

MICHEL KEDIA

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

KEDIA, Michel
Michael

GRR-1

- 1 -

G any

Multi - State

KOENIGER, Michael

O 5073
4/21/43

Arrived at Istanbul from Prague on 3/26/43. Visited Istanbul from Prague twice last year staying only a few days each time. () says he is organizer of a German-trained group of Armenians who are to cross Turkey to Erivan on the Armenian border, and there foment a revolt against the U.S.S.R.

Has been in the service of the Germans since 1941. First recruited [] XX 305
Caucasian prisoners of war in order to form an anti-communist/Prague Turkey Primer
and Turkey in 1942. Was in Istanbul from 3/26/43 to 4/17/43 and from 12/4/43
12/4/43 to 12/15/43. Was described in March, 1943 as a German of Armen-
ian extraction, this being probably part of his cover. In 1942 and 1943
recruited agents for the S.D. to send to the Caucasus by parachute. During
his visit in December is reported to have been attempting to find staff for
a Georgian monastery to be set up in Rome which should include two S.D. agents.
Is connected with Friedrich WAGNER and Eugen LANG. Stated to be son of Meki KEDIA,
former director of "Surete Georgienne".

Considers himself chief of all anti-Bolshevists Georgians in Europe ** XX 574
and arrogated to himself the right to dispose of all Georgians outside (X-2 TS 106)
Russia. A plan was made in autumn, 1943 to set up a Georgian cloister 7/10/44
in Rome under Vatican protection and among the monks to introduce two agents

REGISTRY COPY

(over)

- Y

KEDIA, Michel

(qv)

Page 2

Recruited Akaki TCHIKLADZE and other Georgians for the TAMARA (qv) FX-147 B-2
groups. They were trained at the Chateau de ROCQUENCOURT (qv). Kedia S-211
made them sign papers in German, promising to reveal nothing of what Paris
they learned there. After they were trained, they returned to Paris, 10/17/44
and were paid daily 100 francs while Kedia waited for orders from the
Germans for their disposal. They saw him in the ave Montaigne. Just before Germany declared
war on Russia, subject was very busy looking up all the Georgians in France. When war was
declared, he called them all together and told them they could return to their native land
if they would join the Germans. He said that those who did not volunteer to go
at first could not return later. Subject apparently had complete charge of the Georgians
although he didn't go with them on the Tamara projects. TCHIKLADZE (qv) claims that
Kedia is chiefly responsible for the whole Tamara business, and that he acted through
ambition, and not through Georgian patriotism. He made all the arrangements with the
Germans on his own initiative. He knew what was intended with the Tamara project all the
time.

----- MW

Still in Switzerland. Was accepted by the Soviet IS as their principal agent #1400
in Switzerland, upon the intervention of GUEGUETSKORY and KOBAKHIDSE (qv.) 6/46
the latter is his cousin. Very dangerous.

hsf

(OVER)
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NWC-001991

Subject headed the Georgian section of Amt VI/Z (Zeppelin), RSHA, which dealt with sabotage and subversive operations in Russia. He enjoyed the complete confidence of the Germans and was allowed to direct all the political penetration work. He also directed operations out of Turkey. He took an active part in the work of the Georgian National Committee, an organization organized and subsidized since '41 by ROSENBERG's Ministry for Eastern Territories to serve what seem to be mainly politico-propaganda work.

JZX 2037
8/16/45

mhc

It appears that the "brains" of the Caucasian nationalist anti-Russian movement have taken refuge in Switzerland. The reason for these leaders being in Switzerland while they sent their subordinates to Italy is because they, presumably, intended to intervene with the IRC at Geneva on behalf of the Caucasian PWs and displaced persons in British and American occupied territory, to prevent their deportation to Russia. Subject is probably in Geneva. It seems well established that subject had taken up contacts (in Turkey and Berlin) with various Allied IS.

JZX 5297
10/29/45

mhc

Subject's internment has been postponed. He would like to go to Munich, send DJMILIAN to Paris, KANTIMIR and ALIBEKOFF to Syria and TSOMALIA to Turkey (qv all).

[]
Born
2/7/46

who were to keep contact with the S.D. net in the city. The principal persons connected with this scheme were subject, Sadathieraschwili BASILIUS, Father Tarschmisvili MICHELE, and the S.D. chiefs KAPPLER, HOETTL, REISSMANN (qv). Subject was to pick three novices from among the Georgian emigrants in Germany and send them to BASILIUS; then they would be recommended to Father MICHELE, who was to be the Cloister Abbot. The three novices sent by subject were found unsuitable and many difficulties arose.

Father MICHELE and BASILIUS (qv-Italy) came to Rome in late October of 1943 with special German passports, issued under the approval of subject, in Berlin. 20637-1028
Rpt-Father
Michele TARSCHNISVILLI
8/15/44

-ic

Was in contact with Ast II, Paris from Sept. 1, 1940 on. Made trips to Abwehr II Hq. in Berlin to assure Georgian independence in case of invasion of Russia. Wanted to take over the Georgian government after the country's liberation. This was subject of his conferences with CANARIS (qv), LAHOUSEN (qv), and von LORINGHOVEN. After outbreak of Russo-German hostilities subject lived in Berlin, where, through Abwehr and High Command, he had direct connections with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Made three trips to Turkey and prepared the ground for uprisings in the Turkish and Caucasian frontier regions. He formed a Georgian office at 6, Ave. Sully-Prudhomme, Paris 7e. FX 26. S-123,
A-1
9/24/1944.

Associated with Standartenfuhrer BICKLER (qv). — BM
Was associated with SCHAVG' IDZE (qv) up until 1941. — BM

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KEDIA, Michael

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Switzerland

[]
Bern
1/29/46

Under impression that American are interested in him and offers us the use of his intelligence chain. Was to have been interned 2/1/46 (see []).

Subject was interviewed by []; cable contains list of contacts.

[]
Bern
1/29/46

no further information

*Dr. Koelle dead
Dr. Weber
Gebrant, Maude*

A-62887a
1.10.45

Continued on Page 4

Subject's chain includes Iaki MEUNARGLIA, (qv), editor of "Les Affaires Georgiennes" and Konstantin KOBARIDSE (qv), both of Paris. It has been reported from two sources that subject and his chain are now controlled by the Russians. Both the French and Swiss are interested in possible use of subject's chain. In offering us his chain subject revealed earlier contacts with SI Geneva.

* 2153a
BX 651, 2/8/46

[] (qv) believes subject to be a British SIS agent.

BX 564
12/21/45

Subject offered the Innsbruck Ukrainians his ex-Georgian contacts in Turkey (set up originally for Amt VI) This list was given to [] by Subject on the condition that the former makes the initial contacts. [] considers Subject impulsive and insecure, fears compromise of the STACHIV Mission, so has submitted the KEDIA list for us to check, see cable for names. (Comment: this list has been checked and reply cable sent #NASH

**
Bern, 9/18/46

Subject was a suspect NKVD agent by his fellow Georgians as late as 1945. His contacts with the NKVD are said to be Lt. MDIVANI and Capt. CHARTISHVILI, former member Kaukasische Verbindungsstab under RSHA Amt. VI patronage, who subsequently (1946) overtly connected with Soviet Repatriation Mission in Austria. Heidelberg has no trace on the Turks. Cable reply sent 9/24/46.

[]
Heida to Bern
9/21/46

nsf (over)

KEDIA, Michael

p. 4

** 2095a
BX 625
1/30/46

Document contains summary of info on subject. He reportedly saved BERICZE (qv) from the Germans and the latter in gratitude has been financing subject for some time. Through Dr. WEBER (qv) subject met Eugen LANG (qv), with whom he now corresponds in Spain, of the CTIO Organization in Paris, part of the profits of which are set aside for subject. Subject, upon learning that he, DJAMALIAN, KANTIMIR and ALIBEIKOFF (qqv) were to be interned by the Swiss, approached the Americans for intervention on his behalf. In return he would turn over the use of his Georgian intelligence network, with its outposts allegedly reaching as far as Moscow. The Bern office _____ mhc has received several warnings about subject's being _____ a Russian agent.

Subject and TSOVAIA (qv) implicated in RUPPERT Mission in France.

☐ ☐
4/12/46

SEC 847
ADCS DIVISION
October 14, 1944

TO: Colonel W. A. Bruce
via Lt. Col. Neve
FROM: Lt. A. S. Jolis
SUBJECT: Mission Support

It is proposed to dispatch an agent, recruited by the Labor Division in Paris, and described in further detail below, to Berlin for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, also described below.

1. Agent. Agent's name is [] age 21, of quite Russian parentage, born in Germany but educated in France. He was employed from the summer of 1943 to February, 1944 at the Swiss Legation in Berlin in the department handling American affairs. He returned to Paris in February, 1944 and failed to report to the Deutschen Vermittlungstelle for compulsory labor. He was arrested on June 12, 1944, imprisoned at Pepiniere and from there was escorted back to Germany where he was held for several days in a concentration camp for foreigners (Verwaltungsbezirk Koepenik). He was released from this camp and obtained a job with the "Deutsche Verlag" (formerly the publishing house of Ullstein). On the 9th of September, 1944, he quit his job legally in the normal fashion and decided to make his escape through the lines in order to volunteer for service with the French Army.

On arrival in Paris he was contacted by CGC, through members of the Labor Division, and due to his recent presence in Germany was able to furnish a great deal of very valuable information on travelling conditions, daily life, new regulations and restrictions, etc. Specifically he has furnished:

- a. Information which led directly to the arrest of a C-stapo agent in Paris. This was accomplished in conjunction with X-2.
- b. A report on the counter-espionage movement organized by Collaborat:cnist French officers among French workers in Germany.
- c. A report on the dispatch of Miliciens and Desertiers into France by the Reichswehrdienst giving the names of the responsible organizers.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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NWC-002004

~~SECRET~~

The Labor Division has remained in close contact with [] since his arrival in Paris and he has proven a continued and valuable source of reference for information on Germany. Due to the connection thus established, [] decided to abandon his original intention of volunteering for the French Army, preferring to work with the Americans. During this period it has been possible for us to get to know him fairly intimately. He is an extremely intelligent and observant young man, resourceful and "debutant". Due to his French and Russian background, he has no love for the Germans and has demonstrated convincingly a sincere desire for the victory of the Allies. The security problem is dealt with below.

[] has volunteered to return to Berlin on an intelligence mission for the U.S. Government. He has all the necessary German identity papers to permit him to circulate without difficulty. His mother is at present living in Berlin and he can return to her and resume his normal legal life exactly as he left it in September. The circles in which he moves are mostly French and White Russian, with many Austrian, German, Rumanian and Bulgarian friends. It is a circle of young persons all of whom have regular occupations in Berlin, many of whom are employed as specialists in vital war plants in the Berlin area, but who maintain fairly close social contacts in their leisure hours. They lead a "social" life, spend money and "get around" in spite of present Berlin conditions. Apparently politics are never discussed; although the war is a constant topic of conversation. Most of these people are fence sitters. They all want the war to end, are hoping for an early arrival of the Allies in Berlin and hope that the Americans will be there before the Russians. [] moves in these circles as a friend and an equal. There is a certain conspiratorial unity which binds them together in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. This is due to the fact that practically all of them are engaged in some form of black market operations. They spend money freely, and are able to make it again by such means. The ramifications of such contacts are of great potential value as a source of intelligence. [] is aware of this and is confident of being able to exploit the situation.

2. Intelligence Objectives

A. Penetration of the Sicherheitsdienst. [] is closely acquainted with a highly placed official of the SD in Berlin. This person is a Georgian who served the Nazis out of his opposition to the Stalin regime. His position is now extremely delicate. He dreads the arrival of the Russian armies, and will undoubtedly grab at any opportunity of being able to show that he helped the Allies. Furthermore, this man's wife is at present in Paris. She has been arrested once by the French police and subsequently released. She is now at liberty but under surveillance. With his wife in Paris and the Russian armies

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31 MAY 45

~~SECRET~~

approaching from the East, sufficient pressure could be put on this man to place him entirely in our hands. [] is confident that he can exploit the situation to the limit and obtain the following types of information:

- 1. Personalities, plans and structure of the GPU.
- 2. Plans of the Nazi party for continued resistance to the Allied occupation of Germany.
- 3. Political, diplomatic and "personality" intelligence of a more general nature, which would normally come to the knowledge of a highly placed SD official.

4. Through social and commercial contacts information can be gathered on air targets, industrial and technological developments.

5. The establishment of safe addresses and a letter-box. In this connection [] has stated that he can provide a safe address at his own home for further agents. He could accommodate up to three at a time; if necessary being able to place two of them with friends in complete security. He is in possession of his address, telephone number and explicit details as to how contacts can be arranged. We have discussed with him at length the type of personnel whom he would be able to receive without embarrassment. We have agreed upon a password and a counter-password. [] will be able to take in such agents, hide them if necessary, or alternatively permit them to live openly for limited periods. He can also provide them with food obtained on the Black Market.

3. Finance

This falls under two headings. Remuneration for the agent and operational expenses:

A. Agent remuneration. [] wishes any salary which may be due him for his services to be deposited for him with an American bank in Paris, payable in dollars or else credited to his account with the CEF payable also in dollars after the termination of his services. A sum of \$300. monthly has been provisionally agreed upon. This figure is determined by the limitation placed upon agent remuneration by this organization. It is strongly urged, however, that an exception to this rule be made in this instance in view of the hazards of the operation, the potential value of the mission to the United States, and the natural expectations of the agent. It is requested that a salary of \$300. per month be approved.

B. Operational needs. [] wishes to take no actual currency into Germany for security reasons. He will, however, require funds for the purpose of purchasing information, "buying" individuals and making such use of the Black Market as may be necessary in order to

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facilitate his operations. It is suggested that he be permitted to buy a number of articles in Paris which he could take with him without arousing suspicion and which because of their integral value could provide him with necessary money. Such articles should preferably be of gold. A gold watch, a gold signet ring, a cigarette case, would not arouse undue suspicion in possession of a well dressed, upperclass young man. In addition he could be provided with a number of gold louis d'or which could be inserted into the heels of his shoes. It is recommended that the sum of \$10,000. be allocated for this purpose.

4. Security

A request has been made to the Security Department and K-2 for a check on [redacted] This, of necessity, has had to be a negative check. Subject arrived in Paris on September 16, therefore any positive investigation of the references he has given would reveal the interest of the U. S. Government in his case and would prejudice his security. His grandfather and grandmother are at present living in Paris, also an aunt and uncle. In the absence of any positive clearance from the security department, it is requested that approval be granted by the C.C. under existing regulations. On the basis of the close association already established with [redacted] as described on page 1, the Labor Division has made a favorable evaluation of his security.

5. Dispatch

In order to reach Berlin [redacted] must first stop at Strassbourg. When he left Berlin in September to return to Paris he did so with the help of his Russian friend in the SD. At that time [redacted] did not disclose his intention of remaining in France but simply stated that he wished to attend to some important personal business. His friend at the SD offered to help him in order to get news to and obtain news from his wife in Paris. It should be understood that the White Russian colony in Berlin is drawn by ties of mutual loyalty, and personal favors of this kind are not unnatural. [redacted] can return to Berlin without any difficulty by reporting to the SD office in Strassbourg (with all his papers in order, of course) and asking that his friend in Berlin be contacted immediately by phone. His friend will at once grant him every facility. In order to get to Strassbourg [redacted] must cross the line somewhere between Nancy and Epinal. He is anxious to pass through the town of St. Die since it is the last border control station on French soil. It is desirable, therefore, that every effort be made to expedite this mission without delay lest St. Die be captured before dispatch can be arranged.

