

傑羅·彌特爾敦作

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(轉載「紐約時報」)

美國新聞處編印

一九四八·中國

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前言

本書內載「紐約時報」記者傑羅·彌特爾敦所作連貫性文章多篇，彼等均係渠留居倫敦時根據渠於駐蘇時所得材料寫成。一九四七年渠獲假離蘇，從此即被拒再度入境。

Foreword

This pamphlet contains a series of articles by **Drew Middleton**, New York Times correspondent, who wrote them in London from notes he made while assigned in Moscow. When Middleton left Moscow for a vacation in 1947 he was denied a reentry permit.

南京 039035

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A Report on Soviet Russia

by

DREW MIDDLETON

Reprinted from the New York Times



Published in China by
The United States Information Service
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以目下蘇聯的工業，農業，各種建設及民氣而論，至少在十五年內她不能發動侵略性的戰爭。有許多理由使美國人民時時注意着蘇聯的龐大力量，但是，蘇聯可能立即發動軍事侵略並不是其中的理由之一。表面上看來，蘇聯的陸軍和裝甲部隊威脅地擺在我們的眼前，但是看穿了內幕以後，我深信在最近的十年內，她不敢惹起現代化的戰爭，與美國抗衡。

蘇聯的共黨在國內或向國外的宣傳，都把他們的國家描寫成現代技術化和社會正義化的仙境，但是較之事實的真像却差得很遠。各種族和人民還忍受着歷次戰爭毀壞所遺留下來的痛苦。所謂工業，農業及社會機構的一切措施，也不過是指冬瓜畫葫蘆的一套把戲罷了。

以蘇聯與美國的競爭而論，她兩本身就受着其嚴格制度的阻礙。人力的充裕，土地的肥沃及資源的豐富，一切都被共產極權政治的失敗糟塌了，使人民飽精力白費。它壓制着個人的自覺，以正統派的政治效率為光榮，並把人力消耗於軍隊中，同時又採取官僚政治濫及不合經濟原則的奴化勞工計劃。爲了這種原因目前蘇聯的政治制度，並不適合她的社會。社會是要發展的，因此，它欺騙了社會。

蘇聯的工業和農業雖然是在發展中，但是它進展的程度，較之人民的需要和國內經濟的形勢，相當遲鈍。此實由于極權制度下警察政治的特性所致。

在未詳細討論蘇聯的社會以前，讓我們把蘇聯卅一年（一九一七——一九四八）來的社會生活作一次廣泛的觀察。那麼，我們便可以知道它是一種剛從戰爭的恐怖中恢復過來的社會。

蘇外長莫洛托夫及其他的蘇聯領袖們常常強調着戰爭的損失，但是，他們演講的結果却得到相反的效力。尤其是當他們彈着哀鳴的老調，而以此作爲在國際上得不着公平的待遇的藉口時，人民一聞及「戰爭的損失」就覺得厭倦極了。

雖然毀壞和建設是蘇聯的二大問題。據史達林元帥的估計謂：曾被德軍佔領的白俄羅斯和烏克蘭兩共和國，須至一九五

五年以後，始能恢復一九四〇年時的繁榮。但是在這次戰爭中，蘇聯的死傷達七百萬，其中的工程師，技術員，監工及工廠的經理何日始能補充，尙無人能加以估計。

蘇聯戰後的建設很是遲鈍。一九四六年時德軍退出了頓尼茲流域已閱三年。那時，該流域的許多城市的情況還好像德軍撤退後第三天的情形一樣。蘇聯戰後建設遲鈍的原因固然很多，但是，這種遲鈍却是助長蘇聯今日經濟弱點的主要因素。從心理上的觀點看來，對工作麻木與無能已成了蘇聯的工人的藉口了。他們說：「戰前的一切都是好的，戰爭使我們到這樣的境地！」

蘇聯工業的真相與共黨宣傳家誇張的圖畫正如一幕滑稽的話劇。丑角利用黑色原紙板製成一部機動自行車的半面模型放在舞台上。當前幕初啓時，一人站在車旁，襯托得這個模型畢肖一部完美的機動自行車。但是當它轉動的時候，丑角却在後面騎着一部腳踏車，一不小心，這西洋鏡便被觀眾揭穿了。

在未被戰爭蹂躪的許多地方，今日蘇聯的工業仍是零亂的，參差不齊的。交通工具甚不充足，且操勞過度。儘管她的宣傳在嚷着：「烏拉爾區的生產頻頻增加！」「頓尼茲流域迅速復員」；然而據國外可靠的消息謂：一九四七年蘇聯出產的鋼約一千五百萬噸，較是年英國的產量約多一百五十萬噸。總之她的鋼和煤的生產趕不上其預定的數量。

鋼的產量不足供其國內的需求，為數甚鉅。蘇當局正向國外購買鐵軌，且正設法購入鋼管的設備為煉油之用。

蘇聯的煤，鐵在一九四六年及一九四七年的上半年中，每人平均的產額銳減。嗣後如不能以充份的消費品給與工人，鼓勵彼等勤奮工作及延長工作時間，則生產狀況，仍將繼續地江河日下。

讓我們把蘇聯的工人及其問題，作一詳細的觀察，因為現在我們可以這樣說：「蘇聯工業的恢復，尙遙遙無期。而恢復工人的繁榮則反是。」

蘇聯銳意振興工業已閱卅年，但是就大體言，她還是一個農業國家。她今日遭遺的問題與一九二〇至一九二九年的毫無二致。即如何利用肥沃的土地來支持新工業的發展。

這裏我們又碰到每次戰爭後重演的問題，即工業界工人之缺乏。農莊是勞力主要的來源，但是，若不將驅農為工的機械

供給農民，則彼等不易僱用。

在收復區的農業，復員得很慢。甚至有許多在白俄羅斯及烏克蘭的耕地，去年（一九四七）還運用着以手代農具的耕種方式。

蘇聯的農業，有些是利用科學方法去耕種的，更有些是因為科學化的耕具破壞了，而以動作遲慢的牽引車來耕種的。這些耕地，每畝平均的收穫較豐，然而，這些收穫較豐的產量，都用在西伯利亞為開發廣大農場而消費了。就一般情形而論，農業在蘇聯的經濟上，可算是較為有希望的一面。

蘇聯廢止計口授糧制度的用意，與「自由經濟」的意義不同。蓋蘇政府把一切農產「由農莊運至配給所再行發給人民」的運輸加以統制，為期已久，故另一方式的計口授糧制度，將再產生。茲舉莫斯科及基輔兩城市為例。在去年（一九四七）的最後一週及本年一九四八的第一週期間，該兩城市的人民，從前領到的食糧配給券，業已取銷了。但是，他們還可以從商店裏領到許多配給的牛油和麵包。

共產黨的宣傳家們偏要使人們相信：「二萬萬的蘇聯人民在團結着，快樂地為生活而奮鬥」；「蘇聯的人民是不會疑惑的，富有無畏精神的」。他們愉快地，真誠地接受政府領導。假如這些宣傳都是事實的話，為什麼蘇聯的內政部還要保留着二十個師團武裝整齊的警衛軍，來維持社會的安寧和西伯利亞的集中營裏還拘押着一千萬眾的蘇聯人民？

所謂幸福的社會裏，逐日必須舉行檢查。這些事實，除了共黨及其盲從者之外，都會使任何人深信蘇維埃政權對於革除弊政，還沒有成功，而且這些弊政，還遺存在資本主義社會裏。

蘇聯的內政部因發現國內營私舞弊，賄賂公行者比比皆是，曾舉行一次掃蕩弊政的運動。由此影響，她的工業組織至今還是動搖的。同時政府還產生出一個制裁的機關，專門從事於掃蕩集體農場組織中的弊政。

在蘇聯國內，農工業產量的虛報數字，觸目皆是，因為這些偽造的數字，常與百分數發生矛盾，故政府進行一種新的措施時，必須加以審慎的考慮。蘇聯的一切統計數字常不準確，是一件司空見慣的事。這不是因為受了虛報的影響，而是因為在一個極權國家裏，一切的統計，如工業生產數字，都用作對內和對外宣傳的好資料。

五年計劃下的蘇聯人民，並沒有達到其目標中的境地。他們吃碗，穿的都很可憐。房屋的缺乏是最令人傷感的事。在戰爭及戰後接踵而來的荒年中，他們的奮鬥，把他們天賦的活力都耗盡了。結果，他們對於宣傳的反應，及生產的技能都變得遲鈍了。

「加速穀物的耕種」；「加強煤產速度」；「讓工人們增加鞋的產量」，報端上諸如此類的標題很多。文章の後頭，却現出神經病的症候，強調不滿資本主義的工業。同時，又哀求工人們努力生產，以符其宣傳品上的生產數字。

所謂「自動的請願」即自號為優秀份子的工人，致書史達林元帥，保證食糧，煤炭及木材產量的增加，但是，結果亦不發生效率。各地黨部的首領則高聲疾呼；輿論則要求更多的這個和那個；而史達林則不顧一切地蠻幹。他對於這些宣傳和呼籲是很滿意的。

蘇聯的人民對共產主義的經濟措施，會感到失望和不满。但是，對於個人自由的剝奪，却麻木了。其原因有二：

(一)蘇聯人民從不自由為生活上的主要因素，只有一些老黨員，他們在革命時代，曾為國家的自由而結黨死戰的，是屬於例外。

(二)蘇聯卅年來的宣傳制度，完全控制了一切通訊的方法。一般的人民只聽過人家對他們說：他們也享受着自由的權利。因國外的消息和事實無法得到，所以革命後長成的蘇聯兒女，只有盲從宣傳家所叫囂的保證。在另一方面，關於衣食，住，行的缺乏，尤其是住的問題的咆哮，遍地皆是。

在蘇聯大選的期間，莫斯科有一個詼諧的笑話，足以表示人民對一切的不满。即當政府舉行政務會議的時候，一位老人傳說曾這樣發問道：「我們的社會主義，現在是成功了呢？還是把事情弄得更糟了呢？」

有些蘇聯的人民是有政治的覺悟的，但是，在這個嚴密統治思想，言論和行動的國度裏，有政治覺悟的人實在是少之又少。更有一批覺悟過來的，不滿現狀的人們，他們的覺悟與不滿，並不是因為國家的制度，使他們的精神忍受着無限痛苦，而是為了他們參加革命時，所應得到的利益——權勢和威望——太微薄。

當一九一七年時（俄國革命）曾抱着無限的希望，為新世界效命的人們，現在也和大眾一樣地覺得傷感和失望。據其中

的一位說：「從前我們這樣地想，我們已建立了一座天堂給與人民，可是現在，我們却發現它是一所地獄」。

二

蘇聯自實行共產主義以後，冊載於茲。人民一般的生活程度，較西歐者為低。共黨們還吹牛說他們的收穫是「自由」和「豐富」。其實是毫無所得。所謂「自由」，就是人家告訴你做什麼，你就得做什麼。所謂「豐富」，也不過是屬於少數人的罷了。因此，經濟和社會的不平等，便蓬勃地發展着。生活程度在今日的蘇聯，較諸一九一七年的，雖已有所增進，但是，在別的國家裏，與蘇聯同一出發點的改良，却長足邁進。且不致使其國民，遭遇殘酷的犧牲。由于官僚政治的肆虐，秘密警察的遍處搜查，衣食的經常缺乏和房屋的簡陋，蘇聯的一般人民，都陷于如此的境地。這種境地，殊難與西歐一般人的命運相比擬。人民和「無階級社會」中的上層階級，在彼此的命運之間，將畫上一條區別的界線。後者是使蘇聯的經濟退化的，因其生活之優裕，不亞于戰前的納粹官僚。

蘇政府正以毒辣的手段，施行着一種廣泛的運動。藉使一般人民，深信他們的生活，較西歐工人更優裕。這種運動雖得到一些成功；然而，却不能阻人民對經濟情況作不斷的咆哮。

戰爭的結束，加上了這種怨聲。前綫歸來的士兵們，都盛傳維也納工廠裏工人和波美倫（Pomerania）農人的繁榮。這些兵士的描述，並沒有得到絕大的效果，好像西方的一個樂觀者所透露的。於是，一種秘密的反宣傳組織，便在蘇聯的軍隊裏和民衆中產生出來。在任何的情況下，都有英勇的士兵起來與秘密警察反抗，和盛讚國外的繁榮。

今天，每一個蘇聯人民所面臨的主要問題就是住的問題。蘇政府雖有許多重建戰災區域——如敖得薩，基輔，明斯克，及史達林格勒的計劃，及莫斯科，列寧格勒和烏拉區新工業區的新建設計劃。但是戰爭的結束，已閱二年，而建設的表現，却很遲鈍。在未被德軍蹂躪的區域裏，人民所住的房屋，是一九一七至一九四一年間建築的平房和破爛的田舍，或卅年前所建の木屋。因為人民必需的工業產品，出產得很慢，故一切的建設，也就遲緩下來。鋼鐵木材，士敏土，三合土及磚塊等，

自一九四五年以來，每一個時期的出產實額，都趕不上預期的出產數量。

史達林格勒一城的百份之九十都被戰事毀壞了。一九四六年，該地工廠一年所產的土磚，為數僅二百萬塊，約等于需求總量的十分之一。結果便形成了屋少人多，擠擁在平房內的一個房間裏，或單間的茅舍內。茲以莫斯科為例。莫斯科的居民，有的是六個家庭同居在平房的六個房間裏，沐浴和炊爨的地方都是公用的。

如此的情況，在西歐有之，即美國亦間而有之。它們的人民所以能忍受的，蓋他們擁有自由的權力來抗議，或推翻那些設法改善如此情況的無能政府。可憐的蘇聯人民，却沒有得到這種自由的權利。

記得有一次，我訪問道過一位較為富裕的工人。他住在莫斯科的郊外。他的房屋，看起來，好像一個巨大的行李箱。它並不是建在街市裏，而是在耕地的中心。在那房子的四周，若不踏雪而行，自己開僻一條雪徑，則無出入的道路。這片雪圍的外邊，散佈着許多其他的房屋。

在這房屋的內邊，那又濕又滑的鐵樓梯，簡直看不見任何照明體發出來的光明。地板和牆壁都很骯髒。樓梯上邊的窗玻璃已失落了。現在却用木板來代替。每一個房間內，則住着四五個甚至六個不同家庭的人。

我認識一位外國人。他的僕人有一個患了肺病的孩子。這孩子暫時住在這裏，診病時則到醫務所去，後來因為他母親沒法養活他，只得把他送回學校去。我的一位女友對她說：這孩子的病，會傳染別的孩子。

「啊！太太」她回答「沒關係！大多數的孩子，都是已經染上了這種病的。」

幾度訪問各個集體農場之後，只有一次，得見一個家庭，有着一間以上的住所。無論如何，生活在鄉村較諸城市，總是衛生得多的。

較居住稍為次要的問題，便是食糧。目下蘇聯的人民，常有饑饉不繼之憂。由於食糧憑券配給制度之廢除，糧慌的嚴重始稍輕減。然而商店的老板，又拒絕出售超過每人應得的數量，故另一方式的配給制度又將繼續存在了。

在食糧配給時期，因為食糧供給的缺乏，或配給券額面的數量大低，蘇聯的老百姓們，都一天又一天，一月又一月地藉黑麵包，馬鈴薯，或有時偶然得到的魚來苟延他的生命。

爲什麼蘇聯全國的生產量都一般的降低？研究這問題的人，只要在飲食方面一想，就可以發現其中的一個理由。因爲蘇聯今日全國的人民；只有千百萬分之一是吃得合乎標準的。

如目前的食糧分配問題能獲解決，當商店「配給制度」結束的時候，工人們，爲增加收入，多買一些東西，也許會更勤奮地工作。這樣一來對於增加全國的生產量，在適當的時期內將必有新貢獻。

在今日的世界裏，階級間最顯明的界線，莫過於日常的飲食。有一天晚上，史達林元帥設宴招待英軍總司令蒙哥馬利，其筵席之豐，盡是美酒佳餚，山珍海錯。（菜單上有魚湯，炸黃鱔，燒羊肉，烤火雞，烤鷄，烤鵪鶉，咖啡，餅乾，鮮菓，牛油，蛋，各式凍品，香檳，紅酒，白酒等）。

大概就是在史達林元帥大宴蒙哥馬利的那一年，我看見兩個婦人，因營養不足，昏倒於地道中。我又看見巡邏莫斯科大街的警察，把行乞的農婦，驅入地道裏去。

在東部的新工業區裏，生活的情況，較莫斯科的更糟。下面是一封從該區寄來的信。茲把它摘錄下來。作者是受過良好訓練的工人，在一所新建的重要工廠中工作。

「我們住在一所很長的建築物裏。它一半兒是防空洞，一半兒是穀倉。同住的有六十人。我們大夥兒睡覺的地方，是木製的壁床。這許多相連的壁床，是不分彼此世界的。我們每十天洗澡一次。每一次只容許一半的人數同浴。因此，跳蚤的自由是無法控制的。我回到防空洞裏，稍事打掃，便睡覺去。睡在我前面的，就是一位那天沒有洗澡的人。次晨，我的小夥伴都回來了。

「他們是爲我們建造宿舍的，可是工作的表現並不很快。

「工廠裏是很冷的，因爲它是戰時的建築物。氣管和窗戶的設置都不妥當。雪片紛紛飛入，鋪在地板上。因此，附近窗戶的地方，都很冰滑。工場門口的門板，竟不要而飛。聽說，盜兒把它偷去了。我們很賣氣力地做工，以藉保持身體的溫暖。這也許是一個很好的見解。」

信中所述的工人，並不是罪犯。事實上，工人也不會被判刑罰。因爲共黨們可以力辯說：在一個與蘇聯前途關係重大的

區域裏，工廠的工人是光榮的。

外國人感到最可笑的，就是蘇聯的人民，固執地認為蘇聯的文化，是登峯造極的。關於這一點也許是宣傳家吹牛得太過火了。蘇聯再三說明世界沒有一個國家可以和它比較的。但是這些說明並不產生在未來的長期奮鬥中所需的心理學。

這種夜郎自大的態度，最標準的例證，乃一位蘇聯外交家的太太說話。在一天晚上的宴會裏，她的伴侶，滔滔不絕地說論動物園裏的野獸。她說：「莫斯科的動物園裏，有一頭巨象。」她的伴侶回答道：「在這嚴寒的天氣裏，巨象一定不會快樂的。」

「恰恰相反」，她向他保證，「聽說莫斯科動物園的巨象，是世界上最快樂的一個。」

蘇聯宣傳家所描寫的蘇聯情形，與事實不同之點，茲舉醫院的內容，為其最好的例證：在莫斯科及其他地方，我曾訪問過的醫院，計有七所。關於整潔，設備和治療，它們都比不上西歐的二等醫院。因此，我才恍然大悟。原來蘇聯的醫藥和治療，在理論方面，已達到頗高的水準。然而，在實際方面却不然了。

或曰，「那些醫院的所在地，三十年前，還是人烟絕跡之境」。這辯論是對的。可是，共黨們的辯論則不然。他們說：「關於醫藥和治療標準方面，世界上任何地方都趕不上蘇聯」。真是荒謬絕論了。

看吧，戰時英，美軍隊的野戰醫院。其機構及衛生的完美，較諸永久性醫院，堪稱奇蹟。

在蘇聯的醫院裏，凡擺有病床——由六個至十四個不等——的地方，都叫做病房。故所謂「病房」者，隨地皆是。有時，簡直把病床擠在一起。使人無法通行其間。地板和牆壁都很污穢。燈光很暗淡，護士也很少。

在緊接着戰爭的那年，為了醫院的情況很糟，蘇聯的衛生部次長便發表了一封致醫藥工作者的公開信。關於衛生的缺乏，醫護之疏忽，藥材之缺少及商戶和屋頂之失修，均加以斥責。

六個月以後，醫院之監督者便具呈報告，痛述工作人員的不力；關於這一點，真不愧為集權主義者典型的作風。讀者切勿忘記，那些醫院中的簡陋和骯髒，係依照西方人士的觀點而言，至於有些病人的眼光，却認為極端的華貴。同時，這些簡陋和骯髒，亦足以證明蘇聯政府的漠視民命。蘇聯的病人，只要有一張床布舖在床上，就不會發牢騷。那管這張床布，幾週

來都沒得更換。在蘇聯人民的眼光裏，床布依然是一種奢侈品。

還有一個關於醫護方面的奇聞，足以反映出消費品的缺乏的，就是嬰孩日用品的供給方法。婦女們都可以榮膺一種優待券，為購買尿布，餵奶瓶，橡皮頭，橡膠床布及其他的嬰孩用品。這種優待券，非至小兒出生以後不能使用。不然的話，那產婦會把這些供應品留作己用，假如她生下來的是死嬰的話，而且這些供應品就會變成徒然白費的。

衣服，傢具，廚房用具，鞋，鉛管設備的供給品，火爐及其他千百種用具的缺乏，又是蘇聯人民日常生活的一幕悲劇。配給制度最近廢止以後，際此盧布貶值之秋，人們都知道只花廿五個盧布就可以買到一雙膠套鞋。但是卻沒有人知道，買鞋的手段是揀足先登的。

配給制度之廢止，並沒有解決食糧和消費品——迫切需要和供給不足的問題。

人民的毛氈，都是補綴過的。傢具是用一段一段的鐵線去修整過的。小孩子們沒有膠套鞋，在雪地裏發抖。郊外的情況較城裏的好些，因為那裏有古式的棉衣，和毛氈製的靴鞋以禦嚴寒。在這物資缺乏的情況下，最痛苦的是工業的勞動階級。然而，假蘇聯工業增加生產的勞力，也是仰給於這個階級的人們。

