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REPORT

*1/2 Revised*  
OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE

ON

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,

AT THE

SECOND SESSION THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS.

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RED RIVER EXPEDITION.  
FORT FISHER EXPEDITION.  
HEAVY ORDNANCE.

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WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.  
1865.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 20, 1865.

*Resolved by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to complete their investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, they be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate.*

*Resolved further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the War five thousand copies for the use of the Senate and ten thousand copies for the use of the House of Representatives.*

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, March 1, 1865.

*Resolved, That this House do concur in the foregoing resolution with the following amendment: Strike out the words "thirty days" and insert the words ninety days in lieu thereof.*

Attest:

EDWARD McPHERSON, *Clerk.*  
By CLINTON LLOYD, *Chief Clerk.*

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SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1865.

*Resolved, That the Senate agree to the foregoing amendment of the House of Representatives.*

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

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I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original resolution and the amendment of the House thereto and the concurrence of the Senate therein.

J. W. FORNEY,  
*Secretary of the Senate of the United States.*

# RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

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THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *December 6, 1864.*

On motion of Mr. Spalding,

*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be requested to inquire into the causes of the disastrous issue to the Red River campaign, under Major General Banks, and to report thereon at their earliest convenience.

Attest:

EDWARD McPHERSON, *Clerk.*

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report :

At the time General Banks was appointed to the command of the department of the Gulf, the following instructions were given him:

‘ HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“ *Washington, D. C., November 9, 1862.*

“ GENERAL : The President of the United States having assigned you to the command of the department of the Gulf, you will immediately proceed, with the troops assembling in transports at Fort Monroe, to New Orleans, and relieve General Butler. An additional force of some ten thousand men will be sent to you from Boston and New York as soon as possible.

“ The first military operations which will engage your attention on your arrival at New Orleans will be the opening of the Mississippi and the reduction of Fort Morgan or Mobile city, in order to control that bay and harbor. In these expeditions you will have the co-operation of the rear-admiral commanding the naval forces in the Gulf and the Mississippi river. A military and naval expedition is organizing at Memphis and Cairo to move down the Mississippi and co-operate with you against Vicksburg and any other point which the enemy may occupy on that river. As the ranking general in the southwest, you are authorized to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command. The line of division between your department and that of Major General Grant is therefore left undecided for the present, and you will exercise superior authority as far north as you may ascend the river.

“ The President regards the opening of the Mississippi river as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it.

“ This river being opened, the question arises how the troops and naval forces there can be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy of your attention :

"First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly east to destroy the railroads at Jackson and Marion, and thus cut off all connexion by rail between northern Mississippi and Mobile and Atlanta. The latter place is now the chief military depot of the rebel armies in the west.

"Second, to ascend with a naval and military force the Red river as far as it is navigable, and thus open an outlet for the sugar and cotton of northern Louisiana. Possibly both of these objects may be accomplished if the circumstances should be favorable.

"It is also suggested that having Red river in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas.

"It is believed that the operations of General Rosecrans in East Tennessee, of General Grant in northern Mississippi, and of General Steele in Arkansas, will give full employment to the enemy's troops in the west, and thus prevent them from concentrating in force against you; should they do so, you will be re-enforced by detachments from one or more of these commands.

"These instructions are not intended to tie your hands or to hamper your operations in the slightest degree. So far away from headquarters, you must necessarily exercise your own judgment and discretion in regard to your movements against the enemy, keeping in view that the opening of the Mississippi river is now the great and primary object of your expedition; and I need not assure you, general, that the government has unlimited confidence not only in your judgment and discretion, but also in your energy and military promptness.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK,

"*General-in-Chief.*"

"Major General N. P. BANKS, *Commander.*"

After the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson the attention of the government was again turned to operations west of the Mississippi. On the 6th of August, 1863, General Halleck telegraphed to General Banks:

"There are important reasons why our flag should be hoisted in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Commodore Farragut will co-operate. There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible."

At that time General Banks favored a movement by sea into Texas. General Halleck favored a movement by way of the Red river, but left General Banks free to adopt such route as he deemed best, as will appear from the following:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"*Washington, D. C., August 10, 1863.*"

"GENERAL: In my despatch to you of the 6th instant, sent by the direction of the Secretary of War, it was left entirely to your own discretion to select any point for occupation in Texas, either on the seaboard or in the interior, the only condition imposed being that the flag of the United States should be again raised and sustained somewhere within the limits of that State.

"That order, as I understood it at the time, was of a diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications.

"The effect and force of that order are left precisely as they were on its issue. The authority conferred on you by it is not in the slightest degree changed.

"You will, therefore, consider the following remarks as suggestions only, and not as instructions:

"In my opinion neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it is necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to *some one point* in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up the Red river to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas. This would be merely carrying out the plan proposed by you at the beginning of the campaign, and, in my opinion, far superior in its military character to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola. Nevertheless, your choice is left unrestricted.

"In the first place, by adopting the line of the Red river you retain your connexion with your own base, and separate still more the two points of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcements from Texas. They are already cut off from the rebel States east of the Mississippi.

"If you occupy Galveston or Indianola you divide your own troops and enable the enemy to concentrate all of his forces upon either of these points, or on New Orleans.

"I write this simply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK,

*"General-in-Chief."*

"Major General N. P. BANKS,

*"Commanding Department of the Gulf."*

Much correspondence ensued between General Halleck and General Banks, which is given at length in the testimony herewith submitted. General Banks proceeded to carry out his idea of a movement upon Texas by sea, which, however, failed of accomplishing any substantial results.

Attention was again directed towards the Red river line of operations. The correspondence between General Halleck, General Banks, General Grant, General Sherman, and General Steele, in relation thereto, is submitted herewith.

Arrangements were finally made by which General Banks was to furnish for the expedition such troops as could be obtained within his department; General Sherman was to furnish 10,000 men from his command, under General A. J. Smith; General Steele, with a column of 10,000, was to join the expedition at some point on the Red river; and Admiral Porter was to accompany the expedition with a sufficient naval force. The 17th of March, 1864, was fixed upon as the time when the naval force and the infantry under General Banks and General A. J. Smith should meet at Alexandria, on the Red river.

Admiral Porter and General A. J. Smith arrived at Alexandria at the time appointed; General Smith capturing Fort De Russy on his way up, and Admiral Porter clearing out the obstructions in the river. The forces under General Banks did not all reach Alexandria until about the 26th of March. General Banks says he was detained in New Orleans, by order of the President, to arrange for a civil organization of the State, and that General Franklin, to whom he intrusted the movement of the troops by land to Alexandria, did not start at the proper time, in consequence of rains and other reasons.

General Franklin says that he was not informed until the 10th of March of the time appointed for the rendezvous at Alexandria, and that on the 10th only 3,000 of the troops to form the column were at Franklin, from which place the column was to move. The troops commenced their march on the 13th or 14th of March, but being 175 miles from Alexandria the advance did not reach there until the 25th of March.

This delay in arriving at Alexandria, however, does not seem to have retarded the progress of the expedition, for the water in the Red river was exceedingly low for the season of the year. The vessels of the naval portion of the expedition were unable to get above the falls until near the 1st of April.

The force assembled at Alexandria was composed as follows : under General Banks, the 19th corps, commanded by General Franklin, a portion of the 13th corps, commanded by General Ransom, and about 5,000 cavalry under General A. L. Lee, making in all from 17,000 to 18,000 men ; General A. J. Smith, with 10,000 men, was there from General Sherman's command ; and Admiral Porter was there with a large fleet of iron-clads.

The expedition reached Grand Ecore and Natchitoches, about 120 miles above Alexandria, on the 2d and 3d of April, where it remained until the 6th of April. On that day and the succeeding day the troops under General Banks, with a portion of the troops under General A. J. Smith, started for Shreveport, by way of Pleasant Hill and Mansfield. On the 7th of April General T. Kilby Smith, of General A. J. Smith's command, started up the river with transports and supplies, with instructions to proceed to the mouth of Loggy bayou, opposite Springfield.

The column moving by land marched in the following order: first, the cavalry under General A. L. Lee, with a large supply train; then the detachment of the 13th corps, under General Ransom; the 19th corps, under General Franklin; and the force under General A. J. Smith. The whole was placed under command of General Franklin.

On the 8th the cavalry, with a brigade of infantry, constituting the advance of the column, reached a point about five miles from Mansfield. The column had been moving upon a single, narrow road, through a wooded country, and by that time was extended from 20 to 30 miles, the different portions being separated so as not to be within supporting distance of each other.

The enemy were found in force, estimated at from 12,000 to 18,000. General Lee, in command of the advance, sent word back to General Franklin of the condition of affairs. But before receiving any orders from him, General Banks came to the front and assumed the control. General Lee represented to him the necessity of immediately falling back, or of being heavily re-enforced. General Banks determined to make a stand there, and sent back orders for the infantry to hurry forward; but before re-enforcements arrived the enemy attacked, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, and in a short time our forces were routed and driven from the field in great disorder, with the loss of the cavalry train and many pieces of artillery. The



enemy continued the pursuit for some miles, and until checked by the 19th corps, under General Emory. The enemy were then repulsed with heavy loss, and forced to retire. That night General Banks directed the army to fall back to Pleasant Hill.

On the morning of the 9th of April General Banks directed General Lee to take the most of the cavalry, what was left of the 13th corps, the trains, and several batteries of artillery, and proceed at once back to Grand Ecore. The residue of the army remained in position at Pleasant Hill during the day. About five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked with great vigor, but were completely repulsed, and retired some distance from the field of battle. During the night General Banks gave the order to retire immediately to Grand Ecore, the supplies for the army having been already sent back there under General Lee. The movement was made in such haste that many of our wounded were left on the field, and were captured by the enemy upon their return.

The expedition seems to have been abandoned at this point, if not at the time General Banks sent General Lee with the cavalry and trains to Grand Ecore from Pleasant Hill, on the morning of the 9th. It is true that in a despatch to General Halleck, of the 17th of April, General Banks urges at length the importance of the Red river expedition, and asks that General Steele's forces be ordered to join him; but no movement seems to have been made towards renewing an advance beyond Grand Ecore.

The witnesses are divided in opinion as to the immediate cause of the disaster of the 8th at Sabine Crossroads. General Banks, with nearly all the members of his staff who were examined by your committee, holds that it was owing to the order of march, for which they claim that General Franklin was responsible, he having been placed in charge of the column when it left Natchitoches on the 6th of April. Much stress is laid by many witnesses upon the fact that the cavalry train, which was a very large one, was between the cavalry advance and the infantry, presenting a serious obstacle to the retirement of our troops after their defeat. But your committee cannot perceive any reason for exonerating the commanding general of the expedition from the responsibility of those details which it was his duty to be cognizant of. Even had the order of march been unknown to him at the time he left Grand Ecore on the 7th, he certainly was informed of it on the 8th before the affair at Sabine Crossroads. He had ridden from Grand Ecore to Pleasant Hill on the 7th, and from Pleasant Hill to the extreme front on the morning of the 8th. General Lee testifies that as soon as General Banks arrived, he informed him of the condition of affairs, and recommended that the troops in advance should immediately retire or be at once heavily re-enforced. General Banks determined to remain where he was, and sent for troops to re-enforce him. He thus assumed the responsibility of the position, for no witness has testified that the cavalry was unable to fall back at that time.

General Franklin, and the witnesses who take the other view, hold that the order of march was a very proper one, and that there would

have been no disaster (at least at that time and place) had no infantry been sent forward to General Lee, thus tempting him, or whoever was in command there, to persist in pressing forward until it was too late to retire in safety. General Franklin had refused the application of General Lee for infantry to be sent to him; but General Banks, upon his arrival at Pleasant Hill on the night of the 7th, had ordered first one brigade and then another of the 13th corps to move forward and report to General Lee. General Franklin had ordered a short day's march for the advance of his infantry on the 8th of April, for the purpose, he testifies, of closing up his column and getting it in a better condition to meet the enemy.

The further prosecution of the expedition having been abandoned, nothing remained to be done but to take measures for relieving the navy from the critical position in which it was placed by reason of the low water in the Red river. There was reasonable ground for apprehending that all the vessels taken up there by Admiral Porter, comprising the most effective vessels in the Mississippi squadron, would have to be destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. It is evident, from the testimony, that the naval officers apprehended that General Banks would abandon the fleet in his desire to return with his army to New Orleans, after it was determined to abandon the expedition. But it does not appear that General Banks and the officers under him failed in any respect to do all in their power for the safety of the naval squadron; and it was due to the efforts of the army that the navy was finally enabled to get away.

After the gunboats had been got down over the bar just below Grand Ecore, the army moved from there for Alexandria, having many skirmishes with the enemy on the way down, but no affair of much importance. The navy were attacked by the enemy while passing down the river. The army had moved with such rapidity that the rebels ventured to approach the banks of the river with artillery, and endeavored to inflict some injury on the fleet. The navy suffered some loss in killed and wounded, but no vessels were destroyed or captured by the enemy. The Eastport, the most formidable iron-clad in the fleet, having got aground, was destroyed by order of Admiral Porter to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.

To enable the fleet to pass down over the falls at Alexandria, General (then Lieutenant Colonel) Bailey devised and superintended the construction of a series of dams to raise the water upon the falls, the details of which are fully stated in the testimony. After the first dam had been constructed, but before many vessels had passed over the falls, a portion of it gave way. But work was promptly resumed, and in a few days the efforts of the army were rewarded by the successful operation of the plans adopted for the relief of the navy, and the vessels were all enabled to pass down in safety.

While the army was at Alexandria, the rebels succeeded in getting upon the banks of the river below, and destroyed one or two gunboats and some transports. Although they succeeded in almost entirely blockading the river, it does not appear that any serious injury

to the army or the navy was accomplished by them beyond the destruction of a few vessels.

After the fleet passed over the falls at Alexandria, General A. J. Smith, with his command, returned to Mississippi, and General Banks and his command returned to New Orleans and the lower portion of the State of Louisiana.

It is difficult to determine what beneficial result could reasonably be expected from such an expedition as this. None of the officers engaged in it, so far as the committee can learn, ever believed it was advisable. They state that had the town of Shreveport been reached there would have been nothing to be done but to return by the very route they had travelled in going there. Even General Halleck, while urging the Red river route from the time General Banks was appointed to the command of the department of the Gulf, carefully refrains from ordering such an expedition to be undertaken, but leaves General Banks free to pursue such course as to him may seem best. As late as the 11th of February, after General Banks had begun his preparations for the expedition, General Halleck writes to him as follows :

“GENERAL: Your despatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting ‘orders’ and ‘instructions’ in regard to operations on Red river. If by this is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my despatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with Generals Sherman and Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best under all the circumstances of the case.”

General Banks states most positively that he never considered a movement upon that line practicable. Why, then, he should have commenced it, with the discretion allowed him, or have continued it beyond Alexandria after he had ascertained that the river was so very low at so late a season, your committee cannot understand. It certainly could not have been from any very great deference to the opinion of the then general-in-chief, for he undertook movements against which General Halleck expressed opinions so strong that they almost partook of the nature of commands.

During the summer of 1863 General Halleck writes General Banks concerning the importance of occupying some point of Texas in reference to foreign complications, most probably the movement to establish a monarchy in Mexico. But even then General Banks was explicitly told that he was too far from Washington for positive orders or instructions to be given him. It may be that in the movement to establish a State government in Louisiana may be found the key to the Red river expedition, for elections were held at Alexandria and Grand Ecore for delegates to the State constitutional convention

which undertook to set in operation such a government. But the testimony is meagre upon that point, and General Banks makes no reference to it, except when he speaks of being detained in New Orleans in "reference to assisting in the organization of civil government in that State."

General Grant seems to have been opposed to the expedition at that time, at least under the command of General Banks. And one of his first instructions to General Banks, after becoming general-in-chief, was to abandon the expedition at once if he found he could not accomplish it by a certain time, stating that if General Banks failed to return to New Orleans by a given day, he, General Grant, should be sorry that the movement was ever begun.

There is one feature of this expedition to which your committee would call attention, as it seems to have exerted an important influence upon it after it was begun, if it does not furnish one of the motives which prompted the undertaking. It seems to have been confidently expected that a large amount of valuable agricultural products, principally cotton, would be brought within our possession by a successful movement upon this route. There were many persons accompanying the expedition, generally known as cotton speculators, and most of the witnesses testify that their presence exerted a very unfavorable influence upon the expedition. General Banks states most positively that he gave no permission to any one to accompany the expedition for the purpose of trading in cotton or other products of the State. Admiral Porter, and other officers of the navy, deny with great positiveness that they gave permission to any persons to accompany the navy for any such purpose, or that, except in one instance, to which reference is hereafter made in this report, they rendered any assistance to those engaged in that business.

As to the means by which these "cotton speculators" obtained permission to accompany the expedition there is no satisfactory testimony, except in the case of some persons who had a permit from the President authorizing them to visit that portion of the country, and directing military and naval officers to afford them facilities. Your committee have not been able to obtain a copy of that permit, but Captain Breese, of the United States navy, testifies as follows :

"The only persons who were up there with authority were a Mr. Butler and another one. They had an order from the President directing all persons in authority, military or naval, to grant them all facilities in going where they pleased, mentioning particularly Red river, and about there. They were the only ones that had any kind of permit that I knew of.

"I know that General Banks requested the admiral to give orders to the guard vessels stationed at the mouth of the river not to permit any vessel at all to come up the river except those engaged with the army and navy; and to examine all persons on board of them, and to see if there were any persons who had not proper passes from proper military authorities to come up.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Question. Did you see the permit of the President ?

"Answer. Yes, sir; I copied it myself.

"Question. What was the name of the party to whom the permit was given ?

"Answer. Casey & Co. was the name in the permit, and Butler was the head of the establishment, I think; either Butler or Halliday.

"Question. Was it all the same firm?

"Answer. Those men belonged to a party engaged in this business. They came along with this order from the President requiring all military and naval men to give them their assistance to pass beyond our lines, &c., and let them get cotton and take it out, and upon that order this steamboat was allowed to come up the Red river.

"Question. What was the name of the steamboat?

"Answer. I do not recollect now.

"Question. Did it pass up before or after General Banks went up?

"Answer. I think she came up after General Banks did, or about the time he did. \* \* \* \* \*

These people talked so much about it on shore in Alexandria, and said that Admiral Porter was engaged in this cotton business, and was interested with Butler, Casey, and that kind of people, that Mr. Halliday, who was in this company of Casey and Butler, showed the order to some of these speculators on shore. That stopped their mouths, and they said nothing more about Admiral Porter being engaged in it.

"They said it was very hard, indeed, that Admiral Porter would grant permits to some to go up and not to others. They talked so much about it, and read remarks in the newspapers, and things of that kind, that Mr. Halliday, who was a friend of the admiral, showed them this order. That was the way it got out that there was such an order in existence."

Admiral Porter testifies, in relation to the same subject, as follows:

"One person came up there with permission from the President to purchase cotton, and requesting or calling upon the officers of the army and navy to afford such assistance as might be desirable. He brought his papers to me; they were all made out in form, and of course I indorsed them, directing all the officers of the navy to respect the authority. And General Banks did the same. But General Banks finally took all the cotton away from this man, threw it out on the river bank, and took his vessel for a transport.

"Question. What was the name of that man?

"Answer. I think there were two names, Butler and Casey; Butler was really the man; Casey was the agent of Butler. I think Mr. Butler went there to see if the lines could not be opened, so that the government could get hold of the cotton. But I never talked with those people much; I know that cotton destroyed the whole expedition. If there had been no cotton there we could and probably would have gone to Shreveport."

General Banks testifies as follows:

"Question. \* \* \* I will ask you if any person accompanied your expedition up the Red river having authority from the President to purchase cotton or other commodities?

"Answer. No, sir; no person accompanied the expedition for that purpose, either with the authority of the President or of any other officer. But, at Alexandria, a gentleman from the west called on me—I cannot tell whether it was Mr. Butler or Mr. Casey—and showed me a paper from the President, which authorized him to go beyond the lines. It was substantially in the nature of a pass; but, inasmuch as he was to go by water, it of course carried, with the privilege to pass the lines, the privilege to take the steamer he was on, or something of that kind. \* \* \* \* \*

The naval and military authorities were called upon to recognize the pass, but not to put anything at his service, or to give him any support or protection, or to pass supplies or property of any kind, as I understood it, but merely to recog-

nize the personal pass. When I saw the paper Admiral Porter had indorsed it, instructing the naval officers to recognize it, and to comply with its instructions, and I did the same thing to all military officers. I never gave him any assistance or protection, but instructed the officers in my command to recognize that paper as coming from the highest military authority.

“Question. You say you do not remember the name?”

“Answer. It was either Butler or Casey—I am quite confident it was Casey.

“Question. Do you know what his object was in going beyond the lines?”

“Answer. No, sir; I was never informed. I do not know that I ought to give my idea about it. I supposed it was in reference to cotton, although I did not know that. His authority was not so far recognized as to interfere with our military operations. I think he did not go beyond the lines. At Grand Ecore, where he had a barge filled with cotton, which was necessary for the completion of a pontoon bridge over the Red river for our military operations, we took the barge and the cotton, and gave him a receipt for the same.

“Question. Of course you do not know whether he did go beyond the lines or not?”

“Answer. I could not say that he did not; he, perhaps, had been beyond the lines earlier. I am quite confident that he was not beyond the lines of the army during this expedition. However, this ought to be said: the pass or privilege which Mr. Casey had, and which I indorsed, was dated the December previous. We were at Grand Ecore early in April, and the question arose between myself and my officers whether I ought to recognize the pass; and one of the reasons assigned for not recognizing it was that it was dated in December, 1863. Still, inasmuch as I did not know for what purpose it had been given, and the authority was sufficient to justify it, I had no hesitation in giving it my recognition, so far as to instruct the officers in my command to comply with its directions.

“Question. Did it emanate from the President or from the Secretary of the Treasury?”

“Answer. It was in the handwriting of the President, and with his signature.”

The testimony of Captain Breese would indicate that there had been previous dealings in cotton between some parties and the inhabitants and rebel authorities in that region of country. But the testimony does not show by whom those transactions were authorized, if authorized at all. Captain Breeze's testimony is as follows:

“We had information from these cotton speculators, who had charts of the country, with every parish and township in the State of Louisiana and in the State of Mississippi all marked off, with the amount of cotton in each one, where it was stored, the marks on it, and everything about it. Many of the speculators would come and give us information concerning these things, in hopes that we would take out some that they claimed was their own, so that they could present their claims to the court. They knew very well that the cotton that was taken away by the navy was sent before the court, and if they could present a fair claim for it they would get it; and they tried to get the admiral and his officers to take their cotton wherever it could be found.

“Question. Do you know how those cotton speculators got up to Alexandria?”

“Answer. I know that a large number of them came up on the Black Hawk with General Banks, with a large quantity of bagging and roping. The way that I happened to know that was, that she landed at the bank just under our stern. I saw that vessel discharge her cargo there. On our arrival at Alexandria we captured at least thirty wagon loads of roping and bagging, which the man who had charge of it told us was not three weeks from New Orleans. It was marked ‘C. S. A.,’ the whole of it, and was in the confederate storehouses.

“Question. Were there two steamers called ‘Black Hawk’?”

"Answer. Yes, sir; the Black Hawk of the navy was Admiral Porter's flagship, and the transport Black Hawk was General Banks's headquarters boat.

"Question. This bagging of which you spoke came up on the Black Hawk of General Banks?

"Answer. Yes, sir.

"Question. Do you know in what vessel the bagging and roping came up that you found in Alexandria on your arrival there?

"Answer. It came by land transportation. It was landed somewhere on the Mississippi river and hauled to Alexandria. While we were in Alexandria, there was captured a captain of the home guard, whose duty it had been, previous to the arrival of the troops there, to convoy the wagons laden with confederate cotton to the banks of the Mississippi river, and to get the supplies that were landed there in payment of this cotton, and bring them up to Alexandria. He said that several times while the gunboat was protecting the transport landing these supplies he could have killed the captain of her, mentioning his name, without any trouble; but that he was in honor bound not to fire, for he was there simply as a guard to the cotton to keep the guerillas, or improper bands of confederate troops, from destroying it.

"Question. Did this bagging and roping come there under the protection of the army?

"Answer. That that came up on General Banks's boat came up under the protection of the army.

"Question. I mean the other, that you found there on your arrival;

"Answer. I do not know about that. I know only that they said it had been only three weeks from New Orleans. It must have been started just previous to General Banks's departure from New Orleans; but I do not think he had any connexion at all with it."

Colonel Wilson, one of General Banks's staff, testifies as follows:

"There came to Grand Ecore a Mr. William Butler, of Illinois, and a Mr. Thomas E. Casey, from Kentucky, who had authority from the President—I saw the letter myself—to go with the expedition. They were to have, I think, any transportation they should request from the naval commander or the commander of the army; at all events they were to have such assistance as the army and navy could render."

"Question. Were they purchasing cotton?

"Answer. They did purchase cotton, because we used some of it in our dam.

"Question. What did they do with it after they purchased it?

"Answer. They had proposed sending it down the river; but the river was blockaded, as it were, by the enemy, who captured several of our transports and destroyed two of our gunboats; so they did not send it down, but kept it at Alexandria, where the army and navy were; and before they had got away with it we had used a great deal of it in the construction of our dam.

"Question. How was it marked?

"Answer. I do not remember; I only know that Mr. Butler came to me one day and said, "I wish you would take somebody else's cotton than mine; that is very fine cotton!" \* \* \* \* \* This Mr. Casey is the person who is said to have been out into the rebel lines, and had an understanding with the rebel general, Kirby Smith, in regard to getting all the cotton in that region of the country. He made some arrangement with him that Butler and Casey should get this cotton and pay him a percentage upon all they received; and the arrangement was that he was to fall back with his army until the cotton was secured. That was simply a rumor in the army. I know Casey had been out into the rebel lines, because he told me so himself. He said he had been out there and had seen General Smith, and that he had a brother-in-law who was a colonel under him.

“Question. You say you saw the letter of the President giving these gentlemen authority; will you be particular about the extent of that authority?”

“Answer. Well, I could not be very particular about that, because I did not actually read the letter. The letter was given to General Banks and he read it. I got my information as to the contents of the letter from him. I remember his expressing surprise to me that the President should send such people there with any such authority. I saw the letter in his hands, and recognized the writing of the President from other letters I had seen, but did not actually read the letter myself.

“Question. Did General Banks permit other cotton dealers, or other dealers, to accompany the expedition, except those who were authorized from Washington?”

“Answer. No, sir; there were no other persons that I know of, except those on our headquarters boat, who I understand had presented letters to General Banks from the authorities in Washington, requesting that they should be permitted to go; which was equivalent to an order that they should go. In that way they had secured their permits from him to go on the boat.”

Subsequently Colonel Wilson came before the committee, and asked permission to make the following statement:

“In my testimony given to the committee the other day I stated that a Mr. Butler and a Mr. Casey came to Alexandria with a letter from the President, which I thought directed the commanders of the army and the navy to render them such assistance and give them such facilities as they might ask. Upon further reflection, I am convinced that I was in error when I made that statement; that the letter of the President was simply in the nature of a pass, authorizing them to accompany the army and navy in their movements.”

The navy seized a great deal of cotton as naval prize, both on the Red river and on the Washita, nearly if not quite all that seized on the Red river being found below Alexandria. That cotton was sent to Cairo, Illinois, for adjudication by the United States court. What ultimately became of it is not fully shown by the testimony. But it seems that after the rebel authorities learned that the navy was seizing cotton below and at Alexandria, they burned large quantities of it to prevent its falling into the hands of our forces.

Your committee would state that while the object had in view by General Halleck, in urging this expedition, was a military one, with the expectation perhaps of accomplishing some important political result by the occupation of some point in Texas, the general commanding the expedition appears to have had in view the two objects of carrying out measures for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana, and of affording an egress for cotton and other products of that region of country. And many of the witnesses express the opinion, in which the committee concur, that the attention directed to the accomplishment of those objects exerted a most unfavorable influence upon the expedition.

This expedition presents many remarkable features. It was undertaken without the direction of any one, so far as the evidence shows. The authorities at Washington did not furnish the troops which the general commanding the expedition considered necessary for the purpose, but suggested that they might be obtained as a matter of favor from Generals Grant, Sherman, and Steele; and it appears from the



evidence that General Sherman "loaned" for the expedition 10,000 men for thirty days, under the command of General A. J. Smith. The only orders emanating from Washington in relation to this expedition, as developed by the evidence, were those of the President contained in a permit he gave to Casey and Butler "to go up Red river and purchase cotton," in which he directed the "officers of the army and navy to furnish such assistance as might be desirable."

In the absence of all orders requiring this expedition to be undertaken, and after the refusal of the authorities at Washington to furnish the troops asked for, it was entered upon by the commanding general, as shown by the evidence, against his judgment and in the belief that it must necessarily fail; and it was prosecuted at immense sacrifice of property, of life, and of valuable time, after the development of facts that utterly precluded all hopes of success. It did not seek to accomplish any distinctly avowed military object, and as a military movement it seems to have been conducted without capacity or discipline. Its only results, in addition to the disgraceful military disasters that attended it, were of a commercial and political character. The commercial transactions were conducted by those who ascended Red river by authority of the President's permit, as before stated; and in part by "speculators," who, without any permit or other authority, so far as is shown by the evidence of the commanding general, came up on the headquarters boat of the army, bringing with them bagging and rope for the cotton they might secure.

The political transactions were shown by the holding of elections in the camps of the army while engaged in the expedition, with the view of reorganizing a civil government in Louisiana. The attempt to do this was clearly a usurpation on the part of the military authorities, the execution of which was as weak and inefficient as the attempt was improper and illegal.

B. F. WADE, *Chairman*.  
Z. CHANDLER.  
GEO. W. JULIAN.  
B. F. LOAN.

## MINORITY REPORT.

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The undersigned, being unable to concur in the report of the majority of the committee on the Red river expedition, respectfully submits the following :

The first question presented is, upon whom does the responsibility of that expedition rest, and what were the objects expected to be accomplished thereby?

In order to answer both branches of this question satisfactorily, it becomes necessary to examine the correspondence between General Halleck, then general-in-chief, and Generals Banks, Grant, Sherman, and Steele, in relation to this subject, and that this may be done the material portions of that correspondence are made a part of this report.

General Banks assumed command of the department of the Gulf on the 16th of December, 1862, with the following instructions :

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
“ *Washington, D. C., November 9, 1862.*

“GENERAL: The President of the United States having assigned you to the command of the department of the Gulf, you will immediately proceed, with the troops assembling in transports at Fort Monroe, to New Orleans, and relieve General Butler. An additional force of some ten thousand men will be sent to you from Boston and New York as soon as possible.

“The first military operations which will engage your attention on your arrival at New Orleans will be the opening of the Mississippi and the reduction of Fort Morgan or Mobile city, in order to control that bay and harbor. In these expeditions you will have the co-operation of the rear-admiral commanding the naval forces in the Gulf and the Mississippi river. A military and naval expedition is organizing at Memphis and Cairo to move down the Mississippi and co-operate with you against Vicksburg and any other point which the enemy may occupy on that river. As the ranking general in the southwest, you are authorized to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command. The line of division between your department and that of Major General Grant is therefore left undecided for the present, and you will exercise superior authority as far north as you may ascend the river.

“The President regards the opening of the Mississippi river as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it.

“This river being opened, the question arises how the troops and naval forces there can be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy of your attention :

“First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly east to destroy the railroads at Jackson and Marion, and thus cut off all connexion by rail between northern Mississippi and Mobile and Atlanta. The latter place is now the chief military depot of the rebel armies in the west.

"Second, to ascend with a naval and military force the Red river as far as it is navigable, and thus open an outlet for the sugar and cotton of northern Louisiana. Possibly both of these objects may be accomplished if the circumstances should be favorable.

"It is also suggested that having Red river in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas.

"It is believed that the operations of General Rosecrans in East Tennessee, of General Grant in northern Mississippi, and of General Steele in Arkansas, will give full employment to the enemy's troops in the west, and thus prevent them from concentrating in force against you; should they do so, you will be re-enforced by detachments from one or more of these commands.

"These instructions are not intended to tie your hands or to hamper your operations in the slightest degree. So far away from headquarters, you must necessarily exercise your own judgment and discretion in regard to your movements against the enemy, keeping in view that the opening of the Mississippi river is now the great and primary object of your expedition; and I need not assure you, general, that the government has unlimited confidence not only in your judgment and discretion, but also in your energy and military promptness.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief.

"Major General N. P. BANKS, *Commander.*"

Vicksburg was captured on the 4th and Port Hudson on the 9th of July, 1863. On the 18th of the same month General Banks wrote General Grant :

"It is my belief that Johnston, when defeated by you, as I am confident he will be, will fall back upon Mobile. Such is also the expectation of the rebels. The capture of Mobile is of importance, second only in the history of the war to the opening of the Mississippi. I hope you will be able to follow him. I can aid you somewhat by land and by sea if that shall be your destination. Mobile is the last stronghold in the west and southwest. No pains should be spared to effect its reduction."

\* \* \* \* \*

July 26 General Banks wrote to General Halleck from New Orleans :

\* \* \* \* \*

"There is still strength at Mobile and in Texas which will constantly threaten Louisiana, and which ought to be destroyed without delay." The possession of Mobile and the occupation of Texas would quiet the whole of the southwest, and every effort ought to be made to accomplish this.

"Its importance can hardly be overestimated."

\* \* \* \* \*

Again, on the 30th of July and on the 1st of August, General Banks wrote General Halleck, urging operations against Mobile, concluding his communication of August 1st as follows :

"The possession of Mobile gives the government the control of the Alabama river and the line of railways, east and west from Charleston and Savannah, to Vicksburg, via Montgomery, and places the whole of the State of Mississippi and southern Alabama in position to return to the Union. If the rebel government loses this position, it has no outlet to the Gulf except Galveston. The operation need not last more than thirty days, and can scarcely interfere with any other movements east or west. I understand it to meet with General

Grant's approval, if it be consistent with the general plans of the government, upon which condition only I urge it. I send this from Vicksburg, having arrived here at 9 o'clock this morning, and return to New Orleans this evening.

On the 6th of August, before the reception of the above communication of General Banks, General Halleck sent the following telegrams through General Grant :

“Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg* :

“Please send a special messenger to Major General Banks with the following telegram, and also give him all necessary assistance for its execution.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

“Major General BANKS, *New Orleans* :

“There are important reasons why our flag should be restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Admiral Farragut will co-operate.

“There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

And on the 10th the following :

“GENERAL : In my despatch to you of the 6th instant, sent by the direction of the Secretary of War, it was left entirely to your own discretion to select any point for occupation in Texas, either on the seaboard or in the interior, the only condition imposed being that the flag of the United States should be again raised and sustained somewhere within the limits of that State.

“That order, as I understood it at the time, was of a diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications.

“The effect and force of that order are left precisely as they were on its issue.

“The authority conferred on you by it is not in the slightest degree changed.

“You will, therefore, consider the following remarks as suggestions only, and not as instructions :

“In my opinion, neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it is necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to *some one point* in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up the Red river to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas. This would be merely carrying out the plan proposed by you at the beginning of the campaign, and, in my opinion, far superior in its military character to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola. Nevertheless, your choice is left unrestricted.

“In the first place, by adopting the line of the Red river you retain your connexion with your own base, and separate still more the two points of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcements from Texas. They are already cut off from the rebel States east of the Mississippi.

“If you occupy Galveston or Indianola you divide your own troops, and enable the enemy to concentrate all of his forces upon either of these points, or on New Orleans.

“I write this simply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.”

And on the 12th the following :

"Your despatches of July 30 and August 1 are just received. I fully appreciate the importance of the operation proposed by you in these despatches ; but there are reasons other than military why those heretofore directed should be undertaken first. On this matter we have no choice, but must carry out the views of the government."

On the 15th of August General Banks replied to General Halleck's despatch of the 6th :

"GENERAL : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, (in cipher,) a copy of which is enclosed as received. It was received this morning, at 9.15 o'clock, by telegraph from General Grant, and a duplicate of the same this evening by Colonel Smith, one of his aides-de-camp.

"Measures have been already taken to carry into effect your orders. We shall plant the flag in Texas within a week, I hope. My plan has been to move against Galveston upon the land side, *via* the Sabine Pass, and from Berwick's bay, *via* Vermillionville and Niblett's bluff, to Houston and Galveston, for the transportation and artillery. We shall be ready, I think, as soon as General Grant's corps can reach us. The route indicated is that followed by the Texans in their invasion of western Louisiana. We can move eight thousand (8,000) men at once to the Sabine Pass, and thence concentrate rapidly on Galveston, fortifying and holding a position on the main land, or the island only, as may be deemed expedient. From thence operations are practicable in any direction to the interior or to the Rio Grande. From Galveston, when strongly fortified, I would move a force of five thousand (5,000) or more to the Rio Grande, where one or more positions can be so fortified as to be held by a much less force, while we hold Galveston or the interior of the State. This has been my view of operations in Texas from the beginning.

"Indianola is too far distant ; does not command the important communications of the State, and, if occupied, would leave the forces of the enemy between us and New Orleans, which is to be avoided if possible.

"No movement can be made from the Gulf against Galveston with a certainty of success. Our naval forces are not strong enough, and the enemy's works are too extensive and thorough. The enemy fear only an attack from the land, *via* Niblett's bluff, the route I propose, or Alexandria. From that point our success is certain. We learned this from intercepted letters while at Alexandria in May. I send a sketch of the fortifications at Galveston, made at that time by one who was engaged upon them, with a description of the guns mounted.

"If General Grant sends me ten thousand men, I can throw twenty thousand immediately into Texas. The force should be larger, if possible.

On the 22d of August, General Halleck wrote to General Grant :

"GENERAL : \* \* \* \* \*

"Your plan of moving against Kirby Smith from Natchez, by Harrisburg and Monroe, will agree very well with the line of operations suggested to General Banks, viz : to ascend the Red river to Shreveport and move on Marshall, Texas ; or to move from Natchitoches to Nacogdoches, Texas. This will make your two lines near enough together to assist each other. In case Banks adopts this plan Kirby Smith and Magruder must abandon either Texas or Arkansas, or they will be obliged to wage a mere guerilla war.

"General Banks has been left at liberty to select his own objective point in Texas, and may determine to move by sea. If so, your movement will not have his support, and should be conducted with caution. You will confer on this matter freely with General Banks. The government is exceedingly anxious that our troops should occupy some points in Texas with the least possible delay.

“In your contemplated operations in Arkansas and Louisiana you will probably require additional cavalry. You are authorized to mount any of your infantry regiments, making requisitions on the proper departments for horses and equipments. Your forces should move as much as possible by water transports, in order to save land transportation through a country where the roads are few and bad.”

On the 26th of August, General Banks sent General Halleck the following :

“GENERAL: The steamer Hudson arriving yesterday, brought duplicate copy of the order of August 6, received earlier by telegraph from General Grant, and also your letter of the 10th instant, upon the subject of the expedition into Texas.

“I have made all possible exertions to get a sufficient force into the field to execute the order, but encounter serious difficulties in the preparation. General Ord’s corps d’armée has not yet arrived; the last division will be here at the close of this week. The sickness and absence of officers delay seriously our preparations for movement. There is very great deficiency of transportation for movement by water, either by sea or the river. The river boats sent up with the nine-months troops are detained above, and return slowly. By the Gulf we are able to move, after all possible exertions, but one-third of our forces at one time. This is a serious misfortune, as it costs us most valuable time, and gives the enemy opportunity to anticipate our plans and concentrate his forces against us. I hope, however, to be able to execute your orders without further material delay.

“The considerations embraced in your letter of the 10th, duplicate copies of which I have received, have been carefully weighed.

“To enter Texas from Alexandria or Shreveport would bring us at the nearest point to Hernville, in Sabine county, or Marshall, in Harrison, due west of Alexandria and Shreveport, respectively. These points are accessible only by heavy marches, for which the troops are hardly prepared at this season of the year; and the points occupied would attract but little attention; and if our purpose was to penetrate further into the interior, they would become exposed to sudden attacks of the enemy, and defensible only by a strong and permanent force of troops.

“The serious objection to moving on this line in the present condition of the forces of this department is the distance it carries us from New Orleans—our base of operations necessarily—and the great difficulty and the length of time required to return, if the exigencies of the service should demand, which is quite possible. In the event of long absence, Johnston threatens us from the east. The enemy will concentrate between Alexandria and Franklin, on the Teche, until our purpose is developed. As soon as we move any distance, they will operate against the river and New Orleans. It is true that we could follow up such a movement by falling on their rear, but that would compel us to abandon the position in Texas, or leave it exposed with but slender defences and garrison. This view is based, as you will see, upon the impossibility of moving even to Alexandria, at the present low stage of the rivers, by water, and the inability of the troops to accomplish extended marches.

“A movement upon the Sabine accomplishes these objects: 1st. It executes your order by planting the flag at a prominent and commanding position in Texas; 2d. It is accomplished by water; 3d. It is safely made with a comparatively small force, and without attracting attention of the enemy until it is done; 4th. It enables us to move against Galveston from the interior, destroying at the same time all the naval and transport vessels of the State between Sabine and the Colorado; 5th. To occupy Galveston island with a small force of two or three thousand only, and to push on to Indianola, on the Rio Grande,

or to return to the Mississippi, as the exigencies of the service may require. If the enemy moves in force upon New Orleans, we can return from Sabine or Galveston in such time, and in such strength, as to cut off his retreat by the bay on the Atchafalaya. The advantages to be gained by the destruction of the rebel boats on the Sabine, in Galveston bay, and on the Trinity and Brazos rivers, would be very great. This can be effected only by a movement upon Galveston from the Sabine by Beaumont, Liberty, and Houston. If the enemy is in such strength as to defeat this, by occupying a position between the Sabine and Neches, we shall make available the fortifications of the enemy at Orange, and be supported by the navy, whose light boats can run up to Orange or to Beaumont. If the season were different, the northern line would be doubtless preferable on many grounds."

General Banks finding it impossible to establish the flag in Texas by an inland movement, in the then condition of the rivers, attempted to accomplish that object by operations on the coast, representing to the government that the overland route was, at that time, impracticable. On the 16th of October he sent a communication to General Halleck, from which the following are extracts :

\* \* \* \* \*

"The importance of Shreveport, as reported, is very great, and it confirms representations made to us. I had the strongest possible desire to reach Shreveport when in Alexandria, in May, but the necessity of operations on the Mississippi prevented it."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The movement upon Shreveport and Marshall is impracticable at present. It would require a march from Brashear City of between 400 and 500 miles. The enemy destroying all supplies in the country as he retreats, and the low stage of the water making it impossible for us to avail ourselves of any water communications, except upon the Teche as far as Vermillionville, it would require a communication for this distance by wagon trains. Later in the season this can be done, making Alexandria the base of operations; but it could not be done now. The rivers and bayous have not been so low in this State for fifty years, and Admiral Porter informs me that the mouth of the Red river, and also the mouth of the Atchafalaya, are both hermetically sealed to his vessels by almost dry sand-bars, so that he cannot get any vessels into any of the streams. It is supposed that the first rise of the season will occur early in the next month."

\* \* \* \* \*

On the 22d of October General Banks wrote General Halleck :

\* \* \* \* \*

"By the way of Alexandria and Shreveport to Marshall, which is the nearest point on the route, we have a march of from 350 to 400 miles in that direction without other communication than by wagon train, and through a country utterly depleted of all its material resources. Either of these routes presents almost insuperable difficulties. It is not good policy to fight an absent enemy in a desert country if it can be avoided."

On the 18th of November, while engaged in operations by way of the coast of Texas, and after several points had been seized, General Banks wrote General Halleck from flag-ship McClellan, off Aransas Pass, as follows :

"The success of our expedition will very likely transfer our operations to the coast. The best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against

Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya. To operate promptly and effectively on this line, we need light-draught sea boats, drawing six or seven feet of water. A supply of these will be a measure of great economy to the government. Large ships are in great peril constantly, from their inability to escape the northers by entering the bays. We lost one excellent steamer, the Nassau, on the bar at Brazos from this cause. The steamers St. Mary's, Clinton, Crescent, and others of that class, have been of the greatest service, and to them we owe the success of our expedition. It is of the utmost importance that this number should be increased. We need very much light-draught gunboats on the Atchafalaya, as, if this line is well protected from Berwick's bay to the Red river, the enemy necessarily is thrown back from the Mississippi. Admiral Porter informs me that he had received your order to send boats down, but that he was unable to enter the Atchafalaya from Red river owing to the low stage of the water; his boats could not pass by sea into Berwick's bay with safety. I am quite confident that, watching for fair weather, all his boats can be buoyed around, with the assistance of steamers. The distance is only forty miles, and the sea is often quite smooth. We have frequently sent river boats around in that way. I respectfully request your attention to this subject."

On the 7th of December General Halleck sent the following communication to General Banks:

"GENERAL: I have just received your letter of November 18, 'off Aransas Pass.' In this you say the 'best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya.' I fully concur with you in this opinion. It is the line which I advised you from the beginning to adopt. In regard to your 'Sabine' and 'Rio Grande' expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here till they were actually undertaken. The danger, however, of dividing your army, with the enemy between the two posts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force, was pointed out from the first, and I have continually urged that you must not expect any considerable re-enforcements from other departments. Your communications in regard to light-draught sea-going vessels have been referred to the Quartermaster General, who has uniformly answered that he had given you all such vessels that were available, there being only a small number that could be procured. His attention will be again called to the matter to-day.

"In regard to the gunboats for your department, we must rely upon the navy. Admiral Porter has been requested to give you all possible assistance in this matter. You may not be aware that by a law of last Congress the building, purchasing, and commanding of gunboats are placed exclusively under the Navy Department. I will again ask that the admirals commanding in the Gulf and in the Mississippi be directed to co-operate with you and render you all the aid in their power. You will also communicate with them, asking their assistance in any way you desire."

\* \* \* \* \*

To which General Banks replied, December 23, as follows:

"GENERAL: Your despatch of December 9 I received yesterday. My orders from the department were to establish the flag of the government in Texas at the earliest possible moment. I understood that the point and the means were left at my discretion. It was implied, if not stated, that time was an element of great importance in this matter, and that the object should be accomplished as speedily as possible. In addition to the instructions received from your department upon this subject, the President addressed me a letter, borne by Brigadier General Hamilton, military governor of Texas, dated September 19, 1863, in which he expressed the hope that I had already accomplished the object so much desired. In the execution of this order, my first desire was to obtain pos-



session of Houston, and the expedition which failed to effect a landing at the Sabine was designed to secure that object. The failure of that expedition made it impossible to secure a landing at that point. I immediately concentrated all my disposable force upon the Teche, with a view to enter Texas by the way of Niblett's Bluff, on the Sabine, or by Alexandria, at some more northern point. The low stage of the water in all the rivers, and the exhaustion of supplies in that country, made it apparent that this route was impracticable at this season of the year—I might say impossible within any reasonable time, and it would be accomplished by imminent peril, owing to the condition of the country, the length of marches, and the strength of the enemy, making this certain by thorough reconnoissance of the country; but without withdrawing my troops, I concluded to make another effort to effect a landing at some point upon the coast of Texas, in the execution of what I understood to be imperative orders. For this purpose I withdrew a small force stationed at Morganzia, on the Mississippi, which had been under command of General Herron, and was then under Major General Dana, and put them in a state of preparation for this movement.

“Assisted by the commander of the naval forces, Commodore Bell, I directed a reconnoissance of the coast of Texas as far as Brazos Santiago, making my movements entirely dependent upon that report. A return from this reconnoissance was made October 16, and my troops being in readiness for movement somewhere, without the delay of a single day, except that which the state of the weather made necessary, I moved for the Brazos. You will see from these facts that it was impossible for me to give you sufficient notice of this intention, to receive instructions from you upon this subject; but as soon as I had received the information necessary, and arrived at the determination to land at the Brazos, I gave you full information of all the facts in the case. It is my purpose always to keep you informed of all movements that are contemplated in this department, but it did not seem to me to be possible to do more in this instance; and upon a review of the circumstances, I cannot now see where or when I could have given you more complete and satisfactory information than my despatches conveyed.

“I repeat my suggestion that the best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya, and I also recall the suggestion made by you upon the same subject. But that line was impracticable at the time when I received your orders upon the subject of Texas. I ought to add that the line of the Atchafalaya is available for offensive or defensive purposes only when the state of the water admits the operations of a strong naval force. At the time when I made this suggestion to you it was impossible to get a boat into the Atchafalaya, either from the Red river or from the Gulf, owing to the low stage of the water, and there were very few, if any, boats on the Mississippi, or in this department, that could have navigated these waters at that time. It was, therefore, impossible to avail myself of this natural line—first, for the reason that we had not sufficient naval force for this purpose, and that the navigation was impossible. As soon as the Mississippi and Red river shall rise, the government can make available the advantages presented by this line of water communication.”

\* \* \* \* \*

On the 30th of December General Banks wrote General Halleck :

\* \* \* \* \*

“It is my desire, if possible, to get possession of Galveston. This, if effected, will give us control of the entire coast of Texas, and require but two small garrisons, one on the Rio Grande and the other on Galveston island, unless it be the wish of the Department of War that extensive operations should be made in the State of Texas. A sufficient number of men can probably be recruited in that State for the permanent occupation of these two posts. It will

relieve a very large number of naval vessels, whose service is now indispensable to us, on the Mississippi and in the Gulf. This can occupy but a short time, and if executed will leave my whole force in hand to move to any other point on the Red river, or wherever the government may direct. Once possessed of Galveston, and my command ready for operation in any other direction, I shall await the orders of the government; but I trust that this may be accomplished before undertaking any other enterprise. It is impossible, at this time, to move as far north as Alexandria by water. The Red river is not open to the navigation of our gunboats, and it is commanded by Fort De Russy, which has been remounted since our occupation of Alexandria. This position must be turned by means of a large force on land before the gunboats can pass. To co-operate with General Steele in Arkansas, or north of the Red river, will bring nearly the whole rebel force of Texas and Louisiana between New Orleans and my command, without the possibility of dispersing or defeating them, as their movement would be directed south, and mine to the north. It is necessary that this force should be first dispersed or destroyed before I can safely operate in conjunction with General Steele. Once possessed of the coast of Texas, and the naval and land forces relieved, I can then operate against the forces in Louisiana or Texas, and I can disperse or destroy the land forces in Louisiana, and safely co-operate with General Steele, or with any other portion of the army of the United States."

\* \* \* \* \*

January 4, 1864, General Halleck urges upon General Banks the movement by way of Red river, as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

"Generals Sherman and Steele agree with me in opinion that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas. If this line can be adopted, most of the troops in Arkansas can be concentrated on it. But, as before remarked, Steele cannot alone attempt its occupation. His movements must therefore be dependent, in a great measure, upon yours. If, as soon as you have sufficient water in the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, you operate in that direction, Steele's army and such forces as Sherman can detach should be directed to the same object. The gunboats should also co-operate. If, on the other hand, your operations are mainly confined to the coast of Texas, Steele must make the Arkansas river his line of defence, and most of Sherman's force may be required to keep open the Mississippi.

"So long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Sherman and Steele. The best thing, it would seem, to be done, under the circumstances, is for you to communicate with them, and also with Admiral Porter, in regard to some general co-operation. All agree upon what is the best plan of operations if the stage of water in the rivers and other circumstances should be favorable; if not, it must be modified or changed."

On the 7th General Halleck wrote to General Steele:

"GENERAL:

\* \* \* \* \*

"I have just seen your letter of December 12 to General Schofield in regard to an advance towards Red river. It was at one time hoped that you might co-operate with General Banks in holding that line, and thus secure Arkansas and Missouri from further rebel raids. But when General Banks changed his plan of operations to the Gulf coast, an advance on your part would have been extremely perilous, and you acted wisely in occupying the defensive position of the Arkansas. It is hoped that means may hereafter be concerted between yourself and General Sherman and General Banks to drive the enemy entirely

out of Arkansas, and then occupy the line of Red river, which is shorter, and probably easier of defence. In the mean time I presume all your present forces will be required to hold your present line of defence, and to prevent rebel raids north of the Arkansas.

"You will please to communicate frequently with these headquarters, giving as full information as possible of the condition of affairs in your department."

On the 8th General Halleck wrote to General Grant:

"In regard to General Banks's campaign against Texas, it is proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of state policy. As a military measure simply, it perhaps presented less advantages than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama river, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines, and effect a diversion in favor of our armies at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter of political or state policy, connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so considered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and to his cabinet, and it was, therefore, unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage. I allude to this matter here, as it may have an important influence on your projected operations during the present winter.

"Keeping in mind that General Banks's operations in Texas, either on the Gulf coast or by the Louisiana frontier, must be continued during the winter, it is to be considered whether it will not be better to direct our efforts, for the present, to the entire breaking up of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi river, rather than to divide them by operating against Mobile and the Alabama. If the forces of Smith, Price, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red river as a line of defence, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere.

"General Banks reports his present force as inadequate for the defence of his position, and for operations in the interior; and General Steele is of opinion that he cannot advance beyond the Arkansas or Sabine, unless he can be certain of co-operation and supplies on Red river. Under these circumstances it is worth considering whether such forces as Sherman can move down the Mississippi river should not co-operate with the armies of Steele and Banks on the west side.

"Of course, operations of any of your troops in that direction must be subordinate and subsequent to those which you have proposed for East and West Tennessee. I therefore present these views at this time, merely that they may receive your attention and consideration in determining upon your ulterior movements." \* \* \* \* \*

On the 11th General Halleck again strongly urges upon General Banks the movement by the Red river:

\* \* \* \* \*

"I am assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter will be prepared to co-operate with you as soon as the stage of the water in the southwest will admit of the use of his flotilla there. General Steele's command is now under the general orders of General Grant, and it is hoped that he and General Sherman may also be able to co-operate with you at an early day. General Sherman is now on the Mississippi river, and General Grant expects to soon be able to re-enforce him."

\* \* \* \* \*

"It has never been expected that your troops would operate north of the Red river, unless the rebel forces in Texas should be withdrawn into Arkansas; but it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river, if he

could rely upon your co-operation, and he could be certain of receiving supplies upon that line. Being uncertain on these points, he determined not to attempt an advance, but to occupy the Arkansas river as his line of defence.

"The best military opinions of the generals in the west seem to favor operations on the Red river, provided the stage of water will enable gunboats to co-operate. I presume General Sherman will communicate with you on this subject. If the rebels could be driven south of that river it would serve as a shorter and better line of defence for Arkansas and Missouri than that now occupied by General Steele; moreover it would open to us the cotton and slaves of north-eastern Louisiana and southern Arkansas. I am inclined to think that this opens a better field of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant can spare during the winter. I have written to him, and also to General Steele, on this subject.

"Please advise me if you want more field artillery sent to your department, and also in regard to the shipment of animals from the northeast."

On January 16 General Sherman, in a letter to General Banks, after referring to a movement that he then contemplated, wrote as follows :

"I think this movement, and one similar on Shreveport, as soon as the Red river rises, would pretty well settle the main question in the southwest, and I would like nothing better than to unite with you in such a movement, but I expect soon to be required by General Grant to hasten back to Huntsville, where I left the army of the Tennessee."

On January 23 General Banks sent the following to General Halleck :

"GENERAL: Your despatches of the 4th and the 11th January are received—the first on the 13th instant and the second by the mail to-day. I am much gratified to know that General Sherman is instructed to co-operate with the commands on the Mississippi.

"With the forces you propose, I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, 'that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas.' But it would be too much for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces and the assistance of General Sherman the success of movements on that line will be certain and important. I shall most cordially co-operate with them in executing your orders. With my own command I can operate with safety only on the coast of Texas; but from the coast I could not penetrate far into the interior, nor secure control of more than the country west of San Antonio. On the other line, with commensurate forces, the whole State, as well as Arkansas and Louisiana, will be ours, and their people will gladly renew allegiance to the government. The occupation of Shreveport will be to the country west of the Mississippi what that of Chattanooga is to the east; and as soon as this can be accomplished the country west of Shreveport will be in condition for movement into Texas. I have written to General Sherman and General Steele in accordance with these views, and shall be ready to act with them as soon as the Atchafalaya and Red river will admit the navigation of our gunboats. Our supplies can be transported by the Red river until April, at least. In the mean time the railway from Vicksburg to Shreveport ought to be completed, which would furnish communication very comfortably for the whole of eastern Texas. I do not mean that operations should be deferred for this purpose, but, as an ultimate advantage in the occupation of these States and the establishment of governments, it would be of great importance.

"I enclose to you with this communication a very complete map of the Red river country and Texas, which embraces all the information we have been able

to obtain up to this time. It has been prepared by Major D. C. Houston, of the engineer corps, and will show that we have not overlooked the importance of this line. Accompanying the map is a memorial which exhibits the difficulties that are to be overcome. To this I respectfully invite your attention. I have sent to General Sherman and General Steele copies of this map.

"I shall be ready to move to Alexandria as soon as the rivers are up, most probably marching by Opelousas. This will be necessary to turn the forts on Red river and open the way for the gunboats. From that point I can operate with General Steele, north or south of Red river, in the direction of Shreveport, and from thence await your instructions. I do not think operations will be delayed on my account. I have received a despatch from General Sherman, in which he expresses a wish to enter upon the campaign, but had not at that time received orders upon the subject."

\* \* \* \* \*

"I can concentrate on Red river all my force available for active service, except the garrisons at Matagorda and Brownsville, which will be small."

\* \* \* \* \*

January 29 General Banks wrote to General Halleck :

"I shall be ready to co-operate with General Sherman and General Steele as soon as I receive definite information of the time when they will be ready to move. I can take possession of Alexandria at any time, but could not maintain the position without the support of forces on the river."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Anxiously awaiting information and instructions in regard to operations on Red river, I have done nothing in Texas except to provide for the security of the positions held."

\* \* \* \* \*

On January 31 General Sherman wrote to General Banks :

"GENERAL: I received yesterday, at the hands of Captain Dunham, aide-de-camp, your letter of the 25th instant, and hasten to reply. Captain Dunham has gone to the mouth of White river, *en route* to Little Rock, and the other officers who accompanied him have gone up to Cairo, as I understand, to charter twenty-five steamboats for the Red river trip. The Mississippi, though low for the season, is free of ice and in good boating order, but I understand Red river is still low. I had a man in from Alexandria yesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that place impassable, save to the smallest boats.

"My inland expedition is now working, and I will be off for Jackson, &c., tomorrow. The only fear I have is in the weather; all the other combinations are good. I want to keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile and the Alabama river, and therefore would be obliged if you would keep up an irritating foraging or other expedition in that direction.

"My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me in embarking for Red river, though I am very anxious to operate in that direction. The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, I sent communication to Admiral Porter, and despatched to General Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to co-operate with you against Shreveport, and I will have his answer in time, for you cannot do anything till Red river has twelve feet of water on the rapids of Alexandria. That will be from March to June. I have lived on Red river, and know somewhat of the phases of that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be made rapidly, by simultaneous movements from Little Rock on Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of gunboats and transports directly up Red river. Admiral Porter will be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1. I think Steele could move with

10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. I could take about 10,000, and you could, I suppose, the same. Your movement from Opelousas simultaneous with mine up the river would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy, near Marks-ville, and the whole could appear at Shreveport about a day appointed. I doubt if the enemy would risk a siege, although they are, I am informed, fortifying and placing many heavy guns. It would be better for us that they should stand at Shreveport, as we might make large and important captures.

"But I do not believe the enemy would fight a force of 30,000 men, with gun-boats. I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and hope, before you have made up your dispositions, I will have the necessary permission. Half the army of the Tennessee is near the Tennessee river, beyond Huntsville, awaiting the completion of the railroad, and by present orders I will be compelled to hasten there, to command in person, unless General Grant modifies the plan. I have now in this department only the force left to hold the river and posts, and I am seriously embarrassed by the promises made the veteran volunteers for furloughs. I think by March 1 I could put afloat for Shreveport 10,000 men, provided I succeed in my present plan of clearing the Mississippi and breaking up the railroad about Meridian."

On February 1 General Halleck sent the following communication to General Banks:

"GENERAL: Your despatches of January 23, transmitting report and map of Major Houston, are received. This report and map contain very important and valuable information.

"The geographical character of the theatre of war west of the Mississippi indicates Shreveport as the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign for troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas rivers.

"Of course, the strategic advantages of this point may be more than counter-balanced by disadvantages of communication and supplies. General Steele reports that he cannot advance to Shreveport this month unless certain of finding supplies on the Red river, and of having there the co-operation of your forces or those of General Sherman.

"If the Red river is not navigable, and it will require months to open any other communication to Shreveport, there seems very little prospect of the requisite co-operation or transportation of supplies. It has, therefore, been left entirely to your discretion, after fully investigating the question, to adopt this line or substitute any other. It was proper, however, that you should have an understanding with Generals Steele and Sherman, as it would probably be hazardous for either of those officers to attempt the movement without the co-operation of other troops.

"If the country between the Arkansas and the Red river is impassable during the winter, as has been represented, it was thought that a portion of General Steele's command might be temporarily spared to operate with Sherman from the Mississippi. The department of Arkansas was, therefore, made subject to the orders of General Grant.

"It is quite probable that the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, so different from what General Grant anticipated when he detached General Sherman, may have caused him to modify his plans, or at least to postpone their execution. This may also prevent your receiving the expected aid from Sherman. Communications by the Mississippi river are so often interrupted, and despatches delayed, that I am not advised where General Sherman now is, or what are his present plans.

"So many delays have already occurred, and the winter is now so far advanced, that I greatly fear no important operations west of the Mississippi will be concluded in time for General Grant's proposed campaign in the spring. This is

greatly to be regretted, but perhaps is unavoidable, as all our armies are greatly reduced by furloughs, and the raising of new troops progresses very slowly. Re-enforcements, however, are being sent to you as rapidly as we can possibly get them ready for the field.

“Have you not overestimated the strength of the enemy west of the Mississippi river? All the information we can get makes the whole rebel force under Magruder, Smith, and Price much less than ours under you and General Steele. Of course you have better sources of information than we have here.”

The following is an extract from a communication sent by General Banks to General Halleck, February 2:

\* \* \* \* \*

“I enclose copy of communication from Admiral Porter, which shows the condition of Red river and the Atchafalaya. From this it would appear that some delay would occur before any extensive operations can be carried out in that direction. As I stated in my last despatch, I have sent officers to communicate with General Sherman, or General McPherson, in case of General Sherman's absence, and also with General Steele, and shall hold myself in readiness to co-operate with them.”

\* \* \* \* \*

February 11 General Halleck wrote to General Banks :

“GENERAL: Your despatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting ‘orders’ and ‘instructions’ in regard to operations on Red river. If by this is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my despatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with Generals Sherman and Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best under all the circumstances of the case.

“My last communication from General Sherman is dated January 29, 1864, and received here to-day. He says the stage of water in Red river is such that he cannot operate in that direction earlier than March or April, and that in the mean time he would operate on the east side of the Mississippi river. I think he had not then communicated with you. Nothing of a recent date has been received from General Steele in regard to the condition of affairs in Arkansas or his intended movements.”

General Banks wrote to General Halleck on the 12th:

“GENERAL: Captain Robert T. Dunham, of my staff, returned this evening from a visit to General Steele, at Little Rock, Arkansas, to whom he had been sent to communicate upon the subject of the movement up Red river. General Steele states in his despatch sent by Captain Dunham that he will be able to co-operate with the forces of this department, by the way of Pine Bluff and Monroe, at the time we are ready to move.

“This route is said to be practicable earlier than by way of Camden or Arkadelphia, though he states that there are serious objections to it. He will be able to advance with ten thousand well-appointed troops, leaving a force sufficient to hold the line of the Arkansas. I hope to keep in constant communication with General Steele, so as to be able to effect a junction with him as early as the navigation of the river will permit, and also with General Sherman.”

On the 16th General Halleck wrote to General Grant :

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“Washington, D. C., February 16, 1864.

‘Major General GRANT, Nashville :

“According to General Banks’s last despatch, (February 7,) Admiral Farragut was to threaten Mobile in order to draw the enemy from Sherman and Thomas. As soon as Sherman’s present expedition is terminated, (about the 1st of March,) it was understood that he and General Banks would move up Red river to meet Steele’s advance against Shreveport. This was General Banks’s plan, if Sherman and Steele could co-operate with him. Sherman had agreed, but Steele not yet heard from. The time of movement would depend upon stage of water in Red river. It was understood that as soon as Steele and Banks had effected a junction on that river, Sherman’s army could all be withdrawn to operate east of the Mississippi.

“Will not the probable delay in expelling Longstreet from East Tennessee justify the adoption of this plan of Banks and Sherman? Banks reports his force too weak to advance without Sherman’s aid.

“H. W. HALLECK,

“General-in-Chief.”

On the 17th General Halleck wrote to General Grant :

“Major General GRANT, Nashville :

“I have given no orders to General Sherman in regard to his movements, but requested him to communicate freely with Generals Banks and Steele in regard to concert of action. I presume, from General Banks’s despatches, that General Sherman proposes to go in person to assist in effecting a junction between Banks and Steele on Red river. By last despatch he was waiting an answer from Steele.

“In regard to river transportation you will exercise your own discretion, giving them all you can spare.”

On the 23d General Halleck wrote to General Banks :

“GENERAL: Your despatch of February 12 is received. It contains our latest information from Generals Sherman and Steele. It is hoped that your arrangements for the co-operation of these generals may prove successful. The communication with them from these headquarters is so difficult that it is not possible to give them other than very general instructions.

“Several additional regiments are ready for transportation to your command, but are delayed for want of suitable vessels. I hope, however, to get them off in the course of a few days.”

February 25, General Banks wrote to General Halleck :

“GENERAL: Your despatch of February 11 is received. My allusion to the expectations entertained of instructions from Washington, to which it refers, relates to the paragraph of your despatch of January 4 which says that, ‘so long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Generals Sherman and Steele.’ I replied, immediately upon receiving this despatch, that I would be ready to move in conjunction with Generals Sherman and Steele on the 1st of March, or as soon as they could move, or navigation would permit the movement. I immediately put myself in communication with General Sherman and General Steele, receiving from them despatches the substance of which has been transmitted to you, and stating that they would be ready to co-operate with me in the movement up the Red river by the 1st of March.



"I had informed them that I would be ready to move at that time, and have sent an officer to communicate with General Sherman, if he can be found, or General Steele and Admiral Porter, upon the same subject, and to the same effect. I am ready to move the moment I can hear from either of these officers. If General Steele alone can co-operate with me, I shall move my column by the 5th of March. I am daily expecting despatches from him upon this subject.

"General Sherman appears to have gone to the east, and, as far as public rumor indicates the direction of his movement, it is towards Mobile. In compliance with his request, Admiral Farragut made a demonstration upon the coast in the vicinity of Mobile, as indicating a purpose of attack, in order to draw off any troops that might be sent from Mobile to intercept the movement of his column. He expected, as I have heretofore informed you, to return to the Mississippi by the 1st of March, and to be ready to co-operate with me. Since that, I have not heard from him.

"I am very greatly embarrassed and depressed by the demand which Admiral Farragut makes upon me for troops to assist him in a movement against Mobile, and also by the idea impressed upon the public mind that I am to co-operate with General Sherman against the same point. This would be my desire, if it were consistent with my orders from the government; but I understand that I am to move against Shreveport, and am unable to divide my command by any demonstration against Mobile, which must take some weeks before I could get them to this point again, and which would effectually defeat the operations which I have contemplated under your orders.

"If General Steele replies, in conformity with his last despatch, that he can move by the first week in March, in the direction of Shreveport, I shall start my column, with as near fifteen thousand (15,000) men as I can make it, at the same time. It will be impossible for me to go into that country alone, as I have not a sufficient force to make myself secure against the concentrated force of the enemy, which is much stronger than mine.

"I do not expect instructions from Washington beyond what I have received, except it relate to the movements of General Sherman or General Steele. If either one of these will co operate with me, I shall move at once. I have been in constant preparation for this enterprise since the reception of your despatch upon this subject. There is but thirty-two inches of water above Alexandria; navigation to Alexandria is practicable. There is not water enough in the Atchafalaya to enable us to communicate at any point south of the Red river, and, therefore, all our water communication must be by the Mississippi and Red rivers. I can be at Alexandria or Natchitoches on the 15th of March, if either of the other commands shall co-operate with me in time."

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March 5, General Halleck wrote General Banks:

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"When General Sherman left Vicksburg he expected to return there by the 1st of March to co-operate with you west of the Mississippi, but he was of opinion that the condition of the river would not be favorable till a later period. I think it most probable that before this reaches you he will have returned to Vicksburg, or some other point on the river. Whether he has received any recent orders in regard to his movements from General Grant I am not advised, nor have I any information of General Steele's plans, further than that all his movements will be directed to facilitate your operations towards Shreveport."

\* \* \* \* \*

March 12, General Steele sent the following despatch to General Halleck:

"General Banks, with seventeen thousand (17,000) and ten thousand (10,000) of Sherman's, will be at Alexandria on the 17th instant. This is more than

equal for anything Kirby Smith can bring against him. Smith will run. By holding the line of Arkansas secure I can soon free this State from armed rebels. Sherman insists upon my moving upon Shreveport to co-operate with the above-mentioned forces with all my effective force. I have prepared to do so, against my own judgment and that of the best-informed people here. The roads are most if not quite impracticable; the country is destitute of provisions on the route we should be obliged to take. I made a proposition to General Banks to threaten the enemy's flank and rear with all my cavalry, and to make a feint with infantry on the Washington road. I yielded to Sherman and Blunt, so far as this plan is concerned. Blunt wished me to move by Monroe to Red river; Sherman wants me to go by Camden and Overton to Shreveport. The latter is impracticable, and the former plan would expose the line of the Arkansas and Missouri to cavalry raids. Holmes has a large mounted force. I agreed to move by Arkadelphia or Hot Springs and Washington to Shreveport. I can move with about seven thousand (7,000,) including the frontier. Our scouting parties frequently have skirmishes with detached parties all over the State, and if they should form in my rear in considerable force I should be obliged to fall back to save my depots, &c.

"Please give me your opinion immediately, as I shall march to-morrow or next day."

March 13, General Halleck replied to General Steele as follows:

"Major General STEELE, *Little Rock, Arkansas* :

"I advise that you proceed to co-operate in the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport, unless General Grant orders differently. I send to him the substance of your telegram of the 12th."

And on the same day sent the following to General Grant:

"Lieutenant General GRANT, *Louisville, Kentucky* :

"General Steele telegraphs that Banks with seventeen thousand, and Sherman with ten thousand, move from Alexandria on Shreveport, and wish him to co-operate. He says he can go with seven thousand effective, but objects to the movement on account of bad roads and guerillas, and prefers to remain on the defensive line of the Arkansas. I have replied that he should co-operate with Banks and Sherman unless you direct otherwise. His objections on account of guerillas threatening his rear will apply equally to an advance at any time into the enemy's country."

On the 15th of March General Halleck, as chief of staff, sent the following to Lieutenant General Grant:

"Lieutenant General GRANT, *Nashville* :

"A despatch just received from General Banks, dated March 6. He expects to effect a junction with Sherman's forces on Red river by the 17th. He desires that positive orders be sent to General Steele to move in conjunction with them for Red river with all his available force. Sherman and Banks are of opinion that Steele can do much more than make a mere demonstration, as he last proposed. A telegram from you might decide him."

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The facts set forth in the foregoing correspondence show, conclusively, that the objects of the expedition were, as stated by General Halleck, "to take and hold possession of the Red river, and Shreveport, as the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign of the troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and

the Arkansas rivers," and "to establish a better line of defence for Arkansas and Missouri than that" then "occupied by General Steele, shorten the line of defence on the western side of the Mississippi river," and "to establish a position within the State of Texas, which should be permanently held," "it being considered an important object by the executive branch of the government, at that time, that a post should be held, at all consequences, within the State of Texas," and "at the same time open an outlet for the sugar, cotton, and slaves of northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas;" and that the general-in-chief, who first proposed the expedition and repeatedly urged its undertaking, with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances relating to it, who directed the co-operation of three separate armies and secured the assistance of the navy for its accomplishment, was the responsible author.

Although the general-in-chief, on the 11th of February, 1864, says to General Banks, "It was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after free consideration, deem best," it is evident that General Banks, under all the circumstances of the case, felt that he was but complying with the wishes and expectations of the general-in-chief and the government in undertaking the Red river campaign; for, as late as February 25, he said to the general-in-chief: "I am greatly embarrassed and oppressed by the demand which Admiral Farragut makes upon me for troops to assist him in a movement against Mobile, and also by the idea impressed upon the public mind that I am to co-operate with General Sherman against the same point. This would be my desire, if it were consistent with my orders from the government; but I understand that I am to move against Shreveport, and am unable to divide my command by any demonstration against Mobile, which must take some weeks before I can get them to this point again, and which would effectually defeat the operations which I have contemplated under your orders."

General Banks probably remembered that, on a former occasion, he had been instructed that there were "important reasons why our flag should be restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay," and had been told to "do this, by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable; if by sea, Admiral Farragut will co-operate; there are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible;" and subsequently, in reference to the same subject, he had been told "it was left entirely to your own discretion to select any point for occupation in Texas, either on the seaboard or in the interior, the only condition imposed being that the flag of the United States should be again raised and sustained somewhere within the limits of that State." And when he had found it impossible to comply with views expressed "*as suggestions only, and not as instructions,*" he was told, by way of censure, "In regard to your Sabine and Rio Grande expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here until they were actually undertaken," and did not deem it advisable to disregard the wishes of

his superior, so often repeated and so urgently pressed, in regard to the movement by way of Red river, when that season of the year had come when that river might be expected to be navigable by our gunboats and the accomplishment of the expedition a possibility. He had probably come to the conclusion that the difference between a military instruction and a military suggestion, made by a superior to his inferior, often repeated, urgently pressed, and pertinaciously persisted in, was more in form than substance, rather imaginary than real.

General Banks says :

“In the instructions I received from the government it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition, but I was directed to communicate with General Sherman, General Steele, and Admiral Porter upon the subject. I expressed the satisfaction I should find in co-operating with them in a movement deemed of so much importance by the government, to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that *with the forces designated* it would be entirely successful. Having received from them similar assurances, both my discretion and my authority, so far as the organization of the expedition was concerned, were at an end.”

He had informed the general-in-chief of the conditions which he deemed essential to the success of the Red river expedition, by submitting to him a memorial which he had caused to be prepared by Major Houston, of the engineer corps, and which is a part of the testimony submitted by the committee. Had the conditions stipulated in that memorial been complied with, it is possible that the objects desired by the general-in-chief might have been accomplished, and the committee, and the officers engaged in the campaign, relieved from their doubts as to “what beneficial results could reasonably be expected from such an expedition.”

It was estimated that the enemy had about 25,000 effective men in that part of the country. For the proposed expedition General Sherman was to furnish 10,000 men, General Steele 10,000 men, and General Banks from 15,000 to 17,000 men.

The forces of General Sherman and General Banks were to concentrate at Alexandria on the 17th of March, when they were to unite with a naval force under Admiral Porter. General Steele was expected to move forward in the direction of Munro, and unite with them before reaching Shreveport.

The troops from General Sherman's army, under General A. J. Smith, arrived at the mouth of Red river, and from thence marched to Alexandria, capturing Fort De Russey on their way up, and arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of March. Admiral Porter and the gunboats reached there about the same time.

General Banks says:

“My force was placed under command of General Franklin, who was an officer of high rank, and, as I supposed, of great capacity. I supposed him to be perfectly competent for the organization of his force of 15,000 men, and the march up the Red river to Alexandria. When we were engaged in these operations at Pass Cavallo, and preparing for movements against Galveston, the President had written me a letter in regard to civil affairs in Louisiana which required my personal attention in New Orleans. It had reference to assisting in the organization of civil government in that State. We had suspended

operations at Pass Cavallo and moved all our forces, except those necessary to hold Matagorda bay, upon the Teche, for the land movement under General Franklin. He had the 19th army corps, two divisions of the 13th army corps, and 5,000 cavalry—making about 16,000 troops. He was to move on the 5th of March, and be at Alexandria on the 15th or 17th, where we were to meet General Sherman.

“He failed altogether to get his troops ready for the movement at the time. He was not ready to move until the 13th of March. A severe storm and other difficulties were assigned as the reason for that delay. Moving on the 13th, he reached Alexandria on the 26th of March.

“I kept myself informed of the movements of the troops, and left New Orleans and Port Hudson in season to be at Alexandria before my command was there. I reached Alexandria on the 24th of March. The navy took possession of the place on the 16th or 17th of March. General Sherman’s troops, under command of General A. J. Smith, arrived there on the 16th of March. The cavalry advance of my force reached Alexandria on the 19th, and the main force on the 25th and 26th of March. This was eight days later than we had expected. But as it happened, it was not material, because it was impossible for the gunboats to pass above Alexandria. The river, instead of being high, as it was supposed it would be at this season of the year, was unusually low. It was impossible for the larger gunboats to move up at all, or for any of the boats or transports to move up for some days.

“We were detained at Alexandria for eight days, before the boats and transports could be got over the falls, waiting for a rise in the river. The river was rising slowly, the admiral said. The fleet consisted of nine or ten of the most important gunboats on the Mississippi, and from thirty-five to forty transports. As soon as it was possible to get the boats and transports over the falls, we moved on to Natchitoches, (Grand Ecore,) but we could not ascend the river from that point for some days.”

General Franklin says :

“General Banks first informed me that he had promised to meet General Sherman’s forces at Alexandria on the 17th of March. This information I received on the 10th of March. As Alexandria was 175 miles from Franklin, of course it was impossible to fulfil his promise, so far as my troops were concerned. And besides, at that time only 3,000 of the troops which were to form my column were at Franklin. The remainder had just arrived from Texas, and were at Berwick bay, without transportation, and the cavalry had not come up from New Orleans. We started, however, on the 13th and 14th of March, and without any accident my advance arrived at Alexandria on the 25th of March; my rear guard arrived there on the 26th of March, and the pontoon train on March 27. The cavalry was placed under my command about the time we left Alexandria.”

General Lee says :

“About the 7th of March the forces were ordered to move from Franklin, but were detained for two or three days by a storm which rendered the roads almost impassable. At the end of that time I was ordered forward, in command of the cavalry division, to reach Alexandria as soon as might be to co-operate with any forces I might find there or approaching there.”

It will be seen that this delay, whoever may have been responsible for it, did not affect the forward movement from Alexandria, as the gunboats could not be taken over the falls until several days after the arrival of the last of General Banks’s army.

A portion of General Smith’s force consisted of a marine brigade

of 3,000 men under General Ellet. It was impossible to get the boats of this brigade over the falls at Alexandria, and these troops had no wagon trains. General McPherson, commanding at Vicksburg, sent information that the enemy were attacking his forts, and that it was necessary that this brigade should return immediately, which they did, thus reducing the force of the Red river expedition to 23,000 men.

It was found impossible to get some of the gunboats and transports over the falls, and it became necessary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria, and to transport supplies from below to above the falls at that point by wagons, a distance of from one and a half to two miles; and General Grover's division of 3,000 men were left to defend that point, thus reducing the land force to about 20,000 men.

On the 28th of March the army moved forward from Alexandria, and arrived at Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, which is the post of Natchitoches, from the 2d to the 4th of April, about eighty miles from Alexandria; the troops under command of General A. J. Smith moving in transports by the river.

"The army was put in motion for Shreveport by the road through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, April 6. General Lee, with the cavalry division, led the advance, followed by a detachment of two divisions of the 13th corps under General Ransom; 1st division, 19th corps, under General Emory, and a brigade of colored troops, under command of Colonel Dickie—the whole under the immediate command of Major General Franklin. The detachment of the 16th army corps, under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith, followed on the 7th, and a division of the 17th army corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, accompanying Admiral Porter on the river as a guard for the transports.

"The fleet was directed to advance to Loggy bayou, opposite Springfield, where it was expected communications would be established with the land forces at Sabine Crossroads, a distance of fifty-four miles by land from Grand Ecore, and one hundred miles by water."

General Lee had with him, between himself and the infantry, a wagon train with ten days' rations for his men, and three days' forage for animals, a large supply of ammunition, and camp and garrison equipage, numbering from 320 to 350 wagons.

The distance from Natchitoches to Shreveport is about one hundred miles, through a barren country, with but little water and forage, being mostly an unbroken forest. The first day no enemy was encountered. On the second day the cavalry under General Lee moved to and through Pleasant Hill, meeting a regiment or two of the enemy, and about noon came upon a pretty strong force about three miles beyond Pleasant Hill. General Lee says:

"By the time I reached Pleasant Hill I found the country densely wooded. We were then going along a single road, in which it was difficult for wagons to meet and pass each other. Our way led through a dense forest, through a sparsely settled country, where we found no people.

"We met the enemy on a little hill. They were mostly cavalry and mounted infantry, but had dismounted there. We went into action, putting in a brigade at first. The enemy drove that brigade back about a hundred yards. I then put in the other two brigades dismounted, and drove the enemy. We lost about seventy-five killed and wounded there; captured about twenty-five prisoners, and the enemy left on the ground about the same number as we lost.

“During this action, which occupied about an hour and a half, I sent word to General Franklin informing him that the enemy were in force in my front. General Franklin, with the infantry, had camped about ten miles back of my camping place on the preceding night. I sent word to him that the enemy were in force in my front, and suggested to him to move forward a brigade of infantry to my support. This message found General Franklin at Pleasant Hill. He sent forward a brigade of infantry, but before they reached me the artillery firing had ceased, and he withdrew it before it reached me.

“At 2 o'clock in the afternoon I sent the following to General Franklin :

“ ‘APRIL 7—2 p. m.

“GENERAL FRANKLIN: The enemy drove us, with considerable loss in killed and wounded. We have driven them in turn and regained our ground. They have just disappeared from our front; the fire has ceased. I shall advance a little cautiously.’

“I then moved forward. The enemy had simply retired, and resisted our advance very stubbornly, so that we gained ground very slowly. About 5 o'clock I received the following despatch :

“ ‘HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
“ ‘*Pleasant Hill, April 7.*

“GENERAL: The general commanding has received your despatch of 2 p. m. A brigade of infantry went to the front, but the firing having ceased, it was withdrawn. The infantry is all here. The general directs that you proceed to-night as far as possible with your whole train in order to give the infantry room to advance to-morrow.’”

General Banks remained at Grand Ecore to superintend the departure of the forces, until the morning of the 7th, and then rode to Pleasant Hill that day, reaching there in the evening, and, learning that General Lee had requested of General Franklin that a brigade of infantry be ordered to the front, at an early hour in the morning, to assist in the advance, and that General Franklin had declined to comply with his request, directed that a brigade should be sent to him. The brigade reached General Lee at sunrise on the morning of the 8th. General Lee continued to drive the enemy slowly until noon or a little after.

On the morning of the same day General Banks left Pleasant Hill, and as he passed General Franklin's headquarters General Franklin said to him, “There will be no fighting;” and he replied, “I will go forward and see.” He went directly to the front, found General Lee at Sabine Crossroads with his wagon train but a short distance in his rear, and a strong force of the enemy in his front, and immediately sent an order to General Franklin, whom he had left about five miles in the rear, to hurry forward the troops as fast as possible. This was between one and two o'clock. In order that there might be no delay or miscarriage in the matter, he also sent a member of his staff to inform General Franklin of the condition of affairs at the front, and to push forward the infantry as fast as possible. These messengers found General Franklin at his headquarters, where General Banks had left him when he went to the front. General Franklin says these orders reached him about three o'clock. Between four and five o'clock General Franklin, with General Cameron's division

of the 13th army corps, reached the front. Skirmishing had been constantly going on during the afternoon, and about four and a half p. m. the enemy made a general attack along the whole line, with great vigor on the right flank, and at the time when General Franklin arrived our forces had been driven back from their position to the woods in the rear of the open field, where a new line was formed and held with the assistance of the troops who had just arrived, and were formed in line of battle by General Franklin until our forces were outnumbered in front by the enemy, and both flanks turned. The infantry was forced back upon the wagon train of the cavalry, and it was impossible to remove the guns in consequence of the position of that train, and an immediate retreat commenced.

General Emory, commanding the first division of the 19th army corps, who, when ordered to advance, was about two miles in the rear of General Franklin, had advanced and formed a line of battle at Pleasant Grove, so called, in accordance with instructions, some two or three miles from Sabine Crossroads. The enemy attacked this line a little before sunset; the action lasted more than an hour, and the enemy were decidedly repulsed with serious loss.

After this engagement, it was decided that the army should fall back to Pleasant Hill, which it did, reaching there about nine o'clock in the morning of the 9th, there meeting the troops under command of General A. J. Smith. A line of battle was formed, and there was much picket firing during the day. About five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked with great vigor, but were repulsed at all points, and pursued as long as daylight would permit.

It was urged by General A. J. Smith, and at first determined by General Banks, to commence a forward movement the next morning; but subsequently, on representations made by General Franklin and other general officers as to the condition of their respective commands, it was decided to return to Grand Ecore.

On that evening a reconnoissance which had been sent to the river returned and reported that they had not been able to discover the fleet, or learn from the people of its passage up the river. There was no water at Pleasant Hill, and the want of rations for some of the troops made it imperative that the army should advance, or retire to some point where it could communicate with the fleet. The difficulties already experienced in ascending the river, with the fact that no information could be obtained as to how far the fleet had gone above Grand Ecore, made the return to that point a necessity. The dead were buried, and the wounded who could not be moved were placed in hospital and surgeons left in charge of them. Doctor Sanger, who returned to Pleasant Hill two days after, says that they had suffered but little, except in a few cases where they could not be operated upon for want of instruments. He had left instruments with his assistants, but the rebels, when they returned the next day, had taken them. When he returned he got a protection for his instruments, and after that he had no trouble.

The army returned to Grand Ecore on the 10th. The fleet having left Grand Ecore on the 7th, reached Loggy bayou, the point where



it expected to communicate with the army, at two o'clock p. m. on the 10th, the same day that the army fell back to Grand Ecore. Shortly after its arrival there General T. Kilby Smith, in command of the transports, received orders informing him that the army was falling back, and directing an immediate return to Grand Ecore, where they arrived in safety on the 15th. The passage down the river was delayed by the larger vessels frequently getting aground in consequence of the low stage of the water, and they had several sharp engagements with the enemy on the banks, in which it is claimed we inflicted serious loss on the enemy, and sustained but slight loss ourselves.

On the 17th Admiral Porter reported to the Secretary of the Navy, from off Alexandria: "We have only eight feet of water between this and Grand Ecore, and many lumps exist. This expedition and the failure of the army to advance has given me a great deal of trouble, but I don't despair of getting out of it; it is only a matter of want of water, and I cannot think that this river would fail to rise when all the others are booming."

Information had been received by General Banks that General Steele would not probably be able to co-operate, and also a request for the return of the forces under General Smith to General Sherman, which request General Banks, owing to the condition of the army and navy, refused.

On the 22d of April, the whole fleet having passed below Grand Ecore, with much difficulty, the army moved towards Alexandria. General Franklin says:

"General Banks had directed me to take charge of the movement, and I did direct the retreat from Grand Ecore to the vicinity of Alexandria. The advance and rear guard had constant skirmishing, and in crossing Cane river quite a serious fight occurred, in which two brigades of the 19th corps, and two divisions of the 13th corps, all under Brigadier General Birge, were engaged, Brigadier General Emory commanding the whole movement. The enemy retreated, or was driven away from the crossing, about nightfall. This was the only serious fight that the advance guard had during the retreat. General Smith was the rear guard and had one or two serious affairs with the enemy, although the loss was not great. He arrived at Alexandria on Tuesday, the 26th of April."

The Eastport, the largest gunboat of the navy, after having been frequently on shore in consequence of the low stage of water in the river, and after great exertions had been made to get her down, was blown up to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy. All the other vessels of the fleet, though attacked by the enemy, and a few men killed on board on their passage down, arrived at Alexandria the 28th of April.

The water in the river had been falling, and, as had been anticipated, it was found impossible for the gunboats to pass the falls. General (then lieutenant colonel) Joseph Bailey proposed the construction of dams for the purpose of raising the water in the channel so that the boats could be floated over the rapids.

A dam at the foot of the rapids was first constructed under his direction, and finished about the 8th, when two gunboats passed over

the rapids. The pressure of the water was so great that a portion of this dam was carried away. The portion which had been carried away was partially repaired, and two wing dams on each side of the river, above the rapids, were constructed; and on the morning of the 12th of May the entire fleet went over the rapids in safety; some of the vessels having been lightened by taking off their iron-cladding, and the removal of their heavy guns.

The river at this point is about seven hundred and fifty feet wide, and from four to six feet in depth, with a current running at the rate of ten miles per hour. The main dam increased the depth of water five feet four and a half inches, and the wing dams one foot two inches, making the whole increase six feet six and a half inches. These dams were constructed almost wholly by the army, two or three thousand men being detailed at a time, and the work prosecuted with great vigor day and night.

It does not appear that the fleet met with any further disaster, except the loss of two small light-draught gunboats, which had been sent down the river as convoy to a quartermaster's boat.

On the 13th the army marched from Alexandria, and reached Simmsport on the 16th, having had a sharp skirmish with the enemy at Mansura.

From this point General Smith's corps returned to Mississippi, and General Canby arrived at Simmsport on the 19th, and assumed command, having been appointed to the command of all forces west of the Mississippi.

This expedition having failed to accomplish the object proposed, it becomes necessary to inquire what causes occasioned the failure.

The repulse or disaster at Sabine Crossroads, whoever may have been responsible for it, was not of sufficient importance to cause the failure of this expedition. But as there is diversity of opinion as to the responsibility for that repulse, it may be well to inquire what causes produced it, and upon whom the responsibility rests.

General Franklin, who directed the order of march from Grand Ecore, placed the cavalry train, of more than three hundred wagons, between the cavalry and the infantry. General Lee, commanding the cavalry, had repeatedly asked that his train, or the larger portion of it, might be placed in rear of the infantry. General Lee says :

“Question. You say you had to advance through what is called a ‘piney woods’ country, where there was only one road, and that so narrow that it was difficult for two wagons to pass each other; now, in a country like that, would it not be a highly improper manner of disposing of troops to have a wagon train close in the rear of the cavalry which were in the advance? In other words, should you not have been pretty much unencumbered with trains, and gone ahead merely as scouts perhaps, so as to be able to fall back if you met a superior force?”

“Answer. On the evening before the battle of Sabine Crossroads I wrote to General Franklin a communication, in which I said that while I respectfully deferred to his judgment—and I used that language because I had insisted on my view so often that I did not dare do so any longer—I thought if I met with an obstinate resistance my trains should go back.

“Question. Suppose your wagon trains had been in rear of the infantry, and there had been a fair chance for you to have retired when you met this superior

force of the enemy, what would have been the result? Could you have been whipped there by the enemy?

"Answer. Not where we were whipped.

"Question. You would have had the support of the infantry so as to have had a more equal battle?

"Answer. I think so. We certainly should have had a better chance, for we should have had an increased force.

"Question. You say that when you met the enemy at Sabine Crossroads they were four or five to your one?

"Answer. They had about 20,000 men, and I had from 4,000 to 5,000.

"Question. Was it not possible to have conducted the advance of our army so as to avoid such a contingency as your meeting so overwhelming a force while you were so far distant from your support?

"Answer. I think there is no question of that; that is a very plain proposition.

"Question. Then was it not unmilitary not to have arranged your march differently in an enemy's country?

"Answer. To give a rather vague answer to that question, I believe that the theory was pretty well seated in the minds of the commanding officers that we were not to have any fighting until we got to Shreveport. That is a conjecture of mine from what I heard and saw. I was laughed at for insisting that we would have a fight before we got to Shreveport; but, as I have already stated, I did not dare to insist upon it after a while, because people began to think I was frightened. General Franklin used to send me word that the cavalry was in the way. I think the impression was that I was slow. It is a simple thing to march a column behind a heavy advance guard that is doing all the fighting.

"Question. If I understand it, General Franklin's objection to sending forward infantry to your support was that you would go ahead too fast?

"Answer. Well, sir, his orders to me were, 'Must crowd the enemy vigorously; keep your train well up.'"

General Franklin, in speaking of the cavalry train at the battle of Sabine Crossroads, says:

"Question. Were your trains an impediment?

"Answer. Not at that time. The trains had nothing to do with the defeating of the infantry or cavalry. But when the rout began, then the trains were in the way; nothing could be got away, because the train was jammed up to where the infantry was driven back, and when the time came to turn the artillery back there was no place for them to get through.

"Question. Was that a good military disposition of your forces?

"Answer. Not at all.

"Question. Who is responsible for that?

"Answer. I suppose that to a certain extent I am responsible, thus far: the cavalry general had always been asking me to put his train behind the infantry troops, and let it march in front of the infantry train. I had always refused to do that; I told him that it was his business to take care of his own train. The reasons which actuated me in this were these: I had about 700 wagons with me, which the infantry had to take care of. If it had taken the 250 which the cavalry had and put them in front of my infantry train, my infantry wagons would never have got into camp the day of my march. The consequence would have been that the cavalry would have had their wagons up, but at the expense of the infantry. I therefore told General Lee that he must take care of his own wagons. To that extent I am responsible for his wagons being here they were. But he writes me, at 7.30 a. m. on the 8th, 'I am keeping y train back, in order that I may see the thing settled before I bring them up the front.'"

It will be seen that whether this train was close up to the cavalry or only a little in advance of the infantry, it would still be on a narrow road, where it was difficult for two wagons to pass each other, and consequently would obstruct anything which must pass it. That it did so obstruct the infantry on the day of the battle of Sabine Crossroads will be seen by the following from the report of General Ransom:

"The infantry finding much difficulty in passing the cavalry train which obstructed the road, I went on in advance of them, and arrived at the front,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles from St. Patrick's bayou, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  o'clock p. m. I found that our forces had just driven the enemy across an open field, and were shelling him from a fine position on a ridge which Colonel Landrum occupied with his infantry and Nim's battery about 2 o'clock p. m. It was determined to halt here, in order to allow the 2d brigade to come up and relieve the 1st."

General Emory says:

"I may mention here, to illustrate the difficulties in our way, that the road was very narrow, with precipitous ravines occasionally on each side of it, and it was for the most of the way from Natchitoches to Pleasant Hill through a wooded country. And I also consider that the order of march was not the order that should be followed in the vicinity of an enemy."

It appears that General Banks had no knowledge of the position of this wagon train until the time he passed it on his way to the front, when he found the advance in the immediate presence of the enemy.

It is claimed by General Franklin, and several other officers, that the disaster at Sabine Crossroads was caused by the order of General Banks directing a brigade of infantry to be sent to assist General Lee in the advance.

It will be remembered that on the 7th General Lee sent word to General Franklin that the enemy were in force in his front, and requesting him to send a brigade of infantry to his assistance; that General Franklin sent forward the brigade of infantry, but before it had reached General Lee the artillery firing ceased and it was withdrawn.

On the same day he sent a message to General Lee by Colonel Clark, "Will send infantry at any time, if certain enemy is in force."

When General Banks arrived at Pleasant Hill that evening and learned that General Lee felt that the enemy in his front were too strong for the cavalry, and that he had made an application to General Franklin for a brigade of infantry, which General Franklin had refused to send, General Banks directed General Franklin to order a brigade to report to General Lee early next morning.

On the 8th General Franklin, having been informed that this brigade was somewhat exhausted, ordered a brigade forward to its relief.

General Lee says:

"About 12 o'clock General Ransom came to my rear with a brigade of infantry which had been sent forward to relieve the brigade of infantry with me. Just after he had reported to me we came on a large open field of perhaps a mile in extent in each direction. The road ran over a hill, which was an admirable position, and I was surprised, as we came out of the woods, to find that the enemy had abandoned it. I deployed a regiment, skirmished up the hill, found

no enemy there, and took possession of the hill. We advanced the skirmishers about half a mile further and found the enemy in force. They were there, infantry and cavalry, in line of battle. I then put those two brigades of infantry in position on this hill."

Just at this time General Banks and his staff arrived on the field.

It will be seen that both General Lee and General Ransom regarded the position held by our forces as a good one; that, in addition to the cavalry and artillery which had composed General Lee's advance, there were on the field, also, at that time, two brigades of infantry, and that the balance of the 13th and 19th army corps were, respectively, about five and seven miles in the rear, and probably at that time advancing.

Under these circumstances, General Banks, when he arrived upon the field, was obliged to decide to abandon this favorable position, over which he would be compelled to pass in order to establish his proposed communication with the transports at Loggy bayou, and to reach Shreveport; withdraw his artillery, and the large baggage train of the cavalry, in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, on the narrow and difficult road which has been described, or remain upon the field and order up to his assistance the troops of the 13th and 19th army corps from the points heretofore mentioned. He decided to remain upon the field and take the chances of a battle.

Had the enemy deferred the attack one hour longer, or had it been possible for our troops to reach the field one hour earlier, the result of that battle would, undoubtedly, have been reversed, for, even after having driven from the field the artillery, cavalry, and two brigades of infantry, which received the first attack, and broken the line formed with the assistance of General Franklin and his troops in the edge of the woods, the enemy were repulsed by the line formed by General Emory, with serious loss, after repeated attacks; so much so, that General Emory says, "At this moment I asked General Franklin, who, with General Banks, was near me, if we could not make a demonstration with cavalry, for I thought the enemy were beaten and in full retreat. But the cavalry could not be found—we could not get at it—it was gone."

A careful examination of the testimony in relation to this expedition will show that prominent among the causes which contributed to its failure are the following: From the outset it was understood that it could only be accomplished as a combined military and naval movement, and that the naval movement could only be made when the Red river should be full; having, in the opinion of General Sherman, in the neighborhood of twelve feet of water on the rapids at Alexandria, which he supposed it would have from March to June.

This river, which had failed to have its annual rise, continuing from five to seven months, but once in twenty years, did not have its usual rise in 1864.

The want of water in the river delayed and made uncertain the movements of both the army and the navy, and diminished the strength of both arms of the service. Some of the boats could not be taken over the rapids, and a depot was obliged to be established at Alexan-

dria, requiring troops for its defence. The condition of the river when our troops returned to Grand Ecore made it a necessity that the gunboats should be taken below the falls at Alexandria with the least possible delay.

It was originally proposed that from 35,000 to 37,000 men should be engaged in the expedition. The facts that 3,000 of the troops sent by General Sherman were withdrawn; that General Steele, with his 10,000 men, found himself wholly unable to advance to Monroe, or to any point on the river below Shreveport, as was desired and expected by General Banks; and that General Grover, with 3,000 men, was obliged to remain at Alexandria, thus reducing the force of the expedition nearly one-half, also contributed to its failure. The fact that the forces sent by General Sherman understood that they were to be *loaned* to General Banks only for the limited period of thirty days, and were to return at the end of that time, without regard to the progress or success of the expedition, seems to have prevented the forces actually present from feeling that they were an army engaged in a common object, in the success of which all were alike interested, which feeling, if it is not absolutely essential, always contributes greatly to the success of all military operations. Over these things, want of water in the river, the inability of General Steele to co-operate, and the period of time allowed to the forces of General Sherman, the general commanding had no control.

On the 27th of March, as the expedition was on the point of moving forward from Alexandria, General Banks received the following from Lieutenant General Grant:

\* \* \* "I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi. It is also important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible. Send Brigadier General A. J. Smith's command back to Memphis as soon as possible. This is necessary for movements east of the Mississippi. Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten or fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of March —, even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition. \* \* \* \* \*  
If successful, hold Shreveport and return with balance of troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans. I would not at present advise the abandonment of any territory held west of the Mississippi." \* \* \*

Had General Banks known at this time that the river would not rise, and that the forces of General Steele would not be able to co-operate, prudence, perhaps, might have required him to abandon the expedition. But this river, which had failed to rise only once in twenty years, was rising at the time our forces reached Alexandria, and continued to do so until our fleet was taken above the rapids, and, although it was late in the season, it was believed to be the beginning of the annual rise; it proved to be but a short rise from the bayous, and began to fall about the time the last boats were taken up.

At this time it was expected, both by General Banks and the authorities at Washington, that General Steele would be able to co-

operate, and it was hoped that within the time allowed to the troops from General Sherman's army a junction between the forces composing the expedition and General Steele might be formed, and Shreveport reached.

This done, and the river being open and navigable, as it would have been had the usual and anticipated rise taken place, with the gunboats to maintain the line of the river, it was supposed that General Sherman's troops could be spared, and General Banks's and General Steele's forces, united, could commence operations in Texas, or a portion of them be withdrawn to operate east of the Mississippi, if required by the lieutenant general.

In relation to the failure of the expedition, General Franklin says:

"Question. To what do you attribute the failure of that expedition?"

"Answer. I think that the great reason for its failure was that the point of junction of the two armies, General Banks's and General Steele's, which had been designated, to wit, Shreveport, was two hundred miles within the enemy's country. Of course it was the policy of the enemy, if he had an army as large as either one of the two armies which were to meet at Shreveport, to attack one of them and check it, or beat it, and then turn around and attack the other; and that is precisely the course which was adopted by the enemy. The point of junction of the two forces ought to have been nearer to our lines, where the two armies could have joined without any danger of being attacked separately."

General Banks says :

"The difficulties of navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of April, and the limited time allotted to the expedition, were the causes of its failure."

It appears from the testimony that the extent of the disaster to the army at Sabine Crossroads (the only engagement during the whole campaign in which our forces did not inflict upon the enemy far greater loss than they sustained) was very greatly exaggerated at the time.

It seems that the only loss our army sustained during the expedition, except in killed and wounded, was at Sabine Crossroads, when a portion of the train and batteries of the cavalry were abandoned; several of the guns captured were retaken the next day at Pleasant Hill.

General Banks says :

"In every one of these engagements, except that of Sabine Crossroads, we had been successful. The failure to accomplish the main object of the expedition was due to other considerations than the actual superiority of the enemy in the field. In these operations, in which my own command had marched by land nearly four hundred miles, the total loss sustained was 3,980 men, of whom 289 were killed, 1,541 wounded, and 2,150 missing. A large portion of the latter were captured, and have been since exchanged, but a considerable portion returned to the army during its operation on Red river. No loss of artillery, or of trains, or any army material whatever was sustained, except that which occurred at Sabine Crossroads. We lost there Nims's battery and a section of the Missouri howitzer battery, 150 wagons and 800 mules, captured by the enemy on account of the position of the train near the field of battle. All the ammunition wagons were saved. The army had captured up to this time from the enemy 23 guns and 1,500 prisoners. The losses in killed, wounded, and

prisoners—officers and men—were much greater than ours. Among the former were some of the most efficient rebel commanders, whose loss can never be made good. Up to this time, April 26, no other loss of men or material had been sustained by our army, and none was sustained during the subsequent part of the campaign.”

When General Canby arrived at Simmsport and met the army on its return, he sent the following :

“MOUTH OF RED RIVER, *May 18, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

“The troops from Red river arrived at Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya, in the course of yesterday, and will reach Morganzia, on the Mississippi, to-day.

“This army is in better condition than I supposed from the accounts that had reached me, and will soon be ready for offensive operations.

\* \* \* \* \*

“ED. R. S. CANBY,

“*Major General.*”

It will be seen, by referring to the original letter of instructions of General Halleck to General Banks, that one of the advantages expected to be gained by an expedition up Red river was the opening of “an outlet for the sugar and cotton of northern Louisiana;” and also that he again refers to this subject in his letter of January 11, 1864, when, urging this expedition upon General Banks, he mentions, among other reasons in its favor, the following: “Moreover, it would open to us the cotton and slaves of northeastern Louisiana and southern Arkansas.”

The navy, it will be remembered, went up Red river as far as Alexandria, and reached that place before General Banks or any part of the army of the Gulf. The navy, under the direction of Admiral Porter, immediately commenced seizing cotton at that place, and other points on the river below, sending four and five miles into the country and hauling it in. Admiral Porter says that he sent 3,000 bales from Alexandria, and 3,000 bales from Wachita, and that that was about all the cotton got out of the country. A number of prominent citizens at Alexandria, claiming to be Union men, called on Admiral Porter and told him that if he continued to seize cotton as he was then doing, the rebels would burn all private as well as confederate cotton; but the Admiral seemed to think otherwise, and went on with the seizures, and in a short time the rebels began to burn all cotton within their reach.

The property thus seized by Admiral Porter was taken as naval prize and sent to Cairo, but it is not shown by the testimony what final disposition was made of it. This seizure of cotton by the navy, with the expectation on the part of its officers that they were to receive large sums of prize money from it, seems to have occasioned ill feeling between the officers of the army and the navy. The officers of the army felt that the navy was engaged in a business that did not belong to it at all, and desired General Banks to put a stop to it; but, as he had no knowledge of the instructions from the Navy De-



partment under which Admiral Porter was acting, and desired to avoid all conflict with the naval arm of the expedition, he declined to do so.

There were a number of civilians who accompanied the expedition—exactly how many does not appear, the names of seven or eight persons only being given—who were believed by many of the witnesses to be cotton speculators, and were supposed to be there for the purpose of operating in cotton; but it does not appear by the testimony of any credible witness that more than two of these had any authority or permit to do so. These two men, Casey and Butler, presented to Admiral Porter and General Banks a pass or permit, dated several months before, and signed by the President of the United States, directing military and naval authorities to grant them facilities in going where they pleased in that section of country, and mentioning particularly Red river.

This permit General Banks and Admiral Porter felt bound to respect, and each directed the officers under them to grant the facilities required by its terms.

The following is the statement which General Banks makes in relation to the seizure of cotton :

“Under the general prize law, the naval authorities, upon their arrival at Alexandria, commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, extending their operations from six to ten miles into the interior.

“Wagon trains were organized, cotton gins put in operation, and the business followed up with great vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the army; who threatened, at one time, to turn their guns against the troops, which was terminated by the advance of the army and navy to Grand Ecore. I was informed by parties claiming property which had been taken by the naval authorities, to whom I referred them, that upon application for relief their property had been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter into competition with the navy in the capture of this property.

“In order to remove all the products of the country which might under any circumstances be used to aid the rebellion against the government, General Grover, in command of the post at Alexandria, and the quartermaster of that post, upon the departure of the army from Alexandria, were directed to collect such property as should remain there after its departure and transmit it to the quartermaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn it over to the officers of the treasury, to be disposed of according to the orders of the government and the laws of Congress. Notice was also given to the supervising agent of the treasury at New Orleans that no trade would be allowed in that portion of the State until it should be completely and permanently occupied by the army. No person was allowed to accompany the army upon this expedition as reporter, or for any other purpose, without a distinct and written declaration that no trade by private parties or for personal purposes would be permitted under any circumstances, and that no property, on private account, would be transported by public or private vessels to New Orleans; but that all property sent to New Orleans would be consigned to the chief quartermaster, and by him turned over to the treasury agent, and held subject to such claims and orders as should be approved by the government at Washington. Previous to my departure from New Orleans, the chief quartermaster, Colonel S. B. Holabird, had been instructed that no privileges would be given to any party whatever, under any circumstances, to trade in, to dispose of, or to transport private property; that all the

property that came down from that country, so far as the army was concerned, would be turned over to him, and by him to the proper treasury officers. The same information was given to the treasury agent. No permission was given to any person to accompany the army except upon these express conditions, and then only to such persons whose public position seemed to be a full guarantee against abuse of the privilege, and whose requests could not be properly refused. They were given to reporters of the public press, to officers of the treasury, and to prominent civil officers of States whose troops were in the field.

"Upon representations made by officers of the Treasury Department, at Alexandria, that there would be difficulty in receiving such property except under the treasury regulations of the 26th of January, 1864, those regulations were officially promulgated for that purpose at Alexandria and at New Orleans. These orders were strictly enforced by all officers connected with or representing the army. There was no permission whatever given to any person to trade, to dispose of or transport private property; no privilege of this kind was recognized under any circumstances. Every dollar's worth of property that came into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated to its use in kind by the proper officers of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, receipts being given therefor, or transmitted to the chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the treasury agents, to be disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the government. When cotton or other property interfered with the transportation of any material of the army, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of the country, it was thrown from the boats and abandoned upon the river levee to the enemy. I intend this statement to be as comprehensive upon the subject as language can make it, and to cover all possible methods, direct or indirect, by which officers or citizens, public or private parties, or any persons whatever, could evade or violate these orders, on the river or at New Orleans, or appropriate by any means public or private property to private uses or personal advantage, or to deprive the government or individuals of any property which, by any interpretation of military orders or public laws, could be considered as belonging justly and properly to them. Copies of the instructions to General Gröver, commanding the post, Colonel S. B. Holabird, chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and Hon. B. F. Flanders, supervising special agent Treasury Department, accompany this report, all of whom will be able to account to the government for public or private property coming into their hands during this campaign."

Most of the witnesses seemed to take it for granted that every civilian who accompanied the army did so for the purpose of speculating in cotton. The following from the testimony of Captain Breese, of the navy, shows that the cotton speculators did not expect to receive any aid or assistance from the army or any of its officers in getting cotton out of that section of the country. Captain Breese, of the navy, says:

"Question. Do you know anything in relation to operations in cotton by the army on that expedition?"

"Answer. I only know what the cotton speculators told me; I know nothing of my own knowledge, except seeing cotton brought in in army wagons. There was quite a number of speculators there. How they got there I do not know. A number of them came to me and asked me if I would not seize their cotton in the name of the navy; I told them I could not do it. They said they had 200 or 300 bales there, scattered about in different directions, and asked me to seize it in the name of the navy, and let it be carried to Cairo as prize cotton and go

before the courts. If they could prove their claim to it, well and good; if not, then the navy would have it.

“Question. What were the names of those men?”

“Answer. One was named Sells.

“Question. Do you know where he was from?”

“Answer. I think from St. Louis.

“Question. Do you know what authority he had?”

“Answer. I do not know that he had any. I think he went up there as the owner of a steamboat. The only persons who were up there with authority were a Mr. Butler and another one. They had an order from the President, directing all persons in authority, military or naval, to grant them all facilities in going where they pleased, mentioning particularly Red river, and about there. They were the only ones that had any kind of permit that I know of.

“I know that General Banks requested the admiral to give orders to the guard vessels stationed at the mouth of the river not to permit any vessel at all to come up the river, except those engaged with the army and navy; and to examine all persons on board of them, and to see if there were any persons who had not proper passes from military authorities to come up.”

Whatever there may have been of feeling between the army and the navy in relation to the seizure of cotton, an examination of all the testimony will show that the military operations were not delayed or interfered with by any operations in cotton. The delays at the points where these operations were carried out were occasioned wholly by other causes.

During the progress of the expedition, meetings were hold at two places (Alexandria and Grand Ecore) for the election of delegates to a convention then about to meet, for the organization of a State government in Louisiana.

It does not appear that any officer or private, or anybody connected with the expedition, in any way interfered with, or participated in, these elections, or that they caused the slightest delay to the movements of the army or navy, or influenced or controlled the expedition in the slightest degree.

D. W. GOOCH.



## RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

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*Testimony of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 14, 1864.

Major General NATHANIEL P. BANKS sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank in the army of the United States ?

Answer. I am a major general in the volunteer army.

Question. Have you been stationed at New Orleans, in command of that department ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the department of the Gulf, including Louisiana, Texas, and portions of Alabama and Florida.

Question. How long have you been in command of that department ?

Answer. I assumed command on the 16th of December, 1862.

Question. You succeeded General Butler in the command of that department ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you still in command of that department ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; on leave of absence.

Question. Will you now proceed to give the committee, in your own language and in your own way, a narrative of what is known as the Red river expedition or campaign ? I will first ask, from whom did you receive your orders in relation to that campaign ?

Answer. From General Halleck, then general-in-chief, and subsequently from Lieutenant General Grant, when he became general-in-chief.

Question. Can you furnish the committee with copies of the orders which you received from those generals ?

Answer. I have not all the orders with me, but I will forward them to the committee.

Question. Will you state now the substance of those orders, according to your best recollection, about what time you received them, and also what you did in reference to them ?

Answer. It will be necessary for me to refer to operations in which I was engaged previously to that, in order to a full understanding of the case.

Question. Do so ; make your statement in your own way.

Answer. Port Hudson surrendered on the 9th of July, 1863. Immediately after the capitulation of that place I joined in a recommendation to the War Department that I should be allowed to make a movement against Mobile, stating my general reasons for it : First, that it would enable us to move up the Alabama river and connect with the forces at Chattanooga, whenever they should move in that direction ; or secondly, in case our forces should move up from Charleston or Savannah, I could co-operate with them. I had, with troops provided me by General Grant, about 30,000 men at that time. This recommendation was forwarded the last of July or the first of August. I received instructions from the War Department that my military reasons for this campaign were approved, but that there were political reasons, not given to me in detail,

but, as I supposed, growing out of European complications, requiring that the flag of the United States should be immediately re-established in Texas. Everything was left to my discretion, but my instructions were imperative to raise our flag in Texas in the least possible time. I directed a movement, in execution of these orders, against Sabine pass, the forces being placed under the command of Major General Franklin, who had just then been ordered to my department. There was a naval force and a land force of 5,000 men. His instructions were to land below the Sabine and move up against the enemy's works in their rear and capture them; or, if it was found, upon reconnoissance by the navy, that the works were not occupied, and that the gunboats could go up immediately, he was to go into the pass instead of landing below. The gunboats were captured by the enemy. I cannot explain what transpired. Instead of landing ten or twelve miles below Sabine pass, which was the only idea connected with the campaign, they entered the pass and attacked the works directly in front. They found them much stronger than they expected. The boats were mere shells, wooden vessels, and they could not stand before the guns of the fort. The boats first ran aground and then surrendered, and the army returned.

Question. At what time was that?

Answer. That was in September, 1863. The Sabine pass was the point for opening operations against Texas. He should have moved directly from the Sabine to Houston, and thence, according to our orders, into the interior of Texas, or holding the island or town of Galveston simply. But the failure of that expedition put an end to all military operations in that direction. This took place on the 8th or 9th of September. On the 13th of September, still pursuing my instructions, I moved up into the Teche country, attempting an overland movement towards Opelousas, Alexandria, and Shreveport, to go into Texas by land. My troops were *en route* for that point on the 13th of September. It was found wholly impossible to cross the country from Opelousas or Alexandria to the Texas line. It was in the month of September; there was no water; it involved a march of 300 miles, and it was scarcely in human power to make that march in that season with wagon transportation. I therefore halted the troops between Franklin and Opelousas, and made a small expedition to the Rio Grande to try the effect of landing at that point. Of that expedition I assumed command, the troops being under the command of Major General N. J. T. Dana. We effected a landing at the Rio Brasos and occupied Brownsville, on the Rio Grande. As soon as we could we established communications between Brownsville and the mouth of the river, which we had to do with boats obtained of the Mexican government, then friendly to us. We commenced operations upon the coast of Texas to go back to the point I originally had in contemplation, which was the capture of Galveston. With Galveston island in our possession, we could enter upon the main land whenever we pleased. We could hold a large force of the enemy constantly upon the Texan coast, and we could hold the island with a force of from 500 to 1,000 men. That island had been in our possession, but had been taken from us during the first month. Leaving the Rio Grande, we first moved up against Corpus Christi, and then to Aransas, where the enemy had strong works. The troops under the command of Major General Ransom landed upon the island, and after a most gallant and brilliant action the works, garrison, and artillery of the enemy were captured. From Aransas pass we moved up to Pass Cavallo, commanding the entrance to Matagorda bay, which, next to Rio Grande and Galveston, was the most important point on the coast. The troops were under the immediate command of Major General C. C. Washburn. Pass Cavallo was captured in November. We then made preparations for a movement against the works at the mouth of Brazos river, which would have brought us within 30 or 40 miles of Galveston, intending to move inland upon Houston, and to take Galveston, and either hold Houston, the town of Galveston on the main land, or the island, as should

be thought proper. To do this it was necessary to concentrate all our force. In moving inland we were certain to encounter all the troops under Magruder, from 12,000 to 15,000 men. General Washburn had 6,000 men under his command; sufficient for operations along the coast, but insufficient for a movement 500 miles inland. My attention, therefore, was directed to the concentration of all my troops at this point, which I regarded as important in connexion with operations in Texas and Louisiana. I notified the government of my plan, and asked for any assistance that could be given me, stating, as before, in regard to the Sabine pass movement, the importance of our occupation of Galveston. While engaged in these operations, in December, I received a despatch from General Halleck stating that all the western generals were in favor of a movement directly upon Shreveport, and operations against Texas from that direction; and that, as I knew, he himself had always been of that opinion. That movement had always been pressed upon me by General Halleck before I left Washington to assume command of that department. He pointed out to me that line as the proper line of operations against Texas. While I was on the Rio Grande I received a despatch from General Halleck, stating that my operations upon the coast had been without notice to the government. To which I replied that I had no time to give them notice; that I was under orders to establish the flag immediately; that those were the only operations for me, except a movement overland, which I had tried—that is, by the way of Alexandria and Shreveport—and which I had found not only impracticable but impossible. I will transmit to the committee the material parts of this correspondence if it is desired. I had said as much of the difficulties of the land route into Texas as was becoming for an officer of the government when he knew that the government had taken a different view of the subject.

Question. Those statements you speak of are contained in the correspondence?

Answer. Yes, sir, and I will transmit them to you. In addition to what I had said in my general despatches on the subject, I directed Major D. C. Houston, of the engineer corps, to prepare a memorial presenting all the difficulties of the movement against Shreveport, as well as the advantages. He had studied it, and understood it thoroughly. I shall transmit to you a copy of his memorial, which was approved by the government, as containing most important suggestions and information in regard to operations in that part of the country. In that memorial the preparations necessary for that campaign were specially and strongly stated:

First. That all the troops west of the Mississippi should be concentrated for that purpose.

Second. That they should all be put under the command of one general, inasmuch as the enemy were under the command of one general, and in such condition that they could be concentrated.

Third. That considering the uncertainty of the navigation of Red river, a line of supplies should be established, or preparations made for it independent of water communications; first, by a train of wagons, and ultimately by a railway from opposite Vicksburg to Monroe, and then to Shreveport. A line of railway there had already been half completed, and could be completed in a little while. And

Fourth. That preparations should be made for a long campaign, so that, if we reached Shreveport without encountering the enemy, and he receded from Shreveport, we would be able to follow him; the military being of the opinion that it was necessary to disperse or destroy that army, and not merely to take the place and hold it. Not one of these conditions was established, and I had no power to enforce any one of them. All I could do was to transmit this memorial to the government, and call attention to it, because it embraced views that had been talked over for a year and a half by all our officers. I stated in my

despatches, that with the preparations contemplated by that memorial, and the forces proposed by the government, the movement against Shreveport could be effected and our success made certain, assuming that those suggestions which would occur to anybody in regard to expeditions of that kind would be carried out.

The forces proposed by the government were General Steele's command a detachment from General Sherman's command, and my own command; that is, the disposable force of each. It was understood at the beginning that I could concentrate from 15,000 to 17,000 men for that movement. General Sherman was to detach 10,000 men from his army, and General Steele, then at Little Rock, was to send us 15,000 men. With this force, making from 37,000 to 42,000 men, in one column, and under one command—we would be more than equal to any force the enemy could get together. They had about 35,000 troops in that part of the country. They had 55,000 men on their pay-rolls, but in reality only about 35,000 men, conscripts and all, and but about 25,000 effective men; and with the force that we would have, 35,000 to 40,000 men, under one command, with the assistance of the navy, I regarded success as certain; but all depending upon that concentration.

Having stated this view, I said to the government, "I await instructions." They immediately replied, "It is impossible for us to give you instructions at this distance, from Washington. You must communicate with General Steele and General Sherman. Everything is left to your discretion in that way." That is about the fullest statement that can be made of the view of the government, for I desire to present the fullest statement that can be made of the views of the government. I could not communicate with General Steele in less than from twenty to thirty days. It required at least from ten to twenty days to communicate with General Sherman; and all the communication I could effect with them was to inquire what they proposed to do. I had no power to send orders to them in any respect whatever. They would return information of what they proposed to do, and that would require another twenty days. So that, in regard to authority to command, there was none; and in regard to communication with them, it was, perhaps, as difficult, or more difficult, than to communicate with the government at Washington.

Question. Did not this broad discretion which they gave you imply a right to command these generals to send forces to you?

Answer. No, sir; they were not in my command. I asked that the command should be given to some one general. But it was understood that General Sherman was to command his own troops, and General Steele was to command his. I should have acted under either one of them with perfect satisfaction. The movement of General Steele, who states in his despatch that he could furnish 10,000 good troops of all arms, was to be in the direction of Monroe, on Red river; General Sherman was to move from Vicksburg to the mouth of Red river with 10,000 men, and proceed up to Alexandria, on the Red river, where he was to join me. I was to move up on land, making the campaign I had tried the year before, on the same line, to be at Alexandria on the 15th or 17th of March. My forces were to leave Berwick bay on the 5th or 7th of March, and it would take ten days' march to get to Alexandria, on Red river, where I was to meet General Sherman; we were then to move up to Grand Ecore, where we expected to join General Steele. General Sherman was to come down Black river and strike a blow at Harrisonburg, which was a fortified place on Black river. This was an understanding—that was all; it was not an order. General Steele found it impossible to come down to Monroe and join us at Grand Ecore, (Natchitoches,) on the Red river. I think all he did was to send us word that he could not get to Monroe, and therefore he would try to move on Shreveport in the direction of Camden, which was in another direction from that originally contemplated. After he moved it was almost impossible to get



any communication at all with him. General Sherman, instead of coming down Black river and striking a blow at Harrisonburg, came immediately to the mouth of Red river. He was there on the 12th of March, three or four days earlier than I expected him to be there. My force was placed under command of General Franklin, who was an officer of high rank, and, as I supposed, of great capacity. I supposed him to be perfectly competent for the organization of his force of 15,000 men, and the march up the Red river to Alexandria. When we were engaged in these operations at Pass Cavallo and preparing for movements against Galveston, the President had written me a letter in regard to civil affairs in Louisiana which required my personal attention in New Orleans. It had reference to assisting in the organization of civil government in that State. We had suspended operations at Pass Cavallo and moved all our forces, except those necessary to hold Matagorda bay, upon the Teche, for the land movement under General Franklin. He had the 19th army corps, two divisions of the 13th army corps, and 5,000 cavalry—making about 16,000 troops. He was to move on the 5th of March, and be at Alexandria on the 15th or 17th, where we were to meet General Sherman.

He failed altogether to get his troops ready for the movement at the time. He was not ready to move until the 13th of March. A severe storm and other difficulties were assigned as the reason for that delay. Moving on the 13th, he reached Alexandria on the 26th of March.

I kept myself informed of the movements of the troops, and left New Orleans and Port Hudson in season to be at Alexandria before my command was there. I reached Alexandria on the 24th of March. The navy took possession of the place on the 16th or 17th of March. General Sherman's troops, under command of General A. J. Smith, arrived there on the 16th of March. The cavalry advance of my force reached Alexandria on the 19th, and the main force from the 25th and 26th of March. This was eight days later than we had expected. But as it happened, it was not material, because it was impossible for the gunboats to pass above Alexandria. The river, instead of being high, as it was supposed it would be at this season of the year, was unusually low. It was impossible for the larger gunboats to move up at all, or for any of the boats or transports to move up for some days.

We were detained at Alexandria for eight days, before the boats and transports could be got over the falls, waiting for a rise in the river. The river was rising slowly, the admiral said. The fleet consisted of nine or ten of the most important gunboats on the Mississippi, and from thirty-five to forty transports. As soon as it was possible to get the boats and transports over the falls, we moved on to Natchitoches, (Grand Ecore,) but we could not ascend the river from that point for some days.

A portion of General Smith's force consisted of the marine brigade, under General Ellet. It was a quasi naval force. General Ellet had three thousand men, and a large number of boats fitted for service on the Mississippi. His force was specially designed for that duty. It was impossible for him to get his boats over the falls. He had no land transportation, by which he could move his troops on land, for he never operated on land, and we had none to give him, because no such need had been anticipated.

General McPherson, commanding at Vicksburg, sent me most urgent information that the enemy were attacking his forts, and he had no force, except the marine brigade, by which he could defend them, and that I must send General Ellet's force back immediately. Inasmuch as we could not move him upon land, and he could not get his boats over the falls, I reluctantly gave my consent to the request of General McPherson, thus reducing our force three thousand men. Many men of the brigade were infected with small-pox, and there were other difficulties under which they labored which affected their capacity for service.

The idea of the campaign was, that, entering Red river, we should move

immediately upon Shreveport, having no land communication, or line of supplies, that the enemy could assail. We were to bring our fleet and the land forces together to move upon Shreveport. It ought not to have taken us twenty days to have reached there, but the condition of the river made it impossible that the gunboats or transports should go over the falls, or to obtain our supplies by the line of the river with such boats as could get up the falls; we had, therefore, to change our calculations in that respect, and establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria, where there were several transports that we were obliged to leave there, transporting our provisions from below to a point above the falls by wagons, a distance of a mile and a half or two miles. That required that there should be a force left there to protect the fleet and the depot of provisions and to prevent the breaking up of the transportation above. I was therefore compelled to leave at Alexandria General Grover's division of 3,000 men, as the smallest force that could defend that point if the enemy should come in our rear and attack us as we moved on.

I started with the idea—and that was the idea expressed in all my despatches—that with the force the government proposed for me we could execute this movement. That force, it was distinctly understood, was to consist of from 37,000 to 40,000 of the best troops on the Mississippi. Without this force it was impossible to accomplish the movement. I might do it with General Steele's forces and my own; possibly with the forces of General Sherman and my own, but that was doubtful. But without this increased force it was impossible to execute it, and it was unwise to undertake it.

Now my force, instead of being 37,000 men, had been first reduced by the withdrawal of General Steele's force, 10,000 men. He was of no earthly assistance at all to us. When we were in the crisis of the campaign, we got information that the most he could do was to make a feint against Shreveport. I advised against that; General Sherman and General Grant advised against it. General Halleck instructed me that he had given orders to General Steele, instead of making a feint to make an actual movement against Shreveport. But that would have been of no assistance to us; General Steele alone could not have crossed the waters around Shreveport, and therefore the enemy gave his principal attention not to him, but to us.

General Steele's forces were withdrawn from me, which reduced the force on this line to 25,000 men. The withdrawal of the marine brigade took away 3,000 more, because it was impossible for them to continue with us on the line of march, and their services were required elsewhere. That reduced my force to 22,000 men; and the force of General Grover, which was necessarily required at Alexandria to protect our line of communication, further reduced it 3,000 men, leaving me with but 19,000 men. I would say, without any hesitation at all, that that was not a sufficient force with which to meet the enemy upon equal ground, for they had, at the lowest estimate, 25,000 effective troops, which they could concentrate in our front at any time.

An officer intrusted with important commands ought to be able to say what can be done in his own profession, and should be willing to take that responsibility. It was hazardous to undertake naval operations upon Red river in that condition of things, two or three hundred miles into the interior, unless there was water enough to float the boats. But it was not for me to decide. That belonged to the naval officers to say.

Question. Was there obtained information of their ability to navigate that river at that time?

Answer. It was talked over every thirty minutes in the day. It was conceded by everybody that it was impossible to navigate the river in the condition it then was in. But Admiral Porter thought the river would rise; and he used this expression until our officers were indisposed to talk about it: He said, "that wherever the sand was damp he could run his boats." Upon this subject

the opinion of General William H. Emory would be valuable, because he had been through that country, and was filled with apprehensions of the consequences of the movement in that condition of the river; and being better acquainted with that country than any other man, he advised with the admiral, as I was informed, but found him confident of a rise in the river. And he had a perfect right to run that risk, and accept the responsibility. But he did not do that; he left it apparently for somebody else to say that the expedition ought not to be continued. I was told that Admiral Farragut, to whom I communicated officially for relief, after I got into trouble, said on the instant he heard of this movement, that if the boats were put into that river they would never be taken out again.

We reached Grand Ecore the 2d of April, my own force and that of General Smith's, amounting to about 17,000 or 18,000 men; one division of 2,500 men, General Smith's forces, went up in boats; the balance marched by land. We encountered the enemy at two or three points on that line, but they were quickly routed by our advance, under General Lee, and we each made that point without loss of time or difficulty.

The gunboats were not able to pass Grand Ecore until the 7th of April. General Smith's force had to be provided with transportation for use on land, and we had to replenish our trains with supplies from that point, so that the utmost that the army and navy could do was to move from Grand Ecore on the 6th and 7th of April.

I will say, as a general remark, that apprehensions growing out of the difficulties of navigation prevented such haste as might have otherwise been advisable, because we were waiting for a rise of the river; and if at any moment it had been assured to us that there would be no rise, the conclusion would have been irresistible that it was inexpedient to continue an expedition predicated upon high water.

Question. In your conversation with General Halleck in relation to this expedition, was the condition of the river referred to?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was made the basis of everything; it was to be undertaken at this time only, because it was supposed the river would be high.

Question. Do I understand you to say that you were opposed to this expedition up the river, in that way?

Answer. Yes, sir; my preference was for other operations. I had tried it before twice, and then believed it to be impracticable; but with all the forces that could be drawn together, with, then, 35,000 or 40,000 men, a full river, and proper preparations for a long campaign, which should make us independent of water communications, it might be perfectly feasible. I was engaged upon operations on the coast, intended to produce the same results, when we were diverted from safe and certain operations upon the coast, and our attention was turned to this land movement of 400 or 500 miles into the interior.

While we were operating upon the coast with plenty of transportation, and the enemy had none at all, it seemed unwise to march our troops inland through a country without supplies or water, where we had no friends, for a distance of 400 or 500 miles.

Question. I understand you to state that General Halleck had explained this to you several times, and you had replied nothing at all to him, because you knew nothing about it?

Answer. My remark was this: that when I was preparing to go to New Orleans, General Halleck pointed out the river and Shreveport as the proper points to operate against Texas, to which I replied nothing, for I knew nothing about it. But when I came to go over that country twice, and see the difficulties to be encountered, I at once concluded that for ordinary operations that route was impracticable.

Question. Did you ever communicate that opinion to General Halleck?

Answer. That is in my despatches. General Halleck writes to me in this

wise: "Why did you go to the Rio Grande and the Sabine Pass? Coast descents are always dangerous. Why did you not take the Shreveport route, which is the true line of operations?" I replied, that we had tried that and found it impracticable, if not impossible. It did not seem proper for an officer in my position to press his own view too far, because these movements might be connected with other military operations which he could not be supposed to understand. What I wanted to say was, that on account of the difficulties of navigation and the low water we did not hurry from Alexandria to Grand Ecore, as we would otherwise have done, because we hoped daily and hourly that there would be rain. You cannot imagine anything more intense than the feeling of the whole army and navy for a rise in the river. The army did not leave Grand Ecore until the 6th of April. The navy and transports could not sail till the 7th of April. The condition of the river led us to fear that we might get up and not be able to get back again. It was at Grand Ecore where this conversation took place between General Emory and Admiral Porter in regard to the probabilities of a rise. The expedition was planned upon the idea that, by having everything well prepared, moving rapidly up the river, leaving no communications for the enemy to attack, we should encounter him, if at all, before he could concentrate his forces against us. On the 6th of April we marched from Grand Ecore for Shreveport, a distance of ninety-eight miles. There were two things for me to do: one was to move with the advance, and trust to the rear coming up; the other was for me to remain at the river until I saw that everything was in motion, and then follow up. I chose the latter course. I superintended the arrangements for supplies for the land troops and the embarkation of the troops that were going up on the river, which was a portion of General Smith's command. Then, on the morning of the 7th of April, after seeing the land troops and the fleet in motion, I rode immediately to the front. I will say here that the necessity of protecting the fleet required one division of General Smith's force, under General T. Kilby Smith, to go with the boats, which reduced our force again 2,500 men; so that, when we moved up on this line, we had not more than 16,000 or 17,000 men on land. I left Grand Ecore about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 7th, and rode immediately to the front, and arrived at Pleasant Hill, a distance of fifty-six miles, that evening. Our troops were on the road from Grand Ecore to Pleasant Hill. The advance was under General Franklin, and consisted of cavalry, the 19th corps and a part of the 13th corps, and camped at Pleasant Hill on the night of the 7th. On the morning of the 8th they moved forward. General Franklin went forward to a creek, the name of which I do not recollect at this moment, where he camped, in order that the troops might come up; and he sent the advance on from seven to ten miles further, in order to make as rapid a movement as possible. The whole difficulty of this expedition turned upon the manner in which this march was conducted from Grand Ecore to Mansfield, where the action took place. It was a distance of fifty-six miles, and the column was stretched over from thirty-five to forty miles of that road, so that, in the event of an attack, or a sudden encounter with the enemy, it was not in human power to concentrate our troops. We camped at Pleasant Hill on the night of the 7th. On the morning of the 8th General Franklin moved forward with the head of his column to this creek of which I have spoken, where he made a halt, in order that the troops might come up; and the advance, consisting of about 3,000 cavalry and two brigades of infantry, were at Sabine Crossroads, where they encountered a considerable force of the enemy. I left Pleasant Hill on the morning of the 9th, was at General Franklin's headquarters at 11 o'clock, and immediately rode forward to the front. General Franklin said to me in passing, "There will be no fighting." I said, "I will go forward and see." I reached Sabine Crossroads at 1 o'clock. The advance had reached there, perhaps, an hour before, and had just deployed in line. The skirmishing with the enemy had commenced pretty

briskly. As soon as I arrived there I felt that the enemy was in greater force than we had expected. The idea generally entertained by the men, from representations of the people, was that the enemy would not fight; that he would withdraw in order to get us into Texas, and that if he withdrew beyond Shreveport to Marshall, and we pursued him to Shreveport, and no further, we would have to march back again without a contest. I was of opinion that he would fight; I thought he must fight. But that was a matter of speculation. General Franklin said, when I passed his headquarters, "There will be no fight." I said, "I will go forward and see." As soon as I reached Sabine Crossroads I sent for General Lee, who was in command. He said the enemy was stronger than we believed. I felt instinctively, for no reason that I can give, that we were in the presence of the whole force of the enemy, and I immediately sent back to General Franklin to hurry forward all his troops. If the troops had been in solid column at that time, as they should have been, we could have brought them in season to check any disaster, except for one thing. The cavalry in the advance had its entire wagon train, consisting of 156 wagons, within a mile of the position held by the enemy. General Lee says, and that will appear in the reports which you will have, that his instructions from General Franklin were to keep his train close up to his command, and to make all the haste possible; that he wanted to lose no time. General Lee had two batteries of artillery. Within twenty minutes of the time of my arrival there, I sent to General Franklin to hurry forward his troops with all possible expedition. The orderly who took my command back is here, and can give you his story himself. He had no sooner gone than, feeling still more strongly that the enemy was there, and we had to meet him, I sent other messengers, and, until the first encounter was over, messengers were continually going to the rear to hurry forward troops; but, on account of the dispersed manner of their march, it was impossible to get them up for a long time.

Question. Will you describe the order of march.

Answer. General Lee, with the cavalry, was in front on the 6th and 7th of April. General Lee had met the enemy in considerable force and had asked for assistance. It was a question whether he should have infantry assistance or not. I said to General Franklin, "Certainly; send forward a brigade of infantry to assist him in his march." I did it upon the idea that the advance guard should be composed of cavalry for celerity, artillery for force, and infantry for solidity; that General Lee could not safely march faster than the column, and therefore he might have this infantry to support him, but not for a general battle; only that they might not be stopped by a slight force of the enemy. If the enemy was in full strength they were to halt, if only in small force it would be otherwise. First, then, was General Lee with his cavalry, and General Ransom with two brigades of the 13th army corps, to support him. The infantry had just got up to him at this time. Then came the 13th corps, under General Cameron. General Ransom was commander of that corps in fact, but General Cameron was commander of the main body on the march. Then came General Emory and the 19th corps, a brigade of colored troops following the 19th corps. Then came General Smith with the balance of his forces, amounting to about 5,000 men, 3,000 having gone back at the request of General McPherson, and 2,500 being on the river to protect the fleet. From Grand Ecore to Sabine Crossroads, where this encounter with the enemy took place, was fifty-six miles, but the troops were separated on the road by a distance of twenty or twenty-five miles from the front to the rear. General Smith's command reached Pleasant Hill on the evening of the 8th, at the same time we beat back the enemy in the second encounter at the Sabine Crossroads.

Question. What made it necessary that they should advance in one column?

Answer. Because we were in a country occupied by the enemy. We were moving upon a single road through the woods; we were, therefore, likely to

encounter the enemy at any step. Whenever we encountered the enemy, if our troops were in compact form, we could immediately engage him and take our chances for the battle; if, on the contrary, our advance guard was ten or fifteen miles in advance of the other troops, and should encounter the enemy and be compelled to fall back, whatever disaster we might incur in that encounter might be avoided by being in compact order.

Question. Why could you not have advanced on two or three different lines within supporting distance?

Answer. There was no other road except that upon which we were marching. There was no other route within ten or fifteen miles, probably no other parallel road.

Question. Who was responsible for that order of march?

Answer. General Franklin was in command of the troops on the march from Grand Ecore, as he had been from the beginning of the movement.

Question. Were there parallel roads there within convenient distance?

Answer. No, sir. We were upon one line with our trains and troops, and that was a narrow, crooked, circuitous road; merely a country road through a dense forest.

Question. You spoke of your advance column being attacked and compelled to fall back to where they could receive support; would not they be impeded in doing so by these great wagon trains on this one narrow road?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that is the point to which I was just coming. At Sabine Crossroads we met the enemy about 1 o'clock. At 4 o'clock, seeing our condition, they made an attack upon us. They were upon both our flanks and strong in our front, having from 15,000 to 18,000 men. As a matter of course, our forces, being overpowered, were compelled to fall back. The cavalry train was within a mile of the position that the enemy held. It was utterly impossible to turn it upon that narrow road. The troops had to scatter through the woods. It was impossible to withdraw the artillery. There were about twenty pieces of artillery, of which some fourteen or fifteen were left in the hands of the enemy, with the entire train of the cavalry, 156 wagons in number. The cavalry train and this artillery was all the loss we sustained in the whole campaign. We fell back for four or five miles, doing all we could to keep the troops in good order as far as possible, until General Cameron came up, which was about 5 o'clock. We fell back to him, he moving rapidly up under the orders I had sent to General Franklin. But his force was insufficient to stay the enemy. They still pressed on with great power, and we fell back to a place called Pleasant Grove, where we met General Emory with the first division of the 19th corps, and forming a line of battle, waited the presence of the enemy. This attack was as desperate an assault, perhaps, as was ever made, but it was resisted with great steadiness at every point of our line, and the enemy was repulsed with terrible slaughter. General Morton and a large number of their most valuable officers were among the killed. They suffered great loss. But it was impossible for us to hold our position after repulsing the enemy. We could not reorganize our forces and be certain of holding the ground until General Smith came up. We therefore fell back towards morning to Pleasant Hill, a distance of twenty miles from Sabine Crossroads, where the first action took place. General Smith reached that point on the evening of the 8th, and the army arrived there during the morning of the 9th, and awaited the attack of the enemy who was close upon our columns.

The enemy had been re-enforced on the 9th by Price's troops, which had been up in front of General Steele, and on the morning of the 9th they had concentrated from 22,000 to 25,000 men in our front. We had not more than 15,000 all told with which to encounter him, but we took a position at Pleasant Hill and waited the attack. In the mean time our entire army train, ammunition and supplies, had been turned upon this single road through the woods to

the rear, so that in the event of disaster there might be a chance of its safety, and a portion of the cavalry of the 19th army corps was sent to protect it. It was impossible for us to know whether the enemy would attack us in front or on our flank for the purpose of capturing our trains. Skirmishing commenced about 12 o'clock, and it was evident that there was to be a battle. At 4 o'clock the enemy assaulted our lines with almost demoniac energy. The contest was desperate. If the enemy defeated that army he had the best part of the Mississippi fleet in his possession, and would deprive New Orleans of its only effective land defence. Both armies comprehending the stake at issue, there was a most terrible contest. It lasted three hours. The enemy succeeded in breaking our line on the right, but our forces being strengthened by the reserve, the enemy was driven from the field. It was as clear a rout as it was possible for any army to suffer. We had not then heard from the fleet or the troops that formed its guard under General Smith. The arrangement was that they were to connect with us at a point on the river called Springfield landing, parallel to Mansfield, but distant from twelve to fourteen miles. On the 8th I had sent a squadron of cavalry to the river to ascertain if anything had been heard of the fleet; Mr. Young, an engineer officer, to whom I want to do justice, and who exhibited great energy and the highest devotion to the interests of the country, accompanied the squadron as guide. He had been earlier engaged in the survey of that country, and was familiar with the locality we occupied. He returned on the afternoon of the battle and reported that he could not see or hear of the fleet. We were, therefore, uncertain what had been the success of the fleet. The probabilities were that, on account of the difficulties of navigation, it had been unable to get up. We therefore had no certainty of getting supplies from it or communicating with it. It was a question whether we should remain at Pleasant Hill, in the condition we were in there, the enemy, although beaten, being much stronger than we were, and still within reach of re-enforcements, or fall back to Grand Ecore, where we could re-establish our communications with the fleet, unite and reorganize our forces, already much shattered in these three battles. Apart from military considerations, it was still a question whether, if we got to Shreveport, we should ever get back again. My own belief is now—I might say it was my belief then, but although it was a question debated, I had formed no opinion about it—my opinion now is that it was not in our power to return if we got up as far as Shreveport.

Therefore, after consulting with my officers, I concluded, against my own judgment, to fall back to Grand Ecore and reorganize. I had given orders after this battle, at 10 or 11 o'clock in the evening, to make preparations for an advance at daybreak, and to turn the trains then on the road to Grand Ecore to the front.

General Smith, who came to see me, said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "We move forward in the morning." General Franklin, General Emory, General Dwight, and the officers of my immediate command, were very strongly of the opinion that nothing could be effected by an advance; that it was impracticable in the condition of the river to reach Shreveport, and that it was dangerous to remain where we were. They urged very strongly that we should retire to Grand Ecore and reorganize, perhaps find another route on the opposite side of the river, where we might possibly join General Steele.

Between 11 and 12 o'clock at night I consented to that arrangement, and, all things considered, it was probably the best course that could have been taken. But that is an open question, as all such questions are. We held the field of battle. Our dead were buried. The wounded men were brought in and placed in the best hospitals we could organize, and surgeons were left with them with provisions, medicines and supplies, and at daybreak we fell back to Grand Ecore.

In addition to the general reasons I have stated of the condition of the army, and the uncertainty whether if we went forward we could get back again, was this, we were still upon this single road. When we left Pleasant Hill we found no water for fifteen miles. General Emory said his troops had been without rations for two days. The evening before I had sent Lieutenant Colonel Chandler an order to turn his trains, and he said it would take him two days to do it.

We were in that condition—without water, without rations, without our supplies, and not where we could immediately supply them. We were where we could not increase our forces by a junction with General Steele, while the enemy was certain of re-enforcements. In that condition of affairs I fell back to Grand Ecore.

On the 16th the fleet had come down. After the battle on the night of the 9th I sent Mr. Young, a second time, with a squadron of cavalry to the river, with instructions to any officer of the army or navy that we were retiring to Grand Ecore, and that the fleet should join us there. He found them and gave the order, and they reached there on the 16th of April.

At Grand Ecore Admiral Porter told me that it was unsafe to renew the attempt to move upon Shreveport without a rise in the river; that he could not get his boats up or down. Both the gunboats and transports were constantly getting aground. That was the reason why he was from the 10th to the 16th getting a hundred miles on the river. The Eastport was aground up the river; it was got down, but again grounded, and was finally destroyed.

Having made up my mind, upon the statement of Admiral Porter, that we could not go forward without a rise in the river, I sent information to General Steele, and to the government, of the general condition of affairs, and agreed that if he could join me, I could still go forward and complete the expedition.

The fleet returned on the 16th. General Smith then wrote me a letter stating, in substance, that the time given to him for this expedition expired that day. His orders were imperative to return to the Mississippi. I replied to him that it was impossible; if he left us, then we could not defend ourselves against the enemy; that neither the army nor navy could get below, and that I would take the responsibility of refusing to recognize his orders. He said, "You must give it to me in writing;" and I did so.

The reason of that arrangement with General Smith, of which I knew nothing until that day, was this: General Sherman, whom I met in New Orleans, said, "How long will it take you to reach Shreveport?" I replied, "We can get there in thirty days after our forces meet at Alexandria." My idea was to move rapidly upon that point, leaving no line of communication to be interrupted by the enemy anywhere, and not expecting detention in consequence of low water. He asked if I thought I could then spare his troops, to which I replied in the affirmative. He said that would do very well. Upon that declaration, carelessly made, all the arrangements were made for the return of his troops at the end of thirty days, whether or not, to take part in other operations elsewhere.

General Grant had sent me a communication, which I had received on the 27th of March, before leaving Grand Ecore, in which he used these words: "If you do not accomplish the object of your expedition, by the occupation of Shreveport, within ten days from the time fixed by General Sherman in his letter," the date being left blank in General Grant's despatch, and I never having seen General Sherman's letter, "you will return to New Orleans, even if you have to abandon entirely the expedition upon which you have entered; and if it takes you beyond the 1st of May to return to New Orleans, I shall regret that you ever started upon the expedition at all."

Unquestionably General Grant felt that it was not the best place for troops. It was then the 16th of April. There was no certainty that we could get up to Shreveport with the fleet; and it became absolutely certain that, if we did get there, we could not get down again; and it was certain that if the army and the



fleet were destroyed, we endangered, if we did not lose, the navigation of the Mississippi and the possession of New Orleans. I therefore determined that, as soon as we could get the fleet clear, I would return to New Orleans under the order of General Grant.

General Grant had given me earlier an idea of what his operations were to be; that is, it was the basis of my original purpose of a movement against Mobile. That was the idea with which I had started, and which I had cherished constantly after the fall of Port Hudson.

When I had determined what to do, we had only to wait for the release of the fleet. The fleet could not get up beyond Grand Ecore without great difficulty and danger, and could not get below at all. The heavier boats were aground, and the Eastport, one of the most valuable of the gunboats, was destroyed. We went back to Alexandria, and between Grand Ecore and Alexandria we encountered the enemy at Monet's bluff, on Cane river.

It was some ten or twelve days before we could get released from Grand Ecore; the naval officers, by the way, protesting in the most earnest terms against being left at that point, and receiving from me the most earnest assurances that while there was a man left we would not leave a boat there. While we were there the enemy took possession of Monet's bluff, which was, perhaps, the strongest position on Red river, or elsewhere in Louisiana, with a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men.

From Monet's bluff to the river was about eight miles. We sent down to ascertain the possibility of crossing below the bluff; Colonel Bailey reported that it was not possible. We then had to capture that position or lose our army and navy. General Emory commanded the troops in front of the bluff to make the front attack, when we were ready for the operation; and a portion of his command, under General Birge, a portion of the 13th corps under General Cameron, and a brigade under General Fessenden, crossed Cane river, two or three miles above, with a view to the recapture of the heights that commanded the hill held by the enemy. The difficulties of the march were so great that, although the troops started in the morning, it was 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon before they reached the point from which they could make their attack. They assaulted the heights occupied by the enemy, and finally carried them. It was a fight that would do honor to any army. The moment we occupied those heights the enemy were obliged to retreat. The enemy had from 16 to 20 pieces of artillery, and an infantry force to support them.

We then marched to Alexandria. It was not possible for the fleet to pass the rapids. What was to be done was a serious question.

The idea of damming the Red river was not first suggested at Alexandria. It had been proposed at Grand Ecore, and even above there. It had been proposed to Admiral Porter by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey to construct wing-dams on the river so as to bring the body of water directly under the Eastport, where it was aground, and float it off. Such an experiment was familiar to western men. It is as easy to find men in western regiments who understand that matter, as it is to find men in eastern regiments who can repair a locomotive or set a steam-engine in order. There are hundreds of men in the western army who are familiar with the difficulties of swell-water navigation, and perfectly familiar with the idea of construction and wing-dams to float off steamers when they are aground.

But Admiral Porter did not seem to think much of the plan. As he expressed it in his way, "If damming would get the fleet off, he would have been afloat long before."

At Alexandria it was determined, after consultation with the officers and men of the army, that we would undertake to construct a dam across the Red river, and get the fleet off in that way. The rapids at Alexandria extend for a mile and a quarter. The officers and men were familiar with the work, and

were willing to undertake it. It was constructed under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, of the 4th Wisconsin volunteers, to whom too much credit cannot be given for courage, energy and skill. Still it would have been attempted if Colonel Bailey had not been there, for many other men there, familiar with navigation on the western rivers, had the same idea, and perhaps did as much as Colonel Bailey for the preparation and plan of executing the work. But he was in command of the detachment that did the work, and is entitled to great credit.

There were between 2,000 and 3,000 men assigned to this work. It was commenced on the 2d of May, and finished on the 8th of May. There were six days given to the work—a stupendous work; there is nothing in army engineering equal to it. The men worked in that operation as you have probably never seen men work anywhere. They were in the water night and day. I have seen them working in the water by squads naked or with light clothes. In about six days it was completed, raising the water several feet for the distance of a mile and a quarter, over which the rapids extended.

I was there most of the time. I saw everything that was done. On the night of the 7th or 8th of May I went over the dam at 11 o'clock. It was completed, and two gunboats had passed the rapids to the dam the evening before. We were all in great exultation, expecting to get the fleet off the next morning. The men were still at work making repairs. I went over the dam, and felt conscious that it could not long stand the pressure of the water. Every moment increasing in depth and weight above, I knew it could not stand.

I immediately rode up to the fleet to see if they were prepared to move by daylight in the morning. It was a couple of miles above the dam. When I got there, there was not a light to be seen; not a man was stirring; not a ship had been lightened. I could not arouse anybody there. I went down to my headquarters, a distance of three miles, and wrote a letter to Admiral Porter, stating my belief that it was not possible for the dam to stand, and that if it was carried away it did not seem as if we could replace it; that I had been up to see his fleet, and found everybody asleep, and that I feared they would not be ready to move in the morning. This letter was delivered to him by Colonel Wilson at 1 o'clock that night. Admiral Porter said he would attend to it. What orders he gave I do not know.

I went to the dam the next morning at 7 o'clock, just in time to see a part of it swept away. The gunboats were then just moving, and it would have taken them all day to move down. We thought the game was up; but officers and men were ready to recommence the work, and suggested other plans which had been talked of before.

The question originally was, whether they should make one dam at the foot of the falls, with wing-dams above, thus dividing the pressure, or trust all to one principal structure. The dam had been carried away because the whole body of the water had been stopped at one point, leaving no passage for the escape of any portion of it. Of course the pressure was too great for it to stand; still, if the boats had been ready on the morning of the 8th, they could have got over the dam, even after the break.

Question. Why did not Admiral Porter get ready at that time?

Answer. I do not know. We immediately went to work, but not to reconstruct the dam that had been carried away; that was left substantially as it was, repairing it a little. We commenced building wing-dams above, on each side of the river—three or four on each side—thus turning all the water of the river into one current. The channel through the rapids was a very circuitous and narrow one; but after four days' more of labor, night and day, we had raised the water so that the boats could go over the rapids. In the mean time they had taken the iron-cladding off the boats, removed the heavy guns, and lightened the boats two feet. Had that been done before, the boats would have

gone over with the first dam without any trouble. The heavy guns were transported below the dam by Lieutenant Beebee, of the ordnance department.

During the morning of the 12th of May the boats went over the rapids; every one of them was safe. Photographs were made of the structure in the different stages of its progress, and of the passage of the fleet. It was one of the most interesting achievements in army engineering.

I had sent to the government, from time to time, a full statement of our condition, and of the doubt as to the release of the navy, and my determination not to leave that point unless the navy was safe. I had notified the government that the enemy would concentrate all his forces upon us at Alexandria, and that therefore they must concentrate their forces west of the Mississippi, and bring them to our relief; that we should not leave the fleet, and that it might be possible that we could not escape. The government took my advice, so far as to send a major general there, but without troops; he arrived on the 18th; we had relieved the fleet on the 12th of May.

We crossed the Atchafalaya upon a bridge of transport steamers, perhaps the first structure of the kind ever made. This was a suggestion of which Lieutenant Colonel Baily is entitled to exclusive credit. We had a battle at Sabine Crossroads, one at Pleasant Grove, and another at Pleasant Hill; and at Monett's bluff we had had one of the most difficult operations to perform that was ever imposed upon an army. We lost there two hundred men, killed and wounded. Among the wounded was General Fessenden. We were engaged in frequent combats and skirmishes at Grand Ecore and at Alexandria.

Leaving Alexandria, we met the enemy again at Mansura, in full force. We had an engagement there which lasted for three hours, and which resulted in our driving him from the position they had taken to intercept our march. They took the road towards Cheneyville. The army moved to the Atchafalaya, which we crossed upon the bridge constructed of transport vessels of which I have spoken.

The intention of the enemy, whose forces under Polignae hung upon our rear, was to attack us in the act of crossing. General Smith's troops, under General Mower, met the enemy at Yellow bayou, and had a very severe battle there, in which the enemy was completely repulsed, with very heavy loss.

In the whole of this campaign we lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 3,500 men. Many of the prisoners have returned, so that our losses in all those battles would not much exceed 3,000 men. The only material we lost, whether of artillery, supplies, or wagons, was at Sabine Crossroads, which arose entirely from the negligent manner in which the trains were allowed to be moved. General Lee, who commanded the advance, is in the north, and can explain the facts to you.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Was General Lee responsible for the position of the wagon train on the line of March?

Answer. He was under command of General Franklin. Whether he was immediately responsible or not I cannot say. He will explain that to you himself.

I desire to say this: that General Lee was relieved from the command of the cavalry subsequent to this affair at Sabine Crossroads, but it was not on account of this action. It was because the general officers expressed to me so positively their want of confidence in the organization and condition of the cavalry, and advised so earnestly a change. That was an act which I afterwards regretted. It was done because of the demoralized condition in which the cavalry found itself after this affair, and the very important part it must have in our subsequent movements. I have no complaint to make of General Lee's general conduct. He was active, willing, and brave, and suffered, more or less unjustly, as all of us did, for being connected with that affair.

Allow me a word or two about the forces in that command. I had said to the government that they ought all to be put under the command of one general. That is very simple advice to give, but it was not followed. General Smith showed me his instructions; they were in these words: "You will confer with Admiral Porter, the approved friend of the army of Tennessee." General Smith's instructions from General Sherman were, that he should leave, after he had served thirty days, on the 16th of April, wherever he might then be. And General Sherman wrote me a letter upon the same subject, in which these words commenced the despatch: "I *loan* you General Smith's command for thirty days. As soon as his time is up you will send him back, as we are engaged in operations in which we must have him." Admiral Porter was not under my command at all.

Admiral Porter, with his fleet, was at Alexandria on the 16th or 17th of March. The army arrived there from the 23d to the 26th, when Admiral Porter had been there ten days or more. Immediately on his arrival at Alexandria he began to capture cotton on both sides of the river. His marines were furnished with a wagon train, and during the whole of that time they were passing out of our lines and returning with loads of cotton. Mechanics were sent from the vessels to put cotton-gins in operation, and to gin cotton. This was done under the prize-law. The officers of the navy, during the time we were there, were representing from day to day to the officers of the army the amount of prize money they were to receive, which excited a great deal of bad feeling on the part of the army. All the general officers urged me very earnestly to arrest these men, make war upon them, upon the ground that they were engaged in a business which did not belong to the navy at all. I replied to them: "I do not like this condition of things, or the feeling it excites here. But Admiral Porter is, doubtless, acting under instructions from the Navy Department, and it is not my business to interfere with him." And I did not.

I have no reason to complain of the admiral in any respect whatever, because our conferences were pleasant, and we disagreed about nothing. But he was not under my command.

On the other hand, my instructions to the officers of the army, and to all persons not connected with the army, such as reporters and others who claimed the right to go with us and report the proceedings of the army, were, that no property could be carried from that country except by and for the government; and that no man would be allowed to accompany the army in any capacity, except with the distinct understanding that he was not to engage in any operations in relation to taking property or trading in the products of the country. That was expressed in the passes, so far as I gave them. And I gave only about ten or twelve, to men connected with the press, officers representing the Treasury Department, and officers of the western States, whose troops were in service in this campaign. Every dollar's worth of property that was captured by the army was taken down to New Orleans in government vessels, in charge of the quartermaster's department, and turned over to the treasury agent. There was not a dollar's worth of property taken by any individual, or on any private account whatever.

Question. What became of the cotton which Admiral Porter gathered?

Answer. It was submitted, we were told, to the decision of a prize court. I never knew what that decision was.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Can you state the extent of the cotton operations of the fleet?

Answer. They were very large; I could not tell how much. I speak of it only because there was some feeling excited between the army and navy upon the subject which lasted all through the campaign.

By the chairman :

Question. You spoke of treasury agents going with you. Were there any who had permission to trade with the enemy?

Answer. No, sir; they had no such permission; they were allowed no privileges at all. They were simply allowed to accompany the army, I suppose for the purpose of seeing what was done. I had a correspondence on this subject with Mr. Flanders, the supervising agent of the treasury at New Orleans. He asked whether trading places could be established on the river. I said, not until we had full possession of the country. And no man, so far as the army was concerned, was allowed to take away a dollar's worth of property from that country on private account. Everything that was taken was receipted for and turned over to the quartermaster, and then by him turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department.

Question. Was any cotton seized for the government, by any of your troops or officers, that belonged to private individuals?

Answer. Yes, sir. Before leaving Alexandria I myself gave directions to the quartermaster to take any property which was found in the district where we then were. We did nothing of the kind while we were on the march. But on our return I thought it was good policy to leave nothing which could be appropriated to the support of the rebellion by public or private enemies, but to take and hold it for the government, giving receipts therefor to the persons from whom it was taken, with a full record of the facts, and turning it over to the treasury agent, to be disposed of according to law. While I was at Alexandria, on the return of the army, I publicly promulgated the treasury regulations of the 26th January. This had not been done before in the department of the Gulf. I thought they gave to the enemy a chance to transport their property to Europe through our hands to pay for rebel cruisers. I did not approve the principle upon which they were founded, and as it was left to my discretion whether or not to approve them, I did not approve them. In this case I gave them my approval, upon the recommendation of the treasury officers, so that this transfer to the treasury agent might be made according to law. They said they could not otherwise receive the property.

Question. What amount of cotton did you seize there?

Answer. Not a large amount. Nothing in the nature of a military operation or movement was made subordinate to this matter of trade. Whenever we wanted a vessel for any purpose, for the transportation of colored people, or the families of refugees, for instance, any cotton that might have been loaded on it by orders, or put on by stealth, was taken out and left on the levee.

Question. I understand you to say that this expedition was planned and commenced before General Grant became general-in-chief.

Answer. Yes, sir; almost the first order I received from General Grant, after he assumed command of all the armies, was to the effect that if we had not secured the objects of the expedition within thirty days, it should be abandoned altogether; and that if we were not in New Orleans before the 1st of May he should be sorry that the expedition was ever undertaken.

Question. When did you receive that?

Answer. The first on the 27th of March; the second upon my arrival at Alexandria. It was my expectation, upon receiving the first order, that we might accomplish our purpose before that time.

Question. And you received orders from General Halleck previously?

Answer. Yes, sir; but they were not positive orders, but rather suggestions. The difficulty in regard to this expedition was that nobody assumed to give orders; each commander acted for himself.

Question. What was the immediate object—what great military advantage—to be accomplished by the taking of Shreveport?

Answer. There are two views which might be taken of military operations upon the line of Shreveport, but the immediate view of the government was that that was the quickest way to get into Texas. Instead of going in from the coast, to move up and take possession of Shreveport. But I believe if any of our forces had taken Shreveport they could not have held it for one month.

Question. I was going to ask if you could keep up your communications with Shreveport?

Answer. No, sir. We might have gone there, destroyed the place, and then come back again; but I think if the enemy had allowed us to go up there, we should never have got back with the army to the fleet.

Question. How could that be supposed to conform to the idea of going into Texas with an army?

Answer. That is not for me to say. It was the purpose of the expedition to occupy Shreveport, and hold it. General Steele's forces were to hold it if we occupied it. But without some communication on that line, independent of river navigation, as sketched in my memorial to the department, furnishing a land communication between Vicksburg and Shreveport, General Steele could not have got his supplies. It would have taken at least 10,000 men to hold Shreveport against the concentrated forces of the enemy. There was nothing in the country upon which he could subsist. They would have cut off his communications, and he would have been compelled to surrender. But there is another view of operations west of the Mississippi, which, if I had had command of all the forces, I should have been disposed to adopt. There were about 100,000 men west of the Mississippi, in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. If a campaign without limit of time had been set on foot, with the purpose of concentrating all disposable forces in these States, with means of supply independent of the river, and orders to follow up the enemy wherever he could be found and destroy him, then we would have cleared the country west of the Mississippi of any organized force of the enemy; then, by constructing a railroad from the Mississippi river to Shreveport, fortifying that place, getting supplies there sufficient for a year, and leaving troops enough there to hold it, we could cover Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. The occupation of Shreveport, as the conclusion of such a campaign, resulting in the destruction of the enemy west of the Mississippi, would have been an important achievement. That is in opposition to an idea which I have heard much debated. If you destroy the rebel army at Richmond, it has been said, there is no use in doing anything west of the Mississippi. The army of the west must fall with the army of the east. I think exactly the opposite view might be wisely adopted. If you cripple or scatter the enemy's army of the James, he will take refuge first in the Apalachian range of mountains, and ultimately the country west of the Mississippi, and there reorganize. Therefore it was wise and expedient for us first to have cleared that country, and held it, so that they could not cross the Mississippi. The enemy should be held on this side of the Mississippi, between the mountains and the Atlantic and the Gulf coasts. On that view Shreveport would be a more difficult position; but it might be as important west of the Mississippi as Chattanooga on the east.

Question. Was it not contemplated that this expedition should be a temporary one?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You did not expect, if you took Shreveport, to stay there with your whole force?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was it in contemplation, after taking that place, to leave a garrison there, and return with the rest of the troops?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How was it expected to subsist that garrison there?

Answer. I do not know. I saw that if I reached Shreveport without encountering the enemy, and marched back again without accomplishing anything, the army would be discredited. I felt that, perhaps, more than anything else that occurred. I wanted an opportunity to meet the enemy, with our forces concentrated.

Question. I do not see any object to be accomplished by that expedition, without you could have destroyed the army of the enemy.

Answer. I proposed to the government, if we attained the object of our expedition, that instead of coming back on the line of the Red river, we should sweep down through Texas and go to Galveston, that being the key of the operations on the Gulf coast west of the Mississippi. If we had the island of Galveston, with a garrison of one thousand men on it, we had all we wanted.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Was Shreveport a place that could have been fortified and held ?

Answer. Its distance from the Mississippi in an air line is nearly two hundred miles.

Question. What I wanted to ascertain was whether it was a place of any such strategic importance that it was an object to fortify and hold it ?

Answer. No, sir ; admitting that the enemy had an army west of the Mississippi, it could not be held. Before it was permanently occupied, you should have destroyed the enemy in that country, pursued him wherever he went until he was destroyed. That is what I wanted to do. Then we could have fortified and held Shreveport, establishing a line of supplies, so that it would have covered Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri—the whole country west of the Mississippi—against any small forces.

By the chairman :

Question. What was the cause of the failure of the campaign ? Was it on account of low water and the want of navigation in the Red river ?

Answer. We should have succeeded if we had had uninterrupted navigation ; and without navigation we should have succeeded if we had had a united command.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Succeeded in reaching Shreveport ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; that was the object of the expedition. But the want of either of those two things was too much to contend against successfully. There was another difficulty consequent upon those two—it was the loss of most valuable time. We started with the idea that we were to have a concentrated command of at least 35,000 to 40,000 men, when in fact we had less than 20,000, and but little more than 15,000 for actual battle with the enemy. It was unsafe for me to advance from Pleasant Hill with that force, with no communication with the fleet, and with no certainty that the fleet could come up to us, and having only from the 9th to the 16th of April to do it in.

By the chairman :

Question. What I desire to inquire more particularly about is the manner of the advance of your army on its way toward Shreveport. You have partly explained that ; I refer to the order of marching, the division of the different arms of the service, and their separation from each other, not being within supporting distance.

Answer. That was the grand fault of the campaign.

Question. We desire to ascertain, as near as we can get at it, who is responsible for that ?

Answer. General Franklin had been in command of the advance of the column. He was in command of all the troops except those of General Smith's command, which brought up the rear of the column, and for the movements of which he

could not strictly be held to be responsible. But he was responsible for the movements of the column, with the exception of General Smith's command.

Question. How, in your judgment, ought that advance to have been made?

Answer. The order of march was perfectly proper, but it was not compact enough. The different parts of the column were not within supporting distance of each other; they were extended for from 20 to 30 miles.

Question. Could the column have been more compact with those wagon trains between the parts?

Answer. It was certainly a great fault that the advance guard, with a possible chance of meeting the enemy, should have had its train close upon its rear. That was inexcusable.

Question. Did not such an advance invite an attack of the enemy?

Answer. We should not have met the enemy where we did, except for the manner in which we advanced. As I said before, and repeat it, knowing the critical condition of things, and the uncertainty of our movements, I felt it to be my duty to see with my own eyes that the fleet and our troops were on the move with the land column; therefore I remained behind, at Grand Ecore, until they had all started. I then rode rapidly to the front.

Question. Were you aware, at the time this movement commenced, of the order of its advance?

Answer. Not of the separated order. I knew the general order in which the brigades and divisions followed each other, but I had no idea, until I passed the column on the road, that they were moving in the loose manner in which they did move. I rode the 7th of April from Grand Ecore to Pleasant Hill, where the troops bivouacked that night. In the morning I went immediately to the front. It was not my place; the commander of the expedition was not required to go with the advance guard; but I was on the spot when the attack commenced; saw the whole of it, and gave such orders as I thought necessary.

Question. And was it not a fault that the commander of the land force did not command the fleet also?

Answer. It would seem to be a fault; but I believe that has never been the case with our forces. Whenever there has been joint action of the army and navy there has been some difficulty of that kind. I do not complain of the want of co-operation on the part of Admiral Porter. He did what was necessary, perhaps; but he did it voluntarily. His language to me was, I shall go, whether I get orders from the department or not, as soon as the river is up, because I am willing to assist the army at any time.

Question. But the public will criticise that he was not prepared to move down when the first dam was built.

Answer. The navy, with the exception of one or two officers, did nothing in the way of aiding in the construction of the dam. The captain of the Mound City aided us in setting the cribs for the dam. He was the only one who assisted us. When I went up there to see them the others did not know how much water their vessels drew, or how much water they wanted.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was not the order of march given by you?

Answer. The order in which the divisions should move was the established order which had continued from our movement from Alexandria. The only addition was that General Smith's forces brought up the rear. Everything in that respect was perfectly right. It was approved by me, and it may be said to have been changed by me somewhat, because when the enemy in our front was found to be increasing in strength I gave directions to General Franklin to send a brigade to the assistance of the cavalry. But the fact that this force was stretched out more than twenty miles was necessarily without my knowledge, and I am not responsible for it in any way. That responsibility



rests with General Franklin. General Lee, who is responsible for the advance, received written instructions from General Franklin, which are stated in General Lee's report. My own staff officers took written instructions to General Lee from General Franklin to keep his trains close up, the theory probably being that they would not meet the enemy. When I passed General Franklin, on the morning of the 8th of April, he said, "There will be no battle." Besides in his instructions to General Lee he evidently supposes that the enemy were not there, for he says, "General Banks and General Ransom have gone to the front, but it is not expected that they will remain there."

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Was there anything in your instructions, or any action on the part of any person connected with or accompanying your expedition, which looked to the acquisition of cotton for private purposes ?

Answer. No, sir, it was strictly forbidden in every possible way, and to the great dissatisfaction of the very patriotic men who were there; and every article of property that was not applied to the use of the army was turned over to the treasury agent, according to law.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Of what did that property consist ?

Answer. Of cotton and sugar, forage, horses, mules, &c.

Question. What was about the amount of that property ?

Answer. That I cannot tell. Colonel S. B. Hollabird, the quartermaster of the department of the Gulf, can supply that information.

Question. Did it embrace any furniture, such as pianos, looking-glasses, &c. ?

Answer. No, sir, not a solitary thing in the way of private furniture was authorized to be taken. If it was taken it was stolen. If a soldier was seen with a rocking-chair or a looking-glass it was taken from him and sent back. There was a great deal of property destroyed, and a portion of the town of Alexandria was burned. When the navy began to seize the cotton the enemy began to burn it. Below Alexandria nothing was burned, but above Alexandria it was understood that the town would be fired. I did not see any necessity for firing the town. I knew there were a great many Union people there, and I gave instructions to General C. C. Grover to provide a guard for its protection at the time of our leaving it, which he did. But on the morning of our departure, or on the day that we left, a fire broke out in the attic of one of the buildings on the levee. I was there at the moment the fire broke out. Some soldiers or refugees had been quartered there, and it was not in human power to prevent their setting their place on fire when they left. The colored engineers and other troops were sent for, to the number of a thousand or more, and they did everything that it was possible to do to extinguish the flames; but everything was so dry, there having been but little rain for many months, that a great part of the town was destroyed. The fire endangered greatly the ammunition transports and the depot of ammunition on the levee, which were within a few yards of the fire.

Question. Was there much cotton destroyed there ?

Answer. Considerable was burned on the levee. We did not allow any to be taken from there, the transports being required for refugees or negroes, of whom we had a great many to take away.

Question. Was the cotton that was destroyed by that fire the property of persons connected in any way with that expedition ?

Answer. No, sir; no person connected with the army or that had any right to any property whatever there.

By the chairman :

Question. What number of colored troops had you in that expedition ?

Answer. About 2,500.

Question. How did they behave ?

Answer. Perfectly well. From the nature of the operations they did not have a chance to get into a fight with the enemy, as I should have been glad to have had them. But they behaved well, and are efficient soldiers. On the day of the battle of Pleasant Hill their position was to cover the left where our trains were placed.

Question. Is there any great difficulty in raising more colored troops in that region ?

Answer. If we could get into Texas we could get them. That was one of the reasons that I assigned for operations on the Gulf coast, to get where the negroes were. In order to get negroes for your army you must go into the country where they are. If we had possession of Galveston, or of Mobile, as I wanted, and then moved into the interior of Texas, or up to the west side of the Alabama river to Montgomery, in Alabama, where we should have been only some sixty or seventy miles from General Sherman after he got to Atlanta, we should have had all the negroes in that country. But while we are outside of the enemy's lines we cannot get their negroes, or but very few of them.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. On your advance upon the Red river expedition had the enemy been encountered ?

Answer. Constantly, all the way.

Question. Where were you ; what relation did you occupy with the army ; were you on the land or on the water ?

Answer. From Alexandria to Grand Ecore I went by water ; from Grand Ecore I went with the army by land.

Question. How far is Grand Ecore from Sabine Crossroads, where the battle of the 8th of April was fought ?

Answer. I think it is fifty-six miles.

Question. If I understand you, the army was marching in single line along one single road ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the character of the country on each side of that road ?

Answer. Dense forests, so that on the retreat it was difficult for us to ride through. Still, the soldiers could get through, but no wagon or vehicle of any kind could.

Question. During the time the army was moving from Grand Ecore to Sabine Crossroads, were you aware that the wagon trains of General Lee were in advance of the artillery and infantry ?

Answer. I knew nothing of it until I was on the spot.

Question. Did General Lee send you word that he was in danger of being attacked by the enemy, and ask for infantry to come up in advance of his wagon train ?

Answer. No, sir. From Grand Ecore, and indeed from Alexandria, General Lee expressed a very strong desire for infantry assistance, in which I concurred. But it was not sent forward to cover his wagon train, for I did not know, until I was on the spot, that the wagon train was there.

Question. Was any suggestion or information sent from General Lee to you to the effect that this wagon train, just in his rear, was leaving him in a very exposed condition if attacked by the enemy and forced to retreat ?

Answer. No, sir, it was never mentioned to me by General Lee ; and when I state the facts you will see exactly how this must have occurred.

Question. I ask this question of you only because I think it probable that questions of this kind will be asked of others.

Answer. You will see from my position that it was impossible for General Lee to have referred to that fact. I left Grand Ecore on the morning of the 7th, after all the troops and the fleet had moved, either by water or on land. I rode immediately to the front. I reached Pleasant Hill, a distance of about forty miles, that evening, and camped there with the army. In the morning I rode immediately to the extreme front of our column. General Lee had reached Sabine Crossroads at perhaps about 12 o'clock, just in time to deploy his troops before I arrived, at 1 o'clock. I sent for him immediately to learn the condition of affairs. He said to me, "I think the enemy is here in greater strength than we have supposed, and that we shall meet resistance." He was excited, but full of spirits, energy and courage. He thought the enemy were stronger than we had supposed. I myself felt satisfied that the enemy were there in force, and immediately sent back for infantry support.

Question. I speak of prior to that time. How long was it from the time that General Lee, who was in the advance, had passed Grand Ecore before you left Grand Ecore?

Answer. He was in the advance all the time.

Question. I know; but he must have passed Grand Ecore at some period prior to your leaving it.

Answer. He probably passed through Grand Ecore on the 3d of April; I left it on the 7th.

Question. During the time that intervened from the time General Lee left Grand Ecore until the battle of Sabine Crossroads, had he been skirmishing with the enemy as he advanced?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And notwithstanding that continual skirmishing with the enemy, his wagon train was permitted to be interposed between him and any support whatever?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you state what was the distance between the cavalry in the advance and the infantry supports?

Answer. Except the brigades that had been ordered forward, it was seven miles between the cavalry and the nearest infantry supports.

Question. Where was the artillery at that time?

Answer. The artillery that was lost was with the cavalry.

Question. In advance of the wagon train?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was up to the line of action with the enemy; the wagon train was about a mile in the rear.

Question. What was the length of that train?

Answer. General Lee had about one hundred and fifty-six wagons, which would extend perhaps a mile.

Question. And the woods were so thick on each side of the road that there was no chance to pass along them?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. About what was the width of that road?

Answer. It was difficult for two wagons to pass each other except at places. It was merely a sort of beaten path through the woods. General Lee will give you his reasons for having his trains there; he refers to that subject in his report.

Question. Did he not ask express permission to have his trains go to the rear?

Answer. He did not communicate at all with me upon that subject; but I believe he had communication, correspondence in writing, with his immediate commander, which correspondence you can get of the parties themselves, no doubt. I never thought of those matters, because we were naturally occupied about other things.

Question. At what point in your advance were you expecting to meet the enemy?

Answer. My expectation was that we should meet the enemy between Mansfield and Shreveport; but it was never certain whether we should or not.

Question. What reasons had you for expecting to meet the enemy at that point, or at any point between Grand Ecore and Shreveport?

Answer. I had information upon which I relied implicitly, from a man who had been through that country, that we would have to fight at some point between Mansfield and Shreveport, at some point near Mansfield. My belief is that the plans of the enemy were changed as we approached Mansfield. And it has been stated that the rebel General Taylor was suspended from his command for having attacked us at Sabine Crossroads; General Kirby Smith being confident that if his orders had been complied with, and we had been allowed to approach Shreveport, we would have been unable to return. And of that I am assured myself. If General Taylor had not attacked us I do not know what we would have done. But he was tempted by our position, knowing that we were in a condition where we could not get our forces together, and he knew he could gain an advantage over us. He was thereby induced to attack us against orders, it has been said, and was suspended from his command for that reason.

Question. I believe you have stated that you had no knowledge of the distance between the different portions of your column during its march?

Answer. Except as I rode past them.

Question. I understood you to say, in your examination-in-chief, that this disaster occurred because the army was not more compact—because the different portions of the columns were not sufficiently near each other for support?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I infer from that that you had no knowledge of the manner in which they were scattered along the road until you rode forward yourself?

Answer. Not until I had passed them. When I reached General Franklin's headquarters on the morning of the 8th he had halted for the purpose of getting his troops up in compact form; and I approved of his halting there for that purpose. I then went on immediately to see the condition of affairs at the front. And soon after I arrived at Sabine Crossroads the attack of the enemy commenced, so that the troops had no opportunity to close up. The truth is that the troops should have moved in compact form, in readiness for a battle at any moment; and there was no good reason why that could not have been done.

Question. Why was it not done?

Answer. General Franklin was in command of all the troops, and was responsible for the manner of the advance. He was an experienced and a competent officer, and I never thought of giving orders to him on that point.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was the wagon train accompanying your expedition out of proportion to the number of troops?

Answer. It was not unreasonably large, but it was larger than I would have made it had I taken the direction of that myself; and I tried very hard to reduce it while we were at Grand Ecore, but the general officers with whom I consulted said that all the subordinate officers, the company and regimental officers, had made all their arrangements, and the reduction could only be made in the wagons for their accommodation, and it would create a great deal of dissatisfaction. I therefore gave it up. I tried very hard to reduce my headquarters' train; but I had the engineer corps, the signal corps, and the telegraph corps with my own train, so that my headquarters' train numbered thirty-five wagons. I could have reduced it to fifteen wagons if I had the organiza-

tion of the train at first; but that was left to General Franklin. The President had given me instructions at New Orleans which required my attention there at that time.

Question. What has been your action at New Orleans, as commander of the department, in relation to the purchase and sale of cotton, sugar, &c.?

Answer. My belief is that the government should have purchased or taken this property in the enemy's country for itself. I think they might safely have paid the people whatever it was worth in the place where the property was found, which would have been, perhaps, eight, ten, or twelve cents a pound for cotton, and four or five cents a pound for sugar. I arrived there in 1862. I commenced a campaign in March, 1863. In April I found myself at Alexandria. For about ten days I published a printed notice to the people there, that if they would bring in the products of the country I would pay them what it was worth there. In the ten days I was there, they either brought in or assisted us to bring in, or gave us information where it was, 10,000 bales of cotton, a large quantity of sugar, and mules, horses, and forage to a considerable extent. This was all turned over to the quartermaster's department, and sold for the benefit of the government; and Colonel Hollabird, the quartermaster of the department, paid into the treasury of the United States two millions of dollars from the cotton, and nearly one million of dollars from the sugar, mules, horses, &c. I wrote to the department what I had done, and recommended to them that process of dealing with the products of the country as our armies advance. The matter was referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, who replied in a letter of considerable length, in regard the general management of property in the insurrectionary States, which letter was indorsed by the Secretary of War that he did not think it advisable that army officers should take any part in that kind of business, and from that day I did nothing further in regard to it. My judgment has been against allowing individuals to trade beyond our lines. I have never, under any circumstances, given permission to any one to do so, except where a man was sent into the country to get information, I have sometimes given him permission to take a little stuff along with him—a sort of pedler's pack. And I did only in one or two instances allow small quantities of cotton to be brought within our lines by persons who claimed to own it; but I did not follow that up. Whatever products of the enemy's country have been brought into our lines at New Orleans have not been brought in with my permission, and nobody has had my permission to go out for the purpose of bringing it in.

I still think it should be done by the government. I believe that if that policy had been pursued, I could have paid from \$60,000,000 to \$100,000,000 into the treasury in the year 1863, which would have paid all the expenses of that department for five years. I do not think it advisable to allow individuals to go into that trade, and I have never given any general or special permits for that purpose. These are the facts that will appear down there. If I had allowed individuals to take the \$3,000,000 which we paid into the treasury, and given them a sniff at the \$60,000,000 or \$100,000,000 that might have been obtained there, there would have been much less complaint about the affairs in that department. The quartermaster thinks the \$3,000,000 we paid over to the government has been the cause of all our trouble; and I want to make this statement, which is in the same connexion: that since I have been in the department of the Gulf, I have never spent a dollar for myself which was not drawn in my pay as a major general, or which does not stand against my personal account. I have not received a dollar there from any source in the world, except from the paymasters of the army upon my receipts, and every dollar I have received from the government has been expended for the benefit of the government rather than of myself. My own individual expenses are, probably, as low as those of any one who sits at this table. My view of the proper management there has been different from that of some other people. But the results of my admin-

istration satisfy me entirely. I think if you, gentlemen, could go down there and talk with the people, and see what they are, you would be amazed at the change that has occurred there; it is almost incredible; hardly any one would believe it. I am sometimes deterred from the expression of my honest opinion of the character of the people of Louisiana, because of the incredulity which meets me almost everywhere. I have stated in Massachusetts that I think them as sound for this government as the people of that State, and I say it here. But their opinions, traditions, and feelings, of course are not the same in all things. They are weak and exhausted by their calamities, and require the assistance and recognition of the government of the United States, and I think them entitled to it. And, as I said before, if any honest, intelligent man could go down there, he would be able to ascertain the condition of things for himself, and I think the gentlemen of the committee would do well to make such personal investigation. It is better than reliance on the opinions of men. The chief statements in regard to the department of the Gulf, and the Red river expedition, have been made by men who were refused privileges, both before they went there and when they were there, to take property out for their own advantage.

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*Testimony of Major General Wm. B. Franklin.*

WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1865.*

Major General WM. B. FRANKLIN sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, and a brevet brigadier general in the regular army. I am now the president of the board for retiring disabled officers, in session at Wilmington, Delaware.

Question. Were you in what is known as the Red river expedition, under General Banks, in the spring of 1864 ?

Answer. I was in that expedition.

Question. Please state, in your own way, what connexion you had with that expedition, and whatever came under your observation during the expedition that you may deem material.

Answer. During the winter of 1863 and 1864 I had some conversation with General Banks on the subject of an expedition by way of Shreveport to Texas. I understood that he favored such an expedition. I gave to him what I thought were good objections against it. The main objection I urged was the fact that the Red river was not certain to rise in the spring. Another objection was, that the road from Shreveport to Houston, where we would be likely to first meet the enemy in force after leaving Shreveport, was nearly 300 miles long, and was destitute of provisions and forage, and I did not think it possible to march an army of the size and kind that he wanted to take through that country. He told me that he was sure the river would rise, and that the country he was sure would support an army between Shreveport and Houston. I then went back to Franklin, where my troops were stationed; I then received orders to move about the 12th of March.

Question. How far is Franklin from New Orleans ?

Answer. It is about 105 miles—80 miles by railroad and 25 miles by steamboat. General Banks first informed me that he had promised to meet General Sherman's forces at Alexandria on the 17th of March. This information I received on the 10th of March. As Alexandria was 175 miles from Franklin, of course it was impossible to fulfil his promise, so far as my troops were concerned. And besides, at that time only 3,000 of the troops which were to form

my column were at Franklin. The remainder had just arrived from Texas, and were at Berwick bay, without transportation, and the cavalry had not come up from New Orleans. We started, however, on the 13th and 14th of March, and without any accident my advance arrived at Alexandria on the 25th of March; my rear guard arrived there on the 26th of March, and the pontoon train on March 27. The cavalry was placed under my command about the time we left Alexandria. On Monday, March 28, my command started for Natchitoches, the cavalry in the advance, and the infantry in the rear. The cavalry had constant skirmishing from that time until they arrived at Natchitoches, on the 2d of April. The cavalry went out about 22 miles beyond Natchitoches, on the road to Mansfield, and there halted.

General A. J. Smith's command, of General Sherman's forces, arrived at Grand Ecore on April 3. Grand Ecore is on Red river, four miles from Natchitoches. General Banks arrived at Grand Ecore by boat on April 4.

On the 6th of April I started with my command from Natchitoches, and went seventeen miles on the Mansfield road and encamped. The next day I arrived at Pleasant Hill, which is about eighteen miles further on. It had rained heavily during that day, so that my train, which was very large, was much impeded, and it did not all get up until the morning of the next day; and the troops that were guarding it, of course, had to remain back with it.

About 9 o'clock on the night of the 7th General Banks arrived at my headquarters from Grand Ecore. During the afternoon of the 7th the cavalry had had a severe skirmish about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 miles in front of Pleasant Hill. The skirmish was so heavy that the cavalry general, General Lee, sent word to me that he must have a brigade of infantry to go with him. I declined sending him a brigade. He finally sent me word that he was being driven in. Then I sent him a brigade of infantry, but they had hardly got out of camp when General Lee sent me word that it was all right, and he was holding his position. I therefore ordered the brigade back into camp. General Lee at that time had with him four regiments of mounted infantry, who fought dismounted. One of General Banks's staff, Colonel Clarke, was with me in the afternoon. At my suggestion he rode out to General Lee to see how things were going on. He came back between 9 and 10 o'clock, and told me that General Lee felt a great deal depressed at having met with so much opposition, and was very anxious to have some infantry to march with him. I told Colonel Clarke that he could not have the infantry; that if he (General Lee) could not hold his position he must fall back upon the main body of infantry. Colonel Clarke, however, went to General Banks, and General Banks sent me a verbal order, through his adjutant general, to this effect:

"You will send a brigade of infantry to report to General Lee by daylight to-morrow morning."

I sent this order to General Ransom, telling him to send a brigade, or a division if he saw fit.\* The brigades were so small that I presumed a division would better carry out General Banks's view. General Ransom, however, sent a brigade, which reported to General Lee at daylight in the morning. The evening before I had sent an order to General Lee to this effect:

"HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

"*West Louisiana, Pleasant Hill, April 7, 1864.*

"GENERAL: The commanding general has received your despatch of 2 p. m. A brigade of infantry went to the front, but the fire having ceased it was withdrawn. The infantry is all here. The general commanding directs that you proceed to-night as far as possible with your whole train, in order to give the infantry room to advance to-morrow."

\* This order is quoted in General Ransom's report, hereto attached.

General Lee, therefore, moved forward to a point eight miles in front of Pleasant Hill. General Smith started from Grand Ecore the day after I did. He would arrive at Pleasant Hill the next day, where my troops then were. As the wagon train was not all up that night, and as the men and animals were very much fatigued, and as it was my intention to place General Emory's command, which had hitherto been in rear, in front, I concluded that we ought only to march to this eight-mile point with the infantry the next day. This short march would not only be a rest to the infantry, but General Smith with 8,000 men would in the evening be only eight miles from us.

Before starting, on the morning of the 8th of April, I went to General Banks and told him what my design was about marching the infantry, and he approved it in every particular. The cavalry with the accompanying brigade of infantry started out in the morning, skirmishing sharply all the morning; and about 11 o'clock he had arrived at a point some seven miles beyond the eight-mile point. About 11 o'clock I arrived with the advance of the infantry about two miles in front of the eight-mile point. I was engaged there in building a bridge for the train, when General Banks joined me. He remained there about half an hour, and finally said that he should go to the front. Just at this time a despatch came from General Lee informing me that the brigade of infantry which he had with him was much exhausted, and asking me to send another brigade of infantry to relieve it. I ordered one to be sent, and directed General Ransom to go with it to the front, and see that it was not put in alongside of the first brigade, but really relieved it.

The remainder of General Ransom's command went into camp where I was, and General Emory's division of the 19th corps encamped at the eight-mile point. About three o'clock in the afternoon I received a despatch from General Banks to this effect, without date or hour:

"The commanding general desires me to say that the enemy are apparently prepared to make a strong stand at this point, and that you had better make arrangements to bring up your infantry, and to pass everything on the road. The general will send again when to move. He thinks you had better send back and push up the trains, as manifestly we shall be able to rest here.

"I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE B. DRAKE,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

"Major General W. B. FRANKLIN,

*Commanding forces."*

I presumed, from the fact that General Banks thought "manifestly we should be able to rest here," that no general battle was expected. I gave the orders which this order required. In about ten minutes Lieutenant Sargent, an aide-camp of General Banks, arrived, and told me that the general desired me to push up the infantry as fast as possible. In an hour afterwards the infantry which was encamped where I was had arrived at the field where the battle was going on, nearly five miles distant from where they started. About eight o'clock in the morning I had received a despatch from General Lee to this effect:

"ONE MILE IN ADVANCE OF LAST NIGHT'S CAMP,

*7.30 a. m., April 8, 1864.*

"The enemy were in stronger force apparently than yesterday as I advanced this morning. I have had in two regiments of mounted infantry dismounted, three regiments of cavalry, and a brigade of infantry. We are driving them, but they injure us some. I do not hasten forward my trains, as I wish to see the result certain first.

"Yours, respectfully,

"A. L. LEE, *Brigadier General.*

"General FRANKLIN.

"The prisoners report fourteen cavalry regiments and a six-gun battery."



I arrived at the field of battle about 4.15 p. m., with General Cameron's division of the 13th corps. I found that our line had fallen back to the edge of a thick wood, which they were attempting to hold, and which this division which I put in assisted in holding, until the enemy outnumbered us in front and turned both our flanks. At this time our infantry was nearly jammed against the wagons of the cavalry, so that, if otherwise, the guns could have been got away, the wagons would have prevented their escape.

When the rout began I sent an order back to General Emory, commanding the division of the 19th corps, by a staff officer, Lieutenant Williamson, to form line of battle at a place which I indicated, about two miles in rear. He did form his division there, and it was attacked by the enemy about twenty minutes before sundown. The enemy was decidedly repulsed in this attack, and the officers and men of the 19th corps behaved exceedingly well. The command then fell back to Pleasant Hill, starting about ten o'clock, Brigadier General Dwight commanding the rear guard, and my part yet formed a line of battle there, where it had been the preceding day. General Smith was there, and formed in rear and on the left of my command.

There was a great deal of picket firing during the day, and at five o'clock in the afternoon another attack was made by the enemy, which at first bid fair to be successful; but they were eventually handsomely repulsed at all points, and darkness put an end to the fight, and to the pursuit on our side. That night we started for Grand Ecore, and arrived there on the second day after. We remained at Grand Ecore until Friday, the 22d of April, when we began to move back to Alexandria. General Banks had directed me to take charge of the movement, and I did direct the retreat from Grand Ecore to the vicinity of Alexandria. The advance and rear guard had constant skirmishing, and in crossing Cane river quite a serious fight occurred, in which two brigades of the 19th corps, and two divisions of the 13th corps, all under Brigadier General Birge, were engaged, Brigadier General Emory commanding the whole movement. The enemy retreated, or was driven away from the crossing, about night-fall. This was the only serious fight that the advance guard had during the retreat. General Smith was the rear guard and had one or two serious affairs with the enemy, although the loss was not great. He arrived at Alexandria on Tuesday, the 26th of April.

I had been wounded in the battle of the 8th of April, and my wound had become so serious after I arrived at Alexandria that I was obliged to leave the field, and I went to New Orleans, and my connexion with the Red river campaign ceased on the 30th of April. During parts of two days on the retreat I was unable to ride on horseback.

Question. What were the objects intended to be accomplished by that expedition?

Answer. I know nothing more than the impression I received from General Banks that he intended to march into Texas by that route.

Question. And do I understand you to say that General Banks thought the expedition was a practicable one, and would result favorably?

Answer. That was the impression I gained from him in the conversation I had with him. It would be hard for me to say what his impressions were. I went to him as a subordinate to argue against it. But he may have had orders which he felt obliged to follow. Still I received the impression from him that he was decidedly of the opinion that the campaign must be a success.

Question. What was the distance from Natchitoches to Shreveport?

Answer. I think about 150 miles.

Question. How far had you progressed when you commenced your retreat?

Answer. About fifty miles from Grand Ecore.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the expedition?

Answer. I think that the great reason for its failure was that the point of junction of the two armies, General Banks's and General Steele's, which had

been designated, to wit, Shreveport, was two hundred miles within the enemy's country. Of course it was the policy of the enemy, if he had an army as large as either one of the two armies which were to meet at Shreveport, to attack one of them and check it, or beat it, and then turn around and attack the other; and that is precisely the course which was adopted by the enemy. The point of junction of the two forces ought to have been nearer to our lines, where the two armies could have joined without any danger of being attacked separately by the enemy.

Question. The order of march pursued on this expedition has been criticised—that is, the cavalry being sent a good way ahead, with their wagon train close up to them, and blocking up the way.

Answer. I have already spoken of my antipathy to sending a small force of infantry with a large body of cavalry, as both General Banks and General Lee seemed to think proper. I do not think that any military man will disagree with me in the opinion that any order of march which involves sending a force of infantry of one brigade with, say four brigades of cavalry, is entirely wrong. If any fighting occur, it is most likely that the infantry will do it while the cavalry looks on; and if there be merely a march, the cavalry exhausts the infantry, or it must regulate its march by the infantry rate. It will be seen from General Lee's letter to me of April 8, already quoted, that the whole brigade of infantry was engaged at the time of writing, while only three regiments of cavalry, out of a whole division of four brigades, were in action at the same time. The result of the brigade of infantry being ordered to join the cavalry the morning on which they were sent forward together, was that the infantry got very much tired, as the cavalry general expressed it, by 11 o'clock, and he sent for another brigade. I did what I could to prevent this brigade being put in alongside of the first one; but General Banks was on the field, and ordered that brigade in with the first. Then came back an order for me to hurry up the infantry, and I came in with a division.

The whole thing ran on in this way: first, a brigade was defeated; then another brigade was sent up and was defeated; and then a division went up and was defeated.

Question. Were your trains an impediment?

Answer. Not at that time. The trains had nothing to do with the defeating of the infantry or cavalry. But when the rout began, then the trains were in the way; nothing could be got away, because the train was jammed up to where the infantry was driven back, and when the time came to turn the artillery back there was no place for them to get through.

Question. Was that a good military disposition of your forces?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. Who is responsible for that?

Answer. I suppose that to a certain extent I am responsible, thus far: the cavalry general had always been asking me to put his train behind the infantry troops, and let it march in front of the infantry train. I had always refused to do that; I told him that it was his business to take care of his own train. The reasons which actuated me in this were these: I had about 700 wagons with me, which the infantry had to take care of. If it had taken the 250 which the cavalry had and put them in front of my infantry train, my infantry wagons would never have got into camp the day of my march. The consequence would have been that the cavalry would have had their wagons up, but at the expense of the infantry. I therefore told General Lee that he must take care of his own wagons. To that extent I am responsible for his wagons being where they were. But he writes me, at 7.30 a. m. on the 8th, "I am keeping my train back, in order that I may see the thing settled before I bring them up to the front."

That relieved my mind entirely about the train, and I had no idea that I would find it up where I did find it. I was so anxious about the trains that I ordered them to close up during the day, finding that the wagons straggled badly as they passed my camp. I understand that General Lee has interpreted that to mean that I ordered his train forward, which I did not. I gave no orders to General Lee's train that day except to close up. There were several open places between the point where the infantry was to encamp (the eight-mile point) and the battle-ground, where a train much larger than the cavalry train could have been parked. The general in command at the front should, I think, have ordered the train in park at one of these places when he saw that a general battle was imminent. I could not, because I was with my immediate command.

Question. Do you remember at what point General Banks joined the expedition?

Answer. I found him at Alexandria when I arrived there. Then he went by steamboat from Alexandria to Grand Ecore, and joined us at Natchitoches, about four miles from Grand Ecore; and then he joined us again at Pleasant Hill. In my opinion, the cause of the disaster of the 8th of April was the order which sent a brigade of infantry to join the cavalry. My reason for that opinion is this: if the cavalry had gone to the front that morning by itself, the infantry would have marched its eight miles that day; General Smith would have been at Pleasant Hill that night, eight miles in rear, and the cavalry would have been only as far as it could have fought its way that day. The whole army would have been in as compact condition as it could have been. The consequence of sending this brigade of infantry was, that the cavalry got on much faster than it would otherwise, and its fast progress was a temptation to General Banks and to the cavalry to bring on a general battle.

Question. Was there any speculation in the army in regard to the probability of a fight before you reached Shreveport?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was a great deal of such speculation. I believed that we would have a fight between Mansfield and Shreveport; that was from information I received from the people of the country, and I rather think it was the order of the rebel commanding general that the fight should be between Mansfield and Shreveport. But this fight was accidentally brought on. I have always thought it was wrong for us to have fought that day; that the next day, if the enemy chose to make a stand, was the time for us to fight, because the infantry would then have been compact and easy handled.

Question. What was the nature of the ground over which you had to pass? Was the road a narrow one?

Answer. It was a very narrow road, through a piney wood country, where there was a great deal more underbrush than you usually find in pine woods upon a sandy soil. That was the nature of the road from Natchitoches up to the point where the fight took place on the 8th of April.

Question. So that you were compelled to march in very narrow columns?

Answer. Very narrow. There was but this one road feasible.

Question. Do you know anything about the gunboats being left there by the fall of the river?

Answer. I know something about that.

Question. Will you tell about that?

Answer. I had become convinced before we left Grand Ecore for Shreveport that it would be impossible for the gunboats to be got over the falls unless we had a rise in the river; and the day of the fight at Pleasant Hill I had a conversation with Colonel Bailey, who was a staff officer of mine, in regard to a feasible plan of getting them over the falls; and on that day he suggested the idea of a dam. When we returned to Grand Ecore I sent Colonel Bailey to

Admiral Porter, so that he might present his plan to the admiral; but it was looked upon with derision, as a foolish thing. I was, however, convinced that Colonel Bailey knew his business very well, and I sent him to Admiral Porter again; and after he got down to Alexandria I sent him two or three times. Finally, I sent him to General Banks to try and impress upon General Banks the necessity for giving the orders for details of men to build this dam. General Hunter was there at the time, and he told General Banks that he thought as I had recommended the thing he ought to try it. And it was tried. I have the report of Colonel Bailey to my adjutant general, which gives all these facts as I have stated them.

Question. You say that Admiral Porter did not believe in it?

Answer. Not at all in the beginning.

Question. Did he make any exertion to take advantage of it? Was he ready when the dam was ready?

Answer. I was not there then. The day the orders for constructing the dam were given I left Alexandria. I had not been able to ride from the day before we got to Alexandria. I have also here a copy of General Ransom's report of that battle. General Ransom is now dead; he died at Chattanooga.

Question. Was General Banks aware of the order of march on that expedition? Did he know of the position of the cavalry, infantry, and the trains in your line of march?

Answer. Perfectly. I left General Banks at Pleasant Hill on the morning of the fight, after giving him this information. He passed along the whole line and went to the front, where the cavalry was fighting; and had he not known the order of march before, must certainly have known it when he arrived at the front. There is one point in regard to that which I desire to state. When I sent word to General Lee that I would send him the second brigade of infantry, I informed him, in writing, that General Banks and General Ransom had gone to the front, but I did not understand that they had gone there to assume command. General Lee informed me that he showed this note to General Banks, who handed it back to him, merely saying, "I shall remain upon the field, general." I rather think that General Lee considered General Banks in command there after that conversation with him; and I think that the presence of General Banks, during a partial fight of that kind, did embarrass General Lee materially in making his arrangements.

Question. Do you know anything about any cotton speculations by anybody with that expedition?

Answer. No, sir, I do not. A cotton speculator, or, rather, a merchant, from New Orleans, named McKee, came up with my command as far as Alexandria, as I understood, with the permission of General Banks, to buy cotton. He is the only one I know of at all in connexion with cotton buying.

Question. Was any cotton brought in by the wagons of the expedition?

Answer. No, sir; there was no cotton taken by the trains. I have understood that while we were at Alexandria the wagons of the trains were used for hauling cotton into Alexandria from the country around there. I do not know whether that interfered with their other use. I do not think it did.

Question. Was any cotton taken on board any vessels of the navy?

Answer. I saw some flatboats with cotton in them, which I understood belonged to the navy.

Question. Flatboats connected with the naval part of the expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many of them did you notice?

Answer. That I cannot tell, because the thing did not attract my attention at all. There is one other point to which I desire to refer. On the day after we started for Alexandria from Grand Ecore, one of General Smith's staff officers informed me that he was hard pressed by the enemy with infantry, cav-

alry, and artillery, and that he could not hold his ground. Thinking that there was about to be an attack in force, I reported the fact to General Banks, who was close by, and then went to looking up a line of battle for the division under command of General Emory, accompanied by that general. While I was engaged in this, a staff officer of General Banks, General Dwight, handed me a note, in which I was informed that I was in charge of all the field operations at that time. I destroyed the paper, because, as I told the staff officer, it was my duty to do all I could without any such order.

Question. At what place was it that the enemy were so completely repulsed ?

Answer. At Pleasant Hill.

Question. What do you, as a military man, say about retreating from that position ? Or do you think it should have been held ?

Answer. There were several reasons, I think, why the place should not have been held. In the first place, the cavalry had all been sent to the rear that morning, with the exception of about five hundred men. The 13th corps detachment had also been sent to the rear. The horses had that morning been without food for thirty six hours. There was nothing for them to eat, and there was nothing for the cavalry men to eat, for their trains had all been captured the day before. There was no water at Pleasant Hill for either men or animals. The enemy's picket line could have kept us from getting water at any time. I wanted the army to fall back to the river, but at a point only fifteen miles from Pleasant Hill. I knew that there we could reach our transports and protect them. But General Banks preferred going to Grand Ecore. By falling back to the river we would have been joined by the cavalry, the 13th corps, and a brigade of General A. J. Smith's command, under Brigadier General Kilby Smith, and we would have had our transports with provisions and forage with us.

The position at Pleasant Hill was weak, and had the enemy attacked us in rear as well as in front we would have probably had a disaster. Had he attacked us on the next day, the attack would have been made in greater force, and had it been properly managed, it would have resulted in a defeat to us.

Besides, from what I had seen of General Banks's ability to command in the field, I was certain that an operation dependent upon plenty of troops, rather than upon skill in handling them, was the only one which would have probability of success in his hands, and that, therefore, when we next met the enemy we ought to have all the strength available to us.

Question. Was it contemplated, after you got back to Grand Ecore, to again resume and prosecute the expedition, or was it abandoned at that time ?

Answer. I think General Banks had some idea of still prosecuting the expedition. Before we left Grand Ecore for Shreveport I tried to have a reconnoissance made directly up the Red River, with a view to taking that route, instead of going off to Mansfield, because I thought we would have a better chance on the Red river to obtain corn. The plantations were all on the Red river, and we would be all the time close to our transports, which contained all our supplies, and the transports would not be in any danger. If a feasible route up the Red river could be found I thought it would be the better way. The answer that I received was that it would take time to reconnoitre that river, and therefore it could not be done.

General Ransom was wounded in the fight of the 11th of April, and came on to New York, where he wrote this report :

“NEW YORK CITY, *June 11, 1864.*

“SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movement of the troops under my command, consisting of the 3d division 13th army corps, Brigadier General R. A. Cameron commanding, and the 4th division 13th army

corps, Colonel W. J. Landrum commanding, on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of April, 1864.

“On the 6th of April my detachment, having the advance of the infantry column, moved from Natchitoches at 6 o'clock a. m., in rear of the cavalry division, and being constantly delayed by the baggage train of the latter, went into camp late, on Bayou Mayou, having marched nineteen miles on the Pleasant Hill road.

“Moved at 5½ o'clock a. m. on the 7th, the head of the column arriving at Pleasant Hill, nineteen miles, at 2 o'clock p. m., overtaking the cavalry train on the road, and Dudley's brigade of cavalry at Pleasant Hill. When these had moved from our camping ground, I went into camp, about 4 o'clock p. m., though my train and rear-guard did not arrive till late at night. At 10 o'clock p. m. of the 7th I received an order of which the following is a copy :

“HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
“*Western Louisiana, April 7, 1864.*

“GENERAL: The commanding general directs that a brigade of infantry be sent to General Lee, to be with him by daylight to-morrow morning. You may use your discretion as to sending a brigade or division. The spirit of the order will, doubtless, be carried out by sending a division. Send, therefore, a brigade or division to report to General Lee at or before 5 a. m. to-morrow, Friday, 8th instant.

“Respectfully,

“W. B. FRANKLIN,  
“*Major General.*

“BRIGADIER GENERAL  
“*Comm'g Detachment 13th Army Corps.*'

“I immediately sent Colonel W. J. Landrum, commanding 4th division 13th army corps, the following order :

“HEADQUARTERS DETACHM'T 13TH ARMY CORPS,  
“*Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, April 7 1864—10.20 p. m.*

“COLONEL: In obedience to the enclosed order, you will move at 3 a. m. to-morrow with the 1st brigade of your division, and report to General Lee, eight miles in front, at daylight, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

“By order of Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom.

“C. E. DICKEY,  
“*Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.*

“Colonel W. J. LANDRUM,  
“*Commanding 4th Division, 13th Army Corps.*'

“Colonel Landrum moved with the 1st brigade of his division, and reported to General Lee at daylight on the 8th. Under orders from Major General Franklin I moved the remainder of the corps forward at 5½ o'clock a. m., and arrived with the advance at St. Patrick's bayou at 10½ o'clock a. m., our march having, as before, been retarded by the cavalry train. General Franklin had previously designated this creek as my camping ground, and I accordingly ordered the 3d division, and the 2d brigade of the 4th division, into camp at 10.45 a. m. Before the order had been complied with a request was received from General Lee for more infantry to relieve that already with him, and General Franklin directed me to send forward the 2d brigade, 4th division, Colonel J. W. Vance commanding, to relieve the 1st brigade, who were reported as worn out with hard skirmishing and marching. The 2d brigade moved forward at 11 o'clock a. m., and at my request General Frank-

lin authorized me to go to the front and see that the 1st brigade was relieved by the 2d. I immediately went forward, and on the road received a despatch, of which the following is a copy :

“12 NOON.

“General RANSOM: My men have skirmished and marched through the bushes and thickets for eight or nine miles, making, in all, a march of fifteen or sixteen miles. They have no water and are *literally worn out*. Can you have them relieved *soon*? General Lee insists on pushing ahead.

“W. J. LANDRUM,

“Colonel Commanding 4th Division.”

“The infantry finding much difficulty in passing the cavalry train which obstructed the road, I went on in advance of them, and arrived at the front, 5½ miles from St. Patrick’s bayou, about 1½ o’clock p. m. I found that our forces had just driven the enemy across an open field, and were shelling him from a fine position on a ridge which Colonel Landrum occupied with his infantry and Nims’s battery about 2 o’clock p. m. It was determined to halt here, in order to allow the 2d brigade to come up and relieve the 1st.

“In company with Brigadier General Stone, and Lieutenant Higby, signal officer, I went to the front of the line of skirmishers, and carefully reconnoitred the position of the enemy. We were able to perceive two batteries and a large force of infantry in line of battle in the edge of the woods, from one-half to three-fourths of a mile to our front, and also considerable bodies of infantry moving down the road leading to our right and rear.

“Hearing of the arrival of Major General Banks and staff upon the field about 3 o’clock p. m., I reported to him and advised him of the position and apparent strength of the enemy, and from him received instructions as to the disposition of my troops then on the field and of those momentarily expected.

“Upon the arrival of the 3d brigade, the positions of two of its regiments, the 83d and 96th Ohio infantry, were assigned, by Major Lieber, of General Banks’s staff, on the opposite flank from that determined on by General Banks and myself, and in a position where I should not have placed them.

“The infantry on the right of the road occupied a narrow belt of timber dividing two large plantations, and having open though broken ground in front, and in the rear cultivated fields which descended to a small creek, and thence rose to the edge of the timber one-half mile to the rear of our line.

“Nims’s battery was posted on a hill near the road, about 200 yards to the left of the belt of timber, and was supported by the 23d Wisconsin infantry, which was on the left and behind the crest of the hill, with open fields in front. The 67th Indiana supported the battery on the right, joined by the 77th Illinois, 130th Illinois, 48th Ohio, 19th Kentucky, 96th Ohio, a section of mounted artillery, and the 83d Ohio, making in all 2,413 infantry. The cavalry and mounted infantry under General Lee were posted on the flanks and rear, having Colonel Dudley’s brigade on the left and Colonel Lucas’s on the right, and also skirmishers deployed in front of the infantry.

“The skirmishing continued throughout the afternoon, becoming sharp on the right about 2½ o’clock p. m. At this time Colonel Lucas reported that his skirmishers on the extreme right were driven in, and that a few of his men on that flank were captured.

“About 4 o’clock p. m. the enemy commenced advancing his lines across the open fields in our front and east of the road. I directed Colonel Landrum to advance our right, consisting of the 83d, 96th, and 48th Ohio, 130th Illinois, and 19th Kentucky, and he immediately opened fire on the enemy, now in good range and advancing in two lines. We drove back his first line in confusion upon his second, but recovering, he again advanced, till, unable to endure our

heavy fire, he halted about 200 yards from our front, where many of his men lay down and returned our fire.

"I felt confident that this portion of our line could not be broken, but while moving towards the left flank I was informed that the enemy were pressing our left, and that the mounted infantry there were falling back.

"At this time Captain White, chief of artillery, reported that the Chicago Mercantile battery, Lieutenant Cone commanding, and the 1st Indiana battery, Captain Klauss commanding, had arrived, and I directed him to place them in an advantageous position on a ridge to the east of the road, and near a house occupied as General Banks's headquarters, where they opened on the enemy, who had shown himself in strong force on the left.

"I sent Lieutenant G. I. Davis, A. D. C., to order Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin, commanding the 83d Ohio, to move his regiment to the support of the 33d Wisconsin. He moved promptly, but the 33d Wisconsin and the mounted infantry were already driven back, and I directed him to support the batteries.

"Our left flank was now completely turned, and the enemy, having taken Nims's battery, were in strong force on the hill, and pouring a destructive fire into the batteries of the 4th division. I ordered the latter to the rear to a point on the right of the road, and sent Captain Dickey, my assistant adjutant general, to order Colonel Landrum to withdraw his division to the edge of the timber in our rear. Captain Dickey was to send aids to the different regiments to give them the orders direct in case he should not find Colonel Landrum; but while in the performance of this duty this gallant officer fell senseless from his horse, mortally wounded.

"Owing to the loss of Captain Dickey, before he had communicated my orders, some of the regiments did not receive them till they were surrounded and their retreat cut off, while they were gallantly fighting a superior force in front.

"In company with Colonel Landrum, I was, as the troops arrived, re-forming the line in the edge of the woods, when I was severely wounded in the knee and carried to the rear. I found the woods and roads filled with mounted men flying in confusion from the field.

"I desire here to bear witness to the gallantry of Brigadier General Stone, who was on the left of the line with General Lee. He used the small force of infantry to the best advantage in bravely but unsuccessfully endeavoring to repulse the overwhelming force of the enemy.

"Colonel Landrum, commanding 4th division, was conspicuous, and everywhere present encouraging all by his own gallant conduct and judicious dispositions of his men. His efforts were ably seconded by Colonel Vance, 96th Ohio infantry, commanding 2d brigade, who was killed, and by Colonel Emerson, of the 67th Indiana infantry, commanding 1st brigade, who was wounded and taken prisoner.

"I was an eye-witness of the bravery and soldierly bearing of Lieutenant Colonel Cowan and Major Mann, of the 19th Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin, 83d Ohio; Major Bering, 48th Ohio; Major Reed, 130th Illinois, and know the gallantry with which their men repulsed the enemy in his first attack.

"The 23d Wisconsin, Major Green commanding; 67th Indiana, Major Sears commanding, and the 77th Illinois, Major Burdett commanding, are reported to me by Generals Stone and Lee to have acted nobly, meeting steadily the assaults of a very superior force of the enemy.

"I desire here to thank the officers of my staff, Dr. J. S. McGrew, surgeon-in-chief; Captain Buel, A. D. C.; Captain White, chief of artillery; Lieutenant Tredway, A. D. C.; Lieutenant Davis, A. D. C.; Lieutenant Richardson and Lieutenant Colonel Hatch, A. Q. M., all of whom performed their whole duty, and rendered me valuable assistance. Lieutenants Higby and Harris, signal officers; Captain Vilas and Lieutenants Ayres and Landrum, of Colonel Landrum's staff, were also distinguished for praiseworthy conduct.



“The Chicago Mercantile battery, Lieutenant Cone commanding, and the 1st Indiana battery, Captain Klauss commanding, went promptly into action, and behaved with gallantry. When the second line was broken, notwithstanding their great loss in men and horses, they would have brought off their guns in safety had it not been that our line of retreat was blocked up by the trains of the cavalry.

“Captain White, chief of artillery, was in this battle, as in all others, distinguished for coolness and excellent judgment. He was captured with Lieutenant Cone while endeavoring to save the battery.

“I regret to find it my duty to record the disgraceful conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay, of the 48th Ohio infantry, whom I saw, at some distance in the rear of his regiment, lying behind a fallen tree, while his veteran regiment was in the thickest of the fight, under the lamented Major Bering.

“The conduct of the troops under my command was all that I could ask. They repulsed a superior force in their front, and but for the movement of a large body of the enemy upon our left, which could not be prevented by the force at our command, would have held the first line, and, with the assistance of General Cameron’s 3d division, could have checked the enemy till the arrival of the 19th corps.

“Soon after I was wounded General Cameron arrived with the 3d division, and took command of the detachment of the 13th army corps. For further details of the battle, and for the particulars of the casualties, you are respectfully referred to his report and that of Colonel Landrum.

“My thanks are due to both of those distinguished officers for the valuable assistance and hearty co-operation in my plans which they uniformly rendered me while under my command, and for the able manner in which they conducted the affairs of their respective divisions in camp, on the march, and in battle.

“I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“T. E. G. RANSOM,

“*Brigadier General Vols.*”

“Major WICKHAM HOFFMAN,

“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

By the chairman :

Question. In the affair spoken of by General Ransom in his report, what were the respective numbers of the enemy and our force ?

Answer. I arrived on the field rather late to form a good judgment of the number of the enemy ; but, from what I saw, I judged they had about 8,000 infantry in and about the position. Our force amounted to about 4,000 infantry and about 3,000 cavalry.

Question. How far was it to the infantry support in the rear ?

Answer. Seven miles back we had between 5,000 and 6,000 men ; and fifteen miles back we had from 7,000 to 8,000 more.

Question. Was it good generalship to allow three different portions of the army to be so far apart in an enemy’s country ?

Answer. No, sir ; it was not.

Question. Who was responsible for marching the army in that manner ?

Answer. I can best give my idea of that by referring to my communication to General Banks in the morning, before we started. I told him that it was my intention to take my part of the infantry eight miles from Pleasant Hill, as the end of that day’s march, making 10,000 infantry at that point. General Smith’s would at the same time reach Pleasant Hill, making 8,000 infantry there. The cavalry without any infantry would have been as far as they could have gone that day—certainly not more than a mile or two in front. If the cavalry met with any check or disaster, no infantry would be involved in it. And there could not have been any great disaster to the cavalry, because it would have been in

its power to fall back on me at any time. But sending forward the brigade of infantry to the cavalry enabled the cavalry to get much further ahead, and got it into difficulty, and that led General Banks to order all the infantry up.

Question. You think the disaster of that day was consequent upon the order to advance the infantry to support the cavalry?

Answer. To advance a small portion of the infantry with the cavalry.

Question. And that tended to separate the cavalry still further from the main body of the army?

Answer. Yes, sir; and then the temptation is so great to relieve one small force of infantry by sending up another small force.

Question. What would have been the result of that day had our infantry been up within supporting distance at the time of that battle?

Answer. My opinion is that we ought not to have fought a general battle at all on that day—that we merely ought to have had the cavalry out to the front; then, after General Smith got up to Pleasant Hill, we could have gone ahead. There was no reason for having General Smith with us if we were not going to use his forces.

Question. Suppose you had penetrated the country as far as Shreveport before you had met the enemy or been defeated, what would have become of your communications, and what, then, would have been the condition of your army?

Answer. I think that, as soon as we had arrived at Shreveport, we should have had to make the best of our way back to the Mississippi again.

Question. Should not that have prevented a military man from undertaking such an expedition overland?

Answer. By all means I think it ought.

I desire to state that two batteries, of six guns each, belonging to General Ransom's command, were ordered by General Banks to go to the front, and encamp with the two brigades of infantry then with the cavalry. I had previously ordered them to remain with the infantry main body. The cavalry already had with it three batteries, numbering fourteen guns, so that, after the two other batteries arrived, there were twenty-six guns engaged, with 7,000 men. This proportion of artillery is so great, that, even had there been no wagons in the way to interfere with the retreat, at least half of the artillery would have been lost, as the time required to get the guns from the field, after the retreat began, would have enabled the enemy to capture guns, gunners, and supports.

The following is the report of Colonel Bailey, who had charge of the construction of the dams for the release of the fleet:

HEADQUARTERS 19TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Semmesport, Louisiana, May 17, 1864.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report in reference to the construction of the dam across Red river, at the foot of the Alexandria falls, for the purpose of releasing that portion of Admiral Porter's Mississippi squadron which was unable to pass the falls, owing to the low stage of the water.

Immediately after our army received a check at Sabine Crossroads and the retreat commenced, I learned, through reliable sources, that the Red river was rapidly falling. I became assured that by the time the fleet could reach Alexandria there would not be sufficient water to float the gunboats over the falls. It was evident, therefore, that they were in imminent danger. Believing, as I did, that their capture or destruction would involve the destruction of our army, the blockade of the Mississippi, and even greater disasters to our cause, I proposed to Major General Franklin, on the 9th of April, previous to the battle of Pleasant Hill, to increase the depth of the water by means of a dam, and submitted to him my plan of the same. In the course of the conversation he expressed a favorable opinion of it.

During the halt of the army at Grand Ecore, on the 17th of April, General

Franklin having heard that the iron-clad gunboat Eastport had struck a snag on the preceding day and sunk, at a point nine miles below, gave me a letter of introduction to Admiral Porter, and directed me to do all in my power to assist in raising the Eastport, and to communicate to the admiral my plan of constructing a dam to relieve the fleet, with his belief in its practicability. Also, that he thought it advisable that the admiral should at once confer with General Banks and urge him to make the necessary preparations, send for tools, &c.

Nothing further was done until after our arrival at Alexandria. On the 26th the admiral reached the head of the falls. I examined the river and submitted additional details of the proposed dam. General Franklin approved of them, and directed me to see the admiral and again urge upon him the necessity of prevailing upon General Banks to order the work to be commenced immediately. There was no doubt that the entire fleet then above the rapids would be lost unless the plan of raising the water by a dam was adopted, and put into execution with all possible vigor. I represented that General Franklin had full confidence in the success of the undertaking, and that the admiral might rely upon him for all the assistance in his power; the only preliminary required was an order from General Banks.

On the 29th, by order of General Franklin, I consulted with Generals Banks and Hunter, and explained to them the proposed plan in detail. The latter remarked, that although he had little confidence in its feasibility, he nevertheless thought it better to try the experiment, especially as General Franklin, who is an engineer, advised it. Upon this General Banks issued the necessary orders for details, teams, &c., and I commenced the work on the morning of the 30th. I presume it is sufficient, in this report, to say that the dam was constructed entirely on the plan first given to General Franklin, and approved by him.

During the first few days I had some difficulty in procuring details, &c., but the officers and men soon gained confidence, and labored faithfully. The work progressed rapidly, without accident or interruption, except the breaking away of two coal barges, which formed part of the dam. This afterwards proved beneficial. In addition to the dam at the foot of the falls, I constructed two wing dams on each side of the river, at the head of the falls.

The width of the river at the point where the dam was built is seven hundred and fifty-eight feet (758,) and the depth of the water from four to six feet. The current is very swift, running about ten miles per hour. The increase of depth by the main dam was five feet four and a half inches; by the wing dams, one foot two inches; total, six feet six and a half inches.

On the completion of the dam, we had the gratification of seeing the entire fleet pass over the rapids to a place of safety below, and we found ample reward for our labors in witnessing their result. The army and navy were relieved from a painful suspense, and eight valuable gunboats saved from destruction. The cheers of the masses assembled on the shore, when the boats passed down, attested their joy and renewed confidence.

To Major General Franklin, who, previous to the commencement of the work, was the only supporter of my proposition to save the fleet by means of a dam, and whose persevering efforts caused its adoption, I desire to return my grateful thanks. I trust the country will join with the army of the Gulf and the Mississippi squadron in awarding to him due praise for his earnest and intelligent efforts in their behalf. Major General Banks promptly issued all necessary orders, and assisted me by his constant presence and co-operation. General Dwight, his chief of staff, Colonel Wilson and Lieutenant Sergeant, aids-de-camp, also rendered valuable aid by their personal attention to our wants. Admiral Porter furnished a detail from his ships' crews, under command of an excellent officer, Captain Langthorne of the Mound City. All his officers and men were constantly present, and to their extraordinary exertions, and to the

well-known energy and ability of the admiral, much of the success of the undertaking is due. I am also under many obligations to Major Seutell, provost marshal, and Lieutenant Williamson, ordnance officer of General Franklin's staff, to Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Kinsey, 161st New York volunteers, to Lieutenant Colonel N. B. Pearsall, 97th United States colored infantry, who was my assistant, to Captains Harden, Morrison, and Harper, of the same regiment, and to Captain G. W. Stein, 16th Ohio volunteers, all of whom exhibited much practical knowledge and untiring zeal.

The following is a list of the troops who constructed the dam: Pioneer corps of 13th army corps, under Captain Hutchens, 24th Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant Smout, 23d Wisconsin volunteers, and Lieutenant Kimball, 24th Indiana volunteers; 29th Maine volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Emerson; 97th United States colored infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Pearsall; 99th United States colored infantry, Colonel G. D. Robinson; and detachments from 23d and 29th Wisconsin volunteers, 27th Indiana volunteers, 19th Kentucky volunteers, 16th and 23d Ohio volunteers, 24th Iowa volunteers, 77th and 130th Illinois volunteers, and from other regiments.

These details worked patiently and enthusiastically by day and night, standing waist-deep in the water, under a broiling sun. Their reward is the consciousness of having performed their duty as true soldiers, and they deserve the gratitude of their countrymen.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

I. BAILEY,

*Lieut. Col. and Military Engineer, 19th Army Corps.*

Major WICKHAM HOFFMAN,

*Assistant Adjutant General, 19th Army Corps.*

A true copy :

W. B. FRANKLIN,

*Major General Volunteers.*

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*Testimony of Colonel Isaac Dyer.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 7, 1865.

Colonel ISAAC DYER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am colonel of the 15th Maine regiment of volunteers.

Question. Were you with General Banks in what is called the Red river expedition ?

Answer. I was.

Question. Were you commanding your regiment at that time ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State what you observed upon that expedition—what part you took in it.

Answer. My regiment was attached to the 2d brigade, under command of General McMillan, of the 1st division of the 19th corps. On the 15th of March we broke camp at Franklin, where we had arrived a week or ten days before from Texas, and commenced the line of march, said to be to Shreveport. We marched along by the flank movement, from day to day, nothing occurring of any particular interest, or worthy of note to us, until the 8th of April. We had commenced the line of march late in the morning of the 8th—at eight or nine o'clock, I should judge—and marched some eight or ten miles. Orders were

given to go into camp for the night. We were encamped somewhat in line of battle, as well as the ground would permit. I was field officer of the day that day, and had gone around to give orders to the different regiments for the men to be stationed as picket-guards, and was about stationing them, when orders came from General Emory for me to leave the guards as they were and go immediately to the front, where it was said our troops were engaged with the enemy. The men who had been detailed for picket-guards were immediately ordered to rejoin their different regiments. About the same time orders came from General McMillan, commanding our brigade, for me to leave all the men of my command who could not march at a rapid rate back with our train, to come up the next day. I accordingly ordered my surgeons to ascertain, if possible, who the men were and report, that they might be ordered to be left, which was done. The division was immediately formed into line, and we commenced our march, marching some six or seven miles, at a very rapid rate, in about an hour and a quarter. The men ran most of the way. Coming up to where our troops were engaged, we found those of the 13th corps falling back in a very disorganized condition, indeed, so much so that we were obliged to halt, for we could not get through the press that was coming against us. I ordered my men to halt, load their guns, and fix bayonets, for our own safety. About the same time the order was given by General McMillan for us to step out of the road for a moment and let the men who were coming so fast pass by us. We immediately stepped out one side for a moment—perhaps a minute or two—and when the main body got by we commenced marching again, and went up a little rising ground on to a clearing. When we came on to this clearing we saw the enemy, on the other side of a ravine, advancing towards us. I think my regiment was the third in line that day. We took turns in marching, first one regiment and brigade ahead, and then the others, on alternate days. The 13th Maine, I think, were ahead on that day. They filed out to the right—the 47th Pennsylvania to the right of the road, my regiment came on their left, and the 160th New York on my left. The enemy advanced and commenced a very sharp fire. Our men were ordered to lie down and fire. In a few moments the enemy's fire was very heavy, but it was so high that the bullets passed over our heads. As soon as our line was formed we commenced firing. They at first made demonstrations on our right, and failed there; then they came down to the centre and the left, and made three demonstrations there, trying to break our lines, but were unsuccessful. After manœuvring that way for an hour or two, and night coming on, the enemy retired. We were then ordered to place a certain number of men in front of our respective regiments as picket-guard, under charge of an officer, which we immediately did—at least I did so, and I suppose the other regiments did the same. The men, during this time, were lying down, occupying the line of battle that was first formed. The line was not broken or moved at all from the position first occupied. About nine o'clock—it may have been a little later—orders came for us to retire, leaving our pickets, with instructions to the officers in charge of them to report to the brigade officer, who had charge of the whole, at a certain point, at twelve o'clock, when they were to fall back. I immediately gave that order to the officer having charge of my picket-guard, when we commenced to retreat, retreating in regular order. We marched that night, and arrived the next morning, about nine o'clock, I should judge, at Pleasant Hill. There is quite a clearing at Pleasant Hill, a road running through it diagonally. Our division marched through this opening and a short distance into the woods on the other side, when the order was given to halt. A rumor ran along through the line that we were being attacked in the rear. After standing in that position a few minutes, orders were given to about-face and march back a short distance; and then a line of battle was formed across the clearing, on the side opposite the one we first entered, just at the edge of the woods, our brigade being placed at the left of this clearing. We remained there until about eleven o'clock, when

General Smith's forces came up, and my regiment was relieved by some regiment from that corps. The other regiments of our brigade were relieved, and we passed from our left, as we were then facing, to the right, where we went into camp, the men having marched some thirty-four or thirty-five miles without resting.

Question. Will you state the general line of march on that expedition, and what, in your opinion, was the cause of the disaster.

Answer. To put the whole thing in a nutshell, I should say the whole failure was caused by the wagon train of the cavalry being in front of the 19th corps, and that corps being so far in the rear that they were unable to support the cavalry and the 13th corps.