6. Communications. It is intended that Division Ruppert be coordinated with the overall Faust plan for penetration of Germany. Faust agents will avail themselves of the safe address in Berlin. They will likewise avail themselves of the letter-box facilities. Information collected by [redacted] will fall into three classes, the

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NWC-00200

most urgent will be sent out by a w/t, if and when such facilities are available; long messages or reports of a strategic, but not urgent nature, may be sent via courier or further letter-box contacts to be established. The information of a counter-intelligence nature may be held by the agent for communication after he is over-run.

Specifically, the Marthe project, already approved, contemplates the dispatch of a team, including w/t, to Berlin. This w/t will be available for Ruppert. The Marthe team is already documented and clothed and is ready to be dispatched from London as soon as the safe address to be provided by Ruppert is obtained.

Approval of this project is requested.

A. E. J.

1st Increment

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT, OSS, ETO., Fwd., 16 October 1944
TO: Colonel David K. Bruce, Commanding Officer, HQ & HQ Det.

1. Recommend approval of this project including:
 - a) That the remuneration in this special case be increased to \$500. per month, this not to create a precedent.
 - b) That a sum of \$10,000. be approved for operational needs.

(s) Charles F. Neave
CHARLES F. NEAVE
Lt. Colonel, TC
Executive Officer, SI

APPROVED:

(s) DKE Bruce
CO. OSS Det.

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10 October 1944

1975/100

To: Colonel G. W. G. Bruce

From: G. W. G. Bruce, Lt. Col.

Subject: Mission 80000000 - Amendment to Financial Provisions

1. This project, as approved by Executive Officer, SI, and Commanding Officer, OSS Detachment, provided for a budget of \$10,000.00 for operational needs. It was expected that this money would be issued in dollar currency.

2. It is recognized that the issuance of dollar currency for such purposes is highly undesirable and runs contrary to the interests of the United States Government. It is, therefore, requested that the funds for this operation be issued in French francs.

3. Since, however, the budget figure of \$10,000.00 was determined in accordance with the enhanced purchasing power of the dollar, it has been found necessary to re-estimate the financial requirements of this project if the funds are to be issued in French francs.

4. It is, therefore, requested that approval be granted for the allocation of two million (2,000,000) French francs for the operational requirements of Mission 80000000.

APPROVED:

G. W. G. Bruce

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

1000-00200

12 JAN 45
14 January 1945

MISSION RUPPERT

Having received advice from Bern that no word had been received in Switzerland through pre-arranged channels regarding the safe arrival of Ruppert in Berlin up to December 24, 1944, I sent

to check with Madame Maedia and other friends of Ruppert in Paris.

being a personal friend of Ruppert, his visits arouse no suspicion.

It was thought that these persons might possibly have received information through other channels. Reports of visits are attached.

Conclusion: None of these persons had any information on Ruppert.

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NWC-002002

HQ: 3d DISTRICT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Forward)
APO 887

Paris Division, Paris
16 April 1945

1945

TO : Commander THOMAS G. CASBARI, USA
Major COLDFIELD

FROM : Thomas S. Wilson

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON MISSION SUCCESS []

The following account was received in a short interview with [] on the night of 15 April after his arrival in Paris from 3rd Army. It has as yet not been checked.

I. TRIP. [] left Berlin 5 April accompanied by K.E.A., a representative of the "Georgia Government" who was closely with Department Six of SD, and Doctor-Professor VON KEDIA, an official in Department EST.

These three traveled from Berlin to Bad-Elster in a diplomatic automobile. At Bad-Elster [] proceeded on foot and bicycle to the American lines with assistance from the SD. KEDIA left Bad-Elster the evening of 9 April by train for Switzerland. VON KEDIA supposedly left at the same time for Nuremberg near which Department EST is presently located.

[] was captured by the Americans on 12 April and succeeded in getting to Colonel SMALLCROSS of 3rd Army on 13 April. He arrived in Paris at 2100, 15 April.

II. MISSION. [] was assisted in leaving Berlin and getting to the American lines by certain members of the SD because he agreed to undertake a mission on behalf of KEDIA. This mission is as follows:

a. [] was to contact the Americans and notify them that:

1. KEDIA desired to contact a high American official on his own mission for certain unknown (to []) officials of the SS, SD and WEHRMACHT with whom KEDIA had been in touch since 1940.

2. KEDIA can be reached at the following address: c/o Mr. CHAVICHWILI, 10 Avenue Gaspard, Valette, Geneva.

3. The American who contacts KEDIA should use the words, [] "G-2 OSS", and bring a letter to KEDIA from Mrs. KEDIA who now resides in Paris. If possible [] was to accompany the American official, but KEDIA will accept a high American official with the password.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

1000-002000

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

and letter.

III. THE GENEVA MISSION. KEDIA, as a Georgian, secured a Swiss VISA valid until 20 April to accomplish the following Missions:

1. To contact the International Red Cross on behalf of the Georgians, both civilian and military, in an attempt to provide for their future welfare. This Mission was the cover for KEDIA's trip. He wants to arrange that the Georgian civilians and WEPPSACHT should be treated as PWs and not turned over to the Russians.

2. KEDIA also was to contact the Americans on behalf of certain officials of SS, SI and WEPPSACHT. [] was given no definite understanding of the purpose of the desired meeting between KEDIA and the American officials. He believes that the SD feels that the Americans will be interested in the "mutual" problem of penetrating Georgia and Russia. He also believes that certain officials of the three named organizations are attempting to make a personal deal with the Americans. As [] was apparently protected from the GESTAPO by the persons for whom KEDIA is acting, KEDIA may have a more official mission.

IV. SECURITY. KEDIA fears that the GESTAPO has information regarding his true mission to Geneva. However he made no plans for the method of making contact beyond the password and letter definitely stating that he trusted the Americans to take all necessary security measures. KEDIA secured his VISA under the threat that the GESTAPO would shoot VON MENDE and a number of high ranking Georgians in the event that he failed to return to Germany. He expects to return.

V. TRAVEL PERMIT. KEDIA's VISA is valid for entry into Switzerland to 20 April with permission to remain in Switzerland for ten days. He expects to be able to receive ten or twenty days extension of the period inside the country after entry.

TSW

~~SECRET~~

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17
1 April 1945

MISSTION RUPPERT

The following is a summary of the situation presented by the return of Ruppert to Paris and Kedia to Switzerland:

A. KEDIA is a high official in the "Georgian Government" (Hitler Puppet Government set up at the beginning of the war to exploit the strong and traditional nationalist and separatist movement in Georgia). KEDIA has worked very closely with the SD, furnishing Georgian recruits for espionage and sabotage missions in South Russia. According to Ruppert, his sole motive in collaborating with the Nazis has been his fanatical dislike of the Communist regime and his traditional Georgian nationalism. He is reputed to be on intimate terms with highly placed SD officials and is in a position to give us the following information either directly or through his contacts:

1. The complete Nazi plans for their clandestine movement in Berlin to be activated after the Allied Occupation of that city.
2. Location of secret files.
3. Information on SD personalities.

B. In order to secure KEDIA'S full cooperation he is anxious to secure certain assurances regarding the treatment of Georgians and others who are compromised in the "anti-Bolshevist Crusade". Specifically he is interested in the following:

1. That Georgian "nationals" when captured by the Americans not be turned over to the Russians. These Georgians include Ost-arbeiters, members of the Wehrmacht, and Georgian civilians who were resident in Germany before the war. He is also anxious to protect 100 officials (of which he has a list) who have been most active in anti-Russian activities. Such persons include Georgians "nationals", SD personnel who worked on the "Russian Desk" and certain Wehrmacht officials. This list will not be known to us until we have seen KEDIA.

Among these 100 persons there are some who are prepared for ideological and nationalistic reasons to continue their espionage activities.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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NWC-001999

C. KEDIA is anxious to confer with some "high American official" who is in a position to give some specific and authoritative assurances on the above matters. He has stated to Ruppert that he would prefer to deal with the British "since the British have a keener political understanding of such matters", but has given Ruppert an assurance that he will contact noone until having had a chance to talk with the Americans.

D. Our Suggestions

1. To talk with KEDIA and find out what information he can give us immediately on the SD and the post-hostilities clandestine movement.
2. Inform him of the treatment accorded to Russians captured by the American forces (both Wehrmacht and civilian personnel) who either do not wish to return to Russia or do not acknowledge Soviet citizenship.
3. Ascertain who are the 100 persons whom he wishes to protect and obtain a list of their names, pseudonyms, jobs, physical descriptions, if possible.
4. Give him passwords whereby the above persons can contact OSS Field Detachments.
5. Indicate to him that such persons will be treated as P/W's (and will not be turned over to the Russians) but that any other concessions will depend entirely upon their value to us after suitable opportunities for interrogation and screening.

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TRANSLATION OF AIDE MEMOIRE PREPARED BY KEDIA

Geneva 28th April 1945

Sir:

In referring to the discussion we had on April 27th I would like to set down in this aide memoire the principal points which I exposed.

The principal question which dominates the international situation today is the determination of Stalin to emerge as sole beneficiary from this war which has been fought with so much sacrifice by the Allies.

The Western democracies will be committing a very grave error which may cost them the total loss of Europe, Asia and even Africa if they regard Stalin simply as a Russian statesman. If that were the case he would be satisfied with the enormous gains which this war have brought him in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and in Asia.

But the Allies must know Stalin; know his aims, and his methods of fighting as we know them in order to understand that Stalin is not just a Russian statesman. He makes use of Russia and flatters her imperialist sentiments only in order to introduce communism and thereby his own personal power wherever he can.

This denaturalized Georgian, exiled from his country, now dictator of Russia, has nothing to lose and everything to gain. Intelligent, and above all cunning, with a willpower of iron, he knows what he wants and will endeavor to arrive at his ends without retreating before any obstacles.

His aims today are no longer the defeat of Nazi Germany, a fact which is already practically accomplished, but the expulsion of the Anglo-Saxons in Europe, Asia, and wherever else he can. In addition to his legendary cunning and his iron will, he possesses throughout Europe and Asia armies of discontented people and fifth columns. The ranks of these fifth columns are being swelled in proportions with Stalin's advance through Europe under the halo of a Liberator.

In the face of this grave danger which threatens the world the democracies must face Stalin without a day's delay with an active and tenacious policy. If the democracies wish to avoid committing suicide they must prepare a cordon and organize the people on this side of the barricade before the explosion of the inevitable armed conflict. The first problem to be solved on this side of the barricade on the part of the democracies is the German problem. The whole of Stalin's policy at the present time is geared to the winning over of Germany himself. He is well aware of the great value of the trump card which Germany represents in his fight against the Allies. It should be added that he has many convinced supporters in all German circles. Some of these are being recruited through

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[]
NWC-001996

ideological convictions, others through the distress provoked by Allied bombings, and others who hope to work out a Bismarckian policy and salvage Germany through a Russian alliance.

Stalin, with his cunning, knows how to exploit all these sentiments for his own ends. It is for this reason that the Allies are compelled to dispute territories with Stalin in Germany itself.

But there are also many other elements in Germany who wish to come to an understanding with the democracies for the organization of Europe on a just basis. These Germans must be sought out. They must be helped by every means to organize themselves. With a just understanding of the expectations and desires of these circles one can win over the whole people to the common cause. With regard to the liquidation of the last vestiges of the Nazi movement, this must be left to these German elements. They will accomplish the task much better than the Allied Military Government.

We are acquainted with some of these German personalities. With their help we were able to maintain ourselves in Berlin, carrying on a definite opposition to the nefarious Nazi policy in the question of the Eastern European Nationalities. Attached to this memorandum is a list of persons with whom we were in regular contact in Germany. These individuals can in turn complete the list with quantities of other names more important than their own.

Once this first important factor in Europe, namely Germany, has been won for the cause, other European problems will have to be tackled. The peoples of Western Europe must be satisfied and won over to the anti-Stalinist block, and the most important of these is France. Once the German and Western European problems have been settled, the Balkan countries will go along with the Anglo-Saxons as well as the great majority of the Poles who wish neither Russian domination nor communism.

With regard to the people of Eastern Europe including non-Russians in the USSR who number 90 millions, the Baltic states, White Ruthenia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Volger-Tatar, and the Tatars of the Crimea for whom I and my friends were the spokesmen in Berlin; their organization and direction will be simple. These people all want to separate from Russia and establish the independence of their countries. It was for this reason for that matter that the sons of these people ever since the outbreak of the Russo-German war deserted in masses from the Red Army and came to Germany to demand arms and volunteer in the German army. It was only the cruel treatment of the Nazis for these prisoners volunteers, and the nefarious German policy toward these nationals which provoked their mass desertion and developed a vigorous anti-Nazi opposition among those who remained until the end in German units and the National Legion. This great mass of men consisting of several hundreds of thousands cannot of course be organized on a policy based on a concept of the "sub-human" out of the East, but with a democratic policy of Liberty and the self-determination of peoples.

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The first thing to be done in this direction is to prevent at once all the Caucasians and other non-Russian people who have fallen into the hands of the Western Allies as prisoners, refugees or deported workers from being returned to the Russians. Naturally many among these men believe in the victory of Stalin, and would like to create an alibi in order to regain his favor and thus save their lives. But this effort will avail them little, since once Stalin has made use of them he will eliminate them not because they have fought against him, but because they have seen too much of European life.

It is necessary therefore, to save these men, but if it is unfortunately not possible under present conditions, then we must save at least the Elite and save them until tomorrow. For this reason we ask that we may be permitted to return to Germany, with the necessary papers, and accompanied by American officers, also to Northern Italy and Denmark in order to seek out first of all the National Committees who have led these people, and also the elite and any others who can be saved. We must of course also seek out all our German friends mentioned above. In this connection, Prof. Von Mende who is at present at Buhler will be a helpful collaborator, an old friend of ours a decided anti-Nazi and a European of the best type, with whom among others we would be able to set up the necessary apparatus.

It would also be useful if I could be permitted to establish as soon as possible contact with my friends in Turkey with whom we worked for three years.

To summarize, I would be grateful if you would transmit to your government or whoever is concerned our fears of Stalin's policy, which can only be fought by an equally energetic policy and the organization of anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian forces and not merely by diplomatic dealings.

I hope that our apprehensions and fears for the policies and person of Stalin will be received by you with more understanding than they were by the Nazi government of the Herrvolk who thought they understood everything better than us poor "sub-humans" from the East.

Signed.

