

sent at the time of the Japanese Army's entry to co-operate with the Japanese Army in working for the protection of foreign residents and foreign rights, and interests. They were also instructed to strive to treat the Chinese people fairly, in order to preserve public order. They all always did their best along these lines. Examples are as follows:

(a) At first communications from Nanking were extremely difficult. Therefore, soon after the entry to Nanking, they used news correspondents' radio to send reports about the welfare of foreigners to Shanghai.

(b) They promptly investigated foreign rights and interests and other points requiring protection and, co-operating with the Army, had "no admittance" signboards set up.

(c) They employed Consulate police men for the protection and convenience of foreign residents.

(d) They directed the Consulate-General Staff to treat the Chinese people fairly and in particular to protect civilians. These carried out their duties with success, since they had all served formerly in Nanking and had been well acquainted with conditions in the city in ordinary times. (They sometimes posted lock-outs at the entrances of such refugee quarters as Kinling University.

(e) Reports on anything wrong <sup>allegedly</sup> done by Japanese soldiers were submitted to the Consulate-General by foreign residents. Most of



these reports were based on hearsay, however, and since the Consulate-General had not time enough to investigate each of them, the reports were sent to the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, (I read through some of the copies in Shanghai) and to the Army in Nanking. It seemed the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo gave notice of these reports to the War Ministry.

(3) I went to Nanking several times during that period, and each time <sup>I went</sup> I heard reports from the Nanking Consulate-General. I saw existing conditions and talked with foreign residents. I submitted a written report of these items to the Foreign Ministry, and made the same report orally to Foreign Minister Hirota and other Foreign Ministry Staff members when I returned home for instructions at the end of Jan. 1938. Then I heard that whenever reports were submitted from the officials on the spot the authorities in Tokyo called the attention of the Army to them. It was due to this fact, as I said before, that the Army Central Headquarters some times gave directives about this to Army officials on the scene. Furthermore I knew that in early February Maj. General Homma, then chief of the General Staff Office Division, went to Nanking. He told me that, though the purpose of his trip was chiefly concerned with problems of foreign relations, there were other matters concerning the Chinese people.

(4) Soon after the collapse of Nanking I sent Secretary



DEF. DCC. #1165

Okumura to Nanking and Wuhu by Navy plane. He returned from Wuhu bringing with him an American correspondent who had been in a hospital suffering from a wound, and the wounded <sup>Vice-</sup>commander of the warship, Lady bird. I also took steps to permit several foreign correspondents to go down the River to Shanghai at will.

(6) Just after the fall, the entire city of Nanking was confusion itself, but calm was gradually restored. Especially, after the Self-Governing Committee was established by Chinese citizens, 1 January 1938, and began to govern the city, working as mediator between the Japanese Army and the general public, mutual misunderstanding and doubt lessened. After the end of March, when the Restoration Government was established to govern the downstream area of the Yangtze River, the life of the general public brightened considerably.

7. Before and after the Nanking fall, there were affairs such as the following:

(1) In the battle around Shanghai, the resistance of the Chinese Army was far more severe than the Japanese Army had expected, since anti-Japanese feelings were very strong there.

The Japanese troops despatched there for the protection of Japanese residents and Japanese rights and interests were far fewer than the Chinese force in number. Hence, the battle was very hard, and Japanese casualties were great. This naturally enhanced the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldiers. (Originally, the antipathy of Japanese soldiers toward the Chinese people



was not so strong.)

(2) Accordingly, contrary to our expectations very few of the Chinese soldiers were taken prisoner at first, (most of them either died in the field or retreated).

(3) In order to hinder the Japanese Army the Chinese Army carried out from the beginning the so-called "scorched-earth policy", setting fire to houses and munitions dumps and compelling the inhabitants to evacuate. Hence, at the beginning of the battle the Japanese had few chances to contact inhabitants on peaceful terms, and it was natural that both the Japanese troops and the Chinese inhabitants had become more and more uneasy and suspicious of each other.

(4) It was due to the propaganda of the Chinese Army and authorities that anti-Japanese feelings were generally strong. Even the few old men, women and children who had remained in the occupied area, acted as spies, sabotaged, or attacked Japanese soldiers in the dark. By these acts the activities of the Japanese Army were greatly hampered. Japanese soldiers at first tried to treat civilians with kindness, taking them as quite apart from military men. As a matter of fact, however, confronted with such an attitude on the part of the inhabitants there arose among the Japanese soldiers a feeling of hostility and an attitude of suspicious watchfulness.

(5) The Chinese Army <sup>made</sup> strong resistance around Shanghai and the battle front came to a standstill there. It was thought that if the Chinese



DEF. DOC. #1165

were defeated there, they would make a stand on the route between Shanghai and Soochow and resume their opposition. Under these circumstances, it was necessary to destroy all the Chinese troops in order to set up security around Shanghai. For this purpose, Japan reinforced her Army in early November with a new force which landed at Hangchow Bay. Meanwhile, the Chinese Army was defeated and the Japanese Army, giving them no time to recover, started to chase them and entered Nanking at once. Hence, it was impossible for the Japanese army first to lay siege on Nanking and then to attack and capture, as it had been foretold to us by General Matsui. And as a consequence, I believe, confusion arose.

(6) It was due to the said circumstances that along the road leading to Nanking, not only had munitions, houses, and fuel been taken away or burned, but also Japanese supplies were late in coming. It was very cold in December. Troops of the Japanese Army, individually took up things scattered about on the field to use, or to eat, or to burn as fuel.

Even in Nanking, military barracks and other buildings that remained were without beds and other facilities, and it was extremely difficult to quarter the Japanese Army there.