Question. Do you know what led to that unmilitary arrangement of so marching in an enemy's country?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know who is responsible for it?

Answer. I do not; I was merely commanding a regiment.

Question. Do you know where General Banks was about this time?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Your regiment was in the division of which General Emory was commander?

Answer. Yes, sir; General McMillan was our brigade commander.

Question. How far did you go on that expedition?

Answer. We went to Mansfield, or rather Sabine Crossroads, as our folks call it.

Question. And, as you suppose, the disastrous battle of the 8th was caused by the fact that the wagon train was between the cavalry and the 19th corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you hear from any of the commanding officers—General Banks, General Franklin, or any others—whether they expected any fight before they got to Shreveport?

Answer. I did not; I only know what the general impression among the officers was—which general impression I understood to come through the staff officers—that there would be no fight until we got to Shreveport.

Question. That was the impression of the army?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was the impression given to the officers of the brigade and the regiment, coming from headquarters, as we understood.

Question. Were you with the expedition when the dam was made, to float down the boats of the fleet?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Under whose superintendence was that dam built?

Answer. Colonel Bailey's.

Question. Do you know with whom that idea originated?

Answer. I do not. There was nothing very alarming about it. I had one hundred and fifty men in my regiment who could build just such a dam as that without any trouble at all.

Question. Was it a new thing?

Answer. No, sir; it was a very common thing among the lumbermen in our State.

Question. To raise the water in that way?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know whether Admiral Porter favored that plan?

Answer. I know only what rumor said; I know nothing about it officially. Rumor said he had no faith in it.

Question. Do you know what means he took to avail himself of the benefits of the dam after it was made? Did he lighten the vessels and get them in a condition to pass over, when the first dam was built?

Answer. A portion of the vessels went over when the first dam was built. Some of my men, who were watching the progress of the thing with interest, reported to me that one night all the vessels were afloat and might all have gone over; but, from some cause or other, they did not know what, during the night a portion of the dam went away, so that the water fell and the vessels could not be moved.

Question. Do you know anything about persons dealing in cotton on that expedition?

Answer. I do not know anything about it, only that there were large amounts of cotton brought in and put on board of the transports; and a day or two before the army left there, my regiment was detailed to unload the cotton on some half a dozen different boats and throw it on shore. I went on board one boat, and the captain positively forbade my men coming on board for any such purpose, stating that it was private property. I reported to my general, General McMillan, and he immediately gave me positive orders to go on board the boat. I immediately reported to the captain what my orders were, and stated that if resistance was offered I would go on board the boat by forcible means. He immediately gave way, and my men went on board and took the cotton off.

Question. In whose charge was that cotton?

Answer. I do not recollect the name of the officer.

Question. Was he an officer belonging to the fleet?

Answer. It was a common transport, said to be a private boat; but I cannot vouch for that.

Question. You took the cotton off?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was done with it?

Answer. It was left on shore.

Question. Was there any mark on the cotton showing whether it belonged to private individuals or not?

Answer. I do not recollect whether there was any mark on it or not.

Question. Do you know where it was obtained?

Answer. I do not. I know that teams brought in cotton from different directions; where it came from, or whose it was, I do not know.

Question. Were army teams engaged in bringing in cotton?

Answer. Not that I am aware of. They appeared to be teams belonging to different plantations; so I judged from the looks of them.

Question. Were any permits to trade in cotton given to anybody, or did anybody have permits purporting to be given by authority?

Answer. I do not know that.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. About what time did you arrive at Grand Ecore, on the Red river?

Answer. We were not at Grand Ecore going up; we stopped at Natchitoches; that is about four miles from Grand Ecore, south. Natchitoches is a town on the old channel of the Red river; Grand Ecore is the town on the new channel.

Question. About what time were you at Natchitoches?

Answer. I do not recollect the precise date when we arrived there. We left Natchitoches on the 6th of April.

Question. About what time did the cavalry leave Natchitoches?

Answer. I do not know; they were in the advance.

Question. About how far was it from Natchitoches to Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. I do not know the distance; I should judge it to be between fifty and sixty miles.

Question. Do you know the relative order of march from Natchitoches to Sabine Crossroads—that is, what arm of the service was in advance, and how was the line of march arranged?

Answer. First was the cavalry force under General Lee, then a division of the 13th corps under General Ransom, then came a division of the 19th corps, the wagon train of the 13th corps and of the cavalry, with the advance of the 19th corps.

Question. Were they in advance of the 13th corps also?

Answer. I do not know as to that.

Question. Do you know whether the wagon train of the cavalry was between the cavalry and the 13th corps?

Answer. I do not.

Question. What is the character of the country between Natchitoches and Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. Pine woods; sandy soil, a little undulating; in some places very thickly wooded, especially in the ravines and low places, where it was almost impossible for troops to pass through with any facility. Then you would come to an open country with thin groves again.

Question. What kind of a road was it on which the troops were marching?

Answer. A narrow road almost all the way—simply a road where the trees were cut down, without any work having been done upon the road. Only one wagon could pass along in some places, and generally it was very difficult for the wagons to pass each other.

Question. How thick was the timber on either side of the road? Was it easy for men to pass through it on horseback?

Answer. In some places it was very difficult to pass through it; in other places a man could pass along very easily. Wherever you came to a little rising ground the trees would be large and there would be openings. Then you would pass on perhaps a mile or more in that way and then come to a ravine or swampy place, and in those places it would be almost impossible to pass along without keeping upon the main road.

Question. Was the order of march in more than one column?

Answer. Only in one column, so far as I saw.

Question. Were any advance guards thrown out in advance of the cavalry?

Answer. Not being there myself, I only know what rumor said.

Question. If I understand the matter correctly, the cavalry met the enemy at Sabine Crossroads, and being resisted there, your command was ordered up?

Answer. Yes, sir, in support of them.

Question. The 13th corps was ordered up first, and then you followed the 13th corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you cannot tell what took place prior to your coming up?

Answer. I cannot; I only know that when we came up, the 13th corps was retreating in a very demoralized condition.

Question. You do not know where General Banks was during the march from Natchitoches to Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know where General Franklin was?

Answer. A portion of the time General Franklin was immediately ahead of our division, but not all the time.

Question. You have no means of knowing who was responsible for this order of march?

Answer. No, sir.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you find any difficulty in advancing to support the cavalry at or near Sabine Crossroads, in passing the baggage trains to the cavalry?

Answer. We did; we found the road very badly blocked up by the trains who were trying to retreat, so much so that the road was filled up with them. They were all mixed up together in a motley mess, in all conceivable positions.



*Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel George B. Drake.*

WASHINGTON, Saturday, January 7, 1865.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE B. DRAKE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. My rank is that of lieutenant colonel, and I am assistant adjutant general of the department of the Gulf.

Question. Did you accompany General Banks in what is called the Red river expedition ?

Answer. I did, as his adjutant general. My rank at that time was major.

Question. Will you, in your own way, state all that you deem material in connexion with that campaign? If there is any further information which we may deem necessary, we will question you afterwards.

Answer. On the 13th of March, 1864, two divisions of the 16th corps, under Brigadier General Mower, landed at Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya river, and proceeded at once to Fort De Russey, carrying it by assault at 4.30 on the afternoon of the 14th. Two hundred and sixty prisoners and ten heavy guns fell into our hands.

General Mower here rejoined Brigadier General A. J. Smith, and after destroying all the captured property, as well as blowing up the fort, the expedition, consisting of the fleet under Admiral Porter, the troops and transports under command of General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade, under Brigadier General Ellet, proceeded towards Alexandria, which was occupied without opposition on the 16th of the same month.

The cavalry division of General Franklin's command, under Brigadier General A. L. Lee, arrived at Alexandria on the 19th. On the 21st a force under Brigadier General Mower, consisting of two brigades of the 16th corps, and a brigade of cavalry, moved out from Alexandria to dislodge a body of the enemy posted at Henderson's hill. We surprised his camp, capturing 250 prisoners, a four-gun battery, and 200 horses. This expedition marched 61 miles in 48 hours, through a cold rain and hail-storm. Information from scouts placed Walker and Taylor beyond Henderson's hill from 6 to 12 miles. Corn stations were reported every 15 miles on the road from Coteau Bayou to Burns's ferry, on the Sabine river. Major General Franklin arrived at Alexandria on the 25th, with the 19th and a detachment of the 13th corps. Major General Banks arrived on the 24th. On the 27th the detachments of the 16th and 17th corps, under Brigadier General A. J. Smith, were moved to the mouth of Bayou Rapides. This force, to the best of my remembrance, consisted of an aggregate present of between five and six thousand men. Previous to this date, the marine brigade, said to number three thousand, but of which I had no knowledge, was withdrawn from the expedition, and returned to the Mississippi river. The effective strength of General A. J. Smith's command was necessarily constantly impaired by heavy guard details for the numerous transports, by the means of which his force had been transported. On the 28th, the column under Major General Franklin moved from Alexandria, on the Natchitoches road, and the fleet, with transports in convoy, proceeded up the river towards Grand Ecore. Brigadier General A. J. Smith re-embarked at the mouth of Bayou Rapides, and continued with the fleet.

Owing to the unprecedented low stage of the river, which rendered the navigation of the falls difficult and dangerous for boats of ordinary draught, and impossible for those of larger tonnage, as was sufficiently shown by the wreck of the fine steamer "Woodford," the establishment of a depot at Alexandria

became a necessity. The supply transports that went up could not get back without serious danger; consequently a garrison was left there to protect stores and shipping; to keep navigation open above and below; to wagon supplies around the falls, and to reship them for above, in the event of the water on the falls becoming lower, and to fortify themselves according to plans already made.

This force, though necessary to be left, could ill be spared from the advancing column, more particularly as General Smith's force, originally below in number what had been calculated upon, had been reduced by the withdrawal of General Ellet's command; also, as the enemy were between us and the point of co-operation with the forces under General Steele, which were, it was understood, also below the number that had been counted upon.

A scout was sent from here across the country to communicate with General Steele, and Captain R. T. Dunham, A. D. C., was sent by way of White river and Little Rock. Both succeeded in delivering their despatches.

General Lee, with his cavalry division, reached Natchitoches on the 1st of April; General Franklin, with the main column, on the 2d. General Lee at once pushed on towards Pleasant Hill. At Cane river crossing the enemy showed a front, but were speedily driven.

The fleet transports, and General Smith's command reached Grand Ecore also on the 2d. The wagons were here loaded afresh, haversacks refilled, and everything done to put the army in good order.

General Franklin's command had been augmented before its arrival, by a brigade of colored troops from Port Hudson.

The river was here very low, and falling, the navigation being very difficult. General Lee moved out from Natchitoches on the morning of the 2d, with the 1st, 3d, and 4th brigades of his division; General Lee continuing to report to Major General Franklin as heretofore. After advancing about twelve miles, at a bridge just beyond White Store, he encountered the pickets of the enemy. They were driven rapidly, but received continual re-enforcements until reaching Crump's plantation, twenty miles from Natchitoches, when they retired behind a strongly posted body of their force.

The pursuit of an enemy through so heavy a wooded country was attended with much difficulty and many disadvantages. The enemy when forced back regained their horses, and retreated to a favorable position. They then left their horses, came forward, meeting our advance from behind trees, dead logs, and fallen timber. Our forces were then obliged to send their horses to the rear, and drive the enemy from his new position; which done, he fell back to his horses as before, and was off, while we had to wait for our horses to be brought up before pursuit could be effectively made; and when the advance was again resumed, the utmost caution had to be exercised, as frequently every tree and log concealed a rebel skirmisher.

Crump's plantation is a clearing about half a mile square at the forks of the road. As the advance neared the forks, artillery opened on us with vigor. The 14th New York temporarily drove the enemy by a brilliant charge. He recovered himself, however, and charged our line impetuously. A discharge of canister from battery "G," 5th artillery, together with a counter charge from the 6th Missouri cavalry, broke him, however, and he retired to the woods beyond, to obstruct and annoy the march as heretofore.

Prisoners reported Walker's and Mouton's divisions at Pleasant Hill. General Lee therefore awaited at White Store the advance of the main body.

The enemy showed in the action at Crump's plantation the 2d and 4th Louisiana cavalry, the 2d, 5th, and 7th Texas, and De Bray's independent cavalry.

On the 4th instant, the fifth cavalry brigade, Colonel O. P. Gooding, drove a force of the enemy from their camp near Campte, capturing their equipage. This

force of the enemy was reported as a portion of Marmaduke's command, under General Siddell.

The army commenced its movement from Natchitoches on the 6th, in the following order: 1st. The troops under Major General Franklin, consisting of the cavalry division, the 19th corps, the detachment of the 13th corps, the engineer brigade, and the brigade of United States colored troops, together with the main wagon train; the wagon train of the cavalry having been placed immediately in rear of the division, between it and the main column. 2d. The troops under Brigadier General A. J. Smith, consisting of detachments of the 16th and 17th corps.

The charge of the advance was intrusted to Major General Franklin. He gave orders to General Lee "to attack the enemy wherever he could find him, but not to bring on a general engagement." The train of the cavalry division amounted at this time to 200 wagons, carrying ten days' rations, three days' forage, ammunition, and camp equipage. This amount of supply seemed to be indispensable, as we could have no access to the transports from Natchitoches to Loggy bayou.

General Banks remained at Grand Ecore until the army and fleet had entirely left. On the 7th he rode through to Pleasant Hill, a distance of about thirty-five miles.

The advance cavalry steadily drove the enemy beyond Pleasant Hill to Wilson's farm, where they appeared in larger force, and in strong position. After a very stubborn resistance, he was again forced back. During the action General Lee requested General Franklin to send him a brigade of infantry. A brigade was started forward, but before reaching the front the heavy firing ceased, and it was withdrawn.

At about five o'clock of this day, (the 7th,) General Franklin ordered General Lee to proceed that night as far as possible with his whole train, in order to give the infantry room to advance on the morrow. General Lee proceeded to Carroll's mill, where he arrived at night. General Franklin, with his troops, encamped at Pleasant Hill.

General Lee, during the evening, requested of Major General Franklin a brigade of infantry to assist him in the advance on the morrow, as it was so difficult to penetrate such a country with cavalry. He further requested that his trains might be sent back with the infantry in case the resistance should be obstinate.

Major General Banks learning through Colonel Clark, his aide-de-camp, of the condition of things in front, immediately ordered General Franklin to send a brigade of infantry to co-operate with General Lee. This order I took in person. The brigade reached General Lee at sunrise on the morning of the 8th, when the advance was again commenced, encountering the same resistance as before. It was frequently necessary to use artillery to drive him from his stronger positions. He was, however, driven to the woods beyond the clearing of Sabine Crossroads, four miles from Mansfield. The position here appeared so strong that it was decided to await the arrival of the main column. The line of battle was formed under the personal supervision of Generals Lee and Ransom, and orders were at once sent by General Banks to General Franklin to push on rapidly with all his infantry. I should judge this order to have been sent at 1½ o'clock.

From the time of General Banks's arrival on the ground, the enemy had continued moving by the left flank, in order to obtain a position enfilading ours. This had induced the change of position of the troops on our right, until their line was parallel to the road.

At about 3½ o'clock the enemy's line advanced, said by prisoners to number 8,000 infantry, and 12,000 mounted infantry and cavalry. Our force in line to oppose this was three brigades of cavalry and two of infantry, with artillery

A general engagement ensued, lasting an hour and a half; the line remained firm against vastly superior numbers, until, entirely overlapped and attacked in rear, it retired, suffering terrible loss.

Brigadier General Ransom was wounded while trying to rally his men, and had to be removed from the field. Three pieces of Nims's battery were abandoned in this retreat.

The 3d division of the 13th corps arrived on the field in season to temporarily check the advance of the enemy beyond the inner edge of the woods. General Franklin, in person, posted this division, receiving a severe contusion of the leg from a fragment of shell. This small body of men, with such as could be rallied of those previously driven in, could not, however, withstand the attacks of the entire force of the enemy. They were soon overwhelmed, and compelled to fall back. The jam of the wagons of the cavalry train blocked up the road so that the artillery could not be moved. The remaining three guns of Nims's Battery, the artillery of the 13th corps, together with ambulances containing wounded, were lost. Defeat degenerated into a panic, and 156 wagons here fell into their hands, all containing forage and rations; no ammunition was taken. No other wagons or material was lost during the entire campaign.

The 19th corps came into action just before dark, under fire, and under the demoralizing effect of stemming a tide of fugitives. The enemy made several attempts to break this line, but without effect, and shortly after dark he withdrew from action.

During the night the army, under the orders of General Banks, fell back to Pleasant Hill, where it was joined by General A. J. Smith's command, which had just reached there. The enemy followed and attacked our position at about 3.30 p. m. of the 9th. The line of battle was formed in the following order: 1st brigade 19th corps on the right, and resting on a ravine; the 2d brigade in the centre, with the 3d brigade on the left; the centre was strengthened by a brigade of General Smith's force, whose main force acted in reserve.

The enemy moved towards our right flank. The second brigade withdrew from the centre to the support of the 1st brigade. The brigade in support of the centre moved up into position, and another of General Smith's brigades was posted to the extreme left of the position on a hill in echelon to the rear of the left of the main line.

Shortly after 5 p. m. the enemy drove in our skirmishers and attacked in force, his first manœuvre being against the left. He advanced in two oblique lines extending well over towards the right of the 3d brigade, 19th corps. After a determined resistance this part of the line gave way, and went slowly back on to the reserves. The enemy then came upon the centre, which in its turn was forced back to the reserves. The 1st and 2d brigades were soon enveloped in front, right, and rear. By skilful manœuvring of General Emory, the flanks of the two brigades now meeting the brunt of the battle were covered. The enemy pursued the brigades composing the left and centre, until he approached the reserves under General Smith, when he was met by a charge led by General Mower, and checked. The whole reserves were now ordered up, and in turn we drove the enemy, continuing the pursuit until night compelled us to halt.

During the 10th and 11th the army retired to Grand Ecore, and established itself in camp. On the 15th the entire fleet had returned safely from Loggy bayou, notwithstanding the numerous attempts to obstruct its passage.

The river continued to fall at an unprecedented rate, and had reached so low a stage that it was with the utmost difficulty that stores could be brought up. It was known that the gunboats of heavy draught could not pass the falls.

On the 18th Brigadier General Lee was relieved of the command of the cavalry division by Brigadier General Arnolds, hitherto chief of artillery.

On the 16th Brigadier General Stone was relieved from duty as chief-of-staff by Brigadier General William Dwight.

On the days succeeding the battles I heard the matter of the dam spoken of by General Banks, together with his intention of intrusting it to Colonel Bailey, as he had successfully built one at Port Hudson under his orders.

Orders for the withdrawal of the army to Alexandria were given on the 21st, and on the same night the army moved out on the road towards Cane river, in the following order: Cavalry, 19th corps, 13th corps, trains, and 16th and 17th corps. The fleet left during the 21st. At Cane river the enemy were found strongly posted upon Monet's bluff, completely commanding all approaches to the river. He was dislodged by a flanking column under General Birge. During the entire march, and while General Birge was executing his movement, the rear was being very hotly pressed by a strong body of the enemy. No further resistance of consequence was offered by him during the march, and on the 27th the army entered Alexandria. The transports and light gun-boats had already reached there; the heavy boats were still above the falls, being unable to cross.

The dam was built under the personal orders and supervision of Major General Banks, nobly seconded by Colonel Bailey, and every officer and soldier of his command.

On the 3d day of May the enemy established batteries at Wilson's farm, below Alexandria, capturing and burning the steamer City Belle. On the following day the Warner, with her two convoys, met the same fate.

May 13, the army commenced its movement towards the Mississippi river. The enemy continued to hover about our flanks and annoy our progress. At Avoyelle's prairie and Yellow bayou he made stands, but was speedily driven away. The army arrived at Morganzia the 20th of May. General Smith's command left on their transports on the 19th at Simmsport.

Question. Can you tell what was the entire force of General Banks in that expedition?

Answer. I should judge it to have been between twenty-three and twenty-four thousand men altogether. I cannot tell positively, as we did not have a report of all the troops.

Question. What was the object of that expedition? Do you know what was expected to be attained by it, supposing it to have been successful?

Answer. I do not know; the objective point, however, was Shreveport.

Question. How far was Shreveport from Grand Ecore?

Answer. I could not tell the distance—I do not know. I have never seen any correct map of the country beyond which we went, and the statements as to the distance are altogether at variance.

Question. Suppose your army had been successful in reaching Shreveport, how did you expect to keep your communications open?

Answer. That was a matter of great doubt. We could not have kept our communications open by any possibility whatever. At that time the river was too low; and, besides, the channel had been obstructed by the enemy by sinking boats.

Question. Then, had you been successful in reaching Shreveport, you would probably have been obliged to have retired from that position?

Answer. Yes, sir, if we had been permitted to do so by the enemy. It is a question in my mind whether we could ever have got out.

Question. Was anything said about going that way into Texas?

Answer. There was some talk of commanding Texas by the occupation of Shreveport, as that was supposed by some to be the key to all the adjoining portion of Texas.

Question. As your object was to take Shreveport, to what do you attribute the failure of the expedition?

Answer. I attribute the failure of the expedition to the presence of a wagon train in the front, on the day of the first fight. To the best of my judgment, that was the cause of our retreat.

Question. How came the wagon train to be in such a position as to cause such a disaster?

Answer. It was ordered there by Major General Franklin. Positive orders were given to General Lee to that effect, as I have already stated.

Question. State more particularly how that was. Was the wagon train in the rear of the cavalry?

Answer. The cavalry wagon train was immediately in the rear of the cavalry in the advance.

Question. How far was it from the infantry supports?

Answer. On the day of the first battle, at least six miles—probably eight.

Question. What was the character of the ground the troops were passing over?

Answer. It was a thickly-wooded country, impenetrable except by way of the road, and the road was a very narrow one. I do not remember that in any instance it was wide enough for two wagons to pass abreast.

Question. Was it not unmilitary to put your advance in such a position as that?

Answer. It would seem so to me. It was certainly out of reach of support.

Question. Had General Banks any knowledge of the order in which you advanced?

Answer. He had intrusted that to General Franklin. General Banks knew the cavalry was in front, and the 19th corps in the rear of them; but he was led to suppose, as I am led to believe from his conversation at the time, that the infantry support was well up to the cavalry.

Question. What was the length of the wagon train between the infantry and the cavalry?

Answer. I should think it may, perhaps, have been two miles in that country, because it necessarily had to stretch out a great deal on account of the different runs which crossed the road, and such things.

Question. Could it not easily have been foreseen that if the enemy in large force should attack that cavalry it would be lost for want of support?

Answer. It was not believed at that time by the officers in immediate charge that there would be any resistance on the part of the enemy. In fact, I heard General Franklin say, as General Banks passed me to go up to where General Lee was, that there would be no fight, or words to that effect. I remember that distinctly.

Question. Give us the order of that march—the order of the different divisions of the army.

Answer. General Lee's division of cavalry was in front, supported by Landrum's brigade of infantry, of the 13th army corps; then the cavalry wagon train was immediately in the rear; and then, about six miles behind that, I should judge, (I did not go back myself,) came the 19th corps, under General Emory, and Cameron's division of the 13th corps; then, back at Pleasant Hill was General Smith's command. Colonel Dickey's brigade of colored troops were in charge of the wagon train of the 19th, immediately in the rear of the 19th army corps.

Question. I think you stated that the enemy's force was supposed to be about eight thousand.

Answer. No, sir; the forces of the enemy were eight thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry and mounted infantry.

Question. That were present at the time of the first day's battle?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think that was about their number.

Question. Making nearly twenty thousand men?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How much force had we?

Answer. We had three brigades of cavalry, two brigades of infantry, and the artillery.

Question. Suppose your infantry had all been up, as they ought to have been, in position to have supported your cavalry there, what would have been the effect of their presence in that battle?

Answer. We should have gone on to Shreveport without any interruption at all. We should never have been compelled to have fallen back behind our wagon train if the infantry would have immediately gone into line of battle?

Question. Have you ever known before of a large army advancing into an enemy's country in that order?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Where was General Banks during this time? What knowledge had he of the order in this matter?

Answer. General Banks remained at Grand Ecore until all the transports and fleet had left there. The army in the mean time had gone forward under the charge of General Franklin. The order of march was left to him. On the morning of the 7th of April General Banks left Grand Ecore and passed along the whole line of the army, arriving at Pleasant Hill on the evening of the 7th.

Question. Then he knew about what order the army was proceeding in at the time he passed up to the front?

Answer. He only reached the head of the 19th corps at that time; he did not go forward to the cavalry then; it was already in the advance. He conferred with General Franklin, however, and I have no doubt they both understood the matter at that time, or that General Franklin informed him of the condition of things. I know that one of General Banks's aids, Colonel Clark, was at the front with General Lee and came back and informed General Banks of the condition of things, and General Banks sent a brigade of infantry to assist General Lee.

Question. Do you know whether General Lee sent to General Franklin for a brigade of infantry to support him?

Answer. I know he did.

Question. Was General Franklin at first disposed to send them?

Answer. That was during the battle at Wilson's farm, and General Franklin started a brigade to help General Lee in that battle; but the brigade got only a short distance before the firing ceased, and then General Franklin withdrew it. General Lee again applied for a brigade, but no answer was given to that request. At the same time he requested that his wagons should remain back with the main wagon train, and not encumber him in the front. That request received no response; on the contrary, General Franklin gave orders, on the evening of the 7th, for the wagons to continue in front, and for General Lee to push ahead.

Question. Do you know whether General Franklin was indisposed to have this infantry support go to the assistance of General Lee, and that he did it only upon the order of General Banks?

Answer. Yes, sir; at the same time I think he protested against it.

Question. Do you know any military reason which he gave for not wishing his infantry to go to the support of Lee?

Answer. The military reason which General Franklin gave to me when I took him the order was, that it would bring on a general engagement, which he wished to avoid.

Question. And General Franklin was disposed to keep the cavalry nearer the infantry?

Answer. I think not, by his orders which he gave to General Lee to push ahead, to get as far ahead as he could, so as to get out of the way of his infantry on the morrow, in order that he might make a good day's march.

Question. And General Lee, you say, requested to have his wagon train protected by the infantry, so as not to encumber him?

Answer. He requested to have the wagon train left back with the main wagon train, behind the 19th corps. Had that been done the cavalry could have fallen back when attacked, and there would have been no guns or wagons lost.

Question. Then you attribute the failure to the manner in which the army advanced?

Answer. I attribute it to the presence of the wagon train; that is the best of my judgment.

Question. Were you with the expedition at the time the dams were built?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Who planned the dams originally? Who ought to have the credit of them?

Answer. That is impossible for me to say. I know it was talked over the very day after these two battles.

Question. What agency had Admiral Porter in the building of those dams?

Answer. None whatever, that ever I saw; he might have been consulted about them; but that I do not know. He certainly took no action in regard to them.

Question. If I understand the testimony aright which we have already taken, after these dams were made a portion of the fleet passed down, and then the dam itself went off?

Answer. I was not there at that time; I was at headquarters.

Question. Were you with General Banks when he went up to see Admiral Porter about it?

Answer. I was not.

Question. Then you do not know whether Admiral Porter took any means to get down when a portion of the fleet went down?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know.

Question. Do you know whether any of the teams of the army were used for the transportation of cotton?

Answer. I never heard of its being done at all, except, perhaps, in one or two instances. When we were near Alexandria, and there was cotton immediately outside of or near the lines, when they could have been spared as well as not, wagons might have been sent out to bring it in to the government transports, by which it was taken to New Orleans and turned over to the agent of the government.

Question. Do you know who that agent was?

Answer. I think Mr. Flanders was the special supervising agent of the treasury at New Orleans. It was sent to Colonel Hollabird, and by him turned over to the agent. There was no private speculation in cotton permitted at all, to my knowledge.

Question. Were there any permits given to individuals to purchase cotton there?

Answer. I never heard of one; there was never any record of them on my books, and I never had any knowledge of any. On the contrary, I know that General Banks ordered private cotton to be thrown off the boats.

Question. Do you know whether Admiral Porter or any of the officers of his fleet had anything to do with the cotton business?

Answer. I saw a great deal of the cotton on the levee at Alexandria, marked "U. S. N. prize," and I saw it loaded on the boats. It was spoken of as prize cotton for the navy. I saw the navy with teams which had been taken from the plantations in the vicinity, and I saw the sailors bringing in cotton.



Question. Do you know whether that cotton obtained by the navy was turned over to the quartermaster ?

Answer. No, sir, I do not know; I do not think the navy cotton would be delivered to the quartermaster.

Question. Where would be its destination ?

Answer. It would go to the nearest naval station—to Cairo, as headquarters of the Mississippi squadron.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Was it not in the power of a very much smaller force than yours to have impeded your progress through a country such as you have described ?

Answer. Yes, sir; the country was such that we could not, in hardly any case that I remember, use a flanking column, or show a line of battle. There were one or two clearings where we could form a contracted line of battle; but the road generally was such that you could not show much if any front at all. It was such that you had to use skirmishers entirely.

Question. Then if a very small force of the enemy had determined to resist your passage it would have been impossible for you to have reached Shreveport ?

Answer. I do not think it would have been impossible, but it would have been difficult, extremely so. It was a country in which cavalry was almost useless.

Question. What do you say should have been the position of the wagon train of the cavalry ?

Answer. In the rear of the main body of the army, and in front of the rear guard, where the main wagon train was at the time.

Question. Was it or not a necessity that the cavalry train should be in advance of the 19th corps, in order that the cavalry might draw their supplies from their own train ?

Answer. No, sir; the cavalry could carry three or four days' supplies about their persons and in their haversacks.

Question. How about forage ?

Answer. They could have carried their nose-bags full, which would have lasted one day, and then they could have sent back different squads of men for supplies; or they could have sent up a certain number of wagons every night—say, for instance, six wagons, enough to supply a certain amount, and when they had drawn that and put it in their haversacks and nose-bags, those six wagons could have been sent back. That is the way that rations are always supplied to the main body of the army; a certain number of wagons are sent up and the rations and forage taken out.

Question. Did not the fact that you had but one narrow road upon which to advance render that mode of supplying the cavalry difficult or impossible ?

Answer. No, sir, I think not; because at night, when the army halted, they got off of the road as well as possible, so that wagons might have gone back and forth. They generally halted at these clearings, such as Pleasant Hill and other places of the kind, so that wagons might have passed.

Question. So, then, it is your opinion that that train could have been kept in the rear of the 19th corps, and at the same time the cavalry have been supplied with the necessary rations and forage, and in that event the disaster which befel the army would have been averted ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman :

Question. Was there any necessity for the cavalry being so far in the advance ?

Answer. No, sir; they were, in my judgment, altogether too far in advance ?

Question. Did General Banks expect any fight before you got to Shreveport?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where did he expect it?

Answer. I do not know. He could not tell. He did not know the country.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. If General Franklin did not expect an engagement, why did he fear that the advance of the infantry near enough to support the cavalry would bring on a general engagement?

Answer. I cannot tell that. I simply know the fact that he said he did not expect any fight.

Question. Are you positive that you heard General Franklin make the remark that the sending forward of the infantry would bring on a general engagement?

Answer. To the best of my remembrance that is the substance of the remark that General Franklin made.

By the chairman:

Question. What knowledge had you, about that time, of the strength and position of the enemy?

Answer. We had rather imperfect knowledge, if I may say so; and what knowledge there was, was in the hands of General Banks personally and his chief of staff. I, as his adjutant general, was not so intimately connected with it as though he had had no chief of staff; and all these very minute facts of generalization I have no knowledge of at all.

Question. What means were taken, so far as you know, to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy?

Answer. We had a corps of scouts organized at Alexandria, whose business it was to obtain all the information that was possible. I think there were two companies of scouts—men belonging in that region of the country, or always having lived there.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Was not your cavalry skirmishing with the enemy on almost every day of the march?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think there was no day, from the time we left Pleasant Hill, that they were not in the presence of the enemy.

Question. And occasionally taking prisoners from the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir, a very few; and the information we derived from them was added to the general stock.

Question. Do you know why it was that General Franklin was so confident that there would be no fight when you were in the immediate presence of the enemy, and obliged to pass over a road where so small a force could offer such strong resistance to your advance?

Answer. I do not know what his reason was for thinking so; I never heard him state it; but I am very confident that that was his opinion at the time from the fact that he so stated.

By the chairman:

Question. But he would not have entertained that opinion so positively as to have acted upon it. He might have a loose opinion of that kind, but then a military man would not have acted upon that as a fact, would he?

Answer. I should suppose not.

*Testimony of Brigadier General A. L. Lee.*WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1865.*

Brigadier General A. L. LEE sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers.

Question. Did you serve under General Banks in what is known as the Red river expedition ?

Answer. I did.

Question. Will you, in your own way, go on and state whatever you may deem material in connexion with that expedition ? If we desire any more particular information we will question you, either while you are making your statement, or after you have completed it.

Answer. I might commence by saying that in the winter of 1863 and 1864 an expedition was organized whose destination was supposed to be the Red river country. The troops in General Banks's department which were to form the expedition rendezvoused at Franklin, on Bayou Teche. This force, I should judge, consisted of something like 15,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. It was understood at the same time that there was to be a co-operative movement on the part of Admiral Porter, and also a division under General Smith, from General Sherman's forces. They were to meet at Alexandria. These facts were generally communicated to me by General Banks.

About the 7th of March the forces were ordered to move from Franklin, but were detained for two or three days by a storm which rendered the roads almost impassable. At the end of that time I was ordered forward, in command of the cavalry division, to reach Alexandria as soon as might be to co-operate with any forces I might find there or approaching there.

I moved forward, seeing very little of the enemy, perhaps driving a couple of regiments before me, and reached Alexandria just as the fleet and a portion of General Smith's forces reached there. This was some four days in advance of our infantry column. We remained at Alexandria about a week. Towards the expiration of that time General Banks arrived at Alexandria, coming up the river. The infantry column which came up from Franklin by land was commanded by Major General Franklin. During the week we remained at Alexandria there was an expedition from that place about a hundred miles, which surprised a camp of the enemy and captured some prisoners.

We then moved from Alexandria, marching to Natchitoches, about three days' march, I should think. The fleet in the mean while, after being detained a little at Alexandria, had got above the rapids, and reached Natchitoches, or Grand Ecore, which is the port of Natchitoches, and some four miles distant from it, about four days after I reached Natchitoches, and I reached there some two or three days before the infantry column arrived. We were fighting all the way from Alexandria up, capturing a great many prisoners.

We remained at Natchitoches, I should think, about a week or eight days. During that time I was sent out to ascertain the position of the enemy. I went twenty-three miles to a place called Crump's Corners, and found the enemy there from 3,000 to 5,000 strong. We had quite a fight there. I drove them from their position, captured a few prisoners, and left some fifty or sixty of their dead on the field. I found that the enemy was in considerable strong force between there and Pleasant Hill, which was about ten miles beyond. I reported the facts and was ordered back to Natchitoches.

In the mean while the fleet had arrived at Grand Ecore, and general orders were given for a general movement about the 6th of April. On the 5th or 6th

of April I received orders from General Banks to report to General Franklin until further orders. General Franklin was placed in command of the 19th army corps, the detachment of the 13th army corps under General Ransom, and my division of cavalry.

I was ordered by General Franklin to move on the 6th of April on to Shreveport, on the Shreveport road. My cavalry division then consisted of four brigades. One brigade was detached to guard the infantry flanks and trains. I was ordered, with three brigades and three small batteries, to move in the advance. My force consisted of about 3,300 men. I had with me a train of wagons, in which we carried for my division ten days' rations for my men, three days' forage for my animals, a large supply of ammunition, and some camp and garrison equipage. This train numbered, I should judge, from 320 to 350 wagons. My orders were to move out on the Shreveport road, attack the enemy wherever I could find him, but not to bring on a general engagement.

On the first day out we saw no enemy, but their pickets, which we drove before us. That night we camped at Crump's Corners, twenty-three miles from Natchitoches.

On the next day the division moved to and through Pleasant Hill, meeting a regiment or two of the enemy. Pleasant Hill was distant ten miles from our camping place of the night before. About noon we came upon a pretty strong force of the enemy some three miles beyond Pleasant Hill. We had a fight there; put a brigade into the action at first.

By the time I reached Pleasant Hill I found the country densely wooded. We were then going along a single road, in which it was difficult for wagons to meet and pass each other. Our way led through a dense forest, through a sparsely settled country, where we found no people.

We met the enemy on a little hill. They were mostly cavalry and mounted infantry, but they had dismounted there. We went into action, putting in a brigade at first. The enemy drove that brigade back about a hundred yards. I then put in the other two brigades dismounted and drove the enemy. We lost about seventy-five killed and wounded there; captured about twenty-five prisoners, and the enemy left on the ground about the same number as we lost.

During this action, which occupied about an hour and a half, I sent word to General Franklin informing him that the enemy were in force in my front. General Franklin, with the infantry, had camped about ten miles back of my camping place on the preceding night. I sent word to him that the enemy were in force in my front, and suggested to him to move forward a brigade of infantry to my support. This message found General Franklin at Pleasant Hill. He sent forward a brigade of infantry, but before they reached me the artillery firing had ceased, and he withdrew it before it reached me.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon I sent the following to General Franklin:

"APRIL 7—2 p. m.

"GENERAL FRANKLIN: The enemy drove us with considerable loss in killed and wounded. We have driven them in turn and regained our ground. They have just disappeared from our front; the fire has ceased. I shall advance a little cautiously."

I then moved forward. The enemy had simply retired, and resisted our advance very stubbornly, so that we gained ground very slowly. About 5 o'clock I received the following despatch:

"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
"Pleasant Hill, April 7.

"GENERAL: The general commanding has received your despatch of 2 p. m. A brigade of infantry went to the front, but the firing having ceased, it was

withdrawn. The infantry is all here. The general directs that you proceed to-night as far as possible with your whole train in order to give the infantry room to advance to-morrow.

“Respectfully, &c.”

I was at that time about six miles beyond Pleasant Hill, and continued my advance until near nightfall, driving the enemy to Carroll's mill, about ten miles beyond Pleasant Hill. At Carroll's mill we found the enemy posted in considerable force, I should judge 5,000 men. They had four pieces of artillery in position. There was a creek and a ravine dividing us from them. It was near dark, and they held us there. We bivouacked on the field, and lay in line of battle all night. The most of my train, which was in my rear, was in the road. The country there was of such a character that we could not find room on the side of the road to park the train. I parked perhaps a third of it, and the rest I faced to the rear, as I was a little apprehensive that I might be overpowered in the morning and compelled to fall back. I might say that during the action at Wilson's farm in the afternoon, Colonel Clarke, a staff officer of General Banks, arrived and offered his services, and I used him during the engagement. I told him to inform General Franklin, when he went back, to whom he was ordered to report, of what he had seen; and tell him that the enemy were in considerable force, and I thought we were on them, and that he should give me what I had asked for before, an infantry brigade to act with the cavalry in the advance. I wanted the infantry for the reason that it was necessary to dismount every cavalryman I put in the fight, and of course their horses made a long, loose, irregular train to lead and take about; and cavalrymen are not fit to fight on foot for a great length of time. I also told him that my greatest annoyance was my train which was there, and which stretched out for a distance of two or three miles, and must be guarded, which took from one-third to one-half of my force. This, however, was but a repetition of what I had said before very often to General Franklin. But the general seemed to think that it was more convenient to me to have my train near me at night, and that some men would have to be charged with the care of it if I left it or any part of it behind; and that at present there would be very little danger, and I better keep my train with me. Colonel Clarke came back about dark, when I was at Carroll's mills, and reported to me that he had delivered my message to General Franklin. He took out some tablets and read from them these words, being the gist of what General Franklin had said to him for me: “Must crowd the enemy vigorously. Will send the 16th Indiana; will be up in half an hour.” That was a regiment of my division which the general had had back on some other duty. “Will send Goodwin's brigade,” which was the cavalry brigade I had left when I started from Natchitoches. “Artillery and all are up in good order; if wanted, will reach Mansfield to-morrow.” This Mansfield was about twenty miles from Pleasant Hill. “Will send infantry at any time, if certain enemy is in force. Smith is coming on Grand Ecore road. Must help ration him. Keep your train well up.” These were the orders verbally delivered to me by Colonel Clarke, and enlarged upon, in response to the message I had sent back. At 9 o'clock that night, when I had got my men in camp, I sent this despatch to General Franklin, who was then at Pleasant Hill:

“ABOUT 8 MILES FROM PLEASANT HILL,

“April 7—9 p. m.

“GENERAL: I am encamped with most of my force along the road near this point. The fourth brigade is camped on battle-ground of to-day. At sundown the enemy was just in our advance, in strong position, with four pieces of artillery, which they used freely. We suffered here somewhat; I am simply

holding ground. I deem it much more expensive of life to fight the enemy in this immediate country, with dismounted and necessarily somewhat confused cavalry, than with infantry. I intended visiting you to-night, but think I better not leave. I will, however, suggest that a brigade of infantry be ordered to the front at an early hour to-morrow, to act with me in the conduct of the advance. If the resistance should be obstinate, I should like to have my train with advance of infantry. I shall be ready to move at daylight. I find here almost no water."

During the latter part of the night, at 1 or 2 o'clock, I received this despatch :

"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

"April 7—12 a. m.

"General Franklin is in receipt of your despatch. He directs me to say that General Banks is here, and by his orders a brigade of infantry will move to your support at 3 a. m."

We had no trouble that night. At sunrise, on the morning of the 8th, a brigade, Colonel Landrum commanding, of the 4th division, 13th army corps, reported to me, having arrived just at daylight. I put out a cavalry skirmish line, and this brigade of infantry in line of battle, and moved on the enemy. In half an hour we drove them from their position. We then kept advancing on this road. I used the infantry, a regiment in line of battle on each side of the road, with cavalry skirmishers in front, my train following behind. We moved forward very slowly, about half a mile an hour. The enemy occupied every hill, and had as strong a force as we had. We had to drive them by shelling them with artillery, and flanking them. At 11.45 a. m. we had advanced about five or six miles, and reached a point within five miles of Mansfield. I then wrote to General Franklin as follows :

"The enemy have thus far disputed our progress at every favorable position. We suffered in killed and wounded, but advanced steadily. Lieutenant Colonel Webb just killed. Two or three other officers killed and several wounded."

About 12 o'clock, just after this despatch was written, General Ransom came to my rear with a brigade of infantry which had been sent forward to relieve the brigade of infantry with me. Just after he had reported to me we came on a large open field of perhaps a mile in extent in each direction. The road ran over a hill, which was an admirable position, and I was surprised, as we came out of the woods, to find that the enemy had abandoned it. I deployed a regiment, skirmished up the hill, found no enemy there, and took possession of the hill. We advanced the skirmishers about half a mile further and found the enemy in force. They were there, infantry and cavalry, in line of battle. I then put those two brigades of infantry in position on this hill.

Beyond this hill the ground still rose very gently. About half a mile from the top of the hill a road crossed the one we were moving on and swept down towards our right flank. The enemy were formed on that road, reaching around on our right flank. I got my artillery in position, put my cavalry on my flanks, as far as possible, and stopped my train about half a mile in my rear.

Just at this time General Banks, with his staff, rode on the field and sent for me. The enemy were quiet. There was a little skirmishing, but the enemy did not seem disposed to attack immediately. General Banks asked the position of affairs, and I explained it to him. He asked me what we could do. I told him that in my opinion we must fall back immediately, or we must be very heavily re-enforced. I said that the enemy must have some 15,000 or 20,000 men there; four or five times as many as I had. I told him how my troops were disposed. He approved of the disposition, said I must retain the position I had occupied, and he would send back immediately to hurry up the infantry, which must then be very near. He said that he expected me to inform him

from time to time of the condition of things, and I then went back to the rout.

We lay quiet there on that ground, in position, until about 4 o'clock. I had seen General Banks two or three times in the mean while. The enemy were shifting their troops around on our right flank on the crossroad I have spoken of, strengthening their left flank, or rather enveloping our right flank. I changed the position of two or three regiments of infantry to strengthen our flank, as the enemy changed theirs. General Banks repeatedly told me that he had sent back for troops, but they had not come up.

About 4 o'clock a staff officer of General Banks came up to me and said that General Banks ordered me to dispose my force to move immediately on Mansfield. I was a little surprised, and, more than that, I thought there must be some misapprehension; but the staff officer said that was the order. I rode back to General Banks, and asked him about it. He said that was the order. I told him we could not advance ten minutes without a general engagement, in which we should be most gloriously flogged, and I did not want to do it. We had some little conversation in regard to the general intention of going to Mansfield that night. I told the general I could move just about ten minutes; just about a quarter of a mile, for the enemy were distant about a half a mile. He finally told me we would wait if I thought it was impossible to advance, and he hurried off another staff officer for the infantry.

I went back, got in front of my line, got off my horse, and lay down on the ground. I lay there about fifteen minutes, I guess, when there was very brisk picket firing, and the whole line of the enemy advanced on our flanks and on our front, and marched right straight up to our line. We opened upon them with artillery, with canister, and with musketry, and fought in line perhaps twenty minutes, when they charged right straight up to our line. They were repulsed two or three times, but the end of the thing was that in twenty minutes our line was just crumbling everywhere and falling back. I ordered my batteries off when the infantry support gave way; but three guns of one of my batteries had to be left on the crest of the hill, as every horse and almost every man had been killed. We fell back from that open field perhaps three-quarters of a mile, the enemy pressing us. We got back to the line of woods, and found there, just arrived, General Cameron's division of the 13th corps. We formed a line in the edge of the woods, and our broken line reformed there. We had another little fight there, a bloody fight, for about half an hour. The enemy advanced a column on each of our flanks, and attacked us also in front.

Just in these woods, half a mile back, was my train. When the fight first commenced I sent back orders to get that train back as fast as they could. Some of the wagons turned around. But there were conflicting orders, and a great deal of confusion about it. Some officers of General Banks's staff and some of General Franklin's were unwilling that the train should go back. They did not believe, in the first place, that we were whipped; and another reason they gave was, that it would interfere with the coming up of the infantry, which was marching up that road.

When we broke on the edge of the woods, after about half an hour's fighting, the retreat became very soon a perfect rout; we got back about half a mile, and found a hundred or more of these wagons stopped there; some of them were not turned round; the most of them were turned around; but a great many of them were in ruts, against trees, the mules shot, &c., and we lost some artillery there by reason of it.

I ought to have mentioned that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon I received a despatch from General Franklin, which was written about six miles in my rear, in response to the one I had sent him at 11.45 a. m. :

“ 1½ p. m.

“ GENERAL: I have just received your despatch of 11.45 a. m. You have doubtless been joined by General Ransom with another brigade by this time.

General Banks left here about 11 o'clock to go to the front. I hope to be able to get up part of General Emory's force to-morrow to relieve General Ransom. In the mean time keep me informed of what is going on. I do not understand that it is General Banks's or General Ransom's intention to stay with you, but merely to see what is going on."

I sent this despatch immediately to General Banks, and he sent word back that, under the circumstances, he and General Ransom would remain.

When we met this train as we were falling back, I lost seven pieces more of artillery, and there were some guns lost belonging to other commands. We fell back in a perfect rout for about three miles I should judge; our cavalry, what was left of it, fighting the enemy on the flank, and the infantry trying from time to time to make a stand in the rear. But it did not amount to very much until we reached General Emory's 19th corps. That corps had advanced to a point about three or four miles from the battle-field, and formed behind an open field; it was then nearly dark. We went through and behind the 19th corps; and as the enemy came up in considerable force they were checked and fell back. We punished the enemy very severely then no doubt.

Of our train we lost 156 wagons and about 800 mules. Those wagons were mostly loaded with forage. There was in the train about 20,000 rations, and most of the camp equipage of two brigades, which was saved.

General Banks called a council of war that night, and it was decided that as General Smith was then at Pleasant Hill, about twelve miles distant, and our troops were pretty well broken, we would fall back to Pleasant Hill that night. Accordingly, orders were given, and we fell back to Pleasant Hill that night.

The next morning I was ordered by General Banks to detach one thousand cavalry to act as scouts and skirmishers, and to take the remainder of my division, and take whatever was left of the detachment of the 13th corps, and some negro troops that were there, and take the trains and the majority of the artillery of the army to Grand Ecore. It was thought that the enemy would get between us and Grand Ecore; I started about 11 o'clock, I should think, with this train, and with six or eight batteries of artillery, and reached Grand Ecore the next day.

The battle of the 9th of April commenced just as I was leaving; I cannot give any personal information about that, except so far as the reports of my troops were sent to me. The next day at night the main army had reached Grand Ecore, and joined me there.

Question. The fighting was over then, I suppose?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know why General Banks ordered a retreat from Pleasant Hill after the battle of the 9th?

Answer. I do not know. He impressed on me very strongly that, in sending me back from Pleasant Hill, just as the fight was commencing, it was of the greatest importance to save what material we had left; that he would give me the remainder of the 13th army corps, the most of my cavalry, and the negro troops; that I probably knew the roads better than any other person there, having scouted there so often; and he wished me to take charge of the matter, and get the trains and artillery back with great rapidity, not to rest.

Early the next morning, when I was distant from Pleasant Hill eighteen miles, I received a despatch from General Banks. I have not the despatch with me, but it was to this effect: That they had whipped the enemy terribly; that Price was killed, also two or three other rebel generals, whom he named, but who have since recovered, and that I was to send back the subsistence trains for such and such troops. I was very much puzzled by that order, and immediately sent a staff officer back for more specific instructions. But he had not been gone more than half an hour, when a staff officer of General Banks arrived with an order to me, with which he had left in the night, for me to con-



tinue pressing on with the whole train to Grand Ecore, and with instructions that if any wagons broke down to burn them, not stop to fix anything, but get everything into Grand Ecore as quickly as I could, and look out very carefully on the flanks. I do not know that I can give a more terse history of the fighting than that.

Question. Will you state, as far as you know, who first originated this expedition, and what were its objects?

Answer. I cannot speak with any knowledge at all that would avail anything in reference to who originated the expedition. As to its objects, the general idea was that we were going to Shreveport, and perhaps to Texas. It was known that General Smith was ordered to report to us for a definite number of days, and the theory was that he and the fleet were going to help us as far as Shreveport, at any rate. But I do not believe that anybody had any very well-defined impression as to what we were going for. I am very sure the subordinates had not.

Question. Considering the kind of road, the nature of the country, and the long distance you would be from your base, how could you expect to hold Shreveport, even if you should get possession of it?

Answer. I never supposed we could get to Shreveport.

Question. Do you know whether General Banks was originally in favor of this expedition?

Answer. I cannot tell.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the expedition? What was the immediate cause of its failure?

Answer. I think there was a combination of causes; that several things transpired, either one of which would have caused a failure.

Question. Give them all.

Answer. I think that while it was possible, it was not very probable that even a well-managed expedition of that kind could have reached Shreveport, or if it had reached there, could have remained there. What I mean by that is this: I think the country from Alexandria, up to which point there was no difficulty, is of such a character that you have to subsist your men and animals entirely yourself; and that with an opposing force very nearly, if not quite, equal to our own, it would have been very difficult to penetrate that country.

Question. What do you say of the order of march pursued on your expedition, with the cavalry ahead, and two or three miles of wagon train immediately in its rear? In your opinion, as a military man, was that a proper way of advancing into an enemy's country?

Answer. I remonstrated against it in private conversations and in written despatches, until I am very certain that the parties to whom my remonstrances were made, and those around them, began to think I was getting panicky, as they say, and I had to stop it. I could not allow myself, for reasons which you will understand, to represent further or more urgently my sense of its impropriety.

Question. Did the views you entertained upon that subject come to the knowledge of General Banks?

Answer. General Banks at Alexandria talked with me about the advance, and I gave him my ideas about it. I told him that it ought to be light, and not cumbered. He told me that it should be differently arranged. That I should have infantry. That he would mingle the arms of the service in the advance. That is the only opportunity on which I had occasion to converse with General Banks on the subject. That was some time prior to the commencement of the real solid fighting marching.

Question. What was the idea entertained by General Banks and others about meeting the enemy before you got to Shreveport?

Answer. I cannot say so far as General Banks was concerned. My theory was that we should have a fight at or near Pleasant Hill, and I insisted on that very strongly. And I think it very probable that as we did not have a fight immediately at or near Pleasant Hill, my judgment was discounted a little. I put the fight ten or fifteen miles too near.

Question. You say you had to advance through what is called a "piney woods" country, where there was only one road, and that so narrow that it was difficult for two wagons to pass each other; now, in a country like that, would it not be a highly improper manner of disposing of troops to have a wagon train close in the rear of the cavalry which were in the advance? In other words, should you not have been pretty much unencumbered with trains, and gone ahead merely as scouts perhaps, so as to be able to fall back if you met a superior force?

Answer. On the evening before the battle of Sabine Crossroads I wrote to General Franklin a communication, in which I said that while I respectfully deferred to his judgment—and I used that language because I had insisted on my view so often that I did not dare do so any longer—I thought if I met with an obstinate resistance my trains should go back.

Question. Suppose your wagon trains had been in rear of the infantry, and there had been a fair chance for you to have retired when you met this superior force of the enemy, what would have been the result? Could you have been whipped there by the enemy?

Answer. Not where we were whipped.

Question. You would have had the support of the infantry so as to have had a more equal battle?

Answer. I think so. We certainly should have had a better chance, for we should have had an increased force.

Question. You say that when you met the enemy at Sabine Crossroads they were four or five to your one?

Answer. They had about 20,000 men, and I had from 4,000 to 5,000.

Question. Was it not possible to have conducted the advance of our army so as to avoid such a contingency as your meeting so overwhelming a force while you were so far distant from your support?

Answer. I think there is no question of that; that is a very plain proposition.

Question. Then was it not unmilitary not to have arranged your march differently in an enemy's country?

Answer. To give a rather vague answer to that question, I believe that the theory was pretty well seated in the minds of the commanding officers that we were not to have any fighting until we got to Shreveport. That is a conjecture of mine from what I heard and saw. I was laughed at for insisting that we would have a fight before we got to Shreveport; but, as I have already stated, I did not dare to insist upon it after a while, because people began to think I was frightened. General Franklin used to send me word that the cavalry was in the way. I think the impression was that I was slow. It is a simple thing to march a column behind a heavy advance guard that is doing all the fighting.

Question. If I understand it, General Franklin's objection to sending forward infantry to your support was that you would go ahead too fast?

Answer. Well, sir, his orders to me were, "Must crowd the enemy vigorously; keep your train well up."

Question. Now, I want to inquire about another matter. What do you know about individuals accompanying the expedition for the purpose of cotton trading?

Answer. I do not know anything about that. I know there were a number of citizens who came up to Alexandria about the time that General Banks arrived there; but as my duty was outpost duty, and we were skirmishing and fighting almost all the while, I would be about the poorest informant in regard to such matters.

Question. Were the army wagons at any time employed to collect cotton, so far as you know?

Answer. While we were in Alexandria, and before the advance, one of my brigade commanders informed me that he had been ordered, I think by General Stone, General Banks's chief of staff, to bring in several hundred bales of cotton. Whether that cotton was private property or not I do not know. I know the wagoners brought it in.

Question. Did you notice any cotton on the fleet?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw a great deal of cotton being rolled on flatboats at Alexandria.

Question. Do you know of any one professing to have authority to purchase cotton at Alexandria or anywhere else?

Answer. I do not know that I understand your meaning.

Question. Do you know of any persons pretending to have authority from any source to purchase cotton?

Answer. I do not know that I do. No, sir, I think not. There was a general impression that there were people accompanying the expedition for that purpose, but I was not in a position to know anything about it.

Question. You know of no persons who received authority from the military or other authorities?

Answer. No, sir; I had several applications from men to ride with my command with a view to gathering cotton, but I allowed no citizen to accompany my command.

Question. You have stated that it was a pretty general impression there that there would be no fighting before you got to Shreveport?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Must not that impression have been dispelled by your communications that you were continually skirmishing with the enemy?

Answer. That is the mystery.

Question. Did they still persist in that belief against your information that you were contending with the enemy all along there?

Answer. They still conveyed that impression to me. The impression I feared, and still fear, did exist was, that I was allowing myself to be played with, perhaps, by smaller forces; that I made too much in my reports of the difficulties which were in the way. I think I was unfortunate in not being understood; but I was so fortunate as to retain these despatches, which show what was my status in the matter.

Question. As a military man, what, in your judgment, would have been the proper manner for an army to advance through that country with that reasonable caution that it is necessary to exercise under such circumstances?

Answer. I presume you could get a great deal better opinion from other parties.

Question. No matter about that. You are a military man, and have opinions on these matters, although you acted in a subordinate capacity. What is your opinion?

Answer. If I had been taking an army up there I should have had an advance guard of cavalry large enough to repel any little sudden attack of the enemy, but not so large as to be unwieldy. A thousand men of cavalry would be enough. That cavalry ought to be cumbered by no single wagon or train or artillery. I would have put very near them an infantry support. The cavalry could have advanced three, four, or five miles beyond the infantry support, for, at that distance, I could have kept the main command informed of what was transpiring in front. I should have kept, step by step with this advance guard, parties of 300 or 400 men on our flanks, to have kept me informed of what was passing there. I should have had the head of my column, so far as I could, the

advance part of it, unencumbered by trains, and only such artillery with it as was necessary for immediate use. Then have the flanks and rear of the main part of the army looked after by cavalry. I should have expected to use my cavalry, not to fight battles with entirely, but only to be fought at critical moments when that arm of the service could have been made good use of. That would have been my general plan.

Question. Suppose that plan had been followed, do you believe we should have met with such a disaster as befell us there?

Answer. The more serious of the events could not have occurred.

Question. Your general opinion is that the expedition was impracticable any way?

Answer. Not wholly so; but so much so, in my opinion, as to be an unwise one.

Question. Had the river been navigable all the time, could you have probably reached Shreveport?

Answer. I cannot say that. Had the river been navigable it would have been of great assistance to us; but the river being open on the days of our fights would not have affected the issue there.

Question. I was speaking of the wisdom of the expedition itself.

Answer. The river being open, would have been of great assistance to us.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Who was responsible for placing all this cavalry in the advance, with a large train immediately in its rear?

Answer. General Banks was commander-in-chief of the expedition. But I was ordered by him to report to General Franklin, and received my orders from General Franklin. Whether General Banks directed General Franklin to give such orders I cannot state. I received orders from General Franklin to keep my train well up. I was ordered a great many times in just about that language. The burden of my order was, "Get along, get along; keep closed up; make time." The whole column was marching to the sound of my guns every day; still they would not believe there was fighting. That is the mystery to me.

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*Testimony of Captain John Schuyler Crosby.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1865.

Captain JOHN SCHUYLER CROSBY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a first lieutenant of the 1st United States artillery, and a captain and aide-de-camp to Major General Banks.

Question. Were you in the Red river campaign?

Answer. I was with Major General Banks until the army returned as far as Grand Ecore, after the battle of Sabine Crossroads and Pleasant hill, when I was sent to New Orleans to take charge of the adjutant general's department, there being no officer in the city to assume those duties.

Question. Will you state what you observed in that campaign that you deem material? If there is anything further that we wish to know, we will question you about it.

Answer. Detachments of the 16th and 17th corps, under command of General A. J. Smith, had landed at the mouth of the Atchafalaya, and proceeded by land to the rear of Fort De Russy, which they captured, when they proceeded

to Alexandria. I think they arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of March. In the mean time our land forces, under command of Major General Franklin and General Lee, who commanded the cavalry, were marching by land through Opelousas, towards Alexandria, at which point they arrived on the 19th. Major General Banks and staff arrived at Alexandria, I think, on the 24th of March; and General Franklin, with the rear of his whole command, arrived the day after, on the 25th. Admiral Porter, with his fleet, was then at Alexandria. The water in the river was exceedingly low, and the whole command was detained there for nearly a week before they moved. I think it was either on the 1st or 2d of April that the army, marching by land, reached Grand Ecore, in the neighborhood of Natchitoches. The fleet under Admiral Porter arrived there about the same time, although great difficulty was experienced even in going comparatively the short distance between Alexandria and Grand Ecore, for his iron-clads were constantly getting aground. General Banks and staff went by way of the river from Alexandria, and reached Grand Ecore on the 1st or 2d of April. The 16th corps, under General Smith, led the advance all the way from Alexandria to Natchitoches. I am not positively certain in regard to the dates; it may have been, possibly, before the 1st or 2d of April that the command reached there. On the morning of the 7th of April, Major General Banks and staff left Grand Ecore, and reached Pleasant Hill that night, a distance of thirty-seven miles, arriving about half past seven or eight o'clock. The roads were in a terrible condition, it having rained all day. On reaching there, which was General Franklin's headquarters, some time between that hour and nine o'clock that night, I should judge, Colonel Clark, of General Banks's staff, who had been in the advance with General Lee, came back and reported that they had had a very heavy cavalry fight that afternoon, at a place called Wilson's farm, but that they had succeeded in driving the enemy. He stated that General Lee would like to have a brigade of infantry sent forward to assist him while moving forward the next morning. General Banks directed me to see Colonel Drake, or if I could not find him, to write the order myself to Major General Franklin. A brigade of infantry was sent forward so as to reach General Lee about daylight on the morning of the 8th. I would state that the whole country between Grand Ecore and Sabine Crossroads—as we term it, or Mansfield, as the southern army term it—where the battle of the 8th was fought, was a very heavily wooded country—what they call in the south, piney woods. There was very little water indeed in the country; even with the heavy rains of that day, there was very little water that could be used; the ground seemed to absorb it all. In the little creeks there were stagnant pools; but they would not furnish water enough for half of the army or the animals, and we were told that the first good water we would reach was at or near Mansfield. I did not hear General Franklin give General Lee the order, but it was understood that day, and afterwards, that General Lee was ordered to take care of his own wagon trains, which consisted of about 185 or 190 wagons, including the ammunition train. I think that on the morning of the 7th General Lee asked General Franklin if he would take care of his wagon train, stating that the enemy was in pretty strong force in our front; and General Franklin's orders to General Lee were that he should keep his wagon trains well up with his command, so that on the morning of the 8th there would be plenty of room for the infantry of the 13th and 19th corps to move forward.

Question. How long a train did that necessarily make?

Answer. I should judge about two miles and a half, possibly three, from the fact that very often the lines of the wagons were extended very greatly, in consequence of the nature of the road. There were deep gullies in the road; and the wagons would be obliged to halt on the top of one hill until the wagons ahead had crossed the gully or the valley and reached the opposite hill. General Smith, in the mean time, was bringing up the rear from Grand Ecore, and

was supposed to be within supporting distance of General Franklin's column. General Banks had directed General Franklin to attend entirely to the order of marching, both of General Lee's command and his own. I presume General Banks did not wish to interfere with him. On the morning of the 8th General Franklin's command started; and General Banks and staff overtook them at St. Patrick's bayou, or Carroll's ford. At this point the bridge across the little bayou had been destroyed by the enemy; and the command was halted there, and trees were felled to make a substantial bridge, so that the whole command could cross. About this time some officer—I do not remember who he was, or from what command, but he was from the advance—reported that there was pretty heavy skirmishing in front. Occasionally we could hear artillery firing. General Banks remarked to General Franklin, "General, I believe I will ride to the front. If there is no heavy fighting," or something to that effect, "I will come back again." That was to let General Franklin know that unless he received some message from him, he was to understand that everything was going on right at the front. I should judge that this may have been about ten or half past ten o'clock in the morning. I do not think it could have been much later. At any rate, the command had not marched over thirteen or fourteen miles. None of us supposed that that was the end of that day's march by General Franklin's command. We rode to the front, and found General Lee skirmishing very heavily with the enemy. General Lee then had one brigade of infantry, with his cavalry forces. He occupied the further end of a large, open field, the enemy holding the edge of the woods on the opposite side towards Mansfield, and their lines seeming to extend pretty well from our left, as it were, nearly overlapping our right flank. General Stone (General Banks's chief of staff) had ridden forward early in the morning to be with General Lee. As soon as General Banks found out the position of affairs, he sent an officer, I think—at any rate, he sent a despatch back to General Franklin, directing him to send either a division or a brigade, or at all events to send more infantry to the front. I consider that the nature of the whole country was such that it was almost an impossible thing for cavalry to operate with any very great effect, on account of its being so densely wooded. After leaving a crossroads a few miles in the rear of Sabine Crossroads, there was but one road, leading through very heavy woods; and I certainly think that a brigade of infantry well deployed could whip any division of cavalry there with ease. I consider that in that whole advance, after leaving Grand Ecore, we should have had as much infantry as cavalry at the front the whole time. If it had been an open country it would have been very different, for then we could have felt the force of the enemy, and could have retired, if necessary, at our own pleasure; but in this case it was difficult for the cavalry to fall back regularly.

From about half past one to half past three or four o'clock on the 8th of April, the enemy were skirmishing very heavily with our advance. At the same time they were pushing around to our right, and occasionally there was very heavy skirmishing on our right flank with our skirmishers. In the mean time one brigade or a division of infantry had come up under General Ransom, with some other officer, a colonel, commanding the brigade. They were deployed on our right centre and our right. About four o'clock the enemy seemed to move forward from their whole line, but with heavier force on our right. Our men stood the fire very well indeed for a time, but were finally overwhelmed and fell back. In the mean time General Banks had despatched at least two or three officers to General Franklin, stating that the enemy were there in force, and that he should push forward as rapidly as possible with his whole command, infantry and artillery. The enemy drove us across this open field; but by the time we gained the edge of the woods, General Cameron, whom General Franklin had sent forward with a division of the 13th corps, reached there with the head of his column. As fast as possible, his men were deployed to the right

and left to assist in checking the enemy until General Franklin with General Emory could move forward; but the enemy came across the field with such impetuosity that they captured all our artillery that was there on the field—I should think some eleven pieces—and drove the cavalry, in great disorder, through the woods; and finally General Cameron's whole command had to fall back.

Question. Were you attacked by infantry or cavalry?

Answer. By infantry, mostly; I saw very little cavalry of the enemy during that day. We could see them deploying a little or our right occasionally, but very little cavalry was used; it was principally infantry. From the original position we had taken in the morning, to the position which Emory's division of the 19th corps had taken on the crest of a hill, it must have been a distance of about two miles in the rear. The enemy were checked at that point, but not until they had captured the whole of Lee's train, which occupied that whole line of road between the edge of the woods and the rear—a distance, perhaps, of two miles and a half. The wagons of that train were loaded with forage and rations for the men. I know that one or two wagons were hurried to the front with infantry ammunition and they were captured, but I should not suppose that over half a dozen ammunition wagons were captured. After General Cameron's line was driven back, the men seemed to give up all hope, and it was almost impossible to rally them. A great many of the officers were dismounted, with their hats off, trying to urge their men to halt. It was a perfect panic, and every one was trying to get to the rear as fast as possible, so as to be beyond the enemy's fire.

Question. At what number did you estimate the force of the enemy in that attack?

Answer. I should think there were about seventeen thousand men—that is, in front; I am not speaking of their forces on our right flank, of which I did not have an opportunity of judging; but they seemed to drive us back so rapidly, and with such determination and force and power, that I suppose there must have been at least seventeen thousand men. On our side, we had not over fifteen thousand men engaged on that day. At one time, of course, we had not half of that number; but I speak of those who were engaged during that whole day, including Emory's division, which assisted in repulsing the enemy at the point to which we were driven.

Question. You spoke of an order being sent back to General Franklin to bring up the infantry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he have any objections to have the infantry assist there?

Answer. Yes, sir; I will not be positive as to the expression I heard General Franklin use, but it was to the effect that no infantry should have been sent to the cavalry at all; that it was Lee's business to find out the position of the enemy, and if they were too strong, to fall back.

Question. If the nature of the ground was such as you describe, how was it expected, that if he met a superior force of the enemy he could fall back, when the roads were obstructed for three miles with wagons?

Answer. That is more than I could ever understand. I think General Franklin's idea, from the time he left Grand Ecore until he met the enemy in force, was that we were not going to meet any enemy of any account much before we got to Shreveport.

Question. But he must have been undeceived about that when General Lee sent him word that he was skirmishing with a large force of the enemy in front. That must have removed any such idea, must it not?

Answer. I do not think it did.

Question. Can you tell the object of that expedition—what it was intended to accomplish, had it been successful?

Answer. I have talked with a great many officers on the campaign, and before we started, in regard to it, and we all had certain ideas.

Question. What was the prevailing idea ?

Answer. The prevailing idea, among officers whose opinions were worth anything, was that, if possible, it was to capture Taylor's army, reach Shreveport, and destroy all the transportation on the Red river, so that in future the enemy would have no transportation at all to bring troops and supplies down that river to operate in Lower Louisiana. That was my idea, and that seemed to be the idea of a great many. I have heard it expressed by many officers of the line—men who were not so apt to know as other officers near headquarters—that one reason for the expedition was that they wanted to bring Louisiana back into the Union after conquering her territory. Another idea was that we were going through to get all the cotton there was in the State of Louisiana for the benefit of the government.

Question. Do you know who first conceived this expedition—who planned it originally ?

Answer. It was always my impression that it was planned in Washington. I know that at the time the expedition was first talked of, General Banks expressed to me the idea—I do not know whether it was in the presence of other officers or not—that we should move towards Mobile. That was the opinion, from the fact that at that time (I think it was about the time of the battle of Chattanooga, when Johnson was in command of the rebel army) a movement towards Mobile would have taken so many men from Johnson to protect that place. I think that of the officers with whom I talked upon the subject before the expedition started, very few were in favor of the expedition; and I do not think General Banks was in favor of it at all.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the expedition ?

Answer. To the want of sufficient infantry force in the forward movement from Grand Ecore; that is, in advance with the cavalry; or rather, the want of a proper support to the advance.

Question. What order of advance would you, as a military man, have recommended ?

Answer. I think there should have been as much infantry as cavalry in the advance, with a proportion of artillery—not as much artillery as we would use in our northern country, where the roads are wider, and the country more open. That country was no country at all for cavalry to operate in, except at a very great disadvantage; and owing to the low water in the Red river, we were compelled to stay back at least ten days. I think if we could have moved forward ten days earlier—that is merely my opinion—we would not have met the enemy in such force in that position, for we heard afterwards from prisoners that there were many troops pushed forward within a day or two before we arrived there; and could we have gained Mansfield we would have had plenty of water for our men, and we should have got into a corn-growing country, for the pine woods seemed to end at Mansfield.

Question. What have you to say of the order of this march, with the cavalry ahead, backed up by three miles of wagons, in a country where they could not turn out, and where there was only one road for them to pass—was that according to military rule ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Had that anything to do with the disaster at Sabine Crossroads ?

Answer. Yes, sir; I consider that if that wagon train had not been there, the infantry could have come forward an hour and a half sooner on that day and in time, in all probability, to have checked the enemy until the whole command could have moved forward.

Question. Had it not been for the obstruction, would it not have been better



for the cavalry, when they found a superior force of the enemy in their front, to have fallen back to the infantry support?

Answer. I think the cavalry would have been enabled to fall back to the edge of the woods and there hold their ground; I do not think it would have been necessary for them to fall back further, for if the road had not been obstructed, the infantry could have been got forward in time.

Question. Then you think the presence of that wagon train was the immediate cause of the disaster on that day?

Answer. That, and the fact that the main force of the 19th corps was too far in the rear—not within supporting distance. The advance of that corps should have been at least up to the end of the wagon train.

Question. Who is responsible for this unmilitary order of march?

Answer. Major General Franklin, I should think.

Question. Did General Banks know of the order of march along that narrow road?

Answer. I am not able to state; I should think that he ought to have known it, although, with regard to the order of march, I think General Banks allowed General Franklin to make all the arrangements; I believe it is the general custom with an officer commanding an army not to go into the details of the daily order of march.

Question. Was any part of this wagon train engaged at any time in collecting cotton?

Answer. Previous to this battle?

Question. Yes.

Answer. I did not see one.

Question. Were they so engaged afterwards?

Answer. I think a very little cotton was brought in by these army wagons, but I think it was for the benefit of the navy, and that they were driven by sailors. It is possible that there might have been a few bales brought in while we were waiting at Alexandria for a rise in the river. Yes, sir, there was, at Alexandria, but not up to where there was any forward movement.

Question. What amount of cotton do you suppose was collected at Alexandria?

Answer. I have no means of judging; I could merely give a rough guess.

Question. Give a rough guess, then.

Answer. By the army and navy?

Question. Yes.

Answer. About twenty thousands bales, I should think; between fifteen and twenty thousand bales, that were collected upon the line of that river.

Question. Do you know what was done with it?

Answer. I saw the most of that cotton put on board of scows, under the superintendence of the navy, to be sent, I think, to Cairo. I know that was about the principal thing the navy did, to get cotton.

Question. That was the principal thing the navy was doing?

Answer. While they were at Alexandria? Yes, sir.

Question. Had anybody with that expedition permits in advance to buy cotton?

Answer. I think there were some, but I did not see any permits myself.

Question. Who was understood to be purchasing cotton under permits?

Answer. I cannot say. I know there was a Mr. D. A. Dwight, of Boston; a Mr. George B. Waldron, of New York, who lived in New Orleans at that time; and there was a Mr. Henry Thompson. I do not know whether he had any permit or not. I do not know, indeed, whether any of these gentlemen had permits to buy it, but it is my impression that they had. They had passes, at any rate.

Question. And were buying cotton?

Answer. They had agents, I think, who were buying cotton.

Question. From whom did they claim that their permits were?

Answer. My idea was that they had permits to buy cotton through General Banks; but I think they came with letters, or with the original permits, from Washington, for I know that I had heard the general refuse, time and time again, to allow anybody without that authority to go and buy cotton, or to accompany the expedition.

Question. Were the army wagons employed at any time to haul the cotton that these persons bought?

Answer. I never knew them to be used for that purpose. There was a man by the name of Mr. McKee, who was formerly a partner or interested with Mr. H. A. Butler, (General Butler's brother.) I heard several remarks made about him, but I never took any interest in anything of that kind. Once or twice in going along the levee at Alexandria I saw a load of cotton there, and I saw McKee standing on a pile of it, and I heard several people say, "Well, McKee has got a good thing of it; he has got an understanding with the quartermaster's department." He was a great friend of the quartermaster.

Question. Who was the quartermaster?

Answer. The quartermaster of the 19th corps is Lieutenant Colonel Chandler.

Question. Where is he now?

Answer. He is in the department of the Gulf, with the old command of General Granger.

Question. You say the navy was principally engaged in the cotton business?

Answer. Yes, sir; they seemed to turn their whole attention there to getting cotton. Every available vessel that could carry a bale of cotton was taken for that purpose. I think the idea was that it was to go for prize money; and there was an immense amount of cotton burned along the banks of the river, from the very moment the people heard that the navy was seizing it.

Question. Were there any private individuals who were taking cotton for the navy?

Answer. I do not know. I heard different rumors in regard to it. I heard that some of the gentlemen who were engaged were interested in the cotton in that region of the country. I know they were from what they said.

Question. Do you know the names of those who were so interested?

Answer. I think Mr. Dwight was. I mean those men whom I supposed to be engaged in the buying of cotton. I think Mr. George B. Waldron was the agent of a man by the name of Mansfield, who is one of the largest, if not the largest cotton producer in Louisiana.

Question. Did he have any connexion with the government?

Answer. No, sir; none at all.

Question. Where did this Mansfield reside?

Answer. He was a northern man, from Boston, and is now living in New Orleans.

Question. Do you know anything in regard to the building of dams for floating down the fleet?

Answer. No, sir; I was sent to New Orleans before that was done.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Do you know whether Admiral Porter had any knowledge that the naval vessels there were engaged in collecting cotton?

Answer. Yes, sir; he was there, and he and his staff were riding around on horses. On his headquarters boat he had a stud of horses, upon which they used to ride around the country. He saw it all; saw the cotton brought in; and the officers were all talking about it, and talking about the prize money they were going to make. Admiral Porter and General Banks had several interviews

in regard to this cotton business. The general wanted to secure the cotton for the benefit of the government, and I learned that he said to the admiral that if he went on to seize the cotton indiscriminately through the country, the people would burn it up, and he would not be able, after we had driven the enemy out of the country, to secure any cotton for the benefit of the government.

By the chairman:

Question. Did General Banks himself have anything to do with the purchase of cotton for himself or others?

Answer. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Question. Not while he was in New Orleans?

Answer. I never knew of General Banks being engaged or associated, in any way, with any mercantile or commercial transaction during the whole time I have been with him, which is now nearly two years.

*Testimony of Captain Jerome Bradley.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 12, 1865.*

Captain JEROME BRADLEY sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What has been your position in the army, and what is it now?

Answer. My position in the army has been captain and assistant quartermaster; at the present time I am out of the service. My resignation was accepted this month.

Question. Where did you serve in that capacity? under General Banks in New Orleans?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was in the department of the Gulf. I was quartermaster of the cavalry under General Lee.

Question. Did you accompany the Red river expedition?

Answer. I did not; and I think there is where a mistake has been made in regard to me. Knowing that I was the quartermaster of General Lee's cavalry, it was supposed that I accompanied that expedition, which I did not do.

Question. Were you in the quartermaster's department in New Orleans?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know anything about cotton speculations there?

Answer. I do not know anything about them. I was not in a position to know anything about them except from what I could hear. I had charge of the cavalry, and had nothing to do with anything else.

*Testimony of Major D. C. Houston.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 12, 1865.*

Major D. C. HOUSTON sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a captain of engineers, and major and additional aide-de-camp. I was chief engineer of the department of the Gulf, under General Banks, and reported to him in New York when he started on the expedition.

Question. Did you accompany him on the Red river expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir; I accompanied him as far as Grand Ecore. My health

was very poor, and I went up with the gunboats and transports above that point, and did not go with the army, except that portion of it that was on board the transports. I was not present at the battle of Sabine Crossroads or the battle of Pleasant Hill. At that time I was on the river with Admiral Porter, or at least on one of the transports.

Question. Then you do not know much about what was going on on the land?

Answer. No, sir, not at that time. I then returned to Grand Ecore with the gunboats and transports, and in a few days came away to New Orleans on sick leave.

Question. Were you there when the dams were constructed?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You say you were with the navy a portion of the time, what do you know about the dealings in cotton by them?

Answer. I was at Alexandria at the time General Banks arrived there. The navy was already there, and had been there for some two or three days, ever since the capture of Fort de Russy. At that time they were seizing cotton in the vicinity of Alexandria, and bringing it in there and putting it on board barges and other vessels as prize, as I understood at the time. What became of the cotton I don't know.

Question. Was this done by direction of Admiral Porter?

Answer. I cannot say that it was; I do not know whether he directed it or not.

Question. Did he know it was going on?

Answer. It was all in plain sight; I should think he could not help seeing it.

Question. How extensive were their dealings in cotton, so far as you observed?

Answer. I could not give any idea of the amount that was seized by them; it did not come within my province at all to notice it. I merely noticed that there was a large quantity of cotton seized by the navy. The army was rather disgusted with it.

Question. Was it detrimental to the army to have such speculations going on there?

Answer. It was rather demoralizing to the soldiers to see the navy seizing the cotton for prize on land, while they did not get any.

Question. Do you know anything about any private speculators accompanying that expedition?

Answer. I know there were men up there, but as to what were their rights or authority, or what they were doing, I could not say.

Question. Do you know who they were who were supposed to be in that business?

Answer. There was a Mr. Thompson there. I do not remember any others now. I paid very little attention to the subject of cotton. My business was that of chief engineer of the army, and that left me free from all that matter.

Question. Will you state whatever you think of that you deem important in connexion with this expedition; why it failed, &c.

Answer. As to the starting out of the expedition, I will say that General Banks consulted me with regard to the propriety of making an expedition to Shreveport. This was in the December before the expedition started. The idea of an expedition of that character had often been discussed. We had, at that time, captured the mouth of the Rio Grande, and our forces also occupied Matagorda bay; and, so far as I understood, it was the intention of General Banks to operate from that point against Galveston, and every arrangement was made for that purpose in my department. Then it seemed that the government—at least that was my understanding—and some general officers were of the opinion that an expedition could be effectually made against Shreveport.

I was opposed to that movement in general, because I was opposed to any movement of troops west of the Mississippi river.

Question. What military objections to that expedition occurred to your mind?

Answer. In the first place, in regard to operating west of the Mississippi, I regarded that the enemy's forces having been divided by the Mississippi river, all of our forces should have been ordered east of the Mississippi river, leaving only so many troops west of the Mississippi as was necessary to hold the enemy in check. After the enemy's forces east of the Mississippi had been whipped by us, the small party west of the Mississippi would have soon yielded without any difficulty. But we were operating from the department of the Gulf. We had this army there, and were obliged to operate somewhere with these troops; and the legitimate locality or theatre of operations for that force I regarded to be the coast. First to occupy the coast of Texas, then to occupy Mobile. I desired first to go to Mobile; but the operations all having been started, it was proposed to go to Mobile afterwards. That was my idea about it.

Question. Did you state this to General Banks?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was his opinion of it?

Answer. That was his idea; that is, he was favorable to it. The operation up the Red river required for its success this: The true object of such an operation was the wiping out of the rebel army west of the Red river; the merely taking and destroying Shreveport, and then coming back, was not a sufficient object for such an expedition. In order to carry out the true object of that expedition, I considered that all the troops west of the Mississippi river should be placed under the command of one officer, who was on the ground. Now the forces that were destined to operate there were actually under two different commanders, General Steele and General Banks. In the next place, as a reason against this movement, or one showing its difficulty, the Red river is not a reliable stream, as a line of supplies, for an army moving so distant from its base as Shreveport and Texas were; and, to insure success, it was necessary that we should have a more reliable line of supplies than that river. I deemed it was necessary to have first a wagon road, and eventually a railroad, from Vicksburg to Shreveport. At first use the railroad as far as Monroe, then use wagons to Shreveport, which was nearly directly west from Vicksburg, a distance of 165 miles.

Question. Did General Banks share your views?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Who was it that planned and directed this expedition, and ordered General Banks to go there?

Answer. I cannot tell that. I presume it was ordered from Washington. I did not see the orders at the time?

Question. You say General Banks was opposed to that expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir. He was opposed to that movement originally, and all the time, except under the conditions which I mentioned, uniting the command and a proper line of supplies; and the third condition was that we should have ample time to make this campaign, inasmuch as it might take us some months to accomplish the object of the expedition, owing to the difficult character of the country, and the great distance over which the army would have to travel, and the uncertainty of the direction in which the enemy would go. It was desirable to destroy their army west of that river effectually; and we could not make arrangements to do that in any definite time.

Question. Would it not have taken a very large force to have guarded so long a communication as that from the Mississippi to Shreveport?

Answer. It was considered that we had force enough. We should probably have had forty thousand men in our movable column, if all the forces had been concentrated properly; then we had a large number of colored troops who could

have guarded the railroad and garrisoned points on the road for its protection.

Question. What number of colored troops accompanied that expedition?

Answer. I think up as far as Grand Ecore, about twenty-five hundred men. They were not required in any engagement; they were guarding the trains—one brigade of infantry and two regiments of troops acting as sappers and miners.

Question. What do you know about the order of march from Grand Ecore?

Answer. I know nothing about it except from hearsay. I was not along with the army?

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*Testimony of Colonel J. G. Wilson.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 12, 1865.*

Colonel J. G. WILSON sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a colonel and aide-de-camp on General Banks's staff.

Question. Were you in the Red river expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir; I went with the general.

Question. Will you tell us, in your own way, all the leading facts and circumstances connected with that expedition, so far as the same came to your knowledge?

Answer. I would begin by saying that I arrived in Alexandria, in company with General Banks, on the 24th of March. General Franklin arrived with the 19th corps on the day following, and the day after that the army moved forward, the 19th corps and cavalry under General Franklin, and General Smith's corps moving up the river on their transports. About a week after that we left Alexandria, where we had been detained in holding elections for delegates to the constitutional convention, &c. We reached Grand Ecore, where we found all the army assembled there, and in the vicinity—a portion of it at Natchitoches. As soon as our transportation and the army was ready to move forward, it was ordered forward, and after the last regiment had left Grand Ecore we followed. That night we reached Pleasant Hill, where we found General Franklin with the advance of the army encamped. The next morning they moved forward, the moving column being under the disposition and orders of General Franklin. We reached a bayou about twelve miles distant from Pleasant Hill at noon the next day, where we found General Franklin building a bridge. Our headquarters train not having come up with our tents and mess arrangements, the general said he thought he would ride forward to the front and see what was going on. General Franklin had told us that nothing was going on in front except some slight skirmishing, and gave it as his opinion that there would be no fighting. We rode forward to the front, where we got, I think, between 1 and 2 o'clock. Soon after that there was considerable skirmishing, and General Banks expressed anxiety about the situation, and sent back an aid to request General Franklin to be ready to move up his main column, and immediately to make preparations for so doing. About an hour after that an orderly was despatched, and in a moment or two afterwards an aide-de-camp, with an order to General Franklin to hasten to the front as rapidly as possible. The skirmishing was increasing, and extending down to our right flank, with danger of getting to our rear. The general sent me down the road to see if I could find any regiments, and to take them in on the right flank, to prevent our being overlapped. I found several regiments, and took them in and placed them on our extreme right. About half past four this battle began.

Question. At what place was this battle?

Answer. At Sabine Crossroads, on the 8th of April. Our troops maintained

their front for some time very gallantly ; I happened to be in front myself with General Ransom, who was there wounded. Our troops maintained their position very well until they were overlapped on both the right and left flanks, and until the enemy began to fire on their rear; no troops in the world could stand that. It produced a sort of panic, and they began to fall back in disorder. Unfortunately, General Franklin had ordered the cavalry train to the extreme front, against the expostulations of General Lee, who did not wish it there in case of any event of the kind which did occur. The train blocked up the road so effectually, that neither the troops nor the artillery could get away by the road. It was a piney forest there, and there was but one road. The artillery saw there was no chance of getting their guns away, and after standing by their guns until the enemy was almost on them, they left them. The army then began to fall back in a great deal of confusion, when a division of troops came up under General Cameron, of the 13th corps. Those troops were very judiciously posted by General Franklin himself, who came to the front about that time—about 5 o'clock. We tried all we could to induce the disorganized troops to rally behind this division, and some of them did so; but the charge of the rebels was too strong and too impetuous, and they just swept away the new division as well as the others, and then the army began to fall back utterly routed and panic-stricken, every man for himself, until they reached a hill, where the 19th corps, or rather the first division of it, under General Emory, was formed. That division opened their lines and allowed us to pass through, and awaited the assault of the rebels, who seeing that we had got strong re-enforcements and hearing the cheering, stopped and reformed their lines preparatory to a charge, which they finally made, but which we repulsed. It was then dark, too late to continue in pursuit of the enemy; and thus terminated the first day.

General Smith was supposed to be then at Pleasant Hill. A staff officer was sent back with orders for General Smith to push forward with his troops as rapidly as possible, in anticipation of an attack by the enemy early the next morning. He was expected to be there before daylight with his troops. About 9 o'clock that night a council of war was held, and it was then decided that it would be necessary for us to fall back. There was no water there; there were six thousand animals that must have water; and we decided to fall back to Pleasant Hill. The order was given, and the troops reached Pleasant Hill about daylight, or very soon thereafter.

I should have stated that when that decision was arrived at, another aid was sent back to tell General Smith not to come forward, but to await our arrival at Pleasant Hill, which he did.

Another council of war was held at Pleasant Hill, when opinions were divided. Some were for pressing forward, and some were for falling back. It was finally decided, however, as the most prudent step, to fall back. We could not count on the co-operation of the navy, and we were constantly receiving reports of an intention on the part of General Magruder to come up from Texas and cut off our communications. He was supposed to have ten or twelve thousand men. Orders were given for the trains to proceed to Grand Ecore, and they began to move in that direction about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 9th. The army was put in a position to receive the enemy in case they made an attack. Skirmishing went on more or less during the day, and a little before 5 o'clock the enemy made an impetuous charge upon us, which was most gallantly repulsed, and the enemy were driven back two miles. If we could have had another hour of daylight, I think we should have taken all their guns and trains; but it came on dark and we could not pursue them.

It was then decided at another council of war that the army, in spite of their victory, had better fall back to Grand Ecore. The army therefore moved off the next morning about 3 o'clock. Some of our severely wounded, and also the severely wounded of the enemy that we had taken care of previously, were left

at Pleasant Hill, in charge of surgeons. A little skirmishing occurred on our way back, but we arrived at Grand Ecore, where we remained for a time, and then fell back to Alexandria, fighting three successful battles on the way back. I believe we lost neither a wagon nor a gun, except on the unfortunate 8th day of April. From Alexandria we fell back to the Atchafalaya. These, I think, are the leading points of the expedition.

Question. What amount of force had General Banks in all?

Answer. Including General Smith's forces, he had about twenty-two thousand men when he began the campaign.

Question. Of all arms?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was your estimate of the force opposed to you?

Answer. As near as I could learn from conversations with prisoners, the enemy had just about twenty-two thousand; I do not think they had any more. We never had the use of all of our troops at any one time. We were obliged to leave a division of troops at Alexandria, to keep open our communications; and when we reached Grand Ecore a brigade of General Smith's troops was left with his transports, a portion which proceeded up the river with the navy. I do not think we had engaged at Pleasant Hill more than sixteen thousand troops. The enemy unquestionably that day had twenty thousand. That was the testimony of some of their officers with whom I conversed.

Question. Have you the means of knowing who planned this expedition, and where it was originated?

Answer. I have always understood it was originated by General Halleck. The campaign was made in opposition to the judgment of General Banks. That it originated in Washington there can be no possible doubt, from the fact that troops from other departments co-operated in that campaign.

Question. You say that General Banks was opposed to it?

Answer. Yes, sir; he was always opposed to this campaign.

Question. Have you the means of knowing what were the objects expected to be attained by it—what advantages were expected to the government from this enterprise?

Answer. I never knew; I never could conceive, because simply destroying Shreveport did not seem to be a sufficient motive or reason for this campaign, and that seemed to be the only end that was had in view, so far as we knew. It was supposed that we were going to destroy Shreveport, and come back again.

Question. How far was it from Alexandria to Shreveport?

Answer. I do not know the distance; but my impression is that from Grand Ecore to Shreveport was about one hundred miles.

Question. Through what kind of country, and on what kind of road?

Answer. It was a country densely wooded, chiefly with pine woods. The roads were very few, very bad, and very narrow. It was esteemed a very bad country in which to make a campaign—entirely unsuited to cavalry operations, as they could not operate there, except when dismounted. Whenever General Lee skirmished with the enemy, he was always obliged to dismount his men and send his horses to the rear.

Question. How could you expect to destroy the army of the enemy in a country like that?

Answer. We could have done it if there had been a proper disposition of our troops. The general opinion in the army among officers and men was, that General Franklin, acting under his belief and theory that the enemy did not mean to fight, made a wrong disposition of the troops, and separated his advance too far from the main column; and when we fought that battle on the 8th, the truth of our supposition was abundantly proved to us on that day, for if our main column had been at the front the enemy could not have driven us back; we could have held our own.



Question. Then it was General Frankliu's opinion that there would be no fight?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where did he expect there would be a fight?

Answer. He did not think there would be any fight. He thought they were going to retreat, as they had done in our campaign in the Teche country the autumn previous. In that campaign there was now and then a little skirmishing, but no battle. We followed them several hundred miles, but we could not get a fight out of them.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the campaign?

Answer. Firstly, I should say, the navy did not co-operate with us on account of the low water in the Red river; and secondly, I should say, the disaster of the 5th.

Question. And to what do you attribute that disaster?

Answer. To the improper disposition of our forces. I think you will find that that is the general opinion of all the officers and men engaged in that campaign.

Question. State as near as you can what was the disposition that General Franklin made of the forces under him.

Answer. When he left Pleasant Hill he ordered General Lee to move forward with his cavalry, and take his train with him, and keep his train close up to the front, in order not to impede the march of the infantry. General Lee went forward, and at a place called Wilson's farm he had a very severe engagement with the enemy, and lost a great many men. He then sent back word to General Franklin that he desired the support of infantry; that that was a country not fitted for cavalry to operate in. A brigade of infantry was sent to him, and the enemy were finally driven back. General Lee moved forward, and expressed the opinion that there would be fighting, and requested General Franklin to permit him to send back his train to the main column. He did not want his train so near to the front, for in the event of any disaster it would make trouble. General Franklin still repeated his order to move forward and take his train with him. General Lee went forward, skirmishing with the enemy continually, and finally when he got to Sabine Crossroads he found the enemy so strongly posted that he declined to move forward any further until he could get the support of more infantry. Another brigade of infantry was then sent forward, and, I think, after that still another brigade was sent forward—making about three brigades of infantry that were at the front under General Ransom when we reached there.

Question. How was it about General Franklin's willingness to furnish infantry at any time?

Answer. I was told—I was not there on the spot—that he exhibited an indisposition to send infantry to the front, as being unnecessary. All his movements were based on the idea that the enemy were retreating, and would not fight. That explains the whole thing. If that had been correct, his indisposition to send infantry to the front, or have the cavalry train in the main column, would have been perfectly proper.

Question. How far in advance of infantry support was this cavalry train?

Answer. About eight miles.

Question. How many infantry were there back that eight miles?

Answer. General Franklin must have had between seven and eight thousand.

Question. And where was the rest of the army?

Answer. At Pleasant Hill, twelve miles back of General Franklin. The estimated distance from Pleasant Hill to Sabine Crossroads was twenty miles; and it was eight miles from Sabine Crossroads to where General Franklin was with his main column, where we found him engaged in making a bridge when we arrived, about noon, on our way to the front. He said to General Banks,

when we left, that he was going to halt his army there and camp for the night. General Ransom expressed to me a great deal of anxiety when I saw him in the front about 3 o'clock on the 8th. He said he thought we were in a very dangerous position.

Question. Did General Banks know of the order in which the march was being made?

Answer. Not until he witnessed it, because he left the general disposition of the moving column to General Franklin, who, being an educated soldier, and a West Point man, was supposed to be a perfectly competent judge of the proper disposition of troops in making a forward movement. He left the details to him, simply giving him a general order to move forward. General Banks remained at Grand Ecore until all the troops left; he wished to see them all off before he left. After he saw them all off, he made a very hard ride of upwards of thirty miles through a severe rain to Pleasant Hill that day.

Question. As a military man, what order of march should you say would have been proper in such a country as that?

Answer. Simply this: that where we knew we were near a large body of the enemy, we should have moved in a compact body, so that they could not have attacked a portion of our army without meeting the whole. In other words, if this cavalry had been but two or three miles in advance of the main column, and their cavalry train had been in the rear with the army train, there could have been no disaster, for we could have held our own against that force, or even a larger, as was abundantly proved at Pleasant Hill, where we were all together, and drove the enemy.

Question. You attribute this disaster to the order of march?

Answer. Yes, sir, in my judgment, that was the whole cause of it—the wrong disposition of the troops.

Question. And you say General Franklin was responsible for that?

Answer. Entirely; they were all under his orders, and when General Lee desired any different arrangement from that which existed, he did not send to General Banks, but to General Franklin, as being the commander of the column.

Question. Was there an unusually large train accompanying that army?

Answer. The train was considerably larger than was absolutely necessary. The cavalry train, for instance, consisted of about 180 wagons. It is usually estimated that if a brigade has 25 wagons it is sufficient, which would have made 100 wagons for the cavalry division, instead of 180.

Question. Why was this excess?

Answer. I never knew; I only knew the fact that a great many officers were carrying more baggage than the regulations would permit. A great many were carrying luxuries not usually taken on an expedition; for instance, a dozen of wine, and things of that sort. General Lee had the general direction of the cavalry division, both as regards the extent of the train and other particulars.

Question. Was the infantry train unusually large?

Answer. No, sir, I should say not for a campaign such as we were making. We had a long march through an enemy's country, and were obliged to rely upon our own train for supplies for the troops, ammunition, &c.

Question. What do you know about any dealings in cotton there by the army, or any persons attached to or going with it?

Answer. I only know that, to my very great surprise, when I went on board our headquarters boat at New Orleans, the Black Hawk, I found Colonel Frank Howe, with four or five friends of his, who I knew were cotton operators. I thought it strange that they should be there. It naturally occasioned some conversation among the staff, and they all expressed surprise at it. I could only learn—I never spoke to General Banks about it—that there had been

some sort of authority produced by these gentlemen, from the authorities in Washington, to accompany us.

Question. Will you give the names of those gentlemen?

Answer. One was Henry Thompson, who has been residing for the past year in New York; another was a Mr. Waldron, who lived at the New York Hotel; a third was a gentleman who was formerly on Governor Shepley's staff, a Captain Bolles; and Colonel Frank E. Howe, of New York. I believe those were the four. When we reached Alexandria we found the navy taking possession of all the cotton; we found them going back into the country a distance of six or seven miles.

Question. Were those gentlemen whom you have mentioned engaged in it, so far as you know?

Answer. No, sir, I never knew of their being actually engaged in any operations, although it was understood that they were cotton operators, and that they went up for that purpose. The operations of the fleet were carried on by order of the admiral. They would go into the country a distance of five or six miles, find a lot of cotton and brand it "C. S. A.," and underneath that "U. S. N." I recollect that I asked the admiral one day, when he did me the honor of asking me to dine with him, if he knew what those letters stood for. He said, "No." I said they stood for "Cotton Stealing Association of the United States Navy." There came to Grand Ecore a Mr. William Butler, of Illinois, and a Mr. Thomas E. Casey, from Kentucky, who had authority from the President—I saw the letter myself—to go with the expedition. They were to have, I think, any transportation they should request from the naval commander or the commander of the army; at all events, they were to have such assistance as the army and navy could render.

Question. Were they purchasing cotton?

Answer. They did purchase cotton, because we used some of it in our dam.

Question. What did they do with it after they purchased it?

Answer. They had proposed sending it down the river; but the river was blockaded, as it were, by the enemy, who captured several of our transports and destroyed two of our gunboats; so they did not send it down, but kept it at Alexandria, where the army and navy were; and before they had got away with it we had used a great deal of it in the construction of our dam.

Question. How was it marked?

Answer. I do not remember; I only know that Mr. Butler came to me one day and said, "I wish you would take somebody else's cotton than mine; that is very fine cotton!"

Question. About what amount of cotton did you see there with the navy?

Answer. Being a novice in the matter of cotton, I do not know that I could make an estimate. I should say that I must have seen in the neighborhood of one thousand bales that the navy had; and in addition to that, was the cotton that belonged to Mr. Butler, and also a great deal of cotton that belonged to the people of Alexandria. There must have been several thousand bales of cotton in Alexandria. The navy, I should say, must have had more than a thousand bales, because they had several barges loaded with it; perhaps they had two or three thousand bales of cotton. Some of that cotton went down the river, and, as I was informed, then went to Cairo. This Mr. Casey is the person who was said to have been out into the rebel lines, and had an understanding with the rebel general, Kirby Smith, in regard to getting all the cotton in that region of the country. He made some arrangement with him that Butler and Casey should get this cotton and pay him a percentage upon all they received; and the arrangement was that he was to fall back with his army until the cotton was secured. That was simply a rumor in the army. I know Casey had been out into the rebel lines, because he told me so himself. He said he had been out there and had seen General Smith, and that he had a brother-in-law who was a colonel under him.

Question. You say you saw the letter of the President giving these gentlemen authority; will you be particular about the extent of that authority?

Answer. Well, I could not be very particular about that, because I did not actually read the letter. The letter was given to General Banks and he read it. I got my information as to the contents of the letter from him. I remember his expressing surprise to me that the President should send such people there with any such authority. I saw the letter in his hands, and recognized the writing of the President from other letters I had seen, but did not actually read the letter myself.

Question. Did General Banks permit other cotton dealers, or other dealers, to accompany the expedition, except those who were authorized from Washington?

Answer. No, sir; there were no other persons that I know of, except those on our headquarters boat, who I understand had presented letters to General Banks from the authorities in Washington, requesting that they should be permitted to go; which was equivalent to an order that they should go. In that way they had secured their permits from him to go on the boat. The impression seemed to prevail that this authority had been secured through Colonel Howe, and that he had secured it through his friend, Mr. Chase. That was the impression.

Question. Was not such a thing detrimental to military operations?

Answer. We thought so. I remember that General Stone was very much aggravated indeed at seeing any of these people there.

Question. Do you know whether any teams belonging to the army or navy were engaged in bringing in this cotton from the country?

Answer. The navy had seized wagons and animals wherever they could find them, and they were using those wagons and horses and mules to draw in this cotton. Some of the mules, I remember, were branded with letters two feet long, "U. S. N.," and it created a great deal of amusement in the army to see such huge letters instead of the small letters generally used, two or three inches long.

Question. Admiral Porter was aware of all this?

Answer. It was done by his order.

Question. Do you know whether he claimed any authority from the President to go into that business?

Answer. No, sir; I never heard that he assigned any reason or authority for doing it; he simply did it. It seemed to be the general opinion that his course in regard to cotton had produced some feeling between himself and General Banks, who did not approve of his operations. At the same time General Banks did not wish to quarrel with the navy by attempting to stop it. Some of our officers claimed that he ought to stop it—that the navy had no right to go ashore.

Question. Did these cotton expeditions pass beyond our pickets?

Answer. Yes, sir, constantly. Our pickets were not above three miles from Alexandria, and some of these expeditions went out six or seven miles into the country, and of course were obliged to pass our pickets. They were always accompanied by a commissioned officer of the navy, who stated that he was sent out by order of the captain of his vessel or of the admiral, so we never liked to assume the responsibility of saying that they should not pass.

Question. Could the government have known during this expedition that Admiral Porter was taking this cotton?

Answer. They must have known it very soon after our arrival there.

Question. How long was this dealing in cotton continued?

Answer. As long as the navy remained in Alexandria—until they moved up the river; and when we came down the river, and the navy reached the rapids, which they could not cross on account of the low stage of the water, we found

that every one of the gunboats had cotton in their holds. I went to the general one day and said that I did not think we should be working there like beavers, night and day, to construct a dam to float these vessels when they were loaded down with cotton; and as a result of his expostulations with the admiral they were compelled to disgorge.

Question. Was this cotton business a profitable business?

Answer. Exceedingly so.

Question. What was paid for the cotton by those men who were getting it there?

Answer. Nothing; the navy just seized it.

Question. Have you any means of knowing what finally became of this large amount of cotton?

Answer. I was told that it all went to Cairo, and was there sold, and that after the sale a large portion of the proceeds had been returned by the admiral to the government, or to the parties who were able to prove that they owned the cotton; so that my impression is that the navy derived very little benefit from their action there in the matter of cotton.

Question. Did the proceeds go into the hands of the quartermaster?

Answer. Not of the cotton—that went to Cairo. My impression is that it was sold by somebody's order—whether the admiral's order from the Secretary of the Navy, or whose order it was, I could not say. My impression is that the cotton was sold by some proper authority, and the proceeds returned to the parties who owned the cotton. The cotton that went from Alexandria to New Orleans was all transferred to the quartermaster's department.

Question. What object could the government have in entering into such a speculation as that, if they returned the proceeds to the parties who owned the cotton?

Answer. We did not suppose that the government had any knowledge at all of this thing at the time, but that the admiral did it on his own authority. We certainly supposed that if any such order had been given to the admiral, General Banks would have been informed of the fact. He had no such information, but, on the contrary, was very much surprised when he found that the navy was seizing cotton.

Question. Was the navy employed in transporting the cotton of these gentlemen who had authority from the President?

Answer. No, sir, they had their own boats.

Question. Now, in regard to the dam, who originated the idea of constructing the dam, to enable the boats to get over those rapids?

Answer. General Bailey, then Colouel Bailey.

Question. Will you give us a little account of that?

Answer. The first knowledge which I had of it was from General Franklin coming to our headquarters with Colonel Bailey and mentioning the subject to General Banks. The general immediately became impressed with the idea of the practicability of the scheme, and went down to see the admiral, who did not seem to think it was of much use, or that it would succeed; but after General Franklin had seen him, and after General Banks had called upon him a second time, he expressed a desire that the experiment should be tried, and orders were immediately given by General Banks, and the dam was begun. Nearly three thousand men were employed there, night and day, for ten days, when two or three vessels were able to cross. At that time a portion of the dam gave way, consisting of two or three large coal barges, which we had filled with iron, stones, bricks, &c., and which we had supposed were secure; but the immense strength of the current carried them away. As it proved afterwards, it was a very fortunate occurrence, because those barges floated against some rocks, and there they rested, and acted as a sort of guide, as the vessels passed through—the vessels striking against these barges, sheering off and

passing down safely. We then went to work again, and at the expiration of four days and nights the dam was completed, and all the vessels passed over. The general expostulated with the admiral about his vessels being loaded with cotton, and the cotton was taken out of all the vessels. They also took off their guns, and a great deal of their ammunition, which was moved by the army wagons down below the falls.

Question. If Admiral Porter had ordered the vessels to be lighted, so as to enable him to take advantage of the first dam before it gave way, could he have gone over safely?

Answer. Yes, sir; every vessel.

Question. What reason did he give to General Banks for not lightening his vessels so as to take advantage of that first dam?

Answer. He never gave any. The navy men are always very jealous of anything like what they deem interference on the part of the army.

Question. I think the interference that liberated their vessels should have been pardoned.

Answer. It seems to me that they manifested a very great want of interest in trying to save their vessels. With the exception of one officer of the fleet, we had no assistance from the navy at all. That officer placed these barges in the dam, which required a great deal of skill, by first making hawsers fast to the shore, and then by making them fast to the barges and letting them down to their places. Sometimes I would ride up to where the navy were anchored and ask them how much the water had risen. They did not seem to know—did not seem to show any interest in it. There was not an ounce of anything taken out of these vessels until after the accident happened to the dam. Then General Banks went to the admiral and said, "You ought to lighten your vessels, take off your iron plating, and take off your guns and ammunition, because time is precious. Our forage and provisions are getting low, and we do not want to stay here any longer than is necessary." The admiral then gave orders to have his vessels lightened, and the draught of some of the vessels was decreased eighteen inches.

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*Testimony of Major General N. P. Banks.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 13, 1865.

Major General N. P. BANKS recalled and examined.

The reporter was directed to read to General Banks the following testimony given by Colonel J. G. Wilson:

"There came to Grand Ecore a Mr. William Butler, of Illinois, and a Mr. Thomas E. Casey, from Kentucky, who had authority from the President—I saw the letter myself—to go with the expedition; and they were to have, I think, any transportation they should request from the naval commander or the commander of the army; at all events, they were to have such assistance as the army and navy could render.

"Question. Were they purchasing cotton?

"Answer. They did purchase cotton, because we used some of it in our dam.

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"Question. You say you saw the letter of the President giving them this authority; will you be particular about the extent of that authority?

"Answer. I could not be very particular about that, because I did not actually read the letter. The letter was given to General Banks, and he read it, and I got my information, as to the contents of the letter, from him. I remember his expressing surprise to me that the President should send such people there with any such authority. I saw the letter in his hands, and recognized

the writing of the President from other letters which I had seen, but did not actually read the letter myself."

By the chairman:

Question. The committee having obtained this testimony, they have deemed it best to send for you, as your name is mentioned in connexion with it, and read it to you. I will ask you if any person accompanied your expedition up the Red river having authority from the President to purchase cotton or other commodities?

Answer. No, sir; no person accompanied the expedition for that purpose, either with the authority of the President or of any other officer. But, at Alexandria, a gentleman from the west called on me—I cannot tell whether it was Mr. Butler or Mr. Casey—and showed me a paper from the President, which authorized him to go beyond the lines. It was substantially in the nature of a pass; but, inasmuch as he was to go by water, it of course carried, with the privilege to pass the lines, the privilege to take the steamer he was on, or something of that kind. The inference drawn by Colonel Wilson is not sustained by the fact. The naval and military authorities were called upon to recognize the pass, but not to put anything at his service, or to give him any support or protection, or to pass supplies or property of any kind, as I understood it, but merely to recognize the personal pass. When I saw the paper Admiral Porter had indorsed it, instructing the naval officers to recognize it, and to comply with its instructions, and I did the same thing to all military officers. I never gave him any assistance or protection, but instructed the officers in my command to recognize that paper as coming from the highest military authority.

Question. You say you do not remember the name?

Answer. It was either Butler or Casey—I am quite confident it was Casey.

Question. Do you know what his object was in going beyond the lines.

Answer. No, sir; I was never informed. I do not know that I ought to give my idea about it. I supposed it was in reference to cotton, although I did not know that. His authority was not so far recognized as to interfere with our military operations. I think he did not go beyond the lines. At Grand Ecore, where he had a barge filled with cotton, which was necessary for the completion of a pontoon bridge over the Red river for our military operations, we took the barge and the cotton, and gave him a receipt for the same.

Question. Of course you do not know whether he did go beyond the lines or not?

Answer. I could not say that he did not; he, perhaps, had been beyond the lines earlier. I am quite confident that he was not beyond the lines of the army during this expedition. However, this ought to be said: the pass or privilege which Mr. Casey had, and which I indorsed, was dated the December previous. We were at Grand Ecore early in April, and the question arose between myself and my officers whether I ought to recognize the pass; and one of the reasons assigned for not recognizing it was, that it was dated in December, 1863. Still, inasmuch as I did not know for what purpose it had been given, and the authority was sufficient to justify it, I had no hesitation in giving it my recognition, so far as to instruct the officers in my command to comply with its directions.

Question. Did it emanate from the President or from the Secretary of the Treasury?

Answer. It was in the handwriting of the President, and with his signature.

Question. I do not now remember whether I asked you in your former examination who was the originator of this Red river expedition.

Answer. I stated that in the first interview that I had here in Washington with General Halleck, concerning the administration of the department of the Gulf, he pointed out to me upon the map Shreveport as the line of operations for Texas; and that in all my correspondence with him in regard to military

affairs he often, always repeated the suggestion, and conveyed to me a kind of censure because I did not adopt it when ordered to re-establish the flag in Texas. When this expedition was first proposed to me, he said, "It is the opinion of all the western generals that this is the proper line of operations for an advance into Louisiana and Arkansas, and operations against Texas." Unquestionably it would have been a very good line of operations for Louisiana and Arkansas, and perhaps against Texas; but, as I said before, it required that all the forces west of the Mississippi should be concentrated for that purpose, and united under one command, and that we should have time enough to make a campaign against the enemy in any part of the country to which he might retreat. In that view, I believe it would have been the wisest thing that the government could have done; but that was a very different campaign in its objects and results, from an expedition for thirty or sixty days. My belief is, that after the campaign of the Mississippi, which was the first grand success of the war, the next best step would have been the concentration of the forces on the Mississippi, for the purpose of clearing the entire western part of the country of the enemy. That would have enabled us to have filled up that part of the country with a loyal population. Texas would have been filled up immediately with loyal people, and thus have placed a barrier between us and Mexico.

Question. Do you know when this western project was got up by the administration here, whether they contemplated concentrating the forces for that expedition?

Answer. I supposed the intention was to concentrate all the forces. If it had not been, I would not have consented to have taken a part in it. My consent was predicated upon the concentration of all the forces specified for that purpose—which forces were ten to fifteen thousand men of General Steele's, ten thousand of General Sherman's, and such as I could bring, some seventeen thousand, making thirty-seven to forty thousand men in all, which was enough, and with which the expedition would have been successful in spite of all the difficulties encountered. I do not know what would have resulted from it, because lines of communication, such as I suggested, had not been established. The fact was that I had less than half of that number to operate with. If I had known that, I should have declined entering upon the movement; but I had said as much against the Red river line of operations in my despatches for two years as was proper for a subordinate officer, where the idea was continually pressed upon him as it was upon me.

Question. What led them to change the plan, and detach from that expedition those who you supposed were to co-operate with you?

Answer. I do not think that the plan was changed. My idea is, that it was a failure to comply with the plan, that each of the three commanders was left to take his own course and follow his own judgment, and neither of them was acting under any positive orders in regard to this matter of concentration. That naturally accounts for the difficulty. General Steele was operating upon his own line. He was to join me at Natchitoches, by way of Monroe, from Little Rock, or I was to join him at Monroe, on the same line; so that in either event he would have operated with me south, or I would have operated with him north of the river, according to the exigencies of the case. But he did not go on that line at all.

Question. Was it not a capital error to so divide the command?

Answer. It was a fatal error. As I stated before, in my own recommendation, and also in that of Major Houston, an engineer, it was made an indispensable condition that the command should be put under one head. The truth was, that while four forces—General Steele's, General Sherman's (under General Smith,) Admiral Porter's, and my own—were operating together, neither one of them had a right to give any order to the other. General Smith never made any report to me, but considered his as substantially an independent force.



Question. General Halleck was general-in-chief of the army during that period?

Answer. Yes, sir. When General Grant assumed the command of all the armies, he manifestly entertained somewhat different views of the expedition; he wanted it to close up in fifteen days, and said that if it did not he should be sorry that it ever had been commenced. Inasmuch as the Arkansas force was a part of this expedition, and operating at the same period, I think the committee, as a matter of history, ought to make some inquiries in regard to that. It took us twenty days to communicate with General Steele, and then we could only state our own position, ask what he was doing, and give advice; but we could not tell whether he followed the advice or not, or what he was doing. I sent to him, by my officers, three or four times while the campaign was in progress. That is an important feature in the history of this case, in regard to which I cannot give any testimony. In regard to the cotton matters, of which you have inquired, I want to add a word to what I said before in regard to the navy. As I have said, the navy took cotton wherever they could find it; and at Alexandria they also released it whenever they chose, which was an additional feature which I did not mention before. They released it to such persons as they thought proper. The way that came to my knowledge was that parties frequently came to me to get cotton released. I said I could do nothing about it; but they came to me afterwards and said that they had had it released by the admiral.

Question. Did the admiral claim authority from the administration to deal in cotton?

Answer. No, sir; no special authority. It was taken, according to the representations of naval officers, under the prize law.

Question. Under the general prize law that operates at sea?

Answer. Yes, sir; and they had a prize court up the river somewhere, which settled such cases as they did not choose to determine themselves, and release upon the representations of claimants.

Question. Who appointed the prize court?

Answer. I do not know. I understood in the general history of the affair that there was a prize court up the river, which was called the admiral's prize court.

*Testimony of Brevet Brigadier General J. S. Brisbin.*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1865.

Brevet Brigadier General J. S. BRISBIN sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your present rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am brevet brigadier general in the army.

Question. Did you serve under General Banks in what is called the Red river expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. I was colonel at that time on the staff of General Lee, commanding the division of cavalry.

Question. Were you in that army from the time it started upon that expedition?

Answer. I joined General Lee at New Orleans, and was with him during the whole expedition from New Orleans to Pleasant Hill.

Question. State the incidents of that expedition which seem to you to be of public interest.

Answer. The cavalry marched from New Orleans to Franklin, and from there to Alexandria. Nothing of particular interest occurred until the army arrived at Alexandria, where we joined the cavalry column under General Banks. The whole army then advanced up Red river, and arrived at Natchitoches about the 4th of April, 1864. We broke camp at Natchitoches on the 6th of April, and advanced in the direction of Wilson's farm. The cavalry was in advance one day—a part of the infantry did not follow us until after one day—and during the sixth and seventh we skirmished with the enemy. We marched twenty-one miles on the sixth to Crump's Hill, and the advance of infantry was reported to be at Bayou Dupal, seventeen miles from Natchitoches. The cavalry advanced again, on the morning of the seventh, in the direction of Pleasant Hill, still skirmishing with the enemy, and finding some resistance until we arrived at Wilson's farm, where we came upon all the rebel cavalry reported to be under General Green, of Texas, twenty-five hundred strong; we having, I think, three thousand cavalry. We had a battle there, and sent back to find out how near the infantry were, and it was reported not a great way behind. We had all our cavalry train between us and the head of the infantry column. General Lee wrote a despatch, after the action at Wilson's farm, asking that the wagon train might be taken care of by the infantry, and that we might send it back; at least so far as the first division of the infantry, so that it could be protected by it. A reply was returned by General Franklin that we should have to take care of our own train and keep it up with the cavalry. I did not see the despatch myself.

The next morning, the 8th, we advanced and found the enemy in considerable force about two miles from Wilson's farm, and during the whole of that day there was fighting. We pressed the enemy back until we arrived at a place called Sabine Crossroads, where the enemy were reported to be in heavy force in our front. We skirmished with them incessantly until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when it was definitely ascertained that a very large force of the rebels were there.

General Banks himself came up in the mean time. A brigade of infantry, under Colonel Landrum, joined us, and went into position, and also a division of the thirteenth corps, under General Ransom. General Lee sent to General Banks to know how far back the main body of the infantry was, stating at the same time that there was a large force of the enemy in our front—too large to be moved with the force we had there. General Banks answered that he thought General Franklin was not very far back—probably three or four miles; that he would soon be up, and that we must hold our position.

At about 4 o'clock the whole rebel line advanced. I think we had there on the ground about 8,000 men, cavalry and infantry, and I believe the rebel force to have been fully 18,000. Our troops did all they could, but were overpowered by numbers, and forced to fall back. Several couriers were sent to General Banks, from cavalry headquarters, to know where General Franklin and his division of infantry were; and it was then said he was back six miles, and had gone into camp about 1 o'clock. Whether that was true or not, I do not know, but such was the report in the army. We commenced falling back, but were so pressed upon both flanks that the retreat soon degenerated into a rout. We were compelled to abandon all our cavalry wagon train and our cannon, some eighteen pieces, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

About four miles back we came upon the force of General Franklin, drawn up across the road. Our force retreated by his, and General Emory, who was commanding a division under General Franklin, met the enemy and checked the retreat.

A portion of the army had been defeated at Sabine Crossroads, and con-

tinued to fall back to Pleasant Hill. General Emory followed with his division, General Smith in the mean time having arrived at Pleasant Hill with his force. The forces rallied at Pleasant Hill and gathered together, and about nine o'clock in the morning, the enemy following began to attack our outposts beyond Pleasant Hill. Another battle was fought at Pleasant Hill, only a portion of which I saw, a brigade of cavalry having been ordered to go back to the rear to guard the wagon train—to go as far as Grand Ecore, and I was sent with it. The whole of the army arrived at Grand Ecore the next day and night after the battle at Pleasant Hill.

It was claimed that we defeated the enemy at Pleasant Hill, and that they retreated in the direction of Sabine Crossroads. From all I heard, I think the rebel army were defeated there; but our army was in no condition to follow, for, being nearly out of rations, it was necessary to fall back to Grand Ecore in order to obtain supplies.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of that expedition?

Answer. To the scattering of our forces, and not marching them in one body.

Question. State the order of that march as it was, and as you think it should have been.

Answer. I think no cavalry wagon train should have been put between the cavalry and the advance of the infantry. The whole train should have been in the rear of the army, or at least a sufficient body of infantry should have been put in advance of the train in order to support the cavalry.

Question. Who was responsible for that order of marching?

Answer. I supposed the order of march was published by General Banks, as he was understood to be in command of the army at that time.

Question. Was he apprised of the manner in which the army was advancing, and that it was obstructed by the wagon train in the way spoken of? Had he the means of knowing that was the way in which the advance was being made?

Answer. I do not know. I saw nothing of General Banks but once at Natchitoches, and then but a few minutes, but I presume he knew of and published the order of march.

Question. Do I understand you that General Lee was opposed to that disposition of the wagon train?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Franklin commanded the advance of the infantry, and when we sent communications from the cavalry to the rear we sent them to General Franklin, and received replies from him. Whether he sent them to General Banks I am not aware.

Question. What do you know about General Lee sending back for an infantry support?

Answer. He did send for infantry forces, but they were refused him; but afterwards a small body of infantry from Colonel Landrum's command was sent up the next morning, but the force sent was deemed by cavalry officers insufficient.

Question. Was not that mode of advancing by cavalry, impeded by wagon trains, on such a road, calculated to invite the enemy to attack in force, and throw into confusion the cavalry, so that they could not get back upon the infantry supports?

Answer. Yes, sir. If the general commanding expected to meet a force of the enemy in front, that manner of advancing was indiscreet; for, the cavalry once defeated, there was no hope of saving the train.

Question. Were not you skirmishing with the enemy before that attack?

Answer. Yes, sir, all the time for two days before.

Question. Was it expected that you would meet the enemy before you got to Shreveport?

Answer. I think most of the army officers expected to meet no serious resistance until we should arrive near Shreveport. However, there were some of the officers of the army that thought differently.

Question. How was it with General Lee, who was in the advance?

Answer. I do not know that I ever heard him express his opinion upon the subject.

Question. Do you know what the object expected to be accomplished by the planners of that expedition was?

Answer. I understood it to be the capture of Shreveport, and the large amount of stores and numerous steamers there, all of which were of use to the enemy.

Question. You were with General Banks at New Orleans, were you?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know who planned this expedition?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know whether General Banks believed in the practicability of the expedition when he started?

Answer. I never heard General Banks express an opinion upon the subject.

Question. Do you know anything about the fleet getting blockaded in the Red river?

Answer. After the army arrived at Grand Ecore, I was sent by General Banks to New Orleans, and I knew very little about the fleet or what happened after that time.

Question. Do you know whether any cotton speculators accompanied the expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was a large number of persons, who I was told were cotton speculators, along with the army.

Question. Do you know the names of any of them?

Answer. No, sir. I saw citizens accompanying the army, and inquired who they were, and was told that they were men speculating in cotton.

Question. Do you know from whom they derived their authority to trade in cotton?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of any authority given to any of them. I believe that some who accompanied the army were newspaper correspondents.

Question. Was the army or any portion of it engaged in cotton operations?

Answer. Not to my knowledge. I know of no officer of the army so engaged.

Question. Were there any private persons along with the army so engaged?

Answer. Not to my certain knowledge. I know of no such persons connected with the officers of the army.

Question. Do you know of any of the army transports being engaged in it?

Answer. No, sir; I never saw a bale of cotton hauled by a government wagon during that expedition upon the part of the army. I saw the navy hauling cotton to the river at Alexandria upon wagons which I supposed to be government wagons.

Question. Do you know whether any officers of the marine or navy were so engaged?

Answer. I do not. I understood it was all done by authority; that the navy seized the cotton as prize of war, and put it on board their vessels as such. When I inquired about it, I was told it was done by authority of Admiral Porter, and that he acted under instructions from the trade agency of the treasury in that matter.

Question. Is there anything further, in reference to that expedition, which you think important to be stated?

Answer. I think I have stated about all I know about the matter.

WASHINGTON, *January* 19, 1865.

Colonel J. G. WILSON appeared before the committee, and made the following statement:

In my testimony given to the committee the other day I stated that a Mr. Butler and a Mr. Casey came to Alexandria with a letter from the President, which I thought directed the commanders of the army and the navy to render them such assistance and give them such facilities as they might ask. Upon further reflection, I am convinced that I was in error when I made that statement; that the letter of the President was simply in the nature of a pass, authorizing them to accompany the army and navy in their movements.

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*Testimony of Brigadier General Francis Fessenden.*

WASHINGTON, *January* 19, 1865.

Brigadier General FRANCIS FESSENDEN sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers.

Question. Were you in the Red river expedition of General Banks ?

Answer. I was.

Question. What was your rank and position at that time ?

Answer. I was colonel of the 30th Maine veteran volunteers, and I was in command of my regiment on the 8th of April, 1864, during the action of Sabine Crossroads.

Question. To what brigade, division and corps, did your regiment belong ?

Answer. Third brigade, first division, and 19th corps.

Question. Will you give us a narrative of what occurred from the time our troops left Grand Ecore or Natchitoches ?

Answer. We left Grand Ecore, I think, on the 6th of April, marching about 15 miles, when we encamped for the night. The next day, the 7th, we marched to Pleasant Hill; and on the 8th we marched to a bayou, the name of which I forget, some nine miles beyond Pleasant Hill, where we went into camp. I was general officer of the day on that day. My regiment was behind with the baggage that day; but I kept on with the main column under General Emory, as I was general officer of the day. About an hour after we had reached this bayou and gone into camp, my regiment came into camp, and I returned to it, having been relieved by another officer of the duties of officer of the day.

About half past four o'clock, I should think, we were ordered to get into line and form a column on the road, and got ready, with two days' rations of hard bread, to move forward immediately. It was understood that there was an action going on at the front, about six miles distant, between General Ransom's detachment of the 13th corps and the enemy. We got into line and moved forward very rapidly, going those six miles in about an hour and ten minutes. We arrived on the ground a few moments after 6 o'clock, and were immediately put into action. There was one attack made upon our brigade, but it was a slight attack and soon repulsed, I understood that there were two attacks made on the other brigades of the 1st division of the 19th corps, which had come up and deployed—the one attack in the centre, and the other more to the right; but those attacks were all repulsed.

On that night, at 10 o'clock, we commenced to fall back. My brigade led the column of the 1st division of the 19th corps. We marched all night, and

arrived at Pleasant Hill the next morning about 9 o'clock. Hearing the enemy behind us, we were deployed to the right and left of the road; but it proving to be but a slight affair with the cavalry, our position was changed, and we were placed in line of battle and the men allowed to rest.

Question. What was the condition of affairs when you moved up on the evening of the 8th?

Answer. We found that the cavalry, and the troops under General Ransom, had been very badly beaten, and driven off the field in a great deal of confusion; that the baggage train of the cavalry, or a portion of it, had been captured, as well as some twenty pieces of artillery, I think, belonging to the cavalry, and I do not know but some of it belonged to General Ransom's troops; but I will not be positive about that.

Question. What troops did General Ransom command?

Answer. Two divisions of the 13th corps; one of them was a very small one, being equivalent to a brigade, for it did not amount to more than an ordinary brigade. And the other division was a small division. In all, his command numbered only about seven thousand troops. They were very badly demoralized and beaten. They had been entirely overwhelmed by superior numbers. General Ransom had been wounded very early in the action, and compelled to leave the field; they had all fallen back; and I think our division was deployed in rear of the point at which their train, the baggage-train of the cavalry, had halted. We checked the enemy there, as I have already stated, and fell back to Pleasant Hill.

Question. The train must have been within the enemy's lines when you arrived on the field?

Answer. The enemy had advanced and taken the train; but it was not within the enemy's lines when the action commenced.

Question. But at the time the enemy attacked your division the enemy must have passed this train, and it would then be within the enemy's lines?

Answer. I so understood.

Question. Do you know anything about the causes of that disaster, the order of march, &c.?

Answer. The order of march when we started from Grand Ecore, as I understood it, was this: The cavalry kept in the advance from three to five miles, with their ammunition train, and I think some supplies; then came the infantry, commanded by General Ransom and General Emory, all under command of General Franklin; then came their baggage train; and, lastly, General Smith's troops, which had left Grand Ecore one or two days after we did. I understood at Grand Ecore, I think, from conversation with General Franklin, that it had been designed at first to send General Smith's troops up the river on the fleet. That is what I understood at the time, and I think from conversation with General Franklin; but that he was opposed to it, and they decided rather late to have General Smith's forces follow us on the same road. I understood that they wanted to send them up on the transports, because it was thought that there were not a sufficient number of wagons to carry enough supplies and equipage with them on the road. It was deemed rather important not to separate the troops by having them advance in two directions. That is what I understood, though of course I was not high enough in rank to be consulted at all about it.

We advanced in that way to Pleasant Hill, where we arrived on the 7th. Our division of the 19th corps came to the camping ground, and advanced several yards in advance of General Ransom's detachment of the 13th corps, which had thrown out pickets in front of us. I understood that General Banks arrived at Pleasant Hill that night. General Lee had wished some infantry to be sent him to support his advance, which General Franklin had declined to allow him. And General Lee made the request of General Banks when he

arrived at Pleasant Hill, and General Banks sent an order to General Franklin to send a brigade of infantry to General Lee that morning early, so that it could report by 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th at the headquarters of General Lee. That was some five miles in advance of Pleasant Hill. I think the troops sent forward were ordered to start at half past 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. I saw the order which General Banks sent to General Franklin. General Franklin sent the order to General Ransom, with the indorsement that General Ransom would obey the spirit of the order by sending a division. I think he sent his small division, which was about equal to a brigade. I think it consisted of only about 1,400 or 1,500 men, though I am not positive about that.

Those troops started at half past 3 in the morning, and reported to General Lee. General Lee commenced his advance in the morning, and went forward a little distance. General Ransom was applied to by the officer commanding this division or brigade of infantry, to send forward another brigade to relieve it, as the troops were very tired, having been on the march since half past 3 in the morning, having of course eaten but little, and being very thirsty. There was very little water in that region of country. General Ransom went forward to relieve this brigade or division, but was drawn into the fight by the enemy suddenly developing a very large force and overwhelming him. It was very sudden, and the first thing we heard of it was this firing to the front; and our division got under way and moved forward immediately. We went forward and found the troops there had been beaten badly; but we checked the enemy and enabled the army to fall back to Pleasant Hill.

Question. Was there any information furnished of the enemy being in strength in front of your advancing column, in front of the cavalry? Was there any skirmishing going on there, or any evidence of the enemy being in force?

Answer. There was skirmishing going on all day, but there had been skirmishing going on every day since we left Grand Ecore. The enemy had fallen back, and we had made a good march every day.

Question. There had been skirmishing pretty constantly with the advance?

Answer. I think all the time; at least I so understood, though I was with the infantry.

Question. From what you saw of the condition of the country there, and the condition of the baggage trains, wagons, &c., do you think the order of march was a judicious one, or did it have any tendency to cause that disaster?

Answer. I think a great mistake was committed in sending forward the infantry that way to support the cavalry. I think the cavalry was strong enough to do all the skirmishing necessary to develop the enemy. I think it was a mistake to send forward the infantry to support the cavalry, because it exposed them to be drawn into a fight without all the infantry being present to take part in it. Of course it is contrary to military principle to fight a battle with only part of your troops, when it is better to use the whole of them.

Question. What do you say about the baggage train being between the cavalry and infantry? Considering the character of the country, was that a judicious arrangement?

Answer. I do not see how it could have been avoided, with the cavalry kept so far in advance as it was. It was proper to keep some supplies, ammunition, and rations with them. I do not think they would have been drawn into that disastrous fight if the infantry had not been sent forward. Still I do not think it was right to have any trains in advance in that way.

Question. Was not the country a very difficult one to move over?

Answer. There was a single dirt road for us to move on; that was all.

Question. Were there any obstructions on either side of the road which would impede the movement of troops outside of the road?

Answer. The country was a rolling country, covered with forests.

Question. Were the forests dense and impassable to troops to any great extent?

Answer. They were impassable for trains, and, I presume, for cavalry to manœuvre; but they were not impassable for troops to go through and fight through.

Question. How was it for cavalry?

Answer. I do not think cavalry could fight there as cavalry; they would have to dismount.

Question. State what occurred after you got to Pleasant Hill; how the retreat was managed from there.

Answer. After we arrived at Pleasant Hill we were put in line of battle, and the men were allowed to rest, which they did nearly all day. There was skirmishing kept up nearly all day, and we could hear it gradually growing nearer. I held with my regiment the extreme left of the front line of battle that day, in the woods in front of Pleasant Hill. I sent out some companies as skirmishers, to watch the approach of the enemy.

In the afternoon we were changed, from a position in the woods in front of Pleasant Hill, to a position in rear of a deep ditch near the town. We were placed behind this ditch, in open ground, and practically held the left of the front line; and my regiment was on the left. I think it was not expected that an attack would be made by the enemy in that direction. The attack was expected by the road which led in by the right centre of the army.

Instead of that, however, the enemy came around through the woods, and about half past five o'clock drove in our skirmishers, and made a very fierce attack on the brigade I was in, Colonel Benedict's brigade. The brigade fell back under the attack, a great deal broken up, and my regiment was separated from the other three regiments, which went off in another direction. I had fallen back still further to the left, as I knew there was a brigade of troops in there to the rear and left of the army, placed there to protect our left flank and rear of the army from attack in that direction. My regiment being the last of the brigade to fall back, the enemy had already advanced so far after the other three regiments that I could not fall back where they did. I therefore fell back in another direction, rallying my regiment and forming on the right of the brigade I have referred to; and that brigade, my regiment, and another brigade which I think had been brought up under General Emory, made an attack upon the enemy's column, which had advanced some distance, and drove them back with great loss. We continued to advance, and drove them a mile or more, so completely off the field that there was no other attack made by the enemy in that direction.

There was an attack afterwards made to the right; I heard the firing, but it was easily repulsed. They made several advances there, but they were each time repulsed, and we reoccupied the ground that we had been on all day.

That night we fell back again, marching all night, and all the next morning, until we reached the camping ground at the end of our first day's march from Grand Ecore.

I ought to state here, that in that attack of the enemy on our left the brigade commander, Colonel Benedict, was killed; and I then assumed the command of the brigade.

Question. Did the remainder of the army fall back to the point you have indicated, and did the enemy pursue?

Answer. The whole army fell back. But I understood that the enemy was so badly beaten that he fell back to the bayou nine miles beyond Pleasant Hill, and did not advance again until he had found out that we had fallen back from Pleasant Hill.

Question. Did the enemy attack again subsequently to that?

Answer. They did not attack us again on our way back to Grand Ecore.



We remained at Grand Ecore some eight or nine days, where we built intrenchments to a certain extent; rifle pits. I think the whole army threw up a kind of temporary work in front.

Question. What is the distance from Grand Ecore to Pleasant Hill?

Answer. From 35 to 40 miles.

Question. What became of our wounded at Pleasant Hill?

Answer. I think many of them were left at Pleasant Hill. All that we could find transportation for we brought off.

Question. Will you explain the necessity of your withdrawing from Pleasant Hill at the time you did?

Answer. There was no water at Pleasant Hill. I understood we had used up all our supplies; I was told we had but enough to last us one day, but I know nothing personally about that. But we had no water at Pleasant Hill, and the mules were suffering very much. If we had remained there much longer the mules would have all died, and then we should have lost all our transportation.

Question. How would it have been with the men?

Answer. We got a little water from the pools, and some of the men got some water from the wells. But I think most of the cistern water had been used when we went up. But there were little pools in the woods, and I think the men could have got water enough to have enabled them to remain there another day.

Question. I understood you to say that you took off some of the wounded from Pleasant Hill. What was the necessity for leaving any on the battle-field?

Answer. We took off all that we had ambulances for.

Question. What provision was made for taking care of those who were left?

Answer. I understood that some surgeons and some supplies were left.

Question. Have you any knowledge of that fact?

Answer. I have no personal knowledge of it. I inquired in order to ascertain what was to become of my own wounded. Having no medical staff of my own, and no officer of the commissary department, I could not ascertain with certainty; I know only what I was told. I thought myself that we ought to stay there another twenty-four hours, in order to bring off the trophies of the field so as to have the moral effect of a victory, and to see if we could not bring off some more of our wounded.

Question. From where did you draw your supplies?

Answer. We started from Grand Ecore. I understood, with supplies enough in our wagons to last us until we struck the Red river again, where we should meet our transports with supplies.

Question. If I understand you aright, you withdrew from Pleasant Hill because your supplies had given out. From where did you then expect to draw supplies?

Answer. I think we could have remained there a little longer; I should have pinched the troops a little.

Question. You had supplies at Grand Ecore?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And if you had remained at Pleasant Hill you could have drawn supplies from there?

Answer. Yes, sir. Still I thought we should have to fall back any way. But I thought we could have sent back and started supplies from Grand Ecore towards us. And supposing we had one day's rations with us, we could have remained at Pleasant Hill at least another twelve hours, in order to bring off the wounded and the trophies of the field; and if necessary for that purpose we could have put the men on half rations for one day.

Question. What disposition was made of the wounded belonging to your brigade?

Answer. Some were brought off, and some were left there; one officer was left there wounded. They were left in houses, and provided for, so far as shelter was concerned; so the medical officer informed me. They were put in houses, as I was told, their wounds dressed, and left as comfortable as they could be under the circumstances. The difficulty was to find transportation to bring them off.

Question. Do you know whether any of the wounded were left at Pleasant Hill for forty-eight hours without supplies or attendance?

Answer. I do not know that.

Question. Give an account of the movements from Grand Ecore down the river.

Answer. We started from Grand Ecore somewhere about the 19th of April, I think, though I will not be positive as to the exact date, to retreat to Alexandria, as it was understood. I received an order that the movement would be under the direction of General Franklin. It was generally understood that General Franklin had command of the retreat. On the day that we left I received an order to report with my brigade to General Birge, who was to conduct the advance of the army. He had his own brigade and my brigade to lead the army. The principal body of the army was kept in the rear in order to cover the trains, which were quite long, and to repel the enemy in case they should make an attack.

We marched in that way for two days, I think, until we got some distance down below Cheneyville, where we went into camp. The next morning General Emory came up with the rest of his division of the 19th corps; the other two brigades and General Cameron came up with the troops of the 13th corps, formerly under General Ransom. I think there were left of that detachment of the 13th corps about 3,500 men, who had been re-equipped and furnished with arms and whatever they had lost in the disaster of the 8th at Sabine Crossroads.

It was understood before we left Grand Ecore that the enemy had sent down quite a heavy force to take possession of a crossing of the Cane river in order to prevent us from getting across Cane river and marching to Alexandria. At Grand Ecore the Red river is divided into two streams. The one is called the Cane river, which is the old Red river, and is rather a small stream, fordable in most places, but with very steep banks. The other is the new or principal Red river, and flows more to the left. The two unite below, forming a long island, some forty miles long I should think, perhaps more; I have never computed the distance exactly. That island between Cane river and Red river is a perfectly flat country, like the lower part of Louisiana; though it is higher above the streams—it is perfectly level. On the southern side of Cane river the country is rolling and covered with pine woods; and at the crossing, where it was understood the enemy had posted a force to oppose us, the banks of the stream were quite high bluffs, covered with pine woods.

When we left Grand Ecore we came down a road that led down this island, on which is Cheneyville, until we came to a crossing where the road had been cut down through the steep banks on each side of the river. That was the only place where we could get our wagons down to the river, and lay our pontoon bridge. The enemy had sent down a force and occupied the south bank of the river, thus commanding the crossing on our side.

We got down there on the morning of the 23d of April, General Emory coming up with the rest of his division, and General Cameron with the troops of the 13th corps, in order to drive the enemy away from the crossing so as to allow us to lay our pontoon bridge, and get across our trains and continue our march to Alexandria. The enemy's position was found to be a very strong one.

General Birge was ordered to take his temporary division, composed of his own brigade and my brigade and General Cameron's troops, and ford the river a mile and a half or so from the principal crossing, and to go around on the flank of the enemy, who were posted on these bluffs. He crossed his troops over and put out two regiments of his own brigade as skirmishers. He then advanced with the rest of his force in column until we got around to where the enemy had taken his position. We found them posted on quite a steep hill, some forty or fifty feet high, and covered with pine trees, but not with a great deal of underbrush. Their position was flanked on one side by a thick impenetrable swamp, which opened into a lake, and on the other side by the river.

General Birge ordered me to make an assault on the position with my brigade. I found upon examination that there seemed to be no other way but to attack the position in front; to do that we should have to take down a high fence, cross an open field, take down another fence, and advance up the hill where the enemy were posted. I formed my brigade, and we made the assault. We drove the enemy from their position and gained the hill where they had been posted. The brigade lost quite heavily, and I was wounded there. It was a short attack, not lasting over five minutes, it seemed to me. The enemy retired and took up a position on another hill. But the troops reformed, advanced immediately, and the enemy retired without any further opposition.

Upon going to this other hill we found we had possession of the crossing. The pontoon bridges were brought up and laid, and the trains and the army crossed that night. I was very badly wounded there, and took no further part in the active operations of that campaign.

Question. And that was the last serious attempt the enemy made to obstruct your movement to Alexandria?

Answer. They made no further attempt to obstruct our movement to Alexandria, although I understood they several times attacked General Smith's forces, which brought up our rear.

Question. In connexion with this expedition, I will ask you if you know anything about the operations of the fleet in gathering cotton along the line of the river?

Answer. I do not know anything about that.

Question. It has been stated that the fleet, or some portions of it, were pretty extensively engaged in collecting cotton there.

Answer. I understood that there was a great deal of that done. But as I was wounded, I left Alexandria at once after our army reached there. They lay at Alexandria for several weeks. I heard that there was a great deal done in the way of collecting cotton, but I know nothing personally about it.

Question. Do you know whether any persons accompanied the expedition with authority from any one to purchase cotton, or with permits or anything of that kind?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know anything about arrangements being made during the time the expedition was going or returning to hold elections and to organize a State government?

Answer. No, sir; I know nothing at all about that.

Question. You do not know, then, whether elections were held along the line of the river?

Answer. I do not know that any were held. In fact, I heard nothing said about that.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,  
January 28, 1865.

SIR: In answer to your call of the 13th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of all correspondence between the War Department, General Halleck, and General Banks, in relation to the Red river expedition, under Major General Banks, in the spring of 1864.

Your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., January 20, 1865.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of January 19, 1865, I submit herewith copies of all papers and correspondence filed at these headquarters in reference to the Red river expedition, under General Banks, in the spring of 1864.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., November 9, 1862.

GENERAL: The President of the United States having assigned you to the command of the department of the Gulf, you will immediately proceed, with the troops assembling in transports at Fort Monroe, to New Orleans and relieve General Butler. An additional force of some ten thousand men will be sent to you from Boston and New York as soon as possible.

The first military operations which will engage your attention on your arrival at New Orleans will be the opening of the Mississippi and the reduction of Fort Morgan or Mobile city, in order to control that bay and harbor. In these expeditions you will have the co-operation of the rear-admiral commanding the naval forces in the Gulf and the Mississippi river. A military and naval expedition is organizing at Memphis and Cairo to move down the Mississippi and co-operate with you against Vicksburg and any other point which the enemy may occupy on that river. As the ranking general in the southwest, you are authorized to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command. The line of division between your department and that of Major General Grant is therefore left undecided for the present, and you will exercise superior authority as far north as you may ascend the river.

The President regards the opening of the Mississippi river as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it.

This river being opened, the question arises how the troops and naval forces there can be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy of your attention:

First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly east to destroy the railroads at Jackson and Marion, and thus cut of all connexion by rail between northern Mississippi and Mobile and Atlanta. The latter place is now the chief military depot of the rebel armies in the west.

Second, to ascend with a naval and military force the Red river as far as it is navigable, and thus open an outlet for the sugar and cotton of northern Louisiana. Possibly both of these objects may be accomplished if the circumstances should be favorable.

It is also suggested that having Red river in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas.

It is believed that the operations of General Rosecrans in East Tennessee, of General Grant in northern Mississippi, and of General Steele in Arkansas, will give full employment to the enemy's troops in the west, and thus prevent them from concentrating in force against you; should they do so, you will be re-enforced by detachments from one or more of these commands.

These instructions are not intended to tie your hands or to hamper your operations in the slightest degree. So far away from headquarters, you must necessarily exercise your own judgment and discretion in regard to your movements against the enemy, keeping in view that the opening of the Mississippi river is now the great and primary object of your expedition; and I need not assure you, general, that the government has unlimited confidence not only in your judgment and discretion, but also in your energy and military promptness.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS, *Commander.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G*

VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI, *July 15, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

\* \* \* \* \*

General Banks has made requisition on me for steamboats, coal, and forage, which I have sent.

\* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT,

*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., July 24, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have nothing from you since the 8th. I suppose the first thing done by your army, after the fall of Port Hudson, was to clean out the Teche and Atchafalaya countries. That being accomplished, your next operations must depend very much upon the then condition of affairs. Texas and Mobile will present themselves to your attention. The navy are very anxious for an attack upon the latter place, but I think Texas much the most important. It is possible that Johnston may fall back towards Mobile, but I think he will unite with Bragg.

While your army is engaged in cleaning out southwestern Louisiana, every preparation should be made for an expedition into Texas. Should Johnston be driven from Mississippi, General Grant can send you considerable re-enforcements. The organization of colored troops should be pushed forward as rapidly

as possible. They will serve as part of the garrisons of the forts on the river and interior posts, and some of the older regiments will do well in the field. Your water transportation should be increased. Many of your supplies can now be obtained from St. Louis and the west. I enclose herewith a copy of my despatch, of July 22, to General Grant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS, *New Orleans.*

JANUARY 20, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 31, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg :*

You will send to Major General Banks a corps of ten or twelve thousand men, to report at such point as he may designate, probably at New Orleans.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., July 31, 1863.*

Major General BANKS,

*New Orleans, via Cairo and Vicksburg :*

General Grant has been ordered to send you a corps of ten or twelve thousand men for operations west. Get everything ready. We are only waiting for your answer to my despatch of the 24th.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, July 31, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of July 23 is just received. It is impossible, at present, to send you a single man from the north. We must wait the enforcement of the draft. General Grant has been directed to send you a corps of ten or twelve thousand men. As soon as the expedition, now in Arkansas, occupies Arkansas river, more troops can be sent to you, or to Red river.

It is important that we immediately occupy some point, or points, in Texas. Whether the movement should be made by land or water is not yet decided. We shall wait your answer to my despatch of the 24th. In the mean time every preparation should be made. If by water, Admiral Farragut will co-operate.

The Navy Department recommends Indianola as the point of landing. It seems to me that this point is too distant, as it will leave the expedition isolated from New Orleans. If the landing can be made at Galveston, the country be-

tween that place and New Orleans can soon be cleaned out, and the enemy be prevented from operating successively upon those places. In other words, you can venture to send a larger force to Galveston than to Indianola.

I merely throw out these suggestions, without deciding upon any definite plan till I receive your answer to the former despatch.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS, *New Orleans.*

JANUARY 20, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 6, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg :*

Please send a special messenger to Major General Banks with the following telegram, and also give him all necessary assistance for its execution.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS, *New Orleans :*

There are important reasons why our flag should be restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Admiral Farragut will co-operate.

There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Copy sent Major General Banks by mail.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, 19TH ARMY CORPS,  
*New Orleans, August 15, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, (in cypher,) a copy of which is enclosed as received. It was received this morning, at 9.15 a. m., by telegraph from General Grant, and a duplicate of the same this evening by Colonel Smith, one of his aides-de-camp.

Measures have been already taken to carry into effect your orders. We shall plant the flag in Texas within a week, I hope. My plan has been to move against Galveston upon the land side, *via* the Sabine Pass, and from Berwick's bay, *via* Vermillionville and Niblett's bluff, to Houston and Galveston, for the transportation and artillery. We shall be ready, I think, as soon as General Grant's corps can reach us. The route indicated is that followed by the Texans in their invasion of western Louisiana. We can move eight thousand (8,000) men at once to the Sabine Pass, and thence concentrate rapidly on Galveston, fortifying and holding a position on the main land, or the island only, as may be deemed expedient. From thence operations are practicable in any direction, to the interior or to the Rio Grande. From Galveston, when strongly fortified,

I would move a force of five thousand (5,000), or more, to the Rio Grande, where one or more positions can be so fortified as to be held by a much less force, while we hold Galveston or the interior of the State. This has been my view of operations in Texas from the beginning.

Indianola is too far distant, does not command the important communications of the State, and, if occupied, would leave the forces of the enemy between us and New Orleans, which is to be avoided if possible.

No movement can be made from the Gulf against Galveston with a certainty of success. Our naval forces are not strong enough, and the enemy's works are too extensive and thorough. The enemy fear only an attack from the land, *via* Niblett's bluff, the route I propose, or Alexandria. From that point our success is certain. We learned this from intercepted letters while at Alexandria in May. I send a sketch of the fortifications at Galveston, made at that time by one who was engaged upon them, with a description of the guns mounted.

If General Grant sends me ten thousand men, I can throw twenty thousand immediately into Texas. The force should be larger, if possible.

I urge strongly upon the government, if possible, to fill up some of our old regiments with conscripts or volunteers. This would greatly relieve us. Officers have been sent north for this purpose. I am very deficient in cavalry. I ought to have a few regiments from the west. General Grierson desires to join us in the expedition to Texas, and would render us infinite service. If possible, I hope he may be ordered to join us. Once in Texas with a moderate cavalry force, we can mount our men rapidly.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Refers to organization of the Corps d'Afrique.]

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,

*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. A.*

[Copy of enclosed despatch.]

WASHINGTON, August 6—12.30 p. m.

Major General N. P. BANKS, *New Orleans:*

There are important reasons why our flag should be hoisted in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Commodore Farragut will co-operate. There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.

H. W. HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., August 9, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg:*

There is no objection to your visiting New Orleans, leaving an officer at



Vicksburg to receive and carry out any orders that are sent from Washington. The orders sent through you to General Banks will indicate what operation is next to be undertaken.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 10, 1863.*

GENERAL: In my despatch to you of the 6th instant, sent by the direction of the Secretary of War, it was left entirely to your own discretion to select any point for occupation in Texas, either on the seaboard or in the interior, the only condition imposed being that the flag of the United States should be again raised and sustained somewhere within the limits of that State.

That order, as I understood it at the time, was of a diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications.

The effect and force of that order are left precisely as they were on its issue. The authority conferred on you by it is not in the slightest degree changed.

You will, therefore, consider the following remarks as suggestions only, and not as instructions:

In my opinion neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it is necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to *some one point* in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up the Red river to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas. This would be merely carrying out the plan proposed by you at the beginning of the campaign, and, in my opinion, far superior in its military character to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola. Nevertheless, your choice is left unrestricted.

In the first place, by adopting the line of the Red river you retain your connexion with your own base, and separate still more the two points of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcements from Texas. They are already cut off from the rebel States east of the Mississippi.

If you occupy Galveston or Indianola you divide your own troops and enable the enemy to concentrate all of his forces upon either of these points, or on New Orleans.

I write this simply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 12, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatches of July 30 and August 1 are just received. I fully appreciate the importance of the operation proposed by you in these de-

spatches, but there are reasons other than military why those heretofore directed should be undertaken first. On this matter we have no choice, but must carry out the views of the government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS, *New Orleans.*

JANUARY 20, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 16, 1863.*

GENERAL : In the event of the movements contemplated in my despatch of this date, it will be necessary that the Atchafalaya river and Berwick's bay should be patrolled by light-draught gunboats to prevent the invasion of the Lafourche district by the enemy. If Admiral Porter can send three or more of his light-draught tin-clads down the Atchafalaya into Berwick's bay, from the Red river it will effectually accomplish this object, and at the same time prevent the incursion of guerillas upon the west bank of the Mississippi below the mouth of Red river. This will be the most effectual service that these boats could possibly render in this quarter. I respectfully, but earnestly, recommend that such an order be given. It is impossible to protect Brashear city and the Lafourche district except by the aid of gunboats. It was their absence that enabled the enemy to capture Brashear and to escape across the bay upon our return from Port Hudson.

I have addressed this request to Admiral Porter, or the officer commanding the fleet at Vicksburg.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A.*

I enclose copy of the letter sent to Admiral Porter at Vicksburg.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 16, 1863.*

SIR : It is probable that a movement will be undertaken from New Orleans which will draw most of the forces from that city. To prevent an invasion of the Texan troops, it will be necessary that the Atchafalaya river and Berwick's bay should be patrolled by light-draught gunboats. If you have half a dozen light-draught tin-clads that you can send into these waters it will be of great service to us. None of our gunboats will pass Lake Chicot, as they draw over six feet of water. If your boats could enter the Atchafalaya from the Red river and patrol that river to Berwick's bay it would effectually cut off any invasion of the enemy from that point.

In view of the movements contemplated, it is probable that two or three boats would be sufficient for the purpose indicated, and they would at the same time prevent the incursions of guerillas on the west bank of the Mississippi as far

up as the mouth of Red river. This would be perhaps the most effective service to which this small force could be put.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Or the Officer Commanding the Fleet at Vicksburg.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 17, 1863.*

GENERAL: I think it my duty to represent that among the French residents of this city there is evidently an expectation of some assistance from the government of France. This comes informally from the conversation of the French residents here, but too frequently to leave room for doubt that they have some reason upon which to ground the remarks that are commonly made. This is undoubtedly the conversation of the officers of the French frigate *Catinet*, which has recently arrived at this port. I do not think that it is more than mere surmise on their part, but have thought it worth while to direct the provost marshal general of the department to investigate the subject, and to report the facts as they are, of which I will give you due notice.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 17, 1863.*

GENERAL: The departure of many regiments of nine-months troops, and the organization of many regiments of the corps d'Afrique, with a large number of detachments occupying outposts, and the sick in the hospitals, confuse somewhat the statements embraced in the monthly report of the 31st of July. I shall in a day or two, as soon as an exact statement can be prepared, give you a better idea of our forces here than can be obtained from the examination of that report. Our effective force of white troops does not exceed ten or twelve thousand. I am reluctant to call upon you for re-enforcements from the north, but if these regiments could be filled by men obtained by the draft, or conscription, it would aid us very much indeed. I am confident that the authorities of most of the States would be glad to send them to this department.

If we succeed in the movements referred to in my despatches of this date, it will be indispensable that our military force should be increased beyond what can be obtained by the enrolment of negroes.

The letter addressed to the President, a copy of which I send to you, as well as the reference to this subject in my despatch addressed to you, will show what we have done in this respect. I can assure the government that nothing will be omitted that is calculated to strengthen this arm of the service; but be-

fore we can successfully organize the negroes of this country we must obtain control of the States where they are, by means of white troops. The want of cavalry is the greatest deficiency we suffer. It is indispensable in any movement in Texas that we should be strong in this arm. All the Texan troops are mounted men; their movements are rapid, and their concentration effective and powerful. We must meet them in the same way, and I earnestly urge upon the government the necessity of strengthening us in that arm. We also want horse equipments, carbines, and sabres for the negroes who will be enlisted in this service. Once in Texas, mules and horses will be abundant; but the equipments are indispensable.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
 N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 20, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of the 12th instant is just received. The report on the defences of New Orleans, said to have been transmitted with it, is not received.

My despatches to you will show that no movement on Mobile is at present contemplated. Nor can any iron-clads be now detached from Charleston or other points for the defence of New Orleans.

Mexican and French complications render it exceedingly important that the movement ordered against Texas should be undertaken without delay.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS, *New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 22, 1863.*

GENERAL:

\* \* \* \* \*

Your plan of moving against Kirby Smith, from Natchez by Harrisburg and Monroe, will agree very well with the line of operations suggested to General Banks, viz: to ascend the Red river to Shreveport and move on Marshall, Texas; or to move from Nachitoches to Nacogdoches, Texas. This will make your two lines near enough together to assist each other. In case Banks adopts this plan Kirby Smith and Magruder must abandon either Texas or Arkansas, or they will be obliged to wage a mere guerilla war.

General Banks has been left at liberty to select his own objective point in Texas, and may determine to move by sea. If so, your movement will not have his support, and should be conducted with caution. You will confer on this matter freely with General Banks. The government is exceedingly anx-

ious that our troops should occupy some points in Texas with the least possible delay.

In your contemplated operations in Arkansas and Louisiana you will probably require additional cavalry. You are authorized to mount any of your infantry regiments, making requisitions on the proper departments for horses and equipments. Your forces should move as much as possible by water transports, in order to save land transportation through a country where the roads are few and bad.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg, Miss.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

NEW ORLEANS, LA., *August 15, 1863,*  
*via Cairo, Ill., August 24, 1863.*

[Received 9.30 p. m. August 24, 1863, in cipher.]

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. :*

GENERAL: Your despatch of the 6th was received this morning at 9 o'clock. There will be no delay in the execution of your orders. I shall be ready to move as soon as General Grant's troops can reach this point, and hope to obtain the object in view within a week or ten days, at outside.

I have forwarded a full statement of my purpose and plans by mail. I shall be greatly deficient in cavalry. If you can aid me in this it will greatly facilitate my work. The duty assigned me is very satisfactory, and I hope to realize all your expectations.

N. P. BANKS, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

NEW ORLEANS, LA., *August 16, 1863,*  
*via Cairo, Ill., August 24, 1863.*

[Received 7.40 p. m., August 24, 1863, in cipher.]

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief U. S. Army :*

It is necessary that three or four steamers should be sent us from New York without delay. If they are needed for public service, the steamers on the way from New York from New Orleans can be substituted for them. I beg you to give order to the quartermaster at New York to this effect. We shall not await their arrival, but we shall need their assistance.

N. P. BANKS, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 26, 1863.*

GENERAL: The steamer Hudson arriving yesterday, brought duplicate copy

of the order of August 6, received earlier by telegraph from General Grant, and also your letter of the 10th instant, upon the subject of the expedition into Texas.

I have made all possible exertions to get a sufficient force into the field to execute the order, but encounter serious difficulties in the preparation. General Ord's corps d'armée has not yet arrived; the last division will be here at the close of this week. The sickness and absence of officers delay seriously our preparations for movement. There is very great deficiency of transportation for movement by water, either by sea or the river. The river boats sent up with the nine-months troops are detained above, and return slowly. By the Gulf we are able to move, after all possible exertions, but one-third of our forces at one time. This is a serious misfortune, as it costs us most valuable time, and gives the enemy opportunity to anticipate our plans and concentrate his forces against us. I hope, however, to be able to execute your orders without further material delay.

The considerations embraced in your letter of the 10th, duplicate copies of which I have received, have been carefully weighed.

To enter Texas from Alexandria or Shreveport, would bring us at the nearest point to Hernville, in Sabine county, or Marshall, in Harrison, due west of Alexandria and Shreveport, respectively. These points are accessible only by heavy marches, for which the troops are hardly prepared at this season of the year; and the points occupied would attract but little attention; and if our purpose was to penetrate further into the interior, they would become exposed to sudden attacks of the enemy, and defensible only by a strong and permanent force of troops.

The serious objection to moving on this line in the present condition of the forces of this department is the distance it carries us from New Orleans—our base of operations necessarily—and the great difficulty and the length of time required to return, if the exigencies of the service should demand, which is quite possible. In the event of long absence, Johnston threatens us from the east. The enemy will concentrate between Alexandria and Franklin, on the Teche, until our purpose is developed. As soon as we move any distance, they will operate against the river and New Orleans. It is true that we could follow up such a movement by falling on their rear, but that would compel us to abandon the position in Texas, or leave it exposed with but slender defence and garrison. This view is based, as you will see, upon the impossibility of moving even to Alexandria, at the present low stage of the rivers, by water, and the inability of the troops to accomplish extended marches.

A movement upon the Sabine accomplishes these objects; 1st. It executes your order by planting the flag at a prominent and commanding position in Texas; 2d. It is accomplished by water; 3d. It is safely made with a comparatively small force, and without attracting attention of the enemy until it is done; 4th. It enables us to move against Galveston from the interior, destroying at the same time all the naval and transport vessels of the State between Sabine and the Colorado; 5th. To occupy Galveston island with a small force of two or three thousand only, and to push on to Indianola, on the Rio Grande, or to return to the Mississippi, as the exigencies of the service may require. If the enemy moves in force upon New Orleans, we can return from Sabine or Galveston in such time, and in such strength, as to cut off his retreat by the bay on the Atchafalaya. The advantages to be gained by the destruction of the rebel boats on the Sabine, in Galveston bay, and on the Trinity and Brazos rivers, would be very great. This can be effected only by a movement upon Galveston from the Sabine by Beaumont, Liberty and Houston. If the enemy is in such strength as to defeat this, by occupying a position between the Sabine and Neches, we shall make available the fortifications of the enemy

at Orange, and be supported by the navy, whose light boats can run up to Orange or to Beaumont. If the season were different, the northern line would be doubtless preferable on many grounds.

With much respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,

*Commander-in-Chief U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and Assistant Adjutant General Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 26, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of the 12th instant, referring to the necessity of operations in Texas rather than against Mobile, was received by the Morning Star, arriving yesterday. Independent of any political or diplomatic considerations, Texas presents an arena as important as any portion of the country. The occupation of Galveston, if it could be accomplished by a dispersion or capture of any considerable portion of Texan troops, and the destruction of the rebel steamers in the central rivers emptying into the Gulf, would cripple beyond recovery the rebel forces of the southwest. The rebellion in Louisiana is kept alive only by Texas.

A considerable land force is requisite to accomplish this result, even with the co-operation of the navy, and protect at the same time New Orleans. The enemy has been very active in gathering up conscripts. There are about fifteen thousand (15,000) between Natchitoches and Franklin. Kirby Smith has moved the forces at Shreveport westward to the terminus of the railway from Shreveport to Marshall, where a convocation of the trans-Mississippi governor and commandery was held on the 15th instant. The governor of Texas has ordered the conscription of all men between sixteen and sixty years of age. General Magruder is at Galveston, with from five to seven thousand men. This will constitute a pretty formidable army if concentrated against us in Texas, or if thrown against New Orleans.

My disposable force is not over twenty thousand; but the deficiencies of transportation make it impossible to move at once more than one-third of this force by water. I have twenty negro regiments, numbering, 500 each, or about 10,000 in all, but they are just organized, armed, and uniformed, and are available only for labor at the present moment. If New Orleans is attacked or threatened, the defence is in a very great degree dependent upon the navy in the absence of the army. They must make it impossible for them to cross the Mississippi and obstruct the passage of Berwick's bay, on the Atchafalaya, by any considerable military force. It is necessary the naval force should be strengthened for this purpose and to protect the river. The light-draught gunboats of the upper fleet would be of the greatest service, and I hope they may be ordered down for temporary service at least.

I renew most earnestly my request for the despatch of sea steamers from New York for temporary service in the department. If our enterprise is successful, as I am confident it will be, it ought to be followed up closely and with power. It will give us great military as well as diplomatic advantages.

The severity of conscription, as well as the success of our arms, has led to demoralization, and in some instances to open revolt, in the rebel district. Deserters bring in a report to-day that a collision occurred between the disaf-

fecting Texans and the troops under command of General Mouton, near New Iberia, which resulted in the death of General Mouton. This is probably incorrect, but is repeated in so many forms, and from so many sources, that the fact of disaffection or revolt can hardly be questioned.

I hope to move by Monday at furthest. The first object will be quickly obtained.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,  
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and Assistant Adjutant General Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., August 28, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatches of the 15th and 16th are just received.

The Navy Department has been requested to direct Admiral Porter to send to the Atchafalaya the gunboats asked for.

General Grant was directed to give all the re-enforcements in his power; this of course includes cavalry. Cavalry equipments have been ordered both to New Orleans and Vicksburg for mounting infantry. No re-enforcements of any kind can possibly be sent to you from the northeastern States at present. You will not base your calculations upon receiving any for some time to come.

Be cautious in moving on the Rio Grande. It should be your effort to get between the armies of Kirby Smith and Magruder. Should they unite and get between you and Grant, or between you and New Orleans, they may give you much trouble.

Your note in regard to reports in New Orleans respecting French intervention only confirms what we already received from other sources. While observing every caution to give no cause of offence to that government, it will be necessary to carefully observe the movements of its fleets, and to be continually on your guard.

You will readily perceive the object of our immediately occupying some part of Texas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS, *New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C. September 5, 1863*

Major General HURLBUT, *Memphis:*

If General Steele requires re-enforcements, you must do all in your power to assist him. Generals Rosecrans and Burnside must so occupy the enemy



as to remove any danger of attack on you. General Pope has been directed to send a part of his command to Helena. If necessary, you can stop them in Tennessee. I have no other available forces to send you.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., September 5, 1863.*

Major General POPE, *Milwaukie :*

Any troops you can possibly spare should be sent to Helena to re-enforce General Steele.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., September 6, 1863.*

Major General HURLBUT, *Memphis :*

Communicate with General Grant or commanding officer at Vicksburg for re-enforcements to Steele, if they are necessary. If all Kirby Smith's forces have moved to Little Rock, so many troops are not required on the Mississippi river. Rosecrans and Burnside will occupy all of Bragg's forces. Steele's expedition must not be permitted to fail; its success is of the greatest possible importance. Communicate this to General Grant, and, in the meantime, assist Steele all you possibly can.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, September 5, 1863.*

GENERAL : I have the honor to report that Major General Franklin has sailed on the expedition to Sabine Pass, Texas.

Owing to the limited means of transportation at my disposal in this department, especially of steamers capable of navigating the Gulf of Mexico, the start has been delayed much beyond the time I had hoped and expected; but I believe rumor has been entirely at fault, and that the blow will fall on the enemy in a quarter unexpected by them.

Using all our transportation, it has been impossible to send in the first line more than about 5,000 infantry, with their field batteries and two heavy Parrott batteries.

Such of the navy gunboats as can enter the pass were assembled in Berwick's bay, and telegraphic communication having been established between the South West pass of the Mississippi river and Berwick's bay, the sailing of the transports from the one point and the gunboats from the other was made with such interval as to bring the two at the same time, or nearly the same, off Sabine pass.

As an exposition of the intended operations, I enclose a copy of my instructions to Major General Franklin.

As soon as the first line shall have disembarked, the transports of light draught will come to Berwick's bay, whither I have ordered the 1st division of the 13th army corps, to be ready for embarkation. Three-fourths of that division are already at a point a few miles distant from Brashear city. The transports of heavier draught will return to this place, where troops of the 13th army corps will be ready to embark.

The day before yesterday information was sent me by the naval officer in command near Morgan's bend, on the Mississippi river, that the rebels were establishing three or four field batteries to annoy our transports. I have despatched the 2d division 13th army corps to that quarter, directing the commander (General Herron) to co-operate with the gunboats and to capture or destroy the rebel force in that vicinity, which by various accounts numbers from 900 to 1,500 men of the three arms.

General Herron will be able to accomplish this object and return in time to take part in the Texas expedition, and will doubtless have returned before transportation will be ready for him.

I have reliable information to-day from Galveston, August 14, which gives the force of Magruder at that point as 2,300 men, in a very demoralized condition. The refugee is highly intelligent, and states that our attack on Texas is expected in the direction of Vermillionville, Louisiana, and Niblett's bluff.

Very respectfully, I am, general, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and Assistant Adjutant General Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*19th Army Corps, New Orleans, August 31, 1863.*

GENERAL : You are hereby assigned to the following duty :

1. You will please embark the 1st brigade, 1st division, and the 3d division, 19th army corps, with the artillery which has been assigned to the 1st and 3d divisions, and that portion of the 1st Indiana heavy artillery temporarily assigned to your command at Baton Rouge.

You will embark the reserve brigade, 19th army corps, which has been ordered to report to you at Algiers, and the Texas cavalry and a battalion of the 1st engineer regiment, at this place.

On account of the limited means of transportation available at this time, you

will not be able to embark the whole of the artillery of the divisions named, but the remainder, with wagons, camp equipage &c., will be sent to you as soon as possible.

2. As soon as the embarkation shall have been effected, you will assemble all the transports at some convenient point on the river below this city, and will then have a personal conference with the commodore commanding the Western Gulf squadron, and with Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Crocker, United States navy, who, it is understood, will command the co-operating naval force.

You will arrange with them the detail of your contemplated movement, it being well understood that the gunboats will immediately precede the transports, and cover the landing of the troops; but at the same time you will please bear constantly in mind the fact, that *there are important reasons, in addition to those of a purely military character*, for the immediate occupation of some important point in the State of Texas where the government of the United States can permanently maintain its flag.

A landing, if found impracticable at the point now contemplated, should be attempted at any place in the vicinity where it may be found practicable to attain the desired result.

3. After coming to a complete understanding with the naval commanders, you will proceed to Sabine pass, Texas, and if you find that the navy has succeeded in making the landing feasible, you will disembark your whole force as speedily as possible, occupy the strongest position to be found, and immediately commence strengthening it by means of your engineer force.

4. After making your landing, you will make a careful examination of the country in your front, and if you can safely proceed as far as the railroad from Houston to Beaumont, you will seize and hold some point on that line; Beaumont is probably the preferable point, but the exact position will be left to your own judgment and professional skill after your arrival on the line.

5. After seizing such point on the railroad, you will make reconnoissances in the direction of Houston, so as to learn the position and force of the enemy; but you are not expected, with the force you take with you, to occupy any point further west than the one selected by you on the railroad, unless you find that no enemy appears in force.

6. You will communicate with me as fully and as frequently as possible, giving all the information necessary to guide me in determining the amount and character of the force to be added to your command for further operations, which will be immediately forwarded.

Very respectfully, I am, general, your most obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General WM. B. FRANKLIN,

*Commanding 19th Army Corps.*

A true copy :

CHARLES P. STONE,

*Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., September 8, 1863.

Major General POPE, *Milwaukee*:

It has been found necessary to re-enforce General Steele immediately with troops from Missouri. You will, therefore, send to St. Louis, without delay, all the regiments you can spare, to report to General Schofield, to temporarily replace those which he sends south.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., September 9, 1863.

GENERAL:

\* \* \* \* \*

I wish you to watch General Steele's movements and give him all necessary assistance. His expedition is a most important one, and must not fail. With the occupation of Little Rock, and the line of the Arkansas river, all the country north is secure to us. If Steele and Banks succeed, all trans-Mississippi must return to the Union.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, September 21, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the 19th army corps crossed Berwick's bay on Saturday, and will have advanced as far as Franklin to-morrow. The 13th army corps, under General Ord, is at Brashear awaiting transportation. Owing to the low stage of the water, we have been able to get but two steamers around to Brashear, and crossing has been very slow in consequence of this deficiency. It adds another proof of the absolute necessity of light-draught boats for the service of the government in the waters of this department. Four or five boats sent around to assist the troops in crossing are aground on the way out. Major General Herron, with one division of the 13th army corps, is between the Atchafalaya and Morganzia, holding in check General Green, with about three thousand (3,000) of the rebel force now on the west bank of the Atchafalaya.

Reports reach us this evening that Price has evacuated Little Rock, and is moving towards Alexandria. If this prove true, it will show that they intend to concentrate their force west of the Mississippi, in Texas. It is greatly to be regretted that we failed to make a landing at Sabine City, which would have placed our forces in the very centre of the circle upon which they operate, in

such time and strength as to make their concentration impossible. We shall endeavor, without loss of time, to compensate for this failure by a land movement.

The troops are in good condition, improving in health and spirit. I hope that orders may be given to Admiral Porter to furnish us some of the light-draught boats now in the upper river. By the occupation of the Teche country, and the dispersion of the enemy in that quarter, we cover completely the west bank of the Mississippi, both from the rebel forces and the assaults of guerillas. The only danger to New Orleans must come from Johnston's army on the east. Two or three light-draught gunboats should be placed in Lake Ponchartrain, subject to the orders of the military commandant of this department.

This is indispensable to protect the city from invasion from that quarter, and also to check contraband trading operations with the enemy.

I join my command as soon as the crossing of the forces can be effected.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, September 26, 1863.*

GENERAL: Major General Franklin reports from Berwick's bay, that Weitzel's and McWilliams's divisions of the 19th army corps will be at Bisland today (26th.) The obstructions to the navigation of the Teche bayou are being rapidly removed. The 13th corps is crossing the bay, and the troops will all be over to-night. As soon as the obstructions in the Teche bayou can be removed, which will be speedily, we shall advance.

General Taylor is represented to be between Opelousas and Bisland, with ten to fifteen thousand men. I bear in mind, constantly, the instructions of the government as to Texas, and shall lose no time in doing all that is required of me so far as the means in my hands render possible.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

ST. LOUIS, *September 29, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK:

We have requisition from General Banks's command for six hundred wagons

and trains. We have also unfinished requisitions for wagons and animals from General Rosecrans. Which shall have the preference, as we cannot at once supply both?

ROBERT ALLEN,  
*Captain Quartermaster.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., September 29, 1863.*

General ROBERT ALLEN, *St. Louis :*

Six hundred wagons will be immediately sent to General Banks from Philadelphia. Send him all the animals you can spare after supplying General Rosecrans. Cannot General Grant spare some from his command till you can give him more?

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., September 29, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Vicksburg :*

General Banks has made requisition on quartermaster's department for six hundred wagons and teams. The wagons and harness will be sent from Philadelphia. Send all the teams you can spare, and General Allen will replace them as soon as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., September 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of September 13 was received some days ago, and submitted, through the Secretary of War, to the President. It has not been returned, nor have I received any instructions in relation to it. The failure of the attempt to land at Sabine is only another of the numerous examples of the uncertain and unreliable character of maritime descents. The chances are against their success.

In regard to steamers, we sent you all the sea transports of light draught that could be procured. We also requested the Navy Department to send you down the Mississippi river the tin-clads which you asked for. This was done the moment your requisitions were received. Admiral Porter replied to the Navy Department that he would send you some gunboats, although he did not believe they could be used on account of the draught of water. Light river transports must be obtained on the Mississippi or western rivers; they cannot be sent from here. Were we to attempt this, probably three quarters of them would founder at sea.

I do not regard Sabine City in the same light as you do. Instead of being "the very centre of the circle" of the enemy's operations, it seems to me to be upon the very circumference of his theatre of war west of the Mississippi. The centre of this theatre is some point near Marshal or Natchitoches. The

enemy's line extends from near Little Rock to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The occupation of Sabine City neither cuts this line nor prevents the concentration of all his forces on any point of it which he may select. Nevertheless, as the objects of your expedition are rather political than military, and do not admit of delay, you may be able to accomplish the wishes of the government by the route you have chosen sooner than by any other.

There is no possible danger of New Orleans, at the present time, from Johnston's forces east of the Mississippi river. All these forces have been sent to Bragg at Chattanooga. General Steele is in possession of Little Rock, and it is reported that Price's army is retreating on Arkadelphia. Possibly they may fall back into Texas to re-enforce Magruder. Probably, however, they will not fall back further than Shreveport, perhaps not so far, being without water transportation to obtain supplies in that exhausted country.

I am very happy to receive such favorable accounts of affairs in New Orleans.

I must again call your attention to the fact that your communications sent by mail usually reach here two or three days before your bearers of despatches. These bearers of despatches seem to stop a day or two in New York to refresh themselves before coming to Washington. Are they not, except in extraordinary cases, a useless expense to the government?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS,  
*New Orleans.*

JANUARY 20, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

[Received 1 p. m., October 17, 1863, in cipher.]

NEW IBERIA, LOUISIANA,  
*October 9, 1863.*

*(By steamer from New Orleans.)*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:*

My advance under Major General Franklin is near Vermillion bayou to-day.

It is believed that there are but two or three thousand of the enemy on the other side. If this be so it is probable they are moving in the direction of the Sabine, for the purpose of concentrating their forces there.

I mourn our failure to get possession of Sabine pass, which enables them to do this. If it prove true, I shall disperse them by a counter movement which has been in preparation for ten days. As soon as we cross the Vermillion bayou I will inform you of my plans. The new position of affairs seems to be among the most important developments of the war in this quarter. I will explain to you more fully by letter. No time will be lost in raising the flag as directed.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, October 16, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of September 28, with accompanying memoranda of the movements of the enemy in Arkansas and the northern part of Louisiana. The position of my force, at the present time, between Vermillionville and Opelousas, will preclude the operations contemplated by them on the Mississippi, as from the mouth of the Red river we shall cover it completely, and, as we move north, our protection will be extended above. The importance of Shreveport, as reported, is very great, and it confirms representations made to us. I had the strongest possible desire to reach Shreveport when in Alexandria in May, but the necessity of operations on the Mississippi prevented it.

There has been no such reaction in the public mind of this section as is represented to have existed upon the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. They have been depressed rather than stimulated by such effects. I have also to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th September, by the river mail of yesterday. It was never our intention to make Sabine City the base of operations, but only to effect a landing at that point or on the coast below. Had we been successful, I should have had, in ten days, an army of twenty thousand (20,000) at Houston, which commands all the prominent communications of the State of Texas, and will be the centre of the operations of the rebels when they are completely concentrated.

This was the point of operation. It would have separated the rebel forces of Louisiana and western Texas, and also those of Galveston, from the Arkansas army; and, although not geographically the centre, it would have placed us in such position as to have made impossible the concentration that is now contemplated. All our information here leads us to believe that there will be a concentration of the rebel forces in the State of Texas. They have upon their pay-rolls fifty-five thousand six hundred men (55,600) west of the Mississippi; so it is reported, but, I am sure, with exaggeration.

The movement upon Shreveport and Marshall is impracticable at present. It would require a march from Brashear City of between 400 and 500 miles. The enemy destroying all supplies in the country as he retreats, and the low stage of the water making it impossible for us to avail ourselves of any water communications, except upon the Têche as far as Vermillionville, it would require a communication for this distance by wagon trains. Later in the season this can be done, making Alexandria the base of operations; but it could not be done now. The rivers and bayous have not been so low in this State for fifty years, and Admiral Porter informs me that the mouth of the Red river, and also the mouth of the Atchafalaya, are both hermetically sealed to his vessels by almost dry sand-bars, so that he cannot get any vessels into any of the streams. It is supposed that the first rise of the season will occur early in the next month.

I am satisfied that if we could have placed our force at Houston, as contemplated, it would have prevented the concentration. Had the army relied upon itself exclusively, the failure at Sabine City would not have occurred. It was perfectly feasible to land below at any point on the coast between Sabine and Galveston bay. The instructions of General Franklin contemplated this, but the naval officers were so perfectly confident in regard to their information of the fortifications at Sabine pass that their boats were disabled and in the possession of the enemy before any other course was contemplated. It was equally practicable to march from the coast between the Sabine and Galveston directly to Houston, as from Beaumont to Houston, and a landing could have been effected without difficulty. It would have been repeated immediately, but the failure had given to the enemy so much notice that he was able to concentrate his forces to prevent a landing at that point. It left me no alternative, therefore, but to



move across Berwick's bay, in the direction of Opelousas, for the purpose of taking a route westward to Niblett's bluff on the Sabine, or to advance north to Alexandria, Shreveport, and Marshall, in accordance with the suggestion which you have made both now and heretofore.

I make this explanation in regard to Sabine and Houston, as your letter implies that Sabine City was the contemplated position which we intended to assume. Sabine City did not enter into our original calculations at all, and was only contemplated by the navy as a point of landing.

The boats asked for have been received, and relieve us very much in the matter of transportation. I will pay attention to your suggestion in regard to official communications by mail, and avoid the expense incurred by special messengers, except in cases of great importance.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. Vols.*

[Duplicate.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, October 22, 1863.*

SIR: Despatches from the general-in-chief impress me with the belief that my plan of action in the movement to the Sabine pass is not perfectly understood by the government. It was not intended for the occupation of Sabine City, nor was it indeed the purpose to land at that point, except it could be done without serious resistance. The landing contemplated and referred to in the orders given to General Franklin as an alternative for that of Sabine pass was upon the coast, ten or twelve miles below. Had the landing been accomplished either at the pass or below, a movement would have been immediately made for Beaumont from the pass, or for Liberty if the landing had been made below, and thence directly to Houston, where fortifications would have been thrown up, and our line of communication and supplies immediately established at the mouth of the Brazos river, west of Houston, until we could have gained possession of Galveston island and city. I should have had in ten days from the landing twenty thousand (20,000) men at Houston, where, strongly fortified, they could have resisted the attack of any force that it was possible to concentrate at that time. Houston would have been nearly in the centre of the forces in and about Louisiana and Texas, commanding all the principal communications, and would have given us ultimately the possession of the State.

The enclosed sketch illustrates the intended routes. The movement to the Sabine was made upon the reports furnished by the naval officers, who were perfectly confident of their success in being able to destroy the enemy's guns. The grounding of two boats, and the withdrawal of the other two boats, caused the failure to effect a landing, and the return of the army. In my judgment the army should not have returned, but should have continued to the point indicated for landing upon the coast, as contemplated in the instructions. This would have been done but for the withdrawal of the two boats that were free after the loss of the Sachem and the Clifton. The expedition sailed from the

Mississippi on the 4th of September, and returned to the Mississippi on the 11th of September. It was impossible to repeat the attempt, the failure having given notice to the enemy of our purposes, and enabled him to concentrate his forces against us. I therefore directed the movement of the troops across Berwick's bay, with a view to an overland movement into Texas. The deficiency of transportation, the removal of the numerous obstructions to the navigation of the Teche, and the difficulty of obtaining supplies, made it impracticable for us to reach Opelousas until this date. We are now in position for a movement westward into Texas, and northward to northeastern Texas, by the way of Shreveport.

The resources of the whole of this country are completely and thoroughly destroyed by the enemy. To the Sabine we have a march from Opelousas and Vermillion of between one and two hundred miles without water, without supplies, and without other transportation than by wagons. At Niblett's bluff, on the Sabine, we shall encounter all the possible force of the enemy in the State of Texas, and a powerful enemy hanging upon our rear throughout the whole march, which is now waiting for us between Alexandria and Opelousas. From the Sabine to Houston is a hundred miles; making altogether a march of from 250 to 300 miles. By the way of Alexandria and Shreveport to Marshall, which is the nearest point on the other route, we have a march of from 350 to 400 miles in that direction without other communication than by wagon train, and through a country utterly depleted of all its material resources. Either of these routes presents almost insuperable difficulties. It is not good policy to fight an absent enemy in a desert country if it can be avoided.

While the army is preparing itself for one or the other of these movements, I propose to attempt a lodgment upon some point upon the coast from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Rio Grande.

The gunboat Tennessee was despatched by Commodore Bell for this purpose on the 29th. A careful and intelligent engineer, Captain Baker, accompanied the expedition. The Tennessee returned to New Orleans on the 16th instant. The report was most favorable for operations upon the Gulf coast, and the difficulties, although great, much less than those presented upon either of the land routes, by way of Niblett's Bluff to Houston, or to Alexandria, Shreveport, and Marshall; and if it is successful, the results must be far more important than could be obtained by getting possession of the town of Marshall, in northeastern Texas. I have therefore determined to make an expedition for the purpose of landing between Sabine and the Rio Grande—most probably at the latter point. The expedition will sail to-morrow morning (23d) at nine o'clock. The troops, about 3,500 in number, are under the command of Major General Dana. I accompany the expedition myself, and am confident of its success. The earliest possible communication will be made to you of its results. This expedition will produce exactly the same results as that by the Sabine pass; it is only reversing the order of procedure, beginning at the Rio Grande, and moving eastward, instead of at the Sabine, moving westward.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

The PRESIDENT of the United States, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., January 22, 1865.

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Flag-ship McClellan, off Brazos, Santiago, November 4, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on November 2, at meridian, the flag of the Union was raised on Brazos island, which is now in our possession. It was occupied by a small force of rebel cavalry, which fled at our disembarkation without serious resistance.

We left New Orleans on Monday, the 26th, at 12 o'clock, having been three days in the river beyond the time fixed for our departure in my last despatch by a violent storm. On Friday, the 30th, off Aransas Pass, we encountered a severe gale, which lasted through the day, and separated several of the transports from the fleet. The flag-ship reached the rendezvous, latitude 27, Sunday morning, reconnoitred the Brazos and Boca Chica, and returning to the fleet, resumed the voyage, and arrived off Brazos Santiago at 5 o'clock Sunday evening. The sea was high, and the wind very strong; a landing seemed impossible, but energetic preparations were made, and on Monday, the 2d instant, at meridian precisely, the first transport, General Banks, crossed the bar in safety, and was immediately followed by other transports. We have since been engaged in discharging those too heavy to cross the bar.

Three naval vessels—the Monongahela, Owasco, and Virginia—left New Orleans as convoy for the fleet. The Virginia was disabled on the 29th off Aransas, and did not reach the Brazos until Sunday evening. The Monongahela and Owasco were separated from the fleet during the gale, keeping company with the dispersed transports, and reached the mouth of the Brazos Tuesday morning.

The force consists of the 2d division 13th army corps, to which are added the 13th and 15th regiments Maine volunteers, 1st Texas cavalry, and the 1st and 16th regiments corps d'Afrique, numbering in all about four thousand men, under the immediate command of Major General Dana, who has superintended the disembarkation. The recent movements in the Teche country, and the late attack upon the Sabine, have drawn all the forces from western to eastern Texas. But for this the landing we have effected would have been impossible. Our success is complete, and if followed up will produce important results in this part of the country.

It is my purpose, after getting possession of the Rio Grande, to secure the important passes upon the coast as far as Pass Cavallo. To effect this object, I shall move a portion of the troops under General Franklin at Vermillionville to this point. I earnestly entreat that we may be strengthened in our force by the return of so many conscripts at least as will fill up our regiments. I am certain that in New England and the west men will readily volunteer for service in Texas if it is permitted. Unless we are strengthened we may have to abandon the great advantage we have gained. We shall commence our movement to the Rio Grande to-day.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

[Received 8.25 a. m., November 20, 1863.]

NEW ORLEANS,

November 13, 1863, via New York.

Major General H. W. HALLECK :

Major General Banks was at Brownsville, Texas, on the 9th instant, with a good force of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery. There had been three revolutions in Matamoras. His position highly satisfactory.

C. P. STONE,

*Brigadier General, Chief of Staff,*

Per Colonel GOODING,

*Bearer of Despatches.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*Flag-ship McClellan, off Aransas Pass, Texas, November 18, 1863.*

GENERAL : I left Brownsville on the 13th for the purpose of moving against the passes above Brazos Santiago. We completed the embarkation of troops at Brazos island on the 15th, and sailed on the morning of the 16th for Corpus Christi. The troops on board were the 13th and 15th Maine, 34th and 26th Iowa, and the 8th Indiana regiments, and one battery of artillery, numbering in all about 1,500 men. We reached Corpus Christi the day before yesterday (16th) at 1 o'clock. We expected to be able to cross the bar at Corpus Christi with the Matamoras, one of the boats brought from the Rio Grande, and drawing three and a half feet of water, but we found the passage was impracticable, the bar being covered by only two and a half feet. We were therefore compelled to land our troops upon the coast. The disembarkation was superintended by Brigadier General Ransom, who commanded the troops during the day, and was commenced immediately upon our arrival, and occupied the night. The troops, after landing, commenced a movement towards the upper end of the island, a distance of twenty-two miles. This march, performed immediately after effecting a most difficult landing by means of boats through the surf, reflects great credit upon the officers and troops engaged. The enemy was completely surprised by our arrival, having no intimation of our presence until the morning when we presented ourselves. After skirmishing a couple of hours on the island, and some most effective and well-directed artillery fire from the gunboat Monongahela, the enemy surrendered. Lieutenant Colonel ——— was in command, and we captured altogether nine officers, ninety-nine men, three heavy siege guns, a quantity of most excellent small-arms, eighty or ninety good horses, a schooner nearly new, and considerable minor land and water transportation.

We shall move to-morrow against Pass Cavallo, the most important pass on the coast except Galveston. We shall have a sharper contest there than at Aransas, but are confident of success.

The success of our expedition will very likely transfer our operations to the coast. The best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya. To operate promptly and effectively on this line, we need light-draught sea boats, drawing six or seven feet of water. A supply of these will be a measure of great economy to the government. Large ships are in great peril constantly, from their inability to escape the northers by entering the bays. We lost one excellent steamer, the Nassau, on the bar at Brazos from this cause. The steamers St. Mary's, Clinton, Crescent, and others of that class, have been of the greatest service, and to

them we owe the success of our expedition. It is of the utmost importance that this number should be increased. We need very much light-draught gun-boats on the Atchafalaya, as if this line is well protected from Berwick's bay to the Red river, the enemy necessarily is thrown back from the Mississippi. Admiral Porter informs me that he had received your order to send boats down, but that he was unable to enter the Atchafalaya from Red river owing to the low stage of the water; his boats could not pass by sea into Berwick's bay with safety. I am quite confident that watching for fair weather, all his boats can be buoyed around, with the assistance of steamers. The distance is only forty miles, and the sea is often quite smooth. We have frequently sent river boats around in that way. I respectfully request your attention to this subject.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, November 19, 1863.*

GENERAL : Your despatch of the 4th instant, announcing the occupation of Brazos island, Texas, is received.

In regard to re-enforcing you, I can only repeat what I have previously written. All drafted men are assigned to regiments from their own States. Orders were issued some time ago to fill up your regiments, as far as possible, from the States to which they belong. Some progress has been made in this, but it is slow work. We cannot send you other regiments at present without taking them from other generals in the field, who are as urgent as yourself for re-enforcements. Moreover, it is thought that your army is sufficiently strong for that against which you are operating. The enemy can defeat you only by concentrating all his forces against your separate and isolated columns. The concentration of rebel forces in northern Georgia has compelled us to send there everything available.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding the Dep't of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, November 20, 1863.*

COLONEL : In the absence of the major general commanding, I have the honor to report the following for the information of the general-in-chief :

On the 10th instant the major general commanding department was at Brownsville, Texas, with about 3,000 men and 16 pieces of artillery. No known force of the enemy nearer than Corpus Christi, where there was but a handful, and San Antonio, whither Bee had retired with from 150 to 200 men.

Refugees and recruits were coming into our lines in great numbers, and the commanding general called on me for additional horse equipments and cavalry

arms. The recruits bring their own horses. I have forwarded about 2,000 sets, with arms for cavalry.

Brownsville was being put in defensible condition, and works were being constructed on Point Trobel and Brazos St. Jago island. It was supposed that Corpus Christi would be occupied and fortified by our troops.

During the past week I have, on the requisition of the commanding general, forwarded to the mouth of the Rio Grande 2,000 infantry, a battery of artillery, and 100 extra artillery horses. More troops, to the extent of 3,000 infantry of the 13th army corps, two regiments of the corps d'Afrique, and two batteries of field artillery are awaiting means of transportation to go forward.

Major General Franklin is holding the Teche country, with his headquarters at New Iberia. The enemy have made considerable show of force in his front, and it has been reported that Magruder has joined General Dick Taylor from Niblett's bluff, and a portion of Price's force from Shreveport; but neither General Franklin nor myself credit the report. This morning General Franklin effected a surprise of the enemy's advanced force of cavalry (6th Texas regiment) and captured all but 25 of it. The regiment was small; the captured amounted to 12 commissioned officers and 100 rank and file.

Up the river the enemy have shown some activity. Day before yesterday they came to the Mississippi river, at Hog's landing, near the mouth of Red river, and fired upon a transport coming down, with four pieces of field artillery. No lives were lost on the boat, and a gunboat at the point immediately commenced shelling the position. No further result reported as yet.

The rebel General Green has crossed the Atchafalaya river, back of Morganza, with cavalry and artillery, and was yesterday reported as intending a raid down the Grosse Tête to intercept our line to Berwick's bay. To prevent mischief in that direction, I have sent re-enforcements to Donaldsonville and Plaquemine.

On the east bank of the river, Logan is reported as near Clinton, Louisiana, with from 3,000 to 4,000 men, (much scattered,) on Tuesday of last week, and re-enforced last Monday at Clinton by three small regiments from Alabama, with promise of more, to threaten Port Hudson and Baton Rouge. Both these positions are well garrisoned and in good state of defence.

While writing, I receive information that a steamer is just coming up the river from the Texas expedition, and she reports by telegraph from the quarantine station that Corpus Christi was in possession of our forces when she sailed.

I would respectfully suggest that the heavy guns and ammunition called for by the chief of ordnance of the department, by last steamer, be sent forward as rapidly as possible, as they will be much needed in the positions which have been seized on the Texas coast.

I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. P. STONE,

*Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.*

Colonel JOHN C. KELTON,

*Assist. Adj. General, Headquarters of the Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., November 25, 1863.*

GENERAL: The Secretary of War directs me to call your attention to the importance of having a proper commander in New Orleans. He wishes you to immediately report the name of the officer left in command of that post.

Your communications of the 6th, 7th, and 9th, from Brownsville, have been received and submitted to the Secretary of War.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf, New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

[Received 3.45 p. m., November 28, 1863 ]

NEW ORLEANS, *November 20, 1863,*  
*via New York, November 28, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

GENERAL: Aransas, Texas, was taken by our forces the 17th instant, 100 prisoners, and 3 guns captured.

C. P. STONE,  
*Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 3.45 p. m., November 28, 1863.]

NEW ORLEANS, *November 20, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Commanding U. S. A.:*

I have just received intelligence that Corpus Christi, Texas, is in possession of our forces.

C. P. STONE,  
*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received 10.15 a. m., December 12, 1863.]

NEW ORLEANS, *December 5, 1863.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

GENERAL: The following despatch is just received from Major General Washburn, at Fort Esperanza, Pass Cavallo, Matagorda bay. The command of the bay gives us substantially the control of central and western Texas, and all the important points of the coast except Galveston.

FORT ESPERANZA, TEXAS, *December 2, 1863.*

At 1 o'clock a. m., November 30, the rebels blew up the magazines of this fort, having evacuated two hours before. It is a very large and complete work, bomb-proof and partially cased with railroad iron. It had a garrison of one

thousand men, who escaped all but six. By reason of the continuance of the gale the gunboats could not furnish me with launches to enable me to cut off their communications, nor could they take part in the attack. On the 29th we drove them from all their outworks and advanced our sharpshooters well up to the fort. We captured 10 guns ranging from 24 to 128-pounders.

Very respectfully yours,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., December 7, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have just received your letter of November 18, "off Aranzas Pass." In this you say the "best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya." I fully concur with you in this opinion. It is the line which I advised you from the beginning to adopt. In regard to your "Sabine" and "Rio Grande" expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here till they were actually undertaken. The danger, however, of dividing your army, with the enemy between the two posts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force, was pointed out from the first, and I have continually urged that you must not expect any considerable re-enforcements from other departments. Your communications in regard to light-draught sea-going vessels have been referred to the Quartermaster General, who has uniformly answered that he had given you all such vessels that were available, there being only a small number that could be procured. His attention will be again called to the matter to-day.

In regard to gunboats for your department, we must rely upon the navy. Admiral Porter has been requested to give you all possible assistance in this matter. You may not be aware that by a law of last Congress the building, purchasing, and commanding of gunboats are placed exclusively under the Navy Department. I will again ask that the admirals commanding in the Gulf and in the Mississippi be directed to co-operate with you and render you all the aid in their power. You will also communicate with them, asking their assistance in any way you desire.

The Secretary of War has directed Major General J. J. Reynolds to repair immediately to New Orleans and assume command at that place in your absence, reporting to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief*

Major General BANKS,

*Commanding Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, Louisiana.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

*St. Louis, Mo., December 10, 1863.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Steele informs me that Price is again advancing towards Little Rock. Some of the Texas troops lately at Shreveport are with him.



Is it true that General Banks's force has retired down Red river? If so, General Steele will be much exposed.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., December 11, 1863.*

Major General SCHOFIELD, *St. Louis:*

General Banks, when last heard from, proposed to operate from New Orleans towards Red river. Should he do so, it will assist General Steele. But as his plans have been so often changed, it is not safe to rely upon them. You will therefore give General Steele all the assistance in your power. I will also telegraph to General Grant to do the same.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., December 11, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Chattanooga:*

General Steele reports that the rebel forces under Price and from Texas are advancing upon Little Rock. It is also reported that they are seriously threatening West Tennessee and the Mississippi river. Admiral Porter reports that Port Hudson is also threatened. Would it not be well, under these circumstances, to send back some troops to Hurlbut, so that the troops detached from Steele and Schofield to West Tennessee may be returned? And also to instruct General McPherson to assist, if necessary, General Banks's forces on the Lower Mississippi? Rebel papers received here indicate that an effort will be made to reclose the Mississippi river during the absence of your army and that of General Banks. The movement of the latter on the Rio Grande was unexpected and contrary to the advice of the government.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., December 11, 1863.*

GENERAL: I enclose herewith a copy of memorandum from the Navy department to the Secretary of War in regard to guns left at Port Hudson. In my despatch to you of August 24 it was directed that the fortifications at New Orleans should be supplied by removing to that place the heavy ordnance at Port Hudson and Vicksburg. It appears from Admiral Porter's despatch that this has not been done, and that there is danger of the water batteries at Port Hudson falling into the hands of the enemy. Major General Reynolds has been directed, in your absence, to remove these water batteries to New Orleans, as

we control the waters of the Mississippi river. We require only land batteries on its banks, between New Orleans and Memphis, especially in places which are liable to fall into rebel hands.

General Steele reports that Price, with a portion of the Texas troops, is moving towards Little Rock. If your forces are operating up the Atchafalaya, as stated in your last despatch, they will be likely to check Price's advance. If your forces operate together on the line proposed, you will be strong enough to resist anything the enemy can bring against you; but the division of your army and the occupation of so many points in western Texas cause serious apprehension that the enemy may concentrate and overwhelm some one of your isolated detachments.

A regiment of cavalry is being sent from Baltimore to your command. In the present condition of affairs in the west and on the Mississippi river, it will not be possible to immediately re-enforce you from that quarter. I hope, however, that General Grant may be able to spare some troops from his line. But, as I have stated, you must make your dispositions with regard only to the troops of your own army, and not so divide it as to render re-enforcements necessary for your own security; contingencies may arise elsewhere which will render it impossible to give you more troops at the time you ask for them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS,  
*Comd'g Dep't of the Gulf, New Orleans, Louisiana.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 25, 1865.*

Official:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C. December 17, 1863.*

Major General GRANT, *Chattanooga:*

\* \* \* \* \*

I agree with you that all troops not required for these purposes, and for cleaning out West Tennessee and the Mississippi, can operate with greater advantage during the winter in the south. From present appearances General Banks will need all the assistance you can give him just now on the Lower Mississippi and in Louisiana, as I telegraphed you a few days ago.

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H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 25, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, December 23, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of December 9 I received yesterday. My orders from the department were to establish the flag of the government in Texas at the earliest possible moment. I understood that the point and the means were left at my discretion. It was implied, if not stated, that time was an element of great importance in this matter, and that the object should be accomplished as speedily as possible. In addition to the instructions received from your department upon this subject, the President addressed me a letter, borne by Brigadier General Hamilton, military governor of Texas, dated September 19, 1863, in which he expressed the hope that I had already accomplished the object so much desired. In the execution of this order, my first desire was to obtain pos-

session of Houston, and the expedition which failed to effect a landing at the Sabine was designed to secure that object. The failure of that expedition made it impossible to secure a landing at that point. I immediately concentrated all my disposable force upon the Teche, with a view to enter Texas by the way of Niblett's Bluff, on the Sabine, or by Alexandria, at some more northern point. The low stage of the water in all the rivers, and the exhaustion of supplies in that country, made it apparent that this route was impracticable at this season of the year—I might say impossible within any reasonable time, and it would be accomplished by imminent peril, owing to the condition of the country, the length of marches, and the strength of the enemy, making this certain by thorough reconnoissance of the country; but without withdrawing my troops, I concluded to make another effort to effect a landing at some point upon the coast of Texas, in the execution of what I understood to be imperative orders. For this purpose I withdrew a small force stationed at Morgauzia, on the Mississippi, which had been under command of General Herron, and was then under Major General Dana, and put them in a state of preparation for this movement.

Assisted by the commander of the naval forces, Commodore Bell, I directed a reconnoissance of the coast of Texas as far as Brazos Santiago, making my movements entirely dependent upon that report. A return from this reconnoissance was made October 16, and my troops being in readiness for movement somewhere, without the delay of a single day, except that which the state of the weather made necessary, I moved for the Brazos. You will see from these facts that it was impossible for me to give you sufficient notice of this intention, to receive instructions from you upon this subject; but as soon as I had received the information necessary, and arrived at the determination to land at the Brazos, I gave you full information of all the facts in the case. It is my purpose always to keep you informed of all movements that are contemplated in this department, but it did not seem to me to be possible to do more in this instance; and upon a review of the circumstances, I cannot now see where or when I could have given you more complete and satisfactory information than my despatches conveyed.

I repeat my suggestion that the best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya, and I also recall the suggestions made by you upon the same subject. But that line was impracticable at the time when I received your orders upon the subject of Texas. I ought to add that the line of the Atchafalaya is available for offensive or defensive purposes only when the state of the water admits the operations of a strong naval force. At the time when I made this suggestion to you it was impossible to get a boat into the Atchafalaya, either from the Red river or from the Gulf, owing to the low stage of the water, and there were very few, if any, boats on the Mississippi, or in this department, that could have navigated these waters at that time. It was therefore impossible to avail myself of this natural line—first, for the reason that we had not sufficient naval force for this purpose, and that the navigation was impossible. \* As soon as the Mississippi and Red river shall rise, the government can make available the advantages presented by this line of water communication.

I recognize the embarrassments under which the government labors in regard to re-enforcements in this department; yet, as my lines are continually extending, I thought it to be my duty to renew the suggestion which I had formerly made in regard to the strength of my command and the many imperative demands made upon it. This is in the way of information, and not of complaint. I do not think my despatches will show unreasonable urgency in this regard. I do not intend unnecessarily to divide my forces. I shall keep them concentrated as far as it is possible to do so. You may be sure that your suggestions upon this subject will receive due consideration. I know there is great difficulty

in obtaining light-draught sea-boats; yet, from the necessities of the service, I feel called upon to urge, as far as may be proper, the want of vessels of this character. We have had many serious difficulties in obtaining the use of such vessels when in this department and in possession of the government. I am very glad that you have called the attention of Admiral Porter again to the subject of light-draught boats for the Atchafalaya and Berwick's bay. He has promised that as soon as the state of the water will admit the passage of his boats, he will send some of them into that river.

I was not aware of the existence of the law to which you refer, but I appreciate the embarrassments which it throws upon the administration of the War Department. I will, as you suggest, communicate with the naval authorities and request their assistance in all enterprises which I may undertake.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and Assistant Adjutant General.*

LANCASTER, OHIO, *December 26, 1863.*

General HALLECK : Mr. Ewing's health and distress of my family almost forced me to come here for a few days, but I will be at Cairo and down the Mississippi by January second, and strike Grenada and Shreveport, if the admiral agrees.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., December 28, 1863.*

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, *Cairo :*

A package will be sent to you by mail, directed to Cairo, containing complaints that stores sent from the Upper Mississippi to New Orleans have been seized at Vicksburg and Natchez, and diverted from their proper destination. The Secretary of War directs that the necessary orders be issued to remedy this evil.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, December 30, 1863.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of December 11, enclosing despatch from Admiral Porter, was received on the 27th instant. Orders were given to Brigadier General Andrews long since for the destruction of the river batteries at Port Hudson, and the removal of the guns. There is no excuse for his neglect, as his attention has been repeatedly called to the subject. Since your despatch has been received the guns have been removed, and the works demolished.

In reference to the report made by General Steele, that General Price, with a portion of the rebel troops, was moving towards Little Rock, I beg to suggest that but a small force of Texas troops can be moving in that direction. The greater portion are in Texas, or in central Louisiana.

A portion of my command is now on the Teche, but will probably be withdrawn. The rivers are not yet deep enough to enable us to advance towards the Red river, except by wagon communication, which is impracticable. The country is without supplies of any kind.

It is my desire, if possible, to get possession of Galveston. This, if effected, will give us control of the entire coast of Texas, and require but two small garrisons, one on the Rio Grande and the other on Galveston island, unless it be the wish of the Department of War that extensive operations should be made in the State of Texas. A sufficient number of men can probably be recruited in that State for the permanent occupation of these two posts. It will relieve a very large number of naval vessels, whose service is now indispensable to us, on the Mississippi and in the Gulf. This can occupy but a short time, and if executed, will leave my whole force in hand to move to any other point on the Red river, or wherever the government may direct. Once possessed of Galveston, and my command ready for operation in any other direction, I shall await the orders of the government; but I trust that this may be accomplished before undertaking any other enterprise. It is impossible, at this time, to move as far north as Alexandria by water. The Red river is not open to the navigation of our gunboats, and it is commanded by Fort De Russy, which has been remounted since our occupation of Alexandria. This position must be turned by means of a large force on land before the gunboats can pass. To co-operate with General Steele in Arkansas, or north of the Red river, will bring nearly the whole rebel force of Texas and Louisiana between New Orleans and my command, without the possibility of dispersing or defeating them, as their movement would be directed south, and mine to the north. It is necessary that this force should be first dispersed or destroyed before I can safely operate in conjunction with General Steele. Once possessed of the coast of Texas, and the naval and land forces relieved, I can then operate against the forces in Louisiana or Texas, and I can disperse or destroy the land forces in Louisiana, and safely co-operate with General Steele, or with any other portion of the army of the United States. It was in this manner that we captured Port Hudson. It would have been impracticable to proceed against Port Hudson from the Mississippi, without having first dispersed the army of Texas and Louisiana, on the west of that river.

I bear in mind the danger consequent upon the division of forces, but must suggest to you that my department is extended, and many posts must be occupied; and while I would be very glad to keep my forces concentrated, it is impossible to do so. The orders of the government seemed to be peremptory that I was to occupy a position in Texas, and those which I have in view, Brownsville and Galveston, required as little force as any other positions in that State. To this fact may be added, that there are supplies and recruits which cannot be found in any other portion of this department. In all my operations you may rely upon the bulk of my forces being kept together, and prepared for

any movements of the enemy. It is possible, but not probable, that they may make a successful assault upon some of the isolated positions. We shall endeavor to prevent this by all possible means. I repeat, that in any movements in which I engage I shall concentrate the available forces of my command, and peril nothing by an unnecessary division.

I am very much gratified that the 3d Maryland cavalry is ordered to this department. It promises to be a fine regiment. From the nature of the country in which we operate, a strong cavalry force is indispensable, and I am endeavoring to convert infantry regiments into cavalry as rapidly as possible, consistent with the service.

The true line of occupation, in my judgment, offensive and defensive, for this department, is the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. The Teche country, and that between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi, can be defended only by the assistance of the navy. It is impossible for land forces to operate on that line successfully without the assistance of gunboats. The best position that we could occupy will be to defend this line by the aid of a strong naval force of light and heavy draught gunboats for the different waters in which they may operate, and the disposable land forces so held as to be able to move from one point to another in a body. We should then have one complete line of water navigation from the Rio Grande to Alexandria or Shreveport during the winter and spring, and from the mouth of the Mississippi to Key West, in the Gulf, and could throw our entire force against any point of the territory occupied by the enemy, without the possibility of their anticipating our movement or purposes. I am endeavoring constantly to secure means for offensive and defensive war upon this plan, and am confident that it can be very speedily accomplished.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. Volunteers.*

CAIRO, ILLINOIS, *January 4, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK:

By orders from Major General Sherman we send you the following message, which is a copy of message from him to General Grant, at Nashville.

CAIRO MIL. TEL. OFFICE.

CAIRO, *January 4, 1864.*

Major General GRANT:

Arrived last night. Mississippi above frozen over, but Ohio full and river below in good order. Railroad cars running very irregularly, from the late intense cold weather. Have seen Admiral Porter. Boats navigating the Mississippi have not been disturbed of late, and no apprehension felt on that score. Red river and Yazoo too low to admit of the movement on Shreveport and Grenada, but the season is otherwise favorable. I am satisfied we have men enough to take Shreveport if we get up Red river, which the admiral thinks impossible. I will inspect Paducah to-morrow, and Columbus next, then to Memphis. I will make all preparations for striking inland whenever the blow will be most effectual. There is no doubt the whole matter would be simplified if you had

command of the Mississippi valley below Cairo. I think if you were to name the subject to General Halleck, that he would order it, for its propriety is better known to him than to any other. Admiral Porter's command extends to and below New Orleans, and ours should also. \* \* \*

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of December 23 is just received.

I had hoped to be able to send you re-enforcements from the department of the south, but, for reasons not necessary to explain here, it was determined to retain the forces in front of Charleston to co-operate with the navy. The troops in North Carolina are reported as barely sufficient to maintain the defensive. Every man not deemed necessary by General Meade to oppose Lee was sent to Chattanooga and East Tennessee. The only other resource was the west. General Steele's forces in Arkansas were directed to advance towards Shreveport, so as to co-operate with you on Red river. He went as far as Arkadelphia, when, hearing of your movement into western Texas, he deemed it unsafe to attempt alone the occupation of the line of Red river. General Grant was urged to send back to the Mississippi river a part of his command as soon as he could spare the troops. General Sherman has been detached for that purpose, and he will move down the river as rapidly as practicable. He is instructed to give you all the aid in his power. I have also ordered to New Orleans several detached regiments and batteries, both in the west and in the east. I enter into these details in order that you may know that no efforts have been spared to give you all possible assistance.

Generals Sherman and Steele agree with me in opinion that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas. If this line can be adopted, most of the troops in Arkansas can be concentrated on it. But, as before remarked, Steele cannot alone attempt its occupation. His movements must therefore be dependent, in a great measure, upon yours. If, as soon as you have sufficient water in the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, you operate in that direction, Steele's army and such forces as Sherman can detach should be directed to the same object. The gunboats should also co-operate. If, on the other hand, your operations are mainly confined to the coast of Texas, Steele must make the Arkansas river his line of defence, and most of Sherman's force may be required to keep open the Mississippi.

So long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Sherman and Steele. The best thing, it would seem, to be done, under the circumstances, is for you to communicate with them, and also with Admiral Porter, in regard to some general co-operation. All agree upon what is the best plan of operations if the stage of water in the rivers and other circumstances should be favorable; if not, it must be modified or changed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 25, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

COLUMBUS, KY., *January 6, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK :

Package relating to complaints of the interruption of stores en route for General Banks is received, and shall receive my immediate attention. You know General McPherson well enough to agree with me that he would not do such a thing without some good reason, or in consequence of some mistake. I will assure General Banks that instead of taking his provisions, we stand prepared at all times to share with him our own.

W. T. SHERMAN.

*Major General.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., January 7, 1864.*

GENERAL :

\* \* \* \* \*

I have just seen your letter of December 12 to General Schofield in regard to an advance towards Red river. It was at one time hoped that you might co-operate with General Banks in holding that line, and thus secure Arkansas and Missouri from further rebel raids. But when General Banks changed his plan of operations to the Gulf coast, an advance on your part would have been extremely perilous, and you acted wisely in occupying the defensive position of the Arkansas. It is hoped that means may hereafter be concerted between yourself and General Sherman and General Banks to drive the enemy entirely out of Arkansas, and then occupy the line of Red river, which is shorter, and probably easier of defence. In the mean time I presume all your present forces will be required to hold your present line of defence, and to prevent rebel raids north of the Arkansas.

You will please to communicate frequently with these headquarters, giving as full information as possible of the condition of affairs in your department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

Major General F. STEELE,

*Little Rock, Arkansas.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., January 8, 1864.*

GENERAL :

\* \* \* \* \*

From the enclosed copy of a letter of instructions from Major General Steele, and from the published orders issued by the Adjutant General of the army, you will learn that General Steele's command, in the department of the Arkansas, has been placed under your orders.

\* \* \* \* \*



In regard to General Banks's campaign against Texas, it is proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of state policy. As a military measure simply, it perhaps presented less advantages than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama river, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines, and effect a diversion in favor of our armies at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter of political or state policy, connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so considered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and to his cabinet, and it was, therefore, unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage. I allude to this matter here, as it may have an important influence on your projected operations during the present winter.

Keeping in mind that General Banks's operations in Texas, either on the Gulf coast or by the Louisiana frontier, must be continued during the winter, it is to be considered whether it will not be better to direct our efforts, for the present, to the entire breaking up of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi river, rather than to divide them by operating against Mobile and the Alabama. If the forces of Smith, Price, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red river as a line of defence, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere.

General Banks reports his present force as inadequate for the defence of his position, and for operations in the interior; and General Steele is of opinion that he cannot advance beyond the Arkansas or Sabine, unless he can be certain of co-operation and supplies on Red river. Under these circumstances it is worth considering whether such forces as Sherman can move down the Mississippi river should not co-operate with the armies of Steele and Banks on the west side.

Of course, operations of any of your troops in that direction must be subordinate, and subsequent to those which you have proposed for East and West Tennessee. I therefore present these views at this time, merely that they may receive your attention and consideration in determining upon your ulterior movements.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding, &c., &c., Chattanooga, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS, OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of December 30 is received. General Andrews's neglect of orders in regard to the river batteries at Port Hudson deserves a reprimand, if not a more serious punishment.

I am assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter will be prepared to co-operate with you as soon as the stage of the water in the southwest will admit of the use of his flotilla there. General Steele's command is now under the general orders of General Grant, and it is hoped that he and General Sherman may also be able to co-operate with you at an early day. General Sherman is now on the Mississippi river, and General Grant expects to soon be able

to re-enforce him. A regiment of cavalry and one of infantry have to-day been ordered to your command, from Maine. Two or three batteries will be sent from here as soon as transportation can be procured. It is enormously expensive to ship horses from here, on account of the heavy losses at sea. The failure to send you animals and forage from the west is probably due to the neglect of subordinate agents of the quartermaster's department. An examination has been ordered, and it is hoped that measures will be adopted to prevent a recurrence of the evils complained of.

Re-enlistments in old regiments progressed favorably till Congress prohibited bounties. Unless this resolution should be repealed, we shall get very few more old soldiers. Recruiting at the north and east is very slow, but the regiments will be forwarded to you as speedily as they can be filled up.

It has never been expected that your troops would operate north of the Red river, unless the rebel forces in Texas should be withdrawn into Arkansas; but it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river if he could rely upon your co-operation, and he could be certain of receiving supplies upon that line. Being uncertain on these points, he determined not to attempt an advance, but to occupy the Arkansas river as his line of defence.

The best military opinions of the generals in the west seem to favor operations on the Red-river, provided the stage of water will enable gunboats to co-operate. I presume General Sherman will communicate with you on this subject. If the rebels could be driven south of that river it would serve as a shorter and better line of defence for Arkansas and Missouri than that now occupied by General Steele; moreover it would open to us the cotton and slaves of north-eastern Louisiana and southern Arkansas. I am inclined to think that this opens a better field of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant can spare during the winter. I have written to him, and also to General Steele, on this subject.

Please advise me if you want more field artillery sent to your department, and also in regard to the shipment of animals from the northeast.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*New Orleans, Louisiana.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: \* \* \* \* \*

General Banks represents the condition of affairs in his department to be such as to require all the re-enforcements that we can possibly send him. As soon as I found that he had divided his forces, by operating upon the Gulf coast, I urged that troops should be sent him from South Carolina, and that the attack on Charleston be abandoned. It was decided otherwise. My opinion has been, and still is, that all troops not required to hold our present position in Virginia and on the Atlantic coast should be sent to you and to General Banks for operations this winter, and as preparatory to a spring campaign. I hoped that by this means Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana would be secured, and the rebel force in Texas be so reduced and hemmed in as to give us but little trouble hereafter. Our armies in the west and south could then have been so

concentrated, or at least could have so co-operated, as to inflict some terrible blows upon the rebels. But I fear that the unexpected condition of affairs in East Tennessee will prevent the accomplishment of these objects, or at least a part of them, this winter, and that we must soon prepare for a spring campaign. The furloughing of so many troops has greatly reduced our forces in the north, but I hope to send some more to General Banks. There is, however, much difficulty and delay in obtaining transportation by sea. This makes it still more important that the navigation of the Mississippi should be well protected, and that Sherman and Steele should so operate as to assist General Banks as much as possible. I leave it entirely to your judgment to determine how and to what extent such assistance can be rendered.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General GRANT,  
*Nashville, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of January 11, enclosing copy of your proclamation, is received.

Major General John A. McClelland has been ordered to report to you for duty. I am directed by the Secretary of War to say that you can assign him to such duty as you may deem best. If you think it advisable to restore him to the command of his former corps, your order will be confirmed by the President.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS,  
*New Orleans, Louisiana.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 28, 1864.*

GENERAL: Three batteries of artillery and a regiment of cavalry have been embarked from Baltimore for your command. A regiment of New York veteran cavalry is now being embarked at this place. It is sent with equipments, but without horses, as transportation for horses by sea cannot now be procured. The Quartermaster General expects to send you horses by the Mississippi river. A regiment of infantry will be ready here as soon as vessels can be obtained. The two regiments in Maine, reported ready for the field, and ordered to you, are now reported not quite ready. Several regiments of Indiana troops are expected to be ready in a short time. They will be sent by the Mississippi river. Some of the New York regiments are also reported as nearly ready. There may, however, be some delay in getting them off for want of ocean vessels. This difficulty results in part from the detention of sea-going vessels in the de-

partment of the Gulf. To obviate it, such vessels should be returned north as early as possible. Unless this is done, there must be delay in sending you troops from the north and east.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, January 23, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatches of the 4th and the 11th January are received—the first on the 13th instant and the second by the mail to-day. I am much gratified to know that General Sherman is instructed to co-operate with the commands on the Mississippi.

With the forces you propose, I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, "that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas." But it would be too much for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces and the assistance of General Sherman the success of movements on that line will be certain and important. I shall most cordially co-operate with them in executing your orders. With my own command I can operate with safety only on the coast of Texas; but from the coast I could not penetrate far into the interior, nor secure control of more than the country west of San Antonio. On the other line, with commensurate forces, the whole State, as well as Arkansas and Louisiana, will be ours, and their people will gladly renew allegiance to the government. The occupation of Shreveport will be to the country west of the Mississippi what that of Chattanooga is to the east; and as soon as this can be accomplished the country west of Shreveport will be in condition for movement into Texas. I have written to General Sherman and General Steele in accordance with these views, and shall be ready to act with them as soon as the Atchafalaya and Red river will admit the navigation of our gunboats. Our supplies can be transported by the Red river until April, at least. In the mean time the railway from Vicksburg to Shreveport ought to be completed, which would furnish communication very comfortably for the whole of eastern Texas. I do not mean that operations should be deferred for this purpose, but, as an ultimate advantage in the occupation of these States and the establishment of governments, it would be of great importance.

I enclose to you with this communication a very complete map of the Red river country and Texas, which embraces all the information we have been able to obtain up to this time. It has been prepared by Major D. C. Houston, of the engineer corps, and will show that we have not overlooked the importance of this line. Accompanying the map is a memorial which exhibits the difficulties that are to be overcome. To this I respectfully invite your attention. I have sent to General Sherman and General Steele copies of this map.

I shall be ready to move to Alexandria as soon as the rivers are up, most probably marching by Opelousas. This will be necessary to turn the forts on Red river and open the way for the gunboats. From that point I can operate with General Steele, north or south of Red river, in the direction of Shreveport, and from thence await your instructions. I do not think operations will be delayed on my account. I have received a despatch from General Sherman, in

which he expresses a wish to enter upon the campaign, but had not at that time received orders upon the subject.

\* \* \* \* \*  
 [In reference to garrison at Matagorda bay and east of Lake Pontchartrain.]  
 \* \* \* \* \*

I can concentrate on Red river all my force available for active service, except the garrisons at Matagorda and Brownsville, which will be small.

I am very much gratified by the report of re-enforcements, to which your despatches refer

With great respect, &c.,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General W. H. HALLECK,  
*Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
 Washington, January 21, 1865.

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
 New Orleans, January 29, 1864.

GENERAL: \* \* \* \* \*

I shall be ready to co-operate with General Sherman and General Steele as soon as I receive definite information of the time when they will be ready to move. I can take possession of Alexandria at any time, but could not maintain the position without the support of the forces on the upper river.

It is important that river steamers should be sent down from St. Louis, suitable for the navigation of Red river. I want ten or fifteen of first-class and light-draught boats. Some months since you ordered steamers to be sent here, but very few reached New Orleans. They will be indispensable now.

Pending information and orders in regard to the movement on Red river, but little change has occurred in the position of troops. I have sent officers to communicate with General Sherman, or General McPherson, in his absence, and General Steele, but have yet no information from them. I have sent an officer to St. Louis also to obtain steamers, and shall be very glad if you will communicate with the quartermaster at that post, and direct him to aid me. The troops are generally re-enlisting. The furloughs granted upon re-enlistment will materially reduce my force, and I hope those sent from the north may replace those who obtain leave of absence.

\* \* \* \* \*

Anxiously waiting information and instructions in [regard] to operations on Red river, I have done nothing in Texas except to provide for the security of the positions held.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, with respect, your obedient servant.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK,  
*Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
 Washington, January 21, 1865.

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., February 1, 1864.

GENERAL: Your despatches of January 23, transmitting report and map of Major Houston, are received. This report and map contain very important and valuable information.

The geographical character of the theatre of war west of the Mississippi indicates Shreveport as the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign for troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas rivers.

Of course, the strategic advantages of this point may be more than counterbalanced by disadvantages of communication and supplies. General Steele reports that he cannot advance to Shreveport this month unless certain of finding supplies on the Red river, and of having there the co-operation of your forces or those of General Sherman.

If the Red river is not navigable, and it will require months to open any other communication to Shreveport, there seems very little prospect of the requisite co-operation or transportation of supplies. It has, therefore, been left entirely to your discretion, after fully investigating the question, to adopt this line or substitute any other. It was proper, however, that you should have an understanding with Generals Steele and Sherman, as it would probably be hazardous for either of those officers to attempt the movement without the co-operation of other troops.

If the country between the Arkansas and the Red river is impassable during the winter, as has been represented, it was thought that a portion of General Steele's command might be temporarily spared to operate with Sherman from the Mississippi. The department of Arkansas was, therefore, made subject to the orders of General Grant.

It is quite probable that the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, so different from what General Grant anticipated when he detached General Sherman, may have caused him to modify his plans, or at least to postpone their execution. This may also prevent your receiving the expected aid from Sherman. Communications by the Mississippi river are so often interrupted, and despatches delayed, that I am not advised where General Sherman now is, or what are his present plans.

So many delays have already occurred, and the winter is now so far advanced, that I greatly fear no important operations west of the Mississippi will be concluded in time for General Grant's proposed campaign in the spring. This is greatly to be regretted, but perhaps is unavoidable, as all our armies are greatly reduced by furloughs, and the raising of new troops progresses very slowly. Re-enforcements, however, are being sent to you as rapidly as we can possibly get them ready for the field.

Have you not overestimated the strength of the enemy west of the Mississippi river? All the information we can get makes the whole rebel force under Magruder, Smith, and Price much less than ours under you and General Steele. Of course you have better sources of information than we have here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 20, 1865.

Official copy:

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
New Orleans, February 2, 1864.

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit despatches from Major General F. J. Herron, commanding United States forces on the Rio Grande, from the commander of the forces at Mesilla, New Mexico, Brigadier General J. R. West, commanding forces in the district of Arizona. The suggestion made in my despatch to General Carleton was, that he should communicate with me the strength and position of his command, with a view to ascertain if any co-operation of our forces was practicable in western Texas. It does not appear that he can assist us; and my own operations are so changed since the date of my despatch that we cannot, with advantage, co-operate with him. Other measures more feasible and important are open to us.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Affairs at Matamoras, Brownsville, and Pass Cavallo.]

\* \* \* \* \*

I enclose copy of communication from Admiral Porter, which shows the condition of Red river and the Atchafalaya. From this it would appear that some delay would occur before any extensive operations can be carried out in that direction. As I stated in my last despatch, I have sent officers to communicate with General Sherman, or General McPherson, in case of General Sherman's absence, and also with General Steele, and shall hold myself in readiness to co-operate with them.

\* \* \* \* \*

Their forces [rebels] are divided between Shreveport, Alexandria, and Simmesport, and are stated to number, in all, some twenty-five thousand (25,000) men, including all their conscripts. This is doubtless an exaggeration of numbers, but their strength is considerable. They are fortifying at various points, and strengthening Fort de Russey, on the Red river, and the passage of the river at that point is filled by heavy rafts and other obstructions.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
N. P. BANKS,  
Major General, Commanding.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
General-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK,  
Cairo, January 19, 1864.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of December 29. I have already sent down four good "tin-clads," light-draughts, to Commodore Bell, to co-operate with you in the waters of the Atchafalaya, &c. I will send six more in a few days; they are new vessels and have fine batteries, mounting in all 60 guns. You have no idea how I am pressed on all sides for gunboats; if it could have been done, you should have had them sooner.

Our winter has been severe; the thermometer 26° below zero, the river full of ice, and the Mississippi frozen hard from St. Louis to Cairo. My whole force is taken up in co-operating with Generals Grant and Sherman, who are now on the move, or I should be below in person.

The water in the Atchafalaya is only back water from the Mississippi, and when the river rises I will shove a strong force in there.

The rebels are blockading Red river again with rafts and fortifying Shreveport strongly.

The shoals at Alexandria are yet dry, but three inches will cover them. It will require a rise of twelve (12) feet for any vessel to ascend the river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,  
*Little Rock, Arkansas, February 4, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 25th ultimo was received this evening by the hands of Captain Dunham. I have endeavored to communicate with your forces in Louisiana and Texas by means of spies sent across the country. One of them returned this evening, having been below Shreveport, on Red river, and thence to the Mississippi. Captain Dunham will converse with him. I learn that the rebels have forage depots every ten miles from Monroe to within forty miles of Pine Bluff. It is reported that they were established for General Taylor's troops, who were to march against Pine Bluff in concert with Holmes's command. The roads are in such a condition now that an army could not move from here to Ouachita with artillery or trains, and I am told that they will be impracticable for several months to come. I could not supply the advanced post at Benton on account of bad roads. It is therefore evident that if an advance movement is to be made soon, it must be made up Ouachita and Red rivers. If the troops should be moved down from Fort Smith to hold the mountain passes, sufficient forces moving up the two rivers could drive the rebels into Texas. This would cause many of the Arkansas and Missouri troops to desert and perhaps of the Texans also. I may be able to move my command through Pine Bluff to Monroe by the time you will be able to go up Red river, as this route is said to be practicable earlier than the one by Camden, or that by Arkadelphia. However, there are serious objections to this route. Holmes has a large mounted force and excellent stock. It is impossible for me to state with any certainty how large a force I can concentrate. A large proportion of my command have enlisted as veterans, and are gone and going on furloughs. As matters in the army now are influenced so much by political intrigue, it is not certain that these troops will return to my command. The limits of my department are not perfectly defined. Fort Smith is excluded from it. The fort of that name is in the Indian territory, or partly so, and the town in Arkansas. I was informed by an officer from there this evening that some of the troops in that vicinity were being moved out of Arkansas. I hope, however, to be able to advance with ten thousand well-appointed troops, leaving enough to hold the line of the Arkansas. This will be more than a match for Holmes's twelve or fifteen thousand. My troops are scattered now, but it is the best arrangement under present circumstances. The principal posts are

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

I shall endeavor to keep up communication with you through emissaries, and shall be glad to receive any suggestions from you, and to co-operate in any of your movements if possible.

I will point out on the map to Captain Dunham the position of the rebel forces in Arkansas. They can concentrate rapidly on the Ouachita at Camden, or on Red river, near Washington.



