

Art Friel

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SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST

MINAMI, Jiro

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I. Charges Against Minami

MINAMI is charged on all counts of the Indictment, except Counts 19, 20-26, 33, 35-43, 45-52. He is charged as a conspirator in the plan to secure military, naval, political and economic domination for Japan in the regions specified in Counts 1-5; and in Counts 6-18 he is charged with planning and preparing a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law; treaties, agreements and assurances; and in Counts 27-32 and in 34, he is charged with waging a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances; in Count 44 he is charged with conspiring to procure and permit murder of POW on a wholesale scale and in Counts 53-55, he is charged with conspiracy to order, authorize or permit breaches of law or custom in respect to POW, in China, from and after 18 September 1931.

II. MINAMI's Background

MINAMI graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1895 as a 2nd Lieutenant. He served in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. From 5 March 1927 to the termination of the war in 1945, he held military as well as political positions of great importance. On 5 March 1927 he became Vice Chief of the Army General Staff; 1 August 1929, Commander of the Chosen Army; 7 March 1930, General; 22 December 1930, War Councillor; 14 April 1931, War Minister; from 13 December 1931 to 9 February 1934 he acted first as War Councillor and then Councillor; on 10 December 1934 he was appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army and concurrently was Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary

and Kwantung Governor General, which position he held until 6 March 1936, except that of Kwantung Governor General, which office was abolished on 26 December 1934; on 6 March 1936 he was attached to the Army GHQ; on 22 April 1936 he was placed on the reserve list; on 5 August 1936 he was appointed Governor General of Chosen; on 29 May 1942 he was appointed a Privy Councillor; and on 31 March 1945 was appointed a member of the House of Peers.¹

In viewing the important assignments and appointments of MINAMI from 1927 to 1945 it becomes apparent that between those dates, he was in positions of great authority, where policy making was required, and where action had to be taken either to advance or halt acts of military aggression. Such offices as Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, War Councillor, War Minister, Commander of the Kwantung Army and Governor General of Chosen, were offices of crucial importance during the periods MINAMI held such positions. That he took a leading part in, and enhanced the movements of Japanese aggression by his participation in the successive military movements, which culminated in the Pacific War, is amply shown by what will later appear.

III. MINAMI's Activities Prior to the Mukden Incident

MINAMI is first seen in the open, during his tenure as War Minister in the Wakatsuki Cabinet from April to December 1931. He knew or should have known of the March Incident, and he knew or should have known that the War Office was represented in the Sakura-Kai and that

1. Ex. 117, T. 740-42

the aims of the Sakurai-Kai were to carry out an internal revolution and settle the Manchurian problem.² MINAMI was fully apprised of the seriousness of the situation in Manchuria as early as the summer of 1931, because KOISO, who had become apprehensive that trouble was brewing, spoke to MINAMI and to the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff about it.³ The upshot of such conversations was the dispatch of General Tatekawa, a section chief of the General Staff to Manchuria to head-off irresponsible action.⁴ There is a dispute as to who dispatched Tatekawa to Mukden. TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified that MINAMI ordered Tatekawa to go,⁵ whereas KOISO testified that Tatekawa was sent by the Army General Staff.⁶ MINAMI testified that Tatekawa was sent by orders of the General Staff, but that he met with Tatekawa prior to the trip and talked over the matter with him,⁷ and he told Tatekawa that he should see Consul Hayashi to investigate reports made by him of Army movements around Mukden.⁸ Regardless who ordered Tatekawa to make this trip, Tatekawa failed to carry out his mission and permitted the incident to occur, as was admitted by Tatekawa, because he did not desire to stop it.⁹ Having in mind that MINAMI testified that Tatekawa was interested in Manchurian problems,¹⁰ and assuming MINAMI knew that Tatekawa was the person responsible for releasing the bombs to Okawa in the March Incident,¹¹ it would seem that the slightest

2. T. 1963
3. T. 32308
4. T. 32309
5. T. 2006
6. T. 32310

7. T. 19821
8. T. 19827
9. T. 2006; 2505-7
10. T. 19822
11. T. 32325

consideration of the matter on the part of MINAMI would have caused him to make sure that Tatekawa, one of the chief conspirators in the March Incident, was not entrusted with such an important and delicate mission.

MINAMI, prior to this crucial time, was fully apprised that a crisis was impending as appears from a meeting which took place in July 1931, when he summoned the Manchurian Railway authorities to his official residence to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems.¹² At that meeting the Army side was represented by MINAMI, Kanaya, Chief of the General Staff, Sugiyama, and Ito, Vice Minister, Ninomiya, Vice Chief of the General Staff, Koiso, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Oki, Chief of the 3rd Section of the General Staff, and Tatekawa, Chief of the 2nd Section of the General Staff,¹³ the latter being the conspirator in the March incident, previously mentioned. At this meeting, the parties present "exchanged their outspoken opinions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian problems"¹⁴ Later in the same month, MINAMI stated: "The Army has long recognized the necessity of increasing our divisions in Korea and we hope the day will come when more divisions will be dispatched there."¹⁵

MINAMI was far from passive in his relation to the Mukden Incident. He knew that the problem was acute, or else the aforesaid meeting would not have taken place, at which the entire top hierarchy of the General Staff, met with him and his top satellite Koiso, along with the officials of the South Manchuria Railway. Although he testified that this

12. T. 15753

13. T. 15753

14. T. 15753

15. T. 15753

meeting was but a social luncheon; there is no doubt that the meeting was for the purpose of exchanging views on the strategy to be used to apply forceful action in Manchuria. That MINAMI was not an apostle of peace, as he seeks to portray himself, prior to the Mukden affair, appears from the report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations¹⁶ where it is said, that the "vigorous speeches by the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by the Army in Manchuria" were one of the things which set the stage for the events that took place on 18 September and thereafter.

MINAMI also knew of, or should have been familiar with, studies being made in the War Ministry prior to the Manchurian incident, concerning the conquest of Manchuria;¹⁷ and he knew or should have known that a group in the Army led by Lt. Colonel Hashimoto and Shigeo Fuji had become so powerful between July and October 1931, that the Army could not check such persons and difficulty was even had in drafting a budget¹⁸; and that this group, including General Tatekawa were strongly of the opinion that unless Manchuria were seized by Japan, it would be impossible for Japan to become one of the powers of the world as a highly developed national defense state.¹⁹

Shidehara testified that prior to the Mukden incident he notified MINAMI that he had received a cable from the Japanese Consul General in Mukden, that within a week a big incident would break out. Shidehara protested strongly to MINAMI in connection with the report²⁰ and he

16. Ex. 57, p. 66-7
17. Ex. 3375, T. 32300
18. Ex. 179, T. 1926
19. T. 2003
20. T. 2006

also saw MINAMI personally to advise him that several civilian residents in Manchuria had come to him at the Foreign Office and told him that "something extraordinary was going onsome war-like preparation might be going on".²¹ Shidehara said he told MINAMI that this was very serious and MINAMI agreed with Shidehara that he would do "his level best to maintain discipline among these officers"²² MINAMI's testimony is to the effect that Shidehara only casually mentioned the matter at a Cabinet meeting and MINAMI told Shidehara he would have the matter investigated, otherwise he couldn't believe it.²³ It was at this point that the officers responsible for the situation should have been dealt with appropriately, if MINAMI really desired to stop an incident.

The record, however, does not show that MINAMI, the "doubting Thomas" did a single thing to stave off the event, which was so notoriously bruited about that the Foreign Office, the General Staff and the War Minister in Tokyo knew approximately when it was to take place, and what was to happen.

The sum and substance of the matter is that the Shidehara policy of conciliation was thrown overboard and a new political force emanating from the army came into play, aided and abetted, by MINAMI, as was found by the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations,²⁴ and the Mukden incident, the overt act of the conspiracy, was permitted to occur.

IV. MINAMI's Acts after Mukden

Immediately upon receiving notice that military action had taken

21. T. 33589-90
22. T. 33592
23. T. 19821
24. Ex. 57, pp. 66-7

place in Mukden on 18 September 1931, MINAMI became very active. He called General Sugiyama, Koiso and Kushibuchi to his official residence "to consider steps to meet the situation"²⁵. Liaison was made with the General Staff and a policy of non-expansion was agreed upon. This policy was approved by the Cabinet and the Emperor.²⁶ Honjo, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army was notified of the decision.²⁷ MINAMI claims that from that time on "the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command."²⁸ Further decisions made were: (a) approving the movement of a Brigade of the Korean Army which movement had already taken place at the discretion of the Commander thereof who had been "moved with irresistible sympathy over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army"²⁹; (b) ratification of the action of the Kwantung Army as a "temporary measure"³⁰; (c) and a decision that no military administration was to be established.³¹

Despite MINAMI's attempt to whitewash himself and place all responsibility on the Supreme Command for further activities of the Kwantung Army, he admitted on cross-examination that he, MINAMI, agreed to put the "Cabinet policy into effect with the Army at once."³² This shows that MINAMI, as War Minister, had more than a theoretical duty or interest. It shows he had a duty to perform and how he failed to perform it is an eloquent answer to his protestations of lack of authority. He admitted that he had conferences day after day with Premier Wakatsuki as day after

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25. T. 19780
26. T. 19781-2
27. T. 19782
28. T. 19782
29. T. 19782
30. T. 19783
31. T. 19783
32. T. 19830-1

day the incident expanded. Wakatsuki said that MINAMI would show by a line, a boundary beyond which the Army would not go, and almost daily this boundary line was ignored and further expansion was reported "but always with assurances that this was the final move."³³

MINAMI also admitted that although Honjo had blanket authority to do what he liked "within the scope of his official authority"³⁴. MINAMI could have stopped him.³⁵ He failed to stop him, he said, because "a situation was created wherein there could be nothing else but expansion or extension of the hostilities,"³⁶ due to the large number of the enemy and frequent surprise attacks made on the Japanese.³⁷

MINAMI was fully advised as to the expansion of the incident, and the failure of Honjo to obey the Cabinet decision, as MINAMI was sent copies of various telegrams received by Shidehara from Consuls and Consul-Generals during the progress of the incident from 21 September 1931 and 7 November 1931³⁸ and it would have been legally possible for MINAMI to have either refused to supply the necessary money out of the budget for carrying on such movements, or to recall the officers who failed to carry out his instructions.³⁹

MINAMI's initial action on the outbreak of the incident, in wiring Honjo that a policy had been adopted to localize the affair to a minimum,⁴⁰ and that the action of the Kwantung Army was to be a "temporary measure" and not an occupation of Manchuria, and that no

33. T. 19831

34. T. 19832

35. T. 19833

36. T. 19833

37. T. 19833

38. Ex. 3479, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J. T. 33600 - 27

39. Ex. 3479, T. 33639

40. T. 19331

military administration was to be established,⁴¹ was almost immediately reversed because, as he said, he was placed "in a very awkward position" due to a new situation developing before the government could act.⁴² This, he claims, occurred when the Kwantung troops withdrew from Harbin; in the battle on the Nonni River; in the occupation of Tsitsihar; and in the so-called reconnaissance flight over Chinchow,⁴³ after he had agreed with Secretary Stimson in November 1931, that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow.⁴⁴ For the Chinchow bombing, MINAMI issued a severe warning to Commander Honjo,⁴⁵ although he admitted that he could have recalled him, but he "did not recognize the need".⁴⁶ In fact, MINAMI admitted that he approved the action which Honjo took.⁴⁷ MINAMI also approved the appointment of Doihara, as Mayor of Mukden, which he thought was an "unavoidable" step in the light of the situation,⁴⁸ and he also admitted he never took any disciplinary measures to compel the leaders of the Kwantung Army to carry out the orders they were getting from Tokyo.⁴⁹ On re-direct examination, MINAMI testified that both the General Staff and the War Ministry investigated the Kwantung Army to determine whether the Army was ignoring the policies and intentions of the Central authorities, and whether the "younger officers were treating its commanding general as a robot, or that Itagaki, Ishihara and other staff officers were taking arbitrary action" and the report was that all these rumors were without foundation.⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that the General Staff investigation which resulted in a whitewash, was made by Ninomiya,

41. T. 19783
42. T. 19787
43. T. 19788
44. T. 10073-5
45. T. 19788

46. T. 19918
47. T. 19918
48. T. 19879
49. T. 19915
50. T. 20061-62

a participant in the March incident conspiracy,⁵¹ and the investigation by the War Ministry which resulted in a similar whitewash, was made "with an extremely careful attitude," and after consultations with the chief of the Army General Staff.⁵²

MINAMI's real views on the Mukden incident are summed up by Tanaka, who in testifying said that MINAMI told him in 1935⁵³ that he had advocated a decisive settlement of the pending issues in Manchuria, from the standpoint of national defense,⁵⁴ and because of this he had come into "loggerheads with Foreign Minister Shidehara, who maintained a passive attitude resulting in friction which extended even into their personal enotions."⁵⁵

From the foregoing it appears that MINAMI, in conjunction with the General Staff approved aggressive actions by the Kwantung Army in direct conflict with policies of non-expansion prescribed by the Cabinet.

V. Views of MINAMI on Manchurian Incident

MINAMI believed that the Manchurian Incident was an "unavoidable exercise" of the right of self-defense,⁵⁶ and that even after it expanded it was not a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty.⁵⁷ He "firmly believed" that Honjo was loyally abiding by the instructions he sent and "was not interfering with the internal political affairs of Manchuria," but was primarily engaged in the maintenance of law and order.⁵⁸ He "took precautions" that no military administration was to be set up.⁵⁹ And

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- 51. T. 1927-8
 - 52. T. 20061
 - 53. T. 2019
 - 54. T. 2020
 - 55. T. 2019
 - 56. T. 19883
 - 57. T. 19883
 - 58. T. 19894
 - 59. T. 19894

although he knew that under the Portsmouth Treaty, Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was recognized,⁶⁰ he believed that Manchukuo was founded in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of Manchuria.⁶¹

These opinions of MINAMI are in direct conflict with his testimony that the real use Japan intended to make of Manchukuo was as a base for operations against Russia in the event of war between Japan and Russia,⁶² and they also conflict with his tacit approval of Doihara's activities in connection with the establishment of the Peace Preservation Committee in Mukden under leadership of Doihara;⁶³ the Liaoning Autonomous Government organization, under sponsorship of Doihara;⁶⁴ the abduction of Pu-Yi, through the efforts of Doihara;⁶⁵ and the establishment of a "temporary expedient system" in Manchukuo which provided for guidance of the various Chinese regimes by a small section in the Kwantung Army, with the plan to "inwardly" guide a new regime if such were established, by an "advisory body" of the Kwantung Army.⁶⁶ MINAMI knew or should have known that plans were thus made for the establishment of a puppet government in Manchukuo, by the interference, and the guidance of Japanese agencies, in violation of the Nine-Power Pact, and that procedures were planned and adopted to effectuate the continued domination of Manchukuo by Japan, through secret and evasive means. His testimony that Manchukuo was established in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of Manchukuo⁶⁷ and that Honjo was not interfering with the internal political affairs of Manchuria⁶⁸ is flatly disproved by the machinations of his agents in

60. T. 20039

61. T. 20040

62. T. 19807, Ex. 837, T. 8160

63. T. 33605-06

64. T. 33607-8

65. T. 33618

66. Ex. 3377, T. 32339-41; 33629-30

67. T. 20040

68. T. 19804

the field, who were doing the opposite. That MINAMI knew fully what was going on, appears from Shidehara's testimony⁶⁹ in which he stated: "I have often told MINAMI of what was then happening there in Manchuria, but my impression was that he practically had no power to control these men." And if he had the power, Shidehara did not think that MINAMI sent out orders to recall the officers who did not obey him.⁷⁰ At a Cabinet meeting when the matter was broached, Shidehara said MINAMI "looked very much embarrassed."⁷¹

The conclusion can be reached that MINAMI was entirely in sympathy with what occurred in Manchuria, and that he wanted things to happen as they did, just as Tatekawa permitted the original incident to occur because he did not want to stop it.⁷²

VI. MINAMI's activity after his regime as War Minister

MINAMI testified that after his resignation as War Minister he was "given the obscure post of Supreme War Councillor "in which job he had nothing to do except assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the military authorities. He also said he acted as tutor to young Prince Kan-In by request, and therefore paid little attention, if any, to political and military matters.⁷³ On cross-examination, MINAMI admitted that within three weeks after his resignation as War Minister, he was sent on an inspection trip to Manchuria under orders of his successor, War Minister ARAKI.⁷⁴ While on such trip, he knew that orders issued by him as War Minister to prevent the occupation of

69. T. 33631-32
70. T. 33633
71. T. 33633
72. T. 2006; 2505-7
73. T. 19790
74. T. 19922

Chinchow had been disobeyed,⁷⁵ and that the Kwantung Army had occupied Chinchow on 3 January 1932.⁷⁶ Yet he did not ask Honjo why he was disobeying the orders he had received,⁷⁷ although on his return he says he reported to ARAKI that the occupation of Chinchow was contrary to the policies which he had set up during his tenure of office.⁷⁸ Upon receiving this information all ARAKI did was to listen.⁷⁹ On cross-examination, MINAMI recalled that in addition to listening to lectures as a Supreme War Councillor, he himself delivered a lecture before the Emperor, on 28 January 1932, on the latest situation in Manchuria.⁸⁰ Among others present was Kido.⁸¹ In this lecture, MINAMI concluded that Japan should take over the defense of Manchuria-Mongolia and expedite completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway, thus making the Sea of Japan into a lake and facilitate Japan's advance into the North Manchuria area;⁸² take concrete measures economically by Japanese-Manchuria Joint Management, as a hedge against economic blockade from abroad; and take measures to solve the population problem by giving emigrants in Manchuria the same protection as they receive in South America, provided a colonial trooping system is established there.⁸³

In view of MINAMI's continued activity for the War Department, as a direct representative of War Minister ARAKI, his report to the Emperor of his findings; and being "tutor" to Prince Kan-In, he was far from being the inactive person he sought to paint himself. His sudden emergence as Commander of the Kwantung Army in December 1934, illustrates in no uncertain manner his importance in the chain of events centering around

75. T. 19922
76. T. 19921
77. T. 19922
78. T. 19923
79. T. 19923
80. Ex. 2251, T. 19924-5
81. T. 19924
82. T. 19924
83. T. 19925

Manchuria, in which he was so much concerned initially when the overt act at Mukden took place.