M. MEDIA.

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ATTACHMENT TO MEDIA'S ATDE MEMOIRE

MEN WHO WILL BE USEFUL FOR WORK IN GERMANY

IN THE CKW Abwehr 11

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Professor Hadz RAUPACH | Lt. in the Reserve |
| 2. Engineer CAJKE | Oberleutnant in the Reserve |
| 3. Dr. MARQUERT | Oberleutnant in the Reserve |
| 4. Docent NAUMANN | Oberleutnant in the Reserve |
| 5. Professor CBERLENDER | Capt. in the Reserve. Professor
→ the University of Prague |
| 6. Major von URLAR | Cadre Officer. |

The leader of this group, Colonel FREITAG, who was also a friend of ours, committed suicide on the 20th July 1944. Thereafter the SS took the rest of the group in hand and appointed another chief SKORZENI, who organized the kidnaping of Mussolini.

IN THE SS. (Section SD AMT VI, groupe 5).

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Dr. WAGNER | Former journalist, who was an
Anti-Nazi in 1940 in Paris and
who helped me save all our Jews.
He also knew of the affaire Jura. |
| 2. VON STADEN | |
| 3. Capt. BENINGHAUS | |
| 4. Dr. SCHULE | Lt. in the Reserve, an an anti-
Nazi from an old family. |
| 5. Sturmabfuhrer Dr. HENGELHAUPT | who also came to paris in 1940 and
helped me a great deal in Jewish
questions, and later in Berlin
during my struggles with the
Georgian Nazi group. |
| 6. Dr. SCHINDOWSKI | Former mayor of Tilsit. |

IN THE SS. HAUPTAMT

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 1. Gruppenfuhrer Dr. WACHTER |) |
| 2. Obersturmbahnfuhrer Dr. ARLT |) |
| 3. Standartenfuhrer Dr. WOLF |) |

All these three are now with the
Ukranian Division and marching
westwards to surrender to the
Americans.

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NWC-001996 B

IN THE OST-MINISTERIUM

- 1. Professor VON ISENDE

A man who has never been a member of the Party. I cannot say enough of the services rendered to all of us. Among his many collaborators I will only cite:

- 2. WALTER ZEITLER
- 3. DR. HIMPFL

IN THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE VOLUNTEERS LEGION.

- 1. Major VOLKER
- 2. Lt. Col. NIKEL

Chief of the Headquarters
Chief of Propaganda

IN THE WEHRMACHT PROPAGANDA.

- 1. Sonderfuhrer LEDERER:

IN THE WAFFEN AMT

- 1. Lt. Col. PASSAU

In the Waffen Amt this man played a big role, and knows everything about the manufacture of German arms.

- 2. HARALD FEHRMAN

His friend, a Brazilian Barker. He was in constant relations with the Anglo-Saxons in order to promote a cessation of hostilities. A specialist in international political and economic questions.

IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

- DR. KLEIST

who despaired of ever arriving at an understanding with the Western powers and undertook personal discussions with the Soviets via Stockholm. Ministerial director, and Standartenfuhrer in the SS he was supported by the Chief of the SD KALTENBRUNNER.

Also among our friends we have General HOFFMANN, Commander of Luftgau III

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Genève, le 28 avril 1945.

Monsieur,

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En me référant à l'entretien que nous avons eu ensemble à la date du 27 avril, je tiens à préciser dans cet aide-mémoire les points principaux des idées exposées.

La question principale qui domine la situation internationale actuelle, c'est la volonté de Staline d'être le seul profiteuse de la guerre menée avec tant de sacrifices par les Alliés.

Les démocraties de l'Ouest commettraient une erreur grave, qui leur coûterait la perte totale de l'Europe, de l'Asie, et même de l'Afrique si elles se bornaient à considérer Staline comme un homme d'Etat russe.

Si tel était le cas, il pourrait s'estimer satisfait des gains énormes que la fin de la guerre lui a apportés à l'Est de l'Europe, dans les Balkans, et en Asie.

Mais les Alliés doivent connaître Staline, ses visées et ses méthodes de lutte, comme nous les connaissons, pour comprendre que Staline n'est pas l'homme d'Etat russe qu'ils s'imaginent.

Il se sert seulement de la Russie, en flattant les sentiments impérialistes russes, pour introduire le communisme, au moyen de son pouvoir personnel, partout où il le peut.

Le Géorgien dénaturalisé, chassé de son pays natal, devenu dictateur de la Russie n'a rien à perdre et tout à gagner.

Intelligent, rusé surtout, et doué d'une volonté de fer, il sait ce qu'il veut et il essayera, en ne se laissant effrayer par aucun obstacle, d'arriver à ses fins.

Son but, aujourd'hui, n'est plus la défaite de l'Allemagne nazie, ce qui est un fait presque accompli, mais bien de chasser les Anglo-Saxons de l'Europe, de l'Asie et de partout où il le pourra.

A côté de sa ruse légendaire et de sa volonté de fer, il utilise dans toute l'Europe, en Asie et ailleurs des armées de mécontents, et des cinquièmes colonnes.

Les rangs de ces cinquièmes colonnes s'accroissent au fur et à mesure de l'avance de Staline en Europe, d'autant plus qu'il acquiert l'auréole d'un libérateur.

Devant ce grave danger qui menace le monde, il faut que les démocraties, sans perdre un jour, opposent une politique active et tenace.

Avant l'écllosion d'un conflit armé inévitable avec Staline, si toutefois les démocraties ne préfèrent pas se suicider directement, il faut préparer un cordon sûr et organiser les peuples, du côté de la barricade.

Le premier problème à résoudre de ce côté, pour les démocraties, c'est le problème allemand.

Toute la politique de Staline tend actuellement à gagner l'Allemagne. Il sait bien quel atout présente pour lui la carte allemande dans sa lutte contre les Alliés. Il faut préciser qu'il a beaucoup de partisans convaincus dans tous les milieux allemands, les uns gagnés par l'idéologie soviétique, les autres par le mécontentement provoqué à la suite des bombardements alliés, et enfin tous ceux qui espèrent reprendre la politique de Bismark, du sauvetage de l'Allemagne par l'alliance russe.

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n'avait jusqu'alors jamais tenu une place de quelque importance dans la politique géorgienne. C'est l'homme de la seconde génération, qui a été connu par ses sentiments nationalistes et patriotiques. Au reste, il avait une assez importante fabrique de fromage, vivait lui-même bien et aidait beaucoup ses compatriotes.

Les allemands avaient l'habitude, quand ils occupaient un pays, de s'adresser à un homme choisi parmi les émigrés des différents pays et d'établir par le truchement de cet homme le contact avec chaque groupement de ces émigrations.

Quand les premiers officiers de l'Etat-major se sont adressés à X. Kedia, ce fut une surprise générale. Cette surprise sera compréhensible quand nous dirons qu'à Berlin il existait un groupe de jeunes gens national-socialiste, mais dirigé par un jeune professeur géorgien, naturalisé allemand et ami personnel de Rosenberg. A Paris même existait une petite filiale de ce groupe.

Naturellement tout le monde craignait que les allemands ne prennent leur homme dans ce groupe et cette crainte était d'autant plus justifiée qu'un règlement de compte était à redouter. En effet, les nazis, recrutés avec les rangs de nationaux sont plus dangereux et cruels pour ces nationaux que les nazis allemands eux-mêmes. L'expérience de 6 années a prouvé largement ce fait.

Ce n'est que trois mois plus tard qu'il a pu être établi le motif qui a poussé les militaires allemands à choisir Kedia. Ce groupe de militaires était composé par des officiers de réserve, en majorité des professeurs et doctes de l'université. Ils étaient anti-nazis mais patriotes allemands et ne voulaient pas avoir affaire avec les nazis d'autres nations.

Un de ces officiers allemands, R. Mademacher, déclara en conversation confidentielle à X. Kedia, déjà au mois d'octobre de 1940, que le salut de l'Allemagne dépendait d'un sous-officier et de dix soldats allemands qui auraient fusillé Hitler. Cette confiance a constitué la base des relations ultérieures entre Kedia et le groupe allemand anti-nazi camouflé. Ce groupe d'officiers a introduit, par la suite, Kedia dans tous les ministères et auprès de l'organisation allemande qui s'occupait de la question de l'Est européen et surtout du Caucase.

Pourtout ces anti-nazis avaient leurs ramifications et leurs hommes. Kedia se lia d'amitié avec ces hommes tels que le comte de Schulenberg, ancien ambassadeur à Moscou et occupant un haut poste au ministère des affaires étrangères, Prof. von Bende qui appartenait au ministère Rosenberg, Lt-Colonel Br. Kreffe chez les S.S., pour ne pas citer des dizaines d'autres noms.

Ces hommes ne pouvaient malheureusement pas changer le cours fatal de la politique allemande, mais, étant donné qu'ils occupaient des situations importantes, faisaient leur possible pour corriger le mal que le parti nazi faisait d'abord en Allemagne elle-même et ensuite à toutes les autres nations de l'Est européen.

C'est grâce à ces hommes, disséminés un peu partout, que

*l'émigré
géo-ry...*

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-3-

dans les zones des Alliés Anglo-Saxons, d'être livrés aux Soviétiques.

Naturellement, beaucoup de ces hommes qui croient au triomphe de Staline, voudront peut-être aujourd'hui se créer un alibi pour gagner la grâce de Staline et sauver ainsi leur vie. Mais cet essai ne leur sera guère utile, car, lorsque Staline les aura utilisés, il les supprimera, non parce qu'ils ont pris les armes contre lui, mais pour cette raison suffisante qu'il ont pu connaître la vie européenne.

Il s'agit alors de sauver ces hommes, et si, par malheur, l'état actuel des choses ne permet pas le sauvetage de cette masse, il faut au moins mettre l'élite hors de danger, et la réserver pour demain.

Pour cette raison, nous demandons qu'il nous soit permis, à nous et nos collaborateurs, munis de tous les moyens nécessaires et accompagnés par des officiers américains, de retourner en Allemagne occupée ainsi qu'en Italie du nord et au Danemark pour rechercher d'abord les Comités nationaux qui ont dirigé ces peuples, et pour sauver des élites tout ce qui est susceptible d'en être sauvé.

Il faudrait naturellement rechercher en Allemagne tous nos amis allemands, pour le but dont nous avons parlé plus haut. A cette fin le Prof. von Mende, qui est actuellement à Böhler, sera un précieux collaborateur. C'est un de nos vieux amis, un anti-nazi déclaré et un européen de la meilleure classe, qui, avec d'autres amis, pourra monter l'appareil nécessaire.

Il serait également utile qu'il me soit permis d'établir le plus vite possible des relations avec mes amis, en Turquie, avec lesquels nous avons collaboré pendant trois années.

En résumé, je vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre à votre gouvernement ou à qui de droit, notre crainte que les moyens ordinaires de la diplomatie ne soient insuffisants à combattre la politique de Staline. Nous préconisons une politique active d'organisation des forces antibolcheviques et anti-russes. Nous espérons que vous accueillerez avec ^{plus de} compréhension l'expression de notre appréhension et de nos désirs, que ne le fit le gouvernement nazi du "Herren Volk" qui prétendait tout savoir mieux que nous, les "Unten Menschen aus Osten".

signé: Kédia.

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Aide-memoire

Geneve le 22 aout 1951

Cher Monsieur,

En me referant a l'entretien que nous avons eu ensemble avec vous a la date du 22 aout, je tiens a preciser dans cet aide-memoire les points principaux des idees exposees.

La question principale qui domine la situation internationale d'aujourd'hui c'est la volonte de Stalin d'etre le seul profiteuse de la guerre menee avec tant des sacrifices par les allies.

Les democraties de l'ouest comettraient une erreur grave et qui leur coûterait la perte totale de l'Europe de l'Asie et même de l'Afrique, s'ils considereraient Stalin comme un homme d'Etat russe; si tel etait le cas il pourrait être satisfait des gains énormes que la fin de la guerre lui aura apporte dans l'Est de l'Europe, dans les Balcons et dans l'Asie.

Cependant les allies doivent connaître Stalin, connaître ses visées et ses methodes de lutte, comme nous les connaissons, pour comprendre que Stalin n'est pas un homme d'Etat russe. Il se sert seulement de la Russie, en flattant les sentiments imperialistes russes pour introduire le communisme et par ce moyen son pouvoir personnel partout ou il le peut.

Ce georgien denaturelise, chassé de son pays natal, devenu dictateur de la Russie, n'a rien a perdre et tout a gagner.

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II. Intelligent, surtout rusé et avec une volonté de fer, il sait ce qu'il veut et il l'essayera en ne reculant devant aucun obstacle et arrivera à ses fins.

Son but aujourd'hui n'est plus la défaite de l'Allemagne nazie, laquelle est un fait presque accompli, mais ce de chasser les Anglo-saxons de l'Europe, de l'Asie et de partout où il le peut. -

A part sa ruse légendaire, à part sa volonté de fer, il a dans toute l'Europe, dans l'Asie et ailleurs des armées de mécontents et de ses cinquièmes colonnes. Les rangs de ces cinquièmes colonnes augmentent à fur et à mesure que les avances de Staline en Europe s'accroissent et qu'il obtient l'oreille d'un libérateur.

Devant ce grave danger qui menace le monde, il faut que les démocraties sans perdre un jour opposent à Staline une politique active et tenace.

Avant l'écllosion d'un conflit armé inévitable avec Staline, si toutefois les démocraties ne veulent pas se suicider eux-mêmes, il faut préparer un cordon sur et organiser les peuples de ce côté de la barrière.

Le premier problème à résoudre de ce côté pour les démocraties, c'est le problème allemand.

Toute la politique de Staline tend actuellement au gain de l'Allemagne pour soi. Il sait bien quel atout puissant présente pour lui la carte allemande dans sa lutte contre les alliés.

Il faut dire qu'il a beaucoup de partisans convaincus dans tous les milieux allemands.

III. - les uns gagnés par les sentiments idéologiques, les autres par le mécontentement provoqué à la suite du bombardement allié, et d'autres enfin, espérant faire une politique de Bismarck de sauvetage de l'Allemagne par l'alliance russe.

Stalin par sa ruse sait exploiter tous ces milieux pour son propre but. -

C'est pour cette raison que les alliés sont obligés de disputer le terrain à Stalin en Allemagne même.

Mais il y a en Allemagne beaucoup d'autres forces qui veulent s'entendre avec les démocraties Anglo-saxonnes, en vue de l'organisation de l'Europe sur une base juste.

Il faut chercher ces allemands, il faut les aider par tous les moyens de s'organiser.

Avec une politique juste et la compréhension de desiderata de ces milieux, on peut gagner le peuple pour la cause commune.

En ce qui concerne la liquidation des derniers vestiges du Nazisme, il faut laisser ces milieux allemands même de s'en occuper.

Ils vont le faire beaucoup mieux, que l'administration militaire alliée.

Vous connaissez quelques-uns de ces personnalités allemandes, avec l'appui d'aucun nous avons pu nous maintenir à Berlin, tout en faisant une politique de vive opposition contre la politique refaite au Nazis, dans les questions des nationalités de l'Est Européen.

IV.

A cet exposé je joins la liste des personnes, avec lesquels nous étions en contact suivi en Allemagne. Ces personnes à leurs tour peuvent compléter cette liste par quantité d'autres noms de personnalités encore plus importantes qu'eux mêmes.

Si ce premier important facteur en Europe et l'Allemagne est gagné pour la cause, il faut s'attaquer aux autres problèmes Européens.