今天是禮拜二，他們如何度日？

三

在市街裏還見不到一線曙光的時候，伊凡便起身了。那時，他的妻子，季塔，還正在睡着。他們倆是住在莫斯科阿爾巴特住宅區。她每天除抽出一部份時間到工廠去做工及回來整理家務外，還要花幾個鐘頭的時間，站在購買食物者的行列裏。在這些日子裏，她常常感到厭倦。

他有兩個兒子。室內雖有餘地，足以擺設第四張床鋪，但是在這嚴寒的春天裏，瓦西里和佐治（他二個兒子的名）却願意同床就寢。貼在窗上裂口處有些「真理報」報紙，却擋不住冷氣的侵入。伊凡曾向房屋委員會請求修理，然而却得不到任

何的反響。

在廚房裏——這廚房是伊凡的家庭和其他四個家庭公用的——伊凡和他的全事安得烈偶爾在一起用早點。他們各拿着一盅茶，嚙嚼着一些黑麵包和分享着一小片奶酪。

當伊凡和安得烈到達市街的時候，曙光已經映在灰白和悽清的雪上了。在市街的中心，一隊一隊拿着農具輪流工作的老婦已將街道上的雪掃光了。這裏和克里姆林宮相距不過五分鐘的路程，地面上除了印着附近居民的足跡外，却綿延不斷地鋪着雪。

伊凡很是幸運。當他從軍隊裏復員出來的時候，他帶了一對軍靴回來，還可以把它當作水鞋之用。他把褲腳捲在靴統裏。他那條又黑又笨重的工人褲是綴補過好幾處的，但是這並不算稀奇。在他的軍大衣的內邊，他穿着一件很舊的短棉衣，其次是破舊的內衣。因為肥皂不易獲得，故這件內衣雖經他的太太勤力洗滌，也還是一樣的骯髒。

在街道的一隅，他們等候着無軌電車。今日的莫斯科，公共汽車很少，而候車者的行列却很长。伊凡快要跳上交通車的時候，一面力推，一面頻頻地唱道：「當心，市民們，你在推着我了。」在車上他發現一個空位，且剛好坐在一位健談者的隔壁。這位健談者是工廠會計室的職員，也是一個共黨信徒，且常常談論政治。

伊凡很恭敬地傾聽他的談吐。但是所談的並不是奇聞，而是「美國正在北極建立空軍根據地」或「莫洛托夫的合理要求為外長會議所拒絕」。這些報導，伊凡在報章上已經見過的，在無線電的廣播中也聽過的。因此，他的外表雖好像在傾聽，但是他的心裏却在担心着他的兒子瓦西里的咳嗽和他的妻子季塔的倦容。

在工廠裏所度的日子，依然如故。伊凡是一個工作小組的組長。這小組是負責裝置無線電機的刻度盤的。近來廠內的工作甚形缺乏，但是今日的情況似暫好轉。

上月份，伊凡小組裏的工作成績已超過了它的「標準」。這標準是五年計劃下廠方依其應負的責任內給它規定的。因此，該小組的工作人員在廠內的食堂裏得以加菜。本日除加上了白菜湯，通心粉和茶外，伊凡還多加了一些肉。這一餐，按廠方規定的價格，他付了九毛錢。

今天是一個紀念日，雖然在報上他已看過它的名稱，但是它究竟是什麼紀念日——陸軍紀念日呢？戰車紀念日呢？砲兵紀念日呢？還是海軍紀念日？他却忘記了。但無論如何，他都要跟着其他的組長們去聽莫斯科蘇維埃委員會派來的演說家高讀蘇維埃制度的光榮和美帝國主義侵略者對它所存危險的演講。工作完畢以後，一直到天黑伊凡才能歸家。工作的時間雖只有八小時，但是爲了交通的不便，他每天約有十二個小時離開家庭。

在歸途中的交通車上，他閱讀一些報紙。但是那些報紙，如真理報及消息報等，關於國際新聞及理想的文章很少，而本地新聞則很多。

並不是所有蘇聯人民的生活都和伊凡的一樣，不過大多數都和他的相同。這是因爲計劃社會業已發展成標準社會而其標準却定得太低的緣故。假如伊凡和某一些人比較，也可稱爲相當富有的人，因所他每月的收入約有八十五元，而他太太的約有四十元。

有一個較伊凡更上一層的階級，名曰「諾維巴里」，即新貴族的意思。這新貴族係由黨閥，海陸軍高級官員，治安警察的首領，工廠經理及技術人員，科學家，作家，藝術家和優伶等組成。他們的生活是很優裕的。

茲以M（簡寫的人名）君爲例。他是新貴族的一員，也是政府的官吏。因爲他是某機關的主要人物，所以在較新的大樓中他能取得一連三個房間爲其住宅。他的職位使他很光榮地在一員存貨豐富的商店裏從事貿易，並爲其同階級者囤積物資。他的住宅的設備，頗合西方的標準。此外，他還多買了一張桌子，一個很漂亮的碗櫥和一些盤碟。這些用具是從前他到西歐的時候帶回來的。雖不算得頂好，但較諸莫斯科買來的却好得多了。

在未來的幾年中，當真理報的主筆們呼籲人民作「更進一步的犧牲」時，將有一批「蘇聯的愛國人民」起來請願。而伊凡者便是主筆先生們的理想人物。可是，這位M先生却乘這些「犧牲」的機會，從中漁利。

M君曾設法積聚了許多盧布。貨幣的貶值也許把他將來的計劃都傾覆了。縱令如此，他或許還沒有做醫生的那麼倒霉。醫生們在醫務所的工作完畢以後，在家裏又私自地執行業務。在若干星期內，他曾每週賺得二萬五千元盧布。

凡在報上登載的或無線電廣播的一切訓令，伊凡都毫不驚愕地，毫無疑問地接受。時至今日，他仍深信「蘇聯打败了德

國解放了全歐洲，然後移師東向，予日本以致命的打擊」。

前天晚上，他看過一部電影。該影片會映出日本和蘇聯的將領在戰艦上簽訂和約，但是却沒有說明那戰艦是美國的。同時也未說明在美艦米蘇里號的聯合國代表中只有幾位是蘇聯的。假如將這事實告訴伊凡，他也許不會置信。

他只聽得人家說，他現在是在最自由和最文明的社會制度下過活著，而這種制度是人類的聰明迄今才發明的。其實伊凡是蘇聯國度裏的囚犯。他根本沒有標準來判斷這種宣傳。

伊凡根本沒有人民權利和進取的傳統信仰或背景。假如他想把自己的命運和別人的比較，那麼，它就只得和他父親或祖父的作一比較。他聽得人家說，他的父親和祖父是在苛刻的制度下工作，且為資本家和貴族所壓榨。因此，他現在雖然咆哮着物資的缺乏，可是還敢武斷他的生活比他的先人好得很多。

一位年高的老者也許會在工廠的俱樂部裏與人耳語地說：在沙皇的統治下，一個人最低限度還可以提出一些抗議。縱使因抗議而入獄。那麼，他的家人會照顧他，他的朋友也會援助他。

伊凡不去睬他。因為他，正如每一個其他的蘇聯人民，知道「他們」是常常傾聽着耳語的，而這位老者也許是「他們」一羣中的一員，故最好的辦法便是裝聾。

伊凡和他的太太都渴望着兒子們的生活會比他們的好些。今日的孩子們，假如他們的程度够高的話，便可以由學校出身成為工程師或醫生或律師。反之，他們就會被征入工人的後備隊裏。為父母的都想避免那種境遇。

近來，伊凡却在焦慮：是否他的兒子的成就到底不致使他們父子離散呢？

他有一位朋友是工廠的同事。這位朋友有一個很聰明的女兒。她在大學讀書時，化學成績很好。後來她轉入專科學校，研究食糧的製造。但是不幸得很，她將不得在莫斯科居留了。

大規模的麵包製造廠正在東部建築着。她已奉令派往該處工作。誠然，這是一個很好的職業，但伊凡却為她父母焦慮：他們是否不能再見她呢？

伊凡的生活是卑賤的一種。但是歸根結底圍繞着生活的烏烟瘴氣並不是卑賤，缺乏，擠擁，飢餓，也不是政治制度固有

的保障的缺乏引起了工業改變的定期發作。其實是伊凡和季塔及成千萬的伊凡和季塔都沒有改造生活的方法。
今天是禮拜三。這個警察國家怎樣活動？

四

雖然蘇聯的統治是如此的苛刻和暴戾，但在蘇維埃聯邦內，並無存在任何有組織的地下反抗的跡象。有時也有許多個人的反抗，不過很容易地就被平息了。蘇聯國家的機構中存在着許多雄厚的勢力，如政府最高當局發生某種騷動的事變時，則彼此互相對立。但民衆反抗的現象很少，其理由是基於國家的組織和其人民的心理。

她是一個警察的國家。使她支持在一起的力量便是 MYD（蘇聯內政部）的祕密警察。儘管共產黨如何地勸導和懇求，MYD 却老是把這架巨型而笨重的機器——在倒置的狀態。

在蘇聯的近代史裏，根本就找不着以和平手段改革政府的紀錄。最後一次的改革是在一九一七年。那時，統治了三百零四年的羅曼諾夫（Romanov）王朝已被傾覆了。布爾希維克黨，雖好像一顆由八百個微粒合成的雨點掉在蘇聯的海洋裏，可是自從那時攫取了政權以後，就一直把持到現在。

尼古拉（Nicholas）的俄國和史達林的蘇聯均有這些相同之點：崇拜有如半神的全國領袖，巨型的官僚政治，權力集中，統治範圍的廣大，極端重視海軍和陸軍，毫不猶疑的和嚴厲的採用武力和祕密警察。

一切的趨勢就是使蘇聯人民深信自由的氣氛目前使他們眼花撩亂的確是真正的自由。這種現象以蘇聯的選舉觀之，尤其真實。她的選舉制度對於共黨的政權是有用的。它供給一個緊張宣傳的機會及在政府中產生『信任票』以資對外宣傳，使國外的應聲蟲相信「蘇聯人民畢竟是全體擁護史達林的。」

蘇聯選舉制度的反映並不是民意，而是黨方引誘民衆投票的能力。共黨的提名者得票之多，簡直是無人能出其右。在這二萬萬民衆的國度裏，共產黨員的人數只有五百萬強。但是，提名者却被認為黨派集團——無黨無派及共產黨的集團——

的代表。

在每一個蘇聯人民的腦海裏，大部份充滿着 MVD（祕密警察）及 MGB（全國保安部）的意識。

最初，蘇聯只有正規軍負治安及國防之責。其總數約有二十個師團裝配優良的部隊，而空軍即戰鬥機，輕轟炸機及中型轟炸機各隊，亦包括在內。

其次，則有許多便衣特務，分屬於 MVD 和 MGB 各部。根據可能獲得的消息，前者負責於國內，後者則活動於國外。兩者皆忙於間諜及反間諜的工作。

他們的人數究有多少，却沒有人知道。有一位外國人，他了解蘇聯的程度和國外的任何人一樣，估言 MVD 和 MGB 的間諜至少有五十萬人。

尚有一個審查機關——全國管理部，負責監督經濟計劃實施之責。一九四六年發現蘇聯全國工業中黑幕重重的就是這個機關。

爲了黨的目標，又有一個共黨組織部，負責監督黨策在政府及黨務機關施行的情形。在戰爭期間而至於現在，此機關曾與軍事機構保持密切的聯絡，務使政治的領導方式灌注到軍隊裏去。

MVD 除執行其他任務外，還開設外事局 (Intourist) 爲專責處理外籍遊客的機關。它 (MVD) 並且支配集中營和監獄。被拘禁在集中營的人們，其確數究有多少，只有天曉得。MVD 曾承認謂在蘇聯國內有大批的役力「僱員」。這些「僱員」在百忙中於一九四六年完成了白海與波羅的海間之運河。他們大部份的勞力化在西伯利亞。

許多關於他們人數的估計數字，均可排列在九百萬至二千萬之間。有一位集中營的探賈，有一次對我的位朋友說：「你曉得嗎，我們就是統治本國的人們。」

假如 MVD 的組織加上戎裝整齊的制服，則與國社黨德國的武裝黑衣衝鋒隊毫無二致。我們知道黑衣衝鋒隊先補充德國國防軍的權利，使正規軍的士氣和指揮官根據黨策的軍令受到莫大的損傷。這種損傷比軍事上的打擊還要厲害。結果削弱了德國最高司令的指揮效率。

共黨已踏上了德國的覆轍，是一件很可能的事。

星期四：——克里姆林宮的遠大對外政策。

五

時間，並不是戰爭，是蘇聯在國際中與美國競爭的目標：「及時完成戰後的建設及工業的擴充」；「及時加強衛星國維繫在蘇聯的政治和經濟的關係」；「爭取預料中的西歐資本主義社會的日益瓦解的時間」，「及時助長在資本主義國家進行的共產主義運動」。這些都是今後十年內蘇聯政策的要點。

美國的人們對克里姆林宮利用國外共黨的活動甚為焦慮，因為這就是美國在西歐，希臘及土耳其所攻擊的。爲了加速解散別的社會，共黨的壓力可能採取武力的方式，如希臘所受的壓力是也。或政治的方式，如法國和義大利所受之壓力是也。假如蘇聯的經濟繁榮起來，就會採用經濟方式的壓力。

但是蘇聯與美國顯明的衝突將可避免。克里姆林宮以許多軍略擾亂世界之視聽，其中最成功的一個是散佈一種空氣說：史達林仍堅持「在一個國家中實行社會主義」而反對托洛斯基及「世界革命」。

現在顯明的，史達林所主張的是各種不同的方法而已，包括欺騙許多西歐人士的方法。我深信第三國際是從未被解散過的。

「當然它依然存在」，一位蘇聯的老百姓說，「這不過是換湯不換藥而已」。

在莫斯科，有著許多形形色色的學校。那裏有一羣一羣的美國人，英國人，義大利人，西班牙人，及南美人在受訓，準備當他們回國後，發動革命的工作，如倡導罷工，煽動一切的不滿和國內的分裂，設立偽政府和另樹旗幟等，藉以動搖羣衆的信念。

依現在蘇聯聯邦的統治者的解釋，蘇聯的外交政策是以馬克斯主義及列寧主義爲根據。這樣的解釋在使人知道資本主義

，以目前美國爲例證，是共產主義的敵人；帝國主義，目前美國走上的路線，是資本主義最後的階段。大規模的經濟崩潰終將資本主義的基礎徹底傾覆，如此就在現在的資本主義國家裏爲共產主義降臨打開一條道路。

最重要的是，共產黨對政策的觀點並非以二年或四年而是以數十年爲期的。或許歐洲復員計劃的要點已迫使共產黨在法國及希臘採取比所預料更爲迅速的行動。

以共產黨的立場而言，美國是它的敵人，而且是必然的敵人。因爲克里姆林宮是很有把握地把所有國內的敵人都消滅了，所以別的國家就得扮演這個角色。這些捏造的空氣，謂美國對蘇深懷敵意及美國將實行「獨霸世界的計劃」是蘇聯的統治者們深感滿意的。

把美國畫上了這樣的色彩，政府對人民生活毫無止境的酸澀才有藉口。

蘇聯現在的情況與一九三八年不同之點便是：當時（一九三八）蘇聯的國民——領導者與被領導者都很明顯的恐怕德國的侵略。現在，是否共產黨的政治部，即蘇聯最高政策審判的機關曾有顧慮到美國侵略的感覺，是件可疑的事。

當然，蘇聯的人民是不知道「恐美病」的，但是，經過不斷的宣傳以後，結果他們也開始染上「恐美病」了。

溯自一九四五年以來。蘇聯的代表便仇視，有時更侮辱美國。憑他們所說的自由也許會使他們覺悟，美國是不會宣戰的。

蘇聯今日對美國的態度和一九四〇年時對德國的恰恰相反，那時德國的軍力威脅着整個歐洲，蘇聯却恭而敬之。因爲他知道德國的侵略是可能的。

以美國的一原子外交」爲宣傳引起了這樣的問題：對美國描述的假設行動是否正確地反映蘇聯向所採用的手段，假如蘇先製造好第一顆原子彈的話？

蘇聯對美國態度和對英國的亦有不同之點。美國之可懼是因爲她的軍事和工業的力量。

共產黨並不恐懼資本主義的民主變爲歐洲的一個政治力量。他們爭論說它不適合於一個荒廢和受限制的經濟社會的需要，然而英國却提出一種不同的政治挑戰。

假如，一個最大的假如，今日的英國不求工人的直接行動，不用祕密警察和集中營，而能獲得他們所尋求的有限度的社會主義的成功，則共產黨將必困於黑市貿易的市場中了，

蘇聯已於去年四月放棄社會主義向外發展的政策，但是在列寧「四月提綱」三十週年紀念時所受到的重視大可預示共產黨在國際上的活動已死灰復燃，這是出以第三國際的形式，且說現在法國及義大利所發動的政治攻勢亦可窺見。

這些活動永不會被放棄，尤其在戰爭的期間中還被裝成蘇聯與西歐合作的模樣，以配合她的陰謀。

歐洲復員計劃的降臨，加強了共產黨國外活動的節奏，因為這個計劃是以物資的援助為武器（這是蘇聯目前所不能運用的），以與共產黨作戰，以保證在混亂中的西歐的安全。共產黨的活動可能在法國，義大利，希臘及中東繼續地施行。最顯明的便是蘇聯最近在伊朗的行動。這種行動希望將美國目前注意西歐的視線暫時轉變過來。同時蘇聯亦將繼續加強蘇聯與其衛星國的關係。其目的：第一是避免衛星國有任何親近歐洲復興計劃的傾向，第二是增加衛星國對於東歐集團的經濟復興的貢獻。蘇聯確有兩個外交政策，一個是莫洛托夫宣佈的，這是一國對付其他各國的傳統政策。其次就是未經宣佈的共產黨政策，這是共產黨對其海外部屬的理想呼籲的新技術。

這兩個政策都是以達到蘇聯的世界政治目標為鵠的。後者主要以共產主義理想為基礎。前者以馬克斯列寧及史達林的著作為藍本的，與國際甚有關係。

以對歐洲以言，蘇聯的傳統外交政策係以蘇聯政府在德黑蘭，雅爾達及波茨坦會議中所採取之步驟作其解釋。這些步驟是業經獲得同意為國際關係的基礎的。

蘇聯的人民都會感覺到這些會議會賦予他們自由處理東歐的權利，而交換的條件便是：他們默認西歐共產主義活動的限制。但是，他們從不想依照這樣去做，這是很顯明的事實。

真的，蘇政府是不可能照着這樣去做的。因為資本主義是共產主義的敵人，他們是勢不兩立的。東西兩歐戰後的合作開始進行的時候，就被法定沒有希望了。在戰時，共產國家因被迫而合作，但在平時，就不能合作和忠於共產黨的原則。隨着波茨坦會議之後而發生的唯一問題就是什麼時候就會弄成決裂呢。作者曾獲悉蘇聯的政治會議裏對於這個問題曾作不少的討論

，並詢問那些了解美國和西歐的官吏謂：再經過一二年合作以後，又有什麼收穫呢？決議是這樣：表面上的合作被擯棄為一種政策。這種決議的意思是將來以互不相容來代替合作。它並非表示蘇聯將發動顯明的侵略，而是表示蘇聯對西歐的政治和經濟將加予不斷的攻擊。將來，等到和假如蘇聯的國民把主人給與它的工作完成以後，假若西歐的分裂的速度進行得好像克里姆林官所預言的，他們或許追求一個更積極的政策。

六

根據蘇聯目前至一九五〇年完成的五年計劃，史達林委員長和政治局把一種巨大的任務給予蘇聯人民，使蘇聯經濟擴展到工業能力超過美國的程度。莫斯科一般人士都認為這是蘇聯安全的步驟。

為達到此一目的，蘇聯必須解決許多問題。蘇聯與聞此一工作的官員都相信這些問題可以解決，依照我個人的見解，蘇聯資源蘊藏雖極豐富，但制度嚴峻的特質和各種經濟難題，將難於一九五〇年達到這些目標。

抑有進者，蘇聯對爭取世界工業優勢的努力，過份依賴共產黨的理論，認為資本主義的經濟現正趨沒落或停滯不前。

當蘇聯當前計劃逐步實施時，擁有新式工業機械生產的美國，必仍保持工業生產質量遠超蘇聯的優勢。這是極可能的事。

在平時和戰時，蘇聯耗費大量盧布和最優秀人材從事應用原子分裂的試驗。雖然在中亞有實驗的優越條件，正常的工業發展所遭遇的問題依然存在。

第一，勞動力的實質問題。蘇聯戰時犧牲七百萬人，其中大部是勞工，蘇聯最需要的勞工技術人員，管理機器的技師，監工和工程師。

在當前的五年計劃中，蘇聯每年須動員新工人一百廿萬名以應工業和運輸業的需要。至一九五〇年，這一五年計劃不管完成與否（我們西方人士實在無從知道）男女業工人將增至三千三百萬名，這批後備工人大部份祇能從農村青年獲得補充。