VII. MINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army.

From 10 December 1934 to 6 March 1936, MINAMI was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army.⁸⁴ He was concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, and as such was in direct communication with the Foreign Office in Tokyo.⁸⁵ He testified that his principal problem was the stabilization of Manchuria and maintenance of peace. He also said he gave advice to the Manchukuoan Government on various matters, such as agriculture, transportation, education,⁸⁶ and he admitted he exercised "absolute control over the military and diplomatic affairs of Manchukuo."⁸⁷ He no doubt knew that in the regime of his predecessor, an advisor system had been established by General Tada, which gave the Kwantung Army complete control of the Manchukuoan Army as well as the Manchukuo Government;⁸⁸ and not satisfied with this admitted system of control over the internal and external affairs of Manchukuo, MINAMI knew that such control was tightened by a preponderance of Japanese on the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo, although he tried to explain this away by saying that the deciding vote Japan had on the Board was of no value to Japan, since this Japanese, as a Manchurian official,⁸⁹ received "no treatment as a Japanese official" since he obeyed "the laws of Manchukuo as an official of the Manchukuo Government and represents Manchukuo".⁹⁰ This conclusion on MINAMI's part seemed to differ from the view of Hirota,

84. Ex. 117, T. 740-42, T. 19948
85. T. 19955-6
86. T. 19962
87. T. 19963
88. Ex. 3378-A, T. 32357-72
89. T. 19965
90. T. 19966

who concluded that such official was "simultaneously a leading instrument dispatched by Japan," and MINAMI believed that this was was "a cause of anxiety" for his colleague Hirota.⁹¹ Naturally, this sad state of affairs, this conflict of fiduciary relationship would be not only embarrassing, but absolutely unworkable, if it had not been aimed at providing control by Japan, and not the "free and equal partnership between Japan and Manchukuo" which MINAMI so naively claimed existed.⁹²

While MINAMI was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, he also approved a plan for controlling organs directing public opinion in Manchuria.⁹³ He decided that this was necessary because of the intense competition in the publishing world.⁹⁴ The real reason was that there were many newspapers and journals owned by the Chinese, and this was an element in the decision to guide public opinion to secure the "healthy development of Manchukuo",⁹⁵ by making them conform to Japan's views, or be eliminated.

As for the Umezu-Ho, Yin-chin, Doihara-Cheng Te-Chun, and other agreements which were concluded in 1935, MINAMI claimed that they were consummated in an "exceedingly friendly atmosphere".⁹⁶ He did not know, he claimed, that the Umezu-Ho Agreement resulted from an ultimatum with a fixed date, with the alternative an invasion of China by the Kwantung Army.⁹⁷ He claimed he never saw the agreement⁹⁸ and he said that although he had seen newspaper reports of the impending movement of Kwantung Army troops into China, he believed such reports were groundless rumors and

91. T. 19967
92. T. 19965
93. T. 19967
94. T. 19968
95. T. 19967
96. T. 19981, 19794
97. T. 19981
98. T. 19983

suppositions and he placed no confidence in them whatsoever.⁹⁹ He further claimed that there were rumors of demands by the North China Army, which was commanded by Umezu at one time and by General Tada, later, but MINAMI claims he knew nothing of what took place,¹⁰⁰ although he did admit that General Umezu attended a conference at Mukden on 29 May 1935, at which MINAMI and General Hayashi were also present.¹⁰¹ At this meeting Umezu, he says, reported only on conditions in the area of his command, namely North China, but not one word was said about the impending Ho-Umezu Agreement which was consummated in the first week of June 1935. MINAMI claims that at the meeting of 29 May 1935, Umezu merely gave his "greetings" and returned to Peking, after having reported on "routine business matters".¹⁰² MINAMI also said that Hayashi came to Manchuria on the occasion of this tri-partite conference only in order "to inspect conditions in Manchuria" and he did not mention the subject of troop movements or ultimatums.¹⁰³ MINAMI said that the rumors that troop movements might take place were "all groundless" based on mistaken suppositions, and are unworthy of notice.¹⁰⁴

On the conclusion of the Umezu-Ho Agreement, only a few days after the meeting mentioned above, MINAMI received a report of the same, but he said he did not know about "small details" such as whether the Chinese agreed to all the demands, and he said he thought an ultimatum with a time limit with a threat of invasion was "too silly".¹⁰⁵ However, MINAMI heard that in consequence of the agreement, the Chinese evacuated their troops from North China.¹⁰⁶ ~~and anti-Japanese military forces were~~

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- 99. T. 19985
 - 100. T. 19986
 - 101. T. 19986
 - 102. T. 19987
 - 103. T. 19989
 - 104. T. 19989
 - 105. T. 19991
 - 106. T. 19991

All anti-Japanese military forces were withdrawn on 10 June 1935.¹⁰⁷

MINAMI also denied that he had knowledge of an ultimatum Doihara had given the Chinese on 18 November 1935, that unless autonomy of the north was proclaimed, five Japanese divisions were going into Hopei and six into Shantung. He admitted that autonomous regimes for Eastern Hopei and Hopei-Chahar were established but these, he said, were set up by the Chinese themselves.¹⁰⁸ When confronted with a document dated 9 December 1935, entitled "Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan which shall be carried out in parallel with its military activity in North China,"¹⁰⁹ he admitted that things described in the document really happened.¹¹⁰

This document included such material as follows: "We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into North China takes place...It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China sometime in the future, we¹¹¹ do it for the purpose of finishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large...."¹¹²

In view of the foregoing activities of aggression planned or consummated, MINAMI still maintained that while he was in command of the Kwantung Army he was doing nothing hostile to the Chinese Government.¹¹³

Vis-a-vis the Soviet, there were plans of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and 1935, for a war against U.S.S.R.;¹¹⁴ and from 1934 to 1936, MINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, was engaged in the development of Manchuria as a military base for an attack by Japan against the U.S.S.R.¹¹⁵ It was in this same period that the Kwantung Army furthered

107. T. 20787
108. T. 19996
109. Ex. 195, T. 19997-99
110. T. 20006
111. T. 19998
112. T. 19999
113. T. 20,000
114. Ex. 703, T. 7515
115. Ex. 723, T. 7581; Ex. 670, T. 7330, 20037-8

the creation of an autonomous movement in North China, and an Inner Mongolian autonomous regime, the purpose of which was to separate the five northern provinces from the Nanking regime,¹¹⁶ and to bring this area into close relationship with Manchuria under Japanese leadership.¹¹⁷ This movement gained great headway from June 1935, after the conclusion of the Umezu-Ho Agreement.¹¹⁸

VII. Activities subsequent to his career in Manchuria.

MINAMI became Governor General of Korea on 5 August 1936.¹¹⁹ On 23 September 1938, while Governor General, he wrote Ugaki the Foreign Minister of the "invincible" Japanese troops, the "Holy War" against China, the necessity for the "recognition of a pro-Japanese regime in North and Central China," and the enhancement of the prestige of Japan, and the imminency of the fall of Hankow.¹²⁰ MINAMI admitted that he had previously stated that he was against a war with China, but explained that what he meant was that it was always highly unfavorable and a disadvantage to fight a war with a neighboring country.¹²¹ As for the China war, he said these hostilities occurred as a result of "unavoidable circumstances"¹²² Finally, in order to really explain his change of attitude, he said that his views on peace with China were views held by him prior to the outbreak of the incident.¹²³

It was while he was Governor General of Korea, on 14 May 1941¹²⁴ that he received from Hitler, the decoration of the Grand Cross of the Eagle,

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116. T. 2026
117. T. 2027
118. T. 2027
119. Ex. 117, T. 746-42
120. Ex. 2437, T. 20012-13
121. T. 20014
122. T. 20014
123. T. 20015
124. T. 20016

a decoration only 2 or 3 other Japanese had ever received, but he did not know the reason why he had been thus singled out by Hitler for such award.¹²⁵

Also, while Governor General of Korea he gave his consent to the internment of 1,000 British and 1,000 American POW in Korea, "as it would be very effective in stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America."¹²⁶ The deal regarding this matter was made while Itagaki was Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army,¹²⁷ and the matter was fundamentally one to be arranged by the Army. However, the consent of the Governor General, or at least his favorable views had to be obtained, otherwise the request for authority to intern such POW, would not have stated that "the Governor General and the Army are both strongly desirous of it."¹²⁸

In May 1942, MINAMI became a member of the Privy Council.¹²⁹ He admitted attending a series of meetings in October 1942 concerning the Greater East Asia Ministry.¹³⁰ At one of these meetings it was stated that the draft for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was not based on rules of righteousness, but were based upon "rules of might."¹³¹ MINAMI remembered that such a statement was made and he agreed with it.¹³²

As for the establishment of a Greater East Asia Ministry, MINAMI claimed that he opposed it,¹³³ but his only ground of opposition was that there was already a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and this new ministry was but adding "one house on top of another".¹³⁴

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125. T. 20016
126. Ex. 1973, T. 20018
127. T. 20017
128. T. 20018
129. T. 20021
130. T. 20021
131. T. 20022
132. T. 20023
133. T. 20023

His opposition seemed to melt later, when he congratulated Shigenitsu on becoming Minister of Greater East Asiatic affairs as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹³⁵ Also, while a member of the Privy Council, on 18 August 1943, he concurred in the deal whereby parts of Malaya were handed over to Thailand;¹³⁶ and he also admitted that he concurred in Tojo's views that "international law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our (Japan's) own opinions."¹³⁷ He also became President of the Greater Japan Political Association¹³⁸ whose principal aim was to extend the Co-Prosperity Sphere all over Asia, including India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines.¹³⁹ He believed in Asia for the Asiatics,¹⁴⁰ but he thought the idea of Japan ruling the world was an entirely mistaken notion.¹⁴¹ Apparently MINAMI was satisfied if such rule could be imposed within the limits of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.

IX. Connection of Minami with Charges in the Indictment.

Counts 1-5. The evidence of MINAMI's activities while War Minister, and his dealings with KOISO, Tatekawa, NINOMIYA and others who conspired to secure domination for Japan; his later approval of the China War, and his activities in the Greater East Asia movement, connect him with these counts as a conspirator.

Counts 6-18. The evidence of MINAMI's approval of the expanding movements in Manchuria, Mongolia and North China, connect him with these counts as planning and preparing a war of aggression.

135. T. 20026
136. T. 20027
137. T. 20029
138. T. 20033
139. T. 20034
140. T. 20034
141. T. 20048

Counts 27-32 and 34. The evidence of MINAMI's activities while War Minister and as Commander -in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, while the movements for the separation of parts of China were taking place, connect him with these counts wherein he is charged with waging wars of aggression.

Count 44. The count charging him with conspiracy to procure and permit murder can be sustained against him on the basis that he is responsible as a co-conspirator.

Counts 53-55. As for these counts under which he is charged with conspiracy to order, etc., breaches of law or custom in respect to POW, in China, he can be held as a co-conspirator, except in the instance of his action in having British and American POW brought to Korea for illegal purpose, in which case he is directly chargeable for the wrongdoing.

20 Sol 12/4/47

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE RE MINAMI, JIRO

MINAMI, Jiro is charged on all counts of the Indictment except Counts 19, 20-26, 33, 35-43, 45-52.

MINAMI was appointed 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry on 22 May 1895. He served continuously until 22 April 1936 through various commands, being appointed to the rank of General on 7 March 1930.

From 14 April 1931 to 12 December 1931 he served as Minister of War in the WAKATSUKI Cabinet. From 10 December 1934 to 6 March 1936, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo. On 5 August 1936 he was appointed Governor-General of Korea and he served as such until 29 May 1942, on which date he was appointed Privy Councillor.

On 7 February 1934 he was decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun. On 23 December 1935 he was decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flower, in recognition of his services in the Affairs from 1931 to 1934. On the same date he was granted the War Medal for participation in the Affairs from 1931 to 1934. On 29 April 1940 he was granted a set of silver cups in recognition of his services in the China Affairs. On 31 March 1945 he was appointed a member of the House of Peers.

I. ACTIVITIES AS WAR MINISTER

MINAMI held a meeting attended by South Manchuria Railroad officials and the Chief of the General Staff and other high Army officials on 30 June 1931, where Manchurian-Mongolian problems were discussed. At that time he expressed the desire to increase the divisions in Korea but stated it was impossible at that time. (Exhibit 2202, Record page 15,752-3).

On 4 August 1931 at a meeting of Army and Division Commanders, MINAMI made a statement regarding the Manchurian situation which the Press construed as inflammatory and inciting trouble in Manchuria. (Exhibit 2392, Record page 19,200). At the same meeting, it was alleged that he said, "Guard Manchuria, our lifeline." MINAMI said that he did not recall making this statement, but that those were his sentiments. (Exhibit 2207, Record page 15,783).

MINAMI had knowledge from Baron SHIDEHARA, then Foreign Minister, prior to the Manchurian Incident that warlike preparations were being made by some of the officers of the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit 3479, Record page 33,590-2). Baron SHIDEHARA also sent to General MINAMI copies of the various telegrams received by him from Consuls and Consuls-General during the progress of the Manchurian Incident between 21 September 1931 and 7 November 1931, so that MINAMI was fully advised that the declared policy of the Cabinet was not being followed by the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit 3479-B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I, J, Record Pages 33,600 - 33,627). It would have been legally possible for MINAMI, as War Minister, to have either refused to find the money out of the budget for carrying on the operations of the Kwantung Army, or to recall those officers who were not carrying out his instructions. (Exhibit 3479, Record page 33,639).

When the Mukden Incident broke out on 18 September 1931, the Cabinet told MINAMI on 19 September that the affair should be terminated at once. The next day MINAMI reported that for strategic and tactical reasons it had been necessary for the Japanese forces to pursue Chinese troops a certain distance into Chinese territory but it would not be expanded. On 20 September at the Cabinet meeting MINAMI reported further expansion but said it would not be enlarged. This happened again on 22 September. At the 23 September Cabinet meeting MINAMI reported that General HAYASHI had moved part of the Korean Army into Manchuria without authority. It was the sense of the Cabinet that these operations in Manchuria cease and MINAMI agreed to put this policy into effect, but day after day expansion continued. MINAMI failed to control the armies in Manchuria. (Exhibit 162, Record page 1,554-7).

MINAMI approved the action taken by General HONJO in connection with the Mukden Incident of September, 1931. (Exhibit 2207, Record page 15,783).

On or about 18 October 1931 MINAMI made the statement that the Manchurian question should be dealt with directly by the Japanese and Chinese and that Japan cannot admit the intervention of any third party and would not alter her policy. (Exhibit 2204-A, Record pages 15,759-60).

MINAMI agreed with the then Secretary of War Stimson that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow - November, 1931. (Exhibit 1104, Record page 10,073-5).

