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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 348
~~(CHILD FROM #2)~~

PLACE Tokyo, Japan
DATE 10 November 1945

Division of Origin Capital Equip & Construction

Subject: Fuji Electric Co.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Mr. WADA - President of Co.

Where interviewed Meiji Bldg (Room 361)

Interrogator Pfc Jacobson

Interpreter None

Allied Officers Present S/Sgt G.L. Stauffer

Summary:

Discussion on the production of electrical equipment, attempts toward dispersal, the results of bombings and difficulties encountered.

DISTRIBUTION 1 ALL DIVISIONS

RESTRICTED

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION BRANCH
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

MIJ/gls

10 November 1945

FUJI ELECTRIC CO.

It is estimated that production of electrical machinery would have continued to rise if air raids had not occurred. From 45 to 50% of subcontractors were damaged. Fuji was dependent on them to the extent of approximately 30%.

Even though the amount of acquired material went down production still continued to rise because of use of stock on hand. 1942 was the peak for iron and steel production. The first quarter of 1945 was the point of peak production for Fuji. It was stated that if there had been no damage by air attacks and the war lasted another year, capacity production could still have been maintained (this is based on one-shift capacity).

Shortages of materials such as small wires, mica, and transformer oils started to be felt in 1943. Transportation difficulties in motor trucks and railways were seen in 1944 and 1945. Trucks were needed to get materials to subcontractors. After the bombings transportation became critical because the armed forces confiscated all remaining transportation that was not destroyed.

Research. Study was confined to substitutes for raw materials. Better methods of making small wire was stressed. There was very little assistance from the government except for help to procure raw materials, according to Wada.

Expansion of industry. New buildings were added along with more machinery and more labor was hired. Production capacity was based on a one-shift day. Overtime for workers was prevalent (10 to 13 hour working day) since the beginning of 1945. The machine tool section of the company worked on a two-shift basis because of the shortage of machine tools. The reason that a double shift was not established was because of shortage of food and housing and heating facilities.

New construction was confined to wood because of the shortage of concrete and steel. Demand for power was steadily increasing in Japan before the war so when the war broke out there were stock piles of power equipment available.

Dispersal. Dispersal started early in 1945 but did not contribute toward production except to protect material and machines. Raw materials were scattered as a means of dispersal but this was limited because of transportation difficulties. Light machinery was dispersed by moving

machines to other factories of the firm. There was little underground storage of material because of deterioration to materials by putting them underground. No machinery was placed underground by the Fuji Company.

Government plans bureau generally gave industry a high production goal. This goal was never attained but the firm usually came within 70% of that wanted by the government.

It took about 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ years to get large machines after ordering them. Imported machines were of a higher standard than machines made in Japan.

(A detailed explanation of the control system for the electrical industry in 1937-1945 was obtained from Mr. WADA. It is intricate and will not be explained here. Any person interested can obtain information on it in Room 361, Meiji Building).

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