在工業未能製造農業機械代替農村青年以前，由集體農場吸收這批後備工人，先造成人力問題嚴重的後果。

在極權國家中，動員十四歲以上的男女後備工人工作自然不難，但要得到特種人材以訓練那些青年，在目前的條件下，可就不容易了。

凡訪問蘇聯工廠和工業設備的人都可得到這樣的結論，新工人因係應付工業急需，一般皆訓練不足。在理論上，他們受過學校教育和短期訓練；而事實上，學校教育對於緊急需要是不適應的。

這似乎是一件重大的失敗，因為蘇聯工人素質方面的低落，和當前量的方面的缺乏同等重要。蘇聯女工的工作能力足以補救後者，但是，即就目前急需工人期間，除非有一種實際訓練的努力，否則目前和未來都有工人幹部缺乏之弊病。

爲了目前的需要，一種指導和威迫蘇聯產業工人增產的努力正持續進行中。鞋工馬特拉梭夫由於在鞋廠中建設一種使工人生產達到機器生產的計劃，便成爲蘇聯的民族英雄。

一九四七年總預算中，計算分配於當前五年計劃期間後備工人項下的支出爲二千七百萬盧布。祇是該款用於建築工人宿舍的總額較用於訓練方面的爲多。

蘇聯所以拒絕交還一九四三年至四五年勝利期間所俘虜的大批德俘，其中一大理由是許多德國俘虜有着工業才幹高度的水平。這輩戰俘是工業前進的國家的兒女，自然他們所做的正是蘇聯設法教育那些來自農場的笨拙後備工人所要做的工作。

在重建橫越聶伯河大水壩工程中，工人百分之十係日耳曼人。他們被雇用於不很繁重的工作。——這些工作由蘇聯婦女担負——他們担任諸如接合工，排水，吸水一類機器操縱的技師。

蘇聯政府會力圖保持這些戰俘的勞動力。有一個工程人員敘述人家向他所作的建議。這個建議是以假定德國已完了而蘇聯才是耕耘的大地作基礎的。

「閣下還年青，這裏有你的前途」，蘇聯人說。「你可以成爲蘇聯人，可在西伯利亞找到適當的建設工作，你可以得到住宅和充足的食物。你也可以和蘇聯女子結婚。」

利用這一類的誘餌，德國人和一些日本人便被吸收爲蘇聯的工業勞動力了。

蘇聯必須克服的第二個問題，便是前在一九四六年便已傳佈開來的工業界的腐化。這種流弊浪費蘇聯巨額的盧布，同時也影響煤、鐵和鋼的生產。這種腐化所產生的低效率在一個經過一百卅年而非卅年的工業發展的民族裏實屬出人意表的。這種腐化被廣佈各地的虛報和歪曲的工業統計數字所掩飾。所有蘇聯工業生產數字——最虛偽的數字——都被公開提出質問是不確實。

在工廠中發現侵吞原料，虛報生產數字以獲取特別獎金，挪用工人工資，私人動用或盜賣工業產品等現象，都被蘇聯人民揭露了。

這種昔年保持蘇聯工業生產超過原定計劃「標的」的獎勵制度，由於工業界腐化的存在，現已百弊叢生。礦場顧問和工程師使用炸藥生產超額煤斤，獵取更多的特別獎金。在若干情形下，視察發現「煤斤」中百分之四十是石頭。

蘇聯政府曾用嚴格法令限制這種腐化，但是，在很多事例中，表現腐化依然盛行。

蘇聯必須克服的另一重大問題是每一單位勞動力生產相對的低落，產業工人方面更甚。雖然有若干諸如經驗和機器缺乏這些附帶原因，但是，最主要的一點，是由於刺激工人努力的食物和消費品缺乏的結果。

一組克里伐洛格鐵礦調查團報導說：一九四〇年該場一架挖掘機每班平均出產生鐵五七·七噸，六年後跌至三六或三七噸，目前雖略見增加，離滿意的程度尚遠。

在頓尼茲盆地若干礦場中，目前一單位勞動力地下煤斤產量僅為一九四〇年數字百分之六十。

政府已明白缺乏消費品和一九四六年秋每一單位勞動力生產減少間的相互關係。

他們已利用一切機構，開始宣傳政府增加消費品供應的計劃。根據五年計劃，出產這一類食物的物品合作復興計劃被取出作例，用來表明未來工人可獲得食品的数量。

這種計劃依然是無濟於事的，統計處指出，計劃生產和合作後的增產不足應付刺激工人的需求。

顯然的，把五年計劃的重點轉變到消費品的生產已是太遲了。不足的食物可向外國購買補充，但是從觀念的危險性來說，又不適宜如此做法。

戰時德國加諸蘇聯的破壞構成另一困難。美國人從蘇聯外長莫洛托夫和其他領袖的演辭中聽到許多關於他們把這一點當作蘇聯復興障礙的意見。但是凡訪問頓尼茲盆地——明斯克，維德比斯克，基輔，卡爾科夫，奧德薩，伏洛希羅夫格勒或史達林諾——礦區的人，必不致造成同樣的錯誤。

在這些區域中，到處都應用德國和捷克的機器。其中雖有一部份復原工作已告完成，但是，一般說來，要填補遭受德國摧毀和沒收的工業建設空隙，仍需一段悠長的途程。

大體說，至少，蘇聯當局特別注意烏拉爾區工業的發展，但是，訪問該區的外國人却認為就是在條件最有利的區域中，由於每一單位勞動力生產的低落，器械和住所的缺乏，使工業依然無法儘量發展。

一封自克拉斯尼，魯赤（在頓尼茲盆地）寄來的信指出，煤礦工人和其家屬必須睡在走廊的地板上，因為人數擁擠，睡牀缺乏，宿舍一般說起來是「骯髒而不舒適。」

頓尼茲盆地伏洛希羅夫格勒附近加狄夫卡鎮大礦場，是德軍撤退三年後礦業發展最好的例子。蘇聯期望這礦場至一九四七年春生產完全恢復舊觀。

蘇聯的礦場內，空氣的流通設備還很簡陋，電力的設備也不完善。

縱使盛讚古斯尼茲和基賽爾盆地的富藏開了三三年之後，頓尼茲產量，依照史達林諾礦場官方的報告僅達一九四〇年的百分之五十。在同一時期中，古斯尼茲的煤產量，約達頓尼茲煤產量百分之四十。

史達林諾附近馬基依夫加的基洛夫鍊鋼廠和史達林格勒的紅軍十月鍊鋼廠的情形也是一樣。其生產量約為戰前三分之一。

把尚待廓清的德國嚴重破壞，技術工人，住所，消費品，每一勞動生產力的影響諸因素一同計算，在計劃家認為這二大工廠「在一年內」恢復戰前生產率的希望，似乎沒有什麼根據。

在戰前，蘇聯工人把作戰的勇敢精神也用到工業的生產上。在平時，美國領導的新資本主義包圍，並沒有從蘇聯壓榨出新的生產水平來。

在大體上言，農業是蘇聯經濟最有希望的一面。五年計劃主要重點是工業的擴張。但是，至目前，困難問題略比工業方面爲少的農業，較有實際的進步。其理由甚多：其一常爲人忽略而重要的，是蘇聯農民的能力和專心。他們有無窮的精力。他們能使事物發展。他們是堅忍的，比蘇聯產業工人能担負較長時間而艱難的工作。還有一點最重要的，他們大都是留在本土工作。

在蘇聯，就是昔日工業區中，也可看到許多工人表現沮喪，懶散。這種態度在集體農場卻碰不到，在集體農場中，農民酷愛土地，稱讚出產品，熱誠學習使生產豐多的新方法。

去年，農產增加的近因，是在西伯利亞西部拓展科學化和機械化的耕種方法，尤其是小麥的耕種，和到處開墾新地的結果。

一九四七年，蘇聯約增加耕地二千萬英畝。一九四八年仍繼續增加。再者，白俄羅斯和烏克蘭戰時受摧殘的耕地也部份繼續復原了。

第二個因素是農業部和其他各有關部門在一九四七年爲收穫所作的全盤計劃，勞力和物資都用以力圖到達最高峯的生產。同時，農業機械，特別是牽引機的生產，日見增加。目前，史達林格勒史達林牽引機製造廠的產量已達戰前日產二二〇架的半數了。卡爾科夫牽引機製造廠的生產雖較落後，但仍比以前多。

其他農業機械生產依然不滿人意的情况把這些成就抵銷了。許多工廠恢復平時的生產需要很長的時間，結果，農業生產又到損失。

科學對農人的幫助是很大的，而且也受農人的歡迎。工人居住和工作的環境是很簡陋的。

他們生活於農場中，但是，這一切無礙於農人的尊敬和農人工作的效果。

在集體農場中，老農一再告訴作者，政府科學家如何增加穀物，採用出產優良穀物和貯藏方法。出產新種小麥的方法已經採用，牲畜疾病大見減少，農田上現有新種牛羊。機械和電力已代替了人力和燭光了。

在蘇聯三十年全部成就中，這一切是最重要的。各地都不發生流血和痛苦的改進，使世界人士清楚看到，幾千年落後的農業在三十年中完全克復的偉大成就。

勞工缺乏和重建工作，是工業和農業共同遇到的問題。

農場遭受戰事的摧殘。在作者訪問的非集體農場區中，工人人口損失幾達一半。現在由於擴張工業的需求，鄉村的勞動力又復受到威脅。農業機械如有辦法，即使勞動力減少，集體農場仍可繁榮，不然的話。一九四八年的穀物，便很難收割了。佔領區中戰爭的破壞極大，其損害不祇是牲畜，機器和建築，也包括田園本身在內。

一向非出產食品在白俄羅斯曾設法為其城市生產一部份食品。在戰爭發生後的幾年中，西伯利亞所貯的食糧不得不運至這個地區來。

大體說來，腐化雖不及工業方面來得厲害，一九四六和四七年也先後有揭發腐化的事情。

在集體農場制度下，每一農場的收穫皆分配到各方面。若干供給國家，若干供給附近牽引機站作為牽引機的租金與駕駛人的工資。若干則售賣，作為農民的收益。站在政府的立場來說，這種制度最有利的一點便是收集制度的優點。

就是在這種制度內腐化在流行，國家得不到所規定的產品。農人私自耕種，把產品在市場公開售賣，牲畜和食物產品在鄉村公社便被截住了。

政府必須建立新機構管理集體農場和收集產物，這種組織自農業部擴展到農民本身。在這業已過多的官僚集團中增加許多新僱員。

一九四七年新機構制度試驗時結果圓滿。公佈新機構的第一年度，約有一千五百萬英畝歸回國家——就是說，由國家生產。再者，國家重獲四四，〇〇〇匹馬，牲畜四五，〇〇〇頭，其他農場動物一二三，〇〇〇頭。約有五〇〇，〇〇〇名農

場官吏因腐敗而被免職。

這一步驟是隨「增強農場人民政治自覺，掃除農村私人佔有」的宣傳鬥爭而俱來的。蘇聯承認在戰爭期間德國所宣傳的「反對集體農場的宣傳顯然已發生後果了。」

農人由於耕種公共土地，由於對農村產物的投機和由於一般人表示不願意回復到布爾喬亞資本主義的傾向，都已增加了個人的所有。

大體說，在現社會中，蘇聯農民對政府是最馴服的。既然他們對政府影響不大，懲治他們觀念上的罪失，一般也較工業方面反對腐化的工作來得沒有這麼嚴厲。

雖然蘇聯已廢除定量分配的制度，而食物問題依然無法解決。在烏克蘭，因受德國摧殘，製造食物的工廠缺乏。在西伯利亞和卡沙基斯坦，雖然食物生產已增加，但該區仍殘破，因鐵路破壞和毀損仍是重大問題，分配發生了困難。

蘇聯政府急欲建立食物的儲藏，其用意固不止預防荒饑而已。克里姆林宮深知和歐洲進行思想戰中食物的重要性。

作者看過蘇聯的工廠和工業計劃，從鋼鐵的生產到外衣的生產，從牽引機到杯盤。但是，作者所得的印象，仍覺得該國和人民的力量寄託在農場。

原野中點綴着散佈的村落，在這些村落中，我們可以看到有禮貌，努力而懇懇的誠實人民，他們是前一世紀蘇聯作家筆下出色的人物。蘇聯真正力量就是他們了。

八

在蘇聯制度下，再也沒有像文學和藝術的統制來得嚴厲了。政治上的正統是必備的條件。藝術的題材必須得到政府的同意，所以妨礙創作的天才，使作品沒有進步。現在蘇聯的戲院於重演比較自由的時期的作品如「鮑里斯·戈登諾夫」「櫻桃園」「天鵝湖」等時，成績必佳。歌劇，話劇與舞蹈的演出頗為完好。

每當近代作家想創作時，他便要受共產黨中央委員的訓令所規定的限制。如果他知道什麼對他有利，他一定以阿諛施於思想的材料上。因此極有希望的「日日夜夜」作者西蒙諾夫也寫起「俄羅斯問題」那類粗淺的宣傳品了。

一個政府以黨的利益來限制藝術，對世界文化的損失是難以估計的。蘇聯偉大詩人巴斯塔拿克已停止創作，從事翻譯莎士比亞的作品了。

愛森斯坦編過「恐怖的伊凡」三幕電影，黨方面表示不同意時，便祇好將它改作。同時，愛森斯坦以攻擊西歐藝術，政治形態和生活來表示他的忠誠。

天才女詩人阿克瑪多瓦和短篇小說與散文作家左斯泰戈於一九四六年清算後便沒有再在蘇聯的文學上露面了。這種清算的工作達一向是俄羅斯文學中心——列寧格勒。因地理上的關係，這個城市比蘇聯大多數的城市較為「西化」。

這種工作的目標在反對共產黨人所謂「西歐布爾喬亞觀念的殘餘」的藝術和文學，特別是反對為藝術而藝術和各種不能直接有益於蘇聯制度的政治目標的創作。

同時，政府用宣傳人員來攻擊一切引導蘇聯人忽視當前問題的藝術。藝術變成共產主義的宣傳品。

舉一個例：如回國將士所引起的問題有關的戲劇受到攻擊。士兵妻子的貞潔與不貞潔，對士兵在前線的愛情生活這一類真實的人生，克里姆林宮的戲劇批評家是一向不評論的。

為藝術而藝術在蘇聯是沒有的。但是，就是那些最忠於理想路線的作家，劇作家，音樂家和畫家也一樣受檢查。

戰爭後二年中蘇聯文學英雄中有一位叫做法達伊夫。他的血和彈的愛國活動小說「年青的守衛者」是一部偉大的成功作品。法達伊夫藉着已製成戲劇，無線電傳真和電影的「年青守衛者」的力量，已成爲蘇聯文藝界一位最出名的人物和作家聯盟中的一個權威。

至一九四七年杪，因當局發現「年青守衛者」的上下文觀念不一致，法達伊夫像左斯泰戈和阿克瑪多瓦一樣公開受辱，但是，他的罰較輕，他們到底對西歐文化有興趣。他被懲戒後便釋放，自認觀念上的短見，願意未來好好地做人。



共產黨中央委員會安排了路線，所有蘇聯一切藝術和文學的活動皆依這些路線行動。但是，原動力卻操於史達林委員長的手上。

他向一羣在克里姆宮的電影製作家提出：「你的輕率污辱了蘇聯人。你們應實實在在繪出他們和他們的工作情形來。」這一告訴之後，接着便是無數的訓令和責難，自不知名的領袖以至知名人士如愛因斯坦一類人皆不能倖免。

自此以後，電影攝製家，著作家，小說家，作家，畫家，詩人和木刻家最重要的事便應放慮自己和五年計劃，與建設問題，偉大愛國戰爭（第二次世界大戰）是否配合。主題是列寧格勒作家協會定下來的。諸如：「我們的偉大勝利善後與社會重建計劃中的悲憤，社會主義建設，蘇聯人民完成與超過新史達林五年計劃的英雄事業。」

電影工業收到約二十個主題的目錄，製片人應以此作根據。每一主題都多少和五年計劃的重要性有關。未來電影中的英雄可能是礦工，製鋼工人，漁人和樹植棉花的工人。

在履行這些訓令時，知識界須留心克里姆宮的評論。

一位一九四五年開始一部描寫保衛莫斯科小說的作家，在一九四六年會可能全部收作約。因爲在當時，他巴未可夫元帥寫成保衛戰中能勝任的人物。

但是，一九四六年，朱可夫已失寵了！

一年後，這部書又必須重寫，因爲一九四七年抄，這位今天勢力及於巴爾幹的南部軍團司令朱可夫又重新得寵了。

依照現行法規，如「文化與生活」報所提出的布爾喬亞愛情，這種「大主題」的安娜·卡列尼娜或普式庚的描寫豪華鄉村與燦爛的沙皇宮殿生活的「幼琴尼·阿蕾金」一類的題材都不得再寫。

根據政府定下來的限制，蘇聯的繪畫，祇限於繪日曆了。

若干大胆的畫家在私人的書室畫有時代意義的畫，但是作品永遠不能展覽。永遠留於書室中，畫家們把畫掛起來，無非在表示他已完成了理想上的要求罷了。

也有若干得到同意的主題，但是，最得到批評家贊同的圖畫，都是以史達林爲中心人物的作品：史達林和列寧，這是一

幅最有宣傳意義的圖畫；內戰期間史達林城已改爲史達林格勒。

這種反對西方墜落的「布爾齊亞藝術」也剝奪蘇聯人許多欣賞藝術的機會。

若干法國近代派的優秀作品掛於莫斯科陳列館中，這陳列館是不開放的。從柏林威廉陳列所收集來的希臘大理石雕刻物和埃及古董與特里斯登陳列館收集來的義大利文藝復興繪畫都放在列寧格勒和莫斯科。

就我們所知，蘇聯當局並非不願將勝利品（繪畫）公開展覽以眩耀於大眾之前的，而是怕這些展覽品裏沒有史達林的肖像會引起觀衆爲藝術而藝術的口號來。

總之，今日蘇聯顯然欲把藝術變成宣傳的工具，把這民族創作天才的烈燄熄滅，特別是天賜的音樂，舞蹈和長篇故事的創作。

蘇聯報紙，是政府另一重要的宣傳武器。

實在，報紙是蘇聯政府的一種工具。須得政府許可才得發行，消息登載與否要由政府決定。社論和消息都是奉命「寫成」的。

報紙有內政的批評，這是政府要這樣做的，不過祇限於腐敗，無能，或共產黨集團中觀念的最後一類內容，而不攻擊政體和它的理想。

報紙對重要國外新聞的態度是由政治局決定，由中央委員會的「煽動和宣傳委員會」轉達各報。

因此，真理報和消息報對於國際事件的評論常常延擱一週的時間。對於小項目，這些報紙都能配合黨的路線。

在這種條件下，蘇聯的報紙和美國報紙的自由，簡直不能相比較。美國人所了解的新聞自由，在蘇聯是不會存在的。

自然，蘇聯的報人會認爲他們才有自由的報紙，因爲他們的報紙是代表以民意爲依歸的政府。他們自然可以很妥當這樣做的，因爲各種新聞永遠不會拿出來公開投票。

不幸蘇聯人民都相信報紙上所說的。也有懷疑的人，但是，多年的教育已使他們相信政府所說的話，又因缺乏比較的標準，使蘇聯人民接受報紙上的「事實」。

蘇聯人是偏狹的民族。他們不像國社黨治下的德國人還有若干心情，樂於閱讀外國報紙，雜誌和書籍，以吸取外國的生活經驗。

這一點不必全歸罪於政府不願讓人民出國。昔在馬克斯或恩格斯以前蘇聯和西歐文化就告分家，從沒有把這空際填補，在現在的制度下，也一樣無法填補。蘇聯不像德國一般的「歐化」。在版圖和特性上，她是大陸國家，自己另成一個世界。因此，當「真理報」報導美國建立北極基地以包圍蘇聯，又當報紙的主筆寫出美國是法西斯德國的繼承人時，蘇聯人民相信了。

在紐約，一個不高興這種寫法的人可以買一份「每日工人」讀一些有關蘇聯的其他報導。但是，在蘇聯，這種情形是不存在的，目前，流通於這愚昧大海的祇有四條小流。

這四個消息來源便是「美國雜誌」和「英國盟友」周刊。是由國務院和英國外交部出版的，此外有二個無線電廣播網，即「美國之聲」和在蘇聯的「英國廣播公司」的新聞節目。

這四種媒介便是介紹英美觀點給蘇聯人民的唯一工具。

其流通雖小，其影響卻極大。這在「文化與生活」對它們的一再攻擊中，便可看到。

當一九四七年三月杜魯門總統宣佈美國援助希土時，莫斯科掀起一陣戰爭再發生的恐懼，因為消息被政府統制，他們勢必有所作為。我所認識的一二位蘇聯人，簡直煩惱極了，但是有一天早晨，其中一位笑對我說，不會有戰爭發生了。他說，一位朋友已聽到英國廣播公司一篇解釋杜魯門計劃的廣播。

九

哥里城的修鞋匠的兒子史達林今年六十八歲。這一點是蘇聯最重要的政治事實。

每年到黑海岸蘇契度過的假期總有一段悠長的時間。也總是一再歸傳這位領袖患痛症。這個繼承問題也一月較一月來得

嚴重。世界上最有權威的統治者是這個極權國家的首腦，他引爲自豪的全體的團結是從上而下的。繼承的問題或會使團結破裂。

莫斯科方面認爲史達林已準備好繼承人了。這一點在這祕密的國度中是祕密中的祕密。因爲假如一旦繼承人的名字公開了，在政府中便可能演成分裂的情勢。或則史達林和繼承人間分裂，削弱前者的權力，或則史達林和其繼承人與其他有權識得此一地位者間的衝突。