Il faut que les peuples de l'Ouest d'Europe aussi soient contents et gagnés pour le bloc anti-stalinien et en premier lieu la France.

Une fois le problème de l'Allemagne, de l'Ouest Européen amorcé, les pays balcaniques marcheront avec les Anglo-saxons ainsi que la grande majorité des Polonais, qui ne veulent pas la domination de la Russie et du communisme.

En ce que concerne les peuples de l'Est Européens, les peuples non russes inclus dans l'U.R.S.S. et lesquels représentent 90 millions d'ames: les pays baltes, la Ruthénie blanche, l'Ukraine, le Caucase, le Turkestan, les Volga-Tatars et les Tatars de la Crimée, dont mes amis et moi étions porte-parole à Berlin, pour ceci leur organisation et leurs directions sera facile.

Ces peuples veulent tous se séparer de la Russie et rétablir la liberté et l'indépendance de leur pays. C'est pour cette raison du reste, que les fils de ces peuples dès le commencement de la guerre germano-soviétique ont désertés en masse l'armée rouge et sont venus en Allemagne pour demander des armes et pour s'engager dans les armées allemandes comme volontaires.

V. C'est seulement le cruel traitement de la part des nazis envers ces prisonniers tenus volontairement et la nefaste politique allemande dans les questions de nationalités qui a provoqué la desertion en masse de ces volontaires et suscité une vive opposition anti-nazi parmi ceux qui restaient jusqu'à derniers jours dans les unités allemandes et dans les Légions Nationales. Toute cette masse d'hommes et elle est de l'ordre de plusieurs centaines de milliers, peut être organisée, naturellement pas avec une politique nazie d'Unter Menschen aus Osten, mais avec une politique démocratique de liberté des peuples et de droit de disposer d'eux mêmes.

La première chose à faire, dans cet ordre d'idées est d'empêcher toute suite, que tous les Caucasiens et autres peuples non russes, qui tombent soit comme travailleurs, soit comme légionnaire, soit comme réfugiés dans les zones des alliés Anglo-Saxons, ne soient pas livrés aux soviets.

Naturellement beaucoup, parmi ces hommes qui croient au triomphe de Staline, voudront peut-être aujourd'hui se créer un alibi pour gagner la grâce de Staline et sauver ainsi leurs vies. Mais cet effort ne leur sera de beaucoup d'utilité, car lorsque Staline les aura utilisés, il les supprimera, non parce qu'ils ont pris les armes contre lui, mais une seule raison suffit c'est d'avoir vu la vie européenne.

VI. Il s'agit alors de sauver en somme, mais si possible malheureusement l'état actuel des choses ne le permet pas il faut au moins sauver l'élite de ces hommes et la garder pour demain.

Pour cette raison, nous demandons, qu'il nous soit permis à nous et à nos collaborateurs munis de tous les moyens nécessaires et accompagnés par les officiers américains, de retourner en Allemagne occupée, en Italie du Nord, au Danemark pour rechercher d'abord les Comités Nationaux qui ont dirigés ces peuples, sauver les élites des légionnaires et tous ce qui est susceptible d'être sauvé.

Il faut naturellement rechercher en Allemagne tous nos amis allemands aussi, pour le but dont nous avons parlé plus haut. A cette fin le Professor von Meude, qui est actuellement à Bülter sera un précieux collaborateur, un vieil ami de nous, un anti-Nazi décidé et un Européen de meilleure classe, lequel avec d'autres amis pourrons monter l'appareil nécessaire. —

Il serait utile aussi qu'il me soit permis d'établir le plus vite possible des relations avec mes amis en Turquie avec lequel nous avons collaboré durant 3 années.

En résumé, je vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre à votre Gouvernement ou à qui de droit toute notre crainte envers la Politique de Staline, laquelle pourra être combattue seulement par une politique active, d'organisation des forces anti-bolcheviques et anti-Russes et non

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pas seulement par des financiers diplomatiques.
J'espère que nos appréhensions et nos craintes pour
la politique et pour la personne de Staline, seront
accueillies avec beaucoup plus de compréhension
par vous que ne le fit le Gouvernement Nazi
du "Herrn Volk" qui prétendait de savoir
tout mieux, que nous les "pauvres Unter-
menschen aus Osten".

M. Kedzie

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REPORT ON GEORGES BERIDZE - Prepared by Max Lippman on
info furnished by ()

April 1945

It appears that () was interned in 1940 in the French camp at Le Vernet with GEORGES BERIDZE, one of the Georgian leaders in France who had worked with KEDIA. BERIDZE and () became friends. KEDIA arranged for BERIDZE to be released under the occupation in 1941. He remained in France until August 1944 and then left for Switzerland. He is reputed to be strongly anti-Nazi but at the same time to have profited enormously through his German contacts, earning millions of francs which he succeeded in transferring to Switzerland.

At the end of the war of 1914 BERIDZE was the Georgian representative at the League of Nations in Geneva, and is considered as one of the greatest experts in petroleum matters. His friendship with KEDIA was very close, and it was he who subsidized KEDIA'S studies when the latter was a young man. It is thought that BERIDZE had personal petroleum interests in the Caucasus.

At the present time BERIDZE is living with his family at Lausanne where () sees him frequently. () has a power of attorney for BERIDZE and supervises his apartment and other affairs in Paris. This letter has been seen, and it is a full power.

It is probable that KEDIA while in Switzerland will be in touch with BERIDZE.

BERIDZE is also a friend of General GUIZA, Swiss Chief of Staff, and M. MARTIN, former director of the Journal de Geneve.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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After Hitler started his war against Russia, the leading members of the four Caucasian nations (who in nearly all cases had already been living for a long time in exile) gathered in Berlin, hoping to gain independence by a German victory. At first the German army supported these ideas, but later Rosenberg and Schickedanz (Ost Ministerium) convinced Hitler that the independence of the Caucasian nations would be of no interest to Nazi German imperialism, as particularly the Caucasian oilfields, and the border zone towards Persia and Turkey should be entirely under German control. At this time Schickedanz became Governor of the Caucasus.

So in 1942 the N.C.C. found itself in a very difficult situation. On the one hand they saw their political aims frustrated, on the other they had been used by the German authorities, since August 1941, to build up a network of intelligence covering the Caucasus and the Kalmuck Steppes. At the same time the panturanian Turks had built up an intelligence connection in central Asia, and, which was still more important, had picked out Caucasians from German prison camps to build up a Caucasian Corps. These Caucasians had followed the call of the N.C.C. because its leaders, deceived by the Nazi authorities, had promised them the chance to fight against Russia for the independence of their countries. But they were not at all interested to support either Russia or Germany in a war at the end of which their nation would be dominated by either of the two. The N. C. C. (which was not liquidated by the Nazis, who still planned to use it eventually) now had the difficult task of disentangling their men from the German army, who were called to arms under false pretences.

The president of the N. C. C. was Kedia, who says that the only Germans who admitted the injustice done to them were Von Mende of the Ost Ministerium and the chief of the Eastern department of the S.D. Graefe (the latter was killed in a motor accident in 1944). Von Mende is half Russian, knows south Russia well and was German specialist for Caucasian questions. According to Kedia, from 1942 on Mende helped the members of the N. C. C. whenever he could, and exposed himself continually to grave dangers in working against the declared policy of his ministry and the Reichskanzlei. Count Schulenberg (chief of the South Russian department in the Foreign office, killed after July 20, 1944) helped him considerably. As the fight for their men brought Kedia and his committee into conflict with the army and Nazi authorities, Kedia assures us that only through Mende's very courageous handling of the matter were their lives and liberty saved, and those of many others with them. Among other incidents were the following:

1. Only through the help of Mende and his collaborators was Kedia able to save the lives of the Georgian and Persian Jewish community in Paris (250 people) for which Kedia received the attached letters of thanks from the Jewish authorities.

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2. In March 1945 it was again possible only through Kedia's help to save the life of an American agent, (), now in touch with Mr. Jollis in Paris.

After managing to move the whole staff of the N. C. C. and the Caucasian Corps to North Italy and West Germany (and thereby out of the immediate danger of falling into the hands of the Russians) Kedia escaped in April 1945 together with the last remnants of the N.C.C. He took with him Kedia, who had made this escape to Switzerland possible, out of the hands of the ever suspicious Gestapo. On April 27th they crossed the Swiss border, Kedia under the false name of George Metrinelli. On May 7th five of them were brought back to the prison camp at Hochst, near St. Margarethen on the Swiss border (in Germany), but according to what Mr. Marty of the International Red Cross told Kedia, are still under some control of the International Red Cross. Kedia was told that they could only be kept under this control until May 13, after which they are supposed to be delivered to the Allies, and consequently probably handed over to the Russians.

Kedia, who is in touch with Mr. Marty of the I.R.C. begs for help:

1. To save his friends at Hochst from being delivered to the Russians.
2. To save at least the elite of the Caucasian Corps now prisoners of the Western Allies in France and Northern Italy from being handed over to the Russians.

According to information Kedia has received from France, many members of the Caucasian Corps have voted to return to Russia, fearing that they will be handed over to the Russians in any case, and if they have voted for Russia they will then have a chance for survival. But at least 20,000 men of the Corps have voted against returning to Russia. It is for this group of men that Kedia asks for help. Kedia is convinced that deliverance to the Soviet of either his friends or the 20,000 men of the C.C. means for them certain death.

Kedia, Djamalien, Alibegow and Kantemir, who formed the N.C.C. and who are still in Geneva, have decided to leave Switzerland and deliver themselves up to the Russians if they do not succeed in their plan to help their friends, because "they prefer death to eternal shame".

My opinion:

1. Kedia, who proved to me to be a good friend of Nuri pasha in Istanbul, seems to be a person of great decency, strong character, sharp in elligence and trustworthiness. Knowing him, I think we should give his friends the benefit of the doubt. Knowing these Turkish and Caucasian people myself,

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I am convinced that we will not find many bad eggs among Kedia's leading men. Their work was dangerous and without any remuneration (Kedia assures me that he never received a cent from the Nazis, which I, knowing the standpoint of Nuri Pasha and his friends in these matters, believe to be the truth).

2. These Caucasians should not be regarded as Quislings; they are more or less in the same position as the Poles, struggling for their independence from the Russians.

3. Kedia, especially if in contact with Nuri Pasha, should be in a position to build up the finest intelligence network in the Caucasus and central Asia, Persia, India and the near East, as their followers do not work as paid agents, but for purely patriotic reasons (details can be given in a special memo).

I propose, presuming there is an interest for this work, to get in touch with the other members of the N.C.C. in Geneva and/or at Hochst. Also to ask the Y.M.C.A. to take care as far as possible of the elite of the Caucasian prisoners in the prison camps in France and North Italy, and try to save them from being handed over to the Russians. The American and English churches, if one could interest them in the matter, could be of great help in putting this through in the political arena.

Concerning Mende, and referring to my earlier statement, it is quite possible that I committed a grave error (grave, because his life is at stake) in pointing him out as being unworthy of help. Perhaps, having already too much on his hands in helping the Caucasians, he shelved the Central Asian problems presented to him by Nuri Pasha and myself, thinking they would only increase the antagonism of the Ost Ministerium against which he already had to fight in the interests of his Caucasian friends. Not realizing my political views - which I did not and could not disclose to him, being an official of Rosenberg's - it is not improbable that he tried every means of getting me out of the way, even to asking his friends of the S.D. to intervene against me.

On the other hand one must take into account the possibility that my liaison man in the S.D. who informed me of Mende's steps against me, had exaggerated the case in order to prove the extent of his help.

Be that as it may, certainly Kedia seems to have no personal interest to endanger the case of his Caucasian friends by making Mende appear better than he really is.

I should like very much to talk the matter over with Mende myself.

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Forward)
APO 887

LABOR DIVISION, PARIS
18 May 1945

TO : Lt. HODKINSON, Special Funds
FROM : Lt. A. E. JCLIS
SUBJECT: MISSION RUPPERT

Reference is made to the advance of 1500 Swiss Francs advanced to the undersigned as per request dated 22 April 1945.

This sum should be charged to MISSION RUPPERT and is accounted for as follows:

Expenses re trip to Switzerland--Annemasse--Geneva--Bern with Agent RUPPERT. Rail fares, meals, hotel and entertainment for purposes of conferring with KEDIA or other persons connected with this project.

April 15 - April 26, 1945	250
Clothing for agent; Raincoat, shirt, etc.	287
	<u>537</u>
Balance returned herewith	<u>963</u>
	—

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RELEASE AS SANITIZED

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

2000

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

EXTRACT FROM ACTIVITY REPORT DATED 31 May 1945

PARA 2 (b) MISSION ROBERT

As reported in the last activity report dated April 30, Lt. Jolis accompanied George () to Annemasse for the purpose of contacting various individuals whom he had induced to leave Berlin with him and who had succeeded in getting into Switzerland. Contact with one of the persons was made in Geneva. The remainder was being held in a Swiss Refugee Camp. Lt. Jolis discussed the matter with Lt. Dulles in Bern and the latter agreed to assign someone in Bern to follow through. On 13 May Bern reported that the three persons held by the Swiss were transferred out of Switzerland into a Swiss Red Cross Camp at Hocht, Austria, and that it was no longer possible to follow through on the interrogation from Bern. Consequently Lt. Jolis on his return from having escorted Lambert to Salzburg, stopped over at the 7th Army Field Detachment in Augsburg and discussed the matter with Major Crosby. Major Crosby agreed to contact the three persons held at Hocht and advise of further developments. Meanwhile one of the persons, namely a Frenchman, succeeded in leaving the camp in Switzerland before the rest of the party was transferred to Hocht. The Frenchman crossed over into France and succeeded in contacting Col. Baker at Annemasse and was sent to Paris. Upon arrival in Paris he was placed in the X-2 interrogation center where he was interviewed by YOURI and representatives of X-2. After having determined that this person was of no further interest to OCS he was turned over to the French. A full report on the developments outlined above is now in preparation.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3,
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

31 May 1945

MICHAEL KEDIA

MISSION RUPPERT

Summary of Mission and results obtained as of this date

1. As described in the original statement of the mission, Ruppert was to go to Berlin in order to exploit certain contacts which he claimed to have in the SD. This section was satisfied that Ruppert was capable of accomplishing the journey, maintaining his cover, and carrying out such directives as might be given him. Not being qualified however, to provide specific briefing material on SD matters, the project was presented to X-2 in order to obtain certain directives and lines of enquiry which might be fruitful for Ruppert to follow. Such directives unfortunately, were not forthcoming, and it was not possible to obtain any briefing material from X-2. It was therefore necessary to dispatch Ruppert with only the most general directives, namely to exploit whatever contacts he might develop, and to use his own initiative and discretion.

Thrown thus upon his own resources, Ruppert followed whatever contacts presented themselves, and these all led from his original contact KEDIA whom he had known in Paris. The information supplied by KEDIA and the names of his contacts in German government and military circles which he furnished to me in Geneva in April 1945 indicate that had Ruppert been given a detailed briefing on SD matters by X-2 before dispatch, this mission would have yielded far more important and tangible results.

2. When Ruppert returned to Paris and advised us that KEDIA, VON MENDE, TSOMALA, ALCHIRAJA, and GATOUX were in Switzerland, it was decided that contact should be made with these persons to determine what intelligence potential they represented.

