) Combined Fleet Headquarters said Mandate Island vulnerable unless Pearl Harbor was attacked first. YAMAMOTO threatened resignation. Naval General Staff gave tentative consent. (Par. 6)
- (f) Pearl Harbor attack aircraft carriers:  
  
Akagi and Kaga  
Soryu and Hiryu  
Zuikaku and Shokaku (Par. 7)
- (g) Air personnel requested by Combined Fleet Headquarters - Supply inadequate. Hurried training. (Par. 8)
- (h) Refueling problem and solution. (Par. 9)
- (i) Aerial torpedo problem and solution in October for Pearl Harbor. (Par. 9)
- (j) From China diverted 11th Air Force to home bases. Inadequate training. Fighter planes from Formosa vs. Philippines - practice night flying. (Par 11)
- (k) Air Base Construction Corps unprepared and not equipped.
- (l) Orders were conditioned on stopping the attack if U.S.-Japanese peace negotiations were successful or any other "great change". (Par. 13)
- (m) On 6 December - Witness by telegram told the Task Force "No hope of peaceful settlement". KUSAKA later told me they were worried about possibly not getting a back-up message. (Par. 14)
- (n) Submarine orders conditioned - not to attack - sole reason might miss call-off message. (Par. 15)
- (o) Thought U. S. forces would detect by radar or scout planes - thereby have notice, and thought proper authorities would take necessary diplomatic steps preceding hostilities. (Par. 16)

(MIYO, Tatsukichi - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

3. Objections to Introduction of Affidavit: None

4. Gross-Examination:

- (a) (Curriculum Vitae points)
- (b) What is your present employment? (Object - to see whether witness is now employed by 2nd Demobilization Ministry or other Japanese Defense agency.)
- (c) Did you alone write this affidavit?
- (d) (If not, who assisted you in writing it? Do you know which defendants each of them represent?)
- (e) In paragraph 2 you mention May 1941 as the first date of a plan to attack Pearl Harbor. As a matter of fact, do you <sup>not</sup> know that Admiral YAMAMOTO had begun work on the plan at least five months before that date, in January, 1941?
- (f) In Paragraph 14 you state that you were the chief in the Naval General Staff Headquarters assigned to drafting information and sending it to the Task Force as it moved to attack Pearl Harbor.

The information forwarded to the Task Force from Naval General Staff Headquarters on the subject of what ships were in Pearl Harbor was, therefore, sent by you, was it not?

Where did you get that information?

How long before 7 December, 1941, had the General Staff been obtaining such information from Pearl Harbor?

(Purpose: to show Japanese aggressive preparations for war had included such espionage for a long time before 7 Dec.)

- (g) You mention various difficulties which you faced in the Pearl Harbor plans such as maintaining absolute secrecy, refueling carriers at sea, and preparing a shallow water torpedo. As a matter of fact, did you not overcome all of these technical difficulties and make a successful attack at Pearl Harbor?
- (h) In regard to calling back the Task Force if the Japanese-American negotiations resulted favorably for the Japanese demands, (paragraphs 13,14,15 and 16) the Task Force was ordered nevertheless to attack the ships of any possibly opposing power met as late as D-1, or that is on 7 December, Tokyo time, -is that not true, - regardless of a favorable diplomatic victory for Japan by that time?

(MIYO, Tatsukichi - prepared by Opt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

- (i) In indicating that sentiment in the Japanese Navy in the Summer and Fall of 1941 favored war against the United States and approved the plan for the attack at Pearl Harbor, do you wish to convey the impression that such sentiment was unanimous among all Japanese Naval officers? (If answer is "yes", then ask the following question: Is it not true that Admiral Keisuke OKADA and other older officers urged that Japan stay out of war, but that many young Navy officers favored war?)
- (j) You mentioned that in early September the 11th Air Force was recalled from China to Japan (paragraph 11). You state that, "The operation in China conducted by the above mentioned Fleet had been mainly bombing land targets", and that "the personnel of the Fleet had to be trained anew in such vital tactics as the bombing of mobile vessels". Is it not true that Japanese Naval fliers in China had had training there in bombing mobile vessels, as for example in the bombing of the Panay?

(Object of above questions: To emphasize split of opinion among Japanese then and now, and to reinforce Prosecution evidence.)