MINAMI stated at a meeting of the Privy Council on 9 December 1931 that a unit had been sent to the Chinchow district and that, "We do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Manchuria-Mongolia." After mention was made of the operations in Chinchow, MINAMI stated, "Apparently Europe and America are mistaken in thinking that we made use of the large bombs such as were used in the European war." (Exhibit 2205, Record page 15,764-5).

The Japanese army waged war upon China while MINAMI was Minister of War in 1931. (Exhibit 2207, Record page 15,783).

The affidavit of Lt. General UTSUBA, Tatsuma, states that in 1931 War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA, Kando considered it convenient to use Manchuria as a base for the invasion into the Soviet Union. (Exhibit 837 Record page 8,160).

II. INTERIM ACTIVITIES

After an inspection trip to Manchuria, MINAMI appeared before the Emperor on 28 January 1932 and stated his conclusions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian question as follows: "I. In the matter of our national defense, Japan's relation to the new state and its administration will be taken over its defense and by expediting the completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway, make the Sea of Japan into a lake and facilitate Japan's advance into the North Manchuria area. Thus our national defense plans would be revolutionised. (Exhibit 2201, Record page 16,213-

"II. Japan-Manchuria Joint Management - To take concrete measures against economic blockades from abroad, thereby firmly establishing a method by which she can live forever as a Japan of the world.

"III. Solution of the Population Problem - It is not so difficult to solve the population problem provided that we give our emigrants in Manchuria the same protection as that which they receive in South America, and provided that we establish a colonial trooping system there." (Exhibit 2251, Record 16,213-4).

MINAMI wanted to extend the Co-Prosperity Sphere over all Asia, including India, Burma, Dutch East Indies, Philippines, and believed in Asia for the Asiatics. (Exhibit 2207, Record page 15,783).

III. ACTIVITIES WHILE COMMANDER OF KWANTUNG ARMY AND CONCURRENTLY
AMBASSADOR TO MANCHUKUO

The plans of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and 1935 were for a war against the U.S.S.R. and the occupation of the Maritime Province. (Exhibit 703, Record page 7,515).

In 1934- 1936 while Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, MINAMI was engaged in the development of Manchuria as a military base for Japan against the U.S.S.R. (Exhibit 723, Record page 7,581), (Exhibit 670, Record 7,330).

During this period the Kwantung Army occupied practically all of Manchukuo and some of MINAMI's command went beyond the Great Wall into China. (Exhibit 2207, Record 15,783). During this period, MINAMI's advice to the Emperor and Manchukuo authorities, in substance, was a direction. (Exhibit 2207, Record page 15,783).

During this same period, MINAMI sent TANAKA, Ryukichi and General ISHIMOTO to Prince TEH in an effort to bring Mongolia in line with the Kwantung Army anti-Soviet Policy. (Record pages 2,026-2,143).

MINAMI most effectively exercised the right of inter-leadership of Manchuria as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. (Record 2,020).

IV. ACTIVITIES WHILE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF KOREA

While Governor-General of Korea, MINAMI approved the sending of prisoners of war to Korea for illegal purposes. (Exhibits 1973-5, Record pages 14,512-20).

On 23 September 1938, while Governor-General of Korea, MINAMI addressed a letter to the then Foreign Minister UGAKI, advising the recognition of pro-Japanese regime in Northern and Central China and the establishment of further puppet governments. (Exhibit 2437, Record 20,010-14).

V. ACTIVITIES WHILE MEMBER OF PRIVY COUNCIL

MINAMI attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy

Council on 18 August 1943, which approved the treaty between Japan and Thailand which was a violation of the 9-Power Pact. (Exhibit 1275, Record page 11,364-6).

VI. REBUTTAL

Request has been made for the processing of Document No. 3231, Affidavit of KAWAGISHI, Bunzaburo, which contradicts the testimony of General MINAMI and former General KAWABE as to the concentration of troops by the Kwantung Army immediately prior to the HO-UMEZU Agreement.

Recommendation also has been made for the processing of various excerpts from the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs which tend to contradict the evidence given by MINAMI himself.

Minami

9 July 1947

MEMO TO: Mr. Frank S. Tavenner, Jr.
Acting Chief of Counsel

FROM: James T. C. Liu
Assistant, Chinese Division

SUBJECT: Pu Yi's Handwriting--Exhibits 278, 2189 and 2440

Exh. 278, a letter allegedly written by Pu Yi to the accused Minami in 1931 with manifestation of Pu Yi's desire to collaborate with Japan, was denied by Pu Yi. (Record page 4, 115-4,118) Mr. Keenan indicated that the prosecution wished to have it as one of its own evidence, charging fraud and forgery. (Record page 4,160-4,164) To follow up, we produced the Affidavit of Professor Chang Feng-chu, Exh. 2189, Record page 15,708-15,712, which refutes the contention that the document in question was written by Pu Yi.

The defense in turn produced the witness TAKAMURA, Iwao, a Japanese police expert on handwriting, whose affidavit, Exh. 2440, Record page 20,188-20,206, supports the defense contention and challenges the opinion of Prof. Chang.

Recently, in going over the Kido's Dairy, I find two passages as follows:

Jan. 19, 1943 Called on the Minister of the Imperial Household and consulted him on the personal letter of Emperor Pu Yi (Manchukuo) which was told by General Minami.

Jan. 27, 1943 Met with General Minami, concerning the personal letter of Emperor Pu Yi (Manchukuo). I told him, "Since the letter was written to you, who were the War Minister at that time, it would be most appropriate to keep it in your possession, to which he agreed.

It is evident that Minami's story from his own end is quite true. While Pu Yi may be right at the same time, because I always maintain that most probably the letter was forged either by the Chinese around Pu Yi or the Japanese who worked on Pu Yi or jointly by them both. It served the purpose of double-crossing both the Japanese Government and Pu Yi in order to create an opportunity for the people who forged it. I think I have reached the conclusion that Pu Yi never saw this document before, while Minami always kept it, believing that it came from Pu Yi. This Memo, I hope, will help you to determine the position we are going to take later on with regard to this matter.

Copies to: Mr. Satton
Mr. Wagner
Lt. Steiner

10-10-47

STATEMENT OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RE MINAMI, JIRO

- Year
- 1931 On 4 August 1931 MINAMI addressed the commanders of army divisions and amongst other things, referred to the Manchurian and Mongolian situations. (Record 19,200).
- 1931 MINAMI testified on direct examination that ⁱⁿ his speech to the Division Commanders on 4 August 1931, while he was Minister of War, he stated that in order to perfect Japanese national defense with a minimum of arms, there must be an improvement in quality; that he did not try to inspire a protective policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia; that he maintained a policy of non-expansion; and that the pending questions in Manchuria and Mongolia were exceedingly complicated so that the Army should not fail to give its attention thereto. (Record 19,777-9).
- 1931 MITARI, in redirect examination, stated that at the conference of Division Commanders in August, 1931, General MINAMI pointed out that conditions in Mongolia and Manchuria were becoming extremely bad on account of activities of Chang Tso Lin, and that the situation was becoming very aggravated and in order to protect Japanese interests, it was decided that due preparations be made, the Army should always be on the watch so that action could be taken. (Record 17,855).
- 1931 KATAKURA testified that toward the end of September or early October, 1931, on orders of MINAMI, SUGIYAMA, Vice Minister of War, wired instructions that the Kwantung Army should not connect itself with the movement to restore the monarchy in Manchuria. (Record 18,974, also MINAMI's testimony, Record 19,784).
- 1931 Prior to the Manchurian Incident the whole Kwantung Army, its commander, staff officers, force commanders, officers and men, entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable and ITAGAKI and all other officers of the Kwantung Army who went to Tokyo on business reported this to the War Minister, General MINAMI. (Record 22,199).
- 1931 MINAMI stated substantially as follows re the Manchurian Incident: About 3 o'clock in the morning of 19 September 1931 he received a telegram from the Special Service Organ in Mukden, announcing that on the 16th the tracks of the Southern Manchuria Railway northwest of Mukden had been destroyed by Chinese troops and the Japanese railway guard had been fired upon and that the 2nd Battalion of Independent Garrison had moved to the spot. At about 6 a.m., he reported the incident by telephone to the Premier, the Foreign, Overseas and Navy Ministers and requested an extraordinary Cabinet meeting. At about 9 a.m., the General Staff and War Minister came to an agreement and decided upon the policy of non-expansion; that he was fearful that the 200,000 Japanese residents and one million Koreans in Manchuria and the lengthy railway line could not be protected by the small Kwantung Army of 10,000 in the face of the army of Chang Hsueh-liang of 250,000. At the Cabinet meeting held at 10 a.m., the policy of non-expansion was adopted by the Cabinet. That he sent telegraphic instructions as to government policy to Commander HONJO, on the 21st of September a telegram arrived from the Commander of the Korean Army

stating that he had ordered the Mixed Brigade to cross the border into Manchuria. (Record 19,779-782).

- 1931 About 6 p.m. on 19 September 1931 the following telegram was received by HONJO from War Minister MINAMI, "The present issue between the troops of Japan and China was caused by the attempt on the part of the Chinese troops to blow up the railroad of the South Manchurian Railway, and it is obvious that the blame should be placed upon China, but we have definitely adopted a policy of localizing the affair to a minimum. You will, therefore, deal with this affair with due consideration of the above." (Record 19,330-1).
- 1931 At the instigation of the Central Command, War Minister MINAMI went before the Cabinet Council on 22 September 1931 and had the expenditures of the Korean Army's expedition into Manchuria sanctioned and it was submitted to the Emperor for his ex post facto approval. (Record 19,414-5)
- 1931 MINAMI wired instructions on 26 September 1931 to his subordinate in Manchuria that Japan must not interfere in the internal movement of Manchuria and that no military administration should be established. (Record 20,064).
- 1931 MINAMI counselled the sending of troops to Chinchow as being necessary for the maintenance of law and order. (Record 20,060).
- 1931 In October, after the bombing of Chinchow, MINAMI issued a warning to HONJO, and the reinforcements to the Kwantung Army which had come to Chinchow were ordered to draw east to the river. (Record 19,788-9).
- 1931 WACHI testified that when War Minister MINAMI was told of the October Incident, he ordered the military police to arrest the instigators thereof. (Record 19,667, also MINAMI's testimony, Record 19,791).
- 1931 MINAMI testified that while he was War Minister, "There was never issued a false statement or a breach of international agreements committed, although because of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, the statements of the Japanese Government and the actual conditions on the spot were inverted in point of time and therefore were confused. (Record 19,789-90).
- 1932 MINAMI stated that because the state of Manchukuo was founded in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of Manchuria, the idea was that it was separate from China, and that is how he now believes. (Record 20,040).
- 1932 General MINAMI, on his inspection trip to Manchuria, knew that Chinchow was occupied, and upon his return told ARAKI that the occurrence of Chinchow was contrary to the policy which had been set up during MINAMI's tenure of office. (Record 19,923).
- 1932 MINAMI stated that he had always been an advocate of peaceful re-

- lations with the Soviet Union, and that construction of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway was helpful in that direction as well as in joining Japan and Korea in maintaining trade with Manchuria, and would result in stability for Manchuria and aid in its defense against the Soviet Union. (Record 19,935-7).
- 1932 General MINAMI welcomed the coming of the inquiry commission from the League of Nations. (20,058).
- 1934 On 10 December, 1934 MINAMI was appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo and Commander of the Kwantung Army at the time the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol had been concluded. (Record 19,791).
- 1934-1936 General MINAMI abolished the Special Service Department in the Kwantung Army, his principle reason for doing so being to enable the Manchurian Government to be free to conduct the administration of its own affairs. (Record 20,077 and 19,976).
- 1934-1936 MINAMI usually met the Emperor of Manchukuo three times per month and did not discuss politics or the national fortunes. (Record 20,069).
- 1934-1936 While Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, MINAMI had no military operations plans against China but had the national defense plan as prepared by the General Staff with regard to the Soviet Union. (Record 20,077).
- 1934-1936 The "Otsu" plan was adopted by MINAMI while commander of the Kwantung Army. (Exhibits 691 and 703, Record 20,037).
- 1934-1936 MINAMI stated that he was opposed to the Concordia Society and that its growth ceased after he became Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army. (Record 19,968).
- 1934-1936 MINAMI stated that, "Manchuria and Japan were on equal standing. To assist in the development of a strong, healthy state simply meant to help it become such a state and to hope that it would become such a state, and it is very far from meaning to control it." (Record 19,955).
- 1934-1936 MINAMI stated that there never was a case of his having given advice to the State of Manchukuo which was equivalent to orders; that Japan and Manchukuo talked with each other on equal basis and no orders were issued during his years in Manchukuo. (Record 20,070).
- 1934-1936 MINAMI stated that during his tenure of office he never once gave any kind of order to the Manchurian Government, but he does not remember any occasion when they did not accept his advice. (Record 19,959).
- 1934-1936 While Ambassador to Manchukuo and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, MINAMI, on behalf of Japan, exercised absolute control over the military and diplomatic affairs of Manchukuo. (Record 19,963).
- 1935 General MINAMI as Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, urged the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. (Record 20,125-6).

- 1935 In June, 1935, MINAMI sent two officers to Panchiang, Inner Mongolia, to establish liaison agencies for the purpose of observing conditions on the spot. (Record 19,993-4).
- 1935 In July, 1935, MINAMI negotiated a new Manchurian-Japanese economic agreement (Exhibit 850) with four representatives from Manchukuo, one of whom was to be Chief of General Affairs, who was always a Japanese, which resulted in the Japanese having a permanent majority in the committee. (Record 19,960).
- 1935 On October 25, 1935, MINAMI authorized his Chief of Staff, General NISHIO to send to the Vice Minister of War Exhibit 240, being the Plan for Controlling Organs directing public opinion in Manchuria; since the state of Manchukuo had just been born, he felt that the direction of public opinion was necessary. (Record 19,967-8).
- 1935 UMEZU came to Hsinking in 1935 on the invitation of War Minister, General HAYASHI, to report on conditions in North China. (Record 19,967).
- 1935 MINAMI denied any knowledge of how and in what manner the Chinese evacuated North China of its troops. (Record 19,991).
- 1935 The East Hopei regime was set up by the Chinese themselves and MINAMI had nothing to do with it. (Record 19,996).
- 1935 In November, 1935, MINAMI sent DOHIMARA to Peking to talk with General SUNG Che-yuan and to see if some means for peaceful relations between Japan and China could not be found. (Record 19,995).
- 1935 On 9 December 1935 NISHIO, on MINAMI's authority, issued a document about propaganda in North China. (Record 19,997-9).
- 1936 After the 2-26-36 Incident, MINAMI requested relief from his office and was relieved on 6 March, 1936. (Record 19,796).
- 1938 Exhibit 2437 was a personal and private letter to General UGAKI. (Record 20,078).
- 1941 While Governor-General of Korea, MINAMI had nothing to do with POW except consultation on requests with regard to housing them. (Record 20,093).
- 1945 As President of the Japan Political Society from 30 March 1945, MINAMI thought something should be done at the proper time to bring the war to an end. (Record 20,083-4).
- 1945 The Dai Nippon Seiji Kai (Japan Political Society) was formed 30 March 1945. Its chief aim was to reflect public opinion upon government and correct government and military policy. MINAMI accepted the leadership of this organization and established chapters in the various localities to maintain direct contact with the people. He attended

MINAMI, Jiro

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the inaugural meeting of local chapters and counselled the government and military of the people's thinking. The association was dissolved on 20 August 1945. (Record 19,798-9).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

23 June 1947

STATEMENT OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AS TO MINAMI, JIRO

Domicile: Oita Prefecture
Born: 10 August 1874
Social Status: Samurai
1890 Sept. 1 Entered Military Preparaty School
1893 June Graduated from Military Preparatory School; Appointed Cadet, attached to the 6th Cavalry Battalion
1894 Jan. 6 Detached to Military Academy
1895 Feb. 1 Completed the curriculum of Military Academy
1895 May 22 Appointed 2nd Lt. of Cavalry; Attached to the 6th Cavalry Bn.
1895 Nov. 15 Received the 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade
1895 Dec. 19 Granted 100 yen in recognition of the services in the war from 1894 to 1895 (Bureau of Decorations)
1896 Sept. 25 Relieved of present post; Attached to the 3rd Cavalry Company of the Formosa Garrison (War Ministry)
1895 Nov. 18 Granted War Medal authorized on the 8th October 1895, the War Minister's petition being sanctioned according to the War Medal Regulations of 1894 - 1895 (Bureau of Decorations).
1897 Oct. 25 Appointed Lieutenant of Cavalry (Cabinet); Relieved of present post; Attached to the 6th Cavalry Regiment (War Ministry)
1897 Feb. 15 Received the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade
1898 Feb. 8 Relieved of present post; Attached to the Cavalry Cadet Unit of the Army Preparatory School (War Ministry)
1899 Mar. 31 Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure and granted 150 yen in recognition of the distinguished war services (Bureau of Decorations); Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure
1899 Nov. 17 Relieved of present post; Attached to 1st Company of the 13th Cavalry Regiment (War Ministry).
1899 Dec. 25 Relieved of present post; Attached to the Military Academy Cadet Unit with concurrent duties as riding master (War Ministry)
1900 Mar. 14 Granted 1st Class Allowance
1900 Nov. 12 Appointed Captain of Cavalry; Appointed Company Commander in the 1st Cavalry Regiment (War Ministry).
1900 Dec. 10 Entered the Army's General Staff College (War Ministry)
1901 Feb. 26 Received the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
1901 Nov. 3 Relieved of present post; Attached to 1st Cavalry Regiment (W.M.)
1903 Nov. 28 Relieved of present post; appointed Company Commander in the 1st Cavalry Regiment (War Ministry); Graduated from Army General Staff College
1904 Nov. 2 Granted 1st Class Allowance
1904 Nov. 29 Decorated with the Fifth Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure
1905 Mar. 1 Promoted to Major of Cavalry
1905 Apr. 7 Received the 8th Court Rank, Junior Grade
1905 Dec. 20 Appointed Military Science Instructor at Army General Staff College (War Ministry).
1906 Sept. 1 Appointed Staff Officer attached to Government-General of Kwantung (War Ministry).