蘇聯國家最高權力的試驗，要看目前史達林手下有繼承資格的無情，能幹，智慧的人物在史達林死後能不能服從他的選擇而決定，歷史的前例表現，指定繼承人往往是激起爭權最有力的一種手段。

有四個人是最適當的繼承者。

最知名的是莫洛托夫，他自一九三九便任外交部長至現在。今年五十七歲，曾任人民委員會主席十一年，現在是外交部長。

在未來爭取領導的鬥爭中，莫洛托夫是代表政府派的人物。他是政府和官僚政治的經理。他在政治局中較任何其他人物卓越，他懂得如何運用官僚和政府機構這部錯綜的機器。

在一個政府和工業方面缺乏技術人員的國度中，這一點是很重要的。

莫洛托夫還另有二個條件。他較任何其他政府最上層人物經驗豐富，一九一七年革命時已和列寧和史達林合作，這一點在歷史上有極大的重要性。

日丹諾夫有如旭日初升的形勢。他處理共產國際的組織工作，負責發佈共產主義理論和國外黨的活動路線的訓令，今年五十一歲，任黨中央委員會書記政治局委員。

日丹諾夫的力量反映黨的力量。戰爭期間軍隊削弱黨內的位置。自從戰爭結束迄今，共產黨黨員約增至五百萬人，重獲昔日的優勢。

貝利亞是史達林周圍較不知名的人物。他和史達林同是喬治亞人，今年四十八歲。

他的可能取得繼承人地位是由於他的學識和對保安機構的控制。最近被提名為國家保安部長。

早在一九四六年貝利亞已離開這位置從事「特殊任務」。

這一切都未經證實。但是，衆信貝利亞負有組織軍事和工業研究原子分裂的重大任務。

貝利亞是部長會議的副主席，一般說，這一位置給與他管理二三個重要部會的權力。但是，照他目前的地位，他的領得這個銜頭便可能有權控制一切和他的工作有聯繫的部會。

自從戰爭結束以來，布爾加寧元帥已成為最有希望的繼承人，他的担任陸軍部長表示黨的力量已勝過戰爭時佔得優勢的軍事人物的地位。

政治局輪值委員會的布爾加寧元帥是軍人在該局的代表人，他的軍部沒有正規部隊，他並非黨方面為排斥異己而崛起的軍事領袖。戰時，他握有調整重工業的重要位置，戰前是國家銀行的主席。

此四人以外另有二人，他們即使沒有繼承的資格，至少都和領袖有友誼和聯繫。

其一是馬倫可夫，他是政治局的委員，協助日丹諾夫組織共產黨，另一是卡岡諾維區，他負有戰後重大的工作，最近從事烏克蘭的清黨工作。一九四七年十二月十九日重任昔年的工作，為部長委會的副主席，他和馬倫可夫同是政治局的委員。

日丹諾夫在黨內的勢力如此，使蘇聯國內若干政治人物一回憶史達林獲得政權的舊事，便覺得他是第一個最得寵的繼承人了。

但是，自史達林繼承列寧及消滅托洛斯基後，情勢已改變了。昔日，共產黨是這年青的國度中唯一有力的集團。今天，這一集團的力量雖仍強大，卻已有保安機構和包括官僚與軍隊的政府集團相抗衡了。

舉一個例，貝利亞可以二十師國家秘密軍隊和若干便衣特務炫耀他人，但是問題卻在於到底這些人忠於其組織或其領袖抑忠於黨呢？

布爾加寧元帥可以軍隊來炫耀第二次世界大戰的功績，這些軍隊是嫉忌共黨和保安機構的，然而後兩者自二次戰爭以來即已合併，以限制戰時的將領的權力和削弱他們在政府中的勢力。

最近，政府派的力量大見增長。不僅包括諸如外交部，漁業部的一般部會，也滲入其他主要工業部門。因此，其勢力除行政人員外，也及於技術人員，工程師和必要時可得到經濟計劃的專家們了。好像國家計劃的重要性較軍隊，黨和保安機關更為重大。

所有三個集團，軍隊，政府和保安部這樣擴張，形成雖謂黨培養其生長，然已不為黨所控制的形勢了。

目前，各方對現時史達林所掌握的領導地位的爭取維持一種不安的平衡。在這帝國的克里姆林宮的氣氛中，優勢的競賽此起彼落。同時，史達林則維持得高高在上。

今日雖謂史達林在莫斯科的工作一如往昔的長時間和艱苦，但據說在政治局的辯爭中他已少參加了。他祇是靜聽各人發言，最後，以極少的話語作結論。

他似較莫洛托夫更有人性，更可親近。這一點使西方人士相信，假如能和史達林直接談判，一切或更有進展。

在往日不是沒有人有這樣的權力。當蘇聯受壓迫時，史達林能作必要的讓步。在蘇聯祇有他個人能這樣做而不受批評。但是當獻身於共產主義的教條時，他卻像莫洛托夫一樣的冷酷和堅定。

在蘇聯，史達林是半神化的人物。他是詩歌和故事中的英雄，對他誇張的頌讚會使波斯的專制帝皇也為之赧顏。他的肖像懸於蒙古騎兵的帳幕內，列寧格勒平民住宅的牆上和烏克蘭農民的農舍中。

掛像隨境而異。在種族複雜的蘇聯中，每一民族各以自己的偶像看史達林，因此當卡薩克人在人像展覽會中掛起巨大的圖像時，很易看出領袖的特質渲染了許多卡薩克性。

中央亞西亞諸共和國的旗幟寫着：「史達林，我們的太陽」。伏爾加方面各部落的讚歌中有史達林的名字。在最高蘇維埃前面每一代表的演辭中總會包括史達林這一名字神祕音節。

無數蘇聯人民認為史達林是最聰明而萬能的；他是勝利的創造者，製造新俄羅斯的工程師，教義的創作人和解釋人，全蘇聯人的父親。

他的死，將不僅留下權力的空隙，也留下一個偶像崇拜的空隙。

繼承的主要問題在乎爭取繼承權的問題能否由議會暗中決定。假如可以這樣做，表面的團結仍可維持。否則，團結將告破裂，而克里姆林將發生的權力鬥爭擴及以前早已為爭取優勢而互相譴責的各大集團去。

史達林可能在兩天中把繼承的問題解決，他可以指定一人為其繼承人，繼續目前掌握的最重要職位。否則，他更把政府的大權落到莫洛托夫，日丹諾夫，貝利亞和布爾加寧的四角競爭了。

看一看這賭注中的政權，爭奪這一政權的鬥爭似乎無法避免。但是，這種鬥爭也不一定要等到史達林逝世，可能在這一部長集團中便爆發了。另外種三十年來灌輸到所有黨員的鬥爭，可能應用到克里姆林宮中了。

假如沒有這種鬥爭發生，新的形勢必危害蘇聯未來的經濟及其在世界上的地位。在蘇聯，沒有一個機構能改變蘇聯政府或同時滿足二三敵對的集團。再惡化的話，爭奪政權擴大下去便演成內戰。終於使國家經濟和社會生活脫離正軌。

在全蘇聯進行鬥爭的形勢中，控制保安機構的貝利亞最有勝利的希望。如由議會決定時，那麼，莫洛托夫和日丹諾夫便是最顯著的候補人。

十

假如蘇聯人民知道事實的真相，且可自由說出的話，他們對蘇聯政府及共產黨在蘇聯所建立的對美的憎恨必加摒棄的。世界上沒有一個民族像蘇聯人民一樣堅決渴望和平，對戰爭的謠言這般恐懼。世人所不幸的是蘇聯人對政府的政策絲毫不關痛癢。

蘇聯的政策依然是尋求和平，這種和平就是希特勒在慕尼黑時向西歐所要求的。既然美國政府不同意，蘇聯政府和支持她的人民便將繼續接受蘇聯政府和黨方面的仇視觀念。這二者都極力欲把這種故意傳播到該國全國的人民去。

目前，因有二個更重要的因素，敵意便作最着重的目的了。第一，便是蘇聯目前經濟上的脆弱。第二，便是蘇聯絕大多數人民對戰爭的極度反感。

蘇聯人民可以他們傳統的勇敢來作防禦性的戰爭，但是，在他們目前的心理狀態中，是否克里姆林宮一切誘惑能引導他們向外國冒險卻是可疑的事。

經濟和心理的因素，克里姆林宮是很清楚的。蘇聯人民不像德國人，往往能够體認什麼是可能的事，什麼是不可能的。抑有進者，他們堅信蘇聯政治主義的優越性，他們曉得能够期待其成功。

由於蘇聯的宣傳工作，在往後十年中，澈意會深植到蘇聯的人的心靈中。

當德境蘇軍向美國列車開槍射擊時，這種事並不值得驚異。有人一再告訴他，美國人是他的敵人，現在陰謀一次新而可怕的戰爭，掠奪他和國家應得的報酬。

目前，一般蘇聯人民對美國的態度是一方面憎恨而一方面又欣羨。其宣傳目的所表現的是欲在蘇聯人民心理把前者增強，而把後者消滅。

這種工作並非輕而易舉的。因為三十年蘇聯皆用美國工業和農業技術作模範。第二次世界大戰時，美國的援助仍為衆所週知而且得到讚譽的，雖然蘇聯藉口美國不能在西歐開闢第二戰場而發動反美宣傳將這事情湮沒了。

對美國技術稱讚已不再有了。一切的努力都在昭示蘇聯工業和農然是世界的巨擘。報紙和電台正從事全民性的催眠，使蘇聯人民確信他們的制度在經濟，政治和社會上是優越的。

其結果造成強烈的愛國狂。當去年春天天橫越聶伯大水堰重建電力廠第一個渦輪發電機使用時，一位蘇聯友人問我，在美國有沒有這一類的機械？

當我回答他說這種機器是美國製造而運至聶伯時，我的朋友問，為什麼真理報不報導這件事呢？

理由是簡單的：真理報和其他的報紙，已於六個月前誇言為供應此水堰，在列寧格勒已建造此一渦輪發電機。我們為蘇聯製造的六套機器之一仍未完全裝備。在水堰許多工程師都懷疑此一機器將來能否裝置。

同樣的，有人這樣說：戰時美軍會使用蘇聯的坦克，盤尼西林是蘇聯發明而在外國製造的，因為蘇聯的工廠必須生產供應盟軍和蘇軍的物質。盟軍戰時使用的戰鬥機是蘇聯製造的，美國生產工具較蘇聯使用的落後。

但是，這一切都沒有像逐漸散佈開來的對美國恐懼和懷疑的毒素來得嚴重。從事這種工作的主要手段之一便是選摘美國的新聞。

一切供給蘇聯人民的新聞指出，美國歧視勞動，種族和政治信仰不平等，也指出生活水準低下，公私道德墮落，並顯著地暴露美國迫害其他民族及其人民。凡美國名人對蘇聯的批評都登載，但刪節地方甚多。

同時，如塔里，愛倫堡，沙斯拉夫斯基等在評論中指出，美國是自由與和平的敵人，美國政府代替了德國和日本軍閥的工作。

擺在我們前面的是一幅幽暗的遠景。蘇聯經濟的重建和發展，就蘇聯的能力看，或仍需十年的期間。但是在同一期間內，對美國的敵意，却要培植起來。

有一些美國人是被目為對蘇友善的。這些人包括華萊士在內。華萊士如果說不是克里姆林宮甲冑閃爍的騎士，至少，也是值得鼓勵的搗亂份子。

就這種宣傳和目標而言，在未來十年中，對蘇聯政策影響最大的是什麼？

最主要的是權力，有效力的民主政治支持的權力。從政治上說，共產黨不怕鼓勵壓制工作計畫的國家，卻恐懼美國注重工人利益的合作制度。

政治自由和武力的結合常為極權政治最有力的敵人，擺在美國人面前的任務似乎就是未來幾年中保持東西兩權力制度間的共存。

小心研究這兩種制度以後，作者認為假如美國能保持政治上的民主，再發展社會的民主，則當前進行中的理想鬥爭，美國必可操左券。

在一向自誇沒有種族偏見的蘇聯，反猶太的情緒如此廣泛緊張，實在是值得驚異的事。

在街上，特別在政府機關中，隨處都可碰到這種情緒。反猶太的運動不但盛行於莫斯科，也盛行於敖德薩和基輔。從地方法院各種案件中表現，就是首都貧民住宅區中，反猶太情緒的流行也極明顯的。

他們譴責猶太人造成麵色和馬鈴薯缺乏的現象。在基輔，廣播開來的對定量分配不足的不滿，開始了反猶太的局面。沒有一個蘇聯人民當他走過在國家假日張掛出來的政治局各委員肖像時而不喃喃說：

「骯髒的猶太狗，你害了我們的父親？」

二位已辭職的步兵上校，對蘇聯的反猶太情緒了解得最清楚。

這二位上校是猶太人。戰前他們住在同一城市中，在同一工廠工作。當他們復員回復昔日的工作時，他們發覺被安插到蘇聯邊遠的地區，地位也降低了。

這兩位戴着抗德時所獲得的勳章的上校來到莫斯科。當他們的抗議書上達後，他們得到在離家不遠的城市中和昔日相同的工作。但是這兩位友人再也不在同一工廠了。

他們依然不解，當他們回家時，他們邀請昔日工廠的經理出來共飲一頓。

在這次酒會中，他說「你們的工作改變了。這是無礙的。你們都是好工人，但是，我們根據會議（地方蘇維埃）決定的在這城市和工廠中，猶太人太多了。我們確有這種經常的怨言。」

我認識一位年老的蘇聯人，他是革命時代的正規士兵，有兒子三人。其中一位在薩瓦斯托波耳死亡，一位在克里伏伊諾格喪失一條腿。

這位年老的蘇聯人自一九一七年以後二十年來雖然沒有想起往事，但他是一個猶太人，他時常驕傲的說，在蘇聯，再也沒有猶太人了，所有都是蘇聯的人民。

漸漸地，莫斯科城警察對付猶太人的態度把他激怒了。在商店中，在電車中，在工廠裏黨的俱樂部中，他聽到許多對猶太人的喧鬧和污辱。

最後，他把二位留下的兒子叫在一起。

「你是猶太人」，他告訴他們：「你們的媽媽是猶太人，我是猶太人，所以，我希望你告訴非猶太人說，你們是猶太人，你們要引為自傲。當你們填寫一切證件之時，寫下你們是猶太人」。

反猶太並不在德國一樣，是政府公開宣佈的政策。但是，在這一如此嚴格統制國策的國家中，這樣廣泛的反猶太行為能夠存在，假如說政府設有默示贊同的話，那簡直是不可置信的。

不管公開宣佈與否，事實似乎表現政府的政策是欲減少猶太人在外交部有力的地位。抑尤有進者，就是外交部較次要的地位，猶太人也被摒諸門外。

猶太人不能進莫斯科重要的軍事幹部學校。他們僅可進基輔大學和莫斯科大學研究醫學和法學，人數也受限制。

猶太人從目前的敵意追溯到十二年前開始的蘇奸審判，他們指出，托洛斯基是猶太人，跟着他路線的人中間有許多也是猶太人。

問題的另一方面便是昔年蘇聯政府中猶太人所担任的職付問題。革命結束時，猶太人是蘇聯唯一受高深教育的集團，政治的要求使他們在政府中取得許多顯要的地位。

自此以後，廣泛的教育制度為各種位置準備成千成萬的人材。在這一集團中，非猶太人較猶太人為多。這一點說明政府中較次要的地位，猶太人已逐漸減少了。

但是，這並不是說，在政府機構中，有信用而責任重大的位置中大部份猶太人都被頂替了。在滿洲邊境附近有一猶太自治共和國叫比洛比德然，雖然蘇聯的報紙對其他共和國的猶太人多所攻擊，但對比洛比德然的則絕少。

在蘇聯，反猶太情緒的增漲，可能是猶太人在蘇聯共和國利益恢復的結果。

但是，在莫斯科因反猶太人所造成的最顯著的結果，卻是猶太人方面有力的民族自覺的復活。

像蘇聯的許多其他東西一樣，她的軍隊顯示壯大的嚇人的陣容。蘇軍——「紅」這個形容詞已經不用了——從人力，坦克車，和大砲這方面看來，是很不可輕視的。現在一九四八假如她的軍隊用以對付一九四五年的戰爭，那麼還可以算是世界上最完美的了。在這個陣容的後面，便有許多重大的缺點。有些缺點的來源是因為陶醉于過分誇張勝利的宣傳。

顯然地許多蘇聯的軍事領袖相信他們自己的宣傳。

西歐的一般情形也是這樣，因為受了蘇軍龐大的戰鬥力和一部份蘇軍堅決不移的勇氣所感動，於是在戰術或其他方面就有一種這樣的趨勢，——用蘇聯的估計，來衡量蘇聯的兵力。

因為除了蘇聯宣傳家的那些千篇一律和讚美的報導之外，西歐人士對東線的戰爭，幾乎毫無所知。這是很明顯的。蘇軍並非一個像宣傳家所說的那麼十全十美的軍隊。

儘管她在一九三九年簽訂德蘇協定之後，準備了差不多兩年，但它却險些在德兵侵入後最初的兩月間，全被消滅。

德國的指揮官，尤其是倫德斯特元帥老是把做對手的蘇聯，估計太高。許多民族組合的龐大的蘇軍之中，有許多部隊打起仗來靠不住；據一位蘇聯的參謀說；頂顯明的是亞美尼亞人(Armenians)，加查克人(Kazaks)和烏茲貝克人(Uzbeks)物質武器和彈藥在質量兩方面都差。

蘇聯是陸軍建國，陸軍保衛的國家。如今蘇聯的海軍(牠的歷史充滿驚人的敗績與可疑的勝利)是附屬於陸軍的。

蘇聯的空军頗可觀，但它也是應陸軍的需要而附屬於它的。

蘇聯遠距離重轟炸機隊的建立，為陸軍領袖們所反對。他們這樣的觀點在戰前德國國社黨的國防時代及戰時和戰後，都很流行。

蘇聯軍事情報網的範圍很廣，且有悠久的歷史。大批的情報從世界每一個國家裏，及由國外的共黨機關和其盲從者傳

入莫斯科。識者認為這些情報在大體上實是可靠的，是根據千辛萬苦的偵察而得來的，也許與事實毫無出入。

然而是否這個情報有着最大的價值還是一個問題，因為在蘇聯的國家裏，正像在任何一個極權主義的國度裏一樣，如傳入的情報與政府確定在先的計謀背道而馳時，那就危險了。

我們知道希特勒及其政府，早在一九三九年以來，就很固執地拒絕接受關於皇家空軍的可靠消息。因為那些消息與他們自己對該空軍的估計發生衝突。

假如情報來了說「美國已經製造了一個準確地受指揮的飛彈，其射程達一二、〇〇〇英里」，而政治部（靈敏和非凡的機關）在先已經斷定了這項武器是不可能製造的話，那麼這時候的情形會怎麼樣呢？

根據極權主義國家過去的作風來作判斷，則如此的情報將會束之高閣，因為誰敢揭穿政治的整脚？

自從第二次世界大戰結束以後，蘇聯高級長官在極權主義心理的發展上，顯出了一個基本的弱點。駐德國的蘇聯空軍官長，對盟國空軍所毀壞的一切深表驚奇。他們並不像頭腦簡單的蘇聯步兵，而會相信那些毀壞完全是蘇聯的軍力使然的。

但是在莫斯科建立遠距離轟炸的空軍的建議，却不被接受。因為克里姆林宮的政治領袖，從不承認空軍官員的基本前提——盟軍的轟炸使德國損傷慘重的事實。否則，與蘇聯的宣傳謂「蘇聯是摧毀德國唯一的國家，同時，猛烈的和疲勞的轟炸並不算是開闢第二戰場」相互抵觸。

蘇聯的戰爭指揮機關最顯明的弱點，就是深信她的武器，技術及戰術能戰勝這一次戰爭的，也能戰勝其他的戰爭。

現在對原子彈之重視，足以表示政治體系中至少有一部份是了解原子核分裂在戰爭中的重要性。然而，依軍事報章，雜誌所載之論文及談話，有幾個外國的（包括西歐二位成功的將領）及蘇聯的將領都有一種堅強的信念，謂適用於一九四五或甚至一九四五以前的軍備和戰術，也能適用於本世紀的。

蘇聯當局會邀請一位外國將領參觀蘇聯製的戰爭影片。該片係描繪蘇聯對日作戰之勝利，且甚得蘇聯高級官員的好評。

有一幕映出蘇聯的騎兵以大刀襲擊日軍之機關槍陣地。儘管在該陣地的日軍機槍不斷地掃射，結果蘇聯的騎兵以最輕之損失，佔領了陣地，殺戮了日軍。

這位將領原是一位性情率直的人。他將片中的重要關鍵作進一步之研究後便發問道：「竟有人真的相信這樣的情況能在今日的戰爭裏發生嗎？」「噓」；一位翻譯官回答說，「這是史達林元帥最喜歡的一齣。」

蘇聯參謀人員的思想，由報章上或其對軍校學生及軍隊的演講中公諸社會的，還保留着一九三九年法國參謀人員的平凡的，自信心過強的和刻版的思想。

蘇聯工業經濟的弱點，亦即軍事機關的弱點。因今日的工業力量，不但是勝利而且是生存的先決條件。且決定性武器製造，較諸從前，需要更多訓練更良的，經驗豐富的勞工羣衆。

囚幾世紀以來，蘇聯抵抗軍事侵略的主要防禦，始終是靠着它的龐大的力量。由於補給線之擴展，追擊撤退中的蘇軍，侵略軍常陷於蘇聯廣大的國境中而不能自拔。可是現在，當戰場移到空中去的時候，這樣的防禦可不適用了。正如蘇聯農民堅強的勇氣到底抵不住飛彈，原子核分裂和細菌武器的戰爭一樣。