- (k) Did you take any part in the War Games in September, 1941, at the Naval War College? (NOTE - MIYO's interrogation - IPS Case File 75-5, p. 2 - shows that he acted as an umpire at the War Games, yet he is not listed among the umpires in Exhibit 809.)
- (l) On page 9 of your affidavit you mention Combined Fleet Order #1 and quote from it. In your interrogation of 27 November, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Sackett you stated that you had read General Order #1 but did not remember anything in it.

Q: "If you remember General Order #1 which gave the details for the operation plans - do you remember that order?"

A: I do not.

Q: You read that order a number of times, did you not?

A: I do not remember anything in it, but I have read it."  
(Case File #75-5, p. 8)

How do you account for the fact that you are now able to quote from that order? Did you personally prepare that portion of your affidavit referring to Order No. 1?

- (m) Did you help to draft the Pearl Harbor operation plan prepared by the Naval General Staff? (NOTE - Interrogation of NAGAMO in IPS Case File 25-44, p. 10, contains a statement by NAGAMO that the plan was drafted by the members of the First Section of whom MIYO was one.)

Q: What portion of the plan did you prepare?

5. References to witness in Prosecution Exhibits - None found.

Defense Document 1976

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Tatsukichi MIYO



Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tatsukichi MIYO and I was formerly a captain in the Japanese Navy. I served in Section One (Operations Section) of the Naval General Staff from 1 November 1939 until 27 December 1942. At that time I held the rank of Commander. During this period of service I was placed in charge of air operations and took part in the planning of the Pearl Harbor Operation as well as other operations in the Pacific War. My assignment involved coordinating work between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet

1. The Pearl Harbor Attack was decided upon only a short time before the outbreak of war. A study of the circumstances related to the planning and preparation thereof will reveal when it was originated.
2. Around May 1941, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet submitted to the General Staff a plan of operations to cope with the possibility of our being drawn into a war with the United States. This plan was based upon the assumption that the United States Pacific Fleet would be anchored at Hawaii and that our fleet could deal an initial blow against it through the medium of an air raid by carrier borne planes. This whole idea was a radical departure from the plans of naval defense hitherto designed by the Naval General Staff. Since it was a venturesome plan, the Naval General Staff viewed it with great scepticism and little interest.

Among some of the grounds that made the project appear definitely impractical was the fact that our air strength was not adequate; the degree of secrecy for such an operation would be difficult to maintain; the fact that the United States Fleet might not be in Pearl Harbor at the time designated for the attack, and the difficulty in securing proper intelligence for the execution of such operation. In addition to these, at that time both the Army and Navy Supreme Headquarters were in complete accord on the opinion that the Sino-Japanese conflict must be brought to a speedy conclusion and that all other matters pertaining to national policies in the Southern Regions and elsewhere should be left to the diplomatic representatives of our government for solution.

Moreover, the Navy at that time felt strongly that war with the United States could be averted. Such being the case, as said before, the Naval General Staff considered the Pearl Harbor Attack Plan a fanciful thing and did not take it seriously. In view of this opinion of the Naval General Staff, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet, in turn, did not press the subject further.

3. However in July of 1941, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands took severe economic steps toward Japan with the result that the oil supply of the country was shut off. Parallel to these measures, we had had knowledge of United States, British and Netherlands war preparations designated against Japan. And the conception of matters at that time in the Navy was that Japan was steadily being encircled.

The Navy, charged with the primary duty of national defense in the Pacific, faced a situation which could not be complacently ignored. Some time in September, and in view of the then existing conditions, my colleagues and I in the General Staff received orders from our superiors to begin making preparations for formulating potential plans of operation against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Approximately in the early part of September, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet resubmitted



an opinion to the General Staff that an air attack against the United States Fleet at Hawaii was a requisite operation in the event of war. They also notified us that this plan was scheduled to be studied at one of the regular chart maneuvers of the Navy to be held some time in the middle of September with key personnel of the Fleet as the participants. Whereupon the Naval General Staff agreed that if the result of the ~~chart~~ maneuvers were found successful the Hawaii Operation would be taken into consideration and studied.

4. After the maneuver, opinions were exchanged between the Naval General Staff, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and Headquarters of the First Air Force Fleet as to whether or not the plan was plausible. A recognition of serious difficulties in the execution of the plan, from a technical viewpoint, resulted from this discussion. The First Air Force Fleet, which would have to take the most active role in the attack, opposed the plan. The Naval General Staff also was opposed to it. It was then decided to make further studies of the matter. Therefore, even at this time, there was no plan acceptable by the High Command directed at attacking the United States Fleet if the Navy was called upon in the event of war.