Since writing the above, the spy alluded to informs me that General Taylor moved to Shreveport with part of his command, a part went to Camden, and two brigades to Monroe. It would seem from this that Pine Bluff may be their objective point.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

FRED. STEELE, *Major General.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, February 7, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter received on the 5th instant from Major General Sherman, giving a statement of his operations towards Meridian, and the prospect of navigation on Red river. We shall be ready to co-operate with him at the time he designates. Admiral Farragut is, in accordance with the suggestions of General Sherman, making some demonstrations against Mobile. He left this port yesterday for the purpose of a reconnoissance in that direction. The force east of Lake Pontchartrain will also make some demonstration for the same purpose.

There is no material change in the position of our troops since my last despatch, nor in the strength and position of the enemy.

The steamer George Washington, with mails to the 30th, will arrive this morning. I regret that the steamer which leaves this port could not take with it acknowledgment of instructions which I hope the mail will bring me in regard to the operations you contemplate in the Red river country.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

MEMORANDUM.—The letter referred to herein as received from General Sherman is that of January 31, 1864, accompanying General Banks's letter of February 27, 1864.

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., February 8, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Nashville :*

General Banks is urgent to have more cavalry. There are several regiments nearly organized in Minnesota and other western States, which can be sent to him by the Mississippi river, unless you absolutely need them. The Quartermaster General reports that it will be difficult to supply horses and forage to

any additional cavalry in Tennessee, and that ocean transports cannot be obtained to send much cavalry from the north to New Orleans. Please answer.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 8, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Let General Banks have the cavalry now ready for the field. That belonging to this military division, if filled up, will be quite as much as can be fed.

U. S. GRANT, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., February 11, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting "orders" and "instructions" in regard to operations on Red river. If by this is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my despatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with Generals Sherman and Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best under all the circumstances of the case.

My last communication from General Sherman is dated January 29, 1864, and received here to-day. He says the stage of water in Red river is such that he cannot operate in that direction earlier than March or April, and that in the mean time he would operate on the east side of the Mississippi river. I think he had not then communicated with you. Nothing of a recent date has been received from General Steele in regard to the condition of affairs in Arkansas or his intended movements. In regard to re-enforcements for your army, I am sending regiments forward as fast as they can be organized and transportation procured. Recruiting is slow and will be till Congress passes the conscription bill, which they have been discussing more than two months.

It is very difficult to procure horses, and transportation for animals and forage. To obviate this in some degree you may be obliged to put some of your cavalry in the field on foot to be remounted as you procure animals in the enemy's country. General Grant did this in Mississippi with complete success. Some of his men were mounted on mules and instructed to change them for horses wherever they could find them. Would it not be possible to purchase Mexican horses at Matamoras? They are small, but hardy, and would answer well for a campaign in Texas.

General Carleton was ordered, some time since, to occupy the line of the Rio Grande as far down as possible. Although he may be too weak to open

communication with you, he may, by occupying some points in northern Texas, afford a shelter to refugees, and perhaps draw some of the rebel troops in that direction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK.

Major General BANKS, *New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, February 12, 1864.*

GENERAL: Captain Robert T. Dunham, of my staff, returned this evening from a visit to General Steele at Little Rock, Arkansas, to whom he had been sent to communicate upon the subject of the movement up Red river. General Steele states in his despatch sent by Captain Dunham that he will be able to co-operate with the forces of this department, by the way of Pine Bluff and Monroe, at the time we are ready to move.

This route is said to be practicable earlier than by way of Camden or Arkadelphia, though he states that there are serious objections to it. He will be able to advance with ten thousand well-appointed troops, leaving a force sufficient to hold the line of the Arkansas. I hope to keep in constant communication with General Steele, so as to be able to effect a junction with him as early as the navigation of the river will permit, and also with General Sherman.

Captain Dunham bears a despatch from Brigadier General Tuttle, commanding at Vicksburg, dated the 8th of February, in which it is stated that General Sherman had encountered the enemy on the 4th or 5th instant, and driven them through Jackson, occupying that place on the 6th. It is understood that he has since occupied Meridian. General Sherman's despatches to me represent that he will be able to co-operate in our movement by the 1st of March.

No advices have been received from Admiral Porter since my last despatch. I shall be ready to move by the 1st of March. A staff officer sent up the river to obtain such river transportation as shall be necessary for our movement reports that he has succeeded in obtaining all that is required.

My troops are in good health and spirits, and a sufficient re-enforcement has arrived to compensate for the furloughs given to veteran volunteers. I am confident of a successful result of the expedition.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 15, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Is General Banks preparing an expedition to go up Red river? Boats seem to be assembling at New Orleans for that purpose. I ask because in that event

it will not be necessary for me to send, as I contemplated doing on Sherman's return, to the Red river.

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U. S. GRANT,  
Major General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., February 16, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Nashville :*

According to General Banks's last despatch, (February 7,) Admiral Faragut was to threaten Mobile in order to draw the enemy from Sherman and Thomas. As soon as Sherman's present expedition is terminated, (about the 1st of March,) it was understood that he and General Banks would move up Red river to meet Steele's advance against Shreveport. This was General Banks's plan, if Sherman and Steele could co-operate with him. Sherman had agreed, but Steele not yet heard from. The time of movement would depend upon stage of water in Red river. It was understood that as soon as Steele and Banks had effected a junction on that river, Sherman's army could all be withdrawn to operate east of the Mississippi.

Will not the probable delay in expelling Longstreet from East Tennessee justify the adoption of this plan of Banks and Sherman? Banks reports his force too weak to advance without Sherman's aid.

H. W. HALLECK,  
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 16, 1865.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief :*

General Allen telegraphed me that General Banks had taken large amount of river transportation to New Orleans, preparatory to a move up Red river; also that a staff officer was collecting transportation for Sherman for the same move. This was crippling us here for transportation, and I stopped it. I expected Sherman, however, to go to Shreveport and form junction with Steele's movement, if Banks has not the force to send. I would suggest that Sherman himself go in person, if a part of his troops go.

U. S. GRANT,  
Major General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., February 17, 1864.*

Major General GRANT, *Nashville :*

I have given no orders to General Sherman in regard to his movements, but requested him to communicate freely with Generals Banks and Steele in regard to concert of action. I presume, from General Banks's despatches, that General

Sherman proposes to go in person to assist in effecting a junction between Banks and Steele on Red river. By last despatch he was waiting an answer from Steele.

In regard to river transportation you will exercise your own discretion, giving them all you can spare.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, February 19, 1864.*

GENERAL: It is with great pleasure that I have the honor to report the arrival in this department of the following named regiments and batteries, in good order, viz: 2d regiment New York veteran cavalry; 29th regiment Maine volunteer infantry; 30th regiment Maine volunteer infantry; 3d regiment Rhode Island cavalry; 1st Delaware battery; 2d Connecticut battery; 7th Massachusetts battery; company D, 4th Wisconsin heavy artillery; 13th Wisconsin battery. Also the following colored troops, viz: 1st regiment Missouri colored infantry; 1st and 2d battalions 14th Rhode Island artillery.

The 2d New York veteran cavalry seems to be an admirable body of men, but I fear, from present appearances, that their horses will not arrive in time to have them mounted for the impending campaign. I hope the Quartermaster General will hasten the forwarding of horses from St. Louis.

Very respectfully, general, your most obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., February 23, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of February 12 is received. It contains our latest information from Generals Sherman and Steele. It is hoped that your arrangements for the co-operation of these generals may prove successful. The communication with them from these headquarters is so difficult that it is not possible to give them other than very general instructions.

Several additional regiments are ready for transportation to your command, but are delayed for want of suitable vessels. I hope, however, to get them off in the course of a few days.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General BANKS, *New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 22, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, February 25, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of February 11 is received. My allusion to the expectations entertained of instructions from Washington, to which it refers, relates to the paragraph of your despatch of January 4 which says that, "so long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Generals Sherman and Steele." I replied, immediately upon receiving this despatch, that I would be ready to move in conjunction with Generals Sherman and Steele on the 1st of March, or as soon as they could move, or navigation would permit the movement. I immediately put myself in communication with General Sherman and General Steele, receiving from them despatches the substance of which has been transmitted to you, and stating that they would be ready to co-operate with me in the movement up the Red river by the 1st of March.

I had informed them that I would be ready to move at that time, and have sent an officer to communicate with General Sherman, if he can be found, or General Steele and Admiral Porter, upon the same subject, and to the same effect. I am ready to move the moment I can hear from either of these officers. If General Steele alone can co-operate with me, I shall move my column by the 5th of March. I am daily expecting despatches from him upon this subject.

General Sherman appears to have gone to the east, and, as far as public rumor indicates the direction of his movement, it is towards Mobile. In compliance with his request, Admiral Farragut made a demonstration upon the coast in the vicinity of Mobile, as indicating a purpose of attack, in order to draw off any troops that might be sent from Mobile to intercept the movement of his column. He expected, as I have heretofore informed you, to return to the Mississippi by the 1st of March, and to be ready to co-operate with me. Since that, I have not heard from him.

I am very greatly embarrassed and depressed by the demand which Admiral Farragut makes upon me for troops to assist him in a movement against Mobile, and also by the idea impressed upon the public mind that I am to co-operate with General Sherman against the same point. This would be my desire, if it were consistent with my orders from the government; but I understand that I am to move against Shreveport, and am unable to divide my command by any demonstration against Mobile, which must take some weeks before I could get them to this point again, and which would effectually defeat the operations which I have contemplated under your orders.

If General Steele replies, in conformity with his last despatch, that he can move by the first week in March, in the direction of Shreveport, I shall start my column, with as near fifteen thousand (15,000) men as I can make it, at the same time. It will be impossible for me to go into that country alone, as I have not a sufficient force to make myself secure against the concentrated force of the enemy, which is much stronger than mine.

I do not expect instructions from Washington beyond what I have received, except it relate to the movements of General Sherman or General Steele. If either one of these will co-operate with me, I shall move at once. I have been in constant preparation for this enterprise since the reception of your despatch upon this subject. There is but thirty-two inches of water above Alexandria; navigation to Alexandria is practicable. There is not water enough in the Atchafalaya to enable us to communicate at any point south of the Red river, and, therefore, all our water communication must be by the Mississippi and Red

rivers. I can be at Alexandria or Natchitoches on the 15th of March, if either of the other commands shall co-operate with me in time.

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I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.  
*Washington, D. C., February 27, 1864.*

GENERAL : Your despatch of the 19th instant in regard to the arrival of reinforcements is received, and your remarks in regard to cavalry horses have been copied and transmitted to the Quartermaster General.

Much anxiety is felt here lest your operations may be delayed till the season for a winter campaign is entirely over. Every effort has been made to send you troops. A part of a New York cavalry regiment has embarked with their horses at this place, and the remainder will follow as soon as transportation arrives. The 14th New Hampshire regiment will leave New York about the 12th of March, if transportation should be ready. The passage of the draft bill has greatly stimulated recruiting.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS, *New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 20, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, February 27, 1864.*

GENERAL : I have the honor to enclose copies of despatches received from Generals Sherman and Steele in relation to their movement, the substance of which I have stated before, and to which my despatch of the 25th of February refers. I am in daily expectation of receiving communications either from one or both of these officers through Captain Dunham, of my staff, who is now on his way to their headquarters for this purpose.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT.  
*Major and A. A. G. Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMY CORPS AND DEP'T OF ARKANSAS,  
*Little Rock, Arkansas, February 5, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 25th ultimo was received this morning by the hands of Captain Dunham.

I have endeavored to communicate with your forces in Louisiana and Texas, by means of spies sent across the country. One of them returned this evening, having been below Shreveport and thence to the Mississippi river. Captain Dunham will converse with him.

I learn the rebels have forage stations every ten miles from Monroe, Louisiana, to within forty miles of Pine Bluff, Arkansas. It is reported that they were provided for General Taylor's troops that were to march against Pine Bluff, in concert with Holmes's command.

The roads are now in such condition that an army could not move from here to the Ouachita with artillery or trains, and I am told that they will be impracticable for several months to come. I could not supply the advanced post at Benton on account of bad roads. It is therefore evident that, if an advance movement is to be made soon, it must be made up the Ouachita and Red rivers. If the troops should be moved down from Fort Smith to hold the mountain passes, sufficient forces moving up the two rivers could drive the rebels into Texas, which would probably cause many of the Missouri and Arkansas men to desert, and perhaps of the Texans also.

I may be able to move my command by way of Pine Bluff to Monroe by the time you will be ready to go up the Red river, as this route is said to be practicable earlier than the one by Camden, or that by Arkadelphia.

However, there are serious objections to it. Holmes has a large mounted force. It is impossible for me to state with any certainty how large a force I can concentrate.

A large proportion of my command have enlisted as veterans, and are going on furlough. As matters in the army are influenced so much by political intrigue, it is not certain that these troops will return to my command. The limits of my department are not perfectly defined—Fort Smith is excluded from it. The fort of that name is in the Indian territory, or partly so, and the town in Arkansas.

I was informed by an officer from there this evening that the troops at some of the posts this side of there were being moved out of Arkansas. I hope, however, to be able to advance with ten thousand well-appointed troops, leaving enough to hold the line of the Arkansas. This will be more than a match for Holmes's twelve or fifteen thousand. My troops are scattered, but it is the best arrangement under present circumstances. The principal posts are Batesville, Duval's Bluff, Little Rock, Pine Bluff, Lewisburg, and Dardanelles. I do not know whether any person is authorized to take from Arkansas the troops at Waldron, Van Buren, and Fayetteville, but it appears that some such movement is going on.

I shall endeavor to keep up communication with you, through emissaries, and shall be glad to receive any suggestions from you, and to co-operate with you in any of your movements if possible.

I will point out on the map to Captain Dunham the position of the rebels in Arkansas. They can concentrate rapidly on the Ouachita at Camden, or on Red river near Washington. Since writing the above the spy alluded to informs me that General Taylor moved to Shreveport with part of his command;



a part went to Camden, and two brigades to Monroe. It would appear from this that Pine Bluff may be their objective point.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FREDERICK STEELE,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy:

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

*Vicksburg, January 16, 1864.*

DEAR GENERAL: I arrived here yesterday from Chattanooga, having come via Nashville, Louisville, Cincinnati, Cairo, and Memphis. En route a letter from General Halleck overtook me, directing me to inquire into certain seizures here and at Natchez of horses, forage, &c., destined for you from St. Louis, and to make such orders as would prevent a recurrence. I have already directed a minute report of all the facts by General McPherson, and have received verbal explanations that satisfy me your chief quartermaster, Colonel Halabird, has much exaggerated the facts, and indulged in unwarranted crimination. His assertion that he can protect his stores *in transitu* against guerillas, but not against our own officials, is hardly the province of a quartermaster, however bellicose. But I assure you that both courtesy and a sense of right will cause me to make such orders as will prevent any of your stores being disturbed *in transitu*; and furthermore, I assure you that I will gladly share with you anything we possess.

Corn and forage are very scarce now above. There was a partial failure of the corn crop, and the severe winter has closed up all the water channels. I left Cairo in floating ice, and it was with infinite difficulty we forced our way through it. Navigation above Memphis is impossible, and below Memphis most difficult.

We are compelled to hunt for corn and fodder wherever it may be found, and I doubt if you will receive anything by the river for a month to come.

I must return to the army in the field in early February, but I propose to avail myself of the short time allowed me here in the department to strike a blow at Meridian and Demopolis. I think I can do it, and the destruction of the railroad east and west, north and south of Meridian, will close the doors of rapid travel and conveyance of stores between Mississippi and the confederacy east, that will make us all less liable to the incursions of the enemy towards the Mississippi river. In order to raise the necessary force I must strip some of my posts and lines, but the objects aimed at are so important as to justify the risk. I will return to Memphis to-morrow, start a cavalry force down the Mobile and Ohio road, bring down to Vicksburg certain troops now preparing at Memphis, and aim to leave Vicksburg for Jackson, Brandon, and Meridian about the 25th instant, and hope to be at or near Meridian February 8th, or 10th. Now the sudden movement of troops on this object will threaten Mobile.

I know not what you are doing in that quarter, but if you could have boats manœuvring about the mouth of Pascagoula, and near the passage between Fort Gaines and the main shore, about that time, it would keep up the delusion and prevent the enemy drawing from Mobile a force to strengthen the points aimed at by me. A feint kept up there for a week might be most useful, for, if on destroying Meridian and its railroad connexions, as I did those of Jackson last

summer, effectually, so as not to admit of repair in six months, Mobile would have no communication to the interior, save the Alabama river, and would, to that extent, be weakened. You know that the Memphis and Charleston road is either permanently ruined or in our hands, and that the single track from Meridian to Selma is the only link which unites Mississippi to Alabama and Georgia, and will agree with me that its destruction will do more to isolate the State of Mississippi than any single act; therefore I shall attempt it, and think I will surely succeed, if General Polk is not too heavily re-enforced from Mobile and Atlanta. Of course I want to preserve the utmost secrecy, which I can do unless the "free press" steal it from our clerks, who derive their knowledge from letters placed in their hands for record.

I think this movement, and one similar on Shreveport, as soon as the Red river rises, would pretty well settle the main question in the southwest, and I would like nothing better than to unite with you in such a movement, but I expect soon to be required by General Grant to hasten back to Huntsville, where I left the army of the Tennessee.

In this department I pay but little attention to guerillas. They have never attacked any place of note, and are chiefly employed in harassing their own people, who merit little favor at our hands. These will in time beg us to save them from their own irregular soldiery, and even then it will be well to let them continue to suffer the protection of Jeff. Davis—the protection the wolf gives the lamb.

Inasmuch as I must be absent from the department a good deal of my time, I beg you will correspond directly with General McPherson, who has my entire confidence, and whom I clothe with all my power in this part of my command.

I left General Grant about Christmas, at Nashville, but he was about starting for Knoxville. He seems to think that Lee, in Virginia, may push the repairs of the Virginia Valley railroad down to Longstreet, reinforce him, and make East Tennessee the scene of the next great battle.

I left my own troops busy patching up the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, and from Decatur to Stevenson, with the view to complete the circuit, so that stores can be accumulated along the line of the Tennessee, the base of operation for the next general campaign.

I should like much to hear from you as early as the 24th, by which time I hope to be here again.

Your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf, New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official copy:

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Vicksburg, Mississippi, January 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: I received yesterday, at the hands of Captain Dunham, aide-de-camp, your letter of the 25th instant, and hasten to reply. Captain Dunham has gone to the mouth of White river, *en route* to Little Rock, and the other officers who accompanied him have gone up to Cairo, as I understand, to charter twenty-five steamboats for the Red river trip. The Mississippi, though low for the season, is free of ice and in good boating order, but I understand Red river

is still low. I had a man in from Alexandria yesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that place impassable, save to the smallest boats.

My inland expedition is now working, and I will be off for Jackson, &c., tomorrow. The only fear I have is in the weather; all the other combinations are good. I want to keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile and the Alabama river, and therefore would be obliged if you would keep up an irritating foraging or other expedition in that direction.

My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me in embarking for Red river, though I am very anxious to operate in that direction. The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, I sent communication to Admiral Porter, and despatched to General Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to co-operate with you against Shreveport, and I will have his answer in time, for you cannot do anything till Red river has twelve feet of water on the rapids of Alexandria. That will be from March to June. I have lived on Red river, and know somewhat of the phases of that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be made rapidly, by simultaneous movements from Little Rock on Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of gunboats and transports directly up Red river. Admiral Porter will be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1. I think Steele could move with 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. I could take about 10,000, and you could, I suppose, the same. Your movement from Opelousas simultaneous with mine up the river would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort DeRussy, near Marks-ville, and the whole could appear at Shreveport about a day appointed. I doubt if the enemy would risk a siege, although they are, I am informed, fortifying and placing many heavy guns. It would be better for us that they should stand at Shreveport, as we might make large and important captures.

But I do not believe the enemy would fight a force of 30,000 men, with gunboats. I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and hope, before you have made up your dispositions, I will have the necessary permission. Half the army of the Tennessee is near the Tennessee river, beyond Huntsville, awaiting the completion of the railroad, and by present orders I will be compelled to hasten there, to command in person, unless General Grant modifies the plan. I have now in this department only the force left to hold the river and posts, and I am seriously embarrassed by the promises made the veteran volunteers for furloughs. I think by March 1 I could put afloat for Shreveport 10,000 men, provided I succeed in my present plan of clearing the Mississippi and breaking up the railroad about Meridian.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*Commanding Department of the Gulf,  
New Orleans, La.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 5, 1864.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of February 25 is just received. I have no official information of the plans or movements of Generals Sherman and Steele later than that received through you. Some newspaper accounts state that

General Sherman had penetrated to Selma, and others that he was moving on Mobile. But neither of these statements seems reliable. I understood General Sherman's plan, after reaching Meridian, was either to return to Vicksburg, or to act further against the enemy, as the circumstances of the case seemed to justify. A movement on Mobile was a possible contingency, but no part of any definite plan. It was further understood that Admiral Farragut's movement on Mobile, like that of General Thomas on Dalton, was simply a demonstration to draw a portion of the enemy from Sherman's front. No detachment of your forces on Mobile was contemplated, except by correspondents of newspapers, and it is not always safe to rely on their statements.

When General Sherman left Vicksburg he expected to return there by the 1st of March to co-operate with you west of the Mississippi, but he was of opinion that the condition of the river would not be favorable till a later period. I think it most probable that before this reaches you he will have returned to Vicksburg, or some other point on the river. Whether he has received any recent orders in regard to his movements from General Grant I am not advised, nor have I any information of General Steele's plans, further than that all his movements will be directed to facilitate your operations towards Shreveport.

The remainder of Scott's 900 cavalry regiment, and also a regiment of colored troops from Philadelphia, will leave immediately for New Orleans. Whether any more will soon be sent to your department I am not at present able to say. Much will depend upon recruiting, which is now progressing most favorably. Lieutenant General Grant is expected in Washington about the 10th instant, and I presume will then assume the command of the army as general-in-chief.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,  
*New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*January 20, 1865.*

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, March 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: Major General Sherman, of General Grant's department, arrived in this city on the evening of the 1st instant, having completed his expedition to Meridian to his entire satisfaction. He returned to Vicksburg on the evening of the 3d, to arrange for his co-operation in the Red river movement. Unless delayed by want of steam transportation, of which we have put everything we have at his command, he will be ready to join me on the Red river by the 17th, where I hope to be at that date. He expects to furnish ten thousand (10,000) men for that purpose.

Captain Dunham, of my staff, returned from the headquarters of General Steele yesterday, bearing communications from him, copies of which will be forwarded to you. General Steele appears to have changed the plan entertained when he last communicated with me. Copies of his despatch at that time have been forwarded to you. He then proposed to move by the way of Monroe for the Red river. He is now apprehensive, in consequence of the reduction of his forces, that he can only enter upon a movement, for the diversion of the enemy, in the direction of Arkadelphia, without any expectation of joining us at Shreveport, or any other position on the river. General Sherman and myself have

earnestly urged him to abandon this idea, that in any event, the three forces in the course of thirty days would meet at Shreveport. General Steele represents that he will have about six thousand men at his command. I respectfully request that orders may be given to him to co-operate with us upon the point named, in accordance with the plan originally proposed by you. I see nothing to defeat its success. Admiral Porter is ready to move up the river in co-operation with us as soon as his vessels can be admitted.

General McClernand has been assigned to the command of the troops in Texas, and will leave for an examination of the posts at Matagorda bay and Brownsville to-morrow. Brigadier General Ransom will have command of that portion of the 13th army corps which participates in the movement on the Red river.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, March 10, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a despatch received from Major General Frederick Steele, by the hands of Captain Dunham, of my staff, on March 5, the substance of which was transmitted to you in my despatch of March 6. I also enclose a copy of a letter received from Admiral Farragut, which contains our last information from the fleet off Mobile.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,

*Little Rock, Arkansas, February 28, 1864.*

GENERAL: When my letter to you was written I did not anticipate being called upon to move at so early a day as that named in your despatch, while the obstacles with which I should have to contend, then alluded to, still exist, in addition to others which have since arisen. Several of my veteran regiments are on furlough, and several others demand that the promises under which they enlisted shall be fulfilled. An election for State officers is ordered for the 14th proximo, and the President is very anxious that it should be a success. Without the assistance of the troops to distribute the poll-books with the oath of allegiance, and to protect the voters at the polls, it cannot succeed. It is reported already that the rebels contemplate making a dash for the purpose of breaking up the election. They have a large mounted force, and their horses

are represented to be in fine condition. They have just received a re-enforcement to their stock from Texas. I could not now concentrate anything like the force named in my former letter; and if I should move by the way of Monroe with the principal part of my command, it would leave Missouri open to another cavalry raid, and I think the rebels would certainly take advantage of it. They supposed that Sherman's expedition was projected against them, and it caused quite a stampede among them. All their troops, except the cavalry and mounted infantry, were moved to Red river, and part of Price's division crossed at Duley's ferry. They have a pontoon bridge at Fulton now. Quite a large infantry force is reported to be at Spring Hill, about 25 miles from Washington. The newspaper printed at the latter place informs the people that General Smith is going to hold the line of Red river. It is my opinion that if you and Sherman move up Red river with what forces you can muster, and I make a demonstration to turn their other flank (supposing Red river to be their line of defence) from here and Fort Smith, they will run to Texas. It seems that they are prepared for some such movement, for their principal supplies have been sent in that direction. The rebel troops are becoming more demoralized every day than they were the day previous. Their officers have no confidence in them, and I believe they will desert to us by the thousand the first opportunity.

I have ordered out a cavalry scouting party in considerable force, with orders to distribute 3,000 copies of the amnesty proclamation among them. I would send all my effective cavalry force from here to get on to the Fort Smith road by way of Hot Springs. The cavalry from Fort Smith would join, and the whole move to Red river, which they would reach at some main crossing above Fulton.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

FREDERICK STEELE,

*Major General.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding Department of the Gulf,*

Official copy:

JAMES L. ANDERSON,

*1st Lieut. and Sec. to Maj. Gen. Banks.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G.*

LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS,

*March 12, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

General Banks, with seventeen thousand (17,000) and ten thousand (10,000) of Sherman's, will be at Alexandria on the 17th instant. This is more than equal for everything Kirby Smith can bring against them. Smith will run. By holding the line of the Arkansas secure I can soon free this State from armed rebels. Sherman insists upon my moving upon Shreveport to co-operate with the above-mentioned forces with all my effective force. I have prepared to do so, against my own judgment and that of the best-informed people here. The roads are most if not quite impracticable; the country is destitute of provisions on the route we should be obliged to take. I made a proposition to General Banks to threaten the enemy's flank and rear with all my cavalry, and to make a feint with infantry on the Washington road. I yielded to Sherman and Blunt, so far as this plan is concerned. Blunt wished me to move by Monroe to Red river; Sherman wants me to go by Camden and Overton to Shreveport.

The latter is impracticable, and the former plan would expose the line of the Arkansas and Missouri to cavalry raids. Holmes has a large mounted force. I agreed to move by Arkadelphia or Hot Springs and Washington to Shreveport. I can move with about seven thousand (7,000,) including the frontier. Our scouting parties frequently have skirmishes with detached parties all over the State, and if they should form in my rear in considerable force I should be obliged to fall back to save my depots, &c.

Please give me your opinion immediately, as I shall march to-morrow or next day.

\* \* \* \* \*

F. STEELE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 13, 1864.*

Major General STEELE, *Little Rock, Arkansas:*

I advise that you proceed to co-operate in the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport, unless General Grant orders differently. I send to him the substance of your telegram of the 12th.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 13, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Louisville, Kentucky:*

General Steele telegraphs that Banks with seventeen thousand and Sherman with ten thousand move from Alexandria on Shreveport, and wish him to co-operate. He says he can go with seven thousand effective, but objects to the movement on account of bad roads and guerillas, and prefers to remain on the defensive line of the Arkansas. I have replied that he should co-operate with Banks and Sherman unless you direct otherwise. His objections on account of guerillas threatening his rear will apply equally to an advance at any time into the enemy's country.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 15, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Nashville:*

A despatch just received from General Banks dated March 6. He expects to effect a junction with Sherman's forces on Red river by the 17th. He desires that positive orders be sent to General Steele to move in conjunction with

them for Red river with all his available force. Sherman and Banks are of opinion that Steele can do much more than make a mere demonstration, as he last proposed. A telegram from you might decide him.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major General, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., March 17, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Nashville:*

\* \* \* \* \*

General Banks reports that the 12th Illinois cavalry ordered to his department have been dismounted at St. Louis and the horses sent to your orders, and that other horses collected there for his command have been diverted. I fear these diversions may interfere with his movements.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major General, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, March 18, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose for your information copies of despatches which reached me yesterday morning, announcing the capture of Fort DeRussy on the 14th by General A. J. Smith's division, and of Alexandria on the 15th by the co-operating naval forces. The army in western Louisiana, consisting of the 1st division of the 19th, the 3d and 4th divisions of the 13th corps, and the cavalry division, with several regiments of the corps d'Afrique, was to have moved from Franklin on Alexandria early last week, but its march was interrupted by a severe rain-storm, rendering the roads wholly impassable. The movement was, however, commenced on the —; the whole force was in motion beyond New Iberia, and my headquarters were en route to join the expedition when the enclosed despatch arrived.

Leaving General Franklin to continue his march as expeditiously as possible to Alexandria, I shall proceed immediately to that point.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
Major General, Commanding.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
General-in-Chief, *Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
Major and A. A. G. of Vols.

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
*War Department.*

The following telegram received at New Orleans 9.40 a. m., March 17, 1864, from Baton Rouge, dated March 17, 1864:



Brigadier General C. P. STONE, *Chief of Staff*:

Just received from General A. J. Smith 24 officers, 300 rank and file, prisoners taken at Fort Russy, Red river; will send New Orleans as soon as possible.

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,  
*Brigadier General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, March 18, 1864.*

Official copy:

A. DUER IRVING,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 21, 1865.*

Official copy:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
*Culpeper, Va., March 25, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff.*

I sent a letter to General Banks before leaving Nashville, directing him to finish his present expedition and assemble all his available force at New Orleans as soon as possible, and prepare to receive orders for the taking of Mobile. If Shreveport is carried, about eight thousand (8,000) troops can be spared from Steele and Rosecrans to join Banks, and if more is necessary to insure success against Mobile, they can be taken from Sherman.

\* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official;

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD,  
*Culpeper Court House, March 28, 1864.*

GENERAL:

\* \* \* \* \*

In the campaign which it is desirable to commence as soon as our veterans return, it is important to have some one near Banks who can issue orders to him and see that they are obeyed. This will be specially important if a move is made against \_\_\_\_\_, as I now calculate upon.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865.*

Official extract:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Volunteers.*

DENVER, *March 31, 1864.*

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF: The expedition you ordered down the Rio Grande cannot be made at present for the want of subsistence, corn and beef, and corn must be purchased in Chihuahua, where only specie or specie drafts will be received. Please have the subsistence and quartermaster's departments each credited in either New York, St. Louis or San Francisco with one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in specie to be paid on the order of Major J. C. McFerran, my chief of staff. We can make these purchases only in Mexico, where our treasury notes will not be received. It is important to have this deposit at once, as time is everything. Please answer by telegraph. If governor of Chihuahua gives permission for us to march on Mexican side of river to Presidio del Norte, or below, may we accept? Can Mexican minister in Washington grant such permission on behalf of his government? If so, please obtain it and send it to us. There are but two routes through our territory, namely: wagon road by Fort Davis, Texas, impracticable for want of water; the other, a very difficult pack train route, down the Rio Grande. The route through Mexico is the shortest and best. Please answer by telegraph at once, as I am ordered to await your answer here.

By order of Brig. Gen. Carleton, commanding department of New Mexico.

J. C. MCFERRAN,  
*Major and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Alexandria, La., April 2, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th of March. Our information is, that General Steele is moving on Shreveport from Little Rock, and was at the last advices at Camden. We have scouts on the way to him, and must have more definite information soon. General Smith, with a column of ten thousand (10,000) men, from the army of the Mississippi, is with us. Our troops now occupy Natchitoches, and we hope to be in Shreveport by the 10th of April. I do not fear concentration of the enemy at that point; my fear is that they may not be willing to meet us there; if not and my forces are not weakened to too great an extent, I shall pursue the enemy into the interior of Texas for the sole purpose of destroying or dispersing his forces, if in my power, keeping in view the necessity of the co-operation of some of my troops east of the Mississippi, and losing no time in the campaign in which I am engaged. Until we reach Shreveport it will be impossible to form any definite plan of operations.

The enemy has fortified the Sabine at Burr's ferry and at Sabine Town during the last two months, for the double purpose of preventing the invasion of the State in that direction and covering their retreat. Taylor's forces are said to be on that line. This will not divert us from our movement.

General Smith's command will return to Vicksburg on the 15th or 17th of this month, under orders from General Grant. The river has been and is still very low, which has delayed our operations. The gunboats were not able to cross the rapids at Alexandria until day before yesterday. Admiral Porter went up to-day. I leave Alexandria for Natchitoches to-night.

Your suggestions in regard to the concentration of my command have been duly considered. I do not think that there is any unnecessary dispersion of troops. I have garrisons on the Rio Grande, at Pass Cavallo, in Texas, New

Orleans, Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, and Pensacola and Key West : none of them large, considering the importance of the positions they occupy. I should be glad to surrender any of these points if, in the judgment of the government, it can be done with safety. The President has expressed the wish that our ground may be maintained in Texas. In my belief they are all important. Matagorda bay commands the entrance to eastern and central Texas from the coast ; it is of great importance that this place should be held if we should be compelled to operate from the coast. The garrison is not large ; it can co-operate with us the moment we enter Texas in our present movement, and hold on the coast a force superior to its own. I enclose a statement of the strength of each garrison. If you glance at our positions, you will see that I am able to draw from each the last man that can be spared from its defence. This is true of every garrison from Brownsville by the way of New Orleans to Port Hudson ; Pensacola and Key West, on the Gulf, are the only exceptions. I do not think it possible better to arrange the troops for the operations in which we are engaged at this time ; and if we are not limited as to time, or greatly reduced in force, I am confident of an immediate and successful issue.

It will be necessary for the government to designate which of the posts now held can best be abandoned. One brigade of troops now at Port Hudson is ordered to join this column.

The following statement will present to you the strength of the garrisons of all the posts now held :

Rio Grande.....	3,000	New Orleans.....	1,125
Pass Cavallo (Matagorda bay).	3,277	Baton Rouge.....	1,565
Pensacola.....	900	Plaquemine (colored).....	620
Key West.....	791	Port Hudson (colored).....	9,409

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
*Headquarters of the Army, Washington D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 21, 1865.*

Official copy :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *April 7, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

GENERAL: \* \* \* \* \* Arkansas has no real connexion with this command. All the territory lying west of the Mississippi forms one military command. The active fighting force should be united under, say, Steele, on Red river, Shreveport especially, which covers all Arkansas and Missouri, and is the great doorway to and from Texas.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

CULPEPER, VA., *April 15, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

Please send General Hunter to report to me. From the last despatches from

Major General Banks, I fear he is going to be late in his spring movement, and I am desirous of sending an officer of rank with duplicates of his orders, and with further instructions.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Extract from telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,

*In the Field, Camden, April 17, 1864.*

GENERAL: The troops from Fort Smith were to have joined me at Arkadelphia on the 1st instant. Thayer changed his route, and all my messengers failed to communicate with him until the 5th, at Rockport.

I had crossed the Little Missouri at Elkins's ferry and was on high ground, having found the other roads to Camden impassable. A heavy rain fell, raising the Little Missouri so it could not be forded, and rendering it necessary to corduroy about five miles of bottom and lay the pontoon bridge to get Thayer across. He delayed us eight days, which he explains.

We were bushwhacked, attacked in front, rear, and flank by Price's cavalry and twelve pieces of artillery. At Little Missouri they had a line of breastworks covering the hills where the bottom terminates over a mile in extent. After a severe skirmish they fell back to Prairie Dore, where another severe skirmish took place. The rebels were always repulsed, with considerable loss on our part and with greater on theirs.

The rebels fell back across the prairie to a line of rifle-pits and epaulements for guns in barbette along a skirt of timber commanding the Washington and Camden road and the approach on the prairie for over half a mile across. This part of the prairie and the works were hid from view by a belt of timber along a creek. We developed their position by skirmishers, and turned their left flank, and would have had an enfilading fire, but Price, who commanded in person, withdrew his forces and retreated towards Washington. We pursued a few miles, and then turned towards Camden. Our supplies were nearly exhausted, and so was the country. We were obliged to forage from five to fifteen miles on either side of the road to keep our stock alive. My spies sent to Banks did not return. Those he promised to send did not reach me. Everybody said that Banks had been repulsed below Natchitoches, and had fallen back. Telegraphic despatches have been received at this place to the same effect. One of my spies sent to Banks has come in and confirms the report. He says that he went to within thirty miles of Alexandria.

The rebels have endeavored to destroy all produce that they could not consume or carry away for a considerable distance around this place. When they found we had turned this way they tried to beat us here; Marmaduke got in our front, and Dunking in our rear, by the middle and north roads, and endeavored to hold us until Price could get into the fortifications by the south road with his infantry and artillery, having evacuated Camden under the supposition that we were marching on Shreveport by the way of Washington. We marched twenty-three miles the last day into Camden, driving Marmaduke before us from position to position. Cooper and Maxy have come from the Indian territory, and Price is now concentrating at Woodlawn.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, &c.,

F. STEELE, *Major General.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *Washington, January 20, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
Grand Ecote, La., April 17, 1864.

[Duplicate for General Halleck.]

GENERAL: The campaign upon which we have entered has already developed several facts of great importance :

*First.* The enemy regards the possession of Shreveport as a point vital to the existence of the trans-Mississippi army, and will fight to maintain its possession with all their forces, and with great desperation.

*Second.* It has changed their operations from an *offensive* to a *defensive* character. It is unquestionable that they had intended to make an invasion of Missouri, which they hoped would have disturbed the arrangement of troops east of the Mississippi.

By this movement we have defeated that expectation, and hold their full strength for the defence of their position, relieving entirely Missouri and Arkansas.

*Third.* The co-operation of Steele upon the line on which he is moving renders us no assistance whatever. We should have but one column and one line, and with his forces there would be no obstacle to our progress.

*Fourth.* The low stage of water in Red river deprives us substantially of the assistance of the gunboats, leaving us to depend entirely upon the strength of our land forces, with very little aid, even of water transportation, above the point now occupied.

These considerations, together, show that the campaign is of greater importance than was generally anticipated at its commencement, and also that immediate success, with a concentration of our forces, is within our reach. I have drawn from my department all the men that can be spared, which gives me at the outside twenty thousand (20,000) bayonets.

The junction of General Steele's forces would give me all the strength I need.

Governor Hall, of Missouri, who is here, and who accepts the idea I have presented, that this campaign is a defence of Missouri, represents that there is a large unoccupied force in Missouri and Kansas, from which ten thousand (10,000) men could be spared without detriment to the public service. I earnestly represent the increased importance of this campaign; the impossibility of withdrawing from it *without the sacrifice of the navy* in the present state of navigation; the fact that it has changed the operations of the enemy from an offensive to a purely defensive attitude; that it is a protection to Missouri and Arkansas as well as Louisiana, and the certainty of its immediate and successful termination, as reasons why the forces west of the Mississippi should be concentrated as far as possible upon this line, and with this column. If the rebel army under Smith is destroyed no other can be reorganized, and the defence of these States can be safely left, in a great measure, to the people themselves; the whole of the available force of the Union army being turned, in the course of the season, to the assistance of the troops east of the Mississippi. Unless this army can be destroyed or dispersed, it will require all our forces, and more, to protect these States. I regard it of the highest importance, in the changed aspect of affairs, that this concentration should be made.

I enclose herewith a statement of the garrisons in my department, with the number of men at each, and suggest that the forces are not too large for the defence of the posts which they hold. The river is steadily falling, and scarcely navigable above this point. But our expedition does not depend on the river. We only want the men necessary to overcome the enemy, who is in full force between us and Steele, moving alternately against one and the other, neither column being in sufficient force to effect his position.

If we leave the Red river in possession of the unbroken forces of the enemy,

it will require constant vigilance and large forces to protect the navigation of the Mississippi or any of the trans-Mississippi States from invasion during the year.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding Army of the United States, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*January 21, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*Grand Ecore, La., April 17, 1864.*

Effective aggregate for duty of troops at the several posts and stations in the department of the Gulf:

Rio Grande.....	3,000
Pass Cavallo.....	1,227
Pensacola.....	1,500
Key West.....	791
New Orleans.....	750
Baton Rouge.....	885
Port Hudson.....	6,809

The above statement is as accurate as the imperfect material at hand will admit of making.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*January 21, 1865.*

Official:

— — —, *A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,

*In the Field, Camden, Arkansas, April 18, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff, Washington D. C.:*

Since sending my despatch of yesterday one of my messengers has returned from Red river. He left General Banks on the 13th instant, but brought no written communication. He says General Banks directed him to say that he fought the enemy on the 8th and 9th of April at or near Pleasant Hill, about thirty miles above Natchitoches, and defeated them, but was obliged to fall back to Grand Ecore for supplies. This place is about seventy-five miles above Alexandria. He further says a staff officer of General Lee informed him that in the first day's fight the enemy took twenty-two pieces of artillery and all of General Lee's train, but that next day the artillery was recaptured, except eight pieces. He also says Red river is very low, and that some of the gunboats are aground, unable to move either way.

Very respectfully,

F. STEELE,

*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.*

Official:

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major and A. A. G. Volunteers.*

[Received April 25, 1864.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,  
*In the Field, near, Camden, via Little Rock, April 20, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Chief of Staff*:

GENERAL: Since sending my despatch of yesterday one of my messengers has returned from Red river. He left General Banks on the 13th, but brought no written communication. He says General Banks directed him to say that he fought the enemy the 8th and 9th of April, at or near Pleasant Hill, about thirty miles above Natchitoches, and defeated them, but was compelled to fall back to Frondusis for supplies. This place is about seventy-five miles above Alodego. He further says a staff officer of General Lee informs him that the first day's fight the enemy took twenty-two pieces of artillery and all of General Lee's train, but that the artillery was recaptured, except eight pieces. He also says Red river is very low, and that the gunboats are reported aground, unable to move either way.

Very respectfully,

F. STEELE,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

[Received April 25, 1864.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,  
*In the Field, Camden, via Little Rock, April 20, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff*:

The troops from Fort Smith who have joined me are at Arkadelphia. On the 1st instant Thayer changed his route. All my messengers failed to communicate with him until the 5th, at Rockport. I had crossed the Little Missouri at Elkin's ferry and was on high ground, having found the other roads to Camden impassable. A heavy rain fell, raising the Little Missouri so it could not be forded, and rendering it necessary to corduroy about about five miles of bottom and lay the pontoon bridges to get Thayer across. He delayed us eight days, which he explained. We are bushwhacked and attacked in front, rear, and flank by Price's cavalry and twelve pieces of artillery. At Little Missouri they had a line of breastworks crossing the hills where the bottom terminates over a mile in extent. After a severe skirmish they fell back to Prairie Dore, when another severe skirmish took place; the rebels were always repulsed, with considerable loss on our side and with greater on theirs. The rebels fell back across the prairie to a line of rifle-pits and epaulements for guns in barbette along a skirt of timber commanding the Washington and Camden road and the approaches on the prairie for one-half a mile around this part of the prairie, and the works were hid from our view by a belt of timber along a creek. We developed their position by skirmishers and turned their left flank, and would have had an enfilading fire, but Price, who commanded in person, withdrew his forces and retreated towards Washington. We pursued a few miles, and then turned towards Camden. Our supplies were nearly exhausted, and so also the country. We were obliged to forage from five to fifteen miles on either side of the roads to keep our stock alive. My scouts sent to Banks did not return. Those he promised to send did not reach. Everybody said Banks had been to Natchitoches and had fallen back. Telegraphic despatches have been received

at this place to the same effect. One of my spies sent to Banks has come in and confirms the report. He says he went to within thirty miles of Alexandria. The rebels have endeavored to destroy all products that they could not consume or carry away for a considerable distance around this place. When they found we had turned this way they tried to beat us here. Marmaduke got in our front, and Dokeney in our rear, by the middle and north road, and endeavored to hold us until Price could get into the fortifications by the south road with his infantry and artillery, having evacuated Camden under the supposition that we were marching on Shreveport by the way of Washington. We marched twenty-three miles the last day on Camden, driving Marmaduke before us from position to position. Cooper and Morey have come from the Indian territory, and Price is now concentrating at Wood Camden. An immense amount of labor has been expended in fortifying Camden and cutting away forests. There are nine forts on eminences, and they seem to be well located, strategically and commercially. I regard it as the first town in Arkansas. The Washita is navigable always for several months in the year to this place, and sometimes to Arkadelphia. At present there is twenty-four feet in the channel. We captured a large steamer thirty miles below here, which the enemy left on our approach, with a gunboat as convoy. We can get supplies at the river sooner from Pine Bluff, and will move to Red river as soon as possible, but I consider it all-important to hold this place. Red river is much less depended upon for purposes of navigation than the Arkansas.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to be, &c.,

F. STEELE, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

CULPEPER, VA., *April 22, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

You can see from General Brayman's despatch to me something of General Banks's disaster. I have been satisfied for the last nine months that to keep General Banks in command was to neutralize a large force and to support it most expensively. Although I do not insist on it, I think the best interests of the service demand that General Reynolds should be placed in command at once, and that he name his own successor to the command of New Orleans.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, April 23, 1864.*

This telegram shown to the President by order of the Secretary of War. The President replied that he must delay acting on it for the present.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 25, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper* :

\* \* \* \* \*

I have just seen Admiral Porter's despatch, dated Grand Ecore, April 14, to the Navy Department. He says, whatever may be said, the army there has met with a great defeat, and is much demoralized. He speaks in strong terms of Banks's mismanagement, and of the good conduct of A. J. Smith and his corps. He fears that if Smith is withdrawn Banks will retreat still further, and Steele's command and the gunboats above the rapids (which, from fall of water, cannot be withdrawn) will be greatly periled, if not lost. He says Banks's army was ten days behind the appointed time. He protests against the withdrawing of Smith at this time, as it would be fatal to us. The Navy Department asks to know this, in order to telegraph instructions to Cairo for Admiral Porter. What shall I reply?

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, CULPEPER, VA., April 25, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

I would send orders to General Steele to return to Little Rock ; to General Banks to return himself immediately to New Orleans, and make preparations to carry out his previous instructions the moment his troops returned ; to place the senior officer under himself in command of the troops in the field, with instructions to see the gunboats safely out of Red river as soon as possible, and then return all the troops rapidly to where they belong. If before receiving these instructions he has taken Shreveport, then to leave General Steele and the navy in charge of the river, giving General Steele, if necessary, all of Smith's troops.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER COURT HOUSE, VA.,  
April 25, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

A. J. Smith will have to stay with General Banks until the gunboats are out of their difficulty. General Banks ought to be ordered to New Orleans, and leave all further execution on Red river in other hands. I have just received two private letters, one from New Orleans and one anonymous, from the 13th corps, giving deplorable accounts of General Banks's mismanagement. His own report and these letters clearly show all his disasters to be attributable to his incompetency. \* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 26, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper* :

Your telegram of the 22d, asking for the removal of General Banks, was submitted to the President, who replied that he must await further information before he could act in the matter.

General Steele was at Camden on the 20th instant, and was informed of General Banks's disaster. An order to him to return to Little Rock would probably reach him in five or six days; one to General Banks would not reach him in less than two or three weeks. This would cause a conflict in your proposed instructions to these officers, if Banks should have advanced on Shreveport, for Steele would then have returned to Little Rock.

Would it not be better to send the instructions of your telegram to Banks, and a copy of them to General Steele, with orders to communicate with General Banks, or his superior in command, and to carry out the spirit of your instructions as, in his judgment, the condition of affairs at the time would require?

I omitted to state that Admiral Porter says that the failure of Banks's expedition, and the withdrawal of our forces from Red river, will result in the loss of nearly all Louisiana and a part of Arkansas, where there is already a pretty strong Union sentiment.

If General Banks is withdrawn from the field, General Franklin will be the senior officer left.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

APRIL 26, 1864.

General HALLECK :

I send this sketch, just received from Admiral Porter, with a very long letter full and *strong*, but evidently designed for me alone. I would be willing to send it to you or General Grant, but I fear some expressions as to General Banks would not be proper. I fear for Steele, but messengers have been sent him from every quarter.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, January 21, 1865.

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 27, 1865.

Major General BANKS,  
*Department of the Gulf, via Cairo :*

Lieutenant General Grant directs that on the receipt of this order you will return yourself immediately to New Orleans, and make preparations to carry

out his previous instructions the moment your troops return to that place. The troops in the field will be left under command of the senior officer, with instructions, if Shreveport has been taken, and junction formed with Steele, to leave General Steele with all of General Smith's troops, if necessary, and the navy, to hold the line of Red river.

If, when this is received, you shall have failed to accomplish the object of your campaign, by securing Red river to Shreveport, you will direct the officer left in command to see the gunboats safely out of Red river as soon as possible, and then return all the troops rapidly to where they belong; General Steele returning to and holding the line of the Arkansas.

A copy of this despatch will be sent to General Steele via Little Rock, with instructions to communicate with you as early as possible.

The commanding officers at Cairo and Little Rock will send this to Generals Banks and Steele by special messengers.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VA., *April 28, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

General Banks's despatch of the 17th received.

I do not see that better orders can be given than those sent a few days ago. If General Banks has not advanced on Shreveport and beaten the enemy, then Steele will be so exposed to a superior force as to make it necessary to re-enforce him. I would order, in this event, General A. J. Smith's whole force to General Steele. General Banks, by his failure, has absorbed ten thousand veteran troops that should now be with General Sherman, and thirty thousand of his own, that would have been moving towards Mobile, and this without accomplishing any good result.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VA., *April 29, 1864—10.30 a. m.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

On due reflection I do not see that anything can be done this spring with troops west of the Mississippi, except on that side. I think, therefore, it will be better to put the whole of that territory into one military division, under some good officer, and let him work out of present difficulties without reference to previous instructions. All instructions that have been given, have been given with the view of getting as many of these troops east of the Mississippi as possible.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 29, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper* :

Your telegram of 10.30 a. m. has been received and submitted to the Secretary of War. You do not name any officer for the trans-Mississippi command. Did you propose to leave Banks in the general command, or only of his present department, or to supersede him entirely?

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major General, *Chief of Staff*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VA., April 29, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

\* \* \* \* \*

I would leave General Banks in command of his department, but order him to his headquarters in New Orleans.

\* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VA., April 30, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

My despatch to you of 6 p. m. yesterday answers the questions asked in your letter of the 29th, just received, except as to the extent of the trans-Mississippi division. I would not have it include Roscerans's and Curtis's. An entire failure of the Banks expedition may make operations requiring an increase of force necessary in either of those departments. You see from my despatch I do not propose removing General Banks, but would not increase his command.

\* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., April 30, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper* :

As some time may elapse before trans-Mississippi affairs are definitely decided upon, had I not better telegraph to Cairo and Little Rock, modifying my telegram of the 27th, to the effect that no troops will be withdrawn from operations

against Shreveport and on Red river, and that these operations will be continued, under direction of the officer senior in command in the field, till further orders?

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VIRGINIA,  
*April 30, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

Your suggestion to modify orders for troops on Red river, so as to leave them to operate there until something definite is settled upon, I think advisable. Please send the order.

\* \* \* \* \*

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., April 30, 1864.*

Major General BANKS, *via Cairo,*  
Major General STEELE, *via Little Rock:*

Lieutenant General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red river, and that operations there be continued under the senior officer in command until further orders.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

CULPEPER, VIRGINIA,  
*May 3, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff:*

\* \* \* \* \*

I will have to leave affairs west entirely with you. General Banks now proposes to keep Smith's force altogether, so as to give him sufficient strength to operate against Mobile. It is now too late for Smith's force to return to be of any use in the spring campaign, but I do think it is a waste of strength to trust General Banks with a large command or an important expedition.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., May 3, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT, *Culpeper* :

Your last instructions in regard to trans-Mississippi matters were telegraphed to Cairo, and were sent by General Brayman down the river on May 1. The President has seen your telegram, but has said nothing to me on the subject since I last wrote to you. I will write to you immediately.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major General, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, January 23, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,  
Little Rock, May 4, 1864.

GENERAL : It is my opinion that no future operations can be carried on against Red river with the line of the Arkansas as a base of supplies. If Banks has failed to take Shreveport, I think the Ouachita should be held by us, before any combined movement like the last should be attempted again. It would be utterly impossible to obtain forage, or any other supplies, in any part of the country that I have been over during my recent expedition. The Ouachita is next to White, in this State, for purposes of navigation, and if held by our gunboats it would deprive the rebels of one of their most fruitful sources of supplies, and break up a very extensive contraband trade on the Mississippi.

\* \* \* \* \*

During the absence of the principal part of the troops from the Arkansas, the guerillas have organized quite extensively, and will do a good deal of mischief in different parts of the State, especially in the district of the frontier, if they are not speedily dispersed. I do not like to scatter my troops again until I hear from headquarters and know if any special work is laid out for me, or whether I am still expected to reach Red river soon.

If citizens report truly, Kirby Smith's troops will cross the Sabine as soon as the water is low enough. They say that Banks has taken Shreveport. If this be true I shall expect a visit from them ; it is reported they have 30,000.

Very respectfully, general,

F. STEELE, Major General.

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, &c.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, January 22, 1865.

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
Major and A. A. G. Vols.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,  
Little Rock, May 4, 1864.

GENERAL :

\* \* \* \* \*

I shall defer my detailed report of the campaign until reports and returns of casualties can be obtained from subordinate commanders ; giving in this only a synopsis of the operations since the 18th ultimo.

\* \* \* \* \*

On the 22d ultimo the supply train was sent back under escort of a brigade of infantry, about 1,600 men, 400 cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. Captain

Dunham, bearer of despatches from General Banks, arrived, confirming the report which I had previously received, that Banks had fallen back behind intrenchments at Grand Ecore. I also received information that Price had been re-enforced by 8,000 infantry from Shreveport. In the evening of this day he opened with artillery upon my out-posts. Captain Dunham returned with despatches to General Banks, informing him of my inability to advance on account of a want of supplies, and the superior rebel force in front of me. He had sent me a request to move forward at once and join him on Red river.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,  
Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff*.

F. STEELE,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 22, 1865*

Official :

ROBERT N. SCOTT,  
*Major and A. A. G. of Vols.*

NEAR MOUTH RED RIVER, *May 14, 1864.*  
*via Cairo, May 21, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

We have rumors through rebel sources that the gunboats, except two, succeeded in getting over the falls at Alexandria on the day mentioned in General Banks's despatch. It is not confirmed yet, but I think it probable.

Very truly yours, &c.,

ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

MOUTH OF RED RIVER, *May 15, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK, *Chief of Staff* :

Admiral Porter has just arrived. The remainder of the gunboats will arrive to-night. General Banks will probably reach Semmesport, on the Atchafalaya, to-morrow.

ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, *A. A. G.*

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, VIRGINIA,  
*May 17, 1864.*

Major General HALLECK :

Private letters and official statements from the department of the Gulf show such a state of affairs there as to demand, in my opinion, the immediate removal of General Banks. The army has undoubtedly lost confidence in him. I would suggest the appointment of Franklin to the command of the 19th corps, and Reynolds or Hunter to the command of the department. This is sent in the

supposition that Canby has gone in command of the military division of the trans-Mississippi. If Canby has simply relieved Banks in command of the department, then the change will be satisfactory.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., May 17, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *near Spottsylvania :*

Your telegram of yesterday, in relation to General Banks, has been received. Nearly all your wishes in this matter have been anticipated. Canby has general command of the department of the Gulf and Arkansas. Banks was ordered to New Orleans, and Franklin put in command of the army. \* \* \* Canby has full authority to make any changes in commanders he may desire.

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H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

MOUTH OF RED RIVER, *May 18, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff :*

The troops from Red river arrived at Semmesport, on the Atchafalaya, in the course of yesterday, and will reach Morganza, on the Mississippi, to-day.

This army is in better condition than I supposed from the accounts that had reached me, and will soon be ready for offensive operations.

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ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

MOUTH OF RED RIVER, *May 21, 1864.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff :*

The army from Red river was delayed in crossing the Atchafalaya by the high water and insufficient pontoon equipage. The crossing was completed to-day, and the army is now moving across to the Mississippi. I returned to this place last evening, and will leave for points above to-day. Brigadier General



A. J. Smith had a spirited engagement with Polinac's rebel division on the 18th instant, defeating it, driving it several miles, and capturing three hundred prisoners.

ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*January 23, 1865.*

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

*Testimony of Surgeon Eugene F. Sanger.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 23, 1865.*

Surgeon EUGENE F. SANGER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your position in the army ?

Answer. Surgeon of United States volunteers ?

Question. Did you accompany the Red river expedition under General Banks ?

Answer. I did.

Question. Were you present at the battles of Sabine Crossroads and Pleasant Hill ?

Answer. I was.

Question. What was the condition of our wounded there ?

Answer. We brought off about half of our wounded in the first battle, and at the second battle we brought off all that could walk off.

Question. It has been said that at Pleasant Hill we won a victory ; how happened it that we left our wounded in the hands of the enemy ?

Answer. That is a great mystery to me. I was at that time medical director of the 19th army corps. I saw General Franklin immediately after our victory, as we assume it to be. I told him that in the hurry of sending off the supply trains in the morning, they had sent off my medical supply train. He said at that time that it should be ordered to return at once. To make sure of the matter, I went to see Major Drake, General Banks's adjutant general. He told me to give myself no uneasiness about the matter, as he would send off a courier at once and order up the medical supply train. I saw General Franklin and told him that I should be busy all night, and in case the army moved off in any direction he must apprise me. I was told that I should be informed. That was the last I knew of the matter until between six and seven o'clock the next morning, when observing a little squad of cavalry drawn up in front of my hospital, I went out and inquired, and found that the army had retired during the night, and that this cavalry was the rear guard about leaving the place. They said they had seen the enemy approaching in the distance ; whereupon I left one or two assistant surgeons with instructions, mounted my horse, and rode off.

Question. Did you see any real necessity for leaving our wounded in the hands of the enemy there ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; we had no transportation at that time of any kind. There was not a wagon of any kind there.

Question. You say your medical train had been sent off ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; but that was done in the morning. From what little I learned of the matter, I understood that it was expected, if the enemy attacked at all, they would attack early in the morning at Pleasant Hill ; and as one of the causes of the disaster of the day before was the presence of the trains, they

determined that that should not be the cause of a disaster again, and moved them off. We waited until four or five o'clock, when General Banks remarked that the enemy would not probably attack us that day, and that we were all right; but it was not half an hour after that before the enemy commenced with a yell and a charge.

Question. As we drove the enemy at Pleasant Hill, what prevented our forces from going back and taking care of the wounded?

Answer. I went back myself two days after within the lines of the enemy, under a flag of truce. I do not think that we knew at that time the completeness of our victory over the enemy. As near as I could learn, we had driven them back at dark into the woods, but how completely they were routed we did not know at that time. We had not quite gained the possession of the water for which we were fighting, although we had driven the enemy back. The provision and supply train starting off in the morning to the rear, had got eighteen or nineteen miles from Pleasant Hill, and the next morning they gave me as a reason why my medical supply train was not sent back, that they could not turn around their entire train; and if the enemy had advanced in the morning we would have been without supplies, and with the risk of not getting any water. General A. J. Smith was strongly in favor of advancing, and insisted upon it that he would not retire. I met him as I left Pleasant Hill, and he insisted that we should have gone on; that our victory was complete. When I returned to Pleasant Hill two days afterwards, under a flag of truce, travelling about forty miles in the enemy's country, I there learned from the assistant surgeons whom I left in charge that the enemy did not come in there until about ten o'clock the next day, and that the few skirmishing men that we had seen in the distance were our own men, who had been left on picket and not relieved, and stragglers who were working their way back to what they supposed was our camp. In regard to the battle of the day previous at Sabine Crossroads, I learned that so far from the engagement being so very serious a disaster to us, the enemy, after having taken our cavalry trains and making a second charge, felt themselves so thoroughly beaten and routed that they fled all the way back to Mansfield, intending, if we pursued them the next morning, to fall back to Shreveport; but finding that we did not follow them, they followed us. The enemy acknowledged a complete rout of their army on the second day, and also acknowledged that if we had advanced a little further that night, or had advanced the next morning, we could have captured all their artillery, or, at least, could have retaken all which they had taken from us. I had a talk with the medical director of the rebel army when I went into their lines. He wanted to know the number of our wounded. I admitted only nine hundred. He told me that they had at least fifteen hundred wounded that they knew of, and a great many more that they had not ascertained. So that the number of their wounded was equal to, if not greater than, that of ours.

Question. Do you know whether our wounded had suffered for want of supplies before you went back?

Answer. No, sir; not very much. At the time I left I knew of a place where there was some corn-meal, and I directed my assistant surgeons, who had charge of them, to get that meal and make them some porridge. They also succeeded in getting some chickens, and the like, so that they did not suffer very much, except in a few instances where they had not been operated upon, for the rebel surgeons took the instruments which I had left with our assistant surgeons. I was back on the second day after the battle, and after operating myself all day, I left a case of instruments, for which I got a protection, and from that time I never heard any complaint.

Questions. Do you know anything about speculations in cotton, or agents following the army for the purpose of dealing in cotton?

Answer. I know there were a great many of them.

Question. Do you know who any of them were?

Answer. There was a Mr. McKee who went up with us.

Question. From where?

Answer. He went up with the army from Franklin to Alexandria.

Question. Went up by land with the 19th army corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was his business?

Answer. I do not know from him; but the clerk of our quartermaster's department said that he was going up, expecting to have the control of the sales of large quantities of cotton, from which he was to make large profits; intimating that he had an understanding about the matter.

Question. With whom did he claim to have an understanding?

Answer. With General Banks. But after we arrived at Alexandria, this same clerk told me, and I heard McKee express himself as very much disgusted that his prospects of entering into any agreement amounted to nothing—that there were so many others there that he had to operate upon his own basis.

Question. Did any of these agents go into the enemy's lines and purchase cotton, that you know of?

Answer. Not that I know of?

Question. Was any of the transportation used to haul in cotton?

Answer. Not after we got into Alexandria, that I know of.

Question. Was any used anywhere else?

Answer. It is authorized by Congress, I think, that army wagons shall be used for that purpose; however, I know nothing more than the general custom of sending out wagons when not in other use to bring in cotton.

Question. When was that done?

Answer. That was not done after we started from Franklin, that I know of.

Question. Was it done before?

Answer. Yes, sir; wagons were obtained, to be sent out under escort, by the parties paying for them. That, I understand, is allowed by Congress and by the Treasury Department.

Question. With whom did they make these arrangements for the wagons?

Answer. With the quartermaster's department.

Question. How much of that business was done out there?

Answer. That I do not know, I am sure.

Question. Was there any considerable amount?

Answer. I could not state. I know too little about the quartermaster's department to be able to state with any accuracy.

Question. You say that McKee was along; were there any others along, that you know of?

Answer. I know of no others by name.

Question. Was there a man by the name of Butler along?

Answer. I do not remember. There was an immense number of men there, we all suspected might be engaged in such traffic; but of course we knew nothing about it.

Question. Men who accompanied the army?

Answer. This McKee was the only one I knew, who accompanied the army from Franklin to Alexandria. After we arrived at Alexandria, we found hordes of men there who were engaged in speculative business. There was a Colonel Howe, of New York city, who was pointed out to me as such.

Question. Was the navy engaged in the cotton business, to your knowledge?

Answer. They were said to be shipping it on board of their vessels. Great complaint was made in reference to their seizing cotton.

*Testimony of Brigadier General William Dwight.*

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1865.

Brigadier General WILLIAM DWIGHT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, commanding the first division of the 19th army corps, now near Winchester, Virginia.

Question. Were you with General Banks during the Red river expedition?

Answer. I was.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. I left New Orleans with General Banks to join the Red river expedition at Alexandria, to take command there of the first brigade of the first division of the 19th army corps. The reason that I did not join the 19th corps at Franklin was that I had been in command of Fort Jackson, Louisiana, and had suffered there from ill health, and was therefore delayed, and went up with General Banks. I took command of the first brigade of the first division of the 19th corps about the 26th of March, and marched with it from Alexandria to Natchitoches. We arrived at Natchitoches about the 3d of April. General Banks joined us there, and assumed command of the whole force. The expedition moved from Natchitoches towards Shreveport on the 6th of April. On that day we made about sixteen miles. On the next day, the 7th, we moved to Pleasant Hill, which was about eighteen miles further. The cavalry was in advance; the detachment of the 13th army corps, infantry, came next; a detachment of the 19th army corps followed that; and a day's march behind was a detachment of the 16th army corps, under General A. J. Smith. There was also a force of negroes, 1,500, a brigade under command of Colonel Dickey. The cavalry was in advance, and had had some skirmishing with the enemy. Previous to this they had made a reconnoissance towards Pleasant Hill, and had had a skirmish. Sufficient skirmishing had occurred to show that the enemy was in force enough to check the cavalry, though the cavalry had never all been put in to see whether they could drive the force of the enemy which was in front of them.

It was late in the afternoon of the 7th of April when the infantry of the 13th and 19th corps arrived at Pleasant Hill. The infantry under General A. J. Smith was still a long day's march in the rear. The detachment of the 17th army corps under General Kilby Smith, being a portion of General A. J. Smith's command, was still on board the transports, and accompanying the supplies which had gone up the river. The cavalry, on the night of the 7th, was a short distance in front of Pleasant Hill, so short a distance that the sound of their musketry could be heard there. It was said to have had a very severe skirmish on that day.

The next morning the infantry of the 19th corps was ordered to march at 8 o'clock; the infantry of the 13th corps to march at a much earlier hour, and to aid the cavalry. The army on this day was not in a condition to fight on account of the long distance between the different detachments of infantry; and it was understood that the march of the infantry on that day was to be a short one, in order that it might be concentrated. The infantry of the 19th corps did in fact march but a little over eight miles, when it went into bivouac shortly after noon of the 8th, and it was understood that it was to wait there until General A. J. Smith's command should arrive at Pleasant Hill.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, however, heavy firing was heard in front, and an order came for the infantry of the 19th corps to move immediately to the front in light marching order, and with two days' rations, leaving its artillery

and wagons behind. It commenced its march before 4 o'clock, and as speedily as possible after receiving the order. It marched forward until it met a crowd of fugitives coming back on the road on which it was advancing. This crowd gradually increased, showing more and more signs of alarm and terror, until the division found itself in the midst of a rout. Going to the rear were a large number of wagons, a large quantity of artillery, or rather the wreck of artillery, artillery horses, &c., the guns being left behind, and cavalry men. In the midst of this an order was received for the division to go into line of battle. Previous to receiving this order, portions of the division had been marched on the right and left of the road to endeavor to check the fugitives, and to keep a clear space for the infantry to advance.

The line of battle was formed at a place called Peach Orchard Grove, in the midst of this panic, and under the greatest difficulties. My brigade, being the first brigade of the first division, was in the centre; the second brigade was on its right, and the third brigade on its left. The first brigade occupied a line of fence along a narrow farm road, which ran perpendicularly to the road from Pleasant Hill to Mansfield. A space on the Pleasant Hill and Mansfield road was left open for the cavalry, portions of artillery, and the fugitives of the infantry to pass through. One of the regiments of my brigade had been sent to the front, and deployed as skirmishers to check the enemy as much as possible, and give notice of his approach. The fugitives hardly passed through the space left open for them, when the enemy came upon this position. They drove before them, without apparently being retarded in the least, the regiment which been deployed as skirmishers, capturing a portion of the regiment as they came on.

The enemy came on in column; we had no artillery in this position. On his having approached in three columns within from eighty to a hundred yards, the enemy was met by the fire of the whole of the first brigade, and was instantly checked. That fire was maintained steadily, and the enemy broke and went back. After reforming, the enemy next moved around towards the right flank of this position, where they were again met by heavy volleys, and again retired; they tried the left flank in the same manner, and with the same result. By this time darkness had come on to such an extent that they could not pursue the attack any longer. The enemy were entirely repulsed in this attack. During this attack I had been first on the line of my own brigade when the attack was there, and then I had gone both to the right and the left, when the enemy moved in those directions, so as to observe closely his motions, because I regarded his repulse from this position as essential to the safety of the army.

After this attack was over, I went to the rear of the line, perhaps one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards, where General Banks, General Franklin, General Lee, General Stone, and other generals were collected; they were talking over the incidents of the day, and agitating the question as to what was best to be done; my opinion was asked both by General Banks and General Franklin. I ascertained that at the most the infantry command of General A. J. Smith would reach Pleasant Hill that night, it then being after 6 o'clock. General Smith having made a long march with his command that day, and we being at a distance of about seventeen miles from Pleasant Hill, I judged that it would be impossible for General Smith to arrive on the ground, where we then were, with his command in condition to fight the next morning. In addition to that the cavalry had been entirely routed so as to be almost useless, with the exception of one brigade which was in the rear. The detachment of the 13th corps had been utterly routed, and there was no hope of stopping any portion of it short of Pleasant Hill. Under these circumstances I concurred with the opinion that it was best to retire to Pleasant Hill, where what cavalry could be found might be collected, a portion of the 13th corps rallied, and the infantry of the army concentrated.

The order to retire was issued by General Banks, the retirement to commence at 10 o'clock that night; my brigade being left as a rearguard, and directed to leave at 12 o'clock. As soon as this was agreed on, I threw out a heavy infantry picket in front of the whole position. It was very dark—as dark a night as I ever knew. The picket was ordered to advance 300 yards in front of the line of infantry, keeping so close together that each man should not miss his next neighbor on either side. They were ordered, if they met the enemy, not to fire on them, but to take as many prisoners as possible; take all they found and send them immediately to the rear. They did not advance over 100 yards, when they came upon the pickets of the enemy. They captured between 70 and 80 in the way indicated; they did not fire a shot. They took a staff officer of General Taylor, and captured other officers; and from the prisoners, especially from the officers thus captured, we obtained a great deal of information, all of which indicated the necessity of our retiring. It may be well to remark here that this staff officer was not a staff officer of General Richard Taylor, but of a General Taylor commanding a brigade of the rebel army there.

The retirement that night of my brigade as rearguard was commenced at the hour designated. It retired all its pickets at the same time. The enemy had been surprised at our sending out so strong an infantry picket, and changed their pickets, which were about 150 yards in front of the line, for cavalry videttes, and had evidently retired their main body to a greater distance. Beyond our picket line could be distinctly heard the groans of the wounded, showing that a large number had fallen in front of that line. Our men constantly came on the wounded men in front of that line. The rejoicings of the enemy over the captures they had made that day could be distinctly heard; also the rumbling of wagons and artillery going to the rear, showing that the enemy were taking their spoils to the rear. Those spoils consisted of the captures which had been made previous to the arrival of the infantry of the 19th corps at the position at which it had fought. They had been captured from the cavalry and the detachment of the 13th army corps, and consisted of about 20 pieces of artillery, a large number of wagons—something over 200—and a good many prisoners from the infantry.

My brigade retired in perfect silence, and the enemy knew nothing of its having left. The march back to Pleasant Hill was a very tedious one. The brigade had a large force of its own on each flank driving up the stragglers, which so much delayed it that it did not arrive at Pleasant Hill until a little after 9 o'clock the next morning. The cavalry of the enemy made their appearance in its rear when it was within about two miles of Pleasant Hill, but only in so small force that they attempted no attack.

The affair of the 8th was called by General Banks the battle of Sabine Crossroads, and by the enemy the battle of Mansfield. It was fought over a narrow extent of country, about a mile and a half or two miles in length, and within about three miles of Mansfield. It could not properly be considered a battle. It was an affair of detached portions of the army commanded by General Banks with the whole force of the enemy, or such portion of the whole of the enemy's force as was necessary to defeat those detachments of General Banks's force which presented themselves successively to the whole force of the enemy; except that the last infantry brought up by General Banks repulsed an attack of the enemy, which was made so near nightfall that there was not daylight sufficient for the enemy to bring up their whole force against that last infantry detachment.

No battle ought to have been fought on that day. Nothing but the cavalry ought to have gone beyond the position, eight miles from Pleasant Hill, where the whole of the infantry should have been concentrated, or should have been brought so near together that the whole could be engaged with the enemy

whenever it was deemed best to fight a general battle. That was the intention on the morning of the 8th of April; and the army was led into this disastrous affair because the principle was violated which requires that you shall never fight a battle without having all your resources in hand. The fact that a detachment of the infantry force of the command was sent forward with the whole cavalry of the command, where it was liable to meet the whole of the concentrated force of the enemy, and where it ought to have been known that it might meet the whole force of the enemy, was the immediate cause of the disaster; for this infantry and the cavalry did in fact find itself, about 1 o'clock on the 8th, confronting a much larger force of the enemy, and it remained in that position until that larger force of the enemy enveloped it, attacked it, and defeated it. So distinct was this violation of military principle that not even the whole of the infantry of the 13th corps was together when the enemy made their first attack. It is not necessary to go back of this, or to seek any other than purely military causes for this disaster.

I will state that some of the statements I have already made, and some I may hereafter make, are not from my own personal knowledge, but derived from an examination of the records after I became chief of staff to General Banks. As there has been some time elapsed since the events occurred, it would require some care on my part to distinguish between what came under my own personal observation and what came to my knowledge from the records.

Question. Will you state in what order, in your opinion, the army should have advanced?

Answer. Everything went right up to Pleasant Hill. From there the cavalry should have advanced, followed by the infantry of the 13th and 19th corps, which infantry should have been halted at such a position that a concentration of the whole of the infantry of the army might have been effected before a general battle could possibly have taken place. The cavalry should have gone on, attacked the enemy vigorously, and found out his force, his position, and his intentions. If successful, it should have pushed on; if driven back, it should have fallen back to the infantry, or to within supporting distance of the infantry.

Question. Where should have been the train which was between the cavalry and the infantry?

Answer. That train should have been under the control of the commander of the cavalry; he should have been responsible for it, and he should have parked it, when he found himself engaged with the enemy, in a safe position.

Question. Do I understand you to mean that that large train should have been between the cavalry and its infantry support, on that narrow road, through that thickly wooded country?

Answer. There was no objection to the train being on the road, provided the cavalry was not so heavily engaged with the enemy as to endanger it. There were a great many places on that road where the train could have been parked. And it is observable that the advance of the infantry of the 19th corps, from the position eight miles from Pleasant Hill to the position at Peach Orchard, where it fought, was in no way impeded by any wagons. Perhaps I can make myself better understood by saying that it was a matter of judgment as to the manner of managing that train, and a matter strictly for the judgment of the commander of the cavalry. The cavalry commander had a large force of cavalry, somewhere between five thousand and seven thousand; I cannot pretend to give the exact number; it was understood to be that number, and was that afterwards. He had what wagons he chose; he organized the cavalry and commanded it; and he was bound to take care of his train. He should by no means have permitted his train to be between the infantry of the army and the cavalry of the army when he was going to fight a battle. But he ought to have known

whether there was danger of a battle; he ought to have known the enemy's force in front of him, for he had a very large force. But it is to be remarked here that he did not seem to know well, that he did not manage as if he knew the whole force of the enemy was in his front. The moment that he found the enemy was in his front in force, he should have parked the train where it would be safe; and if he found that he had got it too far to the front, he should have turned it to the rear. That is a matter of his own responsibility, of which he ought to be a competent judge. Of course, the commander of the army, when he went to the front, might have directed him as he chose about it.

Question. Do I understand you to still adhere to the opinion that that train of the cavalry should have been between the infantry and the cavalry, in the order of march?

Answer. There was no objection to its being assigned to a position between the cavalry and the infantry, in the order of march, provided it had been properly managed; and the force of cavalry was so large that it never would have got to its train unless it had been so placed. It was exceedingly objectionable that the train should have been where it was when that battle was fought. But it is necessary to remember that no general battle was anticipated. There had been, before the battle of Sabine Crossroads, no affair of sufficient magnitude to indicate that there would be a general battle so soon.

Question. Is it not true that General Lee, who commanded the cavalry, was advancing with the cavalry, and with his train following him immediately in his rear, when he found himself suddenly attacked by a large force of the enemy?

Answer. It is.

Question. And what disposition should he have made of his train that he did not make? What disposition of his train had he in his power to make, being thus suddenly attacked, so as to have had it out of the way before the battle?

Answer. He should have parked his train at or near the position eight miles from Pleasant Hill, where it was contemplated to concentrate the infantry that night, particularly if he found himself skirmishing with the enemy. General Lee did not keep his cavalry far enough from the infantry; nor did he keep his train far enough from the cavalry.

Question. Then, in your opinion, he should have kept his train but just in advance of the infantry, while he himself, with his cavalry, should have been further in advance of his train?

Answer. Yes, sir. And if he found himself engaged with the enemy, or if there were indications that there was a possibility of a battle, he should have parked his train off the road, leaving nothing between him and the infantry. General Lee did not behave as if a battle was possible.

Question. Is it not true that General Franklin did not believe that there was any considerable force of the enemy in his front, and did not believe that there would be any battle with the enemy; and that he urged upon General Lee that he should advance more rapidly, and keep his command and his train out of the way of the infantry?

Answer. From my knowledge of the official reports, which I have read very carefully, as chief of staff, and from my knowledge of the dispositions which were intended by General Franklin for the 8th, I consider that General Franklin gave proper orders for the movements of that day, and had his orders been complied with, no battle would have occurred on that day. The infantry of the army would have been concentrated, or all within supporting distance of each other, eight miles from Pleasant Hill; the cavalry would have pushed on as far as it could, which it was proper that it should do—would have taken its train with it, always keeping it at a proper distance from it; and such information of the enemy would have been obtained which we did not have, but which was essential before a battle should occur, and should be rendered possible. I have no means of knowing positively whether General Franklin considered



that there was any considerable force of the enemy in his front. But General Franklin's orders would indicate that he did consider that there was a large force of the enemy in his front, and that he considered it necessary to concentrate the whole of the infantry of the army before pressing on further than eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill. He undoubtedly did order General Lee to press on to the front, as it was eminently proper that General Lee should, in order to engage the enemy heavily with the cavalry, and find out positively what was in front.

Question. What was the length of the baggage train of General Lee on the road on which it was advancing?

Answer. I do not know positively what its length was; but I should think that when it was moving, it may have been six miles in length. But I would like to state here, however, that this train was General Lee's train, the cavalry train. He organized it, made it larger or smaller according to his own judgment, and was responsible for it. I consider that the train was altogether too large a train to have belonged to the cavalry.

Question. Do you know whether or not General Lee ever asked permission, or suggested, that the larger portion of his baggage train should be in rear of the infantry, and that he should have between himself and the infantry only such portion of his train as was necessary for present purposes?

Answer. I do not know personally that General Lee ever made such a request. But from the official reports, I believe that he did.

Question. How long a time would it have required to park that train, six miles in length or thereabouts as you suppose it to have been, considering the character of the road and the topography of the country through which you were passing?

Answer. The time would have varied with circumstances from two to four hours.

Question. Do you think that on the road where it was it would have been possible to have parked that train in four hours from the time when General Lee was attacked by the enemy, the road being, if it has been correctly described to us, through a wilderness, where it was difficult for two wagons to pass abreast, and where it was almost impossible to find a turning-out point?

Answer. I should not say that that was a correct description of the road. I believe that there were many places, or several places on that road, where the whole of that train might have been parked in any three hours' time, when it was ordered to be parked. You seem to suppose that it was proper for General Lee to have had his train in motion on that road at the time he was attacked by the enemy, which is not correct. He should have known whether he was likely to be attacked by the enemy. The cavalry commander is responsible for such knowledge, directly responsible for it, and he should never have had his train in motion on the road when there was a possibility of his being so attacked; but he should have had it already parked at such a time. And it is not true of that road that two wagons could not pass abreast on it at any point, or that the cavalry might not have been marched on each side of it for the greater part of the way. The enemy had taken some precautions in this matter, which it is worth while to notice. They had cleared away the underbrush on either side of the road, so that their cavalry might manœuvre through the woods easily; and they met our cavalry in line of battle dismounted, with their horses hitched in rear of any position which they occupied, and immediately on being driven from that position, or on firing one or two volleys from it, they ran back, seized their horses, mounted them, and dashed off through the woods. Woods that were so open that the enemy's cavalry could make this sort of manœuvre in them could have been readily penetrated by our cavalry in line of battle, and could have been readily marched through by our infantry in any order in which it was deemed advisable to march them.

Question. Was the condition of the country between the cavalry and the main body of the infantry, on that day, to any considerable extent as you have described it? and if so, to what extent?

Answer. It was so for the greater part of the distance, if not for the whole distance, from the eight-mile point, where the infantry was ordered to concentrate, up to the position of Peach Orchard. If anything is wanting to prove this, it is only necessary to refer to the fact that the fugitives of the cavalry and the 13th army corps escaped through these very woods, and did not escape in any considerable numbers by the road.

Question. Is it not true that infantry and cavalry can escape through woods where a baggage train could not be parked?

Answer. It is; but there were large open patches there where the wagon train might have been parked.

Question. Would the condition of things which you require to justify the wagon train being in motion, ever obtain in that country through which you were passing, so that it would have been possible for that train to move?

Answer. I do not know that I exactly understand your question.

Question. Was there not a possibility of attack at all times during that advance from Pleasant Hill?

Answer. No, sir; it was the easiest country in the world in which to tell when you were going to be attacked, or when there was a liability of attack, because it was comparatively a narrow country. A strong advance guard of cavalry, much less than the main body, of good cavalry scouts, could have always told where the main body of the enemy was, so that no battle should have occurred until the army was prepared for it. I myself had led an advance through that country the previous year, with only about 300 cavalry, and I never had any trouble in telling where the enemy was.

Question. Was not the character of the country such that it was impossible for the cavalry to fight to any considerable extent without being dismounted?

Answer. To any considerable extent it was; but in this respect we were on perfectly equal terms with the enemy.

Question. You were on perfectly equal terms with the enemy, provided the enemy made the same disposition of their forces that you did of yours; but if the enemy had put but a small cavalry force in front, and supported that with infantry, would you have been on equal terms with the enemy then?

Answer. If a small force of the enemy's cavalry had been supported by a small force of the enemy's infantry, and placed in front of the whole cavalry of our army, and out of supporting distance of the main body of the enemy's infantry, such a force ought to have been captured or dispersed by our cavalry.

Question. My question did not contemplate that condition of things, but that there might have been a small advance of the enemy's cavalry with a strong infantry support.

Answer. Then the advance of our cavalry ought to have found out that condition of things, and such a disposition of our force should have been made as would have overcome that obstacle.

Question. Cavalry dismounted for the purpose of fighting infantry always fight at a great disadvantage, do they not?

Answer. Yes, sir, unless they are used exactly like the infantry, and not against superior numbers of infantry.

Question. Was it or not a good disposition of our forces to place that large body of cavalry in front? Would not the advance have been made with more certainty of success, had a small or moderate force of cavalry been placed in front and been properly supported by the other arms of the service?

Answer. This cavalry force, as it was called, of General Lee, consisted of cavalry proper, of mounted infantry, and a very large proportion of artillery for such a force. It was really more infantry than it was cavalry. For the work

of cavalry proper it was utterly unfit. The men were not good riders, and did not understand how to take care of their horses properly. They were infantry soldiers who had been put on horseback; they were not properly cavalry. General Lee's force, therefore, consisted of some of the very best infantry regiments that were ever in the department of the Gulf; with cavalry proper, and a large amount of artillery. Considering the character of that force, it was an eminently proper disposition to place the whole of it, or so much of it as was in advance, in advance. The whole of it was not in advance; one brigade of it at least was in the rear. In considering this question, it ought to be borne in mind that this force of General Lee was more mounted infantry than it was cavalry. It was not to be compared in any respect with the cavalry that we have had in the Shenandoah valley. But it was exactly the style of force that the enemy opposed to it until they opposed their whole army to it.

Question. But they had their army in a position where they very soon brought it into action after their cavalry met our cavalry, did they not?

Answer. They had their army in a position where we did not expect to find it, but where we ought to have expected to find it, and ought to have made our dispositions accordingly. General Franklin's orders of the morning of the 8th of April provided against finding the enemy in the position where he was found, and had those orders been complied with we should have met the enemy, if at all, with our whole force.

Question. Have you copies of the orders to which you refer?

Answer. I have not; but I have read all those orders carefully.

Question. Can you furnish the committee with copies of those orders?

Answer. They are not within my control now; were within my reach only while acting as chief of staff for General Banks; but they can be found in the official reports of General Franklin and General Lee, and they can be ascertained by inquiring of General Franklin and General Stone as to the conversation that took place between them and General Banks early in the morning of the 8th.

Question. Do you know whether or not there was any conversation between General Banks and General Franklin on that morning, when General Banks passed General Franklin on his way to the front, in which General Franklin said there was no apprehension of any battle, that the enemy were not in force in his front?

Answer. I do not know of any such conversation. I know that General Franklin went into camp at the point about 8 miles from Pleasant Hill, and at a position between where he had desired that the infantry of the 13th corps and of the 19th corps should be encamped until the infantry of General A. J. Smith should reach Pleasant Hill. General Franklin having gone into camp there indicated that he did not anticipate that the enemy was in force in his immediate front; but that if the enemy was in force there, that he intended to provide against it, and he purposed to meet them in force when he should advance further.

Question. Considering the character of the cavalry force, made up in the manner which you have already described, do you, as a military man, deem that it was good generalship to place that large body of cavalry in front, and at so great a distance from any infantry supports, taking into account the character of the country through which you were passing, and all the circumstances known at the time?

Answer. I do consider that it was a perfectly proper disposition of that force, for the force of the enemy was similarly situated, only in greater numbers. Their Texan troops were almost wholly mounted, and armed with Enfield rifles. It was a mounted infantry force, to which it was eminently proper we should oppose a mounted infantry force. But I cannot satisfactorily answer questions of this kind without going further, and stating that I consider our force

of cavalry, mounted infantry, &c., was badly commanded; that the officer commanding it did not well understand the manner of leading an advance, of obtaining proper information concerning the enemy, or of penetrating any little curtain of troops which the enemy might throw in front of him to prevent his obtaining information which he ought to have had. Our force, or that portion of the force which, on the 8th of April, advanced to the position in which it was attacked by the enemy, stood dormant in the presence of the enemy until the enemy completely enveloped it. There can be but one solution of such a conduct of affairs, and that is, that whoever directed that on our part was incapable.

Question. From whom do you derive the information which enables you to state that our forces stood dormant until the enemy enveloped them?

Answer. From the official reports which, as chief of staff, I carefully read and examined.

Question. Reports made by whom?

Answer. Made by General Lee, General Ransom, General Cameron, Colonel Landrum, and other officers connected with the cavalry and the 13th army corps. But even if I had not those official reports, that fact would be plainly evident from the length of time that elapsed between the hour at which the advance force of cavalry and infantry met the enemy at the point where the enemy attacked them, and the time when the enemy made that attack. If that force was not standing dormant during that time, it certainly was not falling back, as it ought to have been when it found that large masses of the enemy were before it.

Question. At what time do you understand that attack was made by the enemy?

Answer. Between 3 and 4 o'clock, in force; previous to that there had been nothing but heavy skirmishing.

Question. And at what time do you say our cavalry should have fallen back?

Answer. Our cavalry should have known what was in front of it before 1 o'clock of that day; it could have known it before noon.

Question. Then, if I understand you, it is your opinion that that disaster occurred in consequence of the failure of the cavalry and its officers to do that which they should have done?

Answer. I consider that that was the cause of our not having proper information of the enemy. I consider that the cause of the disaster of that day was that the infantry of the army was in three detachments, one near the scene of action, and the other two respectively nine and twenty-four miles from it, and that a battle never ought to have occurred under those circumstances. The infantry of the army was not concentrated; it was in exactly the proper position to be beaten in detail, which, in fact, was what occurred.

Question. Would not precisely the same thing have happened that did happen, if the infantry of that army had been concentrated, the cavalry force being in the position in which it was?

Answer. It could not possibly have happened in that event. Had the infantry of the army been concentrated, and the cavalry sent in advance as it was, the greatest disaster that could have befallen us would have been that the cavalry would have been thoroughly beaten; but this need not have occurred had the cavalry been well handled, though it might have occurred had it been badly handled. Had the cavalry alone gone in advance and come into the presence of the enemy, found itself in the presence of a superior force, it could have fallen back to the infantry, or to within supporting distance of the infantry, and should have done so.

Question. Would the concentration of the rest of the army have prevented the disaster which did happen to General Lee and those under his command, the distance between the advance of the infantry and the force with General Lee being as it was?

Answer. Had General Lee managed as badly with his cavalry alone as the infantry and cavalry with him were managed, a disaster would have befallen his cavalry; but it would have been confined to the cavalry, for the enemy, in following his cavalry, could have made no impression upon the infantry of the army concentrated. That would have been dependent entirely upon General Lee's management. The infantry, at the position where it was directed to concentrate, was not at a greater distance from the cavalry when they found the enemy than it should have been; the cavalry should have been sent ahead that distance in front of the infantry until the enemy was found in force. On the contrary, it was a very short distance to be between the infantry and cavalry when the cavalry was seeking the enemy.

Question. I have questioned you thus at length because the opinions expressed by you are very considerably different from the bulk of our testimony upon this subject.

Answer. I expected my testimony would be different from that of most of the witnesses who would be likely to come before this committee upon this subject. I am willing to answer any questions which the committee may ask me.

I wish to state that the history of war may be looked over in vain for any such disposition of forces as was made on that Red river campaign without disaster following it. And for that reason I gave one of the answers I did, that there was no need of going beyond *military* reasons for an explanation of the result of that campaign. I made the answer I did in relation to the cavalry train, because that train was lost in consequence of its position and the defeat of the cavalry and infantry in front of it. The cavalry and infantry in front of it was not defeated because the cavalry train was where it was, but entirely independently of that. The position of the cavalry train had nothing whatever to do with the loss of that day's fight; but the loss of the fight caused the loss of the train; that is all.

And then an immense amount of artillery was taken to the front which ought not to have gone there. The artillery of that army was very fine; the finest that belonged to any army except, perhaps, the army of the Potomac. And I do not know that I have seen any horse artillery or light artillery in the army of the Potomac that was equal to it.

The cavalry force of that army was a very bad one; ill drilled, ill instructed, and very badly organized. But it was quite well mounted for the objects it had in view, and it was thoroughly equipped.

The infantry force was a peculiar one. It was composed of three different bodies of troops, having great jealousies of each other, the commanders not being thoroughly in harmony, and having very little respect for the general commanding, and therefore it should have been handled with great care. Instead of handling it in the reckless manner in which it was handled, pushing it hither and yon, it ought to have been kept carefully together. By handling it with care a respect for the commanding general would have grown up, which would have enabled him to fight it with success. That was the composition of that army. It was a badly composed army to begin with, and managed without judgment.

Question. Was or was not the topography of that country, the paucity of roads, &c., such as to render not applicable the rules which, under ordinary circumstances, might control the disposition of a large cavalry force?

Answer. The topography of a country could not change the rules, for the rules of war in those respects, as in all respects, are not changeable. They are absolute, and have been from before the time of Julius Cæsar until now; but it might modify the application of those rules.

Question. I do not mean to change the rules, but to require a different application of the rules.

Answer. There was no difficulty in applying the rules of war in that country, none whatever. They were easier of application than usual, because, as I have

already said, the country was a comparatively narrow one. The most difficult country to manœuvre in is a wide country, filled with roads, where the enemy can appear in any direction, on your right or left, your front or rear. A country that is narrow and with but few roads is comparatively a simple country to make war in.

Question. Are not the opportunities of a cavalry force greater in the former country which you have described than in the latter?

Answer. A cavalry force in the former country has much greater mobility; it can appear in any direction. In the Red river country the cavalry force of the enemy could appear in only one direction; and therefore the preparation to meet it was single instead of many.

Question. Did not that fact make it much more difficult for our cavalry force to thoroughly inform themselves in relation to the force, disposition, and intentions of the enemy?

Answer. On the contrary, it made it more simple. If the enemy is obliged to be on one road only, it is much simpler to find out what his force is, and where he is, than where he can be on many roads, and move in many directions. In fact, there were ample means of finding out where the enemy was on this campaign. I well recollect that, as we marched to Pleasant Hill, before we reached there, and also after we passed there, and before we reached the eight-mile point, we met refugee negroes and inhabitants of the country, all of whom said we should find the enemy at the crossroads; that there was the point where the rebels said they were going "to begin to bury the Yankees." I recollect this distinctly, because it was so often said by the fugitive negroes.

Question. Will you now go on with your narrative, from the time you reached Pleasant Hill on your retreat?

Answer. My command reached Pleasant Hill on the morning of the 9th of April, somewhat after 9 o'clock. As I have already stated, the enemy's cavalry made its appearance in very small force in our rear just before we reached Pleasant Hill. My brigade went into the position that it left the previous morning. The army was very tired after that night's march. General A. J. Smith's force was at Pleasant Hill, and it was understood that it would occupy the front towards the enemy, a small portion of the cavalry being sent in advance of it; but General Smith's infantry, with the exception of one brigade, was moved to the rear and left. One brigade was left in front of our position. During the day it was determined to fall back to Grand Ecore. The trains were all ordered to the rear; the 13th army corps was sent to the rear; the negro brigade was sent to the rear; and the cavalry, with the exception of one brigade, was also sent to the rear. There remained then at Pleasant Hill the detachment of the 19th army corps and the detachment of the 16th army corps, under General A. J. Smith. The detachment of the 17th army corps was on board the boats. It was not expected that we should have any battle at Pleasant Hill that day. The enemy, in order to reach us there, would have to march twenty-five miles, portions of their force even a greater distance. None of the general officers, so far as I know, anticipated an attack. About 5 o'clock, however, the enemy, who had done nothing previous to that time but to maintain a heavy skirmish fire around our lines, made an attack in force and in column. At first their attack was almost entirely successful. The brigade of General A. J. Smith's force which was in front was entirely swept away and routed. The 3d brigade of the 1st division of the 19th corps was routed; portions of the 2d brigade were broken. The 1st brigade alone remained intact. The enemy burst through our line, though their force fell into considerable disorder in doing this, as they had attacked in column. They were turned back by the 1st brigade of the 1st division of the 19th corps, and General A. J. Smith's command, and were thoroughly repulsed from the whole left of our line; and as their heaviest attack had been on our left and by their right, the greater portion

of the enemy's force was repulsed. This repulse was so signal as to have been considered a victory for our forces. But notwithstanding the repulse of the enemy, it was still deemed best to continue the retirement to Grand Ecore; and that was done early on the following morning. As there has been some question as to the propriety of this further retirement after the repulse of the enemy at Pleasant Hill, and as I was consulted on that subject at the time, it may be proper for me to make a more full statement in regard to it. The reasons that governed us were these: First, we had at Pleasant Hill, and had fought an engagement with them, nothing but the detachments of the 19th and 16th corps of infantry, and a very small portion of the cavalry. About 13,000 of the infantry and a small portion of the cavalry had contended against the whole force of the enemy, which was somewhere about 22,000 men, minus the stragglers of the enemy left behind. Considering that they had made a forced march immediately before they attacked us, those stragglers perhaps numbered 5,000, leaving them 17,000 to attack about 13,000. We had succeeded in repulsing them under these circumstances. If we should wait until the next morning, then the enemy would have time to collect all their forces, which could not have amounted to much less than 20,000 men. Our losses and stragglers would reduce our force to not more than 12,000, to contend the next morning against about 20,000 of the enemy. That was the principal reason why it was advisable to go back to Grand Ecore, where we should meet 4,000 of the 13th army corps who could be rallied there; the bulk of the cavalry which, by massing, could be got into a condition to fight there, and the brigade of negro troops swelling our force and making it superior to that of the enemy. The retirement was made in good order to Grand Ecore. And there General Stone was relieved as chief of staff, and I became General Banks's chief of staff. It was not contemplated at that time to retreat beyond Grand Ecore. We were still in hopes that the river would rise. And even if it did not rise, it was not impossible to have again advanced on Shreveport. And had that been possible, it might have been well to have done so, considering the position of General Steele's force, which was to have co-operated with us, and the fact that the enemy were greatly elated by their successes, or what they deemed their successes. The continued falling of the river, and the audacity of the enemy in throwing a force below us on our communications by the river, caused us soon to entertain a view of the necessity of falling back to Alexandria. I might state here one point with regard to the falling back from Pleasant Hill, and that is, that the rear guard did not remain on the field there as long as they might have done. In consequence of that, quite a number of small-arms, &c., which the enemy had left upon the field were not collected, and some of our wounded were left there, who might have been brought off. That was the only defect in the falling back of our forces from Pleasant Hill to Grand Ecore. At the time the enemy went below us on the river, the river had fallen so much that the Eastport, a large iron-clad which was up there, got aground and was destroyed by us, and lighterage had to be made around the falls at Alexandria. Our retreat commenced from Grand Ecore to Alexandria. At the time of this retreat the enemy were both in our front and in our rear. They had occupied a very strong position on Cane river, and they also followed us with their forces. The retreat was accomplished without loss on our part, except that involved in the battle of Cane river, where we turned the enemy's flank with a force equal to that which he had in position at Cane river, beat him, and compelled him to leave. We lost in that affair between 300 and 400 in killed and wounded; no prisoners. We took some prisoners from the enemy, some small-arms, and a caisson. The force of the enemy that had thus placed itself between us and Alexandria would have met with greater disaster had it been attacked with more vigor and skill. We marched to Alexandria, where we remained until the fleet which was above the falls at that place was relieved by the construction of a

dam. As soon as the fleet was entirely relieved and saved, which was done entirely by the exertions of the army, we commenced our march to the Mississippi by way of Semmesport, on the Atchafalaya. The enemy was then between us and Semmesport, and again interrupted our communication, by placing himself in a position from which he ought not to have escaped without severe punishment. But, owing to the fact that we retired on a single road instead of occupying all the roads, he did escape without material loss. From Semmesport General Banks went to New Orleans, and I went with him. The condition of the army at Grand Ecore was excessively bad. There was a great deal of insubordination and a great deal of jealousy. General A. J. Smith pretended to be entirely independent, and General Banks did not exercise that authority and control over him which a superior officer should exercise over an inferior. This state of feeling which existed rendered all operations extremely difficult, owing to the relations existing between the commanders immediately under General Banks and General Banks himself.

Question. Was there any failure on the part of General Stone to discharge duties, while chief of staff, which rendered the change of chief of staff necessary?

Answer. General Banks and General Stone were not on good terms. And in the advance up the Red river General Stone did not exercise the influence which a chief of staff ought to exercise. He did not insist, as was his duty as chief of staff, on the different portions of the army being in their proper relative positions. It would seem that General Stone's judgment was excessively bad. He was all day on the battle-field at Sabine Crossroads; he knew the positions of the different bodies of infantry; yet I have understood from General Banks, after I became chief of staff, that General Stone did not insist upon the concentration of our forces, nor did he deem that the enemy was in force in our front. It may be proper for me to state here, for the information of the committee, that General Stone, more than any one else, did not believe that we would meet the enemy. He made the statement freely that we should march unopposed to Shreveport. It is the duty of the chief of staff to issue the orders of march for the troops, and to attend to all the details in the movements of the troops. It does not appear, from anything that I have ever seen, that this was attended to in the way that it ought to have been, or that the influence in these matters which ought to have pertained to General Stone did pertain to him.

Question. Was not the order of march from Grand Ecore determined by General Franklin?

Answer. I do not know; it may have been, but it should not have been. It should have been attended to by General Stone. It should have been ordered by General Banks, for General A. J. Smith was not under the command of General Franklin, but was under the command of General Banks. It was therefore General Banks's duty to issue the order, and General Stone's duty to see to the execution of it in the order of march.

Question. You say that General A. J. Smith denied being under the command of General Banks, and claimed to be entirely independent?

Answer. He did frequently, and in many different ways.

Question. Do you know on what he based his assumption that he was not under the command of General Banks?

Answer. I suppose on the ground that General Banks allowed him to make such an assumption. Nothing can be more contrary to military law, and nothing can be more untrue than that General A. J. Smith was not under the command and control of General Banks the moment he came within the limits of General Banks's department with his troops. But General Smith was a man who would take as much license as he could get. He made the assumption, and General Banks allowed it to a certain extent, and permitted him to act independently of the commander of the army in a greater degree than an inferior ever should. General Banks said that General Smith's troops were only lent to him



by General Sherman. Exactly what was meant by that is difficult to tell, inasmuch as the army regulations lay down the rules on such points.

Question. In your opinion, as a military man, should this Red river expedition have been undertaken at the time it was undertaken, or ever at all?

Answer. It never should have been undertaken at all. There was nothing to be gained by operations on the west bank of the Mississippi as soon as the river was held by us. On the contrary, everything that was west of the Mississippi, and everything that could be kept there, it was greatly for our advantage should be suffered to remain, for it pressed heavily upon the people who were compelled to support the enemy's force there. Before the Red river expedition was undertaken, the trans-Mississippi department, as it was called by the rebels, was very little more than a name, and its troops were considered a great burden upon the country. That country was practically open for trade; its resources in cotton and sugar could have been drawn from it by a wise policy, which would have been of more benefit to us than anything that could have been gained by a successful military operation on that side of the river. When we went up there the enemy called together all their conscripts and assembled a large force, and as the forces with which we were to operate there had for their point of junction the town of Shreveport, which was from 150 to 200 miles within the enemy's country, the enemy had it in their power to concentrate all the forces they had west of Mississippi, and strike first at one of the advancing armies and then at the other, before either could reach the point of junction designated. It was, therefore, from the condition of things existing in the rebel department of the trans-Mississippi, unwise to make that movement then. And in consideration of the orders received by General Banks before he reached Alexandria, it was extremely unwise to have gone beyond that point. Those orders emanating from General Grant, were, that on or before the 5th of May General A. J. Smith's command should be returned to General Sherman, and General Banks, with the remainder of his forces, should place himself before Mobile. General Banks's infantry did not start from Alexandria until the 29th of March. There was not time between the 29th of March and the 5th of May to make that campaign. It is true that General Grant gave to General Banks a lee-way of fifteen days. But even with those fifteen days General Banks would have to meet with perfect and uninterrupted success in order to have gone to Shreveport and come back in that time. An uninterrupted success could not be counted upon. Therefore Alexandria was the place where the expedition ought to have been abandoned, under the orders that then existed, even had it been wise before to have undertaken it.

Question. Did not General Grant know the point at which General Banks was when he gave those orders?

Answer. General Grant did not know at that time. The orders were conditional, and supposed General Banks to have been further advanced in his expedition than he was. Yet even upon that supposition General Grant directed that the whole expedition should be abandoned if there was any doubt as to the force under General A. J. Smith being able to rejoin General Sherman, or of General Banks placing himself before Mobile within fifteen days from the 5th of May.

Question. Was General Banks then operating under the orders of General Grant?

Answer. He had commenced the expedition under orders from Washington, from the War Department, I suppose.

Question. General Grant's superiors?

Answer. Yes, sir; but General Grant's order was competent to countermand the others, received as it was. But the condition of things which made it unwise to have undertaken the expedition at all, and which further made it wise to have abandoned it at Alexandria, did not hold after the retreat to Grand Ecore. Then the

rebel trans-Mississippi department had become a different thing; it had become powerful in artillery and small-arms that it had captured from us; it had taken many prisoners from us; it had collected a large army, animated by a high spirit in consequence of the unexpected successes it had obtained. Had there not been other use for our forces, it would then have been wise to have continued the expedition. We had shown by our advance that an attack upon Shreveport would prevent, as it had then prevented, an invasion of Missouri by the rebels; and that the powerful army of the rebels there, strengthened by so many guns which they had captured, and by so many small-arms which they had obtained from us in the disaster to us on the Red river, should not be able to move against Missouri, it was necessary that we should be able to act against them.

*Testimony of Colonel John S. Clark.*

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1865.

Colonel JOHN S. CLARK sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am an additional aide-de-camp, with the rank of colonel. I have served with General Banks since December, 1861.

Question. Did you accompany General Banks upon the Red river expedition?

Answer. I did.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. As aide-de-camp upon his staff.

Question. Will you give a concise statement of the important events connected with that expedition, so far as they came to your knowledge?

[Extracts from diary, notes and memoranda of campaign.]

*March 17.* Left New Orleans for Alexandria, our forces to-day; cavalry at Opelousas; infantry under General Franklin at Vermillion bayou; little or no fighting. Reported from confederate sources that Taylor's forces are falling back on re-enforcements from Texas.

*Memorandum.—Federal forces to engage in campaign*

Franklin, including cavalry, about .....	18,000
General A. J. Smith, from Sherman .....	10,000
General Steele, from Arkansas .....	10,000
	38,000
	38,000

*Confederate force (estimate.)*

Under General Taylor, infantry and cavalry .....	15,000
Available from Texas, (Magruder) .....	10,000
Available from Arkansas, (Price) .....	5,000
	30,000
	30,000

*March 19.* Arrived at Fort DeRussy during the night; sketched the works and inquired particularly of its capture; learned that Walker, on falling back before our forces, ordered its evacuation. The garrison were engaged in its

destruction when attacked by General Mower with two brigades of infantry and a battery on the afternoon of the 14th. Two hundred and fifty men and officers surrendered; many escaped up the river; ten guns captured; works substantial, but unfinished. Arrived at Alexandria at 3 p. m. to find our cavalry advance under General Lee had arrived same morning; General Smith and Admiral Porter on the 16th; enemy (Walker's division) passing south of Alexandria towards Shreveport, via Cheneyville, generally reported to have about 5,000 men, much demoralized; thus escaping Lee by two days. A brigade, under Mouton, attempted to re-enforce him from here, but, being too late, joined in the retreat towards Shreveport. Polignac's brigade, by forced marches, had also retreated from north side of river, passing through here, and joined forces of Walker; large trains passed over river; a body of cavalry (Harrison's) remain on north side.

*March 21.* Reconnoissance ordered to Henderson's Hill, where enemy had an outpost of a regiment of cavalry and a battery.

*March 22 and 23.* River rising slowly; about six feet on falls.

*March 24.* General Banks arrived on steamer Black Hawk.

*March 25.* General Franklin arrived, via Opelousas, with 19th corps and detachment of 13th corps; were in good spirits, and enduring the fatigues of the long march well. Great pressure brought to bear on General Banks for permission to purchase cotton; he refuses positively, or even to allow owners to take out their own cotton. Before leaving Alexandria it was ordered by General Banks that all cotton be taken for the government by the quartermaster's department, to be turned over to the treasury agent, according to law of Congress and orders of the Secretary of War.

Admiral Porter, on his arrival, commenced seizing cotton, and enemy commenced burning in all directions. Expedition returned from Henderson's Hill; captured 300 officers and men of 2d Louisiana cavalry and Edgar's battery of 4 guns.

*March 26 and 27.* General Smith's forces moved up the river to Bayou Rapides. The marine brigade returned to the Mississippi; boats too large to pass the falls; small-pox reported in command; "Woodford," hospital boat of this command, sunk at upper falls.

*March 28.* Command moved for Grand Ecore and Natchitoches by land and water; enemy retreating before our forces, making no resistance.

*April 1, 2 and 3.* Command arrived at Natchitoches and Grand Ecore; reconnoissances ordered in direction of Pleasant Hill find the advance of Green's command arrived from Texas; main force of enemy reported at Pleasant Hill, 36 miles distant, under command of General Taylor; river still rising slowly, too low for gunboats; put down pontoon bridge. A portion of Gooding's cavalry brigade ordered on reconnoissance up north bank of river.

*April 4.* Sharp cavalry skirmishing at Campte, 6 miles up, with Harrison's cavalry; few prisoners captured, among whom were two from Marmaduke's division of cavalry of Price's army; portions of Price's army reported at Shreveport.

*April 6.* Advance moved from beyond Natchitoches for Shreveport, carrying ten days' rations and forage; started for the front. General Banks will probably leave to-morrow, Franklin in command of column; General Lee, chief of cavalry, reporting to him; our forces falling far below the original estimate; 3,000 of the marine brigade returned. Grover's brigade left at Alexandria to protect the depot and wagon stores, from below to above the falls; our present available force being from 15,000 to 18,000; no satisfactory news of co-operation of Steele; scouts report him as having commenced the march; prisoners report Marmaduke's cavalry as going into Missouri; a portion of Price's army certainly in Shreveport; have they fallen back before Steele's advance, or are we to be fought in detail—first our command, then his?

*April 7.* The main body bivouacked last night 15 or 20 miles from Natchitoches; spent the evening and night with General Franklin. General Lee had met with some opposition before reaching Pleasant Hill, but not much loss; showed General Franklin my estimate of the force of the rebel army we would be likely to meet for the defence of Shreveport. It gave the organization by brigades and regiments; calculated 5,000 from Magruder's army in Texas, the advance of which had already arrived, and 5,000 from Price's army of Arkansas, now probably at or near Shreveport. It footed up 20,175 infantry and cavalry and 76 guns. This was in accordance with his own opinions and information of their strength; heard much complaint of and expressions disparaging to the cavalry; another idea prevalent, that the enemy will not fight.

The advance of Green's command, already arrived from Texas by forced marches, have already joined Taylor; prisoners captured from Price's army of Arkansas, who report a portion of their command already in Shreveport. Concentration and fight heard from every quarter, yet, strangely and unaccountably, officers will persist in declarations of opinion that they will not fight; requested General Franklin to advise General Banks that I had reported to him and was with the advance; passed the column en route and overtook the advance at Pleasant Hill.

Soon after noon cannonading commenced in front. Found the enemy in position at Wilson's farm, three miles out, occupying an open space, our line to right and left of road, dismounted, fighting as infantry. The fighting was particularly sharp and spirited, our howitzers doing good work, and our men showing good spirit and pluck. Enemy charged our line—the right forced back several yards; but the first brigade coming up met them with a terrific volley, impetuously charging in return, driving them from the field. We lost seventy men killed and wounded in thirty minutes. General Lee was cool and fought his men well. Returned to Pleasant Hill, reporting the result to General Franklin. An infantry brigade had been ordered forward as a re-enforcement, but the order countermanded as the firing ceased. A general tone of censure at headquarters regarding the cavalry continued, complaining that they were delaying the march of the column. I explained that General Lee found the enemy equal, if not superior, in numbers—had the advantage of fighting in a country well known to themselves—were in woods favorable to ambuscades—could take their own position, &c., &c. Was desirous to move with utmost possible speed consistent with safety, but did not feel able to press them vigorously without an infantry force, and especially when encumbered with his train. General Franklin flatly refused re-enforcements, said "he must fight them alone—that was what he was for. It might require the sacrifice of men, but in war men must be sacrificed." Being exceedingly anxious to have a good understanding between our generals, I proposed to General Franklin that, with his approval, I would again go to the front to observe personally the force and intentions of the enemy, and urge on General Lee the importance of pushing them vigorously. He approved, and gave the following message in memorandum: "Must crowd the enemy vigorously; will send the 16th Indiana; will be up within an hour; will send Gooding's brigade; keep your train well up; Emory and all are well up, in good order; if wanted, can reach Mansfield tomorrow; will send infantry any time if certain enemy is in force; Smith is coming on Grand Ecure road; must help ration him." Rode to the front; found that the enemy had made a stand at every favorable position; found our forces hotly engaged at St. Patrick's bayou, some eight or ten miles from Pleasant Hill, at a place known as Carroll's Mills; timber continuing up to the stream, the enemy occupying a cleared field beyond, and holding the water, were strongly posted; had been re-enforced, and were vigorously using a four-gun battery, and evidently intending to hold the position for the night. It was now dusk. On my arrival General Lee sent for Colonel Lucas, commanding in

extreme front. The enemy's line nearly a mile in extent, their flanks well defended; thought it would be exceedingly difficult to dislodge them with the present force, and impossible that night. The final determination was to hold the advance position, to make best arrangements possible for water, get the train up somewhere, and await the morrow and its responsibilities. I delivered the message of General Franklin, and explained his views particularly, concluding by asking what shall I say in return? "Tell him," says General Lee, "I shall move on the enemy's works in the morning." Returned to Pleasant Hill, and very much to my delight found General Banks, and explained fully the position; gave it as my opinion that General Lee was in a very dangerous position; at least eight miles from infantry support, in immediate presence of a superior force; would probably be attacked at daylight. He very wisely, in my judgment, immediately ordered General Lee to be re-enforced with a brigade of infantry, to report at daylight, and expressed great surprise that his previous orders had not been complied with, to compose the advance guard of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

*April 8.* Army moved at daylight; enemy pressed vigorously; our advance moving in line of battle; enemy disputing the ground at every available position; retiring in line, fighting; by noon had been driven four miles; the advance reaching a clearing of about a hundred acres, (Sabine Crossroads,) where our further advance was stopped; the entire advance deployed; the two infantry brigades to the right of road; heavy skirmishing; found the enemy strongly posted and taking position; Cameron's and Emory's divisions ordered up immediately; skirmishing continued for three hours, every moment expecting arrival of main body. At 3 p. m. enemy attacked vigorously in force; fighting desperate; superior numbers in front; flanked on our right; an unaccountable delay of Cameron's and Emory's divisions. Our forces were gradually forced back three-quarters of a mile, where a new line was formed by Cameron's division of the 13th corps, and attempt made to rally the broken and retreating regiments; the re-enforcements came just too late; the enemy continued their advance, and this line too gave way, the cavalry train and several guns falling into the hands of the enemy. Our next position was at Pleasant Grove, three miles from extreme front, and fifteen miles from Pleasant Hill, where we found Emory's division of the 19th corps in line. It was now about 6 p. m. Here the enemy were repulsed handsomely, and unquestionably this division saved the army. Had this and Cameron's divisions been in their proper place, within supporting distance of the advance, our army would have reached Mansfield by middle of afternoon, as was expected in the morning.

During the night information was received of movement of enemy to our right and rear; determined to fall back to Pleasant Hill and concentrate our entire force; movement commenced at midnight. I advised General Smith, at 2 o'clock in the morning, of condition of affairs and arrangements for the day.

*April 9.* Army went into position at Pleasant Hill; held a chain of hills in and around the town, having an advance line of two brigades to hold the open space in front. At 5 p. m. enemy attacked in two lines, with five divisions on left and centre, two divisions from Price's army forming their right; Benedict's and Shaw's brigades, holding the advance, were broken after a gallant contest, the enemy advancing rapidly, but in tolerable order over the open space, in face of the cross-fire of our artillery; Dwight's brigade on the right rapidly changed front; McMillan's brigade taking position to left of Dwight, and joining on right of Smith's forces, forming the reserve. When the enemy's force was fully developed on the plain, a severe infantry and artillery cross-fire was poured in from every side at short range, followed by a charge of the entire line. By dark the enemy were driven from every part of the field, and pursued on their right for three miles, their left only making any organized resistance. Orders were given by General Banks to resume the march for Shreveport at daylight; but on

representations of nearly all the generals in council, he very reluctantly assented to proposition to retreat to Grand Ecore.

*April 11.* Army reached Grand Ecore without further molestation.

*April 15.* Fleet returned with detachment under General T. Kilby Smith without serious loss. Rebel General Green killed at Blair's landing. In all these operations we have received no reliable or satisfactory information of General Steele's movements, with no apparent co-operation from him. We have been fighting the concentrated force of the enemy. While they are able to bring 25,000 to 30,000 men against us, instead of 40,000, as we expected at beginning, at no time can we bring over 22,000 against them.

*April 21.* It was determined to fall back to Alexandria, and, if possible, to save the navy, now powerless, and, but for the army, completely at the mercy of the enemy.

*April 22.* Left Grand Ecore at midnight, and by night had marched forty miles; found the enemy in our advance, with 5,000 cavalry and fifteen guns, holding the fords of Cane river, and threatening Alexandria.

*April 23.* Six thousand infantry, under General Birge, crossed the river some three miles above the ford to attack in flank and rear, while Emory's division attacked in front, General A. J. Smith's force resisting the attack of enemy, under Polignac, in the rear. The combined movement was completely successful. A succession of positions were carried by assault by the force under General Birge, while a vigorous attack with infantry and artillery, under General Emory, was made direct. The position was naturally very strong, but, before dark, was in our possession, the enemy retiring toward Fort Jesup, leaving our route to Alexandria unobstructed.

*April 25.* Reached Alexandria; commenced making arrangements to build a dam to relieve the gunboats.

*April 27.* Left for New Orleans.

Question. From what have you taken the extracts which you have just read in answer to my last question?

Answer. From my diary, and from notes which I made at the time, and a short time after the expedition.

Question. To whom do you refer when you speak of the officers at headquarters entertaining the opinion that there would be no fighting on the part of the enemy?

Answer. Those about the headquarters of General Franklin.

Question. Do you know the opinions of the general commanding on that subject?

Answer. General Banks was very decided in his expressions to me that they must fight, that they could not do otherwise; and that he had received information that satisfied him at about what point they intended giving battle between Mansfield and Shreveport.

Question. Was it a brigade or a division of infantry that General Banks ordered up to the support of the cavalry?

Answer. General Banks ordered a brigade, but General Franklin sent up a small division of two brigades.

Question. Did those two brigades remain with General Lee?

Answer. They did.

Question. Were they with him at the time of the attack at Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. They were; and they were the only infantry who were there in the first line of battle.

Question. How far in the rear was the next body of infantry?

Answer. Not less than eight miles.

Question. Why was so long a space permitted to intervene between the advance and the next troops?

Answer. I have never heard, and cannot give any good reason for that. I passed several times by the line from the main body to the advance guard on the day previous and on the day of the battle of the 8th, and often passed over a space of two and a half miles without meeting a single soldier or a wagon between the advance guard and the main body when they were on the march.

Question. Do you know who directed the order of march on that occasion?

Answer. General Franklin, I suppose; I never heard any question about that.

Question. Do you know whether General Banks knew of the order of march of that army; that is, that the cavalry was so far in advance of the infantry supports?

Answer. Up to that time the advance guard had been composed entirely of cavalry; at Grand Ecore General Banks had given orders that the advance guard should be composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, before the army was again put in motion. I left Grand Ecore on the 7th of April, and reached the main body twenty miles from that place, and that order had not then been put in force. The advance guard was composed, at that time, entirely of cavalry, mounted infantry, and a battery of mountain howitzers. General Lee had asked that the advanced guard should have infantry and artillery, because the country was unfavorable to the advantageous fighting of cavalry or mounted infantry. General Banks knew of the order of march of the army, but he did not know of the distance between the main column and the advance guard, at that time, until I had reported that fact to him.

Question. What was done when you reported that fact to him?

Answer. Upon my reporting that the advance guard was engaged with the enemy ten miles in advance, and that they were at least eight miles from any infantry support, he immediately ordered a brigade to go to the support of General Lee, to report to him at daylight the next morning. General Franklin sent two brigades, and they reached General Lee at daylight. The main body commenced its march at an early hour of the morning.

Question. Were there any elections for State officers, or any State elections, held at Alexandria, or at other points, during the progress of this expedition?

Answer. There was none by the army; there were some arrangements made at Alexandria to take the vote of the people; but I did not mix up with that matter at all, and know nothing about it.

Question. Do you know whether the army was detained at Alexandria on account of making preparations for holding elections there?

Answer. Not at all; it was detained there entirely by the low stage of the water preventing Admiral Porter from getting his vessels over the falls, and also to await the arrival of troops.

Question. Do you know anything of any cotton operations in connexion with this expedition?

Answer. I know that at Alexandria Admiral Porter was engaged in seizing cotton and other property and putting it on board his gunboats and transports. He had transportation trains which went into the country several miles. When we occupied Alexandria, and had our pickets around it, an officer of the navy called at our headquarters for a pass for one of his trains to go through our lines, beyond the pickets, to get cotton.

Question. Was the pass granted?

Answer. Really I forget about that; I presume it was—I am sure it was.

Question. Do you know who granted the pass?

Answer. I do not; there were several speculators at Alexandria, and very strong pressure was brought to bear upon General Banks for permission to trade with the people and buy cotton. To the best of my knowledge he refused them all. His language to me was very decided, that he would not be forced into that measure. I know of no operations of the army in cotton, except by General Banks's orders through the quartermaster's department. Cotton was taken for the gov-

ernment and sent to New Orleans, and turned over to the treasury agent, and, as I understood, adjudicated by the courts.

Question. At what point was this cotton taken to which you refer?

Answer. Principally at Alexandria; from that point up along the river the enemy burned nearly all the cotton we could have reached, estimated at the time by the people at two hundred thousand bales. I understood at the time that the reason it was burned was because it was being seized by Admiral Porter without receipts, and as lawful prize for the navy.

Question. Do you know what officers were present after the battle of Pleasant Hill, and remonstrated against the advance proposed by General Banks?

Answer. I have no very distinct recollection. It was understood at the time that it was objected to by all the general officers.

Question. Are there any other matters which you deem it important to state? If so, state them.

Answer. I understand that General Franklin attributed the disaster of the first day, the 8th of April, to the sending a brigade of infantry to the front, to the advance guard, while he ordered the advance guard to be re-enforced by infantry the evening previous on his own responsibility.

Question. From whom did you understand that General Franklin attributed the disaster to that cause?

Answer. He said himself it was wrong, and was the cause of the disaster.

Question. Do you know why he thought that occasioned the disaster?

Answer. I suppose his theory is that the battle was brought on too far in advance; that the advance guard, being composed of cavalry, should fight and fall back to the main body. But, in this case, the advance guard could not fall back without abandoning its train, which was there, and kept there, by General Franklin's order.

Question. Why was that train in advance of the infantry?

Answer. It was there for the reason that General Franklin positively refused to have it sent back, unless it was put in rear of the infantry train. General Lee made repeated requests that it might be sent back. I was with General Lee and General Franklin, alternating between the two, endeavoring to reconcile the differences between them, and I know that General Lee was exceedingly anxious that his train should be sent to the rear; and General Franklin refused positively, unless it was sent to the rear of the infantry train. General Lee asked that he might retain a portion of it containing his supplies; that he did not feel able to resist the force that he found in his front with the force that he had with him, and at the same time take care of all his baggage. It was on a single narrow road, through a wilderness, and the enemy constantly resisting his advance.

Question. To what do you attribute the disastrous result of that campaign?

Answer. The presence of the train at that point was, in part, the cause of the disaster, because its loss crippled the army afterwards on the question of supplies, and it was the immediate cause of the loss of the artillery on that day. But, in my opinion, the disaster of the 8th was attributable, in the main, to the distance between the advance guard and the main body of the army, eight miles intervening. General Lee was constantly pressing the enemy in front, and increasing this distance; the main body was halted for the night, as I understood, during the fight. I think the attenuated condition of the line was the first cause of the disaster, and the presence of the train at that point a secondary one. I was present with the advance under General Lee during the engagements at Wilson's farm and Carroll's Mills on the 7th; was with General Banks during the battle of the 8th, from Sabine Crossroads to Pleasant Grove; was with him at the battles of Pleasant Hill on the 9th, and Monet's bluff the 23d, and speak from personal observation and knowledge.



*Testimony of Alexander Arnold.*WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1865.*

ALEXANDER ARNOLD sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you served in the army ?

Answer. I have ; I was formerly a private in the ranks, and chief of orderlies in the department of the Gulf.

Question. Were you with General Banks at the time of the battle of Sabine Crossroads ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state what you were called upon to do there, and what you did do ?

Answer. Upon our arrival at the front General Banks ordered Major Drake to send an order back to General Franklin to advance his infantry as soon as possible. I took the order back, and found General Franklin at a bayou, eight miles in the rear, where we left him when we rode to the front. I delivered my order, and General Franklin directed me to ride to the rear and ascertain the distance between the advance of the 19th army corps and his headquarters. I rode back three miles, perhaps four miles, but could not find General Emory's headquarters. I found troops all along the rode on each side, acting as if they were going into camp ; some of them building brush-huts, &c. I rode back and reported to a staff officer of General Franklin that I could not find the advance of the corps, at least General Emory's headquarters ; I then rode back to General Banks.

On my way back to the front I met one of General Banks's staff, I think he was Major Lieber. He asked me where General Franklin was. I stated at the bayou where he had left him that morning. He rode to the rear, and I rode to the front again. I communicated to Major Drake that the order I had taken had been delivered, but that there were no troops advancing at that time. After that I took no more orders that day.

Question. Do you know whether General Franklin did or did not advance, or how long it was before he did advance ?

Answer. General Franklin, with his staff, arrived near the scene of action when the sun was about an hour high. But the 19th corps was two or three miles to the rear at that time ; we found them there when we retreated—General Emory's or General Dwight's division of the 19th corps, I forget which.

Question. Do you know anything in relation to the operations at Pleasant Hill ?

Answer. I do not know that I could state anything, only what a mere observer would be apt to remark. I was there during the whole action, and saw the position of the troops, and the fight as it took place. I was at General Banks's headquarters, immediately in rear of the column, during the action.

Question. Did you carry any important orders or messages there ?

Answer. I carried none during the day.

*Testimony of Brigadier General Thomas Kilby Smith.*WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1865.*

Brigadier General THOMAS KILBY SMITH sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers. I am now commanding the third division of the detachments of the army of the Tennessee.

Question. Were you connected with the Red river expedition?

Answer. I was.

Question. Under whose immediate command?

Answer. I will premise my answer by stating that immediately upon my return from the expedition to Meridian, Mississippi, known as Sherman's raid, on the 7th of March, 1864, by Special Order No. 63, from Major General McPherson, I was assigned to a command composed of the following troops as part of the expedition up the Red river. This order was based upon an order issued by General Sherman to General McPherson to report a brigadier general, whom General A. J. Smith should rank, to General A. J. Smith, with a sufficient number of men to make up General Smith's command to 10,000 men, which command was ordered to report to General Banks at Alexandria, Louisiana, on the 17th of March.

My command was composed of the 3d Iowa infantry, the 41st Illinois infantry, the 33d Wisconsin infantry, and the 58th Ohio infantry, forming a brigade under command of Colonel Pugh, of the 41st Illinois infantry, the ranking officer relieved by order, and the command placed under Colonel J. B. Moore, of the 33d Wisconsin infantry; also, the 14th Wisconsin infantry, the 95th Illinois infantry, and the 81st Illinois infantry, forming a brigade under the command of Colonel Lyman Ward, of the 14th Wisconsin, the senior officer; also, a company of the 1st Missouri light artillery, with orders to report in person to General A. J. Smith for full and special instructions.

Question. Will you go on and give us a concise history of what came under your observation in connexion with that campaign?

Answer. On the 10th of March, 1864, we sailed from Vicksburg, Mississippi, and arrived at Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya bayou, at 5.30 p. m. on the 12th of March. The troops having in the mean time debarked for drill and exercise, we left Simmsport at 7 o'clock on the 14th of March. We passed through the little town of Moreauville, and built a bridge over Bayou d'Eglise, which delayed the column some three hours, and then took Fort DeRussy, which was then styled the Gibraltar of the south, with 24 officers and 310 men prisoners, with 11 cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition. On the 15th of March we destroyed the fort. On the 17th of March we commenced embarking, and on the morning of the 18th of March, at 5.30 a. m., we arrived at Alexandria. Our advance guard was in Alexandria on the 17th, and our whole 10,000 were there on the 18th, early in the morning.

We remained at Alexandria the 19th, 20th, and 21st of March, and on the 22d, General A. J. Smith having sent forward General Mower, of his command, to reconnoitre and feel the enemy, at that time operating in our front and commanded by Colonel Dick Taylor, and supposed to be a body of about 6,000 strong, I received despatches from General A. J. Smith stating that General Mower had turned the enemy's flank and taken some cannon and caissons, a number of prisoners, and a large number of horses. In accordance with his orders I sent forward one regiment on the north bank of the river as a support to the cavalry should they meet any other force of the enemy.

On the 23d March, we made a reconnoissance into the country, and on the 24th of March General Banks arrived at Alexandria.

Question. Can you state at what time the fleet arrived at Alexandria?

Answer. The fleet arrived at Fort DeRussy, having met with some obstacles in the river. The enemy had thrown chains and rafts across the river to delay the progress of the fleet. The advance guard of the fleet arrived at Fort DeRussy about three hours after it had surrendered to the army. The fleet arrived at Alexandria at the same time that the transports conveying our troops arrived there.

On the 26th of March we took up the line of march up Red river, meandering along the banks of the river toward Shreveport. On that day we marched 20 miles, and bivouacked on the widow Jones's plantation, at Bayou Cotile, near Judge Boyce's plantation, until the 29th of March, when the major part of the gunboats arrived, and with all the transports except those of the marine brigade, which were ordered back.

On the 2d of April we left Bayou Cotile, and debarked at a point 30 miles above, where we were ordered to station a strong picket to cover the fleet. On the 3d of April the fleet moved out, and arrived at Grand Ecore at 9 o'clock p. m. We remained at Grand Ecore until the 7th of April, occupying our time in reconnoitring up and down the river, and feeling the enemy on both sides of the river. On the 7th of April I was ordered by General A. J. Smith to take charge of the river transportation belonging to the 16th and 17th army corps, and to conduct it to the mouth of Loggy bayou opposite Springfield, at the foot of Lake Canmissia; and arriving at that point after a careful reconnoissance toward Springfield, to disembark one regiment and push it forward to Bayou Pierre and hold a bridge at that point. General Smith remarked to me that on arriving at Mansfield the commanding general would endeavor to communicate with me at Springfield, and it may be send for supplies. He also intimated that from Mansfield I should receive further orders in regard to my movements toward Shreveport. To the transports belonging to the 16th and 17th army corps were subsequently added all the transports connected with the expedition, consisting of twenty-six large boats, very many of them drawing six and a half feet of water, although at the time there was scant six feet of water in the channel of the Red river. Many of these boats were laden with fixed and loose ammunition and siege guns; and the residue with the quartermaster and commissary supplies of the entire army. And I was sorry to observe that many of the larger boats were laden to the guards with what I was informed was sugar and molasses seized at Alexandria.

In this connexion I desire to read the following letter from Admiral Porter :

"MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP CRICKET,  
" *Off Alexandria, Louisiana. May 4, 1864.*

"GENERAL: I have been so engaged since my return to this place that I have not had the time to express to you the high appreciation I have of the services of that excellent and gallant officer, Brigadier General Thomas Kilby Smith, who, with a detachment of two thousand men, accompanied the transports in the expedition to Springfield landing.

"In that expedition we accomplished, under the most difficult circumstances, all that was required of us, and, with a persevering enemy opposing us at almost every bend in the river, returned to Grand Ecore, very much against our will, without the loss of a particle of the material of war with which we started.

"I cannot speak in too high praise of the manner in which General Smith conducted his part of the expedition, doing everything in his power to make it successful, and co-operating in a way to give me the most entire satisfaction. It reminded me of the olden time, when the gallant soldiers of the department of Tennessee, guarded by the gunboats, were pushing their way victoriously up the ever-to-be-remembered Arkansas river. We did not return this time with the same success, yet we went through scenes that tried men's mettle; and the associations of those exciting days will, no doubt, long be remembered by both of us. Nearly one hundred miles in the rear of our army, where we heard of its retreat back to Grand Ecore, and with a successful and indomitable foe ready to harass us at every step, everything was conducted as quietly as if we were still on our way to meet the enemy. We never realized, until we returned to Grand Ecore, that our army had returned discomfited to that place.

"We reached Springfield landing, the place appointed to communicate with

our forces under General Banks. The troops were all landed, and in another hour would have been on the march to Springfield, hoping to greet our friends as conquerors. Our disappointment was great when informed by a courier that our army had returned to Grand Ecore, and that all our perseverance and energy had been thrown away.

"The fire of the enemy was exceedingly annoying on our return, but the soldiers treated it with indifference, exposing themselves on all occasions, and returning the fire with interest when fired into by the rebels. On the afternoon of the 12th of April we were attacked, at a bad bend in the river, by a force of two thousand men, with two field-pieces, under the rebel General Green, backed by a large force of five thousand, with three field-pieces. The enemy attacked the rear of the transports, where there were two gunboats, one or two transports, and the Hastings, with General Smith on board, bringing up the rear. The enemy came in certain of victory; but the gunboats and the Hastings, the Rob Roy, and one other, opened on them vigorously, and after an hour and a half of hard fighting, in which the fragile transports were much cut up, the enemy retreated in confusion, with the loss of their best general, (Green,) about twenty officers, and four hundred or five hundred men. In this action General Smith bore a conspicuous part, and, by his annoyance of the enemy, helped much to secure a victory, so important to us from the death of the rebel General Green, their most popular leader. From that time we were not much molested, the five thousand men in reserve concluding it best to let us alone.

"At Campte some of the boats got aground, and, anticipating further annoyance, I pushed on, and, as you know, requested you to send help to our exposed soldiers, which you promptly did. I regret that the help did not arrive quite in time to save a few lives, the enemy opening their batteries on the boats shortly after I left, which attack, I am informed, was gallantly met, and the rebels driven away.

"I hope it may be my good fortune to be associated with General Smith on some occasion where our exertions will meet with a better reward. Though we cannot lay claim to any great success, we can safely say we accomplished all that was required of us.

"I hope you will commend this gallant officer to General Sherman, who delights to know those under his command who do their duty faithfully and gallantly.

"With much respect, general, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DAVID D. PORTER,

*"Rear-Admiral.*

"Brigadier General A. J. SMITH,

*"Com'g Div's 16th and 17th Army Corps, Alexandria, La."*

The admiral was not thoroughly posted in regard to the battle that I fought at Pleasant Hill landing, because the data had not come in at the time. We left seven hundred of the enemy dead on the ground. Green was killed by a canister shot from a steel Rodman, (3-inch, mounted on hurricane deck of the transport Emerald.)

The transports under my command sailed from Grand Ecore on the 7th of April, and arrived at Campte at 5 o'clock p. m. Learning that the enemy's scouts were near this place, Colonel Moore, commanding the first brigade, was ordered to send one regiment out to reconnoitre. They returned in an hour, having seen nothing of the enemy.

On the 8th of April the Iberville detained us, not arriving until late in the morning. She was so heavily laden that it was necessary to lighten her, and a portion of her cargo was transferred to the steamers Meteor and Liberty. Those three were among the heaviest-class boats that plied the Mississippi river. We were detained by this transshipment of cargo some three hours, and

therefore we did not arrive at Couchattee Point until 6 o'clock p. m. The rebel cavalry left this point only a few moments before our arrival. Learning that a body of the enemy were encamped at Couchattee chute, some three miles above, Colonel Ward's brigade were debarked at 10 p. m., and sent out to reconnoitre the place, and give the enemy battle if found, with instructions to bivouac at the chute until we arrived in the morning. The enemy retreated before the arrival of Colonel Ward's brigade. He succeeded, however, in taking a captain and one private prisoners. This captain, whose name I was unable to learn, was a rebel officer who had charge of all the cotton on both sides of the Red river, with full instructions to destroy the same as our army advanced. The destruction was apparent by miles of the ashes and charred remains of cotton bales that lined the river banks on both sides. I suppose there were millions of dollars' worth of cotton burned there.

On the 9th of April we sailed at half past 9 o'clock in the morning from Couchattee chute, arriving at the "nine-mile point" at half past 5 o'clock p. m. The enemy kept continually retreating as fast as we advanced. On that day and the day previous we heard rumors of the battle at Mansfield, and that our arms were victorious.

I ought to have stated before that on the same day our fleet sailed from Grand Ecore, the main army commenced its march from that place towards Mansfield. The day afterwards the cavalry advance guard, with its wagons, under command of General Lee, met the enemy and were repulsed.

At this nine-mile point we were some fifteen miles from Loggy bayou, where we were to wait further orders. Some few of the transports in the rear were fired into, but no special damage was done. From a letter found on the bank on the evening of the 9th we learned that the enemy was very much deceived as to our strength. This letter was written by a scout whom General Taylor had sent out from Mansfield to learn our probable force, number of transports, gunboats, &c. He states that "The enemy are ascending the river with four gunboats, one little orderly, and twenty-four transports, the large transports having a great many men on board."

From the report of this scout, General Dick Taylor would be led to believe that we had from 6,000 to 10,000 men for the purpose of flanking him. In reality, our effective force was less than 1,800 men.

On the 10th of April, Sunday, we sailed at 10 o'clock a. m., and arrived at Loggy bayou at 2 p. m. As directed, we immediately debarked, making a careful reconnoissance of the ground towards Springfield, with a view of moving to Bayou Pierre and holding the bridge at that point.

At 4 o'clock p. m. Captain Andrews, of the 14th New York, brought verbal orders, together with despatches, that General Banks's advance had met the enemy, and after two days' fighting was falling back. At this time I was in consultation with Admiral Porter as to the best manner in which we should dispose of a very large steamer called the New Falls City, which had been thrown by the enemy directly across Red river, her bow resting on one shore and her stern on the other, and the boat broken by an immense quantity of mud and bricks with which she had been loaded, thus affording an effectual barrier to the progress of our steamboats. We had come to the conclusion to fire her and blow her up, when the courier arrived with the verbal intimation from General Banks that his forces had met the enemy and been defeated, and with peremptory orders to me to fall back with my command. I hesitated to believe the order, inasmuch as it was verbal; but, upon consultation with Admiral Porter, I concluded to obey it so far as to fall back some ten or fifteen miles down the river until we should get further information. I therefore moved down the river and arrived at Couchattee chute at 8 o'clock p. m. on the 11th of April, on which day I received this written order from General Banks:

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
“*On the road, April 10, 1864.*”

“Brigadier General KILBY SMITH,

“*Commanding Detachment 17th Army Corps :*”

“The general commanding directs that you return immediately to Grand Ecore with supply steamers and your entire command. Please report to him upon your arrival.

“By command of Major General Banks.

“GEORGE B. DRAKE, *A. A. G.*”

On the 12th of April I sailed at 7 o'clock a.m. from the chute. Upon arriving at a point ten miles below the chute, the enemy opened upon my boats, doing more or less damage to all of them. I found myself entirely environed. General Liddell was on one side of the river with a force of 2,500 men and a battery; on the other was a force variously estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000, flushed with their recent victory over General Banks's command. The river was very narrow, very tortuous, and very difficult of navigation at all times, and especially difficult at the very low stage of water which then obtained, and with the class of steamers which I had under my control. The bottom of the river was snaggy, and the sides bristling with cypress logs and sharp hard points.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th of April, the wheel of my headquarters boat, the *Hastings*, having gotten out of order, I ran under the bluff of the bank with the view of making repairs. At that time the *Alice Vivian*, a heavy-draught boat, with three hundred and seventy-five cavalry horses on board, was lying aground midway in the stream. The *Black Hawk*, General Banks's headquarters boat, was towing the gunboat *Neosho* a short distance below. The *Vivian* signalled for assistance, and I ordered the *Clara Bell* to report to her. The *Clara Bell* failing to move her, I ordered up the *Emerald*. At that time the steamer *Rob Roy*, with four heavy siege guns upon her fore-castle, ran astern of the *Black Hawk*, and at this moment the enemy with a brigade about 2,000 strong, under the immediate command of General Jack Green, of Texas, with a four-gun battery, formed upon the bank and put their pieces in battery within point-blank range of the *Hastings*, the nearest boat. The *Osage* and *Lexington* gunboats at that time were lying at the opposite bank, half a mile off. I ordered the *Hastings* to cast off, and just as we got under way the enemy's battery opened upon us, the first shot falling a little short, and the others over us. Their practice being defective, we escaped without serious damage, and directly getting out of range, and taking a good position upon the opposite shore, I opened upon them with one section of Lieutenant Tiemeire's battery, one gun of which was mounted upon the hurricane deck of the *Emerald*, the siege guns upon the fore-castle of the *Rob Roy*, and the howitzer from the hurricane deck of the *Black Hawk*; (my guns had more range than the enemy's.) Very soon we killed the battery horses of the enemy, and they changed position rapidly, moving their guns up by hand. Meanwhile their sharpshooters had deployed and sheltered themselves behind the timber that lined the banks of the river, pouring in an incessant fire. My soldiers were all upon the hurricane decks, protected by cotton bales, bales of hay and sacks of oats, covered with soldiers' blankets, upon which I had turned the hose of the steamboats to keep them constantly wet, and which proved sufficient foil against rifle bullets, and enabled them to mark the enemy with a deadly aim. After the fight commenced the *Osage* rounded the point, and, with the other gunboats, opened upon the enemy, rendering me essential service. By sundown we had silenced the enemy's batteries, and, shortly after, they fled from the field, leaving many of their dead, among them General Green, who had his head blown off.

Under direction of the admiral, I ordered the transports down the river, running until one o'clock, when, from the grounding of certain boats, I was compelled to order the whole fleet to tie up. I learned subsequently from captured prisoners and deserters, among whom was one very intelligent captain, that General Green had a force of 5,000 men in reserve within about three-fourths of a mile of the river bank, covered by the timber. The heavy projectiles from my siege guns having exact range of their line of battle, very many of their men were killed—as generally stated, upwards of seven hundred; but that the rebel forces would never permit the federal forces to know the amount of damage that had been done them in that battle.

On the 13th of April I moved down some two miles, where the rest of the fleet lay. Here the Iberville, John Warner, and one or two other boats, were aground. All the boats except the Warner were got off the bar before noon. At about noon the enemy planted two guns on a hill on the other side of the river, and opened upon the fleet. We lay under shell for some five hours. Admiral Porter, with the most effective gunboats, having taken the advance, had reached Grand Ecore in safety. The Osage and Lexington were the only effective gunboats left with me from the navy. The Lexington was a wooden boat of very heavy draught, and of little or no service. General A. J. Smith, having learned through Admiral Porter of my condition, promptly sent re-enforcements from Grand Ecore. So soon as these re-enforcements commenced their march, but before they arrived, the enemy withdrew their batteries, and I had the satisfaction of reporting to General Banks the entire fleet safe, uninjured materially and without the loss of any part of the cargo. My only losses were the casualties of battle, the loss of men killed and wounded.

Question. How many men did you lose?

Answer. I lost but few, comparatively speaking; I suppose fifty would cover all my loss, (I am without my returns, or memoranda.) My men were well sheltered. My men were all veterans from Vicksburg and elsewhere, and knew well how to cover themselves behind bales, &c., and at the same time make their fire effective on the enemy.

Upon my arrival at Grand Ecore, I found General Banks's army engaged in intrenching. On the 15th day of April, Friday, having remained a little time below Campte getting a steamer off the bar, we moved down to Grand Ecore, reaching there at 10 o'clock p. m. (Finding General Banks in bed when we called upon him, we remained over night without seeing him.)

On the 16th of April the 19th army corps commenced fortifying. We remained at Grand Ecore the 17th and 18th, everything remaining *statu quo*. On the 19th we were ordered to have the men stand to arms at 4 o'clock on the following morning, and to have the army ready to march at short notice.

On the 20th of April the river was still falling. We received orders to be in readiness to march against the enemy at 12 o'clock meridian. We stood to arms on the road until half past 2 o'clock p. m., when we moved out on the Natchitoches road. At the latter place our division had the advance. Up to this time our troops had been encouraged by the belief or direct promise that they were to march directly upon Shreveport. But now it had become evident that we were on the eve of making a grand retreat instead of marching against the enemy, as announced in the order; at least, it was not the way in which the army of the Tennessee had been accustomed to march against the enemy.

Hearing it reported that our cavalry were being driven in by the enemy, two regiments of our division were sent out as a support; but, not meeting the enemy, they returned at 8 o'clock p. m.; and, at 10 o'clock p. m., we changed our front, moving the first brigade and a battery so as to connect with General Mower's left, forming a crochet. The position was a very good one, from which the enemy would have found it impossible to move us had they had the temerity to attempt it. All was quiet during the night. At this time we were four miles

in advance of General Banks's main army. As it subsequently appeared, it was placed in that position to enable him to commence a retrograde movement towards Alexandria while moving on the road meandering the Red river, while we amused the enemy at Natchitoches.

On the 21st of April we remained still all day, the enemy being encamped some six miles distant with quite a large force of cavalry and a few pieces of artillery. We stood to arms until 10 o'clock p. m., when we moved out some two miles by midnight, and here we were detained until 7 o'clock a. m. the next day.

On the 22d of April we marched at 7 o'clock a. m., and arrived at Cloutier-ville, on Cane river, at 3 o'clock a. m. on the following day, having marched thirty-two miles from Natchitoches. We made that forced march of thirty-two miles without halting.

At 3 o'clock p. m. the skirmishing, which had been going on for some time in the rear, became quite brisk. Colonel Lucas, commanding the cavalry brigade, sent forward for re-enforcements. Two regiments of Colonel Ward's brigade and a section of artillery were sent back. They soon drove the enemy across the bayou, making them withdraw beyond the range of our guns. We lost but one man killed, and none wounded. As soon as the enemy had retreated we again took up our line of march towards Cane river. At half past 9 o'clock p. m., the men having had but little rest since the night of the 20th, we halted an hour to enable them to get some coffee; at the end of which time we again took up our line of march, arriving, as before stated, at Cloutierville at 3 a. m. on the 23d.

On the 23d of April we marched from Cloutierville at 7 o'clock a. m. After marching an hour we were halted by the advance having some difficulty at a crossing of the Cane river, the crossing being contested by the enemy. Slight skirmishing continued in the rear between our rearguard of cavalry and the enemy until 10 o'clock a. m., when our cavalry commenced falling back to Cloutierville.

I ought to state here that on the first three days of this march my command had the extreme rear, General A. J. Smith's entire command being assigned to the duty of guarding General Banks's army. My own division was ordered back to Cloutierville to meet the enemy. I formed a line of battle, facing to the west, my left resting on Cane river and my right on a belt of timber in which we had deployed a strong skirmish line. General Mower, of the 16th army corps, formed on my extreme right, but was not in the fight. The enemy first came up in double column in our front. They were soon driven back, and immediately made a move to turn our right flank; but here I met them with two six-gun batteries, masked, and three regiments, and gave them such a warm reception that they soon returned. Here the musketry fire was very brisk for a time. The skirmish line was instructed to fall back slowly, if pressed by the enemy, in the hope of drawing the enemy on to our reserves, which were advantageously posted. At 12 o'clock, noon, the enemy made his appearance in force on our left, attempting to get on our flank under cover of the bayou; but this move had been anticipated, and two regiments, the 117th Illinois and the 3d Indiana, supported by the 49th Illinois, were so posted as to sweep all approaches. No sooner had the enemy made his appearance than four pieces of artillery opened upon him, sending his scattered ranks back. Thus, before 1 o'clock p. m., we had completely defeated the enemy at every point. It is impossible to tell the enemy's loss. We took many prisoners, all of whom reported a heavy loss on their part in killed and wounded.

The enemy having fallen back, and our forces having moved up in front, we withdrew and marched four miles, where we formed a line of battle facing to the west, having the cavalry in double line in our front, the 16th army corps being encamped in the rear of us, in supporting distance. We lay there during that night.



On the 24th of April, Sunday, at 3 o'clock a. m., the enemy saluted us with some half a dozen shells, evidently for the purpose of feeling us, and hoping to draw a response from us, in order to learn our exact position. At 5 o'clock a. m. the cavalry pickets were driven in. In a short time the cavalry was ordered to fall back. Our division advanced in line some 200 yards. The enemy came on with a yell, which was cut short by a few well-aimed volleys of musketry and unceasing cannonading. The enemy fell back, and we again advanced in line, driving them beyond the range of our artillery. Our loss was four killed and fourteen wounded. From deserters we learned that the enemy were severely punished in this engagement, in which their general, Parsons, was said to have been killed.

At 9 o'clock a. m., in obedience to orders, the troops were withdrawn, but in such manner as to leave the enemy in doubt whether we were in ambush for them, or had taken up the line of march. We crossed Cane river at 12 o'clock noon, and arrived at Bayou Cotile at 9 o'clock p. m., where we formed a double line of battle facing to the river, having the cavalry and batteries A and M, of the 1st Missouri light artillery, massed in the front line.

On the 25th of April reveille was ordered at 4 o'clock, and we marched at 10 o'clock. From this day, for the first time since leaving Natchitoches, our division had the advance. At Henderson's Hill there was a slight skirmish between our cavalry stationed there and a few of the enemy's scouts, but it did not amount to much. No sooner had we left Bayou Cotile than a squad of the enemy hove in sight.

On the 26th of April we marched towards Alexandria. Cannonading was heard in the rear all day.

On the 27th of April we arrived at Alexandria. The gunboats were above the falls, and the question was how to get them down. The admiral arrived with his headquarters, the Cricket. She had thirty-six shots fired into her in passing a rebel battery. I think there were forty-two killed and wounded. His fireman standing by his side was cut in two, and his chambermaid was literally quartered. The decks were a perfect slaughter pen.

On the 28th of April, at 12 o'clock noon, there was a report that the enemy was advancing. Then came a report that the pickets of the 13th army corps had been driven in. At half past two o'clock p. m. we were ordered out under arms, forming a line of battle facing the south; our division being on the extreme left of the line; our right resting on General Mowers's command; our left resting on the river, having a battery between. We threw out a strong skirmish line half a mile in advance. The 13th army corps was ordered to fall back twice, and refused to do so until ordered the third time, when it fell back, setting fire to a large quantity of forage, which was taken from the fire by General A. J. Smith's command, he having thrown out a brigade over a mile in advance of the 13th army corps, where they remained until daylight the next morning.

I state these facts here because at this time there was a great deal of panic, or that which approached to panic, in that command. General McClernand was there in command of this 13th army corps. They actually fired a lot of sutlers' goods and forage, which was very scarce, and most all of which General A. J. Smith took charge of, or as much as we could save from the fire, and we appropriated it.

On the 29th of April we received orders to withdraw the troops to camp, which was done at 9 o'clock a. m.

On the 30th of April the river had fallen six feet since leaving Alexandria to ascend it; but it was said to be rising at the time from back-water from the Mississippi. At midnight we received orders to march at 1 o'clock a. m.; but instructions were received from General Banks to be ready to march at sharp daylight. We did march at 12 o'clock noon, at which time the pontoon being finished across Red river, we marched over, and went into bivouac at the Louisi-

ana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, the one of which General Sherman was superintendent at the time the rebellion broke out. At 4 o'clock p. m. the troops were formed in échelon, the position being a very strong one, with a strong picket line covering our entire front and flank. We remained quiet there during the day and night.

I will state now briefly, that from that time, which was the first of May, until the 14th of May, we were continually engaged in skirmishing with the enemy, making divers reconnoissances to the front to ascertain the enemy's strength, and endeavoring to force him into a fight.

On the 14th of May we commenced marching towards Simmsport. On the 21st of May we re-embarked our command at the mouth of the Red river, in the mean time having fought a battle every day. We were twenty-nine successive days under fire.

Question. Do you know what instructions General A. J. Smith received when he was ordered to report to General Banks?

Answer. His instructions were to report to General Banks so soon as we got through, for we were only lent to General Banks; we did not belong to his department; we expected to rejoin General Sherman in his campaign towards Atlanta, or make a movement towards Mobile. We had objects ulterior to the Red river expedition.

Question. Was there any time set within which you should return?

Answer. The time specified was thirty days; after the lapse of which General Smith sought to be relieved, but General Banks did not permit him to leave. But the comity which existed between the navy and the army seemed to render it necessary that we should remain with the army until they had at least gotten over the falls at Alexandria. We considered that our time was entirely lost after we had brought the troops back to Alexandria; that General Banks could have taken care of the expedition himself. We never got to our command afterwards, but have been in detachments ever since.

Question. Do you know whether or not General A. J. Smith, during the time he was with General Banks, considered himself to be in all respects under the command of General Banks?

Answer. His rank precluded his occupying any other position. I know General A. J. Smith was adverse in opinion to that entertained by General Banks, because I heard him on more than one occasion express himself very freely, without approaching to mutiny or sedition. He, of course, expressed himself freely to his brother officers. He felt as many of the rest of us felt, that our command was to a considerable extent being wasted. An anxiety on the part of General Banks's staff seemed to be felt to avoid a fight; (whenever a fight was had, General A. J. Smith was brisk for bringing it on;) and yet there was no time when *we* did not feel ourselves entirely competent to handle the enemy.

Question. Was it, or not, the opinion of General A. J. Smith that our army should have advanced after the battle of Pleasant Hill?

Answer. It was, most decidedly; to such an extent was that opinion entertained by him that he proposed, and was anxious, to march to Shreveport with our command, feeling entirely competent to go to Shreveport and do all the devilment that was necessary and return.

Question. What do you understand to have been the object of that Red river expedition?

Answer. It has been a mystery to me, save from what transpired *en route*. In my own mind, I came to the conclusion that it was what would be called in military parlance a mercantile expedition; that is, an expedition for the purpose of opening the country to trade; or, perhaps, taking advantage of a victorious march to gather up what might naturally fall to the army or the government as spoils.

Question. What facts led you to that opinion?

Answer. The presence of bagging and rope in large quantities on government transports; and the fact that upon one occasion when I was assigned to the transports, the quartermaster refused to give me certain room which we required for some troops, on the ground that the space had been assigned for cotton.

Question. Were those transports to which you refer army or navy transports?

Answer. Army transports. There were no navy transports. The navy gunboats are occasionally used to transport troops, but they are not well calculated for the convenience of troops. They are very rarely so used except to meet exigencies of the service.

Question. Do you know anything in relation to cotton operations in connexion with that expedition?

Answer. I do not. I have been specially careful in my service in the southwest, since the war began, to avoid intercourse with anybody who would be apt to give me information in respect to transactions of any sort, kind, or description, relative to cotton. General Smith gave orders that no cotton should be placed upon his boats for any purpose whatever; and if my memory serves me right—I have no written memoranda in regard to it—he refused most positively to obey an order in that behalf, with the remark that while he controlled transports they should not be used for the transportation of cotton.

Question. To what order do you refer?

Answer. I refer to an order made by General Banks to General Smith while the transports lay at Alexandria, after our return to that place.

Question. Can you give the terms of the order?

Answer. I cannot, for I do not have it with me. I only have it from recollection.

Question. Was this cotton that you speak of cotton that had been brought into Alexandria?

Answer. There had been a great deal of cotton brought into Alexandria. The navy had seized vast quantities of it which had been laden on barges and been sent down the river. There were also two or three large boats laden with cotton, as I supposed, under government protection to some extent. There was a great deal of cotton left at Alexandria when the transports finally sailed. That was destroyed, as I understood, by order of General Banks. I do not know that any cotton was brought out from the Red river by order of General Banks.

Question. Was there any cotton taken on board any vessel by order of any one connected with the navy?

Answer. Yes, sir; Admiral Porter ordered the seizure of a vast deal of cotton; I should think many thousand bales.

Question. Was the cotton you have spoken of as being on board during one of the fights on the Red river put on board by order of officers commanding the army, or officers connected with the navy?

Answer. I did not intend to convey the idea that cotton was on board the transports, but that a space for it was reserved on the quartermaster's boat, a space which he refused to assign to me upon the ground that it had already been reserved to load cotton upon.

Question. I do not refer to that, but to one of the fights above Grand Ecore, where you said your soldiers sheltered themselves behind cotton bales, bales of hay, &c.

Answer. That cotton was a few scattered bales that lay on the shore, and which we stopped and took on board solely for protection to the troops. It was afterwards thrown overboard.

Question. To what quartermaster do you refer as claiming that the space was reserved for cotton?

Answer. I do not remember his name, but he was acting under the orders of the quartermaster of the department of the Gulf, Colonel Hollabird.

Question. Do you recollect the name of the boat?

Answer. I do not recollect the name of the boat, but she was a quartermasters' boat; I mean by that, a transport assigned exclusively for quartermasters' stores.

Question. At what point was it that this occurred?

Answer. At Grand Ecore, at the time I was ordered to take charge of the transports and proceed up the river to Loggy bayou.

Question. Do you know why the army was detained at Alexandria on the way up the river?

Answer. Because General Banks was not there in person. The navy were very anxious to move up the river, and the army were equally anxious.

Question. How soon did the army move after General Banks arrived?

Answer. Some four or five days. Our own command was put in motion within two days after his arrival.

Question. Were the other portions of the army ready to move before or at the time of the arrival of General Banks?

Answer. No, sir; I think that General Franklin's command arrived about the time that General Banks arrived. I do not think that all the army was ready before his arrival. We were ordered to report on the 17th of March; and reporting with great promptitude, were somewhat surprised that a movement was not at once made from Alexandria. Celerity of movement was important at that time, inasmuch as the river was falling.

Question. Did or not the army move from that point as soon as it could be got in readiness to move?

Answer. I think not; because our own command could have been sent forward as advance guard at any time after the 17th.

Question. What would have been the advantage of sending your command forward if the remainder of the army had not been ready to follow?

Answer. We had been pressing the enemy vigorously from Semmesport. We had defeated him in every small engagement into which we could lead him. His troops were to a certain extent demoralized. General Magruder and General Kirby Smith had not at that time been able to concentrate their forces. Every day's delay enabled Kirby Smith to concentrate his forces and make a stand at some point between Alexandria and Shreveport, as was evidenced afterwards at Sabine Crossroads and at Pleasant Hill.

Question. Is it your opinion that it would have been advisable for a portion of the army to have moved forward without regard to the readiness of the other portions of the army to follow?

Answer. I am of the opinion that at any time prior to the battle of Sabine Crossroads, our own command of 10,000 men, with the aid of the navy, could have gone to Shreveport.

Question. Do you know with what force the enemy met our advance at Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. I have no means of knowing, except the ordinary rumors in military circles. I suppose there were about 25,000 men.

Question. Do you know whether or not it was the opinion of the principal officers connected with that command that one cause of the disaster was that our infantry was not concentrated at the time of the battle of Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. That was undoubtedly the opinion; that, in short, the battle was brought on too soon. The cavalry were taken unawares, without sufficient support of the infantry.

Question. Is it your opinion that the infantry should have been nearer the

cavalry at that time, and where they could have rendered them immediate support?

Answer. It is.

Question. So far as you know, is that the opinion of the principal officers connected with that expedition?

Answer. It is.

Question. Then you would not be of the opinion that the cavalry should have been still further in advance of the infantry than they were at that time?

Answer. I would not, unless as scouts. I do not think that that body of 6,000 cavalry, (as reported, though I believe in fact there were only 3,500,) under the command of General Lee—not reflecting at all upon him as an officer, for I think he is as good an officer as we have in the service—I do not think they ought to have been forced into a fight without any infantry. That cavalry was fatigued by a long march; it was not well mounted, and it was not veteran cavalry. And under no circumstances would I put cavalry in the vanguard of an army when I expected to fight, except as mere feelers, especially in a country like that, which was a champagne country.

Question. Were the topography of that country, and the roads, of such a character that cavalry were not as efficient as they usually are in movements through an enemy's country?

Answer. My opinion is that the same number of infantry would have been much more efficient than cavalry in that country, so far as I know the topography of that country.

Question. Then you think the cavalry should have been relied upon merely for purposes of observation, and not relied upon to do any considerable portion of the fighting?

Answer. That is my opinion exactly. But my opinion should be taken in connexion with the fact that I was not there on the battle-field. I did not see the ground; I make up my opinion from what others have said in my presence, from my general knowledge of the country, my general knowledge of the command, and my experience on other battle-fields. After all, it is a mere matter of opinion.

Question. Have you any knowledge in relation to getting the navy over the falls at Alexandria as you came down the river?

Answer. Yes, sir. The river was falling rapidly; the Eastport, one or two valuable transports, and in particular the Woodford, one of the most valuable boats of the marine brigade, which had been fitted up by the government at an enormous expense as a hospital boat, were all lying aground above the falls. One or two projects were under discussion: one was to blow out the bed of the Red river; another was to construct a dam, which was considered feasible, and was the generally conceived and well adopted idea of the whole army. I never heard any discussion about it. It was finally determined to build cribs and wing-dams, in such a way as to increase the depth of the channel, by forcing all the water into a narrow channel.

Question. By whom was that done?

Answer. It was done under the supervision of Colonel Bailey, of Wisconsin.

Question. Was it done by co-operation of the army and navy?

Answer. By the army almost exclusively, inasmuch as the army had better facilities for doing the work than the navy. However, I ought not to say that, either, for the navy furnished coal barges, &c. I may say it was done by co-operation of the army and navy.

Question. Was there any want of co-operation between the army and navy?

Answer. By no means; they were exactly *en rapport*. Admiral Porter was always satisfied with the celerity and energy with which the work was prosecuted. And I know, of my own knowledge, that all the men that could work were at work all the time.

I have been asked as to whether, at any time during the expedition, our forces, or any portion of them, could have made the advance so far as Shreveport, which seemed to be the objective point, and, in the course of my narrative, have given an opinion which I desire to explain. I have always thought the troops under my command, trained in the old "Army of the Tennessee," under General Sherman, who had led them constantly onward, and never to retreat, were very far superior in marching and fighting qualities to any troops the enemy could bring into the field in the west; and the same remark could be made of that portion of the 16th army corps who co-operated with us. Hence I believe, by rapid and forced marches from Alexandria, on the 18th or 19th of March, General A. J. Smith could have reached Shreveport with his own command, even had we been opposed by twenty thousand of the enemy—double our own number. But the enemy's forces, at that time, were in number and distributed thus: Magruder had about twenty thousand—fifteen thousand serviceable—his main body covering Galveston and Houston; Dick Taylor's division, seven thousand, upon the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, from Opelousas to Fort De Russy originally, but whom we had driven and had now before us; Mouton's division, behind the Black and Washita rivers, from Red river to Monroe, numbering six thousand. Price, with five thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, held the country from Monroe to Camden and Arokadelphia, confronting Steele—an army, say of from twenty-five thousand to thirty-five thousand. The defences of the enemy consisted of a series of works covering the approaches to Galveston and Houston from the south, the defences of Galveston bay, Sabine pass, and Sabine river; extensive works at Trinity and Fort De Russy, and an extensive and formidable work located three miles from Marksville for the defence of the Red river, a work that had occupied the enemy, with the labor of five thousand negroes, upwards of a year to construct, and that was called the Gibraltar of the south. This work we had carried. Steele was at least entertaining Price; Magruder, then, did not dare to leave the Texas line. The enemy would not have abandoned their works at Trinity, and thus the residue of their army would not have greatly outnumbered our own, and the best part of that residue we had on the run. We could have lived off the country; we were used to it, and our soldiers could forage and keep up with a forced march. But the lighter boats of the fleet, at the then stage of water in the Red river, could certainly have ascended to Shreveport, as was proved afterwards by the boats overcoming the most serious obstacles that intervened before reaching Loggy bayou, between which point and Alexandria is the most difficult part of the river below the raft. Still, my opinion must be taken with the qualification that, as a subordinate officer, I could not know the plans of the commanding general, or the orders that governed the campaign, or whether Shreveport was really the objective point. Nor am I able to say what co-operation was expected from General Steele, (whose point of departure was Little Rock, Arkansas, to operate in our theatre,) or whether he was acting independently or at command of General Banks. These considerations, taken together with the knowledge the commanding general is supposed to have of the numbers and movements of the enemy, his own strength, and the objects to be accomplished, would neutralize the mere opinion of any subordinate general who was not the confidant of the general-in-chief. The enemy, at any time after the first week in April, was able to concentrate from twenty-two thousand to twenty-seven thousand in our front; (did bring into the field at the battle of Sabine Crossroads at least twenty-two thousand, of all arms; by some reports, twenty-five thousand.) This would have been the concentration of the commands of Magruder, Dick Taylor, Mouton, and whatever Price, who was still confronting Steele, might have been able to spare. At this time our own army was being depleted from various causes. A depot of supplies had been made at Alexandria, necessitated by the condition of the river, and the inability of

some of the steamers to pass the falls. A garrison to defend it was the consequence. Sickness arising from bad water and the heat of the climate, the small-pox, that had been engendered by the sick on the filthy and horribly policed marine brigade boats that had been assigned me for transports, and which being ordered back from Alexandria, deprived us of the slight co-operation they might have afforded. And so far as we should march, until we crossed to Texas, the Red river must have been our base, while a more treacherous river, for the purposes of navigation, does not exist. The rapidity of movement to Shreveport and instant return could alone have saved the fleet from stranding in the heart of the enemy's country. These facts it is proper for me to state, in connexion with any opinion as to what movements might have been made, or the results that might have ensued, that I may be called upon to express.

I desire to take this occasion, which will probably be the only public one accorded me, to speak of the valor and fortitude displayed by the officers and soldiers of my command, in its connexion with the Red river expedition, that demanded constantly the exercise of the highest qualities of the soldier. In every engagement with the enemy in which my command participated—Pleasant Hill landing, Campte, Natchitoches, Clouterville, Cane river, Monsouri, Yellow bayou, and several smaller combats near Grand Ecore and Alexandria—we were successful. My staff officers, Captain William Warner, Captain Scott, Captain Wetmore, Major Carle; my brigadiers, Colonel J. B. Moore, Colonel L. M. Ward; and Lieutenant Liemeyer, battery M, 1st Missouri light artillery, deserve the highest commendation the country can bestow. In the very remarkable passage of the fleet from Loggy bayou to Grand Ecore, vast amounts of government property and stores, with munitions and ammunition, were saved from destruction, or falling into the hands of the enemy, by the persistent and enduring efforts of these heroic men, under circumstances appalling to all but the truly brave. The merit of the subordinate is often veiled in the glory of his chief; none, among all who did their whole duty, in obedience to orders in this affair, deserve more than the gallant officers I have mentioned, and the officers and soldiers they commanded. Having paid this compliment to my soldiers, I close my evidence in bearing testimony in favor of the pilots of boats, who, in the affairs alluded to as well as many others that have transpired in the western waters, have developed high courage, coolness, and faithfulness to trust. The pilot at the wheel is the first man singled out by the sharpshooter of the enemy; his wheel-house is the easiest mark for the battery; if he falters one moment in his exposed and delicate trust, his boat is grounded upon a shoal, or bears broadside ashore, at the mercy of a relentless foe. He wins no fame; his name never appears in reports. I have never known an instance of his exhibiting cowardice or treachery.

I present the following table of distances from Shreveport to New Orleans:

Shreveport to Waterloo.....	45 miles.
to Reuben White's.....	15 " ..... 60
to E. C. Aiken's.....	5 " ..... 65
to Caspiana.....	5 " ..... 70
to Madame Bessiers.....	10 " ..... 80
to mouth of Loggy bayou....	30 " ..... 110
to Grand bayou.....	15 " ..... 125
to Willow Point.....	8 " ..... 133
to Coushattee chute.....	7 " ..... 140
to Grappe's Bluff.....	40 " ..... 180
to Compte.....	20 " ..... 200
to Grand Ecore.....	20 " ..... 220
to Tiger island.....	5 " ..... 225

Shreveport to H. Tessier's.....	3 miles	.....228
to George Gurnege's.....	2 "	.....230
to P. Rachal's.....	6 "	.....236
to St. Maurice.....	5 "	.....241
to O. K. Landing.....	13 "	.....254
to A. Favius's.....	3 "	.....257
to Montgomery.....	7 "	.....264
to Durand's.....	5 "	.....269
to Buckstone's landing.....	6 "	.....275
to mouth Cane river.....	25 "	.....300
to Cotile.....	20 "	.....320
to Alexandria.....	20 "	.....340
to Pierce's.....	35 "	.....375
to Norman's.....	32 "	.....407
to Barbin's landing.....	3 "	.....410
to mouth Black river.....	40 "	.....450
to Red river wharf-boat.....	40 "	.....490
to Bayou Sara.....	45 "	.....535
to Baton Rouge.....	35 "	.....570
to Placquemine.....	20 "	.....590
to Donaldsonville.....	30 "	.....620
to New Orleans.....	80 "	.....700

I feel desirous that nothing I have said shall be construed as in any manner reflecting upon the intentions and integrity of General Banks, for whom I have the highest respect. There has been a great deal of criticism in military circles in regard to the Red river expedition; but there was nothing ordered or done by General Banks, within my knowledge, that was not exactly within the purview of his instructions. Nor do I desire to reflect upon any officer: I merely desire to state the facts.

*Testimony of Major General William H. Emory.*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1865.

Brevet Major General WILLIAM H. EMORY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am a brevet major general of volunteers.

Question. Were you in what is called the Red river expedition, under General Banks ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity did you then serve ?

Answer. In the Red river expedition I was a brigadier general of volunteers, and commanded the 1st division of the 19th army corps.

Question. Who commanded the 19th army corps ?

Answer. General Franklin then commanded it; I am now in command of it.

Question. Will you give the committee a concise account of that Red river expedition, so far as you may deem it material, without any special interrogation? After you get through your principal statement, if we desire any more particular statements we will then question you further.

Answer. Last winter a year ago my division lay at Franklin, Louisiana. We were confronted by a small force of the enemy, who were all mounted. About the middle of March, the 14th I think, we moved towards Alexandria, pre-



ceded by the cavalry and the 13th army corps. We arrived at Alexandria about ten days after. There was nothing in our front but some guerillas.

I had never been called into any council, or been told the objects or aims of the campaign; and they were not developed to my mind until we got to Alexandria. I there found Admiral Porter with a part of his fleet. And I also learned that General Steele, with his army, was to co-operate with us in the attack on Shreveport; and I learned also, for the first time, that these two armies were to move at right angles to each other, and were not to unite until they got to Shreveport. And that we were to depend upon the Red river for our subsistence.

It occurred to me, and I so stated, that the plan was in violation of the first principles of war, which were, that two armies intended to co-operate with each other should meet before they encounter the enemy. Instead of our uniting, as we might have done at Harrisonburg or Monroe, which is about 70 or 80 miles from Shreveport, we were to unite at Shreveport; thus giving the enemy the advantage of fighting both armies in detail, one after the other, and making us lose the advantage of numbers, and the advantage of position also. And I learned, also, that it was the design for the fleet to ascend the Red river. I had been stationed on that river at different times, and I knew its treacherous character; that it was entirely unreliable; it would be sometimes up and sometimes down. And the river is also very crooked, as can be seen from the map. I did what I thought my duty. I stated, I think, to both General Banks and General Franklin, and to Admiral Porter, what were my views of the matter.

Question. Where were you when General Banks was informed of your views?

Answer. I will not say positively that he did know them; I may not have mentioned them to him. I stated them to some of his staff about the 24th or 25th of March, while we were at Alexandria; and I think General Franklin concurred with me; but he said it was too late to offer any objection. After that I devoted my whole and sole attention to my own division.

On the 27th of March we marched from Alexandria, and in about the following order: first were three or four brigades of cavalry; then came the cavalry wagons; then came the 13th army corps; then came the ammunition wagons; then came the first division only of the 19th army corps. That was all of the 19th army corps that made the march. Following that division was the train of the 13th army corps, and the train of the 19th army corps, with ten days' supplies in the wagons. The rear was brought up by a small brigade of cavalry.

I forget exactly on what day we arrived at Natchitoches; it was some time early in April—on the third of April, I believe. We then replenished our supplies, and resumed the march in the same order. On the morning of the 8th of April we were at Pleasant Hill. And about 2 o'clock in the morning my wagons were still ten miles to the rear. I addressed a note to General Franklin, informing him of the fact, and suggesting to him that my animals had been in harness for three days and nights, and that I thought we should halt at some convenient spot, issue fresh supplies to the men, and give the animals time to feed and recuperate. He sent me word that we were to go into camp at a place ten miles from Pleasant Hill, called, I think, Ten-mile bayou, or Ten-mile run.

I may mention here, to illustrate the difficulties in our way, that the road was very narrow, with precipitous ravines occasionally on each side of it, and it was for the most of the way from Natchitoches to Pleasant Hill through a wooded country. And I also consider that the order of march was not the order that should be followed in the vicinity of an enemy.

Question. Who is responsible for that order of march?

Answer. I do not know; I have no knowledge.

Question. Where was General Banks at that time?

Answer. He was present with the army.

Question. He, of course, had the means of knowing what your order of march was?

Answer. Of course; we always suppose that the commanding officer is responsible for such things.

Question. Was it the usual way which military men would have suggested for that army to advance in an enemy's country?

Answer. That depends upon the proximity of the enemy. Such an order of march was well enough if we were going through a country occupied by guerrillas alone; for you will observe, by the order of march, that the troops were scattered along among the wagons.

Question. Had you any assurance that the enemy was not near by?

Answer. My own belief was that the enemy was near by. Of course, it was not for me to decide; it was for the cavalry to decide that matter. The cavalry was in front, with all its trains.

Question. Was not the cavalry all the time in danger, if they were attacked with that long train behind them on that narrow road?

Answer. Decidedly so. I might state here, before I resume my narrative, that there were crowds of cotton speculators along with us. Where they came from, or who they were, I do not know. Their impression was, however—and I think that impression might have been communicated to others, to those who were controlling the advance of the army, (I do not know the fact)—that there was to be no fighting; they constantly insisted that there was to be no fighting.

Question. The cotton speculators held this doctrine?

Answer. Yes, sir; a great many of them, and the citizens along there. That impression was, no doubt, founded on what they knew of the intentions of the rebel General Kirby Smith. His plan was to get as far as possible into the interior; and it was upon that point that he and the rebel General Taylor had their trouble afterwards. Smith maintained that if Taylor had not delivered his battle when he did, but had allowed our army to get further into the country, we should have lost our fleet and the whole of our army; that it was inevitable. I think, myself, that we would have lost the fleet—not by the enemy, but in consequence of the condition of the river. These cotton speculators, who ran through the country everywhere, and proffered to bring in information, I think got hold of General Kirby Smith's plan of campaign. They were, no doubt, honest in their opinion, but they did a great deal of mischief. It is my firm belief, from the way in which the cavalry acted, and the advance acted, they did not expect any serious encounter.

Question. How came these speculators to follow the army? Did they have permits or authority to trade in cotton there?

Answer. Of that I have no knowledge at all. There was a Mr. McGee who went along with the army, who professed to know all about it. His cousin was on the opposite side, and regulated the cotton business there. He was subsequently arrested, tried and sentenced to death by the rebel authorities. He was afterwards released by the civil authorities on a writ of *habeas corpus*. But I am sure it was the impression throughout the advance of the army that there was nothing in front of us but the enemy's cavalry, and that we should have no serious battle until we got near Shreveport.

Question. Speaking of cotton: did you see cotton bought or sold, or carried through our lines?

Answer. I do not know whether it was bought or sold. But there was an immense deal of cotton carried to the water's edge; on whose account I do not know. It was understood that the navy seized all the cotton within reach of the river. And as soon as that fact became known, the rebels commenced burning their cotton all over the country.

Question. Please go on with your narrative of the material facts connected with the expedition.

Answer. On the 5th of April we left Pleasant Hill about 8 o'clock in the morning, I think, with the same order of march as before. I reached Ten-mile bayou with the head of my column about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, where I met Major French, an officer of my own staff, whom I had sent to General Franklin to learn the exact spot where we were to go into camp. He pointed out this bayou, and at the same time told me that the 13th army corps, under General Ransom, was already in camp about a mile and a half beyond us, and that General Franklin desired me to permit the wagons of General Ransom to pass to the front. My column was well in hand, and my wagons close up behind. We went into camp, or rather bivouacked, for we had no tents. General Ransom's wagons immediately commenced passing. At three o'clock and fifty minutes—I note the time exactly, because it was recorded—I received the following note from General Franklin :

“HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
“ *Western Louisiana, ten miles from Pleasant Hill, April 8.*

“GENERAL: The commanding general directs that you move your infantry immediately to the front, leaving one regiment as guard to your batteries and train. If your train has got up, you will take two days' rations and the cooking utensils.

“Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“WICKHAM HOFFMAN,  
“*Assistant Adjutant General.*”

My wagons were up, and in fifteen minutes I had issued two days' hard bread, nothing else, to the men; and hearing some firing, I determined I would not wait for the cooking utensils and other things, but march directly to the front, leaving about five minutes past 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We were obliged to march by the flank, owing to the narrowness of the road, and to march in single column. About forty minutes after commencing the march I met an aide-de-camp from the front with orders to hurry up, that the battle had commenced. After going about a mile further I met General Ransom coming back, wounded, in an ambulance, who told me that they had a pretty tough fight in front, but he did not give any very sad picture of the condition of affairs; but I thought there were a great many more men about that ambulance than looked well following him to the rear. I ordered the men to double-quick; to take a slow trot. After going about a mile further, in all, four miles from the point of starting, I met a parcel of servants, men and women, mounted on horses, who told us that the day was all gone, and halloed out to my men to turn back. There were also a great deal of cavalry scattered among these people. At almost the next moment a crowd of perfectly disorganized cavalry, wagons, ambulances, and loose animals came right down the road upon us, and all said the day was gone. I directed the leading regiments and the flankers on each side, without halting, to fix their bayonets, and I ordered the bands to strike up, and we had to use violence to get along the road. There was scarcely a staff officer who did not have his sabre bent beating people out of the road. It soon became apparent to me that the whole cavalry was driven back and in disorder. We continued our march; the men never broke a step, and not a man fell out of the ranks. In a short time we began to meet the infantry going to the rear in disorder. About this time I received a message from either General Banks or General Franklin, I do not remember which, to take as good a position as I could, and form across the road, for the purpose of checking the enemy, informing me that the advance was routed. There was no good place where I was, and I had to continue to advance. The ground there was not

favorable for forming a line. I continued to advance for about a half a mile further, still pressed on each side by infantry and some cavalry going to the rear. Every effort to halt them or reorganize them was impossible. I threw out regiments on each flank to try to stop them, but they ran around them.

After marching from half a mile to a mile further I found a place that I thought was favorable for forming a line. We also began to feel pretty smartly the bullets of the enemy, which began to drop around us thickly, and some of our men fell. For a moment I was afraid I had put off forming my line too late. So I took my leading regiment, the 161st New York, under Colonel Kinsley, and led them to the front and deployed them as skirmishers to cover my line while it was being formed. We then found the enemy in sight and firing upon us very rapidly. I put the first brigade directly across the road at right angles, the second brigade on the right and a little in reserve, and the third brigade on the left. I was still to the front with this regiment holding the enemy. Seeing the line was formed, or nearly formed, I directed Colonel Kinsley to rally his skirmishers and come in behind the line. It was with great difficulty that he did so; his loss was very severe. They had no sooner got in than the enemy appeared in three columns of attack, one coming directly up the road, one on our right, and one on our left.

I directed my men to lie down and hold their fire until the enemy had got close up. The enemy came on, apparently not expecting to meet anything there. When the enemy got within about 100 yards my line opened on them. In about fifteen minutes the enemy were driven from the field with very considerable loss. By this time it was dark, and we could hear nothing in our front, except the noise of wheels, perhaps artillery or wagons going to the rear of the enemy, and the cries of the wounded men calling for water.

At this moment I asked General Franklin, who with General Banks was near me, if we could not make a demonstration of cavalry, for I thought the enemy were beaten and in full retreat. But the cavalry could not be found; we could not get at it; it was gone. There was no water at all at that place. The only force there was the division of 5,000 men I had brought there.

About 12 o'clock at night we received an order to fall back. We had collected all our wounded in the mean time so far as we could. We fell back at our leisure. The first brigade formed the rearguard, but were not fired upon and not followed. At about 8 o'clock the next morning we arrived at Pleasant Hill, and I went into line of battle in front of the town. There was still no firing, and no evidence that the enemy had followed us.

About 9 o'clock I received a message from General Franklin that General A. J. Smith's troops would relieve my line. Colonel Shaw's brigade, of the 16th army corps, did relieve my second brigade. My first brigade was posted on the right, and my third brigade on the left. I sent back word asking that two more brigades might be sent up, and also that my left flank might be extended and covered, as it was then in the air and unsupported in case of an attack; it was in a false position. I received a message that we might cook where we were, keeping the men in line. The second brigade I drew to the right and rear as a reserve.

About 10 o'clock that day picket firing recommenced with the cavalry, for in the mean time some of the cavalry had been thrown to the front. The picket firing was kept up more or less all day. I again sent word about the exposed position of the third brigade, its left resting in the air, without any support whatever. I was informed that it was or would be supported by the whole of General A. J. Smith's command. Things continued in this condition until about half past 4 o'clock in the evening, when it was concluded that there would be no fight; I thought so myself.

But at 5 o'clock the firing became very sharp. I rode to the front and to the right of my line to see how the brigade was posted, believing that the enemy

would make their first demonstration there. A few minutes afterwards I saw emerging from the woods on our extreme left three or four heavy masses of the infantry of the enemy. They charged right on my left flank without firing a shot. They drove in my third brigade, killing the brigade commander and a great many of the leading officers of the brigade. I did not see Colonel Shaw's brigade, but I was told that it was driven in before the third brigade was driven in. I ordered my first brigade to hold their ground at all hazards, telling them they would be supported. And I went to my second brigade and brought it out and deployed it to the left and rear of the first brigade, which was now the only part of the line left standing. They formed a line and charged and retook a battery that I had lost, and at this moment I saw General A. J. Smith's whole command emerging from the woods on my left in line of battle. The two lines charged abreast of each other, General Smith's line continually throwing forward its left flank and enveloping the enemy, who were driven from the field. I considered that the enemy were repulsed in utter disorder.

I sent word to both General Banks and General Franklin, who were on the field, and I have no doubt saw the same things themselves. I sent word to them of what was going on on the right, and that the enemy were repulsed, and suggesting that the cavalry be put in. I think it was General Franklin who told me that the cavalry was gone, and anticipated that we could get nothing out of them. The wagons and cavalry had already been sent to the rear; at what time exactly they went I do not know.

At 12 o'clock that night we were ordered to move to the rear, and at 2 o'clock in the morning we started. After getting out of town, off the battle-field about two miles, we were halted, and remained there until daybreak. We then resumed our march, and that night halted at Bayou Dupont. The next night we reached Grand Ecore, where we stayed ten days.

From Grand Ecore we marched to Clontreville, where we understood that the enemy were in position to oppose our crossing Cane river. General Banks gave orders to General Franklin to attack the enemy in the morning. We had then had a long march of some twenty-five miles. The enemy were to be attacked in the morning, and the position was to be carried. General Franklin was then suffering very much from his wound. He sent for me to take command of the forces and to make the attack. I gave that night all the orders to the different officers. In short, I attacked, with the 1st division, directly in front; the cavalry was sent to demonstrate on the enemy's right; and General Birge, with a picked force, supported by the 13th army corps, was to cross the river lower down and turn the enemy's left flank. While this was going on, General Smith, who commanded the rear, had a very sharp engagement, the particulars of which I do not know. We succeeded in driving the enemy from his position without much loss, with a loss of only 300 or 400 men. We then resumed our march and went to Alexandria.

At Alexandria we were delayed some nineteen days getting the navy over the falls in the river. From my division there was a constant fatigue force of 2,000 men and six of the best colonels I had to superintend the operation. After the navy was got over the falls we resumed our march from Alexandria.

When we arrived at Marksville we found the enemy in position on the prairie to oppose us. I was now in command of the 19th army corps, having been so placed at Alexandria. The 19th army corps formed the left of our line, and General A. J. Smith's command the right. We drove the enemy without much opposition, and, so far as the advance was concerned, we continued our march to the Atchafalaya. The rear, under General A. J. Smith, had some very sharp encounters, particularly one at Yellow bayou.

After crossing the Atchafalaya the army was divided—General A. J. Smith's command went on board the boats and went up the river, and I was sent with

all the cavalry, the 19th army corps, and the 13th army corps, to Morganzia, and that was the end of the campaign.

It is perhaps proper, in justice to myself, that I should mention one thing. When we got to the Atchafalaya I found a great many reports there, some of them reflecting very seriously upon the troops under my command. I issued an order which was objected to by General Banks. I have not the letter from General Banks. It is upon the records of the 19th army corps, which have never been sent me yet.

Question. Why did General Banks object to your order?

Answer. He said he thought I had done injustice to the other troops. The following is the order I issued, and the letter I wrote in reply to the one from General Banks, objecting to the order.

“General Orders, }  
No. 48. }

HEADQUARTERS 19TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Semmesport, Louisiana, May 18, 1864.*

“Soldiers of the 1st and 2d division, 19th army corps! It is my duty to express to you my high appreciation of your uniform good conduct throughout the late eventful campaign. This duty is rendered more imperative by the false reports of your operations which have met you at this point.

“On the 8th of April, at the first notice that our troops in the front were engaged, the 1st division, the only troops of the 19th corps there present, marched in double-quick time seven miles to the front, formed line of battle under the fire of the enemy, checked him and drove him back under circumstances the most trying that could befall troops.

“The whole advance, composed of eight or ten thousand troops, were thrown back upon you in utter disorder and confusion pell-mell with the enemy. You formed line of battle under his fire, and amidst this frightful disorder, with the regularity of forming for parade. You drove the enemy from before you, and held the ground until ordered to fall back.

“The next day, at Pleasant Hill, you of the 1st division bore the brunt of the enemy’s furious attack, and only one brigade, that on the left, gave way, because its left was unsupported, but this soon rallied and joined in the final charge, which drove the enemy from the field.

“On the 23d at Cane river, you, supported by the 13th army corps, found the enemy strongly posted to dispute the crossing of the river. Led by the 3d brigade of the 1st division, you turned his flank and drove him at the point of the bayonet from the hills he occupied.

“At Alexandria you contributed your labor by day and night for seventeen days, under the engineering skill of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, to the great work which relieved the fleet from its perilous situation above the falls, and restored it to the country.

“At Mansura, on the 16th of May, you met the enemy on an open plain, and supported on your right by the 16th and 17th army corps and Colonel Lucas’s cavalry, drove him from the field.

“This, in brief, is a summary of your services for the last two months, and I know, when it becomes known to the country, the judgment will be that you at least have done your duty faithfully.

“W. H. EMORY,  
*“Brigadier General, Commanding.”*

“HEADQUARTERS 19TH ARMY CORPS,  
*“Near Semmesport, La., May 20, 1864.*

“I have the honor to have received, this moment, the despatch from headquarters department of the Gulf, of this date, finding fault with my General Orders No. 48.

"I have myself been too much the victim of injustice and misrepresentation to be capable, knowingly, of inflicting upon others any injury; and if the order that I have issued is capable of misconstruction, I will take the greatest pleasure in changing it.

"I spoke in person to the general commanding of my intention to issue an order meeting the falsehoods that had been put forth and published in the northern papers, and I admit that I would have been more prudent to have submitted it to him before I had issued it.

"I request, however, to state this, in explanation of my order: every paper at the north has published an account of the rout of the advance guard of our army; I suppose that a manuscript order issued only for the troops of my command could not add to the publicity given to that affair.—(See New York Times, herewith enclosed.)

"I must beg to say that the language referred to in my last paragraph is wholly misunderstood, and that I only intended to do justice to my own troops by saying that they had done their duty at least.

"The paragraph referring to the battle of Cane river is addressed to the whole of the 19th army corps there present, and was so understood by those to whom I read it before issuing the order. Look at the list of killed and wounded in the 3d brigade of the 1st division, and see if it was not my duty to make special mention of this brigade particularly, as it had been censured at the battle of Pleasant Hill.

"I have no other motive under heaven than to do my own troops justice and to vindicate them from slander, and I have not the least thought of overlooking the services of the 2d division, which is a part of them, or of casting the shadow of reproach upon the brave men of the cavalry, or the detachments of the 13th, 16th, and 17th army corps, which have been serving with us with harmony and unity.

"If with this explanation the major general commanding still thinks I have done injustice and wrong in issuing this order, I request I may be permitted to publish to the troops his letter of censure and this my letter of reply, as the only atonement I can make for the injury which in his opinion has been inflicted.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"W. H. EMORY,

*"Brigadier General, Commanding."*

"Major GEORGE B. DRAKE, A. A. G."

"Official copy:

"———, A. A. G., 19th A. C."

I wish to add one thing to my testimony, that during that campaign I did not lose a hoof, or a wheel, or a gun—not one.

Question. After you had routed the enemy at Pleasant Hill, why was it that you retreated to Grand Ecore?

Answer. That matter was practically decided early in the morning before the battle took place, by ordering all the wagons and all the cavalry, with the exception of a brigade, to the rear. In the matter of sending away these wagons and cavalry I was not a party.

Question. As a military man, do you think there was a necessity for it, or do you think another course should have been pursued?

Answer. My idea was, that the army should have gone right down the La Pierre road to the river, where I knew that the navy and a number of our transports were, with but a very small force to guard them.

Question. Do you know any reason why the army did not go there, instead of going back to Grand Ecore?

Answer. I heard it stated that the road by Bayou La Pierre was impractica-

ble, but it turned out not to be so. Pleasant Hill is not a tenable position; there is no water there. It is not a place for a large force, particularly of animals. But if there had been ever so much water there, I should have made the move down the La Pierre road. I do not think that a subordinate general can enter into all the views of the general commanding, for he does not know all the controlling facts, and I do not think it is fair to criticise him without knowing all the facts, and I do not know them.

Question. What was the object, as near as you could ever learn, expected to be attained by that Red river campaign? What was its objective point?

Answer. It was alleged to be Shreveport and the factories that were there. It was alleged that Shreveport was the great manufacturing place of what they called the west Mississippi department.

Question. Do you know whether it was contemplated to hold that place permanently, or only to destroy whatever public property was found there?

Answer. I don't know what was the project

Question. Considering the length and difficulties of the line of communication, could Shreveport have been held, even supposing you had taken it?

Answer. It could not have been held and communications kept up by the Red river, except by an immense army—an army twice as large as the one opposed to it.

Question. Do you know who planned that expedition; whether it was conceived by the authorities here in Washington, or originated with General Banks?

Answer. I have no knowledge whatever on that subject except from hearsay.

Question. As a military man of experience, to what do you attribute the failure of that campaign?

Answer. I think any one of three causes might have produced a failure. First, was the plan of the campaign, which allowed the enemy to fight the different detachments moving on there before they concentrated or united. The next was the making the Red river a base of supplies, a river which is notoriously an unsafe and treacherous river. And as an accessory to the disadvantage of using the Red river as a base of supplies, I might mention the great quantity of cotton there was there, which was calculated to divert attention from the direct object and end of war. I do not say it did do so, but it was calculated to do so, and that consideration, connected with the difficulties of the river, would have prevented me from going there.

Question. It tended to demoralize the army?

Answer. Yes, sir; through the horde of civilians and cotton speculators and outsiders who necessarily must go with the army. Then the next thing was the disposition of the troops in the order of march, when it might reasonably have been expected that we would have to fight the enemy. The troops, instead of being massed as we approached the enemy, were thrown in in detail, brigade after brigade.

Question. In your judgment, could the force under General Banks have reached Shreveport had a proper disposition of march been made?

Answer. In my opinion they could have done it by abandoning the gunboats and wagons. On an expedition like that gunboats and wagons are a great encumbrance.

Question. If they had reached it, what would have been the condition of the army about getting back again?

Answer. If the enemy had been in small force there, we might, after getting to Shreveport, have marched down on Galveston; but it would have been such a thing that but few armies could do it. We were not in any condition to undertake a movement of that sort, for we were encumbered with wagons.

Question. Were any of this immense train of wagons ever used for the purpose of collecting cotton?

Answer. They may have been used near the banks of the river for hauling



cotton to the boats, but I think they were never so used on the march by authority; if at all, only surreptitiously.

Question. Were you at the place where the fleet was delayed, and where dams were made to float them off?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Who conceived this plan of building dams there?

Answer. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, of my command.

Question. The credit of originating that idea is with him?

Answer. I so understood; I gave him the credit of it. It may have been originated by somebody else. There was a soldier, I have forgotten his name, of the 114th New York regiment, one of the best regiments I had, who came to me about it after I had heard of it from Colonel Bailey. He told me that on one occasion he had assisted in getting a steamboat out of the Susquehanna, which is a more difficult river than the Red river.

Question. We have been told that the navy was engaged in the cotton business to a considerable extent. Can you state to what extent they were engaged in it?

Answer. I have no knowledge whatever of that, except hearing that they seized all the cotton on the banks of the river. I have no personal knowledge whatever of it. I saw cotton on barges under convoy of the navy, but whose barges they were I do not know.

Question. I only wanted to learn from you, as a military man, what object was to be attained, in a military point of view, by such an expedition?

Answer. It would be difficult to answer the question as to all the objects of that campaign. No man has a right to attribute motives other than those already stated. If I were to mention an object it would be hypothetically, which I would not like to do. The main object, undoubtedly, was to destroy the depots of supplies at Shreveport. It is my opinion, if the enemy had been in one-half the force that they were, they would have done us a great deal more damage by drawing us up to Shreveport, for they could have cut off our gunboats up there, as they would have grounded, and it would have taken the army a year to get them out. They would have neutralized 20,000 or 30,000 men for a year to get the gunboats out, or else we should have been obliged to leave them.

NOTE.—The want of connexion in portions of some of my answers with the interrogations formally proposed and recorded, and a seeming volunteering of testimony not called for by them, is due to the incidental remarks and questions made in the course of my testimony and not taken down by the phonographic reporter.

W. H. EMORY,  
*Brevet Major General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1865.*

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*Testimony of Brigadier General William Dwight.*

WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1865.*

Brigadier General WILLIAM DWIGHT recalled and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. I understand that you desire to make some additions to your testimony upon certain points to which your attention has already been called.

Answer. You asked me the other day what was the cause of the disaster above Grand Ecore, and what was done afterwards. I gave the causes of the disaster, and I wish to add, in corroboration of what I gave as the causes, that

as soon as the army arrived at Grand Ecore, on its retreat, the commanding officer of the cavalry, together with the second in command, was relieved from duty and sent to New Orleans, and in their places were appointed General Arnold, then chief of artillery, and Colonel Davis, of the 1st Texas cavalry, who was a very excellent officer. I desire to make that statement as tending to show the necessity of a change.

Another defect in the organization of the expedition, which was corrected then, was this: General Banks's staff was very defective. His chief quartermaster and chief commissary were left at New Orleans, whereas they should have accompanied the expedition. The reasons for that are obvious. General Banks not having them with him, was obliged to resort to the chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the 19th army corps. That caused jealousies in the command of General A. J. Smith, and the matter went so far as to cause General McClernand, who was afterwards in command of the detachment of the 13th army corps, to issue an order directing his chief quartermaster and chief commissary to obey no orders from the chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the 19th army corps. Besides, the chief quartermaster and chief commissary in New Orleans were men of excellent judgment and abilities, and had they been present on the staff they would have rendered great assistance.

These defects were corrected, as far as possible, by sending for a chief quartermaster, and endeavoring to reorganize the staff of General Banks so as to avoid the troubles which had arisen. It may be well to state here that these difficulties increased greatly after General Franklin left the army at Alexandria. He had exercised sufficient control over General Smith and the commanding officer of the 13th army corps, up to that time, to keep things more in order.

I think these are the only points I desired to add to my testimony.

Question. Why were the chief quartermaster and chief commissary left at New Orleans instead of accompanying the expedition?

Answer. There was a large quartermaster's and commissary's business to be done in New Orleans at all times, and they were left to take charge of that. There was undoubtedly plenty of employment in New Orleans for the quartermaster and commissary, but it would have been much better to have left an assistant there and taken the chief with the expedition, so as to have had the thorough control of the department, or at all events a chief quartermaster and chief commissary for the expedition should have been appointed.

Question. State to us what you know in relation to the co-operation of the navy with the army during this expedition.

Answer. The navy was disposed to co-operate with the army as fully as possible in all the military objects of the expedition, and did ever ything in its power in a military way, such as using its force against the enemy.

But one of the objects of the expedition being to let out as large a quantity of cotton as possible from that country, the navy thwarted that object by seizing the cotton as prize of the navy, which caused the enemy to destroy large quantities of it. The commanders of the rebels were willing that the cotton should come out of the country. Such was the state of feeling throughout that country that they were obliged to consent to let it out; it was all the property that the people had left; and the people saw nothing before them but want and destitution unless they could derive something from their cotton. They therefore did not destroy any cotton at first, and there was not any intention to destroy any, for the reason that the people of the country for supporting the rebel army were to be compensated by what they would derive from their cotton. But the moment the navy began to seize the cotton of the country, which they did in a very extraordinary manner, fitting out teams, putting them in charge of marines, and sending them out distances varying from three to seven or eight miles—and I have reason to believe further than that, but I know that they went out as far as seven or eight miles into the country—and seizing

the cotton without compensation, the rebels began to hide what they could, and destroy what could not be hidden. The result was, that instead of getting a large quantity of cotton out of the country, 200,000 or 300,000 bales, as might easily have been gotten out, there were but a few thousand bales obtained.

Question. What reason have you for saying that one of the objects of the expedition was to get a large quantity of cotton out of that country?

Answer. I have seen the instructions which were given, and it has been further stated to me by General Banks as one of the objects of the expedition.

Question. By whom were these instructions given, and to whom?

Answer. I think they were from the War Department to General Banks. This, however, is merely my impression, because I did not study the subject particularly. My impression is that this is contained in the letters of General Halleck to General Banks as one of the objects of the expedition. I might add that the discussions upon this subject before the expedition started were quite good evidence that that was one of the objects contemplated by the expedition. The only difficulty in the matter was that no distinct policy as to cotton was adopted; that left the navy to seize the cotton when the army was disposed to let the cotton alone, and let it come within our lines. It also left the policy very indistinct and undefined as to the manner in which it should be got out of the country.

Question. Do you understand that it was the object of the army to extend its lines around this cotton so as to embrace it within our lines?

Answer. Yes, sir; and to allow the cotton to come in.

Question. That is, it would come in as captured in this way, or by such arrangements as should subsequently be made?

Answer. Whatever policy would be deemed wise to adopt for letting it in—whether it should be paid for in whole or in part, or paid for in greenbacks in full, or whether a certain amount only should be paid on it—it was necessary, in order to get any cotton out of that country, that the people should derive some benefit from it, otherwise the rebel military authorities were determined to do exactly what they did do, destroy it; they would not have destroyed it were the cotton not being seized as prize of war by the navy.

Question. Do you understand that there was any agreement, understanding or expectation that the rebel authorities would permit our lines to be extended around that cotton, so that we could get possession of it, provided there was no attempt made to seize it?

Answer. I believe there was a tacit understanding to that effect. At all events, it was so publicly known as to be no secret whatever, and it is notorious now that no cotton was destroyed until the navy had seized a large quantity as a prize of war, and it was given out that such was the policy of the navy and its right.

Question. Do you believe that the enemy would not have attacked our forces if the navy had not commenced the seizure of the cotton?

Answer. Not at all. The military part of the expedition was entirely independent of the cotton business. The enemy would have acted against us whenever they found us in such a condition that they could do so with a prospect of success. But the military authorities of the enemy would not have destroyed the cotton, provided it had not been seized as a prize by the navy, or provided the people of the country could have derived a benefit from its being taken. The reason of that is obvious. The rebel army there had been quartered on the people, who had been obliged to furnish supplies to them. The authorities had their regular tithes of corn, bacon, and other products, and each person was obliged to bring into the tithe-house a given portion of his products. These tithe-houses were built all along from some distance below Alexandria, and to the right of it over to the Sabine river, or to Shreveport, and again from be-

tween Shreveport and Houston. They were hidden and concealed as much as possible. It was from them that the enemy derived its chief source of supply, and it was from them that his army was entirely supplied during the time it was idle, and he derived his chief supply from them even in his active campaigns. That had been a great burden to the people. The rebel military authorities were willing that the people should dispose of their cotton.

Question. Then, do you understand that our lines were to be extended over that territory merely for the purpose of taking out this cotton, and to be withdrawn when that object was accomplished?

Answer. I do not consider that that was the only object of the expedition. The original object of the expedition, as indicated in the correspondence, was to move into Texas. After the army arrived at Alexandria the objects of the expedition were changed, and it was then decided that the army was simply to go to Shreveport, destroy the military power of the enemy there, let out as much cotton as possible, and then to retire from the country.

Question. Why were those objects changed?

Answer. They were changed by the order of General Grant, which reached General Banks just before he arrived at Alexandria, and which required that the army should place itself before Mobile as soon after the 5th of May as possible. That would indicate that the objects of the expedition were changed, because General Grant believed that the fighting ought to be east of the Mississippi, and that all our efforts ought to be directed there.

Question. Would the results of the campaign have been changed in any way, in your opinion, if the navy had refrained from seizing the cotton?

Answer. I do not think it would have changed the military results at all. The military failure was entirely due to the bad organization and bad management of the army. It was wholly independent of the subject of cotton, or of the operations of the navy.

Question. Do you know who directed the operations of the navy in relation to the seizure of cotton?

Answer. I do not. I have always understood that it was Admiral Porter. It was a matter of notoriety there that he directed it.

Question. You do not know under what instructions he acted?

Answer. I do not. I never saw them.

Question. And do you know what the policy would have been in relation to taking the cotton out, if we had succeeded in extending our lines so as to embrace it?

Answer. That policy can be found by the committee in the orders of General Banks on the subject of cotton.

Question. Orders issued to or by General Banks?

Answer. By General Banks. It was, in general terms, that the cotton should be turned over to the quartermaster and shipped to New Orleans, where it should be subject to the claims of the owners.

Question. Was there any change in those orders, or in the policy, after the army left Alexandria?

Answer. That policy was adopted at Alexandria and continued for a time.

Question. Was it subsequently changed; and if so how and what caused the change?

Answer. I do not know. It was not changed in my time.

Question. Then, so far as you know, the policy of General Banks was to let that cotton all be taken possession of by the quartermaster, sent to New Orleans, and there await the decision of the authorities?

Answer. In general terms, that was the policy to be adopted.

Question. The cotton was, of course, to be taken for the benefit of the government?

Answer. It was to be subject to the charges which the government should

place upon it for transportation, and other taxes and dues. That was the policy adopted after the retirement of the army to Alexandria. A policy ought to have been adopted when the expedition started; and the more liberal that policy had been, the larger would have been the quantity of cotton derived from the expedition, and the more fully would the object of the expedition in that regard have been accomplished.

Question. And the policy of the army and the navy should have been the same?

Answer. Yes, sir; and the policy followed in letting the cotton out of the country should have been a liberal one, for it was only by compensating those people to a certain extent that you could obtain the cotton. In fact, it was afterwards shown that none but a very liberal policy would obtain any great amount of cotton. The cotton could have been bought for greenbacks at a very reasonable price, and nothing but a compensation to those people in greenbacks could have obtained any great quantity of it.

Question. Was there any cotton seized by the army there?

Answer. There was cotton seized by the quartermaster's department and taken to New Orleans. But that cotton was made subject to the regulations adopted at Alexandria. The order issued at Alexandria was made to cover all the cotton that had been seized.

Question. Was there any cotton taken by the army for private purposes or on speculation?

Answer. I believe not; not to my knowledge; every effort was made to guard against that.

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*Testimony of Major General H. W. Halleck.*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1865.

Major General HENRY W. HALLECK sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your present rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general, and am doing the duties of chief of staff to the Secretary of War and the lieutenant general.

Question. Will you state what was expected to be attained by the Red river expedition under General Banks, and also anything else which you may deem material for the public to know in relation to that expedition?

Answer. The correspondence, copies of which I have already furnished to this committee, gives all the information of an official character which I have in relation to that expedition. What I know or have heard outside of that is mere verbal statements of individuals, which are not of an official character, nor of importance. The object of the expedition, as I understood it at the time, was to form a junction between the forces under General Steele and those under General Banks, so as to shorten the line of defence on the western side of the Mississippi river, and to establish a position within the State of Texas which should be permanently held, it being considered an important object by the executive branch of the government at that time that a post should be held at all consequences within the State of Texas. I think that is about all I can state on that point, beyond what the correspondence sets forth.

With these main objects in view, General Banks was instructed to select his own time and his own lines of operations for the accomplishment of those objects. The correspondence will show that this was the substance of the instructions to General Banks.

In regard to the failure of the expedition, I would only remark that we have

received no official reports except from brief telegrams at the time, copies of which have been furnished to the committee.

Question. Did you consider the Red river the best line to accomplish that object?

Answer. I did, as connected with the position of our troops on the Arkansas river. We thought the two could be united on that route more readily than on any other.

Question. The character of the Red river for navigation is well known to the authorities here?

Answer. Yes, sir; it is precarious; at times good, at times utterly impracticable.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT, *February 17, 1865.*

SIR: In compliance with the request of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, communicated to me in your letter of the 14th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the correspondence on the files of this department in relation to the Red river expedition, under General Banks, in the spring of 1864.

Very respectfully, &c.,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of Com. on Conduct of the War, U. S. Senate.*

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RED RIVER EXPEDITION.—CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY UNDER  
MAJOR GENERAL BANKS.

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK,  
*Off Red River, March 2, 1864.*

SIR: I came down here anticipating a move on the part of the army up towards Shreveport; but as the river is lower than it has been known to be for years, I much fear that the combined movement cannot come off without interfering with plans formed by General Grant.

General Sherman has gone to New Orleans to make arrangements with General Banks, and I am expecting his return every day. In the mean time the gunboats are up the Atchafalaya and Black rivers, destroying bridges and stores, and endeavoring to destroy 8,000 cattle collected at Sicily island.

The Mississippi river is very quiet, and the rebels retreated into the interior on hearing of the advance of the gunboats.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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CAPTURE OF SIMMSPORT AND FORT DE RUSSY.

*Report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK,  
*Fort De Russy, Red River, March 15, 1864.*

SIR: I had the honor to report to you that I was about to ascend Red river with a fleet of gunboats, in company with a portion of General Sherman's command, or that of General Banks, whichever concluded to go.

On the 7th of March I had assembled at the mouth of Red river a large fleet of iron-clads, composed of the following vessels:

Essex, Commander Robert Townsend.  
 Benton, Lieutenant Commander James A. Greer.  
 Lafayette, Lieutenant Commander J. P. Foster.  
 Choctaw, Lieutenant Commander F. M. Ramsey.  
 Chillicothe, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant S. P. Couthouy.  
 Ozark, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant George W. Browne.  
 Louisville, Lieutenant Commander E. K. Owen.  
 Carondelet, Lieutenant Commander J. G. Mitchell.  
 Eastport, Lieutenant Commander S. L. Phelps.  
 Pittsburg, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant W. R. Hoel.  
 Mound City, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne.  
 Osage, Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge.  
 Neosho, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Howard.  
 Ouachita, Lieutenant Commander Byron Wilson.  
 Fort Hindman, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant John Pearce.

And the lighter boats:

Lexington, Lieutenant George M. Bache.  
 Cricket, Acting Master H. H. Gorringer.  
 Gazelle, Acting Master Charles Thatcher.  
 Black Hawk, Lieutenant Commander K. R. Brees.

I received communications from General Banks informing me that he would be in Alexandria on the 17th March, and I made my dispositions to meet him there. On the 11th instant part of General Sherman's command, ten thousand men, under the command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith, joined me in transports at the mouth of Red river, and next morning early the gunboats started up the river, followed by the transports. There was just sufficient water to allow the larger boats to pass. By previous arrangement, Lieutenant Commander Phelps, in the Eastport, was ordered to push on up with his vessel and those that could keep with him, and clear away the heavy obstructions the rebels had placed in the river, and to amuse the fort until the army could land at Simmsport and get into the rear of the enemy's works, which could be done by making a march of thirty miles.

The Benton, Pittsburg, Chillicothe, Louisville, Mound City, Carondelet, Ouachita, Lexington, and Gazelle turned off to the left into the Atchafalaya, followed by the troops, while the others went on up the river. The gunboats arrived at Simmsport about 12 o'clock, and found the enemy posted in force about three miles back. The Benton landed her crew and drove in the pickets. The army came along in about half an hour more and landed the next morning, taking possession of the enemy's camping ground, the latter retreating towards Fort De Russy. That night General Smith concluded to follow them by land, while I proceeded up Red river with all the gunboats and transports. In the mean time the Eastport had reached the obstructions, and, with the vessels that kept pace with her, had commenced the work of demolition on the formidable barricade, on which the rebels had been employed five months. They supposed it impassable, but our energetic sailors, with hard work, opened a passage in a few hours. The obstructions consisted of heavy piles driven into the mud, and braced in every direction; they were also clamped together with heavy iron plates and chains.

The Eastport and Neosho got through about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and proceeded up to the fort, which at that moment was being surrounded by the troops under General Smith, who had marched from Simmsport since daylight. A brisk musketry fire was going on between the rebels and our troops, and they were so close together it was difficult to distinguish the combatants. The Eastport opened her batteries, but, fearing to injure our own men, ceased firing, when

our troops proceeded to the assault and carried the place. In a few moments, and with a small loss, two hundred and fifty prisoners, eight heavy guns, and two field-pieces fell into our hands, and all the munitions of war.

The main body of the enemy, 5,000 strong, under the rebel General Walker, made their escape. They left the fort, it was said, to give battle to our troops, and left a garrison of 300 men to defend it. Our army came in by a different road from what they expected and made short work of them. Among the guns captured was one of the Indianola's 9-inch and one belonging to the Harriet Lane. The rest of the guns were 24 and 32-pounders and one 160-pounder rifle.

As soon as the fort was in possession of the troops I sent off up the river the fleetest gunboats I had, to cut the enemy off if possible, or harass them until our troops could be placed on the transports. By sunset the transports will be in Alexandria and ahead of the rebels, and I hope the latter will be cut off.

These works have been made much more formidable than they were last year, and the loss of the guns must be severely felt by the rebels, as they have only 15 more heavy ones in this section of the country. The whole affair has been well managed; the troops made a splendid march and attack, and the officers in command of the gunboats and transports have shown great zeal and industry in getting up the river and through the obstructions which the rebels deemed impassable.

I forgot to mention in my last report that in the recent attack on Trinity by the gunboats, a number of negroes were recaptured who were captured by the enemy in a recent attack upon Goodrich's landing.

I enclose herewith a list of the guns captured at Fort DeRussy, with their numbers, as some of them appear to be heavy guns. The Ordnance bureau may be able to account for them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral*.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*List of guns captured at Fort DeRussy water battery.*

One 32-pounder, 33 cwt., F. P. F., No. 227, navy, in barbette, J. S. C. Proven 1847.

One 31-pounder, 33 cwt., F. P. F., No. 226, navy, in barbette, J. S. C. Proven 1847.

Two 9-inch Dahlgren guns. No marks could be discovered on these guns, but they bore all the evidence of having been in service in the navy, the remains of gun-blackening being on them. Both lugs were cut for locks with the usual composition; piece fitted in to spare lug.

One 32-pounder, 60 cwt., 1827, navy gun.

One 32-pounder United States rifled, marked W. J. W., No. 289.

This gun is an old army 32-pounder, rifled, with band shrunk on the breech.

Two 24-pounder siege guns, two 6-pounder field-pieces, in hill battery.

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MOVEMENT UPON ALEXANDRIA.—AFFAIRS IN THAT PLACE.

*Report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter, Mississippi Squadron.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK,  
*Off Alexandria, La., March 16, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I arrived at this place this afternoon. As soon as the forts were surrendered, I pushed on the fastest vessels,



Ouachita and Lexington, followed by the Eastport, to Alexandria. The Ouachita arrived here as the last of a fleet of transports passed over the falls. The rebels set fire to a large ferry-boat, and one of the boats grounding on the falls, was also burnt, to prevent her falling into our hands. As no reliable pilot could be procured to take our boats across the falls, the transports will have to escape for the present, but are sure to be captured or destroyed before the month is over. The surrender of the forts at Point De Russey is of much more importance than I at first supposed. The rebels had depended on that point to stop *any advance* of army or navy into this part of rebeldom. Large quantities of ammunition, best engineers, and best troops were sent there, and in two or three months more it would have been a most formidable place. As it was, it was not complete (though the guns were in position,) and would have stood a very poor chance if attacked in force. The works have been laid out by a Colonel DeRussey, and are of the most extensive and formidable kind. Colonel DeRussey, from appearances, is a most excellent engineer to build forts, but don't seem to know what to do with them after they are constructed. The same remark may apply to his obstructions, which look well on paper, but don't stop our advance. The efforts of these people to keep up this war remind one very much of the antics of Chinamen, who build canvas forts, paint hideous dragons on their shields, turn somersets, and yell in the face of their enemies, to frighten them, and then run away at the first sign of an engagement.

It puts the sailors and soldiers out of all patience with them, after the trouble they have had in getting here. Now and then the army have a little brush with their pickets, but that don't often happen. It is not the intention of these rebels to fight. The men are tired of the war, and many of their officers are anxious to go into cotton speculation. A large trade has been carried on between this and New Orleans, the rebels receiving supplies for their cotton. There is a surprising abundance of every kind of food in this country, and no suffering among the people, except for luxuries. It would be folly to suppose they could all be starved out. The only way is to take possession of this rich region, hold it with a strong military and naval force, and enforce the laws.

There are some good Union men here, who have suffered much. I hope the day of their delivery has come.

General Smith has left a good force at the forts (and I left the Benton and Essex) to destroy them effectually, which will be some labor. We have seven or eight thousand troops in this city, and are expecting to hear soon of General Banks's arrival. He has been delayed by storms, which have made the roads heavy.

The force that left the forts with a party under General Polignac from Harrisonburg have gone out to meet General Banks, who will soon dispose of them, and the chances are that, when all our cavalry now approaching with General Banks get after them, the rebels will be captured or scattered, not to unite again for some time.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

P. S.—I beg leave to mention, as a proof of the rapidity with which this portion of General Sherman's command, under Brigadier General A. J. Smith, did their work, they marched twenty-eight miles, starting at daylight; built a bridge which cost them over two hours' hard work; had a sharp skirmishing and artillery attack of two hours, and had possession of the forts, all intact, before sunset.

It is one of the best military moves made this war.

I beg leave to enclose copy of Lieutenant Commander S. L. Phelps's report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

*Instructions from Admiral Porter to Lieutenant Commander S. L. Phelps.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK,

*U. S. Mississippi Squadron, Red River, March 12, 1864.*

SIR: You will proceed at once up the Red river with the vessels I will detail to follow you, and commence removing the obstructions in the river, while in the mean time I will take a tour into the Atchafalaya, and land the troops at Simmsport for the purpose of reconnoitring, &c. If you remove the obstructions, move up within a short distance of Fort De Russy, but make no attack until I get up with the main force, though, if there is any force at De Russy, you can amuse them by feints until the army get into their rear. Take every precaution against torpedoes, and protect your men against sharpshooters.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Lieutenant Commander S. L. PHELPS,

*Commanding Eastport.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander S. L. Phelps.*

UNITED STATES IRON-CLAD RAM EASTPORT,


*Alexandria, Louisiana, March 16, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your order of the 12th instant, I proceeded up Red river, the Lafayette, Choctaw, Osage, Neosho, Ozark, Fort Hindman, and Cricket in company, meeting with no obstacle till we reached the obstructions eight miles below Fort De Russy, on the 14th instant. The great length and draught of the Lafayette and Choctaw rendered it difficult for them to navigate this narrow and crooked river, and our progress was slow. Near the head of the Rappions were works for light artillery, commanding a difficult turn in the river, which had been recently abandoned.

The obstructions consisted of piles driven across the river, supported by a second tier of shorter ones, on which rested braces and ties from the upper ones. Immediately below these is a raft of timber well secured across the river, and made of logs which do not float. Finally, a forest of trees had been cut and floated down upon the piles from above. The river had broken through these obstructions, and had partially undermined the rifle-pits on the right bank. The Fort Hindman removed a portion of the raft, when I ran this vessel up, and, by both pulling and ramming, broke out the piles and framework still obstructing the passage of vessels. This work consumed nearly the entire day. The Osage, Fort Hindman, and Cricket followed me through, and we hastened up to the fort.

For a short time there had been rapid artillery firing, which ceased as we came in sight of the works, then about sunset, except three shots fired by the rebels from a gun in an angle of the water battery. We could see the enemy using musketry from the parapets of the rear works, but could see nothing of the attacking force. An officer from General Smith had reached the vessel, notifying me of the approach of his force, but with no advice as to time or plan of attack.





#### CASEMATED BATTERY,

Doubly plated with railroad iron, at the board near Fort DeRussy, Red river, Louisiana, showing effects of one shell and three solid shot fired from a 100-pounder Parrott rifle on board the United States steamer Essex, at the distance of about 550 yards, March 16, 1864.

A porcupine shell was the first one fired, striking the point marked *a*, and tearing out the iron over a surface 12 inches long (vertically) by 8 inches wide. Four solid shot succeeded; two of them struck full and fair within six feet of the hole made by the shell, one struck the crest at *b*, and one struck the talus of the escarp just below the berm and beneath the middle port-hole. The solid shot broke, shattered and drove in the iron, made holes in the heavy oak backing from 18 to 30 inches long by 8 to 11 inches wide, and buried themselves deeply, the but of one being two feet below the exterior surface.

The line of fire of the gunboats would have passed directly to the rear of the works, injuring our own people more than the enemy in his works. I fired a short-fuzed shell at an elevation as a signal gun, and then ventured one 100-pounder rifle shell at the water battery, which shell burst over it, and the enemy ran from it. A few moments after this a white flag was displayed from the rear works, some six hundred yards from the water battery, and which alone had been attacked.

The guns and works were captured uninjured, and 185 prisoners fell into General Smith's hands, those of the enemy occupying the water battery making good their escape. General Walker, the rebel commander, had marched out with 5,000 men, ostensibly to attack our approaching land force, leaving a garrison of but 300 men to defend works, incomplete and of considerable extent, and which, if complete, had been of great strength.

Your order of the 14th instant was delayed some five hours beyond the time necessary in reaching me, and, in consequence, I did not reach this place till the evening of the 15th, a short time after the lighter vessels pushed on ahead, and which had arrived half an hour too late to capture six steamers which had succeeded in getting over the falls, and escaping with one exception, the steamer *Countess*, burned by the enemy after grounding on the falls. Had your order duly reached me, we no doubt would have captured the steamers. By morning nine gunboats had arrived, and I landed a force of 180 men to occupy the town, and to seize the rebel property. This force, under Lieutenant Commander Selfridge, was in occupation of the place when you arrived. Seven prisoners of war were captured by the pickets.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. L. PHELPS, *Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

#### EFFECTS OF RIFLE SHOT FROM THE ESSEX UPON AN IRON-CASEMATED BATTERY.

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Off Alexandria, Louisiana, March 20, 1864.*

SIR: I enclose a sketch of an iron-casemated battery, showing the effects of four rifle shot from the guns of the *Essex*, the experiment having been tried to test the work. The distance fired from was 550 yards. This is one of the strongest works ever built of earth and iron, and was supposed capable of effectually resisting our iron-clads.

Ten 100-pounder rifles, ten 11-inch guns, twenty 9-inch guns, six 30-pounder rifles, and 8 eight-inch guns would have been brought to bear on this work at one time, to say nothing of fifty guns firing shrapnell. The result can be easily imagined.

I send the sketch for the information of the Bureau of Ordnance.

Yours, respectfully,

D. D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

No. 92.]

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

*Flag-Ship Black Hawk, off Alexandria, Louisiana, March 24, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that we have captured two thousand and twenty-one (2,021) bales of rebel cotton since we came into this river, all of which has been sent to Cairo, together with twenty-eight (28) barrels of molasses.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral, Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

## CONDITION OF AFFAIRS ON THE RED RIVER.

No. 97.]

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

*Alexandria, Louisiana, March 29, 1864.*

SIR: Being about to leave for Shreveport, or as high up the river as I can get, I have the honor to report progress.

After a great deal of labor, and two and a half days' hard work, we succeeded in getting the Easport over the rocks on the falls, hauling her over by main force; now and then a rise of an inch or so of water would help her along, and she finally was enabled to pass the advance of the army, encamped on the bank of the river twenty-five miles above Alexandria. Other vessels got through, and a few more remain to be got over, when we will push on to the end. It is very slow work getting over these rocks, but as yet we have met with no accidents. One hospital ship, belonging to the marine brigade, sank on the falls by striking on the rocks, but all the rest of the transports went over safely. I shall only be able to take up a part of the force I brought with me, and leave the river guarded all the way through. The rebels are retreating before the army, and, as usual, are destroying everything that can fall into our hands, treating public and private property alike. This is the last hold they will have in this country, and they seem determined to wreak their vengeance on the unoffending inhabitants who have some little cotton to dispose of. Their destructiveness has been a death blow to the rebellion in this State, and General Dick Taylor has left a name behind him to be execrated when the rebellion is long past.

Confederate money is worth here one-quarter of a cent on the dollar, or the most I have heard offered is three cents. The currency of a country is the best proof of its prosperity.

The health of the squadron, I am happy to say, continues good.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

## OCCUPATION OF GRAND ECORE.—MOVEMENTS TOWARDS SHREVEPORT.—RETURN TO GRAND ECORE.

FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Off Grand Ecore, Louisiana, April 14, 1864.*

SIR: I had the honor of reporting to you the movements of the squadron as far as Alexandria, and the intention of General Banks to move on at once to Shreveport. He deemed the co-operation of the gunboats so essential to success that I had to run some risks and make unusual exertions to get them over the falls.

The army started on the appointed day, and I pushed up the gunboats to cover them, if they should be needed, as fast as they got over the falls. The vessels arrived at Grand Ecore without accident, and had good water, the river apparently about to reach its usual stage at this season. The Cricket, Eastport, Mound City, Chillicothe, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Ozark, Neosho, Osage, Lexington and Fort Hindman, Louisville and Pittsburg, were the vessels sent up, and a fleet of 30 transports followed them.

Grand Ecore was occupied by our forces without opposition. The works deserted. Lieutenant Commander Phelps captured one 32-pounder on the river, below Grand Ecore, which he destroyed, making 22 guns captured from the enemy since we entered the river.

The army had arrived at Natchitoches, near Grand Ecore, when I got up here, and was preparing for an immediate march. As the river was rising very slowly, I would not risk the larger vessels by taking them higher up, but started on the 7th of April for Shreveport with the Cricket, Fort Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho, and Chillicothe, with the hope of getting the rest of the vessels along when the usual rise came. Twenty transports were sent along, filled with army stores, and with a portion of General A. J. Smith's division on board. It was intended that the fleet should reach Springfield landing on the third day, and then communicate with the army, a portion of which expected to be at Springfield at that time. I found the difficulties of navigation very great, but we reached the point specified within an hour of the time appointed. At this point we were brought to a stop, the enemy had sunk a very large steamer (the New Falls City) right across the river, her ends resting on each bank, and her hull, broken in the middle, resting on the bottom. This was a serious obstruction, but I went to work to remove it. Before I commenced operations, however, a courier came in from General Banks, bringing the unpleasant and most unexpected news "Our army has met with a reverse," and was falling back to Pleasant Hill, some 60 miles in our rear. Orders also came to General A. J. Smith to return to Grand Ecore with the transports and the troops he had with him. Here was an end to our expedition for the present, and we reluctantly turned back, after having nearly reached the object we were aiming at. The information we received was of a very unsatisfactory kind, and we did not know really what was the exact state of affairs, no letters having been sent by post courier.

It would be very difficult to describe the return passage of the fleet through this narrow and snaggy river. As long as our army could advance triumphantly it was not so bad; but we had every reason to suppose that our return would be interrupted in every way and at every point by the enemy's land forces, and we were not disappointed. They commenced on us from high banks, at a place called Coushattie, and kept up a fire of musketry whenever an opportunity was offered them. By a proper distribution of the gunboats I had no trouble in driving them away, though from the high banks they could fire on our decks almost with impunity. As we proceeded down the river they in-

erased in numbers, and as we only made thirty miles a day, they could cross from point to point and be ready to meet us on our arrival below. On the left bank of the river a man by the name of Harrison, with 1,900 cavalry and four or five pieces of artillery, was appointed to follow us down and annoy us. It was very fortunate for us that this person and his command were lately severely handled by a gunboat, (a few weeks ago,) which made them careful about coming within range. On the evening of the 12th instant we were attacked from the right bank of the river by a detachment of men of quite another character. They were a part of the army which two or three days previous had gained success over our army, and flushed with victory, or under the excitement of liquor, they appeared suddenly upon the right bank and fearlessly opened fire on the Osage, Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge, (iron-clad,) she being hard aground at the time with a transport (the Black Hawk) alongside of her, towing her off. The rebels opened with two thousand muskets, and soon drove every one out of the Black Hawk to the safe casemates of the monitor. Lieutenant Bache had just come from his vessel, (the Lexington,) and fortunately was enabled to pull up to her again, keeping close under the bank, while the Osage opened a destructive fire on these poor deluded wretches, who, maddened with liquor and led on by their officers, were vainly attempting to capture an iron vessel. I am told that their hootings and actions baffle description. Force after force seemed to be brought up to the edge of the bank, where they confronted the guns of the iron vessels, only to be cut down by grape-shot and canister. In the mean time Lieutenant Bache had reached his vessel, and, widening the distance between him and the Osage, he opened a cross-fire on the infuriated rebels, who fought with such desperation and courage against certain destruction, that it could only be accounted for in one way. Our opinions were verified on inspection of some of the bodies of the slain—the men actually smelling of Louisiana rum! This affair lasted nearly two hours before the rebels fled. They brought up two pieces of artillery, one of which was quickly knocked over by the Lexington's guns, the other they managed to carry off. The cross-fire of the Lexington finally decided this curious affair of a fight between infantry and gunboats. The rebels were mowed down by her canister, and finally retreated in as quick haste as they had come to the attack, leaving the space of a mile covered with dead and wounded, muskets, and knapsacks. A dying rebel informed our men that General Green had his head blown off, which I do not vouch for as true. If true, it is a serious loss to the rebels. Night coming on, we had no means of ascertaining the damage done to the rebels. We were troubled no more from the right bank of the river, and a party of 5,000 men who were marching to cut us off were persuaded to change their mind after hearing of the unfortunate termination to the first expedition. That same night I ordered the transports to proceed on, having placed the gunboats at a point where the rebels had a battery. All the transports were passed safely, the rebels not firing a shot in return to the many that were bursting over the hills. The next morning, the 13th instant, I followed down myself, and finding at Campte, six miles from Grand Ecore by land, that they had got aground, and would be some time getting through, I proceeded down in this vessel to Grand Ecore, and got General Banks to send up troops enough to keep the guerillas away from the river. We were fired on as usual after we started down, but when I had the troops sent up, the transports came along without any trouble. This has been an expedition where a great deal of labor has been expended, a great deal of individual bravery shown, and on such occasions the commander-in-chief is apt to find out the metal of which his officers are made, and on future occasions it will enable him to select those who will not likely fail in the time of need. To Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge, commanding the Osage, and Lieutenant George M. Bache, commanding the Lexington, I am particularly indebted for the gallant manner in which they



defended their vessels, and for their management during the expedition, always anticipating and intelligently carrying out my wishes and orders.