自從廣島以後，主要的問題並不是要探求原子彈的祕密，而是如何動員人力，物力及有無方法去製造它。極權制度的蘇聯，在和平時候能指揮全國的力量去應付一個目標，也許現在至少有一個原子彈已經製造成功。然而，蘇聯是否能解決由於戰爭狀態的更新而引起的問題是另外的一個問題。

蘇聯的工業環境一經現在一番整頓之後，能否大規模地製造原子彈呢？而軍事參謀是否仍繼續拒絕科學家及技術員在軍事組織和戰爭計劃方面的「干涉」呢？

是否有充份的技術員，科學家及「經理」以應原子軍備的需要，五年計劃下工業擴充的實現及建設軍力的要求呢？

今日蘇聯陸軍的發展已到頂點。大事宣傳的動員因不斷的征兵而局部獲得解決了。難怪她的陸軍的龐大在世界上首屈一指。其總數在西伯利亞東部，沿海省份及滿洲的至少有三百萬人。在蘇聯西部，外高加索聯邦，卡利累阿芬蘭共和國及其衛星國者則超過二百五十人萬以上。

如此龐大陸軍的存在，雖使那些自認爲「愛好和民主的先進國家」深感覺奇，但是，這不過是蘇聯傳統的作風而已。因爲自從十四世紀以來，她的陸軍常常保持着這麼龐大的。

上次戰爭中，蘇軍的裝備是很完善的。坦克車，大砲，迫擊砲比較巨大，戰士裝備的完備及物資的征集的程度均較世界上任何地方都來得驚人。

指揮的方法，如以一九四五年的為比較的標準，則可以算得很好。蘇南（包括巴爾幹，中東及土耳其）司令朱可夫將軍是一位富於經驗，聰明和有領導天才的將領。蘇北（包括芬蘭，列寧格勒及波羅的海諸國）司令羅可梭夫斯基將軍也許是更卓越的戰術家，然而却缺乏朱可夫將軍偉大的魄力。

科涅夫總司令，在外國專家眼中認為較前述之二將領稍遜一籌。他也是一位富於經驗，多才多藝的軍人，坦白而缺乏詭計。此最後兩種特性，是接近克里姆林宮的職業軍人中幸而有之的性格。

瓦西里夫斯基參謀長是一位極端自信的人。自一九三九以後，對國外軍人關於發展空軍及海陸軍並肩作戰這一類的問題，他很少發表意見或毫不感興趣。這二種弱點，均能在蘇聯的軍事影片中看出來。一九四五年，蘇聯政治部接受陸軍將領的忠告，採取二個重要的軍事決策：（一）反對龐大的海軍擴充計劃的實施，（二）反對空軍建造遠距離轟炸的武器。

自上次戰爭結束以後，海軍的建造，除潛水艇外，均在停止狀態中。蘇聯艦隊有些是沙皇時代的遺物，它們是超齡而不堪一擊的。有些是蘇聯自己的產品，它們也是不堪一擊的。有些較新式而具有戰鬥效能的軍艦，都是從外國奪過來的，抑或是經過外交的手續由英美兩國得來的。這些軍艦組成了蘇聯的海軍。

自從那些贊成在西方實行遠距離轟炸的高級官員免職以後，蘇聯的空軍已集中全力支持陸軍了。噴射推進式戰鬥機的製造業經進行中。一九四七年一月該式飛機不下百餘架，在克里姆林宮上空盤旋。在莫斯科，基輔，敖得薩，薩普洛什，史達林諾，羅斯托夫，及莫斯科機場中，據記者目擊，蘇聯的空軍在輕轟炸機及中型轟炸機方面是相當優秀的。

唯有四引擎轟炸機是僅為軍事的示範或演習而製造。

美國B-29式飛機兩架，戰時在西伯利亞及滿洲強迫降落的，給予蘇聯一種新式飛機的模型。假如蘇聯的人們希望採用B-29式飛機的話，則B-29在航空術方面的需要並不遜於自動機方面的需要。該兩架B-29式的飛機，有一架是停在莫斯科機場，其他一架據推測是於去年初撞毀了。

時至今日，蘇聯的軍力仍依賴着士兵的勇氣和信心。

現在雖然她在戰場上的作戰要素業已衰頹，然而士卒依然勇敢，堅毅及富於愛國的精神。共黨的宣傳也不斷地催促他們維護共產主義。

「促進共產主義」的幻想曾有着許多的困難。自一九四五年以來，在報章，雜誌及演講的經常指導和催促軍隊採用共產主義更高的標準。共黨最恐怕的是軍隊會慢慢地脫離了它，因從前曾發生過一次這樣的事件。

一九四六年初史達林親下命令，要求軍隊改良紀律及效忠的政治的理想基礎。

在上次戰爭期間，蘇聯軍隊正如其農工界一樣，流行着許多舞弊的事件。自從蘇軍開始掃蕩其內部之舞弊後，結果蘇聯的士兵才能告發他們的官長。告發的目標並不是理想中的弱點，而是違法使用公物舞弊。

凡了解蘇聯作戰指揮機關中的這些弱點的人，腦子裏都會固定着兩種觀念：（一）英美兩國對德戰勝的貢獻，是超過了人們所想像的，縱使人們曾往西歐而遼闊的前線上旅行過，也想像不到她們偉大的貢獻。（二）蘇聯軍力的發展已到了極度，較時代約落後十年，而且此種機械式的軍隊，笨重的坦克車和大砲，僅為戰爭中的小裝備而已。

A REPORT ON SOVIET RUSSIA

I

AGGRESSIVE war by the Soviet Union is not probable for at least a decade, considering the present condition of industry, agriculture, reconstruction and national morale.

There are many reasons for Americans to be concerned over the Russian colossus. But the prospect of immediate Soviet military aggression is not one of them.

A facade of strength in terms of infantry and armored divisions confronts us. But behind this facade lies a nation that I am convinced would be unable to fight a modern war against the United States at present or for 10 years to come.

The real Russia is a far different country from that wonderland of modern technique and social justice pictured by the Communists in their propaganda at home and abroad. It is a vast assemblage of many peoples and races, still suffering grievously from the most destructive of all wars and far from mastering the industrial, agricultural and social machinery of modern society.

Moreover, in its rivalry with the United States, the Soviet Union is hampered by a restrictive system. The abounding manpower, the great fertility of the soil and the immense resources of the country are balanced by the failure of the system of Communist totalitarianism to free the people and their energies.

With its restrictions on individual initiative, its glorification of political orthodoxy over efficiency, its waste of manpower in the army, security forces and bureaucracy and its adherence to the uneconomic

device of slave labor, the present political system is ill suited to the society, demanding development, on which it has been imposed.

To be sure, Soviet industry and agriculture are expanding. But that expansion, relatively slow, compared to the needs of the people and the country's economic potential, is delayed by the totalitarian character of the police state.

Before examining it in detail, let us look at the Soviet society on a broad scale in the 31st year of its life.

Beyond all else, this is a society recovering from the terrible shock of war.

Foreign Minister Molotov and other Soviet leaders have stressed the destruction caused by the war so often and at such length that their speeches have had negative effect. People have grown tired of hearing of war damage, especially since the melancholy recital is often offered as an excuse for some departure from international fair dealing.

Nevertheless, destruction and reconstruction are two of the most important problems in the Soviet Union. By Premier Stalin's estimate, it will take until 1955 to restore to the conditions of 1940 the occupied areas of the Byelo-Russian (White Russian) and Ukrainian republics. No one can estimate how long it will take to replace the technicians, engineers, foremen and managers who perished among Russia's 7,000,000 casualties.

Reconstruction has been slow, granted its greatest extent. In 1946 in parts of the Donets Basin, the great industrial area laid waste by the Germans, it appeared as though the Germans had been gone for only three days instead of three years.

There are many causes for the slowness of reconstruction. But its tardiness is an important

contributory factor to Russia's economic weakness today.

And, from the psychological point of view, it has presented Russian workers with an excuse for lethargy and an alibi for inefficiency. Before the war, they say, things were better. The war has reduced us to this.

The difference between the reality of Soviet industry and the flattering portrait painted by Communist propagandists is great. One is reminded of those papier-mache silhouettes of automobiles employed by vaudeville comedians. When the contraption first appears on the stage with a man at the wheel it appears to be a finished vehicle. It is only when it turns, revealing the comedian pedaling furiously on a bicycle, that its limitations are revealed.

In those areas not damaged by occupation, Soviet industry today is disjointed and uneven. The transportation system is over-worked and inadequate. Despite all the propaganda on increased production in the Urals and the speed of recovery in the Donets basin, the best foreign sources agree that in 1947 Soviet steel production was around 15,000,000 tons, or about 1,500,000 tons more than of the United Kingdom. Steel and coal production both are behind the target figures.

This production is far from sufficient for Russian demands. The Soviet Union is buying steel rails abroad. It is trying to buy steel tubing for oil drilling and refining.

Per capita production in iron and steel and coal mining fell sharply in 1946 and the first half of 1947. It will remain low until the supply of consumer goods is sufficient to promise the worker an incentive for harder work and overtime.

Later we can take a closer look at the industrial worker and his problems. For the present it is

sufficient to say that remote though industrial recovery is, it is not as remote as prosperity for the industrial worker.

The Soviet Union, despite 30 years of industrialization, still is largely a nation of peasants. One problem today, just as it was in the 1920's, is the use of the rich Russian earth in such a way that it can support the new industrialization.

Here we encounter another aspect of the aftermath of war. Industry needs labor. But the farms, the prime source of labor, cannot be tapped until industry provides the agricultural machinery that will free peasants for urban labor.

Agriculture in occupied areas has recovered slowly. Even in 1947, a good deal of the plowing in Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine took the form of hand labor.

However, this has been balanced by the opening of vast new farming lands in Siberia, a general increase in yield per acre through scientific farming, and the slow but steady flow of tractors to replace those destroyed or broken down. On the whole, the agricultural position is one of the brighter aspects in the Soviet economy.

The abolition of rationing in the Soviet Union did not mean what it would mean in a free economy. For so long as the government controls the movement of food from the fields to the processing plants, and thence to the people, some sort of rationing will exist. This was apparent in the last week of 1947 and the first week of 1948 when the people of Moscow and Kiev, to name two cities, found they were rationed by the shopkeeper to so much bread or butter, even though the old system of food cards had been discontinued.

Propagandists for Communism would have you believe that this great mass of nearly 200,000,000 peo-

ple is united and happy in its struggle for life, that the people have no doubts and no fears, that there is a joyous and wholehearted acceptance of the new revelation.

If these things are true, why is it necessary to maintain 20 divisions of uniformed security troops of the Ministry of the Interior and sequester at least 10,000,000 citizens of the Soviet Union in concentration camps in Siberia?

Daily inspection of the happy society will convince anyone save the Communists and their dupes that the Soviet regime has not succeeded in eliminating many of the ills to which our own capitalist society is heir.

The industrial organization still is shaken from the effects of the purge carried out by the Ministry of the Interior after extensive corruption and bribery had been discovered.

At about the same time the government created a new control organization charged with eliminating corruption from the collective farm system.

In both industry and agriculture, falsification of production figures was widespread. As a result, the new definite figures—as opposed to percentages—that the government now reveals must be viewed with reserve. Soviet statistics frequently are inaccurate not only because of the effects of this falsification but also because in a totalitarian state statistics such as industrial production figures are the basis for internal and external propaganda.

The Russian worker today is not in the best condition to reach the goals set for him under the five-year plan. He is poorly fed and poorly clothed. The inadequacy of his housing is scandalous even in the Soviet Union. His great efforts during the war and in the lean years that have followed it have drained much

of his natural vigor. As a result, his response to the waves of propaganda directed at him and his productive capacity is sluggish.

"Speed the Sowing of Grain," "Eliminate Delays in Coal Production," "Let the Workers Increase Shoe Output," read the headlines over editorials. There is an atmosphere of permanent hysteria in the latter, which emphasize the sad state of capitalist industry while at the same time they plead with the unhappy Russian worker to match its production figures.

Such "spontaneous demonstrations" as letters to Premier Stalin promising more food, more coal, more lumber from selected groups of workers seem to have little effect. The local party leaders shout, the newspapers plead for more of this or more of that, but Ivan continues to go through the motions. He is sated with propaganda and appeals.

Russians, in answer, point out that the Communist party, leading as it does a vast group of inexperienced workers, must resort to such tactics.

"In the United States workers understand the necessity of steel production," a factory manager said. "Here we must lead them."

In the Soviet Union, one encounters considerable dissatisfaction with the economic consequences of Communism but very little over the repression of individual liberties.

There are two reasons for this:

The first is that these liberties never have been a fundamental part of life in Russia. Only a few of the elderly remember that men once conspired, fought and died to bring liberties to the country.

The second is that for 30 years a propaganda system in complete control of all means of communication has told the people that they do enjoy these liberties. Since facts about the outside world are

almost totally lacking, the generations that have grown up since the revolution tend to accept the propagandists' assurances.

There is, on the other hand, widespread grumbling over shortages of food, clothing, furniture, transportation and, above all, housing.

During the elections a favorite joke in Moscow expressed this dissatisfaction. At question time during a political meeting an old man is supposed to have asked: "Have we achieved socialism yet, or are things going to get still worse?"

The Soviet Union has its politically disillusioned, but they are a tiny minority in a country rigidly controlled in thought, word and deed. In this minority, moreover, there are many who are disillusioned and discontented not because of the moral evil of the system but because their own share of the profits of the revolution in power and prestige are small.

But those who did hope for greatness in 1917 and worked for a brave new world are about as unhappy as people can be.

"We thought we were building a palace for the people," said one, "and we built a prison."

II

AFTER 30 years of Communism the standard of living in the Soviet Union is low compared with that of western Europe. The Communists boast that they have brought freedom and plenty. They have brought neither. There is one freedom in the Soviet Union: The freedom to do as you are told. There is plenty only for the few. Economic and social inequality flourishes.

Improvements have been made in the standard of living over that of 1917. But improvements along the same line and on a much greater scale have been

achieved elsewhere in the world without making the people pay the price of tyranny.

Badgered by a sowlen and insolent bureaucracy, spied on by an ubiquitous secret police, perennially short of food and clothing, poorly housed, the average Russian has been reduced to a state that is difficult to compare with the lot of the average person in the western world.

A careful distinction must be drawn between the lot of the people and that of the upper class of "the classless society." The latter, granted the Soviet Union's economic backwardness, lives well on a scale that might be likened to that of the Nazi officials before the war.

The government carries on an intensive and unrelenting campaign to convince the average citizen that he is better off than the worker of the west. This campaign has had some success, but it has not quieted the persistent grumbling over economic conditions.

The end of the war added to this dissatisfaction. Soldiers returning from the fronts told of the comparative prosperity of factory workers in Vienna or farmers in Pomerania. These soldiers' tales did not have the overwhelming effect that some optimists in the west envisage. A careful system of counter-propaganda was instituted in the Soviet army and among the people, and it is a brave soldier, in any case, who will defy the secret police and praise the glories of foreign economies.

Today the prime problem facing the average Soviet citizen is housing. There are grandiose plans for the reconstruction of war-ravaged cities like Odessa, Kiev, Minsk and Stalingrad and for new construction in Moscow, Leningrad and the new industrial cities of the Urals. But in the two years that followed the end of the war construction was very slow. In the areas not occupied by the Germans, Russians live in

the apartment houses built between 1917 and 1941, in old and dilapidated farm houses or in the wooden houses that were standard in the Russia of 30 years ago.

Construction and reconstruction have been slow because production in the industries essential to them has been low. Steel, lumber, cement, bricks and concrete all have lagged behind expected production figures at one time or another since 1945. In 1946 in Stalingrad, a city 90 percent destroyed, the local brick factory was turning out 2,000,000 bricks a year, about one tenth of what is needed.

The result is that there is extreme overcrowding. The average Russian does not live in an apartment or a house. He and his family live in one room of an apartment or a one-room cabin. In Moscow, for instance, six families will live in a six-room apartment with kitchen and bath, one family to a room, with all sharing the kitchen and bath.

Similar conditions do exist in western Europe and in some American cities. But there the people who have to undergo them have the freedom to protest and to change the governments that do not better such conditions. No such freedom exists for the unhappy Muscovites.

I remember a visit to a relatively prosperous worker who lived on the outskirts of Moscow. His apartment house, looking like a huge packing case, stood not on a street but in the midst of a field. No path led to it. You plunged into the deep snow and made your own path. Other apartment houses, each facing in a different direction, were scattered across the snowy fields. There was no street lighting.

Inside there was no illumination to light your way up the wet, slippery, iron staircase. The floor and the walls were filthy. Panes of glass missing from the windows on the landings had been replaced by boards.

There was an elevator, but in common with most of those in the Soviet Union it was out of order. And behind each of the doors was living not one family but four or five, or even six.

This crowding is responsible in part for the high incidence of disease in Moscow, especially in the schools. In one high school class 14 boys were tubercular.

I knew a foreigner whose servant's child had tuberculosis. The child was kept at home for a while and treated at a clinic. Then, because the mother could not provide any longer, the child was sent back to school. My friend told the woman that her child would surely infect other children.

"Oh, madam," said the woman, "that's nothing! Most of them have it already."

Only once in several visits to collective farms did I find a family living in more than one room. However, life in the country is far healthier than life in the cities.

The problem next in importance to housing is food. In Russia there is continued worry over the next meal. This has been slightly eased by the abolition of food rationing on the card system, but since shopkeepers refuse to sell more than so much to a person, rationing of a kind continues to exist.

During the rationing period millions, through penury, shortage of supplies or because their ration cards were on the lowest scale, were living day after day and month after month on black bread, potatoes and sometimes fish.

Those seeking reasons for the relatively low national output in Russia will find one in the diet on which tens of millions have lived.

When the present food distribution problems are straightened out and the new "rationing" by shopkeepers ends, it is probable that workers, knowing they

can buy more, will work harder to get more money. This will contribute in time to a rise in the nation's productive capacity.

But today nowhere are differences between classes greater than in men's daily bread. On the night when Premier Stalin entertained Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Britain at the Kremlin the me-

Cold hors d'oeuvres
Caviar
Pastry stuffed with chopped
eggs and meat and cabbage
Salmon, sturgeon
Jellied sturgeon
Cold suckling pig
with horseradish
Salad Parisienne with game
Cucumbers, tomatoes, cheese
and butter
Creme de poularde (soup)
Fish soup
Fried eels
Roast mutton
Roast turkey, chicken, and
partridge
Cauliflower
Strawberry parfait
Raspberry jelly
Coffee, biscuits, fresh fruit,
roast almonds
Vodka, red and white wine,
champagnes

It was about that time of year that I saw two women faint as a result of malnutrition in the subway and that the city police patrolled the main highways into Moscow to turn back peasant women walking in to beg for bread.

Living conditions in the new industrial areas of the east are in some respects worse than in Moscow. Here is an extract from a letter from one of these new districts. The writer was a fairly well-trained factory hand working in a new and important factory.

"We live in a long building, half dugout, half barn, which holds 60 of us. We sleep on wooden bunks with no barrier between us. We get a bath every ten days, but since only half of us bathe at a time it is difficult to keep free of lice. I come back to the dugout clean and sleep next to a man who has not had his bath that day. In the morning my little friends are back.

"They are building new barracks for us. But work does not appear to go very fast.

"The factory is very cold. It was built during the war and there is something wrong with the pipes and the way the windows are set. Snow sifts in and covers the floor, so that it is slippery on the line near the windows. The door to our shop is gone; they say someone stole it. We work hard to keep warm. Maybe that's the idea."

The worker in question was not a prisoner, he was not being punished. In fact, a Communist might argue that the worker, being selected to work in an area so important to the future of Soviet industry, was being honored.

Nothing is so ludicrous to a foreigner as Russian insistence that civilization has reached its apex in the Soviet Union. The propagandists may have gone too far in this respect. Repeated assurances that no country compares with Russia will not produce the best psychology for the long struggle ahead.

The classic example of this attitude is the remark of the wife of a Soviet diplomat. One night at a dinner party she carried on an animated conversation with her dinner partner on the neutral subject of zoos.

During its course she remarked that the Moscow zoo had an elephant. Her partner replied that the elephant must be unhappy during the cold weather.

"Quite the contrary," she assured him. "I am informed that the elephant in the Moscow zoo is the happiest elephant in the world."

The difference between the portrait of the Soviet Union painted by its propagandists and the truth is best exemplified by the hospitals. In seven of them that I visited in Moscow and elsewhere there was nothing that compared in cleanliness, furnishings or medical care with second-class hospitals in the West. I am prepared to believe that theoretical medicine and hospitalization is on a high standard in Russia; the practice is not.

One may argue that these hospitals exist where none existed 30 years ago. This is quite true. But that is not the Communist argument, which is that medical care and treatment have reached a standard in Russia unobtainable anywhere else in the world. This is not true.

I saw American and British field hospitals during the war that were miracles of sanitation and organization compared with permanent establishments.