1906 Apr. 1 Decorated with the Fourth Order of the Golden Kite; Granted the War Medal of 1904 and 1905; Decorated with the Fourth Order of Merit with the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun.

1907 May 15 Relieved of present post; Attached to the Army General Staff College

1907 Oct. 21 Relieved of attachment to the Army General Staff College; Appointed Military Science Instructor at the Army General Staff College.

1909 Feb. 25 Granted and permitted to wear the Chinese 2nd Order of the 3rd Double Dragon Treasure Star

1910 Feb. 7 Appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of Cavalry (Cabinet)

1910 Apr. 9 Appointed concurrently instructor of Cavalry Practice School (W.M.)

1910 Apr. 11 Received the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1911 Mar. 27 Appointed officer in attendance to the 3rd Special Army Inspector (War Ministry).

1911 Oct. 9 Appointed concurrently instructor at the Naval War College

1912 Dec. 13 Ordered to take an official tour of Europe (Cabinet)

1913 May 31 Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure

1914 Jan. 20 Relieved of present post and concurrent post; Appointed Commander of the 13th Cavalry Regiment; Relieved of concurrent post as instructor at Naval War College.

1915 Apr. 30 Received the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1915 Aug. 10 Appointed Colonel of Cavalry (Cabinet)

1917 Aug. 6 Relieved of present post; Appointed Chief of Cavalry Section of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry

1917 Aug. 30 Appointed concurrently member of Military Technical Investigation Department

1917 Sept. 7 Appointed Member of Horse Administration Committee (Cabinet)

1917 Dec. 17 Appointed officer in attendance to temporary inspector of the Bureau of Horse Administration and the Army Remount Department (W.M.)

1918 June 4 Granted and permitted to wear the 3rd Order of Literature Tiger Decoration presented by the Government of the Republic of China.

1918 Dec. 7 Appointed Chairman of the Horse Judging Committee (War Ministry); Ordered to make an official tour of Siberia and China (War Ministry).

1919 May 2 Appointed member of the Military Technical Conference (Cabinet)

1919 May 12 Abolition of official system of organization of the Horse Administration Committee prescribed in Imperial Ordinance No. 127 of 1906; Appointed member of the Horse Administration Committee (C.)

1919 July 25 Appointed Major-General (Cabinet); Appointed Commander of the China Garrison Army (Cabinet)

1919 July 25 Relieved of the post of member of the Horse Administration Committee (Cabinet); Relieved of the post of member of the Military Technical Conference (Cabinet); Received the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1920 Nov. 1 Decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun; Received 2,550 yen in recognition of services in the war from 1915 to 1920.

1921 Jan. 20 Relieved of present post; Appointed Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Cabinet)

1922 Jan. 31 Decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure

1922 Feb. 8 Relieved of present post; Appointed Commandant of Cavalry School (c.)

1922 May 9 Appointed member of the Military Technical Conference (Cabinet)

1923 Oct. 10 Relieved of present post; Appointed Commandant of Military Academy (War Ministry).

MINAMI, Jiro

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1923 Nov. 6 Relieved of the post of member of the Military Technical Conference (Cabinet)

1924 Feb. 4 Appointed Lieutenant-General (Cabinet)

1924 Mar. 29 Received the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1924 Aug. 20 Relieved of present post; Appointed Cavalry Inspector (War Ministry)

1926 Mar. 2 Relieved of present post (War Ministry); Appointed Commander of the 16th Division (Cabinet)

1926 Apr. 15 Received the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1927 Mar. 5 Relieved of present post; Appointed Vice Chief of the Army General Staff (War Ministry)

1927 Apr. 25 Appointed member of the Railway Conference (Cabinet)

1927 July 19 Appointed member of the Resources Council (term expired 18 July 1929) (Cabinet).

1928 Feb. 9 Appointed as Court Official of the Imperial Household Ministry (Imperial Household Ministry)

1928 Oct. 25 Appointed Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces at the Coronation Review (War Ministry)

1929 Aug. 1 Relieved of present post (War Ministry); Appointed Commander of the Chosen Army.

1929 Aug. 14 Relieved of the post of Court Official of the Imperial Household

1929 Sept. 2 Received the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade

1929 Dec. 14 Relieved of the post of member of the Railway Conference (Cabinet)

1930 Jan. 20 Decorated with the 1st Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure

1930 Mar. 7 Appointed General (Cabinet)

1930 Dec. 22 Relieved of present post (War Ministry); Appointed War Councillor (C)

1931 Mar. 11 Appointed 1st special Inspector

1931 Apr. 14 Relieved of present post; Relieved of the post of 1st Special Inspector; Appointed War Minister (Cabinet).

1931 Sept. 15 Received the 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade

1931 Dec. 13 Resigned from present post (Cabinet); Appointed War Councillor (Cab.)

1932 Apr. 15 Appointed 1st Special Inspector (Navy Ministry)

1933 Apr. 10 Appointed Commander of the Combined Forces at the Emperor's Birthday Review (War Ministry)

1934 Feb. 7 Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.

1934 Feb. 9 Appointed Councillor ("Ziteikan) (Cabinet)

1934 June 1 Appointed Commander of the Combined Forces of Army and Navy Guard of Honor at the funeral service of the late Admiral of the Fleet, Marquis TOGO, Heihachiro (War Ministry)

1934 Dec. 10 Relieved of present post (War Ministry); Appointed Commander of Kwantung Army and concurrently Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and the Kwantung Governor-General (Cabinet); Ordered to be stationed in Manchukuo (Cabinet)

1934 Dec. 26 The post of Kwantung Governor-General was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 348 of 1934

1935 Dec. 23 Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flower in recognition of services in the affairs from 1931 to 1934; Granted War Medal, according to the purport of the Regulations for War Medals in the Affairs from 1931 to 1934.

1936 Mar. 6 Relieved of the concurrent posts (Cabinet); Attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters (War Ministry).

MINAMI, Jiro

- 4 -

1936 Apr. 18 Placed on the waiting list (War Ministry)
1936 Apr. 22 Placed on the Reserve List (War Ministry)
1936 Aug. 5 Appointed Governor-General of Chosen (Cabinet)
1937 Mar. 1 Received the 2nd Court Rank, Junior Grade
1938 Sept. 23 Dispatched as Imperial Messenger to the annual festival of
the Chosen Shrine (Imperial Household Ministry)
1939 Apr. 1 Placed on the 2nd Reserve List (Cabinet)
1939 Oct. 5 Dispatched as Imperial messenger to the annual festival of
the Korean Shrine, the 1st class Government Shrine (Imperial
Household Ministry)
1942 May 29 Appointed Privy Councillor (Cabinet)
1944 Mar. 15 Received the 2nd Court Rank, Senior Grade
1940 Apr. 29 Granted a set of Silver Cups in recognition of services in the
China Affairs
1944 Sept. 9 Appointed Member of Council on Royal Families (Cabinet)
1945 Mar. 29 Resigned from present post (Cabinet)
1945 Mar 31 Appointed member of House of Peers according to the House of
Peers Regulations, Art. 1, No. 4 (Cabinet).

- 1929 When read the following quotation, "...When Chief of Staff at the time of the Sainan Incident...was quick in action and notable in decision. He adopted a strong attitude when the Incident broke out. He at once ordered troops to Shantung for the second time.." he stated that his action was under orders of the Chief of Staff (Exhibit 2207).
- 1931 Excerpt from Osaka Asahi shows MINAMI, then War Minister, invited Manchurian Railway authorities to meet with the Chief of the General Staff and other army officials on 30 June 1931 to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems, at which meeting MINAMI expressed the desire to increase the divisions in Korea (Exhibit 2202, Record Page 15,752-3).
- 1931 At the meeting of Army Commanders on 4 August, MINAMI made a statement regarding the Manchurian situation which the press construed as inflammatory and inciting trouble in Manchuria. (Exhibit 2392, Record Page 19,200).
- 1931 MINAMI admitted that the statement, "Guard Manchuria our life line," which he is alleged to have made at the meeting of Army Commanders on 4 August 1931 were his sentiments although he did not recall the statement. (Exhibit 2207).
- 1931 Article from the Japan Chronicle dated 9 September 1931 shows that at a Cabinet meeting on 8 September, MINAMI took part in the discussion of the alleged NAKAMURA murder in Manchuria, and it was decided that in the event of China's refusing to admit the charge that the measures be taken would be studied by the Foreign Office and War Department. MINAMI expressed the fear that China might refuse to admit the charge. (Exhibit 2396).
- 1931 When the Mudken Incident broke out on 18 September 1931, the Cabinet told MINAMI on 19 September that the affair should be terminated at once. The next day MINAMI reported that for strategic and tactical reasons it had been necessary for the Japanese forces to pursue Chinese troops a certain distance into Chinese territory but it would not be expanded. On 20 September at the Cabinet meeting MINAMI reported further expansion but said it would not be enlarged. This happened again on 22 September. At the 23 September Cabinet meeting MINAMI reported that General HAYASHI had moved part of the Korean Army into Manchuria without authority. It was the sense of the Cabinet that these operations in Manchuria cease and MINAMI agreed to put this policy into effect, but day after day expansion continued. MINAMI failed to control the armies in Manchuria (Exhibit 162, Record Page 1,554-7).
- 1931 MINAMI approved the action taken by General HONJO in connection with the Mudken Incident of September (Exhibit 2207).

- 1931 On or about 18 October 1931 MINAMI made the statement that the Manchurian question should be dealt with directly by the Japanese and Chinese and that Japan cannot admit the intervention of any third party and would not alter her policy. (Exhibit 2204-A, Record Page 15,759-60).
- 1931 MINAMI agreed with then Secretary of War Stimson that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow - November, 1931. (Exhibit No. 1104, Record Page 10,073-5).
- 1931 MINAMI stated at a meeting of the Privy Council on 9 December 1931 that a unit had been sent to the Chinchow district and that, "We do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Manchuria-Mongolia." After mention was made of the operations in Chinchow, MINAMI stated, "Apparently Europe and America are mistaken in thinking that we made use of the large bombs such as used in the European war." (Exhibit 2205, Record Page 15,764-5).
- 1931 The Japanese army waged war upon China while MINAMI was Minister of War in 1931. (Exhibit 2207).
- 1931 The Affidavit of Lt. General OTSUBA, Tatsumi, states that in 1931 War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA, Kando considered it convenient to use Manchuria as a base for the invasion into the Soviet Union (Exhibit 837).
- 1932 MINAMI appeared before the Emperor on 28 January 1932 and stated re the Manchurian-Mongolian question: "a. Revolutionize national defense by expediting completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway and making the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into Manchuria; b. prevent economic blockade from abroad; and c. establish a colonial trooping system and give emigrants the same protection as in South America. (Exhibit 2251, Record Page 16,213-4).
- 1934 MINAMI took command of the Kwantung Army in December, 1934 and was concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo. He was at one time President of the Greater Japan Political Association, one of whose aims was to extend the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Exhibit 2207, Record Page 15,789).
- 1934 MINAMI wanted to extend the Co-Prosperity Sphere over all Asia, including India, Burma, Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines and believed in Asia for the Asiatics. (Exhibit 2207).
- 1934-5 The Affidavit of General USHIROKU, Jun, states that the Kwantung Army plans of 1934 and 1935 were for a war against the USSR and the occupation of the Maritime Province (Exhibit 703).

- 1935 MINAMI was one of the authors of the autonomous movement in Japan which began in 1935 while he was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. (Record Page 2,026-2,143).
- 1934-6 Affidavit of Lt. General YANAGITA, Genzo, states that MINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army in 1934-1936, was engaged in the developing of Manchuria as a military base. (Exhibit 723).
- 1934-36 The affidavit of TAKABE, Rokuze states that the aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent against the USSR in China and that the problem of preparing for war against the USSR was discussed at the Kwantung Army Staff. (Exhibit 670).
- 1934-6 MINAMI's principle duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was to preserve the independence of Manchukuo and his army occupied practically all of Manchukuo. Some of his troops went beyond the Great Wall. (Exhibit 2207).
- 1934-6 While Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, MINAMI's advice in substance was a direction. (Exhibit 2207).
- 1935 TANAKA testified that on orders of General MINAMI he and General ISHIMOTO went to Prince Teh in an effort to have the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Council form a close relationship with Japan to establish an "autonomous" government in Mongolia in line with the Kwantung Army anti-Soviet policy. (Record Page 2,026-2,143).
- 1935 MINAMI's deposition states that the HO-UMEZU Agreement and the DOHIHARA-CHEN Agreements were concluded "in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere." This statement appears to be negated by the current press comments taken from the files of the Japanese Foreign Office (Exhibit 2206-A) which show that these agreements were the result of an ultimatum served on the Chinese and that General MINAMI's army was drawn up at the Great Wall ready to invade China. (Exhibit 2435).
- 1936-42 MINAMI was appointed Governor-General of Korea on 5 August 1936 and continued in such position until 31 March 1942. (Exhibit 117).
- 1938 On 23 September 1938 while Governor-General of Korea, MINAMI addressed a letter to the then Foreign Minister UGAKI advising the recognition of a pre-Japanese regime in northern and central China. (Exhibit 2437).
- 1942 While Governor-General of Korea MINAMI approved the sending of prisoners of war to Korea for illegal purposes. (Exhibit 1973-5).
- 1943 MINAMI attended a meeting of the investigation committee of the Privy Council on 18 August 1943 which approved the treaty between Japan and Thailand. (Exhibit 1275, Record Page 11,364-6).

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Paper No. 1034

- Deponents -

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

NO. COMES MINAMI, Jiro and requests the Tribunal, in accordance with Article 9 (a) of the Charter, to order the production of the following documents (formerly kept in the Japanese War Ministry) necessary to his defense from G-2, Document Section, ATIS, GHQ-ADVON-APO 500, and/or from the Document Division of I.P.S., Tokyo; and further requests that, if the said documents cannot be produced by either of the said agencies, a certificate of non-availability shall be furnished by said agency to the defense so that secondary evidence may be offered in place thereof:

1. The Great Diary, 1931, Vol. B., Section 3 (Dai Nikki, Otsu Shu, San Ruk).
 2. The Secret Great Diary, 1931 (Mitsu Dai Nikki).
 3. The Army Manchurian Secret Great Diary, 1931 and 1932 (Riku Man Mitsu Dai Nikki).
 4. The Military Secret Great Diary, 1931 (Riku Kimitsu Dai Nikki).
 5. File of Un-classified correspondence and Records Dealing with Manchurian Affairs, Part 2 (out of series of 3).
 6. Telegraphic Instructions given by General Minami, War Minister in 1931, to the Kwantung Army (to be found in the Japanese War Ministry File No. 121, called "Riku-Man-Mitsu-Dai-Nikki", meaning "Army-Manchuria-Secret-Great-Diary" for 1931 and 1932).
- (1) Sept. 19th
Riku-Den (Army-Telegram) No. 204. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army re non-expansion policy.
 - (2) Sept. 20th
Telegram No. unknown. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army re rumours of the Mukden Incident.
 - (3) Sept. 22nd
Riku-Den No. 213. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army re prohibition of military administration.