I found the fleet at Grand Ecore somewhat in an unpleasant situation—two of them being above the bar, and not likely to get away again this season, unless there is a rise of a foot. I could not provide against this, when over a hundred miles up the river. If nature does not change her laws, there will no doubt be a rise of water; but there was one year, 1846, when there was no rise in the Red river, and it may happen again. The rebels are cutting off the supply by diverting different sources of water into other channels; all of which would have been stopped had our army arrived as far as Shreveport. I have done my best (and so have the officers and men under my command) to make this expedition a success throughout, and do not know that we have failed in anything we have undertaken. Had we not heard of the retreat of the army, I should still have gone on to the end. A wise Providence, which rules and directs all things, has thought proper to stay our progress and throw impediments in the way, for some good reason.

We have nothing left but to try it again, and hold on to this country with all the force we can raise. It is just as valuable to us and important to the cause as any other portion of the Union. Those who have interests here, and are faithful to the government, have a right to expect our protection, and when this part of Louisiana is conquered we hold Arkansas and all the right bank of the Mississippi without firing another gun.

There is a class of men who have during this war shown a good deal of bravery and patriotism, and who have seldom met with any notice from those whose duty it is to report such matters. I speak of the pilots on the western waters. Without any hope of future reward, through fame or in a pecuniary way, they enter into the business of piloting the transport through dangers that would make a faint-hearted man quail. Occupying the most exposed position, a fair mark for a sharpshooter, they are continually fired at, and often hit, without so much as a mention being made of their gallantry. On this expedition they have been much exposed, and have showed great gallantry in managing their vessels while under fire in this, to them, unknown river. I beg leave to pay this small tribute to their bravery and zeal, and must say, as a class, I never knew a braver set of men. I also beg leave to mention favorably Acting Master H. H. Gorringer, commanding this vessel. He has shown great zeal, courage, and ability during this expedition, serving his guns rapidly and well, at his post night and day, ready for anything, and assisting materially in getting the transports by dangerous points. Mounting one of his 24-pounder howitzers on his upper deck, he was enabled to sweep the bank in all directions, and one or two fires had the desired effect. He was of great service to me throughout the expedition; was slightly wounded, but nothing of consequence, (owing to his exposing himself so much.)

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington D. C.*

No. 103.]

FLAG-SHIP CRICKET,

*Grand Ecore, Louisiana, April 14, 1864.*

SIR: Accompanying this is a report of my expedition up Red river. In that report I touched lightly upon army affairs from prudential motives, not deeming it prudent to give to the public all the facts connected with the case; still I deem

it my duty to state to the department all the difficulties now existing. I have done all I could to co-operate with the army and make the move a successful one, and the co-operation has been carried on most harmoniously. I saw the orders of General Halleck to Generals Sherman, Steele and Banks, to undertake this campaign, indicating in a precise manner how it was to be done. The plan has been carried out to the letter, except gaining a victory, and the co-operation of the gunboats was deemed essential to success. At the beginning, while we co-operated with General A. J. Smith, of General Sherman's command, we carried everything before us, and if we have not met with continued success, it is owing to the delay of General Banks's army, which was ten days behindhand—an important period in a campaign.

The army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the generals try to make of it; with the defeat has come demoralization, and it will take some time to reorganize and make up the deficiencies in killed and prisoners. The whole affair has been seriously mismanaged. Finding the enemy retreating before them, with 25,000 men yet unscattered, our troops moved on with a certainty of meeting with no serious opposition. It was known, however, at headquarters, that the enemy were posted at Mansfield and talked of giving us battle, notwithstanding which six thousand raw cavalry were placed in advance with a large baggage train close after them, and only supported by two thousand five hundred infantry under General Ransom, who protested strongly, but in vain, against the arrangement.

The enemy, numbering 15,000, took advantage of this state of things, and attacked the head of the cavalry column with their whole force; of course they were routed in a short time, fell back, running over the infantry, made a stampede among the wagons, and the whole mass was mixed up in inextricable confusion.

The action took place four miles this side of Mansfield, and it was a disorderly rout as far as Pleasant Hill, fifteen miles, where a stand was made. The enemy followed, doubtless much surprised with their easy victory, until checked by the 19th army corps under General Franklin, which opened its ranks and let the flying multitude pass to their rear. In their turn the 19th corps attacked the enemy and repulsed them in a very short time, but not in time to save the cavalry train, all of which fell into the hands of the rebels and 18 pieces of artillery. Had Franklin's corps been in front, a complete victory would have been ours. It was the worst managed affair that I ever heard of; I cannot ascertain where the fault was.

It was determined, I believe, to retreat that night or next morning, but the enemy attacked the next day (the 9th) and our army had to act on the defensive. The enemy came on with a boldness and desperation seldom met with during this war. Their canteens were found to be filled with Louisiana rum, which accounts for it. They were mowed down by our fire, and though at first they broke one of our wings, they had to stop when General A. J. Smith, with 8,000 of the 17th corps, charging through the 19th corps, met them with the bayonet, and the other troops rallying poured in a destructive fire. The rebels fled in wild confusion, leaving their killed and wounded on the field, and two of the guns captured from us the day before. General A. J. Smith chased them for two miles, when they disappeared and did not stop until they had retreated six miles. This time we really gained the victory, though we came near losing it. Notwithstanding our success, it was decided to fall back to Grand Ecore, which was done. The rebels sent in a flag of truce, asking permission to bury their dead; they were doubtless much astonished to find no one there to receive it. This is one of those instances where two armies ran away from each other.

When I arrived here I found a bad state of affairs, the army much demoralized and the men talking loudly of the mismanagement which thinned their numbers. General Sherman had sent a bearer of despatches to recall General

Smith's division, and I was waited for to decide what course to take. I raised my voice against its departure on the ground that they had been victorious, were animated with a desire to go ahead, and had full confidence in their general. In the next place, I felt assured that if General Smith should leave, it would be construed into a defeat by the rebels, and would result in the remainder of the army retreating with great loss of material.

The most important consideration, however, is, that General Steele is now within striking distance of Shreveport, waiting for our troops to advance. If this army were to withdraw, the enemy would turn upon Steele with their whole force and crush him; he not anticipating any of the unfortunate events which have occurred here, would probably come up with a very strong force in his front, while an equal one would be thrown in his rear. I wrote to General Sherman explaining the reasons of retaining his men, which deficiency he can easily make up by taking from the large force in Arkansas (now not wanted) an equal number of men. I was also influenced in my decision by a desire to save my squadron, which I left here in falling water without a land force; the gunboats aground could do nothing, and this is a case of mutual protection. When I left here I placed the vessels remaining behind in charge of Lieutenant Commander Phelps, with orders to look out for them and watch the falling water. He had dropped some of them below the bar; when our army came in retreating, he ordered up four of the boats again to take position to cover our troops; that was all well and proper, but he should have dropped them down when he saw there was no danger of an attack, and I could then have easily got them to Alexandria; as it is, the thing is uncertain, without a rise in the river. Now is the time of full river, the snows melting and the rains commencing, but we have nothing of the kind, the water falling steadily three inches a day. The moment I came down I ordered the boats below the bar, but a pontoon bridge obstructs the way and detains us in getting along. I shall know in an hour what success to expect. I shall then go to work lightening the vessels. In all my operations I have an eye to the water; as long as I have plenty of that I fear no other obstacles. In this instance I was governed by the reports made by Red river pilots, that we would have plenty of water until June, and a high rise at that time. General Banks was so impatient to move, that all I could get him to say was, "There will be plenty of water," and dwelling much on the importance of the gunboats. It was well we came up, for I am convinced the rebels would have attacked this broken army at Grand Ecore had we not been here to cover them. I do not think our army would be in a condition to meet them. I can get away from here without trouble now by taking out my guns, and can be below the town in three fathoms water for a long time to come, holding a position that would completely cover the army; but if I was to leave altogether, it would be a stain upon the navy for all time to come, and would be followed by a disastrous retreat of the army with much loss of men. Under these circumstances, I have determined to hold on to as many of the vessels as I can, hoping that the usual rise will come; we only want a foot more to go up and down as we please. I have light-draught vessels that will take the place of the heavy vessels in case I can take these below, but if the rebels bring in heavy guns the iron-clads will be the only ones to be depended on.

Now, sir, so far we have met with not the loss of a rope yarn. I even stopped to bring down a steamboat that the army had ordered to be burned, not wishing the rebels to say that we had to burn her. I do not wish to lose anything, and want to understand at once whether the army is to leave us here, in case they go away, or retreat while the water is falling; if so, I will lighten the gunboats of guns and everything else, and work them over the bars.

I do not see why a fleet should not have the protection of an army, as well as an army have the protection of a fleet. If we are left here aground, our communications will be cut off and we will have to destroy the vessels. I do not

intend to destroy a rowboat if it can be helped, and if the proper course is pursued we will lose nothing. The army should hold this place until the last man can stand; if they leave, we lose Steele's army and a portion (perhaps) of the gunboats. We will have spent all this time and treasure in an expedition that promised so much to our cause; we will lose the finest portion of Louisiana, where people are anxious to have the war ended, and where many of them have taken up arms in defence of the Union. Now we can claim to have whipped the rebels in the last day's fighting, which partly wipes out the first day's disgrace, which was not the fault of our troops, but owing to a blind security and mismanagement and a contempt of the enemy, three things that should always be avoided by a good general.

I wish the department would give me its views without delay, and direct Captain Pennock to send me the answer by a despatch vessel. I must confess that I feel a little uncertain how to act; I could not leave this army now without disgracing myself forever, and when running a risk in their cause, I do not want to be deserted. One of my officers has already been asked, "If we would not burn our gunboats as soon as the army left," speaking as if a gunboat was a very ordinary affair, and could be burnt with indifference. I enclose two notes I received from Generals Banks and Stone.

There is a faint attempt to make a victory out of this, but two or three such victories would cost us our existence.

I shall await your answer with anxiety, and remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Pleasant Hill, April 9, 1864—9½ p. m.*

ADMIRAL: By direction of the major general commanding I have the honor to inform you that, about noon yesterday, the advance of his forces reached a point about four miles this side of Mansfield. There the advance became engaged with a force of the enemy which proved to be largely superior, being the combined forces of Taylor, Green, and Price. After hard fighting until sunset with these superior forces, the advance party had to fall back with considerable loss of men, artillery, and transportation, under cover of the 19th army corps, which managed to hold its ground through the night, and to fall back to form a junction with General A. J. Smith's forces here this morning.

This afternoon, nearly at sunset, the enemy attacked our forces here with the command of yesterday, strengthened by two divisions of General Price's army, which had not arrived in time to take part yesterday.

The enemy was driven at all points in the most brilliant manner by charges, and were utterly discomfited. We recaptured two guns taken from us yesterday, and captured caissons and other materials of great value to the rebels. The victory is a complete one, and, together with the loss of *morale*, which is its natural consequence, will contribute greatly to the object in view in the expedition.

Very respectfully, admiral, your obedient servant,

CHARLES P. STONE,  
*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Pleasant Hill, April 9, 1864.*

The land column that was intended for the movement against Shreveport encountered a superior force four miles this side of Mansfield, and, being unable to communicate with the forces from the river, has been compelled to retreat. It is now our expectation to fall back to Grand Ecore. You will make your dispositions accordingly.

The fighting was very sharp, but, from the situation of the country, it has been impossible to bring but a portion of our forces against the entire strength of the enemy.

The loss of the enemy has been very severe; ours serious. General Ransom has been wounded. If possible, send a communication to General Steele.

I am, &c.,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

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OPERATIONS OF THE GUNBOATS.—SINKING AND DESTRUCTION OF THE  
EASTPORT.

*Report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Off Alexandria, La., April 17, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this point for a few hours. I shall return to Grand Ecore in two hours. I had succeeded in getting all the large vessels over the bar at Grand Ecore, and in a fair way of getting down as far as Alexandria, when I heard the Eastport had sunk eight miles below. I sent down at once and found it to be so; she was five hours sinking, said to be done by a torpedo; she don't seem to be damaged much. I came down for my steam-pump boats; have one alongside the Eastport already, and take another up with me to-day. There will be trouble getting her up if the river ever rises again; the water comes as high as her gun-deck; her guns and heavy articles have been taken off. I came here and found trouble at Fort Pillow; the policy pursued, in not defending the strong posts where so much blood and treasure have been expended, will always cause these difficulties. I had two boats up there, but the negro and invalid garrison were not strong enough to do their part. I have sent the Essex, Benton, Choctaw, Lafayette, Ouachita, and Avenger up to Fort Pillow to prevent any permanent landing there. I sent an expedition up the Washita as far as Monroe, which captured 3,000 bales of confederate cotton, brought away 800 negroes, and destroyed much rebel property. The expedition was under Lieutenant Commander Foster, and was particularly successful. I am bringing up light-draught vessels to take the place of the heavy boats during the low water. We have only eight feet of water between this and Grand Ecore, and many lumps exist. This expedition, and the failure of the army to advance, has given me a great deal of trouble; but I don't despair of getting out of it. It is only a matter of want of water, and I cannot think that this river would fail to rise while all the others are booming. Being constantly engaged in providing for the many curious cases that are daily occurring, I hope you will excuse me for not making fuller reports.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

## PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE FLEET.—FALLING BACK OF THE ARMY.

FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Below Grand Ecore, La., April 23, 1864.*

SIR: In my last communication I informed you of the sinking of the Eastport by a torpedo about eight miles below Grand Ecore. The moment I heard of it I went down to Alexandria and sent a despatch vessel for our two steam-pump boats; one was coming over the falls as I passed down, and the other fortunately came in sight an hour afterwards. They were both sent up and set to work to raise the sunken vessel. She was so much shattered in the bottom that I almost despaired of effecting anything. The same day that the boats arrived up General Banks gave orders for the army to prepare to move on to Alexandria, and as Grand Ecore was only four miles from us by land, the chances were that the rebels would mount numerous artillery on the bluff close at hand, and prevent our working. Nevertheless we went to work, and proceeded until the vessel was raised, the pumps working all the time, and we unable to get at the leak. Lieutenant Commander Phelps worked with great perseverance, coolness, and patience under these unpleasant circumstances. The same day the army moved we moved down with the Eastport with her own steam and one steam-pump alongside of her, barely keeping her free, and the leak not discovered. We started very fair, and made in a few hours twenty miles down river, having sent convoy to bring down the transports, which were taken safely to Alexandria. But the Eastport got out of the channel, and it seems impossible to move her ahead. Everything that man can do has been done, and I shall persevere until attacked here, or until the falling water endangers the other vessels. There will be but one course for me to pursue; that is, to perform the painful duty of destroying the Eastport to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands. I have no certainty of getting her down as far as Alexandria; the water has fallen too much to leave her here, with our army retreating to Alexandria, and with 25,000 rebels (if victorious) assailing us at every point. We can fight them to the last. At this time the rebels are following our army, and the artillery and musketry can be heard quite distinctly. We do not know the result. Had the army held Grand Ecore a fortnight, we would with certainty have saved the vessel, and will do so now if we can find water to get her down. She has a great deal of water in her, which increases her draught and makes her very heavy; her pumps cannot get it all out, nor can we find the place where she is injured. The unfortunate issue of this expedition has thrown the gunboats into a bad predicament. When I came up here the water was rising, and all our vessels navigated the river to Grand Ecore with ease, and with some of them I reached Springfield landing—the place designated by General Banks for the gunboats to meet the army. My part was successfully accomplished; the failure of the army to proceed, and the retreat back to Grand Ecore, left me almost at the mercy of the enemy. Fortunately we got through without any accident or serious disaster from the enemy's fire. I soon saw that the army would go to Alexandria again, and we would be left above the bars in a helpless condition. I went to work immediately to get the heavy boats below, which I succeeded in doing by great exertions on the part of the commanders. I kept the lighter draught vessels to cover the army if they should need it, and to take the transports down safely, all of which was done. The vessels are mostly at Alexandria, above the falls, excepting this one and two others I kept to protect the Eastport. When the rebels heard we had arrived at Grand Ecore, they commenced turning the source of water supply off into the lakes, which would have been remedied had the army succeeded in getting to Shreveport. I cannot blame myself for coming up at the only season when the water rises. All the rivers are full and

rising, but the Red river is falling at the rate of two inches a day—a most unusual occurrence; this river always being full until the middle of June. Whether we will yet have a rise it would be impossible for any one to foresee. It seems like an impossibility that we could be caught in such a predicament in the time of rising water, but such may be the case. If General Banks should determine to evacuate this country, the gunboats will be cut off from all communication with the Mississippi. It cannot be possible that the country would be willing to have eight iron-clads, three or four other gunboats, and many transports, sacrificed without an effort to save them. It would be the worst thing that has happened this war. I beg leave, most respectfully, to call your earnest attention to this matter. I shall remonstrate with all the energy I am capable of against being left here and have to destroy my vessel, and I hope, sir, that you will see, in the position wherein I am placed, strong reasons for holding this country, and re-enforcing the army with troops, to do it with a certainty. Two months are left yet in which to expect a rise; but many say it will not come—the wish, perhaps, being father to the thought. It would be hard indeed, after co-operating with the army, and the navy performing successfully all that was required of it, to be left in a position where we would have to surrender or blow up. I will promise you the latter. I have no hope of getting the Eastport down, though the commander is still very sanguine. If we could get her within forty miles of Alexandria we could save her; or if it rises there will be no trouble at all. If the enemy bring on their heavy artillery, the people on the steam-pumps will not be able to work at all. With the gunboats alone and untrammelled, I should not be afraid of any force the rebels could bring to bear upon us, being confident that we could beat them off if they came in strong force. Whatever may happen I shall hope for the best, but consider it my duty to anticipate events, and run no risk of losing this squadron.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral*.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*Additional report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

*Off Alexandria, La., April 28, 1864.*

SIR: I had the honor to inform you, in my communication No. 106, of the sinking of the Eastport while proceeding down to Alexandria, caused by the explosion of a torpedo under her bottom, and near her bow. On hearing this bad news I proceeded at once to the vessel and found her sunk to the gun-deck, the water over it on one side.

I saw that no time was to be lost, and went at once to Alexandria, in hopes of finding one of our steam-pump boats, then due. Lieutenant Commander Phelps had already sent a tug down for the same purpose, and as I passed over the falls, the pump-boat hove in sight and proceeded on up. An hour after, the other boat came up, and I sent her up also, being confident that the Eastport would now be raised.

I had ordered all her guns taken out and all her ammunition transferred to other vessels, which was done by the time I reached her again, forty-eight hours after the pump-boats went up.

I was detained a day in Alexandria, making a different disposition of the vessels in the Mississippi, owing to the report of the capture of Fort Pillow by the rebels. I sent some of the heavy iron-clads up there with orders to remain, and also changed the destination of various vessels in the different rivers.

When I returned to the Eastport, I found her in a fair way of being afloat, though all the heavy steam-pumps together did not do more than slightly decrease the water. The leak had to be stopped by bulkheading. Lieutenant Commander Phelps went to work vigorously to endeavor to save his vessel, and he was seconded by his officers and crew. I don't think I ever witnessed harder work than was performed by the officers and crew of the Eastport, and it seemed to be the determination of all on board that she should not fall into the hands of the enemy if it could be helped.

I felt confident that the Eastport would be saved, if time permitted, but I had a faint idea that our army were about to fall back on Alexandria, when it would become necessary to destroy the Eastport, or perhaps some other vessels.

On my arrival at Grand Ecore I found that preparations were making to move the army in the direction of Alexandria, and I ordered the large vessels at once below the bars with orders to proceed slowly to Alexandria, keeping with me six of the lighter-draught vessels to cover the land forces, and give protection to the transports.

The day after my return to Grand Ecore orders were issued for the army to move to Alexandria. The Eastport was not yet afloat, and I thought our chance of saving her very small, unless we were certain of having no enemy to annoy us after the army left. On the 20th of April I went down to the Eastport again, and after informing the commander how matters stood, we concluded that it was necessary to run some risks if we wished to save the vessel. She was now slightly resting on the bottom on one side, and steam had been raised on her.

On the 21st she started in tow of the pump-boat Champion No. 5, and with the pump of Champion No. 3 transferred to the Eastport, and connected with her boilers. This arrangement, with the addition of one or two syphon pumps, kept the water out of the fire-room, and confined it to the bow.

I waited at a point eight miles below Grand Ecore, and sent up a gunboat to convoy down all the transports that were left up, this vessel bringing up the rear, towing a flat on which were all the Eastport's guns.

On the first day the Eastport made twenty miles down the river, but at 6 o'clock in the evening she grounded, from not being in the channel, and the first of our difficulties commenced in getting her over the bars and other obstructions which abound in this river.

It would be impossible to give an adequate idea of the difficulties of the navigation from the 21st of April up to the 26th, the time when it was no longer considered possible to get the Eastport over the sand-bars and logs, now increasing, unless time was allowed to remove them, and the enemy were kept from annoying us while we were at work.

The lieutenant commander commanding the Eastport, S. L. Phelps, had done all that man could do to save his vessel, and felt it to be a matter of pride to get her to Alexandria.

She had grounded eight times badly, and each time under circumstances where it was very doubtful if she would come off; but the commander's confidence never deserted him, and I could not help but admire his coolness and faith in getting his vessel to Alexandria, when I knew there were places to pass below with much less water on them.

I determined that I would never leave this vessel to her fate as long as the commander felt a hope of getting her down. He worked with almost superhuman efforts to accomplish the object in view, sleeping apparently neither night nor day; everybody worked, and went through privations of all kinds, and I must say that, mentally, I never went through so much anxiety in my life.

On the sixth day of this labor of hauling the Eastport over the bars, and after congratulating ourselves that we had passed every impediment, orders



were given to fill up with fence-rails for fuel, and we started down stream, with the expectation of making at least thirty miles that day. The vessel had already been brought sixty miles on her way, and sixty more would bring her within our lines.

The army, though, were sixty miles ahead of us, and the report was that the rebels were following in their rear, also opposing them in front, and we might naturally expect, when the army arrived safely in Alexandria, that the whole power of the enemy would be directed to cutting off my small force of three light-draughts, and the Eastport, without any guns; indeed, we had already received notice that such were their intentions.

On April 25th I made signal to pass down stream, and had scarcely started before the Eastport was hard aground, and this time in a position where even the commander's hopes of relieving her failed. The difficulty here was a want of water, and the bed of the river was filled with logs, over which it would be impossible to get the vessel unless we had the time.

We tried to lighten her by removing her iron plating, but this we found to be labor beyond our power; the plates could not be removed in a short time, and that plan was abandoned at once.

I had determined to remain by the Eastport until she was safe within our lines, or blown up, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.

On two occasions I had given the commander preparatory instructions relative to her destruction, thinking her time had come; but, still hopeful and persistent, he stuck to the work, and deserved to have met with greater success.

Every effort was made to get the Eastport off from what proved to be her final resting-place.

The gunboat Fort Hindman (whose commander has worked to save the Eastport with a zeal I never saw surpassed) succeeded, with her steam capstan, in moving her bow, but only enough to get into a worse position right across the channel, with a bed of logs under her, and from that place it seemed that no human power could move her. The commander having admitted there seemed no hope of getting her off, unless we had time, and our rear protected, I gave the order to destroy her.

One ton of powder was placed in her in various positions, she was filled with such combustibles as we could procure, and at 1.45 p. m., April 26, the Eastport was blown up, Lieutenant Commander Phelps applying the match and being the last one to leave the vessel. He had barely time to reach the boat when the Eastport blew up, covering the boat with fragments of wood. Seven different explosions followed, and then the flames burst forth in every direction.

The vessel was completely destroyed—as perfect a wreck as ever was made by powder. She remains a troublesome obstruction to block up the channel for some time to come. All stores, &c., were removed, and such parts of the machinery as could be made available by the rebels.

There was nothing but the iron plates left behind, which finally fell inside the hull. Some fell out-board, as the fire burnt away the wood to which they were attached, and will soon disappear under the sands.

I would have brought away every piece of iron, had I not been warned that I had overstaid my time.

Gangs of guerillas began to hover on the left bank of the river, and just previous to blowing up the Eastport we were attacked by a heavy force on the right bank.

This vessel was lying tied to the bank, and I was backing out from the Eastport in the Hindman, to give the former a chance to blow up without injury to any one. The rebels selected this moment to make their attack, and rising suddenly from the bank, opened on our little squadron with 1,200 muskets, and then made a rush to board the Cricket.

The enemy, however, were properly met and repelled, and the Cricket,

dropping out from the bank, opened on them with grape and caister; and with a heavy cross-fire from the two other vessels the rebels were routed in five minutes. After this we blew the Eastport up and proceeded down the river.

We were not molested until we had gone about 20 miles, at a point above Cane river. When rounding the point, the vessels in close order and ready for action, we descried a party of the enemy with artillery on the right bank, and we immediately opened fire with our bow guns. The enemy immediately returned it with a large number of cannon, eighteen in all, every shot of which struck this vessel.

The captain (Acting Master H. H. Gorringe) gave orders to stop the engines for the purpose of fighting the battery and covering the boats astern; I corrected this mistake and got headway on the vessel again, but not soon enough to avoid the pelting shower of shot and shell which the enemy poured into us, every shot going through and through us, clearing all our decks in a moment.

Finding the guns not firing rapidly, I stepped on the gun-deck to see what was the matter. As I stepped down, the after gun was struck with a shell and disabled, and every man at the gun killed and wounded. At the same moment the crew from the forward gun were swept away by a shell exploding, and the men were wounded in the fire-room, leaving only one man to fire up.

I made up a gun's crew from the contrabands, who fought the gun to the last moment. Finding that the engine did not move, I went into the engine-room and found the chief engineer killed, whose place was soon supplied by an assistant. I then went to the pilot-house and found that a shot had gone through it and wounded one of the pilots. I took charge of the vessel, and as the battery was a very heavy one I determined to pass it, which was done under the heaviest fire I ever witnessed.

I attempted to turn her head up stream to attack with our two bow guns, the only guns left, but as this was impracticable, I let her drift down around the point and shelled the enemy's batteries in the rear. This disturbed them for a moment, and enabled the light-draught Juliet and pump-boat Champion, lashed together, to escape from under the bank, where they had drifted.

The Juliet had her steam-pipe cut and became disabled, having drifted clear from under the guns of the enemy and close into the bank, where the guns could not be depressed to reach them, and from whence the Champion towed her in safety when the Hindman opened her batteries, and this vessel was firing into the rear of the enemy's batteries.

Seeing that the Hindman did not pass the batteries, the Juliet disabled, and that one of the pump-boats had her boiler exploded by a shot, I ran down to a point three or four miles below, where I had ordered two iron-clads to be ready to meet me in case of emergency.

Unfortunately, I ran on shore a short time after passing the batteries, and remained there three hours, took fire in the mean time from the explosion of some cartridges, the box containing which had been struck by the enemy's shot. It was after dark when I reached the appointed place, where I found the Osage lying opposite a field battery of the enemy, which they had been shelling throughout the day.

The Lexington had been hard at work at them, and had been hulled fifteen times, with only one man killed. The firing above had ceased, and as the channel was very intricate, I could not send her up to the assistance of the vessels without danger of her getting aground. I knew that they were all above the batteries, and was in hopes that the Hindman had silenced them.

Lieutenant Commander Phelps had two vessels in charge, the Juliet and Champion, which he wished to get through safely. He kept them out of range until he could partially repair the Juliet, and then starting under a heavy fire he made a push by. Unfortunately the pump-boat was disabled and set fire to

and burnt up. The Hindman had her wheel-ropes cut away and drifted past, turning round and round, and getting well cut up in going by.

The Juliet was cut to pieces in hull and machinery; had fifteen killed and wounded. Four miles below they met the Neosho going up, too late to cover them. Had she arrived in time she could have probably cleaned out the batteries, at least diverted the fire of them until the passage of the boats.

I enclose the report of Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, from the time of his first misfortune until his arrival at this place, where I now am with all the fleet, having lost none of the gunboats, but very much surprised that I have any left, considering all the difficulties encountered. When the rebels had followed our army to the point where they could effect no more, all their attention was turned to the little squadron I had escorting the Eastport.

Every man and gun was brought to the river, and we had to contend against such odds that it seemed impossible to escape destruction or very severe handling. No vessels were ever better fought, and none of this class (mere thread-paper vessels) were ever under so hot a fire.

In five minutes the Cricket was struck thirty-eight times with solid shot and shell, with a loss of twenty-five killed and wounded—half her crew; the Juliet about the same, with fifteen killed and wounded. The Hindman lost three killed and four or five wounded.

I may have lacked judgment in not blowing the Eastport up sooner, when I found that we were a secondary consideration to the army; but as I had staid behind myself to see the last transport through safely, I could not do less with one of my own vessels.

I was unable to keep up communication with the army. As the means of communication were with them, and as they marched along faster than I calculated, (forty miles in one day, when I supposed they would only go twenty,) I was more in their rear than I should have been. This arose from my desire to save the Eastport, and hoping that some signal success on the part of the army (which I felt confident was able to whip all the rebels in that part of the country) would dispose of the enemy altogether.

From the beginning of this expedition up to the present time the officers and men of this squadron have worked with superhuman zeal, and overcome difficulties which seemed insurmountable. The success of the expedition depended entirely on the success of the navy in getting the transports safely to an appointed place—Springfield landing—which would have put us in communication with the army, and then in possession of all their materials of war.

This we accomplished; and when the army returned, unexpectedly, we fought our way back again without loss of any kind, excepting men, inflicting a loss of five hundred men on the enemy, killed their best general, Greene, and a number of his officers.

On our way down to Alexandria obstacles were overcome enough to appal the stoutest heart. Guns had to be taken out of vessels and then jumped over sand-bars and logs, and the squadron arrived here in time to prevent any attack on our reserve stores.

The difficulty about water is a most unusual one, and we must certainly have a rise of the few feet we want before the end of the season. All the rivers are booming at this time, and it should be so here. I am no more responsible for the failure of water here than I would be if the Mississippi went dry at this season—a thing that never happened yet.

I came up here with the river on the rise, and water enough for our largest vessels; and even on my way up to Shreveport from Grand Ecore the water rose, while it commenced falling where I left the largest gunboats. Falling or not, I could not go back while in charge of the transports and the material on which an army of thirty thousand men depended. Nothing would justify me in doing so.

I have still confidence in a good Providence, which I am sure will not desert us, and confidence that the nation will not permit this fleet to be sacrificed when it has so well performed its part in what should have been a complete success.

In conclusion, I beg leave to mention the brave, cool, and zealous manner in which Lieutenant Commander Phelps worked to get his vessel out of her difficulties, never losing his faith for a single moment; also the handsome manner in which he brought the two fragile gunboats past those heavy batteries, cheating the enemy of the prize they had promised themselves.

To Acting Volunteer Lieutenant John Pearce, commanding the Fort Hindman, great praise is due for the efforts he made night and day to get the Eastport off, working his officers and men until they could hardly stand.

Acting Master George W. Rogers, of the Pittsburg, deserves great credit for the manner in which he worked at the bulkheads of the Eastport, up to his middle in water, for eight days; to him we intrusted the duty of stopping the leak, which he fairly accomplished under the most trying circumstances.

Acting Master J. S. Watson defended his vessel in the most gallant manner, and never was a vessel more cut up.

Where all do their duty it is hard to discriminate; but when the record of this expedition is overhauled, the names of Commander R. Townsend, commanding Essex; Lieutenant Commander S. L. Phelps, Eastport; Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith, Chillicothe, (temporarily;) Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese, Black Hawk; Lieutenant Commander J. P. Foster, Lafayette; Lieutenant Commander J. A. Greer, Benton; Lieutenant Commander E. K. Owen, Louisville; Lieutenant Commander J. G. Mitchell, Carondelet; Lieutenant Commander F. M. Ramsay, Choctaw; Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge, Osage; Lieutenant Commander Byron Wilson, Ouachita; Lieutenant Commander George M. Bache, Lexington; Lieutenant Commander S. W. Terry, Benefit, (naval transport;) Acting Volunteer Lieutenant W. R. Hoel, Pittsburg; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Howard, Neosho; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant George W. Browne, Ozark; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne, Mound City; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant John Pearce, Fort Hindman; Acting Master H. H. Gorringe, Cricket; Acting Master J. S. Watson, Juliet; Acting Master Charles Thatcher, Gazelle, should stand prominent, having zealously performed everything required of them with an ability deserving the highest praise.

I deem it necessary to send you a bearer of despatches, who will explain to you fully the condition of the fleet.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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[Confidential.]

*Flag-Ship Cricket, Alexandria, La., April 28, 1864.*

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

SIR: I have written you an account of the operations of the fleet in these waters, but take the liberty of writing to you confidentially the true state of affairs. Never was an officer placed in a more unpleasant position than I am, without any fault of mine, but owing to circumstances over which I have no control. Starting with a good rise of water, in the season of the year when the Red river overflows its banks and keeps up until June, I find myself blockaded by a fall of three feet of water—three feet four inches being the amount now on the falls. Seven feet being required to get over, no amount of lightening will accomplish the object.

When I started on this expedition it was with the full expectation of having a complete victory, and the enemy were all ready to remove into Texas on the first approach of our army. I have already written to you how the whole state of things has been changed by a too blind carelessness on the part of our military leader, and our retreat back to Alexandria from place to place has so demoralized General Banks's army that the troops have no confidence in anybody or anything. I do not include, however, the troops of that veteran soldier General A. J. Smith, whose men have behaved with a bravery seldom surpassed, and have saved the honor of the country. They have never failed in anything they have undertaken, and have been prevented from reaping the fruits of victory by the order of higher authority.

Our army is now all here, with the best general (Franklin) wounded and unfit for duty in the field. General Banks seems to hold no communication with any one, and it is impossible for me to say what he will do. I have no confidence in his promises, as he asserted in a letter, herein enclosed, that he had no intention of leaving Grand Ecore, when he had actually already made all his preparations to leave. I enclose you a copy of his letter to Lieutenant Commander Selfridge, also of one General T. Kilby Smith wrote to me, expressing the general feeling about the manner in which the navy have been treated, and which was nothing more than true. General Banks has got himself into a bad scrape, and involved me in it with him; yet it is a scrape that a good general could easily get himself out of by making this his base of operations, and chasing the enemy until he was whipped at every point.

His retreat to Alexandria, instead of being made in an orderly manner, was conducted with great rapidity, and the enemy lunged upon his flanks, annoying him, though they gained no advantages, under which circumstances he should have driven them into the river. The river is crowded with transports, and every gunboat I have is required to convoy them. I have to withdraw many light-draughts from other points on the Mississippi to supply demands here. In the mean time the enemy are splitting up into parties of two thousand and bringing in the artillery (with which we have supplied them) to blockade points below here, and what will be the upshot of it all I cannot foretell. I know that it will be disastrous in the extreme, for this is a country in which a retreating army is completely at the mercy of an enemy.

Little consideration was paid to the situation of myself and little squadron when exposed to all the power of the enemy's forces, who, failing to gain a second victory over our troops, turned all their attention to me. Thank God, they have gained no advantage over me that will do them any good. The record made by the navy in these waters will never discredit it.

Steps will have to be taken quickly to relieve us from our perilous position, and all this country should be invaded at different points, and held as long as the war continues. From here to Natchez is sixty-five miles, with a good road all the way through, and a body of men could march through that country and subsist there for all time to come, preventing any successful attempts on the part of the rebels to cut off our transportation.

Notwithstanding that the rebels are reported as coming in from Washita, with heavy artillery to plant on the hills opposite Alexandria, no movement is being made to occupy the position, and I am in momentary expectation of having the rebel guns open on the transports on the town side, or if they go down or come up the river it will be at the risk of destruction. Our light-clads can do nothing against hill batteries. I am in momentary expectation of seeing this army retreat, when the result will be disastrous. Fifteen hundred persons have taken the oath of allegiance, and their bitter denunciation of the rebels will be followed by a scene of butchery when we leave here that will be dreadful in the extreme.

Unless instructed by the government, I do not think that General Banks

will make the least effort to save the navy blockaded here. The following vessels are above the falls and command the right of the town: Mound City, Louisville, Pittsburg, Carondelet, Chillicothe, Osage, Neosho, Ozark, Lexington, and Fort Hindman.

I have sent Mr. Heap home to explain all that I cannot write. He will tell you exactly how we are, and I trust that you will leave no effort untried to save the fleet and the honor of the navy. Those here in command of the army are entirely inefficient in the whole matter, excepting General A. J. Smith, who is sorely depressed at the prospect before us. At this moment the enemy have attacked our outposts, and have driven in our indifferent cavalry, which came up numbering 6,000, and have brought nothing but calamity in their train. Our whole army is cooped up in this town, while a much inferior force is going rampant about the country making preparations to assail our helpless transports, which, if caught filled with men, would be perfect slaughter-houses.

I see no effort made yet to transport men to the other side of the river, while the rebels are doing all they can to bring batteries in on the river to cut up passing vessels. Quick remedies are required, and I deem it my duty to lay the true state of affairs before you. An intelligent general would get us out of these difficulties, but I see no prospect of it now. If left here by the army I will be obliged to destroy this fleet to prevent it falling into the enemy's hands, and you may judge of my feelings at having to perform so painful a duty. I cannot conceive that the nation will permit such a sacrifice to be made when men and money can prevent it. My bearer of despatches will explain to you fully how I am situated, and the prospect there is of my being taken into consideration if the army has to retreat, which it will do to a certainty on the first opportunity. We have the means and the power of re-enforcing this army to such an extent that it would be impossible for the enemy to compete with us. They cannot subsist a large army here, while by occupying certain points on the river we can go and come as we please.

This is a most important part of the Union to us, and it will be the greatest defeat we have met with in this war if we have to recede an inch further. We have fought hard for the opening of the Mississippi, and have reduced the naval forces of the rebels in this quarter to two vessels. If we have to destroy what we have here, there will be material enough to build half a dozen iron-clads, and the Red river, which is now of no further dread to us, will require half the Mississippi squadron to watch it. It is true that some time will elapse before anything can be made out of the material we shall endeavor to destroy, but it is impossible to foresee how long this war may last. I am apprehensive that the turrets of the monitors will defy any efforts we can make to destroy them.

Our prestige will receive a shock from which it will be long in recovering, and if the calamities I dread should overtake us, the annals of this war will not present so dire a one as will have befallen us. In my whole course I have been governed by a sincere desire to see the rebel power crushed, and no one knows how I have worked to accomplish this object. I have sacrificed all private interests, all desires of a personal nature, in furtherance of the object I have had nearest at heart, and I trust that you, sir, will appreciate my position. I know that you will give me credit for doing all that man could do under adverse circumstances, in which I have been placed. I shall not hesitate to sacrifice myself, if necessary, for the public good, and whatever may befall me, my name shall not go down dishonored to posterity.

This fatal campaign has upset everything; it has delayed ten thousand troops of General Sherman, on which he depended to open the State of Mississippi; it has drawn General Steele from Arkansas, and already given the rebels a foothold in that country; it has forced me to withdraw many light-clad vessels from points on the Mississippi to protect this army, that would desert me without

notice, when a man of ordinary abilities would have marched triumphant to Shreveport.

General Sherman is very indignant at the manner in which he has been treated, and his well-laid plans prostrated. He made an arrangement with General Banks to meet his troops in Alexandria on the 17th of March; so did I; we were here on the 16th, while General Banks did not leave New Orleans until the 22d, never left here for Natchitoches until the 2d of April, and never left Natchitoches until the 6th, at which time General Sherman expected his troops to be back in Vicksburg, and on their way to the scene of action. There is no foreseeing what other calamities may arise from the errors of one man, who, absorbed in his own interests, and diseased with political aspirations, cares little or nothing for the lives of those he has sacrificed, or thinks of anything but the effect this may have upon his future career.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

P. S.—The only man here who possesses the entire confidence of the troops is General A. J. Smith, and if he were placed in command of this army he would, I am convinced, retrieve all its disasters.

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UNITED STATES STEAMER OSAGE,

*Grand Ecure, April 16, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that while on my way down the river, having stopped at Blair's plantation, some 50 miles above this point, to protect the transport Alice Vivian, I was attacked by two brigades of dismounted cavalry and three pieces of artillery, the whole under the command of General Green, amounting to not less than 2,500 men. I waited until they got within easy shelling range, and opened upon them a heavy fire of shrapnell and canister. The rebels fought with unusual pertinacity for over an hour, delivering the heaviest fire of musketry that I ever witnessed. They finally broke in great confusion, leaving the ground covered with the dead and wounded, muskets, haversacks &c., for many yards from the bank. Having received orders to rejoin you without delay, I regretted that I could not give the battle-field the inspection I desired.

From the statement of the wounded, and the appearance of the field, the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 200. General Green, who commanded, a colonel, and major are known to have been killed.

The Lexington, Lieutenant Commander Bache, came down shortly after the action commenced, and from her favorable position below was able to pour in a most destructive enfilading fire that materially hastened the result. Company A, 95th Illinois, were on board, and did good execution. Our total casualties amounted to seven wounded. General Green will prove a great loss, he standing as one of the best generals this side the Mississippi river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

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UNITED STATES STEAMER OSAGE,

*April 27, 1864.*

SIR: I regret having to report that while lying under the bluffs at Dervache's rocks yesterday at 10.50 a. m., Sidney Osborne, quarter-gunner, while on the bank

on picket, was shot in the neck by a rebel, and severely wounded. Acting Ensign Hubbell, and Acting Master's Mate B. C. Wheeler, with twelve men, at once volunteered to bring him on board; they deserve much credit for the manner in which they charged the hill, under heavy musketry fire of the enemy, and succeeded in bringing Osborne on board without receiving any injury.

At 11.30 the enemy opened fire with four pieces of artillery, and kept up a sharp fire for forty minutes; we returned fire with nine 11-inch shrapnell, one five" shell, two stands grape and one canister; 12.20, ceased firing. We sustained no injury during the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. PEASE,

*Acting Master and Executive Officer.*

Lieut. Com'r THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, U. S. N.,

*Commanding United States Steamer Osage.*

Forwarded.

THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION 17TH ARMY CORPS,

*Cotile, April 25, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: Arrived at this point last night; General Banks and army are on the march to Alexandria; we brought up the rear and skirmished all the way; General Banks fought at the crossing of Cane river; not much loss on either side; our fight in the rear was sharp; General A. J. Smith's command is ordered peremptorily to Alexandria; troops are now on the march; you will find the enemy some 2,000 strong on the opposite side; their artillery does not amount to much; what they have we have crippled badly; will communicate more fully from Alexandria by the gunboats Osage and Pittsburg, unless they get off before we arrive; General Smith and I both protest at being hurried away; I feel as if we were shamefully deserting you; if I had the power I would march my troops back to Calhoun, or wherever you might need us, if at all; I will try and get a communication to you from General A. J. Smith.

Most respectfully, truly yours,

THOMAS KILBY SMITH,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*Grand Ecure, La., April 17, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date. On the 15th I had an interview, with Admiral Porter, in which our position was fully discussed, but I did not know that he was to leave this post.

In reference to the operations of the army, I can only say at present that we are here under instructions from the government to move upon Shreveport in co-operation with the forces of General Steele. General Steele fails to co-operate with us, as far as we can learn, and thus far renders us no assistance. I have sent to him by the way of Little Rock, to request of him to join us upon the line of Red river, where we can move forward in column against the enemy. With the co-operation of his forces, our occupation of Shreveport is certain and immediate. It is impossible to say at this time whether we shall receive this co-operation or not, until it is ascertained definitely that this part of the plan of the government at Washington will fall through, and that my force is insufficient to advance further upon the line against the enemy, who appears to be in full force.



I shall entertain no thought of a retrograde movement, certainly not if it leaves the navy in any danger. No such purpose is contemplated now. I have sent for all the troops that can be gathered from my own department to move to this point immediately. I have also requested, as I have stated, the co-operation of General Steele. Governor Hall, of Missouri, who is here, expresses great interest in the success of this campaign, and will do all he can to send forces from Missouri, which he says can be spared from that State. If this assistance fails, I can then determine what course to pursue. Until then, it is my purpose to maintain my position.

Had I known you to have been in command, or that Admiral Porter was absent, I should have sought an interview with you upon the subject embraced in your letter. In my interview with the admiral he expressed the utmost confidence in the rise of the river, and did not speak of the withdrawal of either of his vessels or the troops. His last suggestion to me was, that it would be imprudent for me to advance until the river should rise.

I will take an early occasion to explain to you in person my view of the situation of our affairs.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieut. Com'r THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE,  
*On board United States Steamer Osage.*

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UNITED STATES GUNBOAT FORT HINDMAN,  
*Alexandria, Louisiana, April 28, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your order, I left Grand Ecore on the 14th instant, with the Eastport, and proceeded down Red river.

One mile below grounded on a bar, and did not get over until the 15th instant, when I continued down stream some eight miles, when the vessel received a severe shock forward, and began to fill rapidly with water in that part of her.

I ordered the vessel to be run into shoal water, started the steam syphon and other pumps, and set all hands to pumping and bailing water out of her.

Within the first hour after the accident the gunboat Lexington and towboat B came alongside, and assisted with syphon and other pumps.

Having filled with water forward, the ship was slow in sinking further, and was not entirely down until five hours after the accident, but the pumps made no impression whatever on the water forward, where the leak was; the numerous bulkheads in the hold alone preventing the vessel from sinking as quickly by the stern as it had done by head.

At the time of the accident the vessel was drifting over shoal water one foot more than her draught, the wheels not turning, and the headway scarcely more than the current. The shock forward threw the leadsman from his balance, and he was nearly falling overboard, while in my cabin aft I scarcely felt it, and only noticed it as a peculiar trembling sensation. We had already burst three of the enemy's torpedoes in the vicinity, two of them by small boats, neither of which were injured by the explosion, and in neither case was there much, if any, report.

The Eastport was of great strength in her bottom, and it is impossible that she should have been so torn by drifting upon snags. The severe character of the blow at the injured extremity, and its slight character elsewhere, together with the fact of her headway not having been checked, nor the direction of her course altered, are proofs that it must have been one of the small torpedoes that

did the damage. After raising her we had additional proof in the shattered condition of the bottom.

On the 16th I proceeded to lighten ship, as directed by you, taking off her battery, &c., and on the 17th the steamer *Champion* No. 5 arrived with two pumps of 20-inch and 10-inch diameter, which gradually gained upon the water.

On the 19th the steamer *New Champion* reached us with similar pumps, and also began pumping out the water. It would be tedious to detail the incessant toil of the people of my vessel day and night, assisted by parties from other vessels in the squadron, which resulted in getting the *Eastport* afloat on the 21st, when fires were started in the furnaces, and one of the pumps was transferred from the *New Champion* and placed upon the forecabin, where it was worked by steam from our boilers, which enabled us to dispense with the services of that vessel. The same day we started down the river slowly. The carpenters of the different ships were at work day and night in efforts to confine and stop the leak.

The 22d was passed in getting the ship over a bar on which she had grounded the evening previous, and in which we were assisted by the steamers with their capstans. Four or five miles further down we again grounded, and spent the day and night in getting over the bar, and had then a run of but two miles before we were again fast upon sunken logs on a bar. At *Montgomery* nearly two days, during which time we were on both logs and rocks, were spent in getting a distance of three miles, when we finally grounded upon logs.

Careful soundings taken by experienced pilots made it appear that it was a hopeless labor we were engaged in, and that we could not get the ship below where she was lying. For the first time hope left me; the river was falling steadily, and the pilots reported too little water for her draught on the bars below. My crew was worn out by labor beyond its power of endurance; many had sickened during the interval from the time of the disaster to the morning of the 26th, when, after vain efforts to get the vessel off the logs on which she had been lying all night, you gave me the order to destroy her, and transfer the people to the *Fort Hindman* temporarily. I took off everything movable and of value, and then placed a prepared can and eight barrels of powder under the foot of her forward casemate, which an operator attempted to explode by electricity; failing in his attempts, a similar amount of powder was placed in her stern, and other barrels of powder were put about her machinery, so as effectually to destroy her, and trains were laid fore and aft the vessel, which, on being ignited, rapidly spread fire throughout her, exploding the different mines in quick succession, utterly destroying her.

These are facts which it is an official duty to report to you, although you were a witness of nearly the whole, yourself directing the measures adopted, first to save the vessel, and then to destroy her.

The command of the *Eastport* has been to me a source of great pride, and I could not but deplore the necessity for destroying her. The act has been the most painful one experienced by me in my official career. She was the finest vessel of your squadron, and one of the best possessed by the government.

Your order to me to proceed to destroy her, in which you commend the zeal displayed by myself and the crew in our efforts to save her, not only relieved me from all responsibility, but was also grateful to my feelings both as a man and officer.

I desire further to express to you my grateful sense of your forbearance in ordering the destruction of the vessel when yourself convinced of the impossibility of saving her—yielding your judgment to my natural anxiety to exhaust every means that seemed to offer a hope of success. I fear that your forbearance led to greater risks, both for your squadron and yourself, than even the saving of the *Eastport* would justify. This consciousness added largely to my

anxiety for your safety when separated from you by the accidents of the action which took place on the evening after her destruction, when I had every reason to apprehend the worst.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. L. PHELPS, *Lieut. Com'g.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

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UNITED STATES GUNBOAT FORT HINDMAN,

*Alexandria, Louisiana, April 28, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived here this morning with the Fort Hindman and Juliet. After the destruction of the Eastport near Montgomery, on this river, on the 26th instant, I transferred the officers and crew of that vessel to the Fort Hindman, in obedience to your orders, and started down the river in company with the Cricket, bearing your flag, the gunboat Juliet, and the two steamers Champion.

When the enemy's batteries opened upon you, five miles above the mouth of Cane river, the Fort Hindman was prevented from rendering effective assistance by her fire, owing to the confusion into which the other vessels were thrown getting athwart the river between us and the enemy. You passed around the point out of our sight, followed by a rapid fire, about the time the New Champion was blown up by a shot in her boiler, and the Juliet disabled by one in her machinery, while the Champion No. 5 had a bad shot in the head of her rudder. The first drifted down enveloped in steam, and lodged against the shore where the enemy was. The other two were for a time exposed in broadside to a terrific fire. The Juliet was in tow of the Champion, whose pilot had abandoned the wheel-house, and the crew below had cut all the hawsers fastening the two vessels together save one, which Captain Watson prevented their cutting. A second-class pilot named Maitland, belonging to the Juliet, at this juncture, with great bravery and presence of mind sprang into the pilot-house of the Champion, headed her up stream, and towed the Juliet out of fire by the one remaining line. I had early discovered the disabled condition of the Juliet, and dropped down below her to draw off the fire of the batteries and cover her retreat. When she had passed out of effective range, the fire of the enemy's guns materially slackened, and I turned about and followed her a short distance up the river, almost entirely unmolested, and remained at the bank in sight of the enemy through the night, which was spent by us in repairing the disabled boats and making preparations for engaging and passing the batteries in the morning.

The numerous guns the enemy had in position, and the number of sharpshooters lining the bank, would seem to have made it more prudent to have run the fire during the night. We were able only partially to repair the Juliet, whose steering apparatus was crippled and steam-pipe cut. The latter, it was found on examination, could be repaired by 10 o'clock the next day; the former not at all with the means at our disposal; we had therefore to tow her. The Champion's rudder could also be temporarily repaired, enabling her to run the river. In addition, it was uncertain whether the channel was wide enough to admit of the passage of two boats abreast, by the New Champion, which the rebels had secured and which it was not improbable they might sink across the channel, with a view to obstructing the river. The hope of saving the Champion No. 5, and the determination to bring the Juliet through, with the above considerations, induced me to adopt the plan of passing the batteries by daylight, when I could see the difficulties of navigation. As for the Champion No. 5, she was as well enabled to endure the fire as are the tin-clads; I therefore made her people

go on board to bring her through. Occasionally during the night I fired shell at the *New Champion*, to distract the enemy should he be attempting to sink her across the channel. At daylight no signs of the enemy could be discovered, save occasional rifle-shots fired at our men who were engaged working about the vessels. Before noon all repairs were made, and we headed down for the batteries, but had not proceeded far before the *Juliet* was snagged in the bow, and we were forced to return and stop the leak. Having accomplished this, we again turned down stream, shelling the place where we felt convinced the enemy were lying, concealed by the woods. When within five hundred yards he suddenly opened on us with a numerous battery; a shot passed through the *Fort Hindman's* pilot-house, partially disabling her wheel and carrying away her tiller-rope. This rendered the vessel unmanageable, and we drifted through the fire, striking the bow and stern alternately upon the shore, but happily clearing the *New Champion*. This inability to give direction to the vessel rendered our fire less effective than it would otherwise have been, and the *Champion No. 5*, in following us, consequently suffered more severely than was anticipated.

After passing the batteries she was disabled and drifted upon the opposite shore, where her people escaped, and those who have since come in report that she was on fire in the hold when they abandoned her. It had been my purpose to destroy the *New Champion*, in passing her, as well as the other *Champion*, in case she should fail to pass through the fire in safety, but the loss of our tiller-ropes frustrated the plan. The fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was incessant and very annoying for several miles below the batteries. The *Juliet* received a shot in her post cylinder, and was otherwise much injured. A shot passed through the magazine of the *Fort Hindman*, penetrating a barrel of powder and killing a man. Except being considerably torn in her upper works, and several times hulled, the vessel was not materially damaged, and the loss of life was singularly small.

I regret to report that Acting Ensign S. Pool was killed. He was attached to the *Eastport*.

I refer you to the reports of the captains of the two vessels for the other casualties.

We fell in with the *Neosho*, which vessel you despatched to our assistance about twelve miles below the batteries.

I deem it proper to mention that Acting Ensign Lea appeared to be the only efficient line officer on board the *Fort Hindman*.

Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Pearce, commanding her, received splinter wounds in the head while managing his vessel in the pilot-house, sustaining his reputation for a brave and efficient officer.

Acting Master Watson, commanding *Juliet*, is particularly to be commended for his energetic efforts in saving his vessel, and the good use he made of his guns under difficulties.

The conduct of all the officers and men of the *Eastport* was such as to make it impossible for me to distinguish any one particularly by name without doing injustice to the others.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. I. PHELPS,  
*Lieutenant Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

## CAPTURE OF THE UNITED STATES STEAMERS COVINGTON AND SIGNAL.

*Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant George P. Lord.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER CHILLICOTHE,  
*Above Alexandria Falls, May 8, 1864.*

SIR: It is with feelings of regret that I report the loss of the United States steamer Covington, and most respectfully submit the following report:

I left Alexandria, convoying the steamer Warner, at 8 o'clock on the morning of May 4, 1864. While passing Wilson's plantation the Warner was fired into by about one hundred infantry, losing one man. I fired my stern guns at them for some time, and passed on. After proceeding about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile further Mr. McClossy, a pilot belonging to the General Price, struck the stern of the vessel against a bar, thereby breaking the port rudder badly and shivering the tiller. I told him hereafter Mr. Emerson, my other pilot, would manage her. I tied up all night about a mile from the Red House, and commenced repairing my rudder and tiller. At about 5 o'clock I was joined by the United States steamer Signal. Both of us kept up through the night an irregular fire on the right-hand shore going down, as they had fired upon us with infantry while we were repairing.

At  $4\frac{1}{2}$  o'clock in the morning we all got under way—the Warner in the lead, the Covington next, and Signal last. At Dunn's bayou (on the right going down) we were fired upon by two pieces of artillery and infantry. The Covington was hit by this battery only three times, and the Warner's rudders were disabled; but she still continued down stream until she came to a short point in the river, when she went into the bank. She had no sooner struck the bank when a rebel battery (on the right-hand shore going down) and from 4,000 to 5,000 infantry opened on her and my vessel. The Covington and Signal immediately commenced firing. Almost every shot either struck the boilers, steam-pipe, or machinery of the Warner, as she was only about one hundred yards from the battery. After we had engaged the battery about three hours the Warner hoisted a white flag. We still kept up our fire, and I sent a party from my vessel under a severe fire to burn her, but the colonel in charge sent me word that there were nearly 125 killed and wounded, and requested that I would not burn her, which was granted. A short time after this I was informed that the Signal was disabled. I immediately rounded to and went alongside of her, took her in tow and started up stream, but my rudders became disabled and the Signal got adrift. (It was impossible to pass the Warner; so Mr. Emerson, my pilot, informed me.) Knowing that the Signal would drift down on the Warner, and the rebels could immediately board her, I ordered the commanding officer to anchor her, which was done.

Finding it impossible to handle my vessel, and fearing that I should get on the side where artillery and infantry were, I went over on the other bank and made fast, head up stream. I used my stern guns on the lower battery and my broadside on the infantry abreast of us, and my bow guns on a battery that was ahead of us, which had been brought down from Dunn's bayou. My escape-pipe was cut while alongside of the Signal, causing a great deal of steam to escape, and making the impression that the boilers had been struck. The men, however, soon rallied, and kept up a brisk fire on the enemy. Most of the soldiers and officers, among whom were Colonel Sharp, of the 156th New York volunteers, Colonel Rainer, 129th Illinois, (wounded in both legs,) Lieutenant Simpson, aide-de-camp to General Banks, and Acting Assistant Paymaster Chester, went over on the Signal. The Signal getting adrift from us, they were not able to return to my vessel. After I had been tied to the bank an hour or so my steam-drum was cut, and a shell struck under the boilers, letting out all the water. My ammunition gave out; my howitzers were disabled by the

bracket bolts drawing out; and every shot coming through us, with one officer and a good many of the men already killed, I determined to burn my vessel. I spiked the guns, had coals of fire strewn on the decks, and myself and executive officers set fire to the cotton which was on the guard alongside of the engines. I saw it burning finely before I left, and feel sure she was destroyed. While leaving the vessel to get up on the bank a terrible fire of infantry was opened on us, and some were killed in going up. I collected my officers and men all together, and found I had with me 9 officers and 23 men, (my crew was composed of 14 officers and 62 men,) and started through the woods for Alexandria at 20 minutes of 11 o'clock. When within ten miles of Alexandria we were fired upon by rebel cavalry, thereby scattering us. I am glad to say that they have nearly all arrived here safe, with the exception of Acting Third Assistant Engineer Syms, who was wounded in the head while fighting a few guerillas who had fired into a party of my men while close to Alexandria. He has since arrived safe. The whole action lasted about five hours, and the Covington was badly riddled from stem to stern, there being no less than five shots in her hull, and some forty or fifty in her upper works. The officers and men behaved with great gallantry, and with the exception of a few, this was their first action. Acting Master's Mate C. W. Gross was killed by a shot that came through the shell-room. The officers and men lost all of their personal effects; the only things that were saved being the signal-book and the despatches intrusted to my care, which were returned to you. The arms that were brought with us I turned over to Acting Master H. Gorringe, of the Cricket, taking a receipt for the same.

In conclusion, I most respectfully beg that a court of inquiry may be called to determine whether the honor of our flag suffered in my hands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE P. LORD,

*Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, United States Navy.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

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*Report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

*Mound City, June 29, 1864.*

SIR: I enclose a report of the surgeon of the Signal, who was released unconditionally by the rebels. It only corroborates all the reports I have received of the gallant defence of this vessel, which I am told was a most perfect wreck when she fell into the hands of the enemy, who were much chagrined that so frail a vessel had contended so long against seven guns placed in position to get a cross-fire on her.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

HOB. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*Report of Acting Assistant Surgeon N. Brewster.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER NEW NATIONAL,

*Mound City, June 27, 1864.*

SIR: Agreeably to your request, I have the honor of submitting the following report of the loss of the United States steamer Signal:

Leaving Alexandria on the 4th of May, she proceeded down the river, and

anchored at night in company with United States steamer Covington and transport Warner. Starting again at daylight, we had proceeded but a short distance when the enemy opened on us with a battery of two guns, and from several others as we passed on. Their fire was promptly returned, and continued until 9 o'clock, when it ceased for a few minutes, and the opportunity was seized for distributing bread, as breakfast had not been served. The firing soon commenced again, and continued until near noon, when the order was passed for all hands to prepare to abandon and burn the ship, having been totally disabled for more than an hour, the Warner flying a white flag, and the Covington nearly consumed, exploding her magazine soon after. Preparations were made and a part of the men had safely passed up the bank, when the order was countermanded, it being deemed a useless waste of life for more to attempt it, and wholly impossible to remove the wounded, under the fire of the batteries and several hundred sharpshooters, and the white flag was raised.

My station was unfavorable for observation, and my professional duties occupied considerable of my time; but I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the good conduct of those stationed near me, and with whom I came in contact during the action. Acting Volunteer Lieutenant E. Morgan, commanding, appeared to be coolly attending to his duties. Acting Ensign C. P. Bragg, executive officer, Ensign W. F. Loan, and Acting Master's Mate R. P. Croft, had charge of the divisions, and, cheering the men by voice and example, held them to their stations, despite the withering fire of the enemy's sharpshooters through the open ports, and were ably seconded by the captains of the guns. To the coolness of the engineers in shutting off the steam and emptying the boilers when the steam-pipe was cut, the safety of many is owing. The pilot, Perry Wilkes, left his wheel only when it was disabled in his hand by a bursting shell. I would make special mention of Acting Ensigns Bragg and Loan, who went out in full view of several hundred sharpshooters and let go the anchor; and again to ship the cable, this time assisted by John Fighland (seaman,) who was here disabled by his second wound. Michael McCormic (boatswain's mate) and Timothy O'Donahu (seaman,) captains of guns, were wounded early in the day, but stood to their guns until ordered away. George Butts, gunner's mate, and Charles Aster, quarter gunner, were on the sick-list, but did duty during the whole engagement. Several whose names I have forgotten returned to their guns when their wounds had been dressed, and, with few exceptions, all stood to their work, using muskets when their guns could not be brought to bear.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. BREWSTER, *Acting Assistant Surgeon.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER.

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*Partial list of casualties on board the Signal.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
Mound City, June 29, 1864.

SIR: I beg leave to enclose a partial list of the wounded on board the United States steamer Signal at the time of her loss.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

## UNITED STATES STEAMER NEW NATIONAL,

June 27, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the condition of the sick and wounded captured by the enemy on the 5th of May, and left in my care in the Confederate States hospital at Cheneyville, Louisiana:

Chas. Allen, second-class fireman, Signal, sick.

Michael Lyons, coal-heaver, Signal, wounded.

A. J. Shiver, seaman, Signal, wounded.

John Highland, seaman, Signal, wounded.

Gabriel Frear, landsman, Signal, wounded.

Isaac Highland, seaman, Covington, wounded.

Lewis Jones, quartermaster, Signal, wounded.

They were paroled on the 16th of June, and delivered to Colonel Dwight, United States army, on the 17th, who transferred them to the United States steamer General Bragg. I reported on board the United States steamer Choctaw on the 18th, and received orders to remove the wounded to hospital Pinkney and report to you for duty.

In obedience, I took passage on the New National, and took to the hospital all except Lewis Jones, quartermaster of the Signal, whose time has expired, and Isaac Highland, ordinary seaman, Covington, entirely recovered. They are on board that vessel now awaiting orders.

I have submitted, through the fleet surgeon, a detailed report of the casualties on board the Signal.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. BREWSTER,

*Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. Steamer Signal.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

No. 111.]

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP CRICKET,

*Off Alexandria, La., May 11, 1864.*

SIR: I came across the enclosed article in a western paper, and although I am not in the habit of noticing newspaper paragraphs, I deemed this one of sufficient importance to justify me in making an explanation to the department, the reflections on me coming from the highest legislative body in the land, whose good opinion I am unwilling to forfeit. Fortunately, neither my name nor that of any officer under my command has been connected with cotton, which has led so many men astray from their duties; nor do I think it ever will be. When I came into this river the rebels commenced burning cotton, as they always have done when our forces have appeared, and I ordered all cotton found lying along the banks of the river to be taken charge of, to be sent to Cairo for adjudication, when it was the property of the rebel government or its officers, and to be receipted for when the property of private individuals. When private individuals (loyal) made objections to the cotton being taken, saying that they had no fear of its being molested, it was not troubled, and was generally burned.

In all cases where persons came to me with claims, I either delivered the cotton to them or gave them receipts for it, instructing them how to get it in Cairo, without being put to the expense even of transportation.

Applications were daily made to me to take possession of cotton, the parties being willing to abandon it to the navy, all of which applications I declined



acceding to, not intending to have anything to do with matters of a private nature, and not having the means of transportation. On my arrival here I found a storehouse filled with "C. S. A." cotton, among which were three lots (formerly rebel cotton, evidently) claimed by private individuals. When satisfied that they had paid for the cotton I returned it to them, or gave them the necessary document to enable them to get it. In all cases the fairest dealings have existed towards all persons, which every one here interested will acknowledge; and if some of those concerned may have to go to Cairo, to secure their rights, they are well satisfied to have escaped from the indiscriminate seizure which was made by the army.

I deemed that I had a right to take all rebel government cotton, or that of persons in arms against the Union; for this is truly an enemy's country, in every sense of the word, and to have left the means of carrying on war in their hands would have been anything but patriotic.

When the army came here I gave an order to touch no more cotton, and to respect the rights of every individual, considering it nothing but right that every one should trade with their own property, in accordance with the President's proclamation, (excepting the rebel government, and its aiders and abettors.) Besides, I have more important matters to attend to, and have no desire to have my name associated with complaints which daily reach my ears.

I have no fear that the department will ever doubt the propriety of my course, but make these explanations that members of the Senate, among whom I have some friends whose good opinion I highly value, may understand my true position. I would not walk ten steps out of the way of my duty for all the cotton in the south, and am happy to say that I have never been afflicted with the mania which has led some prominent men astray from more important duties.

Great injustice has been done to many parties here, but with that I have nothing to do, and hope that my name may never be associated with those transactions.

I am happy to say that not one instance occurred, since we entered this river, where officer or man failed to respect private rights. They never entered a house without orders, or took so much as an egg without permission of the owner, and paying for it, all of which is required by general orders.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*The Red river affair in the Senate.*

In a report of the "sayings and doings" in the United States Senate on April 29 we find the following:

Mr. Henderson offered a joint resolution to provide for the printing of the report of the commission, of which Major General McDowell was president, to examine into cotton speculations and frauds on the part of officers in the west.

A modification of Mr. Grimes, requesting the Secretary of War to transmit the report, was accepted.

On motion of Mr. Lane, of Kansas, the words "if not incompatible with the public interest" were added.

An amendment of Mr. Grimes requesting all information touching the persons supposed to be implicated in the report was adopted.

Messrs. Wilson, Fessenden, and others thought the resolution had best not be adopted now.

Mr. Henderson said information on the subject was desired now, as it would bear on the bill pending before this body, and this was the only authentic way to obtain it. He had read letters the last three days from Red river, saying that our defeat there was on account of speculations. The cavalry in advance on that occasion, 3,000 men, had 200 wagons, which became entangled and confused and brought on disaster.

Mr. Wilson wanted to know if the senator charged that the Red river expedition was undertaken for the purpose of gathering cotton.

Mr. Henderson said no such thing; he merely wished to know what this brigade of cavalry wanted with 265 wagons and mules. It was to gather up the products of the country.

Mr. Conness stated, on what he considered the highest authority, that these wagons were part of the regular train of the army, and whatever might have been the defect of generalship which brought them there, the statement that they were intended to bring in cotton was not correct.

Mr. Henderson made no charges himself, but it was singular that the disaster had followed the statement indicated by the newspaper writers. He read a letter from Grand Ecore, dated four days before the battle, alleging a conflict of authority between General Banks and Admiral Porter, and stating that the latter was seizing cotton on land as naval prizes, and predicting disaster.

Mr. Conness denounced the statement read as a cruel and base slander on Admiral Porter, which he had the highest authority for denying.

The resolution, as amended, was adopted.

#### PASSAGE OF THE FALLS BY THE FLEET.

*Report of Rear-Admiral David D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Mouth of Red River, May 16, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the vessels lately caught by low water above the falls at Alexandria have been released from their unpleasant position. The water had fallen so low that I had no hope or expectation of getting the vessels out this season, and as the army had made arrangements to evacuate the country, I saw nothing before me but the destruction of the best part of the Mississippi squadron.

There seems to have been an especial providence looking out for us in providing a man equal to the emergency. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, acting engineer of the 19th army corps, proposed a plan of building a series of dams across the rocks at the falls, and raising the water high enough to let the vessels pass over. This proposition looked like madness, and the best engineers ridiculed it; but Colonel Bailey was so sanguine of success that I requested General Banks to have it done, and he entered heartily into the work. Provisions were short and forage was almost out, and the dam was promised to be finished in ten days, or the army would have to leave us. I was doubtful about the time, but had no doubt about the ultimate success, if time would only permit. General Banks placed at the disposal of Colonel Bailey all the force he required, consisting of some three thousand men and two or three hundred wagons. All the neighboring steam-mills were torn down for material, two or three regiments of Maine men were set to work felling trees, and on the second day after my arrival in Alexandria from Grand Ecore the work had fairly begun. Trees were falling with great rapidity; teams were moving in all directions, bringing in brick and stone; quarries were opened; flatboats were built to bring stone down from above; and every man seemed to be working with a vigor I have seldom seen equalled, while perhaps not one in fifty believed in the success of the undertaking.

These falls are about a mile in length, filled with rugged rocks, over which, at the present stage of water, it seemed to be impossible to make a channel.

The work was commenced by running out from the left bank of the river a tree dam, made of the bodies of very large trees, brush, brick, and stone, crossed with other heavy timber, and strengthened in every way which ingenuity could devise. This was run out about three hundred feet into the river; four large coal barges were then filled with brick and sunk at the end of it. From the right bank of the river cribs filled with stone were built out to meet the barges. All of which was successfully accomplished, notwithstanding there was a current running of nine miles an hour, which threatened to sweep everything before it.

It will take too much time to enter into the details of this truly wonderful work. Suffice it to say, that the dam had nearly reached completion in eight days' working time, and the water had risen sufficiently on the upper falls to allow the Fort Hindman, Osage, and Neosho to get down and be ready to pass the dam. In another day it would have been high enough to enable all the other vessels to pass the upper falls. Unfortunately, on the morning of the 9th instant, the pressure of water became so great that it swept away two of the stone barges, which swung in below the dam on one side. Seeing this unfortunate accident, I jumped on a horse and rode up to where the upper vessels were anchored and ordered the Lexington to pass the upper falls, if possible, and immediately attempt to go through the dam. I thought I might be able to save the four vessels below, not knowing whether the persons employed on the work would ever have the heart to renew their enterprise.

The Lexington succeeded in getting over the upper falls just in time, the water rapidly falling as she was passing over. She then steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was rushing so furiously that it seemed as if nothing but destruction awaited her. Thousands of beating hearts looked on anxious for the result. The silence was so great as the Lexington approached the dam that a pin might almost be heard to fall. She entered the gap with a full head of steam on, pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then swept into deep water by the current, and rounded-to safely into the bank. Thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer, and universal joy seemed to pervade the face of every man present.

The Neosho followed next; all her hatches battened down, and every precaution taken against accident. She did not fare as well as the Lexington, her pilot having become frightened as he approached the abyss and stopped her engine, when I particularly ordered a full head of steam to be carried; the result was that for a moment her hull disappeared from sight under the water. Every one thought she was lost. She rose, however, swept along over the rocks with the current, and fortunately escaped with only one hole in her bottom, which was stopped in the course of an hour.

The Hindman and Osage both came through beautifully without touching a thing, and I thought if I was only fortunate enough to get my large vessels as well over the falls, my fleet once more would do good service on the Mississippi.

The accident to the dam, instead of disheartening Colonel Bailey, only induced him to renew his exertions, after he had seen the success of getting four vessels through.

The noble-hearted soldiers, seeing their labor of the last eight days swept away in a moment, cheerfully went to work to repair damages, being confident now that all the gunboats would be finally brought over. These men had been working for eight days and nights up to their necks in water in the boiling sun, cutting trees and wheeling bricks, and nothing but good humor prevailed among them. On the whole, it was very fortunate the dam was carried away, as

the two barges that were swept away from the centre swung around against some rocks on the left, and made a fine cushion for the vessels, and prevented them, as it afterwards appeared, from running on certain destruction.

The force of the water and the current being too great to construct a continuous dam of six hundred feet across the river in so short a time, Colonel Bailey determined to leave a gap of fifty-five feet in the dam, and build a series of wing-dams on the upper falls. This was accomplished in three days' time, and on the 11th instant the Mound City, Carondelet, and Pittsburg came over the upper falls, a good deal of labor having been expended in hauling them through, the channel being very crooked, scarcely wide enough for them. Next day the Ozark, Louisville, Chillicothe, and two tugs also succeeded in crossing the upper falls. Immediately afterwards the Mound City, Carondelet, and Pittsburg started in succession to pass the dam, all their hatches battened down and every precaution taken to prevent accident. The passage of these vessels was a most beautiful sight, only to be realized when seen. They passed over without an accident except the unshipping of one or two rudders. This was witnessed by all the troops, and the vessels were heartily cheered when they passed over. Next morning at 10 o'clock the Louisville, Chillicothe, Ozark and two tugs passed over without any accident except the loss of a man, who was swept off the deck of one of the tugs. By 3 o'clock that afternoon the vessels were all coaled, ammunition replaced, and all steamed down the river, with the convoy of transports in company. A good deal of difficulty was anticipated in getting over the bars in lower Red river; depth of water reported only five feet; gunboats were drawing six. Providentially we had a rise from the back-water of the Mississippi, that river being very high at that time; the back-water extending to Alexandria, one hundred and fifty miles distant, enabling us to pass all the bars and obstructions with safety.

Words are inadequate to express the admiration I feel for the abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. This is, without doubt, the best engineering feat ever performed. Under the best circumstances a private company would not have completed this work under one year, and to an ordinary mind the whole thing would have appeared an utter impossibility. Leaving out his abilities as an engineer, the credit he has conferred upon the country, he has saved to the Union a valuable fleet, worth nearly two million dollars. More, he has deprived the enemy of a triumph which would have emboldened them to carry on this war a year or two longer; for the intended departure of the army was a fixed fact, and there was nothing left for me to do, in case that event occurred, but to destroy every part of the vessels, so that the rebels could make nothing of them. The highest honors the government can bestow on Colonel Bailey can never repay him for the service he has rendered the country.

To General Banks personally I am much indebted for the happy manner in which he has forwarded this enterprise, giving it his whole attention night and day, scarcely sleeping while the work was going on, attending personally to see that all the requirements of Colonel Bailey were complied with on the instant.

I do not believe there ever was a case where such difficulties were overcome in such a short space of time, and without any preparation.

I beg leave to mention the names of some of the persons engaged on this work, as I think that credit should be given to every man employed on it. I am unable to give the names of all, but sincerely trust that General Banks will do full justice to every officer engaged in this undertaking when he makes his report. I only regret that time did not enable me to get the names of all concerned. The following are the names of the most prominent persons:

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, acting military engineer, 19th army corps, in charge of the work.

Lieutenant Colonel Pearcall, assistant.

Colonel Dwight, acting assistant inspector general.

Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Kinsey, 161st New York volunteers.

Lieutenant Colonel Hubbard, 30th Maine volunteers.

Major Sawtelle, provost marshal, and Lieutenant Williamson, ordnance officer.

The following were a portion of the regiments employed: 29th Maine, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Emmerson; 116th New York, commanded by Colonel George M. Love; 161st New York, commanded by Captain Prentiss; 133d New York, commanded by Colonel Currie.

The engineer regiment and officers of the 13th army corps were also employed.

I feel that I have done but feeble justice to the work or the persons engaged in it. Being severely indisposed, I feel myself unable to go into further details. I trust some future historian will treat this matter as it deserves to be treated, because it is a subject in which the whole country should feel an interest, and the noble men who succeeded so admirably in this arduous task should not lose one atom of credit so justly due them.

The Mississippi squadron will never forget the obligations it is under to Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, acting military engineer, of the 19th army corps.

Previous to passing the vessels over the falls, I had nearly all the guns, ammunition, provisions, chain-cables, anchors, and everything that could affect their draught, taken out of them.

The commanders were indefatigable in their exertions to accomplish the object before them, and a happier set of men were never seen than when their vessels were once more in fighting trim.

If this expedition has not been so successful as the country hoped for, it has exhibited the indomitable spirit of eastern and western men to overcome obstacles deemed by most people insurmountable. It has presented a new feature in the war, nothing like which has ever been accomplished before.

I regret to inform you, among the misfortunes of this expedition, of the loss of two small light draught gunboats—the Signal and Covington. I sent them down from Alexandria to convoy a quartermaster's boat, the Warner, loaded with cotton and some four hundred troops on board, not knowing that the enemy had any artillery on the river below us, or anything more than wandering gangs of guerillas, armed with muskets, which these vessels were competent to drive off. It appears, however, that the rebels were enabled to pass our advance force at night with six thousand men and some twenty-five pieces of artillery. With these they established a series of batteries at a place called Dunn's bayou, thirty miles below Alexandria—a very commanding position. These batteries were so masked that they could not be seen in passing, even by the closest observation.

The first notice the vessels received of the battery was a furious fire which opened on the quartermaster's boat, the Warner, piercing her boilers, and completely disabling her. At the same time six thousand infantry opened with musketry, killing and wounding half the soldiers on this vessel. She drifted in to the opposite bank, where a number managed to make their escape in the bushes, though many were killed in attempting to do so.

The Signal and Covington immediately rounded to and opened their guns on the batteries, and pushed up, endeavoring to rescue the Warner from her perilous position. They had, however, as much as they could do to take care of themselves, the cross-fire of the three batteries cutting them up in a terrible manner. Their steam-pipes were soon cut, and their boilers perforated with shot, notwithstanding which they fought the batteries for five long hours, the vessels being cut all to pieces, and many killed and wounded on board.

Acting Volunteer Lieutenant George P. Lord, commanding the Covington, having expended all his shot, spiked his guns, set fire to his vessel, and escaped with what was left of his crew to the shore, and his vessel blew up.

The Signal, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Edward Morgan, still fought her guns for half an hour after the destruction of the Covington. He found it im-

possible to destroy his vessel by burning, her decks being covered with wounded, and humanity forbade him sacrificing the lives of the noble fellows who had defended their vessel so gallantly. He gave permission to all those who wished to escape to do so. Some of them attempted to get off by climbing up the bank. Many were killed while doing so by the murderous fire of musketry poured in from the opposite side. The captain remained by the vessel and was captured, if he remained alive, but I have no information regarding him. The rebels took the guns off of her, and placed her across the channel as an obstruction—sunk her.

General Banks, on hearing the news, sent out cavalry to hunt for the unfortunate men, many of whom were picked up and brought into Alexandria. A number escaped down river, and went aboard some light-draught gunboats that were coming up at the time to the scene of action, but were driven back by the superior artillery of the enemy.

I feel very much for the poor fellows who fell into the rebels' hands, as the latter have been very merciless to some of the prisoners they have taken, and committed outrages at which humanity shudders.

The vessels will all return to their stations in a few days, as there is no prospect, under present circumstances, of renewing operations in this part of Louisiana, the season having passed for operating with any chance of success.

I am sorry to see that the rebel guerillas have become quite troublesome on the Mississippi since I left, all of which will be rectified within the coming week.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*Additional report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Off Mouth of Red River, La., May 19, 1864.*

SIR: In my report in relation to the release of the gunboats from their unpleasant position above the falls, I did not think it prudent to mention that I was obliged to destroy eleven 32-pounders, not having time to haul them from above the falls to Alexandria, the army having moved and drawn in all their pickets. The best guns were hauled first. The 32-pounders were old guns, and would have been condemned on the first opportunity. For the same reasons I also omitted to mention that I was obliged to take off the iron from the sides of the Pook gunboats and from the Ozark, to enable them to get over. Not being able to haul this iron around the falls to Alexandria, from want of wagons, I ordered the gunboats to run up the river at night to a point where they could find from five to six fathoms of water, where the iron was thrown overboard, and where, in a few moments, it would sink many feet under the quicksands, thus leaving no possible chance for the rebels to recover it.

The Pook vessels run so much better without this iron than any ever did before, and it never having been of any use to them, I proposed leaving it off altogether. Their forward casemates are still heavily protected with iron, and as they always fight bow on, it is all they should carry. Besides, they are getting old, and having done a great deal of service without any repairs, they cannot bear the weight. They now run from two to two and a half knots faster than before.

The Ozark is a miserable vessel. Her turret has ceased to work altogether, and is about twice as high and heavy as it should be. I really do not know what can be done with her, unless it is to take the turret off, and, with some additional strengthening, put casemates about her. This, when done, will enable

her to lie at some of the points on the river where a formidable vessel is required.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral, Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

CAPTURE OF THE STEAMER CHAMPION (PUMP BOAT.)

*Report of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,

*Mound City, June 26, 1864.*

SIR: I enclose a report from Pilot Wm. Maitland, who lately escaped from the rebels. He was the pilot who volunteered to take the Champion, No. 5, (pump boat,) past the batteries up Red river. His report gives an account of the fate of the Champion, and also an account of the lamentable fate of those on board; and though the news is painful to the friends of the parties who were on the boat, it is as well that they should know the worst.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

*Report of Pilot Wm. Maitland.*

MOUND CITY, *June 25, 1864.*

SIR: On the morning of the 27th of April I volunteered my services to pilot the steamer Champion, No. 5, by the rebel batteries, in company with the gun-boats Fort Hindman and Juliet, all of which had failed to get past them the night previous.

We started at about 8 o'clock, the Fort Hindman, having the Juliet in tow, taking the lead. When nearly opposite the batteries, a shell entered the pilot-house of my boat, which wounded me in both legs, causing me to drop on my knees, depriving me from working the wheel; the boat then ran into the bank of the river, on the same side with the batteries; another shell struck her at this time, which wounded me in six other places; and still another, which cut away the bell-rope and speaking-trumpet. Recovering sufficiently from my wounds, I rung the starboard bell, and had the boat backed across the river to the opposite side from the enemy. I then left the pilot-house and jumped overboard and swam ashore, the enemy keeping up a heavy fire upon the boat until she sunk, which was in about a half hour afterwards.

She now lies with her head up stream, her hurricane deck, on the port side, under water; starboard side of the boiler deck, ditto. From what I could learn, the rebels are trying to raise her, with poor prospects of success. Captain Roberts and a deck hand named Michael Calvin were killed. Pat. Gorman, a deck hand, wounded and prisoner, since paroled (on the 17th); the balance of the crew were taken prisoners and sent to Tyler, Texas.

I learned that as the Champion, No. 3, approached the batteries the previous night a twelve-pound shot entered her starboard boiler, which caused it to explode. Captain Stewart and three engineers, whose names are unknown to

me, were scalded to death; also the cook. Michael Shields was wounded and taken prisoner, but since paroled. All the contrabands on board, some one hundred and fifty to two hundred, were scalded to death, excepting fifteen. The rebels have repaired the boilers of this boat, and she is now running on the river below Alexandria. She, in company with the steamer Frolic, came out to the mouth of the Red river, under a flag of truce, with wounded officers. I think, as near as I could learn from the rebels, that the battery consisted of eighteen guns, two of which were of Nims's battery, captured from General Banks's army. A captain and lieutenant were among the killed on the rebel side.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MAITLAND, *Pilot.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding Mississippi Squadron.*

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*Testimony of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1865.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What is your rank and position in the navy ?

Answer. I am a rear-admiral, commanding the north Atlantic squadron.

Question. We have been instructed to inquire into the facts relating to the Red river expedition under Major General Banks. Will you give us a full statement of the connection the navy had with that expedition ?

Answer. The Red river expedition was originally proposed by General Sherman and myself; we were to have gone up there together. But while we were making the preparations for it, General Banks notified General Sherman that he was about to ascend the Red river with 30,000 men. General Banks also requested co-operation from me, showing me certain orders from General Halleck, in which he was directed to go as far as Shreveport. I represented to General Banks the impossibility of going up that river at that season of the year. I told him that General Sherman and I had fully discussed the matter; that General Sherman himself had been all through that country, and knew all about it; and so did I.

But notwithstanding that, General Banks insisted upon going up the river. General Sherman agreed to supply him with 10,000 men, with General A. J. Smith in command. General Smith's forces and my fleet started together about the 12th of March, 1864, and pushed on up the river at once, losing no time. We passed all obstructions in the river, capturing Fort De Russy and everything in the way, and pushed right on to Alexandria, which place we captured. General Banks had told us that he and his army would be at Alexandria on the 17th of March. But notwithstanding he had fixed that time, he did not himself leave New Orleans until the 22d of March, and his army did not reach Alexandria for some days after the time fixed.

That rendered it entirely impossible for us to go up the river. The water was then falling rapidly, and there was no prospect of a rise that season. I told General Banks myself that it was impossible to go up. Still he urged it, and I told him I would do all I could. He said that the success of the army depended upon the navy. I told him I would send up a portion of my fleet at any rate, if I should lose every gunboat I had. And I went to work and got a number of boats over the falls at Alexandria. We had to drag them up over the rocks, after lightening them all we could.

General Banks had come up in the steamer Black Hawk, loaded with cotton speculators, bagging, roping, champagne, and ice. The whole affair was a cotton



speculation. When I first went into the Red river, I found below Alexandria a great deal of cotton, a large quantity of it belonging to the confederate government, marked X, which was their mark. I did not trouble the cotton until the rebel general Dick Taylor commenced burning cotton above. I then seized all the cotton on the river, amounting to 3,000 bales of confederate cotton. There was a great deal more belonging to private persons, a great many of whom were loyal, to the best of my knowledge. To them I gave a receipt for the cotton, marked it "U. S. N.," gave a description of it, its place of seizure, &c., so that the people could at any time identify their cotton, and obtain something for it if they were loyal. That was all I had to do with cotton on that river.

General Banks was very indignant when he got there to find that 3,000 bales of cotton had got out of his hands. He first gave an order that no treasury agent should come into that district, and requested me, in case any of them should ask permission to go up on my gunboats, not to let them go. I told him that I had no authority to interfere with treasury agents; that I supposed the President would give such orders that neither the army nor the navy could control the matter. There were two who came up in a quartermaster boat. I wrote to General Banks that two treasury agents had come up in a quartermaster boat, whether by authority or not I did not know; I merely stated the fact to him. He had them arrested immediately and sent out of the country; at the same time he had four or five men with him who had special permits, contrary to law, to buy cotton or take it.

Question. Who were those men?

Answer. I do not remember their names.

Question. From whom were the permits?

Answer. From General Banks.

Question. Did you see the permits?

Answer. I saw one of them.

Question. What was it?

Answer. A permit to go into the country for the purpose of purchasing cotton.

Question. Signed by General Banks?

Answer. Yes, sir. I found 230 bales of cotton newly bagged. There was a Frenchman who had a permit, signed by General Banks, to take this bagging and rope into the country. I have forgotten the man's name; he has been hung since, I think. I seized all the bagging to send it to court. To show me that he was properly in possession of it, he showed me General Banks's permit. It was a well-understood thing there that General Banks had been giving permits.

Question. At what point was this?

Answer. At Alexandria.

Question. Was it or not true that the army at Alexandria gave notice to the people to bring in their cotton, and that a certain amount was brought in, and was taken, not by individuals, but was taken on government account?

Answer. I do not think that that was the case. There was a man named McGee there; I think he had once had something to do with the rebel government; he seemed to be a man that was superintending everything. The cotton was pretty much all taken in the name of the government. I did not see much private cotton there that people were anxious to ship on their own account. They were not allowed to do anything of the kind. And the cotton was nearly all lost finally; it was thrown out of the steamers in a kind of a panic afterwards, and the rebels got it again.

Question. The statement has been made to the committee that at Alexandria for a time the people were offered certain inducements to bring in their cotton; that it was taken on government account, and that no other cotton excepting that was taken by the government.

Auswer. Every bale of cotton in Alexandria was seized by General Banks, and the quartermaster charged five or ten dollars a bale, I forget which, as freight for taking it to New Orleans; and what got down there I have understood went into the house of Weed & Co. But I think only a small load got down there. We sent down a large vessel loaded with cotton, but she was destroyed by the rebels on the way down, and that put an end to it. The only cotton of any amount that really got out of the country was what I sent down—3,000 bales from Alexandria, and 3,000 bales from Wachita.

Question. Is it true that none of the cotton taken on government account at Alexandria was got down?

Answer. Only one small load of about 300 bales.

Question. What became of that?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Was that seized the same as the rest?

Answer. It was all seized, I know, every bale of cotton; none was exempt from seizure after the army arrived.

Question. Do you know whether that cotton was seized by speculators, or was it seized on government account, and turned over to the quartermaster's department?

Answer. That I could not tell, for I do not know.

Question. Do you know of any cotton being taken by the army, except what was turned over to the quartermaster's department?

Answer. I do not know except what I have heard; I know those men were there, and were very active, and seemed to have entire control of the whole matter. It was a well-understood thing that it was a big cotton raid.

Question. When you say it was a well-understood thing that it was a big cotton raid, was it or not the understanding that one object of that expedition was to extend our lines so as to bring within them a great amount of cotton which could be taken out in such a manner that the government would get the benefit of it?

Answer. I never understood it in that way; I do not think anybody else did. That was not the impression left upon my mind at all. My impression was that the government never would derive any benefit at all from that cotton.

Question. Did you and General Banks ever have any understanding in relation to cotton?

Answer. I never exchanged any opinions with him upon the subject. One person came up there with permission from the President to purchase cotton, and requesting or calling upon the officers of the army and navy to afford such assistance as might be desirable. He brought his papers to me; they were all made out in form, and of course I indorsed them, directing all the officers of the navy to respect the authority. And General Banks did the same. But General Banks finally took all the cotton away from this man, threw it out on the river bank, and took his vessel for a transport.

Question. What was the name of that man?

Answer. I think there were two names, Butler and Casey; Butler was really the man; Casey was the agent of Butler. I think Mr. Butler went there to see if the lines could not be opened, so that the government could get hold of the cotton. But I never talked with those people much; I know that cotton destroyed the whole expedition. If there had been no cotton there we could and probably would have gone to Shreveport.

Question. Was the cotton seized by the navy, seized as prize of the navy?

Answer. It was seized as government cotton, and sent to the courts, without any application on the part of the navy as prize at all. It was merely sent to the court for adjudication, as all cotton which we have got on the Mississippi river has been sent. Where the court adjudicated it as prize, that was the end of it.

Question. How far from the river was cotton seized by the navy?

Answer. Not more than from 50 to 200 yards on any occasion.

Question. Were any teams in behalf of the navy sent into the country for cotton?

Answer. A team was sent into the country for about three miles to get some confederate cotton there. But General Stone was there and said that he had seized all the cotton by order of General Banks. All the cotton we took was right on the river bank. We took all we could find, except it belonged to persons who said they were loyal and preferred keeping their cotton and running the risk of having it burned; their cotton we did not interfere with.

Question. Did the people on the river begin to burn the cotton before any was seized by the navy?

Answer. Yes, sir; we never touched a bale of cotton before the burning commenced. However, that made no difference with me, for I intended to take it any way. I had made up my mind to take the cotton on my way back. But I took it then, to prevent it being burned. We were in the country of the rebels, and I considered that all that cotton belonged to the government. The most of it was marked as confederate cotton.

Question. What did you understand the expedition to be for?

Answer. I never understood.

Question. What was the object of the expedition contemplated by you and General Sherman?

Answer. To go to Shreveport and destroy the place. General Sherman proposed to push right on up the river with his transports and troops—that would have shortened the matter very much—go to Shreveport, destroy the rebel rams up there, get possession of the town, and of all the guns there, which we could have done without any trouble, for the rebels had but 8,000 men at Shreveport. In the mean time, however, we delayed so long that they brought troops from Texas and other points. Still we might have gone there any way.

Question. Did you contemplate holding Shreveport permanently?

Answer. Not at all; merely to destroy the rams, &c., there. The rebel rams kept the Mississippi river in a fever all the time. By destroying them, we could liberate a very large force which we had to keep to watch them. The rebels were constantly coming down, under the protection of their rams and gunboats, crossing the Atchafalaya and going where we could not go with our boats. We knew that if we could destroy their provisions and supplies at Shreveport, their rams and gunboats, and their bridges across the Atchafalaya and other streams, then a very small force—one or two gunboats and 500 or 600 men—would be sufficient there, thus releasing an army of 10,000 men and several gunboats for other operations.

I will here give a letter which I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy on the 2d of March, giving to some extent my opinion of the expedition:

MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP BLACKHAWK,  
*Off Red River, March 2, 1864.*

SIR: I came down here anticipating a move on the part of the army up towards Shreveport; but as the river is lower than it has been known to be for years, I much fear that the combined movement cannot come off without interfering with plans formed by General Grant.

General Sherman has gone to New Orleans to make arrangements with General Banks, and I am expecting his return every day. In the mean time the gunboats are up the Atchafalaya and Black rivers, destroying bridges and stores, and endeavoring to destroy 8,000 cattle collected at Sicily island.

The Mississippi river is very quiet, and the rebels retreated into the interior on hearing of the advance of the gunboats.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

And the following are the instructions which I gave to Lieutenant Commander Phelps, of the Eastport, in reference to moving up the Red river :

FLAG-SHIP BLACKHAWK,  
*U. S. Mississippi Squadron, Red River, March 12, 1864.*

SIR : You will proceed at once up the Red river with the vessels I will detail to follow you, and commence removing the obstructions in the river, while in the mean time I will take a tour into the Atchafalaya, and land the troops at Simmsport for the purpose of reconnoitring, &c. If you remove the obstructions, move up within a short distance of Fort De Russy, but make no attack until I get up with the main force, though, if there is any force at De Russy, you can amuse them by feints until the army get into their rear. Take every precaution against torpedoes, and protect your men against sharpshooters.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Lieutenant Commander S. L. PHELPS,  
*Commanding Eastport.*

That was the day we made the move, and at night we had captured Fort De Russy. We then moved up the river, and on the 16th the navy had possession of Alexandria. General Banks had not then began to move, though that was the day he was to be there to meet us, so as to cut off the enemy, who really escaped.

Question. Do you know when General Banks reached Alexandria ?

Answer. He left New Orleans on the 22d of March, and reached Alexandria about the 27th. He was in Alexandria about three days when the army started. On the 29th of March I wrote as follows :

FLAG-SHIP BLACKHAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON,  
*Alexandria, Louisiana, March 29, 1864.*

SIR : Being about to leave for Shreveport, or as high up the river as I can get, I have the honor to report progress.

After a great deal of labor, and two and a half days' hard work, we succeeded in getting the Eastport over the rocks on the falls, hauling her over by main force ; now and then a rise of an inch or so of water would help her along, and she finally was enabled to pass the advance of the army, encamped on the bank of the river twenty-five miles above Alexandria. Other vessels got through, and a few more remain to be got over, when we will push on to the end. It is very slow work getting over these rocks, but as yet we have met with no accidents. One hospital ship, belonging to the marine brigade, sank on the falls by striking on the rocks, but all the rest of the transports went over safely. I shall only be able to take up a part of the force I brought with me, and leave the river guarded all the way through. The rebels are retreating before the army, and, as usual, are destroying everything that can fall into our hands, treating public and private property alike. This is the last hold they will have in this country, and they seem determined to wreak their vengeance on the unoffending inhabitants who have some little cotton to dispose of. Their destructiveness has been a death-blow to the rebellion in this State, and General Dick Taylor has left a name behind him to be execrated when the rebellion is long past.

Confederate money is worth here one-quarter of a cent on the dollar, or the most I have heard offered is three cents. The currency of a country is the best proof of its prosperity.

The health of the squadron, I am happy to say, continues good.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

Question. Did you hold any council or conference with General Banks at Alexandria, in relation to the ascent of the river by the boats?

Answer. I did, and opposed it all I could, until he told me that he should move, and that the success of the expedition would depend upon the co-operation of the navy; and then I said I would go if I should lose all my boats.

Question. Why did you oppose it?

Answer. Because I knew we could not get out again, except by some such miracle as enabled us to get out at last, by hard work and the brains of an eastern man.

Question. Did you insist, at any conference with General Banks or his staff, that there was no trouble in making the ascent—that your boats could go anywhere where it was a little damp?

Answer. I said that a half-dozen times in joke, for we had gone into a great many queer places. I objected to going up the Red river then, and told them that if they went up they must expect a reverse, so far as losing the boats was concerned.

Question. Were you under the command of General Banks?

Answer. Not at all; I was perfectly independent of him.

Question. Did it not devolve upon you, and you alone, to determine whether the boats should make the ascent?

Answer. I could not very well decide not to go. There was a communication from General Halleck stating that the department had notified him that the navy would co-operate with General Banks; and therefore as long as a gunboat could float I should do what I could to help him. I could not let the army go off saying that the success of the expedition depended upon my co-operation. There was but one thing to do under those circumstances—to run the risk of losing the boats. If the army should succeed in getting Shreveport and destroying that place, and breaking up that large army of the rebels, then it would be quite an important affair at last. If we should lose half a dozen gunboats in accomplishing that, it would amount to nothing in comparison with the importance of the result. If I had said I would not go, then it would have been said that I should have tried it, and I did not want to give them that opportunity.

Question. Now will you go on, if you please, and give a concise account of the progress of the expedition from Alexandria up the river?

Answer. I do not know any better way of doing that than to repeat my report to the department. I gave a pretty good account of the matter, rather long-winded perhaps; but I felt I was in duty bound to tell the department the whole story. I know very little about the military operations above Alexandria. After we got our boats across the falls, at Alexandria, we got along very well and had a foot of water to spare. We got up to Grand Ecore, and I found the gunboats had got up there a little ahead of the army and captured the place, which did not amount to much. General Banks arrived a short time afterwards, and the army came in. The rebels, about 5,000 or 6,000, kept retreating ahead of our forces. After we got to Grand Ecore, General Banks then asked me whether the gunboats could go up to Shreveport. I told him that the heavy gunboats could not possibly get up; that it was out of the question; that we had but one

gunboat proper, an iron-clad, that could go up. She was a little turreted boat. I started with her and four or five what we call tin-clads. I said to the general: We can carry up so many transports and meet you at Springfield landing, about 250 or 300 miles up, and about thirty miles below Shreveport. I made my calculation of how the river was falling, and I saw that with these light-draught boats I could push up. I would be able to reach that landing in time to deliver the ammunition which the vessels had on board and all the provisions, and then come down again light. And I put it in writing, that no vessels should ascend that river drawing over four and a half feet, five feet of water being the largest amount of water that any gunboat should draw. We started, I think, with about fourteen of these vessels filled with troops and stores, to meet General Banks at Springfield landing. We went along very nicely for a while; but finally I found that the vessels began to stop. I sent back to see what was the matter. I was told that there were two large boats that had joined the expedition and were delaying it. I wanted to know what the boats had in them. They had nothing; they were light; they had no stores or ammunition, but were sent up to bring down cotton. That was the object for which these boats joined that expedition, and they gave us a great deal of trouble. I could not leave them behind, and I had to detail gunboats to look after them. I got to Springfield landing, and the troops were landed to reconnoitre. A courier came in and informed us that General Banks had been defeated. I then determined to return at once, for I knew we could get no further. The rebels had thrown a very large steamer across the river, reaching from bank to bank. I had commenced blowing her up, but this news about General Banks seemed to be so certain that I concluded to go back. Then it was that these two large boats that had joined us came near being the cause of our destruction. I was determined not to lose anything, and not to leave them behind. General Kilby Smith, in command of the troops on the boats, proposed to burn them; but I said no, and finally got them all back to Grand Ecore.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What kind of boats were these two large ones?

Answer. They were river boats.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. To whom did they belong?

Answer. To the quartermaster's department.

Question. Had any individual any interest in them?

Answer. Not that I know of. They were quartermaster boats. I know that there were individuals there with permits from General Banks to go into the country and purchase cotton. And men went out and purchased cotton as we went up, calculating that these boats would bring it down.

Question. Did you see any permits there signed by General Banks?

Answer. No, sir; I did not. It was generally rumored that these men were cotton speculators; they were talking about it just as open as day.

Question. What were these men?

Answer. I don't recollect any of them but McGee; I do not remember names very well. I very seldom trouble myself about these matters. These men were recognized by General Banks, and were generally known as cotton speculators. They were there purchasing cotton right under his eye. One of his own staff, Colonel Clarke, purchased 300 bales of cotton, which Captain Phelps himself took away from him. Captain Phelps found out that Colonel Clarke had purchased it, and came to me and told me that Colonel Clarke had hauled it down and put it into one of our barges. I said: "Very well, seize the barge and send it down with the rest of the cotton, and let it go to court. Colonel Clarke has no authority to purchase cotton, and if it was known it would lead to his dismissal."

Question. Did you call General Banks's attention to the matter?

Answer. Not at all; I hardly ever had any conversation with General Banks. This was on the river, where I considered I had jurisdiction. As to seeing these permits, I would likely be the last man in the world to see them. In the first place, I would not go around trying to see men for the purpose of convicting General Banks of a misdemeanor, or anything of the kind; and these men would not come near me, for I should have taken their cotton, or any cotton on the river.

Question. Why did you take up the large vessels of which you speak if you supposed they were taken up to bring away cotton?

Answer. I did not know they were going until we had got one hundred and fifty miles above Grand Ecore; and then they were a long way out of the protection of the army.

Question. Were they under your command then?

Answer. Of course; the moment they came where I was I took charge of them; but they would not have been allowed to take on board a pound of cotton as long as they were with me. Any cotton that we seized ourselves was always put on board one of our own vessels and taken down that way. We had three or four vessels that carried provisions. At Grand Ecore we picked up, floating in the river and lying on the banks of the river, belonging to rebels, about three hundred and fifty bales of cotton, which I finally had to pitch overboard. It floated down to Alexandria and was picked up there and hauled out on shore. That was the only cotton that was taken by anybody up there. But I know there was a great deal of cotton bought by these persons, thinking that the country was under the control of the army; for there was every reason that we should have it. We had men enough there to whip twice the force the rebels had there. Cotton killed that expedition, in my opinion.

Question. When you say that cotton killed the expedition, will you explain more fully what you mean by that?

Answer. There was too much attention paid to getting cotton. The army should not have gone into that business at all; they should have pushed on at once. The importance of getting ahead was impressed upon General Banks. Instead of that, days and days were spent by teams hauling cotton into town.

Question. Where was that?

Answer. At Alexandria; they did not haul cotton anywhere else. That was the only place, except at Grand Ecore, where they had an opportunity to touch it.

Question. Did the army wait at Alexandria on purpose for that? Was that what caused the detention of the army there?

Answer. I think it was; I think that stopped them there, that and going into an election. General Banks ordered an election at Alexandria, and some days were lost in that election. When you see every team in the army employed in hauling hundreds and hundreds of bales of cotton into town, and the whole army stopped, you cannot imagine any other object in their remaining there.

Question. Did the army move forward from Alexandria as soon as it could be organized for that purpose?

Answer. The army could have moved the day after it arrived there. I do not think the army remained very long in Alexandria. I do not know but what they did leave there within two days—certainly as soon as they could have done.

Question. Then you do not think the army was detained there?

Answer. They were detained about two days there; but the most of this thing happened when we came back; but the army was not detained; it only prevented their retreating.

Question. Was cotton hauled into Alexandria in army wagons after you returned to that place?

Answer. Yes, sir; before and after. The army arrived there some days be-

fore General Banks did. General Stone commenced that operation, and told me that he did so by General Banks's order.

Question. Are you positive any cotton was brought in by the army wagons after the return to Alexandria?

Answer. I will not be positive on that point, as from my own knowledge. I was very much engaged myself in getting my fleet down. I know I saw wagons loaded going all over the town—whether they were hauling cotton into the town or hauling it to the boats. They first loaded up all the boats with cotton, all the transports, and then unloaded them. It was after we returned that the second vessel was destroyed down the river. The rebels were allowed to pass by us and go down the river and blockade it. The cotton was hauled to the boats and piled on them; where it came from I do not know. I was not back in the country, for there were pickets there who would not permit any one to go outside of the town a mile.

Question. State the particulars of the difficulties which you encountered in getting your boats down the river.

Answer. The best way I could describe them would be to read my report to the department.

Question. Can you not give us a condensed statement sufficient for our purposes?

Answer. General Banks did not inform me that his army was about to move from Grand Ecore to Alexandria, but impressed me with the idea that he still intended to move upon Shreveport from Grand Ecore. After he had retreated to that place, he threw up fortifications to secure himself, against what I do not know, for there was nothing there to trouble him. He had 30,000 men, and the most the rebels had left at that time was 16,000 men.

General Franklin came to me at one time, and asked me if I had been informed that General Banks was going to retreat to Alexandria. I said, "No, sir; on the contrary, General Banks has just informed me that it was his intention to hold the country." General Franklin said, "I assure you there is no such intention; orders have already been issued for the army to retire, and I have received an order to conduct the retreat." I thought that was very singular, and sent Captain Selfridge to see General Banks. He assured Captain Selfridge that he had not the faintest idea of leaving.

However, having got this hint from General Franklin, I moved my vessels down below Grand Ecore about a mile. I had a great deal of difficulty in getting them over a little sand-bar there; but I got them over just about in time, for another day might have rendered it impossible for me to do so. As soon as I found the army was retreating, I immediately commenced moving the heaviest boats down the river. On the first day down, the Eastport either struck a torpedo or ran on a very sharp snag, and sunk in a very short time. I sent to General Banks and told him that I wanted a chance to get the Eastport up, and asked him if there was any probability of the army moving soon. I told him that I had pump-boats at Alexandria by which I could raise the Eastport. General Banks told me that I had plenty of time to do that, and I went down to Alexandria and brought up the pump-boats, and succeeded in getting the Eastport up and moving. I told General Banks that I wanted to keep in communication with him, for the Eastport was an important iron-clad which I did not wish the rebels to have. General Banks said he would keep communication open every day by the river; but he started off ahead of the army and went to Alexandria, and I heard nothing more of him then.

General Franklin conducted the retreat. I got the Eastport down, after grounding seven or eight times in the river, to a point where I found it impossible to get her any further. The rebels there attacked us with musketry. I knew that the army must be a long way ahead by the enemy appearing in such force there. They opened fire on us as we were getting ready to blow up the



Eastport. We succeeded in blowing her up and destroying her so effectually that she could be of no service to the rebels.

We then proceeded down the river. The rebels finding that we had destroyed the Eastport, and knowing that we had nothing but tin-clads along with us, caught us in a bend of the river, about twenty-five miles below, and opened fire on us with nineteen guns that they had taken from our army. In four minutes' time, by the watch, I lost on my vessel twenty-five officers and men, killed and wounded, out of fifty officers and men, and had thirty-four shots put through my vessel, and I had another vessel which was very badly riddled. We fought our way past the battery, and I got in the rear of the rebels, and opened upon them with one gun with shrapnell and canister, and drove them from their guns. In that way I managed to get my vessels down. I knew our army must be in full retreat, or the rebels would not have brought that battery where our men could have got at it.

Question. How many of the enemy were there ?

Answer. About 3,000 men. When I got to Alexandria, I found the army in a great state of stampede. I did not see anything to be frightened at myself ; but the army was going to clear out at once and go down the river. I told General Banks that that was out of the question ; that we must do something to get the fleet down. Colonel Bailey had suggested the building of a dam ; but they hooted at it, and so did all the engineers. There was the most perfect stampede I ever saw in an army that was in perfect preparation to go into battle. The army had not lost anything coming down, for General Franklin had conducted the retreat in a masterly manner.

I wrote to General Banks pretty stiffly on the subject, and told him that if he did go and desert the fleet, the people of the United States would never forgive him as long as he lived ; that he could see from the tone of the northern press what the feeling there was ; and that the only hope of redeeming the disasters that had already befallen the army was to get the fleet out of the predicament it was in by some masterly move.

Colonel Bailey took hold of his idea of building a dam, and General Banks attended to it very faithfully after it was determined upon. But he would notify me every now and then that he was going to leave. But I knew that General A. J. Smith would not go and leave us there, and I was sure General Banks would not leave as long as General A. J. Smith remained there.

Question. Were these communications oral or written ?

Answer. They were written. I knew the army had plenty of provisions, and there was forage enough in the country. But General Banks was not alone in the desire to get away. There were others there who ought to have known better, military men, who thought they ought to retreat.

Colonel Bailey went to work, and in twelve days built that remarkable dam, the most remarkable thing I ever saw in my life. And I think he deserves the entire credit of that dam, for he went in for it in opposition to the views of everybody else there, except General Franklin, Colonel Hoffman, and myself. General Banks did not pretend to know much about it ; but when the thing was urged upon him, and he saw the necessity of doing something to relieve the fleet, he went into the thing with as much vim as anybody there, and did a great deal towards pushing it through.

Question. There was one dam built which went away before all the vessels got through ?

Answer. Yes, sir. The dam was made continuous across the river, and raised the water high enough to enable the vessels to cross the upper falls. While the vessels were in the act of crossing, and when four or five had got over, the dam gave way. I was there and hailed the vessels and ordered them to push through, for I was afraid that if they did not get over then the soldiers would become so much discouraged at seeing the dam carried away that they would give the

thing up. But in a short time the water had got so low on the upper falls that no more vessels could get over, and it was found necessary to do something to raise the water again. However, the soldiers saw that so many vessels had got over that they were encouraged and went to work again. And it turned out not to have been a bad thing that the first dam was carried away, for the barges that were in the dam were carried down and lodged against the rocks on the side of the channel, and acted as cushions against which the vessels could strike without injury.

Question. About what time did the first dam go away?

Answer. In the morning, about 9 or 10 o'clock.

Question. Was there any delay, after the erection of the first dam, in getting the vessels over before it went away?

Answer. The vessels were going over the upper falls before the dam was actually finished. They were still strengthening the dam, putting more weight in the boats to keep them in position. On the upper falls the channel was just the width of a vessel. The vessels had to be hauled through, and it took some hours to get them over. There was no delay; it is not likely that men would delay in a case of that kind. We had been working night and day, lightening the vessels, taking the guns off of them, and taking off the cables and sending them down in lighters. There were some condemned guns on board, which had not been replaced with others; these I put on shore and destroyed. We did not leave a pound of anything on board that was not needed. No men worked harder in constructing that dam than did the men of the navy, for they were up to their middle night and day in the water, pulling the boats in place, and doing all they could. After the first dam was passed, the army did not wait any longer for us. General Bailey with a few men were at work on the dam. As soon as it was well in progress, I told General Banks that there was no danger about the vessels, and his advance moved at once, and the gunboats came up with them afterwards.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. You say that elections were held on your way up the river?

Answer. There were elections at Alexandria and at Grand Ecore. There were some 1,500 people there who were very much frightened at taking the oath of allegiance and then being left to the rebels. But it was represented to them that we had come to remain and take possession of the country, and I did my best to get the army to remain there and hold the country. And at Grand Ecore they went through the same farce again. We lost, I think, two or three days at Grand Ecore in that way.

Question. For what were those elections?

Answer. For local officers, I suppose, though I did not know what they were. We sailors are not politicians. We hardly know what a sheriff is, unless he comes after us.

Question. Were those elections to choose delegates to the convention which formed a State constitution?

Answer. That is what I presumed.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. When were those elections held?

Answer. At Alexandria, some time between the 22d and 30th of March, 1864.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Were any of the voters along with the expedition?

Answer. I do not know; there was a governor, or an ex-governor, along—I forget his name—with a permit to take down his cotton. He came to me with his papers indorsed by General Banks, and of course I indorsed them to all naval officers to afford him facilities to take the cotton he claimed as his. He

was a Union man—no doubt about that; and, under this permit of General Banks, he had bought up a great deal of cotton, some of which had been taken possession of by the navy. When he proved to me that he had bought the cotton in good faith it was all turned over to him, and he took it. There were some seven or eight lots, amounting to a thousand bales, which this ex-governor claimed to have bought. I not only indorsed his papers, but sent gunboats to protect him. He got his cotton all down, I believe, and made a very handsome thing out of it.

Question. Were any of the candidates at these elections along with the expedition?

Answer. I do not know; I was not in the town at the time of the election, but about ten miles above. I knew the election was going on, for they were voting and flying flags and firing guns. I thought it all a great humbug. We were waiting above for the army to move. However, they did move on the day they said they would—after the election was over. It struck me that the election at Grand Ecore was a perfect farce.

Question. Why was it more a farce there than anywhere else?

Answer. In the first place, the people were very unwilling to vote; they were very much frightened and did not want to vote. But they were impressed with the notion that if they would come forward and prove their loyalty by voting they would be allowed to take their cotton out and do what they pleased with it.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Do you know whether the army was actually detained at Grand Ecore on account of the election?

Answer. I would not pretend to say that the army was detained on purpose for the election; but the complaint was that they stopped at Grand Ecore instead of pushing on immediately.

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*Testimony of Wellington W. Withenbury.*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1865.

MR. WELLINGTON W. WITHEMBURY sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your residence and occupation?

Answer. My residence is Cincinnati, Ohio; my occupation, for twenty-five years, has been that of a steamboat-man, principally upon the Red river, during the navigable season.

Question. Did you accompany the Red river expedition, under General Banks, in the spring of 1864; if so, in what capacity?

Answer. On the 16th March, 1864, I reported for duty to Admiral Porter, and he requested me to report to him from day to day. At that time the river was so low that none of his gunboats could get over the falls at Alexandria. That was the first obstruction the expedition met after the capture of a little fort below. Some of the very lightest boats, denominated tin-clads, could have gone over the falls, but none others.

I made trips from day to day, and sometimes oftener than once a day, with the pilots belonging to the fleet, for the purpose of ascertaining the increase of water; the river was rising slowly. I cannot remember the exact day on which the first gunboat attempted to cross the falls. It was near the end of March before the first boat was taken over. The river was rising at the time I speak of, the 16th of March, and had been rising for some two or three weeks, al-

though the rise was much later than usual. In the course of four or five days I reported to Admiral Porter that boats of a certain draught of water could ascend the falls. That was as far as I had anything to do with the matter.

Finally, probably about the 26th or 28th of March, Admiral Porter sent for us to go on board his flag-ship. He invited us to go on board the Eastport, to assist in taking her over the falls. She was the largest boat in the fleet which attempted the passage of the falls. I remarked to Admiral Porter then, that if my judgment was asked for, I should say that it was bad policy to put the largest boat into the chute first, as she might get aground, and if she did it would hinder the passage of the other vessels. But he said, "I want you to go on board and take her over the falls." Consequently Captain Martin and myself went on board the Eastport. It resulted as I had expected. She got aground, and was aground some three days, until the river began to fall. It required a great deal of extra work, with tugs and lighter gunboats, which ran alongside of her, to get her over. At that time she was lying in the chute, among the rocks upon the edge of the chute. The river had raised sufficiently to allow the lighter boats to pass outside of her. The Pittsburg was one, and others were the Chillicothe, the Neosho, and the Ozark. They were of the new class of iron-clads and monitors, of sufficiently light draught to have gone over the falls, through the chute where the Eastport was aground. They could have gone over four or five days sooner than they did go. And they finally did go over the falls, outside of the channel where the Eastport was aground. However, we succeeded in getting the Eastport over.

After the gunboats had been taken over the falls, I asked permission of Admiral Porter to go to Grand Ecore on the transport on which General Banks had his headquarters. He gave me permission to do so. As we went up the river we overtook the Eastport, and one other of the large boats, aground, and had to stop and pull them off. The other boats had gone on some days previously and were at Grand Ecore, awaiting the arrival of these large boats.

I did not myself go any higher than Grand Ecore, but came back from that point. General Banks left his boat there, and went by land from that point. In regard to the progress of the boats above Grand Ecore, I know nothing of my own personal knowledge; all I know of that matter I have from the pilots who went with them. I know the points on the map which they reach.

The question has been asked me, what was the reason that the boats were four days in going 100 miles? From my knowledge of that business, of steamboating on the Red river, I could give no reason, unless the lighter boats were waiting for the large boats to keep up with them. The Eastport was an extraordinarily large boat for the Red river. And underwriters never would have insured upon boats of her length to go up and down the Red river. To get her around some few points it was necessary to have tugs at each end of her to pull her around. The only way I can account for the boats being so long going up there would be that the small boats waited for the large boats, as they did below.

Question. You say that the larger class of boats could not have been taken over the falls at Alexandria sooner than they actually were taken over?

Answer. No, sir; not such boats of the class of the Eastport. She was the largest and most unwieldy boat on the river. Captain Martin and myself both remarked to Admiral Porter, at the time she started to go over, that we thought it was a chance that she would get foul and hinder the others. He said, "Go on board and take her over." After she was stuck we went to Captain Phelps and asked him to take us ashore. He put us ashore, and we reported to Admiral Porter below the falls. He asked, "How long is it going to take to get her over?" I replied that I did not know; that if they used the appliances ordinarily used by steamboat-men there, she might get over in two or three days. Captain Phelps did as he thought best.

Question. Before you attempted to take the Eastport over, were you consulted about taking the fleet up the river?

Answer. Yes, sir. Captain Martin particularly went up in a tug sounding the river.

Question. Did you or not start to take the boats over as soon as it was deemed by you practicable to do so?

Answer. In talking with Admiral Porter we both stated that boats of a certain depth could go over on such a day. We reported that several days before the attempt was made.

Question. Was the river rising at that time?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How long did it continue to rise?

Answer. Up to the day the Eastport was started up, and then it came to a stand; and after she got aground it commenced falling.

Question. Were you consulted about the possibility of taking the fleet up and back?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. By whom?

Answer. By Admiral Porter.

Question. What opinion did you give?

Answer. That if once over the falls there would be no difficulty in getting the boats along, if proper pilots were employed. The question was often asked, When will the river rise? Of course we could not answer it. I said that in the twenty years of my experience the river had failed to rise only once, in 1855, when it did not rise at all.

Question. How long does the water continue high after the annual rise?

Answer. From five to seven and sometimes eight months in the year, commencing in December or January, and continuing until the last of July.

Question. Did you assist in getting the boats over the falls when they came down the river?

Answer. I left on the 4th of May, and I think the fleet came over the falls on the 12th of May.

Question. You had no knowledge in relation to taking the boats down?

Answer. No, sir; only Admiral Porter asked, if they succeeded in building the dam and getting the boats over the falls, could they get them out of the river? I told him they could.

Question. Is there anything else you desire to state?

Answer. I do not know that there is especially, except that the Eastport was sunk on her way down. I remember remarking to Admiral Porter, in a laughing manner, that if he got the Eastport up over the falls I would not bet on her getting back. I felt she was a bad subject to take on that expedition. Admiral Porter had never been higher up on that river than Alexandria. He had been there in 1863, and had then consulted with several persons about taking his boats over the falls. We advised him not to do it, and he did not do it. After the Eastport had sunk they sent down to Alexandria for some pump-boats to raise her. General Banks the other day asked me some questions in relation to the movements of the army and of the navy, and concerning cotton at Alexandria.

Question. Very well; state anything you know in relation to operations in cotton in connexion with that expedition.

Answer. At the time of the arrival at Alexandria of the navy and the portion of the army from General Sherman's command, there was considerable cotton stored in Alexandria, and quite a quantity of cotton within a few miles of there—say from three to five miles. The rebels had then destroyed no cotton at all, and I had heard the rebel General Dick Taylor say, a few days prior to his leaving Alexandria, that if the federal army respected private property he

would countermand the order to burn cotton. They retired some five or seven miles—far enough outside of town, I suppose, to keep watch of proceedings there. The first movement in cotton I saw was, the crews and officers of several gunboats handling cotton out of the warehouses, and with teams hauling it from some distance on each side of the river.

Question. Where was that?

Answer. At Alexandria, at the foot of the falls. In company with some prominent Union citizens, I went on board the vessel and talked with Admiral Porter on the subject. We told Admiral Porter what the result would be; that the rebels would set fire to and burn up all government as well as private cotton. He said he thought they would not burn much; that they would soon get tired of that. But in a few days smoke was seen rising in every direction. We went to him again, but we had no influence with him. When General Banks came I told him about it. He remarked that it was all wrong. I said to him that I thought it was wrong, but such was the effect of what had been done. I saw cotton taken out of warehouses in Alexandria, and the letters "C. S. A." marked upon it by men who appeared to belong to the navy. That was cotton which had no mark upon either end of the bale; which had been newly baled. The letters "C. S. A." were marked upon one end, and the letters "U. S. N." marked upon the other end. I saw some navy wagons come in one day with some thirty odd bales of cotton, which I recognized as belonging to a lot in which I had an interest. I told Admiral Porter about it, and he said, "We will not touch any more of it." That was hauled some three miles.

The engineer of the flag-ship Blackhawk, a man who had worked for me on the river some years before in the capacity of an engineer, started out one morning with a gang of men and some wagons marked "U. S. N." He himself was on horseback. He was gone a great part of the day. When he came back he asked me about a pile of cotton that was on the railroad track in the woods about four miles off. I told him it belonged to a man who had been forced to haul it out there, for the rebels suspected him of being a Union man. He said, "We have captured a lot of it, but it is in such bad condition that I do not think we will go for any more of it." It was so rotten that it would fall to pieces.

When I told Admiral Porter about my cotton, he said, "You better let us haul it in here." I said, "I will do so if you will let me have it; it is my property." He said, "You will get it after a while; let it go to Cairo." I declined it. He said, "The rebels will burn it if you let it stay." But they did not. General Banks's quartermaster took the rest of it, some sixty odd bales, and carried it to New Orleans, and delivered the proceeds of it to me.

Question. How far into the country did the navy teams go for cotton?

Answer. They went three miles for the cotton that belonged to me.

Question. Were their teams frequently sent out?

Answer. They went out on both sides of the river. They hauled empty coal-barges alongside the bank and loaded cotton into them. Several gunboats went down the river for twenty or thirty miles and gathered up cotton there.

Question. Was the burning of the cotton commenced by the owners before or after the navy commenced seizing it?

Answer. It was not burned by the owners at all; it was burned by the rebel authorities. There was a certain portion of the military detailed for that purpose, who were divided into squads, each with a list of places to go to. But they did not commence burning until after they had time to get news of what was going on within the limits of Alexandria and thereabouts. They then commenced burning it, and from there they burned it pretty generally as they fell back.

Question. What was done by the army in relation to cotton?

Answer. General Banks left General Grover in charge at Alexandria, and left him with instructions, as General Grover told me, to take charge of all cot-

ton; that which was hauled voluntarily into town, and perhaps the army wagons may have captured some; but that I do not know. They went to Governor Moore's plantation and took a hundred hogsheads of sugar on government account. General Grover told me we could bring in whatever cotton we had, and if he could spare government wagons to facilitate our doing so he would do it. But we must turn it over to the quartermaster and let it be shipped to New Orleans, and if we could establish our loyalty we would get the proceeds of it. I did so about mine, and I found they kept their word in regard to it.

I never realized anything for the thirty bales of my cotton which Admiral Porter took and sent to Cairo. I think there is a suit now in the Supreme Court of the United States in regard to the legality of that seizure of cotton by the navy. But I do not think it covers that case of mine, because I think that cotton was sold and the money distributed long ago.

I have no notion that a single person in that vicinity burned their own cotton. There was a great effort made to induce General Dick Taylor to rescind the order to burn cotton. He said, "Don't ask me; General Banks is coming with his army of occupation; make your peace with him. If he respects your rights, I certainly shall." General Taylor and his forces retired apparently with the determination not to burn cotton.

Question. You were in Alexandria before the arrival of our army there?

Answer. Yes, sir, I was there in 1863. I was caught in that river with my steamboat when the rebellion first broke out, and I could not get out.

Question. Were you a Union man?

Answer. Yes, sir. The week before General Butler took New Orleans I was published in a New Orleans paper as a Union man, and a man dangerous to the confederacy, and the tree was picked out to hang me on.

Question. How happened it that the rebels allowed you to remain there?

Answer. I talked them out of it—tried to convince them that they were mistaken in me. They threatened me from time to time. I have never been anything else but a Union man. I am a native of Connecticut, and have no prejudices in favor of the south except as a place of business. During times of peace I prospered there.

At the time General Banks came up there in 1863 I went to him voluntarily and made known to him my position, that my effects were scattered through the country. I told him that if he was not going to hold the country I would like to remain there to protect my own interests, and that I could be the means of furnishing him information that would be valuable to him. And upon Dr. Kennedy, of New Orleans, vouching for my veracity, General Banks gave me a pass to go outside of his lines, and I went to Shreveport, and General Banks went down the river. I did not like to leave there, because once leaving I would lose all claims to anything I had in that country.

I promised General Banks at that time that I would meet him when he returned. He thought it would be in about forty days; instead of that it was over ten months. I promised Admiral Porter the same thing, and I met them both according to promise.

Knowing what I do of the sentiment of the military authorities there, and the sentiment of the people, I do not think a bale of cotton would have been burned in that region if it had not been so promptly seized by the navy. I took other Union men, and went to Admiral Porter, and plead with him to desist from taking the cotton. We said to him, "You have it in your hands, it is here; if you let it alone they will not burn it." I supposed they burned between 50,000 and 70,000 bales there and at Grand Ecore.

There is one matter General Banks questioned me upon, in regard to the character of the people at the election there; I do not know that it is important, but he has questioned me about it since I have come to this city. I was there and acted as a clerk of election a portion of the day, and took General Banks

to the place where it was being held, and introduced him to various parties. I know exactly the number of votes polled, and the sentiment of the people who remained round about Alexandria waiting the arrival of the expedition. I had been there a great deal, and made it a point to know, because I had promised General Banks that when he came again I would give him the benefit of all I had learned. I know that perhaps a majority of the men who voted at that election were of the piney woods people, who had been hid away from the conscription; who had been hunted by bloodhounds and conscript hunters; they came in freely. The number of votes polled was 301; of that number there were at least one hundred worthy, respectable, thrifty people.

There was a Union meeting there. There was one man there who had a plantation, and was good ordinarily for 250 or 300 negroes, and about 2,000 bales of cotton.

And I know that when the rebel army retreated from Fort DeRussy up the river there was not a bale of cotton burned or destroyed. I went down to meet some despatches that were coming from friends whom I had in New Orleans. I went very close to the federal lines with my horse and buggy. I got the sentiment of the people, and I learned from them the promises made to them not to burn the cotton, and found that the promise had been fulfilled. I met the rebel army on their way back, and know that they did not burn cotton. I know positively that there was not a bale of cotton destroyed in the whole country there, and there was none destroyed until some two or three days after the seizure commenced at Alexandria.

Question. Was the army detained at Alexandria on account of the election?

Answer. I do not think they were. The view I took of the case, without being too inquisitive, was that the army was waiting for the fleet. The army could all move at once. But the Eastport was aground in the chute, and the transports, with General A. J. Smith's command, went up the falls outside of the Eastport. These very transports could have gone up four or five days previously through the channel where the Eastport was aground. The hospital boat was sunk in ascending the falls, but it was from a want of knowledge, and not from a want of water. There was an old steamboat shaft sunk there, and she struck it. I suppose the army was waiting for the navy to get up, so that they could move altogether.

As I have stated before, I went with General Banks up to Grand Ecore. The army had gone up by land. General Banks, of course, could remain a day or two behind, and then get up to Grand Ecore as soon as the army did. We got to Grand Ecore about nine o'clock at night, and General A. J. Smith came on board and reported to General Banks. I heard enough of the conversation to lead me to infer that there was a necessity for prompt action. General Banks said, "Well, I will have my horses taken off, and we will go at once to-night." General Smith said, "I have a horse on shore." General Banks went on shore; where he went I do not know.

The next day I asked if there had been any fighting, and I was told that there had been a little skirmishing at Pleasant Hill. General Stone came on board and asked me where Pleasant Hill was. He spread a map out before us, but the words "Pleasant Hill" were not on it. I traced out the different roads leading from point to point, and placed my finger on the spot, and said "Pleasant Hill is about there." He said, "I think not." I said, "It is there," and showed him from other maps. I gave him my own maps for his guidance. During that same day, perhaps, General Stone, in company with General Banks, asked me how it would do to cross the river at that point and go up on the other side. I said that it would take them about two days longer to reach Shreveport, but they would have better roads perhaps. There was an old military road that led from Campte to Fort Towson, but they would be obliged



to go around some lakes if they went that way. They then decided not to go that way.

I then remarked to them: "When you get above Pleasant Hill, on the road to Mansfield, you will not see the river any more. You will go further from the river, and not come in striking distance of it until you get to Shreveport." I pointed out on the map precisely all the roads. I recollect asking General Stone one question, and the answer I got indicated that I was asking too many questions, and I gave it up. It was an unimportant question, however.

But with regard to the boats of the class of the Neosho, Ozark, Osage, Pittsburg, Chillicothe, and I think the Mound City—they were boats as impregnable, as far as iron-clad boats were concerned, as was the Eastport. I think the iron on them was quite as thick, and they had been through some pretty hard fights. I knew that the Pittsburg, particularly, had been in the fight of Grand Gulf, and had not been harmed much. And any of those six or seven boats, according to my judgment of their strength, would be better adapted to any stage of water, going up and down the Red river, to meet any obstructions that the rebels could put there.

I gave them a description of the rebel gunboats at Shreveport. The Missouri, I knew it thoroughly, and described it thoroughly to them. I gave them to understand that that boat was not an affair that they need stand in fear of. I recollect saying to them that either of the gunboats I have mentioned could demolish the rebel iron-clad very quickly.

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*Testimony of John M. Martin.*

WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1865.*

Mr. JOHN M. MARTIN sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Where do you reside, and what is your occupation?

Answer. I am a resident of Belmont county, Ohio. My occupation is that of a river pilot.

Question. Where have you been employed as pilot?

Answer. In the Red river, and from New Orleans upon the Mississippi, for about eighteen years.

Question. Did you accompany the expedition under General Banks up the Red river in the spring of 1864?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. In the capacity of a pilot.

Question. Will you state what connexion you had with that expedition?

Answer. My evidence would be just like that of Captain Withenbury, with the exception that I took two or three boats to Grand Ecore from Alexandria. In regard to boats going up over the falls, the lighter ones could have been taken over some five or six days previous to the attempt to take the Eastport over—that is, the quantity of water was sufficient to allow them to pass over the falls.

Question. Why was it determined to take the Eastport up first?

Answer. I cannot tell. Some one on the boats mentioned that Captain Phelps was a relation of Admiral Porter, who wanted him to go in advance. The Eastport was a large, clumsy boat, and very difficult to navigate.

Question. Who determined which boat should go up first?

Answer. I suppose the admiral did.

Question. Were you consulted in regard to the rise in the river?

Answer. Repeatedly.

Question. What opinion did you give?

Answer. I said there had been but one year, 1855, in which the river had failed to rise; but it was rather late in the year for a rise, which usually commenced in January.

Question. Do you understand that the reason the boats did not pass up over the falls sooner was because you were waiting for a rise in the river?

Answer. Yes, sir. Every morning I reported to Admiral Porter how much the river had risen during the night before.

Question. Did you go up the river with the boats?

Answer. Yes, sir; I went up first on a transport boat. I remained in Alexandria for a time. I was very sick at the time. After that I took the Champion up, and sub-marine boat No. 5, to pump out the Eastport, which had sunk.

Question. You did not go up with Admiral Porter?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You followed him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How far up did you go?

Answer. To Grand Ecore, 100 miles from Alexandria.

Question. How long were you going from Alexandria to Grand Ecore?

Answer. About eighteen hours.

Question. Were you present when the boats were taken down over the falls?

Answer. No, sir; I was taken sick, and got permission from Admiral Porter to go to New Orleans.

Question. Do you know anything about any cotton operations in connexion with that expedition?

Answer. Very little. I know that on their first arrival there the navy seized cotton, hauling it in some three or four miles from the country, for I saw it coming in; and I saw them mark cotton, putting "C. S. A." on one end of the bale, and "U. S. N." on the other.

Question. Who did that?

Answer. Persons belonging to the navy. The engineer of the flag-ship was also engaged in getting cotton. I myself saw him going out in the country on horseback.

Question. At what time did the rebels begin to burn the cotton; before or after the navy began seizing it?

Answer. Afterwards; they did not burn any until they got above Alexandria. Some ten or twelve miles from Alexandria, I believe, was the nearest the rebels destroyed any cotton on their retreat.

Question. Do you know why they commenced to destroy it?

Answer. I was told they did so because the navy had begun to seize private cotton.

Question. You were not with the boats when they were taken over the falls at Alexandria on the return of the expedition?

Answer. No, sir; I was not. I was with several that went over the falls in ascending the river.

Question. Did you express any opinion as to the feasibility of an expedition by boats up the river?

Answer. No, sir; not directly. I remarked to Admiral Porter that the lighter boats could go over the falls; it was folly to attempt to take the Eastport up at the time they attempted to take her over. She remained in the chute about three days, preventing the other boats from advancing.

Question. How far up the river did you suppose those boats could go?

Answer. The lighter class of them could have gone to Shreveport very easily with that stage of water.

Question. Do you deem that it would have been a possible thing to have taken those boats to Shreveport and returned with them?

Answer. Yes, sir; the lighter ones.

Question. Do you mean any of the iron-clads by "the lighter ones"?

Answer. Yes, sir; the Pittsburg, Neosho, Osage, Ozark, and Chillicothe. At the time I took the Champion up I had a letter from Captain Breese, directed to Captain Phelps, to let me return the next morning, as I was sick. I gave Captain Phelps the letter, but he told me I could not go back; that he wanted me to remain there and bring the Eastport out. I told him the water was too low for that. We came down the river about twenty miles, grounding several times on the way down. At last we got her so hard aground that they could not get her off at all. They then destroyed her by blowing her up.

Question. It is your opinion that they never ought to have attempted to take the Eastport above the falls?

Answer. Yes, sir; I advised them so.

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*Testimony of Captain K. R. Breese, U. S. N.*

WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1865.*

Captain K. R. BREESE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and command in the navy?

Answer. I am a lieutenant commander and fleet captain of the North Atlantic squadron.

Question. Were you engaged in the Red river expedition in the spring of 1864?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. Commanding Admiral Porter's flag-ship, the Black Hawk.

Question. Will you state all you know in regard to that expedition?

Answer. As soon as General A. J. Smith's forces arrived at the mouth of the Red river, the fleet being all ready, we ascended as far as the mouth of the Atchafalaya. From there a portion of the iron-clads went down the Atchafalaya as far as Simmsport, where General Smith's troops landed. Another portion of the fleet proceeded up the Red river as far as the obstructions which had been placed below Fort DeRussy, and commenced to remove them. General Smith's army marched up to Fort DeRussy, attacked it, and captured it. That portion of the fleet that had gone up the Red river arrived there just as he got into the fort. The next morning the whole fleet proceeded up to Alexandria. On arriving there they seized a quantity of cotton, bagging, and roping, and some sugar and molasses that was found in confederate storehouses. There was a great deal of cotton found on the banks of the river as we were going up, and a portion of that was seized by the gunboats. It was first taken for the purpose of covering the decks. A great many of the vessels on the previous ascents of the river near Vicksburg had had carried away their hammock-rails, which had afforded a protection against sharpshooters, and these bales of cotton were taken to protect the men against sharpshooters. As we proceeded on up the river large quantities of cotton were found, which I was informed was marked "C. S. A." That was taken and put in some empty coal-barges that we had with us, or rather some barges were discharged of their coal and loaded with cotton. General Smith's troops embarked on the transports at Fort DeRussy, and came up to Alexandria the following evening.

Question. On what day did you reach Alexandria?

Answer. I could not tell the day of the month.

By Mr. Buckalew:

Question. In what month?

Answer. It was in the month of March. After our arrival in Alexandria the admiral received information from persons in Alexandria that there were quantities of cotton along the river at different points which was very accessible. Generally, and always so far as I know, the information was that it belonged to the confederate government, or to persons who were noted rebels; either themselves or the male members of their families in the rebel army; and the admiral sent vessels and secured all that lay along the banks of the river.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you send out into the country for any cotton?

Answer. I do not know of anybody ever going more than four miles; they went four miles into the country; they took some mules from a Mrs. Wilson who was there; she loaned them to the admiral, who promised to return them as soon as he had got through with them, and did so—mules and horses which he used for that purpose. I never went on any of these expeditions, but I am quite sure none ever went over four miles; and I do not know that they went that far.

Question. Do you know the amount of cotton brought in with teams for the navy?

Answer. I do not know positively; but I do not believe that altogether it amounted to 200 bales. It was small lots; the most of the cotton that was taken was right on the banks of the river in gin-houses. The flag-ship never was engaged in any of this, and therefore I know nothing about it of my own personal knowledge. It is only from reports of officers, and seeing the cotton brought in.

While we were at Alexandria there was a large quantity of cotton—how much I do not know—hauled in there in army wagons. That was in the neighborhood of Alexandria. I do not think they hauled that more than six or seven miles at the most. There was also some sugar and some molasses brought in; I saw it in wagons.

Question. Did you go on with the expedition above Alexandria?

Answer. No, sir; the Black Hawk could not go up at that stage of water, and I was left behind as senior officer, in charge of that portion of the river, from there down. After the admiral returned to Alexandria, having been up the river, he sent me down to the Mississippi river, to take charge there, while he was engaged in Alexandria. He said he should remain there until the gunboats were got out.

Question. How long did the gunboats remain at Alexandria before they went up the river?

Answer. About a week, I think; but they could not possibly have gone over the falls before they did. We had the best local pilots, and men whom we had carried there with us, and we had competent officers sounding the falls, as they termed it, every day. The river was rising very slowly and gradually.

As soon as it was found possible to take a vessel over the falls, the admiral sent the Eastport up. She was the first vessel that got over. It was necessary that he should send a formidable vessel up first, because the information we then had of the rebel iron-clads was very indefinite. But it was supposed they were within 20 or 30 miles of Alexandria. He could not send the light-draught vessels up first, because they were not able to cope with the rebel iron-clads. Therefore, as soon as the water was deep enough, he sent up the Eastport, and she was followed rapidly by the others. Some stuck fast on the falls, others got over without much difficulty. The very moment the water would permit, the

Eastport was sent up over the falls. In fact she went up rather too soon, for she was a day at least aground on the falls.

Question. Do you know anything of the operations above the falls ?

Answer. No, sir ; not of my own knowledge.

Question. How long did you remain at Alexandria ?

Answer. I was there upwards of a month.

Question. You remained there until the admiral returned ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I was there all the time until he returned.

Question. Did you leave Alexandria and go down the river before he did ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I left Alexandria the day after his return. He came down, and then went part way up again ; I think not all the way. He told me that the river was falling rapidly, and that there was danger of the Black Hawk being caught there. He told me to go down the river as fast as possible. He went up the river again the day I left.

Question. Then you were not at Alexandria when the boats were taken over the falls on their return ?

Answer. No, sir ; I was then lying at the mouth of the Red river, in command of that part of the Mississippi ; engaged in forwarding supplies, and doing whatever could be done.

Question. Do you know anything in relation to operations in cotton by the army on that expedition ?

Answer. I only know what the cotton speculators told me ; I know nothing of my own knowledge, except seeing cotton brought in in army wagons. There was quite a number of speculators there. How they got there I do not know. A number of them came to me and asked me if I would not seize their cotton in the name of the navy ; I told them I could not do it. They said they had 200 or 300 bales there, scattered about in different directions, and asked me to seize it in the name of the navy, and let it be carried to Cairo as prize cotton and go before the courts. If they could prove their claim to it, well, and good ; if not, then the navy would have it.

Question. What were the names of those men ?

Answer. One was named Sells.

Question. Do you know where he was from ?

Answer. I think from St. Louis.

Question. Do you know what authority he had ?

Answer. I do not know that he had any. I think he went up there as the owner of a steamboat. The only persons who were up there with authority were a Mr. Butler and another one. They had an order from the President, directing all persons in authority, military or naval, to grant them all facilities in going where they pleased, mentioning particularly Red river, and about there. They were the only ones that had any kind of permit that I knew of.

I know that General Banks requested the admiral to give orders to the guard vessels stationed at the mouth of the river not to permit any vessel at all to come up the river, except those engaged with the army and navy ; and to examine all persons on board of them, and to see if there were any persons who had not proper passes from proper military authorities to come up.

On one occasion Governor Yates came there with a steamer, and a number of persons with him, and wanted to come up. They had permits from some military authority which the naval officer at the mouth of the Red river could not recognize, and he told them that they could not go up. They then went down to New Orleans, and had some conference with General Banks, I think, and then came up afterwards. Governor Yates's party had wanted to come up before General Banks had come up.

I heard a great many stories about that, but I know nothing of my own knowledge. I know only what the cotton speculators told me. They said

Governor Yates and his party went to New Orleans, and there had an interview with General Banks. The arrangement came to was this: there was to be an effort made in the coming presidential campaign to elect General Banks. Mr. Lincoln was to be the ostensible nominee, but nobody had any expectation that he would be successful. Therefore they were going ostensibly to push him as hard as they could, but in the end they were going to bring forward General Banks, who was to be a compromise candidate, and there was no doubt that he would be elected.

But they wanted money to push the thing through, and they wanted General Banks's influence to help their friends in the matter. The plan was that General Banks should issue an order that all the cotton that came into Alexandria should be seized and turned over to the quartermaster, and taken to New Orleans. Then, on its arrival at New Orleans, those persons who were "in the ring," as they style it, if they could buy the claims of the owners, would have the cotton immediately turned over to them without any trouble. But should the loyal owners wish to dispose of the cotton themselves, then there would be so many obstacles thrown in their way, such as putting it before the courts, and things of that kind, that it would be made almost hopeless for them to realize on it, and they would be glad to sell their claims for a mere song. Then these people were to step in and buy them, and as soon as they did so, there would be no obstacle in the way of their getting the cotton. This was the story of these speculators.

These speculators said they could purchase cotton all about Alexandria, and they asked me if I would seize it after they had purchased, and claim it as prize to the navy. In that way it would get out of the clutches of General Banks, they said, and would be transported north to Cairo, go before the courts of Illinois, where they could present their claims of ownership, and obtain their cotton. The object of Governor Yates's party, as I understood it from these speculators, was to purchase cotton to promote the interest of General Banks as the compromise candidate for President. I heard this from half a dozen different persons.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Can you give me the names of any of those parties?

Answer. This Mr. Sells is the only one I recollect. He is thoroughly mixed up in that cotton business. But whether he would tell or not, I do not know.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Where is he?

Answer. He is a merchant of St. Louis, as I understand. The way I happen to recollect him so particularly is that his cousin was a volunteer lieutenant in the navy at that time. I think he is now Sixth Auditor, though I am not sure. He is in the Treasury Department, in some position.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Did Governor Yates go up the river?

Answer. No, sir, his agents did. What they did I do not know; I never heard.

Question. Did they pass up before or after General Banks?

Answer. After General Banks came up.

Question. Do you know who composed that party?

Answer. I heard the names, but I did not pay much attention to them; these fellows used to come to me with these stories, in the hope to get me to seize their cotton. They offered to pay me something handsome if I would do it, and to pay the sailors and men. They said they were willing to pay one-twentieth

of the value of the cotton if we would take it. They used to come and beg me every day to take the mules of Mrs. Wilson, which had not then been returned, and go out and get this cotton, promising to pay me handsomely for it, and to pay the officers and men engaged in it.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. This was the story they told you ?

Answer. Yes, sir. Mr. Sells was my particular informant, but they all agreed in the story.

Question. They were in opposition to the Yates party ?

Answer. Sells was in opposition to everybody. He was there just to get cotton. He is one of those men who do not care how they get cotton, or over whose back they ride to get it. I suppose his object was just to get cotton. There was a clergyman who belonged to Alexandria who had been obliged to leave on account of his being a Union man. He had a great deal of trouble with General Banks about a little cotton he had. He used to come to me very often and ask me to take his cotton. He seemed to be thoroughly posted up in the matter.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. How did these speculators get up there ?

Answer. I do not know. When I was at the mouth of the Red river nobody came up who was not entitled to do so. Two days after I got down the river the rebels got their batteries below Alexandria, and there was a blockade of the river.

Question. Did you see the permit of the President ?

Answer. Yes, sir, I copied it myself.

Question. What was the name of the party to whom the permit was given ?

Answer. Casey & Co. was the name in the permit, and Butler was the head of the establishment, I think ; either Butler or Halliday.

Question. Was it all the same firm ?

Answer. Those men belonged to a party engaged in this business. They came along with this order from the President requiring all military and naval men to give them their assistance to pass beyond our lines, &c., and let them get cotton and take it out, and upon that order this steamboat was allowed to come up the Red river.

Question. What was the name of the steamboat ?

Answer. I do not recollect now.

Question. Did it pass up before or after General Banks went up ?

Answer. I think she came up after General Banks did, or about the time he did. That was one reason why Governor Yates was so very indignant that he could not come up with his party, when it was known that this party of Casey had been permitted by Admiral Porter to go up the river. These people talked so much about it on shore in Alexandria, and said that Admiral Porter was engaged in this cotton business, and was interested with Butler, Casey, and that kind of people, that Mr. Halliday, who was in this company of Casey and Butler, showed the order to some of these speculators on shore. That stopped their mouths, and they said nothing more about Admiral Porter being engaged in it.

They said it was very hard indeed that Admiral Porter would grant permits to some to go up and not to others. They talked so much about it, and read remarks in the newspapers, and things of that kind, that Mr. Halliday, who was a friend of the admiral, showed them this order. That was the way it got out that there was such an order in existence.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you know anything else about the cotton business ?

Answer. I do not know. I heard nothing but cotton hardly for the four months I was there. If this Mr. Sells would tell all he knew he could tell the whole history of it.

Question. Did you see any permits signed by General Banks ?

Answer. No, sir. I heard a great many accusations made against his chief quartermaster, Mr. Hollabird, by these speculators. They said that he was the go-between in all this matter ; that this cotton was all turned over to him, and he made all the arrangements for its final disposition ; whether it should go into the hands of the treasury agents, or into the hands of "the ring," as they termed it.

There was no cotton taken by the navy, except near Alexandria, and except that there was an expedition sent from Alexandria up the Wachita river, where they captured some cotton ; how much I do not know exactly, though I think it was about 2,500 bales.

Question. By whom was that expedition sent ?

Answer. It was under orders of the admiral, and under the command of Lieutenant Commander Foster. That cotton was on the banks of the river. We had information from these cotton speculators, who had charts of the country, with every parish and township in the State of Louisiana and in the State of Mississippi, all marked off, with the amount of cotton in each one, where it was stored, the marks on it, and everything about it. Many of the speculators would come and give us information concerning these things, in hopes that we would take out some that they claimed was their own, so that they could present their claims to the court. They knew very well that the cotton that was taken away by the navy was sent before the court, and if they could present a fair claim for it they would get it ; and they tried to get the admiral and his officers to take their cotton wherever it could be found.

Question. Do you know how those cotton speculators got up to Alexandria ?

Answer. I know that a large number of them came up on the Black Hawk with General Banks, with a large quantity of bagging and roping. The way that I happened to know that was, that she landed at the bank just under our stern. I saw that vessel discharge her cargo there. On our arrival at Alexandria we captured at least thirty wagon loads of roping and bagging, which the man who had charge of it told us was not three weeks from New Orleans. It was marked "C. S. A.," the whole of it, and was in the confederate storehouses.

Question. Were there two steamers called "Black Hawk" ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the Black Hawk of the navy was Admiral Porter's flagship, and the transport Black Hawk was General Banks's headquarters boat.

Question. This bagging of which you spoke came up on the Black Hawk of General Banks ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know in what vessel the bagging and roping came up that you found in Alexandria on your arrival there ?

Answer. It came by land transportation. It was landed somewhere on the Mississippi river, and hauled to Alexandria. While we were in Alexandria, there was captured a captain of the home guard, whose duty it had been, previous to the arrival of the troops there, to convoy the wagons laden with confederate cotton to the banks of the Mississippi river, and to get the supplies that were landed there in payment of this cotton, and bring them up to Alexandria. He said that several times while the gunboat was protecting the transport landing these supplies he could have killed the captain of her, mentioning his name, without any trouble ; but that he was in honor bound not to fire, for he



was there simply as a guard to the cotton, to keep the guerillas, or improper bands of confederate troops, from destroying it.

Question. Did this bagging and roping come there under the protection of the army?

Answer. That that came up on General Banks's boat came up under the protection of the army?

Question. I mean the other, that you found there on your arrival?

Answer. I do not know about that. I know only that they said it had been only three weeks from New Orleans. It must have been started just previous to General Banks's departure from New Orleans; but I do not think he had any connexion at all with it.

Question. You say you left before the return of the fleet to Alexandria.

Answer. Yes, sir; the admiral came down ahead of the gunboats, and I left immediately.

Question. Then you know nothing of the circumstances connected with the army and navy retiring from Alexandria?

Answer. No, sir; I was at the mouth of the Red river. I sent iron-clads up the river to prevent the rebels regaining possession of Fort De Russy. They had already posted some field-batteries on the banks of the river, and had destroyed two gunboats coming down and some transports. I sent these gunboats up there as far as they could go with safety, on account of the shallowness of the water, to hold that place.

Question. Is there anything further you desire to state in connexion with the Red river expedition, or operations there in relation to cotton?

Answer. As I have already stated, I used to hear every day all kinds of propositions from these people to induce me to take their cotton. I heard hardly anything else than cotton. They were all pitching into General Banks for the part he and his quartermaster had taken in the business; but I did not pay much attention to what they said, for they were very unscrupulous men. Still they all seemed to agree on the story about General Banks, Governor Yates, and the party with him, making the political arrangement I have stated. I gave more credence to that than to any other of their stories. Governor Yates did not come up to Alexandria, but a portion of that party did; I do not now remember their names. They told the captain of the gunboat at the mouth of the Red river they would gain him another stripe around his wrist if he would let them go up. He told them he could not let them go up under any consideration. They then told him they would have him dismissed the service, and he then told them he would not let them go up any how.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What was the name of that officer?

Answer. Volunteer Lieutenant Cyremus Dominy, now serving in the Mississippi squadron.

Question. Do you know anything about elections being held along the Red river while that expedition was going up or returning?

Answer. I was at Alexandria when an election was held there, but I did not attend it, and I know nothing about it except the result, which they said was just what they wanted. They said they had elected delegates to the State convention, and that everything was going on very prosperously. There was strong talk of sending a force over into some of the neighboring parishes for the purpose of letting the Union men vote; but it was never done, so far as I know.

Question. Do you know what orders were given to enable them to hold an election there?

Answer. No, sir, I do not. I never paid any attention at all to those matters.

Question. Do you know whether any of the candidates at that election were taken up with that expedition?

Answer. I do not. I know one who was elected who was not taken up. We found him there, and he was the only candidate I know of.

Question. Do you know anything about the candidate for election at Shreveport when you got there?

Answer. No, sir. My position was such that I would not be likely to know anything about those matters.

*Testimony of Captain T. O. Selfridge, U. S. N.*

WASHINGTON, *March* 14, 1865.

Captain T. O. SELFRIDGE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What is your present rank and command in the navy?

Answer. I am a lieutenant commander, and now in command of the gunboat Huron.

Question. Were you with the naval force that accompanied General Banks in his expedition up the Red river in the spring of 1864?

Answer. Yes, sir. I was then in command of the iron-clad Osage.

Question. Were you stationed at any time at the mouth of the Red river?

Answer. Only while the squadron was collecting there; probably three or four days.

Question. You proceeded with the squadron up the river?

Answer. Yes, sir; up to Fort DeRussy first, and then up to Alexandria.

Question. Where was the army at the time you reached Alexandria?

Answer. General A. J. Smith's force was at Fort DeRussy; General Banks's army was somewhere between Franklin and Alexandria, on their way to Alexandria.

Question. How long after you arrived at Alexandria was it before General Banks's army arrived there?

Answer. I could not state exactly; I should say it was from three or four days to a week. General A. J. Smith's force came up in transports, and arrived about thirty-six hours after our gunboats reached Alexandria.

Question. How long did the army remain at Alexandria?

Answer. I should judge about three weeks, as near as I can recollect.

Question. For what purpose?

Answer. I do not know why the army remained there. The navy remained because there was not water enough on the falls some two or three miles above Alexandria for the vessels to pass over.

Question. Would it have been prudent for the army to have marched, without the navy moving with them to co-operate with them?

Answer. That is a military question. So far as my own judgment is concerned, I think it would.

Question. What was the navy engaged in while at Alexandria?

Answer. They were doing nothing; they were lying off the town, except some three or four of the lighter draught gunboats, which were employed protecting the river at different points below Alexandria.

Question. Was any cotton collected by the navy while at Alexandria?

Answer. The only cotton taken in Alexandria, that I know of, was about 240 bales that we found in town when the navy took charge of it. The navy first took charge of Alexandria; I was myself commanding at the shore until I turned it over to the army. We found about 240 bales there, I should think. That was all the cotton taken at Alexandria that I know of. There was a great deal of cotton taken below Alexandria, between Alexandria and Fort De-Russy. It may have been anywhere between one thousand and two thousand bales.

Question. At what points?

Answer. At different points; on different plantations. I took a great deal myself; I took, I think, about 800 bales of cotton from the banks of the river.

Question. How far into the interior did you go?

Answer. I think we went once about two miles. Generally we took it on the bank; what you would call on the bank, perhaps a half a mile back.

Question. What means did you have for getting it to the boats when you captured it?

Answer. On those plantations, which were deserted, the bales were rolled bodily on the boats. On those plantations where we could find teams or the make-shifts for teams, we used such teams as we could find. But the country was pretty thoroughly cleared out there, and it was very laborious getting the cotton on board.

Question. What was the army engaged in while they were at Alexandria?

Answer. They were engaged in doing nothing, so far as I know. There was no expedition sent out from there.

Question. Did they collect any cotton from the interior?

Answer. I could not say whether they did or not.

Question. Did you see any persons there, with either the army or the navy, commonly called cotton speculators?

Answer. I know of none with the navy; I understand there were several with the army.

Question. Did you see any persons who were ostensibly engaged in that business?

Answer. I saw one man.

Question. What was his name?

Answer. I do not know his name. He said he had engaged some cotton which I took. I do not think I ever knew his name. If I have ever heard it, I have forgotten it. He was the only person I ever knew of personally who was a speculator.

Question. Did you meet on the expedition any one of the name of Sells?

Answer. His name is familiar to me, but I do not think I met him there.

Question. Had you any means of knowing whether or not the army was engaged in collecting cotton at Alexandria? Suppose they had been so engaged, had you any means of knowing that fact?

Answer. No, sir; because if I should see cotton in the streets, I should not know whether it was hauled in by speculators or by the army.

Question. By what authority did persons go into that country as speculators, if there were any such persons there?

Answer. I can only suppose it was by the authority of the general commanding the army.

Question. Did you know that there were speculators there?

Answer. We saw men about the streets we were given to understand were cotton speculators. It was generally known that there were a great many speculators with General Banks's army; they were seen about the streets. A great deal of the time I was away from Alexandria, and being on the water I would not know those men personally.

Question. Do you know of any attempts being made to induce officers of the navy to seize certain lots of cotton, and then allow the claimants to controvert the right of the navy to it in prize courts?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of any case of that kind.

Question. Were you with Captain Breese, of the navy?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was attached to the same squadron, but not upon the same boat. Captain Breese was fleet captain of the squadron, and I was captain of another vessel. I would be brought in contact with him only so far as my own vessel was concerned.

Question. Do you know anything about an election having been held at Alexandria while this expedition was there?

Answer. I merely know there was an election held there; I know nothing more about it than that.

Question. Do you know who were elected, or where the candidates came from, or what arrangements had been made in regard to that election?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know whether the army was delayed at all for the purpose of holding an election there?

Answer. I do not.

Question. At what time did you leave Alexandria, and where did you go from there?

Answer. I left there the latter part of March, or during the first of April; as soon as the water permitted us to go up over the falls. We then proceeded up the river, as fast as we could go, to Grand Ecore, running all day and bringing to at night.

Question. How far is Grand Ecore above the falls at Alexandria?

Answer. I think it is called one hundred and twenty miles. We lay two days above the falls, waiting for the army to move, after we had got up there. We went up there to protect the right wing of the army, and lay there for two days. Our progress up the river was slow, as we were obliged to sound the bars and crossings; we were also obliged to search for torpedoes, and found some a little below Grand Ecore.

Question. How long did it take you to reach Grand Ecore from Alexandria?

Answer. I think it took us two or three days—I am not sure which; it is so long ago, and not having kept any note or expecting ever to be questioned about these things, that I have forgotten many of the details of that expedition.

Question. How long was it after you arrived at Grand Ecore before the army arrived there?

Answer. I think the army arrived at Natchitoches the same day that we arrived at Grand Ecore. We anchored about five miles below Grand Ecore at night, and in the morning, when we came up, we found the scouts of the army on the banks; and I understood they had arrived that night at Natchitoches.

Question. How long did you remain at Grand Ecore?

Answer. We remained at Grand Ecore three or four days.

Question. Why did you remain there that length of time?

Answer. Waiting for General Banks, I think.

Question. His army had arrived there?

Answer. Yes, sir; under General Franklin, who had been ordered, as I understood, to take the army up as far as Natchitoches, and then wait for General Banks to arrive. General Banks came up by river. General Franklin came up by land with the troops. I think we remained at Grand Ecore three or four days; then the admiral started a half a dozen of us up the river. The river was very low, and we had a great deal of difficulty from snags and stumps. After we had got up about forty miles the admiral sent us a despatch to return; that the army had no provisions, and would not be able to move until—he did

not know when; that if we did not return we might be caught up there in low water and not be able to get down.

Question. Did you find any enemy on your way up the river?

Answer. We had quite a little fight on our way up, at Campte, on the left bank of the river. With that exception, we were not molested at all for our first forty miles.

Question. How long did you remain at Grand Ecore after your return?

Answer. I arrived there at night, and found that the army had received some provisions and were able to move. After remaining there about a day we started up towards Shreveport on the same day that the army moved out towards Mansfield.

Question. How far did the fleet go up the second time?

Answer. Up to Springfield Landing. I myself did not go up nearer than about five miles of that place. I was protecting the rear.

Question. What distance is that, by water, from Grand Ecore?

Answer. About one hundred miles, I should judge; between one hundred and one hundred and thirty miles. We arrived there on Sunday about 2 o'clock. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon the admiral got a despatch from General Banks that the army had turned back. We then had about thirty transports under our protection.

Question. How near had you got to Shreveport at that time?

Answer. I think they called it one hundred miles from there.

Question. What did you do when that despatch was received?

Answer. We then turned back, going down very slowly, protecting the transports.

Question. At what point did you next stop?

Answer. We got down as far as a place called Couchattie chute, about thirty miles below, where we had a little fight. The next day we left Couchattie chute, and I was ordered to bring up the rear. An army transport, the Alice Vivian, got aground in the river about fifteen miles below there, and the army went off and left her. There were some troops with us under General Kilby Smith. I sent a boat to General Smith with a message that if they did not send back a boat to pull the Alice Vivian off we should have to destroy her. They sent back two boats, but did not get her off; and I also got aground. In the mean time I was attacked by the rebel General Greene and four pieces of artillery. We fought them about an hour and a half, inflicted on them a loss of probably four hundred killed and wounded, and drove them off. After nightfall we got the Alice Vivian off and took her down the river. Two or three transports grounded on our way down, and the army deserted them; but we pulled them off and went down to Grand Ecore.

Question. How long did you remain at Grand Ecore that time?

Answer. The light-draught gunboats had orders to remain there as long as they could and still be able to cross a bar about a mile and a half below Grand Ecore. There was a shallow bar there, and the admiral left orders for us to look out for that. I was left senior officer at Grand Ecore. While we had been coming down the river the water was falling so low that Admiral Porter sent orders to the heavy transports to go down the river as fast as they could. Those vessels had left about two days before we returned there.

Question. And how long did you remain there?

Answer. I think I remained there a week.

Question. What number of vessels remained there with you?

Answer. The Osage, the Neosho, the Fort Hindman, and, I think, one other.

Question. The remainder of the fleet had gone down the river?

Answer. Yes, sir, towards Alexandria. While we lay at Grand Ecore it was given out that the army was going to make another forward movement. At the same time I myself saw no sign of a forward movement, because there

were no provisions coming up. I addressed a communication to General Banks, requesting information concerning the movements of the army, and asking whether they would make a forward movement, or would retreat, as I wanted to be able to retire down the river in time, if necessary. Should the army retire before the naval fleet went down, we would be so beset by the enemy on the banks that we might be obliged to sacrifice some of the vessels. General Banks answered me that he had no idea of retiring from the position he then occupied at Grand Ecore, and which he had fortified.

But in a day or two afterwards the river had fallen so that I was compelled to cross down below the bar, in order to be sure of getting down at all. And after I had crossed the bar, as I could no longer be of any assistance to the army at Grand Ecore, I concluded to repair with all despatch to Alexandria.

When we arrived at the falls just above Alexandria, we found that the water had fallen so much that it was impossible to get the vessels down over the falls.

In the mean time the Eastport had become grounded between Grand Ecore and Alexandria. Admiral Porter sent up a steam-pump boat in order to get her afloat again; supposing, I imagine, that the army was still at Grand Ecore. The admiral went up in a little tin-clad, the Cricket, to help raise the Eastport, but in the mean time the army had left Grand Ecore. I was also sent up in the Osage, to a high bluff about forty miles above Alexandria. I drove off a rebel battery, and remained there a couple of days, until I was joined by the admiral, who had been obliged to run the gauntlet of about twenty rebel guns posted on the bank at the junction of the old river and the new river. In running those batteries we lost two of our steamers, transports fitted with steam-pumps.

After that nothing of importance occurred until we found the fleet assembled at the falls above Alexandria. While we were lying there, the rebels came in on the river below in quite large force. I never knew their exact numbers, but they were estimated to be about 8,000 or 10,000 strong. I suppose we had 30,000 men in and about Alexandria. The rebels planted their batteries on the banks of the river below Alexandria, captured two of our tin-clads, the Signal and the Covington, and drove off the rest, completely stopping communication by way of the river for two weeks or more.

Question. While you were waiting at the falls, what were the relative positions of the army and the navy?

Answer. The navy was above the falls, protecting the right flank of the army, which formed a semicircle, a cordon, around the city of Alexandria. They had a line of intrenchments around the city.

Question. How long did you then remain at Alexandria?

Answer. I think we were above the falls about a month until the dam was built. The dam itself, however, was not much over two weeks in building.

Question. In what condition were the vessels when the dam was completed? Were they prepared to take advantage of the rise of water?

Answer. Yes, sir; the water on the falls was carefully measured several times each day. The very moment we found sufficient water on the falls for any vessel to go over, she was sent over immediately. In fact the four heaviest iron-clads were started down before there was water enough; they stuck on the falls, and we were obliged to drag them over. When the first three vessels had been taken over, the gate of the dam broke, which caused considerable delay, of two or three days; but by means of wing-dams built on the fall itself, we got water enough to enable us to pull our deepest draught vessels over.

Question. Did the officers in command of the navy vessels resort to the usual means of lightening the boats so as to be enabled to start over the falls as soon as the water had risen sufficiently?

Answer. Yes, sir, they did. The vessels were lightened to their lowest capacity.

Question. Did the officers and men remain on board the vessels, ready to man them at any moment they could move ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they were ready for action at a moment's notice.

Question. Did you, while above the falls, have any information of the army intending to leave Alexandria ?

Answer. We had no direct information ; but it was looked upon by the navy that a movement might be made at any moment ; that is, in plain terms, the navy had lost confidence in General Banks, and we felt that he might desert us at any moment ; that was the feeling. I do not know that there was any ground for it. There was, on our part, a great feeling of insecurity. To use a common expression, we felt that we might be left in the lurch.

Question. General Banks, in point of fact, did not desert you ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did the navy at any point supply themselves with wagons and teams for hauling in cotton ?

Answer. None that I am personally aware of. I have heard such things attributed to the navy.

Question. Do you know at what points the navy got cotton other than those points you have mentioned ?

Answer. They got cotton up the Wachita river. The only cotton we took on Red river was at Alexandria, and at points between Fort DeRussy and Alexandria. About 200 bales were taken above Alexandria, for the purpose of protection ; but it was thrown overboard before we came over the falls, except some few bales that Admiral Porter gave to some destitute people up there. I personally know of no instance where teams were used to haul cotton, except what I have stated. I understood that some teams had been used for that purpose, where there were no teams on the plantations where the cotton was found.

Question. Have you any personal knowledge of government teams—those belonging to the quartermaster's department or any other—being used for the purpose of hauling cotton for the army or for others ?

Answer. I have heard that it was done, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

Question. You never saw anything of the kind done ?

Answer. No, sir.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. In point of fact, the army did assist the navy to get over the falls ?

Answer. Yes, sir, by building a dam, and also in hauling the vessels over.

Question. They rendered you all assistance ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they rendered us all the assistance we could ask or desire ; still I must say that I myself think this feeling of insecurity on the part of the navy was well founded. General Banks was very uneasy all the time we were at Alexandria ; and it was a mooted question—I heard it from military officers on shore—whether he would not leave us. I was told by military officers that General Banks had said that the whole cost of the naval part of the expedition would not equal the cost of the subsistence of his army for one day. That and other remarks of the kind led us to believe that the army might leave us at any time.

Question. Still the army remained with you and rendered you all assistance ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the army remained there until the dam was completed. I think if the dam had failed we should have been left in the lurch.

Question. You mean by that, that the army might have been obliged to go down the river ?

Answer. They would not have been obliged to go, but they would have

gone. There was no time in the Red river campaign when our army did not outnumber the rebels, at least after the battle of Mansfield, at least two to one.

Question. Did the navy suppose it was an object for the army to remain there until the boats could get down?

Answer. Yes, sir; for they comprised the main part of the Mississippi fleet, which had done great service.

Question. How many boats were above the falls?

Answer. I think there were ten.

Question. The rise in the river had taken place before you went up?

Answer. It took place as we went up.

Question. And then the river began to fall?

Answer. Yes, sir; before we left Grand Ecore.

Question. And there was no reasonable probability that the river would rise again before another year?

Answer. Yes, sir; there should have been the spring rise from the mountains in April, or the latter part of March.

Question. Had not that rise already actually taken place?

Answer. No, sir; the only rise that had taken place was a small rise, probably out of the bayous in the vicinity of the river. But the real spring rise did not take place that year.

*Testimony of Hon. Richard Yates.*

WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1865.*

HON. RICHARD YATES sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your present official position, and what was your official position for some time previously?

Answer. I am at present a senator of the United States from the State of Illinois. I formerly held the position of governor of the State of Illinois.

Question. Were you in the department of the Gulf at any time during the spring of 1864?

Answer. Yes, sir, I was there. I cannot now state positively in what month, but I think it was some time during the month of March.

Question. Did you accompany the Red river expedition under General Banks?

Answer. I did not. I was invited by General Banks to go, but I did not go. My wife was with me, and was rather averse to my going. Therefore, while I wanted very much to go, I did not go, but returned home.

Question. The following testimony has been given before the committee by Captain Breese, of the United States navy:

"I know that General Banks requested the admiral to give orders to the guard vessels stationed at the mouth of the river not to permit any vessel at all to come up the river except those engaged with the army and navy; and to examine all persons on board of them and to see if there were any persons who had not proper passes from proper military authorities to come up.

"On one occasion Governor Yates came there with a steamer, and a number of persons with him, and wanted to come up. They had permits from some military authority, which the naval officer at the mouth of the Red river could not recognize, and he told them that they could not go up. They then went down to New Orleans, and had some conference with General Banks, I think,



and then came up afterwards. Governor Yates's party had wanted to come up before General Banks had come up.

"I heard a great many stories about that, but I know nothing of my own knowledge; I know only what the cotton speculators told me. They said Governor Yates and his party went to New Orleans, and there had an interview with General Banks. The arrangement come to was this: There was to be an effort made in the coming presidential campaign to elect General Banks. Mr. Lincoln was to be the ostensible nominee, but nobody had any expectation that he would be successful. Therefore they were going ostensibly to push him as hard as they could, but in the end they were going to bring forward General Banks, who was to be a compromise candidate, and there was no doubt that he would be elected.

"But they wanted money to push the thing through, and they wanted General Banks's influence to help their friends in the matter. The plan was, that General Banks should issue an order that all the cotton that came into Alexandria should be seized and turned over to the quartermaster, and taken to New Orleans. Then on its arrival at New Orleans those persons who were 'in the ring,' as they style it, if they could buy the claims of the owners, would have the cotton immediately turned over to them without any trouble. But should the legal owners wish to dispose of the cotton themselves, then there would be so many obstacles thrown in their way, such as putting it before the courts, and things of that kind, that it would be made almost hopeless for them to realize on it, and they would be glad to sell their claims for a mere song. Then these people were to step in and buy them; and as soon as they did so there would be no obstacle in the way of their getting the cotton. This was the story of these speculators."

Answer. I think there is none of that true. I remember introducing two gentlemen to General Banks, at their request, and asking passes for them up the Red river; and also a pass for myself, because I had not, at that time, made up my mind that I would not go. I also understood that those gentlemen had some sort of permit from the Treasury Department to deal in sugar and cotton, or whatever they might deal in. Something might have been said to General Banks by the other parties, not by myself, as to his being a candidate for the Presidency. At that time I had not thought of him in that connexion, at least for the election of 1864. To the best of my recollection, nothing was said in my presence about his being a candidate for the Presidency at any time.

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*Statement submitted by Mr. Withenbury.*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1865.

In one instance I knew the marines or sailors from the gunboats to go to Mrs. Crosby's cotton-gin, where she had a large amount of seed cotton, (unginned,) and work the gin with navy mules, and gin and bale a number of bales of cotton, which bales were brought to Alexandria, (three miles;) this cotton was pointed out to me by Admiral Porter, who remarked to me that "Jack made very good cotton-bales."

The gunboats took from Mr. Tom Neal, three miles below Alexandria, two hundred and fifteen bales of cotton, and Admiral Porter refused to give him a receipt for it, and sent the cotton to Cairo, Illinois.

I heard Captain John M. Martin ask Admiral Porter for a permit to sell some cotton, and the admiral gave him a permit to sell *one bale* only, to get supplies for his family.

On another occasion I heard Admiral Porter tell Mr. Martin, and he addressed himself to me also, that there would soon be in town a Mr. William Halliday, from Cairo, who would buy his (Martin's) cotton and pay the full value for it. Admiral Porter then in writing gave Martin another permit to sell as "much cotton as was necessary for the support of his family," and added, "By this you can sell it all."

Soon after this Mr. Halliday arrived, and I saw him frequently on the admiral's flag-ship. Captain Martin went away and left his permit with me, and I sold to Mr. Halliday and his associates some sixty to seventy bales of Martin's cotton for 125 dollars per bale.

Mr. Tom Neal, failing to get a receipt for his two hundred and fifteen bales of cotton, sold to Mr. Halliday and his associates the "chance" of it for \$6,000 in United States treasury notes, (so I was told.)

In June, 1864, I was at Cairo in search of some cotton of my own, and called on Mr. Halliday for information and assistance to get my cotton, or the pay for it. Mr. Halliday answered me, that he would not "do or undertake to do anything for me in the matter that would in the least conflict with the interest of the navy, as the navy had befriended him," &c.

I asked Mr. Halliday if he succeeded in getting the "Neal cotton," and he told me that the Neal cotton was sold by the United States marshal as prize before he got home, and that Admiral Porter had allowed him to substitute two hundred and fifteen bales of other cotton, giving him the choice of any cotton at Cairo, (navy cotton,) and that he, Halliday, had so substituted two hundred and fifteen bales, and he then pulled out his memorandum book and showed me the weights of these two hundred and fifteen bales, which had now been shipped to New York; I afterwards learned that it was sold in New York for over (\$105,000) one hundred and five thousand dollars.

The seizure of cotton by the navy on Red river from men known to be Union men was, in my opinion, the cause of much ill feeling towards the Union army and navy, and I believe was the cause of thousands of bales of cotton being burned, as no cotton was burned in that vicinity until after these seizures commenced, in 1864.

W. W. WITHEMBURY.

I fully concur in all the above testimony of W. W. Withenbury, as I was present at the interviews mentioned with Admiral Porter, and with Mr. Halliday at Alexandria and at Cairo, and heard his statements in reference to the two hundred and fifteen bales cotton substituted for the "Neal cotton."

JOHN M. MARTIN.

## STATEMENT AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY GENERAL BANKS.

NEW YORK, *March* 28, 1865.

SIR: I have made a statement more in detail than the verbal account given by me to the committee of the Red river campaign, upon the military operations in the department of the Gulf in the years 1863 and 1864, which I respectfully request may be appended to my report. The account of the Red river expedition is more full than I was able to give at the time I appeared before the committee, and I very respectfully ask the attention of the committee to this additional statement. I also have the honor to transmit copies of extracts from my orders and despatches relating to the military operations in the department, and my replies to the same, and a general statement upon the subject of trade, with correspondence upon that subject.

I remain, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Volunteers.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War, Washington, D. C.*

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I.—PORT HUDSON CAMPAIGN.

The military objects contemplated by the orders which I received upon assuming command of the department of the Gulf, dated November 8, 1862, were the freedom of the Mississippi, an expedition to Jackson and Marion after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the occupation of the Red river country as a protection for Louisiana and Arkansas and a basis of future operations against Texas.

I assumed command of the department December 16, 1862. The 18th of December Brigadier General Cuvier Grover, with ten thousand (10,000) men, was ordered to take possession of Baton Rouge, then held by the enemy. This was the first step towards the reduction of Port Hudson.

The island of Galveston, Texas, had been captured in October, and was then occupied or held by the navy. Information had been received, previous to my arrival at New Orleans, of a contemplated attack for the recovery of that position by the enemy. Upon consultation with Rear-Admiral D. G. Farragut and Major General Butler, both of whom recommended the measure, the 42d Massachusetts volunteers, Colonel Burrill commanding, was sent to occupy the island in support of the navy.

Brigadier General A. J. Hamilton, who had been commissioned as military governor of Texas, and who accompanied my expedition to New Orleans, with a large staff, also pressed my occupation of Texas with the greatest earnestness, and it was in deference, in a great degree, to his most strongly expressed wishes that the expedition was undertaken, though it was fully justified by the information which had been received of a proposed attack by the enemy, as well as by the advice of the naval and military authorities of the department.

Three companies of this regiment, under command of Colonel Burrill, arrived at Galveston island on the 27th of December, 1862, and, by the advice of the naval officers, landed on the 28th. On the morning of the 1st of January, 1863, they were attacked by about five thousand (5,000) of the enemy, who gained possession of the island by a bridge from the main land which had been left unimpaired during the entire occupation of the island by our forces. The naval forces were attacked at the same time by the cotton-clad gunboats of the

enemy, which resulted in the capture of our land force, numbering 260 men, including their officers; the steamer *Harriet Lane*, two coal transports, and a schooner; and the steamer *Westfield* was blown up by its commanding officer. The losses, in killed and wounded, were but slight. The balance of the regiment did not arrive at Galveston island until the 2d of January, the day after the attack. Upon the discovery of the condition of affairs by the capture of one of the rebel pilots they returned to New Orleans.

This attack upon our forces had been in contemplation for a long time. It succeeded solely because the bridge connecting the island with the main land had been left in possession of the enemy. Had the troops sent for its occupation arrived a day or two earlier, or in sufficient time to have destroyed the bridge, the attack would have been defeated.

The possession of this island and its military occupation would have been of great importance to the government in all operations in that part of the country. It would have held a large force of rebel troops in the vicinity of Houston, enabled us to penetrate the territory of Texas at any time, or to concentrate our forces on the Mississippi, and rendered unnecessary the expedition of 1864 for the re-establishment of the flag in Texas.

Colonel Burrill and his men remained in captivity more than a year, and after much suffering were exchanged in the spring of 1864.

It is true, as stated by Major General Halleck in his report of the 15th of November, 1863, as general-in-chief of the army, that "this expedition was not contemplated or provided for in General Banks's instructions;" but having undoubted information of an immediate attack by the enemy, and of the purpose entertained by General Butler to re-enforce the navy by a detachment of land troops, as well as the direct approval of this purpose by Admiral Farragut as commander of the naval forces in the Gulf, it would have been inexcusable, if not criminal, had I declined to maintain the occupation of so important a position, when so slight a force was required, upon the ground that it was not contemplated or provided for in my instructions.

I regard the loss of Galveston, in its consequences, though not in the incidents immediately attending its capture, as the most unfortunate affair that occurred in the department during my command. Galveston, as a military position, was next in importance to New Orleans or Mobile.

The defensive positions of the enemy in the department were Port Hudson, on the Mississippi, which was strongly fortified and held by a force of not less than eighteen thousand (18,000) men. On the Atchafalaya, the water communications towards Red river were defended by strong works at *Butte à la Rose*, and on Bayou Teche by strong land fortifications near Pattersonville, called Fort Bisland, extending from Grand lake, on the right, to impassable swamps on the left of the Teche bayou.

*Butte à la Rose* was defended by the gunboats of the enemy and a garrison of 300 to 500 men; and Fort Bisland, on the Teche, by a force of 12,000 to 15,000 men, distributed from Berwick's bay to Alexandria and Grand Ecore, on Red river. These positions covered every line of communication to the Red river country and the Upper Mississippi.

The first object was to reduce the works at Port Hudson. This could be done by an attack directly upon the fortifications, or by getting possession of the Red river for the purpose of cutting off supplies received by the garrison from that country.

My command, upon my arrival at New Orleans, with the troops that accompanied me, was less than thirty thousand (30,000.) There were fifty-six regiments, of which twenty-two regiments were enlisted for nine months only, the terms of service of a part expiring in May, a part in July, and all in August. None of the regiments or men had seen service, and few had even handled a musket.

The military positions held by our forces extended from the Floridas to western Texas, on the Gulf, and upon the Mississippi, from its mouth to Port Hudson; Key West, Pensacola, and Ship island, on the Gulf, were strongly garrisoned, and threatened constantly with attack by the enemy. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and English Bend, on the lower river; New Orleans, Bonne Carre, Donaldsonville, Plaquemine, and Baton Rouge, on the upper river; and Forts Pike and Macomb, on Lake Pontchartrain, leading to the Gulf, and Berwick's bay, were open to the incursions of the enemy, and necessarily strongly held by our forces. None of these could be evacuated, except the town of Pensacola, leaving a garrison in the permanent works at the navy yard.

All these positions were constantly threatened by an active and powerful enemy, who could concentrate his strength at any time and at any point he pleased. That at Galveston had been captured by a force of not less than twenty-four men to one. It was deemed inexpedient, with but slight knowledge of the condition of affairs, in the absence of any absolute necessity, to greatly weaken or expose any position then in our possession.

After garrisoning these numerous posts, the strongest force I could command for permanent offensive operations against Port Hudson did not exceed twelve or fourteen thousand. It was impossible to attack so strong a position, garrisoned by a force so much larger, with any chance of success. Attention was therefore turned west of the Mississippi, to the Atchafalaya and Teche, with a view of getting command of these waters; by which our gunboats could reach Red river and communicate with the forces, naval and military, at Vicksburg, and cut off the supplies of the enemy west of the Mississippi. The first effort to accomplish this was made in an unsuccessful endeavor to open the Bayou Plaquemine, which communicated with the Atchafalaya near Butte à la Rose.

The command of Brigadier General Weitzel, on Berwick's bay, had been increased the first and second week in January to 4,500 men, with a view to operations upon the Teche, for the purpose of destroying the works and dispersing the forces of the enemy on that bayou. On the 11th of January he made a successful invasion of the Teche country, repulsed the forces of the enemy, and destroyed the gunboat Cotton. This relieved Berwick's bay from the danger of an attack by the enemy's most formidable gunboat, in case our forces, naval and military, moved up the Atchafalaya towards Butte à la Rose. An attempt was then made to get possession of Butte à la Rose by combining the command of Weitzel moving up the Atchafalaya with that of General Emory moving from the Mississippi by Bayou Plaquemine, their forces joining near Butte à la Rose. This attempt failed on account of the complete stoppage of Bayou Plaquemine by three years' accumulation of drift-logs and snags, filling the bayou from the bed of the stream to the surface, rendering it impenetrable to our boats, and requiring the labor of months to open it for navigation. The troops were engaged in this work during the month of February, 1863.

During these operations on the Bayou Plaquemine and the Atchafalaya news was received of the capture by the enemy of the steamers Queen of the West and De Soto, which had run past the batteries of Vicksburg. This event was deemed of sufficient importance by Admiral Farragut to demand the occupation of the Mississippi, between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, by running the batteries on the river at Port Hudson, in order to destroy these boats and cut off the enemy's communication by Red river with Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thus accomplishing by a swifter course the object of our campaign west of the river. The army was called upon to make a demonstration against the fortifications at Port Hudson, while the fleet should run the batteries upon the river. All the disposable force of the department was moved to Baton Rouge, for this purpose, early in March. On the 13th of March the troops moved out to the rear of Port Hudson, about 12,000 strong. The pickets of the enemy were encountered

near Baton Rouge, and a considerable force in the vicinity of Port Hudson, which was quickly driven in. The army reached the rear of the works on the night of the 14th, and made a demonstration as for an attack the next morning.

The arrangement between the admiral and myself was, that the passage of the batteries by the navy should be attempted in "the gray of the morning," the army making a simultaneous attack on the fortifications in the rear. But affairs appearing to be more favorable for the fleet than was anticipated, the object was accomplished in the evening and during the night of the 14th of March.

Naval history scarcely presents a more brilliant act than the passage of these formidable batteries. The army returned to Baton Rouge the next day, the object of the expedition having been announced in general order, as completely accomplished. Our loss in this affair was very slight, the enemy not resisting us with any determination until we were in the vicinity of their outer works. Colonel John S. Clark, of my staff, received a wound while closely reconnoitering the position of the enemy, which disabled him from further participation in the campaign.

Pending these general movements, a force under command of Colonel Thomas S. Clark, of the 6th Michigan volunteers, was sent out from New Orleans to destroy the bridge at Ponchatoula, and a small force under Colonel F. S. Nickerson, of the 14th Maine volunteers, to destroy the enemy's communications by the Jackson railroad and the bridges on the Amite river. Both these objects were successfully accomplished.

Endeavors were made at this time to collect at Baton Rouge a sufficient force to justify an attack upon Port Hudson either by assault or siege; but the utmost force that could be collected for this purpose did not exceed 12,000 or 14,000 thousand men. To withdraw the force of Weitzel from Berwick's bay would open the Lafourche country to the enemy, who had 10,000 or 15,000 men upon the Teche, and the withdrawal of the forces from New Orleans would expose that city to the assault of the enemy from every point.

The strength of the enemy at Port Hudson was then believed to be from 18,000 to 20,000. It is now known with absolute certainty that the garrison, on the night of March 14, 1863, was not less than 16,000 effective troops. The statement of the general-in-chief of the army, in his report of November 15, 1863, that, had our forces invested Port Hudson at this time, it could have been easily reduced, as its garrison was weak, was without any just foundation. Information received from Brigadier General W. N. R. Beall, one of the officers in command of Port Hudson at that time, as well as from other officers, justifies this opinion. It was inadvisable, therefore, to make an attack upon Port Hudson, either by assault or siege, with any expectation of a successful issue. Operations, therefore, on the waters west of the Mississippi were immediately resumed.

While at Baton Rouge an attempt was made to force a passage to the upper river, across a point of land opposite Port Hudson. This was successfully accomplished after some days, but without establishing communication with the admiral, who had moved to the mouth of Red river. In one of these expeditions the rebel signal officer and a party of his men were taken prisoners opposite Port Hudson.

Orders were given on the 25th of March to take up the line of march for Brashear city. The rebel steamers Queen of the West and Webb were reported at Butte à la Rose, on the Atchafalaya, and it was understood that the enemy, supposing my command to be fixed at Port Hudson, threatened to move at once upon the Lafourche and New Orleans. Weitzel reached Brashear city on the 8th of April from New Orleans, and Grover and Emory on the 9th and 10th from Port Hudson. They commenced crossing Berwick's bay on the 9th. It was a very slow process on account of the want of transportation, but Weitzel and

Emory succeeded in crossing by dark on the 10th, their transportation and supplies being sent over the same night and the following morning. General Grover arrived on the 10th, in the evening, and his command was immediately put on board the transports and sent up the Atchafalaya and Grand lake to turn the enemy's position by landing his force at Indian Bend, above Fort Bisland. It was estimated that his landing and movement would require about twelve hours, but the difficulties of navigating unknown rivers made his voyage longer than was anticipated. His boats could not come within a mile and a quarter of the shore on account of shoal water, and he was obliged to use flatboats to land his men and artillery. After Grover's departure we advanced directly upon Franklin, a distance of twenty miles, encountering small bodies of the enemy during the march. On the 13th we had advanced to within four hundred yards of his works, on both sides of the Bayou Teche, driving him to his fortifications, and destroying the gunboat Diana, which he had captured from us a short time before. This battle lasted the whole day. We captured many prisoners. Our troops were ready for an assault upon the works in the evening, but, it not being certain that Grover had reached the position assigned him for the purpose of intercepting the retreat of the enemy, it was deferred until the morning of the 14th. During the night the enemy learning Grover's successful landing, sent a strong force to attack him at Irish Bend. The fight was very severe. The enemy was defeated, but Grover was unable to get into such position as to cut off his retreat. Early the following morning the balance of the enemy's forces evacuated Fort Bisland, which was immediately occupied by our troops, and we pursued the enemy with great vigor, capturing many prisoners. The enemy's forces were commanded by Generals Taylor, Sibley, and Mouton. They retreated towards Opelousas, making a strong resistance at Vermillion bayou, from which position they were quickly driven. The gunboats, in the mean time, had encountered the steamer Queen of the West on Grand lake, destroying her, and capturing her officers and crew.

We reached Opelousas on the 20th of April, the enemy retreating towards Alexandria in disorder, and destroying the bridges in his flight. The same day the gunboats, under command of Lieutenant Commander A. P. Cooke, assisted by four companies of infantry, captured the works at Butte à la Rose, which contained two heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition, and were garrisoned by a force of sixty men, all of whom were captured. These works constituted the *key* of the Atchafalaya, and being in our possession, opened the way to Red river.

On the 2d of May we established communication with Admiral Farragut at the mouth of Red river, through the Atchafalaya, by the gunboat Arizona, Captain Upton commanding, accompanied by Captain R. T. Dunham, of my staff. The 5th of May our headquarters at Opelousas were broken up, and the troops moved for Alexandria, a distance of from ninety to one hundred miles, making this march in three days and four hours. Moving rapidly to the rear of Fort DeRussy, a strong work on Red river, we compelled the immediate evacuation of that post by the enemy, and enabled the fleet of gunboats under Admiral Porter to pass up to Alexandria without firing a gun. The army reached Alexandria the 9th of May, in the evening, the navy having reached there the morning of the same day. The enemy continued his retreat in the direction of Shreveport.

In order to completely disperse the forces of the enemy, a force under Generals Weitzel and Dwight pursued him nearly to Grand Ecore, so thoroughly dispersing his forces that he was unable to reorganize a respectable army until July, more than five weeks after we had completed the investment of Port Hudson.

During these operations on the Teche we captured over twenty-five hundred prisoners and twenty-two guns; destroyed three gunboats and eight steamers;

captured large quantities of small-arms, ammunition, mails, and other public property, and the steamers *Ellen* and *Cornie*, which were of great service to us in the campaign. A letter from General Taylor, commanding at Fort Bisland, was captured from an officer of the *Queen of the West*, which informed us that the enemy had contemplated an attack upon our forces at Brashear city on the 12th of April, the day before the assault was made by us upon Fort Bisland; and a subsequent despatch from Governor Moore to General Taylor was intercepted by General Dwight, in which Taylor was directed, in case he was pursued beyond Alexandria, to fall back into Texas with such of his forces as he could keep together.

The purpose of the enemy in retreating up the Teche was to draw off towards Texas, on our left flank, for the purpose of cutting off our supplies by the Teche. But the capture of *Butte à la Rose* enabled us to open a new line of communication, through the *Atchafalaya* and *Bayou Courtableu*, direct to Washington and *Barre's* landing, within six miles of *Opelousas*, and upon reaching Alexandria we were enabled to establish a third line of communication by the *Atchafalaya* and *Red* rivers. These were interior waters, wholly inaccessible to the enemy, and made perfectly safe lines of communication during our occupation of that country.

While at Brashear city I received a despatch from Admiral Farragut, by Mr. Gabaudan, his secretary, informing me that General Grant would send 20,000 men by the 1st of May, through the *Tensas*, *Black*, and *Red* rivers, for the purpose of uniting with us in the reduction of Port Hudson. It was felt that this re-enforcement was necessary, and would secure the speedy reduction of that position. On reaching Alexandria I received two despatches from General Grant, one dated the 23d of April, stating that he could spare us a re-enforcement of 20,000 men if we could supply them; and the other, dated the 5th of May, proposing to send one army corps to *Bayou Sara* by the 25th of May, and asking that I should send all the troops I could spare to *Vicksburg*, after the reduction of Port Hudson. To both of these plans I consented, and answered that we could supply them from *New Orleans*, and that this force would insure the capture of Port Hudson. But I was afterwards informed by a despatch, dated May 10, which I received May 12, that he had crossed the *Mississippi*, landing his forces at *Grand Gulf*, and was then in close pursuit of the enemy under such circumstances that he could not retrace his steps nor send me the forces he had contemplated, and requesting me to join his command at *Vicksburg*. This change in his plans was a cause of serious embarrassment. There were three courses open to my command: 1st, to pursue the enemy to *Shreveport*, which would be without material advantage, as his army had been captured or completely routed; 2d, to join General Grant at *Vicksburg*; 3d, to invest Port Hudson with such forces as I had at my command. It was impossible for me to move my forces to General Grant, at *Vicksburg*, for want of sufficient water transportation. I had barely steamers enough to put my troops across *Berwick's* bay and the *Atchafalaya*; and on the morning after the passage of the bay, when our forces had turned the enemy's position, and the troops under *Emory* and *Weitzel* had advanced directly upon his works, there was not a single boat of any kind left with which I could communicate with Brashear city across the bay. It seemed impossible for me at that time to transport any considerable portion of my troops and artillery to General Grant, without leaving my trains and six thousand fugitive negroes, who had come within our lines, to the chances of capture by the enemy. Besides, it was perfectly clear that, in the event of the movement of my forces to *Vicksburg*, unless that post should immediately fall, the rebel garrison at Port Hudson, then sixteen to eighteen thousand strong, would prevent our communication with *New Orleans*, and, in the event of any disaster by which we should be detained at *Vicksburg*, would hold that city at its mercy. The force west



of the Mississippi, which I had dispersed, would reorganize with re-enforcements from Texas, and move directly upon the Lafourche and Algiers, opposite New Orleans, both of which were nearly defenceless. This was so apparent that I felt that a compliance with the request of General Grant would result in the loss of my trains, the recapture of the negroes who were following the army, and the probable loss of New Orleans.

This conclusion was justified by the subsequent invasion and occupation of the west bank of the river, and a most desperate attack by the Louisiana and Texas forces, 12,000 strong, on the works at Donaldsonville, the 28th of June.

I therefore concluded to move immediately against Port Hudson, and to take my chances for the reduction of that post. To avoid mistake, I directed Brigadier General Wm. Dwight to report our condition to General Grant in person, and solicit his counsel. General Dwight returned with the advice that I attack Port Hudson without delay, and that General Grant would send me 5,000 men, but that I should not wait for them.

My command moved from Alexandria on the 14th and 15th of May, a portion going down Red river, and the remainder marching by land to Simmsport, crossing the Atchafalaya at that point with great difficulty by means of our transports and the steamers we had captured, and from thence down the right bank of the Mississippi to Bayou Sara, crossing the Mississippi at that point on the night of the 23d, and moving directly upon the enemy's works at Port Hudson, a distance of fifteen miles, on the 24th of May.

Major General C. C. Augur, commanding the forces at Baton Rouge, (about 3,500 men,) had been directed to effect a junction with our forces in the rear of Port Hudson. He encountered the enemy at Plain's store, about four miles from Port Hudson, repulsing him with a loss of 150 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and effected a junction with the rest of our forces on the 25th. Our right wing, under Generals Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight, (who had succeeded General Emory,) encountered the enemy outside of his works on the afternoon of the 24th, and, after a very sharp fight, drove him to his outer line of intrenchments. On the 25th, the junction of all the forces having been completed, the works of the enemy were invested.

Preparations were immediately made for an assault. Rumors had been circulated for several days previous that the enemy had abandoned the position, and it was impossible to obtain definite information of his strength. It was generally supposed, however, that the force had been greatly diminished, and that an assault would result in its capture. A very thorough preparation was made on the 25th and 26th, and on the 27th of May a desperate attack upon the works was made—Generals Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight commanding our right, General Augur the centre, and General T. W. Sherman the left. The plan of attack contemplated simultaneous movements on the right and left of our lines.

The attack upon the right commenced with vigor early in the morning. Had the movement upon the left been executed at the same time, it is possible the assault might have been successful. But the garrison was much stronger than had been represented, and the enemy was found able to defend his works at all points. The conduct of the troops was admirable, and most important advantages were gained, which contributed to the success of all subsequent movements.

At one time our advance had reached the interior line of the enemy, but were unable to hold the position. Nothing but the assault would have satisfied the troops of the presence or strength of the enemy and his works. Our loss in this engagement was 293 killed and 1,549 wounded. We were unable to estimate with accuracy the loss of the enemy, but it was very severe. In one regiment, the 15th Arkansas, out of 292 officers and men, the loss sustained during the siege, according to a history of the defence by a rebel officer, was 132, of whom 76 fell on the 27th of May. The force of the enemy within the forti-

fications numbered from seven to eight thousand, with two thousand five hundred cavalry in our rear at Clinton, and a small force on the west side of the river, commanding a point opposite the enemy's batteries, making altogether between ten and eleven thousand men immediately engaged in the defence of the positions inside and outside the works. The operations in the Teche country, with the losses sustained in battle, and sickness occasioned by rapid and exhausting marches, had reduced my effective force to less than thirteen thousand, including Augur's command. Of these, 20 regiments were nine-months men whose terms began to expire in May, and all expired in August. This was not an adequate force for the capture of the place. There ought not to have been less than three to one for this purpose. The force that we had anticipated receiving from General Grant, promised in the several communications to which I have referred, would have enabled us on the 27th, beyond any question, to have completed the capture of the works and garrison, when we could have immediately moved to Vicksburg, to aid him in his attack on that place, without exposing New Orleans or any other post on the Lower Mississippi to capture by the enemy.

On the night of the 27th the army rested within rifle-shot of the enemy's works, and commenced the construction of works of defence. The enemy's interior line extended from four to five miles, from river to river. The line occupied by us necessarily covered from seven to eight miles. Our greater length of line made the enemy equal, if not superior in numbers, in any attack that could be made by us upon them.

From the night of the 27th of May until the 14th of June we occupied this line. Another partially successful assault was then made. An incessant and harassing fire was kept up against the enemy night and day from the 27th of May, leaving him without rest or sleep. On the 10th of June a heavy artillery fire was maintained through the day, and at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, we endeavored to get within attacking distance of the works, in order to avoid the terrible losses incurred in moving over the ground in front, but the enemy discovered the movement before daybreak. A portion of the troops worked their way through the abatis to the lines, but were repulsed with the loss of several prisoners.

On the 14th of June a second general assault was made at daybreak. A division was posted on the left, under General Dwight, with the intention of forcing an entrance into the works by passing the ravine, while the main attack on the right was made by the commands of Grover and Weitzel. Neither column was successful in fully gaining its object, but our lines were advanced from a distance of three hundred yards to less than fifty yards at some points from the enemy's line of fortifications, where the troops intrenched themselves and commenced the construction of new batteries. On the left an eminence was gained which commanded a strong position held by the enemy, called the "citadel," and which later enabled us to get possession of a point on the same bluff upon which the citadel was constructed, within ten yards of the enemy's lines. This day's work was of great importance, but it was now felt that our force was unequal to the task of carrying the works by assault, and the slower but more certain operations of the siege were vigorously commenced.

The fighting had been incessant for a period of twenty-one days and nights, giving the enemy neither rest nor sleep. During these operations many of the nine-months men whose terms had expired, or were about to expire, were dissatisfied with their situation, and unwilling to enter upon duty involving dangers. Great embarrassment and trouble were caused by the conduct of some of these troops. One regiment, the 4th Massachusetts, was nearly in open mutiny.

The siege operations were pursued with the greatest vigor. On the right we had completed our saps up to the very line of the enemy's fortifications. On the

left a mine had been completed, for thirty barrels of powder, in such position as made the destruction of the "citadel" inevitable.

Communication had been regular with General Grant at Vicksburg during the progress of the siege, and on the 6th of July we received information of the surrender of that post. Major General Frank Gardiner, in command of the post, asked for an official statement of the capture of Vicksburg, which had been circulated throughout his command, and I sent him a copy of that portion of the official despatch of General Grant relating to the surrender of Vicksburg, and received on the night of the 6th of July a request that there might be a cessation of hostilities with a view to an agreement of terms of surrender. This was declined. He then made known officially his determination to surrender the post and garrison. A conference was appointed to agree upon the terms, which resulted in the unconditional surrender of the works and garrison, formally executed on the 8th of July, and our troops entered and took possession of the works on the morning of the 9th. General Gardiner, in commending the gallantry of his men, for their unwearied labors in the defence, which all our troops readily acknowledged, stated emphatically, as if he desired it to be understood, that his surrender was not on account of the fall of Vicksburg, or the want of ammunition or provisions, but from the exhaustion of his men, who had been without rest for more than six weeks, and who could not successfully resist another attack. Though they might have held out a day or two longer, the attempt would have been at the expense of a useless effusion of blood.

During the investment and siege of Port Hudson, the enemy west of the Mississippi had been concentrating their forces from Texas and Arkansas, and on the 18th of June one regiment of infantry and two of cavalry, under command of Colonel Major, captured and burned two small steamers at Plaquemine, taking 68 prisoners, mostly convalescents, of the 28th Maine volunteers. The same force then passed down the river and Bayou Lafourche, flanking Donaldsonville, and attacked our forces on the 20th at Lafourche crossing, on the Opelousas railway, cutting off communication between Brashear city and New Orleans. They were sharply repulsed, but renewed their attack the 21st, which resulted in their again being repulsed, leaving 53 of their dead upon the field and 16 prisoners in our hands. Our loss was 8 killed and 16 wounded. Re-enforcements were sent from New Orleans, but the enemy did not renew the attack. Our forces were under command of Lieutenant Colonel Albert Stickney, 47th Massachusetts volunteers; subsequently they fell back to Algiers. Orders had been sent to Brashear city to remove all stores, but to hold the position, with the aid of the gunboats, to the last. The enemy succeeded in crossing Grand lake by means of rafts, and surprised and captured the garrison on the 22d of June, consisting of about 300 men. Two thirty-pounder Parrott guns and six twenty-four pounders were captured. The enemy, greatly strengthened in numbers, then attacked the works at Donaldsonville, on the Mississippi, which were defended by a garrison of 225 men, including convalescents, commanded by Major J. D. Bullen, 28th Maine volunteers. The attack was made on the morning of the 28th of June, and lasted until daylight. The garrison made a splendid defence, killing and wounding more than their own number, and capturing as many officers and nearly as many men as their garrison numbered. The enemy's troops were under command of General Greene, of Texas, and consisted of the Louisiana troops under General Taylor and 5,000 Texas cavalry, making a force of nine to twelve thousand in that vicinity. The troops engaged in these different operations left but four hundred men for the defence of New Orleans. The vigor and strength of the enemy in these several attacks show that if he had been supported by the troops at Port Hudson, about 10,000, New Orleans could not have been defended, had my command been involved in the operations against Vicksburg.

Upon the surrender of Port Hudson it was found that the enemy had established

batteries below, on the river, cutting off our communication with New Orleans, making it necessary to send a large force to dislodge them. The troops, exhausted by the labors of the long campaign, including nine-months men and the regiments of colored troops which had been organized during the campaign, from the negroes of the country, did not number 10,000 effective men. It was impossible to drive the enemy from the river below, and leave troops enough at Port Hudson to maintain the position and guard between 6,000 and 7,000 prisoners. For these reasons the privates were paroled, and the officers sent to New Orleans.

On the 9th of July seven transports, containing all my available force, were sent below against the enemy in the vicinity of Donaldsonville. The country was speedily freed from his presence, and Brashear city was recaptured on the 22d July.

During the siege the colored troops held the extreme right of our line on the river, and shared in all the honors of the 27th of May and the 14th of June, sustaining at other times several desperate sorties of the enemy, particularly directed against them, with bravery and success. The new regiments of General Ullman's brigade, which had been raised during the campaign, also shared the labors of the siege, and the honors of the final victory.

Colonel B. F. Grierson, commanding the 6th and 7th regiments of Illinois cavalry, arrived at Baton Rouge in April, from La Grange, Tennessee, and joined us with his force at Port Hudson, covering our rear during the siege, and rendering most important services. His officers and men were constantly on duty, regardless of toil and danger. They covered our foraging parties, dispersed the cavalry forces of the enemy, and contributed in a great degree to the reduction of the post. Our deficiency in cavalry made his assistance of the utmost importance. With the exception of this command, much reduced by long marches, our mounted force consisted chiefly of infantry mounted on the horses of the country collected during the campaign.

The co-operation of the fleet under Rear-Admiral Farragut on the waters west of the Mississippi, as well as at Port Hudson, was harmonious and effective, and contributed greatly to the success of our arms. A land battery of heavy guns was established in the rear of the works by one of the officers of the navy, the fire of which was most constant and effective.

The signal corps under command of Captain Rowley, and subsequently under Captain Roe, and the telegraphic corps under Captain Bulkeley, rendered every assistance possible to these branches of the service. By means of signals and telegraphs a perfect communication was maintained at all times, night and day, between the naval and military forces, and with the different portions of the army.

The rebels admitted, after the close of the siege, that they had lost in killed and wounded during the siege 610 men; but they underrated the prisoners and guns they surrendered, and their loss in killed and wounded was much larger than was admitted by them. It could not have been less than 800 or 1,000. Five hundred wounded men were found in the hospitals. The wounds were mostly in the head from the fire of sharpshooters, and very severe. A small portion of the rebels composing the garrison at Port Hudson were ordered to Vicksburg to strengthen the command of General Pemberton subsequent to the attack in March.

This gave rise to the report that the place had been evacuated, and it was only after the unsuccessful assaults of the 27th of May and the 14th of June that the strength of the fortifications and garrison was appreciated, and all parties were satisfied that our force was insufficient to effect the capture by assault.

The uncertainty as to the movements of Johnston's army which was known to be in the rear of Vicksburg, and the constant expectation that some part of

his force would attack us in the rear, made it necessary that every consideration should be disregarded which involved the loss of time in our operations, and the general systematic attacks upon the works of the enemy were executed at the earliest possible moment after the necessary preparations had been made.

The siege lasted forty-five days, of which twenty-one days was incessant fighting. It was conducted constantly with a view to the capture of the garrison, as well as the reduction of the post.

When the proposition of General Gardiner to suspend hostilities with a view to consider terms of surrender was received there were 6,408 officers and men on duty within the lines, 2,500 in the rear of the besieging forces and on the west bank of the river opposite Port Hudson, and 12,000 men under Generals Greene and Taylor between Port Hudson and Donaldsonville, who had, by establishing their batteries on the west bank of the river, effectually cut off our communication with New Orleans: making 21,000 men actively engaged in raising the siege at the time of its surrender.

The besieging force was reduced to less than 10,000 men, of whom more than half were enlisted for nine months' service, and including the regiments of colored troops organized since the campaign opened from the material gathered from the country. The position assailed, from the natural defences of the country, as well as from the character of the works constructed, was believed by the enemy to be impregnable. The besieging army, to reach the position, had marched more than 500 miles through a country where no single line of supplies could be maintained, against a force fully equal in numbers, fighting only in intrenchments, and gathering material for reinforcing its regiments in the country through which we passed. There are but few sieges in the history of war in which the disparity of forces has been more marked, the difficulties to be encountered more numerous, the victory more decided, or the results more important.

Every officer and man who discharged his duty in that campaign, whether living or dead, will leave an honored name to his descendants, and receive hereafter, if not now, the grateful and well-merited applause of his country.

The result of the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson were the permanent separation of the rebel States east and west, and the free navigation of the Mississippi; thus opening communication between the northern and southern States occupied by our forces, and an outlet for the products of the Upper Mississippi valley to the markets of the world.

The two armies that had fought each other with such resolute determination fraternized on the day of the surrender without manifestations of hostility or hatred. A common valor had given birth to a feeling of mutual respect.

Brigadier General T. W. Sherman was seriously wounded in the assault of the 27th May, and Brigadier General Paine on the 14th of June. Among those killed during the siege were Colonel Bean, of the 14th Wisconsin, Colonel Holcomb, of the 1st Louisiana, Colonel D. S. Cowles, of the 128th New York, Lieutenant Colonel Rodman, of the 38th Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Lowell, of the 8th New Hampshire, Colonel Smith, of the 160th New York zouaves, Colonel Chapin, of the ——— Massachusetts, Major Hafkill and Captain Luce, of the engineers, Lieutenant Wrotnowski, and many other gallant officers, whose names, in the absence of official records, it is not in my power to give, who gave their lives to the cause of liberty and their country.

In this campaign we captured 10,584 prisoners, as follows: Paroled men at Port Hudson, exclusive of the sick and wounded, 5,953; officers, 455; captured by Grierson at Jackson, 150; 1st and 15th Arkansas regiments, captured May 27th, 101; on board steamers in Thompson's creek 25; deserters 350; sick and wounded 1,000; captured at Donaldsonville 28th of June, 150; captured west of the Mississippi, 2,500; in all 10,584, a number fully equal to the force

to which the enemy surrendered. We also captured 73 guns; 4,500 pounds of powder; 150,000 rounds of ammunition; 6,000 small-arms; 4 steamers; 20,000 head of horses, cattle and mules, and 10,000 bales of cotton. We destroyed the enemy's salt works at New Iberia, 3 gunboats, and 8 steam transports. The cattle, horses, mules, cotton, and other products of the country were sent to New Orleans, turned over to the quartermaster, and, except such as could be used by the army in kind, were applied to the support of the government.

The 5th of August a despatch was received and published from the general-in-chief of the army, congratulating the troops on the success of the campaign, for whom was reserved the honor of striking the last blow for the freedom of the Mississippi river, and expressing the belief that the country, and especially the great west, would ever remember with gratitude their services.

## II.—CAMPAIGN IN TEXAS.

After the surrender of Port Hudson I joined with General Grant in recommending an immediate movement against the city of Mobile. My views upon the question were expressed in several despatches in July and August. With such aid as General Grant had offered, and subsequently gave me, a speedy capture of that city seemed to be reasonably certain.

On the 15th of August, 1863, I was informed by a despatch dated the 6th of that month that there were important reasons why our flag should be re-established in Texas with the least possible delay, and instructing me that the movement should be made as speedily as possible, either by sea or land. I was informed by a despatch dated the 12th of August, and which I received on the 27th of August, that the importance of the operations proposed by me in previous despatches against the city of Mobile was fully appreciated, but there were reasons other than military why those directed in Texas should be undertaken first; that on this matter there was no choice, and that the views of the government must be carried out. I was advised, in a despatch dated the 10th of August, that the restoration of the flag to some one point in Texas could be best effected by the combined naval and military movements upon Red river to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the occupation of northern Texas. This line was recommended as superior for military operations to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola, but the final selection was left to my judgment.

The difficulties attending a movement in the direction of Shreveport—a route which had been thoroughly explored in the spring campaign of 1863—satisfied me that it was impracticable, if not impossible, for the purposes entertained by the government. The selection of the line of operations having been submitted to me, I made immediate preparations for a movement by the coast against Houston, selecting the position occupied by the enemy on the Sabine as the point of attack. This point was nearest to my base of supplies. It was immediately connected by the Gulf with Berwick's bay, of which we had full possession, and by the river—and also by railway from the bay—with New Orleans.

If suddenly occupied, I regarded it certain—as the enemy's forces were then disposed—that we could concentrate and move upon Houston by land with fifteen to seventeen thousand (15,000 to 17,000) men before it would be possible for the enemy to collect his forces for its defence. The occupation of Houston would place in our hands the control of all the railway communications of Texas; give us command of the most populous and productive part of the State; enable us to move at any moment into the interior in any direction, or to fall back upon the island of Galveston, which could be maintained with a very small force, holding the enemy upon the coast of Texas, and leaving the

army of the Gulf free to move upon Mobile in accordance with my original plan, or wherever it should be required.

The expedition sailed from New Orleans on the 5th day of September. Its organization and command had been intrusted to Major General W. B. Franklin. The gunboats assigned to the expedition by Admiral Farragut were under command of Captain Crocker, a skilful and brave officer. He was thoroughly acquainted with the waters of Sabine pass, having been stationed there for many months, and was anxious to participate in the expedition. The forces were organized for operations upon land. The gunboats were intended to assist and cover their debarcation and movements upon the coast. At various points between the Sabine and Galveston a landing was practicable and safe. Unless the weather or the forces of the enemy should intervene, nothing could prevent a successful debarcation of troops at some point upon that coast.

General Franklin's instructions were verbal and written. He was expected to land his troops ten or twelve miles below Sabine pass, or at some other point on the coast below, and proceed by a rapid movement against the fortifications constructed for the defence of the pass, unless the naval officers should find upon reconnoissance that the works were unoccupied, or that they were able to take them without delay. Nothing was wanting to secure the success of the expedition. The troops were in good condition, the weather fine, the sea smooth, and the enemy without suspicion of the movement. Instead, however, of moving below the pass and effecting a landing of the troops, General Franklin states in his report that it was determined that Captain Crocker should enter the pass and make an attack directly upon the works. The gunboats (originally lightly constructed merchant vessels) were unable to make any impression upon the works. They soon ran aground in the shallow water and narrow channel of the pass, under the guns of the fort, and were compelled to surrender. The enemy's position was occupied and defended by less than a hundred men. The troops under General Franklin made an unsuccessful and, as it appeared afterwards, a feeble effort to land within the bay, after the loss of two of the gunboats, and returned to New Orleans without attempting a landing below upon the coast in rear of the works. Had a landing been effected, even after the loss of the boats, in accordance with the original plan, the success of the movement would have been complete, both as it regarded the occupation of Sabine pass and operations against Houston and Galveston. The enemy had at this time all his forces in that quarter, and less than a hundred men on the Sabine.

The failure of this expedition having notified the enemy of our purposes, it was impracticable to repeat the attempt at that point. The instructions of the government being imperative, I then endeavored, without delay, to carry out its purposes by a movement towards Alexandria and Shreveport, or, if possible, across the southern part of Louisiana, to Niblett's bluff. The attack upon Sabine pass was made on the 8th of September. The fleet returned on the 11th. On the 13th, orders were given for the overland movement. The troops were rapidly transferred to the Teche bayou and organized for this expedition; but it was soon found impracticable, if not impossible, to enter Texas in that direction. The country between the Teche and the Sabine was without supplies of any kind, and entirely without water, and the march across that country, of three hundred miles, with wagon transportation alone, where we were certain to meet the enemy in full force, was necessarily abandoned. A movement in the direction of Alexandria and Shreveport was equally impracticable. The route lay over a country utterly destitute of supplies, which had been repeatedly overrun by the two armies, and which involved a march of five hundred miles from New Orleans and nearly four hundred miles from Berwick's bay, with wagon transportation only, through a country without water, forage, or supplies, mostly upon a single road, very thickly wooded, and occupied by a thoroughly hostile population.

Being satisfied that it was impracticable to execute the orders of the government by this route for these reasons, which were stated in my several despatches, I decided, as the only alternative left me for the execution of the orders of the government, to attempt the occupation of the Rio Grande, which I had suggested on the 13th of September as an alternative, if the land route was found impracticable. Leaving the troops opposite Berwick's bay upon the land route into Texas, I organized a small expedition, the troops being placed under command of Major General N. J. T. Dana, and sailed on the 26th of October, 1863, for the Rio Grande. A landing was effected at Brazos Santiago, which was occupied by the enemy's cavalry and artillery, the 2d day of November. The enemy was driven from his position the next day, and the troops ordered forward to Brownsville, thirty miles from the mouth of the river. Colonel Dye of the 94th Illinois volunteers, commanding the advance, occupied Brownsville on the 6th day of November, where, a few hours after his arrival, I made my headquarters. Major General Dana was left in command of this post. As soon as it was possible to provide for the garrison and obtain transportation for the navigation of the river, which occupied four or five days, I moved with all the troops which could be spared from that point for the purpose of seizing the passes on the coast between the Rio Grande and Galveston, intending to complete my original plan by the occupation of Galveston from the coast below, instead of above that point.

Point Isabel was occupied on the 8th of November. By the aid of steamers obtained on the Rio Grande, with the consent of the Mexican government, we were enabled to transport troops to Mustang island. The troops were under the command of Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom, who carried the enemy's works commanding Aransas pass after a gallant assault, capturing one hundred prisoners and the artillery with which the place was defended. The troops instantly moved from Aransas pass upon Pass Cavallo, commanding the entrance to Matagorda bay, and which was also defended by strong and extensive fortifications and a force of two thousand (2,000) men—artillery, cavalry, and infantry—who could be re-enforced in any emergency from Houston and Galveston. The troops were under command of Major General C. C. Washburn, then commanding the 13th corps. Fort Esperanza was invested, and after a most gallant action the enemy blew up his magazines, partially dismantled his defences, and evacuated the position, the major part of his men escaping to the main land by the peninsula near the mouth of the Brazos.

The occupation of Brownsville, Brazos Santiago, the capture of the works and garrison at Aransas pass, and the defeat of the enemy and the capture of his works at Fort Esperanza by our troops, left nothing on the coast in his possession but the works at the mouth of Brazos river, and on the island of Galveston, which were formidable and defended by all the forces of the enemy in Texas. The command of General Magruder had been withdrawn from different parts of the State, and concentrated on the coast between Houston, Galveston, and Indianola, in consequence of our movements against the works at Sabine pass, the occupation of the Rio Grande, and the capture of the works constructed for the defence of Aransas pass and Pass Cavallo, on the Texas coast. To carry the works at the mouth of Brazos river it was necessary to move inland and to attack the enemy in the rear, in which we necessarily encountered the entire strength of the rebel forces, then greatly superior in numbers to ours. Preparations were made for more extended operations on the main land from Indianola at Matagorda bay, or by the peninsula connecting with the main land at Brazos river, and notice given to the War Department of the plan of operations, with the request for an increase of the forces for extended operations in Texas if it was found expedient. The troops on the Teche, under command of Major General Franklin, would have been transferred to the coast in such force as to make certain the occupation of Houston or Galveston. From this point I



intended to withdraw my troops to the island of Galveston, which could have been held with perfect security by less than a thousand men, which would have left me free to resume operations, suggested in August and September, against Mobile. The Rio Grande and the island of Galveston could have been held with two or three thousand men. This would have cut off the contraband trade of the enemy at Matamoras and on the Texan coast. The forces occupying the island of Galveston could have been strengthened by sea at any moment from Berwick's bay, connecting with New Orleans by railway, or by the river, compelling the enemy to maintain an army near Houston, and preventing his concentrating his forces for the invasion of Louisiana, Arkansas, or Missouri. The occupation of the Rio Grande, Galveston, and Mobile would have led to the capture or destruction of all the enemy's river and sea transportation on the Gulf coast, and left the western Gulf blockading squadron, numbering one hundred and fifty vessels, and mounting 450 guns, free to pursue the pirates that infested our coast and preyed upon our commerce. The army would have been at liberty to operate on the Mississippi, or to co-operate with the army of the Tennessee by the Alabama river and Montgomery, in the campaign against Atlanta. These general views are substantially expressed in my despatches of the 12th and 30th of December, 1863. If successfully accomplished, it would have enabled the government to concentrate the entire forces of the department of the Gulf, as occasion should require, at any point on the river or coast against an enemy without water transportation or other means of operation than by heavy land marches, or to move by land into the rebel States east or west of the Mississippi. The winter months offered a favorable opportunity for such enterprise.

The map No. 1, appended to this report, exhibits the positions occupied on the coast, the intended line of movement in Texas, and the possible or probable co-operation of my command with the armies east of the Mississippi.

### III—RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.

While engaged in earnest efforts to effect the capture of Galveston, with a view to these general operations contemplated for the winter campaign, I was informed by a despatch received January 23, and dated January 11, that "it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river if he could rely upon your (my) co-operation, and be certain of receiving supplies upon that line;" and that "the best military opinions of the generals of the west seemed to favor operations upon Red river, provided the stage of water would enable the gunboats to co-operate;" that "this would open a better theatre of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant could spare during the winter." I was also informed that Major General Grant and Major General Steele had been written to, and I was *instructed to communicate with them upon this subject.*

Having made known my plan of operations on the coast, and fully stated at different times the difficulties to be encountered in movements by land in the direction of Alexandria and Shreveport I did not feel at liberty to decline participation in the campaign which had been pressed upon my attention from the time I was assigned to the command of this department, and which was now supported by the concurrent opinions of the general officers in the west, on account of difficulties which might be obviated by personal conference with commanders, or by orders from the general-in-chief. It was not, however, without well-founded apprehensions of the result of the campaign, and a clear view of the measures (which I suggested) indispensable to success, that I entered upon this new campaign.

The necessity of a perfect unity of command and of purpose, as well as of constant communication between the forces assigned to this duty, and then separated by hundreds of miles, was too apparent to admit of question.

I replied to this despatch on the 23d of January, stating that, "*with the forces proposed,*" to wit, General Sherman and General Steele, and my own disposable force, I concurred in the opinion that the Red river was the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas, and that with my own forces and those of General Steele, and the assistance of General Sherman, the success of the movements on that line might be made certain and important, and that I should cordially co-operate with them in executing the orders of the government.

In order that the inherent difficulties attending the proposed combined movement—which had been thoroughly tested in the campaign of 1863 and 1864, and which I had represented with as much earnestness as seemed to be proper—might be presented in a manner most likely to gain attention, I directed Major D. C. Houston, chief engineer of the department—who possessed the highest claims to favorable consideration from professional qualifications and experience, and his acquaintance with the route—to prepare a memorial upon operations on Red river, which had been long under consideration. This was transmitted to the headquarters of the army, and appeared to have received the attention and approval of the general-in-chief. It stated with precision the obstacles to be encountered, and the measures necessary to accomplish the object in view. No change would be required in this statement if it had been written in review rather than in anticipation of the campaign. It recommended as a condition indispensable to success: 1st, such complete preliminary organization as would avoid the least delay in our movements after the campaign had opened; 2d, that a line of supply be established from the Mississippi independent of water-courses; 3d, the concentration of the forces west of the Mississippi, and such other force as should be assigned to this duty from General Sherman's command, in such a manner as to expel the enemy from northern Louisiana and Arkansas; 4th, such preparation and concert of action among the different corps employed as to prevent the enemy, by keeping him constantly engaged, from operating against our positions or forces elsewhere; and, 5th, that the entire force should be placed under the command of a single general. Preparations for a long campaign were advised, and the month of May indicated as the point of time when the occupation of Shreveport might be anticipated. Not one of these suggestions, so necessary in conquering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, was carried into execution, nor was it in my power to establish them. The troops under command of General Steele were acting independently of my command, under orders not communicated to me, and at such distance that it was impossible to ascertain his movements, or to inform him of my own, so that we might co-operate with or support each other. The detachment of troops from the command of Major General Sherman, though operating upon the same line with my own, were under special orders, having ulterior objects in view, and afforded an earnest but only a partial co-operation in the expedition. The distance which separated the different commands, the impossibility of establishing necessary communications between them, the absence of a general authority to command them, the time that was required for the transmission of orders from Washington, and the necessity of immediate action on account of the condition of the rivers and operations contemplated for the armies elsewhere, gave rise to embarrassments in the organization of forces and in the execution of orders which could not be overcome.

In the instructions I received from the government it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition, but I was directed to communicate with General Sherman, and General Steele, and Admiral Porter upon the subject. I expressed the satisfaction I should find in co-operating with them in a movement deemed of so much importance by the government, to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that *with the forces designated* it would be entirely successful. Having received from them similar

assurances, both my discretion and my authority, so far as the organization of the expedition was concerned, were at an end.

The disposition of the enemy's forces at that time, according to the best information that could be obtained, was as follows: Magruder had about 20,000 men of all arms, of which 15,000 were serviceable. The main body covered Galveston and Houston from an anticipated movement from Matagorda peninsula, still held by our troops; Walker's division, numbering 7,000 men, were upon the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, from Opelousas to Fort DeRussy; Mouton's division, between the Black and Washita rivers, from Red river to Monroe, numbering 6,000 men; while Price, with two heavy divisions of infantry, estimated at 5,000, and a large cavalry force, estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000, held the country from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia, confronting Steele. Magruder could spare 10,000 of his force to resist an attack from the east, leaving his fortifications well garrisoned on the coast, while Price could furnish at least an additional 5,000 from the north, making a formidable army of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, equal to any forces that could be brought against them, even with the most perfect unity and co-operation of commands. This estimate of the strength of the enemy was given in my despatch of February 2, but was thought, upon information received by the government, to be exaggerated. The defences of the enemy consisted of a series of works covering the approaches to Galveston and Houston from the south, the defences of Galveston bay, Sabine Pass, and Sabine river; Fort DeRussy, a formidable work, located three miles from Marksville, for the defence of the Red river, and extensive and formidable works at Trinity, the junction of the Texas and Washita at Camden, commanding approaches from the north.

To meet these forces of the enemy it was proposed to concentrate, in some general plan of operations, 15,000 of the troops under command of General Steele, a detachment of 10,000 from the command of General Sherman, and a force of from 15,000 to 17,000 men from the army of the Gulf, making an army of 40,000 to 42,000 men of all arms, with such gunboats as the Navy Department should order. Orders were given to my command at once to suspend operations at Galveston, and vigorous preparations were made for the new campaign.

Having been charged by the President with duties not immediately connected with military operations, but which were deemed important and required my personal attention at New Orleans, the organization of the troops of my command assigned to the expedition was intrusted to Major General W. B. Franklin. The main body of his command, consisting of the 19th corps—except Grover's division at Madisonville, which was to join him—and one division of the 13th corps, under General Ransom, were at this time on Berwick's bay, between Berwick city and Franklin, on the Bayou Teche, directly on the line of march for Alexandria and Shreveport. Small garrisons were left at Brownsville and Matagorda bay, in Texas—positions which, under instructions from the President and subsequently from Lieutenant General Grant, were not to be abandoned—at New Orleans and at Port Hudson, which was threatened by a vigorous and active enemy. Smaller garrisons at Baton Rouge and Donaldsonville on the river, and at Pensacola and Key West on the coast, constituted the balance of forces under my command.

It had been arranged that the troops concentrated at Franklin should move for the Red river on the 7th of March to meet the forces of General Sherman at Alexandria on the 17th. But, for causes stated by General Franklin, their march was delayed until the 13th, at which time the advance, under General A. L. Lee, left Franklin, the whole column following soon after and arriving at Alexandria, the cavalry on the 19th and the infantry on the 25th.

On the 13th of March, 1864, one division of the 16th corps, under Brigadier

General Mower, and one division of the 17th corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith—the whole under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith—landed at Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya, and proceeded at once towards Fort DeRussy, carrying it by assault at 4.30 p. m. on the afternoon of the 14th. Two hundred and sixty prisoners and ten heavy guns were captured. Our loss was slight. The troops and transports under General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade under General Ellet, with the gunboats, moved to Alexandria, which was occupied without opposition on the 16th of the same month.

General Lee, of my command, arrived at Alexandria on the morning of the 19th. The enemy, in the mean time, continued his retreat in the direction of Shreveport. Officers of my staff were at Alexandria on the 19th, and I made my headquarters there on the 24th, the forces under General Franklin arriving on the 25th and 26th of March; but as the stage of the water in Red river was too low to admit the passage of the gunboats or transports over the falls, the troops encamped near Alexandria, General Smith and his command moving forward 21 miles to Bayou Rapides, above Alexandria. There was but six feet of water in the channel, while  $7\frac{1}{2}$  were necessary for the second class, and ten feet for the first-class gunboats. The river is narrow, the channel tortuous, changing with every rise, making its navigation more difficult and dangerous, probably, than any of the western rivers, while pilots for the transports were reluctant to enter government service for this campaign.

The first gunboat was unable to cross the rapids until the 26th; others crossed on the 28th, with some transports, and others still on the 2d and 3d of April; the passage having been made with difficulty and danger, occupying several days. Several gunboats and transports, being then unable to ascend the river, remained at Alexandria or returned to the Mississippi. While at Alexandria, Major General McPherson, commanding at Vicksburg, called for the immediate return of the marine brigade—a part of General Smith's command—to protect the Mississippi, for which service it had been specially organized. The transports of this brigade were unable to pass above Alexandria. The hospital boat Woodford had been wrecked on the rapids in attempting the passage. The troops were suffering from small-pox, which pervaded all the transports, and they were reported in condition of partial mutiny. It was not supposed at that time that a depot or garrison at Alexandria would be required; and this command, being without available land or water transportation, was permitted to return to the Mississippi, in compliance with the demands of General McPherson; this reduced the strength of the advancing column about 3,000 men.

The condition of the river and the inability of the transports to pass the falls made it necessary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria, and a line of wagon transportation from the steamers below to those above the falls. This was a departure from the plan of the campaign, which did not contemplate a post or depot at any point on Red river, and involved the necessity of leaving a division at Alexandria for the purpose of protecting the depot, transports and supplies. Brigadier General C. Grover was placed in command of the post, and his division left for its defence. This reduced the force of the advancing column about 3,000 men.

While at Alexandria, on the 21st instant, a movement was organized against the enemy posted at Henderson's Hill, 25 miles in advance. The expedition consisted of three brigades of General A. J. Smith's command, and a brigade of cavalry of the 19th corps, under command of Colonel Lucas, of the 16th Indiana volunteers—the whole under the command of Brigadier General Mower, of the 16th corps. The enemy was surprised, losing 250 prisoners, 200 horses and four guns, with their caissons. Colonel H. B. Sargent of my staff was severely wounded in this action, and disabled from service during this campaign. This affair reflected the highest credit upon the officers and men engaged.

