

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Part II)

Deponent : ENDŌ Saburō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is ENDŌ Saburō and I live now at Irimagawa-machi, Irima-gun, Saitama Prefecture.

2. I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army and was in charge of operations from August, the 7th Year of Shōwa (1932) to August the 9th Year of Shōwa (1934). My rank was Major at first and I was promoted to Lieut.†-Colonel in March the 9th Year of Shōwa (1934).

3. The following are the principal military operations undertaken by the Kwantung Army, when I was chief of operations.

4. The restoration of peace and order at Hulunpeierh.

As a result of the conclusion of the Japanese-Manchoukuo Agreement on the 15th of September the 7th Year of Shōwa (1932), Japan made a co-defense Agreement with Manchoukuo and shared

the important responsibility for the co-defense of Manchoukuo. In view of the fact that it was not long since Manchoukuo had been established, nothing was more urgent from the view point of national welfare than to restore and maintain its peace and order, as well as to prevent the destruction and disturbance in the country. First of all, therefore, the Kwantung Army planned the restoration of peace and order in the eastern parts of Mukden Province, and chiefs of army groups were summoned for this purpose. All of a sudden on the 28th September of the same year (1932), when the plan of operation was being explained to them, a telegram stating "Su Ping-wen has betrayed us. Request assistance." was received by the Headquarter of the Kwantung Army through the Special Agency at Harbin from Capt. OHARA of the Special Agency stationed at Manchuli, and further communication was interrupted. One day previously that is, on the 27th September, nothing was heard from Maj. INOUE and WATANABE who were on their way to Hailar by plane from Harbin (afterwards it was confirmed that they were killed by Su Ping-wen's troops, when the plane made a forced landing in the vicinity of Tientzushan). Inasmuch as we harboured gloomy forebodings and in the latter part of September perceived, through the interception of telegrams, that Su Ping-wen and Chang Tien-chiu had been plotting, it was learned that the plots had actually been carried out. Extraordinary measures, therefore, had to be taken in order to rescue the several hundred Japanese residents at Hailar and Manchuli, as well as some Japanese residents at Hulunpeirh (totalling about 1,000).

Under these circumstances, the Kwantung Army decided to change part of the above mentioned peace restoring plan in the eastern parts of Mukden Province, and rescue the Japanese residents who were thought to have been arrested at Hulunpeirh, but this was certain to give rise to various difficulties. Because, for the rescue of the Japanese residents there was not a little fear in respect of the temperance and our military strength, and especially of stimulating Soviet Russia. Nevertheless it could by means be permitted, not only from the view point of humanity, but also from that of the duty of the Kwantung Army, that we leave fellow-countrymen faced with imminent danger to their fate without rescuing them. Therefore, the Kwantung Army decided to effect the rescue for the humanity's sake despite the difficulty of operation and its inferior military strength. First of all, in order to obtain the understanding of Soviet Russia our frontier commission with Col. KOMATSUBARA, chief of the Special Agency at Harbin as leader, were sent to MATUEFSKAYA (T.N. Phonetic) (next station to MANCHULI) with the consent of the Soviet authorities, and requested the Soviet's favourable treatment for the rescue and defense of the Japanese escaping to the territory of Soviet. Fortunately the request being complied with, the Kwantung Army suddenly made various preparations and started operation in the latter part of November. As it was reported that Su Ping-wen's troops had by that time marched on Chalantun and Fulaerhchi, west of Nunchiang, the Kwantung Army, availing themselves of this favourable opportunity for advancing, decided to rescue the Japanese at Hulunpeirh soon after seizing and exterminating the

enemy on the east side of the great Hsingan mountain ranges. But as Su Ping-wen and Chang Tien-chiu fled from the front line on the 26th of November, our forward elements pursued the remaining enemy, and after passing through the tunnel of the Hsingan mountain ranges arrived at Hulunpeirh, and succeeded at last in rescuing the Japanese there. The Japanese who had previously escaped to Soviet territory were transferred by its courtesy to Vladivostock by the Heilungkiang railway, and thence sent to Japan by sea.