Reports on the discussions with KEDIA and the "Aide memoire" prepared by him, copy attached, indicated that he was not a suitable person to be used for current intelligence objectives. His fanatical anti-communism which amounted on his own admission to a strong desire to see an early war between Russia and the US as a means for realizing the independence of the Caucasus, and the fact that basically he is a political activist and revolutionary, rendered it essential for security reasons that no commitments be made to him, and that contact with him be held to a minimum. Through him, however, it was hoped that leads could be obtained to important SD personalities, the location of hidden files, and plans for continued post-hostilities Nazi activity. The list of names supplied by him may serve that purpose.


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3. With regard to the other persons who escaped to Switzerland,
GAROTY crossed into France, was picked up by the French and then delivered
to J. A. Baker at Annemasse when he returned to



3. With regard to the other persons who escaped to Switzerland, GATTONY crossed into France, was picked up by the French and then delivered to J. Baker at Annemasse when he claimed to be an "American Agent". He was sent to Paris, placed in the X2 interrogation center and questioned. He was found to have no further value to OCS and was consequently turned back to the French, who showed considerable interest in him.

VON MENDE, TSOMALA, and ALCHIBAJA as reported elsewhere, were turned out of Switzerland and placed in a Swiss Red Cross Camp in Hochst, Austria. Major Crosby at the 7th Army Field Detachment agreed to contact these men, and keep in touch with them for whatever uses it might ultimately be decided to make of them.

4. Ruppert is at present in Paris at Field Base D awaiting further disposition. It is currently projected to send him to 12th AG at the request of Col. Harding of X2 for a limited period in order to assist in a special interrogation.

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GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS

Approximate date
of report / Nov. 1945

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Georgia, a Soviet Socialist Republic, is located in the Caucasus, with its eastern border on the Black Sea and Turkey, its southern border on Armenia and its western border on Russian Azerbaijan. It comprises 26,865 square miles in area, with a total population in 1939 of 3,542,289. It is larger in population than either Armenia or Azerbaijan, although slightly smaller than the latter in area. Its capitol, Tiflis (Tbilisi) located in the southeast portion of the province has a population of 519,175.

Until the beginning of the 19th Century, Georgia evidently maintained a kind of quasi-independence, with its own king. The tensions arising from its position between Russia and Turkey, led Georgia in 1801 to place itself under the protection of the Russian Emperor. A good deal of autonomy was evidently allowed. It was permitted to retain its own language and to continue its own culture. At the time of the overthrow of the Czarist Regime in 1917 the Caucasus as a whole found itself out of sympathy with the purposes of the revolutionaries. Each of the three principal provinces in that area, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, proclaimed themselves independent republics. The Republican government of Georgia ensued in an atmosphere, according to qualified observers, of intrigue, graft, and incompetence. Each of these Republics eventually came under Bolshevik control, Georgia the strongest being the last to succumb. The independent survival of the newly proclaimed Republics was short lived due to the failure to achieve an effective alliance, amongst themselves, principally because of territorial disputes, and in December 1922 under Russian influence and sponsorship they became a single Constituent

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Republic known as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. The Georgian Army attempted resistance but without result and the Georgian Republican government fled to Turkey. That government, which has been characterized as Menshevik, retained its organization and in 1924 called from Turkey for another uprising in Georgia. This was quickly suppressed by the Soviets. The adoption of a new Soviet Constitution on December 5, 1936, replacing an earlier one of 1924, resulted in the splitting-up of this Transcaucasian Federation into the Soviet Socialist Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

Georgia has furnished a number of leaders to the Soviet Government, including STALIN, and others in high administrative positions. Available evidence seems to indicate that those who remained in Georgia have accepted their political status, although emigres and refugees abroad, whose numbers increased subsequent to 1922 and 1924, continue their activities and intrigue for the restoration of Georgian independence.

The Menshevik government continued its activities outside Georgia, although its seat was eventually transferred to Paris, perhaps at the request of the Turks. The following names of cabinet members comprising that government are available:

Noi RAMICHEVILI
Noah JIORDANI
GEGETCHKORIA
KLIOMERKI
ERADZE
TSINTSADZE
Isidore RAMICHEVILI
KAUDELAKI
TCHREIDZE

The emigre Georgians maintained the pretense of having a chamber

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of deputies, included in which were the following members of a so-called "National Democratic Party":

AVALICHVILI
TAKAICHEVILI
AERKASI
David WATGENADZE (cousin of Elisbar)
Spiridon KEDIA (not Michael)
ASSETIARIE
FABACHEVILI
KOUTSOUBIDZE
TCHENKELI
VECHAPELI

Of those named above, VECHAPELI, killed in 1926 under unknown circumstances, was reported to have turned Communist. Noi RAMICHEVILI died in the thirties.

There is some evidence that during the thirties certain Georgians together with other Caucasians engaged in intelligence work wherever it could be found. A few are reported to have worked for the French and the Germans, or both, and a Georgian named KORUMIDZE is known to have put one Haydar BAMAT, formerly Charge d'affaires at the Afghan Legation in Switzerland in touch with the Japanese in Paris, early in 1936. BAMAT was the leader of a German fostered Caucasian Nationalist group the aim of which was to establish an independent Caucasian Republic. The Japanese also decided to exploit the connections of this group and endeavoured, in 1937, through BAMAT to establish a Turco-Japanese intelligence association for the purpose of gathering information concerning Russian activities. BAMAT's mission to Turkey failed of "official" Turkish approval because of BAMAT's refusal to consent to the Turkish demand that Mir Ali TAYKUT, a Turkish engineer who had established BAMAT's contact with the Turkish authorities, be designated chief of the group. Notwithstanding BAMAT continued

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to recruit agents on behalf of the Japanese. The most important of these were Ali KANTEMIR, a Caucasian, now believed to be in Switzerland, and Halil HASMERMEDOV, an Azerbaijan (alias Eash-medoff) GONGÖREN, Has MEEMIDOFF, Halil Bek HACMAMEDOV) last believed to be in Istanbul. The Turks expelled BAVAT and fifteen of his followers, including Mir Ali TAYKUT, Halil HASMERMEDOV, Ali KANTEMIR, Mehmet TUCAY, OSMAN HOGA, and OSMAN GÜBE, most of which went to Germany.

Halil HASMERMEDOV went into Iran and organized another Caucasian group on behalf of the Japanese. However, friction between the Azerbaijanis and Georgians resulted in the latter breaking away from the leadership of HASMERMEDOV. Although our source reports the Georgian group as having been the more active and to have produced the better results there is a dearth of information concerning the personalities involved. The reports of these agents working on behalf of the Japanese were submitted to Halil Hideo Helmi NAKAO, expert on Russian affairs at the Japanese Embassy in Turkey, Major General Hario TATEISHI, Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy, Turkey, and his secretary Kazo ITO.

An unfavorable report by NAKAO to Berlin resulted in the withdrawal of support from BAVAT and his assistant KANTEMIR excepting with respect to the Iranian group controlled by HASMERMEDOV whose principal collaborators were Iskender SEHAIZAYAN (alias SHEIKZAYANOV), reported to have been killed by a Soviet agent, and General KERESLIDZE, a former general in the Russian army whose reported death has not been confirmed. Other groups then attempted to form organizations, each of them with the objective of liberat-

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ing Georgia. One of these, known as the "Committee for the Liberation of Georgia", was under Prince BAGRATION-MOUKHARANSKY, who has been characterized as the "Pretender" to the Georgian throne. His committee lasted for only two or three months, despite a certain amount of support given to it by von RIBBENTROP, who took an interest because the Prince, who had a wealthy Italian wife, evidently had some social standing. Another committee that was formed and died during this same period was one organized by the following:

AVANICHVILI
TSERETELLI
MAGALOFF
Spiridon KEDIA

One reason for the quick death of these committees was due to attacks on them by one Michael KEDIA, who was coming along fast, in the eyes of the Germans, in the leadership of the Georgian community. KEDIA had first become prominent when he was designated by ACHMETELI to report to the Germans on the Georgians in Paris. He later transferred the seat of his activities to Berlin. Unification of Georgian activity had not been completed by 1943. The KEDIA organization was operating directly under the auspices of the SD, but there also existed a so-called "Kaukasische Vertrauensstelle" under ACHMETELI, which operated more or less under the auspices of the ROSENBERG Ministry. The conflict between these two groups was ideological among other things, since KEDIA's organization made some attempts to secure a promise by the Germans that the constituent states of the Caucasus would be independent, whereas the ROSENBERG group promulgated the view,

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which had to be accepted by those working with it, that the Caucasus should have only a provincial or colonial status. In 1944 in order to unite the two organizations and, more important, to bring about a unity of all Caucasian organizations, the Germans created and put all groups into one organization known as the "Kaukasische Verbinderngstab". This was divided into four sections, representing Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. The Georgian section was in charge of KEDIA, and the following were active in it:

{MAGALOFF (the previous active supervisor of those working with the ROSENBERG Ministry; now reported to be on the estate of his German wife somewhere between Munich and Salzburg)
{ALCHIBAIA
{GUBLIANI
{TSOMAIA

The north Caucasus section was under BAMAT's old associate, KANTEMIR.

The Georgians seem to have been used by the Germans for a number of purposes. First of all, they furnished recruits for fighting forces which the Germans were using under General VLASSOV. VLASSOV had organized a Free Russian army to fight with the Germans which is reported to have had several hundred thousand volunteers in less than seven months. This army sought the independence of the Caucasus and consequently was opposed by the ROSENBERG Ministry. A Georgian brigade was organized within the army, most of the survivors of which made their way into northern Italy after contriving to surrender to the Anglo-American forces near the Austrian border.

A second objective which the Germans had in organizing the

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Georgians was that of acquiring intelligence. For this purpose, KEDIA seems to have used, to a large extent, the old stamping ground of Turkey. He made frequent trips to Turkey, travelling under the name of Michael KOHNER. During one such visit he stayed with a Georgian named DJAKELI or JAKELI whose cover in Istanbul was a business dealing in manganese. DJAKELI was a direct contact of ZAEHRINGER who was attached to the office of the German Naval Attache; on his last two visits he stayed with one WEIDTMAN, director of the Deutsche Bank. One Georgian made the statement that KEDIA's trips to Turkey were for the purpose of establishing contact with the Allies, but no positive evidence has been found. There was a substantial organization in Turkey consisting largely of Mensheviks (members of the Social Democratic Party) who looked to Noah JORDANIA (@ JIORDANI), leader of the MENSHEVIES in Paris, for guidance. The Georgian organization in Istanbul whose activities were directed by KEDIA comprised three groups all of whose members were members of JORDANIA's party. This was composed of:

a) A Georgian group permanently resident in Istanbul (Turkish citizens): Simaon JENTI; Alexander GAZALISVILI (GOZIOSHVILI), employed at the Ottoman Bank; Shaliko TALANTADZE.

b) A Georgian group from Paris possessing French Passports: BERESHVILI @ Karlo BERIK; SIMON @ Simon GUGURBERIDZE; DADIKO @ DAVID.

c) A group organized by JORDANIA's Private Secretary: Sandro MINAGARI @ Alexander WEISSNER (WEISSNER had a French Passpost, but was protected by the Germans).

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These groups are reported to have been efficient and productive. DADIKO established a number of contacts on the Turkish side of the Turco-Russian border, and one MUSTAFA, a merchant from the frontier village Kemal Paşa, is known to have made regular visits to Istanbul where he contacted Sulëman Abashunze/SANJAMMADE, an Adjarian (Mohammedan Georgian). The Germans sent to the Caucasian groups materials for sabotage, plus certain minority newspapers published on behalf of the Caucasian groups in Berlin. Two other men with whom the KEDIA organization is reported to have worked in Istanbul were:

ESKOMIACHVILI
MENAHARACHVILI

The latter is rumored to have been a double agent whose primary loyalty was to the British.

✓ One further function performed by the KEDIA organization was that of furnishing support and agents for the operation of the ZEPPELIN organization. This division of AMT. VI, known formerly as AMT VI/C/Zeppelein, was set up by the Germans to carry out intelligence and sabotage missions in the Caucasus. The details of its operation are known only sketchily, but for the Georgians the leadership seems to have been in the hands of KEDIA, whose contact in AMT VI was a certain WENGEIHAUPT. Among the German officers working with ZEPPELIN, a Capt. DRESSLER and Lieut. INSER have been identified. Elisban WATCHNADZE admits to having briefed paratroppers for sabotage and information missions to the Caucasus area on behalf of ZEPPELIN. The dropping zones, at least for the missions with which WATCHNADZE was concerned, were intended to be

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"BOTI" and "BOROTCHALIN". The missions were to have WT communication and consisted of one WT operator and five men. WATCHNADZE claims to have discontinued work for ZEPPELIN following such briefing. Whether or not the missions were successful is not known, although SINDJIKACHVILI has stated, in connection with a vague description of ZEPPELIN operations, that certain Georgians sent to the Caucasus were captured and shot by the Russians.

The location of one camp was said to be at Teppel, near Marienbad, Germany. This information was furnished by an Azerbaijani who also identified the following as Azerbaijan instructors at the camp:

✓ ALIJEFF
✓ BACHIROFF
✓ ABASSOF
✓ MAMEDON
✓ KULIZADA

All of them were stated to be former officers of the Red Army. This camp may have been confined to working with the Azerbaijanis.

Evidently certain ZEPPELIN activities were designed to take place at the front, during the German advance. SINDJIKACHVILI has said that he went to Russia in December of 1943 to be in the service of TCHAIVTCHAIVADZE who, he stated, was working with ZEPPELIN. The objective was evidently that of sabotage and intelligence operations in front of the German Armies, particularly as they advanced into the Caucasus. The operation showed no accomplishment for the German retreat started soon after. SINDJIKACHVILI maintains that thereafter he and a certain ZACHARIADZE engaged in helping Polish officers escape to Switzerland.

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The leadership of the Georgian community by KEDIA did not extend to all Georgians, some of whom seemed to have worked independently for the Germans and others to have disputed the authority of KEDIA. Among those who worked independently for the Germans are the following:

YGHANBASCHIDSE: A Georgian in Berlin, who evidently worked from 1937 to 1945 as a part of Abwehr, IWI, Bremen, 65 years old; this agent was reputed to have worked particularly well with the Japanese and the Turks in Berlin and to have reported to the Germans information concerning Trans-Iranian oil, Russia and Russian influences with respect to the oil, and Near Eastern import and export business.

WAGLAHELIDZE: Identified by TCHMELIDZE, chief KEDIA representative in Italy, as one who worked for the Abwehr. It is also stated that he attempted to be the Georgian representative with General VLASSOV.

DIMITRACHVILI: This man was accused by PAVLIASEVILI and Laura KAFHELI (British wife of a Georgian refugee) of having worked for the Gestapo in Berlin. DIMITRACHVILI is obviously in bad standing in the Georgian community, charges of embezzlement and bad faith having been made against him. His accusers state that he has been a spy of long standing, having worked successively for the French, the Russians, and the Gestapo. He is presently in Allied hands in Italy and instructions have been given that he is to remain under surveillance.