5. The Headquarters of the First Air Fleet later reversed their former opinion and around the latter part of September, 1941, Captain KUROSHIMA, Staff Officer of the Combined Fleet, came to the Naval General Staff and there stated the strong opinion of Commander in Chief Admiral YAMAMOTO in favor of the plan. The effect of this opinion was that the attack against Pearl Harbor was the only hope of successfully conducting naval operations against the United States. It was there pointed out by the General Staff that in the event of war it would be necessary for Japan to secure the main areas of the southern regions such as the Philippines, Netherlands Indies, Malaya, etc. at an early date from the standpoint of self existence and self protection. It was recognized that in face of the steadily increasing military

and naval preparedness of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, a Japanese attempt to secure the southern regions would be difficult of attainment, even if virtually all of our air strength was used in such operation.

If it was taken into consideration that our air power would have to be divided if the Hawaii Operation was to take place, a very difficult situation would arise. Furthermore, since a large portion of the Fleet would be involved in the attack on Hawaii, it was evident that a blunder at the very outset of the war would be disastrous. It was suggested that the unprotected Mandated Islands should be defended with what available force there was, based upon a plan that in the event the United States Fleet attacked us in the midst of our southern operations, the Southern Region Operation Forces could be diverted to meet it. In other words, the more advantageous use of our forces would be to concentrate the main strength in the southern region operations at the outset and to smash the bulk of the enemy strength in that area as quickly as possible: Thereafter, to shift the greater part of our naval air strength to preparation for counter attack operations against the United States Fleet.

Against this line of thought, the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet maintained that since the Mandated Islands were unprotected, even if the Southern Region Operation Forces were diverted to meet the United States Forces in the event of an invasion, it might be unavailing and the Islands would easily be occupied by American forces. If this occurred the Mandated Areas would be occupied one after another and the line of communication between Japan proper and the Southern region areas would be severed. Therefore it was deemed vital to stop the United States Fleet before it commenced offensive operations against Japan.

The execution of the Hawaii Operation Plan was so strongly advanced by Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO that he threatened to resign if it was not accepted. Therefore, in view of this set of facts as well as other arguments, the Naval General Staff was

compelled to give tentative consent for complete study of the project.

7. The aircraft carrier forces taking part in the Pearl Harbor Attack were formulated as follows:

On September 25th the aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed and commissioned and together with the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, completed in early August, made up the Fifth Air Force Squadron. This squadron was assigned to the First Air Force Fleet. The aircraft carrier strength of the First Fleet was then as follows:

First Air Force Squadron - composed of the AKAGI and KAGA.

Second Air Force Squadron - composed of the SORYU and HIRYU.

Fourth Air Force Squadron - composed of the RYUO and a merchant ship which had been converted from the KASUGA MARU.

Fifth Air Force Squadron - composed of the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU.

The aircraft carriers of the Fourth Air Force Squadron were small ships of low speed and short radius of action. Furthermore they were capable of carrying only a small number of old type planes and were unfit for the Hawaii Operation which more than taxed the cruising capacity of the new carriers.

8. Again, the air crew personnel and air planes on each of the above mentioned carriers was far less than the prescribed number fixed for war time operations.

The Headquarters of the Combined Fleet requested that the air crew personnel of the Fourth Air Squadron be diverted to fill vacancies existing in the First and Second Air Force Squadrons. They also requested that trained aviators with aircraft carrier experience be supplied from the Flying Corps ashore for the Fifth Air Force Squadron, together with the request that an increase in the number of carrier borne planes to estimated war time standards be made.

In order to provide trained personnel from shore flying unit it was necessary to use instructor personnel of Naval Air Corps training units. This created an additional problem since the then existing conditions were that, even with the number of flying

instructors on hand at that time, we were lacking sufficient instructors to meet the demand of training badly needed new pilots. However, because of the insistence of the Commander in Chief this request could not be denied although the central authorities exhibited great reluctance in complying with it since it greatly affected the plan to train an increased number of air crew personnel.

The air crew members mobilized through the above mentioned measures were assembled in the middle of October. Only one month was allowed for their warming up before the date of departure from the home ports for Hawaii in the middle of middle November. This hurried training inevitably restricted the personnel to daylight attack tactics as well as daylight landing and take off practice from the carriers and is responsible for the fact that the air force units conducting the attack against Pearl Harbor had to avoid night operations and take-off after daybreak.