(4) Sept. 24th

Kan-Sen (Kwantung Army Staff) No. 408. From Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to Vice-Minister of War Ministry, in reply to the above telegram No. 213.

(5) Sept. 24th

Riku-Man-Den (Army-Manchuria-Telegram) No. 17. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, prohibiting despatch of troops to Harbin.

(6) Sept. 24th

Riku-Man-Den No. 20. To the same effect as above telegram No. 17.

(7) Sept. 24th

Riku-Man-Den No. 31. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, requesting cooperation between army and diplomatic organs on the spot.

(8) Sept. 24th

Kan-Sen No. 473. From Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to Vice-Minister of War Ministry, in reply to the above telegram No. 21.

(9) Sept. 26th

Riku-Man-Den No. 35. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, prohibiting participation with new regime movements.

(10) Sept. 26th

Riku-Man-Den No. 37. From Vice-Minister to Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, re rumours of irresponsible conducts of some Japanese.

(11) Sept. 29th

Riku-Man-Den No. 50. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, re rumour of restoration movements of Pu Yi.

(12) Oct. 14-15th

Telegram No. unknown. From Vice-Minister to Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, reprimanding bombing of Gainchow.

(13) October 17th

Riku-Man-Den No. 109. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, re rumour of severance of Kwantung Army from Japan.

(14) Oct. 28th

Telegram No. unknown. From Vice-Minister to Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, re diplomatic negotiations with Ma Chan-shan.

(15) Nov. 16th

Riku-Man-Den No. 221. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, cautioning restoration movements of Pu Yi.

(16) Nov. 16th

Riku-Man-Den No. 223. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, re publication of Government statement concerning attack on Ma Chan-shan.

(17) Nov. 18th

Riku-Man-Den No. 247. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, prohibiting occupation of Tsitsihar.

(18) Nov. 18th

Riku-Man-Den No. 246. From Vice-Minister to Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, advising to let Chinese preserve their own peace and order in Tsitsihar district.

(19) Nov. 28th

Riku-Man-Den Nos. 286 and 294. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, re diplomatic negotiations with Chang Hsueh-liang concerning evacuation from Chinchow district.

(20) Dec. 3rd.

Kan-San-Man No. 470 From Commander of Kwantung Army to War Minister and Chief of General Staff, re dispatching a military emissary to Chinchow.

(21) Dec. 4th

Riku-Man-Den No. 319. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army in reply to the above.

(22) Dec. 4th

Riku-Man-Den No. 325. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army re neutral zone in Chinchow district.

(23) Dec. 7th

Riku-Man-Den No. 339. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army re policy of maintaining peace and order in Chinchow district.

The above-mentioned documents will be needed as defense evidence to show that the accused is not responsible as charged and to prove the policies, utterances and actions of the accused during the time in which he is charged by the indictment.

According to informations received by the Defense, all the above-mentioned documents, together with other files of the Japanese War Ministry, were delivered to the Document Section, GHQ, on the 8th and 9th of January, 1946. The delivery took place at the former Japanese Military Arsenal in Oji, Tokyo.

19th June, 1947.

MINAMI, Jiro

by

OKAMOTO, Toshio

by

BROOKS, Alfred W.

(4) Sept. 24th

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(16) Nov. 16th

Riku-Man-Den No. 223. From War Minister to Commander of Kwantung Army, re publication of Government statement concerning attack on Ma Chan-shan.

9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge Hyi; Dr. Ao; Mr. Sutton

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT DOIHARA

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

Refer to MINAMI, Jiro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E. P. M.
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

General Jiro MINAMI (Retd.): President, Political Association of Great Japan; former Member Privy Council.

1874 Aug.	Born Oita Prefecture. Son of Kihei Minami. Married Kaku, niece of Yoshikazu Miyazaki.
1895	Graduated Military Academy.
1900	Captain, Company Commander.
1903	Graduated Army Staff College.
1904-05	Company Commander in Russo-Japanese War.
1910	Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry.
1912-13	Instructor Army Staff College.
1914-16	Commander 13th Regiment.
1915	Colonel, Cavalry.
1917-18	Chief, Cavalry Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Department.
1919	Major General.
1919-20	Commander of troops stationed in China.
1921	Commander, Third Brigade, Cavalry.
1922	Commandant, Army Cavalry School.
1923	Commandant, Military Academy.
1924-25	Inspector General of Cavalry.
1926	Commander 16th Division.
1927-28	Vice Chief of General Staff Office.
1929	Commander Chosen Army.
1930	General.
1931	First Inspector Extraordinary; Minister of War in Wakatsuki Cabinet; member Supreme Military Council.
1934-36	Commander in Chief Kwantung Army, concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo.
1936	Retired from active service.
1936-42	Governor General of Korea.
"	Appointed Privy Councilor.
1945 Mar.	President Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seijikai)

Address: Unknown.

As Minister of War in 1931, Minami was responsible for the progressive occupation of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army -- this despite his promises to the Wakatsuki Cabinet that the zone of activities of the Kwantung Army would not be enlarged further. The resultant inability of the government to carry out its promises to the League of Nations brought about the resignation of the Wakatsuki cabinet. While Governor General of Korea, Minami administered the country very strictly, bringing back the so-called "barracks rule". (20)

Minami was chosen from among several prominent Japanese considered for the presidency of the Political Association of Great Japan, organized in March 1945 to supersede the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

Mr. Pauwmer

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
NETHERLANDS DIVISION

14 April 1947

CROSS EXAMINATION - MINAMI -- DIANIPPON SEIJKAI

Very little supplementary information on the Dainippon Seijikai has been obtained since my memorandum of 11 April on the same subject. The following sources of information have been checked:

1. Kido's Diary 1 January to 1 August 1945. No information.
2. Case Files. Only Case File 152, Serial 4 and Case File 358, Serial 1 give any relevant information on the subject.
3. Documents. The only document giving any information on the subject is Document 1694, a Home Ministry file on political activities in 1944 and 1945. The information given below is taken from this document:

FIRM In view of the growing discontent with the management of the war, the Imperial Rule Assistants Political Society (IRAPS) established on December 2, 1944 a "special committee for the establishment of a ~~final~~ domestic structure for final victory." On 17 January 1945 this committee reported that it thought the establishment of a "united front political party" necessary and the IRAA, the IRAPS, and the IRA Manhood Corps would have to be dissolved. In the 86th Session of the Diet on 20 January the problem was discussed but it is not clear what the results of this discussion were. After further negotiations, however, it was finally decided that the proposals of the committee should be carried out, as is clear from the fact that on 31 March the Dainippon Seijikai was formed and the IRAA, the IRAPS, and the IRA Manhood Corps was dissolved.

There is no information as to how the Dainippon Seijikai was financed and if the government gave financial support. The declaration issued at the time of the establishment of the new party states simply that the Dainippon Seijikai is formed to help the country in the critical war situation and to fulfil the great duty of national defense and the establishment of Greater East Asia. The general principles for the policy of the new party were:

1. To maintain the spirit of victory and to establish Greater East Asia.
2. To defend the territory of Japan to the utmost.
3. To observe the spirit of the constitution and to follow the Emperor's policy.

#2 Cross Examination - Minami


14 April 1947

The attached chart shows the organizations of the headquarters of the Dainippon Seijikai. As reported before, branch organizations were established in all prefectures, towns and villages of Japan.

The only further indication that the government had direct control of the Dainippon Seijikai, which has been discovered, is found in a directive of the Chief of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry to all prefectural governors stating that it has been decided to set up branches of the Dainippon Seijikai in all prefectures and urging the governors, "to help and lead the local branches in avoiding the failures of political parties and in cooperating in the national policy."

A. T. Laverge

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE POLITICAL ASSOCIATION OF GREAT JAPAN



For Mr. Tamm

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

The Alleged Letter from Pu Yi to Minami

21 August 1946
pp. 4,115-4,118
pp. 4,120-4,121

22 August 1946
pp. 4,160-4,169
p. 4,199

Tribunal's Directions Concerning the Alleged Letter

22 August 1946
pp. 4,160-4,169
p. 4,199

The Fan in Question

26 August 1946
pp. 4,289-4,294

21 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CHE-CHAN HSIANG

With regard to the report on the handwriting of Henry Pu-Yi, the following is a statement of matters which you may desire to consider:

1) First paragraph, page 4. A statement is made that the characters on the first and second sheets were copied from the questioned document. I assume that the material written on the first and second sheets was dictated to Pu-Yi from the questioned document. If I am correct in this assumption, an appropriate change should be made. The last sentence of this paragraph begins with the words "Pu-Yi wrote." I suggest that you insert after the word wrote the words "the characters".

2) Second paragraph, page 4. I do not understand the purpose in referring to Pu-Yi's handwriting on the fan. If the handwriting on the fan is the proven handwriting of Pu-Yi, then it would be important to compare it with the questioned document in order to determine whether there are similarities in handwriting or whether it is the opinion of the expert that the proven handwriting on the fan was not written by the same person who wrote the questioned document. It would seem that we are missing the point as to the principal value of the handwriting on the fan if it is not considered from this point of view. However, the purpose in comparing the specimens with the handwriting on the fan may have been intended to determine whether Pu-Yi was attempting to disguise his handwriting when he made his specimens. Unless one of these two views are clearly expressed it would seem that we are losing the value of the handwriting on the fan.

Another question occurring to me is that, in view of the language used there may be some doubt that the handwriting appearing on the fan is the genuine handwriting of Pu-Yi. If there is any proof that it is the genuine handwriting then I think the language "supposed to be" should be struck out. The same question arises as to copying characters from the fan as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The third word from the end of the paragraph should be "on" instead of "in".

3) Paragraph marked "1", page 5. Strike the word "some," last word in line one, and substitute the word "an".

4) Paragraph marked "2", page 5. I believe that the contents of this paragraph could be stated in a more direct manner which would give it greater strength. You may give consideration to the following type of description of this phase of the report. The style of handwriting used in the questioned letter is commonly known as the "intermediate style" and the style used by Pu-Yi in his specimen handwriting is commonly known as the "square style." The fact that the questioned letter is in the square style and the handwriting specimens are in the intermediate style does not prevent an adequate comparison for the purpose of determining the genuineness of the questioned letter; however, for the purpose of further comparison we requested Pu-Yi while writing in our presence to write also in the intermediate style. Pu-Yi replied that he was unable to comply with our request as he could not write in the intermediate style. After urging him to make an effort he endeavored to do so by making the following Chinese characters:

Found in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th lines of paper one.

These characters are between the intermediate and running or cursive styles and are poorly formed in my opinion. He is not sufficiently adept in the use of the intermediate style of writing to have written the characters appearing in the questioned letter in intermediate style.

5) Paragraph marked "3" on page 5. Instead of using the words "attached to" in the second line, I suggest the use of the words "forming a part of".

6) Paragraph marked "5" on page 6. I suggest that the words "at one glance" appearing at the very end of the paragraph should be struck. The phrase is rather argumentative in character and may detract some from the strength of the paragraph as a factual statement.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Solis Horwitz
TO: Mr. Comyns Carr
SUBJECT: MINAMI, Jiro

April 15, 1947

On July 29, 1937 ~~Harada~~^{Harada} met with Premier KONOYE and the latter told him:

"A written petition for the movement of establishing a new administration in North China has been issued recently by both MINAMI, the Governor General of Korea, and General UEDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Of course, we need not accept this; however, I think that we may presume this to be a premise to a movement to overthrow the Cabinet."

NOTES ON MINAMI

1. 1 July 1931, speech to Manchurian Railway men, army had long recognized necessity of increasing forces in Korea. (R. 15,752, Ex. 2202-A)
2. 6 Aug. 1931, speech opposing limitation of armaments in view of international attitude to Japan's desires in Manchuria. (R. 2199, Ex. 186; see also R. 2192, Ex. 184)
3. 24 September 1931, Cabinet adopts Kwantung Army's explanation of Mukden incident, (R. 2241, Ex. 189) in spite of reports received by SHIDEHARA from Japanese consuls indicative the contrary. (TANAKA, R. 2006; R. 2178, Ex. 181; R. 15,736, Ex. 2194).
4. In alleged execution of Cabinet desire to stop the proposed incident, he sent Gen. Tatekawa, who was himself one of the conspirators; it seems hard to believe that he did not know this. Tatekawa abstained from delivering the order. (Tanaka, R. 2005) According to Saionji's diary, p. 74, the selection of TATEKAWA to deliver to HONJO a confidential letter containing the Emperor's order that the Kwantung Army should avoid any outbreak, was due to KOISO, then Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, and according to both OKAWA (R. 15581-12, Ex. 2177-A, p. 22) and SAIONJI, was a leader of the plot.
5. The following show that the Cabinet was informed of the intention to set up independent governments in Manchuria and bring in Pu-Yi:-(R. 4363-4402, Ex. 289-294, 300-1, 303-5; R. 15,738, Ex. 2195-6)
6. On 28 Jan. 1932 he spoke before the Emperor on Manchuria and advised making the Sea of Japan into a Japanese lake to facilitate advance into N. Manchuria. (R. 16,213, Ex. 2251).

Dear Mr. Tavenner,

I understand Mr. Horwitz has already covered the subject. However, I still submit it in the hope that for the latter years, 1934-36, it may still serve as a reference for comparing notes.

Yours sincerely,

James Liu

only, with regard to ---

After MINAMI delivered his famous speech to the conference of division commanders on 4 August 1931, SHIDEHARA said that he preferred silence, in spite of MINAMI's attack upon his foreign policy. On 6 August 1931, before the cabinet conference, MINAMI went to see Prime Minister WAKATSUGI and asked him "would you have something for me?" WAKATSUGI replied, "No, nothing very special". As a result of such, MINAMI during the cabinet meeting merely explained that he did not say in such strong terms as the newspapers reported.

In the early part of August, Prince KANIN went to Hokkaido and there he found many army pamphlets. Upon his return to Tokyo, he warned War Minister MINAMI, who in turn informed KOISO, but nothing happened.

On 22 August, 1931, Prime Minister WAKATSUGI spoke to War Minister MINAMI confidentially that he thought MINAMI should be responsible for the army discipline, the March Incident and the Kwantung Army. MINAMI in reply accused Minseito (then the major political party in the Diet) as skillful in using the press against the army which in turn aroused the army to retaliate. MINAMI went back and informed KOISO about the conversation he had with the Prime Minister. He used rather provocative language when referring to the Prime Minister.

After the Manchurian Incident and the troops went from Korea into Manchuria, MINAMI tried hard to get cabinet approval but WAKATSUGI refused. The cabinet meeting merely agreed to pay the expenses without, however, approving the dispatch of the Korean Army. MINAMI again pressed for the reporting of this decision to the Emperor. He was successful this time.

During a cabinet meeting in October 1931, MINAMI said "there is no need for paying deference to the League of Nations; there should be no objection to our seceding from the League. Should Japan be determined to wage war against the whole world, secession can be readily done. I'll excuse myself now because I've been invited to the marriage of Prince HIKEN."

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

14 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner; Judge C. C. Hsiang;
Mr. Solis Horwitz.

FROM : Mr. James Liu.

SUBJECT : Saionji-Harada Memoirs re: MINAMI

This is a summation of Saionji-Harada Memoirs from 1931 to 1937 only, with regard to the accused MINAMI, now on the witness stand.

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In another cabinet meeting in November 1931, MINAMI remarked that the Army had never been so restricted by the Cabinet as it was now. He was retorted by SHIDEHARA.

Around 15 November, MINAMI demanded more reinforcements to be sent to Manchuria. The cabinet forbade the Army to cross the Chinese Eastern Railway in Northern Manchuria and refused to assume the responsibility after the army attacked Chichihar. Meanwhile, extreme groups in the Army demanded MINAMI's resignation for his failure to overcome SHIDEHARA's opposition to the advance of the Army in Manchuria.

In December 1934 MINAMI was appointed the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, after ARAKI failed to get the post himself and blocked MAZAKI from having the same.

In May 1935 MINAMI was reported to be convinced that the National government in China was now very weak; a push from the North would be opportune to make China recognize Manchukuo.

In August 1935, MATSUOKA was appointed the President of the South Manchurian Railway Company upon the recommendation of MINAMI.

In the early Autumn of 1935 there was some talk in Kwantung Army to put Pu Yi back in Peiping and to leave Manchuria entirely in Japanese hands.

In June 1936, after the famous 26 February revolt in Tokyo, War Minister TERAUCHI exerted more control from Tokyo. The Kwantung Army was more cautious. The North China problem was ordered to be entrusted to the Japanese army headquarters in Tientsin instead of the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army tried to initiate a pact to be concluded by Manchukuo and the Eastern Hopei puppet regime. However, Tokyo stopped it.