Elisbar WATCHNADZE: Apart from this man's activities for ZEPFELIN, discussed above, it has also been stated that he worked

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in Paris and in the French Provinces for the SD.

David WATCHNADZE: This man, a strongly anti-Communist Georgian, helped form a short-lived Armeno-Georgian community and also, in Berlin, assisted Prince BAGRATION-MOUKHARANSKY in his efforts to form a Georgian organization. It has been stated that he was an AMT VI agent in Rome, although his associates are inclined to doubt it in view of his shiftless character. It may have been a case of mistaken identity with Elisbar.

Among the most famous of the non-corroborators with KEDIA was ODICHARIA (aka AUDICHAR, TSAGOEFF). This soldier of fortune through the years worked for the Germans and the Japanese as well as the French Deuxieme Bureau. He had been a member of the French Foreign Legion and returned to France after its occupation by the Germans. He thereupon seems to have devoted his time to fighting the position of KEDIA as leader of the Georgians. To prejudice KEDIA with the Germans, ODICHARIA frequently denounced KEDIA as well as some of his associates, either on the ground that they were working secretly for the Soviets or for the Allies. Thus ODICHARIA denounced SINDJIFACHVILI as being the bearer of a message from the British Intelligence Service to KEDIA. Despite these efforts, the prestige of KEDIA remained unimpaired, perhaps because of the full confidence given to him by HENGELHAUPT. ODICHARIA proceeded into anti-Maquis activities in France, and became wealthy through black market operations. His anti-Maquis activities, which consisted of forming a band of Georgians to engage in active suppression of the Maquis, has led him to be called "Infamous" by one Georgian, (Elisbar WATCHNADZE) as also

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to a request for his person by the French, who evidently wish to try him as a war criminal. Among OCHIAVIA's associates were PALIACHVILI, who also admits to service in the German army against the Russians; he was among the first 100 recruited by KEDIA after the invasion of Russia. PALIACHVILI is presently interned in Italy by Allied order awaiting further investigation.

The most difficult part of any discussion of Georgian activities for the Germans is to attempt to evaluate their services and find reasons therefor. Despite the characterization of the KEDIA organization in Turkey as being efficient and productive the specific projects which the Georgians seemed to have engaged in appear relatively insignificant. It has already been noted that the ZEPPELIN activities on the Front were disrupted by the German surrender, and the dropping operations into the Caucasus seemed to have resulted only in the capture and death of those participating.

SINDJIKACHVILJ worked with KEDIA on the formation of a Georgian unit which was to liberate Georgia by proceeding overland through Turkey. The scheme was worked upon, elaborated, and had German approval, but finally for very vague reasons it fell through without a single Georgian having proceeded to Georgia. SINDJIKACHVILI is presently interned by the Allies in Italy, pending further investigation.

Another scheme was the so-called "Georgian Cloister" which was worked out by KEDIA, BASILIUS and a Father Michael TARSHNIS-VILI. The scheme, which one report says should be attributed to a certain SALATHIERASCHVILI, was designed to establish a cloister

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in Rome under the wing of the Vatican which could be used as a trusting place and communications center for German agents in Rome. The scheme fell through without having accomplished anything. There is evidence that BASILLIUS used the money furnished him by the Germans for his own ends instead of establishing the cloister. In addition, Father TARSCHNISVILI evidently came to regard the "cloister" as his and objected to having radio communications centered there. There is one further puzzling piece of information to the effect that the cloister, which existed physically although it was never in operation, was used by BASILLIUS for hiding escaped Russian prisoners of war. There is no evidence whether this was due to BASILLIUS's sympathy for them or whether he regarded them as prospective recruits for his own operations.

There is nothing to indicate why German efforts with the Georgians should have been as futile as they seemingly were. It could conceivably be due to the fact that the Soviet Union so controlled Georgians, or so penetrated them, that their schemes were bound to fail. There is some evidence that KEDIA's organization had been penetrated for two members of that organization, TCHARTISCHVILI and Lieut. MEDIVANI, are now working openly for the Russians in their Austrian zone. The inefficiency may have been due to the ineptitude of the Georgians themselves or their mutual jealousies and suspicions. The Georgian community abroad, like a number of expatriate groups, were closely drawn together but rocked with mutual jealousies, accusations, and envy, and this may have led to an inability to accomplish anything substantial

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for the Germans.

Even at this time mutual recriminations continue, as evidenced by Allied interrogations of Georgians. Thus DIMITRACHVILI has denounced the following members of the Georgian community as having been German collaborators:

SINDJIKACHVILI, TCHENCIDZE (discussed below), PAVILJACHVILI, Elisbar WATCHNADZE, ALCHIBAIA, and BEIPKACHVILI. He has also named the following as agents who worked for KEDIA:

X GUARAMADZE (reported to have been arrested by the Allies in Milan);
X BARANIREZE; X KARDOWA (a Turk who has perhaps returned to Turkey) and DJAKELI (now deceased, with a son presently in Spain). DIMITRACHVILI, on the other hand, has been characterized as a blackmailer by Elisbar WATCHNADZE who states that DIMITRACHVILI organized a scheme with one X OKROPERIDZE and Miss Miriam KERESSELIDZE to blackmail prominent Georgians. Among the intended victims are said to be WATCHNADZE, SINDJIKACHVILI, and PALIASEVILI, for being German agents; and a certain Mrs. X ROMARTELLI, whose principal recommendation for being blackmailed seems to be that she is quite wealthy. There have also been mutual charges of embezzlement in the Georgian community, traceable to certain funds of Georgian organizations which made their way into the hands of individuals. Most of these accusations center around the persons of SINDJIKACHVILI and TCHENCIDZE. The latter is a Georgian who worked for the ROSENBERG ministry in 1941. He admits that he had been out of Soviet Russia since the 20's and that he had been abroad under a Russian passport until 1937. He maintains that this was for purposes of convenience but that in 1937 renewal would have com-

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promised him with the Soviet Union and accordingly at that time he applied for, and received, a German passport. In the ROSENBERG ministry he worked under Dr. MAGALOFF, and was appointed Chief of the Georgian Colony in Italy in April 1945. Officially, his position in Italy was that of chief representative of the "Kaukasische Verbindungsstab". He is presently in Allied hands, in Italy, awaiting further interrogation.

Certain other Georgians are known to have been active on behalf of the Germans, although in most cases information concerning them is scant. One is KANTCHIVILI, an engineer, a representative of Siemens in Milan during the war. Another is SCHAVGULIDZE, a close associate of KEDIA's and more specifically pay master to the families of Georgians who were fighting on the Eastern Front. Three others who might be of some interest because of their anti-Soviet reputations are: Girjeri NAKASHIDZE, Nicholas NAKASHIDZE and ZANARIADZE. Others whose names are found in reports include SHAVISHVILI, a former Georgian delegate to the League of Nations, now living in Geneva; and INANSARIDZE, a former German PW now said to be acting as a Soviet agent of the Repatriation Commission. Two other individuals who should be mentioned in this connection are Cardinal TISSERANT, who has written to the British Ministry in Italy protesting that certain Georgians are now being forced to return to USSR against their will; and a certain Princess SEAPEYNCEI whose son was an OSS agent, and whom KEDIA is reported to have protected in Berlin. Elisbar WATCHNADZE claims to be a particular friend of the Princess, who apparently remained in Italy throughout the War.

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Since the end of the war, the Georgians seem to have concentrated in Italy, as also in Switzerland. KEDIA, KANTNER, and TSONCIA are all said to have gone to Switzerland where they proceeded for the announced purpose of working with the Swiss to insure fair treatment of Georgians on matters of repatriation to the Soviet Union. A recent report states that KEDIA has proceeded to France. There is also a concentration of Georgians in Munich. Those include TSONCIA who had previously been reported in Switzerland with KEDIA. This individual, characterized as "chief of police" for the KEDIA organization, is supposed to be working in Munich with ALCHIBAZIA, KASARSHVILI and a certain MAGALOWSEVILI, who had been associated with KEDIA's Georgian Liaison staff writing anti-Soviet propaganda. KASARSHVILI who has been characterized as leader of the Georgian "National Socialist Party" is reported recently to have written to AVOLIANI, another associate of KEDIA, urging that all representatives of KEDIA's old Georgian liaison staff return to Munich since contacts have been established there "with the Soviets as well as with American authorities".

In Italy, Prince KAPHELI presented to the British a proposal for the formation of an organization to gather intelligence for the Allies, the quid pro quo to be a promise by the Allies of the independence of the Caucasus. KAPHELI's document, on file in X-2 Washington, outlines in considerable detail the methods and organization which would be adopted.

There is attached hereto as Appendix A an alphabetical index of persons mentioned in this memorandum, together with references of pages on which they are mentioned.

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sances sur la Russie et principalement sur les régions du Caucase, qu'il soit protégé par les plus hautes personnalités du Gouvernement Allemand. On peut avoir un exemple sur ses idées anti-hitlériennes vu qu'il connaissait personnellement la plupart des personnalités qui prirent part au coup d'état du 20 juillet. Il est à noter que son meilleur ami en Allemagne était le comte de Schulenburg qui fut pendu après cette affaire.

Vu sa position et en temps qu'étranger, représentant d'un peuple émigré reconnu par le Comité Nansen et de la Croix Rouge Internationale, il était la seule personne qui sous un couvert pouvait faire le voyage en Suisse et recevoir par la Croix Rouge Internationale le visa d'entrée en Suisse alors que le visa de sortie de l'Allemagne lui a été procuré par les personnalités qui étaient d'accord avec lui et connaissaient le but principal de son voyage.

La cause principale de son voyage en Suisse est de se mettre en contact ~~avec~~ avec les Américains soit avec les Anglais, pour pouvoir régler la situation des Géorgiens se trouvant dans les pays occupés par les Alliés, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne soient pas livrés aux Soviets mais qu'ils soient traités comme ^{les} prisonniers allemands contrairement à ce que les Américains et les Anglais ont fait avec les volontaires de l'armée Vlassov, c'est-à-dire l'échange avec les prisonniers alliés et les civils français libérés par les Russes.

Il est à noter que l'opinion publique, ainsi que les militaires parlent d'un conflit ~~militaire ou bien diplomatique~~ ou bien seulement d'une tension qui existera après la guerre entre la Russie d'une part et l'Amérique et surtout l'Angleterre ^{d'autre part} toujours pour la question soit de la Pologne, des Balcanes, des frontières caucase-turques, les Balcanes, Tanger et naturellement du ~~le~~ contrôle de toute la Méditerranée. Ces gens - d'accord avec Radio - pour toutes ces raisons demandent à être plutôt du côté allié pour pouvoir ^{à l'heure} venir travailler ou com-

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Kedia a dit qu'il est allé contre le bolchevisme. Il ne faut
néanmoins pas attendre à ce que ces personnalités rendent leur
pays mais dans la mesure du possible attirent l'attention des alliés
anglo-américains alors que ils mettront toute leur force à retarder
l'avance soviétique sur le sol allemand.

M. Kedia se trouve actuellement chez un ami à lui, un compatriote,
M. CHANICHWILI, 10, av. Caspard, VALETTES-GENÈVE.

M. Kedia demande à avoir des pourparlers avec une personnalité
américaine et non avec un employé ou officier d'un service quel-
conque. Sinon cette personne ferait le voyage pour rien étant donné
que M. Kedia est une personne réservée et ne veut à aucun prix avoir
à faire avec une personne sans importance. Il m'a chargé ^{de dire} qu'il ne
venait pas en temps que agent mais comme représentant d'abord d'un
peuple émigré et de haute personnalité, de la SV, SS et WEHRMACHT.

M. Kedia a beaucoup regretté que je travaillais pour les Améri-
cains et non pour les Anglais vu que ces derniers ^{sont} ~~travaillent~~ beaucoup
plus intéressés et connaissent beaucoup mieux les problèmes et les
conflits avec les Russes en Europe, vu que ^{de} ~~ils~~ eux-mêmes et tous les
petits Etats européens sous protection britannique dépendent de ces
conflits.

La personne qui prendra contact avec M. Kedia au nom des Améri-
cains devra dire qu'elle vient envoyé par mes renseignements, et devra
ajouter G-2, OSS et apporter une lettre de Mme Kedia qui habite à
Paris ce qui mettra M. Kedia en confiance, et ~~lui~~ il saura que toute
l'affaire vient de moi et non de la Gestapo.

M. Kedia est d'accord, mais n'en a pas personnellement la possibi-
lité, de venir à Londres, par contre vu la surveillance surtout par le
groupe de Gestapo Odecharian et étant trop connu à Paris parmi les
malicieux russes, Berlin aurait connaissance de son voyage quelques
jours plutôt. C'est pourquoi il se refuse obstinément à faire un
voyage en France.

l'attente de l'arrivée de l'armée soviétique contre la Belgique. Il ne faut
néanmoins pas se laisser aller à ce que ces personnalités rendent leur
pays mais dans la mesure du possible attirer l'attention des alliés
anglo-américains alors que ils mettront toute leur force à retarder
l'avance soviétique sur le sol allemand.

M. Kedia se trouve actuellement chez un ami à lui, un compatriote,
M. CHAWICHWILI, 10, av. Caspari, VALETTES-GENÈVE.

M. Kedia demande à avoir des pourparlers avec une personnalité
américaine et non avec un employé ou officier d'un service quel-
conque. Sinon cette personne ferait le voyage pour rien étant donné
que M. Kedia est une personne résolue et ne veut à aucun prix avoir
à faire avec une personne sans importance. Il m'a chargé ^{de dire} qu'il ne
venait pas en temps que agent mais comme représentant d'abord d'un
peuple émigré et de haute personnalité de la S.S. et WEHRMACHT.

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groupe de Gestapo Odécharian et étant trop connu à Paris parmi les
maîtres russes. Par ailleurs connaît son voyage quelques
jours plutôt. C'est pourquoi il se refuse obstinément à faire un
voyage en France.

il ne faut pas s'étonner de toutes les précautions prises mais il faut au contraire être le plus prudent possible dans toute cette affaire. ~~d'abord, étant représentant d'un peuple vivant en Allemagne, envoyé comme représentant pour des personnalités allemandes, l'affaire~~
Celle-ci ~~aurait~~ s'élevant des milliers de personnes ~~aurait~~ auraient à en souffrir. Il est à noter en outre que dix personnes - professeur von Mandes Tsomaia etc. - sont en Allemagne et servent comme otages auprès du Gouvernement allemand au cas ^{M. Kedia} où ~~il~~ ne reviendrait pas de son voyage.

Les renseignements que M. Kedia peut apporter me sont complètement inconnus mais je peux assurer d'après le peu que je sais, que M. Kedia a les plus hautes relations qui existent en Allemagne et connaît tous les conflits qui existent au milieu de la politique allemande.

En temps que agent américain et n'ayant rien à voir avec les histoires politiques de M. Kedia puisque je ne suis pas Géorgien, connaissant personnellement M. Kedia, je suis sûr que ayant la possibilité de préparer le chemin aux pourparlers nous arriverons à savoir beaucoup plus de choses que toute autre personne se rendant seul auprès de M. Kedia.