Anticipating by a few days the passage of the gunboats, the army marched

from Alexandria for Natchitoches, 80 miles distant by land, reaching that point on the 2d and 3d of April. The enemy continued his retreat, skirmishing sharply with the advanced guard, but offering no serious resistance to our advance.

The shortest and only practicable road from Natchitoches to Shreveport was the stage road through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, distance 100 miles, through a barren sandy country, with little water and less forage, the greater portion an unbroken pine forest.

A reconnoissance from Natchitoches on the 2d of April, under command of General Lee, discovered the enemy in force at Pleasant Hill, 36 miles distant, and established the fact that a portion of Green's command had arrived from Texas and were then confronting us. Prisoners captured from Price's command indicated, what had been feared from the loss of time at Alexandria, a concentration of the entire available force of the enemy, numbering, according to the statements of prisoners and intercepted letters, about 25,000 men with 76 guns.

The river was perceptibly falling and the larger gunboats were unable to pass Grand Ecore. The troops under command of General A. J. Smith had hitherto moved in transports by the river, now marched by land from Natchitoches, with the exception of one division of the 17th corps, 2,500 men, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith, which, by order of General A. J. Smith, continued its movements by the river in company with the fleet, for the protection of the transports. The arrangement of land transportation for this portion of the column, the replenishing of supply trains from the transports, and the distribution of rations to the troops, were made at this point; but the fleet was unable to ascend the river until the 7th of April. The condition of the river would have justified the suspension of the movement altogether at either point, except for the anticipation of such change as to render it navigable. Upon this subject the counsel of the naval officers was implicitly followed.

On the 4th of April Colonel O. P. Gooding, commanding a brigade of cavalry, engaged upon a reconnoissance north of Red river, encountered Harrison's command, 1,500 strong, in which the enemy was defeated with considerable loss. Our loss was about forty in killed, wounded and missing. The enemy's repulse was decisive.

The army was put in motion for Shreveport by the road through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield April 6. General Lee, with the cavalry division, led the advance, followed by a detachment of two divisions of the 13th corps under General Ransom; 1st division, 19th corps, under General Emory, and a brigade of colored troops under command of Colonel Dickie—the whole under the immediate command of Major General Franklin. The detachment of the 16th army corps, under command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith, followed on the 7th, and a division of the 17th army corps, under Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith accompanying Admiral Porter on the river as a guard for the transports.

The fleet was directed to advance to Loggy bayou, opposite Springfield, where it was expected communications would be established with the land forces at Sabine Crossroads, a distance of 54 miles by land from Grand Ecore, and 100 miles by water.

I remained with a portion of my staff to superintend the departure of the river and land forces from Grand Ecore until the morning of the 7th, when the fleet sailed, and then rode rapidly forward, reaching the head of the column at Pleasant Hill the same evening, where the main body encamped. General Smith's command was at the rear of the column on the march, but passed the colored brigade on the route to Pleasant Hill. A very heavy rain fell all day on the 7th, which greatly impeded the movement of the rear of the column, making the road almost impassable for troops, trains or artillery. The storm did not reach the head of the column. In passing the troops from Natchitoches to

Pleasant Hill I endeavored, as much as possible, to accelerate the movements of the rear of the column.

The enemy offered no opposition to their march on the 6th. On the 7th the advance drove a small force to Pleasant Hill, and from thence to Wilson's farm, about three miles beyond, where a sharp fight occurred with the enemy posted in a very strong position, from which they were driven with serious loss and pursued to St. Patrick's bayou, near Carroll's mill, about nine miles from Pleasant Hill, where our forces bivouacked for the night. We sustained in this action a loss of fourteen men killed, thirty-nine wounded, and nine missing. We captured many prisoners, and the enemy sustained severe losses in killed and wounded. During the action, General Lee sent to General Franklin for re-enforcements, and a brigade of infantry was sent forward; but the firing having ceased, it was withdrawn. The officers and men fought with great spirit in this affair.

At daybreak on the 8th General Lee, to whose support a brigade of the 13th corps, under Colonel Landrum, had been sent by my order, advanced upon the enemy, drove him from his position on the opposite side of St. Patrick's bayou and pursued him to Sabine Crossroads, about three miles from Mansfield. The advance was steady but slow, and the resistance of the enemy stubborn. He was only driven from his defensive positions on the road by artillery. At noon on the 8th, another brigade of the 13th corps arrived at the Crossroads under Brigadier General Ransom, to relieve the 1st brigade.

The infantry moved from Pleasant Hill at daybreak on the 8th, the head of of the column halted at St. Patrick's bayou, in order that the rear might come up. I passed General Franklin's headquarters at 10 a. m., giving directions to close up the column as speedily as possible, and rode forward to ascertain the condition of affairs at the front, where I arrived between one and two o'clock. General Ransom arrived nearly at the same time with the 2d brigade 13th corps, which was under his command in the action at the Crossroads.

I found the troops in line of battle, the skirmishers sharply engaged, the main body of the enemy posted on the crest of a hill in thick woods on both sides of a road, leading over the hill to Mansfield on our sole line of march.

It was apparent that the enemy was in much stronger force than at any previous point, and being confirmed in this opinion by General Lee, I sent to General Franklin, immediately upon my arrival, a statement of the facts and orders to hurry forward the infantry with all possible despatch, directing General Lee at the same time to hold his ground steadily, but not advance until re-enforcements should arrive. Our forces were for a long time stationary, with some skirmishing on the flanks. It soon became apparent that the entire force of the enemy was in our front. Several officers were sent to General Franklin to hurry forward the column. Skirmishing was incessant during the afternoon. At 4½ p. m. the enemy made a general attack all along the lines, but with great vigor upon our right flank. It was resisted with resolute determination by our troops, but overpowering numbers compelled them, after resisting the successive charges of the enemy in front and on the flank, to fall back from their position to the woods in rear of the open field, which they occupied, retreating in good order. The enemy pressed with great vigor upon the flanks as well as in front, for the purpose of getting to the rear, but were repulsed in this attempt by our cavalry.

At the line of woods a new position was assumed, supported by the 3d division of the 13th army corps under General Cameron, which reached this point about 5 p. m., and formed in line of battle under the direction of Major General Franklin, who accompanied its advance. The enemy attacked this second line with great impetuosity and overpowering numbers, turning both flanks and advancing heavily upon the centre. The assault was resisted with gallantry, but the troops, finding the enemy in the rear, were compelled to yield the ground and fall steadily back. The road was badly obstructed by the supply train of

the cavalry division, which obstructed the retreat of both men and artillery. We lost ten of the guns of Ransom's division in consequence of the position of the train, which prevented their withdrawal. Repeated efforts were made to reform the troops and resist the advance of the enemy; but though their progress was checked, it was without permanent success.

Brigadier General W. H. Emory, commanding 1st division 19th corps, had been early notified of the condition of affairs and directed to advance as rapidly as possible, and form a line of battle in the strongest position he could select, to support the troops in retreat and check the advance of the enemy. The order to advance found him seven miles to the rear of the first battle-ground. He assumed a position at Pleasant Grove, about three miles from the Crossroads, on the edge of the woods, commanding an open field sloping to the front. The 161st New York volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Kinsey commanding, were deployed as skirmishers and ordered to the foot of the hill, upon the crest of which the line was formed to cover the rear of the retreating forces, to check the pursuit of the enemy, and give time for the formation of the troops.

General Dwight, commanding 1st brigade, formed his troops across the road, upon which the enemy was moving, commanding the open field in front; the 3d brigade, Colonel Benedict commanding on the left, and the 2d brigade, General McMillen, in reserve. The line was scarcely formed, when the 161st New York volunteers were attacked and driven in. The right being threatened, a portion of McMillan's brigade formed on the right of General Dwight. The fire of our troops was reserved until the enemy was at close quarters, when the whole line opened upon them with most destructive volleys of musketry. The action lasted an hour and a half. The enemy was repulsed with very great slaughter. During the fight a determined effort was made to turn our left flank, which was defeated. Prisoners reported the loss of the enemy in officers and men to be very great. General Mouton was killed in the first onset. Their attack was made with great desperation, apparently with the idea that the dispersion of our forces at this point would end the campaign, and, with the aid of the steadily falling river, leave the fleet of transports and gunboats in their hands or compel their destruction. Nothing could surpass in impetuosity the assault of the enemy but the inflexible steadiness and valor of our troops. The 1st division of the 19th corps, by its great bravery in this action, saved the army and navy. But for this successful resistance to the attack at Pleasant Grove, the renewed attack of the enemy with increased force could not have been successfully resisted at Pleasant Hill on the 9th of April. We occupied both battle-grounds at night.

From Pleasant Grove, where this action occurred, to Pleasant Hill was fifteen miles. It was certain that the enemy, who was within the reach of re-enforcements, would renew the attack in the morning, and it was wholly uncertain whether the command of General Smith could reach the position we held in season for a second engagement. For this reason the army towards morning fell back to Pleasant Hill, General Emory covering the rear, burying the dead, bringing off the wounded and all the material of the army.

It arrived there at 8.30 on the morning of the 9th, effecting a junction with the forces of General Smith and the colored brigade under Colonel Dickey, which had reached that point the evening previous.

Early on the 9th the troops were prepared for action, the movements of the enemy indicating that he was on our rear. A line of battle was formed in the following order: 1st brigade 19th corps from the right resting on a ravine; 2d brigade in the centre, and 3d brigade on the left. The centre was strengthened by a brigade of General Smith's forces, whose main force was held in reserve. The enemy moved towards our right flank. The 2d brigade withdrew from the centre to the support of the 1st brigade. The brigade in support of the centre moved up into position, and another of General Smith's brigades was posted to

the extreme left position on the hill in *echelon* to the rear of the left main line. Light skirmishing occurred during the afternoon. Between 4 and 5 o'clock it increased in vigor, and about 5 p. m., when it appeared to have nearly ceased, the enemy drove in our skirmishers and attacked in force—his first onset being against the left. He advanced in two oblique lines, extending well over towards the right of the 3d brigade 19th corps. After a determined resistance, this part of the line gave way and went slowly back to the reserves. The 1st and 2d brigades were soon enveloped in front, right and rear. By skilful movements of General Emory, the flanks of the two brigades now bearing the brunt of the battle were covered. The enemy pursued the brigades, passing the left and centre, until he approached the reserves under General Smith, when he was met by a charge led by General Mower, and checked. The whole of the reserves were now ordered up, and in turn we drove the enemy, continuing the pursuit until night compelled us to halt.

The battle of the 9th was desperate and sanguinary. The defeat of the enemy was complete, and his loss in officers and men more than double that sustained by our forces. There was nothing in the immediate position or condition of the two armies to prevent a forward movement the next morning, and orders were given to prepare for an advance. The train, which had been turned to the rear on the day of the battle, was ordered to re-form and advance at day-break. I communicated this purpose at the close of the day to General A. J. Smith, who expressed his concurrence therein. But representations subsequently received from General Franklin and all the general officers of the 19th corps, as to the condition of their respective commands for immediate active operations against the enemy, caused a suspension of this order, and a conference of the general officers was held in the evening, in which it was determined, upon the urgent recommendation of the general officers above named, and with the acquiescence of General Smith, to retire upon Grand Ecore the following day. The reasons urged for this course by the officers commanding the 19th and 13th corps were:

First. That the absence of water made it absolutely necessary to advance or retire without delay. General Emory's command had been without rations for two days, and the train, which had been turned to the rear during the battle, could not be put in condition to move forward upon the single road through dense woods, in which it stood, without great difficulty and much loss of time. It was for the purpose of communicating with the fleet at Springfield landing from the Sabine Crossroads to the river, as well as to prevent the concentration of the Texan troops with the enemy at Mansfield, that we had pushed for the early occupation of that point. Considering the difficulty with which the gunboats passed Alexandria and Grand Ecore, there was every reason to believe that the navigation of the river would be found impracticable.

A squadron of cavalry, under direction of Mr. Young, who had formerly been employed in the surveys of this country, and was now connected with the engineer department, which had been sent upon a reconnoissance to the river, returned to Pleasant Hill on the evening of the battle with the report that they had not been able to discover the fleet nor learn from the people its passage up the river.\* This led to the belief that the low water had prevented the advance of the fleet. The condition of the river, which had been steadily falling since our march from Alexandria, rendered it very doubtful, if the fleet ascended the river, whether it could return from any intermediate point, and probably, if not certain, that if it reached Shreveport it would never escape without a rise of the river, of which all hopes now began to fail.

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\* The report of General T. Kilby Smith, commanding the river forces, states that the fleet did not arrive at Loggy bayou until 2 o'clock p. m. on the 10th of April, two days after the battle at Sabine Crossroads.



The forces designated for this campaign numbered 42,000 men. Less than half that number was actually available for service against the enemy during its progress. The distance which separated General Steele's command from the line of our operations (nearly two hundred miles) rendered his movements of little moment to us or to the enemy, and reduced the strength of the fighting column to the extent of his force, which was expected to be from 10,000 to 15,000 men. The depot at Alexandria, made necessary by the impracticable navigation, withdrew from our forces 3,000 men, under General Grover. The return of the marine brigade to the defence of the Mississippi, upon the demand of Major General McPherson, and which could not pass Alexandria with its steamers, nor move by land for want of land transportation, made a further reduction of 3,000 men. The protection of the fleet of transports against the forces of the enemy on both sides of the river made it necessary for General A. J. Smith to detach General T. Kilby Smith's division of 2,500 men from the main body for that duty. The army train required a guard of 500 men. These several detachments, which it was impossible to avoid, and the distance of General Steele's command, which it was not in my power to correct, reduced the number of troops that we were able at any point to bring into action from 42,000 men to about 20,000. The losses sustained in the very severe battles of the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April amounted to about 3,969 men, and necessarily reduced our active forces to that extent. The enemy, superior to us in numbers in the outset, by falling back was able to recover from his great losses by means of re-enforcements, which were within his reach as he approached his base of operations, while we were growing weaker as we departed from ours. We had fought the battle at Pleasant Hill with about 15,000 against 22,000 men, and won a victory which for these reasons we were unable to follow up. Other considerations connected with the actual military condition of affairs afforded additional reasons for the course recommended.

Between the commencement of the expedition and the battle of Pleasant Hill a change had occurred in the general command of the army, which caused a modification of my instructions in regard to this expedition.

Lieutenant General Grant, in a despatch dated the 15th March, which I received on the 27th March at Alexandria, eight days before we reached Grand Ecore, by special messenger, gave me the following instructions: "Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten or fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of (blank date) March, *even if it should lead to the abandonment of the main object of the expedition.* Should it prove successful, hold Shreveport and Red river with such force as you deem necessary, and return the balance of your troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans." These instructions, I was informed, were given for the purpose of having "all parts of the army, or rather all armies, act as much in concert as possible," and with a view to a movement in the spring campaign against Mobile, which was certainly to be made "if troops enough could be obtained without embarrassing other movements, in which event New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition."

A subsequent despatch—though it did not control, fully justified my action—repeated these general views, and stated that the commanding general "would much rather the Red river expedition had never been begun than that you should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement east of the Mississippi."

The limitation of time referred to in these despatches was based upon an opinion, which I had verbally expressed to General Sherman at New Orleans, that General Smith could be spared in thirty days after we reached Alexandria; but it was predicated upon the expectation that the navigation of the river would be unobstructed; that we should advance without delay at Alexandria, Grand

Ecore or elsewhere, on account of low water, and that the forces of General Steele were to co-operate with us effectively at some point on Red river near Natchitoches or Monroe. It was never understood that an expedition that involved, on the part of my command, a land march of nearly four hundred miles into the enemy's country, and which terminated at a point which we might not be able to hold, either on account of the strength of the enemy, or the difficulties of obtaining supplies, was to be limited to thirty days. The condition of our forces, and the distance and difficulties attending the further advance into the enemy's country, after the battles of the 8th and 9th, against an enemy superior in numbers to our own, rendered it probable that we could not occupy Shreveport within the time specified; and certain that, without a rise in the river, the troops necessary to hold it against the enemy would be compelled to evacuate it for want of supplies, and impossible that the expedition should return in any event to New Orleans in time to co-operate in the general movements of the army, contemplated for the spring campaign. It was known at this time that the fleet could not re-pass the rapids at Alexandria, and it was doubtful, if the fleet reached any point above Grand Ecore, whether it would be able to return. By falling back to Grand Ecore we should be able to ascertain the condition of the fleet; the practicability of continuing the movement by the river; reorganize a part of the forces that had been shattered in the battles of the 7th, 8th, and 9th; possibly ascertain the position of General Steele, and obtain from him the assistance expected for a new advance north of the river, or upon its southern bank, and perhaps obtain definite instructions from the government as to the course to be pursued. Upon these general considerations, and without reference to the actual condition of the respective armies, at 12 o'clock midnight, on the 9th, I countermanded the order for the return of the train, and directed preparations to be made for the return of the army to Grand Ecore. The dead were buried, and the wounded brought in from the field of battle and placed in the most comfortable hospitals that could be provided, and surgeons and supplies furnished for them. A second squadron of cavalry was sent, under direction of Mr. Young, of the engineer department, to inform the fleet of our proposed retrograde movement, and to direct its return if it had ascended the river; and, on the morning of the 10th, the army leisurely returned to Grand Ecore. The wounded were immediately visited by Dr. Sanger, who took with him clothing, rations, medicines, and other supplies, and who reported them in comfortable condition.

The fleet sailed from Grand Ecore on the 7th, and reached its destination at Loggy bayou on the evening of the 10th, one day after the battle at Pleasant Hill, and two days after the engagement of Sabine Crossroads. General T. Kilby Smith received a verbal message the evening of the 10th, and, on the morning of the 11th, written orders to return. The transports were in a crippled condition, rudders unshipped, and wheels broken. The enemy attacked the fleet on its return, near Pleasant Hill landing, on the 12th, with a force of 2,500 cavalry, a strong reserve infantry, and a battery of six guns, under General Greene; but the troops, protected by bales of cotton and hay, with the gunboats, kept up a deadly fire, and drove the enemy from the river. For two miles the bank was strewn with the wounded and dead. Among other rebel officers killed was General Greene, who was left dead upon the field. The troops of the transports saw him fall, and claim that his death was the work of their artillery—the gunboats and transports all firing at the same time. The enemy under Liddell, who had occupied the north bank of the river with 2,500 men, attacked the fleet on the 13th, but was driven back with loss. The navigation up and down the river was intricate and difficult, and the steamers were frequently aground. Several of the boats were laden with ammunition and ordnance stores, but the energy of the officers and men brought off every boat. The only loss in stores was a hundred sacks of oats thrown overboard for the relief of a steamer aground. They

reached Compte on the 14th, with a loss of *one man killed and eighteen wounded*, where they met a force from the army, sent to their assistance, and reached Grand Ecore on the 15th without further obstruction. General T. Kilby Smith, to whose courtesy I am indebted for all the official information I have received of this part of the expedition, mentions with commendation Major D. C. Houston, of the engineer corps, who had in charge the ordnance stores, and Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Abert, officers of my staff, who accompanied him; and also officers and men of his own command, and the masters of transport steamers. General T. Kilby Smith, who commanded the land forces and transports, is entitled to the highest commendation for the energy, skill, and success with which he managed this most difficult affair.

Lines of defence were established at Grand Ecore the 12th of April, and orders given to attack the enemy if he approached. A pontoon bridge was thrown across the river during the night. Our pickets were driven in on the 13th; but the enemy appeared, upon a reconnoissance made in force, to have gone below for the purpose either of attacking our troops at Alexandria, or occupying Monet's bluff on Cane river. On the same day, the 12th April, General Smith crossed the river with two brigades, two batteries, and a strong cavalry force to aid the fleet still above Grand Ecore. Despatches were sent to General Steele, informing him of the condition of affairs, and requesting him to join us at some point on the river. Orders were sent to New Orleans for re-enforcements; and the lieutenant general commanding the army was informed of the condition of affairs by telegraph, and of my intention to advance upon Shreveport if General Steele could come to our assistance, and my determination not to withdraw without orders.

The fleet returned on the 15th in safety, without loss of vessels or material of war. Admiral Porter, with whom I had a conference on his arrival at Grand Ecore, advised against any further attempt to advance without a rise of the river; and his counsel was followed. The river had been steadily falling. Supplies were brought up to Grand Ecore with very great difficulty. It was found that two of the gunboats could not get below Grand Ecore, and it was now certain that the fleet could not pass the falls at Alexandria. Lieutenant Commander Selfridge, left in command of the fleet by the admiral, who had gone to Alexandria, addressed to me a despatch, dated 17th of April, stating that he had been informed the army was to withdraw immediately, and that it would be impossible in that case to get the gunboats down the river. I informed him at once that the army had no intention of withdrawing from that position; that I had sent to New Orleans for troops, and by special messenger to General Steele, urging his direct co-operation; and that until it was definitely ascertained that his assistance would fail us, and that my force would be insufficient to advance further upon this line against the enemy, who appeared to be in full force, I should entertain no thought of a retrograde movement, and never if it left the navy in any danger. No such purpose was then entertained, and until I received information in reply to my despatches it was my purpose to maintain my position. A copy of this letter is appended to this report.

The next day I received instructions from Lieutenant General Grant (to which I have referred) that if my return to New Orleans was delayed one day beyond the 1st of May, when it would be necessary for my command to co-operate with other armies in the spring campaign, it would have been better that the expedition had never been attempted. These instructions, with the fact that the river was not likely to rise; the report received by Captain R. T. Dunham, that General Steele could not co-operate with us, and that the difficulty of passing the falls at Alexandria was hourly increasing, if the passage was not even then impossible, led me to change my determination. It was not, however, until the entire fleet was free—transports and gunboats—and that Admiral Porter, in charge of the Eastport, which had been aground several miles below Grand

Ecore for several days, sent me word by Colonel W. S. Abert (whose statement is hereto appended) that she was clear, and further protection unnecessary, that orders were given the 21st of April to turn the supply trains in the direction of Alexandria. The army moved on the morning of the 22d of April, every vessel having preceded both the marching orders and the movements of the army. Any statement, from whatever source, that the army contemplated moving from Grand Ecore towards Alexandria against the advice, or without the approval of, the naval officers in command, or until after the departure of every vessel on the river, is without the slightest color of truth. In my interview with Admiral Porter, on the 15th of April, he expressed the utmost confidence that the river would rise, and gave me no intimation of his leaving Grand Ecore, nor of the proposed withdrawal of his vessels, or of his apprehensions of the retreat of the army. I gave him at that time distinct information of my plans, which were to advance. This fact was communicated to Lieutenant Commander Selfridge in my letter of the 17th of April. The admiral expressed the same confidence in the rise of the river to officers of the army, who, from long experience in the Red river country, were equally confident that it would not rise.

The difficulties attending the voyage of the Eastport were incident to the condition of the river, for which the army was in nowise responsible. I had offered every assistance possible, and did not leave this position while any aid was suggested or required.

Colonel Bailey, after consultation with the general officers of the army, offered to float the Eastport over the bars by the construction of wing-dams, similar to those which had been built by the army at Port Hudson for the release of the steamers Starlight and Red Chief, and those afterwards built at Alexandria, but the assistance was declined. No counsel from army officers was required in nautical affairs.

The army marched from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22d of April, having been detained there by the condition of the navy ten days. To prevent the occupation of Monet's bluff, on Cane river, a strong position commanding the only road leading across the river to Alexandria, or to prevent the concentration of the enemy's forces at that point, if it was in his possession, it became necessary to accomplish the evacuation without his knowledge, and to prevent his strengthening the natural defences of the position by the rapidity of our march. The conflagration of a portion of the town at the hour appointed for movement partially frustrated the first object, but the second was fully accomplished. The army marched from Grand Ecore to Cane river on the 20th of April, a distance of forty miles, and moved upon the position held by the enemy the 23d of April before daybreak. About eight thousand men and sixteen guns, under command of General Bee, were found in possession of the bluff on the opposite side of the river, who were evidently surprised at the unexpected presence of our army, but ready to dispute our only passage toward Alexandria. At daybreak one division of the 19th and 13th corps, each, the cavalry commanded by General Arnold, and the artillery by Captain Classon, the whole under command of General W. H. Emory, were ordered forward to the river for the purpose of forcing this position. The pickets of the enemy were encountered on the west side of the river and quickly driven across, but the main position was found to be too strong to be carried by direct attack. A reconnoitring party, under Colonel Bailey, 4th Wisconsin volunteers, sent to ascertain the practicability of crossing below the ferry towards Red river on the morning of the 23d, reported that the river was not fordable below the ferry, and that, owing to impassable swamps on one side and high bluffs on the other, it would not be possible to cross Cane river at any point below the ferry. If we failed to dislodge the enemy at the ferry, the only alternative open to us was to attempt a crossing to the north side of Red river, an exceedingly difficult and dangerous move-

ment. At the same time a force under command of General H. W. Birge, consisting of his own command, the 3d brigade of the 1st division, 19th army corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, and General Cameron's division, 13th corps, were ordered to cross the river three miles above the ferry, and, turning the left flank of the enemy, to carry the heights in reverse, if possible. Upon the success of this movement depended the passage of the river by the army. The route traversed by General Birge's command was intersected by bayous, swamps, and almost impenetrable woods. This force reached its position late in the afternoon. To accomplish the purpose in view it became necessary to carry two strong positions, held by pickets and skirmishers, before the enemy was encountered in force on the crest of a hill, commanding an open field, over which our troops were compelled to cross in making the attack. The 3d brigade, 19th corps, Colonel Fessenden commanding, carried this position, which was defended with vigor, by assault. Its occupation compelled the retreat of the enemy from bluffs commanding the ferry and ford. Our loss in this most brilliant and successful affair was about two hundred killed and wounded. Colonel Fessenden, who led his command with great gallantry, was severely wounded. General Birge—as in all actions in which he has been engaged—deserved and received the highest commendation. Lieutenant William Beebe, of the ordnance department, and Mr. Young, of the engineer department, both volunteers, were conspicuous in the fight. Mr. Young was twice wounded, and died in New Orleans, in July, of the injuries received in this battle. The attack on the rear of the enemy's position, covering the line of the enemy's retreat, failed in consequence of the difficulties encountered on the march, and the late hour at which our troops gained their position. The enemy was thus enabled to escape, with his artillery, by the Fort Jesup road to Texas.

The main body of the army had moved from Cloutreville at 4.30 a. m., on the 23d, to the river. They drove in the enemy's pickets three miles in advance of the river, and formed a line of battle in front of the enemy's position, while General Birge was moving upon the enemy's left flank. The enemy opened with a heavy cannonade from his batteries, which was returned by our artillery with spirit and effect. The fire was continued at intervals during the morning, but the troops were held in reserve for the purpose of forcing the passage of the river at the moment that General Birge commenced his attack on the right. The action lasted till dark, when the enemy retreated and the heights were occupied by our forces. General A. J. Smith's command had sharp skirmishing with the advance of the enemy in our rear on the 23d, during the action for the possession of the bluffs.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 24th, six guns were fired from the camp of the enemy in the rear. It was interpreted as a signal that they were ready for a combined attack, but the enemy in front had then been driven from the river, and the contemplated movement upon our front and rear failed.

During the morning of the 23d an effort had been made by a portion of the cavalry under Colonel E. J. Davis to turn the right flank of the enemy's position by crossing the river below the ferry in the direction of Red river, which proved impracticable on account of impassable swamps. A sharp engagement occurred on the morning of the 24th between the troops of General T. Kilby Smith and the enemy in the rear, which resulted in the repulse of the latter. Our loss was about fifty in this affair. Had the enemy concentrated his forces and fortified his position at Monet's bluff, we could not have forced him from it, and should have been compelled to accept the chances of crossing Red river above Cane river in the presence of the enemy on both sides of both rivers. Orders had been sent to General Grover to move with all his force upon Monet's bluff in the event of its being occupied by the enemy, or our march seriously obstructed, and his troops were in readiness for this movement.

The army marched from Monet's bluff on the afternoon of the 24th of April,

and established lines of defence at Alexandria on the 25th and 26th of April. In the twenty-four days intervening between the departure of the army from Alexandria and its return, the battles of Wilson's Farm, Sabine Crossroads, Pleasant Grove, Pleasant Hill, Compte, Monet's bluff, and several combats in the neighborhood of Grand Ecore, while we were in occupation of that point, had been fought. In every one of these engagements, except that of Sabine Crossroads, we had been successful. The failure to accomplish the main object of the expedition was due to other considerations than the actual superiority of the enemy in the field. In these operations, in which my own command had marched by land nearly four hundred miles, the total loss sustained was 3,980 men, of whom 289 were killed, 1,541 wounded and 2,150 missing. A large portion of the latter were captured, and have been since exchanged, but a considerable portion returned to the army during its operations on Red river. No loss of artillery or of trains or any army material whatever was sustained, except that which occurred at Sabine Crossroads. We lost there Nims's battery and a section of the Missouri howitzer battery, 150 wagons and 800 mules, captured by the enemy on account of the position of the train near the field of battle. All the ammunition wagons were saved. The army had captured up to this time from the enemy 23 guns and 1,500 prisoners. The losses in killed, wounded and prisoners—officers and men—were much greater than ours. Among the former were some of the most efficient rebel commanders, whose loss can never be made good. Up to this time, April 26, no other loss of men or material had been sustained by our army, and none was sustained during the subsequent part of the campaign.

As soon as the lines of defence were completed, preparations were made for the release of the fleet, which was then unable to pass below the falls. From the difficulty which the supply transports had encountered in passing above the falls, it was known at Grand Ecore, as early as the 15th of April, that the navy could not go below, and the means for its release were freely discussed among officers of the army. During the campaign at Port Hudson the steamers Starlight and Red Chief were captured by Grierson's cavalry, under command of Colonel Prince, in Thompson's creek. The bed of the creek was nearly dry, and the steamers were sunk several feet in the sand. After the capture of Port Hudson, Colonel Bailey constructed wing-dams, which, by raising the water, lifted the steamers from the sand, and floated them out of the creek into the Mississippi. This incident naturally suggested the same works at Alexandria for the relief of the fleet. A survey was ordered for the purpose of determining what measures could be best undertaken. The engineers of the army had complete surveys of the falls, captured from the enemy during our occupation of Alexandria in 1863 at the commencement of the Port Hudson campaign. It was found, upon examining the charts and upon a survey of the river, that the channel was narrow and crooked, formed in solid rock, and that it would be wholly impracticable to deepen its bed. It was, therefore, determined to commence the construction of a dam to raise the water of the river to such a height as to enable the vessels to float over the falls. This project was freely discussed by the engineers and officers of the army, and was generally believed to be practicable. Captain J. C. Polfrey, who had made the survey, reported that in his judgment it was entirely feasible, and the only question made related to the time that might be required for so great a work.

The management of this enterprise was naturally intrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, 4th Wisconsin volunteers, who was by profession a civil engineer, familiar with works of that kind, common to slack-water navigation upon all the western rivers, and had successfully released the steamers from Thompson's creek, on the Mississippi. Colonel Bailey had suggested the practicability of the dam while we were at Grand Ecore, and had offered to

release the Eastport, when aground above and below Grand Ecore, by the same means, which offer was declined.

Material was collected pending these preparations, and work commenced upon the dam on Sunday, May 1. Nearly the whole army was engaged at different times upon this work. The dam was completed on Sunday, May 8, and the gunboats Osage, Hindman, and two others came over the rapids about 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The water had been raised upon the dam for a mile and a quarter, about seven feet, with a fall below the dam of about six feet, making in all a fall of about thirteen feet, above and below the falls. The pressure of the water at its completion was terrific. I went over the work at eleven o'clock on the evening of the 8th, with one of my staff officers, and felt that the pressure of the water was so great that it could not stand. I rode immediately to the point above where the fleet was anchored, to ascertain if they were ready to follow the four boats that had already passed the rapids. I reached the fleet about 12 o'clock midnight. Scarcely a man or light was to be seen. It was perfectly apparent that the boats were not in condition to take advantage of the completion of the dam; and feeling that it could not stand another day, I wrote a note to Admiral Porter at one o'clock on the morning of the 9th, which was delivered in person at two o'clock a. m., by Colonel J. G. Wilson, stating my belief as to the condition of the dam and fleet, and asking that measures should be taken to put the boats in condition to move over the rapids at the earliest possible moment in the morning. My apprehensions were fully verified. A little after 5 o'clock on the morning of the 9th I saw myself a material part of the dam swept away. The four boats that had passed the rapids the afternoon before were able to pass below through the opening which the waters had made. Only one of the vessels above the falls, the Lexington, was ready to move when the dam gave away, and that came down after the break, and passed the dam safely, with all the vessels that were below the rapids. Had the others been ready to move, all would have passed the rapids and the dam safely on Monday. Until after the dam had been carried away, no effort had been made to lessen the draught of the imprisoned vessels by lightening them of cargo, armament, or iron plating. Before the second series of dams was completed, a portion of the armament and the plating, materially lessening their draught and the depth of water required to float them, was removed. Lieutenant William S. Beebe, of the ordnance department United States army, superintended the removal of the heavy naval guns from the vessels above the rapids to a point below the dam by land, assisted by officers and soldiers of the army.

The army immediately commenced the reconstruction of the dam. Finding it impossible to resist the current of the river entirely, the opening made by the flood was only partially closed, and eight or ten wing-dams were constructed on the right and left banks of the river, in accordance with the original plan, turning the current of water directly upon the channel, and raising it at the different points sufficiently to allow the vessels to pass. This new work was completed on the 12th of May, and on the afternoon of that day all the boats passed below the rapids to the dam. At six o'clock in the evening the Mound City and Carondelet passed the dam. The other boats remained above until the morning of the 13th. The water upon the dam was steadily falling, but at 9 o'clock on the 13th all the boats had safely passed.

Preparations had been made for the movement of the army the evening after the passage of the boats below the dam on the 12th, and after all were below, on the 13th, orders were given for the march.

The construction of the dam was exclusively the work of the army. But little aid or encouragement was rendered by officers of the navy, except by Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne, commanding the Mound City, who assisted in setting the cribs, and was always ready to answer the call of the officers charged with

the construction of the work. The soldiers labored sedulously and zealously night and day, in and out of the water, from the 1st to the 13th of May, inclusive, when the passage of the boats was completed.

Upon my arrival at Alexandria, on the 25th of April, I found Major General Hunter with despatches from the lieutenant general commanding the armies, reaffirming instructions which I had received at Grand Ecore, relating to the operations of the army elsewhere, and the necessity of bringing the Shreveport campaign to an end without delay. The only possible means of executing these peremptory orders had already been taken. General Hunter left on the 30th of April with despatches to the lieutenant general, giving a report of the condition of affairs; that the fleet could not pass the rapids; that there was no course for the army but to remain for its protection; that the enemy would concentrate all his forces at that point for the destruction of the army and fleet, and that it was necessary to concentrate our troops west of the Mississippi at the same point, by which the army and navy could be relieved, and the forces of the enemy destroyed.

Major General McClermand, with the larger part of the forces recently at Matagorda bay, which had been evacuated by order of Lieutenant Grant, dated March 31, arrived at Alexandria on the evening of the 29th of April. Brigadier General Fitz Henry Warren, left in command at Matagorda bay, followed with the rest of the forces in Texas, except those on the Rio Grande, when he encountered the batteries of the enemy on Red river, near Marksville, which obstructed and prevented his passage. Not having sufficient force to dislodge the enemy, he seized Fort DeRussy below the batteries, which he held until after the passage of the fleet and army.

While engaged in the construction of the dam, a despatch was received from Major General Halleck, dated April 30, as follows: "Lieutenant General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red river, and that operations there be continued under the officer in command until further orders." This despatch was not received until it was impossible to move either up or down the river from Alexandria. It was, of course, impracticable to execute these instructions.

Until the 4th of May communication with the Mississippi by the river was unobstructed. Lieutenant William Simpson, of my staff, left that day, by the gunboat Signal, with despatches for Lieutenant General Grant, Admiral Farragut, General Sherman, and General Rosecrans. The gunboat Covington, having in convoy the transport Warner, accompanied the Signal. We received news on the morning of the 6th of the destruction of the gunboats and the transport. The enemy had established a battery near Marksville, supported by a large infantry force. Communication with the Mississippi was closed from this date. About 400 men of the 56th Ohio volunteers were on board the Warner. A part of them joined our troops below, and a portion of them pierced the lines of the enemy and returned to Alexandria. About 150 were captured. Lieutenant Simpson was captured, but destroyed his despatches. The City Belle, on her way to Alexandria, with 425 officers and men of the 120th Ohio volunteers, was captured by the enemy. Two hundred of the troops escaped.

The fleet passed below Alexandria the 13th of May. The army, on its march from Alexandria, did not encounter the enemy in force until near the town of Mansura, when he was rapidly driven through the town on the evening of the — May. At daybreak of the — we encountered his cavalry on the prairie east of the town. He fell steadily back, after sharp skirmishing, to the belt of woods at the edge of the prairie, which he occupied, his position covering the three roads diverging from Mansura, and appeared determined obstinately to resist our march. The engagement at this place lasted several hours. It was confined to the skirmishers and the artillery chiefly, until our forces obtained pos-



session of the woods, first upon the enemy's right by General Emory, and then upon his left by General A. J. Smith, when, after a short but brief contest, he was driven from the field with considerable loss. We recaptured here several of the prisoners taken from the transports and gunboats on the 6th of May.

The 16th of May we reached Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya. Being entirely destitute of ordinary bridge material for the passage of this river, about 600 yards wide, a bridge was constructed of the steamers, under direction of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. This work was not of the same magnitude, but was as important to the army as the dam at Alexandria was to the navy. It had the merit of being an entirely novel construction, no bridge of such magnitude having been constructed of similar materials. The bridge was completed at 1 o'clock on the 19th of May. The wagon train passed in the afternoon, and the troops the next morning, in better spirits and condition, as able and eager to meet the enemy as at any period of the campaign. The command of General A. J. Smith, which covered the rear of the army during the construction of the bridge and the passage of the army, had a severe engagement with the enemy, under Polignac, on the afternoon of the 19th, at Yellow bayou, which lasted several hours. Our loss was about 150 in killed and wounded; that of the enemy much greater, besides many prisoners who were taken by our troops.

Major General E. R. S. Canby arrived at Simmsport on the 19th May, and the next day assumed command of the troops, as a portion of the forces of the military division of the west Mississippi, to the command of which he had been assigned.

*Burning of Alexandria.*—Rumors were circulated freely throughout the camp at Alexandria, that upon the evacuation of the town it would be burned. To prevent this destruction of property, part of which belonged to loyal citizens, General Grover, commanding the post, was instructed to organize a thorough police, and to provide for its occupation by an armed force until the army had marched for Simmsport. The measures taken were sufficient to prevent a conflagration in the manner in which it had been anticipated. But on the morning of the evacuation, while the army was in full possession of the town, a fire broke out in a building on the levee, which had been occupied by refugees or soldiers, in such a manner as to make it impossible to prevent a general conflagration. I saw the fire when it was first discovered. The ammunition and ordnance transports, and the depot of ammunition on the levee, were within a few yards of the fire. The boats were floated into the river, and the ammunition moved from the levee with all possible despatch. The troops labored with alacrity and vigor to suppress the conflagration, but, owing to a high wind and the combustible material of the buildings, it was found impossible to limit its progress, and a considerable portion of the town was destroyed.

*Election at Alexandria.*—On the 1st of April, two or three days before the army moved from Alexandria to Natchitoches, an election of delegates to the constitutional convention was held at Alexandria, by the request of citizens of the parish of Rapides. No officer or soldier interfered with or had any part whatever in this matter. It was left exclusively to the loyal citizens of the place. Three hundred votes were given in this election, which was a large majority of all the voting population in that parish. Fifteen hundred votes were a full representation of the people before the war. Nearly 500 men from this and neighboring parishes enlisted in the army as mounted scouts, and rendered efficient and valuable services during this campaign.

*Seizures of cotton.*—Under the general prize law, the naval authorities upon their arrival at Alexandria commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, extending their operations from six to ten miles into the interior. Wagon trains were organized, cotton gins put in operation, and the business followed up with great vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the

army ; who threatened at one time to turn their guns against the troops, which was terminated by the advance of the army and navy to Grand Ecore. I was informed by parties claiming property which had been taken by the naval authorities, to whom I referred them, that upon application for relief their property had been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter into competition with the navy in the capture of this property.

In order to remove all the products of the country which might under any circumstances be used to aid the rebellion against the government, General Grover, in command of the post at Alexandria, and the quartermaster of that post, upon the departure of the army from Alexandria, were directed to collect such property as should remain there after its departure and transmit it to the quartermaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn it over to the officers of the treasury, to be disposed of according to the orders of the government and the laws of Congress. Notice was also given to the supervising agent of the treasury at New Orleans that no trade would be allowed in that portion of the State until it should be completely and permanently occupied by the army. No person was allowed to accompany the army upon this expedition as reporter, or for any other purpose, without a distinct and written declaration that no trade by private parties or for personal purposes would be permitted under any circumstances, and that no property, on private account, would be transported by public or private vessels to New Orleans ; but that all property sent to New Orleans would be consigned to the chief quartermaster, and by him turned over to the treasury agent, and held subject to such claims and orders as should be approved by the government at Washington. Previous to my departure from New Orleans, the chief quartermaster, Colonel S. B. Holabird, had been instructed that no privileges would be given to any party whatever, under any circumstances, to trade in, to dispose of, or to transport private property ; that all the property that came down from that country, so far as the army was concerned, would be turned over to him, and by him to the proper treasury officers. The same information was given to the treasury agent. No permission was given to any person to accompany the army except upon these express conditions, and then only to such persons whose public position seemed to be a full guarantee against abuse of the privilege, and whose requests could not be properly refused. They were given to reporters of the public press, to officers of the treasury, and to prominent civil officers of States whose troops were in the field.

Upon representations made by officers of the Treasury Department, at Alexandria, that there would be difficulty in receiving such property except under the treasury regulations of the 26th of January, 1864, those regulations were officially promulgated for that purpose at Alexandria and at New Orleans. These orders were strictly enforced by all officers connected with or representing the army. There was no permission whatever given to any person to trade, to dispose of, or transport private property ; no privilege of this kind was recognized under any circumstances. Every dollar's worth of property that came into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated to its use in kind by the proper officers of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, receipts being given therefor, or transmitted to the chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the treasury agents, to be disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the government. When cotton or other property interfered with the transportation of any material of the army, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of the country, it was thrown from the boats and abandoned upon the river levee to the enemy. I intend this statement to be as comprehensive upon the subject as language can make it, and to cover all possible methods, direct or indirect, by which officers or citizens, public or private parties, or any persons whatever, could evade or violate these orders, on the river or at New Orleans, or appropriate by

any means public or private property to private uses or personal advantage, or to deprive the government or individuals of any property which, by any interpretation of military orders or public laws, could be considered as belonging justly and properly to them. Copies of the instructions to General Grover, commanding the post, Colonel S. B. Holabird, chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and Hon. B. F. Flanders, supervising special agent Treasury Department, accompany this report, all of whom will be able to account to the government for public or private property coming into their hands during this campaign.

*Recapitulation.*—I was engaged upon the Gulf coast, hoping by the capture of Galveston and Mobile, to put my command in readiness for an effective co-operation, by Mobile and the Alabama river, with General Sherman, precisely in accordance with the campaign suggested by the lieutenant general commanding the armies in his despatches of the 15th and 31st of March, when I received instructions to communicate with the admiral, and the general officers commanding the fleet and the forces of the Upper Mississippi, upon the subject of the campaign against Shreveport. I immediately complied with these orders. They had received similar instructions, and, in answer to my communications, expressed their readiness and desire to enter upon the campaign. With the forces proposed, and the co-operation of the fleet, its success was reasonably certain under such circumstances; I could not decline co-operation with them. I at once abandoned all other enterprises, and gave my whole attention to this service.

The first difficulty encountered was in the navigation of the river. Sixteen days' delay caused by the inability of the fleet to pass the rapids at Alexandria, and three days' delay at Grand Ecore in waiting the rise of the river, enabled the enemy to concentrate his forces, and rendered impossible that celerity of movement by the army which the success of the expedition demanded. Eight days of the delay at Alexandria would have been attributable to the tardy organization and movements of Franklin's command; but the fleet was unable to pass the falls until eight days after his arrival at Alexandria. This delay was doubtless owing to the impracticable navigation of the river; but it is not improper to say that the forecast and diligence which is enforced upon all men in the daily affairs of life would have forbidden an attempt to force a fleet of so much importance to the free navigation of the Mississippi to a point from which it could never hope to escape, except upon the theory that the river ought to or might rise. The movement of the navy, in a despatch of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter, to which the Secretary of the Navy has given official publication and sanction, is attributed to the "request" of General Banks, who "deemed the co-operation of the gunboats so essential to success, that he, (Porter) had to run some risks and make unusual exertions to get them over the falls." This implies that the responsibility of his action rests upon the army; but it is not consistent with the facts. The co-operation of the navy was an indispensable condition and basis of the expedition. Major General Halleck informed me, January 11, that he had been assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter would be prepared to co-operate with the army in its movements; and the admiral himself informed me, February 26, that he was "prepared to ascend Red river with a large fleet of gunboats," and to co-operate with the army at any time when the water was high enough. The fleet was as necessary to the campaign as the army. Had it been left to my discretion, I should have reluctantly undertaken, in a campaign requiring but eight or ten light-draught gunboats, to force twenty heavy iron-clads 490 miles upon a river proverbially as treacherous as the rebels who defended it, and which had given notice of its character by steadily falling when, as the admiral reports, all other rivers were booming. There is a better reason for the disregard of the palpable difficulties of naviga-

tion than the over-zealous counsel of army officers in nautical affairs. In a subsequent despatch Admiral Porter says, that "all my vessels navigated the river to Grand Ecore with ease, and with some of them I reached Springfield landing, the place designated for the gunboats to meet the army. My part was successfully accomplished; the failure of the army to proceed, and the retreat to Grand Ecore, left me almost at the mercy of the enemy." The records of the campaign do not at all support the reckless and fiery ardor of this statement. The fleet did not reach the "place appointed" until two full days after the first decisive battle with the enemy. The admiral occupied four days in moving one hundred and four miles on what he calls a "rising river," with "good water" to the place appointed. General T. Kilby Smith states that the fleet made twenty miles on the 7th, fifty-seven miles on the 8th, eighteen miles on the 9th, and nine miles on the 10th of April—total one hundred and four miles. The failure of the fleet to move up the river with ordinary expedition, together with the fact that the gunboats were unable to pass Grand Ecore until the 7th, justified the belief that its advance had been prevented by the low stage of water, and governed the army exclusively in its retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, as it did in every important operation of the campaign. The admiral's despatch does not mention the fact that, in addition to the "mercy" of the enemy, he had the support of General T. Kilby Smith's division of 2,500 men, whose most gallant and honorable part in the preservation of the fleet of gunboats and transports is not referred to, in what the admiral calls "this curious affair between [the enemy's] infantry and gunboats." In view of the published despatches of Admiral Porter, it is proper for me to say, that every position of difficulty in which the army was placed in this campaign was the immediate and direct consequence of delay in the operations of the navy. This may have been inevitable and entirely justifiable from the condition of the river. It is not my province to pass judgment upon its operations; but the fact remains nevertheless. During my term of service, it has been an invariable rule of conduct, from which I have never departed, to forbear the expression of opinion or complaint upon the official action of others; but I feel it to be a solemn duty to say, in this official and formal manner, that Admiral Porter's published official statements relating to the Red river campaign are at variance with the truth, of which there are many thousand living witnesses, and do foul injustice to the officers and soldiers of the army, living and dead, to whom the Navy Department owes exclusively the preservation and honor of its fleet.

The partial disintegration of the several commands assigned to this expedition was a cause of embarrassment, though not entirely of failure. The command of Major General Steele, which I was informed by Major General Sherman would be about 15,000, was in fact but 7,000, and operating upon a line several hundred miles distant, with purposes and results entirely unknown to me. February 5 I was informed by General Steele that if any advance was to be made, it must be by the Washita and Red rivers, and that he might be able to move his command, by the way of Pine Bluff, to Monroe for this purpose. This would have united our forces on Red river, and insured the success of the campaign. The 28th of February he informed me that he could not move by way of Monroe, and on the 4th of March, the day before my command was ordered to move, I was informed by General Sherman that he had written to General Steele "to push straight for Shreveport." March 5 I was informed by General Halleck that he had no information of General Steele's plans further than that he would be directed to facilitate my operations towards Shreveport. The 10th of March General Steele informed me that the objections to the route I wished him to take (by the way of Red river) were stronger than ever, and that he "would move with all his available force (about 7,000 men) to Washington, and from thence to Shreveport." I received information the 26th of March, dated the

15th of March, from Major General Halleck, that he had "directed General Steele to make a real move as suggested by you, (Banks,) instead of a *demonstration*, as he (Steele) thought advisable." In April General Halleck informed me that he had telegraphed General Steele "to co-operate with you (Banks) on Red river with all his available forces." April 16 I was informed, under date of the 10th, by General Sherman, that General Steele's entire force would co-operate with me and the navy. In May I received information from General Steele, under date of the 28th of April, that he could not leave Camden unless supplies were sent to him, as those of the country were exhausted; that we "could not help each other operating on lines so wide apart;" that he could not say definitely that he could join me "at any point on Red river at any given time;" and, from the distance that separated us, that I could render no assistance to him—an opinion in which I entirely concurred. I never received authority to give orders to General Steele. My instructions limited me to communication with him upon the subject of the expedition. His orders he received from other sources. I have no doubt that General Steele did all in his power to insure success; but as communication with him was necessarily by special messenger, and occupied from fifteen to twenty days at each communication, it was impossible for either of us fully to comprehend the relative positions of the two armies, or to assist or to support each other.

The column of General A. J. Smith was a partially independent command. General Sherman, in his despatch of the 10th of April, received the 16th, informed me that "the thirty days for which he had loaned me General Smith's command would expire on the 10th of April," the day after the battle of Pleasant Hill. General Smith's instructions, which he showed me, required him to confer constantly with Admiral Porter, the approved friend of the army of the Tennessee. His orders were dated "*Headquarters Red river expedition, steamer Clara Bell.*" He never declined co-operation with me, nor did he receive orders from me. He made no official reports of his forces or their operations. He was in no wise responsible for the results of the expedition, and may, perhaps, be said to have gained as much by its failure as he would from its success. When his thirty days were up he claimed the right, at Grand Ecore, to return to Vicksburg, irrespective of the condition of the army or the fleet, and did not consider himself at all responsible for the inevitable consequences of his withdrawal to the army and navy, nor for the detention which their preservation demanded. That responsibility I was called upon to assume in written orders. I entertain no doubt that his official course was entirely consistent with his orders, and I cheerfully acknowledge the generous and earnest efforts of General Mower of the 16th, and General T. Kilby Smith of the 17th corps, to infuse into the different corps that unity of spirit which is as essential to victory as the valor of the soldiers in actual battle. I gladly accord to the men of their commands the honor of having fought a desperate enemy, superior in numbers, with as much gallantry and success as that which distinguished the troops of my immediate command. No higher praise than this can be given to any soldiers. Alexander's troops never fought better.

The results of the position of the cavalry train, and the loose order of march by the leading column of troops under Major General Franklin on the 8th of April, before the battle of Sabine Crossroads, have been stated. A commanding officer is of course responsible for all that occurs to his command, whatever may have been the cause. I do not shrink from that responsibility. But while it was both proper and necessary for me to give personal attention to the prompt advance of all the troops and fleet from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 7th, it was supposed that the movement of a single column of 13,000 men, moving in advance on one road for a distance of less than fifty miles, in such manner as to be able to encounter the enemy if he offered resistance, might safely be intrusted to an officer of the reputation and experience of Major General Franklin,

whose rank, except in one instance, was superior to that of any officer of the expedition, or of the department of the Gulf.

I make no complaint of the navy; but in view of its prolific despatches, long since published, on this campaign, I may properly repeat a few facts already stated. The success of the expedition depended solely upon celerity of movement. The navy was detained by low water at Alexandria sixteen days, and at Grand Ecore three days. It occupied four days in moving from Grand Ecore to Springfield landing, a distance of one hundred and four miles, upon what the despatches describe as "a rising river" with "good water," where it arrived *two days* after the first battle, and one day after the decisive battle of the campaign at Pleasant Hill. It detained the army ten days at Grand Ecore and eighteen days at Alexandria on its return. These are not opinions; they are facts. To the army they were pregnant and bloody events.

The difficulties of navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of April, and the limited time allotted to the expedition, were the causes of its failure. We owe nothing to the enemy—not even our defeat. Could any one of these difficulties have been avoided, the object of the campaign would have been accomplished. But the occupation of Shreveport could not have been maintained. The presence of the enemy would have required such a force for its defence as could not have been supplied by the river, and for which no other arrangement had been made, as suggested in my despatch of the 30th March. The only possible method of maintaining this position would have been to concentrate at this point a force superior in numbers to the enemy, with sufficient time to pursue him wherever he should move, even if it took us to Galveston, on the Gulf coast. This was suggested as a possible result of the campaign, but it was not embraced within the original plan, and was specially precluded by orders received from the lieutenant general commanding the armies.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General of Volunteers.*

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*Extract of a letter from Colonel W. S. Abert, dated Fort Bunker Hill, D. C.,  
January 24, 1865, to General Banks.*

"In reply to your communication of to-day, asking for my recollections as to the condition of the navy when our forces retired from Grand Ecore, I have the honor to state that, on the afternoon of April 21, you directed me to report to Admiral Porter, (then superintending the raising of the Eastport,) inform him that the army was ready to move, and, if he was prepared, would start the same night. I left on the steamer Gillum, and, on nearing the point where the Eastport was sunk, found she had gone. The Cricket, with Admiral Porter on board, was tied up to the right bank of the river, and she, together with an army transport, were the only steamers in sight. I went on board the Cricket and delivered my message to the Admiral. He told me they had been successful in raising the Eastport, and that he had started her down the river. He hoped to get her through safely, but at the same time expressed some doubts about it. I told him that the army would move that evening if he was ready. He directed me to inform the general commanding that he had made preparations to protect the transports, and that he was prepared to move. I then returned to Grand Ecore and delivered my message to the general commanding.

"W. S. ABERT,  
"Colonel, Commanding."

ALEXANDRIA, LA., *March 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: Assuming command at Alexandria, your attention is directed to the following instructions:

1. It is probable that this will be a permanent post, and be garrisoned by such troops as can be spared for that purpose. Fortifications will be required, and all the available labor that can be obtained should be applied to their immediate construction.

2. For some time it must remain strictly a military post; the lines must be of limited extent, and the general rule established that no persons are to go in or out. This will be necessary to protect it from the movements of the enemy, who will be certain to attack if he finds it within his power. Negroes should be admitted, deserters from their army, such people as desire transportation to New Orleans, and such other people as in your discretion you think it for the interests of the government to admit. Such cases must be made exceptions to the general rule.

3. I have notified the supervising agent of the treasury, that for the present, and until the country is more permanently settled, no trade stores can be established and no trade allowed. If accumulations of supplies are admitted here, it enables the enemy to make an attack and affords great temptation to incur the risk. It ought not to be allowed under any circumstances whatever. Strict orders will be given at New Orleans to allow no supplies to come here until further orders.

In order to prevent the transportation of cotton belonging to the rebel government—of which there is a large quantity in this country—to Liverpool or other markets for the use of the government of men in arms, it becomes necessary that the products of the country should be shipped to New Orleans under the direction of the officers of the government. The quartermaster will be charged with that duty. He will use such means as are at his disposal for that purpose, public or private. Vouchers will be given to all persons for the property thus taken from them, and compensation will be made by the government as soon as possible to all loyal persons for property so taken. The object is to remove all the products of the country from this section which may under any circumstances enable the rebels, should they return, or their sympathizers who may remain, to aid the rebellion against the government. This should be executed thoroughly, and with as little delay as possible.

The oath of allegiance having been generally taken by the mass of the people in this country voluntarily, and no doubt with honest intention to the government of the United States, it will become necessary that the leading families who have been strongly identified with secession should be placed in the same position with other citizens of this part of the country. As soon as their names can be obtained from Governor Wells, or other reliable friends of the Union, they should be required to take the oath of allegiance, by which is meant the amnesty oath, or to remove within the lines of the rebel army.

It cannot be determined at present whether plantations can be extensively cultivated with safety. The termination of the campaign alone will enable us to determine this. Until then it is unwise to encourage any attempts at cultivation, or to establish any system of labor, such as prevails in other portions of the department. At present everything must be directed to one single point—that of maintaining military possession of this part of the Red river country. All public and private interests must be made to yield to this purpose.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General CUIVER GROVER,  
*Alexandria, Louisiana.*

A true copy:

JAMES L. ANDEM, *Private Secretary.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*April 2, 1864.*

COLONEL: Under the general prize law, Admiral Porter has seized the cotton of this country from six to ten miles from the river. This has caused a general burning above of property which had been spared to this place. As a consequence, no attempt has been made to prevent its destruction, but orders have been given to the quartermaster department here to take possession of all products, give full vouchers therefor, to transport it to New Orleans, and turn over the proceeds to the Treasury Department, taking receipts therefor, leaving it to be disposed of for the benefit of claimants or the government, as justice may require. No party or person has any privileges or promises other than in this manner.

We greatly need boats for the river. I have directed Captain Welch to allow the people of the country to bring in their cotton, turning it over to the quartermaster department.

They are alarmed lest it be destroyed by the rebels.

Very truly yours,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Chief Quartermaster.*

A true copy :

S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Colonel, Chief Quartermaster.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Grand Ecote, April 6, 1864.*

COLONEL: In disposing of the products shipped to the government from Red river, it will be well to confer with the treasury agent, and take such course as he suggests as to the method. As the proceeds will be turned over to him, it will be well to make all the arrangements, as far as possible, satisfactory.

The army moved from this point yesterday. We hope to meet the enemy this side Shreveport.

With much respect, I am yours,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel HOLABIRD,  
*Chief Quartermaster, &c.*

A true copy :

S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Colonel, Chief Quartermaster.*

[Indorsement.]

On receipt of the within order, I informed Mr. Flanders that he could have all the cotton in my possession, and give any directions, conforming to the trade regulations as far as they affected me.

S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Colonel, Chief Quartermaster.*



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Alexandria, Louisiana, April 28, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter delivered to me yesterday by Mr. Hutchins, dated New Orleans, April 22, and to express my high gratification at the desire it manifests to place the commerce of the department upon some general basis in which we can all unite. I am reluctant to undertake to designate any individuals as agents or managers of the general trade. There are various reasons against such a course, but that which weighs most strongly against me is that I am disinclined to it.

I believe our affairs are now in such condition that the additional trade regulations of the 26th of January can be officially promulgated, and have issued orders to that effect, intending that they shall take effect from this date. For that purpose they will be posted here at once. The quartermaster will be instructed to assist in its execution as far as consistent with the public service on the line of the Red river, and to adapt his business to this code as far as it is possible.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,  
 N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. FLANDERS,  
*S. S. Agent Treasury Department, New Orleans.*

A true copy :

JAMES L. ANDEM,  
*Private Secretary.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Alexandria, Louisiana, April 28, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have this day promulgated the additional regulations concerning commercial intercourse, approved by the President on the 26th January, 1864, and have posted the same here as taking effect throughout the department on this day.

You will please to be governed by these regulations in the disposition of all property which is now in your department, so far as it may be affected by the same.

With much respect, your obedient servant,  
 N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Colonel S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Chief Quartermaster.*

A true copy :

S. B. HOLABIRD,  
*Colonel, Chief Quartermaster.*

OFFICE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, La., June 20, 1864.*

I did confer with the supervising special agent and released the cotton upon his approval. He did not express a wish to have the small amounts I have reported at the time. It was impossible to get in writing anything very definite. I have considered it as the safest plan to put cotton stolen in small quantities

into the treasury through my department, and have been led to believe it so to be, inasmuch as I was a sort of custodian of such funds. I should be very glad to know that such course is not approved, in order that I may be relieved therefrom.

S. B. HOLABIRD,  
Colonel, Chief Quartermaster.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL BANKS UPON THE SUBJECT OF TRADE  
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF.

I assumed command of the department of the Gulf December 16, 1862. All the public property was disposed of in such manner by general orders as to bring it strictly within the army regulations. Houses occupied by officers or soldiers were turned over to the quartermaster. Horses, carriages, and every kind of property belonging to the government, or which had been the property of disloyal persons, was placed in the keeping of the chief quartermaster of the department, to be issued or disposed of according to the army regulations. No passes were given to go beyond the lines of the army under any circumstances, except where the public service was immediately connected therewith. No products were received, and no supplies of any kind sent beyond the lines for private or personal advantage. Where agents of the government were sent out for the purpose of obtaining information, they were sometimes allowed to take small quantities of goods, to give them advantage in travelling through the rebel country, and in a very few instances small quantities of the products of the country have been brought into the department upon the recommendation of the civil officers of the government. But this occurred only in a few cases, and was early discontinued. The uniform rule of the military authorities has been that of non-communication. To many thousand applications for privileges to send or receive letters, supplies, or any articles of property, the answer has invariably been in the negative, to all classes of persons, and under all circumstances. In General Order No. 8, published January 12, 1863, the first general regulation as to trade was promulgated, in these words: "All products of the country sent to the city of New Orleans in good faith may be sold at market prices by the proprietors or their factors, for the legal currency of the United States, without restriction or confiscation. \* \* \* Plantation supplies, and other articles, not contraband of war, necessary to the working of the estates or the support of loyal persons, may be purchased in open market by planters or agents, in quantities not inconsistent with the interests and safety of the government, for consumption within the lines of the army, upon the approval and order of the commission named in this order."

These provisions had reference to transactions of loyal persons within the lines of the army, and were intended to remove the impression that any person held a monopoly of this trade. In December our troops took possession of Baton Rouge, then occupied by the enemy, and early in March a general movement was made to Port Hudson. The army engaged the enemy in the rear of the works, while the navy ran the batteries on the river. During two or three weeks much of this country above and below Port Hudson was in our possession on both sides of the river. All the property that was not used for the army was turned over to the civil officers of the government, to be disposed of according to the laws. No privileges of trade, of purchase or sale, were recognized or conferred by the officers of the army. The military object of the movement having been completed by the passage of the naval vessels above Port Hudson to the mouth of Red river, the army moved suddenly to Ber-

wick's bay, for the purpose of dispersing the rebel army that then held possession of the Teche country and the territory west of the Mississippi. Elaborate fortifications had been constructed near Pattersonville, known as Fort Bisland, which covered the only communication between Berwick's bay and the Red river. It was defended by gunboats and a rebel force of nearly 15,000 men between these works and Alexandria. The intention of the enemy, subsequently ascertained by captured despatches, was to attack our forces at Berwick's bay under General Weitzel, numbering about 5,000, on the 12th of April. Our forces invested Fort Bisland on the 12th of April, the day fixed by the enemy for his attack, and on the 13th captured it, after two days' fighting. General Grover had been sent with a force of 6,000 men, by Grand lake, for the purpose of turning this position, to Indian Village, where he landed on the 13th. Several engagements occurred, and the army occupied Opelousas and Alexandria, sending a force up Red river to Clouterville. The object of this expedition was purely military. A rebel force of 15,000 men at Berwick's bay would have made it impossible for our forces to invest Port Hudson with any chance of success. The enemy at that time had 18,000 men at Port Hudson, and 15,000 on the west side of the river. Before we could lay siege to the post, it was necessary to disperse the army west of the river. We held the Teche country for twelve or fifteen days, during which the rebels were driven from their fortifications, their gunboats destroyed, their steamers captured, and 3,000 of their men taken prisoners. The army was so completely dispersed as not to be able to reorganize again for a period of five weeks.

The army left Alexandria May 13, crossed the Atchafalaya, moved down the west bank of the Mississippi, and crossed to Bayou Sara on the night of the 23d of May, with a view to join the forces of General Augur, moving to the rear of Port Hudson from Baton Rouge. While this country west of the river was in our possession, it was judged important to the government, in every point of view, that every species of property that could be made useful to the rebels should be removed from the country which we did not intend to hold. To prevent the destruction of this property, either by the rebel army or the people, the following order was issued before leaving Brashear city:

"Pillage and depredation upon private property are forbidden, and will be suppressed. Whatever property is necessary to the support of the army will be taken by the government, and liberal compensation will be made therefor, *according to its value in the country where it is taken, to all well-disposed persons.*"

The property of the country was chiefly cotton, sugar, forage, horses, and mules. The value affixed to this property was that which it bore in the place where it existed before the government had opened the country to the markets of the world. For cotton, it was about ten or twelve cents a pound, and for other articles in the same proportion. This arrangement was made by the chief quartermaster and commissary, and was satisfactory to the people. No property was burned by the enemy or by rebel sympathizers or private owners in 1863. The people disclosed the locations where it had been hidden, and turned out their teams to assist in bringing it in. Ten thousand bales of cotton were brought in during the time the army occupied the territory west of the Mississippi, (some ten or fifteen days,) and 20,000 beef cattle, horses, and mules, all of which were turned over by general regulation to the quartermaster and commissary officers, who appropriated the whole of it to the use of the government, making compensation to the loyal people at the values I have stated, according to the terms of the order. Colonel S. B. Holabird was chief quartermaster of the department and charged with this duty. I was informed by him that about two million dollars was received in this campaign by him for cotton, and one million for sugar, horses, and mules, making a total of three million (\$3,000,000) dollars, all of which was appropriated to the use of the government.

This operation was so satisfactory to the people, and made such an important addition to the means for the support of the army, that I could not doubt that appropriation of property in this way would have a most advantageous effect upon the people beyond the lines of the army, and at the same time relieve the government, in a great degree, of the burdens attending the war. It was known that there were two or three hundred thousand bales of cotton in that neighborhood at that time. I believed that the whole of this could be appropriated to the use of the government in this way without dissatisfaction to the people, and without causing its destruction. I notified the government May 4, 1863, of the measures I had taken, and suggested that it would be wise to make an arrangement by which the quartermaster should be permitted to take the property of this country, paying to loyal people twenty-five or thirty per cent. of the value therefor. This policy was deemed inconsistent with the purposes of the government, and my recommendation was disapproved. A copy of my letter, and the official answer to the communication by the Secretary of the Treasury, indorsed by the Secretary of War, accompanies this paper.

Port Hudson was invested May 23, 1863. After twenty-seven days' continuous fighting it was found impossible, with the forces we had, to carry the works by assault, and a regular siege was commenced. All the property of this part of the country within the reach of the army, on both sides of the river, was appropriated to the use of the government. During the investment and siege no privilege was accorded to any private parties, under any circumstances, either to purchase or to transport cotton. It was gathered up from time to time by the officers of the army. Sugar, forage, horses and mules were applied to the use of the army, and the cotton in the neighborhood was used almost exclusively for the construction of fortifications. The siege was active, and the works constructed covered a space equal to a continuous line of seven to ten miles. A large portion of this cotton was greatly injured during the siege, and the quartermaster was directed to apply that portion of it which had been broken up, and was scattered over the grounds, when collected and cleansed, to the organization of the corps d'Afrique, consisting at that time of about 25 regiments and 12,000 colored soldiers. The work of gathering and cleansing and sending to market was performed by the colored troops, under the direction of the quartermaster, who applied the proceeds of the same to their use, of which a full account has been by him rendered. During this period of five months the army had been constantly in the field. Not a single permission or privilege of any kind was given to any person to purchase, dispose of, or transmit the products of the country to market. Everything that fell into the hands of the army was appropriated through the chief quartermaster of the department to the use of the government, of which a full, accurate, and just account can be rendered, and the just claims of private parties satisfied.

It was proposed, upon the fall of Port Hudson, to immediately operate against the city of Mobile. But the government regarded it necessary to raise the flag of the United States in Texas, and the campaign was opened for that purpose early in September, 1863. It resulted in the occupation of the Rio Grande, Matagorda bay, and all the fortified posts on the Texas coast except Galveston. On the Rio Grande and at Matagorda bay the same general rule was followed in regard to the disposition of property. Whatever fell into the hands of the army was disposed of for the benefit of the government, and whatever could be used in kind was applied to its service.

September 13 a portion of the army (six to ten thousand) crossed Berwick's bay and reoccupied the Teche country, extending their reconnoissances and military movements as far as Opelousas, which it held until the opening of the Red river campaign in March, 1864, moving from its position on the Teche on the 13th of that month.

During the Red river campaign all the property that came into the hands of the army was turned over to the quartermaster, and by him to the treasury officers. There was no exception to this rule. Every person who accompanied the army whether as reporter, or in any other capacity, was notified that trade was prohibited, and the quartermaster and the supervising agent of the Treasury Department informed that whatever property should fall into our hands would be disposed of according to the orders of the government and the laws of Congress, subject to such claims as should be recognized at Washington. Whenever, during this campaign, cotton or other property interfered with the operations of the army, or with the transportation of refugees or negroes, it was taken from the boats and abandoned to the enemy, upon the levee. Whenever it could be transported to New Orleans without inconvenience to the service, it was sent to the chief quartermaster, Colonel S. B. Holabird, and by him turned over to the treasury agent.

Upon a suggestion received from the officers of the treasury, the trade regulations of January 26, 1863, were officially promulgated at Alexandria and New Orleans, in order that they might legally take charge of the property turned over to them by the chief quartermaster. These officers will be able to account for all property coming into their hands during these military operations.

Throughout this period, from December, 1862, to the 20th of May, 1864, constant pressure from all parts of the country, and from all classes of people, was made for privileges to bring in cotton and to send out supplies or other property. Except under the rule that has been stated, where the military service of the government was directly benefited, and then only in few instances and small quantities, no such permission has been granted to any person whatever by my authority. Other officers of the department have been invested with power upon this subject. The civil officers of the government were charged by laws of Congress with the regulation of trade, the establishment of trade-stores within the lines of the army, and were authorized to pass supplies not contraband of war beyond the lines, except when specially prohibited by competent military authority.—(Treasury Regulations, July 30, 1863, article 29.) The military governor of Louisiana was authorized to give passes beyond the lines, and to permit the products of the country to be brought within our lines for specified purposes. The navy had authority upon this subject coextensive with the army, and exclusive jurisdiction upon the waters. Whatever trade may have taken place, whatever property may have been brought in, and whatever supplies may have been sent out, has been without the permission, approval, or knowledge of the commander of the department of the Gulf.

In general orders, published February 7, 1863, all officers of the government were instructed to observe closely the movement of goods, and whenever well-founded suspicion existed that a fraud upon the government was intended, to seize them without regard to any pass whatever, and that nothing, with the single exception of small oyster or fishing vessels, authorized by the collector to fish or get oysters upon the lakes, would be passed under any circumstances whatever without the approval of the major general commanding, over his personal signature. The fishing and oyster vessels were engaged in obtaining provisions for the people of the city, and it was necessary to go beyond the lines for that purpose. All permits of this character were subject to the investigation and approval of the provost marshal general, Brigadier General James Bowen, except in the cases heretofore specified, where the government had some immediate military interest in the subject.

With these exceptions, which were very few in number, and of immaterial import as to value, the approval of the major general commanding has never been given to the transportation of supplies beyond the lines, or for the admission of the staple or other products of the country, except under general orders.

In the latter part of 1863 I received what I thought reliable information that the cotton belonging to the rebel government, or to the people within the rebel lines, would be surrendered to the United States upon assurance being given to the parties interested that 25 per cent. of its value should be secured to them by a deposit of that proportion in some bank in New Orleans or New York, subject to the joint order of the quartermaster of the department, or some other officer of the government, and one person to be named by the parties interested in the property. Upon consultation with the quartermaster, Colonel S. B. Holabird, I gave my consent to this proposition, which was in accordance with the course pursued in the spring of 1863, so far as it could be done by the commander of the department, and immediately wrote to the President of the United States, and also to the Secretary of War, a full statement of the proposition, of my views concerning it, and the reasons which led me to believe that it would be for the interests of the government to carry it into execution, and asking immediate consideration and instructions.

A copy of both of these despatches, written at their date by Mr. James L. Andem, my secretary, is presented to the committee. Before the letters were mailed, information was received that new regulations were adopted by the government, which proved to be the additional regulations of the 26th January, 1864, and an officer of the treasury was on his way to New Orleans for the purpose of regulating trade with the insurrectionary districts.

Immediately upon the receipt of this information the quartermaster was notified of the facts that my consent to the proposition was withdrawn, and that no further steps would be taken, and that I should not apply to the President or Secretary of War for leave to carry the proposition into effect, since general regulations had been made upon the subject by the Treasury Department.

The additional trade regulations of the 26th of January were to take effect only when approved by the commanding officer of the department. This approval was left to his discretion, dependent of course upon their influence on military operations. Upon examination of these regulations it appeared to me perfectly feasible for the officers of the rebel government, by an arrangement with some merchant or factor in New Orleans, who could easily comply with all the conditions specified in the regulations, to transmit rebel property through our hands to New York, Liverpool, or some other market, and appropriate the proceeds of the same to the purchase of armed vessels to prey upon our commerce, or for any other purpose connected with the rebellion. I was fully confirmed in my view of the effect of these regulations by an incident which occurred in 1863. A schooner, laden with cotton, came across Lake Pontchartrain to New Orleans, and was seized by the provost marshal general as coming without authority from the rebel lines. It was claimed by a British subject, but his claim was disallowed. Subsequently, General Pemberton, then commanding the rebel force at Vicksburg, wrote to me that the cotton was shipped to New Orleans by his consent, and requesting its release, which of course was refused. The letter was forwarded to the Department of War. This shows that by selecting a proper agent at New Orleans who would fully comply with the conditions, the rebel officers might send their property through our hands, to be applied to the payment of interest on the rebel loan, or for the purchase of property for its use. It was not necessary, even, that any return should be made to the people within the rebel lines.

For these reasons I declined to give my approval to these regulations, except to the limited extent adopted at Alexandria in April, 1864, when it was required by treasury officers to enable them to receive property from the officers of the army. Upon this statement, and for this reason, the regulations were promulgated at Alexandria and at New Orleans. They applied, so far as I was con-

cerned, only to property already in the hands of the government, and which could not be disposed of except under the laws of Congress.

Pending the question of promulgating the regulations of the 26th of January numerous applications were made for special privileges to bring cotton from beyond the lines, or to carry supplies to people outside. All these applications were refused, when presented by officers of the government or by loyal citizens; but in order to give some relief to the parties interested, I expressed my willingness to allow the property to come in, upon condition that one-third of its value should be deposited with the officers of the treasury, in kind or in money, to be subject to such order as the government at Washington should give in reference to this matter. This was not intended as a special privilege or regulation, but a general rule to be pursued by all persons who desired to bring their property in. It was founded upon the consideration that one-third of the proceeds would be about equal to its value where it was found; that the cost, profits, and transportation would be one-third; and one-third deposited in the hands of the government would be sufficient security against misappropriation by any party in interest. The provost marshal general was to take bonds and establish regulations such as would enforce the observance of the condition. This proposition was stated to all applicants, both verbally and in writing, and a communication sent to the supervising agent of the treasury upon this subject, which is herewith submitted. I have no doubt that there would have been general acquiescence in this proposition had it not been for the expectation of parties interested in property of this kind beyond the lines, that they would be able sooner or later to appropriate the whole of it to their own advantage. It was, in effect, the promulgation of the regulations of the 26th of January, with the addition that one-third of the proceeds should be reserved by the government and disposed of under its orders, and that the provost marshal general should take sufficient bonds to secure to the government one-third of the property received. No property was ever brought in under this regulation, nor under any other, by any permission or knowledge of mine.

Until the commencement of the Red river campaign there had been no extensive destruction of property by the enemy in Louisiana. Cotton was not burned to any considerable extent during the Teche, Port Hudson, or Rio Grande campaigns. None was destroyed on Red river until the navy reached Alexandria. The enemy retired from the Mississippi and from Franklin without attempting to burn or destroy. From Alexandria up the river it was destroyed by the enemy, and that which escaped them was, in many instances, burned by the soldiers of the army. I attribute this destruction to the fact that the enemy supposed the property was taken by the navy without any regard to the rights of property in private parties.

It has been my belief from the beginning that the government should appropriate this property to its own service. Upon the application of the officers of the treasury at New Orleans, all of whom united in a letter to the President upon this subject, I gave my views of this question in a memorandum, a copy of which is herewith submitted. My opinion was founded upon the conviction that it was impossible to keep the property within the enemy's lines by any system of water or land blockade; that any exertions made by the government to prevent its exportation would give it such increased value as to enable the rebels to take the most extraordinary measures for its transportation to some points where it could be conveyed from the enemy's country. But for the increased value thus given to it it could never have been transported by wagons from Louisiana, Arkansas, and the eastern boundary of Texas, to the Rio Grande and the perils and risks of blockade-running would have been but poorly compensated by the small profits attending its success. It seemed to me, upon general considerations, to be clear that the property belonged of right to the government and the people, and the cheapest and most expeditious method of appro-

prising it to their use, to meet the expenses of the war on the one hand, and reduce the taxes of the people on the other, was the wise course to be pursued. This could be accomplished only through the agency of the government. It could not be accomplished through the agency of private individuals. Whatever advantages they might gain would increase the magnitude of individual fortunes, but not relieve the government in its enormous expenditures, nor lessen the taxes of the people. My conduct has been, in all cases, in accordance with these general views. Whatever privileges have been given have been general. Special privileges to individuals have never been given by me, nor with my consent or knowledge, nor upon my responsibility. My refusal has been uniform and absolute. Whenever any special privilege has been given to any person, it has been, as before stated, with a view to an immediate military advantage or necessity in the transaction to which it related.

Both the rebel government and the people would have acquiesced in this policy, because it gave to them more than they could have received from any other source. The compensation paid would be for services rendered in its preservation, rather than a recognition of the rights of property. It was a question of power rather than of right, and would have been determined by the military authorities controlling the district where it was found, whether the property should be preserved for such purpose or destroyed. The paramount interest in this property was in the government of the United States, because it was necessary to the success of its arms that it should be disposed of in such manner as not to aid the rebellion, but to maintain its own armies. The secondary interest was that of the public enemy. Having the power, he would naturally destroy it to prevent its appropriation to the support of the war against him. The third and subordinate interest was that of the owners. As against either of the contending armies they had no recognized rights. Either army, being in possession of the country, could, from the necessities of war, appropriate or destroy it. The owner could destroy it, or take the chances of its capture, or present his claim to the captors for an equitable compensation for his loss. His claim would, in the nature of things, be limited to what his property was worth at the time and place of capture. He could not claim an equivalent for what would be its value when the country should be opened by our armies to the markets of the world. His rights would be limited to the value of the property before the war, or at the time and place where it was captured during the war.

The government, by an arrangement of this kind, could have satisfied both these parties by allowing them a quarter or a half of its value when in the treasury and appropriating the balance to the support of our armies. Had it failed to accomplish this, or had the enemy refused to make terms upon the subject, we ought to have forced its destruction or its capture by the vigilance of our blockade and the advance of our armies.

In my despatch of the 4th of May, 1863, I proposed that a part of its value, say a quarter or one half, should be surrendered to the parties, whether public or private, who had an interest in its destruction, as a consideration for its preservation, and that the balance should be turned into the treasury for the support of the government. I entertained then, and I entertain now, no doubt that it could have been readily accomplished. It had already been tested by experiment to the extent of three millions of dollars in the space of ten days. Neither the people nor the enemy in arms destroyed this property. The people assisted in its preservation, and begged the army to remain in the country as an army of occupation. Until the Red river expedition there was no general or systematic destruction of the property of the country.

There were more than two hundred thousand (200,000) bales of cotton in the southwestern States belonging to the rebel government, and double that quantity including that in the hands of the people. I estimate the advantage



to the United States to be equal to ten millions of dollars. I do not doubt it would have amounted to fifty or one hundred millions on the Lower Mississippi alone, and, if extended to the general theatre of war, that it would have gone very far towards meeting all its expenses.

All the measures intended to confine it within the rebel lines have tended to increase its value, and give its control to rival manufacturers and the enemies of the country. We have not merely lost the advantages arising from the possession of the property, but have been compelled to pay, from the increased price of gold, at least a double, if not treble, cost for every article consumed by the government in the prosecution of the war, or for the support of the people.

It seemed to me legitimate and proper to appropriate this property to the support of the government upon the best terms possible. There is scarcely a doubt that this would have been accepted upon our terms by the rebel government and the people. It would have substituted for their assumption of independence a confession of dependence. But if it were rejected, the enforcement of the blockade by all the means in our possession must have ultimately compelled their consent. Their hostility would have been subordinate to their necessities, and their boasts of independence changed to a confession of dependence. It could not have been executed except by the military authority on either side. Intermediate or private parties could not, in the nature of things, have controlled the property in the presence of armies. Any government would have been justified in taking this course. The policy of the French government, pending the continental blockade of England, was based upon this principle, though with far less justification. Napoleon interdicted trade with England on the part of every European state in alliance with France, but he allowed, at different times, the importation of English manufactures into France from these states, which they had obtained by smuggling, or otherwise, upon payment of a tariff of fifty per cent. The incidental and subordinate advantage of England in this trade was more than compensated by the advantages of the commerce to France and her allies.

The reply to my despatch informed me that it was deemed advisable, with reference to the disposition of the property of insurrectionary districts, that it should be given in charge of civil rather than military officers. This, of course, was satisfactory and conclusive.

The general result of the early adoption of a system of the character recommended in my despatch of the 4th May, 1863, would have been to prevent the unnecessary destruction of property in localities within the reach of our armies, to remove a source of perpetual discontent to our soldiers, of anxiety to the officers, and of discredit to the service. It would have stimulated and sustained our manufactories, reduced the price of gold, the rate of exchange with foreign nations, the cost of the necessaries of life to the people, the rate of military and naval expenditures and those of other branches of the government, relieved the army of a horde of private speculators, and weakened or dispersed the forces of the enemy. It would have satisfied the people of the rebel States that they were dependent upon us, rather than our government upon them. To maintain constantly their sense of a general dependence upon the resources and power of the north would be to keep constantly before their eyes the inevitable result of the contest. It would have reconciled many people to the restoration of the Union, and placed our operations upon the wise and just maxim that war should support war.

The enemy would have shared with the government in the advantages of this operation, but not by any means in an equal degree. The equivalent paid for the preservation and surrender of the property might have been so regulated, if paid in the national currency, as to have subserved the interest of the government, even in the compensation rendered to the enemy. But the rebel government and people have derived from the opposite course an equal, if not much

greater, advantage, which has been returned in articles contraband of war. The increased value given to cotton, for instance, by our efforts to confine it within the rebel States, has been such as to counterbalance the risks of running the blockade, or the labor of transporting it hundreds of miles to the Rio Grande. If a fifth or even a tenth part thus found its way to the markets of the world, its value was equal to the whole if unaffected by the incidents of war. If any considerable part of the crop had been received upon the payment of the contribution of fifty per cent., it would have so reduced its market value as greatly to have restricted, if it did not suppress, all efforts for evasion of the blockade. The risk of capture would have outweighed the profits of an occasional success. Had such an arrangement been successfully established in regard to existing crops, it could have been as well applied to the yearly products of the soil. Thus the industry as well as the property of the enemy would have been turned to the support of the war. It can scarcely be doubted that the rebels have received as much "aid and comfort" from their contracts with private parties, and from successful evasions of the blockade, as they could have gained from the plan here proposed, without conferring upon our government any direct advantage whatever.

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General of Volunteers.*

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

OPELOUSAS, LA., May 4, 1863.

GENERAL: In the progress of this army I have deemed it expedient, in order to prevent a reorganization of the rebel army, to deprive the rebel government of all possible means of support, and to take possession of mules, horses, cattle, and the staple products of the country—cotton, sugar, and tobacco. I have given the people to understand that those who are well disposed and entitled to the favor of the government will receive compensation for this property, according to its value in this country at the time of our arrival, with its restricted market and liability to destruction by guerillas, or confiscation by the confederate government. In round numbers, I may say that 20,000 beeves, mules, and horses have been forwarded to Brashear city, with 5,000 bales of cotton and many hogsheads of sugar. Some protests have been received from those assuming to be French or English subjects against the possession of this property by the government, but I have regarded it as a war measure, and placed the protests upon file without other response than that I have stated above, verbally given to all these parties. In the progress of the army I believe it will be expedient to adopt a different principle; and should we reach Alexandria under circumstances which will justify our holding that point for any length of time, I propose to announce to the people that the government of the United States will lay a contribution of 50 per cent. upon all the staple products of the country—cotton, sugar, and tobacco—and that subject to this contribution they will be permitted, without discrimination of persons, to transport their products to the market of New Orleans, where they may be sold under the supervision of the government, they receiving in federal currency their proportion of the proceeds of sale. I believe that this policy will loosen from 50,000 to 150,000 bales of cotton, had we force enough to hold this country for any length of time. The revenue received by the government would be enormous; the advantage to the people immediate and important, enabling them to protect themselves from starvation, which will inevitably be upon them within the coming year, and at the same time relieve the domestic and foreign manufacturers in a great degree of the cotton starvation under which they are suffering.

I am aware that at first thought this may seem to be in conflict with the act of confiscation; but upon full consideration I am satisfied that it does not interfere with the policy of the government.

In the first place, it is applicable only to perishable property. None of that property can be appropriated to the government without the consent of the parties in interest, as it is possible for them in every instance to destroy it if they will. A large portion of it is hidden. Its discovery and transportation requires much valuable time, which the army can ill afford. To prevent its destruction, and to avoid the difficulties entailed by appropriating our transportation to this purpose, it will be necessary to give the people possessing it some interest in its preservation and sale, and this, I am confident, will secure both objects. A hundred thousand bales would yield to the government a revenue of ten to twelve millions of dollars, at present prices. If it will yield to the people a larger interest than they can obtain from the confederate government, circulate through the State the federal currency, and make them dependent upon our markets for the necessaries of life, it will go far towards reconciling parties the most hostile to the restoration of the government.

It is problematical, of course, whether such a policy can be initiated, and if initiated, whether it will be successful. If opportunity offers, I shall try the experiment, and ask the instructions of the government, if it be thought to be inconsistent with the policy.

I desire to say that thus far in the progress of the army every dollar's worth of property—except that which has been taken by individual robbers, in money and jewelry, who have been summarily punished therefor—has been scrupulously appropriated to the use of the government. Not a speculator nor a plunderer follows the trail of the army and none will be permitted in this campaign.

I have the gratification of representing in the most unqualified manner the general desire of the people for the restoration of the government. Many thousands would gladly at once renew their obligations to its support did I encourage it. Four hundred of our prisoners of war have voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance, and there are manifestations of various kinds which show that the spirit of rebellion and the confederacy has passed from the minds of this people. There is excellent opportunity, by a wise and conciliatory policy, to realize, in this quarter at least, the most sanguine expectations of the President. On the march to this point I ordered the arrest of ex-Governor Mouton, who occupied the gubernatorial chair in 1845 and subsequently. He is a man of large influence and intelligence, and has wielded with an iron hand his power over the masses of the people in this part of the country. He was president of the convention that declared Louisiana to have separated from the Union. His influence is still important, and at a time when the sentiments of the people were in transition from acquiescence in the confederate government to a recognition and renewal of their obligations to the Union, it seemed to me important that such a man should at least be quiet. I have ordered him, therefore, to be sent to New Orleans in the custody of the provost marshal general, with instructions to that officer to provide him comfortable quarters, but not to allow general intercourse with the people of that city, where he will remain until further orders from the government. This is the only arrest made, except for crime.

The enclosed despatch to the Secretary of State I beg may be transmitted to his department.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c., &c.,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

*From Major General Banks to the President.*NEW ORLEANS, *December 18, 1863.*

SIR: I concur in the opinion so generally entertained, that it is for the interest of the country to deplete the rebel territory of that species of property which is made the basis of credit for the rebel government with foreign nations. But great care is necessary to avoid an injury to ourselves in the operation.

Unless the ultimate and final disposition of the proceeds of this property be ascertained, we may find that the munitions of war furnished to the rebels, and the pirates that prey upon our commerce, may be paid for and supported by rebel products passing through our hands to the markets of the world. No commercial advantages can counterbalance so great a wrong as this. In April I recommended that the cotton in western and northern Louisiana be allowed to find a market, one-half or 50 per centum of the proceeds of sales being retained by the government, but the Secretary of War thought it then not expedient to adopt this policy. The agents selected for the execution of the plan proposed should be designated by the general government. These two points guarded, protection from public injury by the misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of this property, and the selection of proper agents, if it cannot be made a general trade, I see no objections to the proposal made by the treasury agents of this department.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.**From Major General Banks to the President.*NEW ORLEANS, *February 2, 1864.*

SIR: An increase of business men from the north and west in New Orleans, and the accumulation of funds, make it impossible to resist the pressure in favor of opening trade with the people beyond the lines of the army. If it is refused, as it steadily has been by me, the profits of an illicit commercial intercourse are so gigantic that it is almost impossible to prevent the subordination of subordinate officers. So long as the unauthorized trade continues, it will be managed according to the interests of those engaged in it; and the result is, that guerillas and small detachments of rebel troops on the east bank of the river receive their supplies, not only of clothing, but of equipments and arms, from persons doing business in New Orleans, who are stimulated, and are enabled to transact their business, through the numerous profits attending the change of these products for cotton with the agents of the enemy. I am satisfied that if the blockade upon the west bank of the river could be made completely effective, the rebel army would be in a great measure compelled to abandon the coast and a greater part of Louisiana and Texas within a short time. I believe the time has come when the government will be compelled to establish some regulations controlling this trade.

There are two principles which must be established in any trade regulations: The first is, that private parties should not be allowed to appropriate rebel property to their own use. The property of the rebel government, as far as possible, should be applied to the payment of the expenses of the war. The second is, that no property in considerable amount should be allowed to pass through the port of New Orleans with the consent of the government officers, unless there is sufficient guarantee that it could not be used for the

purchase in Europe of rams or other vessels to prey upon and destroy American commerce; otherwise, when indemnity shall be demanded, it will be answered that the purchase-money for such vessels passed through the hands of the government with the knowledge of its officers. I have myself never consented to any commerce of this kind, but have recommended always to the government to take a guarantee for security against possible wrong.

There are in the State of Louisiana about one hundred and five thousand (105,000) bales of cotton belonging to the rebel government, for which it has title papers from the private owners. In Arkansas and Texas there is probably as much more, making at least two hundred thousand bales of cotton, the exclusive property of the rebel government.

The state of the rebellion, and the impoverished condition of its officers west of the Mississippi, is such that they are willing to take measures for the preservation of this cotton wherever it may be found, and allow it to be taken and sold by the officers of the government, appropriating the proceeds, except eighteen (18) cents a pound to be reserved for their use in the hands of the chief quartermaster, until satisfactory guarantees are given that it is not to be used by any person in hostile acts against the United States; it being understood that no objection will be made to this portion of the proceeds of the cotton being paid to any private parties for private personal use wherever they may be. The effect of such an arrangement will be, first, to put into the treasury of the United States—which will be paid over to the assistant treasurer of this department upon its receipt—from two-thirds to three-quarters of the value of this cotton, whatever its quantity may be; second, to deprive the rebel government of any possible advantage hereafter of the appropriation of this property to its use by any chance whatever; third, to relieve our manufactories and increase our commerce to this extent, whether it be more or less; and, fourth, to demoralize the principal and subordinate officers of the army west of the Mississippi by providing them with means for escaping from the service in which they are engaged, it being evident that a man who has secured to himself, within the limits of the United States, a competency for himself or his family, will not continue to risk his life in a hopeless cause. The effect of the introduction of this cotton to the market will be material to the Treasury Department of the United States in two ways: first, it will stop the drain of gold to New Orleans, which is continually taking place, for shipment within the rebel lines for purchase of this cotton upon private speculation. The drain upon the gold market for this purpose is a serious one, and cannot but be felt by the Treasury Department. In the second place, it substitutes property to this extent which is the equivalent of gold both in our own and in the European market. From this brief statement it seems to me that the government will obtain, if the project can be carried through, most important advantages, and guarantee itself against any possible injury that may arise from the shipment of this property, and that it will at the same time regulate and control a business which cannot be prevented, and which cannot otherwise be carried on without serious injury.

Believing this to be the case, I have directed the quartermaster to enter into any arrangement with private parties representing the chief rebel officers to carry into effect this operation.

Copies of the papers are herewith enclosed, to which I ask early attention. I transmit them by this mail, in order that should the proposition be disapproved by the government, immediate information may be given. It cannot go into effect until our armies shall move into the Red river country.

A second proposition, to which a second paper herewith enclosed refers, is of the same character, but differing a little in terms. It relates to the shipment of fifteen thousand bales of cotton to the mouth of Red river, or to some more convenient point on the Mississippi, within one month, securing to the parties engaged in this a certain amount of the proceeds of this cotton, which is stated

in the papers, and leaving the balance in the hands of the government of the United States for its own use; the whole of it, with the exception of one hundred thousand dollars, to remain under the control of the United States until that part which is to be appropriated to individuals engaged in the transaction can be safely paid to them without a possible injury to this government. This also probably relates to cotton belonging to the rebel government, although it is not so specified.

A third proposition which I have to make upon this subject covers, with the two preceding, the whole question of cotton trade, which is, to allow the importation, from beyond the lines of the army, of cotton belonging to private parties, which is not, and has not been, owned by the rebel government, for sale in American markets; one-third of the quantity of cotton in kind, or its proceeds in interest-bearing bonds of the United States, to be held by the government officers until the government at Washington shall be satisfied that it can be used for no hostile purposes, and shall order its payment to the individuals who may deposit it for that purpose. I am informed that if these three propositions can be carried into effect, that from two to three hundred thousand bales of cotton can be brought into the market, and that a greater part of the whole can, in the way I have specified, be appropriated to the use of the government of the United States as a means of carrying on the war. It will not assist, but, on the contrary, weaken, the enemy; it will not diminish, but facilitate and strengthen, our operations against the enemy.

The government will be represented by the quartermaster, who will be obliged to render full accounts of all the details of the transaction, both of the money reserved for the government and of the individuals to whom that portion not reserved for the government is paid; and this money will be turned over to the assistant treasurer of the United States as it is received. I am unable to perceive that there is any danger or opportunity for disreputable proceedings on the part of the officers of the government, or that it will in any way compromise its honor; and I recommend the approval of these measures, or, in the event of disapproval, ask that early information may be given to me upon the subject for my guidance.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

*From the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War.*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *May 28, 1863.*

SIR: I have carefully considered the communication of Major General Banks to Major General Halleck placed by you in my hands yesterday.

He asks instructions as to the disposition of staple products and other movable property found in his department, and particularly during his recent advance, and recommends that all persons within his lines be permitted to bring their products to New Orleans for sale, paying to the government fifty per cent. of the proceeds.

There are four classes of property in the insurrectionary districts—confiscated, abandoned, captured, and purchased property. Confiscated property is that which belongs to certain classes of persons and is liable to seizure and condemnation by judicial proceedings. Abandoned property is that which has been deserted by its owners and is voluntarily abandoned by them to the civil or military officers of the federal government. Captured property is understood to be that which is seized or taken from hostile possession by the military or naval forces of the United States. Under the head of purchased property

may be included that which is the subject of sale and purchase under the license of the President, through permits granted by officers of the Treasury Department.

The first of these classes of property includes much that may be also regarded, until confiscation is enforced through judicial proceedings, as belonging to one or more of the other classes.

The property seized by General Banks belongs to the second class, and its disposition is already determined by law and the orders of the War Department. So far as the property is useful to the army, it is to be turned over to the quartermasters or commissaries; so far as it is not so required, it is to be turned over to the agents of the Treasury Department.

The State of Louisiana having been declared, by proclamation of the President, in a state of insurrection, and the port of New Orleans being excepted from the effects of that proclamation, all trade between that place and other portions of the State of Louisiana, except in accordance with the regulations and orders referred to, is illegal. But with a view to the same end as that contemplated by Major General Banks, the honorable B. F. Flanders has been appointed supervising special agent for the States included in the department of the Gulf, to take charge and dispose of all captured or abandoned property, and also to supervise all permitted trade. The collector of the port of New Orleans has been authorized, under the direction of the supervising special agent, to grant permits, on certain terms, for the purchase of cotton and other staples within the lines occupied by the army. This will enable parties whose property may not be considered fit subject for capture, and who may desire to sell it, to dispose of it to the best advantage, subject to a proper contribution to the government, and will enable them also to obtain such supplies as may be permitted without too much risk of their being carried to the rebels. Mr. Flanders has been instructed to confer fully with Major General Banks, and to act in concert with him.

The communication of Major General Banks is herewith returned.

Yours, very respectfully,

S. P. CHASE,  
*Secretary of the Treasury.*

HON. E. M. STANTON.

[Indorsement by the Secretary of War.]

Referred to the general-in-chief for answer to the communication of General Banks of the 4th of May. The department does not deem it necessary to give any other or further instructions except a reference to the act of Congress and trade regulations of the Treasury Department, which are doubtless well known to Major General Banks. It is desirable that there should be no unnecessary interference by the military authorities with commercial transactions.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

MAY 29, 1863.

EXTRACTS AND COPIES OF DESPATCHES RECEIVED AND SENT RELATING TO THE PORT HUDSON, TEXAS, AND RED RIVER CAMPAIGNS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, 1863 AND 1864.

*From Major General Banks to Major General Grant.*

NEW ORLEANS, July 18, 1863.

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It is my belief that Johnston, when defeated by you, as I am confident he will be, will fall back upon Mobile. Such is also the expectation of the rebels. The capture of Mobile is of importance, second only in the history of the war to the

opening of the Mississippi. I hope you will be able to follow him. I can aid you somewhat by land and by sea if that shall be your destination. Mobile is the last stronghold in the west and southwest. No pains should be spared to effect its reduction.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, July 26, 1863.

\* \* \* \* \*

There is still strength at Mobile and in Texas which will constantly threaten Louisiana, and which ought to be destroyed without delay. The possession of Mobile and the occupation of Texas would quiet the whole of the southwest, and every effort ought to be made to accomplish this.

Its importance can hardly be overestimated.

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, July 30, 1863.

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Information from Mobile leads us to believe that the force at that point is now about 5,000, which is engaged industriously on the land side in strengthening the position. My belief is that Johnston's forces are moving to the east, and that the garrison of Mobile will not be strengthened unless it be by paroled men from Vicksburg and Port Hudson; while the rebel army of the east is occupied at Charleston and at Richmond by our forces, it would be impossible for them to strengthen Mobile to any great extent. It seems to be the favorable opportunity for a movement in that direction. An attack should be made by land. Troops can be transported by the river to Mobile, with the intervention of a march of 25 miles from Portersville, on the west side of the bay and the rear of the city. We have outlines of their works, and can estimate very well their strength. I am confident that a sudden movement, such as can be made with fifteen or twenty thousand men on this line, will reduce that position with certainty and without delay. The troops of the west need rest, and are incapable of long or rapid marches. It is, therefore, impracticable to attack Mobile, except by the river and Mississippi sound. A portion of General Grant's forces could be transported there with but little labor to themselves, and the place could be invested before the enemy could anticipate our movement.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 1, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 27th July, transmitted to me by General Grant. I have already informed you of the condition of this department. The views I expressed in reference to other movements are strengthened by the occurrences of the day.



The advantage of immediate operations against Mobile consists in the fact that its fortifications thus far are upon the Gulf and the bay. The rear of the city is unprotected, except by a line of incomplete works, with few guns mounted, and is unprepared for an assault on the land side. In a short time these works will be completed, the guns mounted, the city provisioned, and the garrison strengthened. The army and people are now in such panic from the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson that, if attacked on the land side, where assault is not anticipated, and re-enforcements are not sent from the east at once, the place will probably be surrendered without serious contest. The approach by land from Portersville, on Mississippi sound, is twenty-five miles; from Pensacola, sixty-five miles. The country to Mobile is level and sandy. Roads can be made in any direction without much labor. From Pensacola the way is open to the rear of Mobile, — miles from which all supplies can be cut off. The troops on the Mississippi are now so much exhausted that rapid or long marches are impracticable. The movement against Mobile can be made by water, except a single march of twenty-five miles. Attacked from land, the water defences are unavailable, and the forts will fall with the city. The cooperation of the naval forces now here is all that is absolutely necessary. — men, (one corps of General Grant's army,) with the available forces at New Orleans, are sufficient for the work. It is believed that western Louisiana is free from any considerable force of the enemy.

The possession of Mobile gives the government the control of the Alabama river and the line of railways, east and west from Charleston and Savannah, to Vicksburg, via Montgomery, and places the whole of the State of Mississippi and southern Alabama in position to return to the Union. If the rebel government loses this position, it has no outlet to the Gulf except Galveston. The operation need not last more than thirty days, and can scarcely interfere with any other movements east or west. I understand it to meet with General Grant's approval, if it be consistent with the general plans of the government, upon which condition only I urge it. I send this from Vicksburg, having arrived here at 9 o'clock this morning, and return to New Orleans this evening.

N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding Department Gulf.*

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*To General Grant.*

NEW ORLEANS, *August 10, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to enclose to you some memoranda concerning Mobile. I still think it of the utmost moment that that post should be in our hands. Except for Johnston's army, we should have no difficulty. He seems to occupy a position intended to cover Mobile, and if he is in force 30,000 or 40,000 strong, as I suppose, he could embarrass the operations against that point very seriously. I am unable, however, to see how he can hold his position in the southwest, with Rosecrans's army pressing down upon the rebel centre. A line extending from Mobile to Richmond, in the present shattered condition of the rebel armies—the right, centre, and left having all been disastrously defeated—it seems to me impossible that they can maintain their positions if Rosecrans, with a heavy force, pushes down upon their centre, or if Charleston shall fall into our hands through the operations of the fleet and army combined. A successful movement in either direction, from Charleston or by Rosecrans, will cut their centre, and place Bragg and Johnston, with their forces, between the

troops under Rosecrans, your troops, and mine at New Orleans. I do not believe that that condition of things can be maintained. All the information we receive here points to a change in their operations.

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*To the President.*

NEW ORLEANS, *August 12, 1863.*

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Should our armies get possession of Mobile or of Texas, these regiments can be filled without delay, and we shall have a force in this department of at least 25,000 good men. It is impossible to raise negro regiments, except we get possession of the country where negroes are. This is a fact overlooked by many persons who are greatly interested in the success of these organizations.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., August 12, 1863.*

Your despatches of July 30 and August 1 are just received. I fully appreciate the importance of the operation proposed by you in these despatches, but there are reasons other than military why those heretofore directed should be undertaken first. On this matter we have no choice, but must carry out the views of the government.

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *July 31, 1863.*

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It is important that we immediately occupy some point or points in Texas. Whether the movement should be made by land or water is not yet decided. We shall wait your answer to my despatch of the 24th. In the mean time every preparation should be made. If by water, Admiral Farragut will co-operate. The Navy Department recommends Indianola as the point of landing. It seems to me that that point is too distant, as it will leave the expedition too isolated from New Orleans. If the landing can be made at Galveston, the country between that place and New Orleans can be soon cleared out, and the enemy be prevented from operating successively upon these places. In other words, you can venture to send a larger force to Galveston than you can to Indianola.

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H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, August 6, 1863.*

There are important reasons why our flag should be restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this, by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Admiral Farragut will co-operate. There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, August 10, 1863.

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In my opinion, neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it be necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to *some one point* in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up Red river to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas. This would be merely carrying out the plan proposed by you at the beginning of the campaign, and in my opinion far superior in its military character to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola. Nevertheless your choice is left unrestrained.

In the first place, by adopting the line of the Red river, you retain your connexion with your own base and separate still more the two parts of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcements from Texas. They are already cut off from the rebel States east of the Mississippi. If you occupy Galveston or Indianola, you divide your own troops and enable the enemy to concentrate all his forces upon either of these points, or on New Orleans. I write this simply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, August 20, 1863.

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My despatches to you will show that no movement on Mobile is at present contemplated. Nor can any iron-clads be now detached from Charleston or other points for the defence of New Orleans.

Mexican and French complications render it exceedingly important that the movement ordered against Texas be undertaken without delay.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1863.

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Be cautious in moving on the Rio Grande. It should be your effort to get between the armies of Kirby Smith and Magruder. Should they unite and get between you and New Orleans, they may give you much trouble.

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H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 15, 1863.

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Measures have been already taken to carry into effect your orders. We shall plant the flag in Texas within a week. My plan has been, to move against

Galveston upon the land side *via* Sabine pass, and from Berwick's bay *via* Vermillionville and Niblett's bluff to Houston and Galveston, for the transportation and artillery. We shall be ready, I think, as soon as General Grant's corps can reach us. The route indicated is that followed by the Texans in their invasions of western Louisiana. We can move 8,000 men at once to Sabine pass, and then concentrate rapidly on Galveston, fortifying and holding a portion of the main land, or the island only, as may be deemed expedient. From thence operations are practicable in any direction to the interior or the Rio Grande. From Galveston, when strongly fortified, I would move a force of 5,000 or more to the Rio Grande, where one or more positions can be so fortified as to be held by a much less force, while we hold Galveston or the interior of the State. This has been my view of operations in Texas since the beginning. Indianola is too far distant; does not command the important communications of the State, and, if occupied, would leave the forces of the enemy between us and New Orleans, which is to be avoided if possible. No movement can be made from the Gulf against Galveston with a certainty of success. Our naval forces are not strong enough, and the enemy's works are too extensive and thorough. The enemy fear only an attack from the land *via* Niblett's bluff, the route I propose, or Alexandria. From that point to Niblett's bluff our success is certain. We learned this from intercepted letters, while in Alexandria in May. I send a sketch of the fortifications at Galveston made at that time by one who was engaged upon them, with a description of the guns mounted.

If General Grant sends me 10,000 men, I can throw 20,000 immediately into Texas. The force should be larger if possible.

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*To Admiral Porter.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 16, 1863.

It is probable that a movement will be undertaken from New Orleans, which will draw most of the forces from that city. To prevent an invasion of the Texan troops, it will be necessary that the Atchafalaya river and Berwick's bay should be patrolled by light-draught gunboats. If you have two or three light-draught tin-clads that you can send into these waters, it will be of great service to us. None of our gunboats will pass Lake Chicot, as they draw over six feet of water. If your gunboats could enter the Atchafalaya from the Red river, and patrol that river to Berwick's bay, it would effectually cut off any invasion of the enemy from that point. In view of the movements contemplated, it is probable that two or three boats would be sufficient for the purpose indicated, and they would at the same time prevent the incursions of guerillas on the west bank of the Mississippi as far up as the mouth of Red river. This would be, perhaps, the most effective service to which this small force could be put.

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 16, 1863.

In the event of the movements contemplated in my despatch of this date, it will be necessary that the Atchafalaya river and Berwick's bay should be patrolled by light-draught gunboats to prevent the invasion of the Lafourche district by the enemy. If Admiral Porter can send three of his light-draught

tin-clads down the Atchafalaya into Berwick's bay from the Red river, it will effectually accomplish this object, and at the same time prevent the incursions of guerillas upon the west bank of the Mississippi, below the mouth of Red river. This will be the most effectual service that these boats can possibly render in this quarter. I respectfully, but earnestly, recommend that such an order be given. It is impossible to protect Brashear city and the Lafourche district, except by the aid of gunboats. It was their absence that enabled the enemy to capture Brashear, and to escape across the bay upon our return from Port Hudson.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 17, 1863.

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If we expect to succeed in the movements referred to in my despatches of this date, *it will be indispensable that our military force should be increased beyond what can be obtained by the enrolment of negroes.* The letter addressed to the President, a copy of which I send to you, as well as the reference to this subject in my despatch addressed to you, will show what we have done in this respect. I can assure the government that nothing will be omitted that is calculated to strengthen this arm of the service; but before we can successfully organize the negroes of this country, we must obtain control of the States where they are by means of white troops.

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 26, 1863.

Your despatch of the 12th instant, referring to the necessity of operations in Texas rather than against Mobile, was received by the Morning Star, arriving yesterday. Independent of any political or diplomatic considerations, Texas presents an arena as important as any portion of the country. The occupation of Galveston, if it could be accomplished by a dispersion or capture of any considerable portion of Texan troops, and the destruction of the rebel steamers in the central rivers emptying in the Gulf, would cripple beyond recovery the rebel forces of the southwest. The rebellion in Louisiana is kept alive only by Texas.

A considerable land force is requisite to accomplish this result, even with the co-operation of the navy, and protect at the same time New Orleans. The enemy has been very active in gathering up conscripts. There are about 15,000 between Natchitoches and Franklin.

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, August 26, 1863.

The steamer Hudson arriving yesterday, brought duplicate copy of the order of August 6, received earlier by telegraph from General Grant, and also your letter of the 10th instant upon the subject of the expedition into Texas.

I have made all possible exertion to get a sufficient force into the field to execute the order, but encounter serious difficulties in the preparation. General Ord's corps d'armée has not yet arrived. The last division will be here at the close of the week. The sickness and absence of officers delay seriously our preparations for movement. There is very great deficiency of transportation for movement by water, either by sea or by river. The river boats sent up with the nine-months troops are detained above, and return slowly. By the Gulf we are able to move, after all possible exertions, but one-third of our forces at one time. This is a serious misfortune, as it costs us most valuable time, and gives the enemy opportunity to anticipate our plans and concentrate his forces against us.

I hope, however, to be able to execute your orders without further material delay. The considerations embraced in your letter of the 10th, duplicate copies of which I have received, have been carefully weighed. To enter Texas from Alexandria or Shreveport would bring us to the nearest point to Hoop hill, in Sabine county, or Marshall, in Harrison, due west of Alexandria and Shreveport, respectively. These points are accessible only by heavy marches, for which the troops are illy prepared at this season of the year, and the points occupied would attract but little attention; and if our purpose was to penetrate further into the interior, they would become exposed to sudden attacks of the enemy, and defensible only by a strong and permanent force of troops. The serious objection to moving on this line, in the present condition of the forces in this department, is the distance it carries us from New Orleans, our base of operations necessarily, and the great difficulty and the length of time required to return if the exigencies of the service required it, which is quite possible. In the event of long absence, Johnston threatens us from the east. The army will concentrate between Alexandria and Franklin, on the Teche, until our purpose is developed. As soon as we move any distance they will operate against the river and New Orleans. It is true that we could follow up such a movement by falling on their rear, but that would compel us to abandon the position in Texas, or leave it exposed with but slender defences and garrison. This view is based, as you will see, upon the impossibility of moving even to Alexandria by water at the present low stage of the rivers, and the inability of the troops to accomplish extended marches. A movement upon the Sabine accomplishes these objects: 1st. It executes your order by planting the flag at a prominent and commanding position in Texas. 2d. It is accomplished by water. 3d. It is safely made with a comparatively small force, and without attracting the attention of the enemy until it is done. 4th. It enables us to move against Galveston from the interior, destroying at the same time all the naval and transport vessels of the State between the Sabine and the Colorado. 5th. To occupy Galveston island with a small force of two or three thousand only, and to push on to Indianola or the Rio Grande, or to return to the Mississippi, as the exigencies of the service may require. If the enemy moves in force upon New Orleans, we can return from Sabine or Galveston in such time and in such force as to cut off his retreat by the bay on the Atchafalaya. The advantage to be gained by the destruction of the rebel boats in the Sabine and Galveston bay, and on the Trinity and Brazos rivers, would be very great. This can be effected only by a movement upon Galveston from the Sabine by Beaumont, Liberty, and Houston. If the enemy is in such strength as to defeat this by occupying a position between the Sabine and Neches, we shall make available the fortifications of the enemy at Orange, and be supported by the navy, whose light boats can run up to Orange or to Beaumont. If the season were different, the northern line would be doubtless preferable on many grounds.

*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *September 13, 1863.*

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Immediately upon the receipt of information of the failure at Sabine, and before the return of the troops, I commenced preparations for an overland movement from Brashear city, via Vermillionville and Niblett's bluff. Had we the requisite naval force or transportation, I would renew the attempt on the Sabine, or strike at the Rio Grande; but we have neither.

It is impossible to move up the Red river at this season, except by the most tedious marches, on account of the low stage of water. The entrance to the Atchafalaya is now covered by a dry sand-bar which extends entirely across the bed of the river. I have constantly borne in mind your suggestion as to a movement from Alexandria or Shreveport, but the low stage of the water makes it impracticable at this season.

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*To Major General Banks.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., September 30, 1863.*

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I do not regard Sabine city in the same light as you do. Instead of being "the very centre of the circle of the enemy's operations," it seems to me to be upon the very circumference of his theatre of war west of the Mississippi. The centre of this theatre is some point near Marshall or Nacogdoches. The enemy's line extends from near Little Rock to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The occupation of Sabine city neither cuts this line, nor prevents the concentration of all his forces on any point of it which he may select. Nevertheless, as the objects of your expedition are rather political than military, and do not admit of delay, you may be able to accomplish the wishes of the government by the route you have chosen, sooner than by any other.

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H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief, U. S. A.*

*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *October 15, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of September 28, with accompanying memoranda of the movements of the enemy in Arkansas and the northern part of Louisiana. The position of my force at the present time between Opelousas and Vermillionville will preclude the operations contemplated by them on the Mississippi, as from the mouth of the Red river we shall cover it completely, and as we move north our protection will be extended above. The importance of Shreveport, as represented, is very great, and it confirms representations made to us. I had the strongest possible desire to reach Shreveport when in Alexandria in May, but the necessity of operations on the Mississippi prevented it.

The movement upon Shreveport and Marshall is impracticable at this season. It would have required a march from Brashear of more than 500 miles. The

enemy destroying all supplies of the country as he retreats, and the low stage of the water making it impossible for us to avail ourselves of any water communications except upon the Teche as far as Vermillionville, would have made necessary a communication for this distance by wagon trains.

\* \* \* \* \*

It was perfectly feasible to land below at any point on the coast between Sabine and Galveston bay. The instructions of General Franklin contemplated this, but the naval officers were so perfectly confident in regard to their information of the fortifications at Sabine bay, that their boats were disabled and in the possession of the enemy before any other course was contemplated. It was equally practicable to march from the coast between the Sabine and Galveston directly to Houston, as from Beaumont to Houston, and a landing could have been effected without difficulty. It would have been repeated immediately, but the failure had given the enemy so much notice that he was able to concentrate his forces to prevent a landing at that point. It left me no alternative, therefore, but to move across Berwick's bay in the direction of Opelousas, for the purpose of taking a route westward to Niblett's bluff on the Sabine, or to advance north to Alexandria, Shreveport, and Marshall, in accordance with the suggestion which you have made both now and heretofore.

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ON BOARD STEAMER McCLELLAN,

*Mississippi River, 4 p. m., October 26, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

To-day, (26th October,) at 12 m., we sailed for the Rio Grande. If a landing is effected, as we hope, at Brazos Santiago, occupying the line of the river, we shall immediately effect a lodgement at Matagorda, and seize an interior position.

\* \* \* \* \*

N. P. BANKS, *M. G., C.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,

*St. Louis, Mo., November 19, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The general-in-chief suggests that General Steele might now advance to Red river and form a junction with you, or at least hold that river while you operate in Texas. I am anxious to advance his force to Red river as soon as practicable. No doubt this will also strengthen you, and aid you to carry out your plans.

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J. M. SCHOFIELD,  
*Major General.*

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*To General Halleck.*

OFF ARANSAS PASS, TEXAS, *November 18, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

*The success of our expedition is very likely to transfer our operations to the coast. The best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya. To operate*



promptly and effectively on this line we need light-draught sea-boats, drawing six or seven feet of water. A supply of these will be a measure of great economy to the government. Larger ships are in great peril constantly from their inability to escape the "northers" by entering the passes. It is of the utmost importance that this number should be increased. We need very much light-draught gunboats on the Atchafalaya, as, if this line is well protected from Berwick's bay to the Red river, the enemy necessarily is thrown back from the Mississippi.

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*From General Halleck.*

DECEMBER 7, 1863.

I have just received your letter of November 18, off Aransas pass. In this you say the best line of defence for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's bay and the Atchafalaya. I fully concur with you in this opinion. It is the line which I advised you from the beginning to adopt.

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In regard to your Sabine and Rio Grande expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here till they were actually undertaken. The danger, however, of dividing your army, with the enemy between the two parts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force, was pointed out from the first, and I have continually urged that you must not expect any considerable re-enforcements from other departments.

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*From Major General Banks to the President.*

NEW ORLEANS, December 4, 1863.

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It has been impossible, within any reasonable time, to gain a foothold in Texas, except by the sea, at this season. The march by land either to the Sabine, or by Alexandria or Shreveport, would cover from three to five hundred miles, to any important point in Texas, over a country without water or supplies of any kind, without other transportation in the present stage of the river than that of wagon trains, and against the constantly retreating but steadily concentrating forces of the enemy, who could not fail, by the superiority in number of their mounted troops, to inflict upon our columns, trains, and communications serious and irreparable injury.

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, December 12, 1863.

Major General Washburn's despatches from Pass Cavallo, Texas, are transmitted herewith. He is instructed not to move further up the coast, but to maintain his position either on the island or at a secure point inland, either at Indianola or Lavacca. He has from 5,000 to 6,000 men, and can defend himself against any force it is possible for the enemy to concentrate against him. A movement upon the Brazos, which he suggests, would unquestionably lead to

an immediate engagement with the forces under Magruder, and I have thought it unsafe to take that position until we are strong enough to insure success. My desire is to occupy Galveston island if it can be done within reasonable time. This will give us the entire coast, and relieve the blockading squadron, which numbers now over thirty war vessels, enabling us to direct this naval force against the enemy on the Mississippi, or any other part of the Gulf coast. If this can be accomplished it will be of very material advantage. If we move in that direction, I shall concentrate on the Brazos all the disposable force at my command for a decisive and very short campaign. Eastern Texas offers us recruits, horses, forage, and supplies of every kind. All other parts of this department have been stripped by the two armies of everything necessary for their support. If this movement is made, the force under General Franklin on the Teche will be withdrawn and concentrated in Texas. I do not intend to divide my forces by the occupation of numerous positions. With the exception of Brazos Santiago, it will be unnecessary to hold any other post, except it be upon Matagorda or Galveston bay.

\* \* \* \* \*

*To Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *December 30, 1863.*

\* \* \* \* \*

A portion of my command is now on the Teche, but will probably be withdrawn. The rivers are not yet deep enough to enable us to advance towards the Red river, except by wagon communication, which is impracticable. The country is without supplies of any kind. It is my desire, if possible, to get possession of Galveston. This, if effected, will give us control of the entire coast of Texas, and require but two small garrisons—one on the Rio Grande, and the other on Galveston island—unless it be the wish of the Department of War that extensive operations should be made in Texas. A sufficient number of men can probably be recruited in that State for the permanent occupation of these two posts. It will relieve a very large number of naval vessels whose service is now indispensable to us on the Mississippi and in the Gulf. This can occupy but a short time, and, if executed, will leave my whole force in hand to move to any other point on the Red river, or wherever the government may direct. Once possessed of Galveston, and my command ready for operations in any other direction, I shall await the orders of the government; but I trust that this may be accomplished before undertaking any other enterprise. It is impossible, at this time, to move as far north as Alexandria by water. The Red river is not open to the navigation of our gunboats, and it is commanded by Fort DeRussy, which has been remounted since our occupation of Alexandria. This position must be turned by means of a large force on land, before the gunboats can pass. To co-operate with General Steele in Arkansas, or north of the Red river, will bring nearly the whole rebel force of Texas and Louisiana between New Orleans and my command, without the possibility of dispersing or defeating them, as their movement would be directed south, and mine to the north. It is necessary that this force should be first dispersed or destroyed before I can safely operate in conjunction with General Steele. Once possessed of the coast of Texas, and the naval and land forces relieved, I can then operate against the force in Louisiana and Texas, and can disperse or destroy the land force in Louisiana, and safely co-operate with General Steele, or with any other portion of the army of the United States. It was in this manner that we captured Port Hudson. It would have been impracticable to proceed against

Port Hudson from the Mississippi, without having first dispersed the army of Texas and Louisiana on the west of that river.

\* \* \* \* \*

The true line of occupation, in my judgment, offensive and defensive, for this department, is the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. The Teche country, and that between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi, can be defended only by the assistance of the navy. It is impossible for land forces to operate on that line successfully without the assistance of gunboats. With their assistance the advance is easy and certain. The best position that we could occupy will be to defend this line by the aid of a strong naval force of light and heavy-draught gunboats for the different waters in which they may operate, and the disposable land forces so held as to be able to move them from one point to another in a body. We should then have one complete line of water navigation from the Rio Grande to Alexandria or Shreveport during the winter and spring, and from the mouth of the Mississippi to Key West, in the Gulf, and could throw our entire force against any part of the territory occupied by the enemy without the possibility of their anticipating our movement or purposes. I am endeavoring constantly to secure means for offensive and defensive war upon this plan, and am confident it can be very speedily accomplished.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Washburn.*

NEW ORLEANS, *January 13, 1864.*

GENERAL: The report of General Warren, dated December 11, 1863, gives a very satisfactory account of his march to Lavacca, and its influence cannot but be favorable both upon the troops and the people. These expeditions are productive of good results, but great care should be taken against surprise. The policy of Magruder will be to lie in wait with a large force to cut off detachments of our troops, and it is certain to succeed, except by extreme vigilance on our part in the execution of these expeditions.

I am very anxious that such fortifications may be constructed at Indianola as will enable us to hold that position with safety; and with the advantage which you describe as likely to be derived from it by our troops, their position will be greatly improved. I hope soon to be able to concentrate such a force there as to make our movement against Magruder's army a certain success. At present his army is stronger than ours. I beg you to convey my compliments to General Warren, and say that I am very glad of his success.

I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 4, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Generals Sherman and Steele agree with me in opinion that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas. If this line can be adopted, most of the troops in Arkansas can be concentrated on it, but, as before remarked, Steele cannot alone attempt its occupation. His movements must, therefore, be dependent in a great measure upon yours. If, as soon as you have sufficient water in the Atchafalaya and Red rivers, you operate in that direction, Steele's army, and such forces as

Sherman can detach, should be directed to the same object. The gunboats should also co-operate. *If, on the other hand, your operations are mainly confined to the coast of Texas, Steele must make the Arkansas river his line of defence, and most of Sherman's force may be required to keep open the Mississippi.*

So long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Sherman and Steele. The best thing, it would seem, to be done under the circumstances is for you to communicate with them and also with Admiral Porter in regard to some general co-operation. All agree upon what is the best plan of operations, if the stage of water in the rivers and other circumstances should be favorable. If not, it must be modified or changed.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

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(From General Halleck,)

JANUARY 11, 1864.

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I am assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter will be prepared to co-operate with you as soon as the stage of water in the southwest will admit of the use of his flotilla there. General Steele's command is now under the general orders of General Grant, and it is hoped that he and General Sherman may also be able to co-operate with you at an early day. \* \* \*

It has never been expected that your troops would operate north of Red river unless the rebel forces in Texas should be withdrawn into Arkansas. But it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red river if he could rely upon your co-operation, and he could be certain of receiving supplies on that line. Being uncertain on these points, he determined not to attempt an advance, but to occupy the Arkansas river as his line of defence. The best military opinions of the generals in the west seem to favor operations on Red river, provided the stage of water will enable gunboats to co-operate. I presume General Sherman will communicate with you on this subject. If the rebels could be driven south of that river, it would serve as a shorter and better line of defence for Arkansas and Missouri than that now occupied by General Steele; moreover, it would open to us the cotton and slaves in northeastern Louisiana and southern Arkansas. I am inclined to think that this opens a better field of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant can spare during the winter. I have written to him and also to General Steele on this subject.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, January 23, 1864.

GENERAL: Your despatches of the 4th and the 11th of January are received—the first on the 13th instant, and the second by the mail to-day. I am much gratified to know that General Sherman is instructed to co-operate with the commands on the Mississippi with the forces you propose. I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, “that the Red river is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas;” but it would be too much for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces and the assistance of General Sherman the success of movements on that line will be certain and important. I shall most cordially co-operate with them in executing your orders. With my own command I can operate with safety only on the coast of Texas; but

from the coast I could not penetrate far into the interior, nor secure control of more than the country west of San Antonio. On the other line, with commensurate forces, the whole State, as well as Arkansas and Louisiana, will be ours, and their people will gladly renew their allegiance to the government. The occupation of Shreveport will be to the country west of the Mississippi what that of Chattanooga is to the east, and as soon as this can be accomplished the country west of Shreveport will be in condition for movement into Texas. I have written to General Sherman and General Steele, in accordance with their views, and shall be ready to act with them as soon as the Atchafalaya and Red river will admit the navigation of our gunboats. Our supplies can be transported by the Red river until April, at least. In the mean time the railway from Vicksburg to Shreveport ought to be completed, which would furnish communication very comfortably for the whole of eastern Texas. I do not mean that operations should be deferred for the purpose, but as an ultimate advantage in the occupation of these States and the establishment of governments it would be of great importance.

I enclose to you, with this communication, a very complete map of the Red river country and Texas, which embraces all the information we have been able to obtain up to this time. It has been prepared by Major D. C. Houston, of the engineer corps, and will show that we have not overlooked the importance of this line. Accompanying the map is a memorial which exhibits the difficulties that are to be overcome. To this I respectfully ask your attention. I have sent to General Sherman and General Steele copies of this map.

I shall be ready to move to Alexandria as soon as the rivers are up, most probably marching by Opelousas. This will be necessary to turn the forts on Red river and open the way for the gunboats. From that point I can operate with General Steele, north or south of Red river, in the direction of Shreveport, and from thence await your instructions. I do not think operations will be delayed on my account. I have received a despatch from General Sherman, in which he expresses a wish to enter upon this campaign, but had not at that time received orders upon the subject.

I do not think it expedient to give up the occupation of Matagorda bay, which is a key-point of Texas, and may be of great service hereafter in communication with the coast from the interior, but the force will be reduced to the lowest number consistent with the safe occupation of Matagorda island. I have a small force east of Lake Pontchartrain, sent over to cover an effort to obtain lumber and other quartermaster's stores, and which will be withdrawn as soon as we have active field duty. I can concentrate on Red river all my force available for active service, except the garrisons at Matagorda and Brownsville, which will be small.

I am very much gratified by the report of re-enforcements to which your despatches refer.

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OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, January 22, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following information concerning the routes from the Mississippi to the interior of Texas:

Brashear city to Alexandria.....	174 miles.
Brashear city to Shreveport.....	344 "
Natchez to Alexandria ( <i>via</i> Harrisonburg).....	80 "
Natchez to Natchitoches.....	120 "
Vicksburg to Shreveport.....	148 "
Little Rock to Shreveport.....	225 "

Fort Smith to Shreveport.....	300 miles.
Alexandria to Shreveport .....	170 "
Alexandria to Houston.....	270 "
Shreveport to Houston .....	295 "

The water *via* Red river commences falling about the 1st of May, and the navigation of the river for most of our gunboats and transports is not reliable after that time. The months of March and April are unfavorable for operations in northern and eastern Texas, owing to the high stage of water in the Sabine, Nueces, and Trinity rivers, and their tributaries, and the overflow to which their banks are subject. The concentration of all the forces available for operations west of the Mississippi, in the vicinity of Shreveport, requires that the line of supply with the Mississippi be kept up. It would not be practicable to abandon the base with so large a force, with a line of operation of 300 miles through a country occupied by the enemy, to be overcome before communication could possibly be effected with points held by us on the coast. The water communication to Alexandria cannot be depended on after the 1st of May, and it would be necessary to depend on the road from Natchez, a distance of 80 miles, and possibly from Harrisouburg, a distance of 50 miles.

Boats of very light draught, say 3 or 3½ feet of water, may go to Alexandria during low water at ordinary seasons; but the larger majority of our boats and gunboats are of greater draught than this.

The most reliable route would be by the railroad from Vicksburg to Shreveport. The track is now laid from Vicksburg to Monroe. The road is graded from Monroe to Shreveport, and mostly bridged; the distance is 96 miles. There is a good wagon road from Monroe to Shreveport, crossing the Washita river and other streams. It would require at least three months to rebuild this railroad, which is indispensable to the supply of our army in northeastern Texas.

To insure success and permanent results to the operations of a force to operate against Texas, or rather against the rebel forces west of the Mississippi, it is essential that the forces available for this purpose, viz., those now west of the Mississippi, and any additional forces that may be assigned, should be placed under command of a single general. The rebel forces west of the Mississippi have a single head, and so should the force operating against them.

Preparations should be made to establish a line of supply independent of the water-courses; otherwise, by the time the forces are concentrated and ready to move forward, they will be compelled to halt until a new line of supply is established, thus giving the enemy a breathing spell, and an opportunity to harass our communications with their mounted troops. It is of vital importance in operations of this kind, where the distances travelled are so great, that there should be no delays, for our main security against raids on our communications consists in keeping the enemy so well occupied in taking care of himself that he will have no time or opportunity to trouble us. Hence the importance of thorough preparations and perfect concert of action among the different corps.

Suppose it is determined to concentrate the forces near Shreveport, preliminary to a movement into Texas. This point is the principal depot of the enemy west of the Mississippi. There are some machine-shops and dock-yards there, and the place is fortified by a line of works with a radius of two or three miles. The position is a strong one, being on a bluff and commanding the eastern bank. This point suggests itself at once as a proper one for such a concentration. The most direct and only reliable line of supply to this point would be the road from Vicksburg to Monroe—railroad as far as Monroe, 52 miles, and a graded road the rest of the way, 96 miles. It would be necessary to put the road in running order, and procure materials for completing the road. The security of this road requires that the enemy be driven out of northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas. This line could be held much more easily than the

Red river, which is very narrow and crooked, and has in many places high bluff banks, where field artillery could be placed to enfilade the channels and have no fear of gunboats. Such a point is "Grand Ecore," where the bluff is 120 feet high. This point, I have been informed by spies, is fortified. Concerning the mode of uniting the forces near Shreveport, I will mention no details, as it will depend much upon the enemy's movements, and the character of the routes in southern Arkansas, which I have not had time to examine fully. Our forces there have doubtless the information necessary to arrange this matter. These movements, however, should be so arranged as to drive the enemy out of Arkansas and northern Louisiana.

I anticipate no danger from any large force moving on New Orleans, Louisiana, from Texas. In case of this movement, our forces would immediately come in on the rear of this force and cut it off.

The enemy will, I think, be unable to interfere seriously with our concentration of troops, and will then mass his whole force, except that at Galveston, near Shreveport, where he will fight, or retire on the line he may select.

Suppose our force to be united at Shreveport, which could probably be effected during the season of high water, and that arrangements have been perfected to supply the army by the road from Vicksburg *via* Monroe, Arkansas, and Louisiana clear of rebels, and the enemy in retreat. I assume that he will do this, as our forces should be much larger than his, and that he will continue to retreat, knowing that we will be weakened thereby, while he can select a defensive position far from our base. Whatever way he takes, we must follow, and expect to have our path disputed at every point, as he will be driven to desperate efforts. The numerous streams with high banks will afford him a favorable opportunity to retard our progress and effect a secure retreat to any point he may select.

Our subsequent movements cannot well be foreseen. It does not seem probable that the enemy will retire to Houston unless his force is large and he should propose to draw us into a trap. It is more probable that he will retire further west, and use his cavalry to harass our flanks and rear, a species of war peculiarly adapted to central and western Texas. We should *then* be prepared for a most active campaign, and our force of cavalry should be especially large and efficient.

Again recurring to the line of supply, it will be seen that the Vicksburg and Shreveport road extends to Marshall, where there is an interval of forty miles to Henderson, where the road is completed to Galveston. The road from Marshall to Henderson, however, is graded, and could be completed in a short time. In case the enemy should abandon the coast, this road will fall into our possession, and supplies could be obtained from two directions. Our colored troops, who are especially qualified for fighting guerillas, could be usefully employed in guarding the entire line of the road from Vicksburg to Galveston. Texas is said to be full of blacks, who will be a valuable auxiliary in our operations in that State.

The campaign above sketched out would, I believe, be a long one. Much preparation and labor will be required to insure the army against vexatious delays, which permit the enemy constantly to elude us.

I should estimate roughly that it would require until some time in May to effect the union of forces and be prepared with transportation for a movement into the interior. This would be about the commencement of the season most favorable for active operations in Texas. I suppose that by that time wagon trains will be provided to haul supplies from Monroe to Shreveport; that the railroad will be in running order to Monroe, and the work of completing the road well under way. The time required for subsequent operations cannot be well estimated. It is highly probable that the rebel army will suffer greatly from desertion—an easy matter in active campaigning. The Arkansians will

probably leave in the greatest numbers. Should their army, however, hold together they will be able to prolong the contest some time.

The results of this campaign will be very great. As long as we are able to keep the enemy actively engaged in Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana will be safe, and the process of reconstruction can be carried on without interruption; and should those States establish loyal State governments, there can be no doubt that desertions would be very numerous.

This plan of operations has these advantages over that of operations from the coast of Texas. It also has the advantage of enabling us to bring a much larger force of cavalry into the field.

It is, however, a much more difficult plan to execute, requires much more time, and is much more uncertain as to the time it will require to accomplish any of the objects undertaken.

The movement by the coast of Texas possesses the great advantage of enabling us to deceive the enemy as to our intentions, which is not the case with the other plan. Our troops and supplies can be quickly moved by steamers to any point on the coast, landing can be threatened at different points, and the enemy kept in ignorance of our intentions. We now hold the harbor of Matagorda, the best on the coast next to Galveston. We have a secure point for the debarkation of troops and supplies. The distance by land to Houston is 150 miles, over good roads, three in number: one *via* Texana and Wharton; one *via* Matagorda and Columbia; the third along the beach to the mouth of Brazos river. Very little baggage need be required on the march, as the point of supply can be transferred to Brazos river and Sabine Pass in succession. A much less force would be required for this operation than the other. The rebel forces now in Arkansas will remain there as long as our forces are opposed to them, and we would only have to meet the force in lower Texas. To direct and draw off this force as much as possible, the following plan could be adopted: Every preparation should be made for debarking the troops at Matagorda and transferring them to the main land. The troops intended to be sent should be designated and collected at New Orleans, so as to go aboard at a moment's notice. The steamers should be got ready and the troops assigned. All the heavy material, artillery, horses, &c., should be placed on board the light-draught vessels, having only men and light stores to be lightened. A demonstration of gunboats, and troops in transports, could then be made at Alexandria in moderate forces, the effect of which would be to withdraw the enemy from lower Texas. This having been effected, the force at New Orleans should be sent with all despatch to Texas, the forces marched to Houston without delay, and Galveston be invested, and the garrison captured unless they hurriedly evacuated. This would give us entire control of the coast of Texas in a comparatively short time.

For subsequent operations we would not be as well prepared as we would be at Shreveport with our forces concentrated. The object we started out with would have been accomplished, *viz.*, the possession of the coast. The object proposed by the movement *via* Shreveport is much greater than the other, and hence requires more time and means. That direct object is no less than the complete destruction or scattering of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi, and it will be impracticable to stop short of this result.

To attempt simply to hold Shreveport as a post would subject us to continual annoyance as long as an organized force remains in Texas. They would make continual raids on our flanks and rear, and our resources would be gradually frittered away. The rebel army must be pursued till it is broken up, and then we can occupy the country and restore order.

I have written the above in some haste necessarily, and have endeavored to make my ideas clear, though they may be somewhat boldly expressed. A strict comparison between the two plans of operations can hardly be made, as their



objects are different. The only question is, which can be most successfully carried out. The results provided by the first plan are much more satisfactory, and they include those of the second. I do not believe, with some, in the impossibility of long land marches with a large force; but I am fully aware of the difficulties to be overcome, and the uncertainty of foreseeing results.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. HOUSTON,

*Major, A. D. C., and Chief Engineer, Dep't Gulf.*

Major General N. P. BANKS,

*Commanding Department of the Gulf.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Vicksburg, January 16, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I think this movement [to Meridian] and one similar on Shreveport, as soon as the Red river rises, would pretty well settle the main junction in the southwest, and I would like nothing better than to unite with you in such a movement, but I expect soon to be required by General Grant to hasten back to Huntsville, where I left the army of the Tennessee.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Major General.*

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Sherman.*

NEW ORLEANS, *January 25, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The success of the movement indicated by you will be very important to our cause. I only regret that we had not been able to occupy Mobile at the close of the campaign against Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

\* \* \* \* \*

Since receiving your despatch, General Halleck informs me that it is possible the forces on the west bank of the river in Arkansas and Louisiana, with re-enforcements from your command, may be concentrated on the Red river for the defence of Arkansas and Louisiana, and offensive operations against Texas; with the forces indicated, such a movement will be successful, and confer important advantages on the government.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Steele.*

NEW ORLEANS, *January 25, 1864.*

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I have received despatches from Major General Halleck which indicate the purpose to effect a co-operation of the troops on the west bank of the Mississippi. I need not say that it will afford me the highest pleasure to operate with you if this plan shall be adopted.

Movements upon the line of the Red river furnish the most effective means for the defence of Louisiana and Arkansas, and also for offensive operations against Texas. But it is impossible for me, with my limited command, safely to undertake such an enterprise; and I suppose, from what I know of your command, that it would be equally unsafe for you.

The concentration of the troops in Louisiana and Arkansas, with re-enforcements from the east bank of the river, under Major General W. T. Sherman, which is indicated as possible, would furnish a force that would enable us to occupy this country, and enter upon the campaign in Texas, which would give us an immediate control of that State. I am fully satisfied that the three States are ready for a return to the Union, if such force shall occupy them as will protect the inhabitants in returning to their allegiance.

Captain Robert T. Dunham bears this despatch to you.

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*From General Steele.*

LITTLE ROCK, February 5, 1864.

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It is evident, if an advance is to be made soon, it must be made up the Washita and Red rivers.

\* \* \* \* \*

I may be able to move my command by way of Pine bluff to Monroe by the time you will be ready to go up Red river, as this route is said to be practicable earlier than the one by Camden or that by Arkadelphia. However, there are serious objections to it.

It is impossible for me to state with any certainty how large a force I can concentrate. I hope, however, to be able to advance with ten thousand well-appointed troops, leaving enough to hold the line of the Arkansas. I do not know if any person is authorized to take from Arkansas the troops at Waldron, Van Buren, and Fayetteville, but it appears that some such movement is going on.

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, January 29, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

No important change has occurred in this department since my last despatch. I shall be ready to co-operate with General Sherman and General Steele as soon as I receive definite information of the time when they will be ready to move. I can take possession of Alexandria at any time, but could not maintain the position without the support of the forces on the upper river. It is important that river steamers should be sent down from St. Louis suitable for the navigation of Red river. I want ten or fifteen of first-class and light-draught boats. Some months since you ordered steamers to be sent here, but very few reached New Orleans. They will be indispensable now. Pending information and orders in regard to the movements on Red river, but little change has occurred in the movements of the troops. I have sent officers to communicate with General Sherman, or General Macpherson in his absence, and General Steele, but have yet no information from them.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

Vicksburg, January 31, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

My orders from General Grant will not as yet justify me in embarking for

Red river, though I am very anxious to operate in that direction. The moment I learned you were preparing for it, I sent a communication to Admiral Porter, and despatched to General Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to co-operate with you against Shreveport, and I will have his answer in time, for you cannot do anything until Red river has twelve feet of water on the rapids at Alexandria. That will be from March to June. I have lived on Red river, and know somewhat of the phases of that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be made rapidly by simultaneous movements from Little Rock on Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of gunboats and transports driving up Red river. Admiral Porter will be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1. I think Steele could move with 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. I could take about 10,000, and you could, I suppose, about the same. Your movement from Opelousas, simultaneous with mine up the river, would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy near Marks-ville, and the whole could appear at Shreveport about a day appointed. I doubt if the enemy would risk a siege, although they are, I am informed, fortifying and placing many heavy guns. It would be better for us that they should stand at Shreveport, as we might make large and important captures. But I do not believe the enemy would fight a force of 30,000 men, with gunboats. I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and hope before you have made your dispositions I will have the necessary permission.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major General.*

---

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., February 1, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The geographical character of the theatre of war west of the Mississippi indicates Shreveport as the most important point of the operations of a campaign for troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas rivers. Of course, the strategic advantages of this point may be more than counter-balanced by the disadvantages of communication and supplies. General Steele reports that he cannot advance to Shreveport this winter unless certain of finding supplies on the Red river, and of having there the co-operation of your forces or those of General Sherman.

If the Red river is not navigable—and it will require months to open any other communication to Shreveport—there seems very little prospect of the requisite co-operation or transportation of supplies. It has, therefore, been entirely left to your discretion, after fully investigating the question, to adopt this line or to substitute any other. It was proper, however, that you should have an understanding with Generals Steele and Sherman, as it would probably be hazardous for either of these officers to attempt the movement without the co-operation of other troops.

If the country between the Arkansas and the Red river is impassable during the winter, as has been represented, it was thought that a portion of General Steele's command might be temporarily spared to act with Sherman from the Mississippi. The department of Arkansas was, therefore, made subject to the orders of General Grant. It is quite probable that the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, so different from what General Grant anticipated when he detached General Sherman, may have caused him to modify his plans, or at least to postpone their execution. This may also prevent your expected aid from Sherman. Communications by the Mississippi river are so often interrupted,

and despatches, &c., delayed, that I am not advised where General Sherman now is, or what are his present plans. So many delays have already occurred, and the winter is now so far advanced, that I greatly fear no important operations west of the Mississippi will be concluded in time for General Grant's proposed campaign in the spring.

This is greatly to be regretted, but perhaps is unavoidable, as all our armies are greatly reduced by furloughs, and the raising of new troops progresses very slowly. Re-enforcements are, however, being sent to you as rapidly as we can possibly get them ready for the field.

Have you not overestimated the strength of the enemy west of the Mississippi river? All the information we can get makes the whole force under Magruder, Smith, and Price much less than ours under yourself and General Steele. Of course, you have better sources of information than we have here.

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, February 2, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*  
 As I stated in my last despatch, I have sent officers to communicate with General Sherman, or General McPherson, in case of General Sherman's absence, and also with General Steele, and shall hold myself in readiness to co-operate with them. \* \* \* \* \*

Their forces are divided between Shreveport, Alexandria and Simmsport, and are stated to number, in all, some twenty-five thousand (25,000) men, including all their conscripts. This is, doubtless, an exaggeration of numbers, but their strength is considerable. They are fortifying at various points, and strengthening Fort De Russy, on the Red river, and the passage of the river at that point is filled by heavy rafts and other obstructions. \* \* \* \* \*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
 Washington, D. C., February 11, 1864.

Your despatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting "orders" and "instructions" in regard to operations on Red river. If by this it is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you upon this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my despatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await any instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with General Sherman and General Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best under all the circumstances of the case. \* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *February 7, 1864.*

I have the honor to enclose copy of a letter received on the 5th instant from Major General W. T. Sherman, giving a statement of his operations against Meridian, and the prospect of navigation on Red river. We shall be ready to co-operate with him at the time designated. \* \* \* \* \*  
The George Washington with mails to the 30th will arrive this morning, and I regret that the steamer which leaves this port could not take with it an acknowledgment of instructions, which I hope the mail will bring me, in regard to the operations you contemplate in the Red river country.

---

*To General Sherman.*

NEW ORLEANS, *February 19, 1864.*

\* \* \* I received your despatch by Captain Dunham, for which I beg you will accept my thanks. General Steele has also communicated to me information as to the location of his troops, and the strength that he can command. He will be able to move 10,000 men, well equipped and armed, early in March. He says that the route to Monroe is the most practicable for him at this season of the year. Monroe is connected directly with Natchitoches by good roads. I doubt not that by a rapid movement I may be able to reach Natchitoches with my own forces; but if you could move a column at the same time from Vicksburg across the country, or by the Red river, which we shall clear in the course of our movement towards Alexandria, it would make certain the immediate occupation of Shreveport, possibly without any contest by the enemy. I shall be ready to move by the 5th of March. Captain Dunham knows the condition here, and can give you any information you desire.

---

*To General Steele.*

NEW ORLEANS, *February 19, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*  
The route indicated by you will be acceptable to us. I think we can make the junction with you from Alexandria—possibly from Natchitoches, which would be better, the route from Natchitoches to Monroe being the best at this season of the year. I think your forces and my own will be equal to any the enemy can bring against us; but if General Sherman can join us from Vicksburg, it will make the thing certain. He has a good road directly to Monroe. I shall be ready to move by the 5th of March, and will communicate to you constantly the progress we are making for that purpose. I shall hope to find you ready for movement at the same time, and will conform to the suggestions you may make in regard to this matter in the return despatches which Captain Dunham may bring. Captain Dunham will communicate to you all the information you may desire.

---

*To Admiral Porter.*

NEW ORLEANS, *February 20, 1864.*

Captain R. T. Dunham, one of my aids whom I sent to communicate with General Sherman and General Steele in regard to movements in the Red river

country, informs me that General Sherman was to transmit to you the information contained in my despatches to him. The government inclines to a movement upon Shreveport, rather than to any other line of operations west of the Mississippi. I hope at least, and believe it probable, that the three commands of Steele, Sherman and myself may move in conjunction. This would make a quick and decisive campaign. I shall be ready to move by the first week in March, for Opelousas and Alexandria, and hope to clear the Red river to that point. I shall expect your co-operation, and suppose you have received instructions from the government at Washington in regard to the movement. The rivers must soon admit gunboats above Alexandria.

\* \* \* \* \*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, D. C., February 23, 1864.*

Your despatch of February 12 is received. It contains our latest information from Generals Sherman and Steele. It is hoped that your arrangements for the co-operation of these generals may prove successful. The communication with them from these headquarters is so difficult that it is not possible to give them other than very general instructions.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

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*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *February 25, 1864.*

Your despatch of February 4 is received. My allusions to the expectations entertained of instructions from Washington, to which it refers, relates to the paragraph of your despatch of January 4, which says that, "so long as your plans are not positively decided upon, no definite instructions can be given to Generals Sherman and Steele." I replied, immediately upon receiving this despatch, that I would be ready to move in conjunction with Generals Sherman and Steele on the 1st of March, or as soon as they could move, or navigation would permit the movement. I immediately put myself in communication with General Sherman and General Steele, receiving from them despatches, the substance of which has been transmitted to you, and stating that they would be ready to co-operate with me in the movement up the Red river by the 1st of March. I had informed them that I would be ready to move at that time, and have sent an officer to communicate with General Sherman if he can be found, or General Steele and Admiral Porter, upon the same subject and to the same effect. I am ready to move the moment I can hear from either of these officers. If General Steele alone can co-operate with me, I shall move my column by the 5th of March. I am daily expecting despatches from him upon this subject.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am very greatly embarrassed and depressed by the demand which Admiral Farragut makes upon me for troops to assist him in a movement against Mobile, and also by the idea impressed upon the public mind that I am to co-operate with General Sherman against the same point. This would be my desire if it were consistent with my orders from the government; but I understand that I am to move against Shreveport, and am unable to divide my command by any

demonstration against Mobile, which must take some weeks before I could get them to this point again, and which would effectually defeat the operations which I have contemplated under your orders. If General Steele replies, in conformity with his last despatch, that he can move by the first week in March in the direction of Shreveport, I shall start my column with as near 15,000 men as I can make it, at the same time. It will be impossible for me to go into that country alone, as I have not a sufficient force to make myself secure against the concentrated force of the enemy, which is much stronger than mine. I do not expect instructions from Washington beyond what I have received, except it relate to the movements of General Sherman nor General Steele. If either one of these will co-operate with me, I shall move at once. I have been in constant preparation for this enterprise since the reception of your despatch upon this subject.

I can be at Alexandria or Natchitoches on the 15th of March if either of the other commanders will co-operate with me in time.

---

*From Admiral Porter.*

VICKSBURG, February 26, 1864.

I arrived here to-day to meet General Sherman, who promised to be here on the 25th. I had no idea he would be here. I am prepared, when he comes, to ascend the Red river with a large fleet of gumboats, and if he fails to get here I shall be prepared to co-operate with you at any time when the water is high enough.

I do not think General Steele will be able to move unless his quartermaster shows more energy. At present half his supplies are blocked up in Arkansas river with low water, and some of his transports sunk on snags. So much for going into a river where I informed them the navigation was impracticable.

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*To the President.*

NEW ORLEANS, February 25, 1864.

On the 5th of March I expect to move in co-operation with Generals Steele and Sherman, or as soon as they may be ready, one or both. My own force is not sufficient to execute the orders of the War Department without the assistance of one or both. We are ready and impatient, expecting daily the word of command from either General Steele or General Sherman.

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*From General Steele.*

FEBRUARY 28, 1864.

I did not anticipate being called upon to move at so early a day as that named in your despatch.

I could not now concentrate anything like the force named in my former letter, and if I should move by way of Monroe with the principal part of my command, it would leave Missouri open to another cavalry raid. It is my opinion if you and Sherman move up Red river with what forces you can muster, and I make a demonstration to turn their other flank (supposing Red river to be their line of defence) from here and Fort Smith, they will run to Texas.

*Note by General Sherman.*

MARCH 4—4 p. m.

I will write to General Steele to push straight for Shreveport with all he has. I will also advise Steele to send you word at Alexandria, by the 17th, of his movement; after which I shall leave all details to your sole and exclusive orders. I would like to go along, but think best to send my quota to you under a good subordinate.

---

*To General Sherman.*

NEW ORLEANS, *March 2, 1864.*

In order to insure the success of operations indicated by the general-in-chief, I request that you will, if practicable, furnish a force of say ten thousand men, with a proper proportion of artillery, to proceed up the Red river in time to reach Alexandria, Louisiana, on or about the 17th instant, with supplies for thirty days.

\* \* \* \* \*

---

*From General Sherman.*

MARCH 4, 1864.

\* \* I will send two divisions of about 10,000 men under a good commander, and order him: 1st. To rendezvous at mouth of Red river, and, in connexion with Admiral Porter, (if he agree,) to strike Harrisonburg a *hard* blow. 2d. To return to Red river and ascend it; army to reach Alexandria on the 17th of March to report to you. 3d. \* \* This detachment in no event to go beyond Shreveport, and that you spare them the moment you can, trying to get them back to the Mississippi in thirty days (30) from the time they actually enter Red river, \* \* desiring to move from the base of the Tennessee by April 15.

---

*From Major General Banks to Major General Steele.*

NEW ORLEANS, *March 3, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Since despatching my aide-de-camp (Lieutenant Sargent) to you, I have had the advantage of a personal interview with Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the department of the Tennessee.

General Sherman will be ready to move in connexion with the proposed operations of your and my expedition against Shreveport on the 7th instant. I now have an efficient column prepared at Franklin, Louisiana, and intend to move on the 7th instant towards Alexandria, which point I expect to reach on the 17th instant, and to meet General Sherman's column at that point at that date.

General Sherman will probably clear the Black river of the enemy on his way to Alexandria. \* \* The force which I shall march from Franklin against Alexandria will be about 17,000 men, including at least 5,000 cavalry.

Will you have the goodness, general, to inform me fully of your intentions by the return of the bearer of this letter.

\* \* \* \* \*



HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, D. C., March 5, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

No detachment of your forces on Mobile was contemplated. \* \*

I have no late information of General Steele's plans, further than that all his movements will be directed to facilitate your operations towards Shreveport.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

---

*From General Steele.*

MARCH 10, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

I will not repeat my objections to the route which you wish me to take, but they are stronger now than ever. I will move with all my available force to Washington, and from there to Shreveport.

\* \* \* \* \*

My force will not be as great as you and General Sherman anticipate. I shall move with about 7,000 troops of all arms, of which 3,000 will be cavalry.

---

*To General Halleck.*

NEW ORLEANS, *March 6, 1864.*

\* \* \* General Steele appears to have changed the plan entertained when he last communicated with me. Copies of his despatches at that time have been forwarded to you. He then proposed to move by the way of Monroe for the Red river. He is now apprehensive, in consequence of the reduction of his forces, that he can only enter upon a movement for the diversion of the enemy in the direction of Arkadelphia, without any expectation of joining us at Shreveport, or any other position on the river. General Sherman and myself have earnestly urged him to abandon this idea, which in any event could effect but little good, and to prepare for a movement direct upon Red river in co-operation with us. I have hopes that he may accept this proposition, in which event the three forces, in the course of thirty days, would meet at Shreveport. General Steele represents that he will have about 6,000 men at his command. I respectfully request that orders may be given to him to co-operate with us upon the point named, in accordance with the plans originally proposed by you. I see nothing to defeat its success.

\* \* \* \* \*

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*From General Grant.—(Received March 26 at Grand Ecore.)*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 15.*

\* \* I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi. It is also important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible. Send Brigadier General A. J. Smith's command back to Memphis as soon as possible. This is necessary for movements east of the Mississippi. Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten or fifteen days

more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of March —, even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition. \* \* If successful, hold Shreveport and return with balance of troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans. I would not at present advise the abandonment of any territory held west of the Mississippi. \* \* It may be a part of the plan for the spring campaign to move against Mobile. \* \* I have directed General Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you, instead of a demonstration, as he thought advisable.

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*To B. F. Flanders, special supervising agent Treasury Department.*

NEW ORLEANS, March 21, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

My expedition is undertaken upon directions from the government. Shreveport is indicated as the objective point of operations. When it is in our possession, we shall be able to determine the character to be given to the country this side of that point, both north and south of the Red river. Until then, it is impossible to allow trade stores at Alexandria or any other intermediate point between New Orleans and Shreveport. As soon as it can be done safely, I will give you information.

\* \* \* \* \*

N. P. BANKS.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, D. C., March 31, 1864.*

In addition to the directions sent you by Lieutenant Towner for immediate concentration at New Orleans of all the forces you can spare from the defences of your department, preparatory to a move against Mobile, I would add the following:

1. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red river to General Steele and the navy.

2. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

3. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi river, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold, until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last returns, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say, concentrate at least 25,000 men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these, and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his

co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but from your long service in the Gulf department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All that I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

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*To General Sherman.—Received April 3.*

The thirty days for which I loaned you the command of General A. J. Smith, will expire on the 10th instant. General Corse is sent to carry orders to General Smith, and to give directions to a new movement. Expedite their return if they have not started, and if possible in the same boats. I learn Steele's entire force will co-operate with you and the navy, but, as before stated, I must have A. J. Smith's force now as soon as possible.

---

*To General A. J. Smith.—Received April 16, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have received orders from Major General William T. Sherman, commanding military division Mississippi, to return immediately with my command to Vicksburg.

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GRAND ECORE, *April 16, 1864.*

Your despatch of this date, informing me of the return of the last of your transports from the upper river, and of your orders from Major General William T. Sherman, commanding military division of the Mississippi, to return immediately with your command to Vicksburg, I have received.

The low stage of water in the Red river, and the difficulties encountered in this campaign consequent thereon, makes it impossible for me to dispense with your services as soon as I expected. Did it not involve more than the abandonment of the expedition, I might consider General Sherman's orders as imperative; but it is impossible for the navy to move below at this time, and the withdrawal of your command at this moment will place my forces at the mercy of the enemy, who is in larger force than General Sherman could have anticipated. The safety, therefore, of the navy and the army compel me reluctantly to withhold my consent to your departure, and for this reason I must request you to remain notwithstanding your orders, and will assume myself the responsibility for this course.

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

General A. J. SMITH.

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*From General Grant, April 17.—(Received by General Huuter at Alexandria.)*

I would much rather that the Red river expedition had never been begun, than that it should be detained *one* day after the 1st of May, in commencing your movement east of the Mississippi.

*From General Steele—(Received by Captain Dunham at Alexandria.)*

CAMDEN, April 28.

\* \* I shall have my hands full to manage Price. We have a strong position here. ——— says country is exhausted, and he has no supplies; desires to co-operate in best manner possible. If he moves down Washita to Red river, he uncovers Arkansas and Missouri. If I move up Washita I uncover Louisiana. If our respective forces were each large enough to move direct on Shreveport, difficulty would be avoided. Cannot help each other, we operate on lines so wide apart.

*To Lieutenant General Grant.*

GRAND ECORE, LA., April 13, 1864.

\* \* \* \* \*

In my conversation with General Sherman at New Orleans, I stated that I hoped to complete our operations within thirty days after reaching the Red river at Fort De Russy or Alexandria, which we should accomplish by the 15th or 17th of March. I am still of opinion that this would have been accomplished, except for the unavoidable delays that have been occasioned by the low stage of the water in Red river, and the very great difficulty of maintaining our communications on that line. My instructions, however, were from Major General Halleck, who directed me to move upon Shreveport, and informed me that General Sherman and General Steele would co-operate with me in that view. No limitation of time was placed upon the movement, although it was expected to be accomplished with the least possible delay. I had the honor of receiving a communication from you, to which a reply was forwarded on the 26th of March by Lieutenant Towner. You instructed me in that despatch, that "if the object of the expedition cannot be accomplished within ten or fifteen days of the time designated by General Sherman, the command of General Smith will be ordered to return to Vicksburg, even should it occasion the abandonment of the chief object of the expedition." The time specified I understand to be the 15th or 17th of this month, and I have hopes that within ten or fifteen days of that time our object will still be accomplished, when General Smith will return. I have the honor to suggest, however, that at this time his departure will affect other interests besides that of the possession of Shreveport. A large fleet of transports and gunboats are in the upper river, which cannot possibly descend below Alexandria on account of the falling of the water. I have in my immediate front an army of 25,000 men, among them some of the best troops of the rebel government, and commanded by distinguished and desperate officers. The withdrawal of General Smith's command from my forces at this moment places me at their mercy and the army under my command. It will lead to the sacrifice of the army and the navy, as well as the abandonment of the expedition. My judgment is against it, and I cannot believe, were the circumstances known to the government at Washington, that it would be insisted upon. Admiral Porter agrees with me fully in this view.

\* \* \* \* \*

ALEXANDRIA, LA., April 28, 1864.

ADMIRAL: Admiral Porter's fleet is above the rapids, and cannot fall below on account of the low stage of water. There are but few boats between Alexandria and the mouth of the river. It is desirable that you should send such

boats as can navigate the river, for the purpose of keeping open our communications. The enemy threaten this line in considerable force. I beg your immediate attention to this subject. *Our situation is in nowise embarrassing, except that the fleet is detained above the rapids, and the movements of the army are dependent upon its relief.* The army is in excellent spirits and condition, and fears nothing. The enemy is reported in force about us, and it is quite probable that we may have a general engagement within a few days, for which we are fully prepared.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Admiral FARRAGUT,  
*Or the Officer Commanding the Fleet at New Orleans*

P. S.—I am unable to suggest the number of boats or their draught; they should, however, be of sufficient strength to vindicate our possession of the river.

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ALEXANDRIA, LA., April 30, 1864.

Since writing my letter to the admiral, (or to yourself, as commanding the fleet at New Orleans,) I have had an interview with Admiral Porter. He expresses a strong desire that such boats as can be spared may be sent to the Red river. The tin-clads that lately have been sent down can be used to advantage. I hope, myself, that you will send some *strong boats*. It is not impossible that the navigation of the river may be severely contested. We are in good condition and in the best possible spirits.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Commodore PALMER,  
*Commanding Fleet at New Orleans.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., April 30, 1865.*

Lieutenant General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red river, and that operations there be continued under the officer in command until further orders.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

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*From Major General Banks to Major General Grant.*

GRAND ECORE, April 14, 1864.

GENERAL: In obedience to orders received from the government, I left New Orleans on the 22d of March and established my headquarters at Alexandria on the 25th.

The 19th army corps and the 3d and 4th divisions of the 13th, General Ransom commanding, encamped at Alexandria on the 26th of March, the whole under command of Major General Franklin. General A. J. Smith, with a part of the 16th and 17th corps, entered the Red river on the 13th, capturing Fort De Russy on the 14th, and moved by the river, under convoy of the gunboats, to Alexandria, which was occupied by the naval forces on the 16th. The cavalry of the 19th corps, General Lee commanding, arriving on the 19th, a very

spirited movement was made against the enemy on Henderson's Hill by a detachment of the 16th corps, under General Mower, and a detachment of cavalry of the 19th corps, in which four guns and two hundred and fifty prisoners were taken from the enemy. Colonel Horace B. Sargent, 1st Massachusetts cavalry, was seriously wounded in this brilliant action.

The very low stage of the river renders it impracticable for the larger gunboats to cross the rapids in ascending the river until the 3d of April, the lighter-draught boats having crossed with difficulty a day or two earlier. The steamers assigned to the marine brigade, being unable to cross the rapids, were ordered to return to Vicksburg, at the request of General McPherson. The troops anticipated the movements of the gunboats, and reached Natchitoches on the 2d of April. General Smith's column by the river, and the 19th and 13th corps, under General Franklin, by rapid marches.

The river was steadily falling, and the larger gunboats were unable to pass Grand Ecore. The troops, except one division of General A. J. Smith's command, which was ordered to go by the river, took up the line of march for Pleasant Hill, thirty-eight miles distant from Grand Ecore, where I made my headquarters on the evening of the 7th of April, the cavalry commanded by General Lee being several miles in advance. Very heavy rains during the march made the single road within our reach almost impassable, and greatly impeded the progress of the trains and troops. The cavalry, which throughout had constantly pressed the rear guard of the enemy's troops, had several very sharp skirmishes, in all of which we had been successful, although suffering considerable loss. The enemy made his first stand at Wilson's farm, near Pleasant Hill, on the afternoon of the 7th. The fight lasted a couple of hours, when he was driven from the field with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The next decided stand was at Carroll's mill, eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, where our advance was stubbornly resisted by a still stronger force with artillery. A brigade of infantry was sent forward to support the cavalry, and the enemy retired upon their attack. They were steadily driven during the day to a position within five miles of Mansfield. My headquarters on the morning of the 8th were at a bayou ten miles beyond Pleasant Hill, where the column halted, in order that the rear of the column, still impeded by almost impassable roads, might close up. At 10 o'clock I rode to the front, where some skirmishing had occurred, intending to return to my quarters on the bayou. The forces in the front consisted of the cavalry under Brigadier General A. L. Lee, and a detachment of the 13th corps, under General Ransom. Upon reaching the front I found the line of skirmishers already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, although but few had yet shown themselves. It soon appeared that our march was likely to be resisted by a stronger force than had yet been encountered. I instantly sent orders for the rapid advance of the troops to the front, though without notice or anticipation of a general engagement.

The active movements of our skirmishers soon developed a strong line of the enemy in position, extending at some length on the right and left of the line of march, in front of the Sabine Crossroads. It had been deemed of considerable importance to occupy this position by our forces, in order to prevent a concentration of the forces of the enemy. General Ransom moved forward to the support of the cavalry, and the skirmishers opened a running fire, which lasted for some hours, though without developing the full strength of the enemy's forces or position.

At 4 o'clock on the 8th a tremendous fire suddenly opened along the whole line on the right and left of the road, when it became manifest that the enemy in full force and in strong position was in our front. The contest lasted for an hour, our troops resisting with remarkable spirit and courage the repeated onsets of the enemy, until, utterly overpowered by numbers, they were compelled to fall back upon the rear of the column. A sharp ravine or gully separated the

plain where this engagement had commenced from the belt of almost impenetrable woods through which we had marched. On passing that point, it appeared that the entire cavalry train with its artillery occupied the road nearly to the line of skirmishers.

The fatal consequences of this most incautious advance of trains and artillery were apparent upon the breaking of our lines in front of the enemy's position. Upon the retreat of the advance guard the enemy instantly enveloped the train of wagons, and it was impossible to withdraw the artillery in consequence of the pre-occupation of the ground by the wagons, and the encumbered roads impeded the movements of the troops, and caused many prisoners to fall in to the hands of the enemy. The disasters of the day are to be attributed to the fatally incautious advance of the large cavalry train and the surplus artillery, rather than to the strength of the enemy, his unexpected resistance, or the deficient valor of our troops. It is always difficult to ascertain the position of a concealed adversary, and temporary defeat is to be expected when the front of an advancing column encounters the face of that of the enemy.

Every possible exertion was made to rally and reform the forces which had been engaged, but all efforts failed. The loss of prisoners, artillery, and wagons, and the fierce pursuit of a victorious and desperate foe, for the moment seemed to paralyze individuals and masses. The troops fell back for the most part in good order, fighting in front of the enemy, the men retaining their arms until towards sunset, when the first division of the 19th corps, Brigadier General W. H. Emory, commanding, had advanced to our support. Under cover of a line of skirmishers from its 1st brigade, the division deployed into line of battle on the crest of a hill—General Dwight's brigade on the right, Colonel Benedict's brigade on the left, and McMillin's in reserve. The unexpected encounter with this force, in pursuit of what he thought a routed army, was very desperate. He attacked the line at every point with demoniac energy, but the division presented at every onset an immovable wall of fire, and after a contest maintained with the greatest spirit on both sides for more than an hour and a half, the enemy retired from the field with very heavy loss.

The forces of the enemy engaged in this affair were the Louisiana troops and a part of the Texas and Arkansas forces, the whole being under the command of General Taylor, and numbering about 15,000. General Mouton was killed.

On our side all our forces were engaged at different periods of the day, excepting General A. J. Smith's command—16th and 17th corps.

We were compelled, anticipating an attack the next morning from the enemy, either to await the advance of General Smith's corps, or to fall back to meet him. The want of water, the weakness of the position we held, and the uncertainty of General Smith being able to reach the position we occupied at daybreak, led to the adoption of the second course. Our forces silently retired during the night, and in the morning took up a position on Pleasant Hill, joining the forces of General Smith, who had halted at Pleasant Hill upon receiving information of our movement. Pleasant Hill represents a plain about one mile square, the residences of the town being located upon its borders. It has a gentle slope to the west. Surrounding it were extensive tracts of woodland. General Dwight's brigade held the right of the line, with McMillen's brigade in reserve—Shaw's brigade of the 16th upon his left and centre, and Benedict's brigade of the 19th and Lynch's brigade of the 16th corps on the left; Mower's division of the 16th corps in reserve. The enemy began to reconnoitre the new position we had assumed at 11 o'clock, on the morning of the 9th, and as early as one or two o'clock opened a sharp fire of skirmishers, which was kept up at intervals during the afternoon. The approaches of the enemy were covered by thick woods, but it was evident by his manœuvres that he was preparing for an attack upon our left. To protect this a regiment was placed in the woods, and the troops of the 13th army corps, under General Cameron, were directed to occupy the road

leading from Pleasant Hill to Natchitoches, covering the train which had been ordered to the rear, in order that the operations of the army might not be encumbered, and at the same time protecting our left flank. Skirmishing continued during the afternoon, with occasional discharges of artillery. About 5 o'clock the enemy abandoned all pretension of manœuvring, and made a most desperate attack upon the brigades on the left centre, commanded by Colonels Benedict and Shaw. The line wavered at this point momentarily, but, supported by the 1st Vermont battery, soon regained its position, and the enemy was repulsed, finding the position so much stronger than anticipated, or, in pursuance of other plans, he gradually worked his way to the centre and right, where the same desperate attacks were repeated upon our right flank. The whole force of the enemy gradually concentrating upon our right, the brigades of McMillan and Dwight repelled every attack, and drove him back with terrible loss. The brigade commanded by General Dwight had been suddenly changed at the commencement of the action so as to cover the right of our centre and a part of the right flank, and became, in the end, the pivot upon which the entire line changed front to meet the altered plans of the enemy. The battle lasted until 9 o'clock in the evening. The rebels had concentrated their whole strength in futile efforts to break the line at different points. The most severe pressures occurred towards the close of the engagement upon the front, occupied by General Dwight's brigade. The troops held in reserve moved forward at the critical moment, and maintained our position, from which the enemy was driven precipitately and with terrible destruction of life. He fled to the woods upon the right, and was pursued with great energy by the whole of our forces until it was impossible in the darkness to distinguish friend from foe. The losses were great on both sides, but that of the rebels, as we could judge from the appearance of the battle-field, more than double our own.

It is impossible, at this time, to state the exact extent of our losses. Colonel Lewis Benedict was killed upon the left at the close of the struggle, having received, in the early part of the engagement, a severe wound, against which he bore up until the fatal shot deprived him of life.

Many most valuable officers fell in leading their troops. We recaptured three pieces of cannon, taken on the day previous, and four or five caissons, a large number of small-arms, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the enemy in officers commanding important positions during the day is said by the prisoners captured to have been very great. The rebel officers and men who have fallen into our hands, as well as officers and men of our own command, represent this struggle as more sanguinary and desperate, for the brief period it continued, than any engagement in which they have ever participated. The route of the enemy was complete. At the close of the engagement the victorious party found itself without rations and water. To clear the field for the fight, the train had been sent to the rear upon the single line of communication through the woods, and could not be brought to the front during the night. There was neither water for man or beast, except such as the now exhausted wells had afforded during the day for miles around. Previous to the movement of the army from Natchitoches, orders had been given to the transport fleet, with a portion of the 16th corps, under the command of General Kilby Smith, to move up the river, if it was found practicable, to some point near Springfield landing, with a view of effecting a junction with the army at that point on the river. The surplus ammunition and supplies were on board these transports. It was impossible to ascertain whether the fleet had been able to reach the point designated. The rapidly falling river, and the increased difficulties of navigation, made it appear almost certain that it would not be able to attain the point proposed. A squadron of cavalry sent down to the river, accompanied by Mr. Young, of the engineer corps, who was thoroughly acquainted with the country, reported, on the day of the battle, that no tidings of



the fleet could be obtained on the river, and we were compelled to assume that the increasing difficulties of navigation had prevented it, even if disaster had not occurred from the obstructions which the enemy had placed in the river.

These considerations, the absolute deprivation of water for man or beast, the exhaustion, of rations and the failure to effect a connexion with the fleet on the river, made it necessary for the army, although victorious in the terrible struggle through which it had just passed, to retreat to a point where it would be certain in communicating with the fleet, and where it would have an opportunity of reorganization. The shattered condition of the 13th army corps and the cavalry made this indispensable. The wounded were gathered from the battle-field, placed in comfortable hospitals, and left under the care of competent surgeons and assistants. The dead remaining on the field, as far as possible, were buried during the night. The next day medical supplies and provisions, with competent attendants, were sent in for the sustenance of the wounded, and at daybreak the army reluctantly fell back to its position at Grand Ecore for the purpose of communicating with the fleet and obtaining supplies, to the great disappointment of the troops, who, flushed with success, were eager for another fight. A detachment of cavalry, under Mr. Young, was sent to communicate with Admiral Porter to notify him of the movements of the army, which message was delivered. Despatches were also sent to him by the river, by the transport Red Chief, giving the same information. Much anxiety was felt for the safety of the fleet, when it was known that they had passed up the river; but all apprehension was relieved on the evening of the 12th by the receipt of information that the gunboats and all the transports were safe, although they had been heavily assailed by the enemy with musketry and artillery. Before this information was received, a pontoon bridge had been thrown across Red river with a view of sending up a force to assist the boats in their passage; and later, upon the receipt of further information, two brigades of Général A. J. Smith's command, with two batteries of artillery and a detachment of cavalry, were sent to their assistance. The safety of the army, as well as the success of the expedition, seemed to justify this movement. Leaving Pleasant Hill, it was fifteen miles before any water was found. It would have been impossible for the army, without supplies of water and rations, to have sustained another battle in the condition in which it was then placed.

The troops are in good heart and spirits, and eager for the contest. The enemy we encountered numbered from twenty-two to twenty-five thousand, embracing all the troops west of the Mississippi, excepting a small force on the Texas coast, and a small portion of cavalry on the north side of the river. General Kirby Smith is said by the prisoners to have commanded in person on the 9th, and was supported by Price, Green, and the most distinguished generals of the rebel army.

General Mouton was killed, and also two officers commanding brigades.

No communication has been received from General Steele of later date than the 2d of April, when it is represented he had an engagement with a portion of Price's command, which had been repulsed. This is confirmed by the reports of rebel prisoners, who state that General Price, two of whose divisions were at the battle of Pleasant Hill, had a contest with General Steele a week or ten days before the recent battle, from which they had just returned. We have captured from the enemy, in this campaign, twenty-three guns, and fifteen hundred prisoners, who are now in our possession.

The only loss we have sustained, except in killed and wounded, was on the morning of the 8th of April, when the train and batteries of the cavalry were abandoned. Sixteen guns and two mountain howitzers, and one hundred and twenty-five wagons, show the extent of the loss. An advance will be commenced immediately upon a line differing somewhat from that adopted first, and

rendering the column less dependent upon a river proverbially as treacherous as the enemies we fight.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

*To General Steele.*

GRAND ECORE, LA., *April 15, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The enemy is in larger force than was anticipated by the government, and has manifested his determination to fight for the possession of Shreveport and the country he now occupies, which was not anticipated by many of our officers. The lines upon which we operate are so far separated from each other that it is impossible for either of us to sustain effectively the forces of the other. If you can join us on this line I am confident we can move to Shreveport without material delay, and that we shall have an opportunity of destroying the only organized rebel army west of the Mississippi.

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*From Major General Banks to Lieutenant Commander Selfridge.*

GRAND ECORE, LA., *April 17, 1864.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date. On the 15th I had an interview with Admiral Porter, in which our position was fully discussed, but did not know that he was to leave this post.

In reference to the operations of the army I can only say at present that we are here under instructions from the government to move upon Shreveport in co-operation with the forces of General Steele. General Steele fails to co-operate with us, as far as we can learn, and thus far renders us no assistance. I have sent to him by the way of Little Rock, and requested him to join us upon the line of the river, where we can move forward in column against the enemy. With the co-operation of his forces our occupation of Shreveport is certain and immediate. It is impossible to say at this time whether we shall receive that co-operation or not. Until it is ascertained definitely that this part of the plan of the government at Washington will fail us, and that my force is insufficient to advance further upon this line against the enemy, who appears to be in full force, I shall entertain no thought of a retrograde movement—certainly not if it leaves the navy in any danger. No such purpose is contemplated now. I have sent for all the troops that can be gathered from my own department to move to this point immediately. I have also requested, as I have said, the co-operation of General Steele. \* \* \* In my interview with the admiral he expressed the utmost confidence in the rise of the river, and did not speak upon the subject of the withdrawing either of his vessels or the troops. His last suggestion to me was that it would be imprudent for me to advance until the river should rise.

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*From Major General Banks to Lieutenant General Grant.*

[By telegraph.]

GRAND ECORE, LA., April 18, 1864.

The rebel army of the west, twenty-five thousand (25,000) strong, is in our front. The withdrawal of my command without the destruction or dispersion of this force will enable them to commence offensive operations in Missouri, Arkansas, or Louisiana, or against each of these States successively. It will require the whole force, more than a hundred thousand strong, west of the Mississippi, to defend these States against the successive attacks of this force, and it will be difficult to concentrate any considerable force from the army on the Mississippi for operations against Mobile with such an active and powerful enemy in our rear. The destruction or dispersion of this army, the desolation of the country it occupies, and the destruction of the land or water transportation, will make it impossible for a reorganization or any movement against the States bordering upon the Mississippi, and enable a strong force of our troops to commence an immediate and successful campaign against Mobile. This result is certain to be accomplished within thirty days, if only a portion of Steele's command could operate with me upon this line, independent of the river and of the navy. This campaign is not of my suggestion, but its results are so much more important than I first thought, and so certain to be attained, that I hesitate to withdraw my forces without positive orders, and I send this despatch by telegraph, knowing that a reply can be telegraphed me in return without delay. Important as the campaign is, I would not embarrass the greater operations of the army in the east.

N. P. BANKS,  
Major General Commanding.

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To General Grant.

ALEXANDRIA, LA., April 30, 1864.

My despatch of the 14th gave you information of the arrival of my command at Natchitoches on the evening of the 10th instant, and also that an immediate advance upon the objective point of the expedition was in contemplation, upon a line differing somewhat from that upon which we had retired, with a view to render my column less dependent upon the river. The rapidly falling river, however, made it dangerous to undertake the proposed movement. Some of the boats of the fleet were aground, and it was the opinion of the admiral, unequivocally expressed, upon consultation with him, that it was inexpedient for the army or the navy to advance until the rise of the river was assured. The Eastport, in moving down the river, had run aground, and was with great difficulty got afloat, when, from the condition of the river, it became apparent that neither the army nor the fleet could move to Shreveport with any reasonable prospect of a return, I directed that the army should fall back to Alexandria. In the mean time the Eastport, one of the most important of the naval vessels, ran aground about eight miles below Natchitoches. No movement of the army was made until information was received that the Eastport was afloat.

Our train was put *en route* for Alexandria at 4 o'clock p. m. on the 21st, and on the morning of the 22d the troops took up the line of march. Information had been received from various sources that considerable bodies of the enemy had been moving from our front our rear, for a purpose not definitely ascertained. It was represented that the object was, either to attack Alexandria, to obstruct our return by occupying Monet's bluff, on Cane river, or to take up a position at the mouth of that stream for the purpose of intercepting the passage of the transports. To prevent the successful accomplishment of either of these

purposes of the enemy, the army made a rapid march from Natchitoches to Monet's bluff. The information we had received as to the movements of the enemy were verified. A strong force, variously represented from five to seven thousand, with two batteries of artillery, were found to be in position at Monet's bluff, and occupying the only road which was accessible to the army in its movements towards Alexandria. This was undoubtedly the force which had contemplated an attack upon Alexandria.

On the morning of the 23d, preparations were made to dislodge the enemy from this position. A force of 5,000 men—composed of a division of the 19th corps under General Birge, and a division of the 13th under General Cameron, the whole being under command of General Birge—crossed Cane river on the right of the enemy's position, and by a flank march of several miles reached a hill, the occupation of which rendered Monet's bluff untenable to the enemy. The possession of this height was of vital importance to either army. It was heavily wooded, protected by deep ravines, and covered a position which, occupied by the enemy, seemed well-nigh impregnable. The forces under General Birge assailed this position at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 23d, and after a very spirited and gallant contest of two hours or more, carried the hill and compelled the retreat of the enemy. Our loss in this action in killed and wounded was from 150 to 200. A full list of the killed and wounded will be forwarded as speedily as possible. Among the wounded was Colonel Fessenden, of the 30th Maine volunteers, who commanded the assailing brigade.

The troops in the front, immediately upon the success of the force on the right, occupied the bridge and the bluff commanding the river, where we rested for the night. The wounded were brought in, and proper attention paid to the burial of the dead. The troops halted in this position during the night, the trains being sent forward early in the morning.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, six guns were fired by the enemy at our rear. This was apparently a concerted signal to the forces in occupation of the bluff on the 23d, that the enemy in the rear, which had been re-enforced the day previous, was ready for the attack. The force for which the signal was intended had retired the day previous; but the guns were answered by General A. J. Smith, commanding the rear guard, who opened a brisk fire at daybreak and maintained a very spirited action for several hours, in which the charge of the enemy was gallantly repulsed and his forces driven back with severe loss. The losses on our side were six killed and fifteen wounded.

On the afternoon of the 24th the column took up its march for Alexandria, undisturbed by the enemy in flank or rear, where it arrived on the 25th and 26th. Our forces were in no disorder, and in no wise dispirited.

Had the river been in condition to admit we might have assumed the advance, but the water had fallen so low that it was impossible for the fleet to go below the rapids at Alexandria. There was no course left for the army but to remain for the protection of the fleet. The fleet above the rapids comprised nine iron-clads—the strength of the fleet of the Upper Mississippi—indispensable to maintaining the supremacy of the government on that river, or to the protection of the mouth against domestic or foreign enemies. It became, therefore, indispensable that the army should remain at Alexandria for the protection of the fleet.

The advanced corps of the enemy manifested a determined spirit to concentrate all his forces in this vicinity, either for an attack on Alexandria, or to get possession of the river below, for the purpose of cutting off our communications. His force, concentrated for this purpose, numbers from thirty to thirty-five thousand men. It is indispensable that all the force of this command should be retained here, and the orders given to General Smith by General Sherman to rejoin his command east of the Mississippi were countermanded.

On the 28th a reconnoissance of the enemy in force caused an expectation of an attack and a general engagement, but the day passed without other conflict

than that of sharp skirmishing between the advance cavalry of either army. The movements on both sides of the river below Alexandria indicate his purpose to avoid an attack on this post, and to concentrate below for the purpose of cutting off our communication with the Mississippi.

The army is in good spirits and condition, has plenty of supplies for the present, and is perfectly confident of success in any engagement that may occur with the enemy. A pontoon bridge has been thrown across the river for the purpose of offensive operations against any detachments of the enemy on the left bank of the river, and the construction of a wing dam across the river, for the purpose of raising the water so that the gunboats may be floated below the rapids, has been commenced. The line of defence, the position of the town, and the location of the bridge and the dam, to which reference is herein made, are indicated in the map enclosed, which will present an accurate view of the position of our army at this time. It is necessary only to say, that we are confident of being able to maintain our position without injury, and are grieved only that it is at present rendered impossible for us to cooperate with any general movements of the armies east of the Mississippi.

Major General David Hunter arrived on the morning of the 28th. He has delivered to me your despatch, and communicated to me your views as to the future operations of this force. He has made himself acquainted with every feature of our situation, and can represent to you truly the necessities which control our action. It has been deemed advisable that you should be placed in possession of the facts as soon as possible, and he leaves for that purpose this afternoon.

Major General McClelland, with the larger part of the force recently at Matagorda bay, arrived here on the evening of the 27th. The balance of the force will reach here as soon as the material at Pass Cavallo can be disposed of. I have reduced the garrisons upon the river to the lowest strength consistent with safety. Nothing has been left undone which would strengthen the force engaged in the movement upon the Red river. In view of the great efforts made by the enemy to concentrate a force sufficient to destroy this army, and to capture the fleet of gunboats and transports, it is advisable that our force should be increased by five or ten thousand men if possible. It will make certain the destruction of the organized army of the enemy west of the Mississippi, the whole of which is here, and will, in that event, enable us to move against the enemy east of the Mississippi in such direction as you shall direct. It is nearly certain that the whole of this force would have been directed against New Orleans if we had become inextricably involved in operations east of the Mississippi; or in the event of our remaining at New Orleans, it is certain that the invasion of Arkansas and Missouri by this force would have occurred. Both of these dangers have been avoided by the campaign which we have made, and except for the delay in co-operating with other forces in other parts of the country, I do not know that anything has occurred which should be a cause of serious regret to the government, except the accidental loss which occurred on the morning of the 8th of April by the incautious advance of our cavalry upon the enemy, in full force, with the unprotected trains and artillery of our advanced guard. Except the loss sustained on this occasion, we have not lost a wagon, or a gun, or any material of the army, and have not suffered unduly in killed and wounded in the several severe conflicts through which we have passed. Our loss in killed, wounded, and captured, including all missing men, is less than 3,500; that of the enemy exceeds 5,000.

I enclose copy of despatch received from Major General Steele by Captain Dunham, an officer of my staff, which is the first communication I have been able to effect with General Steele since the campaign commenced. You will observe that his language is nearly identical with my former despatch—that the

line upon which he was moving was too far distant, and rendered impossible the co-operation of the two armies.

N. P. BANKS,  
Major General Commanding.

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*To Admiral Farragut, or the officer commanding the fleet at New Orleans.*

ALEXANDRIA, LA., May 4, 1864.

On the 30th of April I sent information of the situation of the fleet, and asked the assistance of your gunboats for the maintenance of our communication on Red river. No material change in the condition of affairs has occurred. *We have commenced the construction of a dam across Red river, with every prospect of successful termination, which we hope will release the fleet.* It will occupy ten days in its construction. Our communications are of great importance in the mean time. I beg that there may be no delay in the movements of your boats, as their co-operation will be very important. The army is in the best condition and spirits. It is not impossible that some portion of the enemy's forces may occupy the west bank of the Mississippi. All steamers ought to be prohibited from touching at any exposed point on that side, and the lower river should be thoroughly patrolled. *We look for the concentration of the whole rebel force west of the Mississippi* at this point. Our information concurs with this expectation, and the magnitude of the stake at issue is such that it is impossible to believe that the enemy will fail to capture or destroy this fleet if it be in his power.

N. P. BANKS,  
Major General Commanding.

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*To Admiral Porter.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
Alexandria, La., May 9, 1864.

Colonel Bailey informs me that the river is within six inches of its height of last evening, and is rising. There is a space of twenty (20) feet or more between the tree-dam and the barge, which, when filled, will raise the water from six (6) to ten (10) inches, giving, we think, sufficient depth for the passage of the boats. Every exertion ought to be made to get them ready to-night, so that they may pass the falls to-morrow. I regret to say that our forage is so reduced that it will be impossible for us to remain here longer without perilling the safety of the animals attached to the trains and the artillery. We have exhausted the country, and with the march that is before us, it will be perilous to remain more than another day. Colonel Bailey thinks that the water can be raised to the greatest height which it will attain at any hour when the gunboats may be ready for their passage. He does not want to accumulate the water until then, because a continued pressure is more dangerous to the safety of the dam than that of the weight of the water alone. I hope every exertion will be made to get the boats in readiness for the passage to-morrow. Lieutenant Beebe informs me that his arrangements are complete for the removal of the heavy guns to the bridge and below as soon as they are placed on shore. The detail of trains has been changed, so that they will continue to work during the night.

N. P. BANKS,  
Major General Commanding.

*To Admiral Porter.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,  
*Alexandria, La., May 9, 1864—1 o'clock a. m.*

Colonel Bailey informs me that the water has risen upon the dam two (2) feet since sundown, and is still rising. It is impossible to say how long the dam may stand the effects of a continued rise. The pressure is terrific. The boats of the fleet above ought to be put in readiness at once to take advantage of high water. I have been up to the fleet this morning, and found everything so quiet and still that I feared that there might be unnecessary delay in the movements in the morning, and ask your attention to it.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

*To Admiral Porter.*

ALEXANDRIA, *May 11, 1864.*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this morning. I have never entertained for a moment the thought of abandoning any portion of the fleet, and my only anxiety is, not to move from this post, but to do all that can be done to expedite the release of the vessels. Our men are at work very hard, many of them—as last night, for instance—in the water the whole night. They have been thus employed now for nearly two weeks, night and day, and they complained very bitterly when the men of the navy appeared to be doing nothing to effect the release of their own ships. It was on account of complaints of this character that I requested Colonel Wilson to wait upon you this morning. It is not impossible that there may be persons connected with the army who are interested only for their own welfare, and care but little for the interests of the government; but you may be assured that such considerations will not influence in any respect whatever the command of the army. We shall not leave this post until the vessels are released. Thus far the representations to the northern press are most likely made by men who ran away from the scene of action. When men fail to do their duty they are most anxious to justify it by partial representations of facts. Do not entertain any doubt at all that when the country understands the truth in regard to this expedition, whatever regrets they may feel as to its results, they will not cast serious reproach upon any person connected with it; but even should it be otherwise, it will not disturb me. I appreciate the magnitude as well as the importance of the labor in which we are now engaged, and doubt not its entire success. No efforts of mine shall be wanting to produce that result.

I am very glad to see by the Secretary's letter, a copy of which you enclosed to me last night, that the detention of General Smith's forces on this line beyond the time when he supposed he was at liberty to leave us has been approved.

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

*From Major General Banks to the Secretary of War.*

[By telegraph.]

ON BOARD UNITED STATES STEAMER AVENGER,  
*May 21, 1864.*

My despatch of the 30th of April, transmitted by Major General Hunter, gave a full report of the situation of the navy, which was detained by the low

water above the falls at Alexandria. Orders were given for the construction of a dam above Alexandria for their relief. This dam was commenced on Monday, the 2d of May, and completed on Sunday, the 8th. The work was constructed under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, 4th Wisconsin volunteers, to whom it is impossible to accord too much praise for the skill and energy with which he pursued his work. The army gave its labor to the completion of the work, night and day, with the greatest spirit and success. Two of the gunboats came over on Sunday evening, and on Monday morning at 5 o'clock a portion of the dam gave way, which reduced the water on the rapids to its original level. Its reconstruction was immediately commenced and completed, with additional wing dams above the rapids, on Thursday, the 12th, which raised the water to a sufficient height to allow the boats to pass. On Thursday evening and on Friday morning they all passed over the falls caused by the dam, in safety. The rapids extend in length a mile and a quarter, making a gradual descent of eight feet and some inches; and the fall occasioned by the water passing through an opening made in the dam for their final escape was five feet and a half, making an entire fall of thirteen feet and a half.

On the release of the gunboats the army took up its line of march for Simmsport. It encountered the enemy in full force on the prairie near Mansura, where it occupied a position covering three roads, over one of which the army must pass. A sharp engagement ensued, lasting four hours, chiefly confined to the artillery, and our troops getting possession of the woods in which the enemy was posted, they were driven back, and finally took the road for Moreauville. Our army pursued the same road to Simmsport, where it arrived on the morning of the 17th. The Atchafalaya was bridged by the use of the transport vessels, and the passage of the river was completed on the 20th.

A division of General Mower's, of the 16th corps, supported by a brigade of cavalry of the 19th corps, had a sharp engagement in Yellow bayou with the enemy, in which we captured 180 prisoners. Our losses in killed and wounded were 140. Throughout the entire campaign—except in killed and wounded, in which our losses have been severe—and in the many battles we have had with the enemy, no prisoners, wagons, or other material of the army have been captured by the enemy, except those captured by him in the unexpected engagement on the morning of the 8th of April at Sabine Crossroads. With the exception of the losses sustained there, the material of the army is complete.

Major General Canby arrived at Simmsport on the morning of the 18th, and remained until the passage of the river was completed. The troops will rendezvous at Morganzia, on the Mississippi, a point they will reach to-day or to-morrow.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,  
*Major General Commanding.*

*Testimony of Colonel Charles C. Dwight.*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1865.

Colonel CHARLES C. DWIGHT sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your position in the army at the present time ?

Answer. I am colonel of the 160th New York volunteers.

Question. Did you serve under General Banks in 1864, in what is known as the Red river expedition ?

Answer. I did.

Question. In what position ?



Answer. I was inspector general of the 19th army corps, on the staff of Major General Franklin.

Question. Were you with the army until the expedition had failed and they returned?

Answer. I was with it throughout the entire advance and retreat.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of that expedition?

Answer. As I regard it, it failed from various causes. It seems to me, in the first place, that the campaign was wrong from its conception; that the Red river should not have been relied upon as a line of naval operations, it being a very unreliable stream as regards navigation.

Question. Was that fact known to the general commanding the land forces?

Answer. I think it was. I had heard it spoken of myself. We were told also by residents on our line of march, as we went up, that the time was past for the spring rise in the river; that there would be no rise th at spring. It was a very dry spring, peculiarly so, and particularly unfavorable to a campaign of that character.

Question. What were the other causes of the failure?

Answer. The immediate cause of the abandonment of the campaign was the reverse at Mansfield, on the 8th of April; but it never seemed to me that that reverse was of itself sufficient to have occasioned the abandonment of the campaign, if it had been well conceived and well planned in the outset. That reverse consisted merely of a defeat of the cavalry, and a very small detachment of infantry in advance of the main body of the army. I think that the army was substantially as capable of prosecuting a campaign after that reverse as it was before, or it might have been after a few days to rest and reorganize. The portion of the infantry force defeated that day numbered less than 5,000 men. There were left the detachment of the 19th corps, about 7,000 men, and the entire force under General A. J. Smith, from 9,000 to 10,000 infantry. That force never was defeated, nor had their effectiveness been impaired at all. I think the occasion of the reverse of the 8th of April was the sending forward of this small detachment of infantry to support the cavalry, as it was said; that, I think, was altogether unwise and unmilitary.

Question. Who was responsible for that unmilitary order of proceeding?

Answer. General Banks. He gave orders for that detachment to be sent forward. It was sent forward in two portions. We arrived at Pleasant Hill on the night of the 7th of April. A member of General Banks's staff was that day with the cavalry advance. After we arrived at Pleasant Hill, and went into camp—that is, General Franklin, his staff, and the infantry with him—this officer returned from the front, and proposed to General Franklin to send forward a brigade of infantry to support the cavalry. General Franklin declined to do so. General Banks arrived at Pleasant Hill just about dark that evening, and very soon after his arrival he gave the order for a brigade of infantry to be sent forward to support the cavalry, ordering it to report to General Lee, who commanded the cavalry, at daylight the next morning. I saw the letter written by one of General Banks's staff to General Lee, informing him that this brigade would report to him by daylight the next morning. In the course of the night, as I understood, I do not know it personally, a despatch came from General Lee to the effect that this brigade would be very much wearied by their night march, and that probably they ought to be re-enforced by another brigade. Another brigade was accordingly sent forward by order of General Banks to re-enforce the one that had gone forward in the night. Those two brigades constituted a small division, numbering about 2,000 men. And with the cavalry and that force of infantry the engagement was brought on.

It always seemed to me that a different course should have been pursued. Had the detachment of the 13th corps, which numbered nearly 5,000 men, and the one division of the 19th corps, under General Emory, numbering from 6,000

to 7,000 men, been kept together, and the cavalry only been allowed to conduct the advance, I do not think we should have had the disaster which befell us there. It was a large force of cavalry in proportion to the infantry, and it only should have been kept in the advance, and permitted to do what cavalry is expected to do, follow up and harass the rear of the enemy while retreating, observe their movements and positions, and, if possible, make head against them; if not able to do that, then fall back upon the infantry support.

Question. You say that the order of advance was, in your judgment, unmilitary, and not according to rules of warfare in such cases?

Answer. Clearly so, in my opinion.

Question. And that was the cause of the disaster at Sabine Crossroads?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you ever learn what were the objects of that campaign, what was expected to be accomplished by it?

Answer. No, sir, I never did.

Question. Suppose you had reached and captured Shreveport, in your judgment could you have held the place, and maintained your communications on that long line?

Answer. No, sir; I think we would have been worse off at Shreveport than we were where we were checked. I think the further we went the worse off we would be. I heard General Franklin once say that the only announcement of the plan of the campaign which he ever heard from the commanding general was in these words, "One bound to Alexandria, one bound to Shreveport, one bound to the Gulf."

Question. What was meant by that?

Answer. I suppose the "bound to the Gulf" from Shreveport was through Texas to Galveston, or some other important point on the Texan coast.

Question. Do you know about any transactions in cotton by the army, or by any persons who accompanied the army?

Answer. I had no personal knowledge of that matter. We marched from Franklin to Alexandria. When we arrived in Alexandria General Banks was already there. The force under General A. J. Smith was there, having come up the river in transports after taking Fort De Russy. When I got to Alexandria I saw a very large number of persons reported to be, some of them known to me to be, cotton speculators. When we returned to Alexandria, on our retreat, we found a very large amount of cotton there, lying on the levee and the public square—some thousands of bales, a large amount of which was destroyed by fire.

Question. Do you know whether the teams or transportation of the army were engaged in hauling in cotton at any time?

Answer. I do not think I saw any of that cotton hauled into Alexandria. And what was brought away from there was brought away upon transport steamers.

Question. I would say to you that some of our witnesses seem to regard General Franklin as responsible for the order of march. What have you to say about that?

Answer. I do not know who is responsible for General A. J. Smith being a day behind our column of march. General Smith was never under the command of General Franklin. General Smith's force arrived at Grand Ecore in transports from Alexandria, was disembarked at Grand Ecore, and encamped there, except a portion that went on up the Red river.

Question. General Smith was under the command of General Banks?

Answer. Yes, sir. General Banks had his headquarters at Grand Ecore. The force there with him was the main body of General A. J. Smith's force and a brigade of colored troops. General Franklin's column, which he had marched all the way from Franklin to that point, was at Natchitoches, three miles from

Grand Ecore. I do not think General Smith was ever under the command of General Franklin in any respect until after the disaster at Mansfield. General Franklin's column, consisting of the detachment of the 13th corps and the detachment of the 19th corps, marched from Natchitoches on the morning of the 6th of April, reaching Pleasant Hill on the evening of the 7th of April, taking two days for the march. General Banks, with his staff, started from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 7th, and rode to Pleasant Hill in one day, leaving General Smith to follow, which he did, leaving Grand Ecore on the morning of the 7th. General Smith did not leave Grand Ecore until twenty-four hours after General Franklin's column left Natchitoches, and for that, I take it, General Franklin was not responsible.

Question. Your idea, as a military man, if I understand you, is that the whole army, one portion with the other, should have been in supporting distance?

Answer. Yes, sir, unquestionably; and that all the infantry should have been kept substantially together, the cavalry being sufficiently in advance to harass the enemy and observe his motions, falling back if the enemy should make a stand, and prove too strong for it.

Question. Did you observe anything about the wagon trains which was wrong?

Answer. There was nothing wrong about the train of the infantry column. I think the wagon train of the cavalry was too large; but I think it was where it ought to have been. Had the cavalry been by themselves, and not encouraged to give general battle by this small re-enforcement of infantry, they might have fallen back with their train and saved it. But a portion of the cavalry dismounted, and with the two small brigades of infantry were put into line of battle against the entire force of the enemy. The cavalry was entirely routed, and that division of infantry nearly all captured, so that when we came up with the remaining division of the 13th corps there was scarcely a show of resistance to the enemy being made. This remaining division was put into line of battle, I think, with the hope on the part of General Franklin that General Emory's force would arrive in time to re-enforce them at that point. They made a stand of probably not more than ten minutes. The enemy was advancing in full force, flushed with the success they had already gained, and the division was swept away in a few minutes. The retreat then became a rout, and, of course, the cavalry train with its artillery was abandoned. The main body of the infantry had halted that day. We had made a march nearly as long as had usually been made by the column in advance; but we should have marched further before halting, except for coming upon the rear of the cavalry. We came upon the cavalry train and a brigade of cavalry forming the rear-guard before we halted that day. We found the train attempting to cross a difficult ravine; they were perhaps an hour and a half, an hour at least, I should say, in getting across. We were there in bivouac or halting when word came back from General Banks, who had gone to the front, that an engagement was pending, and ordering General Franklin to hasten forward. The troops were somewhat separated on account of the difficulty in obtaining water.

General Emory's division was not defeated at all that day; it never yielded an inch, and suffered very little loss, scarcely any. As soon as the advance fell back to where General Emory was the enemy was checked. That night a retreat was ordered to Pleasant Hill.

Question. Notwithstanding that defeat was not so disastrous as necessarily to brick up the expedition, in your opinion the expedition itself was impracticable?

Answer. So it seems to me.



# FORT FISHER EXPEDITION.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *January 12, 1865.*

On motion by Mr. Wilson,

*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition against Wilmington, North Carolina, and to report the facts to the Senate.

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary*  
By W. HICKEY, *Chief Clerk.*

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report :

As early as 1862 the Navy Department appears to have been aware of the importance of closing up the Cape Fear river, in order to prevent the introduction of supplies for the rebellion, by means of blockade running. The military authorities of the government, however, did not feel themselves in a condition to furnish the necessary land force for that purpose until the close of the summer of 1864. At that time General Grant expressed his readiness to furnish the requisite number of troops, and gave it as his opinion that he could do so by the 1st of October.

Vice-Admiral Farragut was selected by the Navy Department to take charge of the naval force, but was unable to assume that duty on account of ill health. Rear-Admiral Porter was then transferred from the command of the Mississippi squadron to the command of the North Atlantic blockading squadron, and assigned to the duty of preparing and taking charge of the naval force to operate against the defences of the Cape Fear river and the town of Wilmington.

Major General Gillmore was designated by the War Department to take command of the land forces to accompany the expedition. General Grant objected to this selection, and selected Major General Weitzel for that purpose. Subsequently General Butler announced his intention to accompany the expedition with General Weitzel, the scene of operations being within his department and the troops being from his command. Although until General Butler expressed his intention it may not have been expected that he would accompany the expedition, no objection was made by General Grant to his doing so, notwithstanding he had ample time and power to have ordered otherwise.

Preparations for the expedition were carried on with the expectation at first that it would start by the middle of October. The original intention appears to have been to collect the fleet at Port Royal, in order to lead the rebels to regard the expedition as one against Charleston. But for some reason, which does not fully appear, that intention was changed, and the fleet was collected at Hampton Roads. Owing to the information obtained by the rebels of the destination of the expedition, General Grant determined to delay it until a more favorable opportunity presented itself. Upon learning that a portion of the rebel garrison at Wilmington had been sent to increase the forces opposed to General Sherman in his march across the State of Georgia, General Grant gave orders for the prompt sailing of the expedition.

A powerful fleet was assembled—the most powerful ever known, at least, upon this continent—under command of Admiral Porter. The land force consisted of 6,500 infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a few cavalry. On the 13th and 14th of December the expedition started, General Butler, with the army transports, proceeding to a place 25 miles off New inlet. Admiral Porter, with his fleet, proceeded to Beaufort to complete taking on his ammunition and supplies, including some powder for a vessel proposed to be exploded before Fort Fisher, and some ammunition for the monitors, which (for safety) were towed light from Fortress Monroe to Beaufort.

While the fleet was at Beaufort taking on supplies, General Butler with his transports was lying off Masonboro' inlet, during three days of very fine weather, having reached there during the night of the 15th of December. By the time Admiral Porter and his fleet reached the place of rendezvous, there were signs of approaching bad weather, and on the 19th General Butler, with his transports, proceeded to Beaufort for shelter and also to renew his supplies of coal, water, and provisions, which had become necessary. Beaufort was 70 miles distant from Fort Fisher.

On Friday, the 23d of December, Admiral Porter gave orders that the powder vessel be sent in as near Fort Fisher as possible and exploded that night at 1 o'clock. Information of what he proposed to do was sent to General Butler, but did not reach him until Saturday morning, when he immediately started for Fort Fisher, ordering the transports to follow as rapidly as possible. The powder-boat was exploded a little before 2 o'clock on Saturday morning, and the navy commenced their bombardment about noon of that day. Admiral Porter states that he deferred commencing the bombardment until that time, in the hope that General Butler would arrive; but finding he had not come by twelve, he opened upon the fort, and continued firing until sunset.

After the arrival of General Butler, General Weitzel and Colonel (now General) Comstock, of General Grant's staff, were sent to confer with the admiral in relation to operations the next day. At half past 6 a. m., Saturday, General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock arranged with Admiral Porter concerning the landing of the troops. Some 2,200 or 2,300 men were landed, and General Weitzel was ordered to

reconnoitre the fort, ascertain as nearly as possible its condition, and report as to the practicability of assaulting it. Having done so, he reported that it was not advisable to attack. His testimony upon that point is as follows :

“After that experience [in assaulting military works] with the information I had obtained from reading and study—for before this war I was an instructor at the Military Academy for three years under Professor Mahan, on these very subjects—remembering well the remark of the lieutenant general commanding, that it was his intention I should command that expedition, because another officer selected by the War Department had once shown timidity, and in face of the fact that I had been appointed a major general only twenty days before, and needed confirmation; notwithstanding all that, I went back to General Butler, and told him I considered it would be murder to order an attack on that work with that force. I understood Colonel Comstock to agree with me perfectly, although I did not ask him, and General Butler has since said that he did.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Question. Upon deliberation, and after all you have since learned, are you entirely satisfied with the opinion you then formed about attacking the fort?

“Answer. Yes, sir, I am fully satisfied from all I have heard since, from the result of the second attack, and everything else—I am fully satisfied that I did my duty there.”

Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's staff, testifies as follows :

“General Weitzel made an examination of the work, and reported to General Butler that in his opinion an assault upon Fort Fisher would be impracticable.

“Question. Did you accompany General Weitzel on that examination?

“Answer. I was not with General Weitzel at that time. Later in the evening I was on shore and made an examination.

“Question. To what conclusion did you come in regard to the practicability of an assault upon the work at that time?

“Answer. I cannot say that I formed a definite opinion at the time, as the question of assaulting had already been decided upon the report of General Weitzel. I cannot, perhaps, give a definite answer to that question, because I allow my subsequent knowledge of the work to affect my opinion somewhat.

“Question. Was it a strong work?

“Answer. It was. I will endeavor to answer the question somewhat in detail. I saw the work the first time about the same time that General Weitzel did, and at about the same distance. At that time none of our men had been in the work. I counted, I think, fifteen guns not injured, so far as we could see. I thought the work at that time very difficult of assault; I thought then the chances of success were not more than even. Later, however, perhaps a half or three-quarters of an hour afterwards, I saw General Curtis, and he told me that some of his men had been in the work; that a horse had been taken out of the fort, and that the flag had been taken off the parapet by one of his men; and that there were not more than twenty rebels inside of the work, and that he believed he could take it with fifty men. I asked some questions about his sources of information, and he then said he could take it with a brigade. If I had been in command of the forces at that point, I should have made the trial to take the fort, simply because his men felt or thought they could go into the fort. My opinion as to the practicability of an assault when I first saw the work was changed subsequently by the statement of General Curtis and the men who had been in the work.

“Question. On the supposition that the work was really not properly manned by the enemy?

“Answer. That was General Curtis’s idea. I did not think so. I suppose the men were all in the bomb-proofs; and I thought that if the enemy would let the men get up as close as General Curtis’s men did, I thought it possible that confident men could rush in in time to shut the rebels up in their bomb-proofs. If the men had not had a strong belief that they could get in, I should have thought the chances of success were small. But with such a belief as that, 1,500 men could have done anything.

“Question. With the information that General Weitzel had, would you have agreed with him, independent of what General Curtis said to you?

“Answer. I should, from the information I had at that time.”

In relation to the strength of the garrison of Fort Fisher and the effect of the bombardment, the rebel General Whiting, (while wounded and a prisoner,) just before his death, stated, in answer to questions sent him by General Butler, that—

“Five (5) companies of the 36th regiment North Carolina troops, and Adams’s light battery, amounting to six hundred and sixty-seven (667) aggregate, was the number of the garrison at Fort Fisher on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of December last.” \* \* \* \* \*

“On the 23d, 110 men, veteran artillery of the 10th regiment North Carolina troops, 50 sailors and the 7th battalion junior reserves, about 250 strong, were thrown into the fort.” \* \* \* \* \*

“Question 13. Please state whether any part, and if so, how much of the damage done to the fort by the fire of the navy was repaired during the night.

“Answer. Casualties first day: Killed, none; wounded, one (1) mortally, three (3) severely, and nineteen (19) slightly; total 23. Five (5) gun-carriages disabled.

“Second day: Killed, three (3); wounded, nine (9) mortally, six (6) severely, and twenty-eight (28) slightly; total 46. Damage but very slight; one (1) 10-inch, two (2) 32-pounder, and one (1) 8-inch carriages disabled, and one (1) 10-inch gun disabled. Damage repaired at night. Enemy’s fire formidable and sustained, but diffuse, unconcentrated. Apparent design of the fleet to silence the channel batteries, in order to force an entrance with his vessels, and not to attack by land. The garrison was in no instance driven from its guns, and fired in return, according to orders, slowly and deliberately, six hundred and sixty-two (662) shot and shells.

“Question 14. By reason of the cessation of the bombardment at night, were you not able to rest and recruit your garrison?

“Answer. We were able to do both.

“Question 15. At the time of the landing, where was the supporting force, if any, to the fort?

“Answer. Assembling at Sugar Loaf as fast as Hoke’s people arrived.” \* \* \* \* \*

“Question 17. At the time our skirmish line was deployed before the fort, what was the condition of the guns and defences upon the land side, as to efficiency for a defensive purpose?

“Answer. The guns and defences on the land front were in perfect order at the time referred to, except two (2) disabled guns on the left; 19 guns in position; palisade in perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having been cut.

“Question 18. In view of the condition of the fort and its garrison, would it have been possible, with either three (3) or six (6) thousand men, to have taken the work by assault? (Note.—In answering this question, please give as many of the details for the reason you may give as possible.)

“Answer. Possible, yes. Probable, no. The work was very strong, the



garrison in good spirits and ready; and the fire on the approaches (the assaulting column having no cover) would have been extraordinarily heavy. In addition to the heavy guns, I had a battery of Napoleons, on which I placed great reliance. The palisade alone would have been a most formidable obstacle."

Upon the report of General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock, General Butler determined that it was not advisable to make an assault. It will be remembered that General Weitzel was the officer whom General Grant says he intended should command the land forces accompanying the expedition, and Colonel Comstock was an officer upon General Grant's staff. Both these officers were engineer officers of skill and ability, competent to judge of defensive works.

It will be observed, upon an examination of the testimony, that the naval officers who testified before your committee were of the opinion that Fort Fisher was much more injured by the bombardment, and therefore could be more easily carried by assault, than it was in the opinion of the army officers.

General Butler also determined to withdraw the troops he had landed, and to return to Fortress Monroe. In this he may have not complied strictly with the letter of his instructions from General Grant.

General Butler states, in his testimony :

"I will state what determined my mind against remaining on the beach near Fort Fisher. I was by no means unmindful of the instructions of the lieutenant general. He had directed me to remain if I had effected a landing. If I had effected a landing I should have remained. But a landing requires something more than to land 2,500 men, out of six thousand five hundred, on a beach with nothing but forty rounds in their cartridge-boxes and where their supplies would be driven off the first storm. I did not think that was a landing within my instructions, therefore I deemed it much better for the country to withdraw, as I did; that it was much less risk, and much better for the future, for, if it was necessary, a sufficient number of men could hold the line of communication from Masonboro' inlet down to Fort Fisher; and if they could be spared from the armies around Richmond, could be sent down there, where they could go in with six feet of water, and from thence operating against Fort Fisher, they could come prepared for a siege and remain there.

"By going away I would draw off the enemy's attention. If I remained there it would keep his forces concentrated at that point; and if I was driven away by the storm that was coming up, then I should lose the men I had landed. I acted for the best according to the light I had."

General Weitzel testifies :

" Question. Did you and General Butler fully concur in everything relating to the expedition and the execution of it? I mean what was done after the expedition sailed from Fortress Monroe.

" Answer. Yes, sir; that is, so far as I had information.

" Question. Was there anything done, or omitted to be done, which you would not have done, or omitted, if you had had full command of the expedition?

" Answer. Yes, sir. If I had had the instructions that General Grant gave to General Butler I would have done one thing that General Butler did not do; I would have intrenched and remained there. I should certainly have done that; and I have written to General Butler that I was sorry he did not show me that letter of instructions, so that I could have advised him about that. There is where General Butler clearly made a mistake. The order seems to be explicit

that he should remain there. No matter what the difficulties were, that order would have covered him from any consequences.

“Question. Did the condition of things exist there which that order contemplated?”

“Answer. I think so.

“Question. In relation to the landing of troops, &c.?”

“Answer. I think so. The order simply said that if the work did not fall at once, he was to intrench there. The object appeared to me to be to secure a landing, and to hold it after you had secured it.

“Question. Was there, or not, in your opinion, any difficulty in securing a landing there that could be held? That is, could you land your whole force and the supplies necessary to sustain them.

“Answer. In my opinion, it would have been difficult to have done it; but still, with an order like that, a junior officer should obey it; and then the responsibility of such a step falls upon the one who gave the order.

“Question. You think it would not have been advisable to have done so had it not been in strict obedience to an order?”

“Answer. Yes, sir, I do think so, at that season of the year.”

General Grant testifies as follows :

“Question. The expectation was to surprise the fort?”

“Answer. Yes, sir; and my instructions were very clear, that if they effected a landing there above Fort Fisher, that in itself was to be considered a success; and if the fort did not fall immediately upon their landing, then they were to intrench themselves and remain there and co-operate with the navy until the fort did fall. In my instructions I provided for a bold dash for the capture of Wilmington, in case Fort Fisher did fall immediately upon the landing of the troops. If it did not fall, then they were to intrench, enter upon a siege of the place, and remain there until it did fall. And the capture of Wilmington would thus become a matter for future consideration. General Butler came away from Fort Fisher in violation of the instructions which I gave him. From his own official report it is evident that he forgot his instructions in that particular; his report shows that.”

The rebel General Whiting states :

“Question 19. Please state whether with a force holding the beach, from the nature of the ground and from the configuration of the channel of Cape Fear river, it would have been possible for the confederates to have re-enforced or provisioned the fort to any extent?”

“Answer. No difficulty at all by the river.”

\* \* \* \* \*

“Question 21. In view of the condition of the weather immediately following the demonstration of the 25th of December, and in view of the force that might have concentrated upon the peninsula, as well above as below the place of landing, would it, in your judgment, have been possible for six thousand men, without artillery, to have held out there, without being captured or overwhelmed, from the 26th of December to the 15th of January?”

“Answer. No; and it is a matter of grave charge against General Bragg that the whole force was not captured on the 26th of December. He had the force and the position.”

\* \* \* \* \*

“Question 24. Would you have deemed it the part of wisdom on the part of the commander of the federal forces to have exposed his troops in the situation referred to in question twenty-one?”

“Answer. I do not. Neither attack was practicable in the presence of the supporting force, provided that had been under a competent officer. The first

landing ought assuredly to have been captured entirely; and as for the second, although deriving much greater advantages from the different mode of attack by the fleet, and though pressed with great vigor, it is due to the supineness of the confederate general that it was not destroyed in the act of assault."

A novel feature was introduced into the first expedition against Fort Fisher, viz: a vessel loaded with a large quantity of powder to be exploded as near the fort as possible. The idea appears to have originated with General Butler, in consequence of reading of the terrible effects of the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder at Erith, England, some time before. He suggested it to the departments at Washington, and they submitted it to their ablest engineer and ordnance officers for examination and report. Those officers, while not anticipating any very wonderful results from this new experiment, still deemed it of such importance as to recommend its trial. A suitable vessel was accordingly selected for the purpose, and loaded with powder, taken down to Fort Fisher and exploded. But the arrangements made for the instantaneous explosion of the powder were not such as to insure complete success, and the result of the trial was not as satisfactory as was expected. The time for the explosion was not such, in the opinion of your committee, as was proper to allow all the results which would have been attained by a more complete explosion to have been taken advantage of by the co-operating land force.

The resolution under which your committee have conducted this branch of their investigation had reference only to the first expedition against Fort Fisher. But the two expeditions were so intimately connected, it was so necessary to ascertain the facts in regard to the second and successful expedition, in order properly to understand the first and unsuccessful one, that your committee have taken what testimony they could obtain in relation to it. Some of the important witnesses they were unable to examine, in consequence of their absence in the field on active service. But enough testimony has been taken to elucidate all the leading important facts.

The naval force remained in the vicinity during some very stormy weather, while a second military force was organized under command of General Terry. This force consisted of some 8,500 men, with siege guns and intrenching tools. On the 13th of January the troops were landed on the beach above Fort Fisher, and proceeded to throw up intrenchments. The bombardment of the fort was resumed by the navy on that day, and was continued during the next day. The fire of the fleet was very heavy and exceedingly effective, disabling all the guns, except, perhaps, one or two on the land face of the fort, where the army was to attack.

On the 15th the bombardment was continued, and in pursuance of previous arrangements the fort was assaulted. The assault was begun about 3 o'clock in the afternoon by a column of sailors and marines, 2,000 strong, attacking the fort on the sea face. This assault, though made with great bravery, was repulsed with considerable loss. It proved beneficial, however, by attracting the attention of the enemy in that direction, enabling the army the more easily to

effect a lodgment upon the other side. The contest was very severe, the rebels fighting obstinately, but were driven from traverse after traverse by the force of our troops, aided by the fire of the navy. After some seven hours' desperate and continuous fighting the fort was taken, and the garrison captured. Our troops and officers fought most bravely, and are entitled to the highest credit for their gallantry and daring. The navy co-operated most heartily with the army, and rendered every assistance in their power.

It will be observed, from the testimony, that there are several points of difference between the two expeditions. In the case of the first expedition, while the navy were prompt and active in the bombardment and the landing of the troops, there was a want of cordiality and co-operation between the two arms of the service, which must have seriously impaired the efficiency of their joint action. The testimony of officers and the records of the Navy Department, herewith submitted, are referred to by your committee as containing ample evidence of that fact. In the second expedition no such feeling was manifested, but the most cordial spirit of co-operation appears to have actuated the commanding officers of the army and navy, and to that may be attributed the success which attended their efforts.

In the case of the first expedition, the bombardment by the fleet does not seem to have seriously impaired the efficiency of the fort. But few of the guns of the fort were injured, and the garrison seems to have suffered but small loss. In the case of the second expedition the bombardment was far more effective. Almost every gun was disabled on the side of the fort where the army made its assault, and the contest was more of the character of infantry fighting on both sides than a contest between infantry on the one side, and a heavily armed military work upon the other. And the assault by the sailors and marines, though novel in its character and unsuccessful in its immediate results, doubtless proved of great advantage to the army by its very novelty, and the diversion it created in the operations of the garrison of the fort.

In conclusion, your committee would say, from all the testimony before them, that the determination of General Butler not to assault the fort seems to have been fully justified by all the facts and circumstances then known or afterwards ascertained.

Respectfully submitted.

B. F. WADE, *Chairman.*

## FORT FISHER EXPEDITION.

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*Testimony of Major General Benjamin F. Butler.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 17, 1865.*

Major General BENJ. F. BUTLER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position at the present time ?

Answer. My rank in the army is that of a major general of volunteers, and my position is that of a witness before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Question. Were you engaged in the late expedition against Wilmington, or Fort Fisher, as it is sometimes called ?

Answer. I was, and, with the leave of the committee, I will state all the preliminaries of the expedition, the causes that led to it, and the result of it, leaving to them, when they need any point elucidated, to put any question they may see fit.

Question. That is precisely what I intended to ask you to do. State, in your own way, your connexion with that expedition, and all the facts and circumstances about it that you may deem material.

Answer. In the early part of the fall it was proposed to me by General Grant that I should send down General Weitzel, then brigadier general, and Brigadier General Graham, of the naval brigade, to reconnoitre the position of Fort Fisher, and act in conjunction with a fleet which was being prepared by the navy. General Weitzel was accordingly sent down to make that reconnoissance. About the 20th of September, as I should judge, he returned, reporting the condition of things there.

On the 29th of September we made a march across James river, which resulted in the taking of battery Harrison and the line we at present occupy, which required all the force we had. General Grant said to me that we could not go on with the expedition at that time, for two reasons : First, the want of disposable forces at the time, although at that time it was not contemplated to send down but about 3,000 men, it being supposed that by a surprise Fort Fisher could be taken. The second, and perhaps the more cogent reason, was that the navy had given great note of preparation, had got into Hampton roads, and published that they had the largest armament in the world, and were going to take Wilmington. This seemed to cut off all hope of surprise.

General Grant then said to me that he would not have anything to do with it, to use his exact phrase, because he could not afford an army for a siege, and he supposed the purpose was so far known to everybody for which the fleet was getting ready that there could be no surprise.

Question. About what time was that ?

Answer. From the 20th of September to the 7th of October. The navy gathered a fleet in Hampton roads, and were practicing them. They lay there from that time until some time in November.

At that time, after hearing of the great destruction for many miles around made by an explosion of gunpowder at Erith, England, an examination was had into the various instances of the explosive effect of large quantities of gun-

powder; and it was supposed that, possibly, by bringing within four hundred or five hundred yards of Fort Fisher a large mass of gunpowder, and exploding it simultaneously—for that was the essence of the affair, to have it all exploded at the same moment—the garrison would at least be so far paralyzed as to enable, by a prompt landing of men, a seizure of the fort.

I was examining that question when, on the 1st day of November, or about that time, I received a telegram at Fortress Monroe to report at Washington, to go to New York upon another and a different errand. When I came to Washington I suggested the experiment to the President, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and, I think, to General Halleck, though I will not be certain about him. It was readily embraced by the Secretary of the Navy, and with more caution by the President. Further investigation was to be had, and I left the matter there.

When I returned from New York, I found that the suggestion had received so much favor that it was determined the experiment should be tried. The view in which it was to be attempted was that, if a success, it would alter the whole system of defensive warfare against naval forces; no fort could be made near harbors which would be safe. And it was also an experiment worth trying in another view.

Five thousand barrels of gunpowder were stored by the navy in more than one place in the vicinity of large cities. Of course, as at Erith, which was a government storehouse in England, it was only a question of time when some of those quantities of gunpowder would be exploded, either by carelessness or casually. What would be the effect of such an explosion was a question which it seemed to be very necessary to determine for the safety of the neighboring cities. The naval Ordnance Bureau had made many reports upon the subject, recommending the removal of the powder lest damage might ensue. In this view, also, it was thought best to test the question.

The navy agreed to furnish a vessel and a hundred and fifty tons of powder. The army at first was to furnish a hundred tons of powder, and afterwards fifty tons more. That was furnished from partially damaged powder, all that we had; and the rest was made up by purchasing blasting powder at twenty-eight cents per pound, as I was informed.

As I said before, when I returned, about the 15th or 16th of November, the experiment I found had been substantially agreed upon.

I left Washington and went to the department of Virginia and North Carolina. Immediately upon my return General Grant left to go to Burlington, New Jersey, to visit his family, leaving me in command there. He was gone from that time until the 24th of November. I determine the time of his return, because just before his return I had occasion to send the following telegram to Mr. Stanton:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,  
November 24, 1864—11.30 p. m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

In the absence of Lieutenant General Grant, I have to report to you that the battery and cavalry horses are suffering for hay, and the government is losing large sums in the depreciation of these horses from this cause. For this there can be no excuse, as there is hay enough in the country. It can only arise from inexcusable remissness somewhere, which need but be brought to your attention to be remedied.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

During General Grant's absence I was informed that the powder vessel was being got ready by the navy. I sent the following telegram to the Assistant Secretary of War :

[Cipher.]

NOVEMBER 22, 1864.

C. A. DANA, *Assistant Secretary of War* :

The navy are ready with their one hundred and fifty tons. How soon can you send me ours to Fortress Monroe? Vessel is being prepared.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

To that I received an answer on the 25th of November, which answer I have not now with me; but its substance is embodied in a telegram to Captain Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated the 25th of November, and is as follows :

NOVEMBER 25, 1864.

Captain FOX, *Assistant Secretary of the Navy* :

Assistant Secretary Dana informs me that the needed material will be sent at once to Fortress Monroe—100. Please see him and add 50.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the same day, the 25th, I telegraphed to General Dyer, chief of ordnance, as follows :

[Cipher.]

NOVEMBER 25, 1864.

General DYER :

Mr. Dana telegraphs me that the material for the explosive experiment, 100 tons of which, has been ordered. Please inform me when it will be at Fortress Monroe, and how much.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the 1st of December I received from General Dyer this telegram :

[By telegraph from Washington.—Cipher.]

DECEMBER 1, 1864.

Major General BUTLER :

Telegram received. One hundred tons mining powder were sent from New York and Boston, between the 24th and last of November, to Captain Edson, at Fort Monroe, who is ordered to hold the same subject to your order; fifty (50) tons will leave New York in a day or two.

A. B. DYER.

Official :

H. C. CLARK,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

General Grant had then returned. From information received it was supposed that the garrison at Wilmington, and all the forces about Wilmington, except a small garrison at Fort Fisher, had been detached to meet General Sherman. Thereupon, after consultation, General Grant desired me to do two things. One was to send an expedition up the Roanoke river and endeavor to reach the railroad between Weldon and Wilmington, so as to cut off supplies and re-enforcements from the enemy going north to Petersburg and Richmond, and also to prevent re-enforcements being sent by the Weldon road to Wilmington, in case we moved in that direction; and the other was to get ready to take a force and go down and see if we could not effect a surprise at Wilmington, as it seemed evident that the enemy supposed the expedition gotten up in the early fall had been abandoned. This expedition up the Roanoke was to be a link in the chain of operations, and was to be in conjunction with the navy. Accordingly, on the same day, the 30th of November, I sent this telegram to Admiral Porter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,  
*In the field, November 30, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: Brigadier General Wild will hand you this note, and brings also orders to General Palmer about the matter of which we were speaking. Please give him an order, to be transmitted through him to the commander of your naval forces in the sound, to co-operate in the fullest extent with General Palmer, and to move with all promptness and celerity.

General Wild will show you the orders, which are unsealed for that purpose, which he takes to General Palmer.

If anything occurs to you which I have not covered in my instructions, please telegraph me, and I will reach General Wild by telegraph before he leaves Fortress Monroe.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, James River.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY, *Lieut. and Aide-de-Camp.*

I had gone to Fortress Monroe and had a personal consultation with the admiral upon the Roanoke expedition. This was done, as I have already said, after consultation with General Grant.

On the same day I received this telegram from General Grant:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, November 30, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER: I have files of Savannah and Augusta papers by Colonel Mulford, from which I gather that Bragg has gone to Georgia, taking with him, I judge, most of the forces from about Wilmington. It is therefore important that Weitzel should get off during his absence; and if successful in effecting a landing, he may by a bold dash succeed in capturing Wilmington. Make all the arrangements for his departure, so that the navy will not be detained one moment for the army.

Did you order Palmer to make the move proposed yesterday? It is important that he should do so without delay.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Official:

J. S. BOWERS, *A. A. G.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY, *Lieut. and Aide-de-Camp.*



I answered that telegram by replying to City Point, in person, to get further instructions from General Grant. Those instructions were that we should move as soon as the navy were ready.

Matters remained in that condition until the 4th of December. I had also been to Fortress Monroe to see Admiral Porter, on which voyage I lost my boat Greyhound. I met the admiral in the river, and we arranged some matters about the expedition.

On the 4th of December I received the following telegram from General Smith :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Va., December 4, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER :

I feel great anxiety to see the Wilmington expedition off, both on account of the present fine weather, which we can expect no great continuance of, and because Sherman may now be expected to strike the sea-coast at any day, leaving Bragg free to return. I think it advisable for you to notify Admiral Porter, and get off without delay, with or without your powder boat.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Official :

H. C. CLARK,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the same day I telegraphed to Admiral Porter as follows :

[Cipher.]

DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,  
*December 4, 1864.*

Admiral PORTER :

When can you be ready with our little experiment ?

Captain Edson, ordnance officer at fort, will put ordnance stores at your disposal. Time is valuable from the news we get.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official copy :

H. C. CLARK,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

We did not talk about our little experiment in plain terms much, lest it should leak out—my own telegrams being got hold of—as surprise and secrecy were of the first importance.

On the same day I received from Admiral Porter the following :

NORFOLK, *December 4, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER :

We are ready for the one hundred and fifty (150) tons of powder. Will you give directions to have it bagged ready to go on board ?

D. D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the 5th of December I telegraphed to Captain Edson as follows :

[Cipher.]

DECEMBER 5, 1864—11.20 a. m.