(7) At the time of fall, Nanking was entirely without government. Directly after the fall, conditions I observed in the City were as follows:



DEF. DCC. #1165

(a) When the Chinese Commander of the Nanking Guard retreated before the collapse, all official members of military and civil organs absconded. There was no city government, no police, no responsible man remaining. All registers of citizens, land and buildings necessary for routine administration had been taken away. The police force was disbanded. No police man was to be seen. Only two or three policemen, employed in each foreign Embassy or Legation were found to be in the premises. There were numerous cases in other cities than Nanking, in which some of the civil officials or prominent personages of the place remained after the retreat of the Chinese Army, working as mediators to make relations smooth between the incoming Japanese Army and the common public in the place.

(b) Foreign Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls, and other officials of foreign nationality, all went away from the city before its fall, and there was no person authorized to negotiate formally with the Japanese Army for the protection of the rights and interests of foreign residents and families.

All the foreign correspondents were desirous of getting out of Nanking to send telegrams to their main offices. Within a few days after the fall of Nanking, they all went to Shanghai, taking advantage of facilities offered by the Japanese Army in Nanking. None were to be found when I went there on December 17.

(c) The population of Nanking was said to be one million, but it had been reduced to two hundred thousand at the time of the



fall, most of whom, belonging to the lower class, had moved to the so-called "Safety Zone". The Chinese houses outside of this zone were practically all vacant. The organizing of refugees was in the hands of some 20 private individuals of foreign nationality who formed a committee.

The Japanese Army did not officially approve the above-mentioned zone. The reasons were (1) that the location was **thought** difficult to safeguard, from a tactical point of view, in case of a battle in the city, (2) that a high ranking Chinese officer and <sup>their</sup> staff lived there. (3) that the committee did not have enough power to keep defeated Chinese soldiers and other undesirable persons out the zone and to maintain its "neutrality". (The "Safety zone" in Shanghai was considered to differ on these points and was approved by the Japanese Army.)

The Japanese Army persisted in holding to the doctrine that a place without any hostile troops or military establishment, should not be attacked, and, actually, there was neither battle nor casualty in the area when Nanking was captured.

(d) When the Chinese Army retreated at the time of the fall of the city many military men audaciously took clothing from civilians (some civilians were murdered), and, putting it on instead of military uniform, entered the "Safety zone" disguised as civilians. This fact was told to me by Mac Daviels, AP reporter in Nanking and Hallett Abend of the New York Times, then in Shanghai. It was a matter of course that the Japanese Army



for this reasons held suspicions and doubts.

8. The safety zone in Shanghai (so-called Jaquinot Zone):  
When the battle around Shanghai developed and the Chinese Army was expected to retreat, an international committee consisting of Britons, Americans, Frenchmen, etc, was set up with Father Jaquinot as its leader. The committee proposed, to make a "Safety zone" in a section of Nantao (Chinatown in the southern part of Shanghai) under the approval of both Chinese and Japanese. The purpose was to receive Chinese if the battle reached that area. At first Father Jaquinot, accompanied by Timperley, a Manchester Guardian correspondent, came to me and told me of this. I took steps, co-operating with Shanghai Consul-General Okamoto and Consul-General Okazaki, to put this plan into practice. Army Commander-in-Chief Matsui and Navy Commander-in-Chief Hasegawa showed a favorable attitude toward it from the beginning, and the plan was approved by the two commanders and the Chinese as well. At that time, General Matsui contributed ten thousand yen to the Committee to assist in financing the plan. (Naval Commander Hasegawa contributed money, too.)

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Hirota sent a letter, dated December 8, to Father Jaquinot as a message of the praise and respect of the Japanese people felt toward such a humanistic work, with best wishes for his success. The reasons for which the plan was approved by the Japanese authorities was as follows:



(1) The Area was purely a Chinese town, and it was clear that Father Jaquinot and the other committee members were all impartial and disinterested.

(2) The committee would take in and protect non-combatant Chinese when there was a battle, and relief and protection would continue for a little while after the battle was over, but the committee would agree not to interfere in the government and supervision of the area, which was to be completely in the hands of the Japanese Army.

(3) As the authorities of French concession adjacent to the area willingly co-operated, the committee was thought to have enough actual power to maintain "neutrality"

(4) Judging from the location of the area, it was believed possible to maintain "safety" in the area, despite there being a battle near here.

In the final stages of the engagement in Shanghai, fighting spread to the boundary of the Area. However, no shells were dropped in the area. The Chinese soldiers who retreated into the Area were all disarmed by the committee. The Japanese Army did not enter the Area. Everything passed off quietly. Thus, several thousand houses and 250 thousand Chinese were rescued. The facts are written in detail in a pamphlet published by the committee.



Def Doc No. 1165

On this 1st day of April, 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT HIDAKA, Shinrokuro (seal)

I, witness hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

witness: (signed) ITO, Kiyoshi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

HIDAKA, Shinrokuro (seal)



DEF. DOC. #1165

Translation Certificate.

I, Charlie S. Terry, Chief of the Defense Language Branch,  
heroby certify that the foregoing translation described in the  
above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,  
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning  
of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan  
Date 11 April 1947.



~~The Reports~~

Evidence) Reports made to the

consular authorities are set

out in documents of the

Navigation Safety Zone Exhibit

323 - T.P. 4508-4536

and the testimony of Dr. Bates J.P. 2638-2642

11 to 12 - Dr. Smythe T.P. 4457-4458



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2 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Edwards

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

HIDAKA, Shinrokuro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Memo for the file

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

371



Report by H. Shimojima

2 May 1947

Memo for the file -

SUBJECT: HIDAKA, Shinrokuro

HIDAKA is subject of IPS case file 332.