The Russian wards contain anywhere from six to 12 or 14 beds. These sometimes are packed closely together so that in some cases it is impossible to walk between the beds. The floors and walls are dirty. The lighting is poor. There are few nurses. Most sanitary measures are carried out by charwomen in dingy gray smocks.

So bad were hospital conditions in the years immediately following the war that the deputy minister of health writing in the publication "Medical Worker" attacked the lack of sanitation, the irregular attention given patients, the failure to repair broken windows

and leaking roofs and the shortage of medicines in hospitals.

Six months later there was little improvement and controllers had been introduced to report on the activity or lack of it of other workers; a typically totalitarian expedient.

It must not be forgotten, however, that crude and dirty though the hospitals are to Western eyes, to some of the patients they are luxurious in the extreme and exemplify an almost unheard of concern on the part of the government for the people. They are not indignant if the sheets on the bed have not been changed for weeks. To the Russians sheets are still a luxury.

An odd aspect of Soviet medical care, which reflected the dearth of consumer goods, was the way in which supplies for infants are issued. Women receive coupons entitling them to buy diapers, feeding bottles, nipples, a rubber sheet and other supplies, but they cannot present the coupons until after the baby has been born. Otherwise the mother might get the supplies, even if the baby were born dead, and they would be wasted.

The shortage of clothing, furniture, cooking utensils, shoes and plumbing supplies, stoves and hundreds of other articles is another aspect of the average Russian's everyday life.

When after the recent abolition of rationing and devaluation of the currency it was pointed out that it was now possible to purchase a pair of galoshes for 25 rubles, no one pointed out that in the Soviet Union the trick is first to find the galoshes.

The abolition of rationing has not solved the basic problem in food and consumers' goods—that of an overwhelming demand and an inadequate supply.

Blankets are darned and patched. Furniture is mended with bits of wire and string. Children with-

out galoshes shiver in the snow. In the countryside conditions are somewhat better, for here the ancient padded coats and felt boots keep out the cold. It is the industrial proletariat that suffers most from the shortages and it is this class that is depended upon for the labor that will raise the industrial production of the Soviet Union.

III

IVAN Ivanovich gets up before the light comes to the street in the Arbat quarter of Moscow, where he lives. Gita, his wife, is still sleeping. She works part time at a factory, does the housework and spends hours standing in line to buy the household food. These days she is always tired.

His two sons sleep together. There is space for a fourth bed, but in January it is cold and Vassily and Georgi would rather sleep in one bed. The bit of Pravda pasted over a gap in one of the windows does not keep the cold air out. Ivan has asked the house committee for repairs, but nothing has happened.

In the kitchen, which he and his family share with four other families, Ivan finds Andrei who works in the same factory. They have a glass of tea each, munch some black bread and divide a tiny segment of cheese.

When Ivan and Andrei reach the street the first light has touched the gray, unhealthy surface of the snow. In the center of the city plows and relays of old women have cleared the snow from the streets. Here, five minutes' walk from the Kremlin, it lies unbroken save for the footprints of the inhabitants of the quarter.

Ivan is lucky. When he left the army he kept his boots. They are still fairly waterproof. Into them he has tucked his heavy, black workman's trousers. They are patched at a couple of places, but this is not extraordinary. Under his army overcoat Ivan wears an

old quilted jacket and under that his threadbare, once-warm underwear. Soap is hard to come by and the underwear remains a dull gray despite Gita's exertions over the washtub.

At the corner they wait for the trolley bus. There are not enough busses in Moscow these days, and the line is long. Ivan gets aboard the bus with a good deal of shoving and repeated cries of "look out, citizen, you are pushing." When he finally finds a place he is next to the garrulous man who works in the bookkeeper's office at the factory, who is a Communist and always talks politics.

Ivan listens politely. But it is not a novelty to be told that the Americans are establishing new air bases in the Arctic or that the just demands of Comrade Molotov have been refused at the council of foreign ministers. Ivan has read that himself or heard it over the radio. He seems to listen but he thinks of Vassily's cough and Gita's tired face.

One day at the factory is pretty much like the rest. Ivan is in charge of a section charged with assembling the dials for radios. Recently there has been a shortage of tools, but today things seem to be going fairly well.

Last month Ivan's section over-fulfilled its "norm" under the factory's part of the five-year plan. So this month he and the section get extra dishes at the factory restaurant. Today, in addition to cabbage soup, macaroni and tea, Ivan gets a small piece of meat. He pays for the meal at factory prices, about 90 cents.

Today is one of the "days." Ivan forgets, although the newspapers have reminded him, whether it is Army day or Tank day or Artillery day or Navy day. However, he goes along with some of the other section leaders to hear a speaker sent by the central committee of the Moscow Soviet expound the glories of the Soviet

system and the danger to it of the imperialist aggressors in the United States.

When work is done Ivan starts home through the darkness. He works an eight-hour day, but transportation is so bad that in all he is away from home nearly 12 hours.

On the bus going home Ivan reads the newspaper. It does not have as much international news or ideological articles as Pravda and Izvestia, which are morning papers, but it has more local news.

Not all Russians live Ivan's life. But the majority do. For the planned society has evolved the standard society and that standard is low. Ivan, compared to some, is relatively well off. He makes about \$85 a month and Gita about \$40.

There is an upper class than Ivan sometimes calls the "novi barri," the new nobles.

Composed of party officials, senior army and navy officers, the chieftains of the security police, factory managers and technicians, scientists, writers, artists and theatrical folk, it lives well.

Take M., a member of the novi barri, a government official. As one of the prerequisites of office he has the use of a three-room apartment in a relatively new building. His position entitles him to trade at a well-stocked shop reserved only for officials of his grade and the apartment is furnished moderately well by western standards. In addition, M., who spent some time in the West, acquired a table, two chairs, a very good sideboard and some dishes which, if they do not match in pattern, are better than those purchasable in Moscow.

But Ivan is the man the editorial writers of Pravda have in mind when they declare that "further sacrifices" will be required from "the patriotic Soviet people" during the next few years. M. is the man who will benefit from those sacrifices.

M. had managed to amass a considerable number of rubles. The devaluation of the currency probably has raised hob with his plans for the future. Even so, he was probably not as hard hit as a doctor friend. The doctor, who practiced privately at home after finishing his daily work at the clinic, made as much as 25,000 rubles a week in some weeks.

Ivan accepts without surprise and without question most of what he is told over the radio and in the newspapers. Today he believes that the Soviet Union defeated Germany, liberated all of Europe and then turned East and struck the decisive blows in the war against Japan. Just the other night he saw a movie that showed the Japanese commanders signing the peace terms with the Russians aboard a battleship. The movie did not tell him that the battleship was an American one or that the Soviet officers were merely some of the representatives of the Allied powers aboard the USS Missouri. And if you told Ivan this, he would not believe you.

He is told that the system under which he lives is the most productive, freest and most civilized that the wit of man has yet devised. Since he is literally a prisoner within his country, he has no standards by which to judge this information.

Ivan has no tradition or background of people's rights and people's progress. If he thinks of his lot in comparison with that of others at all, it is to compare it with the life of his father and his grandfather. They, he has been told, worked under a harsh and restrictive system and were sweated by the bourgeois and the aristocrats. He grumbles about shortages, but he is sure that his life is better than theirs.

Perhaps an old man may whisper in the factory canteen that under the czars a man could at least protest. Even if he went to prison for protesting, his family might see him and his friends might help him.

Ivan doesn't want to listen to the old man. For, like every other Russian, he knows that "they" are always listening; that the old man himself may be one of "their" men. The best thing to do is forget.

Both Ivan and Gita are anxious that their sons shall have a better life than they. Nowadays the boys, if their grades are high enough, can go on from school to become engineers or doctors or lawyers. If their grades are not high enough they can be drafted into the labor reserves. Both parents want to avoid that.

Lately, however, Ivan has begun to wonder whether success for his boys will not in the end take them away from him.

A friend of his, a coworker at the factory, has a daughter, a brilliant girl who received high marks in chemistry at the university and then went to a special school to study food processing. Unfortunately, she is not going to be allowed to stay in Moscow.

Huge new bakeries are being built in the East and she has been directed to one of them. It is a good job, but Ivan wonders whether her parents will ever see her again.

Ivan's life is a drab one. But in the long run the worst thing about it is not its drabness, not the shortages, the crowding, the hunger, the lack of security inherent in a political system subject to periodic fits of industrial change, but the fact that Ivan and Gita and all the other millions of Ivans and Gitas have no means of changing it.

IV

THERE are no indications that there exists in the Soviet Union any organized political underground opposition to the regime, harsh and repressive though it is. There are occasional individual protests, easily silenced.

There are powerful forces within the structure of the state that might, in event of some convulsion on the highest level of the government, oppose each other. But all signs of popular resistance are lacking. Reasons for this lie in organization of the state and psychology of the Russian people.

The Soviet Union is a police state. The adhesive that holds it together is the Soviet secret police of MVD the Ministry of the Interior. The Communist party exhorts and pleads, but it is the MVD that keeps the vast, ponderous machinery turning over.

In modern Russian history there is no record of a change in the form of government by peaceful means. Last time the form was changed was in 1917 when the Romanov dynasty was swept away after 304 years of rule. The Bolshevik party, a tiny drop of 80,000 in the sea of Russians, seized power and has held it ever since.

Both the Russians of Nicholas and the Russians of Stalin have these in common: Adoration of the national leader, who assumes the position of a demigod, a massive bureaucracy, centralization of power, an enormous range of state control, heavy emphasis on the army and navy, unhesitating and drastic use of force and the secret police.

Tendency is toward convincing the Russian people that the shadowy wraiths of freedom with which they are now bemused are in fact real freedom. This is especially true of elections. The electoral system in Russia is useful to the Communist regime. It provides an occasion for intensified propaganda. It furnishes a "vote of confidence" in the government which is useful in convincing dupes abroad that the "Russian people are, after all, wholly behind Stalin."

The Russian electoral system reflects, not the will of the people, but ability of the party to induce the population to vote. There is no rival to the Communist

party's nominee on the ballot. Since, however, the Communist party is only 5,000,000 strong in a nation of nearly 200,000,000, nominees are supposed to represent choice of the "bloc of Communist and non-party people."

Large in every Russian's mind is consciousness of the MVD and the Ministry of State Security, the MGB.

First there are the uniformed troops of the MVD for internal security and the security of the frontiers. These amount to about 20 divisions of well-armed troops, including air regiments, that is, groups of fighters and light and medium bombers.

Then there are the plainclothes operatives. These belong to both the MVD and the MGB. As far as can be learned, the former are chiefly responsible within the Soviet Union, while the latter operate abroad. Both busy themselves with espionage and counter-espionage.

No one knows their number. One foreigner, who knows as much about the Soviet government as anyone outside it, has estimated there are at least a half million in the secret police of the MVD and the MGB.

There is also the Ministry of State Control, an inspection agency charged with watching the implementation of economic plans. It was this ministry which uncovered the wide-spread corruption in Soviet industry in 1946.

For party purposes there is the Ministry of Party Organization, which oversees the manner in which party policy is carried out in the organs of both party and state. During and since the war this ministry has maintained close relations with the army organization devoted to the political, as differentiated from the military, leadership of the army.

The MVD, in addition to its other tasks, runs Intourist, the organization that deals with foreign tourists. It also administers the concentration camps and prisons.

No one knows the number of people held in the

concentration camps. The MVD has admitted that it is the largest "employer" of labor in the Soviet Union. These "employees," among other tasks, finished the reconstruction of the White Sea-Baltic canal in 1946. For the most part they labor in Siberia.

Estimates on their number range from 9,000,000 to 20,000,000. An employe of the MVD who purchased supplies for concentration camps once told a friend of mine: "Why, we're the people who run this country."

Growth of the uniformed MVD organization is curiously parallel to the Waffen SS in National Socialist Germany. We know the priority in supplies given to the SS divisions in the Wehrmacht hurt morale in the regular army and that the practice of nominating commanders on the basis of party orthodoxy, rather than military ability, in the end weakened the German high command.

It is entirely probable the Communists have made the same mistake.

V

TIME, not war, is the Soviet objective in the international struggle with the United States. Time to complete reconstruction and expansion of Soviet industry; time to strengthen the economic and political links that bind the satellite states to the Soviet Union; time in which the expected disintegration of capitalist society in the west will accelerate; time to help that process along by the employment of Communist movements in capitalist states. All these are fundamentals of Soviet policy for the next decade.

Americans are chiefly concerned with the Kremlin's use of Communist parties abroad, for it is this process that the United States is fighting in western Europe, Greece and Turkey. Communist pressure to speed the

disintegration of other societies may take a military form, as in France and Italy, and eventually, if the Soviet economy prospers, an economic form.

But an outright clash with the United States will be avoided.

Of the many stratagems with which the Kremlin has bemused the world, perhaps the most successful was the spreading of the idea that Stalin stands for "socialism in one country" as opposed to Trotsky and "world revolution."

It should be clear now that Stalin merely advocated different methods, including the deception of many westerners. I am convinced that the Comintern was never disbanded.

"Of course it exists," said a Russian. "It merely changed its name to something harmless."

In Moscow today there exist various schools in which American, British, French, Italian, Spanish and South American groups are being trained against the day when they can return home to take up the work of revolution, expressed in the form of strikes, fomenting discontent, internal division and the shaking of public confidence in established forms of government and private institutions.

The Soviet foreign policy is based on Marxism and Leninism as they are interpreted by the current rulers of the Soviet state. This teaches that capitalism, now exemplified by the United States, is the enemy of Communism; that imperialism, on which the United States has now embarked, is the last stage of capitalism, and that an economic debacle of the greatest magnitude will in the end destroy the foundations of capitalism, paving the way for the advent of Communism in the present capitalist states.

It is important to remember that the Communists see their policy, not in terms of two or four years, but in decades. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about

the European recovery program is that it has forced the Communists in France and in Greece to act more swiftly than could have been expected.

To the Communists the United States is the enemy. And an enemy there must be. Since the Kremlin is infallible and all internal enemies of the regime have been eliminated, some nation must assume that role. The supposed enmity of the United States toward the Soviet Union and supposed American "plans for world hegemony" serve the rulers of the Soviet Union.

By painting the United States in this light the government finds an excuse for the continued austerity of Russian life.

The difference between the present situation and that of 1938 is that while the Russians, both the leaders and the led, were understandably afraid of German aggression, it is doubtful whether the political bureau of the Communist party, which is the highest policy making body in the Soviet Union, feels any concern over American aggression.

The people, of course, do not know this. As a result of continued propaganda they are beginning to fear American aggression.

Since 1945 the Soviet government's representatives have been hostile, and at times insulting, toward the United States. The very freedom with which they speak may be caused by their knowledge that the United States is not going to declare war. Contrast the Russian attitude today toward the United States and that toward Germany in 1940, when the German army was master of western Europe. The Russians were quite polite. They knew that attack was possible.

The propaganda on the "atomic diplomacy" of the United States raises the question of whether the description of the way the United States is supposed to be acting is not a fairly accurate reflection of what

Soviet methods would have been had they produced the first atom bomb.

There is an important difference in the Soviet attitude toward the United States and toward Great Britain.

The United States is feared because of its military and industrial strength.

The Communists, however, do not fear capitalist democracy as a political force in Europe. They argue that it does not suit the requirements of a wasted and restricted economy. But Britain offers a different sort of political challenge.

If, and it is one of the biggest "ifs" of our day, the British can achieve the limited socialism they seek without mass direction of labor, the employment of a secret police and the concentration camp, then the Communists will be in the dilemma of the black market operator who finds an honest tradesman opening his shop across the street.

The departure of the Soviet Union from even the outward aspects of a policy of socialism in one country came last April.

Then, the importance accorded the thirtieth anniversary of the first publication of Lenin's "April Thesis" in Moscow forecast to a considerable degree the renewal of Communist international activity in the form of the Cominform and the political offensives now launched in France and Italy.

These activities had never been abandoned, however. During the war they had been disguised to fit the Soviet tactics of "co-operation" with the West.

The advent of the European recovery program has increased the tempo of Communist action abroad.

This is because the program, fighting the Communists with the weapon of material aid, which the Soviet Union cannot now wield, promised security instead of chaos in western Europe. Continued action in

France, Italy, Greece and the Middle East can be expected. Most probable is a new Russian move in Iran, which, it is hoped, would divert the United States temporarily from the business at hand in western Europe.

Meanwhile, there will be a continued strengthening of the bonds between Russia and the periphery of countries. The first objective is to remove the satellite states from any chance of contamination by the ERP with its promise of security. The second is to increase the contribution of these countries to the recovery of the eastern bloc.

There are really two foreign policies for the Soviet Union. One is that announced by Foreign Secretary V. M. Molotov, the traditional type of policy of one state toward other states. The other is the unannounced policy of the Communist party, the new technique of ideological appeal from the Communist party to its subordinates abroad.

Both types of policy are employed to gain the world political objective of the Soviet Union. The second type rests mainly on the ideological basis of Communism. The first type, while it too is founded on Marx, Lenin, Stalin and other writings, is also concerned with international agreements.

As far as Europe is concerned Russian foreign policy in the traditional manner rests on the interpretation of the Soviet government of the proceedings at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences. These are accepted as the basis for relations between states.

The Russians feel that these conferences gave them a free hand in eastern Europe. In exchange they agreed tacitly to limit Communist activities in western Europe. It is evident that they never intended to do so.

Indeed it would be impossible for a Communist government. For capitalism is the enemy of Communism and must be fought where it is encountered.

Postwar co-operation between the East and West was doomed from the start. The Communist state could not co-operate in peace, as it had been forced to do in war, and remain true to Communist principles. The only question that arose after Potsdam was when the break should be made.

The writer has learned that there was considerable discussion on this point in the political bureau. Officials who knew the United States and Western Europe best were asked for their opinion on what might be gained by continuing co-operation for another year or two.

The decision was made. Outward co-operation was discarded as a policy.

This means for the future uneasy coexistence instead of co-operation. It does not mean outright aggression by the Soviet Union but an incessant offensive against the economy and politics of the West. In time, when and if the Russian people have succeeded in achieving the internal tasks their masters have set them and if the disintegration of the West has proceeded at the tempo predicted by the Kremlin, then a more active policy may be pursued.

VI

Under the current five-year plan, which ends in 1950, Premier Joseph Stalin and the political bureau have given the Russian people the tremendous task of expanding the economy of the Soviet Union to the point where its industrial capacity surpasses that of the United States. This is generally described in Moscow as a security measure; as the achievement of an economic structure so mighty that all fear of aggression from abroad will be banished.

In pursuit of this objective, Russia must overcome a number of problems. Every Russian official with whom the matter was discussed believed these pro-

blems could be solved. My own impression is that, great though the resources of the Soviet Union are, the restrictive character of the regime and the size of the economic problems will prevent the achievement of these goals by 1950.

Also, the Soviet drive for world industrial supremacy rests too heavily on the Communist theory that the capitalist economy is headed downhill or standing still.

It is quite possible that, while the Russians are slaving toward their present goals, the United States, by the introduction of new industrial techniques, will forge still farther ahead in the quantity and quality of industrial production.

The Soviet Union is devoting millions of rubles and some of its best brains to experimentation on the employment of atomic fission in both peace and war. Despite the priority given this experimentation, which is carried on in Central Asia, the same problems that face industry in its regular branches are present.

The first problem is in the quantity and quality of the labor force. A great majority of the 7,000,000 casualties sustained by the Soviet Union were part of the labor force.

Moreover, hundreds of thousands of the dead were the type of labor Russia needs most: technicians, machine operators, foremen, engineers.

During each year of the present five-year plan, the Soviet Union will mobilize 1,200,000 new workers for industry, including transportation. When the present plan is fulfilled or unfulfilled in 1950 (we in the West will never really know) the industrial labor force will have been increased to 33,500,000 men and women. The greater part of the reinforcements will come from the youth of rural districts. Siphoning these reserves from the collective farms will constitute a dangerous

manpower problem until industry has produced the farm machinery to replace the rural youth.

The mobilization of labor reserves, boys and girls from 14 years old upward, is not difficult for a totalitarian government. But it is difficult under present conditions to replace the specialists needed to train the youngsters.

After visits to Soviet factories and industrial plants, one reaches the conclusion that the newcomers are not being adequately trained because they are so badly needed for immediate industrial tasks. Theoretically, they receive schooling as well as vocational training; actually, schooling is a bad second to immediate needs.

This appears to be an important failure, since the deficiencies in quality of the Russian workers are as important as the present shortage in quantity. The fecundity of Russian women will make up the latter, but unless a real attempt is made to train, even during the present period of necessity, industry will lack the corporals, sergeants and lieutenants as much in the future as it does today.

The attempts to guide and coerce Russian industrial workers to become efficient are persistent; at times pathetic. A shoe factory worker named Matrasoy became a national hero because he introduced platforms in his shop so the workers could reach their machines.

The budget of 1947 contemplated the expenditure of 27,000,000 rubles on labor reserves during the present five-year plan, but the bulk of this is to be spent on housing for new workers, rather than on training.

One reason for the Soviet reluctance to disgorge the great number of German prisoners swallowed in the victories of 1943-45 is the high level of industrial competence of many of the Germans. Children of an advanced industrial civilization, the prisoners do na-

turally what the Russians are trying to teach willing but fumbling recruits from the farms.

In the reconstruction of the great dam across the Dnieper river, 10 percent of the workers are Germans. They are employed not on the most arduous tasks—these fall to the Russian women—but as operators of machines like cement-mixers, drills and pumps.