5. The restoration of peace and order in Jehol Province.

The above-described restoration of peace at Hulunpeirh was completed in January the next year, 8th Year of Shōwa (1933) and peace since prevailed there. In the northern parts of Kirin Province there was still the wriggling of Li Tu and Ting Chao, but it ceased by Ting Chao's submission in January the 8th Year of Shōwa (1933) and peace restoration in the eastern parts of Mukden Province also made great progress. Thus, peace and order in Manchoukuo were generally maintained. With this restoration of peace the majority of bandits in Manchoukuo escaped to Jehol Province and joined Chang Hsueh Liang's troops that had invaded the province before, and their number, it was thought, amounted to as many as 200 thousand under the banner of Tang Yu-lin, Inspector-General of Jehol Province. In reality they often disturbed peace and order in the districts of the Liao-Ho river either with small units of their own or by instigating the remaining bandits there. Since the establishment of Manchoukuo, Tang Yu-lin tried to face both ways and his attitude was irresolute,

but he suddenly and blithely resorted to anti-Japanese and Manchoukuo measures. Under these circumstances, peace and order in Manchoukuo which had fortunately been restored began to be disturbed again. This situation could not by any means be left to take its own course even in view of the Japanese and Manchoukuo Co-defense Agreement, in consequence of which it became necessary to subdue such banditry. It was evident that, as they could not possibly operate on a large scale during the cold season, but began to operate when it became warm after winter retirement, it was therefore necessary to subjugate them before they begin to operate.

Besides, as the roads in Jehol Province are very muddy and most of them river-beds, the operations of our troops, if begun at the time of the thaw, will be confronted with much difficulty. Hence, the subjugation of bandits had to be begun before that time thus, in the latter part of February in the 8th Year of Shōwa (1933) our operation was started despite our inferiority in military strength. Inasmuch as our military operation was nothing but to restore peace and order in Manchoukuo and it was necessary to observe strictly a general principle that it should not be extended beyond the territory of Manchoukuo, strict instructions were given to our troops so as to limit their operation to the line<sup>n</sup> of the Great Wall, and not beyond that line. The Central Supreme Command Headquarter, too taking a serious view of this point, I, being in charge of operations, was summoned to Tokyo in January and given instructions accordingly.

In view of the importance and complexity of the matter, Gen. MUTO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, gave the following

instructions to his troops prior to the start of the operation.

- 1) As the situation in Jehol Province is very imminent, the peace and order of all Manchoukuo will be disturbed, if it is left to take its own course;
- 2) In order to avoid international misunderstanding, our operation should be limited to the interior of Jehol Province;
- 3) The restoration of order should be completed in as short a time as possible.

In the latter part of February our operation was started and mountain "Blitzkrieg" was carried out under the co-operation of Japanese and Manchoukuo troops. With the security of Kupeikou and the line of the Great Wall, as well as the frontier line, our operation was brought to a close on the 10th of March, and our troops stayed in the interior of Jehol Province, not passing a step beyond these lines.

#### 6. The Advance on Hopei Province and the TANGKU Truce.

The Great Wall was originally constructed in defense against enemies from north, and its south side was very easy of access from east to west, and was favourable to free operation, but on the contrary, on its north side (Jehol Province side) facilities were very bad and there was little freedom of operation. There were some hundred escape holes in the Great Wall, and it was therefore very easy to disturb Jehol Province by advancing from this barrier. If disturbances are carried out in that province, availing oneself of the inconvenience of communications from east to west within the province, will not know what to do and became quite bewildered. Seeing that the Japanese and Manchoukuo troops

stayed in that province, as has been stated above. After passing beyond the line of the Great Wall, the bandits escaping within the barrier set up their headquarter at Pingtsin after obtaining reinforcement from Chang Hsueh-liang in the latter part of April, and harassed our troops, and what is worse, made an obstinate challenge from the line of the Great Wall. Under these circumstances, in order to accomplish the self-defense of our army from the viewpoints of the topography and its numerical strength, our troops had to fight reluctantly to repulse the recalcitrant challenge of the enemy and to chase them, passing temporarily to some extent beyond the line of the Great Wall. Thus, after having repulsed the enemy, we retreated momentarily to that line, but they used this fact to claim to have conquered us and began to attack again. Thereupon, on the 3rd of May in the 8th Year of Shōwa (1933) we had to repulse them challenging again and further chased them. Succeeding in this chase, we reached the line of the Soo-Ho river at last and were within hailing distance of Peking and Tientsin. In view of the fact that the advance of our troops upon Peking and Tientsin might cause the aggravation of the situation, our Commander strictly enjoined his troops to stay at the line east of that river. For the purpose of putting to an end to disturbance as soon as possible, in accordance with the principle hitherto pursued by the central military authorities, a statement was issued on the 15th of May to the enemy, that if they immediately renounced their challenging attitude, our troops were willing to retreat instantly to the line of the Great Wall. I remember that such a liberal attitude on the part of the Kwantung

Army and the maintenance of its military discipline, in that despite its troops advance toward Peking, it made them stay there and tried to save the old capital of Peking from the calamity of war and to minimize the disturbance, won great admiration from foreign pressmen at that time.