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--- Rapport sur M. Michael KEDIA, supposé être à Dusseldorf
--- Poursuivi par "RUSSIA" ---

Dimanche, le 9 avril, je suis parti avec M. KEDIA et le professeur DR. VON MENDES de BRESLAU en voiture pour WEIZ (DITERSDORF) où se trouva une partie du Ministère de l'Est, évacuée de Berlin, et quelques Géorgiens. Nous avons passé dans le village DITERSDORF la nuit et sont partis le lendemain après-midi, toujours en voiture, en direction de BAD ELSTER (Saxonie). M. Kedia et le professeur von Mendel seules ont fait les pourparlers avec des officiers de l'ABWEHR, ce qui dura environ 1 heure que je passais dans la voiture dehors. Lorsque tout fut fini, M. Kedia est sorti et s'est entretenu seul avec moi; me disant que tous les papiers allaient être terminés dans quelques instants.

Il s'agit d'abord d'une Dienstreisbescheinigung pour ERFURT, et d'une lettre personnelle et secrète de recommandation auprès du préfet de police d'Erfurt. M. Kedia m'a conseillé, une fois arrivé à Erfurt, de passer les lignes américaines tout seul dans la mesure du possible sans m'adresser au préfet de police parce qu'il serait plus vite d'arriver au but et d'ailleurs pour éviter que le S.D.-VI possède des rapports sur ma personne, lesquels auraient pu plutôt être transmis au S.D.-IV à Berlin et qui auraient nui beaucoup à notre travail.

Les pourparlers terminés à Bad Elster, M. Kedia et le professeur von Mendel ont continué leur chemin en voiture immédiatement pour WEIZEN (Bavrie). Après leur départ j'ai reçu une chambre dans la maison de la ABWEHR qui était l'auberge "Landhaus" où je passais la nuit.

Le lendemain matin, mardi le 10 avril, je suis parti par le train pour ERFURT. Je fus obligé de changer le train environ dix fois et, après voyagé toute la journée et toute la nuit, je suis arrivé le mercredi le 11 avril à JENA à 8 h le matin. De Jena j'ai pris place dans une camion de la Wehrmacht et suis arrivé à WEIZEN vers 9 h. De Weimar je suis marché à pied immédiatement en direction d'Erfurt où je suis arrivé vers midi. A Erfurt la situation était confuse, vu

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que les Américains encerclaient la ville par le Nord et par l'Est, d'autres troupes entraient dans la ville par l'Ouest et de combats de rues étaient en cours. Etant donné l'urgence de ma mission et la difficulté de ma position à Erfurt même, je n'ai pu décider de partir de la ville du côté encore libre c'est-à-dire par la route Erfurt-Weimar, et m'étant renseigné auprès des paysans du pays des positions approximatives des troupes américaines, j'ai décidé de passer directement les lignes au Nord-Est de Erfurt (4 km. d'Erfurt) par le village HESPERLEN dans lequel avait encore lieu des combats entre les Américains et les Allemands. Après avoir passé les lignes, il était 15 h., j'ai fait connaissance avec des prisonniers français qui, saluant les soldats américains, continuaient leur chemin après la prise du village, me faisant passer pour un travailleur civil français évadé. Une demi-heure après j'arrêtais une jeep avec un officier américain lui demandant où se trouvait un bureau de G-2. Après il m'avoir répondu qu'il ne savait pas et m'étant renseigné que ces soldats américains n'étaient pas de la 3^e armée, j'ai décidé de passer la nuit dans le village avec les prisonniers français.

D'autre part je savais que la troisième armée se trouvait sur le front Gotha-Langensalza-Mühlhausen (renseignement que j'ai entendu à Atlantiksender à Berlin). le lendemain, le 12 avril, vers midi, après avoir acheté un vélo au prisonnier français, je suis parti en direction de Langensalza par Schwerborn, et à Mühlhausen j'ai vu les premiers soldats de la 3^e armée. Il est à remarquer que j'ai pu faire 30 km. derrière les lignes américaines avec mes bottes allemandes, et ma culotte militaire, et mon revolver et mes papiers du SS et du SD sans être contrôlé par le MF. Arrivé à Mühlhausen par mes propres moyens, j'ai trouvé tout seul le PC de la Cie. xix à la disposition duquel je me suis mis. Après avoir expliqué ce que j'étais, l'officier mit une jeep, deux soldats et un sous-officier à ma disposition pour me conduire au prochain bureau de CIC qui se trouvait à Töttingstadt. Le bureau était fermé, et le sous-officier m'a conduit auprès du Capitaine

31 May 45

qui commandait les positions dans le bourg. Après avoir été interrogé par le Capitaine, il m'expliqua que le CIC n'étant pas là, la seule possibilité qu'il avait de me faire transporter en arrière, était de partir avec les prisonniers de guerre allemands. Dès ce moment je fus considéré comme un prisonnier de guerre, et vers 17 h. transporté en camion avec les prisonniers de guerre dans un camp de rassemblement à Tuttleben aux environs de Gotha. Vers 22 h du soir, tout le camp de prisonniers a été transporté en convoi et après un voyage de 7 heures, nous sommes arrivés à Kirchheim dans un grand camp de rassemblement.

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January 30, 1946
2252095
BX-625

To: Saint, Washington
From: DB5
Subject: Michel KEDIA, Georgian Nationalist

31 JAN 1946

1. We refer to our BX-193, BX Memo dated 25.9.45, BX-564, BX-575, and cables () dated 13 Nov 45, and () dated 28 Jan 46.

2. In view of the recent offer by Michel KEDIA of the use of his "Georgian Chain", we herein summarize what information we have on the man. As we believe this man to be extremely well known, we would appreciate traces on him and his alleged chain, from any field stations and/or Washington-London.

3. DB7 first contacted KEDIA at the request of the American Consul in Geneva, who had received a request for information from the Commercial Section of the Legation at Bern. KEDIA, who was born in Georgia in 1902, is living at 1 Rue des Granges, Geneva. During the interview KEDIA proved talkative and appeared ready to answer all questions. He apparently assumed that DB7 had approached him in regard to his part in the () case— () being an SI agent dispatched to Berlin in 1944 by Lt. JOLIS (SI-Paris) to contact various members of the Georgian group in Berlin. (SI here is acquainted with KEDIA, but have regarded him as a long range proposition which they at the moment are not anxious to assume.) KEDIA told DB7 that he had always been active among Georgian refugees, but claimed that he had never been interested in any political activity until the German army arrived in Paris. Shortly thereafter a Dr. KRAMER approached KEDIA, stating that KEDIA had been recommended by various Georgians in Berlin. KRAMER asked KEDIA's collaboration. Apparently KEDIA needed little convincing, for 1941 saw him in Berlin. He stayed in that city through out most of the war. KEDIA mentioned as his principal contacts Dr. GREFFE, of the SS I.S. (SD?); Dr. WEBER, of the Abwehr; Prof. Gerhart vom MENDE, of the ROSENBERG ministry. (KEDIA states that a Georges METREVELLI, now in Munich working for the Americans, is in reality, vom MENDE.) During this period in Berlin KEDIA was aided by a Dr. MARTI of the IRC in Berlin.

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4. Most of these people, according to KEDIA, were convinced anti-Hitlerites. Some of them were aware that () was an American agent, but allowed him to continue to function in the hope that he would be able to present the Allies with a list of anti-Nazis in Germany. During this time, however, KEDIA admits recruiting 195 Georgians for the German army. After seeing these

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men were treated, and how Russian PW's fared, KEDIA states that he spent much of his time attempting to alleviate their distress. He also claims to have protected various Georgian Jews. For this work the Jews supported his wife and children who were left in Paris when KEDIA went to Berlin. (His family is now in Megeve, France.)

ced In an episode that is not clear to us KEDIA reportedly saved BERICZE from the Germans. In gratitude for this BERICZE has been financing KEDIA for some time. While in Germany, for example, KEDIA received 11,000,000 French francs from BERICZE. Through Dr. WEBER, KEDIA met Eugen LANG (with whom he now corresponds in Spain) of the OTTO Organization in Paris. WEBER instructed LANG to set aside a part of the profits from the OTTO organization for KEDIA. FEHRMANN, also connected with the LANG, BERICZE group in Paris, lent KEDIA 5000 marks at one time.

copy 5. In this first interview DB7 gathered that KEDIA believed himself being kept in Switzerland by the Americans for some future use. Four days later, however, KEDIA again called at the Consulate to inform DB7 that he, KEDIA, had been informed by the Swiss that he and three friends DJALALIAN, KANTIMIR and ALIBEIKOFF, were to be interned by the Swiss-- the reason being their early political activity. (DJALALIAN, KANTIMIR and ALIBEIKOFF are representatives of the exiled Georgian government and are in Geneva.) Lt. JOLIS had previously told KEDIA that in event of any difficulty with the Swiss he should contact Mr. MELLON (former SI representative in Geneva). KEDIA suggested to DB7 that the Americans intervene on his behalf with the Swiss. The reason for this action would be that we should have the use of his Georgian intelligence network, with it's outposts allegedly reaching as far as Moscow. KEDIA stated that it would be impossible for him to run this chain from an internment camp.

6. Another (), who is not aware that this office has had any contact with KEDIA, has stated that BERICZE, who is receiving money from Turkey, is perturbed about KEDIA's coming internment. BERICZE has continued to finance KEDIA and his chain here in Switzerland. () states that while KEDIA is a politician and interested in the omnipresent Georgians, BERICZE is interested in little but money. BERICZE is afraid that the chain will be broken if KEDIA is not able to contact them. He refuses flatly to have anything to do with any of the Georgians other than KEDIA.

7. This office has received two warnings concerning KEDIA and his alleged contacts with the JE-landers. () himself highly suspect as a former German agent, reported voluntarily to DB1 that KEDIA was in contact with

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JE-land service and was a dangerous man. (

has also declared KEDIA to be dangerous and to be in contact with the JE-I.S.

8. In view of this confused story, our incomplete information on KEDIA and his Georgians and their many contacts, DB1 is leery of the whole situation. For, if KEDIA, who appears to be a professional White Russian, is actually in contact with the JE-land service and is offering his network in a penetration attempt, any action on our part would involve a triple agent operation.

9. Enclosure "A" is a report by KEDIA originally prepared for Lt. JOLIS, a copy of which KEDIA gave DB7. Enclosure "B" is a statement, apparently a routine handout, which KEDIA also presented to DB7 during their interview.

...DB5....

DB5

Approved by:
DB1

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London (1)
Austria (1)
Germany (1)
Rome (1)
Paris (1)
Files (1)

Enclosures: All distribution.

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1 March 1946.

FBS

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Michael KEDIA.

I. Background; activities under the Germans.

Michael KEDIA; (Michel KEDIA); • KOEHLER, Michael.
 Born: Georgia (USSR), 1902.
 Former addresses: (a) 99 Kurfuestendam, Berlin W 31, Germany.
 (b) 4 Rue des Presidannes, Croissy, France.
 (c) Vesinas (near Paris), France.
 Present address: 1 Rue des Granges, Geneva, Switzerland.
 Languages: Russian, French, German.
 Profession: Yoghourt manufacturer.
 Parent: Stated to be son of Leki KEDIA, ex-director of "Surete
 Georgienne"; nephew of Spiridon KEDIA.

Held German passport No. 357, issued Berlin 15 March 43. Claimed
 to be German national of Armenian origin (probably a part of
 his cover).

Travels: Visited Istanbul (from Prague) once in 1943 (March 26th);
 and twice in 1942, staying only a few days each time.

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chronology

Subject was in the service of the Germans from 1941 until the time
 of the German collapse. He first recruited Caucasian POW's in order to form
 an anti-Communist legion. In 1942 and '43 he recruited agents for the SD to send
 to the Caucasus by parachute. During his visit to Turkey in December ('43)
 he was reported to have attempted to find staff for a Georgian monastery to
 be set up in Rome which should include two SD agents. He was connected with
 Friedrich WAWER and Eugen LASK. A plan was made in autumn 1943 to set up
 a Georgian cloister in Rome under Vatican protection and among the monks
 to introduce two agents who were to keep contact with the SD net in the city.
 The principal persons connected with this scheme were Subject, Sadathieraschwili
 BASILIUS, Father Tarschaisvili MICHELE, and the SD chiefs KAPPLER, HOETTL,
 REISSMANN. Subject's duty was to pick three novices from among the Georgian
 emigrants in Germany and send them to BASILIUS; then they would be recommended
 to Father MICHELE, who was to be the cloister Abbot. The three novices sent
 by Subject were found unsuitable and many difficulties arose.

Subject was in contact with Asst II, Paris, from 1 Sept 40 on. He
 made trips to Abwehr II Hq. in Berlin to assure Georgian independence in
 case of invasion of Russia. He wanted to take over the Georgian government
 after the country's liberation. This was the subject of his conferences

duplication & overlapping of material

REGISTRY COPY KEDIA Memo

with ~~CHRISTIAN~~ ERHARDSEN, and VON LOWENHOFEN. After the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities, Subject lived in Berlin, where, through Abwehr and High Command, he had direct connections with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his three trips to Turkey he prepared the ground for uprisings in the Turkish and Caucasian frontier regions. He formed a Georgian office at 6 Ave. Sully-Prudhomme, Paris 7.

H He was associated with Standartenfuehrer ~~BIGLER~~. Also with SCHAVGULIDZE up until 1941. ?

Subject recruited Akaki TCHIKLADZE and other Georgians for the TAMARA* groups. Just before Germany declared war on Russia, Subject was very active in looking up all the Georgians in France. When war was declared, he called them all together and told them they could return to their native land if they would join the Germans. He said that those who did not volunteer to go at first could not return later. Subject apparently had complete charge of the Georgians although he did not go with them on the TAMARA projects. TCHIKLADZE claims that KEDLA was chiefly responsible for the whole TAMARA business, and that he acted through ambition, and not through Georgian patriotism. 1970

Subject headed the Georgian section of Amt ~~VII/2~~ (Zeppelin), RSHA, which dealt with sabotage and subversive operations in Russia. He enjoyed the complete confidence of the Germans and was allowed to direct all the political penetration work. He also directed operations out of Turkey. He took an active part in the work of the Georgian National Committee, an organization organized and subsidized after 1941 by ROSENBERG's Ministry for Eastern Territories.

Subject collaborated actively with ~~BAMAT~~, (another Georgian, chief of the Georgian Liaison Staff (Germany)) and the German occupation authorities in France, recruiting Georgians for labor service in Germany, where they were taken over by BAMAT and forced to join the Georgische Verbindungsstab (i.e. Georgian Liaison Staff). KEDLA, together with his father-in-law ~~PATCHEULIA~~, and his wife (who was the mistress of a certain ~~Kotstuf~~ ~~ZUCHRISTIAN~~, in Abt. VI, in Paris), played the German cause for what they were worth and

IMP H
* TAMARA was the secret name given to a mission made up of Georgian agent recruits. The agents were trained at the Chateau de Rocquencourt (France), and the allowances were paid from the Georgian office at 6 Ave. Sully-Prudhomme, Paris. This mission put about 350 men at the disposal of different units of the Brandenburg Division for special work.

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actively collaborated not only with BAMAT, but through the mediation of ZUCHESTIAN, with Hptstuf. ENGELHAUPT of Abt. VI of the RSHA in Berlin.