Captain EDSON :

Please have at once all the powder of which I spoke to you put in sand-bags or flour-sacks ready for shipment. You will see Admiral Porter on the subject; you will get the bags of the engineer department at Fortress Monroe. If not, notify me by telegram.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

And on the same day I received the following from Admiral Porter :

FORTRESS MONROE, December 5, 1864—4 p. m.

Major General BUTLER :

I am all ready, and shall call on the ordnance officer at Fortress Monroe for material. Beardsl y was the man I wanted, not Birney. I have found him.

D. D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

This Beardsley was the man who fires off gunpowder by electricity. I then waited until the 6th of December, when, hearing nothing further, I telegraphed to Admiral Porter as follows :

[Cipher.]

DECEMBER 6, 1864.

Admiral PORTER :

What day can we start from the fortress? I wish not to keep troops on board transports a day longer than possible.

As it will take some days to reach Savannah anyway? is there anything I can aid you in?

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the same day I received the following answer :

[Cipher.]

FORTRESS MONROE, December 6, 1864—9.30 p. m.

Major General BUTLER :

Your telegram is received; the vessels to carry the ammunition will be ready in the morning, completely filled. The ordnance officer here at Fortress Monroe is doing everything he can to expedite matters; most of our ammunition is here, and will commence loading up to-morrow. I will report progress to-morrow evening, so that you can make your calculations when to embark. I

think I can by to-morrow tell you within an hour when we can be ready. We are ready in every other respect.

D. D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY, *Lieut. and Aide-de-Camp.*

Admiral Porter promised to notify me on the 7th of December, in the morning. Having made, by verbal instructions and orders, all my arrangements, on the 6th of December I issued through my chief of staff, Brigadier General Turner, the instructions intended for the expedition, as follows:

[Confidential.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA  
AND NORTH CAROLINA, ARMY OF THE JAMES,  
*In the Field, December 6, 1864.*

**GENERAL:** The major general commanding has intrusted you with the command of the expedition about to embark for the North Carolina coast. It will consist of about 6,500 infantry, two batteries of artillery, and fifty cavalry. The effective men of General Ames's division, of the 24th corps, will furnish the infantry force. General Paine is under your orders, and General Ames will be ordered to report to you in person immediately.

You will confer with these officers and arrange details; instruct them to select their best men, making your force about 6,500 men. The chief of artillery in conference with you will designate the artillery to be taken. The horses of the batteries, except one horse for each officer and chief of piece, will be left. Take one set of wheel harness. Fifty men, of the Massachusetts cavalry, will be ordered to report to you. Forty ambulances, (two-horse,) with the necessary medical stores, have been selected for the expedition, which will be distributed on at least two boats. Take sixty rounds of ammunition for the men, 100 rounds in boxes, to be distributed through the fleet. If your division trains do not furnish the necessary amount, the balance required will be furnished by the chief of ordnance at the point of embarkation. Three hundred rounds of artillery ammunition per gun will be taken. So much of it as is not contained in limber boxes and caissons will be loaded in boxes at the point of embarkation. Let each regiment draw and take with it on transport five days' rations; three days' cooked meat; twenty days' additional will be taken in at Fortress Monroe, distributing it through the fleet. Field rations only will be taken. Two pack-mules for division and brigade headquarters will be allowed. Mounted officers will take but one horse for personal use.

The chief quartermaster has been instructed to furnish 150 mule harnesses. It is expected to obtain the animals from the enemy's country. The chief quartermaster will also furnish a party of wharf-builders and a small amount of material for a landing, &c. Thirty launches will be taken on board at Fortress Monroe. The chief signal officer has been instructed to order signal officers and men to report to you. Lieutenant Parson, with a company of engineer soldiers, will report to you. Five hundred shovels, two hundred and fifty axes, and one hundred picks have been prepared. It is expected that the necessary transportation will be ready to-morrow at Deep Bottom.

You will report in person to the major general commanding for further instructions.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. TURNER,

*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

Major General G. WEITZEL,  
*Commanding Fifth Corps.*

H. C. CLARK, *Captain and A. D. C.*

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded to Lieutenant General Grant for his information, and with the earnest request that he will make any suggestion that may occur to him in aid of the enterprise.

B. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

On that same day, the 6th of December, I received the first written instructions from General Grant, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, December 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be the capture of Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of a great part of the enemy's forces, now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the number and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant one of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained on effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected, whether the enemy hold Fort Fisher or the batteries guarding the entrance to the river there, the troops should intrench themselves, and by co-operating with the navy effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise.

If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. The details for the execution are intrusted to you and the officers immediately in command of the troops. Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the army operating against Richmond without delay.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General BUTLER,  
*Commanding Army of the James.*

Official:

S. T. BOWERS, *A. A. G.*

You observed that I emphasized the words "to you," in reading the sentence "the details for the execution are intrusted to you and the officers immediately in command of the troops." I did so because when I read the New York Herald of Saturday I received the first intimation I ever had in the world that I was not in command of that expedition, but of that I will speak hereafter.

I will say here, in passing, upon the oath which I have taken, that by personal arrangement with Lieutenant General Grant, (at City Point, at his quarters, as I went down the river on my way to Fort Monroe, to make final preparations for the expedition,) I was to go in command of this expedition, for a reason which was agreed upon between him and me, but which I will not state unless the committee desire it, because it affects a third person, and General Grant detailed Lieutenant Colonel Comstock, an officer of his staff, to go with me; and he did go with me on that expedition.

The chairman. I will submit to the committee the question whether we shall ask the witness to state what that reason was.

After consultation, it was decided that the question should be asked the witness.

By the chairman :

Question. I am directed by the committee to ask you to state what was the reason agreed upon between you and General Grant why you should go in command of the expedition against Fort Fisher.

Answer. I have no objection to stating it, except, as I said before, the fact that it affects a third person. The reason was this : In the consultation I said to General Grant—"This expedition is a matter of very grave responsibility. (I had known Admiral Porter somewhat in the Mississippi river. General Weitzel and himself, I have understood, had some little difference upon the report as to the damage done by Admiral Porter's bombardment to Fort Jackson and St. Philip.) General Weitzel is a very able general, but a very young man. I am anxious to see this powder experiment go on and succeed, for it is a very grave one ; and I think I had better go with the expedition to take the responsibility off General Weitzel, being an older officer." To this General Grant assented. I said to General Grant—"We shall want an intelligent report of the works around Wilmington, and of the effect of this experiment. Give me your best engineer officer for that purpose ; give me Comstock." General Grant replied—"Certainly, general, and any other of my staff that you think will aid you, for we are not doing anything here." General Grant immediately sent out and ordered Colonel Comstock to report to me ; and in obedience to that order he went down to Fortress Monroe with me on my boat that evening (the 8th) and went with me on the subject. He was with me all the time, and has made a report upon the action of the expedition, which, however, has not yet been printed. I trust the time will come when his report will be printed. My reason for not stating this at first is, I did not care to bring General Weitzel's difference with Admiral Porter in the matter, but it is no special consequence. It was further understood that I was to stay until General Weitzel successfully effected a landing ; and then I was to determine whether there should be a dash made on Wilmington, and go as far as that if necessary, and then come back to my command of the army of the James. One consequence was that I took almost my whole staff with me. It was told to all my staff, and to almost everybody in the army, that I was going with the expedition. I took all my horses and other means of moving across the country. But this is episodic, and I will go on with my statement. I went to Fortress Monroe on the evening of the 8th of December. The transportation for the expedition was to be furnished by General Ingalls, General Grant's chief quartermaster of the armies operating against Richmond.

On the 6th I had moved the troops for this expedition out from the line, taking them out of the trenches, and got them ready to move. I fix the date by the following telegram from General Terry to General Turner, my chief of staff :

[By telegraph from 24th army corps.]

DECEMBER 6, 1864.

To General TURNER :

When will Ames's corps be moved out of here ? Will there be any others to supply their place, or shall I fill the gap by extending the first division to the left and the third to the right ?

A. F. TERRY,  
Brevet Major General.

Official :

H. C. CLARK, *Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

In the mean time I received a cipher despatch from General Grant, which was delayed in its transmission a little while. I have not a copy of it, but I think General Grant has published it with my report; but I am not certain whether he has or not, because he has not marked it "cipher." But I answered him on the 6th of December as follows :

DECEMBER 6, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT :

Cipher despatch received. Orders will be given to carry out the orders contained in it.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

General Grant's despatch was one stating that instead of moving from Deep Bottom, as my order contemplated, the troops of the expedition should move over to near Signal Hill, Bermuda front, and encamp there, and then march down to embark at Bermuda Hundred. That was a slight change from my order.

On the 7th of December I received this despatch from my chief quartermaster :

[By telegraph from Bermuda.]

DECEMBER 7, 1864—11.05 p. m.

General TURNER, *Chief of Staff* :

We have here now the following boats : Haze, DeMolay, Eastern State, General Sedgewick, Beaufort, Perrit, Montauk, Ellie Knight, Louisa Moore, Herman Livingston, Weybosset, Idaho, and Charles Thomas; yet to arrive the Western Metropolis, Admiral DuPont, Starlight, and John Rice. These boats will carry 7,000 men, leaving space for ambulances, &c., &c.

GEORGE S. DODGE, *Colonel, &c.*

Official :

H. C. CLARKE, *Captain and A. D. C.*

This shows that of the transportation that was to be furnished me by General Grant's quartermaster four of the largest of the boats were behind on the 7th of December. This will show who, if anybody in the army, was delaying the expedition at that date. My troops were ready on the sixth.

On the 7th of December I received the following from General Grant in relation to the instructions I had issued, a copy of which had been forwarded to him for his approval :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Virginia, December 7, 1864.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,

*Commanding Army of the James :*

I had sent you a cipher despatch before receiving your instructions to General Weitzel. I think it advisable that all embarkation should take place at Bermuda. The number of intrenching tools, I think, should be increased three or four times.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Official :

H. C. CLARKE, *Captain and A. D. C.*

We had intended to take but very few intrenching tools—fifty, or something like that.

On the 7th of December, finding myself short of transportation, I sent the following to Colonel Dodge :

DECEMBER 7, 1864.

Colonel DODGE :

The Baltic is at Annapolis. Get her, we shall need her.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

The Baltic had just arrived at Annapolis with released prisoners from Savannah. Colonel Dodge sent the following reply :

[By telegraph from Bermuda.]

DECEMBER 7, 1864—7.45 p. m.

General TURNER, *Chief of Staff* :

I am now fully prepared to ship the troops. Shall they be embarked tomorrow? I have directed that the launches be shipped at Fort Monroe. The ambulances will be on board to-night.

GEORGE S. DODGE,  
*Colonel and Quartermaster.*

Official :

H. C. CLARKE,  
*Captain and A. D. C.*

The despatch came to me about an hour after its date, 7.45 p. m. On that day I sent the following to General Grant :

[Cipher.]

DECEMBER 7, 1864.

Lieutenant General GRANT :

General Weitzel's command is encamped at Signal Tower, near Point of Rocks, and awaits orders. Admiral Porter telegraphs he will be ready by tomorrow.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

On the same day I received the following despatch from General Grant :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Virginia, December 7, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER :

Let General Weitzel get off as soon as possible. We don't want the navy to wait an hour.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Official :

H. C. CLARK, *Captain and A. D. C.*

I sent the following to General Weitzel at 9 p. m., December 7:

DECEMBER 7, 1864—9 p. m.

Major General WEITZEL:

You will embark your command and get them off to Fortress Monroe as soon as possible after daylight to-morrow morning.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

The last three telegrams which I have just read were within an hour and a quarter; the one announcing that the transportation was ready, another from General Grant asking me to give orders to move, and the last containing my order to move as soon as daylight would permit the embarkation.

On the 8th of December I received the following despatch from General Weitzel:

BERMUDA, *December 8, 1864—9.15.*

Major General BUTLER:

I am here embarking the troops in case you should have anything to communicate.

GODFREY WEITZEL,  
*Major General.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

We were still short of transportation. On the 9th I received the following from General Grant:

CITY POINT, *December 9, 1864—2 p. m.*

Major General BUTLER:

The steamer *Empire City* is loaded with ordnance stores bound for New Orleans. A telegraph from Washington, just received, shows that it is important that these stores be forwarded. If you can dispense with this vessel, let her go on; if not, the moment troops are debarked from her send her forward on her way.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

We had to take a steamer which had put into Fortress Monroe to make out our complement.

On the night of the 8th of December I took Lieutenant Colonel Comstock on board my boat, shook hands with General Grant, and said: "Now we will get off as soon as we can." I went down the river and met Admiral Porter on the morning of the 9th, stating that we were ready to proceed. He said that the powder vessel was not quite ready, but it would be ready directly; and at any rate, he said that it would not be advisable to go to sea in the then state of the weather.



On the 10th of December I telegraphed to General Grant as follows :

[Cipher.]

FORT MONROE, *December 10, 1864—11.45 a. m.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, *City Point* :

Has been blowing a gale ever since we arrived. Is clearing up a little. We are all ready, waiting for the navy.

Any news from Warren or Sherman?

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

To that I received in reply the following :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Virginia, December 11, 1864.*

Major General BUTLER, *Fortress Monroe* :

Richmond papers of the 10th show that on the 7th Sherman was east of Ogeechee, and within 25 miles of Savannah, having marched 18 miles the day before. If you do not get off immediately you will lose the chance of surprising a weak garrison.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Official :

H. C. CLARKE,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

General Grant does not say, (if you will allow me to refer to it,) "If General Weitzell does not get off immediately," &c., but, "If *you* do not get off immediately *you* will lose the chance of surprising a weak garrison."

That was on the 11th. On that day Admiral Porter informed me that he would be ready to sail on the morning of the 12th, if the weather continued as it then was.

I found out by that time the expedition had got to be the talk of every man at Fort Monroe. I knew that the enemy's scouts were within 25 miles of us on the other side of the James river. The expedition was also common talk all over Norfolk.

I thereupon, on the 12th, ordered my vessels to get ready, and the whole fleet to proceed up the Potomac as far as Mathias Point. In doing so they would pass what is known as "the Northern Neck," the country between the Potomac and Rappahannock rivers, where the enemy keeps scouts and spies to count all our vessels passing up and down. But they had no scouts and spies up as far as Mathias Point. So by going up there, and then turning about and running down with all their lights out, the enemy would not be able to tell for some days where we had gone. That was very cleverly done, and the fleet came back and under the lee of Cape Charles, the weather being a little northeasterly, and waited there. They could go up the Potomac whether the wind blew or not; but whether they could go out to sea would depend upon the weather. I ordered them to wait there under the lee of Cape Charles until we should go out there and join them.

The navy started on the morning of the 13th, a portion of the fleet earlier, and a portion of them later in the morning. The 13th of December was Tuesday.

On the 14th of December I received the following from Lieutenant General Grant :

[By telegraph (cipher) from City Point, Va., 10 a. m., dated December 14, 1864.]

Major General BUTLER :

What is the prospect for getting your expedition started? It is a great pity we were not ten or twelve days earlier. I am confident it would then have been successful. Have you heard from Palmer? The Richmond papers give no account of any federals on the Roanoke or Weldon road south of Weldon.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Official copy :

H. C. CLARKE,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

Palmer was upon the expedition to cut the Weldon railroad. The committee will remember that at the same time General Warren was sent out to demonstrate upon the upper end of the Weldon railroad, near Stony brook. To that despatch I replied as follows :

[Cipher.]

ON BOARD BEN. DEFORD,  
*December 14—10.45 a. m.*

Lieutenant General GRANT :

Porter started yesterday. Transport fleet are at Cape Henry. I am just starting. The weather, for the last six days, has been such that it would be useless to be on the coast.

Expedition left Plymouth Wednesday last.

You will remember that you have cut communication between Weldon and Petersburg.

Everything is off in the best time possible.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official copy :

H. C. CLARKE,  
*Captain and A. D. C.*

In my despatch to General Grant I referred to the cutting of the communication between Weldon and Wilmington to show that the Richmond papers would not be likely to have anything about what was doing south of Weldon.

It was arranged that I should meet the naval fleet twenty-five miles off New inlet. But, in order not to arouse any suspicion in regard to Wilmington, and in order that if it became necessary we might land at Masonboro' inlet, which is eighteen miles above Fort Fisher, my fleet was ordered to rendezvous and did rendezvous off Masonboro' inlet, but so far out at sea that they might not be seen, of which Admiral Porter was notified, so that he understood it. I insert here Admiral Porter's letter to me of the date of the 13th of December, which shows he knew of the place of rendezvous, and that I did not start the transports until he was ready.

On the 13th of December I received the following letter from Admiral Porter :

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Hampton Roads, December 13, 1864.*

GENERAL: The rest of the fleet will leave here in three hours, and will proceed to the rendezvous twenty-five miles east of Cape Fear river.

The powder-vessel will go to Beaufort and take ninety tons of powder I had there. I shall follow and communicate with you after she leaves Beaufort for her destination. I think the Louisiana will carry the three hundred tons. She has now two hundred on board, and room for two hundred more, though that would sink her too deep. She has delayed us a little, and our movements had to depend on her.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c., &c., Fortress Monroe, Va.*

Therefore, whoever says that my transport fleet went in sight of Fort Fisher and gave notice of the expedition, says either what he does not know to be true, or does know to be false. If he was connected with the expedition with any high rank, he knows it to be false; if he was not, he does not know it to be true.

The transport fleet arrived off Masonboro' inlet during the night of Thursday, the 15th of December. Their time of sailing was so arranged that they should sail only so fast, in order that they might get there together, and should not get there before daylight, and, therefore, it would not be possible for them to be seen by any blockade runner or fishing vessel that might be out there. My own ship being faster than the rest, I went forward eighteen miles down the coast and twenty-five miles off the land, in order to meet Admiral Porter, who, I supposed, was in the fleet. He had said to me that it would take twelve hours for him to go into Beaufort and get ammunition for his monitors and other vessels; that he should want twelve hours for that purpose. Having had some experience in regard to the delays of sailing operations, I had allowed him to have thirty-six hours' start. I was afraid that he might be detained by a tide in going in or coming out of the harbor of Beaufort, but I supposed he would be able to go in and come out in that time.

I reached the blockading fleet off Fort Fisher between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening of the 15th, (Thursday.) I inquired if Admiral Porter had been seen, but they said he had not. I consulted a few minutes with the officer in charge, and then stood 25 miles out to sea, and found the Minnesota and some of the large vessels out there. I spoke them and inquired if they knew where Admiral Porter was. They said they did not, but supposed that he was at Beaufort; that they could not get in the harbor of Beaufort, and therefore had come along. Expecting him momentarily, I did not come to anchor, but steamed under what steamboatmen call "one bell;" steamed slowly around all that night.

On the morning of the 16th, not seeing Admiral Porter, I stood in towards land, and waited that day. I stood in there with the blockading fleet, my transport fleet still remaining at Masonboro' inlet, with the exception of my own vessel and a little boat for a tender. I waited that day, which was very fine, and waited also the next day. The sea was so smooth that I lowered my gig and took a row for pleasure. There was not wind enough to fill the sail of a yawl boat that was let down.

I sent General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock on the Chamberlain to make a reconnoissance of the fort, and they run in so as to draw the fire.

We waited there Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. On Sunday morning I received this letter from Admiral Porter:

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I take advantage of the tug DuPont going out to write you a few lines.

I think all the vessels will leave here to-morrow morning for the rendezvous, and if the weather permits, I think we will be able to blow up the vessel by the next night. In talking with engineers, some of them suggested that even at 25 miles the explosion might affect the boilers of steamers, and make them explode if heavy steam was carried; and I would advise that before the explosion takes place, of which you will be duly notified, the steam be run down as low as possible, and the fires drawn.

I hear that the rebels have only a small garrison at the forts at New inlet. I don't know how true it is.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,

*Commanding Department Virginia and North Carolina.*

Official:

H. C. CLARKE, *Captain and A. D. C.*

You will observe that this letter was written on Friday, the 16th. You will see that he advises me to get 25 miles off, and draw off my steam when he exploded the powder-vessel, lest our boilers should be blown up, even at that distance. We waited until Sunday night, when Admiral Porter made his appearance. He did not come to the blockading squadron where I was lying, but came directly down to the rendezvous. I run out to meet him, and received from him this letter:

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*At Sea, December 18, 1864.*

GENERAL: The powder-vessel Louisiana has gone in to attempt the explosion. The weather looks threatening; the wind may haul to the west, but it is not likely. The barometer is high yet, though the weather does not please me.

In case of an easterly gale my vessels will rendezvous under Cape Lookout, where yours also will find perfect shelter. In case you land at Masonboro' inlet, which you can only do with northwesterly or westerly winds, will you not want vessels to cover you? I have vessels detailed to cover all landing parties. The powder vessel is as complete as human ingenuity can make her—has 235 tons of powder, all I could get, though she would not have carried much more.

I propose standing in, the moment the explosion takes place, and open fire with some of the vessels at night, to prevent the enemy repairing damages, if he has any.

We have an army signal officer on board, and if you have one we can communicate freely.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,

*Commanding, &c., &c., &c., Steamer Ben Deford.*

Official:

H. C. CLARKE, *Captain and A. D. C.*

Now to explain a little about Masonboro' inlet. It is 18 miles up the coast from Fort Fisher, and is the only inlet where you can get in in six feet of water between Beaufort and Fort Fisher. It was proposed, in case we larded

at Fort Fisher, that we should also land a small force at Masonboro', and hold it, so as possibly to go in there in rough weather, land stores there, and attempt to carry them down the beach or the sound when we could not land them outside. So we left the force there, where they would be out of the way and attract no attention, intending to detail what was needed for the landing at Fort Fisher.

Upon the receipt of that letter from Admiral Porter, it being then 8 o'clock at night, and he having said that he had sent the powder-boat in with orders to have it exploded, I immediately sent General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock on board the Malvern, to represent to the admiral that there would be no use in sending in the powder-boat and exploding it if the troops could not land, for whatever that explosion might do the enemy would have time to repair damages. As we could not land, the powder-vessel would be lost entirely, and as all of us would have to stand off during the northeasterly gale, which he foresaw, it would clearly be best not to explode the powder-vessel at that time.

When they returned they reported to me that the admiral agreed with me, and had sent in a fast-sailing tug to countermand the orders to the powder-vessel. They reported that they had found great difficulty in getting on board the admiral's vessel, on account of the sea being so rough.

We remained there that night, which was the night of Sunday. On Monday morning, the 19th, Admiral Porter signalled to me, through the signal officer, that as it was rough, and he could not land, he proposed to exercise his fleet. Thereupon he got his fleet in line of battle by divisions, and we sailed all about the neighborhood, I with my ship following the flag-ship. We all sailed within sight of Fort Fisher. That, I believe, was the first intimation the enemy had that we were off the coast.

I have here what purports to be a copy of the official report of Lieutenant R. T. Chapman, commanding the battery Buchanan, which was the mound battery just below Fort Fisher. It is published in the rebel papers, and this is a printed copy from one of their papers. Lieutenant R. T. Chapman commences his report in this way :

"BATTERY BUCHANAN, *December 29, 1864.*

"SIR: I reported to you on the 20th instant that the enemy had arrived off this place."

On Monday we were exercising the fleet, and they did go within sight of the mound battery, and it was remarked on the squadron that if we could see them of course they could see us.

On the evening of Monday the wind hauled around to the northeast, and it was very evident that there could be no landing of troops at that time. I had taken coal for ten days on my transport vessels, all they could carry, with the exception of my flag-ship. As she was running light, I could put a hundred tons coal as ballast in her hold. I had taken ten days' water. Most of the vessels, however, had water condensers, with which we could supply ourselves in case of a pinch. I had waited ready to sail from the 9th to the 20th of December, and my ten days' supplies were getting rather short. It was evident that a northeasterly gale was coming on; I was to rendezvous, by Admiral Porter's directions, under Cape Lookout or in Beaufort harbor, as many of us as could get in on account of the draught of water.

I therefore sent my tender to the fleet at Masonboro', telling them all that could do so to go into Beaufort, and renew their coal and water, for I saw that for three or four days we could do nothing, and I proceeded to Beaufort to superintend that operation, because the water was to be brought from a great distance.

I see that some person claims that Admiral Porter says that I had a very

bad class of transports. Admitting it for the sake of the argument, they were such as were furnished me by the quartermaster of the armies operating against Richmond. But that statement is unfair to him. They were an excellent class of transports. That is shown by the fact that they rode out one of the most terrible gales that we have had on the coast, and we did not lose a man.

However, we all run into Beaufort. I got there, I think, on the evening of the 20th. On Tuesday I telegraphed to Lieutenant General Grant as follows:

[Telegram.—Cipher.]

OFF BEAUFORT, *December 20, 1865.*

Lieutenant General GRANT:

Have done nothing—been waiting for navy and weather. Have sent full report by mail.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

And I think I may be pardoned for making a single observation, after reading this report, although it may not exactly be testimony:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 20, 1864—10.30 a. m.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the troops under the command of Major General Weitzel left Fortress Monroe, as I informed you, on Wednesday, the 14th, and got off Cape Henry at 4 p. m., and arrived the next afternoon at the place of rendezvous designated by Rear-Admiral Porter. Admiral Porter left with the naval squadron the day previously, and as soon as possible after the storm.

Fearing lest the enemy might be informed of our movements and guess our destination, I sent the transport fleet up the Potomac as far as Matthias Point, about fifty miles, in the daytime, so timing the sailing that they should arrive there after dark, and then, during the night, retrace their course and get off the eastern shore, near Cape Charles, by daylight. This was cleverly done. The enemy's scouts, on the Northern Neck, where, I see by the Richmond papers, they watch the movements of troops on the Potomac, saw the fleet go up, but did not see it return, so that when I left it was reported in Norfolk that the fleet had gone up the Potomac.

We were exceedingly fortunate in our weather, and lay off New inlet on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in very smooth water and pleasant weather. The admiral arrived on Sunday evening from Beaufort, having been detained there from Wednesday night for reasons presumed to be satisfactory.

Sunday night the wind freshened, so that it would be impossible to land troops on the outside near Fort Fisher.

The admiral was desirous to explode the torpedo-vessel that night at 10 o'clock and attack the next morning with the fleet, although we might not be able to land. I sent General Weitzel with Lieutenant Colonel Comstock, who agreed with me in opinion, that as the navy did not propose to run by the fort into the river, whatever might be the effect of the explosion, it would be useless unless the troops could be landed to seize the point, and it would specially be inexpedient to explode the torpedo at that hour, giving eight hours for the enemy to repair damages before the attack even by the fleet was made.

The admiral, upon these representations, countermanded his orders which had been given for the explosion, and we have waited until now for a smooth sea. Meantime I have sent my transports into Beaufort to coal and water, as our ten

days' supply is nearly exhausted. Last evening I received a telegram from the admiral by signal, saying that the sea was so rough that it would not be possible to land this morning, whereupon I steamed to this port, where I am coaling my ship, and shall return this afternoon.

All the troops are well and comfortable, in good spirits, and, so far, without casualty. I am sorry to say the weather does not look favorable.

I take leave to congratulate you upon General Thomas's victory, which is very gratifying. We have no news from General Sherman later than that which is brought by the northern papers.

The expedition up the Roanoke has been delayed by torpedoes, but I get news from General Palmer that the torpedoes are being cleaned out, and that the movement is still going on.

Very respectfully, yours,

BENJ. F. BUTLER, *Major General.*

Lieutenant General GRANT,

*Commanding, &c., &c., City Point.*

, Official :

H. C. CLARKE, *Captain and A. D. C.*

The observation which I desire to make is to ask whether that report looks much like an absconding general who had run away from his commanding general without any authority so to do.

Now, with the leave of the committee I will go on from that point. I supposed that I should go out of port the afternoon I sent off that report; but it blew very strongly—blew as I never heard it blow before. But then I had never been much at sea. It kept on blowing very hard until Thursday night, when it held up a little.

In order to water the transport fleet I had to send fifteen miles up the railroad and bring it down, and it was a very heavy job. But we did the best we could.

The wind slacking up on Friday, I sent Captain Clarke, of my staff, to Admiral Porter to say to him that I would be through coaling the vessels and be down there Saturday night, ready to commence the attack on Sunday morning, at which time I thought the sea would be smooth. Captain Clarke went down then, but did not return until the next day. He returned the next morning and reported to me that he had arrived off Beaufort on his return during the night before, but it was so rough that it was impossible for him to get his boat in, although it was a light-draught boat, and a very good one.

He reported that he had seen Admiral Porter, who had told him to say to me that he should explode the powder vessel at one o'clock that night. Captain Clarke said to him that it would be impossible for me to get there with the land force, because the vessels were not coaled, although they were doing the best they could; but that he would go right back and inform me. He left Admiral Porter at one o'clock of the afternoon of Friday. Beaufort was 70 miles off, besides the distance made out to sea. He left at one o'clock to come back to Beaufort, but did not reach me until the next morning.

Having received the information that the powder-boat would be exploded, and had been exploded at one o'clock of the night before, I started immediately for Fort Fisher, ordering the transport fleet to follow me, each vessel as fast as it was coaled. Most of them having coaled and watered, got off directly.

I got down near Fort Fisher between 4 and 5 o'clock, and found the fleet engaging the enemy and bombarding the fort. I remained there in sight until the signal was made to cease firing, when the admiral's ship ran out some four or five miles and came to anchor. I ran alongside of her, came to anchor, and sent Lieutenant DeKay, of my staff, on board to say that General Weitzel would go

on board that night to arrange a plan of attack the next morning, if the admiral thought it advisable to attack. Admiral Porter returned me word that he was very tired that night, but if I would send on board in the morning he would see General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock at as early an hour as I chose to send them.

Why I sent General Weitzel instead of going myself was, that as General Weitzel was to be in command of the troops on shore, I proposed that all the minor details, corresponding signals, and all that, should be arranged between Admiral Porter and General Weitzel, so that there should be no mistake in them. And, besides, I supposed that Colonel Comstock, being present, would be able to suggest anything that might occur to either of them; also, being a member of General Grant's staff, with a son of Admiral Porter also on the staff, he might, at least, keep up the *entente cordiale* between the army and navy.

At half past 6 o'clock on the morning of Sunday General Weitzel repaired on board the Malvern, and there had a conversation with Admiral Porter. I dictated the letter—I do not have it here, but it was published by Admiral Porter with his despatch—which was sent him in reply to that conversation. In the letter I suggested that we should go in as early as 8 o'clock in the morning, &c.

It was arranged that the naval fleet should silence the Flag Pond Hill and the Half Moon batteries, and then we would land near them.

Now, unless you gentlemen of the committee are very familiar with a very good map of Fort Fisher and vicinity, it may be well for me to explain one which I have here, as it will elucidate what I have to say.

[The witness then spread out a map upon the table and explained the position of Fort Fisher, the forts above, Masonboro' inlet, the character of the beach, depth of water in the channel near Fort Fisher, &c.]

I urged upon Admiral Porter, through Weitzel and Comstock, to run by the fort into Cape Fear river, but he said he could not do it, that there was not water enough. Now, the navy had four vessels, blockade runners, which had been caught while trying to run out of the port of Wilmington. They had been captured and turned into gunboats; and it might be supposed that they could go in where they came out. Yet the navy folks say they could not run by there because they had no vessels of light-draught.

The vessels of the navy lay in a semicircle around Fort Fisher. Twelve vessels lay up above trying to silence the batteries at Pond Hill and Half Moon, which they did not do except at times. They fired at me while I lay within 600 yards superintending the landing of the troops. I ask the committee to take into consideration the very great difference between a silent fort and a silenced one. Fortress Monroe is silent to-day, but it is very far from being silenced. And at Fort Fisher and the batteries the enemy fired an occasional shot all the afternoon—they could not fire much. It is fair to say that when the Brooklyn was in near the Flag Pond Hill battery she did some splendid shooting, and the enemy concluded not to fire a great deal.

The space between the Half Moon and the Flag Pond batteries is about two and a half miles. We stood in; the transport fleet lay each side of me; I lay at first within 800 yards when we commenced debarking the troops. The moment we got the troops on shore skirmishers were to advance and take possession of some woods, and then the whole party moved down upon Flag Pond Hill battery. The enemy held out a white flag as our skirmishers came up, and the navy sent in boats and took the prisoners off. We took sixty-five prisoners from the 17th North Carolina regiment, which is a regiment which lay before my line when I left from before Richmond. Now it is said that no re-enforcements got there; yet we captured and brought back with us 65 men of a rebel regiment which I left at Richmond when I started on the expedition.



When we landed the fort was entirely silent, with the exception of a gun fired now and then at some small navy boats that were apparently dragging for torpedoes, or taking soundings.

My plan was to first land 500 men and reconnoitre. If it was found that they could hold the landing for the others, then land force enough to assault the place. And then, if it was possible to land the rest of the men and what material I had, then to land and intrench. The first 500 men were landed, and then the boat was sent back, and as many more were put on shore as fast as possible.

As soon as the landing was in fair progress, I ran down to a point within 500 yards of Fort Fisher, just at the right of where the monitors lay that were firing upon the fort. I could run in nearer than they could because my vessel was of lighter draught.

I there met General Weitzel returning from a reconnoissance, and he stated to me that he had been out to the front line and seen Fort Fisher; that one of his best officers had been out on the picket line; that the fort was, as a defensive work, uninjured; that the guns of the fort were all mounted on the land face; that they had seventeen guns bearing up the beach; that his picket line was crouched under the counterscarp of a ditch, which was so high that it covered them. General Weitzel's report to me receives very singular confirmation from the report of Major General Whiting, of the rebel service, who reports that—

“During the day the enemy landed a large force, and at half past four advanced a line of skirmishers on the left flank of the sand curtain, the fleet at the same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire upon the curtain.”

That is, our men advanced up and crouched under the sand-bank which formed the glacis of the ditch, which was high enough to protect them from the fire of the fort; and there they could lie exposed only to the fire of the navy which was enfilading them. We lost ten men by the fire of the navy.

General Weitzel stated that he thought it was impossible to assault the fort successfully. Being unwilling to leave the matter without trying, and seeing from the state of the weather that it must be an assault or nothing, I said to Colonel Comstock, who was on board with me, “Jump into a boat with General Weitzel, pull ashore, and examine with General Weitzel, and report to me if an assault is feasible; to me it does not look possible, but I am unwilling to give up.” I had a vivid perception of the future which has overtaken me. They went on shore. The surf had begun to rise, so that they got very wet in landing.

At the same time General Graham reported to me. He said, “General, you have got either to provide for those troops to-night on shore some way, or get them off; because it is getting so rough that we cannot land much longer.” General Graham had been a naval officer, but is now in the service of the army and commanding the naval brigade. Considering a few moments, I determined the course of action that should govern me. A storm was coming on; the surf was rolling in; the barometer had fallen a half an inch. If we got the men on shore, it might be, and probably would be, a week before we could send an ounce of provisions to them. In the mean time a deserter from the 62d North Carolina, whom I had captured once before, at Hatteras, in the early part of the war, having received good treatment, came in. He said that they had marched down from Richmond, and that Kirkland's brigade, and another brigade, were already down there; and that Hoke was on his way with large re-enforcements, and had arrived at Wilmington the night before.

Question. How far is Wilmington from Fort Fisher?

Answer. About twenty-one or twenty-two miles by land. At the same time our skirmishers advanced upon a small body of men who were in between Flag Pond Hill battery and the pond. They could not get away, because it is a marsh towards the river; they could not go by the pond and go up the beach,

because there is an opening from the pond into the sea; they could not get down to the fort, because we were between them and the fort. Therefore, they had nothing to do but surrender; and Major Reese, five officers and two hundred and eighteen men did surrender. Major Reese was brought to me, and from him I learned also that he had been marched from Bellville, near the Weldon road, where General Warren had made his attack, after they had heard we were at Wilmington. As many of his regiment that morning had been put into the bomb-proofs of Fort Fisher as the bomb-proofs would hold, in addition to the garrison which was there before. His other two hundred and eighteen men, not being able to be put in the bomb-proofs, had been marched up the beach out of the way of the navy fire. I also learned from him that he was in the fort that morning, and that they had lost but two men killed from the bombardment, and that there was but one gun on the land face dismounted. He seemed to be a very communicative gentleman, willing to tell us all he could. I then inquired of him where he was the night before. He said he was lying two miles and a half up the beach. I asked him if he had heard the powder-vessel explode. He said he did not know what it was, but supposed a boat had blown up; that it jumped him and his men, who were lying on the ground, about like pop-corn, to use his expression. He said that he did not know what it was, but supposed that it was a gunboat that had blown up, or something of that kind.

I then made up my mind what to do in view of the fact that a storm was coming on, and if it became necessary to effect a landing again we could do it any day in two hours without the loss of a man. I thought it a great deal better to risk that than to risk the attempt to get the men on shore and intrench then.

If you will look at the instructions you will see that I was to have six pieces of field artillery with me. To attempt anything on the fort with only six field artillery guns against seventeen heavy guns did not seem to me, although not of West Point, a very hopeful task. I knew very well, for I had studied them very carefully, that my instructions said that we were to blockade Cape Fear river by landing and intrenching there. But finding that the channel of the river was a mile and a half from any spot of ground where I could possibly plant a gun, I was not very hopeful of preventing with my field guns blockaders running by. At least I should have no hesitation in going by myself, for I have gone by field guns with the river steamer Greyhound several times at less distance than that. I learned, to my satisfaction, also, that Hoke's division was there, and when they were all there, with the garrisons and the reserves that had been thrown in, they numbered at least twice as many men as I had on shore. Hoke's division was about 6,000 men.

Question. How many men did you land there?

Answer. I landed between 2,100 and 2,300 men.

Question. How many had you there under your command?

Answer. I had 6,500. It became evident that it was impossible to do anything further at that time in the way of landing, but we can get off troops when we cannot land them and their supplies. I therefore gave orders to get the troops off, and did everything that could be done to get them away. I acted in accordance with the exact advice, consent, and aid, in every form in which it could be expressed, of General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock, who insisted that this was the best thing that could be done. I will state here that just before I started in on the reconnoissance Admiral Porter, with his flag-ship, sailed by mine, and with his speaking trumpet hailed me in these words: "How do you do, general?" I answered, "Very well, I thank you." "How many troops are you going to land?" "All I can;" the navy having agreed to furnish me with the means of landing. Said the admiral, "There is not a rebel within five miles of the fort. You have nothing to do but to land and take possession of it" I had a different opinion, and avowed it. I said to those around me, "I think there is a man on shore, by the name of Weitzel, who will find that

out, if it is so." This was the only personal communication I had with Admiral Porter after I left Hampton roads. I started out to have a look myself. And the words were hardly out of Admiral Porter's mouth, his vessel had not got many lengths from me, before the rebel skirmishers opened on ours; and within an hour of that time we had captured two hundred and eighteen men, who had not had time to march one mile, and who denied having marched at all within that time. Under the circumstances I ordered that everything should be done to get the men off the shore. I sent Lieutenant DeKay on shore to give what assistance he could, and to bring me word if there was any assistance that I could render. I then ran out to the Malvern—the fleet had come to anchor—and asked Admiral Porter what could be done. He informed me that he had exhausted his ammunition. I had not spoken to Admiral Porter, or he to me, except through a speaking trumpet, which is not a very good way to quarrel. And you have seen the written communications and can judge whether there was any quarrel between Admiral Porter and myself. I sent to him and asked what could be done. He sent me word that he had not an hour's ammunition, and that he must go to Beaufort to replenish his ships. Now, if it took him four days to put in ammunition when his ships, as I understood, were full, I supposed it would not take him any less time to fill them when they were quite empty. There was a gale coming on. To that I want to cite a piece of testimony from the rebel General Whiting's report. After referring to the landing of our troops, and their skirmishers advancing on the left flank of the sand curtain—which I read a few moments since—he says:

"The garrison, however, at the proper moment, when the fire [of the navy] slackened to allow the approach of the enemy's land force, drove them off with grape and musketry. At dark the enemy withdrew."

General Whiting shows exactly what my report shows—what the report of General Weitzel shows—that we were met with grape and musketry the moment the fire of the navy slackened. General Whiting proceeds:

"A heavy storm set in, and the garrisons were much exposed, as they were under arms all night."

From the beginning of that storm, and until 10 o'clock at night, I was trying to get my troops off. At 10 o'clock it became impossible to get off any more men. And although Lieutenant DeKay tried to get off and report to me, he was not able to do it that night. The next morning we were rolling so that it was almost impossible for any man who was not a sailor to stand on the deck of any one of our vessels. It was impossible for the navy to come in and reopen fire; they could lie there as long as the wind remained in the then direction, which was nearly southwest. But the moment it changed to the other direction they must go off. Then my men would have no heavy guns to cover them, and must themselves clear out or be captured. The fire of the fleet in the rolls would amount to nothing, because with a ship rolling as the vessels did there, it was impossible to hit a county with any certainty. At 11 o'clock the next day I informed Admiral Porter that, in my judgment, there was nothing to be done but go to Fortress Monroe, and I went there.

When I got to Fortress Monroe I made a report to Lieutenant General Grant, and ordered it to be duplicated to the Secretary of War.

I will say here, however, that before I got away from the coast of North Carolina I passed all the heavier vessels of the squadron coming up to Beaufort to get ammunition, viz: the Wabash, the Colorado, and the Ironsides. And I passed also a number of the lighter vessels of the squadron going there for the purpose of coaling, I suppose. And I passed one vessel which I have since learned was the Santiago de Cuba, which was Admiral Porter's despatch boat, and which was sent to bring in his despatches. I passed all those vessels and got to Fortress Monroe first, and if I had been anxious for a newspaper controversy perhaps I could have begun it earlier than it was begun.

However, when I got to Fortress Monroe I telegraphed to my superior, which was my duty, as follows:

HEADQ'RS DEP'T VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,  
December 27, 1864—Fort Monroe, 8 p. m.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, *City Point, Virginia*:

I have just returned from the expedition. We had a storm from Monday until Friday, which was the earliest hour I could get out of Beaufort, where I had put in for coal, most of the transport fleet having got out of coal and water. Without waiting for my return Admiral Porter exploded the torpedo at one (1) o'clock on Friday morning, and commenced his attack at twelve fifty-five (12.55) in the afternoon, twelve hours afterwards. He continued the bombardment of the fort until night. I arrived in the evening and commenced landing on the beach the next morning; got a portion on shore about two (2) o'clock. Weitzel moved down upon the works, capturing three hundred (300) men and ten (10) commissioned officers. He brought his picket line within fifty (50) yards of the work, when he was opened upon by canister and musketry. He found seventeen (17) guns bearing upon the beach, which was only wide enough for an assault of a thousand men in line, the guns protected by traverses, and but one (1) dismounted, notwithstanding the fire of the fleet had been opened upon them for five (5) hours. In the mean while the surf had so arisen as to render further landing nearly impracticable. After a thorough reconnoissance of the work, finding it utterly impracticable for a land assault, and that at least two (2) brigades of Hoke's division from before Richmond had arrived there, and that the rest was on the road, I withdrew the forces and ordered a re-embarkment, and had got on board all of the troops, with the exception of about three hundred (300,) when the surf was so high as to prevent either getting on or off the shore. I lay by until morning and took measures for their relief as soon as the sea might go down. They were under cover of the gunboats, and I have no doubt they are all safely off.

Our loss when I left was but twelve (12) wounded, ten (10) of whom were by the shells of the navy on our picket line near the fort. I will be up in the morning.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

I will state what determined my mind against remaining on the beach near Fort Fisher. I was by no means unmindful of the instructions of the Lieutenant General. He had directed me to remain if I had effected a landing. If I had effected a landing I should have remained. But a landing requires something more than to land 2,500 men, out of six thousand five hundred, on a beach with nothing but forty rounds in their cartridge-boxes, and where their supplies would be driven off the first storm. I did not think that was a landing within my instructions, therefore I deemed it much better for the country to withdraw, as I did; that it was much less risk, and much better for the future, for, if it was necessary, a sufficient number of men could hold the line of communication from Masonboro' inlet down to Fort Fisher; and if they could be spared from the armies around Richmond, could be sent down there, where they could go in with six feet of water, and from thence operating against Fort Fisher, they could come prepared for a siege and remain there.

By going away I would draw off the enemy's attention. If I remained there it would keep his forces concentrated at that point; and if I was driven away

by the storm that was coming up, then I should lose the men I had landed. I acted for the best according to the light I had. Under a strong pressure of unmerited blame, I have said what might otherwise seem to be a little bombastical, that I had "done the best I could, and was responsible to God and my country." It is for you and the country to judge, for you now have the facts upon which I acted before you.

There has now gone down another expedition of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, as I learn, with heavy siege artillery. They can land where I did at any time, with a smooth sea, and God speed them in doing what I failed to do.

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the expedition?

Answer. To the delay of the navy in Beaufort, and the refusal of Admiral Porter to run by the fort, and the failure of the bombardment to silence the fire of the fort on the land front. He was told that if he would run by the fort and go into the river, then we could supply him across the strip of land upon which some of our men landed, and we could have done so, marsh or no marsh, between us and the river; and with the navy in the river we could remain on the beach, because we should have somebody to aid us when the sea was so rough that the gunboats could not aid us from the outside. Lying in the river, the fleet could aid us notwithstanding the weather. Besides, the enemy's gunboats were in the river, and without the fleet being inside we were more liable to be shelled by them in smooth water, if they retained control of the river, than we were to be protected by the navy in front in rough water.

Question. Was that subject of running by the fort agitated among you there?

Answer. Not only that, but it was a portion of the instructions upon which we started. Admiral Porter was to attempt to go by. He lost one of his rowboats, sounding to find out the depth of the water, I suppose.

Question. What reasons did the admiral give for not attempting to go by?

Answer. It was said to General Weitzel, and from General Weitzel reported to me, that he would lose his gunboats by torpedoes. Since the loss of the Tennessee at Mobile, some of the officers of the navy have "torpedo on the brain."

Question. Was it known that there were torpedoes there, so as to render it impracticable?

Answer. I never heard of any knowledge on the subject. There was a strong suspicion in the mind of the admiral that there were torpedoes there.

Question. Was the depth of water an objection to running by?

Answer. Large vessels could not go by; small vessels could. There was no objection on account of the depth of water, as I understand it. I know of three vessels in the fleet that had been captured after they had run out as blockade runners. There could easily be found twelve feet of water on the bar.

Question. If the fire of the fort was silenced by the bombardment, what was to prevent the lighter vessels from going along there?

Answer. There was nothing at all to prevent them if the fire of the fort was silenced. But they would have found the fort very lively if they had attempted to go by, although I do not think they would have been stopped. There was no possible obstruction in the river until you got up to Brunswick, which I think is about twelve miles above.

Question. What reasons did Admiral Porter give for the delay in getting his fleet ready at Beaufort?

Answer. He never gave me any, and I never heard of any given in any form. In regard to the matter of Hoke's division coming down while the fleet delayed at Beaufort, you will observe what the rebel general Whiting says in his official report:

"The garrison remained steadily awaiting a renewal of the assault or bombardment until Tuesday morning, when they were relieved by the supports of Major General Hoke," &c.

Question. Suppose you had got off without any delay at Beaufort, would there have been re-enforcements there to have obstructed you?

Answer. I made a very careful examination of that question. Admiral Porter was right in his letter to me of the 16th December, in which he said that "they had a very small garrison in Fort Fisher." I understand that there were then but about 600 men in and around the fort; and there were not a thousand within the lines of the defences at Wilmington, or a circuit of fifty miles.

Question. It has been stated by the papers that some of our men entered the fort and brought away a flag.

Answer. It was so stated upon my authority. I gave the report as it was brought to me. The men have since been examined under oath, and they say it is not so, as we all knew afterwards when we came to reflect upon the matter. They took a flag on the outside of the fort, which had been knocked down by a shell of the navy, and fell over the parapet on the outside. It was not very dangerous to go and take it, except running the risk of the shells of the navy. Any ten or any fifty men could have gone into the fort, although a hundred men could not have gone in. This may seem to be a paradox. The garrison would not have opposed the entrance of fifty men, but would have quietly "gobbled" them up after they had got in; but a larger force could not have gone in, because the garrison would have manned the parapets and driven them back.

Question. Have you had any conversation with General Grant subsequent to your return from that expedition and before you were relieved from that part of the service?

Answer. Yes, sir; and with your leave I will state it, because it may bear upon another question which is involved in this.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Before you go on with that, there are one or two questions I desire to ask. You have stated that at one point of time you lacked four steamers?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was on the morning of the 7th of December.

Question. When were they furnished you?

Answer. On the night of the 7th. As I have already stated, on the morning of the 7th my chief quartermaster reported to me that he yet lacked four steamers. At 7.45 p. m. Colonel Dodge reports that he was ready to ship the troops. Both of those despatches I have already read. The bearing of them is this: Telegrams to me have been published by General Grant, bearing date November 30 and December 4, without my answers to them, tending to show that General Grant was hurrying me up all the time. Yet on the morning of the 7th of December all the transportation which was to come from General Grant's quartermaster had not been furnished to me; so that the telegrams of the 30th of November and 4th of December do not bear on me. At 7.45 p. m. of that latter day Colonel Dodge telegraphed to me that he was ready, and at 9 o'clock that night I gave the order to embark.

By the chairman:

Question. If I have understood you, you took provisions for ten days after you received a despatch from Admiral Porter that he would be ready the next day.

Answer. I put on coal and water for ten days—all the vessels could carry; I took provisions for twenty days.

Question. That was upon the basis that the admiral would be able to live up to his statement that he would be ready on the morning of the 8th?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Then you were ready?

Answer. Yes, sir, all ready on the 9th.

Question. How long were you delayed before you actually left?

Answer. Admiral Porter actually sailed on the 13th. But it is fair to say just here that the weather was so bad that even if he had been ready, which he was not, it would not have been prudent for him to have gone out before the 12th. I kept adding to my coal what I could, from time to time, up to the time we got off, and I was not wholly out of coal on the 19th; but any man who would have transport steamers out at sea in the prospect of a northwesterly gale, with but two or three days' coal on board, ought to be hung at the yard-arm. I have had a great deal of experience in transporting troops by water, for I have always commanded in a department where I was like the angel of the Apocalypse, with one foot on sea and one on solid land.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You have referred to a report which you sent to General Grant by mail.

Answer. Yes, sir; from Beaufort.

Question. Did you ever get any reply to that report from General Grant, thereby recognizing you as in command of that expedition?

Answer. I never have even to this day, for two reasons: while I was absent he could not get a reply to me, for there was no way to send it; and when I got back we met face to face. I have talked this expedition all over with him by the hour, and he never intimated to me that I was not properly in command of it.

By the chairman:

Question. After your return?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You have referred in your testimony to the fact that you did not want to have your men on the beach because they were without supplies.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When you can land men can you not also land supplies, ammunition, &c.?

Answer. No, sir, you cannot; and there is the difficulty. You can tumble the men out of the boats with the water up to their waists, and they will scramble ashore through the surf. But if you should tumble bread boxes and ammunition boxes into the water in that way, those articles would probably not be of much use.

I will state how I directed supplies taken on shore to the men after the surf arose: I ordered water casks to be unhooped, filled with bread, and hooped up again, and then I directed those casks, with barrels of beef, to be put on a raft, and so thrown on shore by the surf. But that was found to be impracticable, and the only way it was done was to take a hawser ashore, make it fast and draw it tight, and then slide a life-boat on it from an anchored ship to the shore, through the surf, with whatever was in the boat. Lieutenant DeKay, of my staff, was the first to come from shore, to set an example to the men, on Tuesday, when it had become comparatively smooth, but he lost his boots and watch, and pretty much everything else, in coming away. On Monday morning, the 26th, the surf was breaking at least twelve feet high on that beach. I think I state it within bounds when I say twelve feet—I should rather put it at fifteen feet than ten.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Was your expedition delayed any on account of getting ready the powder-vessel?

Answer Not on account of anything on the part of the army. My powder, 150 tons—and I think we furnished 180 tons—was all on board on Saturday, the 10th of December.

I would like to make a statement about that powder-vessel, because it is due to the truth of history and to operations hereafter that the facts should be known upon this subject. It was intended to ignite all the powder at once by putting instantaneous fuze ("gomes") among the bags of powder, and firing it by means of certain apparatus, clock-work, electrical machines, etc. But all those contrivance failed of operation. The powder was actually exploded by setting the ship on fire at the bow. The powder caught on fire at one end of the boat, and blew itself into the air and water by piecemeal, bags of powder being seen to explode in the air. It was proposed to explode all the powder at once. This was vital to the success of the experiment, but that was not done.

By the chairman :

Question. What proportion of the powder do you suppose was actually ignited by that mode of explosion ?

Answer. My belief is that it would be a large calculation to say that one-tenth of it was ignited.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you know whether or not the navy was delayed on account of the powder-boat ?

Answer. All I know about it is this : they reported to me at Fortress Monroe that they had 200 tons on board. There never was but 215 tons on the vessel, and if it took them four days at Beaufort to put on those 15 tons, then it was slower work than I have been accustomed to in the army, and we work pretty slowly there sometimes.

Question. Then if there was any delay on the part of the navy on account of the preparation of the powder-vessel, it was at Beaufort ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think they started from Fortress Monroe as soon as they could have done, within a day or so; for, as I have said, from the time I got to Fortress Monroe I do not think it would have been well to have gone out before the 12th.

By the chairman :

Question. If anything was expected from the effect of the explosion of the powder-vessel, why was it exploded before you were in a condition to land and take advantage of it ?

Answer. That is a matter upon which I cannot testify, because I do not know the motives which governed Admiral Porter. I could theorize upon it very readily. Admiral Porter told General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock that he thought the explosion would knock the fort all to pieces, and knock down Wilmington and Smithville; and you will recollect that, in his letter to me, he advises me to get 25 miles off, let down my steam and draw my fires, lest I should be blown up by the explosion; and he got himself and his fleet so far off that he could not get within gunshot until twelve hours afterwards. He attributed to it unknown virtues and powers. I am still of the opinion that if it had been exploded properly it would have answered the purpose. One-quarter of the amount, properly exploded, would have done all that was expected of it by me. I do not think it would have blown down Wilmington; and I should have been willing to have laid within twelve miles of it. My theory is, that with these views of his the admiral supposed he would blow the fort all to pieces, and be able to land with his marines and take possession of it, so that he could say to General Butler, when he got to Fort Fisher with his



transports, "Here, general, this is Admiral Porter's fort, taken by him, 'his work;' won't you take it and take care of it?" But you can theorize as well as I can.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. How near was the powder-vessel to the fort when it exploded?

Answer. I do not know, and I do not believe anybody on our side does. The powder-vessel was a steamer; her machinery was reported out of order, or else they were so afraid of her that they did not dare to get up the steam, and they towed her in. The proposition was to beach her within two hundred and fifty yards; but they did not do that; they anchored her and set her on fire. I know she could have run within five hundred yards of the fort. We were all very much surprised to find how near that shore we could lay. Our transports, towards the last of our landing, lay within a hundred yards of the beach. The powder-vessel might have been beached within one hundred and fifty yards of the fort; but it was not beached; it was anchored, and I do not believe within two-thirds of a mile of the fort.

By the chairman :

Question. I want to know why this improved process of igniting the powder was not used?

Answer. I do not know. I understand that the Navy Department are investigating that matter. The navy were to do it. The proposition was this: I met the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Captain Fox, the last of November, at Fortress Monroe, in conjunction with Captain Rodman, of the war ordnance bureau, and Captains Wise and Jeffers, of the navy ordnance bureau. We saw Admiral Porter there also. We all went into a discussion of ways and means for loading and exploding the vessel. There is a material known in the army as "Gomez fuze." It is a fuze prepared with fulminating powder, nearly the same that is used for filling percussion caps. The fuze is in the form of a strap, perhaps four times as large as this tape, (holding up a piece of red tape,) and fire runs through it at the rate of at least a mile in four seconds. It was arranged that there should be boxes made, lined with lead, and put in the boat, and the powder was to be put in the boxes. A strap of Gomez fuze was to run all through between layers of bags in these boxes so as to fire the powder instantly. I have since understood that this fuze was not used at all.

Question. You were speaking of English precedents which were supposed to have originated this idea. Was the powder ignited in this improved way in those cases?

Answer. No, sir; the powder in that case was ignited by the explosion of another large mass of powder near by, which is supposed to have produced the instantaneous explosion of the larger mass.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Was there harmony between yourself and Admiral Porter in the preparation and carrying out of this joint operation of the army and the navy?

Answer. Entire; not a word or a thought of a word on my part, in any way or form, of controversy.

Question. Independent of yourself, was there any conflict between any officers of the army and navy?

Answer. No one came in contact with Admiral Porter but myself till we were ready to sail—it was all kept in great secrecy.

By the chairman :

Question. I asked you a question some time ago, which you were about to answer, whether you had seen General Grant since your return from this expedition, and conversed with him upon the subject; and if so, what were his criticisms upon it?

Answer. He never made any criticisms of any description to me except upon the action of the navy. He never criticised my acts in any way or form to me. I was informed by one of his staff that he said he thought I ought not to have come away.

Question. To what did he seem to attribute the failure of the expedition?

Answer. Wholly to delay.

Question. Did he ascribe the delay to the same causes that you have?

Answer. Precisely.

Question. Do you know whether you were relieved in consequence of this expedition, or for some other reason?

Answer. I will state exactly what I do know about it. I made my report on the 3d of January, and it went to General Grant on the 4th, as soon as I got in the reports of my subordinates. A correct copy of my report, with copies of the reports of General Weitzel and General Ames, I now submit to you. As soon as I got in the reports of my immediate subordinates I brought my report to Fortress Monroe and gave it to General Grant, on the evening of the 4th of January, on board of his boat. I said to him, "General Grant, will you allow me to have this published?" "Yes," said he; "as Porter has published his, I suppose yours ought to be published." At this time I supposed I was on friendly and intimate relations with General Grant. He said, "I am going to Norfolk, and will send it up to Washington to-morrow morning." I said, "Very good," as that was as early as any mail could take it. I bade him good night and returned to my duties at the front.

On the 5th of January I telegraphed to the Secretary of War in these words:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,

January 5, 1865.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:*

I have made my report to Lieutenant General Grant of the operations of the army in conjunction with the navy against Wilmington. General Grant thinks it should be published, and will forward it with that request. I respectfully request leave to have it published.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Official:

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,

*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

On the day but one after the 6th of January General Grant informed me that while at the theatre in Norfolk the night before he had lost my report out of his pocket, but that he had sent down for it, and hoped to get it up that night. He did get it up some time Saturday night or Sunday morning. You will observe, when you come to read his indorsement upon the report, that he credits it as having been received on the 7th of January, which was Saturday.

During all this time I was occasionally conversing with General Grant as to getting off this second expedition, which was going down with a siege train, and other matters.

During all this time General Grant never said anything to me on the question raised by his indorsement on my report, and he certainly never hinted to me, nor did any one of his staff, or anybody concerned with him, that I was not rightfully and fully in command of the expedition. And I repeat, that the first time I ever heard or saw any such thing was when I saw in the newspaper the indorsement of General Grant.

At 12 o'clock m., January 8, at my headquarters, twenty miles above City Point, I received the order relieving me from command. Dates here are a little material. The mail boat leaves City Point, General Grant's headquarters, for Baltimore and Washington at 10 o'clock every day. There was no way of getting a telegraphic despatch through without my knowledge, because the telegraph at Fortress Monroe was then under my control, and I have examined it and none passed through there. There was no way of getting a despatch from General Grant's headquarters to New York after 10 o'clock on Sunday until 10 o'clock on Monday, and therefore there was no way, after 10 o'clock on Sunday, of getting a despatch from General Grant's headquarters in time to be published in the New York Herald of Tuesday morning. Therefore the despatch of Cadwallader, the Herald correspondent of Grant's headquarters, which you have no doubt seen, giving an account of my removal, and the comments to which it gave rise, published in Tuesday's Herald, must have left General Grant's headquarters two hours before I was actually removed, or two hours before the order relieving me was served on me, and of course while, by all military usage, it should have been a confidential secret. How much earlier information Cadwallader had than that I do not know. The facts fix it that he knew it and made his comments upon it as early as 10 o'clock on Sunday morning. I read from his despatch :

"The news of the President's order No. 1, series of 1865, removing Major General Benjamin F. Butler from the command of the department of Virginia and North Carolina, is causing much comment ; but, so far as I can learn, little or no animadversion."

General Butler had not been removed at that time, and the comments upon his removal could not have been very widely circulated. Then Mr. Cadwallader goes on to say :

"Whether rightfully or not, General Butler has for months past been losing the confidence of the officers of the army, until very few will regret his departure outside of those that swarm around and attach themselves to those in power. It has been General Butler's misfortune to appoint too many of these selfish and irresponsible persons to official positions of trust and responsibility."

To that last charge I plead guilty to this extent : At General Grant's request, as I supposed, communicated to me by Mr. Cadwallader, I appointed Mr. Cadwallader a second lieutenant of the 2d United States volunteers, in order to save him from the liability to be drafted, and there is no doubt that he is entirely selfish and irresponsible, and I am, in so far, suffering from his appointment. I wish I had let him be drafted.

"The ostensible grounds for depriving him of his command are undoubtedly his recent *fiascos* of Wilmington and Dutch Gap."

And then the other ground is that General Butler is the last of the civilian generals of high rank in command. I think the first reasons are the pretext, and the last is the cause. If you want my opinion of it, that is my view.

Certain it is I had a right to take this despatch as an emanation from headquarters, because it was a story given at Grant's headquarters to his correspondent and sent to the New York Herald, while all other communications were cut off, before I was removed, which was contrary to all military usage.

I had a conversation with General Grant after being removed, upon the reasons for it, which being in the nature of a private conversation, I prefer not to detail here unless he desires it.

After being removed I telegraphed to the President in these words :

HEADQUARTERS, &C., FORT MONROE,  
January 9, 1865.

President of the United States, Washington, D. C. :

I have telegraphed to the Secretary of War for leave to publish my report  
Part III—3

of the Wilmington affair. I have received no answer. He is absent. In his absence I respectfully ask your leave to publish it. General Grant favored it. It is but justice. Please answer by telegraph.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

I received a very proper answer from the commander-in-chief, to the effect that my report had not been received, and therefore, it could not be published; he, of course, could not authorize it to be published until he had seen it.

I therefore telegraphed to General Grant in these words :

[Telegram—10 45 a. m.]

HEADQUARTERS, &C., FORT MONROE,  
*January 11, 1865.*

Lieutenant General GRANT :

I have asked the President for permission to publish my report of the Wilmington affair. He answers that no report has ever been received at the War Department. You told me you had forwarded it. Has it been lost again? If so, I have a copy.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Official :

SIDNEY B. DEKAY,  
*Lieutenant and A. D. C.*

To that I received in answer that General Grant, after I was removed, had sent for it to Washington and had it brought back, and that he was going to send it up by a special messenger; and it would get there on Friday night.

I have since been and examined that report, and find that the indorsement is not in General Grant's handwriting, though it is signed by him. And I find that since it was originally written it has been altered, by erasures scratched with a knife. Whether it was got back to General Grant for the purpose of being altered by him, or by others, I do not know. There have been three or four lines scratched out by a knife.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Can you now make out what was originally written there ?

Answer. No, sir; it has been very carefully erased, so that you cannot make out any of the words which have been scratched out.

He says in his indorsement :

"To avoid publicity of the time of sailing and destination of the expedition against Fort Fisher, my orders to General Butler to prepare it were given verbally, and the instructions to the commanding officer of the expedition were made by him and submitted to me."

One might, if inclined to criticise, want to know how much more secrecy there would be in verbal instructions than in written ones. But one should not be too censorious. Again :

"I append to the report a copy of General Butler's instructions to General Weitzel, together with copies of my despatches and instructions to General Butler relating to the expedition."

The injustice done me by this course is that he only uses one side of the pair of shears; he did not put in my answer to his telegrams. By those answers it will appear that not an hour's delay was in any way chargeable to me or to my command; that each telegram showed that I was waiting for the navy, and all ready at the word. How General Grant can reconcile publishing one side only of a correspondence when he had both, to the injury and calumny of a subordinate officer, is for his own determination. My belief is that it is an emanation from the malice of the staff officer who prepared the indorsement and exhibits accompanying it. If not, General Grant is as unjust as he is reckless of other men's lives and reputations.

"It will be perceived that it was never contemplated that General Butler should accompany the expedition, but that Major General Weitzel was especially named as the commander of it."

This statement is disingenuous, if it was not so intended, and is untrue in fact if it is meant that I was not to go, and it does not look like General Grant."

"I am inclined to ascribe the delay which has cost us so dearly, to an experiment."

An experiment which he approved of and advised, as well as any of the rest of us.

"My despatches to General Butler will show his report to be in error where he states that he returned, after having effected a landing, in obedience to my instructions. On the contrary, those instructions contemplated no withdrawal or a failure after a landing was made."

Now, I do not state anywhere that I returned after I had effected a landing. I stated in my report that I returned because I could not effect a landing; had only got a portion of my men on shore, but could not get the rest of them on, or their supplies. I stated that I could not effect any landing, in my judgment; and also that a landing could be effected there any time, any day or hour thereafter, if the elements did not oppose.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. You make the distinction that a landing must be complete?

Answer. It must be an effective landing. It never occurred to me that it was impossible to land so many men on the coast of North Carolina. There is never a day, except as against the elements, that you cannot land on that beach.

If Fort Fisher has been captured by this last expedition, and Hoke's division has left there, it will prove what I supposed would be the result of my coming away—that when I came away they came away also, and did not remain as they would have done, had I remained there.

The following are copies of my report, and the reports of General Weitzel and General Ames, in relation to this expedition :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VA. AND N. C.,  
*Army of the James, in the field, Va., January 3, 1865.*

GENERAL: On the 7th of December last, in obedience to your orders, I moved a force of about sixty-five hundred effective men, consisting of General Ames's division of the 24th corps and General Paine's division of the 25th corps, under command of Major General Weitzel, to an encampment near Bermuda.

On the 8th the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe; on the 9th, Friday, I reported to Rear-Admiral Porter that the army portion of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed.

We waited there Saturday the 10th, Sunday the 11th, and Monday the 12th. On the 12th, Rear-Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail on the 13th, but would be obliged to put into Beaufort to take in ammunition for the monitors.

The expedition having become the subject of remark, fearing least its des-

tionation should get to the enemy, in order to direct from it all attention, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, at three o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Mathias Point, so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northern Neck, and to retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles.

Having given the navy thirty-six hours start, at twelve o'clock noon of the 14th, Wednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry, and put to sea, arriving at the place of rendezvous off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th, Thursday. We there waited for the navy Friday the 16th, Saturday the 17th, and Sunday the 18th, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea. On the evening of the 18th Admiral Porter came from Beaufort to the place of rendezvous. That evening the sea became rough, and on Monday, the 19th, the wind sprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land troops, and by the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet being coaled and watered for ten days, had already waited that time from the 9th, the day on which we were ready to sail, to the 19th.

On the 20th, Tuesday, 21st, Wednesday, 22d, Thursday, and 23d, Friday, it blew a gale. I was occupied in coaling and watering the transport fleet at Beaufort.

The Baltic having a large supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place of rendezvous with a brigade on board of twelve hundred men, and General Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co-operate with him. On the 23d I sent Captain Clark, of my staff, from Beaufort, on the fast-sailing steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter to inform him that on the evening of the 24th I would again be at the rendezvous with the transport fleet for the purpose of commencing the attack, the weather permitting.

At four o'clock on the evening of the 24th I came in sight of Fort Fisher, and found the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder-vessel having been exploded on the morning previous about one o'clock.

Through General Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the landing under the cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next morning if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half Moon and Flag Pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the beach some two or three miles above Fort Fisher. Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the forts into the Cape Fear river, and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboat, (the Tallahassee being seen in the river.) It is to be remarked that Admiral Farragut even had never taken a fort except by running by and cutting it off from all prospect of re-enforcements, as at Fort Jackson and Fort Morgan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by naval fire during the war. That if the admiral would put his ships in the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do Farragut at Fort St. Philip. That at least the blockade of Wilmington would be thus effectual even if we did not capture the fort. To that the admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he should attempt to run by.

He was reminded that the army might lose five hundred men by the assault, and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view, for a moment with the lives of the men. The admiral declined going by, and the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success.

At twelve o'clock noon of the 25th, Sunday, Captain Glisson, commanding the covering division of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced, and his vessels in position to cover our landing.

The transport fleet following, my flag-ship stood in within eight hundred yards of the beach, and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the reconnoitring party just landed could hold the shore, I determined to land a force with which an assault might be attempted.

Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry and conduct, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, capturing the Half Moon battery and its men, who were taken off by the boats of the navy.

This skirmish line advanced to within seventy-five yards of the fort, protected by the glacis which had been thrown up in such way as to give cover, the garrison being completely kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, which was very rapid and continuous, their shells bursting over the work with very considerable accuracy. At this time we lost ten men wounded on the skirmish line by the shells from the fleet. Quitting my flag-ship I went on board the Chamberlain, and ran in within a few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible.

It appeared to be a square bastioned work of very high relief, say twenty-five feet, surrounded by a wet ditch some fifteen feet wide; it was protected from being enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort to the sea on the one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear river to the salient on the other. No material damage to the fort, as a defensive work, had been done.

Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy by traverses eight or ten feet high, which were, undoubtedly, bomb-proof shelters for the garrison. With the garrison kept within their bomb-proofs it was easy to maintain this position. But the shells of the navy, which kept the enemy in their bomb-proofs, would keep my troops out; when those ceased falling the parapet was fully manned. Lieutenant Walling, of the 142d New York, pressed up to the edge of the ditch and captured a flag which had been cut down by a shell from the navy.

It is a mistake, as was at first reported to me, that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile from the fort, and his horse taken.

In the mean time the remainder of Ames's division had captured two hundred and eighteen men and ten commissioned officers of the North Carolina reserves and other prisoners. From them I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigades of Hoke's division had left the front of the army of the James, near Richmond, and were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their skirmishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the march, if they had not already arrived. I learned also that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the 20th.

Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me outside of the work, larger than my own.

In the mean time the weather assumed a threatening aspect; the surf began to roll in, so that the landing became difficult.

At this time General Weitzel reported to me, that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of the experienced officers of his command who had been on the skirmish line, with any prospect of success, was impossible.

This opinion coincided with my own, and, as much as I regretted the necessity of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. No so strong a work as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war, and I had to guide me the experience of Fort Hudson with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed assault, and the double assault of Fort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher, after it had

been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire; and in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force in its rear, as I had, an army of the enemy larger than itself.

I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should re-embark. While superintending the preparations for this the fire of the navy ceased; instantly the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry, grape and canister swept the plain by which the column must have advanced, and which the skirmish line was returning.

Working with what diligence we could, it was impossible to get the troops again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarkation or even the sending of supplies ashore impossible. I lay by the shore until 11 o'clock the next day, Monday, the 26th, when, having made all the proper dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders to the transport fleet, as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress Monroe, in obedience to my instructions from the Lieutenant General. I learned from deserters and prisoners captured that the supposition upon which the Lieutenant General directed the expedition, that Wilmington had been denuded of troops to oppose General Sherman, was correct; that at the time when the army arrived off Wilmington, there was less than four hundred men in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than a thousand within twenty miles. But the delay of three days of good weather, the 16th, 17th and 18th, waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further delay from the terrible storm of the 21st, 22d and 23d, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three divisions of which were either there or on the road.

The instructions of the Lieutenant General to me did not contemplate a siege. I had neither siege trains nor supplies for such a contingency.

The exigency of possible delay, for which the foresight of the commander of the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit, the large re-enforcement of the garrison. This, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the army of the James. The loss of the opportunity of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the 16th, 17th and 18th, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition. It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of four days at Beaufort. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify it. It is to be presumed they are sufficient.

I am happy to bring to the attention of the Lieutenant General the excellent behavior of the troops, both officers and men, which was all that could be desired. I am under special obligation to Captain Glisson, of the Santiago de Cuba, for the able and efficient manner in which he covered our landing; to Captain Alder, of the Brooklyn, for his prompt assistance, and the excellent gunnery with which the Brooklyn cleared the shores of all opposers at the moment of debarcation. Lieutenant Farquhar, of the navy, having in charge the navy boats which assisted in the landing, deserves great credit for the energy and skill with which he managed the boats through the rolling surf.

Especial commendation is due to Brigadier General Graham, and the officers and men of his naval brigade, for the organization of his boats and crews for landing, and the untiring energy and industry with which they all labored in re-embarking the troops during the stormy night of the 25th, and the days following. For this and other meritorious services during the campaign, since the 1st of May, which have heretofore been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant General in my official reports, I would respectfully but earnestly recommend General Graham for promotion. The number of prisoners captured by us was three hundred, including twelve officers, two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, and six caissons.

The loss of the army was one man drowned, two men killed, one officer captured, who accidentally wandered through our pickets, and ten men wounded



while upon the picket lines by the shells of the navy. Always chary of mentioning with commendation the acts of my own personal staff, yet I think the troops who saw it will agree to the cool courage and daring of Lieutenant Sidney B. DeKay, A. D. C., in landing on the night of the 25th, and remaining aiding in the re-embarkation on the 27th.

For the details of the landing and the operations, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of Major General Weitzel, commanding the troops, and Brigadier General Ames, commanding the division landed, which are hereto appended.

Trusting my action will meet with the approval of the Lieutenant General, this report is respectfully submitted.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,

*Major General, Commanding.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding Armies of the United States.*

HEADQUARTERS 2D DIVISION, 24TH CORPS,

*December 28, 1864.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of this division since the 7th.

At sunset on the 7th this command, numbering about 3,500 officers and men, left its camp and marched to the left of our lines, near the Appomattox river. Early the next morning it moved to Bermuda Hundred, where it embarked on ocean transports.

The 1st brigade, commanded by Brevet Brigadier General N. M. Curtis, was put on board steamers C. Thomas and Wybasset; the 2d brigade, commanded by Colonel G. A. Pennypacker, on board steamers Perrit L. Moore and Idaho; and the 3d brigade, commanded by Colonel L. Bell, on board the Baltic and Haze. The 16th New York battery, Captain Lee, on steamer Starlight.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 13th the transport fleet sailed from Fortress Monroe for Mathias Point. Arriving at this point about dark, it turned about and directed its course for Cape Henry. Before getting to sea it was intercepted, and ordered to anchor near the eastern shore. It remained here till about mid-day, when it got under way and went to sea.

We arrived at the rendezvous twenty miles east of Masonboro' inlet, North Carolina, on the evening of the 15th. Here we remained till the evening of the 20th, when a storm commenced which caused the most of the transports to put into Beaufort, North Carolina, for safety.

On the morning of the 24th, the fleet, under Admiral Porter, moved in towards New inlet. Hearing the navy was to open fire on Fort Fisher, I reported to Admiral Porter that I had with me about 1,000 or 1,200 men to co-operate with him. On the morning of the 25th all of our vessels anchored near the shore, about two and a half miles north of Fort Fisher, and immediately began preparations for landing.

Brevet Brigadier General Curtis and 500 of his brigade were the first to land. During the landing of my 2d brigade I went ashore. Shortly after my arrival the enemy opened a slight infantry fire. This was quickly suppressed by our own skirmishers. Soon after a deserter came in, and reported that "Kirland's brigade of Hoke's division" was in our front. This man I sent at once to the major general commanding the department.

As soon as Colonel Bell's brigade had landed I moved with it along the shore to the support of Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, leaving to the troops then on shore, and those rapidly coming, the task of repulsing any attack the enemy might make. Reports indicated a heavy force of the enemy near at hand.

It was dusk when I reached the front. I there heard that the first brigade

was to remain where it was till further orders, and that if an attack was made on the fort the responsibility would rest with the officer in immediate command. At this time I did not know that it had been decided not to attack the fort, and that the troops were to re-embark.

Upon the report of Brevet Brigadier General Curtis that he could take the fort, I sent his brigade forward to make the attempt. By the time he reached his position it was dark, and the navy had almost entirely ceased its fire. The troops, which during the day had to seek shelter, now boldly manned their guns. Had the attack been made it would have failed. It was not made.

An order reached me at this time to return and re-embark. All returned to the transports, except a part of the first brigade, which, owing to the surf, was forced to remain on shore till the 27th, when the sea had sufficiently subsided to allow its re-embarkation. I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of the officers and men, not only while uncomfortably crowded on ship-board, but when on shore, in contact with the enemy.

Lieutenant W. H. Walling, of the 142d New York volunteers, took from the parapet of Fort Fisher its flag. He deserves some adequate reward.

General Curtis recommends that Lieutenant Walling be breveted major. I heartily approve it. Colonel Daggett, commanding 117th New York volunteers, captured some 220 prisoners. (I enclose Brevet Brigadier General Curtis's report.) The command is deeply indebted to the naval brigade for efficient and hazardous services in taking the troops from the shore, through a heavy surf.

We lost one officer, who by accident passed through our picket into the enemy's, and a soldier drowned in the surf. Some ten or fifteen men were wounded.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. AMES,

*Brig. General Volunteers.*

Captain WHEELER,

*Assistant Adjutant General to General Weitzel.*

HEADQUARTERS 25TH ARMY CORPS, IN THE FIELD, VA.,

*December 31, 1864.*

GENERAL: In accordance with orders I moved on the evening of the 7th instant, with about seven thousand men of General Ames's 2d division, 24th corps, and General Paine's 1st division, 25th corps, to the rear of the left of our lines at Bermuda Hundred, and bivouacked for the night at the signal tower.

During the night I received an order from the general commanding to move my command at daylight next morning to Bermuda Hundred, and embark it on transports that would be furnished, and then rendezvous at Fortress Monroe. This was done. We lay here until the 13th instant waiting for the navy to get ready, and the weather to improve.

At 3 o'clock a. m. on the 13th, the transport fleet, by direction of General Butler, moved up the Chesapeake bay and Potomac river to Mathias Point, and returned the next day and proceeded to sea, arriving at the rendezvous at Masonboro' inlet on the evening of the 15th. We lay here until the evening of the 18th, when Admiral Porter arrived. The weather during sixty hours of this period had been perfectly calm, and the sea smooth; but on the evening of the 18th there was quite a rough sea, making it impossible for troops to be landed on the beach. Admiral Porter was therefore requested to delay his attack until the sea became smooth, so that we could co-operate with him. The weather became more stormy, the sea rougher, and on the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d it blew a gale, compelling most of the vessels of the transport fleet to seek shelter in Beaufort harbor, and to get a fresh supply of coal and water. On the 24th

instant, at an early hour as possible, we left Beaufort harbor for New inlet, and found upon our arrival, just before dark, the navy engaged in shelling Fort Fisher.

Shortly after dark, by direction of the commanding general, I proceeded on board of the flag-ship, in company with Lieutenant Colonel Comstock, A. D. C. on General Grant's staff, and learned from Admiral Porter that the powder-vessel had exploded at 1.40 a. m. that day close to Fort Fisher, and that he had commenced the attack at daylight, firing his first shot after 12 m., and that the rebels had replied with little or no spirit to his fire, and he seemed sanguine of an easy capture of the work. I reported this to General Butler upon my return, and I was then directed to land a reconnoitring party of about five hundred men on the following day to push as close as possible to Fort Fisher, ascertain its true condition, and to report, so that, if it were found practicable to assault, all the troops could be landed and the assault made. At half past six a. m. the next day I saw Admiral Porter, and arranged with him the details for covering the landing and also for landing the troops. As soon as all the transports arrived, and the preparations were ready, five hundred men (the 142d New York volunteers, and about fifty men of the 112th New York volunteers,) of General Curtis's brigade, Ames's division, all under the command of Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, were landed on the beach, about three miles above Fort Fisher. I also accompanied this body of men in person. We were covered in our landing by a division of twelve gunboats, under the command of Captain Gleason, United States navy, and the sloop-of-war Brooklyn, Captain Alden, United States navy, commanding. We were assisted by the boats of these vessels and those of other vessels. As soon as the landing was made, I directed General Curtis to push his command down the beach as far as he could go.

He pushed his skirmish line to within a few yards of Fort Fisher, causing on his way the surrender of the garrison of Flag Pond Hill battery. The flag of this battery and the garrison were taken possession of by the navy immediately after the white flag was raised, and before our men, moving at a double-quick, could get up to it.

I proceeded in person, accompanying the 142d New York volunteers, to within about eight hundred yards of Fort Fisher, a point from which I had a good view of the work. From what I saw there and before that time, and from what I heard from what I considered reliable sources, I believed the work to be a square bastioned work. It has a high relief, a wide and deep ditch, excepting on the sea front, a glacis, has casemates and bomb-proofs sufficiently large to hold its garrison.

I counted seventeen guns in position bearing up the beach, and between each pair of guns there was traverse so thick and so high above the parapet that I have no doubt that they were all bomb-proofs. A stockade ran from the north-east angle of the counterscarp of the work to the water's edge on the sea side. I saw plainly that the work had not been materially injured by the heavy and very accurate shell fire of the navy. And having a distinct and vivid recollection of the bombardment of Fort Jackson, of Vicksburg, of Charleston, and of Fort Wagner, in all of which instances an enormous and well-directed shell fire has done but little damage, and having a distinct and vivid recollection of the two unsuccessful assaults on Fort Wagner, both of which were made under four times as favorable circumstances as those under which we were placed, I returned, as directed, to the major general commanding; found him on the gunboat Chamberlain, within easy range and good view of the work, and frankly reported to him that it would be butchery to order an assault on that work under the circumstances. After examining it himself carefully, he came to the same conclusion, and directed the troops to be re-embarked.

This was accomplished by Tuesday morning. In the interval between my leaving General Curtis's command and their re-embarkation General Curtis performed several operations, resulting in the capture of seven (7) officers and two

hundred and twenty (220) privates, making a total of nearly three hundred (300) prisoners.

Lieutenant W. H. Walling, of the 142d New York volunteers, is reported as having gone on the parapet of Fort Fisher and captured its flag. He deserves prompt promotion for this act of personal gallantry. General Curtis, personally, and his whole command were under my eye, and they all behaved splendidly, and deserve commendation. Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Jackson, inspector general and chief of artillery on my staff, remained on the skirmish line near Fort Fisher until after dark, and deserves reward for his gallantry. I would respectfully refer to the accompanying reports of General Ames and General Curtis for further details. From these you will see that our total loss was one (1) officer captured, one (1) man drowned in re-embarking, and fifteen (15) men wounded, nearly all the latter by our own naval fire.

The garrison of Flag Pond Hill battery belonged to Kirkland's brigade, of Hoke's division, and unanimously reported that they left Richmond on the Sunday previous, arriving at Wilmington on the Friday previous. From some of these, and other prisoners we took, we learn that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigades had already arrived, and that the remainder of Hoke's division was on the way.

Brigadier General Graham, with his command, had charge of our boats and landing material, and deserves the greatest credit for his industry and energy in getting these into system and organizing them, and for the efficient services he and his command rendered during the disembarkation and re-embarkation of the troops.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WEITZEL,

*Major General Volunteers.*

Brigadier General J. W. TURNER,

*Chief of Staff, Department of Virginia and N. C.*

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You have noticed in the communication, to which you have referred, that one of the alleged causes for your removal was your arbitrary arrests. Has General Grant ever spoken to you upon that subject?

Answer. General Grant never spoke to me of but one arbitrary arrest, and, with your leave, I will state what that one was; and if I am removed for that, why, I am very happy to meet the issue. On or about the 26th of May last you may have seen in the New York Evening Post—it was copied in all the papers—a very savage attack upon my action at Drury's bluff, saying that I had not intrenched, as I should have done. I instantly sent to General Gillmore, on the night of the 27th of May, (the dates may not be exact within a day or two,) and asked him if he authorized that in any form. He said he had not. I then went to work to find out who had written that communication, because it evidently came from General Gillmore's headquarters. About a month afterwards I ascertained that it was written by one Chaplain Hudson, of the 1st New York volunteer engineers, who is a sort of actor-chaplain, who comments upon Shakspeare; and he is a very good actor, too. I inquired where he was, and he could not be found. I then made an investigation to find out when he went away, and found out that he went away on the morning of the 28th of May, if that was the morning after I sent to General Gillmore, as before stated. At last I heard of Hudson at New York. Before the 5th of July I sent him a peremptory order to return, which order, I learned afterwards, he received; still he did not come back. I sent for him, but I could not get him back. About the 1st of September I was in New York on private business, and hunted him

up with a detective. I then sent an order to Colonel Serrell, of his regiment, to arrest him and bring him back, or put him on his parole, if he would promise to come.

Some time between the 15th and 25th of September Chaplain Hudson reported to me, when the following conversation, in substance, occurred:

"Where have you been, Chaplain Hudson, absent for nearly four months?"

"In New York and Massachusetts."

"What have you been doing there?"

"I left under orders."

"Whose orders?"

"From Major General Gillmore."

"Produce them."

He produced an order which was, substantially, in these words:

"Chaplain Hudson will go north on business for the commanding general."

I said, "The general had no right to order you out of my department. On what business did you go on the 28th of May?"

"I went to New York to superintend the printing of a book which Van Nostrand & Co. are printing for General Gillmore."

"What book?"

"A history of the siege of Charleston."

"That is private business," said I; "a private enterprise. Do you mean to say that you, a minister of the religion of Jesus Christ, having charge of all the souls of your regiment, left them, in the face of the enemy, to go off on a private enterprise in this way, remaining away four months, while you are drawing pay from the United States?"

He did not reply to that.

I then said, "You heard of General Gillmore's being relieved from command here; you then had no further business with him. Why did you not come back then?"

"General," said he, "I am a bereaved man; I have been watching by the bedside of my dying child."

"No lies to me, Parson Hudson," said I; "your child died on the 3d day of June; you left on the 28th of May; you have not watched much since. Why did you not come back before the 20th of September? Did you not get my order of the 25th of July?"

"Yes, sir."

"Why did you not return, in obedience to that order?"

"I saw my colonel, and he advised me that I need not come back."

I sent for Colonel Serrell, and asked him about it, and he said he had told the chaplain no such thing. I said to the chaplain:

"On or about the 27th of May I wrote to General Gillmore, and asked him if he assumed a certain publication, or knew anything about it; he wrote me that he did not. Now, Chaplain Hudson, did you not write the letter which was published in the New York Evening Post?"

"Well, yes, I did."

"Did you show it to General Gillmore before you sent it off?"

"I did."

"Did he know you sent it?"

"He did."

"Do you not know that I made the inquiry of him on the night of the 27th of May, and you were sent off on the morning of the 28th so that I should not get at you, and that you have stayed away since because you wrote that letter and were in conspiracy with General Gillmore? Do you not know he sent you away for that reason?"

"I do not know it."

"Do you not believe so?"

"Well, I do."

This conversation was taken down in shorthand at the time, and can be produced. Thereupon I said to Chaplain Hudson:

"If I was not personally mixed up in this matter; if I was not personally aggrieved, I should know how to punish such a lying, cheating, defaulting chaplain as you are. But I do not think any man should be the judge in his own case; therefore I cannot sit in judgment upon you. I must put you in close arrest, because you would not come back to your regiment when ordered."

And he was put in a tent close to my headquarters. He sent to me, and said he wanted his clothing. I had his trunk hunted up; it took two days to find it, because it had strayed off somewhere. His colonel came to me, and asked if Chaplain Hudson should have a bed and bedding. "Certainly," I said, "let him have everything that is necessary."

I could not spare then a board of officers to try Chaplain Hudson. In the first part of my testimony to-day I stated that about the 1st of November I was at Fortress Monroe, examining into some precedents about the powder-vessel. I was also examining another question, but I did not know it would come up here. That other question was to ascertain what the law was, and whether, being the prosecutor, I could myself detail a court to try Chaplain Hudson. I wanted to bring out all the facts about General Gillmore. While I was examining that question I was ordered to New York city.

When I got to New York I met a number of my fellow churchmen of the Episcopal church, who said to me, "What have you been doing to Chaplain Hudson?" I told them. "He says you have shut him up and starved him, and all manner of things." I said, "I beg your pardon, gentlemen; we will settle that in two minutes." I sent for Colonel Serrell, and asked him about it. He said, "He has been more comfortably situated and better taken care of since he has been in confinement than I have." I turned to these gentlemen and said, "Now, gentlemen, I should not alter my treatment of Chaplain Hudson but for this: I am here, and God knows when I may get away. Chaplain Hudson has been kept in confinement without a trial a considerable longer time than he should have been. I will order his close arrest to cease, and order him to stay with his regiment, and I will try him when I get the opportunity." And I sent an order accordingly.

Two or three days after I had returned from the Wilmington expedition, General Grant told me that Chaplain Hudson had written him a letter, and he had sent for him and seen him. I gave General Grant the facts that I have now given you, and he appeared to be satisfied. That is the only arbitrary arrest that General Grant ever spoke to me about.

If that is what I am removed for, I can only say that I will do the like again in like circumstances. And I advise any one not to give me a command who does not want me to do the like again.

There is another thing alleged against me, which I have heard since I have been here. It is said I have punished officers wrongfully. I will say here that I will agree to suffer any punishment if it can be shown that I have ever punished a good officer; but I am not very chary when I get hold of a bad one.

Some time ago it was reported to me that an officer tendered his resignation for frivolous reasons. This having been done in the face of the enemy, the regulation required his dismissal. His colonel called the man up to him, and told him that the reasons were frivolous, and that he better not send forward that resignation. The man said he would be damned if he would not get out of the service either honorably or dishonorably. This was a short time before the election. There has been a great change in the habits and manners of some of the officers since. The colonel did not send forward the man's resignation.

A few days afterwards the colonel gave the man some order; he threw his sword down, with a flourish, before his men, and said he would be God damned

if he ever did another day's duty in that regiment. That was mutiny, and must be stopped. What was I to do?

There were a great many officers at that time in the expectation that if they could be dismissed from the service, and be thus made martyrs of by the Lincoln government, and could go home and participate in the canvass for President, they would be canonized by the McClellan government, which they expected would come in, and they rather sought martyrdom. I issued an order, therefore, the first paragraph of which dismissed this mutinous officer from service for the act of which he had been guilty, and the next paragraph sentenced him to work at hard labor. That man did not go home to electioneer for anybody that I ever heard of.

Question. Who was he?

Answer. I do not remember his name; I had no personal knowledge of him; he was, to me, x, y, or z of an algebraical equation; an unknown quantity to be wrought out for the good of the service.

Question. Was he a New York man?

Answer. No, sir. I will give you the case of five New York fellows. I withdrew General Curtis's command from the trenches before Petersburg, because it was very much reduced by sickness, and needed rest and "setting up." He issued an order that his officers should always be present at roll-call, and also that they should wear their coats when they came to headquarters. Thereupon five of his officers sent in their resignations, written upon the same day, and upon similar pieces of paper, and nearly all in the same handwriting, saying that they resigned because they were incompetent to carry out that order. Some of them had been in service for two years. It was said amongst them that they supposed "old Butler" would dismiss them, but that was exactly what they wanted; they wanted to get out of the service.

All of the intermediate commanders reported that they ought to be dismissed. I said, "What good will that do? That is what they want; they want to go home and go into the election." I did dismiss them in the first paragraph of an order; and in the next paragraph I directed them to be set to work on the fortifications to take the places of better soldiers. That stopped that epidemic. I had no more trouble in that way.

Question. How could you do that?

Answer. If I find a civilian within my lines with nothing to do and no right there, I can put them anywhere. After they were dismissed they were civilians, and had no business there.

Question. That is true; they had no business there after they were dismissed. But had they not a right to have a reasonable time to go away?

Answer. I beg your pardon. Has a man who does wrong any right from his wrongs? They did this to get out of the service. I understand that an army is governed by martial law. It is not a town meeting; it is not civil law that controls it. The Duke of Wellington defines martial law to be the will of the commanding general exercised according to principles of natural equity. Was not this act perfectly just to these conspirators and mutineers? Upon that definition of the law I am willing to have every act of mine examined. Do as nearly justice as you can. In regard to his officers, the commanding general can have no temptation to do anything but right. These officers I never saw—I only knew their acts.

Question. I cannot see what right you had to arrest them after they had been dismissed.

Answer. Why, not as civilians there?

By Mr. Julian:

Question. How long did you keep them at work?

Answer. Only a few days; I doubt whether they worked even. They were

not very bad, only very foolish. Their friends wrote to General Grant, and he wrote to me; and I said "Let them out." I only wanted to stop the practice spreading. I do not believe my order was ever executed.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. You acted upon the ground that that epidemic was a very bad disease, and that the good of the service required that it should not be allowed to spread?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Because if that practice was allowed to prevail, it would demoralize the army in a very little time?

Answer. Yes, sir; exactly. There is another thing about which I would like to say a word. It is said that offenders should be tried by a commission. It seems to be supposed that there is some peculiar virtue in a military commission. Now, what is a military commission? It is this: The commanding general selects three or more officers, after hearing the evidence, to advise him what to do in a given case; and that is all there is of a commission. If he chooses to sit himself, hear the testimony—and I think I ought to be quite as competent to do that as any of my officers—will take time for it, work late enough at night and get up early enough in the morning to so do, all the power is in him that there is in a military commission. He must revise and approve all they do, or it is null. Why should not the judgment of the commanding general be as likely to be right as that of his subordinates? In no other case is he obliged to call a council of war to advise him what to do, and the commission is only a council of war. He can and ought to act on his own responsibility when the lives of thousands are in the balance; why not in punishing a rascal who has crept into the army? This matter is not well understood. In the acts of Congress military commissions and court-martials are associated, and no discrimination made as to their powers and duties. André is supposed by some historians to have been hung by order of a court-martial. That is erroneous. He was tried by a military commission, upon which was Lafayette. The commission recommended to Washington that he should be hung, and Washington issued the order to that effect. The commission only ascertained the facts for Washington to act upon. I do not trouble military commissions much, except where there are many controverted facts.

By the chairman:

Question. Are there any other of your acts which have been criticised which you wish to comment upon?

Answer. I do not know. Many things I have done have been criticised. I accounted for and turned over, when I gave up my department, \$500,000—no dollar of which ever came out of the treasury of the United States, but which was collected in various ways under my command, and saved to the government. I accounted for a portion of it, showed where it had been expended for the United States, and the balance I paid over in money. I am stating this now as a little matter of credit to myself. I do not know as anybody has objected to my action in this behalf. I will state some of the principal items:

I found men in the department who were carrying on a speculative trade. I taxed them one per cent. on that trade for the benefit of the United States. That, I believe, brought in about \$178,000. They said I had no right to collect that tax of them. I said, "Certainly not; but then the law requires that before you can do any trade here you shall have a certificate, signed by the military commander. Now, there is no law to make me sign the certificate. Your trade is a permissive one only. Now, if you don't pay this excise, I will



not sign, and no harm will be done to either. If you don't want to trade under my rules and regulations, then don't do so, and no one can compel you."

Again: Congress passed a law allowing the recruiting of soldiers for the loyal States in my department. The result was that a crowd of recruiting agents came down there to take away all my able-bodied blacks, to be credited as soldiers to their States, leaving the women and children to be taken care of by the United States. Now, when you recruit in your own States, you take care of the families of your soldiers by State aid, or in some way. I issued an order that no recruiting agent should take a negro out of my department until he paid over one-third of the bounty money for the support of the wives and children of the blacks. In that way I collected \$68,000, which I turned over to my successor. I should have collected more but for a rascal who was appointed major, and was stationed in North Carolina, recruiting. He recruited men on behalf of the United States, then sold them out, and stole the money, for which he is now being tried.

Congress passed another law to the effect that one-fourth of the value of the cotton brought in should be paid into the treasury of the United States. It took the Treasury Department some time to devise a set of rules and regulations under that law. In the mean time the speculators were running out all the cotton they could, in order to save the twenty-five per cent. I appointed a cotton agent, handed him the law, and told him to go to work and get all the cotton which was being brought out of the rebel States, and take twenty-five per cent. toll. He did so. After he had been at work for awhile the Treasury Department sent down to see about appointing an agent for my department. They examined the books of the man I had appointed, and were so well satisfied with what he had done that they continued him as their agent. Before he got his appointment from them he collected and turned over \$26,000 to the treasury of the United States.

I found stores and shops of all sorts around Fortress Monroe, on government land. Some of them had been there for thirty years without paying a cent of rent; one man had made a quarter of a million of money there during the war. I ordered a commission to assess a fair ground rent. I took one of the stores, where the owner had previously been convicted of fraud, and sold the ground rent at auction, and made that the basis for the rent of the rest; and I have collected ever since at the rate of \$3,000 a month for such rent.

I found the flag-of-truce office received an immense quantity of letters, with money accompanying them to pay their postage in the confederate lines. I saw an opportunity to pay the expenses of the office by collecting these stamps and exchanging our money and stamps for confederate money or stamps with which to pay confederate postage to our prisoners. I employed three clerks, paid them out of that fund, and, besides that, I turned over \$3,000 extra postage saved by the difference between our postage currency and confederate currency.

Now, as to what I have done with the money thus gained—not one cent of which came out of the treasury of the United States. I have paid largely the expenses of digging Dutch Gap canal; I am building a hospital at Point of Rocks, have furnished it with cows for milk, gas, and water; am digging an artesian well and building barracks for the soldiers at Fortress Monroe.

I found convicts, deserters, and others imprisoned at Fort Norfolk doing nothing but eating their rations. I got a live Yankee from my neighborhood as superintendent. I sent to Massachusetts and got prison uniforms, half black and half gray, and scarlet caps, with which to clothe these convicts, so that they could not easily escape when at work. I gave the superintendent charge of these men, and told him to work them on the streets of Norfolk. I said to the men, "If you will work well and behave yourselves, you shall have so many days docked off your sentence, according to your merit." So that they worked well

and did an exceeding amount of work. The result of which is, that permanent work has been done, which was charged to the city of Norfolk, for paving, &c., and on the Albemarle and Chesapeake canal, to which the United States owes large rents, to the amount of about \$38,000, while my whole prison labor has cost less than \$9,000. Besides that, from the 15th of April to the 15th of June, there was taken a thousand loads of filth per week from Norfolk, and thus the yellow fever was kept out.

There is a contraband ration by the act of Congress. I found that in the way it had been managed there had been great waste. The system of supplying the negroes was readjusted, and a saving of \$84,000 in one district, in the rations issued to contrabands, was made.

Again: I found that the poor of Norfolk were supported in this way: Every commissioned officer could give a certificate to any one that he or she was an indigent citizen, which could be taken to the commissary officer and rations drawn on it. The consequence was that there were a great many poor young women in Norfolk drawing rations from the government, in proportion to the number of commissioned officers. I cut that practice all up. I established a commission to examine and decide who really needed assistance. We now issue rations to those only who are deserving, something like 5,000 people daily, white people, for the negroes take care of themselves. It averages to the United States now on each ration eight or nine cents a day.

Why the statement I have made is germane to the question which the chairman asked me is this: it has been reported in the newspapers that I was collecting this money, and it is but just that the uses to which it was applied and the disposition of it should be known.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You say you have turned over half a million of dollars to the government?

Answer. And accounted for it in the way I have mentioned.

Question. What has been the amount of your expenditures, as compared with your receipts?

Answer. I turned over \$258,000 in money; \$66,000 from one fund, \$104,000 from another, \$26,000 in another, and \$38,000, I think, in another. I cannot remember all the items.

Question. Your receipts have been much larger than your expenditures?

Answer. Certainly. I turned over in the neighborhood of a quarter of a million of dollars in cash. It is this money which is referred to in the order relieving me, where I am directed to turn over to my successor my civil fund.

Some of the good I have been enabled to do with it may be judged from this: I had this civil fund on hand in July last; the treasury had become very empty, and we could not get any money to pay our sick and wounded soldiers in the hospitals so that they could go home; I lent \$49,000 to the paymaster to pay them and let them go home, and he paid the money back to me when he got his money from the treasury. In November last our quartermaster's department was short of money. The laborers struck for their pay and wages, because they could not live on their wages if not regularly paid. I lent the quartermaster \$53,000 to pay them up and keep the quartermaster's department going until he could get funds from Washington. This civil fund was "a handy thing to keep in the house."

Question. You have seen the accounts in the New York papers of a statement made in one of the courts, that you had received \$50,000 in gold from Smith & Co.?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. The statement was made by Judge Pierpont, and that you had not accounted for that money.

Answer. If you will go to the War Department, and look at my accounts of my administration in New Orleans, filed on the 8th of February, 1863, you will find that that is the second item in my account; and a voucher was put on file on the 17th of February, 1863, stating the whole of the circumstances connected with the man from whom that \$50,000 was obtained, and asking them to make an order that I be relieved from the charge of that money. I wrote a letter to Judge Pierpont, and told him that if he would get an order I would pay over the money. Secretary Stanton said to me, when I settled my account and asked for an order to hold me harmless for paying over the money, "If you pay that money into the treasury, and are held liable for it in a suit by the claimant, you cannot get it out again without an act of Congress, which may take you years to obtain, if you get it at all. You can hold on to it until you are called upon to account for it." I have written and begged the War Department to make an order to strike it out of my account, and let me fight it out for myself, or that the department should assume the affair and take the money themselves. The department replies, in substance, "Fight it out, and we will make the order after we see the result."

Question. Have you any other fund in the same condition?

Answer. Yes, sir. That is, standing upon my accounts waiting the settlement of the accounting officers.

Question. Subject to a decision at law?

Answer. Certainly, or of the department. Whenever the War Department orders any of my accounts settled, and any balance is found due from me, they may have the money instantly for that balance, which has always been honored. Whenever it is reported that I collected money in New Orleans, it can be answered that I confess to having received from the rebels of New Orleans, Louisiana, nearly three millions of dollars, a pretty large sum. I have put myself on record in the departments as having received that amount of money, and it has been accounted for.

By the chairman :

Question. I want to inquire of you the reason, if you can tell, why we are not able to exchange prisoners of war with the rebels?

Answer. In April, 1864, I received a peremptory order from General Grant not to give the rebels a single able-bodied prisoner.

Question. Give us both the real and the pretended reason for that.

Answer. The alleged reason why the rebel prisoners have not been exchanged is that our negro soldiers have been in the way. In the spring the rebels had, say, 30,000 of our soldiers as prisoners, and we had, say, 60,000 of theirs. Theirs were all able bodied, hale, hearty men, while ours were men who, under our system of recruitment would, substantially, never go into the service again. Their men would at once, upon exchange, have gone into their service again. If the rebels had got their soldiers after the battles of the Wilderness, the face of the campaign would have been changed.

Question. Why are their soldiers, who are prisoners with us, better than our own soldiers whom they hold as prisoners?

Answer. Because we feed their men well. And no man ever gets out of their service who once gets into it, while our men go off on thirty days' furlough, or their terms of service have expired, and we never see many of them again, as a very large proportion are unfit for service.

Question. Is this in consequence of the hard usage they meet with from the rebels while their prisoners?

Answer. Largely.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Is not there another inside view of this case, that large numbers of our soldiers run away, finding it a very easy way of not doing any duty?

Answer. A great many of them do.

Question. And are then exchanged and come home and get thirty days' furlough? And the men have fought better since you have stopped exchanging.

Answer. That is one of the military reasons. I was anxious to retaliate upon the rebels last year, and got ready for it, but was prevented. I think we, in popular apprehension, a little overstate the matter about the rebels as to their intentional starvation of our prisoners. Barring the wrong acts done by their agents, quartermasters, &c., I think they mean to treat the prisoners they hold as they do their own soldiers, but the trouble is that our soldiers will starve on what their soldiers will live on, and there is added to that the fact that our prisoners get put off with a pretty poor quality of rations; but they give them in quantity what they do their own soldiers. In my judgment this matter of ill treatment is destined to be brought to an end. It can be in twenty-four hours without exchanging, if that is desirable, and to the satisfaction of everybody.

I made a proposition to Mr. Ould a month and better ago. I said to him that we would take care of our prisoners just as we chose, except as to the matter of guards; they must guard them, and they must give us transportation for the supplies we sent our prisoners. And they might take care of their prisoners in our prisons precisely as they chose; and we would allow them to bring cotton enough to New York to purchase supplies for their prisoners, and we would furnish them transportation.

This has not been accepted. on the ground that they have not the transportation. That if they got our soldier prisoners all together for the purpose of our feeding them, they would constitute an army, the transportation for which would entirely use up their transportation, which we are continually lessening by the destruction of their roads; and one railroad would not carry what we would send to our prisoners in the way of supplies.

To that, if I had continued in charge of the matter, I proposed to make a counter-proposition: that if they would put all our soldiers whom they hold as prisoners on an island or near the Atlantic coast, and suggested to them an island near Beaufort, we would feed them there, and agree not to recapture them. And I think that the men we would thus save by good treatment would be more than we got by escape or recapture. I should further propose that we would receive the cotton for obtaining supplies for their soldiers in our prisons, and carry it to New York on the transports upon which we brought our supplies to our soldiers; thus they might feed their soldiers in our prisons as they pleased. We would furnish them transportation for their cotton, they their supplies.

The truth has been, that the exchange commissioner, in my person, has been a pretty uncomfortable gentleman. On the one side he has been compelled to report to the Secretary of War; a portion of his duties and powers have been with Major General Hitchcock and Colonel Hoffman; and on the other side he has been outlawed, so that he has had to be very careful in his movements to get along. But there would be no difficulty in carrying out that proposition I have suggested, or in exchanging our prisoners.

By the chairman:

Question. You say that you proposed retaliation, but were prevented. Who prevented it?

Answer. General Halleck, as I was informed. I proposed to build a stockade across Hatteras island, near the inlet; I made the surveys and began to get timber for it. I proposed to put their officer prisoners all in camp within that stockade. It was the same climate, on the same isothermal line with Belle Isle; exactly as cold, exactly as warm, and just as sandy. I proposed to put them there, have negro soldiers to guard them, have some gunboats stationed in the sound there to prevent recapture or escape; put up every day a bill of fare for the day, which should be just the same as we learned it to be at Libby and on

Belle Isle, with a memorandum on it that their fare would be better, just as our soldiers in their prisons got better fare. General Halleck thought that we were not able to hold the sound by the navy and the prisoners would be recaptured. I got the consent of the Secretary of War, and went so far as to examine the place, got the engineering done, and cut the logs for the stockade, when General Halleck's opinion, as I understood, stopped it.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. General Halleck's objection to the plan was a military and not an humanitarian one ?

Answer. Yes, sir, an alleged military.

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*Testimony of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.*

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1865.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. We have been instructed by the Senate to inquire into the cause or causes of the failure of the expedition against Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in December last. Will you state, in your own way, what you know upon that subject, so far as you may deem it proper to state it ?

Answer. I cannot give the dates without the records. For a long time back the navy has been very anxious to have the port of Wilmington closed as an avenue of supplies for the rebels ; and some two or three months before the expedition started, I agreed with the navy to send a military force down there to co-operate with the navy. There was no time fixed, for it would take them some little time to collect their fleet. While preparations were being made the whole affair was so thoroughly advertised to the country and to the south that they were fully prepared for us, and I kept putting it off. At that time I collected all the information I could about Cape Fear river, the strength of the enemy's works, the garrison they had, together with all the maps, charts, and other information, which I turned over to General Weitzel. I had detailed General Weitzel as the commander of the expedition, a fact which General Butler understood. It was so thoroughly advertised to the enemy and to the country that I kept putting off the expedition. A short time before the expedition actually started the gunpowder plot was got up—the powder-boat. It seemed to be a favorite scheme with General Butler. He had been to see me several months before, and wanted to blow up Charleston with a vessel loaded with a thousand tons of powder. I did not favor it, because I did not believe it would have any effect. About the time the expedition did start General Butler got up this idea of a powder-vessel, and sent me a statement of the casualties that had occurred in some place in England from the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder, and wanted to know what I thought about it. I turned the matter over to Colonel Comstock, of my staff, who made a report upon the subject of the effect that the explosion of 300 or 400 tons of powder out at sea would do no damage. That was my opinion. It was referred to the chief engineer, General Delafield, and he thought it would have about the same effect on the fort that firing feathers from muskets would have on the enemy. I believe that is the way he expressed his opinion upon the subject. However, it was submitted to Admiral Porter and the Navy Department, and, I believe, was favored by them. I was then asked if I would allow them to have 2,500 men to hold the point of land upon which Fort Fisher is built, in case they could take the fort by that means. I told them that I would certainly spare them that number of men at any time ; and they went to work getting up the

powder-boat. In the mean time, while preparations were being made for this, General Sherman began to get on so far through Georgia that the enemy, in order to raise a force to put against him, pretty nearly abandoned Fort Fisher and Wilmington. This information I obtained from southern papers and other sources. I saw that Bragg had gone, and the statement was that he had taken about 8,000 men from there. I knew that was about the force he had; and from the information which I had, they had very few of their old regular troops there, as they called them, but mostly senior and junior reserves, men too old or too young to come in under the conscript law. I thought then was the time for the expedition to move. I accordingly ordered General Butler to get off 6,500 men under General Weitzel. General Weitzel had been named for that purpose two or three months before. The expedition was got off with commendable promptness from his army on James river. When they all sailed down, General Butler also went down the river, stopping at my headquarters. Then was the first that I ever dreamed of his going with the expedition. He knew that it was not intended that he should go. But all my orders and instructions were sent through him as the commander of the department from which the troops intended for the expedition were taken, and also as commander of the department in which they were to operate. Military courtesy requires that orders should go in that way. But I never dreamed of his going until he passed by my headquarters on his way down to Fortress Monroe. After he had got there, finding that the expedition was delayed, I sent him a despatch, which I have sent in as one of the papers accompanying his report, urging him to go ahead with or without his powder-boat; not to let that detain him. My calculations for success were based as much upon finding the enemy's troops still away as upon anything else. I never had any faith in the powder-boat doing anything. I did not know but it might probably have some effect, but I did not believe it would.

Question. The expectation was to surprise the fort?

Answer. Yes, sir. And my instructions were very clear, that if they effected a landing there above Fort Fisher, that in itself was to be considered a success; and if the fort did not fall immediately upon their landing, then they were to intrench themselves and remain there and co-operate with the navy until the fort did fall. In my instructions I provided for a bold dash for the capture of Wilmington, in case Fort Fisher did fall immediately upon the landing of the troops. If it did not fall, then they were to intrench, enter upon a siege of the place, and remain there until it did fall. And the capture of Wilmington would thus become a matter for future consideration. General Butler came away from Fort Fisher in violation of the instructions which I gave him. From his own official report it is evident that he forgot his instructions in that particular; his report shows that.

Question. Was it ever contemplated that the fleet should endeavor to run by the fort?

Answer. My instructions for the first expedition contemplated nothing of the kind, though I rather thought they might do it; but when the second expedition went down, in my instructions to General Terry, I said that the enemy being so much better prepared than before, in consequence of our having once attempted and failed, the navy ought to take greater risks than they were called upon to do in the first instance, and, if necessary, attempt to run by; but since the fort has been taken I have been down there, and I know now that it would have been impossible for the navy to have run by the fort. The nature of the channel was such that they could not run by until the fort was taken.

Question. What would have rendered it impossible for the navy to run by the fort before it was taken—the depth of water in the channel?

Answer. To begin with, there is not so great depth of water in the channel as the charts show. Then the channel is, a winding one, with reefs extending

into it, compelling vessels to keep near shore. Lightest draught vessels only could get in, and these would require the assistance of good pilots.

Question. How do the blockade runners get in? they run in at night I understand.

Answer. They draw less water than our gunboats do, and, besides, they have to run no risk of the fort firing upon them; still some of the blockade runners get wrecked trying to get in. Our gunboats have to go in on high tide.

Question. Was it your opinion that General Weitzel's report to General Butler was not correct, and that they should have assaulted the fort?

Answer. I have not censured any person for not assaulting the fort, for they were not ordered by me to assault it; but General Curtis, who commanded the troops that got nearest to the fort, and one or two other officers who were there, voluntarily came forward and made statements, which I have forwarded here and asked to have attached to the report, in which they give it as their opinion that the fort could have been carried by assault; that at the very time they were called back they were up so near that they virtually had the fort; that if they had not been called back, in an hour or two more they would have taken the fort.

Question. What progress had they made?

Answer. They had actually got up so close to it that some of the men could look into the rear of the fort. Those statements are here with the Secretary of War. General Curtis, Lieutenant Ross, and some other officers made statements to that effect.

Question. How many men had they there at the time?

Answer. General Curtis commanded a brigade; but there were only a few men who got up that close to the fort; a few men from the skirmish line.

Question. Was not that fort considered a very formidable work?

Answer. It is a very formidable work to carry by assault; but when four or five shells a second are exploding in any work the men are inclined to keep under shelter.

Question. At the time General Curtis and his men were there the fort was, of course, in better condition than after the second bombardment?

Answer. It was probably in better condition the second time than when it was first attacked, because the first assault gave them the opportunity to ascertain the weak points of the fort, and they had time to strengthen it. I have no doubt that when the second bombardment commenced the fort was in a better condition than when the first bombardment commenced; and when the assault was made the garrison was double as large as General Butler himself stated it to have been when he was there. He told me that, from all the evidence he could obtain from deserters and prisoners, he supposed they had about 1,200 men when he was there. When we finally took the fort we killed, wounded, and captured about 2,500 of the enemy.

Question. General Weitzel says that the first bombardment did not injure the fort for defensible purposes. Admiral Porter says that the second bombardment knocked the fort into a pulp.

Answer. At the second bombardment there were some guns dismounted in the fort, it may be most of them, as would have been the case at the time of the first bombardment had it been continued. General Weitzel was not ordered by me to assault the fort, but to intrench there, and continue there, under the protection of the navy, until the fort did fall.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did General Butler find the condition of things contemplated in his instructions in relation to the landing and intrenching upon the land there?

Answer. General Weitzel and the other officers who were there could answer that question positively from their own knowledge; but there is no question

that General Butler could have remained there, in obedience to my instructions; but I do not think he was guided by them; I do not think he paid any particular attention to them. I will state, in regard to the second expedition, that I ordered General Butler to get up the same expedition that went first with him, together with enough additional men to make the force 8,000 men, to go under General Terry, with orders to report to General Sherman at Savannah. I then gave my instructions to General Terry himself; but General Terry did not know where he was going, supposing, of course, that he was going to Savannah, till he got down to City Point on his way out. I changed that portion of my instructions which ordered General Butler to send additional forces, to be black and white troops, sufficient to make the number 8,000; and directed him to send, in addition to the forces that went the first time, one brigade of General Terry's own division, numbering about 1,500 men, so that the second expedition did actually go with about 8,000 men.

Question. General Terry had the assistance of marines and sailors on the second expedition, had he not?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Butler did not wait for that.

Question. Was there any obstacle in the way of making a full landing at the time of the first expedition, so far as you know?

Answer. I do not think there could have been, from the fact that General Butler landed a portion of his troops, and then re-embarked them some hours afterwards. The time spent in re-embarking could have been spent in debarking.

Question. With the force that General Butler had, could he have held that position and carried out your instructions?

Answer. There is no question about that, so far as the mere holding of the place is concerned, with the navy there to cover them. They could have entrenched themselves in a few hours so as to be able to remain there.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. They did stay there all night, did they not?

Answer. A few remained there all night; and then if there were not men enough already there, I had plenty more I could have sent down there afterwards.

By the chairman:

Question. Have you any means of knowing what force the enemy had about there within a day's march?

Answer. I knew that one division had left Lee's front to go there, and that made me extremely anxious to hear that General Butler had got possession of Fort Fisher, and also Wilmington, if possible, before the enemy got down there. Whether that division did reach Fort Fisher or Wilmington, in whole or in part, before General Butler left, I am not prepared to say. I think the navy was under the impression that it did not get there for two days afterwards. But that is a matter for them to testify to; I cannot say about it.

When I met General Terry down there I went with him down to Fortress Monroe to see him off. I then told him that I should go immediately back to City Point and have a siege train loaded on board vessels, and send it down to Fortress Monroe, so that if, after he had effected a landing, he should find it necessary to go into a siege, he could send up for it, as it would be subject to his orders, and it would go right down to him. Before it started I said that as it would already be on shipboard it might as well go down to Beaufort. And, finally, after he had started some days I sent it on to the fleet, near Cape Fear river. That was a force really in excess of the 8,000 men; they never had use for the siege train, but three pieces were taken on shore, and three companies of men, as I understand. The rest were sent back without going ashore at all.



Question. You spoke of troops landing there and being covered by the navy. Is not that rather a dangerous coast for a fleet to lay off?

Answer. They have been there all the time.

Question. They have been there during calm weather. But were they not prevented at one time from going there by the storm?

Answer. I am not sailor enough to say whether or not they could have remained there then. But they have since landed and remained there; a force not much larger than General Butler had. With all the casualties in taking that place, the force there is about the size of the force General Butler had. After sending off the sick, wounded, and disabled men, the force is now about what General Butler had, and it has remained there ever since, navy and all.

Question. You do not know particularly about the exposed condition of the coast and the danger to shipping there?

Answer. No sir. There may be times when a fleet could not lay off there. But if the troops were fortified strongly there they could defend themselves.

Question. Was there any culpable delay in the progress of that expedition, so far as you know; and if so, what was it, and who is to blame about it?

Answer. I have no means of knowing further than General Butler's own report. There was a delay that worried me excessively, because I wanted to take advantage of the absence of Bragg and his forces. And I telegraphed to General Butler, as I have already stated, to go with or without his powder-boat. But General Butler was evidently determined not to go without it, for he said, in his despatch to me, that it would soon be loaded. And after they had got started, I should think there was a delay of more than a week, perhaps ten days, after they left Fortress Monroe before the troops were landed.

Question. Did you understand that any portion of that delay was on account of boisterous weather?

Answer. Yes, sir. But I understood from General Butler himself, and also from Colonel Comstock, of my staff, that they went down there and lay there for three days of beautiful weather, but the navy did not get there, and when the navy did get there the transports had so nearly exhausted their supplies of coal and water that they had to run back to Beaufort and get a new supply. And there they had some boisterous weather.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Did the delay resulting from the failure of the army and navy to get together make any difference when they did come to make the attack?

Answer. That depends upon whether or not the division of troops that left Lee's front really got down there before our troops landed. General Butler maintains that at least two brigades of them were there. I do not know how that was. If the enemy got no re-enforcements there the delay made no difference.

Question. Do you know a reporter by the name of Cadwallader connected with your army?

Answer. I do.

Question. Did you direct that he should be appointed an officer in order to save him from the draft?

Answer. Never.

Question. Do you know anything about his appointment?

Answer. I do not know anything about it except what I have since heard from the man himself. The man has no more connexion with me than any other reporter who behaves himself. He was absolutely drafted, and went off to obey the draft, and he states that when he got to New York he found that \$800 had been paid for a substitute for him, and that substitute was in the army, and he returned. I heard him say that after he had returned, and had a substitute in the army, General Butler had appointed him a second lieutenant in a colored regiment, and that that was the first that he knew about it.

Question. Do you know anything about Chaplain Hudson.

Answer. I had that case investigated, but I cannot give the exact result of the investigation. The man was confined for fifty-odd days in what is called the bull-pen, near General Butler's headquarters, I understand—put in with deserters and all sorts of prisoners. The investigation shows that he was there that length of time without charges and without trial, though during a good part of the time he was there General Butler had a court-martial sitting right at his headquarters and could have tried him.

By the chairman :

Question. How long ago was that ?

Answer. He was confined there during the fall, in the months of September, October, and November. He was released while General Butler was in New York city, at the time of the election. He was released on the 9th of November, I think.

Question. When did the case come to your knowledge ?

Answer. I received a letter from a lady here in this city telling me about the case. I immediately ordered Chaplain Hudson to report to me, and then I had his case investigated. The man had been all this time in confinement without my knowledge.

Question. Without any charges ?

Answer. Never had any charges preferred against him until after General Butler was relieved.

Question. What was alleged against him ?

Answer. Absence without leave, I believe ; and there may be other charges. All the papers in the case are now in this city. No officer has a right to confine a commissioned officer in a prison or guard-house except for mutiny, or for some offence where it would not be safe to trust the man at large. A commissioned officer, for ordinary breaches of military discipline, is put under arrest. This was only a case of that sort, for which he should not have been confined at all, except in his own tent, under arrest. When this case came to my knowledge I immediately ordered an examination made of all the prisoners about Norfolk, Fort Monroe, and Portsmouth, to see if there were any more such cases.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. What was the result of your examination ?

Answer. The result was to find a great many persons in prison without charges. Some had been there for a great length of time.

Question. In the bull-pen ?

Answer. "Bull-pen" is merely the name given by the men themselves to a guard-house or prison. When prisoners are first brought in they are put there until they can be sent off to other prisons or guard-houses, or can be tried and disposed of. It is a place in charge of the provost guard.

Question. Were there men placed there by order of General Butler ?

Answer. They were placed there by his provost marshals and officers. In many instances there was nothing at all to show by whom they were put there. I have not only ordered an examination to be made of all the prisoners there, but I intend sending inspectors to make an examination of prisons in all the other departments, with authority to correct all such abuses that they may find.

By the chairman :

Question. I am glad of that. There are too many cases of that kind, not only in the army down there, but here and elsewhere.

Answer. It may be so without my knowing it or even being able to correct it entirely.

*Testimony of Captain James Alden, of the Brooklyn.*WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1865.*

Captain JAMES ALDEN sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. State your rank and position in the navy of the United States.

Answer. I am a captain in the navy.

Question. Did you accompany the late expeditions against Fort Fisher?

Answer. I did.

Question. What command had you in them?

Answer. I commanded the Brooklyn, sloop-of-war.

Question. Please state those incidents connected with those expeditions, commencing with the first, which seem to you to be material to state, and which the public ought to know.

Answer. After the first bombardment, on the second day, it was decided while I was on board the admiral's vessel that a landing should be made, and arrangements to that effect were accordingly made. About the time we were going into action, say at noon, I was detached from the line of battle and ordered to go down and shell the woods inside of the line of gunboats. The admiral thought we were not near enough to drive some men out of the Flag-pond battery. I immediately went down and shelled the woods, drove them out, and returned, and after that they were prepared to land. I anchored immediately and sent my boats to assist. I think the first landing was effected at about 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Christmas day. As soon as I had done that I called upon General Butler and asked him if I could do anything else. He said "no," and then asked me if we would not have to retire if a gale of wind arose. I told him that depended upon circumstances altogether; that if we could get the troops ashore they could take care of themselves even if we were driven off. I left him, and had occasion to go on board another ship. Just before dark, perhaps it was four o'clock, the general came alongside of my ship in a tug and said he found it necessary to withdraw the troops, and asked me to send my boats to assist. My boats were, at the time, carrying the men on shore. Of course they obeyed the order and commenced re-embarking immediately. When the boats returned to the vessel they reported that they had great difficulty in getting the men to come back into the boats, for they said they came there bound to take Fort Fisher, and they did not see why they should not do it. I noticed that one of the brigades was pretty nearly up to the fort, and in pretty solid column, too. My boats were kept until very late at night, and my launch did not return until morning. About 12 o'clock that night it became impracticable to land to get any more troops off, and six or eight hundred remained over night on the shore.

That Christmas evening I had occasion to be on board the flag-ship, and asked the admiral if he knew that the general had ordered the troops to re-embark. He said he did not. We were at dinner at the time. He asked "Is that so?" "Yes." He made no further remark, and went on with his dinner. I went back to my ship, and that night it blew a heavy gale, and all the next day and the next night. The next morning about daylight I got a note, dated at 4 o'clock in the morning, from the admiral, telling me that the 500 troops were still ashore, and wished I would use every means to get them off as soon as I could, and that if I could not succeed in that, to get to them provisions and water, as he was told they were suffering for both. I was outside then, having moved out on account of the wind, and I moved my ship in, and sent all my boats ashore; at the same time other boats were getting the troops off; about 12 o'clock we had them all on board. The admiral expressed a strong

desire in this note that they should be got off and sent to Old Point; that he wanted to see the last of them.

I went on board and reported that they were all off, and asked what next. "Well," said he, "fill up with coal and provisions." Says I, "Shall we go to Old Point?" "No, sir," says he, "not a ship leaves this command with my consent until we get to Fort Fisher. We will go to Beaufort first, coal there, fill up with ammunition, &c., and if we cannot do any better, we will try it with the sailors, and, said he, "you shall lead." I did not understand exactly, but I understood the point he was making. He told me afterwards he had sent his fleet captain to Sherman, who was at Savannah, for troops. Indeed, he showed me the letter he wrote. General Sherman wrote back that he had left all the troops he could spare with General Thomas. Sherman told him what he intended to do with regard to Wilmington, and then said that from all he could learn he should suppose that General Butler ought to have taken that fort in three minutes.

Question. From whom did General Sherman learn anything about it?

Answer. From the statements of the admiral, of Captain Breese and others.

Question. What were the circumstances which led him to think the fort could have been taken in three minutes?

Answer. The fact that the fire of the fleet was so heavy, the enemy had to stay in their bomb-proofs, and that the garrison was evidently disaffected.

Question. How did he learn that?

Answer. From the fact of our skirmishers being able to get up to the parapets; from that and other things I suppose he made up his mind. That was his expression.

Question. How near at any time was Admiral Porter to that fort?

Answer. I suppose he was within fifteen hundred yards; perhaps nearer.

Question. Was the landing of the men and the taking of them off again done before or after the bombardment of the fort?

Answer. The fort was being bombarded at the time we landed the troops.

Question. How near were you yourself at any time to the fort?

Answer. Fifteen or seventeen hundred yards. At the first engagement I was using ten-second fuzes for shell, and that would give us about 1,700 yards distance.

Question. What effect had that bombardment upon the fortification?

Answer. No visible effect. Perhaps it made the mounds look a little smaller, as it tore them up, and perhaps it dismounted the guns.

Question. How many guns were dismounted in that first engagement?

Answer. We could not tell.

Question. Are you prepared to say that General Weitzel's report that the fortification was not injured for defensive operations, was not correct?

Answer. I think General Weitzel was not far from the truth, so far as I could see.

Question. How many troops were landed there on the first expedition?

Answer. I should not think much over twelve or fifteen hundred.

Question. Is there any instance on record where such fortification uninjured by bombardment or artillery has been taken?

Answer. Not unless the troops were disaffected.

Question. Why then did Commodore Porter report that it could have been taken in five minutes, or why did Sherman say it ought to have been taken in three minutes, when it was not injured for offensive purposes, and while it is the strongest fort on the continent, and stronger than the Malakoff?

Answer. They judged from the fact that a brigade of troops approached within three or four hundred yards of the fort without being molested by the garrison, without a gun being fired upon them, and that the skirmishers crossed the ditch and went into the embrasures.

Question. Who commanded those skirmishers ?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Did you see any of them afterwards ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you converse with any of them about the matter ?

Answer. I do not think I have exchanged a word with a soldier upon the subject.

Question. Did you see them go into the embrasures ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What made you think they did so ?

Answer. Because General Butler said so, and because they brought in a flag from the west corner of the fort as it was knocked down.

Question. Would it not have been good policy for the enemy to have withdrawn from your fire into the casemates, and there waited till the attack was made by the land force, when they could swarm out and make use of all their means of defence ?

Answer. Under ordinary circumstances it would.

Question. Then how came you to think from that circumstance that they had abandoned the defence ?

Answer. Because, when our fire was slackened they did not fire on our troops. That night our troops were there I never heard a gun.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. At the time you saw that brigade of troops in such close proximity to the fortification, were you not shelling the fort ?

Answer. I think we were ; but the troops were called back about the time we ceased to bombard the fort.

Question. Then if you were shelling the fort at that time, is not that an explanation of the fact that the garrison did not fire upon our troops ?

Answer. It was not so on the last attack ; they did not behave in that way on the last bombardment.

Question. What did they do on the last bombardment ?

Answer. They opened fire upon the troops the moment they came into sight, although they had no cannon on the side that our soldiers attacked. On the land face of the fort every gun was disabled.

Question. But on the first attack, you say it was during the bombardment that this brigade of troops approached so near the fortification. Now, I ask you whether or not the fact that you were shelling the fort at that time is not an explanation of the reason why the enemy did not fire on our troops ?

Answer. That may be the explanation ; but that is not the way the garrison behaved when our troops attacked the fort the second time.

Question. What is your explanation of the fact that they did not fire upon our troops ?

Answer. I think the fort was filled with green troops, inexperienced men, and that they were determined to surrender the moment our men appeared upon the parapets.

Question. Did you suppose such to be the fact at the time of, and during, the first attack ?

Answer. I had no idea of it at the time of the attack, but I was subsequently satisfied it was so from the way the enemy behaved afterwards.

Question. How many men did you say were landed ?

Answer. I have no means of judging, but I should say from 1,200 to 1,500.

Question. At about what time did the landing cease ?

Answer. They were only about two hours in landing.

Question. Do you know why more men were not landed ?

Answer. Because the general gave the order to stop landing, and gave an order to re-embark.

Question. Do you know why he gave the order to re-embark ?

Answer. He never told me.

Question. Were there not indications of a storm coming on ?

Answer. I think there were.

Question. What was the condition of the sea ?

Answer. It was getting a little rough during the re-embarkation and up to 12 o'clock at night, when they could do no more.

Question. Was there any water or provisions landed for the troops ?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Was the condition of the sea such, after the last of the men were landed, that provisions and water could have been landed for them ?

Answer. Yes, sir, up to 12 o'clock at night, when our launch ceased to afford them any assistance, and stopped on account of the condition of the sea.

Question. You could have continued to land troops and provisions until 12 o'clock ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is it not more difficult to land provisions and water than men ?

Answer. No, sir ; it is easier, because, by carrying a barrel into the breakers, it will generally wash ashore, unless there is an under-current.

Question. Then you base your belief that General Butler could have taken the fort at that time upon the fact—which you do not know yourself, but which you believe to be true—that there was disaffection in the garrison ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and I believe that was the opinion of General Curtis.

Question. Knowing now, as you do, what the fort was, could it have been taken by assault without there was disaffection in the garrison ?

Answer. That is a hard question to answer. My judgment is based upon the action of the garrison, upon their treatment of our troops as they approached the fort, and, therefore, I could not tell what would have been the result of an attack ; but, judging from my past experience, I should think that one thousand men could keep out ten thousand—that a thousand resolute men could keep out as many men as could be brought against it. It is the strongest place I ever saw in the shape of an earth-work. As I said before, I do not wonder that General Weitzel made that report. And Admiral Porter, while we were standing on the battlements and looking at the strength of the place, said he did not wonder at it at all. And yet, I believe that if General Curtis had been permitted to advance he would have walked right into it.

Question. But that belief you have upon the fact which you now know, but did not know then, that the garrison was disaffected ?

Answer. Yes, sir, and from what General Curtis himself said at the time he returned. He thought so himself.

Question. Would it not have been very good policy on the part of the officer in charge of that fort, if it was so strong that one thousand men could hold it against almost any force that could assail it, to induce our troops to make an assault, so that they might repulse them with slaughter ?

Answer. By no means. The bomb-proofs were so constructed, from the point where General Curtis was, that he could have got his men in before they could get out to make any resistance. Their resistance should have commenced long before General Curtis got where he did, if they intended to defend the fort.

Question. How far was General Curtis from the fort ?

Answer. I heard that he was within three hundred yards.

Question. How near to the fort did you see him ?

Answer. I cannot tell, as I was in a line with the fort and himself.

Question. How many men had he with him ?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. He could not have had a large body if only 1,200 landed ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. If that work is as strong as you have represented it to be, tell us how it is that the fort properly garrisoned could be so easily assaulted and carried by a small body of men, certainly not to exceed a thousand, who chanced to be within three hundred yards of it.

Answer. Because, as I said before, the garrison did not offer any resistance. I think General Curtis would have developed that fact if he had been permitted to go on. We know it now only from hearsay, but I feel confident that if the garrison intended to offer any resistance they never would have permitted him to get so near.

Question. But had not the garrison the power to repulse these men notwithstanding they were only two or three hundred yards off, as you say, provided they had attempted to assault from that point?

Answer. I do not think they could have got out quick enough, and formed for defence, from their miserable bomb-proofs, with little bits of holes not as big as that door. They never could have got out and formed for effectual resistance to our men.

Question. Then the fort was defective in its construction?

Answer. I thought so—though I am not a military man—from its only having two sides to it.

Question. Then it was not as strong as the Malakoff?

Answer. I never saw the Malakoff.

By the chairman :

Question. How long was it between the first and the second bombardment of that fort?

Answer. The first was on the 25th of December, 1864, and the last on the night of the 13th of January following.

Question. What condition did you find the fortification in when you visited it the second time?

Answer. I visited it with Admiral Porter, and we found every gun on the land face, either the gun itself or the carriage, rendered utterly useless. Not a gun could be fired. Among the whole of them only three were uninjured, and they were half full of dirt and could not be used.

Question. My question was, what condition did you find the fort in when you got there the second time to attack it?

Answer. I could see no change from the condition it was in when we came there the first time.

Question. Then your first bombardment did not, to your knowledge, make much impression on the fort?

Answer. I cannot say that it did, but it was impossible to tell. As in the case of Fort Morgan, every gun looked intact from the outside.

Question. Which was the heaviest bombardment, the first or the second?

Answer. I do not think there was much difference.

Question. Were the two bombardments about the same length of time?

Answer. Yes, sir; about the same length of time, and with about the same force.

Question. The guns were all dismounted on the second bombardment?

Answer. Yes, sir, all but three, and they were filled with dirt and rendered unserviceable from that fact.

Question. Did I understand you to say that they had no light artillery there which they could use?

Answer. No, sir; on the contrary, they had.

Question. What number of troops did you land at the time of the second attack?

Answer. I never heard the number stated, but I think there were about eight thousand, in round numbers, carried there.

Question. And how many sailors and marines did you send to assist them?

Answer. About sixteen hundred.

Question. Your sailors and marines were repulsed, were they not?

Answer. Yes, sir, signally.

Question. Why did you not attempt to assist the assaulting force on the first attack? Were there any sailors or marines sent on the first assault?

Answer. There was no assault made. The troops were landed, and I do not know that there was any conversation ever had between General Butler and Commodore Porter upon the subject. I do not know as anything was said about it. I do not know that such a necessity occurred to them. I do not think anything was said about it.

Question. And nothing was done about it?

Answer. Nothing. I suppose there was no idea there would be an assault that first night. Of course, they intended to get the troops on shore. They did so, and General Curtis advanced up the beach and met no opposition, and we believed he was marching in and would take the fort.

Question. Where did your fleet lie when it was preparing for this first expedition?

Answer. At Fortress Monroe, and waiting for the land forces.

Question. How long did you wait?

Answer. I left Mobile on the 9th of September; arrived at Fortress Monroe on the 13th of September, when the vessels were collected, and Porter took command, and I think everything was ready by the 20th of September.

Question. How long did the land forces wait for you to go, after they got ready at Fortress Monroe?

Answer. We were all ready to go at any time, and the only delay was the powder-boat—a suggestion of General Butler, I understand.

Question. What delayed the powder-boat?

Answer. Her preparation. She was an afterthought.

Question. Where was she while you were lying at Fortress Monroe?

Answer. She was brought there, and had to be altered and accommodated to the powder. She was partially filled by Admiral Porter from the magazine at Norfolk, and when she was ready all the ships, both transports and naval vessels, were started.

Question. Where was General Butler's army lying while the powder-boat was being prepared?

Answer. At Old Point. I think some of them came down while we were getting the boat ready.

Question. How long did it take to get that ready after General Butler came there?

Answer. I have no recollection. We had been ready to start a month or two.

Question. Do you say the fleet was absolutely ready to sail as soon as Butler got there with his transports and gave notice that he was ready?

Answer. We had been ready for weeks, and waiting for the troops.

Question. But after the troops got there and General Butler notified Admiral Porter that he was ready, was there any further delay?

Answer. All the delay was solely on account of the powder-boat.

Question. Were your other ships all ready, with ammunition and provisions?

Answer. Yes, sir, with everything, and had been for weeks.

Question. And you were lying there waiting for the powder-boat?

Answer. That is the way I understood it.

Question. Of course you do not know what passed between Admiral Porter and General Butler?

Answer. I do not; but I understood we were detained on account of the powder-boat.

Question. How many days?

Answer. I have no idea.



By Mr. Gooch:

Question. When did the vessels of Admiral Porter's fleet first come in sight of Fort Fisher?

Answer. On the 23d of December.

Question. Where were the transports at that time?

Answer. Not in sight.

Question. Who first went in sight of Fort Fisher?

Answer. General Butler.

Question. When?

Answer. A day or two before, when he drew the enemy's fire with his transports. So I understood.

Question. From whom did you understand that?

Answer. Some remarks were made about how silly it was to try to keep the thing secret, when the General had undertaken to draw the fire of the enemy a day or two before we went in, and thus exposed the whole thing.

Question. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not General Butler did that?

Answer. Such was the talk.

Question. Where was General Butler with his transports when you first went in sight of Fort Fisher?

Answer. I heard that they had been driven to Beaufort, and had gone there to supply themselves with coal and water, and that they had not returned. The general, however, arrived that evening while the bombardment was progressing.

Question. Had the naval fleet been into Beaufort for any purpose previous to that?

Answer. Yes, sir, a portion of them with the powder-boat to get the amount of the powder required.

Question. Do you know on what day that portion of the naval fleet went into Beaufort?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know whether any part of the naval fleet went in sight of Fort Fisher before that portion of the fleet went to Beaufort?

Answer. There might have been some of the blockading vessels.

Question. I refer to the fleet that was sent down to make the attack.

Answer. Our rendezvous was first twenty-five miles off, and it was afterwards changed to twelve miles, and there we waited until the powder-boat blew up. None of the vessels went nearer until the explosion of the powder-boat.

Question. When you were twelve miles from the fort, were you in sight of the fort?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Could not they see you from the fort when you were within twelve miles of it?

Answer. They could see our mast-heads.

Question. When did the naval fleet first go a point where they could be seen from Fort Fisher?

Answer. After General Butler had been up.

Question. Fix the day.

Answer. I should think perhaps it was the 21st of December. We lay twelve miles off perhaps two or three days. We lay there with the powder-boat and the iron-clads, detained by the storm.

Question. And you do not know of your own knowledge at what time General Butler first went in sight of the fort?

Answer. No sir; it was while we were this twenty-five miles off, I think. I do not know certainly about it. I know it was during the time we were far off.

Question. You say you did not see him and do not know of your own knowledge when he did go there?

Answer. I was told that he went in while we lay twenty-five miles off.

Question. Where were the transports when the powder-boat was sent to be exploded?

Answer. They were not there; I believe they were all at Beaufort.

Question. Do you know why the powder-boat was sent in to be exploded while the transports were at Beaufort?

Answer. No, unless it was to improve the first fair opportunity. The transports were never close up; they would be out of sight one minute, and come in sight another; so no one could tell their locality, but we generally supposed they were at hand; and I have no doubt that Admiral Porter, when he ordered that boat blown up at the first favorable opportunity, supposed that the land force was handy.

Question. But you knew they were not in sight at that time?

Answer. I did not know they were not in sight, though I was told afterwards that they were not. They did not come up, and upon inquiry it was said they were at Beaufort.

Question. How far was it designed that the fleet should be away at the time of the explosion?

Answer. The vessels were ordered to be away twelve miles when the powder-boat went in.

Question. And then what was intended to be done?

Answer. To go in, all hands, and make an attack.

Question. As soon as possible after the explosion of the boat?

Answer. Yes, sir; thinking it would demoralize the fort and perhaps upset it. However, I had not much confidence in it, because the powder was not confined. I said that if they put the powder in a long train like that, perhaps one twentieth of it would explode, and the remainder be blown away.

Question. If the effect of the explosion of that powder had been what was expected, was it not very important that the transports should be ready to cooperate immediately, or as soon as possible after the explosion?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I had not any doubt that they were on hand. I did not know where they were, but very often you would see on the horizon one or two, and then they would seem to keep aloof.

Question. Why was that?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Was the state of the weather such that the fleet could not be kept together?

Answer. Not at all. The naval vessels were all kept together, but I suppose merchant vessels have not generally very good ground tackle, and they do not like to anchor upon the coast or in deep water; but they have generally power enough to keep under way and stand the wind.

Question. Were the transports and fleet together at any time after they left Fortress Monroe until after the attack was made?

Answer. They were in sight of each other.

Question. When were they all in sight of each other?

Answer. When the gale came up at the twenty-five-mile rendezvous, and during the gale I saw three or four of the vessels.

Question. Where should the rendezvous have been after the gale?

Answer. The gale occurred, and as soon as it was over the admiral came down from Beaufort and took us in to the twelve-mile rendezvous.

Question. You were ordered to rendezvous twenty-five miles from Fort Fisher?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You did so?

Answer. Yes, sir, and remained there until the admiral came.

Question. Did you stay there until the gale ceased?

Answer. We had the gale at that rendezvous, and the moment it disappeared the admiral came and took us in to the twelve-mile rendezvous.

Question. Why did not the transports remain at the twenty-five mile rendezvous?

Answer. I am told they were driven off by stress of weather, and for want of coal and supplies.

Question. Now my question was: As you were to rendezvous at a point twenty-five miles from the fort, and as the transports were driven off from that point by stress of weather, where should the rendezvous then have been?

Answer. The admiral came out from that point to which the transports were driven, and joined us and took us in to the twelve-mile rendezvous—the rendezvous being changed. What arrangements he made with the fleet of transports I do not know.

Question. Then you presume the rendezvous was changed by an arrangement between General Butler and Admiral Porter?

Answer. I never thought anything about it.

Question. Should not the rendezvous have remained as it was, unless there was an agreement or some understanding between the general commanding and the naval commander?

Answer. Naturally.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You have stated that General Curtis could have marched into the fort if he had continued his march.

Answer. I said he had said so.

Question. I understood you to say that in your judgment he could have done so?

Answer. I think so now.

Question. Upon what do you form your judgment?

Answer. Upon what I have learned since; from the fact that the garrison was disaffected, and their allowing him to get within three hundred yards of the fort and not firing on him when we ceased firing.

Question. There seems to have been some misunderstanding as to the place of rendezvous, and a lack of concert of action between the fleet and transports?

Answer. I do not think there was the slightest, because Admiral Porter never would have come out to the twenty-five-mile rendezvous and taken us into the twelve-mile rendezvous without informing the fleet at Beaufort of what he was doing.

Question. I want to ask you in this connexion whether that made any difference in the result when you came to the place of action?

Answer. I do not think it did. I do not see that it could, because they went to Beaufort for a specific purpose, and the powder-boat left Beaufort, I presume, at the time they were there, and went to the twelve-mile rendezvous, where we joined her, or she joined us.

By the chairman:

Question. Did you know of any controversy or misunderstanding between Admiral Porter and General Butler upon that expedition?

Answer. None whatever, that I noticed; but it did not seem to me, from what I saw, that there was any concert of action.

Question. Did you understand that there was any personal feeling or misunderstanding about it; or was it merely that they had not concerted a plan?

Answer. I do not believe General Butler had much to say to Admiral Porter upon the subject, or he to General Butler.

Question. Each acted upon his own hook?

Answer. It seemed so. Admiral Porter does not intrude upon anybody. If General Butler wanted his assistance he would say so, and—

Question. But do you know whether there was any unkind feeling existing, from any cause, between those two commanders?

Answer. I do not know of any; on the contrary, they seemed to get along well together. General Butler dined frequently on board the flag-ship, and the admiral was frequently with him at his quarters. I heard the admiral say that the general was very polite. I think that was the expression. And there seemed to be the best *entente cordiale* between them. None of us had any idea that General Butler was going with the expedition.

Question. If they were friendly, how happened it that there was no preconcert of action between them?

Answer. I do not know where the coolness arose. We regarded General Butler as a sort of looker-on, and that General Weitzel was the man.

Question. Was there any attempted concert of action between Admiral Porter and General Weitzel in regard to the troops?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was on board the flag-ship, with the other captains, when General Weitzel was there. When I got through with my business, and he was about closing the interview, he remarked to me that he was about to land. Captain Glisson was present making arrangements with General Weitzel and the admiral in regard to covering the party to assist in landing the troops. Everything seemed to be going on smoothly.

Question. Did General Butler interfere with the command of General Weitzel? Did he oppose the views of General Weitzel in any particular?

Answer. Not that I have heard.

Question. Do you know whether General Weitzel was opposed to the re-embarkation of the troops at the time they were re-embarked?

Answer. I do not know what occurred; I have not seen General Weitzel since.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was there anything in the movement of the two fleets, growing out of any misunderstanding or otherwise, that interposed to success when you both came up to the point of attack?

Answer. There did not seem to be the slightest.

Question. Had this misunderstanding, as to the rendezvous or any other thing, between the two fleets, interfered at all in attaining success in the attack?

Answer. I never heard of any misunderstanding in regard to the rendezvous, or of any disagreement in regard to the manner of landing; and I know that General Butler told the admiral that he was going to re-embark the troops before it was done, as soon as it was practicable that night; and that the next day, and after he had got off all the troops, he informed him that he was going to leave.

Question. Had anything transpired between the two fleets which prevented success, when they came to the attack?

Answer. Nothing that I ever saw or heard of.

Question. Was it not expected that you would pass the forts with the fleet and go inside?

Answer. No such idea was entertained, nor could it have been by any person who ever looked at the chart. New inlet is a break through the arm of land, about nine miles from the main entrance to the river—forming Smith's island—having a very narrow and intricate channel, the shoalest water upon the bar being from nine to ten feet, low water. This difficult point is about three hundred yards from their heaviest guns, and the channel leads right up under the sea face of the fort to within one hundred and fifty yards. To show you how difficult it was, I will state that after we captured the fort, for the purpose of getting the gunboats into the river, a careful examination was made, and the channel buoyed out on either side, and then, in the attempt to get those gunboats through, one whole day was consumed, and we got in only four, and neither of

those were got in, though moved with great caution, without getting aground, and backing out and trying again. This was with every buoy placed, the greatest care exercised, and doing our best to get them in. We had been sounding ourselves with our steam launch, and at night fall I was with the admiral, and he remarked, "There are two gunboats aground; the tide has left them, and if the wind comes south and blows on shore, I would not give ten cents for either of them." But luckily the wind did not come up, the tide rose, and they were got off. When I left the inlet, perhaps twenty-five gunboats were inside. I do not know of an instance, with all our care and watchfulness, of a gunboat getting in there without grounding, owing to the intricacy of the channel. This bar is three hundred yards from their heaviest guns, and leads right up under them, along the sea face of the fort, within one hundred and fifty yards. In our run at Mobile, the bar was out without the range of the guns of Fort Morgan, and with twenty-three or twenty-four feet of water. Our heaviest ships drew only sixteen feet. We went over the bar there into six, eight, and nine fathoms. The channel was wide, so that we could run with perfect safety.

No vessel could have entered Wilmington harbor then with one gun pointed at her. She could not enter at all without the buoys.

Question. Are there any other material facts connected with this expedition which you have not stated?

Answer. None that I think of.

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*Testimony of Major General Weitzel.*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1865.

Major General GODFREY WEITZEL sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, and a captain in the regular army.

Question. What is your present command?

Answer. I am commanding the 25th army corps.

Question. We understand that you were connected with the first expedition against Fort Fisher?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you give us an account of that expedition from its commencement until its conclusion?

Answer. During the latter part of September last General Grant sent for me to come to his headquarters. He there told me that an expedition was being prepared to close the mouth of Cape Fear river, near Wilmington; that it was to be composed of a large naval force, and of a land force consisting of from 6,000 to 10,000 men; that he thought only 6,000 could be sent, but if he could spare 10,000 he would send that many, and that he desired the expedition to go before the middle of the next month, October. He said that the War Department had selected an officer to command the land forces of the expedition, but he did not wish that officer to command them, as he had once shown timidity. He had, therefore, designated me as the commanding officer of the land forces. He also said that Admiral Porter would command the naval force; that he had just gone out west to turn over his command there, and that upon his return he desired me to meet Admiral Porter at Washington and confer with him about the plan of operations.

General Grant furnished me with all the charts and papers he had relating to the expedition—he had quite a number of them—and told me to read them over

carefully, and then if I had any suggestions to make, he wanted me to make them. I read them over and examined them, and on the next day I again called on General Grant and said to him that as I was to command the expedition I thought it probably would be better that I should go down off Wilmington, reconnoitre the ground, and get all the information I could of the character and strength of the enemy's works at the mouth of Cape Fear river. He agreed with me in that, and I went down there on the army gunboat Chamberlain.

Question. About what time was that?

Answer. That was the 27th or 28th of September. I went down off the mouth of New inlet. I found Admiral Lee there, with a number of officers who had been on blockading duty there for more than two years; I found a number of North Carolinians who were on board our vessels there as pilots, and who said they knew every green pine tree between Wilmington and the mouth of Cape Fear river. Through a naval officer I had communication with the president of the Loyal Union League of Wilmington. I got such satisfactory and perfect information of the strength of the enemy's works that I was enabled to return at the end of three days.

I should have stated before, that in about the first conversation I had with General Grant upon the subject of this expedition, he said to me, "Weitzel, this is to be another Mobile affair. The navy will run some of their vessels into Cape Fear river, and I would advise you to land your troops and take a position across the peninsula, and then Fort Fisher and these works will fall exactly as Fort Morgan did."

Believing that would be the plan of the expedition, and having obtained this full information, I returned very confident that the thing could be very easily accomplished.

As soon as I arrived at Fortress Monroe on my return, I found a telegraphic despatch ordering me to hasten to the front with all speed. I did so, and on arriving at General Butler's headquarters I found another telegraphic despatch ordering me to report on the north side of James river as quickly as I could ride there. I rode over there and found the army of the James engaged in battle with the enemy; I reported to General Butler, and he at once assigned me to the command of the 18th army corps; General Ord having been wounded, I was retained in that command.

Fearing that this command might interfere with the expedition to Cape Fear river, I sent to General Grant and inquired whether I should go on making preparations for the expedition; that is, relating to the landing material, boats for landing the troops, &c. There were many little details that I had found, from the experience of five other naval expeditions that I had been on, were necessary to accomplish the object in view. General Grant sent me word to go on and make the preparations. I made all I could that I considered necessary.

A few days after that General Grant called on me in person at my headquarters, and asked me about the result of my investigations down there. I told him, and said that, according to the plan he had mentioned to me, I thought that 6,000 men would be sufficient. He said that he did not think he should start the expedition; that the navy had advertised it so freely by rendezvousing at Hampton roads and Norfolk that the rebel papers had got hold of it, and it was known all over the south. He, therefore, did not consider it advisable to start the expedition then, but directed me to continue making all the preparations for such an expedition. This was about the middle of October.

I afterwards saw General Grant again, and he renewed the same instructions; subsequently I applied through him to the Navy Department for some additional launches for landing, and for some boat howitzers, but they were refused. I then understood, I think from General Grant, or from one of his staff officers, that the expedition had been abandoned.

During all this time I continued in command of the 18th corps.

Shortly after the return of General Butler from the city of New York, he sent for me one day in November, and told me that a powder-boat had been suggested, a large torpedo; that the rebels had frequently used torpedoes against us, and that we were going to use one against them larger than any they had ever used. He showed me a large volume, containing the opinions of several leading officers of the army and navy in this city, as to the probable effect of the explosion of such a powder-vessel near the enemy's works. He then said to me, "I am going down with this expedition, and I am going to take you with two divisions down there, and see that this powder-boat is exploded properly."

One morning, about the third or fourth of December, I received a letter of instructions from General Butler's chief of staff to prepare the effective troops of two divisions with a certain amount of ammunition, and a certain amount of provisions in a certain way, and to get ready to move.

On the night of the 6th of December I was ordered to move after dark to the signal tower, in rear and to the left of the Bermuda Hundred's line, and to bivouac my men there. About 12 o'clock that night I received an order to move my troops at daybreak the next morning to Bermuda Hundred and embark them on the transports that would be furnished us. Afterwards I received an order to move them to Fortress Monroe, and order them to rendezvous there.

On the evening of the 7th, General Butler came down from his headquarters, took me on board his boat, and at City Point took on board Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's staff, and we went down to Fortress Monroe. I then asked General Butler the destination of the expedition, and he told me it was going to Wilmington. I had not seen any letter of instructions from General Grant to General Butler; I never saw it until the other day; I saw it in the papers in Cincinnati. All I knew of the destination of the expedition was this verbal answer I received from General Butler in reply to my question.

On Saturday afternoon, December 10, General Butler asked Colonel Comstock and myself to go with him to Norfolk to see Admiral Porter; he found the admiral on his flag-ship. The conversation related mostly to the powder-vessel, and the time when it would be ready. The tenor of the remarks of General Butler and Colonel Comstock to Admiral Porter was that haste was necessary; that probably it would be better to dispense with the powder-vessel, rather than to delay and give the enemy a chance to send down re-enforcements. The enemy having made a reconnoissance of our position that morning, they had probably discovered that some of our troops had left, and knowing that this expedition had been in contemplation for some time, would probably guess its destination. Admiral Porter said he was hurrying up, getting the powder on board as fast as he could. There was some discussion, also, about the weather, as the weather looked unfavorable.

On the Monday evening following, the navy not yet having sailed, General Butler ordered me to send nearly all the transports up the Chesapeake bay and up the Potomac river to Mathias Point, and then return in the night and anchor off Cape Henry. I started them at three o'clock on Tuesday morning. The object of this movement was this: We knew the enemy continually kept scouts in Northumberland county, at the mouth of the Potomac river, who reported every transport that passed up and down the bay—everything that occurred there. We had frequently seen their reports in the Richmond papers. General Butler ordered the fleet to go up there, that they might be reported to the enemy as going up the Potomac. Then after dark, having reached Mathias Point, we could steam down the bay again, and thus deceive the enemy as to our destination.

On Wednesday morning early, a steamer came in from the department of the south and reported the sea as very smooth outside. We at once started, found the transports already anchored off Cape Henry, and started them at once to sea. When we left the harbor, I did not see there a single vessel that belonged to Admiral Porter's fleet.

I think all the difference between General Butler and Admiral Porter as to the time we sailed is at that one point. Admiral Porter did not know that our transports went up the bay, but supposed they went right out to sea. Thence he says that General Butler started before he did. That, I think, is the cause of difference between them on that point.

When we were off Beaufort harbor General Butler sent the gunboat Chamberlain into the harbor with a message to Admiral Porter that we were there, and were going to the place of rendezvous.

We arrived off New inlet on Thursday morning. We lay there until the evening of Sunday, the 18th, when by steaming out to sea we struck the naval fleet and found Admiral Porter. Several inquiries had been made before without finding him or his fleet. During the time we lay there, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, there was a perfectly smooth sea. There was a little swell, but nothing to interfere with operations. It was one of those times of misty weather when the fog did not lift until about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning.

As soon as we came in sight of the admiral's ship on Sunday night, he sent his fleet captain, Captain Breese, on board, to see General Butler. The captain apologized to the general for the admiral's not calling upon him in person. I do not know what was the reason he gave; whether it was that the admiral had had a fall from a horse, or that he had some indisposition. There were two occasions when the admiral sent his fleet captain to see General Butler and confer with him, both times apologizing for not appearing himself. One time the reason given was a fall from a horse; the other time the admiral was indisposed. I forget which of those reasons was given this time.

When Captain Breese came on board he stated to General Butler that the powder-boat would be exploded at twenty minutes after 9 o'clock that night, and that the fleet would stand in at daylight. General Butler at once objected to that, saying that if the powder-vessel was exploded so early in the night, all the advantage got would be lost entirely. If it had any effect either in injuring the works or the guns, or stunning the garrison, there would be ample time, before the proposed attack of the navy, for the enemy to recover from it. This was my opinion, and also the opinion of Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's staff, very forcibly expressed.

The sea was pretty rough at the time, for it was blowing a stiff breeze—so much so that when General Butler ordered Colonel Comstock and myself to proceed at once on board the flag-ship and represent to the admiral the impropriety of such a mode of attack, it was with the greatest difficulty that we got in and out of the boat, and I remarked to Colonel Comstock, who had never been on a naval expedition before, "You see one of the difficulties of a naval expedition; we could not even get our men into the boats to-night." And he agreed with me about the difficulties of doing so.

After conferring with Admiral Porter, representing the points we made against his plan, he said that the powder-vessel had started in the night before; that he did not know whether he would be able to stop her, but that he would try. He sent his fastest boat, the A. D. Vance, a captured blockade runner and a very fast vessel, with a despatch to the commanding officer of the powder-vessel to delay the explosion until such time as in his judgment it would be possible for the troops to land and take advantage of the effect it should produce. The latter portion of the instructions was sent at the suggestion of Colonel Comstock and myself.

We lay there the next day, the breeze getting stronger all the time. Finally, on Tuesday evening, it being reported by the most of my transports that, by reason of the delay, they had run out of coal and water, General Butler directed all the transport fleet that were short of coal and water to proceed at once to Beaufort harbor and get a fresh supply. Our own vessel was short of coal and water, and we also went in there. The wind increased and blew a gale till



Friday evening, compelling all the rest of the vessels excepting two to run into Beaufort for shelter and supplies. Everything was done to get those supplies as rapidly as possible. The quartermasters were at work day and night. The water was brought by railroad for a distance of fifteen miles. All the barrels that could be gotten hold of in North Carolina were sent for, and I know several instances where coal vessels were placed alongside of a vessel to facilitate its coaling.

On Friday evening, the weather having the appearance of moderating, General Butler sent his staff officer, Captain Clarke, on the gunboat Chamberlain, to see Admiral Porter, and tell him that he would be out the next day. Captain Clarke returned just before we left the harbor, and reported that the admiral had said he would explode the powder-vessel during the night of Friday, and commence the attack as soon thereafter as possible. It was a question of discussion between us, while sailing toward New inlet, whether the admiral would commence the attack before we were there to co-operate with him. Several—I think General Butler among the number—doubted that he would do so. I did not doubt it, having been with the admiral on two or three previous expeditions.

When we arrived near New inlet we found that the admiral had commenced his attack. As soon as we came near his flag-ship General Butler directed Colonel Comstock and myself to proceed on board the admiral's vessel and ascertain the result of the day's work. We found the admiral in good spirits. He stated that he had exploded the powder-vessel at 1.40 the morning before; that the officers on board the powder-vessel told him that they ran it in so close that they could count the embrasures of the fort, and they had been successful in getting her in so close because, as they were going in, they were so fortunate as to find a blockade-runner going in ahead of them, and without discovering themselves they followed this blockade-runner in, and were thus enabled to get so close to the work. He spoke of the explosion as having consisted of two, or three, or four separate shocks, which led me at once to suppose that all the powder had not gone off at once. He said that at daylight he had steamed in with his whole fleet; that he had fired the first shot after twelve o'clock on that day; that from the time three or four of his larger vessels became engaged the rebels had replied with no spirit whatever, and that he thought they were pretty badly used up; he spoke of having silenced their guns.

We came in time to see the fleet drawing off after their bombardment of that day. After the heavier vessels were withdrawn I myself saw the enemy fire several shots. Both Colonel Comstock and myself were of the opinion that, so far from the guns of the fort being silenced, the commanding officer of the fort had but followed the rule that both of us had learned for the defence of a work in such cases; that being entirely overpowered or over-matched by our fire his garrison was ordered into their bomb-proofs for the purpose of saving life and ammunition, there to await either the attempt by the fleet to pass by the fort or the final assault.

Such were the instructions which I have given to the garrison of one work on my line, Fort Harrison, that I have been holding for the last three months and a half. The enemy has much the heavier artillery fire, because the work is in a salient and they entirely envelop it. I therefore have built a large lot of bomb-proofs sufficient to hold the garrison. My orders to the garrison have been, in case the enemy opened this heavy artillery fire upon them, to leave but a thin line of men exposed to the fire, just enough to prevent the work being taken by a dash, or before the garrison could get out of their bomb-proofs, and repel any formation for an assault; and then, at the moment of assault, the whole garrison must come out, no matter to what fire they may be subjected. The work had been subjected to this fire twice, and, although at one time the garrison was composed entirely of new Kentucky negro troops, I have lost but one man wounded. I believed, from the manner in which the commanding

officer of Fort Fisher was acting, that he had given the same instructions to his garrison.

After I returned to General Butler's ship we conferred together as to what was to be done. He directed me to meet the admiral the next morning at half-past six o'clock and arrange details for landing the troops. He also ordered me to send five hundred men on shore, under cover of the gunboats which the admiral would detail, to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's work, and ascertain what damage had been done by the fire of the navy. He said that if this reconnoissance reported the work assailable he would then land all the troops and assault it. The admiral having complained, during our conference with him, that he had not had any plan submitted to him by the general, and did not know what he wanted to do, I advised General Butler to put his plan in writing and send it to the admiral, which he did.

The next morning I saw the admiral, and he detailed twelve gunboats and a sloop-of-war to cover our landing, and gave us a large number of boats in addition to our own. All the boats that were there were just sufficient to carry this reconnoitring party of 500 men. I myself went with this reconnoitring party, not caring to rely upon any other officer for information. We landed, and shortly after landing caused the surrender of a small garrison of a little insignificant earthwork called Flag-pond Hill battery. I then pushed on toward Fort Fisher. Before leaving the vessel General Butler, finding that I was going, told me that the moment I had reconnoitred the work, and made up my opinion about it, to come back and report to him.

I pushed a skirmish line to, I think, within about 150 yards of the work. I had about 300 men left in the main body, about 800 yards from the work. There was a knoll that had evidently been built for a magazine, an artificial knoll on which I stood, and which gave me a full view of the work and the ground in front of it. I saw that the work, as a defensive work, was not injured at all, except that one gun about midway of the land face was dismounted. I counted sixteen guns all in proper position, which made it evident to me that they had not been injured; because when a gun is injured, you can generally see it from the way in which it stands. The grass slopes of the traverses and of the parapet did not appear broken in the least. The regular shapes of the slopes of the traverses and slopes of the parapets were not disturbed. I did not see a single opening in the row of palisades that was in front of the ditch; it seemed to me perfectly intact.

From all the information which I gained on my first visit to New inlet, from what I saw on this reconnoissance, together with the information that I had obtained from naval officers who had been on the blockade there for over two years, I was convinced that Fort Fisher was a regular bastioned work; the relief was very high. I had been told by deserters from it that the ditch was about twenty feet wide and six feet deep, and that it was crossed by a bridge. I saw the traverses between each pair of guns, and was perfectly certain within my own mind that they were bomb-proofs; they ought to have been, and they were. It was a stronger work than I had ever seen or heard of being assailed during this war. I have commanded in person three assaulting columns in this war. I have been twice assailed by assaulting columns of the enemy, when I have had my men intrenched. Neither in the first three cases where I assailed the enemy's works, nor in the two cases where I was myself assailed, were the works, in an engineering point of view, one-eighth as strong as that work was. Both times when I was assaulted by the enemy, the intrenchments behind which my men fought were constructed in one night, and in each case after the men had had two or three days of very hard work. I have been repulsed in every attempt I have made to carry an enemy's work, although I have had as good troops as any in the United States army, and their record shows it. The troops that I had under my command in the first two assaults have been

with General Sheridan in the whole of his last campaign—the first division of the 19th army corps—and they fought as well under me as they have under him. The third time that I assailed a position was on the Williamsburg road. I had two of the best brigades of the 18th army corps. It was a weakly defended line, and not a very strong one. Still I lost a great many men, and was repulsed. In the two instances where the enemy assaulted my position they were repulsed with heavy loss.

After that experience, with the information I had obtained from reading and study—for before this war I was an instructor at the Military Academy for three years under Professor Mahan, on these very subjects—remembering well the remark of the lieutenant general commanding, that it was his intention I should command that expedition, because another officer selected by the War Department had once shown timidity, and in face of the fact that I had been appointed a major general only twenty days before, and needed confirmation; notwithstanding all that, I went back to General Butler, and told him I considered it would be murder to order an attack on that work with that force. I understood Colonel Comstock to agree with me perfectly, although I did not ask him, and General Butler has since said that he did.

Upon my report, General Butler himself reconnoitred the work; ran up close with the Chamberlain, and took some time to look at it. He then said that he agreed with me, and directed the re-embarkation of the troops. The troops were re-embarked, and we came back to Fortress Monroe to our camp. When we stopped at City Point going up, to permit Colonel Comstock to disembark, General Butler went ashore, as he told me, to see General Grant. Upon his return, I asked him whether the general was satisfied with what we had done. He said yes, he was perfectly satisfied with it.

Question. Who was that officer, selected by the War Department, to whom General Grant objected?

Answer. General Gillmore.

Question. You say that an officer of General Grant's staff accompanied you on this expedition.

Answer. Yes, sir; his chief aide-de-camp, Colonel Comstock. He is an engineer officer, and was a class-mate of mine. We are quite intimate friends. I think General Grant sent him along at General Butler's request, but ordered him to report to me. The moment that I found General Butler was going in command of the expedition, I could not consider Colonel Comstock as reporting to me.

Question. Since your return, have you ever had any conversation with General Grant on the subject of this expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What criticism did he make in regard to the expedition?

Answer. He stated to me that he had not desired General Butler to go along, but he could not very well stop him, although he did not wish him to go; for General Butler, being the commanding officer of the department, had properly a right to go anywhere within his department, and if he had stopped him it would have shown a want of confidence in him.

Question. Of course he knew that General Butler was going?

Answer. Yes, sir; but he did not know it until General Butler came to City Point, on his way down the river, to go off with the expedition. He said that that was the first time he knew positively that General Butler was going.

Question. Did he say that he had made any objection to General Butler about going?

Answer. No, sir; I did not so understand him.

Question. When was it that General Grant selected you as the proper person to command the expedition?

Answer. When he sent for me last September he told me he had selected me to command it.

Question. When did you receive the order from him to go upon the expedition you did go on?

Answer. That order I received from General Butler. General Grant sent all orders for this expedition direct to General Butler, and General Butler sent me my instructions.

Question. General Grant communicated through General Butler to you upon the subject of this expedition?

Answer. He communicated to General Butler, and General Butler gave me some of his instructions, not all.

Question. How was it possible that General Grant did not think General Butler would accompany this expedition when he was giving these orders to him, and General Butler was selecting the officers to go?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Could it be possible that General Grant did not suppose that General Butler was to accompany this expedition, when he was giving these orders for it?

Answer. All I know is what General Grant told me the other evening when I went to return to him the papers and drawings I had, as I did not need them any more.

Question. He said that General Butler having the right to go, he did not interfere with his going?

Answer. Yes, sir; Wilmington was within General Butler's department, and all the troops of the expedition were from General Butler's army.

Question. How did General Grant expect such an expedition would go and General Butler have nothing to do with it?

Answer. There might be a military objection to his going. The rule is, that if a commanding officer has a detachment made from his command, he generally remains with the largest portion of his command. You will find that such is the rule. If a detachment is made from a command, from a division for instance, the division commander generally makes it a point to go with the larger part of his command. It might have been upon that principle that General Grant said General Butler should not have gone on this expedition. As this expedition took only about 6,500 of his command, he should have remained with the larger portion of his command.

Question. It is discretionary with the department commander to go or remain.

Answer. The department commander, I think, has the right to go anywhere within the limits of his department, because his duties call him all over it at times.

Question. In the case of a very important expedition, without any orders from the general-in-chief to the contrary, would it not be expected that he would accompany it?

Answer. I should think so.

Question. What reason did General Grant give for not wanting General Butler to accompany the expedition?

Answer. He told me that he did not have much confidence in General Butler's military abilities.

Question. Did General Grant express to you any dissatisfaction as to the course you had pursued on this expedition?

Answer. He said that from events that have since transpired, from what has since become known, he believes that he could have carried that work with even less loss than General Terry did.

Question. Did he tell you upon what that opinion was founded?

Answer. I could not ask him. He was the general commanding, and I could

not well ask him that question. I thought that would be developed by this investigation, and we would find out all about it. There is one thing connected with this subject I would like to mention. Lieutenant Kepler, of General Ames's staff, told me, last Thursday, at Fortress Monroe, that both General Ames and General Terry had said that their success had proved the correctness of my opinion; and as you can see in General Ames's written report, he agreed with me, at the time, that the work could not be carried.

Question. General Ames accompanied you on the first expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir. Of course we are all glad that it has been carried. But General Turner, General Butler's chief of staff, told me the other day that, after conversation with several officers from there, the fact was established that it was by mere luck that the assault succeeded. In the first place, an assaulting column of sailors and marines was sent in with cutlasses and pistols to attack the fort. That is something I never heard of before, and I have tried to find a precedent for it, but cannot do so. That must have confused the calculations of the commanding officer of the garrison. He thought that was the main assaulting column; and that very thing made so strong a diversion that it drew the whole garrison in that direction; and that enabled General Ames's division to get a foothold on the west end of the work. General Turner says that one brigade of that division, Bell's brigade, got its main foothold by charging along the causeway which led from the swamp, in the face of four pieces of light artillery. Now, if those four pieces of light artillery had been served against such a column marching by the flank across the causeway, very few of that column would ever have gotten over or gotten back. But he said that those gunners were stampeded, and would not serve their guns, but ran away. That gave the division a hold on the parapet; and from that time it became a soldier's fight, in which the fighting was on nearly equal terms, and our soldiers had a great deal more enthusiasm and courage than the rebel troops there.

Question. It has been said that there was scarcely any garrison there at the time you were there. What have you to say about that?

Answer. I forgot to mention about that. The garrison of Flag-pond Hill battery, the first party of rebels that we captured after landing, were at once questioned by me; I questioned about a dozen of them, and then left some of my staff officers to question more, as I wanted to go on with the advance. All of them told me that they belonged to the 42d North Carolina regiment, of Kirtland's brigade, of Hoke's division. Now, we have been fighting that division ever since last May. We have a correct list of every regiment in that division. And at one time General Butler had the name of every commanding officer of a company, and the strength of every company in that division. I therefore knew that the 42d North Carolina regiment belonged to that brigade, and that that brigade belonged to that division. And all the men whom I asked were unanimous in saying that they belonged to that regiment, and that that brigade at least was there. And I asked every one the question.

Question. How strong was that brigade?

Answer. I should suppose it would number about 1,200 or 1,300 men, about the same that our brigades do. They might have numbered more from conscripts, but that is about the strength we reckon their brigades to have. Their divisions number from 5,500 to 6,000 men, and they have four brigades in a division.

I asked them where the rest of the brigade was, and they told me they were about a mile and a half to the rear; that three regiments were there; the fourth regiment they said was in Fort Fisher. That has since been proven to be true, and I then believed it to be true, because at that very moment they commenced attacking the little guard I had left at the place of landing. They skirmished there a little while, but were soon repulsed by the fire of the navy and the fire of our men. Subsequently we captured 220 men of the reserves who said they were outside of the fort because there were not sufficient bomb-proofs there to

contain them; and these were sent out in the morning to remain out until night to avoid danger, and then they were expected to return in time to repel the assault, which was expected to be made after dark.

Now, I reasoned in this way: they would not keep three regiments of veterans in reserve outside of the work, a mile and a half to the rear of these other men, unless they had without them sufficient men inside the fort to man the parapet. That was the way I argued the matter.

Question. Do you know what Admiral Porter's idea was founded upon, that there was not much of a garrison there?

Answer. I suppose simply upon the fact that the garrison did not reply to his fire, which was a very correct military procedure on their part.

Question. He had no better means of knowing than you had?

Answer. None at all. The only trouble with the admiral was this—and it is a trouble that I have, from long experience, found with naval officers—they know as little about a work or a fort as an army officer does about a ship. Naval officers do not know the vulnerable points of a fort; they do not know how to regulate their fire so as to injure a fort. That has been the trouble in every naval expedition in which I have been engaged—the utter ignorance of a regularly educated naval officer of the nature, character, weaknesses, and strong points of a fort. I have often said that I thought it would be a benefit to the country if, at the naval school at Newport, there was a professorship of fortifications, and at West Point a professorship of naval matters.

There are some remarks which Admiral Porter makes in his report which show his utter ignorance of the character of a fort; and I recollect another instance in the case of Admiral Porter, to establish my opinion upon that point. The water fleet was lying off bombarding Fort Jackson, just before the fall of New Orleans; General Barnard had supplied Admiral Farragut and Admiral Porter with correct maps of the works there and at the mouth of the river. General Barnard had been stationed in those works for about fourteen years, and had taken a great deal of pains in getting up correct maps. I was sent along because I had been on those works for four or five years before the war. As soon as we got there, General Butler sent me to report to Admiral Farragut, so that he could have the benefit of my local knowledge of the places.

After we had kept up the bombardment for two or three days, a deserter came from the fort, and he was brought to Admiral (then Commodore) Porter. This deserter was a very intelligent man. He had formerly been in Dan Rice's circus, and was enabled to escape from the fort by his skill in that way. He knew the position of every gun in Fort Jackson. Of course Commodore Porter at once questioned him, and as he did so he put down upon the map, as he thought, the positions of the guns in the fort, as the deserter described them. But instead of marking the guns down in their proper positions in the work, in the places where they were located, he had them all put on the glacis; he actually did not know the difference on the drawing between the glacis of the work and the inner work.

Question. It has been said that some of our men approached so near Fort Fisher that they took a flag, and that that was an indication that the garrison was ready to surrender.

Answer. That was told me, but I did not see it. After I had made a reconnaissance, I returned, as I had been directed, to General Butler, to make my report. I directed General Curtis to remain in command, and to push on towards the work until he was stopped, and to find out what was there; and if he discovered anything new to immediately report it to General Butler, and I left a signal sergeant with him for that purpose. During my absence this thing was said to have occurred. After the return of the expedition, I sent for the officer who was said to have done it, Lieutenant Walling, of the 142d New York. He was one of the officers in command of the skirmish line. I ques-

tioned him about it, and he told me that a shell had knocked the flag-staff outside and on top of the parapet, and the flag hung over into or outside of the ditch. Thinking that probably the rebels had not observed it, he crept up on his hands and knees to the palisading, found a hole in it that one of the shells had made, crept through the hole and up to the flag, and got it and got away with it without being observed.

Question. Did he suppose that was any evidence that the fort was not manned?

Answer. No, sir. The fact that one man or fifty men of an assaulting column get inside an enemy's work is no evidence whatever of success. When the rebels assaulted my position on the 16th of May last, they got 265 men inside of my line, but I took every one of them prisoners. You sometimes let the head of a column come over, if you can mash it in the middle, for then you can take all of one end of it prisoners.

Question. When did you have the conversation with General Grant, in which he said he thought you might have taken Fort Fisher easier than Terry did?

Answer. That was on last Friday night, about 11 o'clock.

Question. Was that the first conversation you had had with him upon the subject since your return from that expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir; and the only conversation I have had with him.

Question. He gave you no reason for that opinion?

Answer. No, sir; he gave me none, and I did not ask for any. If it could have been taken, then there must have been some facts developed since then of which I have not heard.

Question. Did Admiral Porter propose to you, or to General Butler, to send sailors and marines to assist in the attack?

Answer. No, sir; and he told me he could not run any boats by, because the channel was too intricate—that it was obstructed.

Question. Was there any agitation of the question of his running by the fort?

Answer. Yes, sir. I spoke of it, and so did Colonel Comstock, but Admiral Porter said it could not be done.

Question. Have not blockade runners, drawing as much water as some of the vessels in that fleet, been constantly passing in and out there?

Answer. I will tell you exactly what I thought, when he made that objection. He had in his fleet one or two, at least, and I think more, vessels that were captured blockade runners. They had been armed and formed a portion of his fleet. Now, those blockade runners, in going in and out there, generally choose the darkest nights. It seemed to me that as Admiral Porter believed he had silenced the fire of that fort, as those vessels had run in and out there in the darkness of the night, it was strange that he should not attempt to get them by there in the daytime, when he could see.

Question. Was the channel there sufficiently deep to permit his vessels to pass?

Answer. He has quite a number of them in the river now.

Question. General Grant's idea was that the fleet would run by the fort?

Answer. He told me that distinctly. The language he used was: "This is to be another Mobile affair." That is what I expected would be the plan until Admiral Porter, for the first time, said that he could not run any of his vessels in. The exact language used by General Grant was: "This is to be another Mobile affair."

Question. When did the fleet or the transports, for the first time, come in sight of Fort Fisher, so as to apprise the enemy that there was an attacking force in the neighborhood?

Answer. The first vessel was the one on which General Butler and I were. That appeared off there on Thursday or Friday, the 15th or 16th of December, I have forgotten which.

Question. I want to know when the enemy, by observations, could have first learned that there was an attacking force about there?

Answer. Our transport fleet never saw the fort until we went up to make the attack. I can answer that question more correctly, if the testimony of Richmond papers is deemed sufficient. I have seen the official despatch of the time they first observed the fleet.

Question. What day was that?

Answer. It was dated on Tuesday, the 20th of December. At that time the most of the transport fleet was near Beaufort, or on the way there, and I will tell you what I think the enemy then saw. On Monday, the day following Admiral Porter's arrival, he exercised his fleet, put it in three lines and moved it about, standing in towards the land. I made the remark then, on board our vessel, that if they ran those tall frigates in nearer to the land they would be seen from the top of Cape Fear light-house.

Question. How far was that?

Answer. I inquired about that, and was told that it was fifteen or twenty miles. Now the tops of a frigate's masts can be seen that distance in clear weather. I know that they can be seen that distance, according to the rules laid down for the construction of light-houses.

Question. There was considerable delay in getting the army and navy together at the rendezvous. To what do you attribute that delay? You had some good weather there.

Answer. Yes, sir, and we were there. Admiral Porter said that the reason he could not get there sooner was that the powder-vessel was not ready, and he had to send his monitors around to Beaufort light, and there take on his ammunition, before he could come out.

Question. General Butler was there ready and waiting for him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. During this good weather you speak of?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what condition was the powder-vessel? What had Admiral Porter to do to it but put some powder on board.

Answer. He had to put the powder on board, and arrange the little clock-work and machinery for setting it off. However, I state this only from hearsay.

Question. Do you know who was the originator of this powder-vessel idea?

Answer. I had heard General Butler speak of the idea nine months ago. I think something similar had been tried before by General Foster on fort Sumter, but I do not know who was the originator of it on this expedition. As I saw a great number of opinions, in the volume shown me by General Butler, I should think there must be some documents here to show that. Those opinions would not have been asked for except upon the suggestion of some one.

Question. Was it not a new thing in naval or any other warfare to attempt to blow up a fortification in that way?

Answer. It was an entirely new thing.

Question. Upon deliberation, and after all you have since learned, are you entirely satisfied with the opinion you then formed about attacking the fort?

Answer. Yes, sir, I am fully satisfied from all I have heard since, from the result of the second attack, and everything else—I am fully satisfied that I did my duty there.

Question. Had the second bombardment any more effect upon Fort Fisher than the first had?

Answer. Evidently it had. That is exactly what made the difference in the condition of Fort Fisher at the time I reconnoitred it, and when it was carried. The report that I made of the condition of Fort Fisher was almost verbatim the report that General Bragg made to General Robert E. Lee. General Butler



spoke to me of my report being almost verbatim the report of General Bragg of the condition of the fort.

Question. In what condition do you understand it to have been after the second bombardment?

Answer. I judge merely from the official reports I have seen. I judge that a great many of the guns on the land front were dismounted, and Admiral Porter speaks of having knocked the work into a pulp. From that I judge that he concentrated his fire upon a particular point of the parapet, as he made a hole to go through. The object of an artillery fire on a fortification is either to dismount the guns, and thus remove that arm of the fort, or to make a breach in the work to enable the assaulting column to go in, or both. On the first expedition neither of those objects was accomplished by the bombardment. Judging from the reports, those objects were at least partially accomplished on the second expedition—that is to say, Fort Fisher, when I reconnoired it, was exactly like a strong man with both of his arms and all his powers complete, except that he has some flesh wounds and is bleeding a little, but is still able to fight. When the fort was bombarded the second time, it was like a man who has had one of his arms broken. The guns of the fort had been dismounted.

Question. In view of that, can you imagine why General Grant should say it could have been taken more easily on the first than on the second expedition?

Answer. I cannot, unless he puts it on the strength of the garrison, and has more information on that subject than I have. He told me that there were from 1,000 to 1,200 men in the garrison there the first time.

Question. Do you know whether General Grant contemplated a surprise of the garrison by the first expedition?

Answer. That is what he told me. He said that he never gave an order for an assault—did not order an assault at all on the first expedition.

Question. What do you say about General Butler's intrenching there if he made a landing?

Answer. The order of General Grant to General Butler, which I saw published in the papers—I never saw the original of the order—stated that in certain cases he was to intrench and hold his position, and co-operate with the navy in the reduction of the fort. General Grant said to me the other night that when he ordered the expedition to sail he knew that Wilmington and the works there were nearly devoid of troops; and he thought if we moved down there and landed quickly, the mere effect of the landing of the troops, together with the presence of such a fleet, would be to compel them to surrender. But in consequence of the delay the enemy got troops down there. But he said that his intention was, after we had made a landing there, finding it was not possible to assault, that General Butler should intrench there.

Question. What was there to prevent compliance with such an order?

Answer. There was nothing there to prevent a compliance with it. There would have been difficulties to contend with at that season of the year. The landing of supplies would have been one difficulty; the annoyance from the rebel gunboats in the river would have been another. But they might, and probably would, have been driven off by our artillery.

Question. Did you experience any great difficulty in landing there on account of the roughness of the sea?

Answer. Not at the time we did land, but it became rough about 9 or 10 o'clock in the evening.

Question. You experienced difficulty in re-embarking?

Answer. Yes, sir. Some of our men had to remain there for thirty-six hours, I think.

Question. How long did that storm continue?

Answer. General Butler came away, leaving General Ames to get the troops off. We had bad weather until we got near Hatteras, about twenty-four or

twenty-six hours afterwards. I understood from General Curtis that all the men could not be got off until Tuesday morning. They landed on Sunday afternoon.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you and General Butler fully concur in everything relating to the expedition and the execution of it? I mean what was done after the expedition sailed from Fortress Monroe.

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, so far as I had information.

Question. Was there anything done, or omitted to be done, which you would not have done, or omitted, if you had had full command of the expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir. If I had had the instructions that General Grant gave to General Butler I would have done one thing that General Butler did not do; I would have intrenched and remained there. I should certainly have done that; and I have written to General Butler that I was sorry he did not show me that letter of instructions, so that I could have advised him about that. There is where General Butler clearly made a mistake. The order seems to be explicit that he should remain there. No matter what the difficulties were, that order would have covered him from any consequences.

Question. Did the condition of things exist there which that order contemplated?

Answer. I think so.

Question. In relation to the landing of troops, &c.?

Answer. I think so. The order simply said that if the work did not fall at once, he was to intrench there. The object appeared to me to be to secure a landing, and to hold it after you had secured it.

Question. Was there, or not, in your opinion, any difficulty in securing a landing there that could be held? That is, could you land your whole force and the supplies necessary to sustain them?

Answer. In my opinion, it would have been difficult to have done it; but still, with an order like that, a junior officer should obey it; and then the responsibility of such a step falls upon the one who gave the order.

Question. You think it would not have been advisable to have done so had it not been in strict obedience to an order?

Answer. Yes, sir, I do think so, at that season of the year.

Question. And might it not have been that the general commanding the expedition felt that the conditions in relation to the landing, &c., which General Grant contemplated, did not obtain?

Answer. That might be; but I do not know.

By the chairman:

Question. Did you know of any want of concert of action or good feeling between General Butler and Admiral Porter?

Answer. I know that Admiral Porter and General Butler have been on bad terms with each other ever since the fall of New Orleans, or shortly afterwards?

Question. Did that feeling manifest itself in that expedition by any want of concert of action, or in any other way?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.

Question. Wherein?

Answer. Admiral Porter, who was the junior officer, sent his fleet captain to confer with General Butler, instead of coming himself.

Question. You think that was in consequence of that bad feeling?

Answer. Yes, sir; for General Butler, although the ranking officer, had twice called upon Admiral Porter at Fortress Monroe.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. In your judgment, was that showing, on the part of Admiral Porter, a want of military courtesy and respect?

Answer. There was a want of military courtesy in Admiral Porter not coming himself.

Question. Do you know what number of men would properly garrison Fort Fisher?

Answer. No, sir; I have had no opportunity to get information on that point.

Question. When you were there had you any reason to suppose there was a demoralization or want of efficiency on the part of the garrison?

Answer. I had not the least, because the garrison, according to my ideas, managed the defence perfectly properly. That, to me, was one evidence of the strength of the garrison.

Question. Did General Curtis advance so near the fort as to imply any demoralization or disposition not to resist on the part of the garrison?

Answer. No, sir; not at all, according to my idea.

By the chairman:

Question. One of the witnesses, Captain Alden, of the navy, seems to be of the opinion that General Curtis got so near the fort that they could not bring their guns to bear upon him. What do you think of it?

Answer. Captain Alden, then, does not know anything about a glacis. The object of the glacis is to prevent anything of that kind being done.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. In your opinion, did General Butler and you give the enemy any intimation that the fleet was there, and about to attack, by your going in your vessel so near Fort Fisher?

Answer. No, sir; not the least. A single transport going in there in that way would look like a supply vessel for the blockading fleet.

Question. Then you think there was nothing in what you did to lead the enemy to infer that a fleet was on its way to attack Fort Fisher?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think there was. They had information several months before that the navy was getting up an expedition for that purpose. That was one reason General Grant assigned to me for starting off the expedition in October; that the navy had so advertised the expedition that there was no use to send it.

Question. At the time of the explosion of the powder-vessel, and the attack, was there or not that co-operation which there should have been between the army and navy.

Answer. There was decidedly not.

Question. Why was there not, and who was responsible for it?

Answer. The navy commenced the attack while the army transports were in Beaufort harbor, seventy miles off, getting coal and water.

Question. Why was that done?

Answer. I have not the remotest idea. I know the opinion expressed on board our vessel by several officers, when it was found that the navy had made the attack as they did. There was one officer who particularly surprised me by expressing the opinion he did. He said that he believed Admiral Porter made the attack in the way he did, because he believed that he could knock the fort all to pieces, and would thus get all the credit of taking it to himself. That officer is generally very quiet in the way of expressing opinions.

Question. You have said you have been engaged in several assaults upon fortifications prior to this.

Answer. Upon intrenchments.

Question. Will you give a concise statement of those assaults?

Answer. I commanded an assaulting column against Port Hudson on the 27th of May, 1863. I commanded another assaulting column against Port Hudson on the 14th of June, 1863. I was the commanding officer of the troops

that made the assault on the 29th of October, 1864, on the enemy's works on the Williamsburg road. I was assaulted three times by the enemy on the 16th of May, 1864, when my men were behind breastworks at Drury's bluff. And I was in command of the 18th corps when the enemy, on the 30th of September last, attempted to retake battery Harrison.

Question. Were you also at New Orleans?

Answer. Yes, sir; but we made no assault there. The fleet ran by the forts, and took the troops in above the forts. I used to hunt around there, and knew the whole country well. I took the troops in there and cut the forts off from communication with the city, and after that was done the forts surrendered. But we did not have any fight there at all with the enemy. Both of Admiral Farragut's great victories have been almost bloodless ones so far as the army was concerned, simply because he ran by the enemy's works with his fleet. A fort cannot walk off; and if you cut it off by running a fleet by it, it must fall. That, I believed, was to be the plan to be adopted in this case. If such a plan had been carried out here, the navy would probably not have lost so many men as they lost in that assault, and the army would not have lost fifty men.

By the chairman:

Question. And the fort would have fallen just as effectually?

Answer. Certainly, for it would have been entirely cut off.

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*Testimony of Brevet Brigadier General C. B. Comstock.*

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1865.

Brevet Brigadier General C. B. COMSTOCK sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army now?

Answer. I am a lieutenant colonel and aide-de-camp on the staff of General Grant, and brevet brigadier general.

Question. How long have you been in the army?

Answer. Nearly ten years.

Question. You have accompanied the army of the Potomac in its campaigns under General Grant?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you with the first expedition fitted out against Fort Fisher?

Answer. I was.

Question. I wish you would state, in your own way, without further questioning from us for the present, all that you deem it material to state in regard to that expedition. After you have done so, we will ask you what further questions we may deem necessary.

Answer. I cannot give dates very accurately. But some days before the expedition started from City Point, General Grant informed me that General Butler wished me to accompany General Weitzel on the expedition, and I was directed to go accordingly. I joined the expedition, going at last with General Butler, however, instead of with General Weitzel, as General Butler, late in the day, accompanied the expedition. We lay at Fortress Monroe on account of bad weather, and waiting for the powder-vessel for several days.

Question. What was the particular cause of delay at that time?

Answer. The weather was bad nearly the whole of the time. But at the same time I think a sufficient cause of the delay was the fact that the powder-boat was not then prepared.

Question. Under whose charge was that powder-vessel?

Answer. It was under the charge of the navy

Question. About how long were you detained there on that account?

Answer. I cannot give the exact time now. I suppose it must have been four or five days at least.

Question. Where did you go from there?

Answer. We went from there to the army rendezvous, about twenty-five miles off New inlet. We arrived there on the evening of the 15th of December, I think.

Question. How long a stay did you make there then?

Answer. We staid there for three days at least, with good weather and a smooth sea.

Question. Why were you waiting there so long?

Answer. Waiting for Admiral Porter.

Question. Where was he?

Answer. I believe he was at Beaufort at the time.

Question. Do you know whether General Butler sent word to him that he was ready, or gave him any information of the kind?

Answer. When we left Fortress Monroe General Butler informed me that Admiral Porter had informed him that the navy would need about twelve hours start of us, as he would have to stop a short time at Beaufort. General Butler proposed to give him twenty-four hours, and then he supposed that we would meet at the rendezvous off New inlet.

Question. Did you ever hear what caused the delay of Admiral Porter at Beaufort?

Answer. I believe Admiral Porter sent two messages from Beaufort to General Butler, one to the effect that it was so foggy one morning that he could not get the iron-clads over the bar at Beaufort; and I think another time the powder-boat was again the cause of the delay.

Question. At what time did the navy go in such proximity to Fort Fisher that the enemy would be apprised of the approach of the expedition?

Answer. I suppose it was the morning of the 24th of December.

Question. How long was it before you actually made a demonstration there?

Answer. There is a point which I should state, perhaps. After we had spent those three days of good weather off New inlet, in perfect readiness to make the attack if the navy had been ready, in the afternoon of the third day Admiral Porter arrived. He ordered the powder-boat to be taken in and exploded that night. But the wind blew so in the afternoon that it seemed to us impossible to land the troops, and General Weitzel and myself went to Admiral Porter and requested that he should postpone sending in the powder-boat until the water should be smooth enough to enable us to go in and land the troops. He therefore sent in discretionary orders to the officer in charge of the powder-boat not to explode it until we could land. The next day the wind blew strongly; our transports had got short of coal and water, and we were forced to go into Beaufort. I was informed by a naval officer remaining there, that while we were gone there was no time when a landing of troops could have been effected, it was so rough; that it was one steady severe gale.

On the 23d of December General Butler sent an officer of his staff to Admiral Porter to inform him that we should be ready to start the next morning. This officer saw Admiral Porter and returned, not getting back until the morning of the 24th. He brought a message from Admiral Porter that the powder-boat would be exploded at 1 o'clock that morning.

The transports were got under way as rapidly as possible from Beaufort, and arrived off New inlet in the afternoon of the 24th. We found that the powder-boat had been exploded at the time proposed, and that the navy had been bombarding since about noon of that day.

Question. Before the land forces of the expedition appeared?

Answer. Before the land forces were there. There were one or two large vessels, army transports, that could not get into Beaufort harbor, and that had coal enough to stand out the gale. The Baltic may have remained in the vicinity of the fleet, so that it is possible some part of the land forces were in the vicinity of the fleet.

Question. Did you find any difficulty when you attempted to land the troops?

Answer. It was easy enough when we commenced to land them. But in the afternoon the wind rose, and by 8 o'clock that night it was difficult to land the troops, and by 10 or 12 o'clock that night it was impossible to land troops there.

Question. You did not land all your troops?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. About what portion did you land?

Answer. I have nothing official in regard to that, but my opinion is that there were about 2,300 landed.

Question. How many troops altogether were with the expedition?

Answer. About 6,500.

Question. You could not land the rest?

Answer. Not at that time. However, I should say this about it: About 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I should suppose, and while it was still practicable to land troops, an order was given to re-embark those which had been landed. The re-embarkation continued from that time up to perhaps 10 o'clock that night. During that interval it was still possible to land troops. It is a little easier to get troops on shore than it is to get them off.

Question. Which is the most difficult, to land troops, or to land provisions, munitions of war, &c.?

Answer. I suppose it is most difficult to land munitions of war and provisions, or rather some kinds of provisions. For instance, in the case of hard bread, put up in thin, light, wooden boxes, there is great danger that it will get into the water. Pork and beef in barrels can be thrown overboard and got ashore in that way without injury. Cartridges and powder must be carried ashore on the men's shoulders.

Question. General Butler did not effect a landing of all his troops?

Answer. He did not.

Question. Why did he not land them all?

Answer. General Weitzel made an examination of the work, and reported to General Butler that in his opinion an assault upon Fort Fisher would be impracticable.

Question. Did you accompany General Weitzel on that examination?

Answer. I was not with General Weitzel at that time. Later in the evening I was on shore and made an examination.

Question. To what conclusion did you come in regard to the practicability of an assault upon the work at that time?

Answer. I cannot say that I formed a definite opinion at the time, as the question of assaulting had already been decided upon the report of General Weitzel. I cannot, perhaps, give a definite answer to that question, because I allow my subsequent knowledge of the work to affect my opinion somewhat.

Question. Was it a strong work?

Answer. It was. I will endeavor to answer the question somewhat in detail. I saw the work the first time about the same time that General Weitzel did, and at about the same distance. At that time none of our men had been in the work. I counted, I think, fifteen guns not injured, so far as we could see. I thought the work at that time very difficult of assault; I thought then the chances of success were not more than even. Later, however, perhaps a half or three-quarters of an hour afterwards, I saw General Curtis, and he told me that some of his men had been in the work; that a horse had been taken out of

the fort, and that the flag had been taken off the parapet by one of his men; and that there were not more than twenty rebels inside of the work, and that he believed he could take it with fifty men. I asked some questions about his sources of information, and he then said he could take it with a brigade. If I had been in command of the forces at that point, I should have made the trial to take the fort, simply because his men felt or thought they could go into the fort. My opinion as to the practicability of an assault when I first saw the work was changed subsequently by the statement of General Curtis and the men who had been in the work.

Question. On the supposition that the work was really not properly manned by the enemy?

Answer. That was General Curtis's idea. I did not think so. I supposed the men were all in the bomb-proofs; and I thought that if the enemy would let the men get up as close as General Curtis's men did, I thought it possible that confident men could rush in in time to shut the rebels up in their bomb-proofs. If the men had not had a strong belief that they could get in, I should have thought the chances of success were small. But with such a belief as that, 1,500 men could have done anything.

Question. With the information that General Weitzel had, would you have agreed with him, independent of what General Curtis said to you?

Answer. I should, from the information I had at that time.

Question. Is there in military history any instance of such a work as that being taken by a small force, if the work had been properly manned, without a regular siege?

Answer. Yes, sir; there are instances on record of far more difficult works than that being taken by storm. In the Peninsular wars of Europe there were several cases of works with vertical walls fifteen to twenty feet in height, and pretty well manned, which were taken by parties of men scaling the walls by means of scaling-ladders.

Question. What evidence had you at that time as to the strength of the enemy within the fortifications at Fort Fisher, and within striking distance?

Answer. Do you mean at the time the decision was made not to attack the fort?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I do not think we had any definite information at that moment of the force inside the works. When the troops were landed they got a few prisoners who belonged to General Kirkland's rebel brigade, showing that they were in our front. And General Butler told me that some of the prisoners informed him that Hagood's brigade were also there. But I think that at that time we had no definite information of the force inside the work.

Question. Have you ever ascertained what the strength of the rebel garrison was at that time?

Answer. I have questioned a great many prisoners, some who were in the work at that time, and their statements agree very well. They had no motive for concealing or suppressing the truth; and an officer, one of the most reliable prisoners who gave me the information, stated that they had about 800 men in the work before we appeared there; that a day or two preceding, it may have been the night of the first day's bombardment, four hundred more men had been brought over there from Fort Caswell, and, I think, Smith's island, making the garrison about 1,200 men.

Question. Would that number be an efficient garrison for such a fort?

Answer. It would be an efficient garrison if the troops were efficient.

Question. Did you take intrenching tools along with you, so as to intrench there, in case you did not make an assault?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You were all prepared for that ?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.

Question. What injury was done to Fort Fisher by the first bombardment, so far as you had an opportunity to learn then or afterwards ?

Answer. It was impossible to judge when we captured the work what damage had been done by the first bombardment, and what by the second. The palisading, which we saw very distinctly, reaching from the ocean to the work, had been quite severely injured, so that there were large gaps in it; but the sun shining in our faces the first time we were there, I did not see, and I do not think that General Weitzel was able to see, that the palisading was injured any.

Question. Was the fort bombarded at any nearer range the second time than it was the first ?

Answer. I think the monitors were somewhat nearer, perhaps 200 or 300 yards; and the wooden vessels may have been somewhat nearer. But I do not think the difference in the distance was so great as to make any essential difference in the effect of our fire.

Question. Which of the batteries was the most effective, the large fifteen inch guns on the monitors, or the smaller and more numerous guns on such vessels as the Ironsides ?

Answer. I have not been on board those vessels when in action, but I know that the judgment of some of the officers of the navy is that the Ironsides is about equivalent to three or four monitors; that they would almost as lief have the same number of guns on board a vessel like the Ironsides as the same number distributed among monitors.

Question. You were there also at the time of the second attack ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you give us a concise account of that ?

Answer. Our force was then about 8,500 men, and from the accounts of prisoners whom we took we estimated the force of the enemy on Federal Point at 2,400. Besides that force the enemy had three brigades of Hoke's command on the peninsula, some three or four miles north of Federal Point; they were probably encamped somewhere in the vicinity of Wilmington at the time the navy showed themselves there and commenced the second bombardment. We were also informed at the time that the enemy had about 1,000 junior reserves there, but we learned nothing subsequently to show that that was positively so.

Question. What was the condition of the fort when the assault was made ?

Answer. So far as the earthwork was concerned it was just as efficient as before a shot had been fired at it. The palisading had a great many gaps in it, although at the place where the storming was made I saw but one or two small openings, and those had to be made.

Question. How about their guns ?

Answer. At the time the assault was made, I think there were six guns and three mortars on the land face which were serviceable. The whole number of guns on the land face I believe was twenty-one.

Question. In making the assault the army was assisted by some marines and sailors, I believe ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What number of them ?

Answer. I am told that there were about 2,000 men in the assaulting column.

Question. Were you with the assaulting party ?

Answer. I was not; I was with General Terry, about six hundred yards from the work; where everything going on could be seen.

Question. Do you recollect how many men were lost in that assault, and in taking the fort ?



Answer. I do not recollect the precise number, but I think there were about seven hundred men killed and seriously wounded—that is, so seriously that it would be necessary to place them in hospitals.

Question. Suppose you had intrenched yourselves there at the time of the first expedition, could you have maintained yourselves there against the enemy? Could you have been sure to have been under the protection of the navy, or was the coast so exposed that you could not be certain of having the aid of the navy at all times?

Answer. The admiral stated that his vessel could lay there under any circumstances. But in very rough weather I do not think their fire would be of any value; still I think we would have been able to maintain ourselves there. There were 6,500 men, and having once established a line across the peninsula, as we did on the second expedition, I think 3,000 men could have held it against a very strong force.

Question. How about obtaining provisions?

Answer. That would have depended on the weather. If we had found that we were in danger of suffering on the beach for want of provisions, we could have run supplies in through Masonboro' inlet, and then down the sound or down the beach.

Question. Was there any difficulty in the navy running by the fort?

Answer. The navy thought it would be impossible. I suppose they knew the difficulties better than I did. There were torpedoes there, and I am told the channel was very difficult, and it was very difficult to run by there. But if the fire of the work had been silenced, or very nearly silenced, as the admiral seemed to believe, I think the experiment should have been tried; and I thought so at the time. But very few of the guns on the sea face had been injured at all at the time the work was taken, and I do not think any vessel could have got by if those guns had been served.

Question. At the end of the second bombardment, when the place was taken, were not most of the guns on the sea face dismantled?

Answer. No, sir; very few of them were.

Question. How was that?

Answer. The fire of the navy was directed mainly to the land face.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you have knowledge of the instructions given by General Grant to General Butler?

Answer. I saw the instructions before they were given to General Butler.

Question. In your opinion, were those instructions disregarded by General Butler in any respect; and if so, in what respect?

Answer. I read the instructions hastily, and did not see them subsequently, so that I do not now know precisely what the directions were in reference to remaining if the assault was not made at the time we came away. I had forgotten that the instructions contained an order that we were to remain there at any rate. I did not see the instructions while we were there; I only read them hastily before we left City Point.

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*Testimony of Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter.*

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1865.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and command in the navy?

Answer. I am a rear-admiral, commanding the North Atlantic squadron.

Question. We have been instructed by a resolution of the Senate to inquire into the expedition against Fort Fisher and the defences of Wilmington. Will you give us, in your own way, a full statement, so far as you have knowledge, of the inception, preparation, and execution of the first expedition against Fort Fisher?

Answer. I think it was about the 20th of September last that I was on my way to Cairo to resume my command of the Mississippi squadron. Secretary Welles sent me word to meet him that evening at Mr. Blair's. I had arranged to leave for the west the next morning. I went to Mr. Blair's and found Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox, who had a number of charts of Cape Fear river, which were spread out for examination. Secretary Welles said that he thought it most important that some attempt should be made to get possession of Cape Fear river; that he had always been in favor of making the attempt, and had, time and time again, invited the co-operation of the army for that purpose, but had received no encouragement. He said that he thought there was then a prospect of getting troops for that purpose, and asked me what was my opinion about the matter. I told him that I had never seen Cape Fear river, and knew nothing about the defences the rebels had erected there. He said he would put me in possession of all the papers he had from Admiral Farragut, Admiral Lee and others, who had investigated the subject, and then let me give my opinion about it. I read over carefully all the papers, and examined the charts. Admiral Lee decided most positively that the place could not be taken with 50,000 men, it was so strong; and Admiral Farragut decided that we had not ships in the navy to do anything with it. Under these circumstances I told the Secretary that I should require time to consider this matter. He told me to take the charts and papers home with me. I did so; looked at the charts and the maps of work, counted the guns, and made calculations of the work. I went back to the Secretary the next morning and told him that if he would give me the force I named, I would promise to take the fort in three days. That was very encouraging to him, for his whole heart was bent upon the matter. He then asked me what ships I wanted. I told him I wanted 300 guns on board ship, and all the heaviest frigates. Said he, "Admiral Lee says, in his reports, that the heaviest frigates cannot approach the fort." I said, "Then these soundings are all wrong, for the charts show that we can approach the fort within three-quarters of a mile, and that is near enough." He then asked what number of men would be required to take the fort. I said that it would require 13,000 men, to land with intrenching tools, and say fifteen guns. He replied, "Very well; now are you willing to take command of the expedition?" I told him that I was willing, but that there was no use to undertake a naval attack without military co-operation. The Secretary said, "I think we can get the men. I want you to go down with Mr. Fox to see General Grant." We started that evening and went down and saw General Grant. I told him what I knew the navy could do. The fort was not represented to be quite so strong as it afterwards turned out to be. The Secretary told me I could have every ship I wanted, and I named all my vessels. They were to be at Hampton roads on such a day. I allowed them ten days to get there, and they were all there at the time. I told General Grant, when I saw him, that in fifteen days I could have that force there, and if he could send 12,000 men the place could be taken. He said, "I cannot send them now; but when all your fleet are assembled I can get them here in 24 hours." On the fifth day after that I went to see General Grant again, and asked him what the chances were of getting the troops. He said, "Whenever you are ready I can put the men on board the transports in twenty-four hours." I replied, "Very well; you better commence now, for I am ready." That was on the 20th of October. General Grant said he would telegraph me, or come down and see me. The next day he came down and told me that he was so situated

that he could not send the men away then. He said, "Would it hurt you to wait a little while? Would it make any difference on account of the weather?" I said it would not.

General Grant did the best he could to get the troops, and I was satisfied he could not get them at that time. I told him I was willing to wait. But a month and a half went by and I began to get a little impatient. Sometimes General Grant would promise me men, and then again he would say he could not spare them. I felt very uneasy. The public were getting anxious; there were a great many remarks in the press. I was willing to go alone and undertake it, and was afterwards sorry I had not gone, for we would have taken the place without any trouble, as it afterwards turned out.

Finally General Butler came on board my vessel one day to see me, and brought some of his staff with him, and took lunch with me. He said, "Admiral, I have come to propose something to you, to take Fort Caswell." He asked me if I had read the account of the great explosion of powder in England? I told him I had. Said he, "Did you notice how terrific it was?" I said, "Yes; it struck me it was very heavy." He then showed me some calculations he had gone into, and proposed to get up a powder-boat with two hundred tons of powder on board, which by his calculations would create a pressure of twenty-two tons to the square inch, and all around would be affected as by a tornado, and the sand-bags and guns would be overthrown and scattered about. I told him I was rather incredulous about that, but at the same time I supposed he had made the calculations from good authority. He said that he had; that he had been in consultation with others. I told him I was willing to try anything. He asked me if I could furnish a boat. I told him I could; that I had a boat of no value at all that could carry that amount of powder; that I could tow her down there, and get steam enough on her to run in.

I wrote to Mr. Fox and told him what General Butler proposed. General Butler was quite full of the thing, and came on to Washington, and then came back and went up to see General Grant about it. Some of my officers were present when General Butler proposed this to me. When he went out they laughed and said to me, "Admiral, you looked serious when the general made that proposition. Do you place any confidence in it?" I replied, "I do not know; it is an experiment; nobody can tell how it will result. But I rather think the general overestimates the power of powder exploded in the open air. Still we shall never get any men until General Butler goes on the expedition, and I am willing to go on any terms; I am willing to take the powder-boat to get the men."

So I went into the general's terms, and the men were furnished. It was proposed to send three thousand five hundred men to take possession of the fort. I objected to that, for suppose the powder-vessel should not succeed? I did not believe it would succeed in doing all that was expected, but I thought it might demoralize the enemy somewhat. I insisted on seven or eight thousand men. The men were sent down on transports.

I was in Norfolk at the time, and it was coming on a heavy blow. The fleet was all ready to start. General Butler came on board in the evening, and told me he was all ready, and was embarking his troops. I said, "General, it is coming on a heavy sou'west gale, which will blow for four days; when you find the wind is coming out nor'west, you can put your men on board in five hours, and we can sail together. I have nothing to detain me but the powder-boat." I took it for granted he would take my advice, as that of a seaman. But he put his men on board that night, and it came on to blow furiously.

The general also told me that he was going to take boats down to land his men. I told him that was not necessary, for we could furnish boats for that purpose. But he rather intimated that he did not want the services of anybody, and was perfectly independent so far as boats were concerned. It rained and

blew, and the soldiers were cooped up in those little transports and must have suffered a great deal. They had five days' cooked rations with them, which they ate up. And they must have got into the other rations, for they told me they had nineteen days' rations; but by some mismanagement it was reduced to ten days.

The moment the wind began to abate, I said to the general, "Your vessels are all light and can go faster than mine; mine are heavy druggers. I have to tow my iron-clads, and I must take them to Beaufort for their supplies, and it will take me from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to load them up, and we can start from Beaufort together." He asked me where I proposed to rendezvous my large ships, and I told him twenty-four miles east of Cape Fear river. He did not tell me that he would rendezvous there, or where he would go.

I went to Beaufort, expecting General Butler there every day. I worked there night and day. It was blowing quite a gale, and for a time we could not cross the bar off Beaufort. As soon as we succeeded in getting out, I went off and found General Butler and all his fleet assembled there. I proposed sending in the powder-boat that night. It was the best weather we had, and the best we were likely to have. I was afraid there would be a gale in two or three days; the officers of the blockading squadron down there said we would soon have a gale. There was every chance to get ashore the next morning.

But General Butler sent me word by General Weitzel that he would prefer that I should postpone sending in the powder-boat, for he was not quite ready for it. I did not see why it should be postponed; but I said, "Very well, we will postpone sending in the powder-boat."

In the mean time it came on a gale. I did not move from my position, but rode it out there. I think it is the first time on record where such a fleet as that rode out such a gale at sea. The smallest tug I had remained there during the gale. General Butler's vessels ran into Beaufort, where they ought to have gone in the first place. I was surprised to find them gone in the morning. Still they could not have done better, as there was no particular object in their remaining there.

As the weather moderated and the sea began to get smooth, I ran in and reconnoitred. I found that it was not quite smooth enough to land soldiers, but still smooth enough to land sailors. Finding General Butler did not come, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon I sent word to him that I proposed to explode the powder-boat that night. It was five hours' run to Beaufort, and five hours back, making ten hours in all. He had plenty of time to get down there by 8 o'clock the next morning, and we would have everything ready to land his troops when he came. Some of the transports did get there with about 1,500 men under General Ames.

I sent in the powder-boat and exploded it that night; at 8 o'clock the next morning, finding General Butler had not come, I postponed the attack on the fort. I held on until 12 o'clock; nothing came in sight, and I gave the order to go in and make the attack; which was done. We kept it up until sunset. I soon found that the fire of the fort was weak; that they had not men enough to man their guns. An hour did the whole thing; it was a one-sided affair. We had nothing to do but fire deliberately, and either dismount their guns, or cover them up with sand, and by the time General Butler came there, about sunset, every gun was disabled; not dismounted, for we dismounted very few of them the first time; but they were disabled by having sand thrown into their muzzles so that they could not be fired; which was all we wanted.

General Butler sent General Weitzel on board my vessel, to ask me all about it. I told him exactly the condition of things; that I thought there were very few men in the fort; that it had not made the resistance I had expected from a work of that kind. He said, "The general wants to know how many boats and vessels you can give him to-morrow to cover the landing." I said, "As

many as he wants." I detailed a force of about two hundred men and about one hundred and fifty boats.

They were to commence landing at 8 o'clock the next morning. The transports anchored a good ways off in the first place. I sent word that they had better move closer in shore, where they could make shorter trips. Some of them moved in; some did not. The whole thing was badly managed. Finally they landed about five hundred men.

There was a little place called Half-moon battery, which was about a mile from the landing. It fired one gun. The gunboats went in and shelled it, and all the people left, spiking the guns themselves. There was another small battery called Flag-pond battery. Our troops landed in front, and as they landed a little white flag was stuck up over the parapet. Six or seven sailors ran up and found it was an old sand-hill, with an old gun in it that was burst. Behind this place were seventy-five boys and men, the junior and senior reserves of North Carolina. I do not suppose any of them had ever fired a gun in their lives, and they were delighted at being captured. The five hundred men moved up to reconnoitre. In the mean time others got ashore, without any particular order. Where anybody was willing to go ashore Jack would take them in the boat. They went in small parties, until about 3,500 were got ashore. This consumed the whole day.

In the mean time General Curtis had moved up towards the fort. The fleet was firing deliberately at the fort, and knocked down the palisades, which were the most troublesome thing the army had to contend with. We did not know at that time that there was an open gate through which they could have marched without any trouble, and a nice bridge across the ditch.

General Weitzel went up and reconnoitred and sent back word to General Butler that the place could not be taken by assault; and Colonel Comstock coincided with him. These were two able engineers, who said that, judging from the appearance of the place, it could not be taken by assault; that they had seen no evidence of its being strongly manned, or of anybody being inside of it; but the work was tremendously strong, and they gave all the engineer reasons for not taking the place; and General Butler himself, without landing, decided to recall his troops.

In the mean time General Curtis had gone up to the fort. The flag of the fort had been knocked down by the fire of the navy, and had fallen over on the side of the fort, and one of his men went through a gap in the palisading and got it.

-The fort facing the water where the navy operated mounted seventeen or eighteen guns. It was filled with traverses from one end to the other. Then the other part of the fort which ran at right-angles with that mounted about the same number of guns. At the end of this upper-work, facing the sea, was a sally-port. That sally-port was open, with palisades extending on the right and left of it, and a bridge across the ditch into the fort.

General Curtis got up within 150 or 200 yards of the fort. His men went across and took the flag off the parapet. One or two of them went across through the gate, and when they got there they found bomb-proofs, and saw one or two men looking out; those men thinking they were going to be taken. Not a single man of the enemy manned the parapet. General Curtis was getting ready to go in and take the fort. There were originally 500 of the rebels on the point. Seventy-five of them were the junior and senior North Carolina reserves. As General Curtis moved up, there were 218 rebel officers and men who gave themselves up without any trouble at all. They had evidently put themselves in the way to be captured. Inside the fort there were about 150 men who were regular soldiers, about 22 or 23 of those men had been killed and wounded by the naval fire. There were 27 men killed and wounded by the bursting of two Brooks guns. Then there was a force of 57

or 60 marines, which were brought in afterwards to man the batteries on Cape Fear river, which were not included with those who were firing the few guns which had been fired on the sea-side. That left actually about 200 men in that fort that could fire a gun, and when General Ourtis came up with his men every one of the enemy were in the bomb-proofs, waiting for him to march in and take possession of the fort. That was all they wanted. But General Curtis received positive orders to re-embark. He had already made his dispositions to take the fort, and if that order had come 15 minutes later he would have taken the place. But when the rebels saw our men retiring two or three of them fired a gun on the portion near the gate, and another gun about 15 minutes after that; and they fired about 25 muskets. I saw them myself, for I suppose I was within 600 yards of the fort on my flag-ship, looking on to see what was going to be done. As General Curtis retired they did fire two guns and about 25 muskets. I left the iron-clad anchored that night, calculating that perhaps General Butler would change his mind in the morning. I was quite surprised when I heard the troops were re-embarking. In the night those fellows in the fort thinking somebody might come up the beach and assail them, fired a gun and about 20 muskets. The iron-clad fired two guns in that direction, and that stopped it. The rebels state that our army was driven back. There was no attempt made by our army to make an assault. Those of our soldiers who were wounded were wounded by our own shells. Some 8 or 10 were wounded in that way. One of our men went in and got a pair of shoes and brought them out. A little before sundown, General Butler wrote me a note stating that his engineers had examined the place, and decided they could not take it, and that he was going back to Hampton roads. I wrote back that I regretted it, but I should stay there, hoping that the place would yet be taken. Two prisoners have since told me the same things about the fort inside that I have stated. There was no effort to reconnoitre and ascertain the condition of the fort inside. General Curtis had every disposition to do it, but the reports of General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock were so adverse to anything of the kind that the whole thing was abandoned. These junior and senior reserves, 218, who were captured, were taken by General Butler on his ship, where he examined them. They were miserable men; everybody could see at once that they were not old soldiers. They told General Butler that Hoke's division was there with 7,000 men, and that more re-enforcements were coming from Wilmington; that they were expecting them all the time. That was taken without any reconnoissance whatever. There was no attempt made to find out whether anybody was there. In fact there was not a rebel soldier within five miles of that place. And there was no reason why we did not take the place. They all told us they did not intend to make any resistance. They were whipped. There was not a blade of grass or a piece of stick in that fort that was not burned up.

Question. By your shells?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was impossible for anything human to stand out there and fire a gun.

Question. How did you get at the number of men there?

Answer. From the officers and men; we captured nearly all the men there.

Question. You have ascertained these facts since the first bombardment?

Answer. Yes, sir; since we captured the place. But we knew it pretty well before; there was no mistake about it; we all knew it. All the men were not taken off by General Butler, but about 700 men left on shore, and we communicated with them by means of boats. But they were such a clumsy set of fellows with their muskets and knapsacks on, that it was hard to get them off. They made such a rush for the boats, thinking they were going to be left behind, that they were quite demoralized. I left them there, and brought the gunboats to protect them. The force that I had there would have commanded that neck

of land against 500,000 men. They could not re-enforce the fort afterwards when we were enfilading that neck of land.

Question. You say you knew pretty well in relation to the garrison of the fort during the first attack. How did you know that?

Answer. From the seventy-five men we first took; they really came forward and delivered themselves up. They said there were no men in the fort except the one hundred and fifty men. There were in the fort originally some 260 men, and we took 218 prisoners on the neck after the seventy-five. There were something like 500 men on the point altogether. They told us they were all the men about there, and that there were some 1,200 junior and senior reserves in Wilmington. There was nothing to prevent our army going right into Wilmington at that time. General Whiting, the rebel commander of the fort, says in his report that "the enemy" left on the 26th or 27th of December, and it was not until after that that General Hoke came to their relief.

Question. You say that the reports of General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock to General Butler were founded on the strength of the work?

Answer. Yes, sir; without regard to the men inside. They never made any attempt to try to find out about inside the fort.

General Grant had at first selected General Weitzel to command the expedition. I made some objections to General Weitzel; it is not necessary to state what they were, but General Grant overruled the objections. I then said to General Grant, "If it is as you say, I have no objection to General Weitzel, because he combines two things: he is a general, and ought to know something about the landing and handling of troops; and he is an engineer, and is the very man we want to throw up fortifications, for I suppose we cannot possibly take Fort Fisher without some days' siege." However, that was rendered unnecessary by the fire of the navy.

Question. Was the condition of the sea such as to prevent the landing of the whole force under General Butler?

Answer. The sea was as smooth as a mill-pond; there has not been so smooth a sea since. It was very smooth all the time General Terry was there; we had twelve days of beautiful weather; but there was no day when the sea was so smooth as when General Butler was there.

Question. Was there any indication of a storm coming on?

Answer. Not at all. I told General Butler there was indication of rain, but no fall of the barometer.

Question. Nothing to prevent the landing of provisions and ammunition?

Answer. Nothing at all; they could have landed the whole of them.

Question. If the force had landed there, could your vessels have laid there and protected them?

Answer. Yes, sir; they have laid there since during a heavy northeast gale, and not a single vessel moved from her position until I went into Cape Fear river. They laid there and covered General Terry; he was in the same position exactly. He landed with a thousand more men, and with 8,000 men opposed to him. But under the fire of the navy guns, no man of the enemy could show his nose there.

Question. Was there a cordial co-operation between General Butler and yourself?

Answer. There was no communication between us. I did not know General Butler was going to command the expedition; I thought General Weitzel was to command it.

Question. Did you have interviews with General Butler in relation to the expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir; but only in relation to fitting it out. I did not know, until he came down there, that he was going.

Question. Then, so far as fitting out the expedition was concerned, there was cordial co-operation between you?

Answer. I had nothing to do with the fitting out his part of the expedition; that he attended to himself.

Question. Was there at any time any want of co-operation between you?

Answer. Not at all. Everything was done that was required. We gave him all the boats and assistance to land his men. We were willing to land all his men, and when he did not want them on shore we took them off again. Everything he requested was done, no matter what it was.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. In a joint expedition like that, is it the part of the navy to land the force?

Answer. Yes, sir; we can do it better than the soldiers. We landed General Terry's force. We commenced at half after eight in the morning. The ships ran in and anchored, just as they did in General Butler's case, and at 3 o'clock we had 8,500 men on shore, with stores for 20 days, all their intrenching tools, and sufficient guns to cover them. We had not such good weather as before, and we lost an hour waiting for the tide to rise, and the sea was not near so smooth as when General Butler was there.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Was there any mistake, or anything wrong, about the sailing of the vessels of the navy and the army transports?

Answer. None at all; they all left when they got ready. The great mistake made was that the army vessels did not go into Beaufort, instead of exposing the troops to the inclement weather on the coast, with the men packed like sheep in a pen. General Terry went into Beaufort; we moved together; it went just like a unit. But that was General Butler's fault, not mine.

Question. Was there any understanding between you and General Butler where you should rendezvous?

Answer. None whatever. I gave him my printed order for the movements of the navy. He said, "I will keep this." I said, "Very well." In that order I gave the place for my vessels to rendezvous, and all the orders about my different vessels. General Butler rendezvoused at a different place, off Masonboro' inlet.

Question. Was any notice of the expedition given to the enemy by the movements of the vessels down there?

Answer. General Butler himself went in with all his transports, all his flags up, and exposed the whole affair. He asked the officer in command of a blockading vessel down there for a boat to go in and examine the fort. The officer told him that he could not take any orders from him; that he could take orders from nobody but me; that he could not allow a boat to go in there.

A person had been down there some time before, which caused that order. He came down there with orders from General Butler to disguise himself as a blockade runner, and run into Cape Fear river, for what purpose he did not say. Admiral Lee asked him what he meant by coming down there within his jurisdiction, and undertaking anything of the kind. He said he had full authority from General Butler to do so. It appears that the admiral took hold of this fellow and said, "Now you shall not go in there, unless you run the blockade in open day." The fellow backed out, and after that the orders were very stringent.

And when this other boat came down, the officer in command there did not know what dodge was up. General Butler told him he had an express understanding with me. Now I never had any understanding with him as commander of the expedition, though I presumed from what I saw that he would take it away from General Weitzel.



Question. Was there any arrangement between you and General Butler as to the time of sailing of the navy and army vessels?

Answer. I asked General Butler not to sail for 36 hours after we got off, so that I could get the iron-clads into Beaufort, and get on coal, &c., and then he would have time enough to catch up. But he did not do that; he went off first, I think.

Question. He sailed before your fleet?

Answer. Yes, sir, a few hours.

Question. Had he gone with his flag-ship before you started?

Answer. No, sir; his transports went first; he did not go until after I did. I could not tell whether he was going or not. It was a delicate question, and I could not ask him.

Question. Was there any objection to your having a perfect understanding with each other?

Answer. None at all; I invited it in every way I could. He never told me what his plans were. But General Terry understood my plans, and I understood his; and we worked together thoroughly.

Question. Were you ever asked at any time to consult with General Butler?

Answer. No, sir; General Butler did come on board my vessel one night in Hampton roads, with General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock, and asked me if I had a map of Cape Fear river, and I said I had. They asked my opinion, and I gave my opinion of what I thought was the best way to go to work. They made no remarks whatever, but went into a far part of the cabin and there consulted together. After they got through their conversation, they got up, bade me "good evening," and went off. That was the only consultation I ever had with them.

Question. Did you ever have any consultation with General Butler in relation to the attack to be made on the fort after he got there?

Answer. None whatever.

Question. Did he invite any?

Answer. No, sir; he made up his own plans. He did not tell me what he was going to do or not do. Except on the deck of his vessel I never saw him there. I had no conversation with him from the day I left Hampton roads.

I will tell you my impression about it. My idea is that the general depended on the powder-vessel; he was perfectly wrapped up in that powder-vessel. He had an idea that she would knock the whole fort down, and that the men would send out a flag of truce. I do not think he ever divested himself of that idea. When he found that that had not occurred, that the rebels did still make a resistance, and quite a formidable one until silenced by the navy, he made up his mind to go, and went as soon as he could go, leaving a large part of his troops on the beach for the navy to get off.

Question. If I remember rightly, General Butler testifies that he sent a messenger to you, one of his staff?

Answer. Not after the action commenced.

Question. No, but the night before the troops were landed?

Answer. Yes, sir, he did, and told me what he wanted, and I gave it to him. I gave him 30 vessels, averaging four boats each.

Question. Were you asked to go on board his vessel then?

Answer. No, sir, not at all; and if he had I should not have gone, for I was very lame, and could not move. I sent Captain Breese on board his vessel to ask if I could do anything for him. I sent word that I would have been very happy to have gone myself to see him, but I had received a very severe fall the day before and injured my leg. But if he would put in writing anything he wanted me to do, I would do it. I did not expect him to come on my ship, because he was not a sailor. He sent General Weitzel to state what he wanted. I said, "I will give you so many vessels, and put them entirely under the con-

trol of the general, to do what he wants." I put Captain Glisson in charge of them. He had saved General Butler's ship and life in the early part of the war. I sent word that whatever General Butler wanted done Captain Glisson would do for him; and if he wanted more force, to signal to me, and I would send it to him.

The next morning, finding that the men were not got on shore fast enough, I ran down in my flag-ship, and ran astern of General Butler's flag-ship, and asked him how he was getting on. He said, "Very well." I said, "Do you want any more force?" I could not understand exactly what his reply was; but he seemed to think he had enough. Still I sent eight more vessels, as I thought the troops were not getting on shore fast enough; that would be about thirty more boats. But they were not used at all, and the first thing I knew a report was brought to me that the troops were re-embarking.

I kept up a fire until late that night; about 8 o'clock I received a letter from General Butler, informing me he was on his way to Fortress Monroe; I replied that I would take care of his men on the beach, and get them off and send them after him, which I did. He had all the co-operation any man could desire.

Question. Did you ever give General Butler any advice in relation to rendezvousing his fleet?

Answer. Yes, sir; I advised him to rendezvous at Beaufort; and the first time it blowed he did run in there.

Question. Did you advise him to run into Beaufort, or off Beaufort?

Answer. At Beaufort, so that we could all start together, as we did the last time.

Question. Did you have any communication with him in relation to the explosion of the powder-vessel before it was exploded?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was it?

Answer. He requested me to wait a day or two, until the moon got out of the way, so as to explode her about 2 o'clock in the morning; I waited three days. He thought it was better to explode it as near morning as possible. It was about that time she was exploded.

Question. Did you know where General Butler was with his transports when you exploded the vessel?

Answer. I supposed he was on his way down. I sent a fast despatch boat to him, and he got the despatches, and had plenty of time to get down to me.

Question. Would it not have been advisable that you should have known where the transports were, and that they should have arrived before the explosion of the powder-vessel, that they might be where they could co-operate with you immediately on the explosion of the powder-vessel?

Answer. I supposed the transports were all off Masonboro' inlet. There is where he told me his transports were. The gale of wind had blown over two or three days, and General Butler had time enough to have gone to New York, certainly to Norfolk and back. This rendezvous was off Masonboro' inlet, and there is where I sent the despatch boat, with orders if General Butler was not there to go to Beaufort after him. He was not over nine or ten hours from me, and I gave him sixteen hours to do it in. He was just as handy at Beauforts as at Masonboro' inlet.

Question. You knew he was in Beaufort?

Answer. Either there or at Masonboro' inlet. That was his rendezvous; he selected it himself, and notified me of it. He came and signalled where his fleet were. Masonboro' inlet is ten miles from Fort Fisher; that is only an hour's run.