9. The question of extending the radius of action of the aircraft carriers was important. Due to the established Japanese naval policy, our warships were so constructed that their cruising ranges were limited to our own waters and were far shorter than the cruising range of warships of the United States. For that reason, three carriers - namely, the AKAGI, SORYU and HIRYU - out of the six aircraft carriers taking part in the Hawaii Operation did not have sufficient radius of action.

As is well known to all navigators, during the winter a strong northeasterly monsoon ranges over the Northern Pacific Ocean with accompanying rough seas. The serious problem of how to refuel our vessels under these conditions presented itself. After considerable study it was decided to carry fuel even in the double bottom of each vessel and to also load fuel drums in every available space aboard ship. By these extra loadings we felt that the Fleet could operate so as to return near the area of the 160° East Longitude line, even if refueling on the way became impossible.

0. There was another problem involved in the use of aerial torpedoes. Previously, in order to secure dead accuracy in attacking warships with aircraft borne torpedoes, it was necessary not only to open fire at sufficiently close range but also to make certain that the torpedoes did not pass under the target.

To answer these technical requirements, research studies had been started around 1939 relative to the use of aerial torpedoes against ships at sea. However, satisfactory results were not obtained until the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps and the Aeronautical Technical Department discovered that the torpedo could be kept from submerging too deeply in the water by attaching a special balancing instrument. This was in September 1941.

These studies had not been made with the purpose in mind of attacking Pearl Harbor. The shallow waters of that area introduced a new problem which involved the use of an aerial torpedo with even a more shallow water approach than had been studied in past experiments. Thereafter, hurried research and experiments for this purpose were commenced early in October. The work of remodeling the torpedoes and equipping them with new balancing instruments was not completed before the aircraft carriers left port to rendezvous at Hitokappu Bay.

Other witnesses will testify more specifically as to these matters and will deal with the further hurried preparations that took place.

11. The Imperial Navy, with the hope of restoring peace to the Orient as soon as possible, was exerting her efforts for the speedy settlement of the China Incident. With this object in view the 11th Air Force Fleet, consisting of base air force units, had been diverted for operations in China.

However, when war clouds hung low over the Pacific Ocean in early September, the 11th Air Force Fleet was recalled to Japan to practice preparation trainings to cope with new problem.

The operation in China conducted by the above mentioned fleet had been mainly of bombing land targets as well as aerial combat

Therefore, in order to prepare for operations inherent to the naval air force, the personnel of the Fleet had to be trained anew in such vital tactics as the bombing of mobile vessels, torpedo attacks, scoutings and reconnaissances, aerial navigation, night flying etc. Such trainings were not only important but required considerable time. To acquire necessary standards, even highly experienced fliers were required to endure long hours of renewed rigid training.

It took practically a whole month for the ground crew together with air base equipments to withdraw from China to home bases. On top of that, it required almost another whole month for them to complete various preparations for proceeding to new bases where they were to await orders for next operations. Such being the case the period for the shore based flying units to go through a strenuous preparation training was limited to one month or so. Due to this lack of training various problems arose. The following is a striking example of it:

According to the original plan of the Naval General Staff, the fighter planes assigned to the Philippines operation were to take off from aircraft carriers due to their short cruising radius of action. As a matter of fact, however, there was not sufficient time to be spared for practicing take off from and landing on aircraft carriers. Therefore, in the field forces a special study and training was introduced in order to lessen the rate of fuel consumption of these fighter planes. At the same time the Fleet Headquarters modified the central authorities plan so that fighter planes would load as much fuel as possible and operate directly from land bases in Formosa. In case some planes would be forced to land on the way due to lack of fuel, rescue means were to be made by the Fleet.

As the above fighter planes had to leave Formosa before dawn they had to practice night flying. To meet this requirement the Air Fleet forces were forced to suspend the training of less experienced fliers and concentrate all available time and material

upon the training of experienced fliers. As a result, the inexperienced aircrew members could not fly until the southern area operations reached a definite stage, while on the other hand, the experienced fliers, whose number were naturally limited, became almost exhausted in taking part in continuous operations day after day.

2. The Navy was further unprepared for war as evidenced by the fact that the Air Base Construction Corps was not organized until the probability of war became imminent in November. The Navy Ministry did not consent to the request of the Naval General Staff regarding the draft and organization of the Construction Corps until too late to properly train them. Consequently, conditions were such that this construction corps boarded ship with practically no training just before the outbreak of war. They lacked necessary machinery and other equipment required for hurried construction of air bases and met with innumerable difficulties.

