

Interv. To Jo- (5 Feb. 46)

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 5 February 1946, 1400-1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

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Q.: Did Japan not use all necessary military and naval forces during the course of the China Incident?

A.: I was not at the center of things then and I don't know just to what extent troops were dispatched, but the numbers gradually increased as time went on. I was not the responsible official at that time. However, speaking from the standpoint of a third party, the situation was that the troops that were sent never seemed to be enough to settle the incident. For that reason, losses were great and the fighting dragged on. My own opinion at that time was that it would have been better to send a great many more troops and get the thing over with.

Q.: In addition to army forces used, Japan also used her naval and air forces freely, did she not?

A.: Yes, she did, I think. The naval air forces in particular cooperated.

Q.: The battles that were fought were not sham battles, were they?

A.: No, they were not sham battles, they were real battles. The government called this the China Incident; nevertheless, the men at the front lines, in both navy and the army, were fighting real battles.

Q.: During the course of the Incident, there were times when the Japanese Navy bombarded Chinese cities, were there not?

A.: Yes, I think so. I don't exactly recall, but I believe there were such cases.

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Q.: The Naval Air Forces also attacked Chinese cities, did they not?

A.: Yes. I intended a moment ago, in my answer to the question about bombardment of Chinese cities, to refer particularly to Navy air bombardment. I don't recall that there was much bombardment of Chinese cities by the ships themselves.

Q.: Is it not true that between 1937 and 1941 there were 2,000,000 Chinese killed and over 3,500,000 Chinese casualties?

A.: I don't remember precisely, but I suppose there may have been.

Q.: How did the total number of Chinese and Japanese casualties during those years compare with the total number of American and Japanese casualties during the war with America?

A.: I don't know exactly. I was not responsible at that time and I don't want to give a careless answer to such a question. I have no reference books of any sort, you know.

Q.: Would the casualties for the China Incident from 1937 to 1941, as printed in the Japan Year Book, be fairly reliable, do you think?

A.: I don't know that publication, but if the statistics were released by the Bureau of Statistics [Tokai Kyoku], I think they are reliable. I don't remember, however, whether military and naval casualties were listed or not.

Q.: In what terms did the Three-Power Pact refer to the China Incident?

A.: It was termed a conflict [funsō].

Q.: Did the Japanese Government have any other reason than those you have mentioned for avoiding the use of the word "war"?

A.: There may have been some other reasons, but my own feeling is as I explained yesterday. I don't know the reasons of those in authority, but I do know that my ideas were as I have said.

Q.: Was not one reason for avoiding the use of the term "war" that Japan had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war?

A.: I don't know. The name was probably decided upon at a cabinet conference, and, since this was before my time, I was not in attendance.

Q.: Why was it necessary for the cabinet to coin a name for this situation?

A.: That was the custom.

Q.: Did not that custom start at about the time of the Manchurian Incident?

A.: I don't remember well when it started. Let's see now, the Changkufeng trouble was called the Changkufeng ^{JIK} incident or affair, the Nomonhan matter was called the Nomonhan Jiken. There had been various disputes on the Russian border.

Q.: But these were after the time of the China Incident. Was not the Manchurian trouble the first thing that was so called?

A.: I don't know. I was not responsible at that time.

Q.: Did not the fact that Japan had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war in 1928 cause the Manchurian Incident to be termed an "incident"?

A.: I don't know. I don't know whether the government had such an idea or not.

Q.: Where were you on July 7, 1937?

A.: I was in Manchuria.

Q.: How long after that day did you stay in Manchuria?

A.: I was there until July of the following year. I was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

Q.: So that during that year, you were the responsible official as far as the Kwantung Army affairs went, were you not?

A.: Of course. I was.

Q.: What was the name of the specific incident which precipitated the China affair?

A.: The Lukouchiao Incident [Rokōkyō Jiken].

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- Q.: Were Kwantung Army troops involved in this incident?
- A.: No, they were troops of the North China Expeditionary Force [Hokushi Hakken Gun]. Their headquarters was in Tientsin.
- Q.: Who was the responsible officer as regards that incident?
- A.: Shozo KAWABE. He was then a Major-General, I believe. He is here, too [in the prison].
- Q.: After the China Incident had started, did the Kwantung Army participate in any way in it?
- A.: Yes. After it started, the Kwantung Army received orders from central headquarters in Tokyo to dispatch troops to Tientsin and this was done.
- Q.: Did you go with the troops?
- A.: As I recall it, a brigade, an air unit [kokū butai], and a mechanized outfit were dispatched to Tientsin to serve under the commander there. Later, Chinese troops were approaching Peking from the north and north-west and the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army ordered me to take two brigades of troops around behind the Chinese to take the pressure off Japanese troops to the south of them.
- Q.: What was the approximate date of this?
- A.: It wasn't too long after the incident started. I think it was about September of 1937, though I am not positive.
- Q.: During that space of time how far had you moved your troops?
- A.: Well, it was a long way any way. I don't know exactly. [After consulting map] - Perhaps 700 miles or so.
- Q.: Before these two brigades reached their destination there had already been hard fighting, had there not?
- A.: Yes. The 5th Brigade, in particular, was being hard pressed by the Chinese from the north.

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- Q-: Up until September of 1937, had the cabinet given this trouble a name?
- A-: Let's see, I don't remember just when they gave it the name "China Incident".
- Q-: But, in any case, there had been bitter fighting going on for a considerable time previous to the coining of the name?
- A-: As to just the time when the name was given in relation to how long the fighting had been going on, I don't remember and I wouldn't care to say.
- Q-: In what manner did you learn that the name "China Incident" had been designated at a cabinet meeting?
- A-: I don't remember. The cabinet members would know; also it was probably promulgated in the official gazette [Kampo].
- Q-: During the first two months after the outbreak of the incident, what name was used in Manchuria and China to describe these events?
- A-: There wasn't actually any need to give it a name. We simply got an order to dispatch troops.
- Q-: During that period, as far as you knew, you and your men were waging offensive warfare?
- A-: Of course my 2 brigades were engaged in offensive action. The Japanese troops around Peking were hard pressed from the north and the northwest and it was necessary to attack. However, in the overall picture, Japan was on the defense.
- Q-: What basis is there for saying that in the overall picture, Japan was on the defensive?
- A-: The cabinet policy at this time was to localize the incident and keep it from spreading. Japanese troops were on the defensive in North China for a number of reasons. The Chinese had more men, the weather was very bad so that Japanese planes could not fly, a number of railroads were washed out because of heavy rains, and it was impossible to dispatch sufficient troops from Japan proper.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 5 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 5
day of Feb., 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO
Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)