On 25th May, at about 4 p.m. Ho Yin-chin, Deputy Chief of the Peking Branch of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang Government sent as a messenger Hsu Yen-Mou, staff officer and Colonel of that Peking branch to our Headquarter of the 8th Division at Mayun at that time, and proposed a formal cease-fire agreement. Accepting this proposition and exchanging a memorandum, the Kwantung Army made out a draft cease-fire agreement based upon it. In Peking Lieu-Col. NAGATSU Sahiji, Military Attaché of the Japanese Legation opened negotiations with the representative of Ho Yin-chin. They examined the draft cease-fire agreement. The representatives of both parties met at TANGKU, and after free discussion the agreement was signed. The Japanese representatives were besides Maj-Gen. OKAMURA Neiji, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who was invested with plenary powers by Commander MUTŌ; Col. KITA, Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army, Attaché; Lieut. Col. NAGATSU, Military Attaché of the Japanese Legation and Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army, Maj. KAWANO, Staff Officer of the 8th Division; Maj. ENDŌ (myself), Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army; Maj. FUJIMOTO ditto; and Cept. OKABE, Staff Officer of the 6th Division. The Chinese representatives were besides Hsiung Pin, Councillor General of Peking Military branch, who was invested with plenary



powers by Ho Yin-chin; Chien Tsung-tse, Attaché, Councillor of the same branch; Li Tsei-i, ditto; Yin Ju-keng, ditto; Lei Shou-jung, ditto; Hsu Yen-mou, High Staff Officer of the Peking branch; and Chang Hsi-kuang, Chief Staff Officer of the 1st Division. After both delegates exchanged commission of full powers, negotiations were made on the 30th and 31st of May with frank conversations in consequence of which a compromise was reached upon between the two parties, and their representatives signed the cease-fire agreement on the 31st of May, at 11.11 p.m., and at 4 p.m. of the same day the both parties simultaneously made public the whole text of the agreement.

This is the so-called TANGKU Truce and its original was drafted by m<sup>x</sup> order. The contents of the agreement are, as have already been known, the mere military cease-fire agreement based upon the viewpoint of pure strategy and do not contain any political points at all.

Moreover, it goes without saying that this agreement was concluded after close arrangement between the Kwantung Army and the Central Supreme Command Headquarter.

This cease-fire agreement is omitted herein, as it was formally made public.

7. The Subsequent Restoration of Peace and Order in Manchoukuo.

With the conclusion of the TANGKU Truce, the so-called Manchurian Incident was actually brought to an end. The remaining bandits in Manchoukuo had then to be cleared out. For this purpose the Japanese and Manchoukuo military police decided upon deliberation to make a concrete plan and put it into practice.

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First of all, steps were taken for collecting of the arms which were being used in many sources, in order to eradicate the root of disturbances, and applying on the other "pao chia" control (self-government system of towns and villages) to secure peace and order. Simultaneously with this, it was decided that it was incumbent upon the military police of Manchoukuo to maintain peace and order at first hand, while the Kwantung Army was to co-operates with them as support, and that the deployed disposition to a high degree of forces would be carried out, in consideration of the menace of the Soviet troops in the Far East, but that this, however, was of secondary importance, while the most important consideration was to clear out the bandits to the last man. For this purpose each Division was allocated some district (generally one province or more) under its control, and each unit of that Division had its own area in its charge, too. Thus, the deployed disposition of every company or sometimes section (its leader was an officer) was carried out in important localities.

In August of the 9th Year of Shōwa (1934) I finally retired from the post of staff officer in the Kwantung Army.

On this 24th day of January, 1947  
at Tokyo

DEFO-ENT /S/ ENDO Saburō (seal)

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I, BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ BANNO Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ENDŌ Saburō (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 10 February 1947