The government has made an effort to retain these prisoners in the labor force. One lieutenant of engineers recounted the proposition offered him. It was based on the supposition that Germany is finished and Russia is the land of opportunity.

“You are young, there is a future here,” say the Russians. “You may become a Russian citizen and you will have a good construction job in the East. You will have living quarters and plenty of food. You can marry a Russian girl.”

On this sort of appeal many Germans and some Japanese will be absorbed into the Soviet industrial labor force.

A second problem the government has struggled with since early in 1946 is the widespread corruption in industry which wastes billions of rubles and affects coal mining and iron and steel production. It accounts for inefficiency beyond that expectable in a people who have been industrialized in 30 rather than 130 years. And it was hidden by such widespread falsification and distortion of industrial statistics that all Soviet industrial production figures—the ones most affected—are open to question as to their reliability.

Speculation in industrial raw materials, falsification of production figures to win bonuses, embezzlement of workers' wages, diversion of industrial supplies to private use and private sale of products were uncovered by the police.

The system of bonuses for production above planned “norms,” which assisted Soviet industry in the

past, played it false when corruption became established. Mine directors and engineers used dynamite to produce more and more "coal" and win richer and richer bonuses. In some cases inspectors discovered that the "coal" was 40 per cent rock.

Sternest measures are being employed to stamp out this corruption, but there is ample indication that it still flourishes.

Another major problem to be overcome in the Soviet Union is the relatively low per capita production of labor, especially industrial labor. There are many contributory causes, among them lack of experience and machines, but the principal one appears to be the lack of incentive resulting from the shortages in food and consumer goods.

A commission investigating the iron mines of Krivoi Rog reported that in 1940 average production per driller per shift was 57.7 tons. Six years later it had fallen to 36 or 37 tons. Since 1946 it has risen slightly, but it remains far from satisfactory.

In some mines of the Donets basin, coal output per capita underground today is only 60 per cent of 1940 figures.

The government became conscious of the connection between the shortage of consumers' goods and the decrease in per capita production in the autumn of 1946.

There then began, with all the propaganda of which the system is capable, a campaign designed to show that the supply of consumer goods was being increased. Schemes for revitalizing the co-operatives in city production of this type of goods under the five-year plan were extracted from the plan and used to show just how much the worker would get in the future.

Broken down, the statistics showed that planned production plus additional production through co-operatives would not be large enough to provide the incentive the worker needs.

It is apparently too late to shift emphasis in the five-year plan onto consumer goods. The shortage might be made up by purchase abroad, but this is unlikely in view of the ideological dangers involved.

The damage done by the Germans to Soviet industry is another major problem. Americans have heard so much about this in the speeches of Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov and other Soviet leaders that they are inclined to minimize it as a factor in Russian recovery. No one visiting the mining towns of the Donets basin—Minsk, Vitebsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Voroshilovgrad or Stalino—is likely to make the same mistake.

There are German and Czech machines in use in all these places. Some reconstruction has been accomplished, but generally the Russians are a long way from filling in the gap torn in their industrial structure by German destruction and confiscation.

Publicly at least, the Soviet authorities place great reliance on the development of industry in the Urals. From one foreigner who visited the area it was learned that even in that favored sector industry is being plagued by low per-capita production, lack of machinery and machine tools, and a housing shortage.

A letter from Krasny Luch in the Donets basin reveals that coal miners and their families have been forced to sleep in corridors on the floor because of overcrowding and lack of beds and that hostels generally are "dirty and uncomfortable."

The principal mine at the town of Kadievka, near Voroshilovgrad, was a good example of the state of the coal mining industry in the Donets basin three years after the departure of the Germans. The mine was expected to go into full production by the first of 1947.

The ventilation system was rudimentary. The electric lighting system extended no farther than the main shaft. There were only seven men actually mining coal.

The Donets coal basin, despite the glowing descriptions of the richness of the Kusnets and Kizel basins, is still the most important in the Soviet Union. But three years after the departure of the Germans, its coal production was only 50 percent of 1940, according to the officials in the mining institute at Stalino. At that time, production in the Kusnets basin was only about 40 percent of Donets production.

The Kirov steel plant at Makeyevka, near Stalino, and the Red October steel plant at Stalingard presented similar pictures. They were in production at about one-third of their prewar rate.

Taking into account the extensive German destruction that still remains to be cleared up, the shortages of skilled workers, housing and consumer goods and their effect on per-capita production, there seemed little ground for the planners' hopes that the two plants "within a year" would be back at their prewar rate of output.

The Russian worker performed prodigies of production, as well as valor, in war. But the specter of a new capitalist encirclement led by the United States has not yet wrung new production levels from him in peace.

VII

AGRICULTURE is, on the whole, the most encouraging aspect of the Soviet economy.

Main emphasis of the five-year plan is on industrial expansion, but, to date, more solid progress has been made in agriculture despite difficulties and problems only slightly less harassing than those of industry. There are many reasons. An important one, often overlooked, is the energy and devotion of the Russian peasant. He has a green thumb; he can make things grow. He is tough. He will work longer and harder

than the Russian industrial worker and, an important point, is vastly more at home in his environment.

Even in older industrial areas of the Soviet Union one sees plenty of workers who appear lost or indifferent. These attitudes are not encountered on the collective farms, where love of the land and pride in its yield produce eagerness to learn new ways of making it fruitful.

Immediate cause of the rise in agricultural production the past year has been extension of scientific, mechanized farming, especially wheat farming, on a huge scale to Western Siberia and opening of large new tracts of land there and elsewhere to farming.

Nearly 20,000,000 acres were added to the tilled area of the USSR in 1947 and more will be added in 1948; in addition, there will be continued recovery of acreage damaged by the war in Byelo-Russia (White Russia) and the Ukraine.

A second factor has been the thoroughness and detail of arrangements made by the Ministry of Agriculture and associated ministries in 1947 for the harvest. A vast amount of planning, labor and material were devoted to seeing that the maximum crop was harvested.

At the same time there has been a slow but steady increase in production of farming machinery, principally tractors. The Stalin tractor plant at Stalingrad now is producing about half of its pre-war daily output of 220. Production at the Kharkov tractor plant is somewhat behind, but also is on the up-grade.

The still unsatisfactory position in the production of other types of agricultural machinery offsets these successes. Reconversion to peacetime production of many of these factories took an extraordinary time and farm production suffered in consequence.

The scientific assistance given farmers is extensive and welcome. Conditions under which these workers live and work often is primitive, as is much on the farms,

but there is no mistaking the respect and gratitude of peasants or the effectiveness of the work done.

On collective farms, the writer has been told repeatedly by old peasants how government scientists have increased the crop and introduced better methods of harvesting and storage. New types of wheat have been introduced, cattle disease has been drastically cut and new breeds of sheep and cows brought to the fields. Mechanization and electricity have replaced manpower and candles.

Of all the achievements of the 30 years of the Soviet regime, these are among the most important. That similar improvements have taken place elsewhere without bloodshed and suffering should not blind the world to the magnitude of the accomplishment there, where a thousand years of backward agriculture have been overcome in 30.

Labor shortage and reconstruction are problems common to both industry and agriculture.

Farms suffered from the war. On no collective farm that the writer visited were war casualties to the working population less than half. Now the labor force in rural areas is threatened anew by demands of an expanding industry.

If agricultural machinery is forthcoming, collective farms may be able to prosper despite their decreased labor force; if not, it will be difficult to gather the 1948 harvest.

.. War damage in occupied areas is extensive. This applies not only to loss of stock, machines and buildings but also to fields themselves.

Byelo-Russia, never a great food-growing area, did manage to produce some of the food for its cities. In the years immediately following the war food stocks had to be diverted to the area from Siberia.

Corruption, on a considerable scale though not as impressive as in industry, was uncovered on collective farms in 1946 and 1947.

Under the collective farm system the crops of each farm are divided. So much goes to the state; so much to the nearest machine tractor station as rent for tractors and payment to drivers; so much is sold for the benefit of the farmers. The system's strongest point, from the government's view, was the excellence of its collection system.

It was in this system that corruption flourished. The state did not get the produce to which it was entitled. Farmers tilled land privately, selling produce in the open markets. Cattle and food products were withheld from the communal group.

Government countered by setting up an entirely new organization to supervise collective farms and collections. This extended from the Ministry of Agriculture down to the farms themselves and added thousands of new employees to an already inflated bureaucracy.

The new agency had its first test in 1947 and passed it successfully. In the first year after promulgation of the new organization, nearly 15,000,000 acres were returned to the state—that is, for state production. In addition the state also got back 44,000 horses, 45,000 cattle and 123,000 other farm animals. Half a million farm officials were removed from their posts for corruption.

This process was accompanied by a propaganda campaign to "increase political consciousness of the farm population and wipe out survivals of private ownership" in it. It was admitted that hostile propaganda against collective farming spread during the war by the Germans had borne fruit.

Farmers were increasing their personal holdings by farming public property, speculating in farm pro-

duce and generally showing an uncomfortable tendency to return to bourgeois capitalism.

By and large, the Russian peasant has been the element of the new society least amenable to the regime. Yet, since he is indispensable, measures taken to cleanse him of ideological sin were, on the whole, less severe than those taken against corruption in industry.

The food problem in the Soviet has not been solved as abolition of rationing might indicate. Lack of food processing plants in the Ukraine, where they were destroyed by the Germans, and in Siberia Kazakhstan, where they are under construction, and difficulties of distribution because of damaged and wornout railroads still are important problems, even though food production is rising.

The Soviet government is anxious to build up stocks of food in reserve, and not only as a safeguard against famine. Well does the Kremlin know the importance of food as a weapon in the ideological war being fought for Europe. At present, however, stockpiles are not large enough to admit a major offensive with this weapon and at the same time allow increased consumption at home as an aid to a rise in per capita industrial production.

The writer saw factories and industrial plants in Russia making everything from steel to overcoats, tractors to dishpans. But the impression remains that the real strength of the country and the people lies in the farms.

The countryside is dotted with isolated villages. It is in these villages that one finds the courteous, hard working, hospitable, honest folk of whom the great Russian writers of the last century wrote. In them is the real strength of Russia.

VIII

IN no other field of endeavor is the restrictive character of the Soviet regime so evident as in literature and the arts. Political orthodoxy as the sine qua non of acclaim and the restriction of the artist to selected subjects approved by the government have combined to stifle the creative instinct and produce stagnancy. Today the Russian theater is excellent when it is reproducing the creations of a freer age, "Boris Godounov," "The Cheery Orchard" of "Swan Lake." Opera, drama and ballet are presented with perfection.

But when the modern tries to create, he is bound by the directives of the central committee of the Communist party. If he knows what is good for him, he lays on the ideological material with a trowel. Thus the promising Konstantin Simonov of "Day and Night" gives way to the shallow propagandist of "The Russian Question."

It is hard to estimate what has been lost to the culture of the world by the government's decision to confine the arts to the paths of party usefulness.

Boris Pasternack, the greatest of Russian poets, has turned his back on creative work and is translating Shakespeare.

Serge Eisenstein has junked part of his trilogy film "Ivan the Terrible" and is remaking it after the party had shown its disapproval. Meanwhile, Eisenstein is showing his loyalty by attacking western art, political forms and life.

The talented poetess Ahkmatova and the short story writer and essayist Zoschenko disappeared from Soviet literature in the purge of 1946.

This purge reached its depths in Leningrad, long a center of Russian literature, and a city that because of geographical position is more "western" than most in the Soviet Union.

It was directed against what the Communists call "the remains of western, bourgeois ideology" in art and literature, specifically against art for art's sake and any creation that does not directly foster the political objectives of the system.

Like all purges in Russia, it was the occasion for widespread denunciation and recrimination. The spectacle of the literati of Leningrad vilifying their old associates, Ahkmatova and Zoschenko, after they had been purged, was not calculated to excite admiration for the Russian writer.

At the same time the government, through its propaganda agencies, attacks any art that appeared to divert the Russian people from what is considered to be the real problems of the day. Art became propaganda for Communism.

An instance was the attacks on plays dealing with the situation arising from the return home of Russian soldiers. The fidelity or infidelity of the soldier's wife, his own amorous affairs at the front were not considered essential problems of real life by the dramatic critics of the Kremlin.

Art for art's sake is out in Russia. But even those authors, playwrights, musicians and painters who hew most faithfully to the ideological line are not immune.

One of the literary heroes of the Soviet Union in the two years following the war was Fadayevev, whose "Young Guard," a blood and thunder novel of partisan activity, was a tremendous success. Fadayevev, on the strength of the "Young Guard," which was made into a play, a radio serial and a movie picture, became one of the most renowned literary figures in the Soviet state and a power in the Authors' union.

By the end of 1947 it was discovered that the ideological context of "Young Guard" was not all that it should be. Fadayevev followed Zoschenko and Ahkmatova onto the public pillory. However, his sins

were less; they, after all, had been interested in western culture. He escaped after a reprimand, a confession of his ideological short-comings and a promise to be a better boy in the future.

The central committee of the Communist party has laid down the lines along which all artistic and literary endeavor in the Soviet Union must move, but the initial impetus toward the purge came from Premier Stalin.

To a group of movie producers in the Kremlin he complained: "You dishonor the Russian people by your levity. Picture them and their labors as they really are."

This admonition was followed by a spate of instructions and reproofs affecting unknown jazz leaders as much as such persons as Einstein, with a world-wide reputation.

Henceforth, movie-makers, composers, playwrights, authors, painters, poets and sculptors are to concern themselves primarily with the five-year plan, the problems of reconstruction and the great patriotic war (World War II), or, as the subject-matter was described by the Leningrad Writers' union, "the majesty of our victory, the pathos of rehabilitation and socialist reconstruction and the heroic deeds of the Soviet people in fulfilling and over-fulfilling the new Stalin five-year plan."

The moving picture industry received a list of about 20 subjects on which pictures could be made. Each subject is connected in some manner with the importance of the five-year plan, and the heroes of the future films will be miners, steel makers, fishermen and cotton growers.

In following these directives, the intelligentsia must have an ear correctly tuned to the tone of Kremlin comment.

An author who in 1945 began a novel on the defense of Moscow would have to recast it entirely in

1946 since he would have begun by rightly ascribing to Marshal Zhukov considerable credit for that defense.

In 1946, however, Zhukov was out of favor.

A year later, the book would have to be rewritten again, for by the end of 1947, Zhukov, now commander of the southern army group commanding the approaches to the Balkans, had begun his climb back into favor.

Under present regulations, neither "Anna Karenina," which deals with a bourgeois amour, a "saloon subject," as the newspaper "Culture and Life" might describe it, nor Pushkin's "Eugene Onegin," with its description of spacious country life and the glittering czarist court could be written.

Painting in the Soviet Union has been reduced to calendar art by the restrictions laid down by the government.

Some of the bolder spirits paint in the modern manner in the privacy of their studios, but this work is never exhibited. It remains in the studios, and the painters hang only the work that appears to fulfill ideological requirements.

There is a variety of approved subjects, but somehow the pictures that meet with the warmest approval from the critics are those that have Stalin as a central figure: Stalin with Lenin, a motive that is strangely emphasized for propaganda purposes; Stalin during the defense of Tsaritsyn, now Stalingrad, in the civil war; Stalin planning new industrial plants; Stalin with children.

The reaction against the "decadent, bourgeois art" of the west has also deprived Russians of an opportunity to view some of this work. Some fine examples of the modern French school are hung in one of the Moscow galleries, but the room is closed to the public. The collection of Greek marbles and Egyptian antiquities from the Friedrich Wilhelm museum in Berlin

and the Italian Renaissance paintings from the Dresden museum are in Leningrad and Moscow.

As far as could be learned, it is not an understandable reluctance to place war loot on display that removes them from the public gaze, but the fear that these exhibits, which do not include a single portrait of Stalin, might infect their beholders with a yearning for art for art's sake.

At any rate, it is obvious in Russia today that the process of turning art into propaganda is quenching the flame of creative genius in a people particularly endowed by temperament for the creation of great music and dancing and the telling of great tales.

The Soviet press is another great propaganda arm of the government.

Indeed, the press is an instrument of government. It functions only by government license. News appears or does not appear as the government deems fit. Editorials are written, news is "treated" on the authorities' order.

The press does contain internal criticism. But this is government inspired and is limited to examples of corruption or inefficiency or ideological backwardness in the Communist society and never is directed at the regime or its ideology.

The attitude of the press on any important news event abroad is decided by the political bureau and transmitted to the press by the agitation and propaganda committee of the central committee.

Thus there is sometimes a delay of almost a week before Pravda and Izvestia comment editorially on an event abroad. On minor items, the press is trusted to follow the party line.

Under these conditions it is impossible to compare freedom in the United States and the Russian press. Freedom of the press as it is understood in the United States does not exist in the Soviet Union.

The Russian reporter will, of course, maintain that his is the only free press, for it alone represents a government based upon the will of the people. He is perfectly safe in doing so, for the issue will never be presented for popular vote.

Unhappily, the bulk of the Russian people believe what appears in their newspapers. There is some skepticism, but years of education to believe exactly what the government says, plus the lack of any standard of comparison, leads the Russian to accept his newspaper's "facts."

The Russians are unworldly folk. There is not, as there was in national socialist Germany, a considerable group accustomed to reading foreign newspapers, magazines and books with experience of life abroad.

This is not attributable entirely to the present government's reluctance to allow its citizens to travel abroad. The cultural schism between Russia and the west is older than Marx or Engels, and the gap has never been filled, nor will it be under the present regime.

Russia is not "European" as Germany is. Russia is continental in size and variety, a world of its own.

Thus, when Pravda reports that the United States is building bases in the far north to encircle the Soviet Union, when editorialists paint the United States as the successor to Fascist Germany, the Russian accepts.

In New York a reader who dislikes this account may buy the Daily Worker and read somewhat different reports of the Soviet Union. Such variety does not exist in Russia. Today there are only four thin streams of information flowing into the sea of ignorance.

These are the magazine Amerika and the weekly newspaper British Ally, published by the State Department and the Foreign Office, respectively, and two radio programs, the United States' Voice of America and

the British Broadcasting Corporation's news program in Russian.

These four media are the only means of introducing the American or British point of view to the Russian people.

Small though their circulation is, their effect is important, as the repeated attacks on them in Culture and Life demonstrate.

When, in March, 1947, President Truman announced United States aid to Greece and Turkey, one of the recurrent war scares ran through Moscow, as they are bound to do anywhere when the means of information are controlled by the government. One or two Russians I knew were extremely worried. One morning, however, one of them said smilingly that there was not going to be any war.

A friend, he said, had listened to the BBC, which had explained the Truman program.

IX

JOSEPH Vissarinovich Stalin, the cobbler's son from Gori, is 68. This is the most important political fact in the Soviet Union.

Each year the annual vacation at Sochi on the Black sea coast lasts longer. There are repeated rumors that the Leader suffers from cancer. With each passing month the question of succession assumes greater importance. Stalin, most powerful ruler in the world, is head of a monolithic state whose prided total unity is imposed from above. The question of succession may break that unity.

It is assumed in Moscow that Stalin has provided for succession. This is a closely guarded secret in a country of secrets. For should the name of the heir apparent become known it might create division within the government either between Stalin and his successor, weakening the former's authority, or between

Stalin and his successor and other aspirants for the position.

A test of the Soviet state's strength at the top will be whether the ruthless, able, intelligent men who now occupy hierarchical positions below Stalin will abide after his death by the choice he has made. Historical precedent indicates appointment of a successor is often the best means of inciting a struggle for power.

Four men emerge as the most likely successors.

Best known of these is Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, minister of foreign affairs since 1939. Now 57, Molotov was for 11 years chairman of the council of people's commissars, now the council of ministers.

In the coming struggle for power Molotov represents the government structure. He is the "manager" of government and bureaucracy. Better than any-one else in the political bureau, Molotov knows how to make the intricate machinery of bureaucracy and government work.

In a country short of technicians in government as well as industry this is important.

Molotov has two other qualifications: He has had more experience on the highest level of government than any of the others and he was associated with Lenin and Stalin in the revolution of 1917, a historic qualification of importance.

The star of Andrei Zhdanov is in the ascendant. Since these articles were written Zhdanov's death was reported in Moscow. He has been charged with organization of the Cominform and apparently is responsible for issuing directives on Communist ideology and the line to be taken by the party abroad. At 51 he is secretary of the central committee of the party and a member of the political bureau.

Zhdanov's strength reflects the party's strength. During the war the army challenged the party's posi-

tion. Since the war the party, its membership increased to about 5,000,000, has regained its old supremacy.

Lavrenti P. Beria is one of the least known of the men around Stalin. A Georgian, like the Leader, he is 48.

His position as a possible successor rests on his knowledge and control of the security machine. He was appointed commissar for the interior in 1938 and assumed control of the security police. Later he was named commissar for state security.

From this position Beria was released early in 1946 to assume "special tasks."

These have never been identified. It is believed, however, that to Beria was given the extremely important post of organizing military and industrial research on atomic fission.

Beria is a deputy chairman of the council of ministers. Ordinarily this would give him supervisory power over two or three important ministries, but in his present position the possession of the title probably gives him power over all ministries whose work is connected with his.

Marshal Nicholas Bulganin has reached the highest of the hierarchy since the war. His replacement of Stalin as Minister for Armed Forces symbolized the victory of the party over the military men who had won favor during the war.

Marshal Bulganin, an alternate member of the political bureau, represents the army in that group, which includes no regular soldier. He is no upstart used by the party to outroot army leaders. During the war he held the important post of co-ordinator of heavy industry and before the war he was chairman of the State bank.