Subject is described as an opportunist of the purest water who at all times tried to play both sides. Thus, he helped many Jews in France, keeping them out of jail for adequate financial remunerations, and later in Berlin, while organizing the Georgische Verbindungsstab and the Georgian Fighting Units within the SD and the SS, he kept up his connections to Georgian Menshevik Irredentist circles and to Soviet agents and cells, such as the NKVD agent Major KASOUNIA, whom he gave refuge within the Georgische Verbindungsstab and shielded from the Gestapo.

II. Flight to Switzerland.

At the collapse of Germany Subject fled to Switzerland, taking with him all the money of the Georgische Verbindungsstab, together with Hptstuf. ENGELHAUPT of the SD, the liaison man with the Georgian Units. BAMAT also went to Switzerland. The reason for Subject's and BAMAT's being in Switzerland (their subordinates went to Italy) is because they, presumably, intended to intervene with the International Red Cross at Geneva on behalf of the Caucasian POW's and displaced persons in British and American occupied territory to prevent their deportation to Russia.

With the help of his money and his former connections, Subject soon started again his political activities together with Bamat in Switzerland, and is reported to have established contact with American and British intelligence agencies. In addition, it is reported he has come into contact with Soviet intelligence officers, more particularly with the Soviet Repatriation Commission in Salzburg, one of the members of which, Capt. TSHARTISVILI, is in constant correspondence with him.

Word has been received that Subject's group (i.e. the former Georgische Verbindungsstab) in Munich has started to work once more in Munich, with contacts to both the Soviets and American authorities. More specifically, it has been reported that the former Chief of Police of the Georgische Verbindungsstab, one Alexandre TSCHEBA, was found in a DP camp near Bregenz; from where he was brought by plane by the Americans to Salzburg and from there to Munich, where he is now working with the former collaborators of Subject, such as MICHIBAYA, and TSHARTISVILI, and MALLOV-MARLOVSVILI, allegedly receiving the assistance of the Americans, such as transportation, etc.

Furthermore, a certain Chota BERESZIANI, reportedly Subject's right-hand man and his liaison with Soviet agents during the time of the Georgische Verbindungsstab, who lived in Salzburg some months (1945), obtained permits at the end of August from the French local liaison officer for his repatriation to France via Switzerland. He (BERESZIANI) was taken to the Swiss border, with his wife and parents, by the above mentioned TSHARTISVILI and

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(KEDIA. p. 4)

and Lt. ^{XH}ADIVANI on 6 September 45 with instructions for Subject to enlarge as much as possible his Georgian Committee in Switzerland. At the same time, BRUSCHWEILER, the chief of the "Borner Hilfsverein (Committee for the assistance to people reluctant to return to the Soviet Union), was prevailed upon by various persons to entrust the representation of his committee in Switzerland to Subject as far as the Georgian interests were concerned.

From () it is reported that one Nina ^{to} ~~KODZE-DJIAKEVIC~~, who worked for Subject in Berlin, was contacted in August or September (1945) by Subject from Switzerland through couriers (assisted by the Soviet Repatriation Commission), and that Subject wants her to go to Switzerland. Subject's reasons for this are not entirely clear.

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This summary on KEDIA should be read in conjunction with the report GEORGIA AND THE GEORGIANS. (Ref. no.).

verified by Mr. METZEL
of FBI

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B. h. m. s.

13 March 1946

TO: SAINT, Bern

FROM: SAINT

SUBJECT: Georgians in General - KEDIA et al

1. We are forwarding for your information and evaluation a study recently compiled by this branch on the subject of Georgia and the Georgians which contains an index. In conjunction with this, we have also prepared a compilation of all recent information on KEDIA.

- 2 Attachments
- (1) Georgia and Georgians
- (2) KEDIA

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SUBJECT: Michael KEDIA

[]
Michael KEDIA; (Michel KEDIA); (G KOEHLER, Michael.
Born: Georgia (USSR), 1902.
Former addresses: (a) 99 Kurfuestendamm, Berlin W 31,
Germany
(b) 4 Rue des Princesse, Croissy,
France
(c) Vesines (near Paris), France.
Present address: 1 Rue des Granges, Geneva, Switzerland.
Languages: Russian, French, German.
Profession: Yoghourt manufacturer.
Parent: Stated to be son of Meki KEDIA, ex-director
of "Sarete Georgienne", nephew of Spiridon KEDIA.
Held German passport No. 857, issued Berlin 15 March
43. Claimed to be German national of Armenian
origin (probably a part of his cover.)
Travels: Visited Istanbul (from Prague) once in 1943
(March 26th); and twice in 1942, staying only
a few days each time.

1. According to our files, KEDIA's first reported contact with the Germans occurred around September, 1940. This contact was with the Abwehr II section of Ast, Paris. While connected with Ast, Paris, KEDIA made trips to Abwehr II headquarters in Berlin presumably on subjects concerning activities of the Germans in Georgia in the case of an invasion of Russia. One report states that KEDIA wanted to take over direction of a Georgian government after his country's liberation by the invaders. This report also states that subject had conferences with such high-level figures as CANARIS, LAHOUSEN and von LORINGHOVEN. There was a Georgian office in Paris under the direction of subject at 6 Avenue Sully-Prudhomme.

2. The chronology of subject's activities under the Germans is not clear. These activities, however, consisted of the following:

(a) Just before Germany declared war on Russia, subject was reported to be very busy looking up all the Georgians in France. When war was declared, he called them all together and told them that they could return to their native land if they would join the Germans. These Georgians were then trained at the Chateau de Rodquencourt. Subject made them sign papers in German promising to reveal nothing they learned there. After they were trained, they returned to Paris and were paid 100 francs daily while subject awaited orders from the Germans for their disposal. TAMARA WAS THE secret name given to missions made up of Georgian agent recruits, and it is claimed that KEDIA is chiefly responsible for the whole TAMARA project. It is also claimed that although the recruits were attracted on the basis of a proposed liberated Georgia, KEDIA, himself, was

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aware of the fact that the Germans merely intended to use the people in the TAMARA project for special operations and had no intention of liberating the Georgians, and that KEDIA was driven by ambition and not Georgian patriotism.

(b) Subject recruited Caucasian PW's in order to form an anti-Communist Legion. During 1942 and 1943, he was reported recruiting agents for the SD to send to the Caucasus by parachute. This may or may not be identical with the TAMARA project. It is known that in connection with this activity, subject was in Turkey during March and December of 1943, also once previously in 1942. During his December visit he is reported to have looked for a staff for the proposed Georgian Ministry to be set up in Rome. This project is described on pages 12 and 13 of the Study, Georgia and the Georgians. In addition to the Georgians mentioned in the study entrusted with the mission of organizing the "Cloister", it is reported that KAPPLER, HETTEL, REISSMANN of the SD were behind the scheme. KEDIA is supposed to have picked 3 novices from among the Georgians of his acquaintance to be sent to the "cloister" who were, however, later found unsuitable.

(c) KEDIA was reported Chief of the Georgian Section of Amt VI/C/Z, the so-called Zeppelin Section of Group C of Amt VI of the NSHA, which had the over-all responsibility for Russia. The Zeppelin Referat ran straight intelligence, sabotage and subversive operations in Russia.

(d) Subject, at one time or another, was reported to have worked with all of the various German Agencies concerning Georgia.

1. The Georgian National Committee which was part of the Rosenberg Ministry for the occupied eastern territories.
2. The Georgische Verbindungsstab which was/under the direction of BANAT, and
3. Kaukasische Vertrauensstelle.

3. The contacts mentioned by KEDIA in your BX-625 do not mean much to us here especially considering the high level of all KEDIA's positions with the Germans and especially the GIS. The only Dr. KRAMER we have here was connected with the Abwehr in Cologne and the specialist in economic espionage with interests directed chiefly toward the USA. The Dr. Greffe of your BX-625 is undoubtedly Ostuf Dr. GRAEFE, former chief

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of VIC and in charge of all SP activities against Russia, Turkey and Near East. GRAFFE was reported to have been killed in January of 1944 in a motor accident and to have been succeeded by Ostufaf Holmut TSCHELSKY, about whom little including his whereabouts is known, in which matter KEDIA could possibly be of help.

4. The Dr. WEBER of your BX-625 is likewise not clearly identified here among the many WEBER's in our files, unless he is possibly Oberst Fritz WEBER @ Dr. OSWALD who was in Paris in the spring of 1941 and was throughout the war connected with Abwehr I in France. Is there any connection between the WEBER of your BX-625 and the Sdf WEBER who occurs on Page 2 of your BX-564, who is also not identifiable here, but would seem to be of exceptional importance because of the part he played in KEDIA's chain.

5. Of all the personalities in the GIS with whom KEDIA must have had contact, it would seem likely that his closest one must have been Stmbf Erich HENGELHAUPT who was Chief of Referat VI/C/Z (ZEPPELIN operation) and at one time, was reported to be Chief of the whole of Referats of VI/C. HENGELHAUPT is a high priority target for London and would undoubtedly be a rich source for the kind of information we are most recently interest in. He was last heard of by London as heading for Danzig around the time of the German break-up in early 1945. A report from () states that HENGELHAUPT fled to Switzerland with KEDIA, and we also understand from a recent arrival here that this information was given/informally some weeks ago in Paris. We should like immediate verification of this news of HENGELHAUPT's presence in Switzerland, and believe if he is actually there, steps should be taken at once to bring about his expulsion and arrest.

6. From (), we have also recently received a good deal of information concerning the activities of KEDIA and other Georgians. () operation run in Austria in the fall which made use of KEDIA's rival, (). Although () evaluates all the information (), we assume here that since () were naturally biased against KEDIA and his group, the information is much more likely to be of doubtful value. We would appreciate your judgment on the matter.

7. In general, () reports that KEDIA is an opportunist of the purest sort who has at all times played both sides. Thus, he helped many Jews in France (as in your BX-625, Page 2), receiving however, quite adequate financial remuneration for this assistance. Although on the

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On the one hand, he organized the Georgische Verbindungsstab and the Georgian Fighting Units within the SD and S, he is reported on the other hand, to have kept up high connections with Georgian Menshevik Irredentist circles and with Soviet agents and cells, such as the NKVD agent, Major KABOUNIA, whom he shielded from the Gestapo by giving him refuge in the Georgische Verbindungsstab.

8. Reports contain information that KEDIA, in fleeing to Switzerland, took with him all the money of the Georgische Verbindungsstab, which would not seem to jive with your information, stating that KEDIA has always been financed and is still by PERICZE.

9. Regarding KEDIA's intelligence activities in Switzerland, reports contain information to the effect that KEDIA put himself in contact with American and British Intelligence Agencies as well as Soviet Intelligence Officers. His contacts are reported to be the following:

a. A member of the Soviet Repatriation Committee in Salzburg, namely, Captain TSHARTISHVILI.

b. Alexandre TSONAYA, ALCHIBAYA, KASAISHVILI, and MAGALOW-MAGALOWSHVILI, all former members of the Georgische Verbindungsstab, at present in Munich where they are receiving the assistance of the Americans, but are also in contact with the Russians.

c. Chota BERESZINI, reportedly subject's right-hand man and his liaison with Soviet agents during the time of the Verbindungsstab, who was in Salzburg during early 1945, succeeded in obtaining permission for repatriation to Switzerland and was taken to the Swiss border with the above-mentioned Captain TSHARTISHVILI and Lt. MDIVANI on September 6, 1945 with instructions for KEDIA to enlarge as much as possible his Georgian committee in Switzerland.

d. BRUSCHWEILER, chief of the Berner Hilfsverein (Committee for the assistance to people reluctant to return to the Soviet Union), who was prevailed upon by various persons to entrust the representation of his committee in Switzerland to KEDIA in so far as Georgian interests were concerned.

e. Nina KIKOFFE-DJIAKEVIC, who worked for subject in Paris and was contacted in August or September, 1945 by subject in Switzerland through couriers. It is reported that KEDIA wanted her to go to Switzerland for reasons which are not entirely clear.

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
Armik ISSAHAKIAN-DJAMALIAN []		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE 28 Jun 46	
5. ANALYST []		6. DATE PROCESSED 2 Aug 1961	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
14. "According to information received from our Swiss representative and records on file in this office, Subject is one of Michel KEDIA's henchmen: a member of the Armenian Section of the "KAUKASISCHER VERBINDUNGSSTAB", into which the Germans united the Georgian and Caucasian agencies which they exploited for anti-Soviet intelligence and sabotage purposes; and one of the "brains" of the Caucasian Nationalist Movement. Michel KEDIA, self-appointed leader of anti-Bolshevist Georgians in Europe, headed an organization which during the war cooperated closely with the Abwehr, SD, German High Command and German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in return for which he hoped to achieve independence for Georgia and to take over the government after his country's liberation. After the end of the European war, KEDIA found refuge in Switzerland where upon being threatened with internment, he applied to the Americans for intervention on his behalf, offering in return to place at the disposal of the American services his Georgian intelligence networks with outposts allegedly reaching as far as Moscow. This offer, which is reported also to have been made to other Allied services; was rejected partly because of indications that Kedia and his collaborators are now Russian agents. It is worthy to note that among these collaborators, subject has been specifically reported as a known agent of the Russians."				
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>				
Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2000				
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		[]		

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NWC-002014

XX-12492 Interr. of () ^{Oct} 9/10/46

Subject is said to have emigrated from Russia in 1922, or 1923 in connection with the Revolution. Subject is described as extremely skillful and knew how to camouflage his activities and the method of his work is described as effective because of long experience and constant pursuit of his aims concerning Russia. () considers it unlikely that he was ever identified by the Russian CI system and believes that Subject's political outlook, although in fact known to this witness, was sufficiently camouflaged to remain unknown to a larger circle. Subject's reports were regarded as both informative and reliable. Exact details of the technical execution of Subject's intelligence operations are not available beyond the general outline given above. Subject is described as a man almost 6 ft tall with sparse reddish hair which was cropped short; regular features except for a rather large nose; no beard or moustache, and ruddy complexion. The only remarkable things about Subject were his eyes which seemed to dominate the entire man and the witness would call him the ~~par~~ type of an intellectual. The shape of his head is square with a rather long face. Subject speaks French, German, and Russian. Was last seen by () in August of 1944. There is nothing known to () about operations of this intelligence chain after his (Subject's) departure from France. (Engelhaupt) of Amt VI, and one-time collaborator of () should be able to furnish more details on Subject as he was closely connected with Subject on a personal basis.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

NWC-002015

Subject also worked in connection with ACTION ZEPPELIN. He was helpful in the selection of qualified personnel but no details are known. DJAMALJAN, son of a General of the same name, also figured in some way in these operations. () however, is not able to recall details at this time. KAMSARAKAN and GULBEKIAN (probably wrong spelling) also figured prominently in connection with these intelligence operations. Both had oil interests in the Near East and also had a grudge against Russia. () is not sure but thinks it possible that these two worked together with MAULATZ; at any rate they furnished much valuable information on the economic and political sector in the Near East Intelligence work. Their permanent residence was Paris and their connections reached into Azerbaijan. As far as () is able to remember, MAULATZ functions on the economic sector coincided with purely intelligence functions in this case.

Continued on Page 6