Question. Did you inform him what time you proposed to explode the powder-vessel?

Answer. I said I should select the first good night, where the beach was favorable for landing. We had to be governed by that, of course. I sent word to him that I should explode the powder-vessel early the next morning, by 2 o'clock, which despatch he received.

Question. At what time did he receive it?

Answer. I do not know. The captain of the boat I sent said he would make fourteen miles an hour with her, and I knew there was time enough for the fleet to get down there.

Question. Still, if anything was to be gained by the effect of the explosion of the powder-vessel, should you not have made it a certainty that the fleet was where it could co-operate with you?

Answer. If General Butler got his fleet out of sight, I had but two places to send to for them. He had named Masonboro' inlet as the place of his rendezvous; I never knew his fleet had gone from there until twenty-four hours after they went. I was told he had gone into Beaufort for coal and victual. But with all that, he had plenty of time to go to his rendezvous. That was the place where I was to communicate with him. As to General Butler himself, he would at one time be outside of his fleet, three or four miles off; then he would run off out of sight in some direction; then appear somewhere else. As to offering me the courtesy of asking my opinion, or giving me a chance to express it to him, that was never thought of. It was impossible for me or any man to keep the run of him.

Question. Did he ever request of you that the powder-vessel should be exploded at such time, and under such circumstances, that the army could co-operate?

Answer. Not at all; he always calculated to keep his transports a great distance off at the time of the explosion. It was the understanding with everybody that every vessel should be ten or twelve miles off. I knew the calculations that General Butler and others had made. I wrote him, "You have made calculations that the explosion of this amount of powder will exert such a pressure upon the atmosphere. Now, if that is the case, what is to become of your boilers? You must necessarily keep your vessels far enough from the place where the boat explodes, and let your steam down, so as to avoid any risk of having your boilers explode." If the force was exerted that he calculated, there would not be a boiler there that would not blow up. It was understood that he was to keep far enough off for the purpose of not having an accident of that kind happen. Even the blockading vessels all moved off eight or ten miles. The closest General Butler ever calculated to be was ten or twelve miles; and he went off twenty-two miles. The naval vessels were fifteen miles off. I gave the order that no vessel should lie nearer than twelve miles of the place of explosion; which was a very proper precaution, considering the houses, and I do not know what all, in England, that were blown down fifteen miles off by the explosion there. And where you have an immense pressure of steam on the boiler you might calculate that something would give way.

Question. Were any of the transports with troops nearer than General Butler?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Ames had a thousand men there; he was close to us; there were about two thousand men altogether. He sent on board and told me he was all ready to land. I told him I could give him no orders, but would give him every facility.

Question. Did you notify him of the time the explosion was to take place?

Answer. He was there with us.

Question. He was cognizant of it?

Answer. I suppose so. They were all told to look out; that the explosion would take place that night. I sent word around to everybody not to go in; and ordered the blockading vessels to prevent anybody from going in, to keep them out of the way of the explosion. I supposed General Butler was at Masonboro' inlet.

Question. Was there anything said between you and General Butler, or army officers, in relation to landing marines and sailors?

Answer. Nothing at all.

Question. Did you form any opinion yourself in relation to the effect to be produced by the explosion of the powder-vessel?

Answer. I thought it likely to injure houses at a distance more than it would injure the fort. I thought it would bring down a number of houses in Wilmington and Smithville. I thought the concussion would be so great that it would be likely to tumble down some of them. I remarked that the inhabitants at Smithville certainly would be injured; and I did suppose that a part of the garrison of Fort Fisher might be so injured that they would not be able to defend the fort. But since I have seen the effects of the explosion of powder down there in Fort Fisher and Fort Caswell, I have come to the conclusion that the exploding of powder in the open air is a great waste.

Question. How was the powder-vessel exploded?

Answer. The hold of the vessel was filled with barrels of powder with the heads taken out. There is what is called a Gomez fuze, which will ignite and burn very rapidly, at the rate of a mile in seven seconds, and even quicker than that, at the rate of a mile in four seconds; seven seconds is the longest time. After these barrels were opened the powder was put in bags over the barrels, and the whole piled up below, with this fuze winding through in every direction. After that was done there was another deck, with the hatches on, and with holes bored all through, so as to secure good ignition. The same process was carried out there, so that it could have been nothing but an instantaneous explosion. Then we had three or four fuzes to be fired by clock-work, one to go by candle-work, all leading to the Gomez fuze. That was placed in a room about twenty feet from the powder; and, to make all things sure, we set fire to the bulkheads, so that the vessel would burn. According to our time-pieces, the clock-work failed, but the fire ignited the Gomez fuze, and the explosion must have been very instantaneous. It was very heavy. But if any one could have seen the effect of the powder that exploded in those forts down there—in one case, sixty tons, closely confined—and how little damage it did to anybody, they would get rid of the delusion of expecting much from the explosion of powder in the open air. It did not injure any one one hundred and fifty yards off.

Question. In your opinion, did the whole of that powder explode?

Answer. Yes, sir; it must have done so. At Hatteras inlet, one hundred and twenty miles off, the houses were shaken so severely that the people thought there was an earthquake. Why we did not feel more effect from it on the vessels I do not know.

Question. How soon after the explosion did you commence the attack?

Answer. The powder-vessel was exploded about half after two, and the attack was commenced about eleven o'clock. There was not time enough for people to recover from or repair damages.

Question. Did you commence the attack as soon as you could?

Answer. Yes, sir; we stood in. The vessels were very slow, for there was quite a fresh breeze blowing off the land; and to get a large fleet of seventy or eighty vessels into position is not an easy job in the night. At daylight we stood in until we got within two miles of the fort. The wind came off the land so strong that, in anchoring, the vessels anchored bow on. I gave the signal to anchor, and, when the wind got back to the old place again, I made the signal to up anchor, which takes time. I think that from the time we commenced moving in we did not lose any time.

Question. You had steam up?

Answer. Yes, sir. On those occasions steam is always kept up all the time.

Question. You spoke about letting the steam go down at the time of the explosion.

Answer. It was only a half an hour's work to get steam up. The water in the boilers was all warm, and the moment the explosion was made they fired up.

Question. You continued to bombard the fort during that day?

Answer. Yes, sir. We had it completely knocked to pieces, the guns all silenced, dismounted, or filled up with sand, and the palisading all demolished.

Question. About what time did the transports of General Butler arrive?

Answer. They commenced coming in by 4 or 5 o'clock, and were all there by sundown.

Question. Too late to make the landing that night, I suppose.

Answer. Not at all; they could have landed without any trouble.

Question. Was any proposition made to land?

Answer. I made none; I let them do as they pleased.

Question. At what time did the landing begin next morning?

Answer. The order was to commence landing about daylight in the morning. I ordered the vessels out to anchor, and we made all the arrangements with General Weitzel the night before. An hour after General Weitzel came on board the vessels went to the landing place, but not a man was landed before 12 o'clock in the day.

Question. Why was the landing delayed so long?

Answer. It was the fault of the army. The boats were alongside the vessels, ready to receive the men. All the boats were lying there on their oars, off ship, waiting to be called. They had no system, no plan for landing organized. Half a division was in one set of vessels, and the other half in another set. In fact, the whole thing was a bungle; but that did not make much difference, for they could have got the men on the beach, and could have organized them there.

Question. Did you ever hear any reason why they did not land sooner?

Answer. I did not. Captain Glisson was the officer in charge. He could tell all about that.

Question. Had you been shelling the fort during the morning?

Answer. We commenced right early.

Question. Did the fort respond?

Answer. Only one or two guns when we first stood in. The fort was completely silenced throughout the day. They fired one or two guns from a place called Mound battery, which did no harm at all. They had nothing at all to do with the main fort.

Question. Was it possible for you to have run your vessels by the fort?

Answer. It was perfectly impossible. In the first place, there was not water enough there for an operation of that kind. Vessels can run past batteries only where there is a known channel and plenty of water. Most of the time there is two feet less of water on the bar than our vessels draw. Our vessels draw from nine to ten feet of water, and we have to get our vessels over with a great deal of care, and with a pilot. After we had buoyed out the channel and knew all about it, our vessels grounded, and it took us four days to get them the distance of a mile, pushing them through the mud. When we first went there nobody knew where the channel was; and when we had taken the place, we had boats sunk which were sent to sound the channel.

Question. Did you have any doubts about the success of the expedition before you left Fortress Monroe?

Answer. Never; I was as certain of it as of anything in the world.

Question. Did you ever write or express any doubts?

Answer. Yes, sir; I did express great doubts if General Butler had anything to do with the expedition. I thought if there was a possibility of a failure he would cause it, and I expressed my opinion accordingly.

Question. To whom did you express such an opinion as that?

Answer. I expressed it to Mr. Fox. I wrote to him and told him what I thought. When this thing was first proposed, I told General Grant that I wished it expressly understood that General Butler was to have nothing to do with the expedition, for if any one in the world would make the expedition fail he would. I do not think General Butler is a soldier; he is not a man who should be intrusted with the lives of men. I have been with him a great deal; although he has good administrative abilities and all that sort of thing, he is not a soldier.

Question. How was it in relation to ammunition. Did you have a full supply during the first assault?

Answer. Yes, sir; we had to fill up again after we got through, but we had our ammunition vessels there. We fired away pretty much all we had on the vessels, and had to haul out and fill up again.

Question. Did you have to send away for ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir, to Beaufort; but we got it down in good time.

Question. Was there enough at Beaufort to keep up the supply?

Answer. Yes, sir; I could have kept up the supply every hour, if I had kept boats enough going. There was no trouble about ammunition except getting it on board the vessels. I never had but one ship that ceased firing for want of ammunition, and she filled up again in half an hour.

Question. After the bombardment on the 24th and 25th of December, did you then find yourself exhausted of ammunition?

Answer. Some of the large vessels were entirely out of ammunition, but I had thousands of it in Beaufort. I had them all filled up again in a day and a half after the action, and they took it on board in very bad weather.

Question. How long a time would it take you to supply vessels with ammunition from Beaufort?

Answer. After firing away every shot, I could fill up again in twenty-four hours. I had vessels all filled, and steamers to take them in tow and bring them down, and the vessels help themselves to what they want. It was a mere matter of smooth weather, as far as that was concerned. I had 60,000 or 70,000 rounds of ammunition down there, and we fired away only about 25,000 rounds, leaving us 50,000 over; and I had vessels coming every day from Norfolk. We fired about 45,000 rounds in the two fights.

Question. Did you have such a supply of ammunition that you could have protected the army on shore, provided General Butler had landed his men there, and they had been attacked by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir, for three years; and not only that, but I could keep off 150,000 men, if they should come against them, without any trouble. The whole neck of land is only a mile wide, perfectly free of woods and everything else. We could have kept that clear with musketry. The gunboats lay within 100 yards of the beach, and during the heaviest gale we have had this season we did not leave there.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. I understood you to say that several guns of the fort had been disabled by your fire.

Answer. About four or five were knocked off their carriages and broken. The guns were all disabled, the sand being thrown into the muzzles of those that were not knocked over or broken.

Question. All of them?

Answer. Well they did not fire them.

Question. What means had you of knowing that they were disabled by sand being thrown into their muzzles?

Answer. We could judge by seeing the sand thrown over the guns. I have

had so much fort fighting to do in this war that I could judge of the effect of that. That was about the nineteenth or twentieth fort I have taken, most all of them having been disabled in that way. At one fort at Grand Gulf, Mississippi, we buried the guns up so that we had to dig them out; there was not a single gun hurt.

Question. What I want is to get a definite statement in regard to the number of guns that were disabled by the first bombardment, as far as you know.

Answer. All that we know that were knocked off their carriages were four or five at the most. But from what we saw of the second bombardment, and from everything else, we know the others were filled up with sand. And not only that, the sand-bags falling down on the traverses disabled the guns. We know that from what the prisoners told us.

Question. General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock made a reconnoissance of the condition of the fort after you had silenced the guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know what means they had for making an accurate reconnoissance?

Answer. They were within about 800 yards of the work. They could only judge by the immense size of the work, and they concluded that the fort was strongly manned. Only on that ground could they say it was still in a defensive condition, which would have been the case if it had been strongly manned.

Question. Did they have the same means of knowing the fort was disabled as you had?

Answer. I should think they had better, if they looked pretty close. But I do not think they wanted to think so.

Question. Is General Weitzel recognized as a skilful engineer?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is his reputation.

Question. What was the position occupied by Colonel Comstock at that time?

Answer. He was a colonel on General Grant's staff.

Question. Was he the chief engineer upon General Grant's staff at that time?

Answer. I do not know whether he was or not. General Weitzel was not there in the capacity of engineer, but in the capacity of general; Colonel Comstock was in the capacity of an engineer, I suppose.

Question. Notwithstanding General Weitzel was there in the capacity of a general, he was still skilled in engineering science?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And Colonel Comstock was an engineer on the staff of General Grant, and was there in his official capacity as an engineer?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. If the guns of the fort were silenced entirely by your fire, why could you not make soundings and run into Cape Fear river with your light-draught vessels?

Answer. Because, in the first place, we did not know where the channel was. It has been very much altered since the coast survey charts were made. There is a bar across the channel, and another bar above that on the reef has very little water on it. There is a heavy fort, called Fort Buchanan, that commands that reef, and was built on purpose to command it. On the opposite side of the river is a fort called Rives's Fort, built to command that reef also.

Question. What relation had that bar to Fort Fisher?

Answer. None at all, except as one of the connecting links. This fort was built expressly to command the bar, where every vessel must bring up.

Question. How far up Cape Fear river is that reef?

Answer. It is under the guns of Fort Fisher, Fort Buchanan, Mound battery, Rives's Point, and protected by batteries besides. It is only at very high tide that we can get our vessels over. With the best of pilots our vessels would all

stick badly, except a little tug. And suppose they had got across the bar, they would have to run a battery of thirty heavy guns. They had an immense number of batteries in every direction, the least quantity of powder in them being 400 pounds. From the torpedo battery they had a wire leading to every one of these torpedoes. Suppose a vessel goes up—only one can go at a time in the best of weather—a torpedo is exploded; if it misses, then the next one may explode and sink the vessel, and a single vessel would close up the whole channel. If the vessel gets past all the batteries and torpedoes, then she finds five feet of water, or six feet at the most, on the reef at low tide. Even the lightest blockade runner has to wait a day sometimes to get over the bar; and then the vessel finds some twenty-odd guns bearing on her from every direction, and any wooden vessel would be destroyed in ten minutes. In the first place, it is impossible for any vessel to go in. The only chance of getting in is with a good pilot, having the channel all buoyed out, and no torpedoes in the way.

Question. How did you ascertain that those torpedoes were there?

Answer. We took the torpedoes up.

Question. Did you know the torpedoes were there at the time of the first attack?

Answer. We knew it. But still it would not have made any difference; I should not have run by if I had known there were no torpedoes there.

Question. Not knowing that those torpedoes were there, of course they were no objection to your running by?

Answer. Not at all. I never stopped at torpedoes; I should never have hesitated for torpedoes; the real cause was the inability to cross the bar. If there had been 5,000 torpedoes there we should have gone in if we could.

Question. What effect had the explosion of the powder-vessel upon your vessels?

Answer. They were lying about thirteen miles off. The explosion sounded like a gun fired from some other vessel; that was the only effect it had, like a very sharp report of a gun.

Question. It disabled nothing, and had no paralyzing influence upon any of your men?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. What quantity of powder was exploded in Fort Caswell?

Answer. As near as we could tell, they had about sixty tons in Fort Caswell; and they had about the same amount in Fort Fisher; perhaps a little more, because that was the main fort.

Question. What was the effect of those explosions in the forts?

Answer. It had none at all, except just around about it. It killed and blew up about 100 men. Those who were 150 yards off were not injured at all.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you now go on and state all the events subsequent to the withdrawal of the forces under General Butler, including the second attack upon and the capture of the fort?

Answer. I lay there, and filled up with ammunition. I received a letter from General Grant, in which he says: "Dear Admiral: Hold on, if you please, a few days longer, and I will send you more troops, with a different general." I issued general orders to make preparations without delay. In a few days General Terry came into Beaufort, and communicated with me instantly. We were together all the time. I had written to General Grant, "There is one thing I want you to impress upon the general, whoever he is that comes here, I do not wish to interfere with military matters, but I do wish to give my advice where weather is concerned, for I do profess to know how weather is on the coast." And General Grant gave him full instructions to be guided by my opinion in regard to all nautical matters. General Terry came



to Beaufort and asked my advice; I said, "It is going to blow a heavy gale to-night; hold on where you are. After this gale is over, we will have beautiful weather;" and we planned the whole thing before we left Beaufort. I had all his general orders printed for him on my flag-ship, and told him how we would move. When the gale was over and it had cleared off, and all was smooth, we started off early in the morning and arrived at Fort Fisher in the night. We anchored within two or three miles of the beach. I sent in gunboats that night to anchor along the beach and hold it until daylight. At 4 o'clock in the morning I signalled to get under way and follow me, for at that time it was getting to be daylight. I went in and put the soldiers ashore. In five hours they were all landed. I made signal to the fleet to get under way to attack the fort; and at 4 o'clock we were hammering away at the fort. I did it merely to show the troops how easily the tremendous fire of the navy could stop the fire of the fort. The rebels had re-enforced the fort very heavily. General Hoke had 8,000 rebel troops on the beach in front of our men; but they could not pass down the beach because our gunboats controlled everything. The moment General Terry landed, he threw a line across the neck of land, and had his men at work; and in less than an hour after he landed he had a line of works that could be defended against 30,000 men. The next day he came on board my vessel. We bombarded the fort all day. He then told me when he would be ready to assault. I said, "Now, general, I want to participate in this thing. I do not want it said that I recommended to others to attack a fort that we are afraid to attack ourselves; and I will send on shore 2,000 men." He said he should attack the northwest angle of the fort; I said, "I will take the hardest part, the sea face, where there are no gates, and if we don't do any other good, we will draw off a great deal of fire from you;" and such was the case. We had settled when the fleet was to stop fire on the fort. We assaulted together; the navy went at its face of the fort, and the army went at its face. We got ahead a little too fast, and had to come back about as fast as we went up. General Terry first made a feint on them. They manned their works as well as they could and partially drove the men back. Thinking they had driven that party off they rushed to the sea face to drive back our men. That gave the soldiers an opportunity to get a footing; and while the rebels came to drive us navy men away, the soldiers got possession of about four to six casemates and held on to them. In the mean time the sailors retreated as well as they could, and relieved the soldiers in front of Hoke's men, and enabled General Terry to bring up more of his troops. That gave him a couple of thousand more men. In the mean time I stopped firing on the fort with the heavy vessels; but the Ironsides fired ahead of our troops, from parapet to parapet, cleaning out the rebels. In the mean time, notwithstanding the shells coming in amongst them, they would throw their men in, and our fellows would be perhaps half an hour taking that part. That is the way they fought for one mile, for that is the extent of that fort; fighting from one end of it to the other. That was the most remarkable fight, I suppose, that ever was fought. Every one of those bomb-proofs was a fort in itself, and there were in that fort 2,300 men, and the most we had engaged at any one time in the assault was 3,500 men, not counting the sailors, for they were repulsed almost immediately. I suppose the whole thing was over in fifteen minutes as far as the sailors were concerned; for they were cut down like sheep. Never, at any time, did General Terry bring his whole force to bear upon the fort. He brought in his reserves towards night; but the whole thing was over then. That was the end of that fight, commencing at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I had been hammering at the fort until there was not a gun on the sea face that was left mounted. They were tumbled into all kinds of positions; some cut in two; some with their carriages broken, &c., &c. The army had no guns to contend with. They got into the traverses, and there it was a

fight between them and those inside. General Terry communicated all the time with me by means of signals; and I knew all the time how he was getting on. At 10 o'clock he made signal, "Don't fire any more; the fort is ours." General Terry had the same engineer as was down there before—Colonel Comstock. I do not think Colonel Comstock is a man who would encourage anybody to do a very daring thing; he is very prudent, like most engineers; but General Terry thinks for himself. He saw how easy it was, and went in and took it; and I think there were the same troops all the way through, and the same generals—Generals Curtis and Ames.

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LOWELL, MASS., *March 11, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: I take leave to enclose to you a correspondence between myself and the late rebel General Whiting, who was in command of the enemy's forces at Fort Fisher at the time of both attacks. General Whiting's answers to the questions propounded may serve to throw some light upon the committee's investigations. It is true these answers are not made under oath, but they are given by a man on his dying bed, and under the solemnity of his approaching death, which has since almost immediately happened, and will therefore carry the force of moral truth and certainty, although not in the form of judicial evidence.

If the committee would desire to see me before them, for any purpose of explanation or otherwise, I will appear forthwith.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 BENJ. F. BUTLER, *Major General.*

Hon. BENJAMIN F. WADE,  
*Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.*

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LOWELL, MASS., *February 22, 1865.*

SIR: I requested, a short time ago, Lieutenant Davenport, a young gentleman serving on my staff, to call upon you and obtain some particulars concerning the condition of Fort Fisher, and its surroundings, at the time of the demonstration of the federal forces under my command against it, from the 16th to the 27th of December last.

From its subsequent capture, and other new dispositions of the forces on both sides, I ventured to conjecture that you would have no difficulty in furnishing me with the information I desired.

I had not heard before of the severity of your wound, and the critical condition of your health, or I would not have troubled you at that time upon this subject, although of some importance and interest to myself. I learn, however, from Lieutenant Davenport, that you are intending soon to make your official report to your government, and therefore I trust I am not intrusive or annoying, in desiring your answer, as specifically as your memory and data will allow, to the questions hereto appended, which I have put in direct form, partly to save you trouble, and still more especially, in order to bring out the exact facts which, at some time, may be needed for the purposes of justice. This is also in accordance with your wish expressed to Lieutenant Davenport, that any questions which I desired to have you answer might be placed upon paper in some specified form.

Will you please state, therefore—

1. What was the number of the garrison of Fort Fisher on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of December last, designating the regiments or battalions ?

2. What portion, if any, of the regular garrison of the fort had been sent south ?

3. What reserves or co-operating forces were there, if any, and how near to the fort were they ?

4. What, if any, force was at Wilmington at that time ?

5. Please give the day of the week or month when you first became aware of the presence of the federal fleet, either of transports or of naval vessels, and what vessels did you observe first ?

6. At what time did any re-enforcements, either from the army of northern Virginia or elsewhere, reach Wilmington or its neighborhood ?

7. How near did the powder-boat, which exploded, come to the fort ?

8. Were you in the fort at that time ?

9. Was the powder-boat observed ? and if so, what, if any, was the effect of the explosion ?

10. At the time of the explosion of the powder-boat, how many men were there in the fort ?

11. What was the effect of the naval fire of the first day upon the fort ?

12. How many, and what guns, did it dismount or disable ?

13. Please state whether any part, and if so, how much of the damage done to the fort by the fire of the navy was repaired during the night.

14. By reason of the cessation of the bombardment at night, were you not able to rest and recruit your garrison ?

15. At the time of landing, where was the supporting force, if any, to the fort ?

16. Were there any re-enforcements brought into the fort between the time of the explosion of the powder-boat and our landing ? If so, please state what, and when.

17. At the time my skirmish line was deployed before the fort, what was the condition of the guns and defences upon the land side, as to efficiency for defensive purposes ?

18. In view of the condition of the fort and its garrison, would it have been possible, with either three (3) or six (6) thousand men, to have taken the work by assault ? (*Note.*—In answering this question, please give as many of the details for the reason you may give as possible.)

19. Please state whether, with a force holding the beach, from the nature of the ground and from the configuration of the channel of Cape Fear river, it would have been possible for the confederates to have re-enforced or provisioned the fort to any extent.

20. How did the strength of the garrison at the time of the first attack compare with the strength of the garrison at the time of the second attack ?

21. In view of the condition of the weather immediately following the demonstration of the 25th of December, and in view of the force that might have concentrated upon the peninsula, as well above as below the place of landing, would it, in your judgment, have been possible for six thousand men, without artillery, to have held out there without being captured or overwhelmed, from the 26th of December to the 15th of January ?

22. Please state, as specifically as you may be able, the differences in the condition of the fort from the fire of the navy at the time of the first and second attacks. Please state the effect of the fire.

23. Please state whether or not the fire of the navy at the time of the second attack was, unlike the time of the first attack, continuous ; and if so, for how long, and what number of guns were dismounted by it ? Also whether the

garrison at the time of the second attack had any time to rest or recruit, or even to repair damages?

24. Would you have deemed it the part of wisdom on the part of the commander of the federal forces to have exposed his troops in the situation referred to in question twenty-one?

Yours, very respectfully,

BENJ. F. BUTLER.

Major General WHITING,  
*Provisional Army of the Confederate States.*

A true copy furnished Hon. Benjamin F. Wade, chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General.*

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HOSPITAL, FORT COLUMBUS,  
*February 28, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have received your communication addressing me certain questions relative to the two attacks on Fort Fisher. As I find none which I can object to answering, I send you herewith the written answers, numbered according to the questions. These are at your service for such use as you may desire to make of them. I have only to add that in a similar manner, though less in detail, these questions are answered in my official report.

Question 1. What was the number of the garrison of Fort Fisher on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of December last, designating the regiments or battalions?

Answer. Five (5) companies of the 36th regiment North Carolina troops, and Adams's light battery, amounting to six hundred and sixty-seven (667) aggregate, was the number of the garrison at fort Fisher on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of December last.

Question 2. What portion, if any, of the regular garrison of the fort had been sent south?

Answer. Five (5) companies of the 36th regiment North Carolina troops (half of regiment) had been sent south.

Question 3. What reserves or co-operating forces were there, if any, and how near to the fort were they?

Answer. About eight hundred (800) reserves at Sugar Loaf, five (5) miles from the fort.

Question 4. What, if any, force was at Wilmington at that time?

Answer. The advance of Hoke's division arrived in Wilmington on the 22d of December last, were pushed to Sugar Loaf, and continued arriving until the close of the attack.

Question 5. Please give the day of the week or month when you first became aware of the presence of the federal fleet, either of transports or of naval vessels, and what vessels did you observe first?

Answer. On Tuesday, the 20th, twenty-five (25) vessels, including several frigates, were reported to me in the offing, all vessels-of-war.

Question 6. At what time did any re-enforcements, either from the army of northern Virginia or elsewhere, reach Wilmington or its neighborhood?

Answer. Answered in number four.

Question 7. How near did the powder-boat which exploded come to the fort?

Answer. Between twelve (12) and fifteen hundred (1,500) yards, not nearer.

Question 8. Were you in the fort at that time?

Answer. I was not.

Question 9. Was the powder-boat observed; and if so, what, if any, was the effect of the explosion?

Answer. Powder-boat was observed, and reported at midnight, aground and set on fire. Explosion reported at 12.45 a. m. No effect at all on the fort. Explosion heard plainly in Wilmington. When I telegraphed Colonel Lamb to know what it was, he replied, "Enemy's gunboat blown up."

Question 10. At the time of the explosion of the powder-boat, how many men were there in the fort?

Answer. Answered in number one.

Questions 11, 12, 13. What was the effect of the naval fire of the first day upon the fort?

How many and what guns did it dismount or disable?

Please state whether any part, and if so, how much of the damage done to the fort by the fire of the navy was repaired during the night.

Answer. Casualties first day: Killed, none; wounded, one (1) mortally, three (3) severely, and nineteen (19) slightly; total 23. Five (5) gun-carriages disabled.

Second day: Killed three (3); wounded nine, (9) mortally, six (6) severely, and twenty-eight (28) slightly; total 46. Damage but very slight; one (1) 10-inch, two (2) 32-pounder and one (1) 8-inch carriages disabled, and one (1) 10-inch gun disabled. Damage repaired at night. Enemy's fire formidable and sustained, but diffuse, unconcentrated. Apparent design of the fleet to silence the channel batteries, in order to force an entrance with his vessels, and not to attack by land. The garrison was in no instance driven from its guns, and fired in return, according to orders, slowly and deliberately, six hundred and sixty-two (662) shot and shells.

Question 14. By reason of the cessation of the bombardment at night, were you not able to rest and recruit your garrison?

Answer. We were able to do both.

Question 15. At the time of the landing, where was the supporting force, if any, to the fort?

Answer. Assembling at Sugar Loaf as fast as Hoke's people arrived.

Question 16. Were there any reinforcements brought into the fort between the time of the explosion of the powder-boat and our landing? If so, please state what, and when.

Answer. On the 23d, 110 men, veteran artillery of the 10th regiment North Carolina troops, 50 sailors and the 7th battalion junior Reserves, about 250 strong, were thrown into the fort.

Question 17. At the time our skirmish line was deployed before the fort, what was the condition of the guns and defences upon the land side, as to efficiency for a defensive purpose?

Answer. The guns and defences on the land front were in perfect order at the time referred to, except two (2) disabled guns on the left; 19 guns in position; palisade in perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having been cut.

Question 18. In view of the condition of the fort and its garrison, would it have been possible, with either three (3) or six (6) thousand men, to have taken the work by assault? (*Note.*—In answering this question, please give as many of the details for the reason you may give as possible.)

Answer. Possible, yes. Probable, no. The work was very strong, the garrison in good spirits and ready; and the fire on the approaches (the assaulting column having no cover) would have been extraordinarily heavy. In addition to the heavy guns, I had a battery of Napoleons, on which I placed great reliance. The palisade alone would have been a most formidable obstacle.

Question 19. Please state whether with a force holding the beach, from the nature of the ground and from the configuration of the channel of Cape Fear

river, it would have been possible for the confederates to have re-enforced or provisioned the fort to any extent?

Answer. No difficulty at all by the river.

Question 20. How did the strength of the garrison, at the time of the first attack, compare with the strength of the garrison at the time of the second attack?

Answer. The garrison at the second attack was nearly doubly stronger, but not altogether of so good material.

Question 21. In view of the condition of the weather immediately following the demonstration of the 25th of December, and in view of the force that might have concentrated upon the peninsula, as well above as below the place of landing, would it, in your judgment, have been possible for six thousand men, without artillery, to have held out there, without being captured or overwhelmed, from the 26th of December to the 15th of January?

Answer. No; and it is a matter of grave charge against General Bragg, that the whole force was not captured on the 26th of December. He had the force and the position.

Question 22. Please state, as specifically as you may be able, the differences in the condition of the fort from the fire of the navy at the time of the first and second attack. Please state the effect of the fire.

Answer. There was great difference in the position of the ships in the two attacks, and in the nature and effect of the fire. The first was a general bombardment, not calculated to effect particular damage. The second firing had for definite object the destruction of the land defences, and the ships were placed accordingly, to destroy them by enfilade and direct fire. On that front and the northeast salient the whole enormous fire was poured without intermission, until the slope of the northeast salient was practicable for assault. Not a gun remained in position on the approaches, the whole palisade swept away, communication with the mines cut off, rendering them useless, and the men unable to stand to the parapets during the fire. There was all the difference in the world.

Question 23. Please state whether or not the fire of the navy, at the time of the second attack, was, unlike the time of the first attack, continuous; and if so, for how long, and what number of guns were dismounted by it? Also, whether the garrison at the time of the second attack had any time to rest or recruit, or even to repair damages?

Answer. In the second attack the fire was continuous during the night. Not so heavy at night, but enough to prevent repairs, and to keep the garrison from rest and food. The land guns all disabled; field-pieces only left to depend on.

Question 24. Would you have deemed it the part of wisdom on the part of the commander of the federal forces to have exposed his troops in the situation referred to in question twenty-one?

Answer. I do not. Neither attack was practicable in the presence of the supporting force, provided that had been under a competent officer. The first landing ought assuredly to have been captured entirely; and as for the second, although deriving much greater advantages from the different mode of attack by the fleet, and though pressed with great vigor, it is due to the supineness of the confederate general that it was not destroyed in the act of assault.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. C. WHITING,

*Major General P. A. C. S., Prisoner of War.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER, U. S. A.,  
*Lowell, Mass.*

A true copy furnished Hon. Benjamin F. Wade, chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

BENJ. F. BUTLER, *Major General.*

*Testimony of Captain K. R. Breese, U. S. N.*WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1865.*

Captain K. R. BREESE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and command in the navy?

Answer. I am a lieutenant commander and fleet captain of the North Atlantic squadron.

Question. Were you connected with the navy in the operations against Fort Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear river, in December last?

Answer. Yes, sir, at that time, and also in the subsequent operations resulting in the capture of that fort.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. I was fleet captain of the squadron.

Question. Will you give us an account of those operations against Fort Fisher, including the organization of the expedition, and all the material facts connected with it, so far as they came within your knowledge?

Answer. I was in the west, serving in the Mississippi squadron, when Admiral Porter came out there and told me that he was to have command of an expedition against Wilmington, and wanted me to go with him as his fleet captain. He said the expedition was to be ready to leave Hampton roads on the 15th of October last.

We left the west and arrived at Hampton roads, I think, about the 7th or 8th of October. We waited there until the arrival of Admiral Lee, which took place about the 13th of October, when Admiral Porter relieved him from the command of the North Atlantic squadron.

There was assembled at that time, in Hampton roads, quite a large fleet, sufficient in the estimation of the admiral to do the work required at Fort Fisher, provided the original plan was carried out. That plan was to send 20,000 men down to operate against the fort, a portion of whom would march straight on to Wilmington, if we landed near Masonboro' inlet, and the other portion were to march down and attack Fort Fisher, in connexion with the fleet. About the 15th of October the admiral reported the fleet ready to go and attack Fort Fisher.

We waited and waited there, I suppose some two or three weeks; finally the admiral gave up the idea, thinking we could get no troops. General Grant said that he could spare none. The matter was delayed and kept back until some time in November. About the 1st of November Admiral Porter got a message from General Grant, stating that, from information he had received, the rebel garrison at Wilmington had been very much weakened, and he thought he could spare troops to send down there, and he wanted to know when the admiral would be ready to go. In the mean time this idea of a powder-vessel was discussed and got up.

Question. With whom did the idea of a powder-vessel originate?

Answer. I always understood that it originated with General Butler. He had read in an English newspaper the accounts of a terrific explosion of gunpowder in England, and the idea suggested itself to him that if a vessel could be placed under Fort Fisher and exploded there, it would at least injure the garrison so much that it would be a very easy thing to capture the fort afterwards. This I know only from hearsay. I know personally nothing about it, except that it was General Butler's idea; the admiral told me that. We had some difficulty in getting the right kind of vessel for that purpose, because it required one of light draught. There was one in the sounds of North Carolina, and the admiral immediately ordered her to Hampton roads, to be prepared for this purpose.

There was no day fixed for this expedition to leave; it was only a thing talked of. While this powder-vessel was being prepared, the admiral received the message from General Grant of which I have spoken, stating that he had information that the garrison of Wilmington was very much weakened, and wanting to know when he would be ready to leave. The admiral replied that he would be ready in forty-eight hours on the old plan, but that it would take some time longer, he did not specify what time, to go on the new plan, which was in connexion with the powder-vessel and a few men. As I understood afterwards, it was concluded to go with the powder vessel, and to send 7,000 men, relying upon the explosion of the powder-vessel to affect the garrison and the works so much that the troops could readily go into the fort and take it.

We all got ready, and the first favorable weather after the powder-vessel was ready we all started. The army transports started a day before we did. The troops had all been embarked for some days previous; I do not know how long; probably four or five days. The fleet rendezvoused about eighteen miles off Fort Fisher, and the powder-vessel went into Beaufort to finish her loading, to take on some fifty-five tons more of powder, which it was not considered safe to do at Norfolk, because the vessel was too deep, and the powder might get wet in going around. As soon as that was done—I think it took two days—we joined the fleet off Wilmington.

The next day was considered a favorable day to send in the powder-boat and explode it, and the admiral gave orders to that effect. He sent me on board General Butler's vessel to inform him of what he had done. General Butler said he was a little surprised at that, and thought it was too soon. It was proposed to explode the powder-vessel before the moon rose, so as to be certain to get her close in to the beach without being discovered. The moon rose then about 9 o'clock at night, and I told General Butler I thought the vessel would be exploded about half past 8 o'clock. General Butler said, in the presence of General Weitzel, that he thought that would be too soon; that the garrison would have time, before an attack the next day, to recover from the effects of the explosion if the vessel was exploded as soon as that. I said to him that the admiral was under the impression that time was very valuable to him, and that was why he had given the order to explode the vessel that night; that if we waited until it could be exploded near daylight, it would be at least a week before the moon would permit that. He said, "Well, at all events it is too early now, and I think it ought to be stopped." I replied, "Well, general, I do not know anything about what the plans are, but if you want this thing stopped, you better let me go back to the admiral immediately and tell him, because the order has already gone out, and there will scarcely be time to send in a vessel to stop it." I did so, and the admiral sent in an order to call the powder-boat off. They had found on getting close to the beach that the surf was too heavy to permit her to get in very close to the beach, and they were coming out. No troops could be landed there the following day.

General Weitzel went back with me to the admiral and talked with him awhile. He said that that was a good opportunity for the transports to go to Beaufort and fill up with coal, provisions, water, and such things; just what they wanted.

We then had a gale of wind all the time for four or five days. After the wind lulled, the admiral sent the powder-boat in, and she was exploded about half past one o'clock in the morning. The next day, about 10 o'clock I think it was, the fleet stood in to open fire on the fort. There were at that time about 1,200 or 1,500 men on transports with the fleet; a number of vessels were in the offing, and we supposed the whole of the army fleet was within signal distance. It turned out afterwards, however, that they had not come out of Beaufort, and they did not get down there until that night. At sunset the admiral hauled off his vessels.



There was some talk between him and General Butler, by means of signals, and they agreed to land the troops the next morning. A portion of them were landed without much difficulty, and made a reconnoissance towards the fort. Under the very heavy fire from the fleet, the fort was completely silenced; they were firing no guns whatever; and they did not fire any, that we could see, at the troops that were making the reconnoissance.

About sunset the admiral ran down to communicate with General Butler, and ask him what he proposed to do. The captain who had had charge of the landing of the troops and covering them came to the admiral and told him that General Butler was re-embarking his troops. The admiral was very much surprised at that, for he could not understand the reason for it. But shortly afterwards he got a letter from General Butler, stating that his engineers considered the enemy's works as defensible as ever; that his instructions did not contemplate a siege; and that he should re-embark his men and start for Hampton roads.

Question. What was the condition of the sea at that time?

Answer. It was, at that time, what we call a very smooth sea. But about two hours afterwards a heavy swell set in from the southward, and made a great deal of surf on the beach, so that it was with great difficulty that the men were got off at night. And, finally, so many boats were capsized in the surf, we were obliged to desist, and quite a number of men were left on the beach for twenty-four hours afterwards. That night a southerly breeze set in very hard, accompanied with rain, and, as is usual with southerly winds, there was a heavy swell rolling in on the coast.

Question. Was there an opportunity during that day to have landed the whole force, with their munitions of war and provisions?

Answer. Yes, sir, without any trouble. General Terry's command, which was larger than General Butler's, was landed, with all their provisions and munitions for small arms, no field-pieces, by three o'clock in the afternoon; and I think the first boat did not touch the beach before nine o'clock in the morning.

Question. Were the facilities for landing troops the same in the one case as in the other?

Answer. Exactly; or rather General Butler claims to have had much better. He had the services of what he calls the naval brigade; an organization, under the command of an officer who was formerly in our navy, composed principally of seamen, with which he operated in and around the bays and creeks of James river. They had their boats with them and their boat guns. They were supposed to be expert boatmen, and had been exercised in landing on a beach in the surf, in embarking and disembarking men. He had quite a large force of them with him, which General Terry did not have.

Question. Was there any understanding between General Butler and Admiral Porter in relation to the explosion of the powder-vessel at the time she actually was exploded?

Answer. I do not think there was any understanding except this: that she was to be exploded the very first favorable opportunity. The order to the officer in charge of the powder-boat was not to explode her unless he found that the surface on the beach would permit the landing of troops without trouble; that it must be very smooth, or he must not attempt to explode the boat. That was his positive order, and General Butler was aware of that. That was the only understanding I know of that existed; that at the first favorable opportunity, when troops could be landed, the powder-boat was to be exploded.

Question. Do you know where the army transports were at the time the powder-boat was exploded?

Answer. A number of them, I do not know how many, were lying there with the fleet. A number of them were just barely within sight, perhaps twelve or

fifteen miles further off. And quite a number of them were at Beaufort; but the admiral did not know anything about that; he supposed they were all in the offing. I think the night before the powder-boat was exploded, a staff officer of General Butler came from Beaufort and told the admiral that the general was in Beaufort and would be down the next day. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon, I think, that he was there; and the admiral sent word back by him that he should explode the powder-boat by daylight the next morning.

Question. Did that afford time for the staff officer to return to General Butler, and for General Butler, with his transports, to get down to Fort Fisher or vicinity?

Answer. I hardly think it would.

Question. What time would be required for that?

Answer. That would depend upon the speed of the vessel. The vessel the staff officer came down in was a very fast vessel. General Butler himself could have returned in that same vessel without any trouble; but whether all the transports could or not, I do not know. This officer did not say anything, that I know of, about any of the transports being in Beaufort harbor. All I heard him tell the admiral was that General Butler was there with his flag-ship. He came down in a little despatch steamer, which was very fast indeed. The admiral told him he should explode the powder-vessel at daylight. That was the second day of good weather; and it was a very wonderful thing down there to have two or three consecutive days of good weather and smooth sea. I do not think, however, there was time for the transports to get to Fort Fisher from Beaufort, if they were there. I did not know of any vessel being there but General Butler's vessel.

Question. Do you know whether or not there was anything done, either by the transports or the naval vessels, that would give the garrison at Fort Fisher any warning that a fleet was there, and that an attack was about to be made?

Answer. I know that General Butler went in towards the land with flags flying and all kind of streamers. He went to the officer commanding the blockading fleet for a tug to go in and reconnoitre. It was perfectly palpable and plain; it was such an unusual proceeding off there, where everything was noticed, that it would be sure to attract notice. Whether they could tell anything particular by it, I do not know.

Question. Did any of the naval vessels go in so as to give the garrison at Fort Fisher any notice?

Answer. No, sir, not one; nothing more than the usual blockading force; that was all. They were all out of sight of land, and did not approach it. One day we all got under way and stood in shore; but it came on a heavy gale and we anchored. A number of the vessels blew in towards the shore, and the height of the masts may have exposed them to the people on shore; I think likely it did.

Question. When did General Butler's vessel run in towards the shore?

Answer. It was previous to the 20th of December. We were all down there on the 18th, and it was previous to that. The way I happen to know about that is, I happened to hear the officer commanding the blockade at the time make a report to the admiral, stating that he thought General Butler's vessel going in there in the manner it had done had given those people information, or something to think about; that it was such an unusual thing that it would not fail to attract attention.

Question. How near were you to the fort at the time of the first bombardment?

Answer. I was in a little tug, running around from one place to another. I was alongside the Ironsides frequently. I should say I was within fourteen hundred yards of the fort.

Question. Can you describe particularly the amount of damage that was done to the fort by that bombardment?

Answer. I could not, except that the works had the appearance of being pitted all over. There was scarcely a spot that you could point out where it did not appear that a shot or shell had struck and scooped out the dirt. It looked like a person pitted with the small-pox. I could not tell how many guns were disabled. I know the fire of the fleet was very severe; that when even three frigates and the iron-clads opened on it briskly, by order of the admiral, it completely silenced the fort; and with the full fire of the whole fleet it would have been a matter of impossibility almost for men to stand there, as was shown afterwards. I could not tell how many guns were dismantled. I happened to be looking when a shot struck one gun, and I saw the gun knocked some distance; that was the only one I myself saw dismantled. I heard from deserters and others that there were eleven altogether burst and dismantled.

Question. Do you know the number of guns in the fort at that time?

Answer. We thought there were more than there really were. We estimated that there were seventy guns in Fort Fisher proper and the work immediately adjacent. We thought it was altogether a very different shaped work from what it was; we thought it was a square work enclosed.

Question. Were there any other communications, to your knowledge, between General Butler and Admiral Porter, than those which you have already mentioned?

Answer. General Butler came to see the admiral very frequently at Hampton roads. They were always closeted together, and I never knew what was the result of their interviews. I spoke to General Weitzel one evening, on his leaving the vessel, and said, "General, do you know what the plans are here?" He said, "I don't know anything about them." I replied, "I don't think the admiral does; I don't think the admiral knows what the general wants to do. I think the admiral feels a little sore that the general does not ask him anything, or tell him what he wants. The general does not appear to regard him at all in any position here." I forget the precise language in which General Weitzel replied, but the amount of it was, that that was the way it appeared to him. It appeared to me that there was no co-operation between General Butler and the admiral. Whether there was or not I do not know. I know that General Butler came to see him, and I supposed, of course, that they talked about matters relating to the expedition then in progress.

But after we got down off Fort Fisher, there seemed to be no concert at all, except on the occasion I have alluded to. They communicated with each other several times by signal, but it did not amount to much of anything. I may be giving a wrong impression in this matter. But I can only state what I thought myself; I did not know anything about it; I never asked the admiral anything. I supposed he always told me what he thought it was right for me to know; and what he did not tell me I did not ask any information about. But that was the impression I had, and I think that was the impression that General Weitzel had of the matter.

Question. Have you any knowledge in relation to the explosion of the powder-boat; whether the whole amount of the powder, or any considerable portion of it, was burnt?

Answer. I only have the opinion of those who were present. I was with Captain Rhind, who was the officer in charge of it, when he called upon Captain Jeffers, the naval ordnance officer, who went down for the purpose of laying the fuse and managing it. I understood Captain Jeffers to say that the fuse was already laid, and in such a manner as to insure an almost instantaneous ignition of the whole amount of powder. He described how it was laid, and also the means of igniting it.

When we got down to Beaufort Captain Rhind went on board the powder-vessel, and upon making the final examination he found that the fuze was not laid in the powder that was stowed in the hold; that it was laid in a portion that was on deck, but not in all. He then went to work and in the time allowed he laid the fuze to the best of his ability. He laid it down in the hold and re-laid it on the deck all around, so as to secure as prompt ignition as possible.

I do not think that all the powder did ignite at once. I myself heard two distinct explosions, and Captain Rhind, who was considerably nearer than I was, told me that he was sure he heard four explosions.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. Have you any means of knowing the number of men in that fort at the time of the first bombardment?

Answer. Only from the stories of the deserters and those people. They reported two companies of artillery, which would be about 125 men to a company; also two companies brought up from Fort Caswell, with about the same number of men in each company; and they also had some sailors and naval officers and marines belonging to the confederate navy. The whole force was estimated at between 600 and 700 men. They had no force outside on the point, with the exception of some home guards and a small force of General Hoke's division, which came from the army of the James, but not a great many of them. They were just coming, but had not arrived.

Question. Do you know how many of the enemy's guns were disabled by the first bombardment?

Answer. I heard from deserters that there were eleven guns disabled. I never knew positively. I myself saw only one dismantled.

Question. Was there any positive knowledge that more than one gun had been disabled at the time it was proposed to land the troops and make an assault on the work?

Answer. I do not know whether there was or not; I only know about the one gun I saw dismantled.

Question. Was it known in the fleet or in the army, so far as your information extends, that any other guns were disabled?

Answer. Not to any great extent. I think that probably five or six on the land face were disabled; but there were still quite a number that were effective. I do not think it was supposed that there were more than five at the utmost that were disabled; I never heard any one say there were more than five guns disabled on the land face.

Question. What means had you of knowing the number of men in the fort at that time?

Answer. I do not think we had any means, except the reports of deserters of some weeks previous, and persons who had been there. It was then reported pretty generally that the previous garrison of Fort Fisher had gone down to Georgia to oppose General Sherman, and that the probable garrison in Fort Fisher was very small. I never heard any estimate of the number of men in it until we went there to attack it. It was then supposed that there were about 700 men there. That is what we supposed in the fleet, without absolutely knowing anything about it.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you now go on and give the particulars of the second attack?

Answer. I was sent away for a time, and when I got back to Beaufort, and found everything ready to start, we left Beaufort, the whole force together, army and navy, and steamed down and anchored within about ten miles of Fort Fisher. The next morning we all got under way. The division of vessels that was selected to cover the landing of the troops ran close in and shelled the

woods. The transports came up and took their position. At nine o'clock the boats of the division were engaged in landing troops. I had it under my supervision for the greater portion of the time. I know that at three o'clock in the afternoon the last provision and the last man of the command which General Terry brought there were landed on shore. I was quite surprised myself at its having been done so soon. The surf was heavier in the morning of that day than it was at any time during the first expedition, except when the southerly storm arose. Everything seemed to betoken great energy on the part of General Terry, and in the way the men went to work in every respect. As soon as they got ashore we saw them organize into proper bodies and march off, and in a short time afterwards we found out that General Terry had thrown up a line of defensive works across the point, and had captured a small steamer. While the boats were engaged in landing the troops, the admiral sent the iron-clads up to attack the fort. They went up and continued the attack until about four o'clock in the evening, when some of the other vessels went up and joined in the attack. The whole fleet was not engaged in the attack on that day. The next day nearly all the fleet was engaged in bombarding the fort. The day after that General Terry sent off word that he proposed to assault the fort at two o'clock in the afternoon. The admiral proposed to send some sailors and marines ashore to co-operate with him, and to attack the sea face while he attacked the land face. The sailors were landed about ten o'clock, and were formed and moved up to within about a mile of the works. There they were all covered. I had command of them. I went to General Terry to see what signals we should agree upon, for we could not see each other from where our forces were. He told me that he would send me word when he was ready, and that after that I must be guided in my movements by his, and must keep watch the best way I could. Our men were engaged in digging rifle-pits and marching up as close to the fort as they could. About three o'clock General Ames sent me word that he was ready with his men, and about to make the assault. I moved my men still closer up, and got them within, I should think, about 600 yards of the fort. About three o'clock, I should think, I saw some guidons planted on the northeast corner of the works. I then gave the order for the sailors and marines to advance. They did so until, I should think, they got within about fifty yards of the fort, when the marines who were to have covered the sailors in the assault failing to come up and clear the parapets by the fire of their muskets, the sailors were unable to advance any further. A great many of them were killed and wounded on that spot. Finally the rest turned around and ran. About sunset that evening I got away from there, and found that General Terry had requested that our men should occupy the lines of some of his troops, which he had been obliged to take to re-enforce his storming party, that was still fighting in the fort. The sailors and marines did occupy those lines. About two o'clock we got the news of the capture of the fort, and shortly afterwards the troops returned and took their places in the lines, and the sailors and marines re-embarked. There was not a gun fired by the enemy on that land face during that forenoon, while we were on the beach and exposed to them, with the exception of two little field-pieces, which were covered from the fire of the fleet, and which were intended to sweep the front face of the palisades; they were fired several times. There was no damage done to any of us; I do not know what damage may have been done to the army by them.

Question. Do you know the condition of the guns in the fort at the time the assault was commenced?

Answer. All on the land face were disabled, with the exception of one 30-pounder Parrott. The two little pieces I have spoken of were not mounted on the fort itself, but were mounted in front of the ditch, and were intended to sweep the face of the stockade; they were mounted near the sally-port; and the car-

riages of those guns were in such a condition that they would not have stood any protracted firing. They would have done well enough, I suppose, to resist an assault; but they could not be manned even for that purpose.

Question. How did the effect of the second bombardment compare with the first, particularly upon the guns of the fort?

Answer. At the time of the first bombardment you could hardly say that we had got regularly to work at all. The first bombardment amounted to about what had been done to the fort previous to the last day of the second bombardment. During the first bombardment there was no one time when the whole force of the fleet was brought to bear upon the fort. There were no directions from the admiral to dismount the guns, as there were at the second bombardment. The army laid great stress, the first time, upon the guns of the fort being still in position; but the admiral did not pay much attention to that, because he knew he could keep the gunners away from them so that they could not serve them. But they laid such a stress upon the guns being still in position that at the second bombardment the admiral gave orders to the vessels to fire at the guns. Afterwards General Terry requested him to fire at the palisades and cut them down, which he did. They were cut down very much, so as to enable the troops to get in without a great deal of opposition. There seemed to be a most cordial co-operation and understanding between General Terry and Admiral Porter all the time; so there was on the first expedition, so far as the officers of the two branches of the service were concerned—perfect good feeling and good understanding. I never heard any other opinion expressed by any one.

Question. Do you know what the strength of the garrison was at the time of the second attack?

Answer. I do not know what it was when we first got there; but there were about 2,300 prisoners captured in the fort and in the work adjacent, and some few had escaped. The garrison was very much re-enforced over what it was before.

Question. How many men were necessary to thoroughly garrison that fort?

Answer. I have no idea; I am no judge of such matters. The force that was there was the greatest abundance in the world to garrison such a place, I should suppose. I heard army officers talking about it after it was taken, and they said they thought they could take a thousand men and defend that fort against any force in the world that could be brought against it. I have heard a great many say that.

Question. Since it was captured?

Answer. Yes, sir; that they could take a thousand men and defend that fort against any land force that could be brought against it in an assault.

Question. Did they mean that they could hold it against a combined attack of land and naval forces?

Answer. I did not understand them in that way. I understood that they could hold it against any assaulting party in the world. It was often said there, "Suppose the rebels should be re-enforced and drive you back?" and all that sort of thing; and I heard a great many say, "Well, with a thousand men we could hold Fort Fisher against any force." They had made some different arrangements in it, though, from what the rebels had—dug rifle-pits and one thing and another.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. What number of men had General Terry under his command?

Answer. I do not know exactly; but I heard it reported that he had the same force that General Butler had had, with a brigade in addition, making about 8,000 men; perhaps 8,500.

Question. What number of sailors and marines co-operated in the assault?

Answer. About 2,000; about 1,600 seamen and 400 marines.

Question. What number of men were in the fort?

Answer. I do not know of my own knowledge. I heard it said that the rebel Colonel Lamb told a naval officer that he had supposed the naval assault was the main assault; that he had 750 men to resist the attack of the army, and 750 men to resist the attack of the navy; and that, supposing the navy was the main assaulting party, he had called 250 men from the other party to resist the naval assault, making a thousand men in that part of the fort. That would make it that he had 1,500 men in the works.

Question. Have you any means of knowing that the enemy's force in the fort was larger at the time of the second bombardment than it was at the time of the first?

Answer. We supposed so, because there were two steamers seen bringing troops to the fort, and, during the assault, some of the vessels saw troops marching across the plain between Fort Fisher and the mound, as it is termed, to reinforce the fort; not any very large body, however.

Question. The fleet bombarded Fort Fisher for two days before the assault was made by General Terry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know whether any guns were disabled by that bombardment

Answer. Yes, sir; I think they had seventeen guns on the land face, and that all but two were disabled.

Question. What means had you of knowing that?

Answer. We did not know it when we made the assault. A great many of them looked as if they were in first-rate order. There were a number that were up-ended and slewed around, which we knew were disabled. We estimated that there were eight of them disabled; the rest of them we thought were in serviceable condition; but we found, when the place was taken, that all but one or two were disabled.

Question. How was it on the sea-face?

Answer. I do not think there were more than one or two guns disabled there. They had been struck; but I do not think there were more than one or two out of five that were disabled.

Question. Was the fire of the fleet as effective in the second assault as in the first, and keeping off the gunners?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. It was utterly impossible for the men of the fort to man the guns at the time the assault was made?

Answer. Yes, sir; not at the moment the assault was made, but previous to the assault. When the assault was made the fleet stopped firing, and that gave the garrison an opportunity to come out, but their guns were disabled; still they could not have manned them if they had not been disabled, for our sharpshooters were too close to them. All the time we were on the land trying to get up to the parapet. They had an 8-inch gun pointed to sweep down it. It was loaded with grape and canister. They did not fire it; I do not know why.

Question. How long did the fighting continue in the fort after the assault was commenced?

Answer. As far as the sailors were concerned, the fighting was all over in fifteen minutes. They made a rush, and got, I think, within about 50 yards of the fort, and then had to give it up. I suppose that 200 of them were kept within the line of the enemy's fire; but they dug holes in the sand and remained there until after dark, and then they came back.

Question. How was the assault of the sailors repulsed?

Answer. By small arms. The sailors were armed principally with cutlasses and small arms. The intention was, that the marines should take the advance,

and act as sharpshooters to keep the garrison from the parapet, and the sailors were to rush over it into the fort. But the marines did not go up close enough; and for that reason, when the sailors got up, they had nothing to enable them to make any kind of defence, and they could not clear the parapets.

Question. And in the course of fifteen minutes they were compelled to retire?

Answer. Yes, sir; in less time than that.

Question. And in the mean time the troops of the army had made a lodgement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And how long did they continue fighting in the fort?

Answer. From about half past three until ten o'clock at night.

Question. How many men were engaged in the assault on the land side?

Answer. There were three brigades, which averaged, I suppose, about 1,500 to a brigade; I do not think they averaged more than that. In addition to them there were some 300 or 400 men as sharpshooters. That I do not know positively, but it is according to the best means of information I have.

Question. What was the loss on each side, as near as you can tell?

Answer. The loss in the army was 700 and odd, killed and wounded. In the navy it was 304, which included the casualties on board the fleet, amounting to about twenty.

Question. What was the enemy's loss in killed and wounded?

Answer. I heard it estimated at about 300. But an explosion took place there which covered everything up in the debris. I doubt that many of them were exhumed. They were found wounded in the casemates. But all that information can be got at; I do not know it myself. I heard the enemy's loss in killed and wounded spoken of as between 300 and 400.

Question. What number of men of General Butler's command landed there at the time of the first bombardment were actually on shore?

Answer. I was not present there; I was with the fleet at the time. I was told that 3,000 men had got on shore, but that the 2d brigade had scarcely got on the beach before they were ordered to go back to their boats again; and some of them had not even landed.

Question. General Terry landed all his men?

Answer. Yes, sir; every one of them, and the next day his guns were landed; but he had very few guns.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How nearly was your ammunition expended at the time the first bombardment ceased?

Answer. I should think we had left one day's allowance for rapid firing; but I will not be positive about that. But judging from the subsequent bombardment, and what I have heard generally, I should judge we had enough to have continued the bombardment another day.

Question. From what point could you have supplied yourselves with ammunition?

Answer. From Beaufort.

Question. How long would it have taken?

Answer. Beaufort is 60 miles from Fort Fisher. A steamer would go there in 6 hours and bring back a vessel in 10 hours more; within 24 hours the fleet could have been entirely resupplied. The ammunition was in vessels lying in Beaufort harbor. All that was necessary was to send a steamer there for the vessels as we wanted them, as we did afterwards, at the second bombardment.



NAVY DEPARTMENT, *February 2, 1865.*

SIR: Your letter of the 25th ultimo, requesting, on behalf of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to be furnished "with copies of all the correspondence between the Navy Department and Admiral Porter in relation to the several expeditions against the defences of Wilmington, North Carolina, both in relation to the preparation and execution of the expedition," was duly received.

I have the honor herewith to transmit copies of the correspondence called for. The preliminary orders for the reduction of the defences of Wilmington were given to Vice-Admiral Farragut on the 5th of September last, but in consequence of impaired health that officer was unable to assume the duty. These orders, copies of which are given, were subsequently transferred to Rear-Admiral Porter, to whom the expedition was confided. Instructions and detailed arrangements were communicated in personal interviews, which are not matters of record, but which have been carried into effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman Committee on the Conduct of the War.*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, September 5, 1864.*

SIR: It has been the endeavor of the Navy Department, since the winter of 1862, to get the consent of the War Department to a joint attack upon the defences of Cape Fear river, but they have decided that no troops could be spared for the operation. Lieutenant General Grant has recently given the subject his attention, and thinks an army force can be spared, and ready to move, by the first day of October. Upon consultation, he is of the opinion that the best results will follow the landing of a large force, under the guns of the navy, on the open beach north of New inlet, to take possession and intrench across to Cape Fear river, the navy to open such fire as is possible upon the works on Federal Point, in conjunction with the army, and, at the same time, such force as can run the batteries to do so, and thus isolate the rebels. At ordinary high water, the chart gives twelve feet on New Inlet bar, but Lieutenant Cushing, who has sounded it, says there is fourteen; this, however, requires verification. The double-enders and small screw gunboats are the only wooden vessels that can go in, and possibly the monitors of the Passaic class.

The lieutenant general considers that much of the success of this plan will depend on its secrecy; and it is agreed that most of the naval force shall assemble at Port Royal, and indications be thrown out that a naval attack is meditated upon Charleston.

You are selected to command the naval force, and you will endeavor to be at Port Royal by the latter part of September, where further orders will await you. Bring with you to the rendezvous at Port Royal all such vessels and officers as can be spared from the West Gulf squadron without impairing its necessary efficiency, and when you leave turn over the command of the squadron to the officer next in rank to yourself until the pleasure of the department shall be known.

I send you by this mail a sketch showing our present knowledge of the ground. Fort Fisher is a casemated work of sand. All the others are two and four gun batteries en barbette. There is one iron-clad finished in the river and in commission.

The Colorado, Wabash, Minnesota, New Ironsides, Susquehanna, Canandaigua, Juniata, about a dozen of the double-enders and screw gunboats, three or four monitors of the Passaic class, one light-draught monitor, one new double-turreted monitor built of wood at the Boston navy yard, and the whole of Acting Rear-Admiral Lee's squadron, besides such vessels as you may bring up from the Gulf, are at your disposal.

If the captured Tennessee is brought around to Port Royal, it will relieve a monitor there, and then she can be brought to Philadelphia and coppered and put in thorough repair.

The department will thank you to indicate your views and wishes in regard to the matter, and authorizes you to call for any or all of the naval force available at that time to the department. The operation is an important one as closing the last port of the rebels, and destroying their credit abroad, by preventing the exportation of cotton, as well as preventing the reception of munitions and supplies from abroad.

The whole subject is committed to your hands, so far as this department is concerned, in the confident expectation that success may attend our arms.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. G. FARRAGUT,  
*Commanding W. G. B. Squadron, Mobile bay.*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
October 28, 1864.

SIR: You are aware that, owing to shoal water at the mouth of the Cape Fear river, a purely naval attack cannot be undertaken against Wilmington. Had there been water enough for our broadside ships of the Hartford class, the naval attacks of New Orleans, Mobile, and Port Royal would have been repeated there. I have, as you are aware, often pressed upon the War Department the importance of capturing Wilmington, and urged upon the military authorities of undertaking a joint operation against the defences of Cape Fear river, but until recently there never seems to have been a period when the department was in a condition to entertain the subject.

Two months ago it was arranged that an attack should be made on the 1st of October, but subsequently postponed to the 15th, and the naval force has been ready since the 15th instant, in accordance with that agreement. One hundred and fifty vessels-of-war now form the North Atlantic squadron. The command, first offered to Rear-Admiral Farragut, but declined by him, has been given to Rear-Admiral Porter. Every other squadron has been depleted and vessels detached from other duty to strengthen this expedition. The vessels are concentrated at Hampton roads and Beaufort, where they remain—an immense force lying idle, awaiting the movements of the army. The detention of so many vessels from blockade and cruising duty is a most serious injury to the public service; and if the expedition cannot go forward for want of troops, I desire to be notified, so that the ships may be relieved and dispersed for other service.

The importance of closing Wilmington is so well understood by you that I refrain from presenting any new arguments. I am aware of the anxiety of yourself, and of the disposition of the War Department to render all the aid in its power. The cause of the delay is not from the want of a proper conception of the importance of the subject; but the season for naval coast operations will soon be gone. General Bragg has been sent from Richmond to Wilmington to

prepare for the attack; and the autumn weather, so favorable for such an expedition, is fast passing away. The public expect this attack, and the country will be distressed if it be not made. To procrastinate much longer will be to peril its success. Of the obstacles which delay or prevent military co-operation at once I cannot judge; but the delay is becoming exceedingly embarrassing to this department, and the importance of having the military authorities impressed with the necessity of speedy action has prompted this communication to you.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

GIDEON WELLES.

The PRESIDENT.

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[Telegram in cipher.]

FORT MONROE, VA.,  
December 13, 1864.—1.30 p. m.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, *Secretary of the Navy:*

I shall leave here for Beaufort in an hour.

D. D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAGSHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Wilmington, December 24, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear river this morning at 12.30, and after getting the ships in position, silenced it in about an hour and a half, there being no troops here to take possession. I am merely firing at it now to keep up practice. The forts are nearly demolished, and as soon as troops come we can take possession; we have set them on fire; blown some of them up, and all that is wanted now is troops to land to go into them.

I suppose General Butler will be here in the morning. We have had very heavy gales here, which tugs, monitors and all rode out at their anchors. The transports have gone into Beaufort, North Carolina.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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FLAGSHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, North Carolina, December 26, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward with this a somewhat detailed report of the two engagements with Fort Fisher and the surrounding works.

We attacked with the whole fleet on the 24th instant, and silenced every gun in a very short time.

On the 25th instant we again took up our position, within a mile of the fort, (the iron vessels within twelve hundred (1,200) yards) without a shot being fired at us; shelled it all day, with now and then a shot from the rebels, and stopped firing after sunset.

The army landed and re-embarked, considering it impracticable to assault the place.

I shall remain here and keep shelling the enemy's works on every occasion whenever the weather will permit.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*At sea, off New Inlet, North Carolina, December 26, 1864.*

SIR: I was in hopes I should have been able to present to the nation Fort Fisher and surrounding works as a Christmas offering, but I am sorry to say it has not been taken yet.

I attacked it on the 24th instant with the Ironsides, Canonicus, Mahopac, Monadnock, Minnesota, Colorado, Mohican, Tuscarora, Wabash, Susquehanna, Brooklyn, Powhatan, Juniata, Seneca, Shenandoah, Pawtuxet, Ticonderoga, Mackinaw, Maumee, Yantic, Kansas, Iosco, Quaker City, Monticello, Rhode Island, Sassacus, Chippewa, Osceola, Tacony, Pontoosuc, Santiago de Cuba, Fort Jackson, and Vanderbilt, having a reserve of small vessels consisting of the Aries, Howquah, Wilderness, Cherokee, A. D. Vance, Anemone, Eolus, Gettysburg, Alabama, Keystone State, Banshee, Emma, Lillian, Tristram Shady, Britannia, Governor Buckingham, and Nansemond.

Previous to making the attack, a torpedo on a large scale, with an amount of powder on board supposed to be sufficient to explode the powder magazines of the fort, was prepared with great care and placed under the command of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had associated with him on this perilous service Lieutenant S. W. Preston, Second Assistant Engineer A. T. E. Mullan, of the United States steamer Agawam, and Acting Master's Mate Paul Boyden, and seven men. So much had been said and written about the terrible effects of gunpowder in an explosion that happened lately in England, that great results were expected from this novel mode of making war. Everything that ingenuity could devise was adopted to make the experiment a success.

The vessel was brought around from Norfolk with great care and without accident, in tow of the United States steamer Sassacus, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, who directed his whole attention to the matter in hand, and though he experienced some bad weather and lost one of his rudders, he took her safely into Beaufort, where we filled her up with powder, and perfected all the machinery for blowing her up. General Butler had arrived at the rendezvous before us, and I hastened matters all that I could, so that no unnecessary delay might be laid to my charge.

On the 18th instant I sailed from Beaufort with all the monitors, New Ironsides, and small vessels, including the Louisiana, disguised as a blockade runner, for the rendezvous twenty miles east of New inlet, North Carolina, and found all the larger vessels and transports assembled there, the wind blowing light from the northeast. On the 20th a heavy gale set in from the southwest, and not being able to make a port without scattering all the vessels, I determined to ride it out, which I did, without any accident of any kind except the loss of a few anchors, the monitors and all behaving beautifully.

Only two vessels went to sea to avoid the gale, and fared no better than those at anchor. The transports, being short of water, put into Beaufort, North Carolina, and were not suitable for riding out at anchor such heavy weather.

After the southwester the wind chopped around to the westward and gave us a beautiful spell of weather, which I could not afford to lose, and the transports

with the troops not making their appearance, I determined to take advantage of it and attack Fort Fisher and its outworks.

On the 23d I directed Commander Rhind to proceed and explode the vessel right under the walls of Fort Fisher, Mr. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, having gone in at night and ascertained that we could place a vessel of seven feet draught right on the edge of the beach; Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, commanding Gettysburg, volunteered to go in in the Wilderness, Acting Master Henry Avery in command, and tow the Louisiana into position, having assisted in the gale in taking care of the Louisiana after she and the Nansemond (the vessel having her in tow) had lost all their anchors.

At half-past ten p. m. the powder-vessel started in towards the bar and was towed by the Wilderness until the embrasures of Fort Fisher were plainly in sight. The Wilderness then cast off and the Louisiana proceeded under steam until within two hundred yards from the beach and about four hundred from the fort.

Commander Rhind anchored her securely there and coolly went to work to make all his arrangements to blow her up. This he was enabled to do owing to a blockade runner going in right ahead of him, the forts making the blockade runner signals, which they also did to the Louisiana.

The gallant party, after coolly making all their arrangements for the explosion, left the vessel, the last thing they did being to set her on fire under the cabin. Then taking to their boats, they made their escape off to the Wilderness, lying close by. The Wilderness then put off shore with good speed, to avoid any ill effects that might happen from the explosion. At forty-five minutes past one of the morning of the 24th the explosion took place, and the shock was nothing like so severe as was expected. It shook the vessel some, and broke one or two glasses, but nothing more.

At daylight, on the 24th, the fleet got under way, and stood in, in line of battle. At 11.30 a. m. the signal was made to engage the forts, the Ironsides leading, and the Monadnock, Canonicus and Mahopac following. The Ironsides took her position in the most beautiful and seamanlike manner, got her spring out, and opened deliberate fire on the fort, which was firing at her with all its guns, which did not seem numerous in the northeast face, though we counted what appeared to be seventeen guns; but four or five of these were fired from that direction, and they were silenced almost as soon as the Ironsides opened her terrific battery.

The Minnesota then took her position in handsome style, and her guns, after getting the range, were fired with rapidity, while the Mohican, Colorado, and the large vessels marked on the plan, got to their stations, all firing to cover themselves while anchoring. By the time the last of the large vessels anchored and got their batteries into play, but one or two guns of the enemy were fired, this "*feu d'enfer*" driving them all to their bomb-proofs.

The small gunboats Kansas, Unadilla, Pequot, Seneca, Pontoosuc, Yantic, and Huron took positions to the northward and eastward of the monitors, and enfilading the works.

The Shenandoah, Ticonderoga, Mackinaw, Tacony, and Vanderbilt took effective positions as marked on the chart, and added their fire to that already begun.

The Santiago de Cuba, Fort Jackson, Osceola, Chippewa, Sassacus, Rhode Island, Monticello, Quaker City, and Iosco dropped into position according to order, and the battle became general. In one hour and fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort. Two magazines had been blown up by our shells, and the fort set on fire in several places; and such a torrent of missiles were falling into and bursting over it that it was impossible for anything human to stand it. Finding that the batteries were silenced completely, I directed the ships to keep up a moderate fire in hopes of attracting the

attention of the transports and bringing them in. At sunset General Butler came in, in his flag-ship, with a few transports, (the rest not having arrived from Beaufort.)

Being too late to do anything more, I signalled the fleet to retire for the night for a safe anchorage, which they did without being molested by the enemy.

There were some mistakes made this day when the vessels went in to take position. My plan of battle being based on accurate calculation, and made from information to be relied on, was placed in the hands of each commander, and it seemed impossible to go astray if it was strictly followed.

I required those vessels that had not followed it closely to get under way and assume their proper positions, which was done promptly and without confusion. The vessels were placed somewhat nearer to the works and were able to throw in their shell, which were before falling into the water.

One or two leading vessels having made the mistake of anchoring too far off, caused those coming after them to commit a like error; but when they all got into place, and commenced work in earnest, the shower of shell (115 per minute) was irresistible. So quickly were the enemy's guns silenced that not an officer or man was injured. I regret, however, to have to report some severe casualties by the bursting of 100-pounder Parrott cannon.

One burst on board the Ticonderoga, killing six of the crew, and wounding seven others. Another burst on board the Yantic, killing one officer and two men. Another on the Juniata, killing two officers, and wounding and killing ten others. Another on the Mackinaw, killing one officer, and wounding five others (men.) Another on the Quaker City, wounding, I believe, two or three. Another on the Susquehanna, killing and wounding seven, I think.

The bursting of the guns (six in all) much disconcerted the crews of the vessels when the accident happened, and gave one and all a great distrust of the Parrott 100-pounders, and (as subsequent events proved) they were unfit for service, and calculated to kill more of our men than those of the enemy.

Some of the vessels were struck once or twice. The Mackinaw had her boiler perforated with a shell, and ten or twelve persons were badly scalded.

The Osceola was struck with a shell near her magazine, and was at one time in a sinking condition; but her efficient commander stopped up the leak, while the Mackinaw fought out the battle, notwithstanding the damage she received. The Yantic was the only vessel that left the line to report damages.

Commander Jno. Guest, at the east end of the line, showed his usual intelligence in selecting his position and directing his fire. Twice his guns cut down the flag-staff on the Mound battery, and he silenced the guns there in a very short time, the Keystone State and Quaker City co-operating effectively.

Lieutenant Commander J. R. Davis, with both rudders disabled, got his vessel, the Sassacus, into close action, and assisted materially in silencing the works; and the Santiago de Cuba and Fort Jackson took such positions as they could get, (owing to other vessels not forming proper lines and throwing them out of place,) and fought their guns well. The taking of a new position while under fire, by the Brooklyn and Colorado, was a beautiful sight, and when they got into place both ships delivered a fire that nothing could withstand.

The Brooklyn well sustained her proud name under her present commander, Captain James Alden; and the Colorado gave evidence that her commander, Commodore H. K. Thatcher, fully understood the duties of his position. The Susquehanna was most effective in her fire, and was fortunate enough to obtain the right position, though much bothered by a vessel near her that had not found her right place.

The Mohican went into battle gallantly and fired rapidly and with effect, and when the Powhatan, Ticonderoga and Shenandoah got into their positions they did good service. The Pawtuxet fell handsomely into line, and did good ser-

vice with the rest, and the Vanderbilt took position near the Minnesota, and threw in a splendid fire. The firing of the monitors was excellent, and when their shells struck great damage was done, and the little gunboats that covered them kept up a fire sufficient to disconcert the enemy's aim.

The rebels fired no more after the vessels all opened on them, except a few shots from the mound and upper batteries, which the Iosco and consorts soon silenced.

Our men were at work at the guns five hours, and glad to get a little rest. They came out of action with rather a contempt for rebel batteries, and anxious to renew the battle in the morning.

On the 25th (Christmas) all the transports had arrived, and General Butler sent General Weitzel to see me and arrange the programme for the day. It was decided that we should attack the forts again, while the army landed and assailed them, if possible, under our heavy fire.

I sent seventeen gunboats, under command of Captain O. S. Glisson, to cover the troops and assist with their boats in landing the soldiers. Finding the smaller vessels kept too far from the beach, which was quite bold, I sent in the Brooklyn to set them an example, which that vessel did, relying, as every commander should, on the information I gave him in relation to the soundings. To this number were added all the small vessels that were covering the coast along; and finally I sent some eight or nine vessels, that were acting under Commander Guest in endeavoring to find a way across the bar. This gave a hundred small boats to land the troops with. Besides those, the army was already provided with about twenty more.

At 7 a. m. on the 25th I made signal to get under way and form in line of battle, which was quickly done. The order to attack was given, and the Ironsides took position in her usual handsome style, the monitors following close after her. All the vessels followed according to order, and took position without a shot being fired at them, excepting a few shots fired at the four last vessels that got into line.

The firing this day was slow, only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the army landed, which they were doing five miles to the eastward of the fleet.

I suppose about three thousand men had landed, when I was notified they were re-embarking.

I could see our soldiers near the forts reconnoitring and sharpshooting, and was in hopes an assault was deemed practicable.

General Weitzel in person was making observations about six hundred yards off, and the troops were in and around the works. One gallant officer, whose name I do not know, went on the parapet and brought away the rebel flag we had knocked down. A soldier went into the works and led out a horse, killing the orderly mounted on him, and taking his despatches from the body. Another soldier fired his musket into the bomb-proof among the rebels, and eight or ten others who had ventured near the forts were wounded by our shells.

As the ammunition gave out the vessels retired from action, and the iron-clads and Minnesota, Colorado, and Susquehanna were ordered to open rapidly, which they did with such effect that it seemed to tear the works to pieces. We drew off at sunset, leaving the iron-clads to fire through the night, expecting the troops would attack in the morning, when we would commence again. I received word from General Weitzel informing me that it was impracticable to assault, and I herewith enclose a letter from General Butler assigning his reasons for withdrawing the troops. I also enclose my answer.

In the bombardment of the 25th the men were engaged firing slowly for seven hours. The rebels kept a couple of guns on the upper batteries firing on the vessels, hitting some of them several times without doing much damage. The Wabash and Powhatan being within their range, the object seemed mainly to

disable them, but a rapid fire soon closed them up. Everything was coolly and systematically done throughout the day, and I witnessed some beautiful practice.

The army commenced landing about two o'clock, Gaptain Glisson, in the Santiago de Cuba, having shelled Flag Pond battery to insure a safe landing, and they commenced to re-embark about five o'clock, the weather coming on thick and rainy. About a brigade were left on the beach during the night, covered by the gunboats. As our troops landed, sixty-five rebel soldiers hoisted the white flag and delivered themselves up, and were taken prisoners by the seamen landing the troops, and conveyed to the Santiago de Cuba. Two hundred and eighteen more gave themselves up to the reconnoitring party, all being desirous to quit the war.

I don't pretend to put my opinion in opposition to that of General Weitzel, who is a thorough soldier and an able engineer, and whose business it is to know more of assaulting than I do; but I can't help thinking that it was worth while to make the attempt after coming so far.

About 12 o'clock I sent in a detachment of double-enders, under Commander John Guest, to see if I could effect an entrance through the channel. The great number of wrecks in and about the bar has changed the whole formation, and where the original channel was we found a shallow bar.

I sent Lieutenant W. B. Cushing in to sound and buoy out a channel if he could find one, with orders to Commander Guest to drag for torpedoes and be ready to run in by the buoys when ordered. \* \* \* \*

The examination was not at all satisfactory. A very narrow and crooked channel was partly made out and buoyed, but running so close to the upper forts that boats could not work there.

Lieutenant Cushing went in in his boat as far as Zeke's island, but his researches would not justify my attempting the passage with six double-enders, some of which had burst their rifled Parrott guns and injured many of their men.

As it was getting late, and the troops were making slow progress in landing, I withdrew the vessels and boats that were searching for the channel, and sent them to help land the troops, otherwise we might have succeeded in buoying it out, though it was a difficult thing for the boats to work under the fire of the upper batteries.

One boat belonging to the Tacony was sunk by a shell, and a man had his leg cut off. Still they stuck to their work until ordered to withdraw for other duty. In conclusion, allow me to draw your attention to the conduct of Commander Rhind and Lieutenant Preston. They engaged in the most perilous adventure that was, perhaps, ever undertaken, and though no material results have taken place from the effects of the explosion, that we know of, still it was not their fault.

As an incentive to others I beg leave to recommend them for promotion; also that of Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, who piloted them in and brought them off. No one in the squadron considered that their lives would be saved, and Captain Rhind and Lieutenant Preston had made an arrangement to sacrifice themselves in case the vessel was boarded—a thing likely to happen.

I enclose herewith the report of Commander Rhind, with the names of the gallant fellows who volunteered for this desperate service. Allow me also to mention the name of Mr. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, who went in and sounded out the place where the Louisiana was to go in, and has always patiently performed every duty that he has been called on to carry out.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese, fleet captain, for carrying about my orders to the fleet during the action, and for his general usefulness; to Lieutenant Commander H. A. Adams for his promptness in supplying the fleet with ammunition. Lieutenant M. W. Sanders, signal officer, whose



whole time was occupied in making signals, performed his duty well; and my aids, Lieutenant S. W. Terry and Lieutenant S. W. Preston, afforded me valuable assistance.

I have not yet received a list of the casualties, but believe they are very few from the enemy's guns. We had killed and wounded about forty-five persons by the bursting of the Parrott guns. \* \* \*

I beg leave to suggest that no more be introduced into the service.

There is only one kind of firing (at close quarters) that is effective, and that is from the 9, 10, and 11-inch guns; they cannot be equalled.

Until further orders I shall go on and hammer away at the fort, hoping that in time the people in it will get tired and hand it over to us. It is a one-sided business altogether, and in the course of time we must dismount their guns, if, as General Weitzel says, we cannot "injure it as a defensive work. The government may also think it of sufficient importance to undertake more serious operations against these works.

An army of a few thousand men investing it would soon get into it, with the aid of the navy. When smooth water permits I will go to work looking for a channel over the bar, which has not yet been found to my satisfaction.

I must not omit to pay a tribute to the officers and crew of the monitors—riding out heavy gales on an open coast without murmuring or complaining of the want of comfort, which must have been very serious. They have shown a degree of fortitude and perseverance seldom witnessed. Equally brave in battle, they take the closest work with pleasure, and the effect of their shells is terrific.

The following are the names of the commanders, and I hope I shall ever keep them under my command:

Commander E. G. Parrott, commanding Monadnock; Commander E. R. Calhoun, commanding Sangus; Lieutenant George E. Belknap, commanding Canonicus; Lieutenant Commander E. E. Potter, commanding Mahopac.

There are about one thousand men left on shore by the army who have not been got off yet on account of the surf on the beach. These will be got off in the morning, and the soldiers will then be sent home.

I enclose general order for the attack.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy.*

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[General Orders, No. 70.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Hampton Roads, December 10, 1864.*

The chart plan of the proposed attack on the batteries of the enemy at New inlet, mouth of Cape Fear river, will explain itself, but the order of taking position is as follows:

It is first proposed to endeavor to paralyze the garrison by an explosion, all the vessels remaining twelve miles out from the bar, and the troops in transports twelve miles down the coast, ready to steam up and be prepared to take the works by assault in case the latter are disabled.

At a given signal all the bar vessels will run off shore twelve miles, when the vessel with powder will go in under the forts. When the explosion takes place all the vessels will stand in shore in the order marked on the plan.

The New Ironsides will steam along shore, coming from the eastward, until the flagstaff on Fort Fisher bears southwest by west half west, and anchor (chain ready to slip) with her broadside bearing on the largest of the enemy's

works and open fire without delay. The monitors will come up astern, anchoring not more than one-length apart directly in line along the shore, leaving space only for a gunboat to lie outside of them, and fire between them or over them. The New Ironsides and monitors will lie in not less than three and a half fathoms water, which will place them about three-fourths of a mile from Fort Fisher, and a little over a quarter of a mile from the beach.

In the mean time the large ships will lie formed in line of battle to the eastward of the iron-clads, and heading parallel with the land in a south half west course in five fathoms water.

When the signal is made to "take position," the Minnesota (the sternmost vessel) will go ahead slowly and anchor about a mile from Fort Fisher, opening fire the moment she passes the New Ironsides, and anchoring so that her stern gun will fire just clear of that vessel. The Mohican will then anchor ahead of the Minnesota, Colorado ahead of Mohican, Tuscarora ahead of Colorado, Wabash ahead of Tuscarora, Susquehanna ahead of Wabash, Brooklyn ahead of Susquehanna, Powhatan ahead of Brooklyn, Juniata ahead of Powhatan, with their cables ready to slip, and with not more than fifteen fathoms of chain, the fifteen-fathom shackle inside the hawse-hole.

The Seneca, Shenandoah, Pawtuxet, Ticonderoga, Mackinaw, Maumee, Yantic and Kansas will take their positions between and outside the different vessels as marked on the plan, anchoring with their cables ready to slip.

When the large ships and intermediate ones get fairly into position the Nyack, Unadilla, Huron and Pequot will take position between and outside the monitors, in the order marked on the plan, keeping up a rapid fire while the monitors are loading.

The following vessels will next take their positions as marked on the plan :

Commencing with the Fort Jackson, which vessel will anchor ahead of the Juniata, leaving a space between of three lengths, Santiago de Cuba, Tacony, Osceola, Chippewa, Sassacus, Maratanza, Rhode Island, Monticello, Mount Vernon, Montgomery, R. R. Cuyler, Quaker City and Josco, will pass on slowly, commencing with the rear, until they form the line marked on the plan.

The reserves of each division will form a line, as per plan, out of gunshot, ready to act as occasion may require.

This is the main plan of the battle. Circumstances may require some deviation from it, such as a partial attack (before going seriously to work) to feel the enemy's strength, all of which will be regulated by signal or by orders. Great care and coolness will be required to drop the vessels in their right places, and a too early commencement of fire on the part of those going into position may create confusion.

As we know but little about the calibre and number of rebel guns, the vessels must concentrate their fire on the heaviest batteries; but get the range before firing rapidly. For instance, the large vessels and iron-clads concentrate on Fort Fisher, while the Vanderbilt, Fort Jackson, and the vessels in the line with the Fort Jackson will open on the forts within their reach between Fort Fisher and the Mound.

All the reserve vessels will prepare to attack Zeke's Island battery by taking a position where they can enfilade it, which is when the fort bears northwest. Vessels drawing fourteen feet can go within a mile and three quarters with perfect safety and use their rifle guns with good effect. They can also reach the forts on Federal Point, and prevent their firing accurately on the other portions of the fleet in closer range.

All the movements of the different lines will be made by sending orders in a tug, as signals will not be seen in the smoke.

As it is desirable not to have superfluous directions, each commander will be furnished with a plan, and the matter fully discussed, and points explained at a general meeting of commanders.

Vessels in distress and finding it necessary to retire from battle will steer out southeast, excepting the headmost vessels, Iosco, Quaker City, R. R. Cuyler, &c., which had better keep on southwest half south course, until they clear an eight-foot shoal (at low water) outside of them.

It is not desirable that the vessels of the squadron should show themselves to the enemy until the time comes for them to act, and they will keep off shore about twenty-five miles, or far enough not to be seen, with New inlet bearing west, in about the latitude of 33 56, longitude 77 20; that will be the rendezvous. Commanders of divisions will assemble the vessels of their divisions, get them into line, and keep them so, each division being far enough from the other to allow them to manœuvre without interfering. When the signal is made or given to form in line of battle, every vessel will take her station in line according to the plan on the chart, the first division forming first and the others dropping in in order.

As only low steam will be required, those vessels that can move and work handily with half their boilers will only use those on one side, keeping the boilers (on the side near the enemy) full of water and without steam, with water warm only, and ready to make steam in case of necessity.

Slow, deliberate firing is desirable; there will be smoke enough anyhow. Rapid and indiscriminate firing will amount to little or nothing. I hope no shot may be thrown away.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA,  
*December 25, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle.

Having captured Flag-pond Hill battery, the garrison of which, sixty-five men and two commissioned officers, were taken off by the navy, we also captured Half Moon battery and seven officers and two hundred and eighteen men of the third North Carolina Junior Reserves, including its commander, from whom I learned that a portion of Hoke's division, consisting of Kirkland's and Haygood's brigades, had been sent from the lines before Richmond on Tuesday last, arriving at Wilmington Friday night.

General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort, while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four men of the picket line ventured upon the parapet and through the sallyport of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off, killing the orderly, who was the bearer of a despatch from chief of artillery of General Whiting to bring a light battery within the fort, and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort.

This was done while the shells of the navy were falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the work, and it was evident, as soon as the fire of the navy ceased because of the darkness, that the fort was fully manned again and opened with grape and canister upon our picket line.

Finding that nothing but the operations of a regular siege, which did not come within my instructions, would reduce the fort, and in view of the threatening aspect of the weather, wind rising from the southeast, rendering it im-

possible to make further landing through the surf, I caused the troops with their prisoners to re-embark, and see nothing further that can be done by the land forces. I shall therefore sail for Hampton roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order.

My engineers and officers report Fort Fisher to me as substantially uninjured as a defensive work.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral PORTER,  
*Commanding N. A. Blockading Squadron.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, December 26, 1864.*

GENERAL: I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date the substance of which was communicated to me by General Weitzel last night.

I have ordered the largest vessels to proceed off Beaufort and fill up with ammunition, to be ready for another attack, in case it is decided to proceed with this matter by making other arrangements.

We have not commenced firing rapidly yet, and could keep any rebels inside from showing their heads until an assaulting column was within twenty yards of the works.

I wish some more of your gallant fellows had followed the officer who took the flag from the parapet, and the brave fellow who brought the horse out from the fort. I think they would have found it an easier conquest than is supposed.

I do not, however, pretend to place my opinion in opposition to General Weitzel, whom I know to be an accomplished soldier and engineer, and whose opinion has great weight with me.

I will look out that the troops are all off in safety. We will have a west wind presently, and a smooth beach about three o'clock, when sufficient boats will be sent for them.

The prisoners now on board the Santiago de Cuba will be delivered to the provost marshal at Fortress Monroe, unless you wish to take them on board one of the transports, which would be inconvenient just now.

I remain, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Major General B. F. BUTLER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c., &c.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Wilmington, December 26, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the special service assigned me in connexion with your attack on the defences at New inlet.

In obedience to your order of the 23d instant, the powder-boat was taken in that night as near to Fort Fisher as possible, the distance reached being estimated by all officers present at from two hundred and fifty to three hundred yards from the beach.

Owing to the night being perfectly clear it became necessary to anchor her there to prevent discovery by the enemy and consequent frustration of the plan.

Had the night been obscure, she could have reached a point about one hundred and fifty yards nearer.

The vessel, though having steam, was towed in and piloted by the Wilderness to a point within a short distance of her station, when the Wilderness hauled off and remained near to take off the party from the powder-boat. The arrangements and movements of the Wilderness were in charge of Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, of the Gettysburg, assisted by Mr. J. S. Bradford, of the coast survey, and Mr. Bowen, bar pilot—the local knowledge and judgment of these gentlemen being of the greatest service to me in perfecting all the arrangements and carrying out the plan successfully. The party on board the Wilderness, commanded by Acting Ensign H. Arey, shared with us whatever of risk or danger attended the enterprise.

Our arrangements being completed, we started in from the station vessel—the Kansas, Lieutenant Commander Watmough—at about 10.30 p. m. At about 11.30 the Wilderness cast off the powder-boat and anchored, the latter steaming slowly ahead until she reached a point E. by N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  N. from Fort Fisher, and within three hundred yards of the beach. The wind was light off shore, and it was expected the powder-boat would tend to the tide if anchored. The anchor was accordingly let go, the fires hauled as well as possible, and the men put into the boat. Lieutenant Preston and I then proceeded to light the fuzes and fires. The latter were arranged by Second Assistant Engineer Mullan.

When all was fairly done, we observed that the vessel would not tail in shore, and therefore let go another anchor with short scope. We then took to the boat and reached the Wilderness in safety at precisely midnight, slipped her anchor and steamed out at full speed, reaching in less than an hour a point about twelve miles distant from the powder-boat, where we hove to and run our steam down.

At precisely 1.40 a. m. the explosion took place, the shock being hardly felt, and four distinct reports heard. What result was occasioned near the vessel we can only estimate by the feeble fire of the forts next day. My opinion is that, owing to the want of confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, much of the powder was blown away before ignition and its effect lost.

The fuzes were set, by the clocks, to one hour and a half, but the explosion did not occur till twenty-two minutes after that time had elapsed, the after part of the vessel being then enveloped in flames.

The following officers and men manned the powder-boat:

Commander A. C. Rhind; Lieutenant S. W. Preston; Second Assistant Engineer A. T. E. Mullan; Master's Mate Paul Boyden; Frank Lucas, coxswain; William Garvin, captain fore-castle; Charles J. Bibber, gunner's mate; John Neil, quarter gunner; Robert Montgomery, captain after-guard; James Roberts, seaman; Charles Hawkins, seaman; Dennis Conlan, seaman; James Sullivan, ordinary seaman; William Hinnegan, second-class fireman; Charles Rice, coal heaver.

The crew were all volunteers from my own vessel, the Agawam.

The zeal, patience and endurance of officers and men were unsurpassed, and I believe no officer could have been better supported. To Lieutenant Lamson, Mr. Bradford, and the officers and men of the Wilderness, we are indebted for the means of escape; and from the first start from Norfolk we have received every desired assistance. The vessel was towed to Wilmington bar by the Sassacus, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, who gave us at all times a cordial support. The Tacony, Lieutenant Commander Truxton, sent us a relief crew after the gale. Both vessels furnished us a boat.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. C. RHIND,  
*Commander, U. S. N.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Commander J. C. Beaumont, of the U. S. steamer Mackinaw.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MACKINAW,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your order of the 30th instant, I would respectfully state, in addition to my report already rendered, regarding the part taken by this vessel in the attack upon the rebel forts and batteries at New inlet, N. C., on the 24th and 25th instants, that the fire from the guns of the fleet under your command was so rapid and effective as to paralyze and render feeble and inefficient the fire of the enemy's batteries.

Feeling satisfied, from the effects of our fire, that a hearty co-operation on the part of our land forces was only necessary to the complete success of the expedition, it was with great astonishment and mortification that I learned, on the evening of the 25th instant, that they were being withdrawn.

I am happy to be able to say that on the above occasions all under my command cheerfully and zealously performed their duty.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. BEAUMONT, *Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander Watmough, of the U. S. gunboat Kansas.*

UNITED STATES GUNBOAT KANSAS,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part this vessel took in the actions of the 24th and 25th instants against Fort Fisher:

Our position was along the beach to the northward of Fort Fisher, and distant from the fort from nineteen to twenty-three hundred yards. This vessel was not struck, nor any accident incurred other than the fracture of the 100-pounder, careful and repeated impressions of the vent showing this fact.

The fleet once in position, the fire from the fort was almost entirely suppressed, even with the most deliberate and limited fire from the fleet. It was evident to all that the rapid firing from three or four of the frigates, permitted for a few minutes on the afternoon of the second day, did make it impossible for the garrison to offer the least resistance to the approach of an assaulting column. I witnessed the advance of the skirmishers' line of the land forces, in the afternoon of the second day, and estimated that they were within five hundred yards of the fort, and unmolested at that point. I have no doubt but the army could have gained a footing on the parapet at that time. Two or three explosions occurred inside of Fort Fisher, and heavy fires—probably the quarters. I think three or four guns were dismounted on the northern parapet, and from the fire of the iron-clads am certain a number must have been disabled.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PEND. G. WATMOUGH,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander T. C. Harris, of the U. S. Steamer Yantic.*

UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP YANTIC,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 2, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part this vessel took in the attack on Fort Fisher, New inlet, N. C., on the 24th and 25th December, 1864:

My position on the 24th was to the northward and eastward of Fort Fisher, distant about two thousand yards, and was doing good execution, when, at 3 p. m., the 100-pounder rifle burst—(having been fired, since the vessel has been in commission, but *nineteen times*)—mortally wounding the officer commanding the division, the captain of the gun, and slightly wounding four of the crew. The vessel being badly shattered, not knowing the extent of the damage, and having lost what was designed to be the most effective gun, I hauled out of fire. Having obtained additional medical assistance from the Fort Jackson, I, at 4.30 p. m., again stood in and opened fire with my only remaining effective guns—the 30-pounder rifle and 9-inch gun.

On the 25th I was assigned the duty of assisting to disembark the troops and cover the landing.

Owing to the accident just mentioned, and my non-participation in the attack of the 25th, prevents me from giving any decided opinion as to the injury done to the fort, as a defensive work. I cannot, however, refrain from giving my testimony as to the accurate and rapid fire of the fleet; no better confirmation could be required that the navy did their work well, than the fact that the enemy, protected as they were by formidable works, could only make a very feeble reply.

At 2 o'clock p. m., on the 25th, a portion of the troops were landed amid deafening and encouraging cheers from the men-of-war and from the troops still on board the transports; cheers which were echoed by the fleet, by a fire that elicited but a feeble response from the fort. The landing of the troops was rapid when fairly commenced, and everything seemed to token that the army would soon have possession of the enemy's works; when, to the surprise and mortification of all, General Butler stopped the further disembarkation of the troops, and gave orders to re-embark those already on shore.

I congratulate you, sir, upon the brilliant share the navy took in the attack of the 24th and 25th; the work was well done. Had the army performed their part, the federal flag would now be flying over the ramparts of Fort Fisher—a fitting Christmas present to be side by side with that of the glorious and gallant Sherman.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. C. HARRIS,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Captain William R. Taylor, of the United States ship Juniata.*

UNITED STATES SHIP JUNIATA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your General Order No. 75, and I rise from my sick-bed to give it an instant reply.

The part that this ship took in the actions of the 24th and 25th instant was as follows: On each day she took the position assigned to her in your plan of

battle, and kept up a constant fire upon Fort Fisher from the moment of anchoring until ordered to withdraw. On the 24th, after having been engaged about an hour, she moved from her first anchorage, in company of several other ships, by your order, to a position nearer to the fort, thus rendering her fire more effective. During the two days she fired six hundred and eighty-one (681) shells, all but seventeen (17) of which were delivered by seven (7) guns. After obtaining the range, the firing appeared to me like target practice.

The falling of the shells of the fleet was so incessant that the enemy was frequently unable to return our fire for long intervals. Several conflagrations occurred in the fort, and I saw one explosion. It was my impression that we had done much injury to the works, as it is impossible for me to conceive that such a weight of fire, so long continued, and falling so accurately, could have left them "substantially uninjured."

I was very much surprised and disappointed on learning that the troops had re-embarked. I saw no attack by them which looked like an earnest one, and, for a time, I entertained a hope that the fort had proved an easy capture, from the feebleness of the musketry firing, so long as we remained within sight and hearing of it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. ROGERS TAYLOR,

*Captain United States Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*U. S. Navy, Comd'g N. A. Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.*

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*Report of Lieutenant Commander G. E. Belknap, of the United States steamship Canonicus.*

UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP CANONICUS,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report respecting the part taken by this vessel in the actions of the 24th and 25th instant, at New inlet, near Wilmington, N. C.:

At 11.15 a. m., December 24, in obedience to general signal from the flag-ship, I got under way, and taking position in line of battle immediately astern of the *New Ironsides*, steamed slowly in for Fort Fisher, and at 0.40 p. m. opened fire upon that work. Keeping under way, I engaged the enemy during the afternoon at a distance varying from 900 yards to 1,200 yards.

The enemy paid little attention to the iron-clads, directing their principal fire at the wooden ships, and in course of an hour and a half, so far as I could observe, were entirely silent.

At 5.35 p. m. withdrew from action, by signal from the *New Ironsides*, and anchored near that ship in eight fathoms water, having expended eighty-five (85) XV-inch shells, and one (1) shrapnell.

At 9 o'clock the following morning, general signal having been made to "get under way" and "prepare for battle," weighed anchor and steamed in towards the rebel batteries, as on the preceding day and, at 10.45 a. m. began to engage the enemy.

In the course of three-quarters of an hour we had the satisfaction of dismounting two (2) guns in the eastern parapet of the fort—due to the excellent gunnery of the executive officer, Lieutenant R. S. McCook.

About 12 o'clock (noon) the other monitor, having closed up near our position, came to anchor at a distance of 800 yards from the fort. At 2.40 p. m. our ammunition had become exhausted, when I reluctantly withdrew to the rear, having fired forty-nine (49) shells, and nine (9) shrapnell.



Probably no work was ever subjected to so heavy a fire before, and certainly the enemy could not and did not stand at their guns after the fleet had fairly become engaged. From the explosion and large fires which occurred inside the rebel works, there could have been no place of refuge for the garrison except in the bomb-proofs; and I am firmly of the opinion that, at any time after three o'clock p. m. on each day of attack, the fort might have been occupied and held by our land forces, with very slight loss. Their failure to do so was doubtless more of a surprise to the enemy than to the fleet.

We received in all four (4) hits, one (1) on the side armor and three (3) on the smoke-stack; neither of which did any material damage.

I am happy to report no casualties on board.

The guns and turret worked beautifully, and the officers and crew displayed the greatest enthusiasm throughout both engagements. While all did their duty well, I cannot forbear special mention of the executive officer, Lieutenant R. S. McCook, who has been untiring in his efforts to make the ship efficient in every respect. The accuracy and comparative rapidity of our fire attest the proficiency of the guns' crews under his drill and training.

My thanks are also due to Chief Engineer D. B. Macomb, who has taken great pains to keep the engines and turret machinery in perfect condition.

Assistant Paymaster R. S. Lisle rendered good service as signal officer.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE E. BELKNAP,  
*Lieut. Comd'r, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Flag-Ship Malvern.*

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*Report of Acting Ensign B. Wood, commanding pro tem. United States steamer Tristram Shandy.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER TRISTAM SHANDY,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: In compliance with General Order No. 75, I have the honor to make the following report:

At 8.55 a. m. of the 24th December, 1864, I reported this vessel, as ordered, to the commanding officer of the United States steamer Keystone State for assignment of my position during the engagement. At 3.10 p. m., about two hours after the firing became general from the iron-clads, the larger vessels and the forts, I took position and opened fire upon the Mound battery, continuing until general signals were made from your flag-ship to retire.

Our firing was good, most of our shot striking the battery and many exploding right on the top of it. The other vessels engaging the same battery also made excellent firing, and much damage must have been done to it.

On the morning of the 25th of December, 1864, I received orders from you to report to the commanding officer of the United States steamer Santiago de Cuba, which I did, and was assigned a position to the eastward and near the United States steamer A. D. Vance. Taking that position, I opened on the Flag-pond battery, to the eastward of Battery Anderson about three miles. Our fire was returned briskly from a heavy gun mounted on this, and a battery of Whitworth guns on the enemy's line of intrenchments, the shot falling very thickly near and around us. At 1 p. m., my ammunition being expended, I withdrew and steamed down for the Santiago de Cuba, which vessel was moored nearly abreast of Battery Anderson. While my boat was on board the Santiago de Cuba a white flag was hoisted on Battery Anderson, and I immediately sent the second cutter with Acting Master's Mate Robert Clifford on shore. He was the

first on the beach, and when Battery Anderson surrendered it was to the navy, and the prisoners were taken by the navy, the United States steamer *Britannia* having taken position in the early part of the day and kept up a rapid fire upon it.

From this vessel Fort Fisher could plainly be seen, and the impression of every officer (and the subject was freely discussed) was that it could not but surrender. It appeared to be in a very battered condition, several of the casemates being entirely destroyed, and we had not a doubt but that it would fall an easy prey to an assault by the troops landed for that purpose. I had no idea that it could possibly be defended much longer. The number and names of the prisoners and the number of rifles captured by this vessel have been already reported to you.

It is but justice for me to state that the conduct of all of the officers and men attached to this vessel during the action was deserving of all praise.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

BENJAMIN WOOD,

*Acting Ensign, Commanding pro tem.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Flag-Ship Malvern.*

*Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Huse, commanding United States steamer Britannia.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER BRITANNIA,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this vessel in the late attack on Fort Fisher:

Arrived from Western bar on the evening of the 24th. On the morning of the 25th was ordered by you to report to Captain Glisson, commanding the United States steamer *Santiago de Cuba*, to assist in covering the landing of the troops in the vicinity of Half Moon battery. I anchored this vessel in line of battle, in four fathoms water, about two hundred and fifty yards from the beach, and directly opposite Flag-pond Hill battery; upon which, as I saw it was full of soldiers, I opened and continued a rapid fire with 24-pounder howitzers. Just as the first boat was landed, containing troops, about three-quarters of an mile above, a white flag was displayed on Flag-pond Hill battery, upon which I ceased firing, and sent a boat in charge of Acting Ensign W. H. Bryant to take possession, which he did, planting our flag upon the work, and capturing about seventy prisoners, who were sent on board the *Santiago de Cuba* by boats belonging to vessels in the vicinity. Boats from this ship were employed until after midnight carrying troops.

On the 26th too much surf to bring off troops. Remained at anchor near the shore, shelling the woods all night at intervals.

At daylight on the morning of the 27th veered chain, backed in, and run a line to shore. Boats were employed until 11.45 a. m. re-embarking troops, until every man was off the beach.

Ammunition expended: sixty-two (62) shell for 30-pounder Parrott; two hundred and twenty (220) shell for 24-pounder howitzers.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL HUSE,

*Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Blockading Squadron.*

*Additional report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Huse, commanding United States steamer Britannia.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER BRITANNIA,

*Beaufort Harbor, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to your order, just received, I have to submit to you the following report:

Arrived in this ship off Beaufort early on the morning of December 30, 1864. I was myself too ill to go on deck, and left the control to my executive officer, Acting Master Joseph S. Cony. We had a jack flying for a pilot till we had nearly reached the bar buoy, but, as none came, Mr. Cony sent me word that, unless I objected, he would follow a tug-boat in, which he did. We had lost both our anchors, and had only a kedge lashed to some broken pieces with which to bring up. Mr. Cony says that, after passing Fort Macon, he saw no berth sufficiently clear to enable him to bring up, with the light ground tackle we had, without danger of fouling some other ship; and he got her head to wind and tide, and tried to shoot across and anchor about abeam of the Ioseco, but not succeeding, steamed down past the storeships, and putting the helm hard a-starboard, ran across, outside all the iron-clads, intending to anchor close to one of the coal schooners east of them, but, owing to the strength of the tide and wind, and the slowness with which this ship turns off the wind, got aground on this shoal in the act of turning.

Every exertion was instantly made to get the ship off. A line was run to the nearest vessel, and I myself went for a tug, which came to our assistance, but not in time to get us off before high water.

Mr. Cony brought this ship in without a pilot because he knew I had urgent orders from the senior officer off Western bar to return with all despatch, and he hoped to save a day by coming in when he did; and as he had gone in and out before without a pilot, apprehended no trouble. I deem it due to him to state that I have found him a zealous and efficient officer, devoted to his duty and the public interest.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL HUSE,

*Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.*

*Report of Acting Master S. P. Crafts, commanding United States steamer Little Ada.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER LITTLE ADA,

*Beaufort, December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have the honor to report that, with the exception of about two and one-half hours of active participation, I was passing along the entire line of ships, either following your motions or carrying your orders. I consider the fort as having been practically silenced on both the 24th and 25th instant, and felt then, as I do now, that there would have been no serious difficulty in carrying the works by a vigorous assault. If so few of their guns were disabled, I cannot see why they did not work them, as they might have done, after our fire slackened, and while there were plenty of vessels within range. The almost complete silence of the guns on the north-eastern face of the fort induced me to think that they were disabled or were

"Quakers." I should have supposed that a soldier would have felt himself bound, by every consideration of honor and patriotism, to attempt those works by assault. But I am not a soldier, and do not, perhaps, know what is discreet and what is not; but, under similar circumstances, I should like to be one of a thousand "blue jackets," to show what sailors can do, and what soldiers might have done.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CRAFTS,

*Acting Master, Commanding U. S. S. Little Ada.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander A. W. Weaver, commanding United States steamer Chippewa.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER CHIPPEWA,

*Off New Inlet, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this vessel in the actions with the enemy's forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river on the 24th and 25th instant:

At 11 a. m., on the 24th instant, took position in line of battle, as ordered by signal, and cleared ship for action. At 2.20 p. m. took our position as per chart plan, and at 2.35 p. m. opened fire on the enemy's batteries between Fort Fisher and the mound. Continued firing until 5.35 p. m., and when ordered to retire the enemy's works seemed to be much damaged, and at times their guns were completely silenced.

At 9.55 a. m., on the 25th instant, took our position in line of battle, as ordered by signal, and at 10.40 a. m. commenced engaging the enemy's forts. At 11 a. m., in obedience to signal, ceased firing, and sent a boat provided with grapnels over the bar to drag the channel for torpedoes.

At 4.30 p. m. stood to the northward, and at 5.30 anchored near the army transports, and sent boats to assist in landing troops.

The firing from the fleet was the best I ever witnessed. The forts seemed to be much damaged, particularly Fort Fisher; and, in my opinion, had an assault been made on that work by our land force on the evening of the second day's engagement, it could have been carried with but little opposition.

In conclusion, I have to state that every officer and man on board this vessel did his duty.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. W. WEAVER,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Com'dg N. A. Squadron, Flag-Ship Malvern, Beaufort, N. C.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander R. Chandler, commanding United States steamer Maumee.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MAUMEE,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have the honor to make the following report:

The position of this vessel in the line of battle on the 24th and 25th instant was favorable for observing the firing of the fleet. Many of our shells burst within the earthworks, and on both days the response was very feeble considering the number of guns mounted.

As far as I saw, only a few casemated guns on the southeast face of Fort Fisher fired, and only at intervals of from fifteen minutes to three-quarters of an hour. On the 25th, after a few rounds, nearly all the shot and shell from the iron-clads landed in the fort or parapet, and the other vessels engaged fired with accuracy and coolness, driving the enemy from their barbette guns, and plunging shot into the earthworks. I might have gone upon the parapet and gained information as to the extent of damage sustained by the fort, apparently without much danger, but as I was under the impression that the troops were sent there for that purpose, I did not make the reconnoissance, and consequently am unable to report upon the subject.

I shall always believe that if Fort Fisher had been assaulted on the afternoon of the 25th instant by the troops under General Butler's command, it would have been taken and held with very small loss.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. CHANDLER,

*Lieutenant Commander, Commanding.*

Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Commander E. R. Colhoun, commanding United States iron-clad steamer Saugus.*

UNITED STATES IRON-CLAD STEAMER SAUGUS,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: On the 25th instant, at 11.45 a. m., I anchored the Saugus in three fathoms water, within 800 yards of Fort Fisher, and opened fire. There was so little wind that the smoke prevented our seeing the effect of most of our shells. Still I had the satisfaction of seeing one gun dismounted by our fire, and also one by that of the Canonicus. My attention was so much engaged with watching our own firing on the northern portion of the fort, and for the advance of the army, in order to fire with rapidity just before the assault, that I did not observe closely the effect of the firing from the other vessels.

From the great number of shells which exploded in the fort the damage must have been very great. I saw that the enemy fired very little, and that only from three guns in Fort Fisher. I believe the fort could have been taken by assault, with but little loss to the army. At 5.40 p. m. we ceased firing. We expended sixty-three shell and one shrapnell; total, sixty-four.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD R. COLHOUN,

*Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Lieutenant Commander E. E. Potter, commanding United States steamer Mahopac.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MAHOPAC,

*Beaufort, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to General Order No. 75, I have to make the following report: On the 25th ultimo, at 9 a. m., I moved this vessel into line of battle, in

obedience to signal from the New Ironsides, and anchored eleven hundred (1,100) yards from Fort Fisher, and three hundred (300) yards from the beach. Commenced action at 11.20 a. m. I found, after the fleet got to work, but two guns firing at us—one Whitworth, small size, and one Brooks, (120-pounder, as near as I could judge.)

During the afternoon saw a line of skirmishers advance towards the fort entirely unmolested. No other body of troops advanced nearer to the fort than an earthwork that I judged to be full one and one-half mile from the main work.

I remained at anchor until dark. My impression of the action is, that if the skirmishers had been properly supported, and the assault made, Fort Fisher would have been captured.

I would recommend to your notice Acting Assistant Paymaster Poole, who took soundings, and assisted me with signals, the only officer except myself outside of the protection of the vessel.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD E. POTTER,

*Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Commodore William Radford, commanding United States steamer  
New Ironsides.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER NEW IRONSIDES,

*Anchored at sea, Beaufort bearing N.NW.,*

*Distant about five miles, December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, I took position under the guns of Fort Fisher, from thirteen to fifteen hundred yards distant, or as near as the depth of water would permit, the monitors Canonicus, Monadnock, and Mahopac following the New Ironsides in. As soon as I anchored I opened my starboard battery, and continued a well-directed fire for some five (5) hours. Night coming on, I hauled off, in obedience to orders. On the morning of the 25th the iron-clad division again led in under the guns of Fort Fisher and took the position we occupied the day previous. The Saugus, having arrived the night previous, took her station, and this division, in connexion with the others, drove the men from the guns in the fort, they only firing one or two guns, and those at long intervals. All the monitors were handled and fought well. Lieutenant Commander Belknap took the in-shore berth, and is reported to have dismounted one or more guns in the fort.

Judging from the immense number of shells which struck the fort, it must have been considerably injured. Several guns were reported to have been dismounted, two explosions took place, and three fires.

The face of the fort was very much ploughed up by the shells from the fleet. If the fort was uninjured, (as a defensive work,) no artillery known to modern warfare can do it. My impression is, that any considerable number of troops could have stormed and taken the fort immediately after the second day's bombardment, with but little loss.

All the officers and men belonging to the New Ironsides served their guns and country well; and I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant Commander Phythian, the executive officer, for his energy and ability in getting the crew and ship in such good fighting order.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. RADFORD,

*Commander, Commanding Iron-clad Division.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Flag-Ship Malvern.*

*Report of Acting Master J. H. Porter, commanding United States steamer Nansemond.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER NANSEMOND,  
*Beaufort Harbor, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of General Order No. 75.

During the engagement of the fleet with Fort Fisher and other works, on the 24th and 25th instant, this vessel was employed in carrying orders and despatches along the whole line of ships, and, from my own observation, I should judge that Fort Fisher was much injured, a part of the guns dismounted, and nearly all silenced by the rapidity of our fire. I think the fort might easily have been taken by assault on the night of the 25th.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. PORTER,  
*Acting Master, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Commander S. D. Trenchard, commanding United States steamer Rhode Island.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER RHODE ISLAND,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Rhode Island on the 24th ultimo, in the attack upon Fort Fisher and other batteries:

This steamer took her position in the line designated upon the general plan of attack at 2.50 p. m., opening fire with the starboard battery upon Fort Fisher and the mound, swung around, moved head and stern, and continued the fire with the port battery until the signal was made to cease firing.

At 3.45 p. m. the flag on Fort Fisher was cut away by a gun from the 2d division. The Rhode Island was not struck, and there were no casualties on board during the action. Lieutenant Frederick K. Smith, executive officer of this vessel, rendered valuable aid in carrying out my orders during the action and in getting the vessel into line. I have great satisfaction in stating that all the officers behaved with uncommon coolness, exhibiting great zeal in the discharge of their duties, and encouraging the men to do the same. The petty officers, crew, and marines, one and all, behaved well at their guns and other stations, discharging their duties in a spirited manner, and maintaining a brisk and continuous fire upon the batteries.

I enclose herewith the gunner's report of ammunition expended during the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEPHEN D. TRENCHARD,  
*Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. MacDiarmid, commanding United States steamer Governor Buckingham.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER GOVERNOR BUCKINGHAM,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this vessel in the late attack on Fort Fisher and the neighboring batteries:

At 1.20 p. m., 24th instant, signal was made from the Keystone State to attack the mound and batteries. At 1.30 p. m. took a position between the United States steamers Quaker City and Monticello, opened fire on the fort and mound, firing with good effect. At 5.30 ceased firing, in obedience to signal from flag-ship. Stood off shore and anchored.

At 9.10 a. m., 25th instant, followed the United States steamer Santiago de Cuba in the direction of the Half Moon battery. At 10.20 a. m. opened fire on the Half Moon battery; received no response; standing slowly to southward. At 11 a. m., in obedience to an order from Captain O. S. Glisson, anchored abreast of Flag-pond battery; could see that there were men in it; opened a heavy fire on it from five rifled guns. At 11 a. m. sent the launch and second cutter to the Santiago de Cuba.

Transports coming in slowly; at 3 p. m. sent the gig, in charge of Acting Paymaster Lynford Lardner, to assist in landing the troops. At 2.40 p. m. a white flag was shown from the battery on Flag-pond Hill; the troops at the time were pulling for the shore; an army launch was training a howitzer on it; I hailed them not to fire. Boats were pulling rapidly for the shore from the Britannia, Howquah, Santiago de Cuba, and other vessels. An ensign from the Britannia was first on the beach; he ran up to the battery, planted the United States flag, and received the surrender of the forces in the battery. About 5 p. m. orders were given from an army tug not to land any more troops; boats returned to the ship. Shortly after dark received orders to send all of my available boats to assist in re-embarking the troops; immediately despatched the launch and second cutter; the boats returned at midnight to the ship, the surf being too heavy for them. Anchored through the night in four fathoms water, in a good position to cover our troops in the event of their being attacked.

During the 26th instant surf too heavy for our boats; firing an occasional shot in the direction of where the rebel troops were supposed to be. At 4 p. m. received a request from Brigadier General Curtis, through Lieutenant DeKay, of Major General Butler's staff, to fire over the woods, as the enemy were massing in his front and both flanks. Communicated with Commander J. C. Howell, commanding United States steamer Nereus. He ordered me to move further to the southward and protect the left flank of the army. Hove up anchor; stood about half a mile to the southward; anchored and commenced firing slowly. Throughout the night fired a gun every fifteen minutes just to the left of our troops on shore. At 8 a. m., 27th instant, despatched the launch and second cutter to assist in bringing the troops off from the beach. At noon they returned to the vessel, all the troops having been got off. At 1 p. m. stood off shore.

I am of the opinion that had the troops on shore been properly supported they would have got into the fort.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN MACDIARMID,  
*Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*



UNITED STATES STEAMER GOVERNOR BUCKINGHAM,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 2, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to enclose the reports of Acting Master's Mates F. H. Pool and William W. Hunter, who were in charge of boats from this ship engaged in landing and re-embarking troops.

Also, report in relation to Henry Driesback, coal-heaver.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN MACDIARMID,  
*Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER GOVERNOR BUCKINGHAM,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 29, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your orders, was in charge of the second cutter of this vessel, engaged in taking off troops from shore to army transports on the 25th and 27th instant; had in my boat different army officers who freely gave me their opinion that Fort Fisher could have been easily taken on the 25th instant, and they very deeply regretted that they were ordered to re-embark without assaulting. I recollect one officer in particular saying that ten of his men lay under the embrasures all night, and that it could have been carried very easily.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS H. POOL,  
*Acting Master's Mate, United States Navy.*

Acting Volunteer Lieut. JOHN MACDIARMID,  
*Commanding U. S. Steamer Governor Buckingham.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER GOVERNOR BUCKINGHAM,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 29, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your orders, was in charge of the first cutter of this vessel, on the 25th and 27th instant, engaged in taking off troops from shore to the army transports; was in conversation with army officers who had been down on a reconnoissance to Fort Fisher; they told me that they fully believed that the fort could have been carried by assault by the troops that were on shore on the 25th instant, and they felt very much surprised, as well as deeply mortified, at being ordered to re-embark without making the assault. I also heard great dissatisfaction with officers and men at their being withdrawn from what they all considered an easy victory already within their grasp.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM W. HUNTER,  
*Acting Master's Mate, United States Navy.*

Acting Volunteer Lieut. JOHN MACDIARMID,  
*Commanding U. S. Steamer Governor Buckingham.*

*Report of Captain James Alden, commanding United States steamer Brooklyn.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER BROOKLYN,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of General Order No. 75, which not only calls upon commanding officers to give you a report of the part they took in the action of the 24th and 25th instant, but also their impressions as to the damage done to the enemy's works, the effect of our firing, and the defensibility of the fort after we had finished the bombardment.

On the first day, the 24th, this ship was in line of attack, and opened fire on Fort Fisher at 12.50 p. m., being then within good "ten second" range. The fire was kept up, with occasional intermissions for the men to rest, till 5.15, (more than four hours,) when darkness intervened, and the signal was made to retire. The enemy's fire, during the whole of that time, was much less than that of one of our large ships; an occasional shot was fired from Fort Fisher; a very feeble and desultory reply to our fire was kept up by the forts between the main work and the Mound battery, which latter was heard from but five or six times during the whole afternoon.

In a word, I am satisfied, from past experience, that if this ship, or any one of the larger ones, could have gotten near enough, say within two or three hundred yards, she would not only have silenced their batteries fully and entirely, but would have driven every rebel from the point.

On the second day, the 25th, this ship was sent to silence some of the enemy's earthworks, which were contiguous to the place fixed upon for the disembarking of the troops, to shell the woods, and to cover their landing. The first troops landed at about 2 p. m.; sent all our boats to assist. At 4 o'clock, just two hours after the landing commenced, the general commanding came alongside this ship and said, "It has become necessary to re-embark the troops; will you send your boats to assist?" You can judge of my surprise at the turn affairs had taken, for at that moment everything seemed propitious. The bombardment was at its height, little or no surf on the beach, and no serious indications of bad weather. Still, the order for retiring had gone forth, and our boats were employed till very late (the launch not returning till next morning) in re-embarking the troops, the surf not interfering seriously with operations till near midnight, when it became impossible to land with any safety. Much dissatisfaction, I am told, was shown by the soldiers and their officers when they were informed that they were to re-embark, and it was with some difficulty that they could be made to get into the boats. They were loud in their denunciations of the order turning them back, saying they had gone there to take the fort, and they were going to do it before they left, &c., &c.

The next day, the 26th, the surf was too high for safe transit from the shore, and this vessel was employed in making a reconnoissance of the enemy's works. Nothing new was discovered, however, and after exchanging a few shots with Fort Fisher we returned to the anchorage for the night. The following day all our boats were sent, and, after some difficulty, the remaining troops were safely embarked.

I have endeavored in the above to give you my ideas of the effect of our fire on the enemy's works, which was to almost silence them. In regard to the damage done, it is, under the circumstances, impossible for any one to tell without a closer inspection, for, as you remember at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, everything from the outside seemed in *statu quo*, hardly any trace of injury was apparent, but on entering and looking around, the terrible effect of the bombardment was manifest at every turn. So, too, at Fort Morgan—little or no injury could be discovered from without, but upon close examination it was found that

almost every gun or its carriage was seriously damaged, if not entirely destroyed.

Now as to the "defensibility" of the fort. The rebels, I am satisfied, considered, from the moment that our troops obtained a footing on the shore, that the work (battered as it was) was untenable, and were merely *waiting for some one to come and take it.*

The general commanding furnishes us with proof of that fact. I think, in his letter to you, informing you of his determination to withdraw, a copy of which you sent me, he says that "three or four men ventured upon the parapet and through the sallyport of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off, \* \* \* and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort." This was all done in open day and without resistance, if, indeed, there was anybody there who was disposed to question their right to such trophies. From that and other concurrent testimony, I am satisfied that if our troops had not been stopped in their triumphant march towards Fort Fisher, they would have been *in it before dark, and in quiet possession without firing a shot.*

With great respect, I am your obedient servant,

JAMES ALDEN, *Captain.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Lieutenant Commander Truxtun, Commanding United States steamer Tacony.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER TACONY,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have just received your General Order No. 75, directing me to report on the condition of Fort Fisher and the works near it, at the close of the late naval attack made upon it by the fleet under your command on the 24th and 25th instants, and whether it was "uninjured as a defensive work," as asserted by General Butler.

In reply I have to state that the enemy's fire on both days was much less than I had expected. The barbette guns were completely silenced, while the casemated batteries fired but rarely. On the close of the 25th the fire of the batteries was so feeble, it seemed to me the assault by the army might have been made with every prospect of success. I was in a position commanding a clear and unobstructed view of the north face of Fort Fisher, upon which I counted nine (9) guns without a man near them, and from which I did not see a shot fired for hours. These guns commanded the sea beach on which the troops had landed, and upon which they could plainly be seen advancing in widely separated detachments towards the fort.

Up to sundown I am quite certain no assault on the works was made by the troops. At daylight I learned to my surprise they had not only embarked, but were leaving for Hampton roads. I am unable to state the condition of the works; but I am certain the navy performed all that could have been expected of it, and that it did not receive from the army the spirited and gallant support it looked for.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. TRUXTUN,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander M. Sicard, Commanding United States steamer Seneca.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER SENECA,  
December 31, 1864.

ADMIRAL: I would respectfully report that, in the action of the 24th and 25th instant, this vessel was with the vessels on the extreme right, that were operating with the iron-clads.

It was evident from the first half hour of the engagement that the enemy did not intend seriously to reply to the fire of the fleet. This vessel fired 122 11-inch shells and 140 20-pounder Parrott shells at the northeast face of Fort Fisher during the two days' bombardment.

Our division fired quite slowly on the second day, and as I was quite close to the fort in the afternoon, and only fired at long intervals, the enemy fired at me several times with a heavy rifle, which, however, did no damage, being evidently hurriedly pointed; this gun could have been silenced in a few minutes, if the vessels had chosen to throw away shot on it; and as it was, by an occasional shot from the division, it soon ceased its fire. I refrained from firing much towards the close of the second day's work, because I expected an assault by the troops, and I wished to save my shrapnell for the purpose of covering their advance.

I was much disappointed that the army did not make an attempt on the fort. I saw the advance of a skirmish line, and of a reserve, (comprising in all about 80 men.)

They advanced quite close to the works, (within pistol shot;) after that I lost sight of them, until I saw two returning along the beach with the flag of the fort, (which had been shot away about an hour previously by a monitor.)

At dusk, and for a short time after, there was some musketry firing between this skirmish line and the fort; but up to dark no attempt was made by any adequate body of the army to assault the fort.

It is my opinion that the fire of the fort was completely under the control of the fleet, and that we could stop it whenever we chose, as the fire by the two frigates on the afternoon of December 25th abundantly showed. In fact, the fort was silent nine-tenths of the time that we were engaging it. I am furthermore of opinion that the fort could not hold out against a combined attack of the army and navy.

I think it a good proof of the effectiveness of the fire of the fleet, that though our skirmishers advanced so close to the fort, no serious fire was opened on them. Indeed, I do not know from my own observation, (and I was in a good position to see,) that they were fired on at all in this first advance; and I scarcely think that the enemy would have suffered his flag to be upon the ground so long after it was shot away, (though he must have known that we were landing troops, and that from the flag's position it was very liable to capture,) unless he had been fearful to venture out and recover it under our fire.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

MONTGOMERY SICARD,

*Lieut. Commander, Commanding U. S. steamer Seneca.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Commodore Joseph Lanman, commanding U. S. steamer Minnesota.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MINNESOTA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to submit the accompanying minutes, taken on the quarter deck of this vessel at the time of the attack upon Fort Fisher; also the reports from several officers of the ship.

It gives me great pleasure to state that, during the engagement with the forts, the 24th and 25th of December, the conduct of all the officers, men, marines, and boys, on board the Minnesota, was entirely satisfactory. Every one performed his duty to the utmost of his ability. The working and practice of the guns could not have been better. Many excellent shots were made, and in this respect the two (2) guns worked by the marines were equal to any other division. In a word, all performed their duty in the most creditable manner; and I need not assure you that, in the opinion of those on board the Minnesota, if the assault was not made upon Fort Fisher it was not for the want of the most tremendous bombardment of modern times by the fleet under your command.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

JOSEPH LANMAN,

*Commodore, Com'dg 2d Division N. A. Squadron.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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UNITED STATES STEAM FRIGATE MINNESOTA,  
*Off Fort Fisher, New Inlet, N. C., December 26, 1864.*

SIR: I respectfully enclose the reports of the boatswain, gunner, carpenter, and sailmaker of this vessel in regard to the actions of the 24th and 25th instant with Fort Fisher and the various batteries at New Inlet. So far as I was able to observe, every officer, man, and boy in the ship performed his whole duty.

I desire to add that, when I reported on board, (only a few days before the action took place,) I found the organization of the vessel perfect; and it is simple justice to say, that whatever praise belongs to the executive officer for this is the due of Lieutenant M. S. Stuyvesant, who was my predecessor in that capacity. I came here too late to make any changes, had any been necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES PARKER,

*Lieutenant Commander, Executive Officer.*

Commodore JOSEPH LANMAN,

*Commanding Minnesota.*

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UNITED STATES SHIP MINNESOTA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 29, 1864.*

SIR: I respectfully report that the following damages were sustained to the rigging of this ship during the action of the 24th and 25th instant: the flying jib stay, fore royal stay, and fore top-gallant stay, were all shot away.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. BUNKER, *Boatswain.*

Commodore JOSEPH LANMAN, *Commanding.*

*Report of ammunition expended on board the United States steamer Minnesota,  
December 24 and 25, 1864.*

DECEMBER 26, 1864.

11-inch charges, 15 pounds .....	64
9-inch charges, 13 pounds .....	21
9-inch charges, 10 pounds .....	1,723
150-pounder charges, 16 pounds .....	95
100-pounder charges, 10 pounds .....	79
Total of powder, 20,773 pounds.	<hr/> <hr/>
11-inch shell, loaded and fuzed .....	64
9-inch shell, loaded and fuzed .....	1,744
150-pounder shell, loaded and fuzed .....	95
100-pounder shell, loaded and fuzed .....	79
	<hr/> <hr/>
Total of projectiles.....	1,982

Very respectfully submitted.

ROBERT H. CROSS, *Gunner.*

Commodore JOSEPH LANMAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Steamer Minnesota.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MINNESOTA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 26, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your order of this date, I respectfully make the following report of the damage sustained by this ship in the engagement of the 24th and 25th instant: One shot struck the first launch, going through her and damaging the first cutter; one struck starboard bow, doing but slight damage; two shots struck the chain, placed on the outside for the protection of the machinery, doing no damage; several pieces of shell are imbedded in the side of the vessel.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. O. GOODSOE, *Carpenter.*

Commodore JOSEPH LANMAN, *Commanding.*

UNITED STATES SHIP MINNESOTA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 26, 1864.*

SIR: I respectfully report that there were no injuries sustained in the sailmaker's department of this ship during the action of the 24th and 25th instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. O. FASSETT, *Sailmaker.*

Commodore JOSEPH LANMAN, *Commanding.*

*Minutes of the bombardment of Fort Fisher, on the 24th and 25th of December, 1864, taken upon the quarter deck of the U. S. steam frigate Minnesota, Commodore Joseph Lanman, commanding, by O. B. McCurdy, captain's clerk.*

OFF NEW INLET, NORTH CAROLINA.

Latitude 33° 56' 30" north. Longitude 77° 22' west.

At 5.15 a. m. got under way, in obedience to signal from flag-ship, and steamed towards "Fort Fisher;" anchored a few moments in line of battle near the fort,

before taking position. At 12 o'clock beat to quarters. Wind southwest by west.

Got spring on both bower anchors, and prepared to anchor with spring on starboard bower.

At 12.30 p. m., dinner at quarters. At 12.55 p. m. the New Ironsides opened fire upon Fort Fisher, followed quickly by the monitors, commencing with the *Canonicus*. The *Minnesota* opened fire as soon as the guns could bear on Fort Fisher. At 1.15 p. m., anchoring at the same time, in the position designated by the order of battle, about one mile from the fort. Fort Fisher bearing west  $\frac{1}{2}$  south. "Mound" W.S.W. Enemy replied; two shots passing close over the *Minnesota*. An explosion took place in the fort; believed to be by the fire of the *Minnesota*. Another shot from the enemy cut the spring. Made signal to flag-ship for a tug to carry out the spring; tug came in answer to signal, having on board Captain Breese, the fleet captain, but was not able to carry out our spring.

The *Colorado* passed on our port bow and took position at 2.50 p. m. At 3.15 p. m. rebel flag shot away; at 4 p. m. flying jib stay, fore royal stay and fore top-gallant stay shot away. At 4.15 p. m. flag-ship made signal to fire more slowly; at 5.5 p. m. general signal from flag-ship to prepare to retire; at 5.15 p. m. order was given to cease firing, and prepare to heave up anchor. At 6 p. m. withdrew from position, dropping a buoy at the anchorage, and steamed off shore, anchoring about seven (7) or eight (8) miles distant, Fort Fisher bearing southwest. The ship was held in position for firing upon the fort, by steam, helm, staysail and jib.

Several explosions and fires took place in the fort during our firing, and many of the enemy's missiles fell near the *Minnesota*.

December 25, 1864.—At 9.30 a. m. got under way; at 10.15 a. m. beat to quarters; at 10.35 a. m. flag-ship made signal to stop; at 10.45 a. m. the *New Ironsides* opened fire; at 10.55 a. m. the monitors opened fire; at 11 a. m. signal from flag-ship to take positions.

At 11.15 a. m. the *Minnesota* took position about three hundred yards nearer Fort Fisher than where she dropped the buoy the day previous, and commenced firing with her forward guns. At 12 m. let go port anchor with twenty-five (25) fathoms of chain; at 12.5 p. m. flag-ship made signal to get under way; at 12.10 p. m. ceased firing; at 12.15 p. m. Commander Rhind came on board with orders from the admiral to plant a buoy as near Fort Fisher as practicable, which he, (Commander Rhind,) placed from one hundred and fifty (150) to two hundred (200) yards nearer the fort. This position was exactly taken by the *Minnesota* at 1.5 p. m.; letting go the kedge on the port quarter at the same time.

At 1.15 p. m. let go port bower anchor, and opened fire by divisions. Fort Fisher bearing west  $\frac{1}{2}$  south—Mound W.S.W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W.—wreck and Mound in a line. Shot passed over our smoke-stack grazing the main-stay.

*Colorado* passed on our port bow, taking position at 1.25 p. m., at which time a shot struck the *Minnesota* below the water-line. At 1.40 p. m. set the spanker; shell came in through amidship's port, on spar deck, passed through launch and 1st cutter, and lodged in the stern sheets of the 1st cutter. At 2 p. m. dinner at quarters, though the firing was continued by divisions. Fired very deliberately, in obedience to orders from the admiral. At 3.45 p. m. brailed up the spanker; shell exploded on starboard chain-armor; another shell exploded, scattering on both sides of the ship. At 4.5 p. m. flag-ship made signal to prepare to get under way; at 4.10 p. m. ceased firing, agreeable to signal.

At 4.20 p. m. rebel flag shot away; at 4.45 p. m. opened fire again, and fired very rapidly, in obedience to signal; at this time the roar from our batteries, for three or four rounds, was most terrific. At 4.55 p. m. ceased firing and prepared to retire, agreeable to signal from flag-ship; at 5.15 p. m. hove up anchor and retired.

No casualties either day, and, although the ship was struck in several places, very little damage was done.

Very respectfully submitted to Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic squadron.

JOSEPH LANMAN,  
*Commodore, Comd'g 2d Division N. A. Squadron.*

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*Additional report of Commodore Lanman, commanding United States steamer Minnesota.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MINNESOTA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to receive, this evening, your General Order No. 75, whereby I am called upon to report the damage apparently done to Fort Fisher, in the attack of the 24th and 25th of December, by the fleet under your command.

The minutes and official report which I had the honor to make to you on the 31st ultimo give the details of the part taken by the Minnesota in the attack upon Fort Fisher.

On the 24th ultimo, in the first engagement, I visited and addressed the crew of every gun, to impress upon them the necessity of careful firing, and to see that their shot took effect before firing again, and not to throw away a shot. At the commencement of the firing, and with scarcely any intermission, I was upon the bridge, just forward of the mizzen-mast, having my glass in hand; thus elevated, ten feet above the spar-deck battery, and fifteen feet above the main deck guns, my line of vision was considerably beyond that of the men at the guns. The wind being off shore, (from the direction of firing,) and clear from smoke, my opportunities for seeing the practice and effect of our guns could not have been better, and I most positively believe that the greater part of our shell told upon the fort; and of this there was no doubt when the 200-pound Parrott and the 11-inch guns were fired, as they raised an unmistakable cloud of dirt and sand.

Upon several occasions the first day fire broke out in the fort, and the crew of the spar-deck battery gave three hearty cheers, in the belief that the fire was caused by our guns; which was my opinion, and I so represented it, at the time, to the men. At the same time there were several explosions, as I believed, within the fort; and if our guns did not do an immense injury to the batteries there is no confidence to be placed in vision or good firing. The batteries were frequently silenced by the rapid firing of the fleet generally, but with the least let up on our part they would again open, and, I should judge, with excellent practice, as their shot flew about us in all directions, and I have no doubt they were equally good in practice to the other ships. By kind Providence we received little or no damage, only eight or ten shots touching the ship, but plain enough in sight to show their good firing.

On the morning of the 25th, having received instructions from you that the army would land to assault the fort, and that we must be prepared to cease firing at the moment the signal should be made to that effect, and that great care must be exercised not to fire upon *our* troops, should they make the assault, and to fire more deliberately than [on] the day previous, I delivered these words in person to every gun's crew at quarters, before the engagement, that the men, as well as the officers, should perfectly understand that when the order was given, and the steam-whistle sounded, all firing should cease, as the assault was then to be made.

Our position in the action of the second day was, probably, three or four hundred yards nearer Fort Fisher than it was the day previous. Our firing was much more slow and deliberate, and the effect appeared to be of the most dam-



aging character, as the lines and angles of the works were evidently changed.

Lieutenant Commander Parker went to the fore-topmast-head to witness our firing, which he pronounced to be excellent. Also our pilot, Mr. F. C. Fowler, a most reliable man, was some time at the mast-head with a glass, and he judged our firing to be excellent, and doing great damage to the fort. Captain Butler, of the marines, commanding his battery, being up on the sheer-pole of the mizzen rigging, pronounced the practice excellent.

Ensign Willard, who was upon the bridge to look out for the change of the head of the ship, (should it become thick,) concurred in the opinion of the above gentlemen, that the injury done the forts by our firing was very great.

Lieutenant Stuyvesant, who had charge of the gun-deck battery, came up on the spar-deck when the gun-deck divisions were not firing. This officer having seen considerable gun-practice on other ships, his opinion that the practice the second day was most excellent, doing much damage to the enemy, is well worthy of consideration.

The last four broadsides of rapid firing, by the Minnesota, were of the most terrific character, and it was represented to me by Commander Watmough, who was in position in-shore and to the northward, that our shell fell like a perfect hail-torm upon Fort Fisher, and that the firing was of the most excellent effect.

Upon retiring from position that night I had not the slightest doubt but that the assault would be made before morning; and could I have then known that "the skirmishers had advanced to within fifty yards of the fort," (the distance from our fore-castle to the quarter-deck,) and that "some of our gallant soldiers had mounted the parapet, captured and brought off a horse, and killed an orderly," also that they had captured a flag, which was shot away by the navy, I would not have believed that there could be the slightest doubt of the flag of the Union being hoisted at daylight upon the well-battered fort. When we were informed, the following day, that the troops were about to re-embark, scarcely any one could credit the report; but when the fact became known, a universal opinion of disappointment (not to say of disgust) prevailed.

May I not be permitted to suggest, if the garrison in the fort could be kept in their bomb-proofs so closely by the fire of the navy that a number of the picket line could venture upon the parapet and into the works, why could not an assault have then been made, and the preconcerted signal given to cease firing, which would have been instantly obeyed, and little danger of the shell of the navy falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the works?

Admiral, excuse this lengthy report. I have gone into detail that it should be understood that the Minnesota did not go into the fight merely to blaze away at the beach about Fort Fisher, but that the sole object of our practice was to demolish the fort; and to convey the impression of so many officers that the fort could have been carried by assault, after the severe battering it received from the navy fleet under your command.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

JOSEPH LANMAN,

*Commodore, Commanding 2d Division N. A. Squadron.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Captain D. B. Ridgley, commanding United States steamer Shenandoah*

U. S. STEAMER SHENANDOAH,

*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Shenandoah in the bombardment of Fort Fisher and the batteries at New inlet, on the 24th and 25th instant.

The Shenandoah was signalled, when in line of battle, to come within hail of the admiral, and was ordered by him to take a position near the Ironsides and open on the batteries of Fort Fisher. The position was immediately taken, and this ship commenced firing at Fort Fisher with two rifles and two 11-inch guns, the shells falling inside of Fort Fisher, apparently with good effect.

At 2 p. m. a large fire broke out within the fort. At 3.10 the flag of the fort was shot away by the fleet. At 3.50 p. m. was ordered by the admiral to go closer in. We steamed in and anchored, head and stern, close to the Ironsides and Monadnock. We fired from the new position with deliberation and good effect. At 5.10 p. m. signal was made to retire from action, when this ship withdrew.

The fire from Fort Fisher during the bombardment this day was very slack and feeble. A few shot fell near the monitors, and a few went over us.

The conflagration in the fort seemed to be of considerable extent, and continued until after nightfall. The shells of the fleet were exploding on the parapet and inside of the fort so rapidly that it was difficult to make out what guns they were using. One shot carried away our stern ladder during the bombardment of this day.

On the morning of the 25th instant got under way with the fleet in line of battle. At 2 p. m. the admiral signalled to the Shenandoah to await further orders. Twenty minutes afterwards we were ordered to take position ahead of the Juniata. We anchored a ship's length ahead of the Juniata, and three ship's lengths outside of a wreck on the bar, and opened deliberately on a water battery, to the west of Fort Fisher, of four guns. We succeeded in silencing three of the guns, which were not used again during the engagement.

To the westward of this battery was another, of two guns, that seemed to be casemated. They fired very slowly, but in good line. The shells from one of them fell a few yards short of us, and the others just over us.

The firing from the guns on the Mound was very slow, and with so much elevation that they went over the fleet. We succeeded in exploding a 150-pounder rifle-shell near the top of the Mound.

At 4.35 p. m. was ordered to withdraw and stand outside of the Minnesota. At 3.45 p. m. a large fire broke out just in the rear of the batteries, which continued until after night. Between Fort Fisher and the Mound batteries we could discern two guns dismantled by the fire of the fleet. After the second day's bombardment I could see nothing more for the navy to do than to await the assault by the land forces, which did not take place as I expected.

It affords me much gratification to speak of the cool bearing of Lieutenant S. W. Nicholls, the executive officer, and other officers, and the crew of this ship, during the two days' bombardment. I enclose a memorandum of the expenditure of ammunition on the 24th and 25th instant.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

DANIEL B. RIDGLEY,

*Captain United States Navy.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Lieutenant Commander William G. Temple, commanding United States steamer Pontoosuc.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER PONTOOSUC,

*Off New Inlet, December 28, 1864.*

SIR: I have to submit the following report of the operations of this vessel in the attack upon the rebel works at the mouth of Cape Fear river, from December 24th to 27th, inclusively.

At 11 a. m. of the 24th, after some previous manœuvring, we got under way in company with the fleet and stood in (with everything ready for action) in the wake of the four iron-clads until Fort Fisher bore southwest by south, when we opened fire at 1.06 p. m. with the 100-pounder Parrott rifles, at long range, and gradually closed in towards the position occupied by the sternmost monitor, from whence the 9-inch guns became effective, at a range of about 1,500 yards. At 1.16 p. m. the enemy fired their first gun; the Ironsides having commenced the action at 12.50 p. m., which soon became general along the whole line, as the various ships came into position. After having carefully ascertained our range, the guns of this vessel were kept constantly and rapidly playing upon the enemy's works, until the fleet hauled off at about 5.30 p. m. Our firing, so far as it could be distinguished from that of other vessels, seemed to be accurate and effective, particular embrasures being selected for targets, and shells being seen to strike and explode at the points indicated. We fired during the action 120 shells from the 11-inch guns and 92 from the 100-pounder rifles. At 2.35 p. m. this vessel was struck just abaft the starboard paddle-box by an elongated (probably percussion) shell, from a 6½-inch rifled gun, which projectile passed through the side of the ship, wounding a hanging knee, and barely clearing the main condenser of the engine, through the iron bulkhead of the engine-room and the starboard steerage and mess lockers, through the berth deck, cutting a beam entirely in two, and into the paymaster's storeroom, where it exploded close to the bulkhead of the shell-room, on striking the skin of the ship, and set the vessel on fire; the fire was soon extinguished, however; not much damage was done and nobody was hurt. Several other shot struck near enough to splash the water on deck, and others passed over us, but none other hit the vessel. The lower plates of both elevating screws (new pattern) to the 100-pounders were torn loose from the rear transom, by the breaking of their bolts in the first four discharges; but they were lashed securely in place and performed very well during the rest of the action.

The gig, launch, and both cutters were badly shattered by the concussion of the 9-inch guns fired beneath them, although they were 6 feet above the muzzles; many of the 100-pounder projectiles "wobbled," and some of them "tumbled," but a more liberal use of slush upon them seemed to correct this in a great measure.

We were employed during all that night and until 10 a. m. the next day in filling and fuzing additional shells, having nearly expended all that had been prepared. At 9.30 a. m. of the 25th we got under way with the fleet, and proceeded, in company with the Iosco and several other gunboats, off the bar, where we opened a deliberate fire at 12.55 p. m. from the 100-pounder rifles, at long range, and continued the practice until 2.30 p. m., when we were ordered to haul off and send the boats in to remove torpedoes from the channel. We expended 46 rifle shells during this day's engagement, many of which were plainly distinguished to fall within the enemy's works, and meantime the batteries on shore made some good practice at us, dropping their shot quite near, but not hitting the vessel. The boats returned at 4 p. m., and the gunboats steamed up the coast to where the troops had, in the meanwhile, been disembarked, and anchored for the night. At 9 p. m. we were ordered to send all boats to the beach to assist in re-embarking the troops; but on starting they were found to leak so badly as to be unservicable, and returned.

We were employed all the next day, the 26th, in repairing the boats, and just after sunset were sent in to within about 600 yards of the beach (on the right of our troops, who, owing to the surf, had not succeeded in getting on board their vessels) for the purpose of supplying them with provisions, protecting them from the enemy, and boating them off to their transports. On anchoring, we received two messages from the army authorities, stating that the enemy were massing large forces on the right and front of our troops, and

that a momentary attack was expected. As we had taken up our position after dark, and had therefore been unable to get the bearing and distance of our own troops, we remained at the guns all night without firing; waiting for the attack to commence, that we might know where to aim; but no attack was made, and no sign of an enemy seen from this vessel. At daylight of the 27th our three boats were despatched to the beach with provisions, and with the means prepared for sending them through the surf to the troops on shore; but the provisions were declined and returned, and the boats remained until noon, taking the troops off to their vessels.

At 1 p. m., when the last man had been re-embarked, and the last transport was under way and standing out, we also got under way and anchored with the fleet in the offing, without having seen a single rebel soldier, although another message had been received at 10.30 a. m. that the enemy were massing for an attack.

The officers and men of this vessel behaved admirably throughout the whole four days, and performed their duties at the guns and elsewhere with most commendable coolness and precision, more particularly in view of the short time (only ten days) that they had been on board and under drill; but where all behaved so well, it would be invidious to particularize any one.

Respectfully,

WM. G. TEMPLE,  
*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.*

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*Report of Commander Daniel Ammen, commanding United States steamer Mohican.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER MOHICAN,  
*Off Beaufort, North Carolina, December 31, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your General Order No. 75, directing commanding officers to make their report in relation to our attack on Fort Fisher and the adjacent earthworks, and also a copy of a communication to you from Major General Benjamin F. Butler, and in regard to some points touched upon you request an opinion.

At about 11.30 a. m. of the 24th the fleet got under way and stood in, in line of battle, towards Fort Fisher, bearing about west southwest, and some six or seven miles distant. The Mohican was kept closely in position assigned, following the leading vessel, the frigate Minnesota, and followed by the frigate Colorado, and she successively by the other vessels forming the main line.

At about 1 p. m. the Minnesota sheered in out of line and took up her position at anchor, opening at once on Fort Fisher, some twenty-one hundred yards distant. As per plan of battle the Mohican was sheered in ahead of her, fired slowly on the fort to get a range and anchored, then opened briskly with the whole battery. The fort had opened on the Minnesota and on the Mohican previous to our anchoring. The Colorado sheered in ahead of us, letting go kedge astern, and then anchored, and opened fiercely on the fort. The vessels forming the line then successively, with more or less success, took up their positions and opened.

The iron-clads, led by the New Ironsides, had anchored a few minutes preceding the Minnesota, some five or six hundred yards to the northward and westward, and were slowly getting their range when we anchored, and the

outer line of vessels moved into position after the main line had anchored and opened on the Mound and several detached casemated guns.

The fire from the fort became weak as the vessels anchored and opened fire. It was soon apparent that they could not work their barbette guns without great loss of life, and the guns' crews no doubt retreated under shelter, with a few exceptions, where high traverses and favorable angles gave them great protection.

Different casemated guns, particularly those mounted in detached mounds and towards the Mound, continued to fire slowly and evidently with not much effect, nor would the position of the guns served favor an effective fire. The whole body of Fort Fisher was filled with bursting shells, and only at long intervals, if at all, was a gun fired from the main work. In the meantime, owing to the wind and the set of the tide, I found that the use of the propeller and the helm would no longer enable me to bring the broadside to bear, and was obliged to weigh anchor and manoeuvre under steam, holding our position as nearly as possible, and avoiding interfering with the firing of the other vessels.

After exhausting all the filled 9-inch shells on board ready for use, the Mohican was withdrawn from the line at about 4.10 p. m., making signal to you of the cause, and we commenced filling shells without delay. After sunset the fleet withdrew, and the Mohican ran into line and anchored.

At about 9 a. m. of the 25th, signal was made to get under way and form line of battle; the Mohican took her position, and the fleet stood in to the attack; when nearly under fire I was directed verbally from you, "not to take position until further orders." The Minnesota, the leading vessel of the main line, proceeded in and anchored, got under way, and after various attempts obtained a well chosen position, the main line awaiting her movements. The iron-clads, having preceded during this time, were in position firing slowly and receiving a part of the fire of Fort Fisher. After the position of the Minnesota was satisfactory, I received orders from you about noon to take position close astern of the New Ironsides, which I did without delay, firing slowly until a good range was obtained, then opened briskly on the fort. I was enabled to see, through the absence of smoke, that our fire was very effective, delivered at a short ten-second range. One of the rebel guns was seen to be dismantled by our fire; half an hour after we had anchored the Colorado passed ahead of the Minnesota and into position, anchoring and delivering a very effective fire. The whole line soon took position, and opened very heavily and evidently with great effect, driving the rebels from their guns, with a few exceptions, as those in casemates and other places sheltered and distant. The position of the Mohican enabled me to see well, as I was first at anchor within half a ships' length of the New Ironsides, and finding that anchoring impeded an effective use of the battery, I weighed, and in delivering fire drifted one or two hundred yards nearer the fort.

At 2.05 p. m. the supply of ten-second fuzes and the rifle ammunition was exhausted, and the Mohican was withdrawn from action for the purpose of obtaining more, speaking the Malvern for the purpose and obtaining none; not being directed to go under fire again, we remained spectators near the Minnesota until about 4 p. m., when I received orders to aid in debarking troops and proceeded to execute, but instead of debarking, aided in bringing off the soldiers that had already reached the shore.

It has not been my lot to witness any operations comparable in force or in effect to the bombardment of Fort Fisher by the fleet; and I feel satisfied that any attempt to keep out of their bomb-proofs or to work their guns would have been attended with great loss of life to the rebels, and would have proven a fruitless attempt.

On the first day we delivered two hundred and seventeen (217) 9-inch shells; fifty-nine (59) one hundred-pound rifle, and eighty-nine (89) thirty-pound rifle shells. On the second day we delivered one hundred and three (103) 9 inch

shells; twenty (20) one hundred-pound rifle, and twenty-five (25) thirty-pound rifle shells, making a total of five hundred and thirteen.

Our firing was effective as well as rapid, and I have to express my high appreciation of the ability and zeal of Lieutenant J. D. Marvin, the executive officer of this vessel, and of Acting Master William Burdett, whose long and varied professional experience proved useful; Acting Boatswain Josiah B. Aiken, owing to a deficiency of officers, had charge of the one hundred-pounder rifle and served it admirably. I have to express my satisfaction at the excellent behavior of the officers and crew, and do not doubt that when the occasion arrives when they should do so, they will stand to their guns as long as enough men remain to serve them.

In relation to the effect of the fire of the fleet on the fort, I beg leave to express my congratulations, as I did verbally on meeting you after the action. It did not require a visit to the fort to see that enormous traverses were nearly levelled as at the southeast angle. The stockade or abatis must have been much shattered, and the debris from the parapets must have filled in the ditch greatly. I feel satisfied that everything was effected that can be by powerful batteries against a sand work, and that we could and can keep the enemy in their bomb-proofs pending an advance of troops to the foot of the parapet.

The official letter of General Butler referred to states that General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort, while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four men of the picket line ventured upon the parapet and through the sally port of the work, is, I think, entirely confirmatory as to the effectiveness of our fire. He adds "this was done while the shells of the navy were falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the work," but appears to forget that at any given signal from an assaulting column that this fire would cease, and the enemy be found, not defending the parapet, but safely stowed away in bomb-proofs.

I do not know what more could be asked of naval guns than to afford a safe approach to the foot of the parapet, with no lines of the enemy drawn up to receive our forces; beyond that, I suppose everything would depend upon the relative forces of the combatants and the vigor of the assault, and although the work might not in a military sense be much injured, I would think the likelihood of carrying the work would be greatly increased by such disposition without loss of life of the respective forces.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL AMMEN, *Commander.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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*Report of Lieut. Commander R. H. Lamson, commanding United States steamer Gettysburg.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER GETTYSBURG,

*Off New Inlet, North Carolina, December 26, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this vessel in the actions of the 24th and 25th of December, 1864:

At 11 a. m., on the 24th, I returned on board of this vessel from the Wilderness, and carried your orders to Captains Glisson and Rolando, in regard to their divisions. In the mean time the fleet was steaming in towards the forts in order of battle; at 12.55 p. m. the New Ironsides commenced the action, quickly followed by the other vessels, the forts returning the fire briskly.

Having obtained permission from Captain Rolando to move in nearer, I took

a position on the port-bow of the Brooklyn, and opened fire on Fort Fisher and the Mound, keeping it up steadily till the signal to retire for the night.

At 4.55 p. m. the Osceola, on our starboard bow, was disabled, and the Gettysburg took her place till 4.55 p. m., [?] when we were called alongside the flag-ship by signal, and directed to carry orders to the vessels off Western bar, at the same time the signal was made for the fleet to retire for the night.

I proceeded to Western bar, and returning the next morning (25th) found the iron-clads and all the heavier vessels engaging Fort Fisher, and the other vessels covering the landing of the troops on the beach. All the available boats of these vessels were employed in landing troops.

I was directed by you to carry a message to General Butler, and to assist in landing troops. At 12 m. no troops had been landed, though many boats were in waiting, and it appeared to me that the most inexcusable dilatoriness was manifested in getting the troops started ashore, and I was struck with surprise that no more effort was made to hasten their landing. General Butler informed me that the steamer containing his surf-boats was at Beaufort.

Just as the first troops landed a white flag was shown from the Flag-pond battery, which was directly under the guns of the vessels, and a boat from the Santiago de Cuba landed and took possession.

During the afternoon the vessels covering the troops fired occasionally into the woods, but no enemy was visible in that direction. Towards evening I was informed that General Butler had ordered the troops to re-embark, and boats were sent to assist in bringing them off. At 8 p. m. I was ordered to go down between the iron-clads and the bar on picket duty.

On the first day the firing was very good, both the flag-staff on Fort Fisher and that on the Mound being shot away. No effort was made to replace the flag on the fort during the action. The entire interior of the fort was in dense flames, and several of the guns appeared to be dismounted, and the parapets as much injured as those of a sand fort can be by the fire of artillery.

On the second day, the firing, as viewed from my position, was splendid. Scarcely a shell seemed to miss the fort, which was kept enveloped in a cloud of smoke and sand; the guns being completely silenced.

While on board General Butler's flag-ship, himself and his officers repeatedly expressed the highest admiration at the remarkable precision and the terribly destructive effect of the fire of the fleet. General Butler remarked that no fortification in the world had ever before been subjected to so terrible a fire.

From a careful observation of the fort, I do not doubt in the least but it could have been carried by the assault of two or three thousand men, under cover of the fire of the fleet. It is impossible that there could have been more troops in the fort than the bomb-proofs could contain, and the fact of four of General Butler's men getting inside and bringing out the flag of the fort shows it was but weakly guarded.

During a year's experience on this part of the coast, I have scarcely seen a more favorable opportunity for landing troops on the beach.

The conduct of my officers and men, under all circumstances, has been all that I could desire.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. LAMSON,  
*Lieutenant Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. N.  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

*Report of Commodore S. W. Godon, commanding United States frigate Susquehanna and 4th division North Atlantic Squadron.*

UNITED STATES FRIGATE SUSQUEHANNA,  
*Off Fort Fisher, North Carolina, December 28, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report on the movements of this ship during the engagement of the 24th and 25th of December, with Fort Fisher and batteries:

At about meridian of the 24th instant, in obedience to general signal, I fell into line of battle, and in regular order drew into my station, as per plan of attack, opening fire from my starboard battery of eight (8) 9-inch guns, and two (2) 150-pounder rifles, at 2 o'clock. I did not, however, get fairly placed with anchors down until 3 o'clock, when I continued a smart fire until ordered out of action at 5.30 p. m. The firing from Fort Fisher was not sustained, and was often silenced for a considerable time. The distance, however, seemed too great, although the practice was good, and kept the fire of the enemy down.

On the 25th I did not get into position until 2.20 p. m., when I tried my rifle range at about 1,700 yards, and anchored within half a ship's length on the starboard bow of the Colorado, as directed by verbal orders, and opened with the 9-inch guns most effectively, using but one division at a time. The enemy's fire, as on the day before, was feeble and not sustained, and was several times silenced for half an hour. Held my position until ordered to withdraw at 4.55, but afterwards steamed up to Minnesota's stern and remained there, with a slight renewal of my fire, until ordered to retire from action and reserve ammunition, then growing short for the assault.

Although fairly exposed, received but few hits and no damage of the slightest consequence. The enemy's practice was bad on both days, owing, I presume, to the steady and well-directed fire of the large ships and iron-clads.

From my position on the wheel-house, overlooking my entire battery, I had every officer and man under my observation, and I have sincere pleasure in testifying to the fine bearing, zeal, and gallantry of the division officers, viz: Lieutenant Bartlett and Acting Ensign Rhoads, of the 1st division; Lieutenant Brown, commanding 2d division; Acting Ensign Laycock, commanding 3d division; Acting Master Porter, commanding 4th division, and 1st Lieutenant William Wallace, who, with his fine company of marines, handled most effectively two extra 9-inch guns. Lieutenant Commander Blake, my executive officer, is all I can desire in battle—cool and collected, calm and intelligent. He is my right-hand man.

I also beg to call special attention to Ensign Preble, the master of this ship, who, whether under fire or any other circumstances, has proved himself without a superior in intelligence or ability on board the vessel.

My aid, Master's Mate Cooper, was prompt in answering signals, and in his spare moments used the 12-pounder howitzer on the hurricane deck with effect.

Thanks to the officers of the powder division, Acting Ensign Bemburn, Gunner Waugh, and Sailmaker Holbrook, the ammunition was promptly supplied throughout the engagement.

The engines, under the control of Chief Engineer Johnson and his able assistants, were at all times ready for duty.

Boatswain Z. Whitmarsh and Carpenter J. E. Miller, stationed in the master's division, not only performed their own duties with intelligence, but gave valuable aid whenever they could.

The subordinate officers of the divisions, the captains of the guns and their spirited crews, have my thanks for their labors those two days.

In short, I have every reason to believe that in action this ship will always be found efficient wherever she may be placed.



If no more satisfactory results were obtained by the fleet from the operations of the 24th and 25th, we must look to the army for the cause. The navy seems to have sustained itself.

I forward herewith the report of injuries to the hull and rigging, as also gunner's report of expenditure of ammunition.

The reports of the commanding officers in this division will be forwarded as soon as received.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. GODON,

*Commodore, Commanding Susquehanna and Ath Division  
North Atlantic Squadron.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

—  
UNITED STATES FRIGATE SUSQUEHANNA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the casualties in my department during the action of the 24th and 25th.

Main lift shot away; both main topmast stays, (chain.) foretop bowlines. With the above exceptions, no other damage done to anything appertaining to my department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. WHITMARSH, *Boatswain.*

Lieutenant Commander F. B. BLAKE.

Respectfully forwarded.

F. B. BLAKE, *Lieut. Commander.*

—  
UNITED STATES STEAMER SUSQUEHANNA,  
*Off Beaufort, N. C., December 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of damages this ship sustained in the engagement of Fort Fisher and batteries on the 24th and 25th instant:

On the starboard after-guard, frame and joiner work nearly torn off and inside of nettings, from the concussion by the continual firing of the guns.

The first cutter and barge were so damaged by the concussion as to be un-serviceable and beyond repairs. The gig was also torn apart by a hawser leading astern, which was entirely unavoidable. A shell from the enemy exploded outside of the wheelhouse, of which a piece struck the shot rack and deck of the engine-room hatch on the starboard side. All of which is submitted.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. E. MILLER, *Carpenter.*

Lieutenant Commander F. B. BLAKE.

Respectfully forwarded.

F. B. BLAKE, *Lieut. Commander.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER SUSQUEHANNA,  
Off Beaufort, N. U., December 30, 1864.

SIR: I respectfully report that during the attack on Fort Fisher the only casualty occurring in the engine department was a damage to the smoke-stack, a round shot having gone completely through it.

Very respectfully,

JOHN JOHNSON, *Chief Engineer.*

Commodore S. W. GODON,  
*Comd'g 4th Division, N. A. B. Squadron.*

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*Report of Commodore H. K. Thatcher, commanding United States steamer Colorado, and 1st division N. A. Squadron.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO,  
Off Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.

ADMIRAL: In compliance with your General Order No. 75, under date of 30th instant, I have the honor to say that in the actions of the 24th and 25th instant, with Fort Fisher and its dependencies, these works were effectually silenced by the heavy and accurate fire of this fleet for hours at a time, the enemy only replying to our fire when an occasional cessation occurred on our part.

On the 24th an explosion took place, during a heavy fire from the fleet, within the main fort of the rebels, and immediately after which flames were observed streaming high above the walls, naturally leading to the conclusion that we had fired the barracks and other tenements connected with Fort Fisher. During the continuance of this blaze, which was for hours, not a gun was fired by the enemy, (to the best of my recollection,) except from the isolated work called the Mound fort.

On the 25th instant the range was shorter and the firing of the fleet more accurate than on the preceding day. It is my belief that not a shot or shell was fired by the advanced line of ships that did not either penetrate the earthworks of the enemy or explode within them. The crew of this ship were perfectly cool and fired with deliberation and apparent severe effect upon the enemy, delivering on the first day fifteen hundred and sixty-nine (1,569) projectiles. Near the close of the second day's action we perceived the near approach of the advanced skirmishers of our army force, which had landed late in the day, when our fire ceased for nearly thirty (30) minutes, and was only resumed after we had been hulled several times by a vicious gun which appeared to be fired from the northeast angle of Fort Fisher. We then reopened heavily, but more to the left than we had previously fired, to avoid annoying our own troops who were seen approaching the fort. The effect of this last heavy fire was apparently severe upon the casemated works to the southward and westward of Fort Fisher. At this time a succession of explosions was heard in the rear of these casemates, followed by the blaze of a large building, which continued to burn during the greater part of Christmas night.

My "impression with regard to the defensibility of the post (battered as it was) against a combined attack of the army and navy" is, that it could have been carried by assault on either of the evenings of the 24th or 25th instant.

I do not suppose that it was deemed possible *entirely* to demolish a casemated earthwork like Fort Fisher, but I am satisfied that everything was done that could be done on the part of the navy to render it untenable, the enemy having been again and again driven from their guns (some of which it appears were dismantled by our fire) and compelled to seek refuge in the sand-holes.

The shoalness of the water for a mile seaward of the forts constituted their only safety against total destruction, or, at least, the dismounting of every gun, such was the heavy and concentrated fire of those two days' bombardment. This ship planted two hundred and thirty (230) shot in the rebel works on the 25th, and exploded nine hundred and ninety-six (996) shells within them on that day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. K. THATCHER,

*Commodore, Commanding 1st Division, N. A. Squadron.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.*

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*Report of Lieutenant Commander Frank M. Ramsay, commanding United States steamer Unadilla.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER UNADILLA,

*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of General Order No. 75.

In the engagement of the 24th and 25th instant with Fort Fisher, this vessel fired one hundred and twenty-two eleven-inch shells, six eleven-inch shrapnell, one hundred twenty-pounder shells, twenty-five twenty-pounder shrapnell, and four twenty-pounder shot. The firing from the vessels engaged was the most accurate that I have ever seen, and was so heavy that on the 25th the rebels did not approach the "17 guns protected by traverses" spoken of by General Butler.

The response from the fort was very feeble, and particularly so on the 25th. The only gun I saw fired on that day, on the northeastern face of the fort, the side on which the "17 guns" were, was a casemate gun, which did not bear up the beach, and it was fired very irregularly.

In my opinion, had the troops been landed early on the morning of the 25th, and any attempt been made by them to take the fort, it would have been ours before sunset. At 1 p. m. the condition of the fort was such, as well as I could judge, that it was only necessary for troops to march in and take possession.

After the ammunition of this vessel for the heavy guns had been expended, all the boats were sent to assist in landing the troops.

At 5 p. m. the boats returned, and the officers in charge of them reported to me that they had been told, by a general, to return, as he did not wish to land more troops that evening.

The last load of troops taken on shore by the launch was ordered back to the transport.

I would respectfully call your attention to that part of General Butler's communication to you in which he speaks of having captured Flag-pond Hill battery.

Flag-pond Hill battery was captured by a boat's crew from the gunboat next ahead of this vessel.

The troops were not near the battery at the time it surrendered, and had nothing whatever to do with its capture.

This vessel was close to the battery, and the whole affair was witnessed by the officers and crew, who gave three cheers as the boat's crew took possession and raised the United States flag.

I beg leave to call your attention to the enclosed statements in regard to it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK M. RAMSAY,

*Lieutenant Commander, Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER UNADILLA,  
*Beaufort Harbor, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your request, I submit the following statement of the surrender and occupation of the small work known as Flag-pond battery, on the beach to the northward of Fort Fisher, on the afternoon of the 25th instant.

Flag-pond battery was occupied, and the American flag placed on it, by a boat's crew from one of the naval vessels, and the garrison marched out as prisoners, before the *skirmishers* in advance of General Butler's army reached it.

Very respectfully,

JOHN CULLATON,  
*Acting Ensign U. S. N., U. S. S. Unadilla.*

Lieut. Com. F. M. RAMSAY,  
*Commanding United States Steamship Unadilla.*

—  
 UNITED STATES STEAMER UNADILLA,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to your order, I respectfully submit the following report in regard to the capture of Flag-pond battery, between the hours of two and three p. m., December 25, 1864. While the troops were landing and forming a line of battle I saw a white flag flying on the battery, and at the same time a boat from one of our navy steamers pulling towards the beach. The boat landed abreast of the battery. Immediately an officer, with a part of the boat's crew, with a Union flag, advanced rapidly to the battery and planted the flag on its ramparts, for which the officers and crew of this ship gave three cheers. Shortly after I saw our men with some of the prisoners marching from the battery to the boat, embark, and pull to one of our navy steamers. During the march to the boat and the embarkation the army *skirmishers* came up to the battery.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES WIEDENBEIN,  
*Acting Ensign.*

Respectfully forwarded to Admiral PORTER.

FRANK M. RAMSAY,  
*Lieutenant Commander, Commanding.*

—  
 UNITED STATES STEAMER UNADILLA,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to your request, I respectfully submit the following statement in reference to the capture of the Flag-pond Hill battery, so called:

Our ship, having been withdrawn from the bombardment of Fort Fisher, was, with several other gunboats, engaged in covering the landing and advance of the troops on shore. While our howitzer division were at their guns and throwing shells across the beach, I observed a movement in the battery referred to (which had hitherto shown no signs of being occupied) and immediately after a flag was raised above the battery, which was decided by our officers to be a white flag, and a signal of surrender. At that time a comparatively small number of our troops had reached the shore, and the advance guard had not left the vicinity of the landing. Some ten minutes after the raising of the flag on the battery a boat left the gunboat next ahead of us and pulled for the shore, and on arriving there the officer in charge seized the boat's ensign, ran up the beach, and waving the flag several times, planted it upon the top of the battery. Our ship's company then gave three cheers, immediately followed by

three more. At that time none of the troops were within a hundred yards of the battery, although a small number had been moving in that direction while the boat was pulling to the shore. As soon as the cheering was over, the men who had occupied the battery were seen coming from the same and towards the boat. About this time the foremost of our troops came up and the assemblage became mixed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN F. BEE,

*Acting First Assistant Engineer, U. S. N.*

F. M. RAMSAY,

*Lieutenant Commander, Commanding.*

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*Report of Commodore Schenck, commanding United States steamer Powhatan and 3d division North Atlantic squadron.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER POWHATAN,

*Off Beaufort, N. C., January 1, 1865.*

ADMIRAL: Your General Order No. 75 did not reach me until this morning, owing to its being sent on board the Colorado. In reply to that part of it requiring me to make a report of the part I took in the actions of the 24th and 25th ultimo, I have to state that at 1.20 p. m., on the 24th, I took my position in the line, as directed by you, with a kedge upon my port quarter acting as a spring, letting go my port anchor with twenty-five (25) fathoms of chain, which brought my starboard broadside to bear upon the forts. I immediately opened a vigorous fire upon the batteries, paying especial attention to Fort Fisher with my 11-inch gun, and to the Mound with my two (2) 100-pounder Parrotts, and with my 9-inch guns to the batteries more immediately abreast of us. It is reported and believed on board this ship that one of the shells from our 11-inch, which exploded in Fort Fisher, set fire to it. At 2.45 p. m., finding that some of my 9-inch shell fell short, and that the Brooklyn, being under way, occasionally interfered with my line of sight, I got under way, continuing the action, and stood into four and a half ( $4\frac{1}{2}$ ) fathoms water, from which position every shot told with great effect. From this time the action was continued under way. At 3.10 p. m. the end of our spanker gaff was shot away, and our flag came down with it; hoisted it immediately at the mizzen. About the same time the rebel flag on Fort Fisher was shot away, and was not raised again during the action. At 3.45 p. m. the flag-staff on the Mound was shot away, which shot is claimed by our pivot rifle. At 5.20 p. m. the signal was made to discontinue the action. Hauled off, having sustained no loss of life or injury to ship.

During this day's action we fired two hundred and thirty-six (236) 9-inch shell, fifty-four (54) 11-inch shell, and eighty-two (82) 100-pounder rifle shell. Not a shell was wasted from the 11-inch and rifles, and only a few in the early part of the action from the 9-inch guns. The starboard battery only was used in action, viz: eight (8) 9-inch guns, two (2) 100-pounder Parrott rifles, and one (1) inch pivot gun.

On the 25th I took my position as before, although nearer the batteries and further in; the batteries between Fort Fisher and the Mound being abreast of us, my position was an admirable one for engaging these batteries, and my 9-inch guns were principally employed in doing this, as it was only by these we were annoyed, with an occasional shot from the Mound. During this day not a shot fell short, which accounts for my increased expenditure of 9-inch shell. At 2.10 p. m. we opened fire, which was replied to by the batteries abreast of us more vigorously than the day before. I am not aware of having

received a single shot from Fort Fisher this day. At 3.30 p. m. a port main shroud was shot away; soon after we were struck three (3) times in pretty rapid succession. One (1) shot struck us under No. 3 port, three (3) feet above the water-line, passing through into a storeroom, and depositing itself in a mattress; it is a solid 8-inch shot. Two (2) shot struck under No. 2 port, twenty (20) inches below the water-line, one (1) remaining in the side and the other going through and lodging in a beam on the orlop deck, causing the ship to leak badly; a glancing shot struck the stern of the ship, but did no material injury, and some of our running-rigging shot away. At 4.10 p. m., having expended all the ammunition for 11-inch and rifles, and nearly all for my 9-inch guns, made signal, "Ammunition I am short of," which was replied to, "Save some," and immediately after, "Discontinue the action," when I weighed my anchor, lifted my kedge, and hauled out of line.

During this day's action we fired four hundred and ninety-four (494) 9-inch shell, fifty-two (52) 11-inch shell, and seventy-two (72) rifle shell.

In conclusion, I beg leave to state that every officer and man on board this ship, under my command, did his duty nobly, and I have yet to hear of any complaint, either of officer or man, except as to the failure to take advantage of our two (2) days' work. With regard to the "damage apparently done to the works," I must confess that I was paying more attention to the proper management of my own battery than the general effect; but it appears to me utterly impossible that any works could withstand such a fire and not be terribly damaged; and I am also fully impressed with the belief that, by a prompt and vigorous assault late in the afternoon of either day, Fort Fisher might have been taken by a comparatively small force, say one thousand (1,000) resolute men. Fort Fisher was silenced, the Mound firing feebly; the only active firing from the enemy that I witnessed was from the two (2) or three (3) guns that annoyed me, and as long as my ammunition permitted me to fire rapidly, I could keep them pretty quiet.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. FINDLAY SCHENCK,

*Commodore, Com'dg U. S. Steamer Powhatan, 3d Div. N. A. Squadron.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron.*

*Report of Lieutenant Commander John L. Davis, commanding United States steamer Sassacus.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER SASSACUS,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that this vessel, in the actions of the 24th and 25th instant, in line of battle, in position assigned by your order, fired

123 100-pdr. Parrott shell,

10 " shrapnell,

119 IX-inch shell,

49 20-pdr. Dahlgren shell,

12 12-pdr. " "

all of which were directed with care and deliberation at Fort Fisher, and the enemy's works adjacent thereto. It may not be amiss to state that the conduct of the officers and men was commendable during the two days' engagement. The fire of the ships throughout appeared to be overwhelming, the enemy not replying when our guns opened with vigor.

The impression on my mind was, that the works of the enemy were much

injured, so much so that an assault, determinedly made, would result in their capture; and my astonishment was great when I heard that the army had resolved on a retrograde movement, as I considered that a corresponding effort made by the land forces would have secured the success of the combined attack of the army and navy.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. DAVIS,

*Lieutenant Commander.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding N. A. Squadron.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, December 27, 1864.*

SIR: My despatch of yesterday will give you an account of our operations, but will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely silenced by our guns—they were so blown up, burst up, and torn up, that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer. Had the army made a show of surrounding it, it would have been ours; but nothing of the kind was done.

The men landed, reconnoitred, and hearing that the enemy were massing troops somewhere, the order was given to re-embark.

They went away as soon as the majority of the troops were on the transports, and it coming on to blow rather fresh, about 700 were left on shore. They have been there ever since, without food or water, having landed with only twenty-four hours' rations. I opened communication with them this morning and supplied them with provisions.

To show that the rebels have no force here, these men have been on shore two days without being molested. I am now getting them off, and it has taken half the squadron (with the loss of many boats in the surf) to assist.

I can't conceive what the army expected when they came here; it certainly did not need seven thousand men to garrison Fort Fisher—it only requires one thousand to garrison all these forts, which are entirely under the guns of Fort Fisher; that taken, the river is open. Could I have found a channel to be relied on in time, I would have put the small vessels in, even if I had got a dozen of them sunk; but the channel we did find was only wide enough for one vessel at right angles, and we were not certain of the soundings. There never was a fort that invited soldiers to walk in and take possession more plainly than Fort Fisher; and an officer got on the parapet even, saw no one inside, and brought away the flag we had cut down.

A soldier goes inside, through the sally-port, meets in the fort, coming out of a bomb-proof, an orderly on horseback, shoots the orderly, searches his body, and brings away with him the horse and communication the orderly was bearing to send up field-pieces.

Another soldier goes in the fort and brings out a mule that was stowed away; and another soldier, who went inside while our shells were falling, shot his musket into a bomb-proof, where he saw some rebels assembled together; he was not molested. Ten soldiers, who went around the fort, were wounded by our shells. All the men wanted was the order to go in; but because every gun was not dismounted by our fire, it was thought that the fort "was not injured as a defensive work," and that it would be to lose men to attack it. It was considered rash to attack the works with wooden ships, and even the officers who have been on the bar a long time (and witnessed the building of the

works) thought that half the ships would be destroyed; and it was said that the only hope we could have of silencing the batteries was in case the powder-vessel did the damage expected.

We silenced the guns in one hour's time; knocked the fort all to pieces, inside and out, and had not one man killed (that I have heard of,) except by the bursting of our own guns, in the entire fleet.

We have shown the weakness of this work. It can be taken at any moment, in one hour's time, if the right man is sent with the troops. They should be sent here to *stay*—to land with a month's provisions, intrenching tools, guns, and Cohorn mortars. Ten thousand men will hold the whole country. The rebels have been able to send here, all told, about 4,000 men—seventy-five of them that were sent here to observe us gave themselves up to the navy. Two hundred and eighteen men sent on the same duty gave themselves up to our reconnoitring party, and this would have been the case all the way through.

\* \* \* \* \*

I know what they would do, and I shall send and ask him to let some of his troops come and locate themselves in Fort Fisher. If I can't do better, I will land the sailors, and try if we can't have full credit for what we do.

I trust, sir, you will not think of stopping at this, nor of relaxing your endeavors to obtain the right kind of troops for the business, the right number, and the proper means of taking the place, even if we fail in an assault. Every attack we make we will improve in firing, and if the weather would permit I could level the works in a week's firing, strong as they are; but there is only one day in six that a vessel can anchor so close. We had a most beautiful time, and the weather for the attack was just what we wanted.

If General Hancock, with 10,000 men, was sent down here, we could walk right into the fort.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, December 28, 1864.*

SIR: I am enabled, from information gained from prisoners, to tell you what effect the explosion had on the rebels in and about Fort Fisher. It was entirely unexpected, and the troops were mostly asleep at the time. It created a perfect panic, stunned and disabled the men, so that they refused to fight, notwithstanding all the efforts of their officers, and the severe bombardment that followed so completely demoralized them that 200 men could have gone into and taken possession of the works.

No injury was done to the forts that I can hear of, nor were any of the wooden huts about half a mile off thrown down; but on looking at the massive structures built of sand-bags it could scarcely be expected to move them by such a process; that can only be done by continual hammering with shot and shell.

As far as this squadron; is concerned, the forts can be silenced at any moment, and taken possession of by a well-organized land force.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*



NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, N. C., December 28, 1864.*

SIR: In my despatch of the 26th instant, I stated that a 100-pounder had burst on board the Susquehanna. This was a mistake, which I now write to correct.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, December 28, 1864.*

SIR: To show the feeling in the army, I enclose statements of some of the officers of the Nereus in relation to the giving up of the expedition on the part of the land forces.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

—

U. S. STEAMER NEREUS, *December 27, 1864.*

SIR: A wounded colonel, whom I brought off from shore in one of my boats, expressed great dissatisfaction at having been ordered off, saying that he was convinced that if permitted to go on, the land forces would have undoubtedly captured the fort.

WILLIAM RUSHMERE,  
*Acting Master's Mate.*

—

U. S. STEAMER NEREUS,  
*Off New Inlet, December 27, 1864.*

SIR: While ashore, assisting in embarking the men under the command of Brigadier General Curtis, U. S. A., I heard that officer remark, that had he been properly supported and timely re-enforced Fort Fisher would have been in our possession on the night of the 25th instant.

The remark and the fact was one of universal comment by army officers ashore.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. SMITH,  
*Acting Ensign.*

Commander J. C. HOWELL,  
*Comd'g U. S. Steamer Nereus.*

U. S. STEAMER NEREUS, *December 26, 1864.*

SIR: While on shore, assisting General Curtis to re-embark his command, General Curtis told me that he could have taken Fort Fisher if he had been supported by the other troops. Also, I was informed the same by several other officers of his command. General Curtis was near enough to Fort Fisher to capture the rebel flag on it; also a horse.

EDWARD L. HAINES,  
*Acting Master, U. S. N.*

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SIR: While ashore, on Federal Point, New inlet, North Carolina, assisting, Brigadier General Curtis, U. S. A., to re-embark his command, I was informed by him that he was near enough to Fort Fisher to capture a rebel flag and a horse, and that if he had been re-enforced when he requested he could have captured Fort Fisher.

This statement was also made by other officers of his command.

Respectfully, &c.,

EDWARD L. HAINES,  
*Acting Master, U. S. N.*

Commander J. C. HOWELL,  
*Comd'g U. S. Steamer Nereus.*

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U. S. STEAMER NEREUS,  
*Off Wilmington, December 27, 1864.*

ADMIRAL: At 12.40 p. m., in obedience to your verbal order, I anchored off Flag-pond battery, mooring head and stern in  $4\frac{1}{2}$  fathoms water. Immediately opened fire upon the battery. No response was made by those inside; and at 2.15 p. m. a white flag was waved, and the soldiers inside the fort showed themselves. A boat was immediately sent from one of the small gunboats, the American flag planted on the fort, and the surrender of the command received by a naval officer. Some sixty-five or seventy men, a captain and lieutenant were captured. The Santiago de Cuba and Nereus sent boats, and, by the order of Captain Glisson, the prisoners were transferred to the Sautiango de Cuba.

Respectfully, admiral, your obedient servant,

J. C. HOWELL, *Commander.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, &c., &c., &c.

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[Telegram in cipher.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, December 29, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, U. S. A., *City Point, Virginia:*

I waited for Porter's despatches. Mr. Blair will explain. He reached Fort Monroe at 6 p. m., having left yesterday at 2 p. m. Mr. Welles has sent you a telegram in cipher, which could not be sent until despatches arrived. Porter will continue his fire, but it is hopeless alone.

G. V. FOX, *Assistant Secretary.*

[Telegram in cipher.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *December 29, 1864.*Lieutenant General GRANT, *City Point, Va.:*

The substance of despatches and reports from Rear-Admiral Porter, off Wilmington, is briefly this: The ships can approach nearer to the enemy's works than was anticipated. Their fire can keep the enemy away from their guns. A landing can easily be effected upon the beach north of Fort Fisher, not only of troops, but all their supplies and artillery. This force can have its flanks protected by gunboats. The navy can assist in the siege of Fort Fisher precisely as it covered the operation which resulted in the capture of Wagner. The winter, also, is the most favorable for operations against Fort Fisher. The largest naval force ever assembled is ready to lend its co-operation.

Rear-Admiral Porter will remain off Fort Fisher, continuing a moderate fire to prevent new works from being erected, and the iron-clads have proved that they can maintain themselves in spite of bad weather. Under all these circumstances, I invite you to such a military co-operation as will insure the fall of Fort Fisher, the importance of which has already received your careful consideration.

This telegram is made at the suggestion of the President, and in hopes that you will be able at this time to give the troops, which heretofore were required elsewhere. If it cannot be done the fleet will have to disperse, whence it cannot again be brought to this coast.

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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[Confidential.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 29, 1864.*

SIR: Since my communication of the 27th it has been blowing and raining incessantly, with a heavy sea running, precluding the possibility of doing anything in the way of offensive operations, and my time and that of half the squadron has been taken up in getting from shore the troops General Butler left there.

Finding that the enemy was not repairing his works, and was dismounting the guns in Fort Fisher, I came to the conclusion that he was doing what I feared he would do—evacuate the present works, and build others up the river out of reach of our guns, and where he knows no vessel of ours can get at him. Still it will take him a month to do it, and I thought by that time we could get troops to help carry on the operations.

I thought it best under the circumstances to let the enemy think we had abandoned the expedition entirely, and sent the fleet to a rendezvous off Beaufort, one or two at a time, to look as if they were crippled. I shall know in a day or two whether the move will have its effect.

Fort Fisher is ours at any moment when we can get a moderate and proper kind of force to go into the works when we silence them. They may get a hundred guns more in position, and it will make no difference. They are evidently impressed with their weakness, and will no doubt try to remedy the defects in the works. At no time did I permit the vessels to open on them with all their batteries, limiting some of them to about two shots a minute, and permitting the large vessels to fight only one division of guns at a time; the army officers thought that was the heaviest fire they had ever conceived of. And now, sir, I beg that you will allow me to work this thing out, and leave nothing undone to take the place. Could I depend on the sailors for landing, I would ask no army force;

but a large portion of the crews are new in the service, have little or no knowledge of the musket or drill, and I intend to make no mistakes if I can avoid it. A repulse is always demoralizing, and sailors cannot stand the concentrated fire of regular troops. I have a plan, though, by which I could attempt to throw sailors into the works, provided they are not evacuated, and the guns transferred to a higher point on the river, for Fort Fisher can't be held half an hour against the attack of the navy and land forces at the same time. When I started on this expedition, you may remember I said how the place could be taken, viz: with the navy attacking it by water, and 12,000 troops properly provided to work on the land.

Well, sir, it could have been taken on Christmas with 500 men, without losing a soldier; there were not twenty men in the forts, and those were poor, miserable, panic-stricken people, cowering there with fear, while one or two desperate men in one of the upper casemates, some distance above Fort Fisher, managed to fire one gun that seldom hit any one.

I feel ashamed that men calling themselves soldiers should have left this place so ingloriously. It was, however, nothing more than I expected when General Butler mixed himself up in this expedition—starting his troops out from Hampton roads with only a few days' provisions, and without water, trusting to the steamers to make it, which they could not do. The transports were so frail that they should never have left Hampton roads. The result was, when the time arrived for action, the troops were all in Beaufort. He had time then to get enough of them to New inlet; he and three transports arrived on the first day while we were firing, while the beach was smooth, and, having two thousand men on the ground, all he had to do was to land and take possession of the panic-stricken garrison. Almost every man in the work was stunned by the explosion, and unfit for duty. This we heard from the prisoners.

It is scarcely worth while to be impatient under these disappointments; the navy will have to meet them throughout a war like this, where so many incompetent men in the army are placed in charge of important trusts. General Butler only came here to reap the credit of the affair, supposing the explosion would sweep the works off from the face of the earth. Had he supposed in the first instance that there would have been difficulties, he would never have joined the expedition.

General Weitzel went on shore, determined what the report of the defences would be, for General Butler had made an opinion for him. The department, sir, has no cause to be dissatisfied with the share the navy has taken in this affair; the ships did their work so beautifully that you will hear of but one opinion expressed by lookers-on.

If this temporary failure succeeds in sending General Butler into private life, it is not to be regretted, for it cost only a certain amount of shells, which I would expend in a month's target practice anyhow.

I am going to send a vessel down to-day to General Sherman, and I think he will come here in person—it is his shortest route to Charleston, to take Wilmington first. All I ask of you, sir, is not to withdraw a single ship. I have plenty, it is true; but each man now knows exactly what he has to do, and they are in the mood to attack anything. I am sure that Sherman must have entered Savannah yesterday; he will want but ten thousand troops to hold it, and will be too glad to join me here; then you will see how this prize was allowed to slip through our fingers by a great *over-caution*, to call it by a mild name. Again, sir, I ask, please don't break up the present squadron of attack until I say that I can't get into Fort Fisher, and consequently get command of the river, which is at this moment the most important thing to be done. The blockade running once stopped, and the confederacy can't live a day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, *Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., December 31, 1864.*

SIR: In my accounts of the actions of the 24th and 25th instant against Fort Fisher, I omitted mentioning the names of the commanders of the different vessels, with the exception of one or two; this might look like an invidious distinction which was not intended, by any means; and though the name of each commander is well known to the public, I desire to correct the omission, that history may give credit to those engaged in these actions.

The following are the names of all the vessels engaged with the forts, and the names of their commanders. Having so well performed their part in reducing these formidable works to a condition where they could be easily taken possession of, they are entitled to all the credit they have so well earned:

Minnesota, Commander James Lanman; Mohican, Commander D. Ammen; Colorado, Commander H. K. Thatcher; Tuscarora, Commander J. M. Frailey; Wabash, Captain M. Smith; Susquehanna, Commodore S. W. Godon; Brooklyn, Captain James Alden; Powhatan, Commodore J. F. Schenck; Juniata, Captain W. R. Taylor; Kansas, Lieutenant Commander P. G. Watmough; Yantic, Lieutenant Commander T. C. Harris; Maumee, Lieutenant Commander R. Chandler; Mackinaw, Commander J. C. Beaumont; Ticonderoga, Captain C. Steedman; Pawtuxet, Commander J. H. Spatts; Shenandoah, Captain D. B. Ridgley; Seneca, Lieutenant Commander M. Sicard; New Ironsides, Commodore Wm. Radford; Monadnock, Commander E. G. Parratt; Canonicus, Lieutenant Commander Geo. E. Belknap; Mahopac, Lieutenant Commander E. E. Potter; Saugus, Commander E. R. Calhoun; Nyack, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Newman; Unadilla, Lieutenant Commander F. M. Ramsay; Huron, Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge; Pequot, Lieutenant Commander D. L. Braine; Pontoosuc, Lieutenant Commander Wm G. Temple; Nereus, Commander J. C. Howell; Vanderbilt, Captain C. W. Pickering; Fort Jackson, Captain B. F. Sands; Santiago de Cuba, Captain O. S. Glisson; Tacony, Lieutenant Commander W. T. Truxtun; Osceola, Commander J. M. B. Clitz; Chippewa, Lieutenant Commander A. W. Weaver; Sassacus, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis; Maratanza, Lieutenant Commander J. W. Young; Rhode Island, Commander S. D. Trenchard; Mount Vernon, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant James Trathen; Britannia, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Huse; Quaker City, Commander W. F. Spicer; Iosco, Commander John Guest; Howquah, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. W. Balch; Wilderness, Acting Master H. Arey; Cherokee, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant W. E. Dennison; A. D. Vance, Lieutenant Commander J. H. Upshur; Moccasin, Acting Ensign James Brown; Gettysburg, Lieutenant R. H. Lamson; Alabama, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Frank Smith; Keystone State, Commander H. Rolando; Nansmond, Acting Master John H. Porter; Emma, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. C. Dunn; Tristram Shandy, Acting Ensign Ben Wood; Governor Buckingham, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. McDiarmid; Little Ada, Acting Master S. P. Crafts.

I should have mentioned that the Saugus, Commander Calhoun, was not in the first day's fight; she arrived from Hampton roads the morning of the 25th, just in time to take her place with the other monitors, and anchored within eight hundred yards of Fort Fisher; though there was no response of any consequence from the fort, she did good service in knocking away traverses, &c., and only fired slowly until the army should come up. At no time during this day's work did any of the vessels open all their batteries; the order was to "fight only one division of guns from each vessel;" some vessels only fired one shot or shell per minute, holding on for the moment when it was expected the troops would approach and enter, for that would have been the result. I cannot conceal my dissatisfaction, nor can the officers under my command, at

the turn things have taken. My first despatch to the department will show you how sanguine I was that the works would be ours before sunset if the troops came up. I supposed that the assaulting was a matter of course, knowing that as soon as the troops landed and surrounded the works in the rear, the white flag would be hung out; but reports of large armies coming up to the relief of the rebels changed all the general's plans, if he ever had any. To show how absurd such apprehensions were, every rebel soldier seen gave themselves up the moment our troops were ashore, when they had nothing to fear from their own people; this would have been the case all the way through, had the troops all landed.

General Butler mentions in his letter to me that he had captured Flag-pond battery with 65 men, and Half Moon battery with 218 men and seven officers. This is making capital out of very small material. Flag-pond battery was some loose sand thrown up, behind which the rebels used to lie with field-pieces and fire at our blockaders when they chased runners in shore. It doesn't deserve the name of a work. Sixty-five or seventy rebels in it came forward and delivered themselves up to the navy and were taken on board the Santiago de Cuba. The men in Half Moon battery (which is no work at all, and exactly like the other) came forward and delivered themselves up to the army. They could easily have escaped, had they desired to do so. There were no guns in these temporary works, and no protection in the rear. The country will scarcely be cajoled, as it has been a hundred times this war, by announcement of captures having no foundation whatever.

I am not very particular, I am well aware, how I express myself in these cases. I have always said what I thought since the first day I took up arms to fight this rebellion, and I intend to do so (impolitic though it may be) until the war is over.

I intend to write my share of the history of this rebellion and place it on record, where future historians can have access to it. I have never omitted to give the army full credit when co-operating with it, and I shall unhesitatingly say what I think when an expedition is trifled with and treated as if it was a grand tournament for the amusement of lookers-on. From beginning to end the military part of the expedition has been a failure. In the first place, the men were thrown into indifferent transports, that could not even condense water, and with only ten days' rations; a storm was just commencing which lasted five days, during which time nothing could be done. Instead of rendezvousing at Beaufort, North Carolina, they anchored with the fleet out at sea; they were driven away the first gale, which the monitors and our smallest tugs rode out. It was never intended by the commander of the troops that they should do anything when they came down here, except to enter the works we had silenced; that we could have done ourselves without the aid of the soldiers, had the fort surrendered.

We all know very well that a fort on shore, unless attacked by troops at the same time ships are bombarding, will always hold out against the ships; that is, the enemy will leave the works, (and let the ships fire away,) and enter again when the ships have gone. We know from the history of this war that in no case have we failed to take a fortification where the troops did their share of the work; and this is what the troops under the command of General Butler failed to do.

The brave fellows who showed the way into the works, brought off horses, mules, and flags, should have their names chronicled far and near. Had the same spirit been felt in other quarters, Christmas would have been a happier day than usual with the nation. There was evidently a misapprehension on the part of the military leader that we could not cover and protect troops on shore.

This fleet demonstrated its ability to hold on at anchor in deep water and twenty miles from shore, through a heavy gale from the southward—all gales from this direction, however, never blowing home or blowing less as the shore

is approached. The only gales to be dreaded here are the northeasters, and then the vessels would lie along the shore with their broadsides bearing on the beach.

This fleet would drive off an army of 300,000 men, intrenched or attacking, on such a level field as that where our troops landed.

Seven hundred men were left on the beach by General Butler when he departed for Fortress Monroe, and we had no difficulty in protecting them from the rebel army said to be in the background, which was a very small army, after all. General Bragg must have been very agreeably disappointed when he saw our troops going away without firing a shot, and to see an expedition costing millions of dollars given up when the hollowness of the rebel shell was about to be exposed.

All through this war we have lost chances, never to be recovered, owing to the timidity of commanders, and their hesitating to attack what offers itself the most easy of conquest.

The report of an army coming up (which army never existed) changes the whole plan of a campaign, when, in my opinion, it would be better to face the army of the enemy and see what stuff they are made of.

Here was our fleet of six hundred guns, commanding a peninsula two miles wide only, and able to cover, for miles, any number of troops we might land. I call this a dead failure. There is no use in mincing matters, for, though the navy did all that was expected of it, or could do, we gained no results. We will only have the satisfaction of knowing that the naval part was well and handsomely done, and that we will do it again the first opportunity.

It is now blowing heavy from the southwest, and the larger vessels are riding it out nicely outside. This is the only wind we care for on this coast. In all the other gales we can find a lee.

If you, sir, have no intention of making any change in the number of vessels in this squadron, I would respectfully say let us work this matter through; at least defer any changes until I say that we have given up taking the forts.

The rebels will, no doubt, claim a victory. A failure is half a victory. They foreshadowed the failure in their papers, and stated what would be the cause; which came true.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Saturday, December 31, 1864.*

SIR: Lieutenant General Grant will send immediately a competent force, properly commanded, to co-operate in the capture of the defences on Federal Point. It is expected that the troops will leave Hampton roads next Monday or Tuesday. This is all the information the department has to give you, but relies upon your skill and judgment to give full effect to any move that may be arranged. The department is perfectly satisfied with your efforts thus far, and you will convey to all hands the satisfaction the department feels.

I am, sir, &c.,

GIDEON WELLES.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Com'g N. A. Blockading Squadron, off Wilmington.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 7, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose you a letter received from Lieutenant Commander Temple, containing interesting matter relating to Fort Fisher.

It is important as a matter of history, and tells the whole story.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

—  
 UNITED STATES STEAMER PONTOOSUC,  
*Off New Inlet, January 2, 1865.*

SIR: It may be of assistance to you to receive (together with the six rebel deserters mentioned in my letter of this date) the following memorandum of information elicited from one of their number, Corporal Thomas Lawler, of the marines:

He says he was stationed, both during and since the bombardment, in naval battery Buchanan, commanded by Lieutenant Chapman, and situated near the Mound; that there were between five and six hundred men in the forts on the two days of the attack, and no troops in Wilmington or its vicinity to re-enforce them; that the fire from the fleet was so fierce as to drive the rebels from their guns and into the bomb-proofs throughout the greater portion of their works soon after the commencement of the action; that two of their Brooke guns burst, killing and wounding some twenty-five men; that we dismounted eight of their guns, besides destroying several of their carriages, killing thirteen men and wounding about thirty; that General Whiting supposed the boats which were sent into the bar on the 25th to be a storming party of seamen, to which he would have been obliged to surrender; that the subsequent rapid bombardment at sunset of the same day was so terrific, that when our troops appeared in front of the fort immediately afterward, the garrison only awaited their assault to surrender without resistance; that they could not imagine why the attack had been abandoned; that matters remained in the same condition on the morning of the 26th, and throughout that day; that we could easily have possessed ourselves of the forts until late in the afternoon, when General Bragg arrived at Wilmington with six thousand men from Lee's army at Richmond; that, finding our troops re-embarking, Bragg decided not to molest us, and sent the six thousand men on to Charleston to re-enforce General Hardee; that General Whiting retains only his original garrison, with whom he is busily engaged in repairing damages, and in getting down four other guns (being all that he can get hold of) from Wilmington, to replace those that were disabled; that the works are stronger against an assault on the land side than on the sea front, and that there are no obstructions in the channel, other than some dozen or fifteen torpedoes—a portion of which were put down a week ago. He further states that William T. Lynch is acting as admiral of the station, and lives at Smithville; that Robert F. Pinckney is acting as commodore of the station afloat, having only a small tug, without any considerable armament, under his command; that the iron-clad ram, formerly in the river, got aground and burst open, and was dismantled of her engines and armor; and that the Tallahassee put to sea on the night of the 22d or 23d of December, with from six to eight hundred bales of cotton on board, by way of the western bar, with a view to bring back a cargo of hard coal, sufficient to enable not only herself, but the Chickamauga, also, to put to sea on another privateering expedition. He as-



signs as a reason for his desertion a long-continued and growing discontent with his officers, his treatment and fare, and the cause for which he has been fighting.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM G. TEMPLE,  
*Lieutenant Commanding.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*U. S. Navy, Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 11, 1865.*

SIR: I have to report that, in obedience to your order, I went on board the Ben Deford on the evening of the 18th ultimo and informed General Butler that the powder-vessel would be exploded that evening, and that you would be ready to follow it up at daylight in the morning by an attack with the fleet.

General Butler, upon discussion of the matter with General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock, directed General Weitzel to call upon you and request a postponement of several days; and I so heard General Weitzel state it to you in your cabin. I have also to state that, as soon as possible thereafter, the A. D. Vance carried in the orders countermanding the explosion, and to direct the powder-vessel to return to her anchorage.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE, *Fleet Captain.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Fort Fisher, N. C., January 14, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that operations have been resumed against the forts at the entrance of Cape Fear river.

Since the first attack on that place and the subsequent withdrawal of the troops, I have been employed in filling the ships with ammunition and coal. The difficulties we have had to encounter no one can conceive. All our work had to be done with the larger vessels anchored on the coast exposed (you may almost say at sea) to the violent gales that blow here almost incessantly. On these gales the enemy depend to break up our operations. We will see. We have gone through about the worst of it, have held on through gales heavy enough to drive anything to sea, and we have sustained no damage whatever.

After the troops arrived, the weather set in bad and the gale was very heavy. As soon as it was over I got under way on the 12th instant, and forming the vessels in three lines, with the transports in company, I steamed for Fort Fisher.

On the morning of the 13th the fleet took its station in three lines, close to the beach, and the boats were sent at once to take off the troops. These were landed, with about twelve (12) days' provisions, at about two o'clock p. m.

This time I pursued a different plan in attacking the rebel works. I sent in the New Ironsides, Commodore Radford, leading the monitors Saugus, Canonieus, Monadnock, and Mahopae.

At 7.30 a. m. the forts opened on them as they approached, but they quietly took up their old position, within 1,000 yards of Fort Fisher, and, when ready, they opened their batteries. In this way I tempted the enemy to engage the monitors, that we might see what guns he had, and, seeing where they were, be able to dismount them by our fire.

Quite a spirited engagement went on between the forts and the Ironsides and monitors. It was soon apparent that the iron vessels had the best of it. Travellers began to disappear and the southern angle of Fort Fisher commenced to look very dilapidated.

The guns were silenced one after the other, and only one heavy gun, in the southern angle, kept up its fire.

The fire of this gun was not at all accurate, as it inflicted no damage on the iron vessels. They were hit, though, several times.

By way of letting the enemy know that we had some shell left on board the wooden ships, and did not intend to take any unfair advantage of him by using the iron vessels alone, I ordered line No. 1, (on the plan,) led by Captain Alden, of the Brooklyn, and line No. 2, led by Commodore Thatcher, of the Colorado, to go in and attack the batteries. This was done in the handsomest manner; not a mistake was committed except firing too rapidly and making too much smoke.

The heavy fire of the large vessels shut up the enemy's guns at once, and after firing till after dark the wooden vessels dropped out to their anchorage. The Ironsides and monitors maintained their positions through the night, firing a shell now and then. They are now lying within one thousand (1,000) yards of the fort, and one of the monitors within seven hundred (700) yards, and the fort does not fire a gun at them, thinking, no doubt, that it is a waste of powder.

The firing from the fleet will commence as soon as we get breakfast, and be kept up as long as the ordnance department provides us with shells and guns.

There is perfect understanding between General Terry and myself. I believe everything has been done to suit him. I have heard no complaints, and know that we have felt every disposition to help the army along.

A detailed report of our operations here will be sent in when we get through. I see no reason to doubt our success. The forts will be used up soon. We have a respectable force landed on a strip of land which our naval guns completely command, and a place of defence which would enable us to hold on against a very large army.

I will report to you by every opportunity.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Beaufort, N. C., January 9, 1865.*

SIR: I understand that there is now an attempt being made to create an impression that I delayed much longer than necessary, and could have attacked on the 18th as well as the 24th. I don't see what that has to do with the question under discussion. We went down to silence the batteries, demoralize the men in the forts, so that the army could easily assault the works. It would be a matter of no consequence whether this was done on the 18th or the 25th, as long as we did our share of the work effectively, which, I believe, no one denies. If the army after landing on the 25th would not undertake the assault, they would not have done so on the 18th. The delay, if any, gave them 1,000 men more, a large steamer and another transport under General Ames having come in on that day.

When General Butler was about to start from Fortress Monroe, (having embarked his men in a storm, when I told him he could not possibly leave for three days,) I requested him to wait a day after I sailed, as my vessels were slow,

and I would have to fill up the powder-vessel; but finding that the monitors were going, he started off for the rendezvous he had established himself, showed himself and some of the transports to the enemy, was fired at by the forts, and revealed our whole design.

Now for the log-book. On the 16th December wind was south, with a swell rolling on the beach so that no boat could land. One hour only during the day was there a northwest breeze; on the 17th wind southwest, a heavy sea rolling in on the beach; 18th, wind east and northeast, east-northeast, east by west, blowing right on the beach; no boat could land; 19th, wind fresh, east-south-east and southwest, with a swell setting on the beach; 20th, for a little while wind west-northwest, but shifted to east-northeast, blowing fresh, heavy breakers on the beach; 21st, a gale coming on from the south and east, which ended by blowing heavy from south and west, heavy breakers on beach; 22d, wind shifted to west, all the transports out of sight; gone to make a harbor at Beaufort; at midnight wind off the land, but heavy breakers on the beach and all over the bar, heavy swell from seaward; steamed in under the land; 23d, wind north-northwest and beach comparatively smooth; steamed in and reconnoitred; still too much sea for a boat to land without capsizing; met General Butler's despatch boat at 5.30 p. m.; sent word to General Butler that the time was so fair that I would blow up the boat at midnight and attack in the morning. We were sixty-nine miles from Beaufort; the captain said his boat could make fourteen miles per hour; this would give him five hours to go to Beaufort, which would put him there at eleven o'clock p. m. General Butler leaving with the transports at six o'clock in the morning, could have reached the bar at one o'clock, allowing him to make nine miles an hour, which all his transports could do. We did not attack until twelve, and General Butler only came in with his own vessel and two or three transports at sunset. He saw the fort silenced, defeated, as far as the navy was concerned, and no doubt could be left on his mind about our ability to do the same the next day. It was the preliminary attack to test the strength of the works.

The programme was made, the troops landed, and without the faintest sign of an assault beyond what was done by one or two gallant soldiers. The army commanders concluded that the work was "substantially uninjured as a defensive work." The letter of Lieutenant Commander Temple, and the testimony of deserters, prove that the works would have been ours had the troops been allowed to assault as they desired. What matters it, then, whether we attacked on the 18th or 24th? the result would have been the same. General Butler left Fortress Monroe with his troops in transports that could not lie at anchor in rough weather, that was ridden out by our monitors, tugs, and small side-wheel boats; the powder-boat Louisiana hanging to the stern of another vessel. General Butler having left the ground with his vessels, where my lightest vessels held on, was not on the ground to take advantage of the first day's good weather, though that had nothing to do with the matter, as he did not do anything when the landing did take place; so what matters it when it was done?

General Butler, with all his soldier-like qualities, could scarcely be considered as good a judge of weather and the proper time of landing as myself, and as a sensible person would not venture to put his opinion in opposition to mine, even backed by some old sailor on his flag-ship.

I do not ascribe to him, therefore, the excuse made for not taking Fort Fisher, when we had opened its gate for him; I attribute the report "that we had wasted time" to some of the junior members of the staff, who are not as good seamen as the general. At all events, if we lost any time in the beginning, we made up for it when we went to work; but allowing that we lost time, that the beach was as smooth as paper, it doesn't account for not taking Fort Fisher when the works were battered and burnt to that degree that there appeared no life within the walls.

The military part of the expedition was got up in a most unmilitary manner; the troops were placed in inferior transports that could not condense water, and had a short allowance only on hand; the troops had four days' cooked rations, (which were eaten up while lying in the storm at Hampton roads,) and ten days' other rations; there were no intrenching tools of any kind, no siege guns; the whole proceeding indicated that the general depended on the navy silencing the works, and he walking in and taking possession. No allowance was made for contingencies, for bad weather, or for delays after getting on shore: the powder-boat when it exploded was to have done the whole thing; the walls of a strong sand fort were to have been blown down, and the rebels all be discomfited. I thought a good deal would be done by the explosion, but still I laid in a double allowance of shell and shot, and did not depend on a doubtful experiment. Starting as that expedition did, was not the way to make war; and landing troops who were full of enthusiasm, and then embarking them again when they were eager to seize the trophy laid at their feet, was not the way to improve the morale of the army.

No matter what might be the delay on my part, (and there was none,) the general failed to take advantage of the opportunity I gave him to take the fort, when a large portion of the troops were landed and stood within one hundred and fifty feet of the works, unmolested, some few of them going on the parapet. No musketry or grape-shot were fired at him during the day; a few muskets, "about twenty," were fired after nightfall by the alarmed rebels, and one or two guns, but the Ironsides opened her broadside, and the firing ceased immediately. Ten of the pickets were left by forgetfulness near the forts after nightfall, and they saw quite a number of men leave the works and embark in boats, which was the garrison leaving to prevent capture. Until late in the day on the 26th the forts laid at our mercy, and if the men had not been brought off, the rebels would have surrendered when they marched up and the navy opened fire. All the reasoning in the world will not make this affair appear in a better light. I have no doubt that had the army been obliged to assault the works alone, without the fire of the navy, they would have been well handled; but as matters stood, we have every proof that the fort was ours.

It is useless, then to excuse a military blunder by trying to make out that the navy was behind time.

The ships laid two months at Hampton roads, waiting for the army to move, and we were satisfied with the reasons that General Grant gave for not sending troops. There was no necessity, after all the delay, for rushing into the matter unprepared, and when the weather was unfavorable; a more flimsy excuse could not be invented. In making these statements, I do not do so for the purpose of making any excuse whatever for the naval part of the expedition; I consider that a settled thing in the estimation of the whole country; but I have so often during this war seen attempts made to cast odium on the navy, that in self-defense I put myself on record, wishing this used only if found necessary to correct false statements.

I am quite sure the lieutenant general feels as I do; he says in a communication to me, "Dear Admiral, hold on where you are for a few days and I will endeavor to be back again with an increased force, and *without the former commander.*"

The remark is not very suggestive of confidence in the late management of affairs.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 11, 1865.*

SIR: In addition to the evidence I have already sent you in my No. 13, I beg leave to enclose a communication from Lieutenant S. W. Preston, who was close in to the bar on the night of the 18th December. I had directed the powder-vessel to proceed in that night, and she was on her way when General Weitzel came on board with a request from General Butler that I would wait a few days, so that the Louisiana could be blown up later in the night. I accordingly despatched Lieutenant Commander J. H. Upshur in the A. D. Vance to carry orders to stop the party and to tell them not to go in until a day or two later. The A. D. Vance found the powder-boat and delivered the order, the party having returned with the vessel, finding the time unpropitious. It was very fortunate that the expedition was stopped, for a heavy surf was found to be rolling on the beach, and the next day the wind freshening from the southward, a landing was perfectly impracticable. Mr. Bradford, of the coast survey, on the night of the 18th went in close to the beach to reconnoitre, and found the surf so heavy that he came near being capsized. No boat of any kind could have gone on the beach without being destroyed by the breakers.

On the next day it was even worse, and the surf increased until the gale was at its height. The beach was never fairly smooth until the afternoon and night of the 24th, and the morning of the 25th. All the troops could have been landed at that time had they chose to do so, for I offered them all the facilities in my power, which were ample.

I enclose you the reports of Lieutenant Preston and Mr. Bradford; they will put at rest any assertions (from whatever quarter they may come) that any favorable time for landing was lost.

It will no doubt be finally urged that it was intended to *surprise* the rebels, and that by not starting *on the day* the troops were first put on board the transports, when it was raining and blowing hard, and there was every indication of a long spell of bad weather, we lost the chance of a surprise. We don't often surprise the rebels; there are too many leaky people who participate in our secret movements. Shipping a large force in transports and lying six days at Fortress Monroe, from whence the rebels obtain all the information they desire, is not the way to surprise the rebels. It was published everywhere that a large expedition was going somewhere, and the rebels knew what it was for.

If General Butler wanted to do the thing with a dash, and surprise the rebels, or get in before re-enforcements could arrive, why did he ask me, by sending General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock, to delay the powder-vessel a few nights longer so that the explosion might take place near daylight? It was delayed at his request, but I attribute no delay from that, as we could have done nothing until the 24th; he was not on the ground with his transports on that day, which he should have been.

In a large expedition like this, where heavy and slow moving frigates and monitors have to be looked after, light transports (that can go in and out of harbors and get protection almost everywhere) should always be the subordinate party; their movements must be governed by those of the navy vessels; and, unless some serious reason exists, the transports and military force should always be on hand to take advantage of anything that turns up. Here they were away at the very time they should have been landing, and the reason given for their being away was the want of water; they stopped also to get coal, having used up a large portion of the naval supply.

I believe I have gone over everything to show that no charge of delay can be laid to the navy, or that any officer in the squadron is to blame for the non-taking of Fort Fisher. I may have taken unnecessary trouble, and been premature; I should perhaps have waited till the attack was made on the navy.

That is not a good rule in making war. I shall fight just as readily in defending the navy against its traducers, as I would against a rebel, and I think it a wise precaution on the present occasion to give the department information about every movement of the late expedition. No one can make a good case out of the late failure, no matter how clever the special pleading may be.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 10, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to your order requesting information regarding the movements of the powder-ship, I have to report that the powder in the Louisiana was all stowed and fuzed and everything ready for sea on the morning of Saturday, December 17, but on account of the southerly wind and consequent coast swell which has prevailed ever since our arrival at Beaufort, she did not start for New inlet until the following morning, December 18.

When we left Beaufort early that morning, it was nearly calm, though we found upon getting outside that there was still considerable swell on; a little later in the forenoon a breeze sprung up from the eastward and continued steady but light from that direction throughout the day, freshening towards night.

On arriving off Fort Fisher, just after dark, we proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for running the powder-ship in that night, the tide serving us about 9 o'clock. At the appointed hour we left the Kansas—our range light—preceded by the Wilderness, which had our pilot on board. As we approached the shore the Kansas light disappeared; soon after the lights on the Mound were put out, and the pilot deemed it inadvisable to take the vessel in, with so much swell on the bar, without the aid of landmarks, which the disappearance of both range lights had deprived us of.

Considering the uncertainty of getting the vessel into her proper position close in by the compass and lead alone, and it being very evident, from the heavy surf rolling on the beach (it was then breaking in three fathoms) that the troops would be unable to land next day, Commander Rhind decided to stand off-shore and not blow the vessel up until the following night. Soon after passing the former anchorage of the Kansas, we discovered the A. D. Vance standing in-shore and signalling us. On communicating with her we received an order from you, addressed to Lieutenant Commander Watmough, of the Kansas, directing him to communicate with Commander Rhind, and if not too late, prevent the explosion of the powder-ship that night, stating that General Butler had requested you to have the explosion postponed, as he did not think it would be possible to land troops through the surf next morning.

On the following day the gale commenced, and no favorable opportunity offered for the explosion and subsequent debarkation until the night of December 23.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

S. W. PRESTON,  
*Lieutenant U. S. Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, BEAUFORT, NORTH CAROLINA,  
*January 10, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to your request that I would give you my opinion, in writing, of the feasibility of landing in boats on the beach above New inlet on the evening of the 18th of December last, or on the following day, I have the honor to make the following statement:

I find from the journal of the powder party, which it was a part of my duty to keep, that on the night of the 18th the wind was N. E. by E. and freshening. There was quite a sea running, and every appearance of heavy weather. Lieutenant Lamson and myself occupied an hour in endeavoring to communicate with the Kansas, Sassacus and Wilderness by means of a boat. These vessels were certainly not over four hundred yards apart, (the Kansas and Sassacus much nearer to each other,) and our communications with the latter named vessels did not occupy us over six or eight minutes in all, although we had a fine boat, pulling six oars. It was with great difficulty that we could make headway against the sea; the roar of the surf could be distinctly heard, both on the beach to the northward and on Caroline shoals. We were at this time about three and a half miles from the nearest point of the beach.

I am certain that I am correct in my statement of the time occupied in pulling between those vessels, as I noted it at the moment, that it might be entered in the journal.

In my opinion an attempt to land in boats upon the beach on the night of the 18th, or on the following day, would have ended in total failure, and probable loss of life to all concerned in it. No boat would have lived after it had once reached the rollers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. BRADFORD,

*Sub-Assistant U. S. Commissary of Subsistence.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.*

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[Telegraphed from Fortress Monroe, January 17.]

FROM OFF FORT FISHER, *January 15, 1865.*

SIR: Fort Fisher is ours. I send you a bearer of despatches with a brief account of the affair.

General Terry is entitled to the highest praise and gratitude of his country for the manner in which he has conducted his part of the operations. He is my *beau ideal* of a soldier and a general. Our co-operation has been most cordial. The result is victory, which will always be ours when the army and navy go hand in hand. The navy loss in the assault was heavy. The army loss is also heavy.

D. D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy.*

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FORTRESS MONROE, *January 17.*

The Atlantic is just in from Wilmington. Fort Fisher and works on Federal Point are in our possession. The assault was made by the army and sailors on Sunday afternoon, and by 11 p. m. the works were ours. Losses heavy.

Lieutenants S. W. Preston and B. H. Porter, of the navy, are killed. Our captures are seventy-two guns and about twenty-five hundred prisoners. Generals Whiting and Lamb, rebels, are prisoners and wounded. The Vanderbilt is on her way with despatches. Two 15-inch guns were burst on the monitors.

E. T. NICHOLS, *Commander.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 17, 1865.*

SIR: The department has just received your brief but highly gratifying despatch, announcing the fall, on the 15th instant, of Fort Fisher, under the combined assault of the navy and army, and hastens to congratulate you and General Terry, and the brave officers, sailors and soldiers of your respective commands, on your glorious success.

Accept my thanks for your good work.

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Com'g N. A. B. Squadron, off Wilmington, N. C.*

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The following telegram was sent, immediately upon the receipt of the news, to the commandants of each of the navy yards:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 17, 1865.*

Fire a national salute in honor of the capture, on the 15th instant, of the rebel works on Federal Point, near Wilmington, by a combined attack of the army and navy.

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Fort Fisher, January 15, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that we have possession of Fort Fisher, and the fall of surrounding works will soon follow. As I informed you in my last, we had commenced operations with the iron vessels, which bombarded while we landed the troops. On the 14th I ordered all the vessels carrying 11-inch guns to bombard, with the Ironsides—the Brooklyn taking the lead. By sunset the fort was reduced to a pulp; every gun was silenced, by being injured or covered up with earth, so that they would not work.

On the 15th General Terry and myself arranged for the assault, and I ordered 1,400 sailors and marines to participate. At daylight the iron vessels, Brooklyn and 11-inch gunboats, commenced battering the work, while the troops made a lodgement within 150 yards of the fort. At 10 o'clock all the vessels steamed in and took their stations, opening a heavy fire, which was kept up until 3 p. m., when the signal was made to assault, the soldiers taking the land side and the sailors the sea face—the ships changing (but not stopping) their fire to other works.

The rebels met us with a courage worthy of a better cause, and fought desperately. About thirty of the sailors and officers succeeded in getting to the top of the parapet, amidst a murderous fire of grape, canister, and musketry. They



had planted the flag there, but were swept away in a moment. Others tried to get up the steep "*pan coupée*." The marines could have cleared the parapet by keeping up a steady fire, but they failed to do so, and the sailors were repulsed.

Many a gallant fellow fell trying to emulate his brothers in arms, who were fighting to obtain an entrance on the northeast angle as it appears on our charts.

The enemy mistook the seamen's attack for the main body of troops, and opposed a most vigorous resistance there; but I witnessed it all, and think the marines could have made the assault successful. In the mean time our gallant soldiers had gained a foothold on the northeast corner of the fort, fighting like lions and contesting every inch of ground.

The Ironsides and monitors kept throwing their shells into the traverses not occupied by our men, but occupied by the rebels.

In this way our troops fought from traverse to traverse—from three o'clock in the afternoon until ten at night. When the joyful tidings were signalled to the fleet we stopped our fire, and gave them three of the heartiest cheers I ever heard.

It has been the most terrific struggle I ever saw, and very much hard labor. The troops have covered themselves with glory, and General Terry is my *beau idéal* of a soldier and a general.

Our co-operations have been most harmonious, and I think the general will do the navy the credit to say that this time, at least, we "substantially injured the fort as a defensive work."

General Terry had only a few more troops than we had on the last occasion, when the enemy had only 150 men in the works, and this time the works were fully manned and contained about 800 men at the time of the assault.

It is a matter of great regret to me to see my gallant officers and men so cut up, but I was unwilling to let the troops undertake the capture of the works without the navy's sharing with them the peril all were anxious to undergo, and we should have had the honor of meeting our brothers in arms in the works had the sailors been properly supported. We have lost about 200 in killed and wounded, and among them some gallant officers.

I regret to announce the death of Lieutenant S. W. Preston and Lieutenant B. H. Porter. They were both captured together in the attack on Fort Sumter, and died together in endeavoring to pull down the flag that has so long flaunted in our faces.

Lieutenant R. S. Lamson was severely wounded. He was lately associated with Lieutenant Preston in his perilous adventure of the powder-boat.

Lieutenant George M. Bache and a number of others were wounded; the former not dangerously.

The assault only took place a few hours ago, and I am unable to inform you of our casualties; they are quite severe from the assault, but we had no casualties from the enemy's cannon.

Knowing the impatience of the department to receive news from Fort Fisher, I have written these few hurried lines.

No one can conceive what the army and navy have gone through to achieve this victory, which should have been ours on Christmas day without the loss of a dozen men.

This has been a day of terrific struggle, and not surpassed by any events of the war. We are all worn out nearly, and you must excuse this brief and unsatisfactory account.

I will write fully by the Santiago de Cuba, which goes north to-morrow to carry the wounded.

Besides the men in Fort Fisher, there were about 500 in the upper forts, and a relief of about 1,500 men brought down by the steamers this morning. So far, I believe, we have only captured the garrison of Fort Fisher.

I don't suppose there ever was a work subjected to such a terrific bombard-

ment, or where the appearance of a fort was more altered. There is not a spot of earth about the fort that has not been torn up by our shells.

I do not know yet the number of killed and wounded by our fire, but one fifteen-inch shell alone pierced a bomb-proof, killing sixteen and wounding severely twenty-five.

I presume we are in possession of all the forts, as Fort Fisher commands them all. It is so late now that I can learn nothing more until morning.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Off Fort Fisher, January 16, 1865.*

SIR: I wrote you yesterday. We have all the forts. The army have captured 1,800 men and a large number of officers, including General Whiting and Colonel Lamb.

The gunboats are now in the river, and Wilmington is hermetically sealed against blockade runners. The rebels have destroyed the works on Smith island, and if they don't destroy Fort Caswell, it is no use to them; we will get that after a little while. You must not expect too much of us at one time; these works are tremendous. I was in Fort Malakoff a few days after it surrendered to the French and English; the combined armies of the two nations were many months capturing that stronghold, and it won't compare, either in size or strength, to Fort Fisher.

The forts contained seventy-five guns, and many of them heavy ones.

I have not yet learned what our casualties are in killed and wounded, but I think three hundred will cover them all.

We had a bad explosion in the fort this morning, which killed and wounded a number of men—about one hundred. Some of our seamen were blown up, and Acting Assistant Paymaster R. H. Gillett, of the Gettysburg, was killed. I do not know how many of the troops were killed.

I will send a detailed report as soon as I can get off the wounded and arrange matters generally.

The world never saw such fighting as our soldiers did.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Off Fort Fisher, N. C., January 15, 1865.*

SIR: My late experience with the monitor class of vessels under the fire at sea, and in riding out heavy gales, justifies me in making a special report in the matter. I feel the importance of the government's receiving accurate information in relation to a class of vessels about which there has been a difference of opinion, and of which we are building quite a number.

My experience has been with the Monadnock, Saugus, Mahopac and Canonicus, all vessels of some difference of construction, and built, I believe, by different contractors.

Before leaving Hampton roads and while waiting for the army to provide

troops for the land part of this expedition, I sent the monitors *Canonicus*, *Mahopac*, and *Saugus* up the James river, to try what they could do with the rebel batteries at Howlet's and above that point. At Howlet's the enemy had a heavy gun mounted, (a two hundred-pounder Brooke's rifle,) which was frequently fired at the monitors, but seldom hitting them. One of their shells or shot, however, struck the *Saugus* fair on the turret, and knocked out or loosened forty of the bolts. This was owing to the bolts being driven from inside to out, instead of from outside to in. The turret was not materially injured, and was repaired again in about two weeks, and I have been using the *Saugus* here against these works, where she has done effective service.

The *Canonicus*, *Mahopac*, and *Monadnock* left Hampton roads on the 13th ultimo, the former two in tow of steamers—the *Monadnock* going under steam with a steamer in company. The weather was quite rough, and at times the sea would go over the turrets and down the funnels; but I passed them while at sea, and they were making excellent weather of it. On asking their commander, afterwards, how they got along, the answer was: "Oh, quite well, sir; only a little damp."

On arriving at Beaufort, North Carolina, I filled them up with coal and ammunition. I found a defect in a pump on board the *Canonicus*, (a "centrifugal pump" they called it,) which did not fetch the water until there was a foot or more in the vessel. This was a serious defect, and one for which the constructors were very culpable. The *Mahopac's* decks leaked considerably, and made the officers and crew very uncomfortable.

The monitors started from Beaufort on the 18th ultimo, the *Canonicus* and *Mahopac* being towed, the *Monadnock* declining such assistance. Indeed she did not require it, outrunning the largest vessels easily, and keeping ahead of all except the very fastest.

On the 21st ultimo it came on to blow hard from the southwest, and a very heavy sea commenced rolling in. The vessels were all anchored in thirteen fathoms water, with a long scope of chain out. Most of the large vessels dragged during the gale. The *Tuscarora* and *Juniata* put to sea, (I think unnecessarily,) while the monitors rode it out beautifully. I was anchored quite near them, and witnessed their performance. I at first thought I had been imprudent, and had unnecessarily risked the lives of officers and men, but I went to sleep the first night of the gale quite easy in my mind in regard to the monitors.

I saw that they were making the best weather, and riding easier than any of the other vessels in the fleet. All the transports cut and ran, though I think that was quite unnecessary. After the gale I inquired of the commanders of the monitors how they passed through the ordeal, and they seem to think they got along very well. The smaller monitors, *Mahopac* and *Canonicus*, at times almost disappeared from view, and the commander of the former vessel complained of discomfort, owing to the decks leaking, but the vessels were in no danger at any time. As to the *Monadnock*, she could ride out a gale at anchor in the Atlantic ocean. She is certainly a most perfect success so far as the hull and machinery are concerned, and is only defective in some minor details, which in the building of these vessels require the superintendence of a thorough seaman and a practical and ingenious man.

*The Monadnock is capable of crossing the ocean alone, (when her compasses are once adjusted properly) and could destroy any vessel in the French or British navy, lay their towns under contribution, and return again (provided she could pick up coal) without fear of being followed.* She could certainly clear any harbor on our coast of blockaders, in case we were at war with a foreign power. As strong and thick as the sides of this vessel are, one heavy shot from Fort Fisher indented the iron on her side armor, without, however, doing any material damage. These vessels have laid five days under a fire from Fort

Fisher anchored less than eight hundred yards off, and though fired at a great deal, they were seldom hit, and received no injury, except to boats and light matter about decks, which were pretty well cut to pieces. Compared with the Ironsides their fire is very slow, and not at all calculated to silence heavy batteries, which requires a rapid and continuous fire to drive men from the guns; but they are famous coadjutors in a fight, and put in the heavy blows which tell on casemates and bomb-proofs.

The smaller class of monitors, as at present constructed, will always require the aid of a steamer to tow them and take care of them. In smooth weather they ought to go along by themselves, and when towed the tow-rope should never be less than two hundred fathoms in length. It strains them very much to have a short tow-line.

I do not know yet what their real durability is or would be in a continuous fire against their turrets. Solid 11-inch or 200-pounder rifles are apt to break something when they strike, and I should be much better satisfied myself to be behind wooden bulwarks and take what comes, than to be shut up in an iron turret, not knowing whether it is properly constructed. This, though, is the prejudice of a sailor, and should have no weight whatever.

The commanders of the monitors seem to feel quite at home and safe in them, and apprehend no more danger at sea than in any other kind of vessel. Commander Parrott, of the Monadnock, remarked he did not see any difference between her and anything else. The Saugus joined me after the first day's fight off Fort Fisher, and was towed round from Norfolk by the Nereus, in very rough weather. The vessel leaked a great deal through her bows, and some uneasiness was felt for her on that account; but her sea-going qualities were spoken of as good. The difficulty was a mechanical one and in no way detracts from the qualities of the vessel. There is no great amount of comfort on board these vessels at sea; that is conceded on all sides, but they are seldom at sea and only exposed when making a voyage. This is the first time, I believe, that the monitors have ridden out heavy gales in an open sea, at anchor, though they have ridden out gales in Charleston roads.