In addition to these four there are two others who, if not claimants to the succession, are at least important enough to make their friendship and allegiance vital.

One is Georgi Malenkov, a member of the political bureau, who assists Zhdanov in Communist organization. The other is Lazar Kaganovich, who has had some of the most difficult postwar tasks. Recently he has been concerned with purging the party organization in the Ukraine. December 19, 1947, he resumed his old position as deputy president of the council of ministers. Like Malenkov, he is a member of the political bureau.

Zhdanov's influence in the party is such that many students of Soviet internal politics, recalling Stalin's rise to power, make him first favorite for the succession.

However, conditions have changed since Stalin succeeded Lenin and eliminated Trotsky. Then the Communist party was the only powerful force in the young state. Today its power, although still great, would be challenged by the security organization, the government structure including the bureaucracy, and the army.

Beria, for instance, could appeal to the 20 divisions of the MVD troops, plus thousands of ununiformed agents. Question would be whether their loyalty would lie with their own organization and its leaders or with the party.

Marshal Bulganin could call on the army, flushed with success in World War II and jealous of both the party and the security organization, which since the war have combined to restrict its authority and weaken the influence in government of its wartime leaders.

Finally the government structure is greatly increased in size and scope. It includes not only conventional ministries such as foreign affairs and fisheries, but others charged with important key industries. Thus its members include not only administrators but technicians, engineers and experts who are necessary if economic plans are to be achieved. From that stand-point it is

more important to success of the regime's plans than either the army, the party or the security organization.

All three organizations, army, government and security, have grown so large that although they are of the party in the sense the party sponsored their growth, they can no longer be said to be in the party.

To date an uneasy equilibrium has been maintained among leading claimants to the position now held by Stalin. In the Byzantine atmosphere of the Kremlin court first one and then the other has spurred forward in the race for favor. Meanwhile Stalin has remained at the pinnacle.

Today, although while in Moscow he works as long and as hard as ever, Stalin is said to enter less into the debates of the political bureau. He is content to listen to the others and, in the end, give his decision in a few words.

He seems more human, more approachable than Molotov. This has given rise to belief in the west that if negotiators could make contact with Stalin they might make progress.

There is no authority for this in past experience. Stalin has made such concessions as the Soviet Union has been forced to make because he is literally the only member of the government who can do so and be above criticism. But in devotion to Communist dogma he is as rigid and unswerving as Molotov.

In Russia Stalin is a demigod. He is the hero of songs and stories whose lavish praise would bring a blush to the cheek of a Persian monarch. His picture hangs in the tents of Mongol horsemen, on the shabby walls of Leningrad apartments and on the farm carts of Ukrainian peasants.

Incidentally the pictures vary. Each of the peoples of multinational Russia see Stalin in their own image. Thus when the Kazakhs bear his enormous pic-

ture in the physical culture celebration, it is noticed that the Leader's features have a distinctly Kazakh cast.

"Stalin Our Sun," reads the banners of the central Asian republics. Chants of tribesmen beyond the Volga are punctuated with Stalin's name. The speech of a deputy before the supreme Soviet invariably includes several references to the magic syllables.

To scores of millions of Russians Stalin is all-wise, all-powerful; the creator of victory, the engineer who made the new Russia, the author and expounder of dogma, the father of all the Russians.

His death will create a vacuum not only in power but in idolatry.

Principal question after that of succession is whether the ensuing struggle for power can be kept hidden within the upper councils of the state. If this can be done then the appearance of unity will be maintained. Otherwise, unity will be broken and the struggle for power may spill out from the Kremlin to include powerful forces that are already jostling each other for pre-eminence.

Stalin may have settled the question of succession in two ways: He may have designated a single man as his heir and named him as his successor in the most important posts he now holds. Or he may have passed on the business of government to a quadrumvirate of Molotov, Zhdanov, Beria and Marshal Bulganin.

Considering the power at stake a struggle for that power is inevitable. However, it is not inevitable that the struggle begin as soon as Stalin is dead or that it break out of the council member group.

The discipline that the regime has struggled to instil into all its members for 30 years may confine it to the Kremlin.

If it does not, a situation will arise endangering the Soviet Union's economic future and its position in the world. There is in Russia no machinery for changing

the government or for settling the claims of two or more rival groups. At the worst a widening of the struggle for power would mean civil war, at best dislocation of the country's economic and social life.

In a struggle carried on against the background of all Russia, Beria with his control of the security organization would seem to be the most likely victor. If the decision is taken in council then Molotov and Zhdanov would seem to be the outstanding candidates.

X

IF they knew the facts and could speak freely the Russian people would repudiate the enmity toward the United States the Soviet government and the Communist party are building up in the Soviet Union.

No people is so firmly desirous of peace, so apprehensive of rumors of war. Unfortunately for the world, the Russian people have nothing to do with the policy of the government.

That policy also seeks peace, the kind of peace that Hitler sought from the West at Munich. Since the United States cannot agree, its government and the people who support it will continue to receive the enmity of the government and party in the Soviet Union, and these two agencies will strive to spread that enmity among the people of that country.

That enmity is not decisive at present since two factors outbalance it. The first is the present economic weakness of the Soviet Union. The second is the sincere antagonism of the vast majority of the people toward war.

The Russian people would fight with their traditional bravery a defensive war. But in their present psychological state it is doubtful if any amount of cajolery by the Kremlin could induce them to welcome foreign adventures.

These economic and psychological factors should be obvious to the Kremlin. The Russians, unlike the Germans, always have been able to recognize what is and what is not possible. Moreover, convinced of the supremacy of their political dogma, they feel they can wait.

In the interim the United States has been selected as the enemy.

During the next decade enmity will be instilled in the minds of the Russian people by the propaganda services of the state.

We should not be surprised when a Russian soldier in Germany fires his rifle at a passing United States railroad train. He has been told repeatedly that the Americans are his enemies, plotting a new and terrible war, robbing him and his country of their just rewards.

Today the attitude of the average Russian toward the United States is a blend of fear and admiration. The propaganda objective appears to be the increase of the first and the elimination of the other in the Russian mind.

This will not be easy. For 30 years the United States industrial and agricultural techniques have been held up to the Russians as models. During World War II United States' help to Russia was known and appreciated, although this was balanced by the anti-United States propaganda based on the failure to open a second front in western Europe before 1944.

The praise of United States technique has ended. Every effort is made to present Soviet industry and agriculture as the peer of all others. A national mesmerism is exercised by the press and radio to convince the Russians their system is economically, as well as politically and socially, supreme.

The result has been an understandable chauvinism. When the first turbo-generator unit of the rebuilt power plant at the great dam across the Dnepr went into

operation last spring, a Russian acquaintance asked me if such units were built in the United States.

When I replied that this unit had been built in the United States and shipped to Dneprstroi, my friend asked why Pravda had not reported this.

The reason is simple: Pravda and the other newspapers had six months before proudly announced that a turbo-generator unit was being built in Leningrad for the dam. This unit, one of six projected for Russian manufacture, was not installed. A number of engineers at the dam doubted if it ever would be.

Similarly one is told that the United States army used Russian tanks during the war, that penicillin was a Soviet discovery made abroad because the Russian industrial machine was turning out material for Allied as well as Soviet armies, that the fighter aircraft used by the allies in the war were made in Russia, that United States' production methods are far behind those employed in the Soviet Union.

This is not as distressing as the gradual spreading of a miasma of fear and suspicion of the United States.

The selection of news items from the United States is one of the principal methods of doing this.

All items that to the Russians indicate United States bias against labor, a race or a political creed, indicate a low standard of living and public or private immorality are published. United States "outrages" against other nations and their peoples are prominently displayed. Every criticism of the Soviet Union by a prominent American is printed, often with other parts of the speech discarded.

Simultaneously men like Eugene Tarle, Ilya Ehrenburg and David Zaslavsky in commentaries expound the thesis that the United States is the enemy of freedom and peace, that the United States government has replaced those of the German Nazis and the Japanese war lords.

The melancholy prospect before us is a period of perhaps 10 years in which the Soviet economy is to be rehabilitated and expanded, as far as the system is able, while at the same time antagonism toward the United States is to be fostered.

Some Americans will be pictured as friendly to the Soviet Union. These include Henry Wallace, who, if not a knight in shining armor to the Kremlin, is at least a disturbing element worth encouraging.

Considering this propaganda and its direction, what will have the most effect on Soviet policy in the coming decade?

Primarily power, backed by a working democracy. Politically the Communists are not afraid of a state that encourages repression of labor interests but they are fearful of the United States represented in the Tennessee valley authority.

The combination of political freedom and military power has always been the most potent foe of totalitarianism. The task before Americans, it would seem, is to maintain both during the coming years of co-existence between the Western and Eastern power systems.

After a careful study of the two systems, the writer's conclusion is that if the United States remains a political democracy and continues the extension of social democracy it will emerge victorious from the ideological struggle in which it is now engaged.

XI

THE extent and intensity of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union is surprising in a country that boasts of its lack of racial prejudice.

It is met in the streets and is evident in government departments. It flourishes in Moscow but also in Odessa and Kiev. Reports of minor court cases reveal

evidences of flourishing anti-Semitism in the poorer quarters of the capital.

The Jews are blamed for shortages of bread and potatoes. In Kiev widespread discontent over the inadequacy of rations assumed an anti-Semitic aspect.

One Russian never passes the pictures of members of the political bureau, which are displayed on national holidays, without muttering:

“Dirty Jew dogs, you killed my father.”

Two former colonels of infantry have reason to know about anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union.

These two colonels are Jews. Before the war they lived in the same town and worked in the same factory. When they were demobilized and returned to their jobs they learned they were to be transferred to inferior positions in distant parts of the Soviet Union.

Wearing the medals they had won fighting against the Germans, the two men journeyed to Moscow. After their protests had been heard, they received jobs similar to their old ones in towns not far distant from their old homes. But the two friends were no longer to work in the same factory.

Still mystified, they invited their former factory manager out for a drink on their return home.

In his cups he said, “So you’re moving. A good thing, too. You’re good workmen, but we decided on the committee (the local Soviet) there were too many Jews in this town and in the factory. So we made a routine complaint!”

I know an old Russian, an authentic soldier of the revolution, who had three sons. One had died at Sevastopol, a second had lost a leg at Krivoy-Rog.

The old Russian was a Jew although for the first 20 years after 1917 he had never thought about it. He had always said proudly that in Russia there were no longer any Jews, that all were Soviet citizens.

Gradually his anger grew at the attitude of the militia (the city police) of Moscow toward Jews, the slurs and insinuations he heard against Jews in shops, on the subway and in the party clubroom at his factory.

Finally he called his two remaining sons together.

"You are Jews," he told them. "Your mother was a Jew. I am a Jew. Henceforth I expect you to tell the Gentiles that you are Jews and to be proud of it. When you are asked to fill out documents, write on them that you are a Jew."

Anti-Semitism is not an announced government policy, as it was in Germany. But it is difficult to believe that such widespread anti-Semitism could exist in so closely controlled a police state if the government did not give its tacit approval.

Announced or not, it appears to be government policy to reduce the number of Jews in positions of influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Jews are barred from joining the ministry even in the most subsidiary positions.

Jews cannot enter the principal military academies in Moscow. Their number is restricted in the medical and law schools in the university at Kiev and in Moscow university.

Jews trace the start of the present antagonism to the treason trials 12 years ago. Leon Trotsky, they point out, was a Jew and so were many of his followers.

Another aspect of the problem is the position held by Jews in the Soviet government during its early years. At the end of the revolution the Jews were the only group in the Soviet Union with the education and political requirements qualifying them to take over a large number of prominent positions in the government.

Since then an extensive educational system has prepared hundreds of thousands more for such positions. There were more Gentiles than Jews in this

group, and this accounts for the decreased number of Jews in the lower echelons of government.

However, it does not account for the removal of hundreds of Jews from positions of trust and responsibility within the government machine.

There is an autonomous Jewish republic called Birobidjan near the Manchurian border. Although much is made of other republics in the same general area by the Soviet press, little is said about Birobidjan.

One result of the increased anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union may be a revival of interest in the republic by Russian Jews.

But the most obvious result in Moscow has been the revival of militant race consciousness on the part of the Jews.

XII

LIKE much else in the Soviet Union, the armed forces of the Socialist state present an imposing and awe-inspiring front. The Soviet army—the adjective “red” has been abandoned—is formidable from the point of view of manpower, tanks and guns. In 1948 it is probably the finest army in the world for the warfare of 1945. Behind this front are certain important weaknesses. Some are the result of a mental hangover arising from a deep draught of victory laced with propaganda.

Obviously many Soviet army leaders believe their own propaganda.

This is also true of many in the West. Impressed by sheer size of the Soviet war effort and undoubted valor of some Russian troops, there is a tendency, in the military art as in other fields, to take Soviet military strength at Russian valuation.

Since the West knows almost nothing about the war on the Eastern front save the uniformly laudatory reports of Soviet propagandists, this is understandable.

The Soviet army was not the universally successful force that propagandists portray.

Despite nearly two years of preparation after the signing of the Russo-German pact of 1939 it was nearly eliminated in the first two months of the German invasion.

German commanders, especially Field Marshal General Karl von Rundstedt, consistently outthought their Soviet opponents. Many elements of the vast multi-national Soviet army were unreliable in battle; notably, according to a Russian staff officer, the Armenians, Kazakhs and Uzbeks. Materiel, weapons and ammunition were deficient in quantity and quality.

The Soviet state is one built by and defended by land power. Today the Russian navy, its history one of startling defeats and dubious victories, is subsidiary to the ground forces.

Soviet air power is considerable. But it is subordinated to needs of the ground forces. Construction of a long-range, heavy bombardment force was opposed by ground commanders, during and after the war, and, as in the Wehrmacht of National Socialist Germany, their views prevailed.

Military intelligence is a field in which Russians have worked long and extensively. A vast amount of information flows back to Moscow from every country in the world and from sources that include Communist parties and their dupes abroad. Those best fitted to judge believe that in the main, the information is good, based on painstaking espionage and, wherever possible, complete checking.

The question arises whether this information receives its maximum value. For in the Soviet Union, as in any totalitarian state, introduction of information that runs counter to previously fixed ideas of the ruler and his court is dangerous business.

We know now that Adolf Hitler and his court persistently refused to accept reliable information on the Royal Air Force as early as 1939, since it conflicted with their own estimates of that force.

What would happen today if information arrived that the United States had built an accurate, guided missile with a range of 12,000 miles after the political bureau, a sapient but unworldly body, had decided this was impossible?

Judging from past performances of totalitarian states, such information would be pigeonholed. For what functionary would wish to prove the political bureau wrong?

An indication of this basic weakness of totalitarian psychology developed in the Russian high command soon after the end of World War II. Soviet air force officers in Germany were astounded by the destruction caused by the allied air forces. Unlike the simple Russian infantrymen, they did not believe it had all been done by Soviet artillery.

But they were never able to sell the idea of long-range bombardment in Moscow. Political leaders of the Kremlin could not admit the basic premise of the air officers' case, the terrific wounds dealt Germany by allied bombers.

For to do so would have been to refute Soviet propaganda that Russia was the only country that had effectively hurt the German war effort, that the prolonged and intensive aerial bombardment of Axis industry was not even a partial substitute for the second front.

One evident weakness of the Soviet war machine is belief that weapons and techniques and tactics which won the last war will win another.

Present emphasis on the atom bomb shows that a section, at least, of the political hierarchy understands the importance of nuclear fission in war. But according to

articles in the military journals and magazines and conversations several highly-placed foreigners, including two of the most successful of Western generals, have had with Russian general officers, there is a strong belief that what was good enough for 1945, or even earlier, will be good enough for 19—.

A famous foreign general was invited to see the moving picture the Russians have made about their "victory" over Japan, a picture much favored by high officials.

At one stage, Russian cavalry charges with drawn sabers a Japanese trench from which machinegun fire spurts. With small losses the cavalrymen gain the entrenchment and saber the Japanese.

The visiting general, an outspoken character, leaned forward at this juncture and asked:

"Does anyone really believe this could happen in war today?"

"Hush," said the official Soviet interpreter, "this is the part the generalissimo (Stalin) likes best."

Thinking of the Soviet general staff as it percolates down to the public in newspapers, and the lectures to officer-cadets and army formations, reminds one very much of that of the French general staff in 1939; incurious, overconfident and stagnant.

Weaknesses of Russia's industrial economy are also the weaknesses of the war machine. For today industrial strength is the prerequisite of not only victory but survival, and manufacture of decisive weapons demands a larger, better-trained, more-experienced industrial population than ever before.

For centuries Russia's main defense against invading armies has been her enormous size. Invading armies were swallowed in the vast expanse of Russian earth as, with supply lines extended, they pursued the retreating Russian forces. Now when war moves in the air such a defense is outmoded.

Like the hardy valor of the Russian peasant, it is helpless to halt the new warfare of guided missiles, nuclear fission and bacteriological weapons.

Principal problem since Hiroshima has not been to discover the "secret" of the atom bomb but mobilization of labor, materials and direction for its manufacture.

The Soviet, with a totalitarian system that can direct all national effort in peacetime to one objective, probably has now succeeded in manufacturing at least one atom bomb. Whether it has solved the other problems that have arisen from the new conditions of warfare is another question.

Can Soviet industry in its present straitened circumstances begin large-scale manufacture of atom bombs?

Will the army's general staff continue to resist "interference" by scientists and technicians in organization and planning for war?

Are there enough technicians, scientists and "managers" to meet new requirements of atomic armament and simultaneously fulfill plans for industrial expansion under the five-year plan and the demands of the established armed forces?

Today the Russian army has reached the pinnacle of power.

Well-advertised demobilization has been balanced in part by continuous conscription. It is undoubtedly the largest army in the world, with at least 3,000,000 troops in eastern Siberia, the maritime provinces and Manchuria and over 2,750,000 in western Russia, the periphery or satellite states and the Transcaucasian and Karelo-Finnish republics.

Such an enormous army, although surprising in a state that invariably places itself in the van of "peace-loving, democratic nations," is in keeping with tradition. Since emergence of the Russian state in the 14th century, the army has always been large.

Equipment in the last war's weapons is excellent. Tanks, guns and mortars are bigger, combat soldiers more heavily armed and sheer mass of materiel more impressive than anywhere else in the world.

Command, again measured by 1945 standards, is good. Marshal George Zhukov, who now has the important southern command, which includes approaches to the Balkans, the Middle East and Turkey, is a general of great experience, sagacity and leadership. Marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, in command in the North, with Finland, Leningrad and the Baltic states in his parish, is perhaps a more brilliant tactician, but lacks Zhukov's enormous drive.

Marshal Ivan S. Konev, commander in chief, in Moscow is considered a step below his two principal field commanders by foreign experts. He is, however, an experienced and accomplished soldier, direct and lacking in subtlety. The last two qualities are fortunate ones for the professional soldier closest to the Byzantine atmosphere of the Kremlin court.

Vassilevsky, the chief of staff, is a supremely confident man. To foreign military men he shows little or no interest in such subjects as development of air power since 1939 or amphibious warfare, both weak spots in the Russian military picture.

In 1945 the political bureau, on advice of leading army commanders, took two important military decisions. The first was against embarking on a program of extensive naval expansion. The second was against construction of a long-range heavy bombardment arm for the air force.

The navy, except for submarine construction, has remained static since the close of the war.

It is composed of aged and uncertain legacies of the czarist fleet, some equally uncertain products of Soviet naval construction and some fairly efficient.

modern craft captured from the Germans in the war, or from the Americans and British in diplomacy.

Since removal from high position of most of the senior officers who advocated long-range bombardment, the Soviet air force has concentrated on support of the ground forces.

Production of jet-propelled fighters has gone on. May 1, 1947, not fewer than 100 of them flew over the Kremlin. From what the writer saw on airfields in Minsk, Kiev, Odessa, Zaporozhe, Stalino and Rostov as well as in Moscow, the Soviet air force is also well off in light and medium bombers.

The only four-engined bombers evident are those produced for major military demonstrations.

United States B-29s, forced down in Siberia and Manchuria during the war, have provided models for the Russians, who need them as much in aeronautical as they do in automotive engineering, if they wish to use them. One of these B-29s was stationed outside Moscow in 1946. Another is supposed to have crashed early last year.

Until today Russian military strength has rested on the courage and devotion of the Russian soldier.

Today, although his importance on the battlefield has declined, that soldier is still courageous, hardy and imbued with a deep love of his homeland. Unceasing propaganda urges him to love Communism as well.

There have been some difficulties in promoting the latter romance. Since 1945, a constant stream of directives has urged imposition of higher ideological standards in the army through its lectures, newspapers and magazines. The party plainly fears the army is growing away from it; as it did once before.

Early in 1946 Stalin signed an order demanding better discipline in the army as well as increased loyalty to the ideological basis of the regime.

Shortly afterward the army took steps to clean itself of the corruption, which, as in industry and agriculture, had flourished during the war. To this end private soldiers were invited to denounce their officers, not only for ideological weaknesses but for "illegal use of state property."

One is struck by two thoughts after seeing such parts of the Russian war machine as are exposed to foreigners. The first is that the United States and Great Britain contributed far more to the victory over Germany than one would expect even after an extensive tour of the fronts of western Europe.

The second is that the Russian army has reached the apex of its power about ten years too late and at a time when vast masses of machinelike soldiery, ponderous tanks and tremendous guns are but minor equipment for war.

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