
Interr. To Jo (27 Feb. 46)

DOC 4170

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 27 February, 1946, 1400-1600 hours.

Place sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hiucki Tojo,

Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator,

Commanuer Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter, Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer.

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly.

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- Qo: You said yesterday that you would like to continue with your state-
- As: Yesterday, I spoke about the economic menace and today, I should like to speak about the military menace. I have spoken before about this military menace in response to your questions and in connection with Japan's being challenged, but there is a connection between the economic menace and the military menace and so I would like to add to what I have said.

This is the third matter. The first matter was the condition of Japan prior to the war; the second was the economic menace.

This is the third matter, the military menace.

Paragraph I is the increase of strength of America, Britain, China and the Dutch encircling Japan.

Point A. President ROOSEVEIF, on 24 October 1941, as I explained, broadcast that America, Britain, China, and the Dutch were steadily increasing the encircling strength. Thus, the President showed clearly his intention or increasing this power.

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Point B, as I explained yesterday, refers to the fact of the Manila and Hongkong conferences.

Point C is that the main strength or the American Fleet, including the Atlantic Fleet, was concentrated in the Pacific and based at Hawaii.

Qo: How early do you understand that was done?

A.: This was just before the war. The concentration of the American Fleet at Hawaii seemed to the Japanese like having the fleet placed right under their very nose. To explain what I mean - a great fleet like that, so concentrated, could be moved by a single order at any time, since naval power is not limited as to its movements in the way that land power is.

Point D is the boastful talk of the American admiral who said that if a Japanese-American war were to break out, the Japanese Fleet would be sunk in a matter or weeks.

Point E is, as I have said before, the statement of the British Premier that if war occurred between Japan and America, Britain was prepared to enter within twenty-four hours. On the basis of these five points, I am able to state the following: Japan was being coerced by a circle or force directed against her by America, Britain, China, and the Dutch.

Paragraph II. Related to the above fact was the keeping of a large mobile military force at Hawaii where it could strike at any moment against Japan. Such was the situation then. As I explained yesterday, Japan was being threatened on the one hand with economic strangulation; here, on the other hand, was a similar military threat.

The fourth matter is the last stage of the negotiations between Japan and America. I have spoken of economic oppression and the corresponding military oppression. In the end, Japan could be strangled at any time America wished. If Japan were strangled, the result would be fatal and yet her strangulation or non-strangulation was a matter of the desires

of America and England. Hence, Japan proposed a meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President. This was refused. The American reply to the Japanese proposal of 20 November 1941 came on 26 November. For the 20 November proposals, Japan had gone from concession to concession. Nevertheless, the American reply of the 26th not only did not accept Japanese proposals but, in addition, raised new and difficult problems. That America knew that Japan could not accept this reply is proved by the statement of Secretary HULL before the Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee. Secretary HULL stated, on 23 November 1945: "We knew by means of intercepted messages that the Japanese plan of 20 November was a final note, and we knew that the chances of Japan's accepting the American reply of the 25th were very slight". I think this last point is very important. It is also proved by the following statement which is part of the Army report to the Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee and which appeared in the newspapers on 3 September 1945: "On 25 November, MARSHALL and STARK made representations /for the purpose of/ softening the reply to Japan, but on 26 November a reply amounting to a final note was delivered to Japan". Another quotation from the same report is as follows: "On 29 November, HULL said to the British Ambassador, The problem has already passed into the hands or the army and Navy ...

All the above has been in the nature of a foundation. Now I should like to make some observations.

- 1. Japan was very weary from the war with China which had lasted for four and one-half years. England and America were encouraging the Chinese to continue resistance.
- 2. The economic blockade was cutting Japan's lire-line.
- 3. The American, British, Chinese, Dutch military encirclement of Japan was increasing in strength and, with the fleet concentrated at Hawaii, Japan's fate could be decided at any time.
- 4. By injecting difficult problems into the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations, Japan was driven inevitably into war. Those are the four points. For these reasons, Japan considered herself challenged and, hence, she considered it justifiable self-defense but she,

nevertheless, complied fully with diplomatic procedures in the form of a final note. That is all I have to say about the question of justifiable self-defense. That was the first of the two big subjects on which I wished to speak.

The second one is the basic causes of the disturbances in the Far East. This will be organized in seven sections, which are as follows:

I. The gist.

II. The special character of the East Asiatic peoples.

III. The penetration of Asia by America, and especially by the European Powers.

IV. The consciousness of the East Asiatic peoples and their cherished desire to live.

V. Relations between Japan and the continent.

VI. Past international conferences regarding East Asia.

VII. Conclusion.

I. The gist.

As I have explained before, the direct causes of the war was the threat to Japan's existence. She exercised the right of self-defense and, hence, this was justifiable self-defense. There are three basic causes of the disturbances in the Far East, to wit: (A) the great powers of Europe have, for some centuries, invaded East Asia, subjected the Asiatic peoples, accorded them discriminatory treatment, and carried out policies of exploitation; (B) the effort for East Asiatic stabilization centered on the right to live, especially the suffering of Japan which was the central Power; (C) hitherto, national conferences affecting Far Eastern problems have not succeeded in solving these problems in conformity with the feelings of the East Asiatic people. I think these three points are basic.

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Certificate of Interpreter 11-35-72 Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR (Serial Number) (Name) being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of # pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August , 1946. John W. Fihelly Duly Detailed Investigating Officer, International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP Certificate of Stenographer ____, hereby certify that I acted Myrtle B, Mills as stenographer at the interro ation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. Certificate of Interrogator I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on _ 27.44 day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO Hideki , and according to _ Commander Yale Maxon, USNR Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly Tihelle

TOKYO (Place)

12 August 46 (Date)