13. The Chief of Naval General Staff issued an Imperial Headquarters Naval Directive Number 5 on 21 November 1941. This directive has been destroyed by fire but has been reconstructed from memory and it read as follows:

"The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet shall immediately recall all operating forces under its command and return home if the United States - Japanese negotiations reach an agreement."

Again, when Commander in Chief YAMAMOTO visited Tokyo on 2 December 1941 to say words of farewell, Admiral ITO, now dead but then Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff, told me that Admiral NAGANO verbally instructed YAMAMOTO as follows:

"If the United States - Japanese negotiations become certain of reaching an amicable settlement before the opening of hostilities, all forces under the Combined Fleet will be recalled from deployment to be returned home."

It was also stated in Combined Fleet Order Number 1 that in the event a great change is observed in the situation, Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness Status Number 1. "A great change in the situation", though needless to

explain, refers to United States - Japanese negotiations. That "Preparedness Status Number 2 may be retracted to Preparedness Status Number 1" meant the retirement of the Fleet Forces to waiting positions from the operational theaters of opening hostilities to waiting positions as was shown in Fleet Order Number One. Consequently, our naval forces were so arranged that in the event of a great change in the situation, such as an amicable settlement of problems between the United States and Japan, they would be able to return to Preparedness Status Number 1. That is, the Task Force would retire to the waiting position of the evening of December 3rd which was 42° North latitude, 170° West longitude. Preparedness Status Number 2 took effect when the Task Force moved into Hawaiian waters after December 3rd, 1941.

Further, the Combined Fleet Order dated 22 November stipulate that the "Task Force Group shall operate so that immediate recall from deployment be possible if negotiations with the United States reach a settlement."

Paragraph 4 of the Task Force Group Order Number 1, dated 23 November said: "Depending upon circumstances, operations may be suspended in the midst of the trip and this group may be made to return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay area."

14. After the Task Force left Japan, weather forecasts and various information was sent to them from the General Staff. I was chiefly assigned to the drafting of such information. As I recall, it was on the evening of December 6th when Operations Section Chief Captain TOMIOKA spoke to me and said:

"The Task Force Group proceeding toward Hawaii may be under great strain because of its belief that it may be ordered to return at any moment. As the situation stands at present it can be said there is no prospect of negotiations between the United States and Japan reaching an amicable settlement so we had better advise them of this fact."

Therefore, I added this sentence to the telegram I was drafting at this time: "No hope is in sight of United States - Japanese negotiations reaching peaceful settlement."

I later learned from Rear Admiral KUSAKA, then Chief of Staff



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of the Task Force Group, that they were considerably worried about receiving such a message too late to be effective, and because of the distance involved were alarmed that they may not receive it at all.

15. The submarines participating in the Hawaiian Operation were ordered to refrain from attack until they knew the aerial offensive had been launched. The sole reason for the above order was the possibility of the submerged submarines missing reception of the telegram ordering cessation of operations because of success in the negotiations at the last minute.

16. We did not expect that our operation against Pearl Harbor would be entirely undetected by the United States Forces. Rather, we anticipated that there was a great possibility of being detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before attack. Our submarines were to reach the waters near Hawaii one day before the scheduled attack in order to observe. We thought it to be entirely possible that they might be discovered or detected prior to the air attack. And in fact I later learned ~~that~~ one midget submarine was discovered and sunk one hour before the operation started. We judged that probabilities were roughly 90% that radar equipment had been installed at Hawaii and that, if so, our air force units would surely be detected at least 30 or 40 minutes before arriving over their target. Scouting sea planes were also scheduled to operate in the vicinity of Hawaii approximately 30 minutes ahead of the attacking air units. If the two sea planes should be caught by radar we thought it possible the detection of our planes would be made more than an hour before the opening of our attack. And, if detected by visual means, the attacking attempt would be discovered at least 30 minutes before the attack.

It was always our firm conviction that all necessary diplomatic steps preceding hostilities would be taken by the proper authorities. We fully expected that before hostilities commenced the United States would know a state of war existed with Japan.

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On this 30th day of June, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: MIYO, Tatsukichi

I, MIYO, Tatsukichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

MIYO, Tatsukichi (seal)