(It can be seen from the last entry that before June 1936 the North China problem, viz: the North China autonomous movement, the creation of Eastern Hopei puppet regime, the pressure to bring about the local arrangements of postal and telegraphic arrangements between Manchukuo and North China, the smuggle from and to Manchukuo through Eastern Hopei, etc., were entirely in the hands of the Kwantung Army under the command of MINAMI).

17/4

1020

Court Exhibit 2436

Minami

Military N. 39

To: Mr. Kamatsubara, Michitaro, head of the Japanese residents in the Soviet Union.

Forwarded through the Foreign Ministry in USSR.

Top Secret
Army General Staff
Confidential #2081

Instruction
on investigation of special organizations, associations and important individuals who may be used for the gathering of intelligence information, for propaganda and subversive activities. October 6, 1927.

To: Kamatsubara, Michitaro,
Military Attache at the
Japanese Embassy in the USSR.

Minami, Jiro, Deputy Chief of the Army
General Staff (seal)

I request to gather the most detailed information on special organizations, associations, important individuals, etc., who may be used for collecting intelligence information, for propaganda, and subversive activities in concert with various military operations in each informant's areas, and keep sending this information as soon as it is received, according to the following points:

1. Information concerning organizations (associations)
 - The name of the organization (association)
 - Its establishment (objectives)
 - Its program
 - Organizational basis
 - Main leaders and their brief biographies
 - Number of members
 - The whereabouts of the central body and of the branches
 - Source of financial funds, present activities, publications, etc.
 - Present influence and means of spreading it
 - Methods of using it
 - The extent of direct contact with us at present; methods of employment of these organizations; preparation for it in time of peace; and all other necessary information.

2. Information concerning individual persons
 - Name, surname
 - Nationality

Sex
Date of birth (day, month, year),
Occupation
Brief biography and education
Personal qualities
Home conditions
Circle of acquaintances
Special abilities
Has he carried or is he carrying on the work of gathering intelligence information or some other work of special character. If the answer is affirmative, then what is this work and its results.
Knowledge of languages.
How he may be used in future; your intentions for the future.
Other important information

To: Kamatsubara Michitaro, Military Attache of the Embassy in Soviet
Russia.
Confidentially
Top Secret

Minami files
Have Minami's letters

PPS A-2992, 2436 - 7/1994

Revised to

Processing - distribution
Authorized

4-16-47

Minami
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

14 April 1947

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EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY REGARDING

MINAMI, Jiro (GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KOREA).

22nd September, 1931*.

9 o'clock in the morning, I visited Mr. Harada at his official residence. He had just returned from Kyoto. I heard the elder statesman's (Genro) opinion about the matter. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain wanted the Elder Statesman to come to Tokyo. I telephoned Mr. Harada yesterday about this matter. There is no indication that the Genro will come to Tokyo.

I went to the office and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came in too.

At 1.30 I visited Mr. Harada's house again. Konoyo, Sakai, Okabe and Takagi came here. Discussed and studied various things arising from various directions.

The Army's attitude toward Manchuria is very strong. There is an indication of negligence of order delivery from headquarters.

The Emperor hinted to the Prime Minister and to the War Minister that everything was very satisfactory because the government had endeavoured to check this affair from growing larger. He stated that the government should make further effort along the same line. However, it is reported that the Army resented this because the Emperor's words must be a hint of someone else's advice around him. In accordance with this, unless there is no other way, it would be best not to have the Emperor's word from now on. The Genro who seems to have ill-feeling towards the Army should not come up to Tokyo. If he comes, it might make the Army resentment stronger. We agreed that he should not come up at this time.

About 4.30, I again went to the office and met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain. I reported the above matters to them and returned home about 5.

17th October, 1931*

I heard very astounding news from Marquis Inoue. War Minister Minami and other ministers held a very important meeting at the Minister's official residence, lasting from last evening to this morning. Their decision did not come until 3 or 4 this morning, but as its result they had the Kempei-Tai arrest Lt. Cols. Hashimoto and Nomoto and ten other men of the General Staff Hqs. These men planned the coup d'etat, to capture the Army Hqs. (it is said that the date set was the 20th). Their plan was to call the young officers to Kaikosha at noon today and issue orders. In the group was a battalion commander of the Imperial Guard Regiment and he reportedly was in the position to move one or two companies of troops.

28th January, 1932.


From 2 p. m. today, General Jiro Minami delivered his lecture on the latest condition of Manchuria and Mongolia before the Emperor in the Palace. I had the honor to attend the lecture in the Imperial presence.

General Minami recently made a trip to Manchuria. He explained the brave action of Japanese troops and the Japanese people's assistance to Japanese troops in Manchuria. General Minami also said that the Japanese troops in Manchuria had full confidence of victory. Regarding the Japanese national defence question, General Minami urged an early completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway. He said upon the completion of the said railway the Sea of Japan would become like a big lake, thereby giving facilities for Japan to advance on North Manchuria area. Thus our national defence would be renewed.

Other items of General Minami's lecture are summarized as follows:-

- A. Japan-Manchuria Joint Management - To establish a concrete measure against economic blockade from abroad, thereby firmly establishing the way in which Japan can live forever as Japan of the World.
- B. Solution of the Population Problem - It is not so difficult to solve the population problem provided that Japan should establish a colonial troop system in Manchuria concerning emigration.

When a new state is established in Manchuria and Mongolia, I think it is advisable to unify various Japanese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one Japanese organ to be placed under Governor-General. The system of Governor-General should be under the following:



29th June, 1934. (Extract)

At 7 p. m. called on Viscount Otago and there met Mr. Chojuro Onodora, whose story was as follows:- "The responsibility in putting the army into the present condition lies on Masaki and Hata.

"Araki already has lost his popularity since last year.

"At the Divisional Commanders' Conference held this year, several commanders held secret conference among themselves. Since last March, officers between colonel and captain in the army, commander and lieutenant in the Navy and those officers close to Admiral Togo secretly met together and were planning a reform in the military circle and arrived at a conclusion that there was no way but to ask General Minami to accept the post. Regarding this Hayashi and Osumi were not informed.

"There are no officers in the reserve who can control the military and in reforming the army Masaki will have to be eliminated. Unless this is carried out opportunely with the political change, it would be very difficult, for Masaki is one of the three highest ranking army officers. Minami, I believe, will be able to carry out the task.

"Those with whom I consulted, are the principals of the army and all involved in the October Incident. They were against my opinion at first but of late have begun to agree with it. Ugaki hated this main strength of the army, since he had taken an ambiguous attitude at the time of the violation of the Supreme Command. A person who is able to reform the army is either Minami or Iwane Matsui."

5th February, 1935 (Tokyo)

At a dinner party at the Karzen Club, Margue Matsudaira told me about his talk with the Premier. The summary of his report is as follows:

The settlement of the so-called bomb movement will be effected after the completion of the investigation. It is expected that at the end there will be an addition of some 15,000,000 yen in case this should not be satisfactory, the dissolution of the cabinet would be unavoidable. This, however, is the determination of the Premier alone, not the result of any consultation with the other ministers.

As for the 500,000 yen affair supposedly connected with Mr. Tokonami, it is true that Tsuruoka and Akatsuka took hold of the sum; but it was also those two who spent it, and Mr. Tokonami has had nothing to do with its consumption. This incident has been plotted jointly by Kuhara and Mazaki. In fact, the Tokyo Provost Marshal is of late associating with Mazaki, while keeping away from War Minister Hayashi. It is said that Tsuruoka has been in Tokonami's hands as a result of some other incident connected with Tokonami.

The theft of the telegram is also true. The telegram was stolen from General Minami's brief-case on the occasion of the grand manoeuvres at Osaka. In connection with this, if the Premier should be called to account for his having recommended Mr. Tokonami to the Throne as a candidate for premiership, the Premier is determined to give as the reason, the fact that Mr. Tokonami received a portfolio even after the incident. In case the House of Commons should commit Mr. Tokonami for hearing by the Inquiry Committee, it is the determination of the Premier to dissolve the cabinet.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

MINAMI, -- (Governor-General of Korea)

6.7.40 Local condition.

BRIEF

NAME: MINAMI (General Jino)
Age: 71
Interrogated: Yes.

FILE: 76

COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

OUTLINE: War Minister of WAKATSUKI Cabinet during which
MUKDEN INCIDENT occurred.
Commander in Chief of KWANTUNG ARMY (1934-1936)
President of Greater Japan Political Association (1944-1945)

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
1929) 1930) (Dec.)		Commander, Chosen Army			22 Jan P 2.
1931) Apr-) Dec.13)		War Minister under WAKATSUKI			22 Jan P.2 25 Jan P.14
1931) Sept 18)	1	While MINAMI was W/M, Incident 1 occurred		Iyt Report	22 Jan P.2
1931) 1934)		Supreme War Councillor			22 Jan P.2 25 Jan P.17
1934 Dec) 1936 Feb)		Commander in Chief of KWANTUNG ARMY and concurrent Ambassador to Manchukuo (Troops occupied practically all of Manchuria and beyond Great Wall, Army there to preserve independence of Man- chukuo. As Ambassador, directed govern- ment of Manchukuo on such matters as agriculture, transportation, education, etc.			22 Jan P.2 25 Jan P 11
1936) 1942)		Governor General of Korea			22 Jan P.2
1942- 1945 (Mar)		Member of Privy Council			22 Jan P.6
30-3-44) 15-8-45)		Member of Greater Japan Political Associa- tion (President). A certain portion of its aim was to extend the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere			22 Jan P.6

Newspaper Report of Speech on 5.8.31.

Minami, the Minister of War, contradicted the problem on the reduction of armaments in his speech at the Commanders and Divisional Commanders Conference. He showed the army's determination by attacking the government for its cowardliness towards the Manchurian-Mongolian question, saying that the condition in the Manchurian-Mongolian districts is not only getting disagreeable for our country, but is even seeming to get serious.

At this conference all the brains of the army were present. Many gave their opinions on the Manchurian-Mongolian question and they encouraged the government on this question through Minami, expressing firm opinion on the protection of our rights and interests there.

Mr. Higgins

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 March 1946

MEMO TO: Executive Committee
International Prosecution Section

FROM : G. S. Woolworth

SUBJECT: MINAMI, Jiro

1. This is an addenda to my memorandum of 5 March 1946 addressed to Mr. Keenan on the same subject.

2. Attached hereto is Document No. 724 IPS, marked "Exhibit A," with pertinent items checked in pencil. During the period covered by the indicated correspondence, Gen MINAMI was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo.

3. Attached hereto and marked "Exhibit B," is quotation from "Japanese Militarism, Its Cause and Cure" by John M. Maki.

4. Attached hereto and marked "Exhibit C" is copy of newspaper comment on and purported extracts from Gen MINAMI's speech made, while Minister of War, at the Conference of Divisional Commanders, 4 Aug 1934.

5. Following are pertinent excerpts from the testimony of various persons who have been interrogated by this section:

"while War Minister in the WATATSUKI Cabinet, he (MINAMI) was for the increase of Army expenditures." (P 29, KIDO Interrogation 18 Jan, File #5.)

"As War Minister, Gen MINAMI was a strong advocate of Army program in Manchuria and of Army taking over political power." (P 78, 79 KIDO testimony 21 Jan., File #5.)

"MINAMI was persistently advocating the Manchukuo enterprise in the Cabinet." (P 82 KIDO testimony, 21 Jan., File #5).

"MINAMI advocated a more aggressive policy in Manchuria." (P 90-1 KIDO's testimony, 21 Jan., File #5.)

"MINAMI, ARAKI, MASAKI, HASHIMOTO AND NEMOTO were the principal leaders of the Army movement for expansion into Manchuria and possibly China." (P 94, KIDO's Testimony, 21 Jan. File #5.)

"MINAMI in January 1932 delivered an address in which he advocated

Memo to Exec Com.

Subj: MINAMI, Jiro

15 March 1946

further advance in Manchuria, early completion of the Kirin-Kwanis Railway, making the Japan Sea a Japanese Lake, and facilitating the advance into North Manchuria." (P 108, 109 KIDO Testimony, 21 Jan. File #5.)

"MINAMI is responsible for actions committed after he took command (in Manchuria)." (P 2 HIRANUMA's Testimony, 1 Feb 46, File #211.)

"MINAMI, one of the militarists directly responsible for violation of the Nine Power Treaty." (P 5, Testimony of NOMURA, 14 Feb. File #154.)

"MINAMI as War Minister responsible for increase in Army at time of Manchurian Incident." (P 25 Testimony of KURODA, 22 Jan. File #320.)

"100,000 troops sent inat time of Mukden Incident." (P 27, Testimony of KURODA, 22 Jan. File #320.)

"When Vice Chief of Staff, MINAMI, at the time the Sainan Incident took place ... was quick in action, and notable in decision. He adopted a strong attitude when the incident broke out. He at once ordered troops to Shantung for the second time." (MINAMI P 113-114).

"WAKATSUKI Cabinet after the Manchurian Incident was substantially led by Gen MINAMI (was was) firmly of opinion that arms alone could settle the issue finally." (MINAMI P 113-114)

"As Minister of War in speech to Division Commanders, he said "Guard Manchuria, our life line'." (MINAMI P 114)

6. Following are quotations from the testimony of General MINAMI given at conference for the China Incident report. This meeting was held before the Councillors, 9 Dec 1936. In the course of this meeting the following statements were made:

Councillor Mr. EGI:

"It sounds somewhat reasonable that attack should be made under some excuse on Chinchou where Chue Hsue-liang has his base, but great will be the loss of our credit with the League of Nations including the powers. It may be convenient for Japan to have Manchukuo an independent state. But it would not be recognized by the powers. It would be well for Manchurian people to show their movement of independence out of their own accord, but are we not losing general confidence because Japan is charged as acting always under a serious of excuses and self-defense?"

War Minister MINAMI (in reply)

"we have a mind not to give the impression to foreign countries that we have aggressed Manchuria and Mongolia.

Memo to Exec Com.

Subj: MINAMI, Jiro

15 March 1946

Councillor Mr. SAKURAI:

"Since our planes bombed Chinchou, our country quickly lost credit of the League of Nations, which is certainly a matter of regret. Is it because it is considered inevitable by every man?"

War Minister MINAMI (In Reply):

"We too consider it regrettable. However, apparently Europeans and Americans are mistaken in that we made use of such big bombs as used in the European War. Moreover, our Government's frequent announcements that the incident will not be extended caused a strong reaction against their expectation."

Councillor Mr. EGI:

"Regarding my interpolation the other day when I asked a question on the malicious action by some of the young officers of our Army. It is not at all for the maintenance of the military order to leave the matter of punishment in ambiguity. Once they ran off the track, is it not a matter of course that they should be punished? I fear some soldiers may rise up in indignation. It is desirable that such matter should be publicly disposed of."

War Minister MINAMI (In Reply):

"We thank you for reminding us, but the affair is under way. However, the authorities also deem it important to maintain the order. So please leave the matter with the Army." (Doc. #831)

7. It may be noted in passing that other than being a member of the Privy Council from 1942 to 1945 and President of Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai in 1945, Gen MINAMI's activities practically paralleled in time more or less similar activities of Gen MASAKI, Jinsaburo.

a. I recommend Gen MINAMI, Jiro be included in the list of defendants to be indicted.

G. S. WOOLWORTH

JAPANESE MILITARISM
ITS CAUSE AND CURE
By John M. Maki

(Page 212-213)

The conflict over the question of disarmament was clearly highlighted in an address delivered by War Minister General Minami Jiro on August 4, 1931, to the heads of Army divisions. The significance of this address is clearer when it is recalled that it was delivered just six weeks before the outbreak of the "Manchurian Incident". Minami declared that the Army reform that had just been carried out represented the minimum strength of the Japanese Army in terms of its needs. No further reduction was possible, and the money that had been saved by the reduction should be used for other purposes, especially the mechanization of the Army, he said. In regard to expenditures, he declared that those who criticized the Army for being extravagant frequently overlooked the Army's sacrifices.

He also bitterly attacked the whole idea of disarmament, then the subject of world-wide discussion. He asserted that those who advocated disarmament in Japan were indulging in propaganda inimical not only to the interests of the Army, but of the nation as well. He expressed the hope that the divisional commanders he was addressing would "co-operate with the authorities in correcting such mistaken views and in disseminating correct-information regarding the situation of the officers and men" under their command. A final section of his speech dealt with Manchuria and Mongolia. He declared that those two regions had important relations with Japan in the fields of politics, economics, and national defense. He said that as far as Japan was concerned the situation in those regions was serious and was being steadily aggravated. This unfavourable state, he added, was due to the change of the international situation and the decline in Japanese prestige due to the "decrease of the Japanese people's courage and spirit."

Six weeks later, immediately after the "Mukden Incident" which opened the attack on Manchuria, the clash between the Army and the civilian branches of the Cabinet broke out. The Cabinet's view of the situation was that the incident was purely local and could be handled by the Cabinet through normal diplomatic channels. The Cabinet in Tokyo actually killed an Army order issued by War Minister Minami calling for reinforcements to be sent into Manchuria from Kwantung Leased Territory and Korea. Premier Wakatsuki, a civilian, was backed principally by Foreign Minister Shidehara and Finance Minister Inouye, both regarded as anti-militarist and liberal in outlook, as was Wakatsuki.

The Army, however, completely ignored the Cabinet's moderate attitude. It took the stand that the Chinese were entirely to blame for the situation and consequently the world powers could not object to any action taken by the Japanese. China, the Army argument ran, would demand that the Japanese

(Page 212-213 con't)

Army withdraw before any negotiation, but that the latter would not agree to this. Meanwhile, although the Cabinet had killed the Army order for the sending of reinforcements, General Hayashi Senjuro, later to become what has perhaps Japan's most inept premier, took the responsibility of sending reinforcements on his own. The reinforcements were sent, of course, and the Army program for the occupation of Manchuria was carried out without let or hindrance.

(Page 217)

That the mutiny was no free-lance plot of a few super-patriotic young officers was proved by the involvement in the case of Major General Mazaki Jinsaburo, vice-chief of the General Staff. Mazaki worked closely with the young officers involved in the mutiny, and seems to have acted as go-between for them and the Army authorities. He was brought to trial, but was acquitted in September, 1937, because of "insufficient evidence." A Tokyo English-language paper described his opinions as follows: "when he looked at the domestic and international situations, he was concerned over the friction between the military and civil services and between those in high places and those in low places. He also was aware of serious defects in national defense and war preparations, which he feared would entail disadvantages in supporting diplomacy. The only manner in which the situation could be remedied, it seemed to him, was to bring about the formation of a truly strong Cabinet that would possess the moral force and power necessary for enforcement of national policies. He was accustomed to voicing concern over the possibility that if weak and wavering men occupied high places in the government and showed themselves weak in diplomacy, there could be no guaranteeing that there would not be bloodshed, the future of the nation being so beset with sources of worry."

MINAMI'S speech caused a great sensation in government circles. When it was reported that Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA had "explained the speech and requested it should be properly interpreted" at the Vice-Minister's Conference, it was stated in high Army circles that if this really was the Vice-Minister's attitude, it was an exceedingly mistaken one. When asked about this the Vice-Minister denied having used the words "explain" or "properly interpreted", which goes to show that the Army is at one on the matter.

Furthermore, Premier WAKATSUKI showed his cabinet colleagues a passage in the speech which he is to deliver at the MINSEITO Convention in Akita and which runs as follows: "If China acts improperly towards us we shall of course use every resource of diplomacy to counteract this. Moreover, to protect the existence of the State we will spring resolutely to action regardless of what sacrifices it may entail." This shows clearly the attitude of the government on the Manchurian-Mongolian question. All that MINAMI'S speech means is that in conformity with the government policy he has emphasized the need to be ready to spring resolutely to action at this time, and he is not in disagreement with the government. Now since MINAMI actually is a Cabinet Minister it is quite wrong to attack him on the ground that he is unduly interfering in political matters.

War Minister MINAMI made a speech at the Conference of Army Commanders and Commanding Generals of Divisions at the War Ministry 4th August, which lasted 30 minutes. According to a digest of the speech given in the paper he said:

(1) After much consideration it had been decided that a revolutionary army reorganization was necessary. But owing to the financial state of the country, additional funds were not forthcoming to accomplish this, so it must be carried out as far as possible with the normal funds available. This would entail certain reshufflings and diminutions of certain units and he regretted the hardships which the consequent break with traditions would impose on some soldiers.

(2) The Manchurian-Mongolian question. We have a vital interest in these areas, political, economic, and from the point of view of our country's defense. But although these areas have such a close bearing on the existence and development of Japan, our position there has been getting steadily worse. This is due to a policy of exclusiveness, resumption of powers, and economic development fostered and propogandized by a neighboring country (T.N. - China). It is no temporary phenomenon, but one of long standing. The army must be completely prepared to fulfill its duty in this situation.

(3) With regard to the forthcoming International Disarmament Conference, the Army has established a committee to decide upon its policy, which will shortly be announced. Every effort will be made to get the support of government and people.

The above embodies the salient points of the digest of the speech given in the paper. The comments of the paper suggest the report may have been toned down a little, and are as follows:

In the course of his speech, MINAMI opposed the idea of a world limitation of armaments and bitterly complained of the government's spineless attitude on the Manchurian-Mongolian question, allowing the army's stand on the question to be clearly perceived. Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA followed and went into the details in a speech lasting about an hour. The brains of the army are as one, and the various commanders and divisional commanding generals without exception asked questions and expressed their opinions, especially on the Manchurian-Mongolian question, insisting that the War Minister press the government to defend Japan's interests.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION


5 March 1946

MEMO TO: Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel
FROM: G. S. Woolworth
SUBJECT: MINAMI, Jiro (General)

It is noted that the suggested list of defendants submitted by Mr. Justice Mansfield 2 March 1946 does not include the above named General MINAMI. The following brief outline of his activities appears to bring him within the definition of a war criminal as outlined in the charter. The facts listed below are supported by competent evidence:

- 1928 - Vice Chief of Staff at the time Chang-Tso-Lin's train was blown up.
- 1929 - Commander in Chief of Japanese Army in Korea.
- 1931 - Minister of War at time of the occupation of Manchuria.
4 Aug 1931 - Made speech to Division Commanders advocating expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia.
- 1934-1936 - Commander in Chief of Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchuria. Was responsible for the progressive occupation of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army.
- 1942-1945 - Member of Privy Council.
- 1945 - President of Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai, one of the goals of which was to extend the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Further investigation is being made in connection with General MINAMI's probable guilty knowledge of the extension of the opium trade in China.)

General MINAMI was a potent member of the military clique responsible for aggressive warfare in violation of treaties.


G. S. WOOLWORTH

SUGGESTED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MIYAH

(Total 18 pages)

Prepared by **HEHEK**

James T.c. Liu

Chinese Division, IPS.

Saturday, 13 April 1947

COPIES TO:

✓ Mr. Frank S. Tavenner
✓ Judge C.C. Hsiang
✓ Mr. Conyns-Carr
✓ Judge Judson Nyl
✓ Mr. David H. Sutton

To Mr. Sutton

1. I direct Mr. Liu to prepare the accompanying paper under Judge Nyl's supervision.
2. Copies of the same have been delivered to both Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Conyns-Carr.

C. Hsiang

13 April 1947

**LIST OF SUBJECTS TO BE
CROSS-EXAMINED**

From the Chinese Point of View

- I. Administration of Mukden under Japanese Occupation, 1931
- II. Independence Movement in Manchuria, 1931
- III. Tientsin Riot and the Kidnapping of PU YI, 1931
- IV. Alleged Understanding Between China and Japan, 1935
- V. THE 'Independent' 'Manchukuo', 1934-36.
- VI. The Abolition of Special Service in Manchuria, 1935.
- VII. The Chinese Neighbourly Friendship Ordinance, 1935.
- VIII. The Ho-Umesu Agreement and the Ching-Dohihara Agreement, 1935
- IX. The Hopei-Chahar Regime and North China Autonomy, 1935.

LIST OF SOURCE MATERIALS

For the Benefit of the Cross-Examining Counsel
to be brought into the Court-Room

Basic Document:

Lytton Report

Testimonies:

Shing page 2,480-2,481
Kasagi page 2,791-2,794
Pa Yi page 3,992-3,995
Tanaka page 2,028-2,037

Court Exhibits

Exh. 195, letter of NISHIO, record page 2,277
Exh. 211, Chinese Report of Foreign Ministry, record page 2,702
Exh. 240, letter of NISHIO, record page 2,967-2,971
Exh. 300, telegram from KUWASHIMA, record page 4,394-4,398

IPS DOC under processing:

IPS DOC 1767A (apply Miss Barc) -telegram from HAYASHI
IPS DOC 1763 (apply Miss Barc) -Report of Special Service

IPS DOC processed and ready to be introduced:

IPS DOC 1763-A (apply Document Distribution) -ditto

IPS DOC not processed but could be introduced:

IPS DOC 1517 (English newspaper clippings)
IPS DOC 4039 (Photostat from Nuremberg) - German Report

REFERENCE :

"Handbook of New Chinese Current Conditions"(in Japanese)
(apply Chinese Division)

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIR.

I. ADMINISTRATION OF MUKDEN UNDER
JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1931

QUOTATION FROM AFFIDAVIT:

"The cabinet meeting on the same day decided that as the action of the Kwantung Army was a temporary seizure and not an occupation of Manchuria, no military administration was to be established."
(p. 6, bottom, to p. 7, top)

QUESTIONS:

(The suggested line of questioning is to ask MINAMI to give explanations or excuses, and then to counter him with evidences. The main accused to be implicated is DOHIMARA.)

1. If there was no military administration, then what sort of administration was established? (The probable answer will be 'it was a local Chinese administration to assist the Japanese Army in maintaining peace and order'.)
2. Who was the Mayor? (MINAMI has to admit that it was DOHIMARA.)
3. Was DOHIMARA then a Japanese military officer attached to the Kwantung Army?
4. Who served under DOHIMARA in that Administration? (The answer probably be 'the local Chinese'.)
5. Were there some Japanese who filled the more important posts?
6. By whom these Japanese were appointed?
7. Was there only one local Chinese Committee? Was this Committee supported by the Japanese Army? Was it true that this Committee was controlled by DOHIMARA who was in turn under the direct command of the Kwantung Army? Was it true that any other Chinese Committee was not allowed to exist?
8. Later, who succeeded DOHIMARA as Mayor of Mukden, was it a Chinese? Did you know how he was appointed?
9. Did the Cabinet ever inquire into the actual state of administration in Mukden? Did you as War Minister ever inquire into the actual state of affairs whether the officers of the Kwantung Army followed the Cabinet decisions?

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

Lytton Report, DOHIMARA was the Mayor of Mukden after the Incident.

IPS DOC 1767A (in process now, not yet introduced)

1767A-5, original number, 2-124, dated 21 Sept 1931, the important posts were filled by Japanese appointed by Army.

1767A-6, original number, 4-1-60, dated 28 Sept 1931, DOHARA told Morioka that he was guiding the local Chinese Committee.

1767A-7, original number, 4-1-88, dated 4 Oct 1931, DOHARA ordered the local Chinese Committee, against the wish of its own, to set up the Board of Finance and the Board of Industry.

1767A-8, original number, 11-26-19, dated 6 Oct 1931, DOHARA prohibited the setting up of another Chinese Committee, saying that Army must support the only Committee which he controlled.

1767A-9, original number, 18-2-5, dated 16 Oct 1931, DOHARA formed the secret plan of appointing a Chinese Mayor and turned the Japanese officials into advisors.

1767A-10, original number, 18-2-11, dated 19 Oct 1931, a Chinese Mayor was appointed only at the insistence of DOHARA.

* The IPS DOC 1767A, being the telegraphic reports of Consul General HAYASHI to the Foreign Minister, SHIDEHARA, is now under processing. It is suggested that the originals, without translation, can also be used in Court with an oral translation. The Tribunal has already indicated that such is admissible, in view of the sudden appearance of the witness and the corresponding mechanical difficulties.

II. INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN MANCHURIA

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

"Further, on Sept 26, the Cabinet passed a decision prohibiting Japanese participation in the movement to establish a new government in Manchuria, and telegraphic instructions to this effect were sent by the Foreign Ministry ...and to the Kwantung Army by myself." (p. 7)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

1. Was there a Self-Government Guiding Board? By whom was it financed? ~~When was it established?~~ When was it established?
2. Who were the staff ~~members~~ members of this Board? Chinese or Japanese?
3. Were there many local autonomous guiding committees in various parts of ~~an~~ occupied Manchuria?
4. Did you know who directed this local autonomous movement or these local autonomous guiding committees?
5. Was it true that the local Committee at Mukden declared independence in Nov 1931?
6. Did you know how it declared independence? or did you know the circumstances of its ~~such~~ declaration of independence?
7. Did you ever investigate or cause it to be investigated whether your order to the Kwantung Army not to participate in the movement of independence in Manchuria was followed?
8. Did you know that early in Oct 1931 there was already an idea among the staff members of the Kwantung Army to utilize PU YI?

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THESE QUESTIONS:

KASAGI's testimony, Record page, 2,791-2,794

The Self-Government Guiding Board was established as early as Sept 1931. It was financed by the Kwantung Army. ITAGAKI directed the plan and DOHIMARA supplied the 'friendly' Chinese. About 90% of the staff were Japanese.

Lytton Report

The said Board fostered and developed 'independent movement'.

IPS DOC 1767A (in processing now, not yet introduced)

1767A-11, no number in original, dated 28 Oct 1931, the local autonomous guiding committees were controlled by Japanese, including the Japanese military police under orders from the Japanese chief of staff and the Japanese employees of the South Manchurian Railway who belonged to the Youth League.

1767A-12, original number, 4-1-264, dated 7 Nov 1931, at the pressure and the insistence of the Kwantung Army, the local committee at Mukden declared itself independent from the National Government.

1767A-17, original number 4-1-205, dated 27 Oct 1931, the staff members of Kwantung Army was in favor of utilizing FU YI.

III. TIENHSIN RIOT AND THE KIDNAPPING OF PU YI

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

"IN the later part of November, when a riot broke out among Chinese troops in Tientsin, .." (page 10)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

(The riot in question, in the first place, was not in the later part of November, but in the early middle part of November; and in the second place, the riot was not among the Chinese troops, but by the Japanese bribed and paid elements, harboured in the Japanese concession of Tientsin, against the regular Chinese troops in the Chinese city of Tientsin. It was engineered by DOHARA.)

1. Did you know what were the Chinese troops involved in this riot?
2. Did you know what was the cause or who caused the riot?
3. Are you sure that the riot was in the later part of November? but not in the early middle part of November?
4. Did you know that during the time of the riot, some one from the Kwantung Army had arrived in Tientsin?
5. Did you know that during the riot, PU YI was taken ^{away} from Tientsin?
6. Did you as War Minister cause an investigation to be made ⁽¹⁾ as to the cause ⁽²⁾ and any Japanese participation in the riot? ⁽³⁾ as to the departure of PU YI from Tientsin ~~the~~ for the Japanese occupied Manchuria?

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

Exhibit 300, Record pp. 4,394-4,398 . telegram from Tientsin Consul KUNASHIMA, dated 17 Nov 1931.

"The object of DOHARA's arrival in Tientsin, in which he embodied the intentions of the Kwantung Army, was in the speedy inticement of the former Emperor Hsuang Tung (PU YI) which was to serve as a promise for the establishment of the independent state of Manchukuo...He repelled all intervention and remonstrance; and at times, knowingly that it was against the national policy, he would resort to all sorts of plots under the secret support of influential politicians with determination that it was unavoidable for him to take free activities from the standpoint of the Kwantung Army. And without regard to means, he finally caused a riot to occur on the 8th...he took the opportunity of the riot throughout the city and carried out resolutely the Emperor's passage

Eduato
and...
...

to Manchuria. His desperate actions are beyond our imaginations. A secret investigation of his plotted schemes revealed that he first attempted to contact the An-Fu faction on his arrival in Tientsin, but because they did not comply, he finally contacted and persuaded CHANG-PI, who had connections with the Peace Preservation Corps of this City and LI CHI CHUN, who is deeply connected with the Tsin-pang secret society and rogues in the city, andto bribe the Peace Preservation Corps; and buy off the 'plain clothes' organization and the troops of Liu Sue Chung. He supplied them with 50,000 taels as working funds, and using two or three men of the garrison troops, let them secretly provide LI with armaments sent by the Kwantung Army. There are unmistakable proofs that he had them participate in all of the riots plotted.

"... Despite our warnings, the army totally denied their implication, but the actual fact was that they have already decided to carry out the riot at 10:00 p.m. of the 8th. They seem to be in a predicament they could not emerge. ...The Peace Preservation Corps did not rally as anticipated. Therefore, despite the activities of the plain clothes organization, the riot ended in a complete failure."

IV. ALLEGED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1935

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

"In January of the following year (1935), Foreign Minister HIROTA declared in the Diet the policy of amity toward China and on Feb. 3, replied thereto came from General CHIANG Kai-shek, Mr. WANG Ching-wei and Mr. SUN Fo, thus bringing about mutual understanding between China and Japan. This was followed by the satisfactory conclusion of various agreements between Manchukuo and China relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters." (p. 12 bottom to p. 13 top)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

(That the ~~the~~ above passage is a distortion of facts. There was never any mutual understanding between China and Japan at any time after 1931. There ~~was never~~ was never any formal reply to HIROTA's speech. It was true that certain arrangements were made by the local north China authorities with Japanese military authorities with regard to customs and postal and telegraphic matters. But it was not between China as a State, in the first place, and never with Manchukuo, in the second place. Further more, the agreements in question preceded, instead of followed HIROTA's speech.)

1. Did you know when the various agreements relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters were made? Was it not in ~~December~~ December 1934?
2. Did you know that Manchukuo was not a party to these agreements?
3. Did you know that ~~these~~ these agreements were the results of Japanese pressure or particularly, the pressure of the Kwangtung Army under ~~your command~~?
4. How did you learn ^{of} the replies from the Chinese leaders to HIROTA's speech? Did you know the contents?
5. Can you tell ^{the Tribunal} you more concretely ~~what was~~ ^{about} the contents of the ~~so called~~ mutual understanding between China and Japan as you said?

EVIDENCES IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

Book, "Handbook of New Chinese Current Conditions" (1938, published by the Eastern Asia DO-BUN-KAI, with a preface by Prince Konoye, also an introductory remark which said that the book was prepared under the supervision of the then vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Matsumoto.) This book is in the possession of the Chinese Division. On page 3, in Japanese, it gives the following information.

"The Agreement to connect the ~~main~~ main, or railway, between Mukden on the one hand and Peiping and Tientsin on the other, was made in

in June 1934 and became effective from 1 July 1934.
The postal agreement was made in Dec. 1934 and effective
in January of the following year."

IPS DOC 1763, being Reports of Mukden Special Service, under
DOHIEARA, 1934, an excerpt (under request by the Chinese Division
to be processed) revealed that the agreements were made at the
pressure of the Kwantung Army.

XXXX

Exh. 240, 2Record page 2,967-2,971, being a letter from NISHIO, Toshizo, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to FURUSO, Mikio, Vice War Minister, dated 25 Oct 1935, with regard to the plans for controlling organs directing public opinion in Manchuria.

MIYAMA should be asked; in addition to the above:

1. Was NISHIO your Chief of Staff when you were Commander of the Kwantung Army?
2. Was it customary for him to follow your stern instructions?
3. Was it customary for him to write to vice War Minister in Tokyo without your approval?
4. Was NISHIO in charge of controlling the public opinions in Manchukuo?
5. Was it a part of NISHIO's duty under you as Commander to control the organs directing the public opinion in MANCHURIA?

VI. THE ABOLITION OF SPECIAL SERVICE IN
MANCHURIA, 1935

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

" I abolished the Special Service Department of the Army"
(page 13, last line)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

1. When was that first established?
2. For what purpose was it established?
3. Why did you abolish it? Was it because it meddled with the Manchukuo Government? Was it because it dealt in narcotic and opium traffic? Was it because it engaged in smuggling between Manchuria and ~~China~~ north China? Was it because it had many ~~renin~~ (bad elements, or adventurers) in it? Did it engage in north China autonomous work?
4. After its abolition, the duty formerly undertaken by this organization, to which department of the Army was it transferred?
5. Did you know whether the Special Service Department of other Japanese armies in China was abolished or not? (may be he would answer that he knew that the other were not abolished, in that case, a further question must be put, for the advantage of later cross-examination in China Phase, why it was not? What were their duties in China?)

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

IPS DOC 4039, from Nurenburg, on page 3 of the Document Analysis Sheet.

"b. Appendix to Tsingtao, report of 27 Jan 1937, being a translation of a recent secret report by Japanese Major General MATSUMURA to the Kwantung Army.

"(1) Smuggling: the smuggling of Japanese goods into China is a good trick, the aim being to hasten the establishment of a special regime in North China under the control of the Japanese."

IPS DOC 1763A, Report of the Special Service Department at Mukden under DOHIMARA, in April 1934. ALREADY PROCESSED. READY TO BE INTRODUCED. revealed that it was working to establish a rebellious Chinese Army, supported by the Japanese and given financial and military aid by the Japanese, to overthrow the legitimate government in north China.

VII. THE CHINESE NEIGHBOURLY FRIENDSHIP ORDINANCE
10 June 1935

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

"In June, General CHIANG Kai-shek promulgated the Neighbourly Friendship Ordinance which greatly stimulated the growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China." (p. 14, middle)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

1. Did you know why that Ordinance was promulgated?
2. Was it a fact that this Ordinance was promulgated a few days after the HO-UMEZU Agreement in north China?
3. Did the content of this Ordinance mention specifically Japan?
4. What was the friendly sentiments between Japan and China which you referred to? Did you mean the autonomous movement in North China? Did you mean the withdrawal of the Chinese Central Army from North China? Did you mean the establishment of the Eastern Hopei Anti-Commintern Autonomous Council?

EVIDENCES IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

Testimony of CHING, record page 2,480-2,481, reveals that it was phrased in a way to caution the Chinese people, especially the Chinese Army, against sentimental extremities, but did not mention Japan.

Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that after which there was any growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China.

VIII. THE HO-UMEZU AGREEMENT AND
THE CHING-DOHARA AGREEMENT

QUOTATION FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

" the so-called Umesu-Ho Yin Chin, Dohihara-Ching Te Shuan and other agreements were concluded. With regard to these agreements I received reports that they were concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere." (page 14, middle)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

1. Would you please describe how exceedingly friendly the atmosphere was? Did you receive a report of the contents of Ho-Umesu Agreement?
2. Did you mean that the Governor of Hopei Province, General YU Hsueh-chung, was dismissed in an exceedingly friendly way?
3. Did you mean that the arrest of ^{the so called} anti-Japanese elements and the closure of anti-Japanese organizations were gladly agreed upon by the Chinese in an exceedingly friendly way?
4. Did you mean that the removal of the troops of the National Government from North China was agreed upon in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere?

THE DEFENSE COUNSEL MIGHT OBJECT THAT THESE QUESTIONS WERE ARGUMENTATIVE, BUT, IN OUR SUBMISSION, WE ARE TRYING TO ASCERTAIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WITNESS AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE HO-UMEZU AGREEMENT, AND ALSO TO DETERMINE THE EXACT MEANING OF THE WORDING 'EXCEEDINGLY FRIENDLY'.

5. Did you ever see a signed document, known as the Ho-UMEZU agreement or did you ever hear that there was one?
6. Did you know that the so-called agreement was no agreement at all, but a series of Japanese demands which the Chinese accepted?

EVIDENCES IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

Testimony of TANAKA, page 2,036, "Army under the jurisdiction of the Nanking Regime evacuated from North China to the south."

The contents or the provisions of the so-called Ho-Umesu Agreement, in fact, the Japanese demands acceded to, were not introduced, but may be found in a semi-official Japanese publication, in the possession of the Chinese Division, "The New Chinese Current Situation", published by the Eastern Asia Co-Bun-Kai, under the supervision of the Vice Foreign Minister, 1938, with a preface of Prince Konoye.

ADDITIONAL QUESTION AND INFORMATION:

1. Did you know that the Japanese set a time-limit for the Chinese to accept the demands later known as the Ho-Umezu Agreement?

SOURCE: SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIR, June 1935, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army at Tientsin; SAKAI, reported success of the demands upon the Chinese. The General Staff Headquarters sent instructions to him to demand the removal of Chinese military police, blue shirts, and General Yu Hsueh Chung, also to set a time-limit for its acceptance, with the specification that no further action should be taken by SAKAI, without further orders from Tokyo.

IX. THE HOPEI-CHAHAR REGIME

QUOTATIONS FROM THE AFFIDAVIT:

"I heard that the formation of the Hopei-Chahar regime toward the end of the same year was at the initiative of the Chinese Government." (page 15, bottom)

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS:

1. In later part of 1935, was DOHARA attached to the Kwantung Army under your command? Was he sent by you to North China?
2. Did you know that DOHARA pressed General ^{Che - Yuan} Sung to form a completely autonomous Government in the five-provinces in North China? with Japanese troops concentrated a division at Shanhaikuan?
3. Did you know that DOHARA announced in North China that five Japanese divisions would be sent to North China if the autonomy was not proclaimed?
4. Did you know that around 20 Nov 1935, the ^{Japanese} Army pressed the ^{Japanese} Navy to move fleet to North China but the Navy refused?
5. Did you know that the Eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council was created in the later part of November, 1935?
6. Did DOHARA upon his return to Manchuria report to you, as Commander of Kwantung Army, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Eastern-Hopei Regime under the Japanese and the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar under the Chinese?
7. Did you know that your Chief of Staff, NISHIO, was working for the disintegration of China from the National Government?
8. Was it true that because the Hopei-Chahar Regime was not ^{run} entirely in conformity with the wish of the Japanese, the people around ARAKI and MAZAKI put the blame of failure upon you?
9. Was it true that DOHARA even hoped that FU YI, then Emperor of Manchukuo, should be made to enter North China?

EVIDENCES IN SUPPORT OF THE QUESTIONS:

IPS DOC 1517, not yet introduced, being Newspaper clippings from September to November, 1935.

Nov 18, Evening post.

Nov 18th, 1935, Evening Post, General DOHARA, the Lawrence of Manchuria, announced that if autonomy for the North was not proclaimed, he was prepared to send five Japanese divisions into Hopei and six into Shantung, to split these key provinces off from the rest of China.

Nov 19th, 1935, Evening Post, The Japanese had already concentrated a division at Shanhaikuan last night and were prepared to march on Tientsin and Peiping. But General Sung Che-Yuan negotiated with General DOHARA and General TADA and managed temporarily to prevent the advance.

Nov. 19, 1935, Daily News, General DOHARA since Nov. 1, has been pressing General Sung to form a completely autonomous government including the provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Chahar and Suiyuan... "The Japanese had already concentrated troops at Shanhaikuan (gateway into North China from Manchukuo) and were prepared to march on Tientsin and Peiping last night," HSIANG** said, "we managed to avert this by last-minute negotiations with general DOHARA and Major General TADA, Hayao, the Japanese Commander."
(** Hsiao was the diplomatic man of General Sung.)

Nov. 19, 1935, Evening Post. General DOHARA is prepared to annex North China into Manchukuo and move Emperor Kang Teh (the former Emperor Henry Pu Yi) from Hsinking to Peiping.

Nov. 20, 1935, Evening Post, the Ultimatum given north China authorities by Major General DOHARA... expires at noon tomorrow. DOHARA demanded formal proclamation of the autonomous state.

Nov. 20, 1935, Daily News, Major General DOHARA, chief of the political agent of the Japanese army, who is credited with promoting the whole scheme, told the newspapermen last night that Chinese plans for an autonomous North China Council have been completed. "I expect formal announcement of the new regime shortly," DOHARA continued.

Nov. 20, 1935, Herald Express, DOHARA, ... did not even have the wholehearted support of General MINAMI, Jiro, head of Japan's Kwantung Army, in his almost successful move to carry out another Manchukuo. General MINAMI, hero of the Manchukuo campaign, sent troops to Shanhaikuan on the great wall only when it appeared that DOHARA was about to win.

Nov. 27, 1935, New York Times, The formation of the Eastern Hopei Autonomous State, inaugurated yesterday is only the beginning of a widespread self-government movement in North China, it was declared by Lt. Col. Tan TAKAHASHI, Japanese Military Attache here.

Nov. 26, 1935, Washington Post, Martial law earlier had been declared at Shanhaikuan, gateway to Manchukuo. Telegrams to all leading Japanese officials urging that Japan send armed forces into north China immediately... were sent to....

Nov. 26, 1935 New York Herald Tribune, same as above, indicating that telegram for military aid was sent to MINAMI. Also Nov. 26, 1935, New York Times, same and MINAMI's name also appeared.

THIS DOCUMENT, IPS DOC 1517, ALTHOUGH NOT PROCESSED, CAN BE INTRODUCED ANY MOMENT, BECAUSE IT CONTAINS ENGLISH NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS IN THEIR ORIGINAL PRINT.

Exh. 211, being a report of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Record Page 2,702, described the establishment of the Eastern Hopei puppet regime in the demilitarized zone of the Tangku Truce.

Exh. 195, Record Page 2,277, a letter from HISHIO, Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, under MINAMI, to FURUSO, vice Minister of War, dated 9 Dec 1935 and received 12 Dec 1935, concerning propaganda to be employed in China to sever allegiance to the central Government and make the Chinese believe the Japanese are 'liberators'.

TESTIMONY of TAHAKA,

Record Page 2,028 DOHIHARA was sent by Kwantung Army, but after his arrival in north China, came under the command of Lt. Gen. TADA in north China.

Record Page, 2,033-4:

"Q. Will you state, if you know, who originated the autonomous movement in the first instance?

"A. The Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, General MINAMI, and the commander of Japanese forces stationed in North China, Lt. Gen. UMEZU..."

Record Page 2,034

DOHIHARA "was sent to Peking on the order of General MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army."

Record page 2, 036-7

DOHIHARA "didn't talk to me directly, but I was present when he reported to Commander-in-Chief MINAMI.

"Q. What did he say in your presence?"

"A. That the Hopei-Chahar Regime and the East Hopei Regime though unsatisfactory, had been established and would more or less obey the demands of the Kwantung Army, and that the North China Regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar Regime as its core.

.....

.....

(DOHIHARA's duty) " to control its politics and economics, in accordance with Japanese hopes."

SAIONJI HARADA MEMOIR:

Around 20 Nov 1935, Army pressed Navy to move fleet to North China, but Navy refused.

Premier OKADA remarked that less harm was done by spending the Army money in North China than by spending this money on the rightists in Japan proper.

General Staff issued orders that no troop should cross the Great Wall without Imperial Command.

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIR (continued)

Early December 1935, the North China crisis and the autonomy was considered to be a failure. ARAKI and MAZAKI factions blamed
~~MIHAMI~~ MIHAMI

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS BASING ON SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIR:

1. Did you know that in Nov. 1935, there was a rapproachment negotiation between China and Japan, but the Chinese charge d'affaire in Tokyo informed SHIGEMITSU that the negotiation could not go on, with the North China situation in such a bad state?
2. Did you know that ^{the} American charge d'affaire in Tokyo asked the Japanese Government whether it had any intention to dispatch troops to North China?

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
NETHERLANDS DIVISION

11 April 1947

CROSS EXAMINATION MINAMI - DAINIPPON SEIJIKAI

The Dainippon Seijikai is dealt with in paragraph 12, page 17 of MINAMI's affidavit. It would be useful to try to bring out the following points in cross examination.

The affidavit states that the Dainippon Seijikai was established on 13 March 1945 to replace the Imperial Rule Assistants Political Society (IRAPS). The IRAPS however was nothing more than the political branch of the IRAA, which was a complete national movement and the Dainippon Seijikai replaced not only the IRAPS but also the IRAA and the IRA Manhood Corps. These three organizations had friction amongst themselves and it was therefore decided to dissolve them and establish one organization to lead the people and give general political direction to the country. The Dainippon Seijikai was like the IRAA the only political movement allowed in Japan. It was sponsored by the government and MINAMI was nominated as president by the government and the members of the Diet. The Diet, of course, was completely under the control of the government through the elections of April 1942. The new party was to be organized on an autocratic basis and was to lead the people on to victory. Further information is still being collected. However, the following points for cross examination are tentatively submitted:

1. Witness states that the IRAPS was formed during the Konoye Cabinet by the dissolution of all political parties. Doesn't he mean that the IRAA was formed at that time? Wasn't the IRAPS formed in May 1942 under the Tojo Cabinet after all political parties had already been dissolved for a year and a half?
2. Isn't it true that at the end of 1944 the three most important political bodies in Japan were the IRAA and its two sub-organizations, the IRAPS and the IRA Manhood Corps? Isn't it true that there was considerable friction between the leaders of these three organizations as to the policy to be followed by the government in the prosecution of the war? Isn't it true that the Dainippon Seijikai was formed to replace all three organizations to suppress the internal dissention and to unite the people behind the government in the last stages of the war?
3. Isn't it true that the Dainippon Seijikai was formed by or on instigation or with approval of the government - that you were appointed president by or on instigation of the government and that all of its officials had to be approved by the government? If any of this is true, how then can you state that the Dainippon Seijikai was not a government serving organization?