I have only to remark that the principle is a good one, if the vessels are all built like the Monadnock. The fire of these vessels continued with the fire of such vessels as the New Ironsides and heavy frigates is very effective, particularly against heavy-plated vessels, bomb-proofs and stone or brick walls. I have never yet seen a vessel that came up to my ideas of what is required for offensive operations as much as the Ironsides. She combines very many good qualities. The most important is the comfort with which the people on board of her live, though she would be no match for the Monadnock in a fight, the latter having more speed.

The accuracy of fire is, I think, in favor of the Ironsides, judging from what I have seen here. The turrets get filled with smoke and do not clear as quick as the Ironsides, though that defect could be avoided by not firing both guns so near together. These impressions of mine are formed from a short experience with monitors, but I think they will be found correct, provided the monitors are properly built.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral.*

HON. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Fort Fisher, January 17, 1865.*

SIR: I had the honor to make you a short report on the 15th, stating to you that Fort Fisher had been captured by the military and naval forces now here. I beg leave to submit now a detailed report of the operations, having received all or nearly all the information required to make out a complete report.

As soon as Major General Terry arrived at Beaufort, North Carolina, which he did on the 8th of January, we arranged together a plan of operations, which have proved successful.

The weather was threatening, and I advised the general to get his transports inside the harbor to avoid the violence of the coming gale; most of them, however, lay outside.

The gale blew very heavy for two days and nights. The ships-of-war all held on, and rode out at their anchors, except the Colorado, which vessel was obliged to go to sea, having only one anchor left, with which alone she could not possibly have ridden out the gale, the sea being very heavy from the southwest, and breaking clean over the vessels. Knowing that the transports had arrived, the commanders all made strenuous exertions to keep their vessels at anchor off Beaufort, to be ready for the move that was about to be made.

Having expended almost every shot and shell in the first bombardment, it became necessary to take in about fifteen thousand more, and fill up with coal, which was done under the most adverse circumstances, the large vessels all lying outside in a heavy sea, and filling up as best they could.

The fleet, accompanied by the transports, steamed away on the 12th for Fort Fisher, and the wind being fair and moderate, I was in hope that we would be able to land the troops by 9 or 10 o'clock that night. The wind changing to southwest, we were obliged to anchor off Half Moon battery for the night.

The fleet sailed in three columns:

Line No. 1, led by the Brooklyn, Captain James Alden, consisted of the Mohican, Commander Daniel Ammen; Tacony, Lieutenant Commander W. T. Truxton; Kansas, Lieutenant Commander P. G. Watmough; Yantic, Lieutenant Commander T. C. Harris; Unadilla, Lieutenant Commander T. M. Ramsay; Huron, Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge; Maumee, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Chandler; Pequot, Lieutenant Commander D. L. Brain; Pawtuxet, Commander J. H. Spotts; Seneca, Lieutenant Commander M. Sicard; Pontosuc, Lieutenant Commander W. G. Temple; Nereus, Commander J. C. Howell.

Line No. 2, Minnesota, Commander Joseph Lammon, leading, consisted of the Colorado, Commodore H. K. Thatcher; Wabash, Captain M. Smith; Susquehanna, Commodore S. W. Godon; Powhatan, Commodore J. F. Schenck; Juniata, Lieutenant Commander T. S. Phelps; Shenandoah, Captain D. B. Ridgley; Ticonderoga, Captain Charles Steedman; Vanderbilt, Captain C. W. Pickering; Mackinaw, Commander J. C. Beaumont; Tuscarora, Commander J. M. Frailey.

Line No. 3, Santiago de Cuba, Captain O. S. Glisson, leading, consisted of the Fort Jackson, Captain B. F. Sands; Osceola, Commander J. M. B. Clitz; Sassacus, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis; Chippewa, Lieutenant Commander E. E. Potter; R. R. Cuyler, Commander C. H. B. Caldwell; Maratanza, Lieutenant Commander George W. Young; Rhode Island, Commander S. D. Trenchard; Monticello, Lieutenant W. B. Cushing; Alabama, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne; Montgomery, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. C. Dunn; Iosco, Commander John Guest.

The reserve division, under Lieutenant Commander J. H. Upshur, in the A. D. Vance, consisted of the Britannia, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant W. A. Sheldon; Tristram Shandy, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant F. M. Green; Lillian, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. A. Harris; Fort Donelson, Acting Master G.

W. Frost; Wilderness, Acting Master H. Arey; Aries, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant F. S. Wells; Governor Buckingham, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. McDiarmid; the Nansemonde, Acting Master J. H. Porter; Little Ada, Acting Master S. P. Crafts, and Eolus, Acting Master E. S. Keyser, and Republic, Acting Ensign J. W. Bennett, being used as despatch vessels.

Great enthusiasm was displayed in the fleet when it was ascertained that troops had come to renew the attack on Fort Fisher, for great was the disappointment on account of the late failure.

Some of the vessels that accompanied the last expedition were badly damaged in various ways. The *Sassacus* had both rudders disabled, but her energetic commander, Lieutenant Commanding J. L. Davis, was ready in time. The *Mackinaw*, Commander J. C. Beaumont, had one of her boilers knocked to pieces, but her commander would go on one boiler. The *Oseeola*, Commander J. M. B. Clitz, in the same condition—one boiler smashed up with shot and a hole near the bottom—was ready for anything, and I heard no complaint from any one. With such a disposition on the part of the officers, I anticipated the most favorable results.

At daylight on the 13th instant, line No. 1 took position within six hundred yards of the beach to land the troops; lines Nos. 2 and 3 anchoring close to and outside of them, and the reserves taking charge of the provision vessels.

At 8.30 a. m. signal was made to the fleet to send boats to transports to land troops. At 2 p. m. we had landed 8,000 men, with twelve days' provisions and all their intrenching tools.

In the mean time the *New Ironsides*, Commodore William Radford; *Saugus*, Commander E. R. Colhoun; *Canonicus*, Lieutenant Commander George E. Belknap; *Mahopac*, Lieutenant Commander A. W. Weaver; and *Monadnock*, Commander E. G. Parrott, were ordered in to take a nearer position, the outside vessel (the *Ironsides*) being one thousand yards from Fort Fisher, which was the principal work, and on which the iron vessels were ordered to pour all their fire and endeavor to dismount all the guns. They got into position about 8 a. m., and opened fire deliberately.

The troops having all landed without opposition, at 3 p. m. I signalled line No. 2 to get under way and go in and attack. Line No. 1 was signalled to take position in front of the batteries, and line No. 3 was to remain and cover the landing party and get the field artillery on shore.

The different lines having formed into line of battle, steamed toward Fort Fisher, the *Colorado* leading, (the *Minnesota* having got a hawser around her propeller.) The vessels took their positions handsomely—having had some practice at that place—and delivered their fire as they fell in. The rapid fire of the monitors and *Ironsides* kept the rebels partly away from their guns, and they inflicted no damage on the fleet, the firing being very unsteady; indeed, I don't see how they could fire at all. After lines Nos. 1 and 2 got fairly anchored in position, the bombardment was very rapid and severe. This was continued without intermission from 4 o'clock p. m. until some time after dark, when the wooden vessels were ordered to haul out and anchor. The monitors and *Ironsides* were directed to keep up the fire during the night. The enemy had long ceased to respond to our fire, and kept in his bomb-proofs.

I could see that our fire had damaged some of their guns, and I determined that before the army went to the assault there should be no guns within our reach to arrest their progress.

Having found that the rebels could still bring some heavy guns to bear, which annoyed us somewhat, I determined to try another plan, and on the morning of the 14th ordered in all the small gunboats carrying 11-inch guns to fire slowly and try and dismount the guns on the face of the works where the assault was to be made. The *Brooklyn* was ordered to throw in a pretty quick fire to

keep the rebels from working their guns. The attack was commenced at 1 p. m. and lasted till long after dark.

One or two guns only were fired this day from the upper batteries, inflicting no serious damage on any of the vessels except cutting away the mainmast of the *Huron*, and hitting the *Unadilla* once or twice. These guns we always silenced when a rapid fire was opened. The attack of the gunboats lasted until long after dark, and one vessel was employed firing (an hour each) throughout the night.

On this evening General Terry came on board to see me and arrange the plan of battle for the next day. The troops had got rested after their long confinement on shipboard and sea voyage, and had recovered from the drenching they received when landing through the surf. Having been long enough on their native element, they were eager for the attack.

It was arranged between the general and myself that the ships should all go in early, and fire rapidly through the day, until the time for the assault came off. The hour named was 5 p. m. I detailed 1,600 sailors and 400 marines to accompany the troops in the assault—the sailors to board the sea face, while the troops assaulted the land side.

Most all of the sailors were armed with cutlasses and revolvers, while a number had Sharps' rifles or short carbines. I herewith enclose the order of attack on the fort and the manner of approaching it. There was a perfect understanding between the general and myself, and a system of signals established (by the army code) by which we could converse at our pleasure, though nearly a mile apart and amid the din of battle.

At 9 a. m. on the 15th the squadron was signalled to attack in three lines, or assume position marked on the plan herewith enclosed.

All the vessels reached position at about 11 a. m., and each opened fire as they got their anchors down.

The same guns in the upper batteries opened again this day, with some effect, as you will see by reference to the reports of the different commanders; but no vessel was injured sufficiently to interfere in the least with her efficiency. The fire was kept up furiously all day. The Mound Hill battery kept up rather a galling fire with its two heavy guns, but the rebels were driven away from their works into their bomb-proofs, so that no vessel was in the least disabled.

At 2 o'clock I expected the signal for the vessels to "change the direction of their fire," so that the troops might assault. The sailors and marines had worked by digging ditches, or rifle-pits, to within two hundred yards of the fort, and were all ready. The troops, however, did not get into position until later, and at 3 o'clock the signal came. The vessels changed their fire to the upper batteries; all the steam-whistles were blown, and the troops and the sailors dashed ahead nobly, vying with each other to reach the top of the parapet; we had evidently (we thought) injured all the large guns, so that they could not be fired to annoy any one. The sailors took to the assault by the flank along the beach, while the troops rushed in at the left, through the palisades that had been knocked away by the fire of our guns.

All the arrangements on the part of the sailors had been well carried out; they had succeeded in getting up to within a short distance of the fort, and lay securely in their ditches. We had but very few killed and wounded to this point. The marines were to have held the rifle-pits and cover the boarding party, which they failed to do. On rushing through the palisades, which extended from the fort to the sea, the head of the column received a murderous fire of grape and canister, which did not, however, check the officers and sailors who were leading. The parapets now swarmed with rebels, who poured in a destructive fire of musketry. At this moment, had the marines performed their duty, every one of the rebels would have been killed.

I witnessed the whole affair, saw how recklessly the rebels exposed them-

selves, and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters, whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision. Notwithstanding the hot fire, officers and sailors in the lead rushed on, and some even reached the parapet, a large number having reached the ditch.

The advance was swept from the parapet like chaff; and notwithstanding all the efforts made by commanders of companies to stop them, the men in the rear, seeing the slaughter in front, and that they were not covered by the marines, commenced to retreat, and as there is no stopping a sailor if he fails on such an occasion on the first rush, I saw the whole thing had to be given up. In the mean time the troops were more successful on their side. The rebels, seeing so large a body of men coming at them on the sea side, were under the impression that it was the main attack, and concentrated the largest part of their forces at that point, and when they gave three rebel cheers, thinking that they had gained the day, they received a volley of musketry in their backs from our gallant soldiers, who had been successful in gaining the highest parapet. Then commenced such a system of fighting as has never been beaten. Our soldiers had gained two traverses, while I directed the Ironsides to fire on the traverses occupied by the rebels. Four, five, and six traverses were carried by our troops in the space of an hour.

These traverses are immense bomb-proofs, about sixty feet long, fifty feet wide, and twenty feet high, seventeen of them in all, being on the northeast face. Between each traverse or bomb-proof are one or two heavy guns. The fighting lasted until 10 o'clock at night, the Ironsides and monitors firing through the traverses in advance of our troops, and the level strip of land called Federal Point being enfiladed by the ships to prevent re-enforcements reaching the rebels.

General Terry himself went into the fort, and I kept up constant communication with him until three hearty cheers, which were taken up by the fleet, announced the capture of Fort Fisher. Finding that the general felt anxious about the enemy receiving re-enforcements, I directed the sailors and marines to relieve the troops in the outer line of our defences, and a large number of soldiers were thus enabled to join our forces in the fort.

It will not be amiss for me to remark here that I never saw anything like the fearless gallantry and endurance displayed by our troops. They fought like lions, and knew no such word as fail. They finally fought and chased the rebels from traverse to traverse until they reached Battery Lamb, or the Mound, a face of work extending about 1,400 yards in length. At this point the rebels broke and fled to the end of Federal Point. Our troops followed them up, and they surrendered at discretion.

Thus ended one of the most remarkable battles on record, and one which will do more damage to the rebel cause than any that has taken place in this war. Twenty-three hundred rebels manned Fort Fisher; 1,900 were taken prisoners; the rest were killed or wounded. I may have stated some inaccuracies with regard to these military matters, which I will leave to General Terry to supply.

I have since visited Fort Fisher and the adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond what I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in saying they could not be captured except by regular siege. I wonder even now how it was done. The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied so long the combined power of France and England; and yet it is captured by a handful of men under the fire of the guns of the fleet, and in seven hours after the attack commenced in earnest.

I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of this fleet during the time we have been engaged in these operations. I do not know an officer in command who has not performed his duty to the best of his ability. There may be some who have done better than others, but, after all, that may be a mere



matter of opinion, or a matter of prejudice or partiality. All did their best, and we can ask no more.

To make invidious distinctions in a report of this kind would be causing matter for dispute, and I shall content myself with saying that the government may well be proud of those whom it has intrusted here with the command of the vessels.

I leave each commander to tell what his subordinates have done, and refer the department to the reports of divisional commanders for an account of what they saw and did. I will, however, make a special report of what I consider due to those who have been engaged in this contest, and have persistently fought for the Union.

I refer you to Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese, who led the assault. The result was not what I expected when I planned the attack; but it would have succeeded without severe loss had the marines performed their duty. As it is, we have lost heavily, and the country has lost some gallant officers, who fell on the enemy's ramparts.

The success is so great that we should not complain. Men, it seems, must die that this Union may live, and the Constitution under which we have gained our prosperity must be maintained. We regret our companions-in-arms, and shed a tear over their remains; but if these rebels should succeed, we would have nothing but regret left us, and our lives would be spent in terror and sorrow.

As soon as the forts were taken, I pushed the light-draught gunboats into the river; that is, as soon as I could find and buoy out a channel and take up the torpedoes, which were very thick. We found the wires leading to many, and under-ran them with boats. We found the torpedoes too heavy to lift with our ordinary boats, and they must have contained at least a ton of powder. The rebels seemed disposed to pay us back for the famous torpedo Louisiana, which exploded in their harbor and did them no harm.

We had some difficulty in getting the vessels across the bar and into the river, as the channel is very narrow and the bar very shoal; a few of them got stuck, but were got off again with the tide. We all came to the conclusion that we had followed the right plan to capture Fort Fisher, one in which the nautical man of any sense will concur. After I got three of the gunboats inside the bar and under the Mound the rebels prepared to evacuate Fort Caswell. Two steamers near the fort (which I think were the Tallahassee and Chickamauga) were set fire to and blown up after the rebels had set fire to the fort that blew up last night with a heavy explosion, followed by some minor ones. The barracks were apparently in flames all night, and some little works between this and Caswell blown up. I have sent vessels to see what has been done, and shall be governed accordingly.

I think they are burning up everything in Wilmington, and are getting away as fast as they can. In the mean time a large force of gunboats occupies the river between Caswell and Wilmington. That place is hermetically sealed against blockade-runners, and no Alabamas or Floridas, Chickamaugas or Tallahassees, will ever fit out again from this port; and our merchant vessels will soon, I hope, be enabled to pursue in safety their avocation.

I send you a list of killed and wounded. We have lost more than I first estimated.

We expended, in the bombardment, about 50,000 shells, and have as much more on hand.

I feel much indebted to the Bureau of Ordnance for so promptly supplying us with ammunition and guns. I regret that some one stopped our supply of coal, (which should have been doubly increased,) for it came very near defeating this expedition. Had we not been supplied by the army this expedition would have been a failure.

We shall move along carefully, have no vessels blown up by torpedoes if I can help it, and I think we will be in Wilmington before long.

You may rest satisfied, sir, that the gate through which the rebels obtained their supplies is closed forever, and we can sit here quietly and watch the traitors starve.

I enclose you a number of reports, (dry, though necessary details,) with which I will not overload my report (already too long) on such an interesting occasion.

The number of guns captured in these works amounts to seventy-five, many of them superb rifle pieces of very heavy calibre. All those facing the ships were dismantled or injured so they could not be used, or the muzzles were filled up with sand or dirt, which rendered them useless. I only saw two that were not rendered useless.

I believe we have burst all the rifled guns left in the fleet, (one on the *Susquehanna*, one on the *Pequot*, one on the *Osceola*,) and I think the reputation of these guns is now about ruined.

I shall take occasion in another despatch to call your attention to those officers whom I consider worthy of the most praise, and the approbation and notice of the department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral*.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy.*

FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Off Fort Fisher, N. C., January 16.*

SIR: I have to report that, in obedience to your order, I represented your flag in commanding the assault on Fort Fisher, and beg leave to state as follows:

Lieutenant S. W. Preston had charge of a force of about ten men from each ship, with shovels and picks, and threw up within six hundred yards of the fort a well-protected breastwork, and from that gradually advanced to within two hundred yards a succession of rifle-pits, which were most promptly occupied by a line of skirmishers composed of marines, under Second Lieutenant L. E. Fagan, United States marine corps. The manner in which this was done reflects most creditably upon Lieutenant Preston. As the advance was made he came to me and reported his work finished, and asked that he might be employed in any way. Lieutenant Preston's services were most useful to me, and in his last moments he attempted to send me word that he had carried out my orders.

The assaulting party was composed of about sixteen hundred seamen and four hundred marines, divided into four lines, as follows: First line, composed of marines, Captain L. L. Dawson, United States marine corps, commanding. Second line, composed of the landing party of the first and fourth divisions of the squadron, Lieutenant Commander C. H. Cushman, commanding. Third line, composed of the landing party of the second division of the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Commander James Parker, who most generously waived his seniority upon reading your order that I should represent you on shore. Fourth line, composed of the landing party of the third division of the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge. The second, third, and fourth lines were of about equal strength.

It was intended that the men should assault in line, the marines acting as sharpshooters, and the different lines were to charge over them; but from the difficulty I had of informing myself of the time when the army was to assault, which was to guide our movements, that moment found us too far off to move to the attack unless under cover. When I discovered that the army was moving

to attack the fort, I ordered the men to advance by the flank, along the beach, hoping to be able to form them for the assault under cover of the marines; but four hundred yards distance, exposed to a most galling fire of musketry, threw a portion of the marines into the first line, and the rest of them did not take position as they should.

The second and third lines came along and the heads of the three lines joined and formed one compact column, which, filing up to the sea face of Fort Fisher, assaulted to within fifty yards of the parapet, which was lined with one dense mass of musketeers, who played sad havoc with our men. Although exposed to a most severe fire from the enemy, the men were rallied three times under the personal encouragement and exposure of their commanding officers, but failed to gain much ground. A few officers and men reached the parapet. I don't know their names, but they will doubtless be found in the reports of the officers accompanying the party.

The marines having failed to occupy their position, gave the enemy an almost unmolested fire upon us.

Men armed with Sharpe's rifles and the few marines in the front opened the fire, but it was too feeble to be of avail. Finding the rear of the men retreating, I hastened toward it to form them under cover, and have them use their rifles, but they were too far distant for me to reach them, and I accordingly returned to a position near the works. As I did so the remaining men, notwithstanding all attempts to stop them, fled, with the exception of about sixty, among whom were Lieutenant Commanders James Parker, C. H. Cushman, T. O. Selfridge, and M. Sicard, and Lieutenants N. H. Farquhar and R. H. Lamson, the latter of whom was wounded, and several volunteer officers whose names I unfortunately do not know.

The fire of the enemy was so severe that the few of our men remaining had to seek such cover as they could, and there remained until dark, when a demonstration upon the part of the rebels induced all to make a rush, and most succeeded in escaping.

The country will regret the death of Lieutenant S. W. Preston, acting as my aid in carrying orders, who was killed in front; and of Lieutenant B. H. Porter, killed in the early assault, at the head of the column; and of several volunteer officers, seamen, and marines, killed during the attack.

Of Assistant Surgeon William Longshaw special mention should be made on account of his great bravery and attention to the wounded under the hottest fire, until finally he fell a victim in the very act of binding up the wounds of a marine.

I can but attribute the failure of the assault to the absence of the marines from their position, as their fire would have enabled our boarders to use their cutlasses and pistols most effectively. By this I would imply the lack of proper organization, it being impossible in the short space of time, on account of throwing so many small squads of men from the different vessels together in one mass, lacking proper company formations, and wholly unacquainted with each other, to secure such organization.

This led to the confusion exhibited, for it was not due to any want of personal valor on the part of the officers or men.

Although the officers and men were exposed to a severe fire from the enemy, to them of a novel character and upon a novel element, which would have tried veterans, yet they advanced nobly, and the survivors must be satisfied that they contributed in no small degree to the success of the army. The enemy believing, as I am informed, that the main assault was to come from us, were much surprised upon looking to their rear to find the army so far advanced in their works.

The medical officers sent on shore with the landing party established their

field hospital at a work about a mile from the fort, where Assistant Surgeon B. H. Kidder took charge of the wounded who were conveyed there, and their wants attended to as well as circumstances would permit.

As near as I could estimate, there were about sixty-five killed and two hundred-wounded.

Lieutenant Commander W. B. Cushing, in the extreme front, finding nothing could be done, left with the retreating men, and succeeded finally in rallying them, and, at the request of General Terry, occupied the lines near his headquarters, which enabled him to withdraw men to re-enforce his force in the fort.

Being a witness to the assault of the army after our repulse, I cannot but express my admiration of the extreme gallantry of its attack.

Where one act of personal bravery was displayed on the part of the enemy, a dozen or more were conspicuous on our part; and it was the most imposing sight to see how splendidly our brave soldiers did their work.

In conclusion I would say that I may have omitted the names of officers who have distinguished themselves by their gallantry, yet I could not fail to mention those above named who came personally under my notice, and I trust that the commanding officers of the assaulting lines will do justice to all.

To Lieutenant Commander James Parker I would say that I was a witness to his efforts to advance the men to the free exposure of his person, and, although ranking me, he would let no obstacle of that nature interpose and check his endeavors to do his utmost to capture the fort.

To your secretary, Mr. C. P. Porter, acting as my aid, I am very much indebted. Though frequently sent to the rear with orders, he was most promptly back, and at the assault he was found at the front.

Although the assaulting party failed, I think it but due to those who advanced, and to the memories of the slain, to claim for them, through their strong demonstration, a corresponding resistance from the enemy, and a weakening of the rebel defence towards our army.

I have been informed by the officers who conversed with prisoners that the enemy believed ours to be the main assault, and concentrated against us their main force. In saying this I would not wish to be understood in the least to detract from the splendid gallantry exhibited by our army, which was worthy of the highest commendation that can be bestowed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE, *Fleet Captain.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.*

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FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off New Inlet, N. C., January 15, 1865.*

[Landing Orders.]

The landing party will land out of gunshot of the fort, and as fast as the boats get rid of their load, they will be shoved off, and the boat-keepers will pull off and hang to the stern of the Nansmond, which vessel will be anchored off the landing.

When the men are landed they will be formed and kept together, the marines forming by themselves.

Lieutenant S. W. Preston will have charge of the men with shovels. He will advance as near the fort as he safely can without running the risk of a single man, and commence throwing up rifle-pits rapidly. He will first advance with a thin line of sappers, and as soon as he can get a ditch deep enough for

shelter, the marines will go in, in thin squads, and occupy them. As the sand is thrown up high enough to conceal a person, other sappers will come in behind and dig it deeper. There will be required a three and a half feet ditch, and about the same height of earth thrown out. The object is to get as close to the fort as possible, and with perfect safety, so that the men will have shelter to go to in case of the enemy firing grape and canister.

The officers leading the men must make them keep under command—not show themselves until the signal is made and the army move to the assault. No move is to be made forward until the army charges, when the navy is to assault the sea or southeast face of the work, going over with cutlasses drawn and revolvers in hand. The marines will follow after, and when they gain the edge of the parapet they will lie flat and pick off the enemy in the works. The sailors will charge at once on the field-pieces in the fort and kill the gunners. The mouths of the bomb-proofs must be secured at once, and no quarter given if the enemy fire from them after we enter the fort. Any man who straggles, or disobeys orders, is to be sent to the rear, under a guard. The men must keep their flags rolled up until they are on the top of the parapet and inside the fort, when they will hoist them.

Remember, the sailors, when they start to board, are to go with a rush, and get up as fast as they can. Officers are directed not to leave their companies under any circumstances, and every company is to be kept together. If, when our men get into the fort, the enemy commence firing on Fort Fisher from the Mound, every three men will seize a prisoner, pitch him over the walls, and get behind the fort for protection, or into the bomb-proofs.

The fleet captain will take charge of the landing party, and all the commands will report to him. He represents me on this occasion, and all his orders will be promptly obeyed.

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

[Special Order No. 7.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,  
*Flag-Ship Malvern, January 1, 1865.*

The commanders of all vessels will have their chart plans of last attack sent in without delay, to be corrected ready for the next attack, and mark the name of their ship in plain letters on the plan.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[Special Order No. 8.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,  
*Flag-Ship Malvern, January 3, 1865.*

A great many shells were thrown away firing at the flag-staff. These are generally placed at a point to entice us to fire at them, and no harm is done by this kind of firing. Commanders are directed to strictly enjoin upon their officers and men never to fire at the flag or pole, but to pick out the guns; the stray shells will knock the flag-staff down. Commanders are directed particularly not to show their plans or general orders in relation to this expedition to any one.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[Special Order No. 10.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,  
*Flag-Ship Malvern, January 9, 1865.*

The following vessels will form a separate line, under command of Lieutenant Commander Upshur, for the purpose of landing the provisions and stores for the army, viz: A. D. Vance, Fort Donelson, Aries, Emma, Lillian, Tristram Shandy, Britannia, and the Wilderness. The Nansemond, Moccasin, and Little Ada will act as messengers as before.

It is proposed now that the troops shall be first landed before any attack is made on the fort by all the vessels. The Brooklyn will lead in with the vessels attached to her line, and anchor in a position to cover the landing, and drive away the rebels if any are there. The landing will probably be made at the same place as before.

Line No. 2 will anchor where their guns can reach, (somewhere in about five fathoms water and not less,) and where they can fire clear of the first line.

Line No. 3 will keep under way a short distance outside the other lines, ready to act as circumstances may require.

The transports will anchor in line outside of line No. 1, and be ready to deliver their troops as fast as the boats come alongside. All the vessels will lower their boats as quick as they anchor, and send them to the transports, line No. 3 doing the same.

When the troops are all landed, the boats will be hoisted up on the port side, and those belonging on the starboard side will be secured alongside for towing, so that they can be manned at a moment's notice, when the assault comes off.

If practicable, the New Ironsides and the monitors will be ordered on to bombard the fort and dismount the guns while the troops are getting on shore. This will be done when the signal is made to the New Ironsides to attack, the monitors following her.

While the vessels are firing, the commanders will keep an intelligent officer at the main-topmast-head to regulate the firing and tell the effect of the shot. The commanders of smaller vessels will have a like lookout kept at the mainmast-head. The officers aloft will note all information that may be valuable, as they can see what is going on in the river inside.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[General Order No. 78.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,  
*Flag-Ship Malvern, January 2, 1865.*

The order of attack for the next bombardment of Fort Fisher will be as follows:

The New Ironsides, Commodore Radford, will lead in, and anchor with the centre of the northeast face of the fort bearing west by south half south, the monitors following. The iron-clads will anchor in succession, as follows: The Dictator will anchor close to, and but a length ahead and outside of, the New Ironsides. The Mahopac, Canonicus, and Saugus will anchor in a line close together, between the New Ironsides and the beach; and the Monadnock will select a position in the same line, so that she will have room to swing and bring both turrets to bear.

When these vessels are fairly engaged, signal will be made to the Brooklyn to go in and engage the enemy, taking her position at anchor close under the

stern of the New Ironsides, with her broadside bearing on Fort Fisher. The Brooklyn will be followed in by the Mohican, Tacony, Kansas, Unadilla, Huron, Maumee, Pawtuxet, Seneca, Pontoosuc, Nyack, Yantic, and Nereus, in the order in which they are marked on the chart. The line when anchored should be with the Brooklyn, bearing about south by east. This will be line of battle No. 1.

Line of battle No. 2 will take position when the leading vessel of line No. 1 is anchored, with the Minnesota leading, Colorado next, Wabash, Susquehanna, Powhatan, Juniata, Shenandoah, Ticonderoga. After the Minnesota anchors in her old place, (or closer,) where her guns will clear the New Ironsides, the Colorado will pass her and anchor, both ships firing slowly to get their range as they go in. When the Colorado is anchored and firing with effect, all the vessels of line No. 2 will anchor in position exactly as they did on a previous occasion.

The Vanderbilt will then anchor a little outside of and between the Colorado and Wabash, Mackinaw between Susquehanna and Wabash, and Tuscarora between Juniata and Powhatan.

When line No. 2 has anchored, line No. 3 will take position, the Santiago de Cuba leading, which vessel will anchor with the centre of the southeast face of Fort Fisher bearing northwest half north, or just ahead of Ticonderoga. The Fort Jackson will then pass the Santiago de Cuba, and anchor as close as she can get; the Osceola will pass the Fort Jackson and anchor, and so on with Sassacus, Chippewa, R. R. Cuyler, Maratanza, Rhode Island, Monticello, Alabama, Montgomery, Keystone State, Quaker City, ending with the Isoco.

When the signal is made to form line of battle, all the vessels of lines Nos. 1, 2, and 3 will fall in line in the order mentioned; the Brooklyn leading line No. 1, the Minnesota line No. 2, and the Santiago de Cuba line No. 3. When any vessel is missing, the vessels behind must close up. All the vessels can with safety get in closer than they did the last time. For this they must depend on the lead and past experience.

All firing against earthworks when the shell bursts in the air is thrown away. The object is to lodge the shell in the parapets, and tear away the traverses under which the bomb-proofs are located. A shell now and then exploding over a gun *en barbette* may have good effect, but there is nothing like lodging the shell before it explodes. The red lines on the chart indicate the object each vessel is to fire at as near as we can make out the works.

In case it is determined to land the troops before engaging the forts, signal will be made. Each vessel will have her boats in readiness to disembark the troops as rapidly as possible. When the signal is made they will run in and anchor close to the shore, covering the landing with their guns. The paddle steamers will not use their paddle boats (but only their davit boats) unless ordered to do so. All these things will be regulated by signal. All the precautions observed in General Order No. 75 will be observed on this occasion.

Fire deliberately. Fill the vessels up with every shell they can carry, and fire to dismount the guns, and knock away the traverses. The angle near the ships has heavy casemates; knock it away. Concentrate fire always on one point. With the guns disabled, the fort will soon be ours.

No vessel will retire from line unless in a sinking condition, nor without permission.

So many accidents have happened with the 100-pounder rifles, that I recommend, if they be used at all, the charges be reduced to seven (7) pounds; and as the time fuzes burst after leaving the gun, fire them with a patch on, or fire percussion shell.

When the troops are ready for the assault, signal will be made to "change the direction of fire," by hoisting general signal 2,211, and blowing the steam-whistle, which whistle every vessel will repeat, and officers will be stationed at

the hatches to pass the word. When the signal 2,211 is made, all the vessels will stop firing at Fort Fisher, and concentrate their fire on the batteries to the left or above it; the Tacony, Kansas, Unadilla, Huron, Maumee, Pawtuxet, Seneca, Pontosuc, Nyack, Yantic, and Nereus, giving their guns *great* elevation, and firing over to reach the river, to disturb any rebel troops that may be resting there. To avoid accidents by firing over our troops by these last-mentioned vessels, the patches will not be taken off the shells until the assaulting column is in the works.

If the troops are driven back, the firing will be directed on Fort Fisher again when the signal is made, and this plan will be followed from time to time as assaults are made and repulsed.

There is one thing to which I beg leave to call attention. When the range is once obtained, the officer of division should note in a book the distance marked on the sight, so that he will not forget it. When the smoke becomes thick, and objects dim, a reference to the notes and an examination, to see if the sight is properly set, will assist very much in insuring accuracy of fire.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[General Order No. 81.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,  
*Flag-Ship Malvern, January 4, 1865.*

Before going into action the commander of each vessel will detail as many of his men as he can spare from the guns as a landing party.

That we may have a share in the assault, when it takes place, the boats will be kept ready, lowered near the water on the off side of the vessels. The sailors will be armed with cutlasses, well sharpened, and with revolvers. When the signal is made to man the boats, the men will get in, but not show themselves. When signal is made to assault, the boats will pull around the stern of the monitors and land right abreast of them, and board the fort on the run in a seaman-like way.

The marines will form in the rear and cover the sailors. While the soldiers are going over the parapets in front, the sailors will take the sea face of Fort Fisher.

We can land two thousand men from the fleet and not feel it. Two thousand active men from the fleet will carry the day.

Two boat-keepers will be kept in each boat.

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[General Order No. 82.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Beaufort, N. C., January 5, 1865.*

The distinguishing flags of the different lines of battle will be as follows:

When signaling to line No. 1, one (1) black ball over the cornet will be hoisted.

When signaling to line No. 2, two (2) black balls over the cornet will be hoisted.



When signaling to line No. 3, three (3) black balls over the cornet will be hoisted.

The vessels leading these lines will repeat the signals made by the flag-ship.

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

[General Order No. 84.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Beaufort, N. C., January 6, 1865.*

When ready to start, the Santiago de Cuba will tow the Canonicus, the Fort Jackson the Mahopac, the Alabama the Saugus, and the Rhode Island the Dictator, if she comes. The Mohican will go ahead of the Monadnock, and take care of her; the Vanderbilt will tow or keep company with the Dictator, and the Pontoosuc will go ahead of the Monadnock to guide her, as her compass does not work. When these vessels arrive at the scene of action, they will drop into their respective lines.

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg North Atlantic Squadron.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Off Smithville, N. C., January 20, 1865.*

SIR: In my last I informed you that Fort Caswell had been blown up and evacuated in consequence of the fall of Fort Fisher. I sent Lieutenant W. B. Cushing around in the Monticello to the western bar, to ascertain what had taken place, and to obtain aid from the officers in command of the Nyack and Vicksburg, and take advantage of the occasion. Lieutenant Cushing did not obtain the aid he required—for what reason I have not yet learned; but, with his usual energy, he pushed on in his boats, found that Fort Caswell had been blown up, Bald Head fort destroyed, Fort Shaw also, and that Fort Campbell, to the westward of Caswell, had been abandoned. All these forts mount 9 and 10-inch guns, and Armstrong 150-pounders.

Lieutenant Cushing then pushed on to Smithville, after hoisting the flag of the Union over Caswell. The next thing I saw was the flag waving over Smithville, which the rebels had left in a great hurry after they saw our boats approaching, leaving everything in the heavy and beautiful fort uninjured, and two IX-inch guns only spiked in the fort at Deep Water Point.

In the mean time I had succeeded in getting one gunboat (the Tacony) over the rip, (or interior bar,) and sent her up to Reeves's Point to disable the guns at that place, about three miles (on the west side of the river) above Fort Fisher. Thus in twenty-four hours after the fall of Fort Fisher and its outworks, all the formidable chain of forts in this river, (at the entrance,) built to keep out anything we had, have fallen into our hands. They are garrisoned for the present with sailors, until we have more troops, and I advise that they be held and kept in order.

I can scarcely give a description of these works. They are certainly the most formidable and best built earthworks I ever saw, and do credit to the engineer who planned them.

One would suppose the whole southern confederacy had been at work throwing up mud and sand; and General Whiting, the engineer, certainly had an

abiding faith in the durability of the confederacy, as he shows his opinion by his works, which have been four years building, and were taken in as many days.

Fort Caswell is in the same shape it was before it fell into rebel hands, only the confederates have covered the masonry with thick earth on the outside, and made it almost impervious to shot and shell. It is in many respects stronger than Fisher, and harder to take by assault. Still it could be taken, and the rebels knew it. Three or four gunboats on the inside would soon have starved them out.

I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting the gunboats over the bar and the rips, and only succeeded this morning in getting the last one through.

I don't know that there is a great deal more for us to do; the port is sealed up. I shall, however, move up to Wilmington, taking up the torpedoes first, of which there are a great many. So far, we don't have much difficulty in finding them. They mostly fire by electricity. They are very large, containing over a barrel and a half of powder.

The rebels left plenty of good stores and provisions, and our men are now subsisting on that.

I send you a list of the forts that have fallen into our hands since Fort Fisher fell, with the number and calibre of their guns.

We have found in each fort an Armstrong gun, with the "broad arrow" on it, and Sir William Armstrong's name marked in full on the trunnion.

As the British government claims the exclusive right to use these guns, it would be interesting to know how they have come into a fort held by the southern rebels.

I find that immense quantities of provisions, stores, and clothing have come through this port into rebeldom. I am almost afraid to mention the amount, but enough to supply over 60,000 men. It is all English, and they have received the last cargo; no more will ever come this way.

We picked up a telegram from General Lee to his subordinate here, saying that if Forts Fisher and Caswell were not held he would have to evacuate Richmond. He says most truly; and I would not be at all surprised if he left it at any moment.

I have sent the three monitors, Monadnock, Mahopac, and Canonicus, to Admiral Dahlgren; also the wooden vessels Tuscarora, Shenandoah, Mohican, Ticonderoga, Juniata, and Keystone State, keeping here only what was indispensable to secure every point. The army force is very small for all this work, and it will not do to separate it at this moment. It is as much as it will be able to do to hold what we have taken.

We have plenty of force to hold this place against the whole southern confederacy. I have two hundred and fifty guns bearing on the narrow strip of land where our troops are heavily intrenched. There are vessels in the river and outside, and we only hope they will attempt to retake it. Ten thousand men in Fort Fisher, with the guns of the squadron, would hold this place a long time.

We find this a better place to catch blockade-runners than outside. I had the blockade-runners' lights lit last night, and was obliging enough to answer their signals—whether right or wrong we don't know. Two of them, the Stag and Charlotte, from Bermuda, loaded with arms, blankets, shoes, &c., came in and quietly anchored near the Malvern, and were taken possession of.

The Stag was commanded by Richard H. Gayle, a lieutenant in the rebel navy, and belongs to the rebel government. A number more are expected, and we will, I hope, catch a portion of them.

I intrusted this duty to Lieutenant Cushing, who performed it with his usual good luck and intelligence. These two are very fast vessels and valuable prizes.

They threw a portion of their papers overboard immediately on finding they were trapped.

I enclose a list of guns captured by the navy since the surrender of Fort Fisher, and the names of the different works. This number, added to those taken around Fisher, makes 168 guns in all (most of them heavy ones) that have been taken.

I enclose a few papers that may be interesting.

The Charlotte brings five English passengers—one of them an English army officer. They all came over (as they expressed it) "on a lark," and were making themselves quite jolly in the cabin over their champagne, having felicitated themselves on their safe arrival. The Stag received three shots in her as she ran by our blockaders outside.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*List of forts taken possession of by the navy since the fall of Fort Fisher, with their armaments.*

Reeves's Point, three 10-inch guns; Smithville, four 10-inch guns; above Smithville, two 10-inch guns; Fort Caswell, ten 10-inch, two 9-inch, one Armstrong, four 32's, rifled, two 32's, smooth, three 8-inch, one Parrott 20-pounder, three rifled field-pieces, three guns buried—29 guns; Forts Campbell and Shaw, six 10-inch, six 32's, smooth, one 32, rifled, one 8-inch, six field-pieces, two mortars—22 guns; Smith's island, three 10-inch, six 32's, smooth, two 32's, rifled, four field-pieces, two mortars—17 guns; reported at the other end of Smith's island, 6 guns. Total captured, 83 guns.

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Off Smithville, N. C., January 20, 1865.*

SIR: I have been so much pleased with General Terry, and the manner in which he has conducted his part of the operations here, that I deem it worthy of a special despatch to express what I feel.

General Terry is, no doubt, well known to his associates in the field who have served with him, and to the lieutenant general, who selected him for the service, but the American people should know and feel the very great service he has rendered them, by his most admirable assault on these tremendous works. Young, brave, and unassuming, he bears his success with the modesty of a true soldier, and is willing to give credit to those who shared with him the perils of the assault. No one could form the slightest conception of these works, their magnitude, strength, and extent, who had not seen them, and General Whiting (the founder) must have had an abiding faith in the durability of the confederacy when he expended so many years' labor on them.

The result of the fall of Fort Fisher was the fall of all the surrounding works in and near this place—Fort Caswell, a large work at the West inlet, mounting twenty-nine guns, all the works on Smith's island, the works between Caswell and Smithville, up to battery on Reeves's Point, on the west side of the river—in all one hundred and sixty-nine guns falling into our hands; two steamers were burnt or blown up, and there never was so clean a scoop made anywhere.

A timid man would have hesitated to attack these works by assault, no matter what assistance he may have had from other quarters, but General Terry never for an instant hesitated; and though I feel somewhat flattered at the confidence he reposed in my judgment, I am quite ready to believe that he acted on his own ideas of what was proper to be done in the matter, and was perfectly qualified to judge without the advice of any one.

Throughout this affair his conduct has been marked by the greatest desire to be successful, not for the sake of personal considerations, but for the cause in which we are all alike engaged.

I don't know that I ever met an officer who so completely gained my esteem and admiration.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,

*Cape Fear River, January 22, 1865.*

SIR: I have read the report of Major General Butler in relation to the late expedition to Wilmington, (in which he bore a part,) and though late results (the capture of Fort Fisher) have completely refuted the assertions of Generals Butler and Weitzel, I deem it due to the naval part of the expedition that General Butler's report should receive some notice at my hands.

To use the mildest terms I can, I pronounce the whole report a tissue of misstatements from beginning to end, scarcely equalled by the misstatements made regarding the lieutenant general.

The navy had been waiting for two months to start on this expedition, but for reasons known to the lieutenant general and myself, and which were perfectly satisfactory to me, the proper time was waited for. We wanted a success, not a failure.

General Weitzel was selected, and General Butler's name was never connected with the expedition, except to fit it out. When the expedition did prepare to start, it was going to the attack on the supposition that the powder-vessel (originally proposed by General Butler) would blow the forts down, and the troops would have nothing to do but to walk in.

I was not opposed myself to the experiment, (for I think everything worth trying,) and gave all my time and attention to the enterprise and fitting out the vessel. I was hard at work getting ready, filling her with powder, and had placed her in the carpenter's hands, the weather looking very squally. Judge of my surprise, when General Butler came on board the flag-ship at Norfolk and told me he was embarking the troops in transports, and would be ready to start in two days. I told him that was out of the question; a heavy southwest gale was coming on that would last three days at least, and we could not go to sea at such a time, neither could his transports move. My advice was "not to embark the men until the gale was over."

He did embark the troops nevertheless. The gale blew heavy for four days, and the troops must have been very uncomfortable. At the end of that gale the fleet sailed. I told General Butler that my vessels were all slow; the monitors would have to be towed; would have to go into Beaufort to fill up with ammunition and coal, as I was afraid to venture them at sea with too much in. I advised him to wait until we had got thirty-six hours start of him, and also recommended him to rendezvous at Beaufort, N. C., where he would find a good

harbor. Even up to this time he did not tell me that *he* himself was going along, but led me to believe General Weitzel was to be in command. He did not take my opinion about sailing. His transports sailed before any of the fleet except the monitors, and instead of rendezvousing at Beaufort, where I could hope to find him, he rendezvoused off Masonboro' inlet; showed his flag-ship decked out with flags to the enemy at Fort Fisher, and had one of his transports fired on by guns near the fort. In the mean time I worked night and day at Beaufort to get the monitors ready and complete the arrangements for the powder-boat, and I sailed when ready. There was no time when any troops could have landed without danger up to the time the first attack took place. I was to be the judge of that, not General Butler, for I had not that faith in his generalship which would induce me to follow him blindly, though I determined to do all I could for him, and make the expedition a success if possible.

I soon saw, though, that General Butler depended on the powder-boat entirely, and I said we would have no assault from the beginning.

I will now proceed to notice General Butler's report in detail, and state where it is incorrect.

He first says he gave the navy thirty-six hours' start. That is untrue; the transports started before the navy, or disappeared. General Butler himself left after I did. He speaks of the "finest possible weather" he had at sea, but says nothing about the surf on the beach. No boat can land on the beach unless the wind has been blowing strong off the land, and on the days in question, by looking at the log-book, you will find the wind blowing southwest and south. On the 15th the monitors had not arrived at Beaufort, and on the 16th and 17th were coaling and filling with ammunition, and had to wait a smooth time to get over the bar, the wind blowing southwest on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and throwing in a heavy surf on the beach. On most of those nights Mr. Bradford, of the coast survey, came near being capsized in the breakers while making a reconnoissance. It was General Butler's duty to have rendezvoused at Beaufort, and wait until the monitors and powder-boat (on which he so much depended) were ready. The movements of the light transports should have been subordinate to the large and slow-moving frigates and iron-clads, and he should have been where he could have arranged with me all the details of the attack; but no; he kept out of my way, and, I think, did it studiously.

When I arrived on the ground of the naval rendezvous with the monitors, I found General Butler there.

I ordered the powder-boat in, on the night of the 18th, (the smoothest beach we had had,) but at General Butler's request, communicated through General Weitzel, in presence of the fleet captain, (Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese,) I postponed the explosion until General Butler should say he was ready. The correspondence on this subject has all been sent to you, and you can judge for yourself how far General Butler's statement is true.

General Butler states that "Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the batteries into Cape Fear river, and then troops could land and hold the beach without difficulty, or without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboat Tallahassee, seen on the river." That is a deliberate misstatement. General Butler does not say who urged me; but I never saw him, or his staff, after the landing on the beach, nor did I ever have any conversation with him, or see him, (except on the deck of his vessel as I passed by in the flag-ship,) from the time I left Fortress Monroe until he left here after his failure.

He showed himself by that remark just as ignorant about hydrography as the rebel General Whiting did when he built his fort where he supposed large ships could not get near enough to attack it. Neither myself nor any one in the squadron had the faintest idea where the channel was, or what depth of water there was in it. We knew there was an outer and inside bar, between

which were included the heaviest fortifications in this country, on which bars the blockade-runners constantly grounded, and had to wait for high water to get off. After we had no guns to annoy us, and I had the channel sounded out and carefully buoyed, nearly all the gunboats of light draught got badly aground, and remained there for a whole tide. We were forty-eight hours getting gunboats of light batteries over the first bar, and they had to anchor under the guns of the heaviest forts. They would have fared badly had the rebels manned them.

Three days were consumed in getting the gunboats over the "Rips," and one of them is stuck there still. The "Rips" are commanded by about twenty ten-inch guns and 100-pounders, and not a gunboat would have been left had they attempted to run the batteries. It might have been sport to General Butler, but it would have been death to the gunboats. I never had the slightest intention of passing the batteries until the fort was taken. The department saw my plan, and the utter impossibility of doing so. I would certainly not have been influenced by General Butler's opinions in nautical matters, or risked my vessels to amuse him.

All the next paragraph in General Butler's report, in relation to what the "admiral" said, and what the "admiral" declined to do, is false from beginning to end. I never had any conversation of the kind with any one. Indeed, the whole report is a tissue of misrepresentations, including the part that says the instructions he received did not contemplate a "siege, &c.," when he knows he never received any instructions, and joined the expedition without orders.

General Butler speaks of pushing up his men to within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and capturing Half Moon battery and its men. The "general" certainly must have had something in his eye, and did not see well. Half Moon battery is four miles from Fort Fisher, had one gun in it, which was silenced after a few shots from the gunboats, and no one ever entered it. It was a small sand-hill, that twenty men could have taken. Flag-pond battery was a larger work, thrown up by the rebels, in which was one 8-inch gun that had burst some time ago. The gunboats shelled it, and, on the landing of the first boat-load of troops, the seamen went up and found some boys and old men in it, (North Carolina junior reserves,) and carried them off to the Santiago de Cuba. The prisoners were quite willing to go. The troops afterwards surprised 218 officers and men near Fort Fisher, and captured them.

General Butler speaks of having run in the Chamberlain to within a few hundred yards of the fort. If he ran that close and was not fired at, he must have supposed the fort silenced; but he never was within one mile and a half of the fort, nor did he ever land himself.

What General Butler says about the difficulties of assaulting, owing to palisades, ditches, and other bugbears, has been refuted by the successful assault made by General Terry on the land side, and the unsuccessful one made by the sailors on the sea face of the fort, when thirty gallant officers and seamen reached the top of the parapet and planted the flag. Soldiers, who were accustomed to the work, would have succeeded there easier than where General Terry assaulted, as the ascent (where the sailors went in) was easier. The same troops that General Butler had did the work finally, and took the most difficult side of the works.

General Butler admits that the fire of the navy did keep the enemy in his bomb-proofs, but he feared it would keep his (Butler's) men out when they attempted to assault. General Terry was influenced by no such fear; on the contrary, we fired twenty yards ahead of our troops, while they were fighting from bomb-proof to bomb-proof, and the General constantly signalled, "Fire away! your shells are doing good execution, and our men are in no danger from them."

In the mean time (General Butler says) "the weather assumed a threatening aspect, and the surf came rolling in on the beach, and the landing became difficult."

I assert that the landing on that day was smoother than when General Terry landed. I arranged with General Butler's chief of staff, General Weitzel, to land the troops early in the morning. I gave him boats, vessels, everything, in fact, that he asked for, and at 3 o'clock p. m. not more than three thousand men were on shore, with one day's rations. With General Terry I commenced to land the men at 8.30 a. m., and at 2 p. m. eight thousand five hundred men were on the beach, with twelve days' provisions and all the intrenching tools. The men were rolled over in the surf, wet their cartridges, and filled up with more.

They went there to stay, and I knew we would have the fort before many days, from the conduct of the men and officers. There was no necessity for General Butler re-embarking his men on account of the weather. It was rough on the beach, but our boats from the fleet communicated at times, and when it was necessary. The gunboats laid within six hundred yards of the beach, and covered the troops left on shore, when the general went away after hearing the news from some North Carolina reserves that Hoke's brigade was advancing, and that the fort was strongly re-enforced. But what if it was? We came down here to take it, and General Terry with the same men did take it. They were determined to follow their brave general wherever he might think proper to lead.

After General Butler left for Fortress Monroe, it was rather rough—too rough to land troops or bring them off, but it only lasted twenty-four hours, and the troops came off without much difficulty; in fact, there was no time when communication stopped altogether.

Had General Butler commenced landing men (with the determination to stay) at 8 o'clock in the morning, they would all have been ashore by sunset. We landed General Terry's 8,500 men in 5½ hours, and had time to give the fort a good battering before dark.

General Butler says he gave orders to the transports to sail for Fortress Monroe as soon as the troops were on board, in obedience to the orders of the lieutenant general.

General Grant never contemplated the withdrawal of the troops. He sent them there to stay, and having once effected a landing, he knew that the most difficult part was done. The army once in possession of that narrow neck of land, and covered by the guns of the fleet, the capture of Fort Fisher was a mere matter of time. (In a heavy gale, blowing yesterday and to-day, the vessels outside did not desert their posts.)

General Butler states that the garrison of Flag-pond battery belonged to Kirkland's brigade. He is in error there; they were a part of the junior North Carolina reserves.

He also states that he captured two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, some caissons, &c. No such captures were ever made; and the captured forts, about which so much has been written, were rough earthworks, thrown up for the purpose of firing at blockaders when they chased close in shore. They made no resistance after a few shots were fired by the gunboats.

I have nothing to say in relation to General Weitzel's report, beyond this—he has made mistakes in his statements. He admits that he requested me to wait a few days until we could co-operate more favorably, on which I suppose General Butler grounds his belief that the navy detained him.

I did wait, and have waited ever since, until the right man and a good time offered to take the forts. They were taken, as I said they could be, and that is the strongest argument in favor of the navy, on whom it was foolishly attempted to fix this blunder.

As it has turned out, the first failure had its advantages, and the country will derive great comfort therefrom.

If General Butler had not descended to a subterfuge to cover his mistakes, I would willingly have allowed him to go into retirement with the honors he has won; but no man shall reflect unjustly on me or the corps to which I belong without his hearing from me in some way or other.

The enclosed papers may, perhaps, throw some light on the Wilmington matter. If they prove to be true, the accused merits a severer punishment than the odium cast upon him by the public; if they are not true, he shall have the benefit of the fact.

I have sent you documents and extracts from log-books to show that what I say is correct, and the log-books of the whole fleet can be examined if necessary.

In conclusion, permit me to say that I don't see what it matters whether General Butler's troops landed one day or another. He decided the fort could not be taken when he did land. He could not expect the rebels to leave a work like that with less than 500 men in it, and he certainly could have tried to assault that number. General Terry had 2,300 to contend against, and he carried the works without a very serious loss, considering the importance of the position to the country.

I enclose you the report of the rebel General Whiting, who states plainly that no "re-enforcements had arrived until Tuesday morning, (the 27th,) when all our troops were embarked."

If the evidence already presented is doubted, the report of General Whiting cannot be; therefore the excuse for re-embarking the troops because the forts had been re-enforced by Hoke's division is a poor one.

General Whiting says "the garrison remained, steadily awaiting the renewal of the assault or bombardment, until Tuesday morning, (27th,) when they were relieved by the supports of Major General Hoke and the embarkation of the enemy." This was two days after the attack of the navy and the landing and re-embarking of the troops.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

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*General Whiting's report.*

HEADQUARTERS, WILMINGTON, *December 31, 1864.*

COLONEL: For the information of the general commanding, I forward the report of Colonel Lamb, commanding Fort Fisher in the action of the 24th and 25th:

On receiving the information, at 1 p. m. on the 24th, that the fleet was moving in to take position, I at once ordered a steamer, and reporting to the headquarters, proceeded to the point of attack, reaching Confederate Point just before the close of the first day's bombardment, which lasted four hours and a half. That of the second day commenced at twenty minutes past 10 a. m., and continued, with no intermission or apparent slackening, with great fury from over fifty ships till dark. During the day the enemy landed a large force, and at half past four advanced a line of skirmishers on the left flank of the sand curtain, the fleet at the same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire upon the curtain.

The garrison, however, at the proper moment, when the fire slackened to



allow the approach of the enemy's land force, drove them off with grape and musketry; at dark the enemy withdrew. A heavy storm set in, and the garrison were much exposed, as they were under arms all night. At 8 a. m. 26th, a reported advance in boats was opened on with grape and shell. The garrison remained steadily awaiting a renewal of the assault or bombardment until Tuesday morning, when they were relieved by the supports of Major General Hoke and the embarkation of the enemy.

Colonel Lamb's report herewith gives all the details of the action. In an accompanying paper I will give you an account in detail of all matters which fell under my own observation during the action and the three succeeding days, which I beg you will cause to be forwarded for the information of the War Department.

As soon as other business will permit a report in detail of the construction of the works, capacity of resistance, effect of fire, movements of the enemy, improvements suggested, will be made out and forwarded for the information of the engineer department.

In this it only remains for me to express my grateful sense of the gallantry, endurance, and skill of the garrison and its accomplished commander.

To the latter I have already paid a just tribute of praise, not for this action only, but for his whole course at Fort Fisher, of which this action and its result is but the fruit. His report of the gallantry of individuals I fully confirm from my own observation.

I wish to mention Captain Mann, Lieutenant Latham, Lieutenant Hunter, of the '36th; Lieutenant Rankin of the 1st battalion; Captain Adams, of the light artillery, as very active and efficient.

To Colonel Tansill, of my staff, we owe many thanks. To his skilful judgment and great experience the defence of the land front was committed at the critical moment of assault. Of Major Riley, with his battery, of the 10th Carolina, who served the guns of the land front during the entire action, I have to say he has added another name to the long list of fields on which he has been conspicuous for indomitable pluck and consummate skill. Major Still, chief of my staff, and Major Strong, aide-de-camp, here, as always, actively aided me throughout. The gallant bearing and active labors of Major Saunders, chief of artillery to General Herbert, in very exposed positions, attracted my special attention.

I present my acknowledgments to Flag Officer Pinckney, Confederate States navy, who was present during the action, for the welcome and efficient aid sent to Colonel Lamb, the detachment under Lieutenant Roby, which manned the two Brooke guns, and the company of marines, under Captain Van Benthuyzen, which re-enforced the garrison. Lieutenant Chapman, Confederate States navy, commanding battery Buchanan, by his skilful gunnery saved us on our right from a movement of the enemy, which, unless checked, might have resulted in a successful passage.

The navy detachment at the guns, under very trying circumstances, did good work.

No commendations of mine can be too much for the coolness, discipline and skill displayed by officers and men. Their names have not all been furnished to me, but Lieutenants Roby, Dornig, Armstrong, and Berrien attracted special attention throughout.

To Passed Midshipman Carey I wish to give personal thanks. Though wounded, he reported after the bursting of his gun to repel the threatened assault, and actively assisted Colonel Tansill on the land front.

Above all and before all we shall be grateful, and I trust all are, for the favor of Almighty God, under and by which a signal deliverance has been achieved.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,  
*Major General.*

Lieutenant Colonel A. ANDERSON,  
*A. A. and I. General, Headquarters Department of N. C.*

P. S.—I wish it to be understood that in no sense did I assume the command of Colonel Lamb. I was a witness simply, confining my action to observation and advice, and to our communications, and it is as a witness that I report.

W. H. C. WHITING,  
*Major General.*

U. S. MONITOR ONONDAGA, AIKEN'S LANDING,  
*James River, Va., January 16, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward, herewith, a statement made by Mr. Levi R. Greene, first assistant engineer, in charge of engineers' department of the United States steamer *Massasoit*, which may account for the sudden abandonment of the attack on Fort Fisher by General Butler.

I have full confidence in the truth and veracity of Mr. Greene, and think that this mystery should be unravelled and ventilated by proper authority.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM A. PARKER,  
*Commanding 5th Division.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Blockade off Wilmington, N. C.*

U. S. STEAMER MASSASOIT, JAMES RIVER, VA.,  
*January 14, 1865.*

SIR: The following is a copy, furnished at your request, of a letter sent by me this evening to Senator H. B. Anthony. With a few exceptions, it is the same as the one submitted to you this morning.

In the event of his declining to act in the matter, Admiral Porter is at liberty to make such use of the information as he may think it warrants.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEVI R. GREENE, U. S. N.,  
*First Assistant Engineer.*

Commander WM. A. PARKER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding James River Squadron.*

U. S. STEAMER MASSASOIT, JAMES RIVER, VA.,  
*January 14, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: In making the statements I am about to do to you, it is with the confidence that, if you see sufficient cause to take any steps toward inducing government to unravel the matter, you will do so without giving me any publicity in the affair, and, if possible, without my being a witness. Government will be able to find its own, and sufficient proof, however, if it follows the matter up.

I have only hesitated in making it known before, for want of direct proof, and dislike of being called upon as a witness.

On the 31st of last month I was returning from a visit to Providence, and met on the wharf at Fortress Monroe a man named William Howard, an Englishman, and formerly in the employ of the Boston, Providence, and New York railroad as baggage-master. He usually accompanied the train, and as my duties have called me over the road two or three times a week for the last two years, until within a short time, I have known him quite intimately, and have known him to be, at heart, a rebel sympathizer and secessionist.

The morning of the day I met him we passed up to Norfolk together. In reply to my inquiries as to how he came there, and why he left the railroad, he informed me he was "on a little money-making expedition;" showed me a passport to Newbern, North Carolina, furnished, he said, through General Butler, and then, after some preliminaries, said in substance that a friend of Butler, named Peters, then in New York, had 3,000 bales of cotton in Wilmington; that they were going to get it out. Butler was to work the thing through, and have half the money; that he was to furnish passes, and he (Howard) had no doubt but that they should succeed. That himself and some other person, whose name I do not remember, were merely acting as agents, knowing nothing but what they were told to do, but if successful, would make money; that, being Englishmen, they should have no difficulty in moving within the rebel lines. He furthermore stated, what I had already begun to see, to wit, *that if Wilmington had been captured, Butler would have lost his cotton*, as it would have fallen into our hands; and expressed his opinion freely that there was but little patriotism in any of our leading men; that they meant money, and like the one who, as he expressed it, was "doing such mean things for his own benefit," looked out first for themselves.

Howard has gone to Newbern, I suppose. The proprietor of the Atlantic Hotel in Norfolk, a relative of Butler, I believe, is concerned in the matter.

There may be no truth in Howard's statements; *if there is*, detectives will soon trace it out, and it will readily be seen *why* Wilmington was not taken, though it is hard to believe any man would so sell his country's honor.

You can use this letter to inform the proper authorities, for I consider it my duty as an officer, and a lover of my country's welfare, to make it known, but the result can be attained without my gaining any publicity.

I am, very respectfully, yours,

LEVI R. GREENE,  
*First Assistant Engineer, U. S. N.*

Senator H. B. ANTHONY.

Respectfully forwarded.

WILLIAM A. PARKER,  
*Commanding 5th Division, N. A. Squadron.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, March 14, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit an answer to the interrogatory of the committee which embraces the inception of the movement upon Fort Fisher, and also includes a narrative of the powder-boat.

Very respectfully, &c.,

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*U. S. Senator, Chairman Committee on Conduct of the War.*

Question. Please give us all the knowledge you have in regard to the naval expedition against the defences of Wilmington, the cause of its first failure, its ultimate success, when it was first proposed, by whom, why it was not sooner attempted, and whatever else relating thereto which you may deem important.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
March 13, 1865.

SIR: After the failure of the attack upon the outer defences of Charleston, under Rear-Admiral Dupont, it was suggested to the President by the Navy Department to seize Morris island. In the conferences that took place with General Gillmore, who was selected to command the land forces, I suggested to him to think over a similar attack upon the forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river, and after the affair at Morris island was finished I would endeavor to obtain a transfer of the necessary forces to that point.

The capture of Morris island proved to be a long siege, instead of a rapid coup-de-main. Herewith are some letters touching upon the subject of the Cape Fear defences:

[Private.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
August 28, 1863.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have been north for a fortnight, and only returned yesterday. The country is well satisfied with your work thus far, and are not at all impatient, notwithstanding the glorious accounts of the reporters, who promise the fall of Charleston in forty-eight hours from the date of their despatch. Every one understands that you have heavy work before you after the ruin of Sumter, and they accord to your skill the highest praise. I went over to see Mr. Stanton last evening, to ask him if he would direct you to take up the Wilmington defences as soon as you had finished at Charleston. I explained the position of the fort and the topography to the southward, and he favored the idea with earnestness; of course nothing can be ordered or arranged at present. I only mention the subject to show you how favorably disposed the department is to this project, and to enable you to govern yourself accordingly. Of naval co-operation, it may be assured that such an expedition will receive the full strength of which our department is capable of exerting. It is an open coast, and has the ocean hazards, which are far more serious to such an operation than the obstacles and perils after being established on shore; but there is generally on our southern coast a long spell of favorable fall weather, during which the work can be done by those who will not despair of success.

Yours, very truly,

G. V. FOX.

Major General Q. A. GILLMORE,  
U. S. Army, Com'dg Dep't of the South, Port Royal, S. C.

FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA,  
October 20, 1863.

DEAR SIR: A long talk with the admiral leaves me with the impression that a due regard to the best interests of the service may require the present iron-clad fleet here to be kept out of any very hazardous work until it is re-enforced. The question of our foreign relations, and the prospect of annoyance from

foreign-built rebel rams, &c., must, I admit, be taken into consideration; and although I have chafed under the delay here, I do not desire and never have desired that my personal feelings and views should weigh for one moment against the good of the cause. Whether the new monitors, to be added to the fleet here, will make it relatively stronger, is, I think, doubtful. The enemy is increasing his strength rapidly.

In the anticipation of temporary suspension of operations here, the Wilmington defences and your suggestions thereon frequently recur to me. I have called the attention of the general-in-chief to it.

What can the navy do there in the way of assistance?

I deem the blockade here perfect at the present time.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE, *Major General.*

Hon. G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *November 8, 1863.*

MY DEAR SIR: I have your letter of the 20th ultimo. I have not mentioned the subject of Wilmington to the general-in-chief, because we have to-day written a despatch to Admiral Dahlgren which embraces the views of the department, and which he is directed to show to you.

Before we could get fairly at work at Wilmington four more iron-clads will be at Charleston, even if it shall be determined to await their arrival. My own views have always been to press up to the city with iron-clads, without stopping to attack forts, provided there were no fixed obstructions. If we can do this, Wilmington and Mobile fall easily. If we do not, those places perhaps can be held.

Your own operations have been so brilliant that I sympathize with you in further delay, but the country forgives anything to success.

Yours, very truly,

G. V. FOX.

Major General Q. A. GILLMORE,

*Commanding Department of the South, Port Royal, S. C.*

Military operations in the summer and fall of 1863 did not admit of any detachment of troops to co-operate with the navy in an attack of the defences of Cape Fear river; but as soon as they ceased, the following letter was addressed to the War Department, but it failed to elicit a reply, and when the spring campaign opened, of course no troops could be obtained:

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 2, 1864.*

SIR: The admiral in command of the North Atlantic blockading squadron is confident that he can land a military force on the open beach to the westward of Fort Caswell, whence the reduction of that important work is easily accomplished by the engineers.

The result of such an operation is to enable the naval vessels to lie inside, as is the case at Charleston, thus closing the port effectually. As this is the only port by which any supplies whatever reach the rebels, and as the armies are mostly going into winter quarters, it seems a fit opportunity to undertake such an operation.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES,

*Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War.*

In August, after the spring and summer campaigns of the army of the Potomac had terminated, I again urged upon the President the propriety of undertaking the attack upon the forts of Cape Fear river, and on account of the correspondence and conversations I had held with General Gillmore upon the subject, I suggested that he should be sent for, which was done, and in his company I visited Lieutenant General Grant, at City Point, on the 2d of September, 1864, and delivered to him a message from the President, to the effect that the attack upon the outer or sea defences of Wilmington might go forward whenever, in the judgment of Lieutenant General Grant, the troops could be spared. After some conversation and examination of the subject, the Lieutenant General promised that 12,000 troops should be ready to move on the 1st day of October, which was subsequently changed to the 15th of October.

Rear-Admiral D. G. Farragut was immediately selected to take command of the naval co-operating force, and preparations were set on foot to collect the most powerful squadron ever assembled under the American flag, thereby to render the attack successful. Rear-Admiral Farragut not being able, on account of ill health, to assume command, Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter was transferred from the Mississippi squadron and assumed the command of the North Atlantic blockading squadron on the 11th of October, at Hampton roads.

The army having made an unsuccessful movement to the left, in October, were not able to move as agreed upon. I visited Lieutenant General Grant after that movement, and he told me that it was impossible to furnish the troops as agreed upon, as his lines were already thin, and that he felt impelled to move to the left, around Petersburg, so soon as he should be re-enforced. Therefore the attack upon the sea defences of Cape Fear river was abandoned by the Lieutenant General for the present, and no definite time in the future agreed upon. I returned and reported this fact to the Secretary of the Navy.

Whilst the fleet was still lying at Hampton roads, General Butler proposed to explode an immense quantity of powder as near as possible to Fort Caswell, thereby destroying that work. The Navy Department adopted his suggestion rather than abandon its long-cherished schemes against this blockade-running port, and every means were used to render the project successful, as being the only alternative left to operate against this place, which otherwise must have continued, by the means of its foreign entries, to strengthen and nourish the rebellion. Lieutenant General Grant promised a co-operating army force of 3,000 men, which was finally increased to 7,500 men.

Annexed to this brief narrative are several explanatory letters and a memoir of the powder scheme, in full, prepared by the Naval Bureau of Ordnance.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

HON. B. F. WADE, U. S. S.,  
*Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.*

[Telegram.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *September 3, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, *City Point :*

Just returned. Does the fall of Atlanta make any change in your views, especially as to the time, October 1 ?

G. V. FOX, *Assistant Secretary.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, September 7, 1864.*

SIR : Herewith are the orders addressed to Rear-Admiral Farragut, which

conform to the arrangements agreed upon during the visit of the Assistant Secretary to yourself on the 2d instant. Every exertion will be made by this department to render the expedition successful; and any suggestions which you can offer relative to naval co-operation will be received and acted upon.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*U. S. Army, City Point, Va.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, September 5, 1864.*

SIR: It has been the endeavor of the Navy Department, since the winter of 1862, to get the consent of the War Department to a joint attack upon the defenses of Cape Fear river, but they have decided that no troops could be spared for the operation. Lieutenant General Grant has recently given the subject his attention, and thinks an army force can be spared and ready to move by the first day of October. Upon consultation he is of the opinion that the best results will follow the landing of a large force, under the guns of the navy, on the open beach north of New inlet, to take possession and intrench across to Cape Fear river—the navy to open such fire as is possible upon the works on Federal Point, in conjunction with the army, and at the same time such force as can run the batteries to do so, and thus isolate the rebels. At ordinary high water the chart gives twelve feet on New Inlet bar, but Lieutenant Cushing, who has sounded it, says there is fourteen; this, however, requires verification. The double-enders and small screw gunboats are the only wooden vessels that can go in, and possibly the monitors of the Passaic class.

The Lieutenant General considers that much of the success of this plan will depend on its secrecy, and it is agreed that most of the naval force shall assemble at Port Royal, and indications be thrown out that a naval attack is meditated upon Charleston.

You are selected to command the naval force, and you will endeavor to be at Port Royal by the latter part of September, where further orders will await you. Bring with you to the rendezvous at Port Royal all such vessels and officers as can be spared from the west Gulf squadron, without impairing its necessary efficiency, and when you leave turn over the command of the squadron to the officer next in rank to yourself, until the pleasure of the department shall be known.

I send you by this mail a sketch showing our present knowledge of the ground. Fort Fisher is a casemated work of sand. All the others are two and four-gun batteries *en barbette*. There is one iron-clad finished in the river and in commission.

The Colorado, Wabash, Minnesota, New Ironsides, Susquehanna, Canandaigua, Juniata, about a dozen of the double-enders and screw gunboats, three or four monitors of the Passaic class, one light-draught monitor, one new double-turreted monitor, built of wood at the Boston navy yard, and the whole of Acting Rear-Admiral Lee's squadron, besides such vessels as you may bring up from the Gulf, are at your disposal.

If the captured Tennessee is brought around to Port Royal it will relieve a monitor there, and then she can be brought to Philadelphia and coppered and put in thorough repair.

The department will thank you to indicate your views and wishes in regard to the matter, and authorizes you to call for any or all of the naval force available at that time to the department. The operation is an important one, as closing the last port of the rebels, and destroying their credit abroad by pre-

venting the exportation of cotton, as well as preventing the reception of munitions and supplies from abroad.

The whole subject is committed to your hands, so far as the department is concerned, in the confident expectation that success may attend our arms.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. G. FARRAGUT,  
*Com'dg W. G. B. Squadron, Mobile Bay.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington, September 14, 1864.*

SIR: Enclosed are certain interrogatories propounded to A. R. Admiral Lee, and his answers. The water seems to be scant for the iron-clads to enter, but the wooden ones can enter if the fire of the forts can be kept under. The Hatteras fort was reduced in August, 1861, with the Minnesota frigate two miles distant; therefore I think the admiral is mistaken in saying that that class of vessels can render no assistance.

The particular and last information we require is this: Will the army force and its commander go to Port Royal? It is necessary to know this, as Farragut goes there to await orders. It seems to me it would be advisable to let them settle the details at that point together, as no other point is so fit in all respects as a rendezvous.

In my letter of the 12th instant, I should have said that it was high water on the 15th of September instead of the 30th.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, U. S. A.,  
*City Point, Virginia.*

[Telegram in cipher.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *December 29, 1864.*

Lieutenant General GRANT, U. S. A.,  
*City Point, Va.:*

I waited for Porter's despatches. Mr. Blair will explain. He reached Fort Monroe at 6 p. m., having left yesterday at 2 p. m. Mr. Welles has sent you a telegram in cipher, which could not be sent until despatches arrived. Porter will continue his fire, but it is hopeless alone.

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary.*

[Telegram in cipher.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *December 29, 1864.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*City Point, Va.:*

The substance of despatches and reports from Rear-Admiral Porter, off Wilmington, is briefly this: The ships can approach nearer to the enemy's works than was anticipated. Their fire can keep the enemy away from their guns. A landing can easily be effected upon the beach north of Fort Fisher, not only of troops, but all their supplies and artillery. This force can have its flanks protected by gunboats. The navy can assist in the siege of Fort Fisher, precisely as it covered the operations which resulted in the capture of Wagner. The winter season is the most favorable for operations against Fort Fisher. The largest naval force ever assembled is ready to lend its co-operation.

Rear-Admiral Porter will remain off Fort Fisher, continuing a moderate fire



to prevent new works from being erected, and the iron-clads have proved that they can maintain themselves in spite of bad weather. Under all these circumstances I invite you to such a military co-operation as will insure the fall of Fort Fisher, the importance of which has already received your careful consideration.

This telegram is made at the suggestion of the President, and in hopes that you will be able, at this time, to give the troops which heretofore were required elsewhere. If it cannot be done, the fleet will have to disperse, whence it cannot again be brought to this coast.

GIDEON WELLES, *Secretary of the Navy.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

(Saturday,) *December 31, 1864.*

SIR: Lieutenant General Grant will send immediately a competent force properly commanded to co-operate in the capture of the defences on Federal Point. It is expected that the troops will leave Hampton roads next Monday or Tuesday. This is all the information the department has to give you, but relies upon your skill and judgment to give full effect to any move that may be arranged. The department is perfectly satisfied with your efforts thus far, and you will convey to all hands the satisfaction the department feels.

I am, sir,

GIDEON WELLES.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, off Wilmington.*

[Private.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *September 12, 1864.*

DEAR SIR: It is full moon on the 30th of September, and again on the 15th of October. The second or third day after these dates are the highest tides, which the navy must have to go in. They rise then  $5\frac{5}{10}$  feet, and at the neap only  $3\frac{8}{10}$  feet.

Of course none of us can be ready on the 30th, but surely can on the 15th proximo. I presume the army force would rather have bright nights for their work. It is high water on full moon days at 7h. 19m. in the morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, U. S. A.,

*City Point, Virginia.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*City Point, Virginia, September 10, 1864.*

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 9th instant, enclosing copy of instructions to Admiral Farragut, was received by last night's mail. I have no suggestions to make beyond what those instructions contain. As soon as the land forces can be spared, and the navy is ready to co-operate, I will send an expedition of sufficient force quietly down the coast, not even allowing the command, with the exception of the commanding officer, to know where they are going.

The details for landing a force can best be arranged by Admiral Farragut, and the commander of the land forces. So soon as all is arranged, I will acquaint you with what is done on my part.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Hon. G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*City Point, Virginia, September 19, 1864.*

DEAR SIR: You had not been gone from here seven days, before I learned from New York that a formidable expedition was to be sent out from here against Wilmington, and that Q. A. Gillmore was to command. I thought this strange, but attached no very great importance to it until now, just returning from the north, where I have been for a few days. I receive reports from scouts, showing much more is known about it in the south than is known in the north. Preparations are even being made which will lead to the evacuation of Richmond, if it becomes necessary to save Wilmington. I will be all ready by the time indicated in your letter—high tides about the 15th of next month—but may be impelled by the preparations of the enemy in that direction to do something entirely different.

I will not fail to keep you informed, if there is an intention to do anything requiring a different disposition of the navy from what is manifested in your letter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Hon. G. V. Fox,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Hampton Roads, December 10, 1864.*

MY DEAR FOX: I hope, if the weather permits, that we will get off Monday—all we are waiting for is the powder-vessel from New York. If she don't come, we will go on to Beaufort and fill up there. Butler has just put his troops on board the transports in all the rain and storm, and is now in a great hurry to get off. I believe the troops are all negroes, and I don't expect much of them. I believe Butler is going himself to look on or direct—he had better leave it to Weitzel. They seem to have a vague idea of what they are going to do, and will take about 5,000 men, depending on the explosion to do all the work. This don't seem to me to be a soldier-like view of the case, for if the explosion should fail to do all that is expected of it, there should be troops enough to hold the point against all attacks, in case the vessels are driven off by the weather, and they should have at least twenty days' provisions with them.

They are not at all communicative as to their plans, but seem to think that everything is to be done by the navy, while I think it will be necessary to have the army go to work with their sharpshooters and invest the works. I don't believe the rebs have more than 1,500 men in the works.

I don't see why the original programme was not carried out, and the 12,000 men sent. Grant, though, has nothing to say, and Butler has it all his own fashion.

I go a good deal on luck, and will make a spoon or spoil a horn. The weather is getting to be bad, and I fear we will meet with some delays; I am glad, though, to be doing something; even if we fail, we can try it again; nothing like sticking to a thing when it is commenced.

I am sure Butler will go; the old fellow seems anxious to have a fight of some kind. All I am afraid of is his interference with General Weitzel, (who understands his business,) though Butler has always had the good sense to defer to his opinions.

I am in hopes that Sherman will keep so many of the rebs employed that we will be able to march right into Wilmington; the forts taken, and that in our hands, the old blockade hen will be killed.

Two steamers have got in this month, and three have escaped out, one

of them (the Chickamauga) loaded with cotton; so they say. This Armstrong is the best vessel we have ever captured; she is large and very fast, and was only captured by a shell setting her on fire. Of course the government will take her.

I wish they would hurry and send the soft coal to Beaufort; the captured steamers won't run by two knots as fast with hard coal.

The torpedo-boat is all ready to go somewhere; but if she goes to sea, she will have to be calked up tight and towed. I think she had better be kept for the present in James river; the smallest wave goes clean over her. The crew want drilling before they go to work, and the thing would be useless until every man knows his business.

Butler tells me in a week he is going to blow out his canal. I tell him to blow away, and make a note of it when he gets through there. He wants to know what I will do if the rebel rams get through. I tell him I will think over the matter when they do. The torpedo-boat I think could be kept there three or four weeks to perfect themselves in the use of the vessel; and if the bulk-head is blown out, she can be made useful; at all events, destroy anything that comes down, or gets aground in the river, which they often do, and are allowed quietly to get off again, instead of attacking them with sharpshooters. I have been so busy the last week with the red tape with which the navy is tied up, that I have had but little time to shove things ahead, and I am daily astonished more and more how much other people expect me to think for them, and how little they think for themselves. I have started Macomb on an expedition up the Roanoke with an army co-operation to capture Rainbow Bluffs and some ten or fifteen guns, that will leave the Roanoke open to Weldon.

The monitors had a fight with Howlett's and canal batteries the other day with excellent firing, but Saugus disabled. Parker don't seem to think her much hurt, but the engineer that came to report makes out a bad cripple. It is blowing a heavy gale, and we can't do much just now. Winter is here in earnest.

Very truly and sincerely,

DAVID D. PORTER.

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*On the destruction of Fort Caswell, and the capture of the site, by an explosion of gunpowder; and also of Fort Fisher.*

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

Washington, November 18, 1864.

It is proposed and considered practicable to destroy Forts Fisher and Caswell, or their garrisons, by blowing up a large ship loaded with gunpowder. This ship is to be conducted to the nearest point to the fort accessible to a vessel of her draught of water, and there exploded by some fuze or match under control of the parties navigating the vessel to her destination. The expectation and reliance is upon destroying the fort or its garrison by the effects of the blast of an immense quantity of powder, not less than ———, some of which it is proposed to take from damaged supplies now on hand. Such I understand to be the project on which my opinion is desired by the War Department.

Is this scheme practicable and likely to be attended with favorable results? Does it promise such reasonable results as to justify the consumption of so large an amount of our military supplies?

On examining the plans and hydrography about this work, and its approaches from the sea, it appears that no vessel drawing ten feet of water can approach nearer to the fort than 450 yards, to reach which point she must make a circuitous course, exposed to the batteries of the fort. If served with hot shot

and shells there is reason to believe she must be set on fire before she can reach the destined position. She may be sunk in attempting to reach her destination, and is liable to self-destruction by the powder being exploded by direct shot or shells from the batteries, or by fire caused by hot shot or shell. Should these projectiles strike and penetrate a wooden vessel, conflagration must follow. It is very doubtful whether men would go on board such a burning ship, so loaded with powder, to extinguish the flames; and if they did so, whether it could be subdued in parts of the ship through which a hot shot might pass and ignite the woodwork, tar, and oakum exposed to such projectiles.

Under such circumstances no other vessel is likely to approach her, either to divert and draw off the enemy's fire, or give assistance in extinguishing the flames. It is possible that naval skill and genius may overcome some of these difficulties, but it is not probable that all of them could or would be surmounted, exposed as the vessel would be to quite formidable batteries in the fort commanded by an officer, Whiting, who is known to possess a knowledge of the efficiency of hot and hollow shot.

Admitting the probability of this vessel being satisfactorily moored at the selected site nearest to the fort, and that the fuze explodes the powder at the desired moment, we find that the horizontal action of the powder thus exploded, whatever it may be, acts first upon the inclined plane forming the glacis of the fort, composed of a solid mass of earth more than 450 yards in length, and rising gradually to the height of 26 feet above the water.

The armament of the fort is in part behind and below this hill. Back of it, about 60 feet, is a ditch filled with water, the side of which ditch is lined or faced with a masonry wall of six to ten feet thick, behind and against which rises another sand-hill—the rampart—to the height of 34 feet above low water, and behind and below which is an additional armament of heavy guns. Behind and below the last sand-hill—rampart—is the bomb-proof barrack, the eaves of which are 31 feet above low water, and 3 feet below the crest of the rampart which entirely surrounds this barrack. The walls of this building, occupied as a barrack by the garrison, are four feet thick, no part of which can be seen from the water or be *struck by any projectile*, other than that of curved fire.

The blast of a large quantity of powder is relied upon to ascend this sand-hill, pass over the ditch, and then descend into the body of the fort, strike and demolish the four-foot walls of the barrack, and bury the garrison in its ruins. If its power can be relied upon to descend into the body of the fort, where alone it can injure the garrison who may choose to seek its protection, it would previously have descended into the ditch and there harmlessly expended its force.

I can find no reason to believe that these solid masses or sand-hills, and massive walls distant more than 450 yards from the site of the powder explosion, are to be removed or destroyed, or in any way injuriously acted upon by the air or atmosphere as a *projectile* propelled by the explosion of any quantity of powder.

All our experience goes to show that the *atmosphere* can only be used as a motive power by condensing it within circumscribed limits and then giving vent to it, as in an air-gun; or by rapidly heating it within similar limits and by sudden expansion act upon a solid in immediate contact, as in the Ericsson engine.

To put the air in motion, and hope to batter and destroy any solid or substantial structure by any motion we can impart to the surrounding atmosphere, is contrary to our belief. The hurricane or tornado, combining the spiral with continued or prolonged action, we know to be capable of destroying vertical opposing surfaces of light structure; but such a continuous prolonged action cannot be given to the atmosphere by any power within the control of man.

The power of the atmosphere put in motion and continued during a moderate breeze is .08 of an ounce on a square foot; during a fresh gale it is 5lb. 3oz.;

during a hurricane it is 31lbs. 3oz.; and during a most violent tornado which destroys forests and wooden buildings, and unroofs others, it is 46lbs. 1oz. per foot, moving with a velocity of 97.5 miles per hour. Such a power—and the greatest we know of from a blast of wind—has never been known to disturb or injure such structures as those we are now considering.

It is hoped to raise a breeze or hurricane at a distance of 450 yards from the object to be destroyed, by suddenly and momentarily upheaving the atmosphere at a point, without any means of conducting its force to the desired objects, which force when it arrives at the distance of a quarter of a mile has to be vastly greater than wind or the atmosphere has ever been known to move.

We have some facts connected with the expansive force of gunpowder bearing upon this point. When confined at the bottom of the bore of a gun, say a 42-pounder, its expansive power is about 36,420 pounds on the square inch; give it, however, an air space of 14 inches, or that distance in which to expand its power, and its force is but 15,850 pounds on the square inch; and give it still more space—42 inches—in which to expand itself, and the force is but 6,470 pounds on the square inch; thus decreasing its expansive power from 36,420 pounds to 6,470 pounds, or 29,950 pounds in the short distance of 42 inches, and that in the confined space of the bore of a gun. Again, when the air space is *twenty times greater* than the space occupied by the powder, the force of the powder is but 1,066 pounds to the square inch. When but ten times greater, it is increased to 2,525 pounds per square inch; and when the powder is equal to half that of air space, the force is increased to 32,200 pounds to the square inch.

When the powder fills and occupies the whole space, without any air space about it, as in an iron sphere (shell) so filled, the force is increased to 113,000 pounds to the square inch.

In the case under consideration, the powder occupies the space equal to the hold of a vessel, and that of the air is infinite. Unless, then, we can conduct this expansive force of the powder in the vessel, immense as it may be, by a tube or other means, to the object to be destroyed, or by means of an immense projectile in contact with the powder, we can expect no result calculated to destroy the garrison, and much less any of the solid ramparts and massive walls distant a quarter of a mile from the centre of the power proposed to be used; a power that decreases rapidly with the distance from the object to be overcome.

In all cases to which reference will now be made, the projectile force of the powder acting upon solid masses in immediate contact with powder, thus making these solids the projectiles, they (the solids) have been the cause of injury; and in no case has the air been the projectile put in motion by the explosion that destroyed or injured buildings remote therefrom.

The reflux of the atmosphere filling the vacuum suddenly created by exploding the powder has in every case been the cause of forcing *open and outwards* doors, &c.; but the motion of translation or propulsion from the explosion through the medium of the elastic vapor of the atmosphere is not perceptible to any injurious degree.

I consider that the explosion of a vessel-load of gunpowder at the nearest point it can approach Fort Caswell or Fort Fisher can produce no useful result towards the reduction of those works, and that no such vessels as are proposed to be so loaded can be navigated and placed at the nearest points to these forts, provided the fort is garrisoned and its guns are served with hollow projectiles and hot shot.

Fort Fisher is another work proposed to be destroyed with its garrison in the same manner as Fort Caswell. The work is situated on a sand-hill about the light-house at the northern entrance into Cape Fear river. It is unlike Fort Caswell in being formed exclusively of earthen or sand ramparts and ditch, without masonry, retaining its shape from the slopes given to the parapets, scarps, and counterscarps, with the aid of gabions and other temporary expedients. Our knowledge of it is imperfect; but enough is known to enable us

to form as correct a judgment of the effects of the proposed explosion in the open sea in front of it as though we possessed as much detail as in the preceding case of Fort Caswell.

The distance of Fort Fisher from the water is not known with certainty. The light-house, situated in this fort or immediately adjacent thereto, was, at the date of our last survey, (1856,) 440 yards from the water-line on a north 65° east course; and the nearest point to which a vessel drawing 12 feet water could float was nine hundred and fifty (950) yards on the same course—very nearly double the distance of Fort Caswell, and hence exposed to much less liability to injury from the proposed explosion.

All my remarks in relation to the destruction of Fort Caswell are hence applicable to Fort Fisher, modified by this increased distance, and diminishing the probability of injuring it or its garrison by the explosion.

I will now give several instances of the explosion of large quantities of gun-powder, and the recorded results of effect produced, in exemplification of the preceding views:

1st. Explosion of the magazine at Fort Lyons, of the defences of Washington, on the 9th of June, 1863. The floor of this magazine was 9 feet below the parade of the fort. The space for powder was 64' × 7' × 7', covered on top with logs of 15 inches square by 18 feet long, and above them 8 feet of earth, (in thickness.) The amount of powder in the magazine was 17,500 pounds in barrels, besides which there was ammunition prepared for 900 cartridges for 32-pounders, 750 ditto for 24-pounders, and 500 ditto for 30-pounder Parrott guns, and about 200 rounds for field-pieces. The earth over and on top of the magazine was scattered in every direction, principally upwards. It fell in considerable quantities at a distance of 400 to 500 yards; other portions of earth were thrown to the right and left and deposited immediately alongside the out-lines of the magazine. The logs on top of the powder-room were thrown in every direction. Some pieces were thrown to a great distance—in one case, to 600 yards. The breadth of the cavity in the earth formed by this explosion was about 45 feet on top. The explosion *did not affect the other earthwork of the fort* to any material extent, although it surrounded this magazine on three sides, and not more than 80 feet from the magazine, rising several feet above it. One gun on the rampart was thrown (rolled) into battery and tipped forward with its muzzle resting on the parapet. The loaded shells in the magazine were thrown to various distances, in one case as far as 2,500 yards. The wooden buildings and tents used as officers' quarters, placed near the magazine, were entirely destroyed. At the time of the explosion *most of the garrison were in the bomb-proof*, which opens on the front opposite the magazine, and about *seventy-five feet from it*; *all the officers and men therein escaped uninjured*. At a house 350 yards from the magazine the glass of the windows was blown violently IN and the doors OUT. The walls were started OUT and TOWARDS *the magazine*, in one case more than an inch, while the whole house was settled unevenly on its foundations. Several persons were lifted up and thrown to some distance, in one instance about 150 yards, escaping with slight bruises, while others sustained scarcely a mark on their bodies.

2d. Another example of the explosion of a depot of powder of recent date occurred at City Point. A canal-boat moored alongside the wharf contained all the surplus ammunition, amounting to not less than eight tons, (19,920 lbs.,) some of it in boxes, which may not all have exploded. There seemed to have been but one explosion. A similar canal-boat or barge was moored against and on the outside of the one loaded with powder, &c. The wharf was built on piles. On the wharf was a wooden storehouse, one story in height. About three hundred feet of this wharf was destroyed. The storehouse was blown down. It contained quartermaster's and commissary stores. A loaded railroad train was on the track on the opposite side of the wharf. The engineer was on

his engine. Neither the train, engine, or engineer were injured. Across the railroad, about one hundred and sixty-five yards from the explosion, stood some light wooden buildings, sutlers' tents, &c. All of these were blown down, or so much injured that they were torn down. Several persons were killed in and around these buildings. Fragments of the boat were thrown some 500 yards, of a size and with a velocity sufficient to kill a man. My informant was in his tent, about 550 yards from the explosion. He felt the shock very sensibly, but received no injury except from pieces of projectiles.

A small boat alongside the barge next to the one blown up contained several men. The boat was capsized, and some of the men slightly injured. No case of injury to any individual could be found, except struck with some projectile.

3d. An explosion occurred in July, 1848, on board a schooner at the levee opposite the city of New Orleans, loaded with 656 boxes of ammunition and other boxes of ordnance stores. It took place after one hundred and forty-one boxes of the ordnance stores had been unloaded and reshipped on board a steamer alongside the schooner, destroying the schooner, killing one and wounding another man on board. No injury was done to the several other vessels in the immediate neighborhood, to the steamer alongside, or the buildings on shore.

4th. In the vicinity of New York, two instances of explosions are within my recollection.

The one a powder magazine near the navy yard at Brooklyn, which exploded about the year 1807, throwing pieces of the building into the city of New York and about the city of Brooklyn, producing no injury, so far as I can now ascertain, to the buildings by the explosion of the powder. The second case occurred about 1830. The steam frigate *Fulton*, the first vessel of this character ever built, (finished and in service in 1814,) was injured by the explosion of her magazine while moored on the flats at the navy yard. The quantity of powder on board was small, and although enough to destroy much of the vessel, it did no injury to surrounding objects. The vessel had timber sides of several feet thick, floated on the hulls, with water-wheels between them.

5th. At Dupont's powder-mills, near Wilmington, Delaware, there have been numerous explosions from time to time. The injury done beyond the immediate locality of the mill or depots has been from fragments of the building in which the powder was stored or being manufactured, and no material injury from concussion or blast of powder.

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6th. The recent test of the 20-inch gun at Fort Hamilton, near New York, was another instance where the effect of the blast of powder was observed with a charge of one hundred and twenty-five pounds of powder. Men were stationed directly on the line of fire distant about seventy-five feet from the muzzle, and screened by the river bank that arose about twenty feet above their heads, and about twenty-eight feet below the level of the axes of the gun prolonged. They experienced no inconvenience from the blast.

7th. Referring to European experience, I may call your attention to the depot magazine of the French army at the siege of Sebastopol in the Mamelon Vert, in 1855. It contained 15,400 pounds of powder. It occupied the centre of the work, was sunk below the parade and made bomb-proof above and around by earth and logs, similar, in most respects, to that of Fort Lyon. It formed a crater extending to the limits of the *terre-plein* of this small work, but did no material injury to the rampart or even the parapets. Two batteries, distant 50 yards from the centre of the magazine, were injured, 140 men killed and wounded, some by the first effect of the explosion, others by the masses of earth, stone, and timbers that were carried a considerable distance. Beams were thrown inside the Russian lines.

8th. In 1840 the English and Turkish fleets bombarded St. Jean d'Acre,

blowing up an extensive arsenal within the limits of the defences. It was situated *in the ditch*, with *ramparts on each side*, about *fifty feet* from the building. The explosions formed an exterior crater extending under the two ramparts, making a breach in each of them, and killing and wounding about 1,600 men at the moment of the explosion on the rampart adjacent to the arsenal. The quantity of powder in this extensive building could not be ascertained, although it was known to fill the building, with some exposed in the court-yard in the open air. The mass of stone, earth, and timber appears to have caused the death of the troops.

9th. We have numerous instances of the blowing up of ships-of-the-line, as the French admiral's ship off Aboukir, and of the Turkish admiral's ship at Navarino, where destruction of the ships was entire and complete, but no effect is known or supposed to have followed from the explosion of the gases, acting upon the surrounding atmosphere.

10th. The square tower of Brescia, of 70 feet in height and 18 feet "out to out," was destroyed in 1769 by the explosion of gunpowder stored within it as a magazine, containing at the time 160,000 pounds (French) of powder. Within a radius of 100 toises, 190 houses were destroyed; within a radius of 300 toises, 500 houses were greatly injured, 308 persons were killed, and 500 wounded. A stone, weighing 150 pounds, was thrown one Italian mile. The walls of this building were 4' 9" (French) thick. It was two stories high, separated by a masonry arch.

11th. A magazine exploded during the siege of Almeida, Spain, containing 150,000 pounds (French) of powder. The cathedral, distant 165 metres, was destroyed and 500 inhabitants buried in the ruins of the adjacent buildings. The French trenches were filled with the ruins and large masses of stone, and pieces of the heaviest calibre were thrown in the country over the ramparts. Three-quarters of this small town, within a radius of 200 metres, was destroyed. The trenches, at the time, were from 600 to 800 metres distant. The fortifications of the place, however, were uninjured. The city contained but 1,500 inhabitants.

12th. *Frith, on the Thames, England.*—In October, 1864, on the south bank of the Thames, between Erith and Woolwich, two powder magazines and two barges loaded with powder exploded, killing eight or nine persons and wounding others. The quantity of powder in the largest magazine, (Hall's,) of 50 feet square, in two floors, was 750 barrels; and in the smaller one, (Lowood's,) of 28' by 48', was 90 barrels; and in the two barges, then at the wharves, 200 barrels; making the total quantity exploded about 104,000 pounds.

The two magazines were 135 feet from each other, situated on the edge of the river, immediately behind the dike. The two barges were moored alongside the wharves or jetties, one of which projected into the river 122 feet, and the other 120 feet. Connected with these two magazines were three cottages occupied by workmen and their families. One of them, Raynor's, was 71 yards from Hall's magazine; another, occupied by York, was 70 yards; and the third, occupied by Silver, was 50 yards from the Lowood magazine.

The two magazines and three houses situated as above were upon a tract of 20 acres of ground, and *the only buildings within a mile of the disaster*. There were three distinct explosions; the first on board the barges, which tore asunder the large magazine, which latter caused the smaller one to explode. Of these magazines, not a single stone remained upon one another. The barges were split into fragments and hurled into the air. The embankment was destroyed, forming a crater of 75 feet in length and 30 feet deep. Raynor's cottage was entirely destroyed; himself and son were killed; his wife and daughter were dug out of the ruins alive. Silver's cottage was in ruins. In it a child was killed. Silver himself was at the back door, and thrown down by the first explosion, but not hurt, while the house was de-



stroyed by the second and third explosions; he was dug out of the ruins. No damage was done beyond the twenty acres on which the magazines and houses were built, other than breaking some panes of glass and doors. The shock was felt more or less throughout London, distant, at the nearest point, about 15 miles; and some statements give the distance as great as 40 and 50 miles to which it was felt. These facts were sworn to before the coroner's jury.

A magazine, a quarter of a mile from those blown up, was uninjured. The storekeeper and four workmen were in this magazine at the time. The second explosion knocked them down, and a piece of iron fell through the roof. Another magazine lay at a distance of a quarter of a mile further off, and a government magazine one mile, to which no injury was done. These facts sworn to as above.

RICH'D DELAFIELD,

*General, and Chief Engineer.*

CHARLES A. DANA, Esq.,

*Assistant Secretary of War.*

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[Confidential.]

WASHINGTON ARSENAL,

*Washington, D. C., November 18, 1864.*

SIR: The proposition which was under discussion last evening, viz: the destruction of the enemy's defensive works by means of exploding large masses of powder near them, appears to me to resolve itself into three parts:

- 1st. The probable effect of such an explosion on the enemy's works.
- 2d. The disposition of the powder on board the vessel.
- 3d. The means of igniting it.

First. The amount of powder I understand has been fixed at 200 tons; and the distance at which the explosion is to take place will be about 100 yards from the object. If these conditions are fulfilled, I think the work will be seriously damaged by the explosion of its principal magazines, and the traverses and bomb-proofs may be shattered or overturned. It appears to me, however, that there will be great difficulty in getting so near the object, if the enemy are vigilant, even in the darkest night. A few light balls will be sufficient to light up a space of several hundred yards in front of the enemy's works; and the offensive operations will be clearly seen by the enemy, and the powder-vessel will become an easy mark for his heaviest guns before it can be brought into position.

Second. The greatest explosive effect is produced by powder when it is confined in a space equal to its own volume. The powder to be used, therefore, should be taken out of the barrels and placed in a timber box just sufficient to hold it. A box of 19 feet linear dimensions, I think, will be large enough to contain 400,000 pounds, or 200 tons; or an oblong box 10 feet high, 20 feet wide, and 32 feet long, will suffice to contain it. The effect of the explosion would be the greatest, I think, if this box be placed above and near the surface of the water, or nearly on a level with the object.

It would be well to have the powder box well covered up with sand-bags as a protection against the enemy's fire and to confine the gases until the combustion is more nearly completed than it would be if fixed in the open air, or under ordinary pressure.

Third. It strikes me that the best means of firing the powder would be one of Beardslee's magneto-electric machines which he has devised for this purpose. Two or three of such machines might be usefully employed, acting independently of each other, to make the explosion more sure.

The little attention and thought which I have been able to give this subject, and the absence of all practical experience in the effect of such explosions, will, I fear, make my opinion of little practical value; such as it is, you are welcome to it.

Yours truly,

J. G. BENTON, *Major of Ordnance.*

Captain H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau of Ordnance,*  
*United States Navy, Washington, D. C.*

While the discussion of the details of the plan was going on at Washington, the following were received at the Navy Department from Rear-Admiral Porter and Major General Butler.

Extract from a telegram dated Fortress Monroe, 20th November, 1864, 11.30 p. m.:

"I think the Louisiana will do for our purpose. Have ordered her from the sound to Beaufort, to take out everything but her boilers and machinery. The material had better be sent to Beaufort at once.

"D. D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

"Hon. G. V. FOX, *Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*"

[Cipher.]

To Major General B. F. BUTLER,

*Commanding Army of the James, Bermuda Hundred:*

Can you send one hundred and fifty tons to Beaufort, when wanted? Vessel is preparing there for three hundred tons.

G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

The immediate answer to the above does not appear upon record; but on the 4th December, 1864, the following was received:

To Captain G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy:*

By calling on Mr. Henry S. Wells, 137 Broadway, New York, a large quantity of mining powder can be procured at once. If you desire to order it, Colonel Serret, one of my engineer officers, at 51 Washington Place, New York, will do it.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,

*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,

9 p. m. *December 4, 1864.*

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*Confidential report with respect to the effect of gunpowder when exploded in large quantities, and not covered and confined.*

NAVY ORDNANCE YARD,  
*Washington City, November 23, 1864.*

No direct experiments have ever been made on this subject with powder in an unconfined state, though there are many records of its effects produced in mines.

In recalling the effects of various accidental explosions, we may, however, have some means of comparing its effects.

First, as most completely authenticated, are the explosions occurring before Sevastopol during the siege. Two of the service magazines in the French batteries, one containing 4,000 pounds, the other 3,000 pounds of powder, exploded, killing a few men, stunning some others, but doing no damage to the guns, and but little to the batteries. A still greater explosion of an English magazine, containing — pounds, caused a much wider-spread damage, but produced no direct effects beyond a radius of 250 yards. Very considerable damage was caused at great distances by the secondary effect of the explosion of many live shells thrown to distant places, and there exploding.

Secondly, the great explosion at Erith. Here, as before, the intense effect was essentially local, and no damage produced except to buildings beyond a quarter of a mile; even individuals distant half a mile suffered no ill effects.

In short, the lateral effect is very limited except upon vertical surfaces, and here it appears to be principally produced by the reaction of confined air, as evidenced by the fact that glass of windows, and all walls beyond the immediate vicinity, always fall towards the point of explosion.

For these reasons I do not consider that any serious damage can be produced beyond 500 yards by the quantity proposed. If attempted, it should be placed in a vessel of light draught and stored above water, the force increased as much as possible by a covering of sand-bags, and these again with live shells, to obtain as great a secondary effect as possible. The most certain mode of causing the explosion would be by the use of several wires, using several of Beardslee's machines.

In addition, half a dozen arrangements, depending on clockwork, should be made to determine an ultimate explosion in the event of a failure of the wires. Finally, the vessel could always be blown up by firing at her after daylight.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. N. JEFFERS,

*Lieut. Commander in charge Expl. Dept.*

Commander H. A. WISE,

*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.*

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[Memorandum.]

To consider the foregoing papers, and discuss the subject generally, Mr. Fox, on the evening of the 23d November, 1864, assembled the following named officers at the residence of Captain Wise:

General Dyer, United States army; Colonel Maynadier, United States army; Major Benton, United States army; Lieutenant Commander Aulick, United States navy; Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, United States navy; Lieutenant Commander Ives, United States navy.

The following propositions were submitted and discussed *seriatim*:

1. To explode on board a vessel 300 tons of gunpowder for the purpose of destroying either Fort Fisher or Fort Caswell.
2. How near would it be safe for the operator to be who explodes the powder?
3. The manner of producing the explosion; shall it be done by Beardslee's or some other battery, or by the Gomez or other fuze?
4. How shall the powder be stored? What the character of the vessel?
5. What would be the effect upon persons in the fort not injured by falling timbers, stones, &c., at a distance of 500 yards?
6. Suppose 300 tons were exploded in a vessel on shore (aground) at Federal Point, what would be the effect upon the earthworks on that point, and the people in them?

1st proposition. The discussion began with a question by General Dyer, that supposing the explosion is effected, will we gain the advantages sought?

Mr. Fox explained, in substance, that if the explosion would deprive the people in the forts of all power to resist for a period of two or three hours, ample time would thereby be afforded for the fleet to pass. The navy should therefore be ready to move forward immediately, using light draught vessels to lift torpedoes, &c.

The principal object in view was to silence and destroy or occupy the forts, and thus get command of the mouth of the river, and put an end to all blockade-running. This would place Wilmington in the same condition as Mobile. The possession of Federal Point would give us the key to the whole position. The contemplated draught of the powder-boat would be twelve feet, and her nearest approach estimated at 450 yards.

(The discussion of the first proposition naturally entered into that of all the others, and was followed during the entire interview.)

2d proposition. The answer agreed upon to this was that a safe distance for the operator would be five (5) miles.

3d proposition. In considering this the probability of failure was kept in view, and it was remarked that the Beardslee apparatus experienced difficulties in its operations at Norfolk in removing piles. It was finally decided, however, to make use of several of these machines with separate and distinct wires leading to different parts of the mass of powder; and at the same time to use the Gomez fuze, and several arrangements of clockwork, in order to insure an ultimate success.

4th proposition. The conclusion reached in relation to this was, that the powder should be stored as much above water as it could be with due regard to the safety of the vessel; to be put up in sacks or bags of 100 pounds each, and placed in separate bins communicating with each other, the bins to be lined with tin, hermetically sealed and surmounted with bags of sand on the outsides and top.

The vessel should be a large steamer of light draught, accompanied by a small tug to bring off the crew.

5th proposition. The answers to this were of course only conjectural; but the opinion was that the explosion would lift the covering of the bomb-proofs, and have a demoralizing and great physical effect upon the garrison.

And this proposition, in connexion with the direct question embraced in proposition six, was thus answered:

That the explosion would injure the earthworks to a very great extent, render the guns unserviceable for a time, and probably affect the garrison to such a degree as to deprive them of power to resist the passage of naval vessels by the forts and the carrying of these works by immediate assault.

Finally, it was unanimously decided that, taking into consideration the great importance of the question, and the advantages to be derived from a successful result as compared with the outlay of means necessary to make the experiment, the effort should be made by exploding a mass of 300 tons of gunpowder in a vessel as near the earthworks on Federal Point as it might be possible to do.

WASHINGTON, *November 23, 1864.*

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[Strictly confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 2, 1864.*

SIR: I have been directed by the Navy Department to request your opinion as to the best description of galvanic or other battery for exploding, with certainty, a large quantity—say 300 tons—of gunpowder, which it may per-

haps be necessary to do in the course of the naval and military operations now in progress.

It is proposed that the operator, in order to insure his perfect safety, should be from eight to ten miles distant at the moment of explosion; and the battery to be used must then be such a one as will be certain to act at that distance.

Beardslee's electro-magnetic apparatus has been recommended, and some experiments in exploding mines were made with it, which were considered very successful; but as, in the case now under discussion, it would be necessary to operate upon or under water, the department desires your opinion as to the method of explosion by means of this or some other instrument which you may suggest.

Please give this your immediate attention, and, if possible, let me have your reply to-morrow.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Prof. JOSEPH HENRY,  
*Sec. of the Smithsonian Inst., Washington, D. C.*

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SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE,  
*December 5, 1864.*

SIR: In reply to your confidential letter of December 2, I write to state that from all the facts which I have obtained from your communication and the conference with yourself and the other gentlemen I met in your office on Saturday, I am of the opinion that a current of induction from a Rumkorff coil would be best adapted to the purpose intended.

If the use of this instrument is adopted, it will be essential to success that the conducting wire be well insulated; since, to produce the desired effect, a current of considerable intensity as well as quantity will be required.

I shall be ready at all times to give your bureau any information on this or any other subject which may be in my possession.

I have, &c.,

JOSEPH HENRY.

H. A. WISE, *U. S. N., &c., &c., &c.*

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[Memorandum.]

On the 26th November, 1864, Assistant Secretary Fox, accompanied by Commander Wise, U. S. N.; Major Benton, U. S. A.; Lieut. Commander Jeffers, and Lieutenant Ives, U. S. N., proceeded in the ordnance steamer Baltimore to Hampton roads for the purpose of a consultation with Rear-Admiral Porter on the subject-matter and details of the intended powder explosion.

At this interview Major General Butler was also present and took part in the discussion.

Before leaving Fortress Monroe, and while awaiting the arrival of Rear-Admiral Porter from City Point, the following letter, and the papers alluded to therein, were intrusted to Captain Alden, of the Brooklyn, for delivery to Rear-Admiral Porter:

U. S. ORDNANCE STEAMER BALTIMORE,  
*Fortress Monroe, Va., November 27, 1864.*

SIR: The accompanying papers in relation to the contemplated operations against the fort at Wilmington, N. C., are intrusted confidentially to Captain

Alden, commanding the Brooklyn, to be handed to you by him for your consideration.

They contain all the information bearing upon the subject which the department has been able to collect, together with a memorandum of the conclusions reached after careful deliberation.

The department desires your own opinion upon the plan proposed in that memorandum; and the Bureau of Ordnance will render you all the aid you may require in conducting the operations.

By order of the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, U. S. N.,

*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, Hampton Roads, Va.*

NOTE.—The papers alluded to were the memorandum of General Delafield, the memorandum of the consultation held at Captain Wise's residence, and the letters of Major Benton and Lieutenant Commander Jeffers.

The following letters and telegrams relating to the equipment of the powder-boat, and assembling the requisite quantity of powder with which to load her, indicate the manner in which the Navy Department endeavored to hasten the execution of the design agreed upon:

[Cipher—Confidential.]

*Telegram from Navy Department.*

FORTRESS MONROE, *December 2, 1864—1.15 p. m.*

To Rear-Admiral PORTER, *Commanding N. A. B. Squadron:*

Your despatch of the 30th of November to Commander Wise has been shown me. If Grant moves twelve (12,) as originally intended, is not the other matter necessarily void?

G. V. FOX,

*Assistant Secretary.*

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,

*U. S. Flag-Ship Malvern, Hampton Roads, November 30, 1864.*

SIR: Grant says he will forward troops as originally intended, 12,000 men to attack Wilmington, and will move when I am ready.

I am ready now. In that case it would be better to send some one here from Washington to fit up the powder-vessel.

I never keep a soldier waiting.

Truly, &c.,

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral.*

Commander H. A. WISE,

*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, Washington.*

DECEMBER 1, 1864.

To Commander H. A. WISE:

The vessel is waiting for the powder and bags, clockwork, and fuzes.

DAVID D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral.*

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
December 2, 1864.

SIR: Referring to your telegram of yesterday, the powder-bags will be furnished by the army as soon as possible, and the *clockwork* will be ready and sent to you in season.

It is to be distinctly understood, however, that the navy share of the powder is *not* to exceed 150 tons, and this is now on hand at the Fort Norfolk magazine. It can be used if there is *great urgency* for it; but the bureau will endeavor to get a large quantity of second-class powder down to you from the northern yards in the course of a week from this date. In any event, however, if the army is unable to furnish the whole of its share, the quantity (150 tons) named above may be exceeded in a small amount from the navy stock.

Your despatch of the 30th ultimo has just been received, and the Baltimore will be immediately sent back with Lieutenant Commander Jeffers and an army officer of experience to arrange the details of the powder-vessel, and the Baltimore will be directed to remain subject to your orders.

I am, &amp;c., &amp;c.,

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, U. S. N.,

*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, Fortress Monroe, Va.*

Endorsement on the telegram received from Admiral Porter, dated head quarters army of James, December 2, 1864—6 p. m.:

"Everything is being done with the utmost vigor by the bureau."

"The moment the Baltimore arrives she will take on board Jeffers and Rodman, and with a barge in tow loaded with about 250 barrels of powder and the Birney fluid, proceed at once to Norfolk to prepare the Louisiana for service."

H. A. WISE.

DECEMBER 3, 1864.

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE JAMES,

December 2, 1864—6 p. m.

Hon. G. V. FOX, *Assistant Secretary of the Navy* :

I have just seen General Grant. He can only send 5,000. He depends upon the Louisiana. She is at the yard. Will you send an order to work on her night and day. Admiral Smith has ordered no night-work. Wise better send everything at once.

D. D. PORTER,

*Rear-Admiral U. S. N.*

## BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,

December 3, 1864.

To Rear-Admiral PORTER, *Com'dg N. A. B. Squadron, Fort Monroe, Va.* :

Your telegram to Mr. Fox of this a. m. received. Everything is being done by the bureau with the utmost vigor. The moment the Baltimore arrives she will leave again with Jeffers and Rodman to assist in fitting out the Louisiana. The Stromboli is on her way to you with eighty (80) torpedoes on board and two (2) of Beardslee's clock movements. If you have not Beardslee near you let me know.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

[Telegram from Hampton Roads.]

To Commander WISE :

Beardslee is not here. I have telegraphed to Butler for him.

D. D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

NOTE.—Mr. Beardslee was summoned from New York subsequently, to Washington, and his services engaged.

HAMPTON ROADS, *December 3, 1864.*

Hon. G. V. FOX :

I am just down from the gap. Telegraphed you from there. The Louisiana will be ready to-morrow night, and we are waiting for the important material.

DAVID D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

*Telegrams in reference to chartering a steamer to take the second-class powder from the northern yards.*

DECEMBER 2, 1864—11 a. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Boston, Mass. :*

Can you charter a swift steamer to load with one thousand (1,000) barrels of powder to be taken up at the different navy yards? Answer immediately.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS, *December 2, 1864—5.30 a. m.*

To H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau :*

Telegram received. Have sent to Boston about steamers. Will answer as soon as information is received.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 2, 1864.*

To H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau :*

The only steamer to be chartered in Boston that can carry one thousand (1,000) barrels of powder is the George Shattuck, that runs between Boston and Provincetown.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

DECEMBER 3, 1864—10.15 a. m.

To Rear-Admiral STRINGHAM, *Commandant Navy Yard, Boston :*

Telegram of yesterday received. Charter the steamer George Shattuck to carry one thousand (1,000) barrels of powder, and direct the ordnance officer to put on board of her all the compressed and number five (5) powder he has on hand. Then despatch her to the Portsmouth navy yard with orders to report to the commandant. Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

DECEMBER 3, 1864—10.20 a. m.

To Commodore THEO. BAILEY,

*Commandant Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H. :*

The steamer George Shattuck, under charter, has been ordered to Portsmouth. On her arrival direct the ordnance officer to put on board of her all the com-



pressed powder he has on hand, then despatch her immediately to New York naval magazine, at Ellis's island. Let her have a red flag to designate her. She must not be delayed for a moment.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 3, 1864—5.30 p. m.*

To H. A. WISE :

Your telegram received. Steamer will be chartered and despatched without delay.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 3, 1864—7 p. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE :

By telegram for shipment of powder is it to be understood to include Smith & Rand number five (5) potash powder?

J. S. MISSROON,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

DECEMBER 4, 1864—10.15 a. m.

To Commodore MISSROON, U. S. N., *Navy Yard, Boston :*

Telegram of yesterday received. Include the Smith & Rand No. five (5) powder in the shipment.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

In order to hasten the delivery of a supply of the second-class powder at Fortress Monroe, it was decided not to send the George Shattuck to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and consequently the following telegram was sent to the commandant of the Boston navy yard :

DECEMBER 4, 1864—10.50 a. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Boston, Massachusetts :*

Do not send the steamer Shattuck to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, but order her direct to the naval magazine, New York harbor. Telegraph the bureau the moment she sails. Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

And to Portsmouth the following :

DECEMBER 4, 1864—10.50. a. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire :*

The order for the steamer to go to Portsmouth for powder has been countermanded.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 4—2.30 p. m.*

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau :*

Your telegram of this date is received. By some mistake the George Shattuck sailed from Provincetown before your second telegram arrived. Will be back to-morrow, and your order will be obeyed.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

DECEMBER 6, 1864—11 a. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Boston* :

Has the George Shattuck returned from Provincetown and received the powder? Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 6, 1864—2 p. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE, *Chief Bureau Ordnance.*

The agent of the steamer George Shattuck refuses to charter the steamer unless the government furnishes an engineer and two (2) firemen. The steamer Bat can be got ready for this service by Thursday. Please answer.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

DECEMBER 6, 1864—2.35 p. m.

To Rear-Admiral STRINGHAM, *Commandant Navy Yard, Boston* :

Telegram received. The Navy Department desires you to get the Bat ready immediately. Put the powder on board at once and send her off under the same instructions as given for the George Shattuck. Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

DECEMBER 6, 1864—2.45 p. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H.* :

Direct the ordnance officer to send immediately by rail to Boston all the compressed powder he has on hand. Let him communicate with the ordnance officer at Boston, and use every exertion to forward the powder. There must be no delay. Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 6, 1864—5.20 p. m.*

To Commander H. A. WISE :

The charter-party for the G. H. Shattuck has been signed, and the vessel will go this p. m.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 6, 1864—5.25 p. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE :

Your telegram is received. The George Shattuck is taking in the powder, and will sail to-night.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 6, 1864—11 p. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE :

The powder is on board the George Shattuck. Will sail to-night or to-morrow morning.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 6, 1864—12 p. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE:

Your telegram relating to compressed powder from Portsmouth to go by the Bat is received, and shall be attended to.

J. S. MISSROON,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 8, 1864—9.40 a. m.*

To Captain H. A. WISE:

The George Shattuck left this port at half past eight last night.

S. H. STRINGHAM,  
*Commandant.*

NAVY YARD, BOSTON, *December 8, 1864—10.15 a. m.*

To Commodore MISSROON, U. S. N.:

Has the George Shattuck sailed for New York, and did the powder from Portsmouth reach you in time for her? Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

CHARLESTOWN, MASS., *December 8, 1864—9.25 p. m.*

To Captain WISE, *Chief Bureau of Ordnance:*

Telegram received. The George Shattuck sailed for New York with near sixteen thousand (16,000) pounds of powder from this station at eight and a half o'clock last evening. Powder from Portsmouth did not arrive in time for her, and is to be shipped by the Bat on Saturday—about ten thousand (10,000) pounds.

The following is the amount of powder put on board the Shattuck at Boston, as per invoice dated december 6, 1864:

204 10-pound charges compressed powder.

1, 142 3 $\frac{1}{4}$  " " " "

417 2 " " " "

972 1 " " " "

84 barrels Smith & Rand, No. 5.

Total, 15,953 $\frac{1}{2}$  pounds.

J. S. MISSROON, *Inspector of Ordnance.*

DECEMBER 8, 1864—10.25 a. m.

To Rear-Admiral PAULDING, *Commandant Navy Yard, New York:*

Inform the ordnance officer that the steamer George Shattuck sailed from Boston for New York last night. Let him keep a lookout for her, and be ready to put the powder on board without a moment's delay, and despatch her the instant she is loaded to Philadelphia. Report by telegraph when she arrives and leaves.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

DECEMBER 8, 1864—10.10 a. m.

To Captain BERRIEN, *Commandant Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.:*

Inform Lieutenant Commander Jeffers that the powder-steamer is now in New York, and will probably reach Hampton roads on next Saturday evening or Sunday, and to carry out my views in regard to the powder as far as practicable.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

DECEMBER 9, 1864—10.45 a. m.

To Captain GANSEVOORT, *Navy Yard, New York* :

Has the steamer George Shattuck arrived at the magazine? Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

DECEMBER 9, 1864—3 p. m.

To Captain GANSEVOORT, *Navy Yard, New York* :

The bureau waits an answer to its telegram of this morning in relation to the steamer George Shattuck. Reply immediately.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

NEW YORK, *December 9, 1864*—4.20 p. m.

To Commander WISE, *Chief of Bureau* :

Telegram received. The steamer George Shattuck has not yet arrived. We are all ready to load her upon her arrival.

W. P. BUCKNER,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

NEW YORK, *December 10, 1864*—6.25 p. m.

To Commander WISE, *Chief Bureau of Ordnance* :

The steamer George Shuttuck has just arrived.

W. P. BUCKNER,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

NEW YORK, *December 11, 1864*—1.10 p. m.

To Captain WISE :

The steamer George Shattuck is loading, and will sail to-morrow morning.

H. PAULDING,  
*Commandant.*

FORTRESS MONROE, *December 12, 1864*—12.50 p. m.

To Rear-Admiral PORTER, *Commanding N. A. Blockading Squadron* :

If the steamer George Shattuck does not arrive with the material in season let the navy's share be made up from the Fort Norfolk magazine, so as not to have a moment's delay on our account. This direction has already been given to Jeffers.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

FORTRESS MONROE, *December 11, 1864*—12 noon.

To Commander WISE :

The vessel from Boston and New York has not yet arrived. The arrangements will be completed by this evening.

W. N. JEFFERS,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

DECEMBER 11, 1864—11.20 a. m.

Captain BERRIEN, *Commanding Naval Station, Norfolk, Va. :*

Tell Lieutenant Commander Jeffers to supply himself from the Fort Norfolk magazine, if the powder-vessel now on her way does not arrive in time.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*UNITED STATES NAVY YARD,  
*Norfolk, December 12, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of 11.20 a. m., 11th instant, directing that Lieutenant Commander Jeffers supply himself from the Fort Norfolk magazine, if the powder-vessel now on her way does not arrive in time.

J. M. BERRIEN,  
*Commanding.*

Commander H. A. WISE, &amp;c., &amp;c., &amp;c.

NEW YORK, *December 11—7.10 p. m.*

To Captain WISE :

The steamer George Shattuck has all her powder on board. She is now detained to get a supply of coal and water on board. She will be ready in the morning.

W. P. BUCKNER,  
*For Inspector of Ordnance.*NEW YORK, *December 12, 1864—6.5 p. m.*To Commander WISE, *Chief of Bureau of Ordnance :*

The steamer George Shattuck sailed at three p. m. this day.

G. GANSEVOORT,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*ORDNANCE OFFICE, NAVY YARD,  
*New York, December 12, 1864.*

SIR: In obedience to orders I herewith send a report of the number of pounds of powder, of each kind, shipped by the steamer George Shattuck, viz:

200 bbls. No. 5:.....	20,000 lbs.
399 bbls. mammoth.....	39,900 lbs.

I am, &amp;c., &amp;c.,

W. P. BUCKNER,  
*Lieutenant, for Inspector of Ordnance.*Commander H. A. WISE,  
*Chief Bureau of Ordnance.*

Forwarded by A. LUDLOW CASE, for commandant.

DECEMBER 13, 1864—11.50 p. m.

To COMMANDANT *Navy Yard, Philadelphia, for Commodore HOFF :*The steamer George Shattuck sailed from New York last evening for the Fort Mifflin magazine. Let a bright lookout be kept for her, and the moment she arrives put the powder on board, and despatch her to Fortress Monroe.  
Answer.H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

PHILADELPHIA, *December 13, 1864—5 p. m.*

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau* :

Telegram received. The instructions will be complied with. Steamer not yet arrived.

HENRY H. HOFF,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

DECEMBER 15, 1864—1.40 p. m.

To Commodore HOFF, *Navy Yard, Philadelphia* :

Has the steamer George Shattuck arrived? Answer.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

PHILADELPHIA, *December 15, 1864—11.30 p. m.*

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau of Ordnance* :

Telegram received. The George Shattuck arrived on the night of the 13th, coaled and left yesterday afternoon, 14th.

H. K. HOFF.

DECEMBER 13, 1864—9.30 a. m.

To Rear-Admiral PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, Fortress Monroe, Va. :*

Telegram of last night received. The George Shattuck is probably now in Philadelphia, and cannot reach the fortress before Thursday.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

PHILADELPHIA NAVY YARD,

*Ordnance Department, December 15, 1864.*

SIR : Referring to the bureau's letter of December 3, 1864,\* I would respectfully state that the chartered steamer George Shattuck arrived at the aaval magazine, Fort Mifflin, during the night of the 13th instant. Every arrangement was made to despatch her without delay.

Not knowing the specifications of her charter, I would inform the bureau that Mr. F. S. Burditt, who was in charge of the ordnance stores, made a requisition for 15 tons of coal. This coal was supplied to the steamer immediately, and she sailed late in the afternoon of the 14th instant, with the compressed powder on board, with orders to proceed to Hampton roads and report, without delay, to Rear-Admiral Porter.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

H. K. HOFF, *Commodore, &c., &c.*

Commander H. A. WISE,

*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.*

Forwarded by J. B. HULL, commandant.

DECEMBER 16, 1864—10 a. m.

To Commander LYNCH, U. S. N., *U. S. S. St. Lawrence, off Norfolk, Va. :*

The steamer George Shattuck may be expected at any moment, as she left the Delaware river on the afternoon of the 14th. Keep a bright lookout for her, and despatch her at once, with Mr. Beardslee on board, to Beaufort, North Carolina. Inform the bureau when this is done.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

\* Total amount of compressed powder sent in the Shattuck from Philadelphia, as per invoice dated December 15, 1864, 7,165½ pounds.

NORFOLK, VA., December 15, 1864—7.15 p. m.

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau of Ordnance*:

Mr. Beardslee has arrived. The steamer Shattuck has not. The powder at Beaufort is to be used, and I am shipping more to supply its place.

D. LYNCH, *Commander*.

NORFOLK, VA., December 17—5.30 p. m.

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau*:

The Shattuck has arrived, and now lies off Craney island, coaling. As soon as ready, which I will immediately notify the bureau of, she will be despatched to Beaufort. \* \* \*

D. LYNCH, *Commander*.

NORFOLK, December 18, 1864—11 a. m.

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau*:

The boilers of steamer George Shattuck are leaking, and she will not be able to leave before Sunday night.

D. LYNCH, *Commander*.

NORFOLK, December 19—6.30 p. m.

To Commander H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau*:

The steamer George Shattuck left during the night for Beaufort. The Baltimore arrived, &c.

D. LYNCH, *Commander*.

In addition to the powder ordered from the northern yards, as much as could be spared from the stock on hand at Washington was directed to be sent down to the Fort Norfolk magazine, together with some Birney incendiary fluid asked for by Rear-Admiral Porter; and the following telegrams were sent and received in relation thereto:

DECEMBER 3, 1864—11 a. m.

To Lieutenant Commander JEFFERS, *Ordnance Yard*:

Charter a schooner to take down the mammoth and number five (5) cannon powder and the Birney fluid to Fortress Monroe. Schooner to be towed by the Baltimore. Let it be done immediately. Answer.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau*.

NAVY YARD, Washington, December 3, 1864—12.20 p. m.

To Commander WISE:

Telegram received. Have taken the schooner J. R. Conover, now at the navy yard, of two hundred tons, at twenty-five dollars per day. There is another schooner here of about the same size if wanted. Please answer.

F. P. IVES, *Assistant Inspector*.

DECEMBER 3, 1864—1.5 p. m.

To Lieutenant Commander JEFFERS, *Ordnance Yard*:

Telegram received. The schooner J. R. Conover will answer. Don't want the other. Load the Conover at once with all the mammoth number five (5) and Smith & Rand powder on hand, together with the Birney fluid, and keep her in readiness to be towed down.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau*.

NAVY YARD, *Washington, December 3—4 p. m.*

To Commander WISE :

Telegram received. There will be about 500 barrels of powder and from 50 to 60 barrels of Birney fluid. Preparations for loading are going on.

W. N. JEFFERS.

DECEMBER 4, 1864—10.25 a. m.

To Lieutenant Commander JEFFERS, *Ordnance Yard :*

The schooner Conover must be loaded to-night and ready to leave in tow of the Baltimore. Answer.

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau.*

NAVY YARD, *Washington, December 4, 1864—11.50 a. m.*

To Commander WISE .

Telegram received. The schooner is being loaded to-day and will be ready to leave with the Baltimore. The Baltimore has not arrived; but everything is in readiness for coaling her, &c.

W. N. JEFFERS, *Inspector of Ordnance.*

NAVY YARD, *Washington, December 4, 1864—5 p. m.*

To Commander H. A. WISE :

Baltimore not arrived at sundown. The schooner is loaded and anchored off Giesboro.

W. N. JEFFERS.

NOTE.—The Baltimore arrived during the night of the 4th, and sailed, with the Conover in tow, on the morning of the 5th December, as announced by the following telegram:

NAVY YARD *Washington, December 5, 1864—10.15 a. m.*

To Commander WISE :

Baltimore sailed at 10.15 a. m. .

F. P. IVES.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 4, 1864.*

SIR: Proceed to Hampton roads in the Baltimore and report to Rear-Admiral Porter for such duty as he may require.

When this is completed, you will return to the ordnance yard and resume your duties.

I am, sir, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Lieut. Commander W. N. JEFFERS, U. S. N.,  
*Ordnance Yard, Washington.*

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 2, 1864.*

SIR: In view of the important operations now under consideration, the bureau has the honor to request that Major Rodman, United States army, may be directed to act in conjunction with Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, in the preliminary details at Fortress Monroe.



The necessary transportation will be furnished on board the ordnance steamer Baltimore, which is expected to arrive here early to-morrow morning, and will leave immediately afterwards for Fortress Monroe. The hour of her sailing will be duly announced.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Brigadier General N. B. DYER, U. S. A.,  
*Chief of Ordnance, War Department.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, December 2, 1864.*

SIR: As requested in your letter of this date, Major Rodman has been directed to act in conjunction with Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, as therein indicated. He will be ready to proceed to Fort Monroe by the ordnance steamer Baltimore to-morrow morning, on being notified of her hour of sailing.

Respectfully, &c., &c.,

N. B. DYER,  
*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

Commander H. A. WISE,  
*Chief Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.*

The steamer George Shattuck having been chartered for the purpose of carrying the second-class powder from the northern yards, with which it was intended to load the Louisiana, (powder-boat,) the following orders were issued to the ordnance officers:

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 3, 1864.*

SIR: The bureau has directed the steamer George Shattuck to be chartered to load with powder for Fortress Monroe, and you will put on board of her all the No. 5 and compressed powder you have on hand, reporting to the bureau the exact quantity in pounds.

The work is to be done as rapidly as possible and the steamer despatched at once to the magazine at Portsmouth, New Hampshire,\* to take in a quantity of pressed powder there; from thence she is to proceed to the naval magazine at Ellis's island, New York, and from there to the magazine at Fort Mifflin; and from this latter place to Hampton roads to report to Rear-Admiral Porter. If necessary, all this should be embraced in her charter-party.

Be pleased to furnish her with a red flag, with directions to use it in approaching and whilst lying at the magazines.

I am, sir, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Commodore J. S. MISSROON, U. S. N.,  
*Inspector of Ordnance, Navy Yard, Boston.*

P. S.—Select a competent and trustworthy man to go in the steamer in charge of the powder.

H. A. W.

\* Subsequently countermanded for want of time, and the steamer sent direct from Boston to New York, &c. The letter of instructions to Portsmouth is therefore omitted.

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 3, 1864.*

SIR: The chartered steamer George Shattuck may shortly be expected to arrive at the naval magazine, Ellis's island, from Portsmouth, N. H.

She will fly a red flag to designate her, and you will direct the gunner in charge of the magazine to keep a lookout for and report her. Immediately upon her arrival you will put on board of her *all* the mammoth and army cannon powder you now have on hand, and despatch her at once with orders to proceed to the naval magazine at Fort Mifflin, and report to the officer in charge.

The bureau desires that all this shall be done as quietly, and at the same time as rapidly, as possible; and you will adopt measures accordingly.

Report the exact quantity of powder you put on board in pounds.

I am, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Captain GUERT GANSEVOORT, U. S. N.,  
*Inspector of Ordnance, Navy Yard, New York.*

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 3, 1864.*

SIR: The chartered steamer George Shattuck has been ordered to the naval magazine at Fort Mifflin, from New York, and may be expected there in a few days.

She will fly a red flag to designate her, and you will direct the gunner in charge at the magazine to keep a bright lookout and report her. You will then immediately place on board of her *all* the *compressed* powder you now have on hand, and despatch her at once with orders to proceed to Hampton roads and report to Rear-Admiral Porter.

Inform the bureau of the exact quantity of powder put on board, *in pounds*.

The bureau desires that all this shall be done as quietly, and at the same time as *rapidly*, as possible; and you will therefore adopt the necessary measures to do so.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Commander H. R. HOFF, U. S. N.,  
*Inspector of Ordnance, Navy Yard, Philadelphia.*

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*Correspondence of Lieutenant Commander Jeffers to Bureau of Ordnance, while engaged in preparing the Louisiana.*

NAVY ORDNANCE MAGAZINE,  
*Norfolk, Friday, December 8, 1864.*

The Baltimore reached Fortress Monroe about 8 a. m. on Tuesday morning, but was detained by a fog and did not reach here until about 1 p. m. Major Rodman and myself immediately visited Admiral Porter, and in company with him inspected the Louisiana, which was in a forward state of preparation, so far as it was proposed to complete her.

The house on deck is  $65 \times 21 \times 8$ , and the berth-deck is  $40 \times 20 \times 4.5$ , in addition to which there is a hold  $20 \times 10 \times 10$  abaft the old berth-deck, extending from her old spar-deck to the keelson. Room sufficient to contain all required.

The vessel was completed and towed to Craney island on Wednesday afternoon. Neither the house on deck nor the berth-deck are lined; but both are slatted on the bottom and sides to keep the bags from contact with the iron. If the vessel encounters any bad weather, I do not think her sufficiently secure.

All the powder taken down by the Baltimore was filled in bags and put on board of her (493 barrels) on Thursday, and Captain Edson informed me last evening that his portion, 150 tons, was already filled in bags, and should be brought up to-day. If it comes it shall be stowed at once. The vessel from Boston has not yet arrived; but we have 6,000 bags (they hold forty-five pounds) ready for her as soon as she arrives.

The Louisiana does not lighten up as much as I expected she would; so that I do not think she will carry the 300 tons on the expected draught.

As the Louisiana is in sight from here, I shall go down as soon as I see the barge alongside. Admiral Porter does not think much of Beardslee, as he once saw some unsuccessful experiments; but the latter appears very sanguine of being able to do all that is required. The next question is one of secrecy; it is not to be doubted that the fact of this vessel being fitted as a fire-ship is already well known to many. The only thing in doubt is her destination, which is generally assumed to be in co-operation with the works on the canal.

\* \* \* \* \*

Yours, very truly,

W. N. JEFFERS.

MAGAZINE NORFOLK, STEAMER BALTIMORE,

*Wednesday, 2 p. m.*

Mr. Beardslee has just arrived; says he can have his wires, &c., ready in three days. We arrived yesterday and saw Admiral Porter and the Louisiana. He thought she could be ready to-day, but she will not be ready before to-morrow. It is now blowing a moderate gale from southeast. Our powder that I brought down is all bagged and ready to put on board as soon as the Louisiana comes down to Craney island. Beardslee says that he was informed before he left New York, by an outside party, what he was wanted for, but does not know the destination of the vessel. Lynch says that everybody here is well acquainted with the object of our outfit.

Major Rodman is writing now in extenso to General Dyer. A steamer waits to take Beardslee to Old Point.

In very great haste, very respectfully, &c.,

W. N. JEFFERS,

*Sc., Sc., Sc.*

NAVY ORDNANCE, STEAMER BALTIMORE,

*Fortress Monroe, Va., December 11, 1864.*

Notwithstanding the bad weather, we have put on board the Louisiana the powder I brought down, and nearly all of the army contingent of 300,000 pounds; the last of it is now going on board, and will be stowed perhaps this evening, certainly to-morrow morning. If the Shattuck comes to-day, she will be in time, and no delay will be caused on that account.

I came down here this morning to see Admiral Porter and obtain any final

directions he may have, and shall then return to the magazine for supervision of work.

Very respectfully,

W. N. JEFFERS,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

Captain H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.*

NAVY ORDNANCE, STEAMER BALTIMORE,  
*Fortress Monroe, Monday, 2 p. m.*

The Louisiana has now on board over 25 tons and the 150 tons of the army. Admiral Porter does not desire that any more shall be put on board until she reaches her destination. She is now very near her old draught, and I doubt if she will carry more than 50 or 75 tons more.

It blew a furious N. W. last night and this a. m. As it has, however, moderated, no doubt all will leave to-morrow morning. The Shattuck has not arrived, but on arrival will be sent after the fleet. The major and myself will make all arrangements to-morrow morning early, and if they get off will leave in the evening. We will, however, see the expedition started.

Your telegram relative to material in Norfolk magazine received; but as it is not to be put on board now, it is better that the Shattuck shall follow, being already loaded.

Very respectfully,

W. N. JEFFERS,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

Captain H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.*

[Telegram.]

NORFOLK, FORTRESS MONROE,  
*December 13, 1864—1 p. m.*

Captain H. A. WISE :

All of our arrangements are complete. I leave at four (4) p. m. for Washington.

W. N. JEFFERS,  
*Inspector of Ordnance.*

In order to complete the history of the powder-boat, and to place upon record all the facts connected with the experiments, the following communications were addressed to Rear-Admiral Porter, Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, and Major Rodman, United States army, and their replies are also given in the order of their date.

The death of the gallant Preston, who fell in the subsequent assault upon Fort Fisher, deprives the record of his *written* testimony; but in an interview with Commander Wise, while in Washington as a bearer of despatches, he stated that he heard two distinct explosions; others said that they heard three; but this was not his opinion. He could see, however, repeated explosions in the air, evidently those of the ignited powder bags which had been thrown up by the explosion of the lower strata of powder.

The method of arranging the powder in the vessel, and the details of the plan for insuring an explosion, are explained in the statements of Commander Rhind and Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, illustrated by sketches.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
January 10, 1865.

SIR: The bureau desires that you will direct the officers who were in charge of the powder-boat, recently exploded near Fort Fisher, to forward to the bureau a full and detailed statement, *but secret and confidential*, of all the circumstances connected with the arrangement of the powder, the fuzes and other appliances intended to secure a uniform and simultaneous explosion, together with the manner in which the plan was executed, and their impressions of the result and the effects produced.

This information is desired as early as practicable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, off Wilmington, N. C.*

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
January 11, 1865.

SIR: The bureau desires that you will forward a full and detailed statement, *but secret and confidential*, of the manner in which the powder-boat Louisiana was prepared for service against Fort Fisher; stating clearly the manner in which the powder was arranged, the fuzes, clock-work, matches, and electric wires were adjusted to produce the explosion, previous to your leaving her and returning to Washington.

I am, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Lieutenant Commander W. N. JEFFERS, U. S. N.,  
*Ordnance Yard, Washington.*

[Confidential.]

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
January 11, 1865.

SIR: In order that all the facts connected with the recent experiment made against Fort Fisher may be placed upon record, the bureau requests that you will furnish it with a full statement of the manner in which the Louisiana was prepared for the service, the adjustment of the fuzes, clock-work, matches or electric wires, and the amount of powder placed on board, up to the time when you left her and returned to Washington.

A description of the manner in which the fuzes were laid is especially desired.

Your communication on the subject is to be considered secret and confidential.

I am, sir, &c., &c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Major T. J. RODMAN, U. S. A.,  
*Washington, D. C.*

NAVY ORDNANCE YARD,  
*Washington, D. C., January 16, 1865.*

SIR: I herewith forward a description of the explosion vessel Louisiana, with all the arrangements made by Major Rodman and myself, in accordance

with the directions of the bureau and the opinion of the ordnance and other officers who were consulted with regard to the probable effects of the explosion on Fort Fisher, and the means of causing it to take effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM N. JEFFERS,

*Inspector of Ordnance, in charge.*

Commander H. A. WISE,

*Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.*

#### PREPARATION OF THE VESSEL.

The iron gunboat Louisiana, a propeller of 295 tons burden, 150 feet long, 22 feet beam, and — feet depth of hold, 8 to 8½ feet draught when loaded, formerly employed in the Atchafalaya cotton trade, was selected and was in every respect suitable for the purpose, except (as was subsequently found to be the case) incapacity for carrying the desired quantity of powder on the given draught.

She was taken to Norfolk, her battery and appurtenances, masts, and part of the deck-houses removed, leaving only sufficient to shelter the officers and men in charge, the berth-deck and holds cleared of fittings, and, in short, all unnecessary weights removed.

The engines, boilers, and coal-bunkers, with forty tons of coal, occupied the after third of the vessel, separated by a bulkhead from the remainder. Before putting the powder on board the vessel was very much by the stern.

The space below the spar-deck available for stowage was divided by a bulkhead extending athwart the vessel, forward of the boiler bulkheads, into two parts. One, the afterhold, used formerly as an additional coal-bunker, about fifteen (15) feet in length, twenty-two (22) feet wide, and ten (10) feet in depth from the spar-deck to the keelson, accessible by a hatch four (4) feet square. The space forward of this, formerly the berth-deck, about forty (40) feet long by twenty-two (22) feet wide and four and a half (4½) feet deep under the beams, with a hold beneath it of the same dimensions. Access to this was obtained by a hatch of four (4) by five (5) feet.

A small store-room and chain-locker occupied the extreme bow of the vessel.



After her masts and fittings were removed, a house was built on deck, occupying the extreme width of the vessel, twenty-two (22) feet, and seventy (70) feet in length, extending aft over the hold and partially over the boiler, eight feet in height. This house was built of three-quarter-inch stuff covered with canvas, painted to render it water-proof; a light grating laid over the spar-deck to protect the powder in case of leakage, and battens or furring put around the sides to prevent contact with the iron sides.

I requested, and I was joined in this by Major Rodman, that large scuttles should be cut in the deck at the forward end of this house, communicating with the berth-deck. This was considered unnecessary, but I bored some holes instead.

It was stated that the Louisiana could carry on 8½ feet draught 290 tons of coal in addition to her armament, stores, and crew; which, if correct, would permit the storage of 300 tons of explosive material on the same displacement, and for which it will be readily seen there was ample room.

#### STORAGE OF THE POWDER.


In order to produce the greatest possible effect in a lateral direction it was necessary to keep as much of the powder as possible, consistent with stability and safety at sea, above the water-line. No powder was, therefore, stowed in











the hold beneath the berth-deck. The berth-deck was filled with powder stowed in bags, (sand-bags obtained from the engineers,) containing about fifty pounds each. About 100 tons were placed on this deck.

The after hold or coal-bunker was stowed first with two tiers of full barrels with their upper heads out, and the stowage completed with bags. The barrels were put in in order to keep the bags well up out of the reach of any dampness in case of leakage.

The remainder of the powder put on board at Norfolk, making in all one hundred and eighty-five (185) tons, was stowed against the after bulkhead of the deck-house, and filled the space over the boiler, extending as far as the hatch to the after hold or coal-bunker, leaving about four-fifths of the space in the deck-house empty.

When this quantity of powder had been stowed it was decided that the vessel was quite as deep as desirable for making the voyage to Beaufort; furthermore the weather, which had been very unsettled, appeared favorable for the voyage, and it was determined to sail without the remainder, which was to be put on board there. I have no information with respect to the quantity afterwards put on board.

In the evening, before the vessel sailed, I was advised of the names of the officers who were to take charge of her, and the next morning went on board the Louisiana to explain to them the proposed arrangements, when they shortly appeared.

As, according to the programme, the trains were to be laid in the upper outer layer of bags in the deck-house, none of which were stowed when the vessel left Craney island, the execution of this part was confided to the officers (Commander Rhind and Lieutenant S. W. Preston) who were to take charge of her. All of these details were as fully explained as the limited time allowed me would admit; the clocks put in position, a rough diagram of the vessel, and a written description of the proposed mode of laying the trains, furnished.

I did not know until the evening previous to the sailing of the vessel who was to command her; and I used my own discretion, knowing that any desired changes could be readily made to suit any other views.

#### MODE OF EXPLODING THE POWDER.

When the probable effects of the explosion were under discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of the experts in ordnance that, to produce the maximum effect, the fire should be communicated and the explosion take place in many points simultaneously, all the accounts of accidental explosions of large quantities of powder agreeing that large quantities of unconsumed powder were blown away from the focus of ignition, causing a great reduction of effect.

Electricity was proposed as offering the most probable means of securing this result; but as this agent is known to be very unreliable in action, it was determined to use several clock-work arrangements, a slow match, and finally to set the vessel on fire to insure an ultimate explosion, and not bestow so large a quantity of material on the enemy in the event of a failure of one or more of the modes of exploding it.

The arrangement of the clock-work being confided to me, I made a very simple one. Removing the face and hands of an ordinary marine clock, I secured to the arbor of the minute-hand a small cylinder with four pins set into the circumference, and equidistant—that is, fifteen (15) minutes of time apart. Three clocks were thus arranged. These clocks were secured to a board; by the side of the clock a copper tube was secured, in the bottom of which was brazed a mass of metal with a common musket cone screwed into it, to be capped with a percussion cap.

An eight-inch grape-shot, weight two pounds, diameter 2.5 inches, was attached

to one end of a piece of catgut which was led through an eye-bolt at the top of the tube, and hooked by a loop in the other end, over one of the pins on the clock cylinder. It is easy to see that by the revolution of the cylinder the loop would slip off, the grape shot drop, and the explosion of the cap take place in 15', 30', 45', or 60', as desired; this it never failed to do in many trials. I frequently set the three clocks going, and the explosion occurred within two minutes of each other at the end of an hour. To determine the time of explosion it was only necessary to put the loop over the proper pin, remove a stop, and set the apparatus in motion.

Major Rodman arranged with great care, and after numerous experiments, to insure safety and certainty, the slow matches, six in number, which were to be distributed in as many places.

#### ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO INSURE SIMULTANEOUS IGNITION IN SEVERAL POINTS.

In the event of the electricity failing the clocks were to be the next dependence; it was, therefore, necessary to so distribute them that in case the vessel was boarded from the shore they could not be conveniently reached; and also to lead the flame rapidly to many points.

This it was proposed to accomplish by the aid of the "Gomez fuze train," which is incomparably quicker in its action than the flame of gunpowder, approximating electricity.

From each clock and each slow match this train was to be laid through the exterior layers of bags in the deck-house and into each hatch; and, in order to secure this simultaneous ignition in many places, the fuze train from each of the clocks was to be grafted into the other fuze train from each of the other clocks at all points of crossing.

By the report of Admiral Porter it would appear that the powder was finally exploded from the effects of a fire kindled in the fore-castle; no results of value were to be expected from this mode. It was proposed only as a final resort in order to prevent the vessel in any contingency from falling into the hands of the enemy. It was certain that the greater portion of the powder would be blown away if ignited in a single point, and the effect very much diminished.

The three explosions spoken of are readily accounted for—the deck-house, the after hold, and the berth-deck would take fire in succession if ignited at one point.

I cannot in any way account for the failure of the clocks, if set to the proper time, except on the supposition that possibly the turn on the cylinder may have been taken the wrong way, and instead of unwinding they wound up the balls!

I am not aware that any attempt was made to use the electric wire; but it was not favorably considered by those charged with the execution of the plan. Mr. Beardslee, who was to undertake this matter, came to Norfolk, made himself acquainted with the requirements and returned to New York to obtain the necessary means, but had not reached Norfolk when the vessel sailed.

A part of the programme required that the vessel should be grounded, which appears not to have been the case. No very sanguine expectations were entertained of a successful result unless the vessel could be placed within 300 yards, and then only after all the precautions had been taken to insure a maximum effect.

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WATERTOWN ARSENAL, *January 27, 1865.*

SIR: Yours of the 24th instant, enclosing for my perusal and remarks thereon the statement of Lieutenant Commander William N. Jeffers, relative to the preliminary preparations of the powder-boat Louisiana, recently exploded near Fort Fisher, North Carolina, is received, and said statement has been by me carefully read and considered.

I find this statement correct in all particulars, so far as I know; and my knowledge extends to everything therein stated, relative to arrangements for explosion, except the instructions given by Lieutenant Commander Jeffers to the officers in charge of the powder-boat.

Experiments connected with the preparation of the slow match, at the Fort Monroe arsenal, required me to be, the greater part of my time, at that arsenal. These experiments having been so far completed as to enable me to decide definitely as to the arrangement of this means of explosion, it was arranged that Lieutenant Commander Jeffers and myself would, on the 12th of December, go on board the powder-boat, and there meet the officers charged with its explosion, and explain to them all the means and their arrangements proposed by us to insure a certain and successful explosion.

I went to the powder-boat at the appointed time, but found that the officers charged with its explosion were not there. I then went on board the steamer Baltimore and saw Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, who informed me that the bay was so rough that the proposed meeting had been postponed till next day.

I started over the next morning from Fort Monroe, and on the way, and in sight of the powder-boat, met and boarded the steamer Baltimore coming down, when Lieutenant Commander Jeffers informed me that he had been on board the powder-boat and fully explained to the officers charged with its explosion all the means and arrangements proposed by us for that purpose; that they fully understood the whole matter, and that the powder-boat was then getting under way. So that I was not present, and cannot, therefore, *of my own knowledge*, say what explanations were given.

Lieutenant Commander Jeffers and myself came directly down on board the Baltimore, went on board the flag-ship of Rear-Admiral Porter, and explained to him the exact state of the case, with which he expressed himself entirely satisfied.

While Lieutenant Commander Jeffers and myself were still on board the flag-ship the powder-boat passed out to sea in tow of another vessel.

I am decidedly of the opinion that the effects of the explosion would have been materially increased if the powder had been ignited by the Gomez fuze-train as was proposed; and I have no doubt that Lieutenant Commander Jeffers offers the true explanation of the three explosions heard.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

T. J. RODMAN,  
*Major of Ordnance.*

H. A. WISE, *Chief of Bureau of Ordnance,*  
*Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

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NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,  
*Cape Fear River, February 6, 1865.*

SIR: In obedience to the request of the bureau, contained in its letter of the 10th ultimo, I enclose herewith the report of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had the powder-boat Louisiana in charge.

I am, &c., &c.,

DAVID D. PORTER,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, *Washington, D. C.*

UNITED STATES STEAMER AGAWAN,  
Navy Yard, Norfolk, February 2, 1865.

ADMIRAL: In obedience to your order of the 23d ultimo, I have to make the following report, as requested in the communication of the Bureau of Ordnance, dated January 10, a copy of which you enclosed me.

The powder-boat Louisiana exploded near Fort Fisher on the morning of December 24, 1864, was turned over to me at Craney island, Norfolk, on the 13th of December, by Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, who had been sent down, I understood, to superintend the arrangements of the vessel. When I went on board, expecting to leave at once with her in tow of the *Sassacus*, I found the cargo stowed full up to the tops of the hatches of the berth-deck, and powder in bags stowed also in that part of the vessel, (marked E on the sketch,) the after part of the house which had been extended over her. The method of adjusting the fuzes and clock-work was explained to me by Lieutenant Commander Jeffers.

No part of the fuze used was circulated through the parts of the vessel already stowed, (marked N and E,) and it was impossible to place it there without breaking out the cargo. On the arrival of the vessel at Beaufort about thirty tons more powder was put in her, making in all about 215 tons, as much as the vessel could carry without being too deep in the water. Lieutenant Preston and I gave our personal superintendence to the storage of that portion of the cargo, and placed the fuzes with our own hands.

The stowage of the cargo and arrangement of the fuzes is best explained by reference to the accompanying sketch.

Had the Gomez fuze been circulated, as it should have been, through the cargo of the hold or berth-deck, the effect of the explosion would doubtless have been increased.

As to my "impression of the results and the effect produced," I stated in my report to you of December 26 that, owing to the want of confinement and insufficient fuzing of the mass, that much of the powder was blown away before ignition, and its effects lost.

As to the effect on the works on shore, I am of opinion that it succeeded only in stunning the garrison, rendering them temporarily unfit for duty, and possibly displaced a few of the guns. I never entertained, while undertaking to execute the plan, the idea that its effect would be great on the fort itself. The facts called for in regard to the manner of executing the plan are detailed in my report of December 26; by referring to that and to the annexed sketch of the vessel, I think all necessary information that I can give will be obtained. Should there be any points not sufficiently explained, I will be happy to furnish any information on their being indicated to me.



Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. C. RHIND, *Commander*.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,  
*Commanding N. A. B. Squadron.*

The powder was stowed within the dotted lines *E M N*; the space *N*, representing the berth-deck, was stowed full up to the tops of the hatches *F M*, the lower tier said to be in barrels with heads out, upper tiers in canvas bags. The space *F M*, being the forward part of the extension of the deck-house, was only partially filled, the powder in canvas bags. The space *E* was entirely filled with powder in bags as far as the bulkhead of the passage *F*.

A clock with two ends of Gomez fuze was placed at each end of the passage *G* and *H*, one fuze leading through the bags in *E* and inserted through them and into bags in the hold at *F* each side. The other circulated through and in the bags in the space *F M P*, crossed, married and ending in opened bags in the







hold *M*. In the space *D* (formerly cook-house) was placed another clock at *I*, with the fuze inserted in cut bags in the space *E*, reached by cutting through the double bulkhead. A fuze with five pieces of candle was led from *D* into *E*. In the space marked *L*, at the end of the shaft alley, was stowed pine wood and kindling. No fuze was circulated through the space marked *N*. The explosion did not take place until one hour and fifty-two minutes after the clocks at *G* and *H* were started. The clocks were set to explode the fuze in one hour and a half.

Upon reference of this statement to Lieutenant Commander Jeffers, the following was received in reply :

NAVY ORDNANCE YARD, *February 14, 1865.*

[Memorandum for Bureau.]

I have perused the letter of Commander Rhind, relative to the powder-boat, and find that it agrees essentially with my own description of the arrangement.

Commander Rhind objects that the fuze was not circulated through the mass of powder in *N*. It was not intended that it should be. The theory was, that by igniting it from the top and sides the lateral effect would be increased. If ignited in the part *N* all above it would be blown vertically upwards without producing any effect.

The principal difficulty appears to have been a very decided miscalculation as to the displacement of the vessel; only 215 tons were carried, when 300 were considered a minimum. This left the deck house *M* but a third full, and of course prevented the use of a confining tier of sand-bags, or loaded shells, as contemplated.

Very respectfully,

W. N. JEFFERS,  
*Inspector Ordnance, in charge.*

It having been originally contemplated to make use of the Beardslee electro-magnetic machines and wires, as a means of accomplishing a certain explosion of the powder, the following telegrams and letters of instructions were written on that particular point :

DECEMBER 2, 1864—11 a. m.

To Rear-Admiral PORTER, *Commanding N. A. B. Squadron, Fortress Monroe*

Would you like to have the services of Mr. Beardslee? Is he not at present with General Butler? Letter by mail.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

HAMPTON ROADS, VA., *December 3, 1864.*

To Commander WISE:

Beardslee is not here; I have telegraphed to Butler for him.

D. D. PORTER, *Rear-Admiral.*

DECEMBER 4, 1864—10.15 a. m.

To Mr. G. W. BEARDSLEE, *No. 44 Cliff street, New York:*

The Navy Department wishes to see you in Washington immediately. Answer.

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

[Confidential.]

FORTRESS MONROE, VIRGINIA—11.15 a. m.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER, *Commanding N. A. B. Squadron* :

SIR : This will be handed you by Mr. George W. Beardslee, the inventor of an electro-magnetic instrument, who is sent you by the department to render such assistance as you may require in the pending operations.

I am, sir, &amp;c., &amp;c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

NOTE.—With the above order Mr. Beardslee visited the squadron, made himself acquainted with what he was required to do, and returned to New York to make his preparations. On the 11th December, Commander Wise telegraphed Admiral Porter as follows :

“ Mr. Beardslee will be ready to leave New York to-morrow night, and will probably reach the fortress on Wednesday morning.

“ H. A. WISE,  
“ *Chief of Bureau.*”

In returning to Fortress Monroe for the purpose of performing his part of the programme, Mr. Beardslee was furnished with the following letter of instructions :

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*December 14, 1864.*

SIR : By direction of the Navy Department you will proceed immediately to Fortress Monroe, and communicate with the guard-vessel off the fortress, and also, if necessary, with Commander Lynch on board the United States steamer St. Lawrence off the Fort Norfolk magazine, to take passage in the steamer George Shattuck with your apparatus, and proceed in her to Beaufort, North Carolina, in order to report in person for duty to Rear-Admiral Porter.

If you find upon your arrival at Beaufort that the admiral is not there, you will follow him.

I am, sir, &amp;c., &amp;c.,

H. A. WISE,  
*Chief of Bureau.*

Mr. GEO. W. BEARDSLEE, &c., &c., *Washington.*

NORFOLK, *December 16, 1864—8. p. m.*

To Commander WISE, *Chief of Bureau* :

The steamer George Shattuck not having arrived, Mr. Beardslee will leave for Beaufort this afternoon, on steamer Karnak.

D. LYNCH, *Commander.*

## COMMITTEE ROOM, "CONDUCT OF THE WAR,"

*Washington, April 27, 1865.*

GENERAL: The enclosed appears among the documents furnished by the Navy Department to the committee. The committee attach no importance to it, but deem it proper to submit it to you for such reply or notice as you may choose to take of it.

I remain, yours respectfully,

B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of Committee.*

General B. F. BUTLER.

## U. S. MONITOR ONONDAGO, AIKEN'S LANDING,

*James River, Va., January 16, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward, herewith, a statement made by Mr. Levi R. Greene, first assistant engineer, in charge of engineers' department of the United States steamer Massasoit, which may account for the sudden abandonment of the attack on Fort Fisher by General Butler.

I have full confidence in the truth and veracity of Mr. Greene, and think that this mystery should be unravelled and ventilated by proper authority.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM A. PARKER,  
*Commanding 5th Division.*

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

*Commanding N. A. Squadron, Blockade off Wilmington, N. C.*

## U. S. STEAMER MASSASOIT, JAMES RIVER, VA.,

*January 14, 1865.*

SIR: The following is a copy, furnished at your request, of a letter sent by me this evening to Senator H. B. Anthony. With a few exceptions, it is the same as the one submitted to you this morning.

In the event of his declining to act in the matter, Admiral Porter is at liberty to make such use of the information as he may think it warrants.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEVI R. GREENE, U. S. N.,  
*First Assistant Engineer.*

Commander WM. A. PARKER, U. S. N.,

*Commanding James River Squadron.*

## U. S. STEAMER MASSASOIT, JAMES RIVER, VA.,

*January 14, 1865.*

DEAR SIR: In making the statements I am about to do to you, it is with the confidence that, if you see sufficient cause to take any steps toward inducing government to unravel the matter, you will do so without giving me any publicity in the affair, and, if possible, without my being a witness. Government will be able to find its own, and sufficient proof, however, if it follows the matter up.

I have only hesitated in making it known before, for want of direct proof, and dislike of being called upon as a witness.

On the 31st of last month I was returning from a visit to Providence, and

met on the wharf at Fortress Monroe a man named William Howard, an Englishman, and formerly in the employ of the Boston, Providence, and New York railroad as baggage-master. He usually accompanied the train, and as my duties have called me over the road two or three times a week for the last two years, until within a short time, I have known him quite intimately, and have known him to be, at heart, a rebel sympathizer and secessionist.

The morning of the day I met him we passed up to Norfolk together. In reply to my inquiries as to how he came there, and why he left the railroad, he informed me he was "on a little money-making expedition;" showed me a passport to Newbern, North Carolina, furnished, he said, through General Butler, and then, after some preliminaries, said in substance that a friend of Butler, named Peters, then in New York, had 3,000 bales of cotton in Wilmington; that they were going to get it out. Butler was to work the thing through, and have half the money; that he was to furnish passes, and he (Howard) had no doubt but that they should succeed. That himself and some other person, whose name I do not remember, were merely acting as agents, knowing nothing but what they were told to do, but if successful, would make money; that, being Englishmen, they should have no difficulty in moving within the rebel lines. He furthermore stated, what I had already begun to see, to wit, *that if Wilmington had been captured, Butler would have lost his cotton*, as it would have fallen into our hands; and expressed his opinion freely that there was but little patriotism in any of our leading men; that they meant money, and like the one who, as he expressed it, was "doing such mean things for his own benefit," looked out first for themselves.

Howard has gone to Newbern, I suppose. The proprietor of the Atlantic hotel in Norfolk, a relative of Butler, I believe, is concerned in the matter.

There may be no truth in Howard's statements; *if there is*, detectives will soon trace it out, and it will readily be seen *why* Wilmington was not taken, though it is hard to believe any man would so sell his country's honor.

You can use this letter to inform the proper authorities, for I consider it my duty as an officer, and a lover of my country's welfare, to make it known, but the result can be attained without my gaining any publicity.

I am, very respectfully, yours,

LEVI R. GREENE,  
*First Assistant Engineer, U. S. N.*

Senator H. B. ANTHONY.

Respectfully forwarded.

WILLIAM A. PARKER,  
*Commanding 5th Division, N. A. Squadron.*

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WILLARDS', *April 28, 1865.*

SIR: I am under obligations to the committee that my attention has been called to the letter of one Levi R. Greene, forwarded to the committee through the Navy Department by William A. Parker, commander of the 5th division, James river squadron, and David D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic blockading squadron.

I can only say that I have no recollection ever to have seen or heard of either of the parties concerned in that document save Parker, who remains in my memory as the naval officer commanding the division that ran away when the rebel rams came down the James a few days after the date of the letter.

The attention of the committee need hardly be called to the form of this apparently malicious attack. The writer, Greene, three times over, requests that his agency in making it may be kept secret, apparently so that he may not be held responsible for it.

He says he has known one Howard intimately as "a rebel sympathizer and secessionist;" that Howard shew him a pass to Newbern.

Passes to Newbern from Fortress Monroe were issued, in the usual course of business, to every person who came from the north and took the oath of allegiance. It will be observed that when at Newbern one would hardly be nearer Wilmington than at Fortress Monroe, and scarcely so easy of access. Greene, then, states Howard's gossip of the supposed statement of Peters, thus making this supposed hearsay three times removed.

The statement of Howard, so far as I see, touches the honorable committee quite as nearly as myself, for this "rebel sympathizer and secessionist" is made to express his opinion freely that there "was but little *patriotism in any of our leading men.*"

Parker and Admiral Porter, however, could transmit this letter without injury to themselves, as they do not come within the description.

That the whole affair is a tissue of lies on the part of Greene to curry favor with his commander, Porter, who was in contest with me, where he makes a statement of a fact within his own knowledge and belief which can be verified, is easily seen. He says that "the proprietor of the Atlantic hotel at Norfolk, *a relative of Butler's, I believe, is concerned in the matter.*"

Now, Mr. Newton, the only proprietor of the Atlantic hotel I ever heard of, is neither a relative of mine nor a person with whom I ever held a minute's conversation in my life.

The heart or the character of an officer who could give official sanction to the circulation of such stupid falsehoods is not to be envied.

But I have troubled you too long with this bunglingly-made slander.

Very respectfully,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,  
*Major General.*

Hon. BENJ. WADE,  
*Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.*

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COMMITTEE ROOM, "CONDUCT OF THE WAR,"  
*Washington, April 28, 1865.*

SIR: The enclosed documents\* were among those furnished by the Navy Department, in reply to the call of the committee, in relation to the Fort Fisher expedition. They were not observed by the committee until after they were in print, and too late to be left out without reprinting a large portion of the testimony.

The statement there appears to be entirely hearsay. The committee have instructed me to forward these documents to you and ask what importance you attach to them, how far you consider them reliable, and whatever information you have upon the subject.

I remain yours, respectfully,

B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman of Committee.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES, *Secretary of the Navy.*

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\* See documents accompanying letter of committee to General Butler.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington, May 1, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, enclosing printed letters connected with the Fort Fisher expedition.

The department has made no investigation relative to the statements made in the letter of First Assistant Engineer Greene, dated January 14, 1865, and has no additional information on the subject. The letter being in the possession of the department at the time of the call of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in relation to the Fort Fisher expedition, was furnished with the other papers. It was the intention of the department to furnish all the papers and evidence on the subject under its control.

Very respectfully, &c.,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman Committee on the Conduct of the War, Washington.*

# HEAVY ORDNANCE.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

January 25, 1864.

On motion by Mr. WILSON,

*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire into the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of fortifications; the mode of fabrication; the amount of "royalty" paid, and to whom, for the use of a patent in the manufacture; the tests to which these guns are subjected when received into service; the reasons for believing the tests satisfactory; what proportion of our sea and land armament is of rifled ordnance; when rifled guns were introduced, and the cause of the delay pertaining thereto.

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary*.

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Mr. WADE, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, submitted the following

## REPORT.

*The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in pursuance of the foregoing resolution, ask leave to make the following report, with the accompanying testimony:*

Your committee began the investigation required by the resolution of the Senate early last session; but being unable to obtain the testimony of the inventors and manufacturers of the two guns, into the composition of which wrought-iron entered in whole or in part, they deferred the subject until this session, when they were enabled to complete their investigation.

Under the head of "heavy ordnance" your committee would call attention to three classes of guns: First, those made entirely of cast-iron; second, those made of cast-iron and banded with wrought-iron; and, third, those made entirely of wrought-iron. Of the first class are the guns generally known as the Dahlgren gun and the Rodman gun. Of the second class is the Parrott gun. Of the third class is the Ames gun. There is still another gun, known as the Wiard steel gun, but as it does not come, so far as your committee have been able to learn, under the head of "heavy ordnance," they have not deemed it necessary to devote much attention to it.

The Rodman gun, while having to some extent its peculiarity of form, is principally distinguished by the mode adopted in its manufacture, which is an invention of Major T. J. Rodman. The casting

is made around a hollow core, or core-barrel, as it is termed, into which is introduced a stream of cold water, the outside of the casting being kept heated until the cooling from the interior reaches the outer portion of the mass of metal forming the casting. This mode of manufacture, it is claimed, insures two important advantages over the old method of casting the gun solid and then boring it out. The strain upon the metal produced by cooling in large masses is reversed, rendering the gun less liable to burst from the explosion of the powder in it; and a much greater degree of hardness is given to the interior surface, rendering the gun less liable to abrasion in the bore by the passage of the projectile along it, and the action of the gases of the powder upon the metal. It is generally held by the witnesses that no effective gun of large calibre can be made of cast-iron except upon the Rodman principle, or the principle of cooling from the interior.

The Dahlgren gun is the invention of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, and is distinguished by its exterior form. The plan adopted to avoid the strain consequent upon cooling a solid casting of large size from the outside is to make the casting considerably larger than would otherwise be needed to produce a gun of the required size, anneal it after cooling, and then turn it down to the proper size and form. But the Dahlgren guns of the largest calibre are now being manufactured upon the Rodman principle.

These two guns are the only guns of large calibre made entirely of cast-iron which are now used in the service. It will be seen from the testimony that officers of the navy generally prefer the Dahlgren gun for naval service, while officers of the army express a preference for the Rodman gun. Both of these guns would appear, from the testimony, to be the best cast-iron guns now known to any service. They are generally smooth-bore guns, but few, if any, of the larger calibre being rifled.

The rifled gun of large calibre, employed almost wholly in the army and naval service, is the gun invented by Robert C. Parrott. It is composed of a cast-iron cylinder with a wrought-iron jacket or band shrunk upon the breech of the gun, in order to strengthen it about the seat of discharge. The cast-iron cylinder of this gun was formerly cast solid, and then bored out; but latterly those of the largest calibre are cast upon the Rodman principle.

The introduction of the turreted iron-clads into our naval service impressed upon the department the necessity for guns of large calibre. Those vessels carrying but few guns, and being designed to operate against other iron-clads, as well as to resist the effect of opposing batteries, it was considered important to have guns throwing projectiles, shot or shell, of the greatest possible weight, and guns of as large calibre as fifteen inches were designed and constructed principally for use on turreted vessels. The result of the contest between the United States iron-clad Weehawken and the rebel iron-clad Atlanta shows the remarkable effect of heavy projectiles upon iron-clad vessels.

The Parrott rifled gun of large calibre is also used upon our naval vessels, being able to throw projectiles with greater accuracy and to a greater distance than the smooth-bore guns. At the time of their



introduction into the service they were undoubtedly the best rifled guns of large calibre which the government could obtain. They were not much more expensive than the cast-iron gun of the same calibre, and yet are deemed by our officers to be nearly, if not quite, equal to the best wrought-iron guns manufactured by other nations. They have rendered most material service both upon land and upon sea.

But the bursting of the Parrott guns of large calibre, together with the bursting of some of the cast-iron guns of large calibre, upon the vessels engaged in operations against the defences of Charleston and against Fort Fisher, has tended to weaken confidence in the durability of those guns, and would seem to show the necessity of obtaining, if possible, some other gun which can be more implicitly relied upon. It is the testimony of our officers of the navy that the bursting of one gun in a fleet tends to demoralize the crew of each vessel upon which a gun of that kind is used, whether it bursts or not. And it is asserted that the loss sustained by the bursting of guns of large calibre on vessels operating against Fort Fisher was much greater than the loss sustained on the entire fleet from the fire of the enemy.

The bursting of these guns is generally attributed to the explosion of shells prematurely within the bore of the gun. The opinion of Mr. Parrott in regard to the cause or causes of premature explosion of the shells is as follows:

“It has been a matter of much concern with me, and I would rather not make a gun than have any accident occur. I ascribe the difficulty to the friction of the powder in the shell itself. At first it was natural enough to ascribe the difficulty to bad shells, bad castings, bad fuzes, &c.; but, upon full trial, it appears above all question that the difficulty arises from the powder exploding in the shell within the gun by friction, caused by the striking of the powder against the inside of the shell. A 300-pounder shell is ten inches in diameter; a round shell of that diameter holds about three pounds of powder. My 300-pounder shell holds about seventeen pounds of powder. Now, when you fire a gun and strike the but of a shell suddenly with the immense force of the charge there is a reaction of the powder within the shell against the bottom of the shell; and if there is any roughness so as to cause friction at the bottom, the powder will be exploded in the shell while it is within the gun. Thinking that to be the case, I have for a long time been endeavoring to coat the inside of the shell with varnish or lacker, and now I am able to do it with entire success. A great many people were skeptical about it, and precautions have not been taken in regard to it as quickly as they might have been. I now melt together rosin, tallow, and brown soap, forming a thin liquid mixture, and pour it into my shells and pour it out again, leaving a coating on the inside which covers over the rough iron, and when that is done I find the shells can be fired without premature explosion.

“Some two months ago Captain Temple, one of the officers of this very fleet of Porter’s, came to the foundry and became aware of this fact. He had two 100-pounders on board his vessel; when he got back he found that his shells had no such coating, and he immediately set to work and lined them with asphaltum, &c. He fired his guns fifty or sixty times each during the engagement, and not a single shell exploded prematurely in his guns; while in some of the other vessels around him shells were exploded prematurely and thrown out of the guns in fragments. That is so stated in a letter of his which I saw yesterday.”

Be the cause or causes what they may, the fact is that these guns do burst while in action, with very disastrous results.

It is, therefore, of the highest importance to obtain, if possible, some kind of heavy ordnance which shall not be liable to these objections. The entire efficiency of an iron-clad vessel, costing the government hundreds of thousands of dollars, may depend almost entirely upon the character of the guns with which she is armed. In the words of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, "You might lose a battle by going into action with a gun around which stood twenty-five men entertaining the idea all the time that it might burst." Considering the great cost of our iron-clad vessels, and the importance of the results to be attained by rendering them as secure and efficacious as possible, a few thousand dollars more of expense would seem to be of but little moment, if it affords the only means of reaching the end desired. The disastrous results attending the bursting of a gun can be, to a greater extent, guarded against upon land than at sea. In the latter case, the loss of the vessel, with all on board, may be the consequence, while the demoralization of the crews of the other vessels similarly armed may lead to results almost, if not quite, as disastrous. But, upon both land and sea, it is of the utmost importance to obtain heavy ordnance of the most reliable character.

In view of these considerations, your committee desire to refer, somewhat at length, to a wrought-iron gun which to them seems to possess those qualities of strength, durability, and safety which are so very desirable. It is the invention of Horatio Ames. But few of these guns have yet been manufactured, yet they have successfully withstood every test that has been applied to them.

Upon the 21st of August last, at the request of the inventor, the President ordered the appointment of a board to test a gun of 7-inch calibre manufactured by Mr. Ames. The board consisted of Major General Gillmore, United States army, Commodore T. A. Hunt, United States navy, and Major T. T. S. Laidley, United States army, inspector of cannon, &c. The trial commenced at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the 15th of September, and continued until the gun had been fired seven hundred times. The details of the trial are contained in the report of the board, a copy of which is submitted in the testimony accompanying this report.

The mode of manufacturing the gun is described by the board in their report as follows :

"The gun is built up from the cascabel on the end of a long cylindrical port bar. The end of this bar is first enlarged by welding pieces around it. It is then enlarged still further by placing two rings on the end, one over the other, concentrically, and welding them there in succession. Against the end of the cylinder, thus increased to twenty-eight (28) inches in diameter, is welded a circular plate or disk, also twenty-eight inches in diameter, and four inches thick. The disk is composed of a centre-piece, ten inches in diameter, surrounded by two concentric rings, one outside of the other, all accurately fitted together by turning. The bottom of the bore terminates against this disk. Upon this disk is welded a ring of twenty-eight inches exterior diameter, four inches interior diameter, and five inches thick, compounded of three concentric rings, accurately fitted together by turning. The inner one is ten inches in exterior

diameter, and about six inches in thickness, so that its ends project on either side about half an inch beyond the faces of the other two rings. This is intended to secure a perfect weld next the bore, and force out the slug. Other compound rings, made in the same manner, are welded on, one after the other, until the gun is of the required length. In making the compound rings for the small part of the gun, between the trunnions and muzzle, the outer ring is omitted.

"The gun remains in a horizontal position during this process of construction, and is hauled by means of the bar projecting from the cascabel. The welding on of the disk and rings is done with a hammer worked horizontally by steam; a hammer working vertically is also used against the sides of the piece. The inner ring of the compound rings is made from a block six inches by ten inches, by boring a hole five inches in diameter through it and turning off the corners. The fibres and laminae of the metal lie at right angles to the axis of the gun. The centre and outer rings are made like a tire by bending the bars and welding the ends together, thus placing the layers of the metal in cylindrical surfaces. The trunnions are attached by being screwed into the sides of the piece three inches."

In regard to the projectiles and charges used the board report:

"Considerable delay and many interruptions in the progress of the trials were occasioned by the want of suitable projectiles. Those of the Hotchkiss pattern, which have been officially proscribed for rifles of a large calibre, on account of their excessive strain upon the gun, were almost exclusively used. In weight they varied from 104 to 127 pounds.

"The powder used was what is known as No. 7 experimental powder, giving a pressure of 57,000 pounds per square inch in an eight-inch gun. The charges were varied increasingly from thirteen to thirty pounds, although it was frequently necessary to reduce the higher charges in order to accommodate the projectiles, from which the packing would often strip, or the cap break, even with comparatively low charges."

As the result of the examination, the board report:

"It is the unanimous opinion of the board that Ames's wrought-iron guns possess, to a degree never before equalled by any cannon of equal weight offered to our service, the essential qualities of great lateral and longitudinal strength, and great powers of endurance under heavy charges; that they are not liable to burst explosively and without warning, even when fired under very high charges; and that they are well adapted to the wants of the service generally, but especially whenever long ranges and high velocities are required. It is also the unanimous opinion of the board that Ames's seven-inch guns, of which he has now fifteen nearly finished, possess sufficient weight and strength to receive an eight-inch bore, and even greater, although not heavy enough for a ten-inch bore."

And to show more fully their confidence in the strength and durability of the gun they had tested by firing it 700 times, the board—

"Further recommend that the gun which they have tried be rebored to eight inches and rifled, and then submitted to another series of tests similar to those through which it has just passed, to be then cut up for examination."

Accounts of further and apparently far more severe tests are given in the testimony of Mr. Ames.

The opinion of Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, of the Ames gun, and of the necessity for some gun of that character, is thus stated by him in his testimony:

“I think it is a fair inference, from the experience we have had with the small guns and 100-pounders which he (Mr. Ames) has made, that he has the correct principle of manufacture, and that guns manufactured by his method will bear any amount of charge that can be consumed in the gun. \* \* \* \* My opinion is that we have got to come to wrought-iron or steel guns, and abandon cast-iron.”

In regard to the cost of those several guns, the price of a 100-pounder Parrott gun is \$1,300; a 200-pounder about \$2,000; a 300-pounder from \$4,500 to \$5,000. Of the cast-iron guns, the contract price for the 15-inch gun, as stated by Mr. Fox, is \$7,500; those of smaller calibre in proportion. The Ames gun would cost about a dollar a pound, or about \$12,000 for a 100-pounder; \$17,000 for a 150-pounder, and \$28,000 for a 200-pounder.

In regard to the payment of “royalty” by the United States for any of these guns, the testimony establishes the following facts:

The Rodman gun, or rather the Rodman principle of manufacture, was made the subject of letters patent under the following circumstances, according to the testimony. The bursting of the “Peacemaker,” on board the Princeton, some twenty years ago, led Major Rodman, then a lieutenant in the military service of the United States, to investigate the subject of manufacturing ordnance of heavy calibre. In 1845 he laid his invention before the Ordnance Bureau, being the first inventor of the principle claimed by him, and urged its adoption, without success. At two other times he urged its adoption, but the bureau did not deem it of sufficient importance to receive its favorable consideration. In 1847 Major Rodman asked General Talcott if there would be any impropriety in having his invention secured by letters patent, and carried out by private enterprise; to which General Talcott replied, “Certainly not,” and, to use the words of Major Rodman, “appeared to be very glad indeed to get rid of the subject in that way and on those terms.” Consequently, in August, 1847, letters patent were taken out in the name of Major Rodman, then Lieutenant Rodman. Arrangements were made with Messrs. Knap & Totten, the proprietors of the Pitt foundry, at Pittsburg, by which they agreed to go to the expense and run the risk, then considered to be great, of carrying the invention into practical operation, in consideration of the transfer to them of one-half the interest in the letters patent. This arrangement continued until about four years ago, when Major Rodman, not being in a condition to take any share in conducting the business, transferred to Mr. Knap the full control of the patent; Mr. Knap obligating himself to pay to Major Rodman one-half cent per pound for all castings upon the Rodman principle manufactured by him, or by others, and upon which Mr. Knap collected what may be termed a royalty. Mr. Knap receives from the government so much per pound for all finished guns made for the United States service, of which Mr. Knap states he regards one cent per pound as the price charged for the patented invention.

Admiral Dahlgren testifies that he has never received anything in

the nature of "royalty" for the guns made according to the principles of his invention.

Mr. Parrott testifies that he never has charged anything for his invention; that he has charged only what he deems a fair manufacturer's profit.

Mr. Ames has made but twenty-one guns for the government; six upon an order from the Navy Department, and fifteen upon an order from the President. He does not appear to have charged anything for his invention, charging so much per pound for his guns.

The proportion of rifled guns to those with smooth bores used in the navy is much smaller than those used in the army. The difficulty of obtaining accuracy of fire upon a vessel in motion renders the rifled gun less efficient when used at sea than when used upon land. The projectile from a smooth-bore, except within point-blank range, is fired so as to ricochet upon the water, and it continues its flight in a straight line until it stops. The projectile from a rifled gun, when it strikes the water, ricochets at an angle from the direct line, sometimes almost at right angles, and it is therefore less reliable at long range. There does not appear to be any want of rifled guns in the naval service, as compared with the number of smooth-bore guns.

The guns herein referred to, except the Ames gun, have been and are now being introduced into both the land and naval service as rapidly as the means of manufacturing them will allow and the demands of the service require.

There are many matters of detail in connexion with the heavy ordnance now in use in this country, as well as that used by other nations, for which your committee would refer to the testimony herewith submitted, in which they are stated at length.

Your committee concur with the Navy Department in opinion as to the importance and necessity of securing a gun possessing the qualities found in the Ames gun; more especially in view of future wars with foreign nations, and the means of offence and defence required to prosecute such wars successfully.

In conclusion, your committee would therefore recommend that Congress immediately adopt such measures as will enable the War and Navy Departments to obtain and introduce into the service wrought-iron guns, especially of large calibre, at as early a day as practicable.

All of which is respectfully submitted:

B. F. WADE, *Chairman.*

## TESTIMONY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 27, 1864.*

Brigadier General GEORGE D. RAMSAY sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service ?

Answer. I am a brigadier general and Chief of Ordnance.

(The resolution of the Senate of January 25, 1864, in relation to ordnance, was read to the witness.)

Question. What do you say of the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of our fortifications ?

Answer. I should say very good—of a superior character; and that it will compare favorably, in my judgment, with any known ordnance.

Question. Do you know the amount of "royalty" paid, and to whom, for the use of patents in connexion with heavy ordnance ?

Answer. With regard to that, I know nothing personally; all that I know is derived from the report of the commission of which Mr. Holt was president. I think the whole story appears in the report, and to which I beg leave to refer. By this report it appears that the original patent to (then) Captain Rodman bears date August 14, 1847, "for a new and useful improvement in casting ordnance, &c." The entire interest in said patent was vested by said Rodman in Charles Knap, of Pittsburg, Mr. Knap agreeing to pay to Captain Rodman the full sum of one-half of one cent per pound of the finished weight of cannon, and other castings, on which Knap may receive a royalty for use of said patent. As I understand it, no *direct* royalty is paid on the part of the United States; but that in consideration of the superior value of ordnance manufactured under this patent, Mr. Secretary Floyd directed this mode of casting heavy guns to be adopted, and paid for at the rate of 20 per cent. additional.

[*Extract from report of the commission on ordnance and ordnance stores, page 568.*]

"November 16, 1859, without the recommendation of the Ordnance board (required by article 1377, General Regulations of the Army, edition 1861,) the then Secretary of War, Mr. J. B. Floyd, directed the adoption of this mode of casting heavy guns, ordering that arrangements should be made to cast all heavy cannon after the 'Rodman plan,' and that 'the free use of the right to cast cannon for the land service, after this plan, should be secured by the Ordnance Bureau to each founder, by the payment from the appropriation for armament of fortifications, for such use, of twenty per cent. upon the cost of each gun, to Mr. Charles Knap, the proprietor of the patent. The price for finished cannon at the foundries will remain the same as now paid.' A copy of this order was transmitted to all the founders then engaged in manufacturing cannon for the United States; and in 1860 thirty-nine 8-inch columbiads were cast after this plan at the Fort Pitt foundry, and were paid for at the rate of 6½ cents per pound, the usual price established some years previously; and Mr. Charles Knap, the proprietor of the patent, was paid, in addition, \$3,037 68, being twenty per cent. upon the cost of twenty-six of these cannon. The account for the patent fee upon the remaining thirteen of these guns, rendered later by Mr. Knap, was disallowed by decision of the Secretary of War *ad interim*, Mr. J. Holt, January 21, 1861, being 'regarded as incompatible with the — section of the act of June 23, 1860.' Messrs. Knap, Rudd & Co. were accordingly notified that the 'order of November 16, 1859, was revoked, and no payment on account of patent fees would be made by the United States.' No other founders than the proprietors of the Fort Pitt foundry have ever cast guns under the 'Rod-

man plan,' and no other payment has been made, expressly as patent fees, than the one above stated.

"Mr. Knap protested against the revocation of the order of November 16, 1859, and as the third section of the act of June 23, 1860, was repealed on the 21st of February, 1861, the basis upon which this payment was denied no longer exists. To complete the history of the case, as shown before the commission, it should be here stated, that in August, 1861, Captain Rodman applied for and obtained an extension, for seven years, of his original patent grant, which would have expired in that month.

"In December, 1861, the Chief of Ordnance, finding it necessary to give immediate orders for casting, and having recommendations from officers of the department the most practiced in experimental firing with heavy cannon, favorable to Rodman's plan, submitted the subject to a board of officers, composed of Brevet Major Dyer, Captain Rodman, and Captain Benton, directing them to 'fix a suitable price to be paid for 8-inch and 10-inch columbiads.' December 19, 1861, the board reported that: First. They consider it important that all pieces of these calibres should be cooled from the interior in casting. Second. In view of the fact that the Navy Department pays  $7\frac{7}{10}$  and  $8\frac{3}{10}$  cents per pound for its 9 and 11-inch guns, respectively, the undersigned consider that  $7\frac{1}{10}$  cents per pound is fair and reasonable for 8-inch and 10-inch columbiads cast hollow, more especially as they consider the latter named cannon more durable than the former. The undersigned are prepared to extend the foregoing recommendation to all cast-iron cannon made by direction of the ordnance department."

This continued to be paid until 21st January, 1861. On December 22, 1861, new orders were given for columbiads at  $7\frac{8}{10}$  cents per pound without specifying royalty; and January 13, 1863,  $9\frac{3}{4}$  was paid in consequence of advanced prices.

Question. In what does the patent consist in this Rodman gun for which this royalty is paid by the government to Mr. Knap; and what does the difference consist between that gun and guns cast in the common or ordinary mode?

Answer. Heretofore all cannon were cast solid and allowed to cool in the casting pit. In this way the cooling of the fluid metal from the exterior extended gradually towards the inside, which was the last part that solidified. The shrinkage by this mode of cooling tended to separate the interior layers of metal from the exterior. In Rodman's plan, the patent consists of cooling from the interior and keeping the outside hot; the shrinkage begins on the inside of the mass, and each layer of metal as it cools shrinks upon the nearest interior layer, thus binding all the successive layers together.

Question. Does the advantage of the Rodman plan consist in the fact that the gun is cast hollow with a stream of cold water poured through the inside?

Answer. Yes, as regards the casting. But the Rodman gun embraces more than this—the exterior form. Formerly guns were in their exterior form a series of sections of straight lines, called reinforces—somewhat analogous to the joints of a telescope when drawn out—but the Rodman gun (which the witness illustrated by a diagram on a piece of paper) gives a curved section. The thickness at the seat of the charge in cast-iron guns is a little more than the diameter of bore, gradually tapering to the muzzle. Some twenty years ago the late Colonel Bomford instituted a series of interesting and original experiments to determine the expansive force with which fired gunpowder acts at different points along the bore of the gun, and with the view of ascertaining the requisite curve of resistance; that is to say, at what points the metal received the greatest strain, and consequently where the greatest thickness was necessary. From these experiments the columbiad—a gun so called—originated, and to which may be traced the French Paixhan gun. The columbiads were originally made with chambers, and are now used for shot or shell. Colonel Bomford did not pursue his investigations beyond determining the above facts. These experiments satisfactorily show that the greatest force of the charge is exerted on the part of the gun which is situated in rear of the centre of the ball, and that the force diminishes rapidly as the ball moves forward from its original position.

Question. When was this investigation?

Answer. About 1843. It is understood that a French officer, General Paixhan, when on a visit to this country, was made acquainted with the experiments of Colonel Bomford, and on returning home he introduced a similar gun into the French service, the Paixhan gun, as a shell gun.

Question. Then I understand you the principle of the gun is an old one?

Answer. Not the principle of cooling from the interior.

Question. The shape of the gun?

Answer. This shape of gun is yet somewhat a matter of contention. It matters not what the shape of the gun is, within certain limits, if cast on correct principles.

Question. I understand you that this Rodman gun was shaped after the experiments of Colonel Bomford to ascertain where the greatest strain would come?

Answer. Yes, sir. But whether Captain Rodman had these in view when he investigated the subject, (which investigation will be found in a work of high reputation on experiments on metals for cannon and cannon powder by Captain Rodman,) I am not prepared to say. As to the shape of the gun, Commander Dahlgren, in a letter to Secretary Floyd, accused Captain Rodman of plagiarism, on the completion of his (Rodman's) 15-inch, and which led to a correspondence between these officers. Rodman's gun conforms more in exterior shape to the columbiad than the Dahlgren.

Question. Are our fortifications supplied with the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir, as far as we have been enabled. The armament is going on as fast as possible.

Question. What is the weight of the ball of the 15-inch gun, the solid shot?

Answer. About 430. The shell is 320.

Question. Is there any rule by which the weight of the powder is proportioned to the weight of the ball? If so, what is the proportion?

Answer. With rifled guns we use  $\frac{1}{10}$  the weight of the ball. For smooth-bores, up to 42-pounders,  $\frac{1}{4}$  the weight of the ball; but for breaching purposes it may be  $\frac{1}{3}$ , or more.

Question. What quantity of powder would be used in the Rodman gun for the 400-pounder ball?

Answer. For the larger guns, from about  $\frac{1}{8}$  to  $\frac{1}{6}$  the weight of ball.

Question. When the gun is rifled, the proportion between the ball and powder is different from what it is in the smooth-bore gun?

Answer. Yes, sir, about  $\frac{1}{10}$  for the rifle.

Question. It has been said that the great 15 inch guns would not stand a sufficiency of powder to propel the shot. Do you know how it is?

Answer. It will stand an ample sufficiency, and has stood charges of 40, 45, and 50 and 60 pounds of powder, propelling the projectile 5,018 yards, or within a few yards of three miles. It is a mistaken notion, much entertained by those ignorant or inexperienced in the science of gunnery, that an increase of the powder charge increases the velocity and range of the ball. This is true up to certain limits, which can be ascertained only by practical trial for each calibre; in other words, there is a *maximum* effective charge of powder for each, any increase beyond which impairs the velocity and range of the projectile, because it introduces powder which is not burnt, but acts as a cushion between the propelling power of the exploded gunpowder and the ball.

Question. We would like to have all the information you can furnish from your office.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. There was one point referred to in the resolution—the proof of guns. I would like to know about that.

Answer. The smooth-bores are fired three times, with charges somewhat greater than service charge of powder and ball. Rifled guns are fired the



same—Parrott guns ten times, with service charge. The rifled guns require more firing to test them, in order to judge whether the projectile and the grooves work satisfactorily together. The service charge is the one ordinarily used. From the bursting of some of the rifled guns before Charleston, I was apprehensive the charges were too heavy, and wrote to General Gillmore on the subject, but he did not think it advisable to reduce them at that time. It may be said of the rifled guns, that we were called upon to introduce the rifled system in time of war, suddenly, and without the facilities for practical experiment. We have no government arsenal, or convenient place adequate to proper trials for range, penetration, &c. There is no place that I am aware of, under our control, for extensive land range, and for that reason my predecessor recommended, at the last session of Congress, the purchase of a tract of land near New York, on the New Jersey marshes, for this purpose, and which presented an uninterrupted and secure range of several miles. We have had a good deal of practice with field and the 4½-inch rifled guns at the Washington arsenal, but necessarily over the water, rendering the experiments unsatisfactory both as to ascertaining penetration, correctness of flight, &c., of the projectiles, and of many other elements necessary in judging of what constitutes a good rifle gun and a good projectile.

Question. I understand you to say that our fortifications are being armed with the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir, and also with the Parrott.

Question. From 10-inch up to 15-inch guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; I have a statement here which embraces the whole matter.

Question. You consider the Rodman gun the best gun now in use?

Answer. Yes, so far as guns made entirely of cast-iron are concerned.

Question. What tests have been applied to the Rodman gun?

Answer. First, there is the preliminary test of ores, which embrace all of the scientific investigations deemed necessary. Castings from the ores selected are tested for density and tenacity. Experiments have established standards below which guns are not received. Then comes the powder-proof. The only proof to which guns were formerly subjected was by using excessive charges; but this was found to be objectionable, and not reliable, as there was no assurance that after all the trials with heavy charges the gun would not, as often happened, burst with the ordinary service charge. Confidence was greatly impaired, and many serious accidents from bursting ensued. I refer to guns cast solid. The theory of Captain Rodman being undoubtedly correct, experiments were made in order to verify or refute it in a practical manner. Several sets of cannon of the same form and calibre were cast, part in the ordinary method of casting solid and cooling from the exterior, and the same number on Rodman's plan. These were fired alternately, alongside of each other, with charges of powder and ball of the same weight and kind, and continued until one or other class of cannon gave way under the repeated firing. The result of these trials on several sets of cannon showed conclusively a far greater endurance for the Rodman gun—more than three hundred per cent. greater than those cast in the ordinary way; that is to say, we could rely on getting as much firing from *one* Rodman gun as from three guns cast solid in the usual way. Besides this greater durability, the Rodman gun possesses the greater advantage of reliability in use; that is to say, being served without danger to the men standing by it from bursting of the piece.

Question. The powder test is the test by powder and ball—the service charge?

Answer. Yes, sir; and when a new kind of gun or ore is introduced, the trial is one thousand rounds.

Question. What difficulty is there in applying a satisfactory test to the Rodman and Parrott guns, for instance, to ascertain which is the best gun?

Answer. The original Parrott gun was, I believe, a 10-pounder, calibre 2.9 inches; the 300-pounder is now the largest. There would be no difficulty in instituting the comparison referred to, provided that guns corresponding in every respect as to size and weight were fired with the same charge and projectile. Parrott's is a rifled gun. Only two Rodman guns have been rifled, an 8-inch and 12 inch. These are now under experiment at Fort Monroe.

Question. What is the difference in construction between the Parrott and the Rodman gun?

Answer. The Parrott gun is (thus far) cast solid—of peculiar form, and rifled—and a wrought-iron jacket is shrunk on about the seat of the charge, to impart greater strength. The Rodman is cast hollow, as before described.

Question. I cannot myself see why it would not be easy to take a 100-pounder Parrott gun, for instance, and a 100-pounder Rodman, and subject them to certain tests of powder and ball, and ascertain which is really the most energetic gun, and which will stand the most discharges.

Answer. There would be no difficulty about it, all things equal. Some of the Parrott guns have burst before Charleston. This, however, is ascribed to various causes, one of which is the frequent explosion of the shell in the gun, and the introduction of sand into the bore.

Question. That would be no evidence of the power and strength of the gun when properly fired?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. The Parrott gun is a rifled gun?

Answer. The Parrott gun is a rifled gun, and of high reputation.

Question. Is more powder in proportion to the ball used in the Parrott than would be necessary for a Rodman gun if rifled?

Answer. You can make no comparison with smooth-bore and rifle; but supposing both guns rifled, and to correspond—that is, using the same projectile and fired under the same circumstances—the charges of powder would be the same. The 8-inch Rodman has a 64-pound ball and 10 pounds of powder, and the Parrott 8-inch (200 pounder) fires a projectile of 150 pounds and 16 pounds of powder. The Rodman 8 inch weighs 9,000 pounds; the Parrott rifled, 16,000 pounds.

Question. Then you do not give any preference to the Rodman gun over the Parrott gun, but are getting both as fast as you can?

Answer. No preference in orders given for guns is shown. We have been and are getting both kinds as fast as we can. Unlimited orders have been given to all the foundries making guns. The entire capacity of the country has been called into requisition to meet the demands of the service. Everything has been done on the part of the government so far as I am advised.

Question. Is General Gillmore using the Parrott gun entirely for his long range?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While the Rodman gun is on board the fleet?

Answer. The iron-clads off Charleston are armed with 15-inch navy guns, (cast on the Rodman principle,) 11-inch Dahlgren, and the Parrott rifles. The wooden vessels of the fleet are variously armed.

Question. Describe the Dahlgren gun and the Rodman gun, and its advantage over the Rodman gun or columbiad.

Answer. The Dahlgren gun is cast solid and cooled from the exterior. The diameter of the rough casting at the chase is much greater than that of the finished gun; the surplus metal is turned off in the lathe. The Rodman gun and the columbiads are cast hollow and cooled from the interior. The advantages of one form of gun over another is an open question; and it matters not, within certain limits, if the gun is cast on correct principles, such as Rodman's, as before stated. But as to the advantages of *casting* very heavy guns on Rod-

man's plan, the navy Bureau of Ordnance has shown its confidence in the method by having them so cast at the present time.

Question. Has either one of those guns any advantage over the other in actual use and practice?

Answer. In practice the Rodman gun cast hollow, in my opinion, must have decided advantages as to endurance. As to range, this will depend upon the circumstances under which they are fired.

Question. Is there a gun called the Ames gun?

Answer. No such gun in the land service. We have field bronze guns made by Ames, at Chicopee, Massachusetts. Horatio Ames made a 50-pound wrought-iron gun, which was tried at the navy yard. He offered to furnish this department with—

50-pounders,	5,500 pounds,	at 75 cents	.....	\$4,125
80	“ 7,700	“ at 75 cents	.....	5,775
100	“ 11,000	“ at 85 cents	.....	9,350
200	“ 19,000	“ at \$1	.....	19,000
300	“ 27,000	“ at \$1	.....	27,000

Question. Have we a wrought-iron gun; and if so, who is the inventor of it?

Answer. We have a 3-inch wrought-iron field gun known as the ordnance gun; it is made at Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. Its calibre is 3 inches, and its weight 820 pounds.

Question. What is the Armstrong—an English gun!

Answer. It is an English gun. The body of the piece is made up by welding together several wrought-iron tubes, and is formed by twisting a square bar of iron around a mandril and welding the edges together. To strengthen the barrel at and in rear of the trunnions it is enveloped with two additional thicknesses or tubes. The outer tube, like the inner one, consists of spiral coils; but the intermediate tube is formed of an iron slab bent into a circular shape and welded at the edges. The breech is closed with a vent-piece, held in its place by a breech-screw which supports it from behind.

Question. The old-fashioned Armstrong gun is a wrought-iron?

Answer. The Armstrong gun is made of wrought-iron.

Question. A breech-loading gun?

Answer. The original gun was breech-loading. The 600-pounder is, I believe, muzzle-loading.

Question. The trial has been, I suppose, to see if they could make the side of a ship strong enough to resist any ball that you can propel against it?

Answer. Perhaps nothing will be more productive of change in these matters than the introduction of iron-clads. For iron-clads at a moderate distance, the smooth-bore gun, on account of the greater momentum of the ball and its crushing effects, would be more effective than rifled guns. The rifled projectile will go further and more accurately. Experiments on iron plates now going on will no doubt disclose to what extent they can be relied upon as armor for ships or forts. I doubt whether any iron-clad vessel capable of floating can resist the effects of the 15-inch gun.

Question. You are of opinion that the cast-iron 15-inch gun is a useful gun?

Answer. Yes; a very useful gun, on account of the weight of the projectile, its force, and range.

Question. In stating that our fortifications are now being armed with these Rodman guns, you do not mean, I suppose, that the old guns are displaced by them?

Answer. Not altogether. And I will state here that many years ago, and

just prior to the Mexican war, a close examination was made of all the army guns in the United States. Our gun-yards were stocked with guns of all kinds and patterns. A series of experiments was then instituted, to ascertain the relative effects of tenacity and endurance. The guns were first theoretically classified—1, 2, and 3. Subsequently, at Fortress Monroe, I fired, I think, some 12,000 rounds, to test this classification; and I made a report upon the subject. The object was to determine whether the endurance of the guns was in the ratio of the tenacity of the metal, as previously determined from specimens taken from the muzzle of the guns. All of the *old* guns in the forts deemed serviceable are now being rifled, and some banded.

Question. Judging from all your knowledge of all the guns in Europe and America, you think none are better than the Rodman and Parrott guns?

Answer. I do not think that any method of casting guns has proved better than or so good as the method adopted by Major Rodman. We have every reason to believe that our own guns are quite as good, if not better than the European.

Question. Can you give us any description of what is called the Whitworth gun—an English gun?

Answer. The Whitworth gun is a wrought-iron, rifled, breech-loading gun. It has a hexagonal bore, and its projectile is a bolt, correspondingly hexagonal. It is a very ingenious and beautifully made gun. It is liable to get out of working order in its breech arrangements, from the peculiar construction of the screw, which requires very perfect mechanism. This screw arrangement becomes foul by escape of gas, and it is sometimes difficult to close the breech. There are also muzzle-loading Whitworth guns.

Question. And the heating of the gun by firing would affect it, I suppose?

Answer. Of course. In the models all the breech-loading guns seem to work very well; but when you apply the principle to large masses of metal it becomes difficult to make the parts work easily.

Question. What about the Blakely gun?

Answer. That is made a little after the manner of the Parrott gun. I think it has a jacket of wrought-iron shrunk on it, commencing at the trunnions and embracing the entire rear of the gun.

Question. That is a wrought-iron gun?

Answer. Yes, sir. There are guns which are called semi-steel, and there are guns of wrought-iron, prepared in various ways.

Question. Is it your opinion that our guns are equal to any they have in Europe?

Answer. They are equal, if not better, as I have before stated. I know nothing of the Armstrong 600-pounder. Foreign attention is certainly directed to the improvements and experiments going on in this country. There are constantly foreign officers visiting our military establishments and studying our system.

Question. You have stated the tests to which these guns were subjected. What reason is there for believing that these tests are satisfactory; what reason have you for placing confidence in them?

Answer. The reliability of the experiments, as shown by the endurance of the guns.

Question. You think they are satisfactory?

Answer. Yes, sir; every effort has been made to render them so.

Question. What proportion of our sea and land armament is of rifled ordnance, and when were rifled guns introduced into service?

Answer. I should have to refer to the records to answer the first part of your question. As to the introduction of rifled ordnance, my first recollection of them was at the battle of Bull Run.

Question. What proportion of the land ordnance is rifled, so far as you know?

Answer. With regard to the old guns forming a portion of the armament of the fortifications, we are now rifling every gun along the sea-board. We are at this very moment rifling the guns at Portland, Portsmouth, and Boston. The 24 and 32-pounders are simply rifled; but to the 42-pounders we are applying the wrought-iron jacket in addition upon the Parrott principle, with the Parrott increasing twist. Experiments have shown that the 24 and 32-pounders have sufficient endurance, without going to the expense of banding.

Question. The intention is to have all the guns rifled?

Answer. Yes, the old guns, to include the 42-pounders—not the Rodman's. Some of them, the 8 and 12-inch, have been rifled for experiment.

Question. Does it not weaken ordnance to some extent to rifle it?

Answer. Yes, to some extent; but we are enabled to make reliable rifled guns, even from those originally smooth-bore—as, for example, a third-class 32-pounder gun, rifled by Captain Parrott, and fired with his own projectile, 64 pounds, (double the weight of the 32-pound ball,) and with 6 pounds of powder, withstood 1,000 rounds. This gun was not banded; its tenacity was not more than 16,000 or 20,000, the standard being about 30,000 pounds. It is doubtful whether this gun, before being rifled, would have shown greater endurance with its own proper service charge with round ball. We consider a good gun that will stand 1,000 rounds.

Question. At what time did these rifled guns come into use?

Answer. We had several batteries at the first battle of Bull Run; and we have since then furnished them with all the rapidity that the foundries could supply them. We have taken all the smooth-bore guns out of the field, and substituted rifled guns as fast as we could get them. At the battle of Bull Run we had a  $2\frac{9}{10}$ -inch, that is, a 10-pounder battery, a 20-pounder battery, and one 30-pounder gun, which was lost.

Question. Whoever drew up this resolution supposed there had been some delay in introducing these rifled guns, and we are instructed to inquire into the cause of that delay?

Answer. I know of no delay whatever. Mr. Parrott commenced making field rifled guns—

Question. The language of the resolution is: "and the cause of the delay pertaining thereto."

Answer. I know nothing about that, of course. I had no administrative duties whatever to perform at that time not pertaining to Washington arsenal. I know that now we are changing all the old guns to rifled guns.

Question. With what expedition are you making the change?

Answer. We are changing them with the utmost rapidity. We have several rifling machines at different places. We have one making for California; and I have ordered one to be sent to Fort Washington, to rifle the guns there. The principle is to be introduced wherever it can be to advantage.

Question. You say you are rifling all your guns. Are you rifling all the guns to be used in the field?

Answer. We have been using the smooth-bore light 12-pounder bronze guns, a very effective gun. I think the rifle principle will be generally adopted for all.

Question. Is the rifled gun as good for grape, canister, and spherical case as the other?

Answer. We do not use grape-shot in field-guns; we use canister, and in rifled guns with good effect. It is very effective when used in the light 12-pounder. We use spherical case in all field-guns.

Question by Mr. Odell. At what foundries, and where located, are the guns made? What are the names of those with whom contracts, and from whom purchases have been made? What is the number of guns of each size made by each founder, and at what prices? What amount, and at what rates, has been paid up to the present time as "royalty," and to whom? What outstanding contracts are there, and with whom? At what places have the old guns been rifled, and at what cost, and has the cost been uniform? What arrangements have been made to supply future wants of the service by contract or otherwise, and at what rates? Is "royalty" paid for any of the material or appurtenances used in connexion with heavy ordnance? If so, to whom, and the rates paid? The same general questions in reference to shot and shell used.

Mr. Gooch suggested that the witness be furnished with a copy of the resolution in relation to the present inquiry, his testimony as far as given, (when written out,) together with the questions submitted by Mr. Odell, and prepare such reply as he may deem necessary, including documents, &c.

The suggestion was adopted.

The following is a copy of the resolution:

"*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire into the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of fortifications; the mode of fabrication; the amount of 'royalty' paid, and to whom, for the use of a patent in the manufacture; the tests to which these guns are subjected when received into service; the reasons for believing the tests satisfactory; what proportion of our sea and land armament is of rifled ordnance; when rifled guns were introduced, and the cause of the delay pertaining thereto."

#### PAPERS ACCOMPANYING THE TESTIMONY.

Statement (marked A) of columbiads and mortars purchased from January 1, 1860, to February 1, 1864, with cost, &c.

Statement (marked B) of ordnance cast on Rodman's plan, with amount due on orders, &c.

Extract (marked C) from letter to the Secretary of War, showing the number of guns required for the armament of fortifications; the estimated capacity of foundries in 1864 for heavy guns, their cost, orders recommended, &c., &c.

Table (marked D) showing the mechanical tests, weights of charges and endurance of guns cast up to the present time, for the purpose of determining the relative merits of the solid and hollow modes of casting.

Statement (marked E) showing the cost of rifling cannon in 1861, by J. T. Ames.

Statement (marked F) showing the cost of rifling old smooth-bore cannon.

## A.

*Columbiads and mortars purchased from January 1, 1860, to February 1, 1864.*

Time.	From whom.	Place of manufacture.	No.	Weight.	Price.	Amount.
<i>8-inch columbiads.</i>						
1860..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	26	233,703	\$0 06½	\$15,190 70
1861..	do .....	do .....	78	674,993	06½	43,874 52
1st half 1863..	do .....	do .....	16	135,358	09½	13,197 40
2d half 1863..	do .....	do .....	19	161,198	09½	15,716 78
Total .....			139	1,205,252		87,979 40
<i>10-inch columbiads.</i>						
1861..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	10	151,735	06½	9,862 77
1st half 1862..	do .....	do .....	21	314,181	07 8-10	24,506 10
2d half 1862..	do .....	do .....	33	491,079	07 8-10	38,304 22
1st half 1863..	do .....	do .....	25	372,735	07 8-10	29,073 31
Do .....	do .....	do .....	29	432,784	09½	42,196 41
2d half 1863..	do .....	do .....	89	1,330,961	09½	129,768 74
Do .....	Cyrus Alger & Co .....	Boston, Mass. ....	2	30,310	09½	2,955 22
Total .....			209	3,123,785		276,666 77
<i>10-inch Rodman.</i>						
2d half 1863..	Cyrus Alger & Co .....	Boston, Mass. ....	7	105,667	09½	10,295 99
Do .....	Seyfort, McManus & Co.	Reading, Pa. ....	1	15,174	09½	1,479 46
Total .....			8	120,841		11,775 45
<i>13-inch columbiads.</i>						
1st half 1863..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	1	33,515	4,500 each.	4,500 00
<i>15-inch columbiads.</i>						
2d half 1862..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	2	98,198	6,500 each.	13,000 00
1st half 1863..	do .....	do .....	8	399,630	6,500 each.	52,000 00
2d half 1863..	do .....	do .....	24	1,194,831	6,500 each.	156,000 00
Do .....	Cyrus Alger & Co .....	Boston, Mass. ....	7	346,409	6,500 each.	45,500 00
1st half 1864..	Charles Knap .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	2	100,120	6,500 each.	13,000 00
Total .....			43	2,139,188		279,500 00
<i>15-inch Rodman.</i>						
2d half 1863..	Cyrus Alger & Co .....	Boston, Mass. ....	5	246,641	6,500 each.	32,500 00
1st half 1864..	do .....	do .....	11	544,468	6,500 each.	71,500 00
Total .....			16	791,109		104,000 00
<i>9-inch Dahlgren.</i>						
1861..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	16	146,966	07 2-10	11,022 45
<i>10-inch mortars, S. C.</i>						
1st half 1862..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	9	16,957	06½	1,102 20
1st half 1864..	Charles Knap .....	do .....	2	3,845	06½	249 92
Do .....	do .....	do .....	5	9,749	09½	950 52
Total .....			16	30,551		2,302 64
<i>13-inch S. C. mortars.</i>						
1861..	Knap, Rudd & Co .....	Pittsburg, Pa. ....	21	224,440	06½	23,590 32
1st half 1862..	do .....	do .....	9	154,193	06½	10,022 54
Do .....	do .....	do .....	60	1,031,272	07 8-10	80,439 21
Total .....			90	1,409,905		114,052 07

## RECAPITULATION.

	No.	Weight—lbs.	Amount.
8-inch columbiads.....	139	1,205,252	\$87,979 40
10-inch columbiads.....	209	3,123,785	276,666 77
10-inch Rodman.....	8	121,841	11,775 45
13-inch columbiads.....	1	33,515	4,500 00
15-inch columbiads.....	43	2,139,188	279,500 00
15-inch Rodman.....	16	791,109	104,000 00
9-inch Dahlgren.....	16	146,966	11,022 45
10-inch S. C. mortars.....	16	30,551	2,302 64
13-inch S. C. mortars.....	90	1,409,905	114,052 07
Total.....		9,061,112	891,798 78

## B.

*Ordnance cast on Rodman's plan due on orders February 2, 1864.*

Date of order.	Manufacturer's name.	Location.	Kind of ordnance.	No. ordered.	Balance due.	
1862.						
March 20.	C. Knap.....	Pittsburg..	15-inch gnns.....	50	15	June, 1866.
	C. Alger.....	Boston....	15-inch gnns.....	50	33	June, 1866.
1863.						
Nov. 24.	Seyfort, McMann & Co.	Reading...	15-inch gnns.....	25	25	March, 1866.
					73	
1863.						
July 7.	C. Knap.....	Pittsburg..	10-in. siege mortars	34	29	
	C. Alger.....	Boston....	10-in. siege mortars	16	10	
					39	
1863.						
Jan. 13.	C. Knap.....	Pittsburg..	8-inch columbiads	Unlimited		At one month's notice from Ordnance Office. The time for delivery of all these guns expires March 1, 1864.
			10-inch columbiads	do		
	C. Alger.....	Boston....	8-inch columbiads	do		
			10-inch columbiads	do		
	Seyfort, McMann & Co.	Reading...	8-inch columbiads	do		
			10-inch columbiads	do		

## C.

*Extract from a letter to the Secretary of War.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE,  
War Department, December 31, 1863.

Sir :

Number of heavy guns required for the armament of the coast and frontier, as per report of the Board of Engineers and Artillery Officers, February, 1862.....	5,622
Of which there are required of 8, 10, and 15-inch.....	4,800
Required for the defences of Washington, Cincinnati, Nashville, Memphis, Vicksburg, and other points not previously in any estimate, say.....	2,000
Of which there are required 8, 10, and 15-inch, say.....	200
<b>Making a total of all kinds, 32-pounders to 15-inch, of.....</b>	<b>7,622</b>
And of 8, 10, and 15-inch alone, of.....	5,000
The total number of guns of all kinds, from 32-pounders to 15-inch, excluding Parrott's, on hand on the 31st December, 1863, may be stated at	2,211
Of which amount there are of 8, 10, and 15-inch calibres, say.....	782
Leaving to be provided for, January 1, 1864, of all kinds.....	5,411
And of 8, 10, and 15-inch, say.....	4,218



Mr. Parrott's product during the war is not included here, as it is nearly all in current use in siege and field operations, and will probably continue to be used during the war.

The estimated capacity of all the foundries in 1864 for heavy army guns may be stated as follows:

	SMOOTH-BORES.			RIFLED.		
	15-inch.	10-inch.	8-inch.	300-pdr.	200-pdr.	100-pdr.
J. McManus & Co.....	12	100	50	-----	-----	-----
C. Knap.....	50	200	50	-----	-----	-----
C. Alger & Co.....	50	100	-----	-----	-----	-----
R. C. Parrott.....	-----	-----	-----	50	100	150
	112	400	100	50	100	150
Total.....	612			300		

We have, therefore, an estimated yearly product of 612 to set off against the 4,218 heavy guns wanted, as during the continuance of the war siege and defensive operations will probably continue to absorb all Parrott's product; it cannot, therefore, at present be taken into the general account.

## ORDERS RECOMMENDED.

*R. C. Parrott's West Point Foundry.*

Calibre.	Entire estimated capacity, 1864.	Army share.	It is proposed to order--	Price.	Total cost.
300-pounder .....	80	40	40—4 per month	at \$4,500	\$180,000
200 " .....	200	100	100—8 " "	at 1,900	190,000
100 " .....	300	150	150—12 " "	at 1,200	180,000
30 " .....	300	200	100—13 " "	at 527	52,700
20 " .....	300	300	50—12 " "	at 387	19,350
10 " .....	300	300	150—12 " "	at 187	28,050
Total cost.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	650,100

*Iron carriages for heavy rifled guns as above.*

Number.	Guns.	Price.	Total cost.
	<i>Barbette.</i>		
50 .....	300-pounder .....	at \$1,400	\$70,000
100 .....	200 " .....	at 705	70,500
100 .....	100 " .....	at 625	62,500
	<i>Casemate.</i>		
50 .....	100-pounder .....	at 625	31,500
Total.....	-----	-----	234,500

*Parrott projectiles.*

Calibre.	No. of guns on hand December 31, 1863.	Ordered as above.	Total guns.	Rounds 250 each.	Cost.
300-pounder .....	1	40	41	10,250	\$153,750
200 " .....	5	100	105	26,250	315,000
100 " .....	100	150	250	62,500	452,000
30 " .....	200	200	400	90,000	208,000
20 " .....	250	50	300	75,000	105,000
10 " .....	300	150	450	112,500	105,750
Total.....					1,339,500

As these guns and projectiles are patented articles and offered at a more reasonable price than any other rifled guns or projectiles, I have the honor to recommend that the above number of each kind of guns and carriages as indicated be ordered, and that 250 artillery projectiles be supplied with each gun, under such instructions as regards places of delivery as may be given at this office.

*Seyforth, McManus & Co., of Reading, Pennsylvania.*

Their capacity, as represented by letter of 23d October, 1863, may be stated as follows:

15-inch guns.....	1 per month.
10-inch guns.....	2 per week.
8-inch guns.....	1 per week.
24-pounder howitzers.....	2 per week.

These parties have a contract with this department for twenty-five 15-inch guns, dated November 24, 1863, and another for one hundred 24-pounder howitzers, dated November 12, 1863. It is only proposed, therefore, to order from them 8 and 10-inch guns. All guns made up to February 1, 1864, under their order of January 1, 1863, to be taken under that order, and a new order to be given for—

100 10-inch, delivered 2 per week, at \$1,477 each .....	\$147,700
50 8-inch, delivered 1 per week, at \$835 each.....	41,750
Total cost.....	189,450

thus taking the whole product for the year 1864.

*C. K. Knap, of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.*

Calibre.	Capacity per annum stated, October 22, 1863.	Army share.	Deliver'd in 1863.	Proposed to order.	Total cost.
15-inch .....	100	50	40	40	\$260,000
10-inch .....	480	240	at rate of 190	200	295,400
8-inch .....	240	120	" 50	50	41,750
Total.....					597,150

Mr. Knap has an order dated March 20, 1862, for fifty 15-inch guns. On the 31st of December, 1863, there will remain eight to be delivered.

It is recommended that this unlimited order of January 13 for 8 and 10-inch Rodman guns be terminated, and that specific orders for forty 15-inch, two hundred 10-inch, and fifty 8-inch be given.

*C. Alger & Co., of South Boston.*

Calibre.	Capacity for army work reported Oct. 23, 1863.	Delivered in 1863.	It is proposed to order—	Total cost.
15-inch .....	75	20	.....	.....
10-inch .....	100	10	100	\$147,000
8-inch .....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total .....	.....	.....	.....	147,000

C. Alger & Co. have an order for fifty 15-inch guns, dated March 20, 1862, on which, December 31, 1863, there will have been delivered twenty, leaving thirty to be delivered in 1864. It is recommended that their unlimited order of January 13, 1863, be terminated, and that an order be given them for one hundred 10-inch guns at present rates, being their whole army product for the next year.

*The Builders' Iron Company, of Providence,*

are wholly engaged on army work. Their capacity may be stated at one hundred 10-inch guns per annum.

RECAPITULATION.

Rifled projectiles and carriages.	Rifled, field, and siege guns.	Garrison guns.	Kind.	Cost.
Rifled projectiles .....	300	290	Parrott .....	\$650,175
Carriages .....	.....	.....	Parrott .....	1,339,500
.....	.....	612	Parrott .....	234,250
.....	.....	.....	Rodman .....	902,700
Total .....	.....	.....	.....	2,126,625

The carriages for the 612 heavy smooth-bored guns can be made by the Ordnance department in the year 1864 at the following arsenals:

Watertown arsenal .....	350
Washington and Fort Monroe arsenals .....	200
Watervliet arsenal .....	62

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE D. RAMSAY,  
Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
Secretary of War.

## D.

Table showing the mechanical tests, weight of charges, and endurance of all the guns cast up to this time, for the purpose of determining the relative merits of the solid and hollow modes of casting.

When cast and proved.	No. of gun.	Calibre.	Weight of charges.		Density of heads.		Tenacity of heads.		No. of times fired.		Remarks.
			Powder.	Shot.	Hollow.	Solid.	Hollow.	Solid.	Hollow.	Solid.	
1849	1	Inch.	10	64	.....	7.221	.....	27.014	.....	85	Burst.
1849	2	8	10	64	7.226	.....	27.963	.....	251	.....	Burst.
1851	3	8	10	64	.....	7.286	.....	37.984	.....	73	Burst.
1851	4	8	10	64	7.286	.....	37.816	.....	1,500	.....	Not broken.
1851	5	10	18	125	.....	7.290	.....	37.129	.....	20	Burst.
1851	6	10	18	125	7.294	.....	38.513	.....	249	.....	Burst.
1852	160	Pds.	8	32	7.281	.....	34.307	.....	1,000	.....	Burst, with 16 lbs. powder and 2 shot, at the 1,021st fire.
1852	161	32	10½	32	.....	7.271	.....	33.590	.....	20	Burst.
		10½	32	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,000	Burst.
1856	331	Inch.	18	125	7.215	.....	31.335	.....	315	.....	Burst.
1856	332	10	18	125	.....	7.160	.....	29.770	.....	26	Burst.
1857	334	10	14	125	7.172	.....	26.082	.....	1,600	.....	Not broken.
1857	335	10	14	125	.....	7.142	.....	24.454	.....	399	Burst.
1857	983W.P.	10	14	125	.....	7.235	.....	30.616	.....	169	Burst. West Point Gun.
1858	362	10	14	125	7.201	.....	27.733	.....	2,452	.....	Not broken.
1858	363	10	14	125	.....	7.159	.....	26.038	.....	2,452	Not broken.

## E.

Cost of rifling cannon in 1861 by J. T. Ames.

Calibre.	Number.	Price.	Total cost.
6-pounders .....	10	\$50	\$500
12-pounders .....	3	50	150
12-pounders .....	4	100	400
18-pounders .....	4	100	400
24-pounders .....	30	100	3,000
32-pounders .....	10	100	1,000
42-pounders .....	1	50	50
42-pounders .....	40	100	4,000
Total cost .....			9,500

## F.

Statement showing the cost of rifling old smooth-bore cannon at Washington arsenal.

## 42-POUNDER GUN.

Pay of machinist .....	\$2 50
Pay of helper .....	1 75
Fuel for engine .....	50
Hauling gun to and from machine .....	1 00
Repair and depreciation of machine .....	25
Total cost .....	6 00

*Testimony of Captain Henry A. Wise, U. S. N.*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1865.

Captain HENRY A. WISE sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your position in the naval service?

Answer. I am chief of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance.

Question. What kind of ordnance is now mostly used in the navy?

Answer. Dahlgren's smooth-bore guns and Parrott's rifled cannon.

Question. What is the proportion of the Dahlgren and of the Parrott ordnance now in use in the navy?

Answer. The proportion is about one-fifth of the Parrott cannon to the Dahlgren gun and the old-fashioned gun. We have but 36 guns cast on the Rodman plan, all of 15-inch calibre.

Question. Are the Rodman guns all 15-inch?

Answer. No, sir; the peculiarity of the Rodman gun consists in the method of cooling it from the inside.

Question. What is the principle of the Rodman gun, as it is termed?

Answer. The Rodman gun, as it is termed, is a gun cast upon a peculiar principle. There is a core of iron in the centre of the mould, and a stream of water is introduced from a hydrant into that core. The metal is poured into the mould around that core, and it is cooled interiorly and exteriorly at the same time. It is assumed that by that means very great strength is obtained for the gun so cast. The water is introduced at the bore of the core, and the head of water from the hydrant causes it to rise in the core to the top, whence it is carried off by a pipe. This process goes on during the process of pouring in and cooling the metal.

Question. So that there is a constant supply of cold water pouring through?

Answer. Yes, sir. These heavy guns made by that method are much stronger than if made by the method of solid casting. In the solid casting a chill takes place on the outside and the strength is drawn from the centre of the gun, and the more excrescences there are on the casting, moulding, &amp;c., no matter of what form, the more the gun is weakened by them while cooling when cast solid. The casting in a cylindrical form is generally supposed to give more uniform strength. This method of Rodman has gained ground only within the last three years.

Question. Is there any other difference between the Rodman gun and the Dahlgren gun than the mode of making it—of casting it?

Answer. The form of the Dahlgren gun is somewhat different, in some respects, from guns designed by Major Rodman.

Question. A Dahlgren is cast solid and then bored out?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And that is the case with the columbiads?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is the case with the old army gun. There are no Rodman guns, so to speak, in the navy; there is only the Rodman method of making guns.

Question. What tests have been applied to try the strength of these Rodman guns?

Answer. Our tests and the tests of the army for the 15-inch guns have been three rounds with 40 pounds of the so-called *mammoth* powder, a powder designed by Major Rodman. But that is merely the first proof. We took the first 15 inch gun made for the navy on the Rodman method, brought it here to the Washington navy yard, and have fired it now up to 900 rounds, increasing the charge up to 60 pounds of *cannon* powder.

Question. With a ball or a bolt ?

Answer. With a 440-pound ball. The gun still endures as well as a gun possibly could, and we perceive no defects in it.

Question. Is that the proportion between powder and the weight of the ball usually used in guns ?

Answer. No, sir. There is a great misapprehension on the part of people generally with regard to the quantity of powder to be used. The powder may be strong or it may be weak ; it may exert a very great pressure or it may not. We do not measure its strength proportionally by the quantity we put in, but by its initial velocity and the impulse given to the shot. By putting an ounce or two of fulminate of mercury in the gun we might exert the same force upon the ball as with the charge of 60 pounds of powder, though we could not, perhaps, control it as well, and the effect would be so great upon the gun that it might give way.

Question. In regard to the proportion between the powder and the weight of the ball, there is a difference between the Rodman gun and the Parrott gun ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; because the one is a smooth-bore gun, and the other is a rifled gun. It is only within the last three months that I have ordered, cast on the Rodman plan, three rifled guns of different kinds.

Question. Of what calibre ?

Answer. Of 12-inch, using 600-pounder bolts. They are not of the design and forms of Major Rodman, but they are to be cast upon his principle.

Question. And are to be rifled ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I took the best propositions for rifling I could obtain from different parties. From a multitude of forms submitted we selected the three which we thought would produce the best results. The guns are now being rifled, and we intend to try them under precisely the same conditions, and with the same weight of projectile, and the same charge of powder, and that is the only real, actual, practical way of getting at any result in these things.

Question. That test has not yet been applied to these guns ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do I understand you that no 15-inch Rodman gun has ever yet been rifled ?

Answer. Never. They are about to cast a 20-inch gun this day fortnight ; but that will be a smooth-bore.

Question. Are you rifling your old guns now ?

Answer. No, sir, not in the navy ; and, in my opinion, whoever uses a rifled gun of the old pattern will cause great mischief.

Question. Do you weaken an old gun by rifling it ?

Answer. Very much. You have no windage in a rifled gun, and old guns are so weak that they will not stand the pressure.

Question. Do you think that cutting the grooves tends to weaken the gun ?

Answer. No, sir, not the mere cutting the grooves.

Question. You have not, then, had an opportunity to form a very definite opinion which of these guns would stand the heaviest charge and be the most durable, the Parrott or the Rodman ?

Answer. No, sir ; because there never has been but one rifled gun made on Rodman's plan until the three guns I have just ordered—one on his plan, one of Mr. Parrott's, and one of Mr. Atwater's. We chose the three kinds which we thought would produce the best results.

Question. You have described the Rodman gun or method. Please describe the Parrott gun as distinguished from that.

Answer. The Parrott gun is a rifled gun. It consists of a solid casting, which is bored out and rifled, and then it is banded with a coil of wrought-iron around the breech ; that is, one continuous coil is shrunk on. They are very

excellent guns—the best, beyond all question, that have yet been brought into service in this or any other navy.

Question. Then these large 15-inch Rodman guns are, as yet, a kind of experiment, are they not?

Answer. The smooth-bore gun is not still an experiment, because we have a number of them in use, and they have done great service at Charleston and elsewhere. A 15-inch shot destroyed the Atlanta; and I may repeat, one of these guns has been fired here about 900 rounds under very great strain, and still stands exceedingly well. Therefore, I should say that the result had been very successful. It has been so much so that the English have taken the alarm, and have got up a 600-pounder, which they have fired a few times.

Question. Is that 600-pounder on the Parrott principle?

Answer. It is not on the Parrott principle, but rather on the Armstrong principle; somewhat different.

Question. The Parrott gun has always been a rifled gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Wherein does the Dahlgren gun differ from the columbiad?

Answer. It differs from the columbiad in its form—in the distribution of the metal.

Question. In the external form of it?

Answer. Yes, sir; and it has two vents. The distribution of metal in the Dahlgren gun gives the very best form in which a gun can be made to attain the greatest strength. In other words, Dahlgren assumes to take a certain weight of metal—we will say, 10,000 pounds—and he will make that metal into a gun of stronger form than any gun that has previously been devised of the same weight of metal. The army and navy guns now correspond in their general outward form, with some exceptions, which are necessary for the different working of a gun on a ship and on land.

Question. You say you consider the Dahlgren the best gun, but you have not yet stated exactly how it differs from the columbiad.

Answer. Nearly in its exterior form. The columbiad, until very recently, was more in the form of a Doric column, with very little difference in the diameter from the muzzle to the breech; it tapers in a slight degree along the whole length. The new columbiad corresponds in form to that of Dahlgren in having the metal in a cylindrical form around the breech, and tapering rather suddenly towards the muzzle.

Question. It is found that the greatest strain is near where the charge lies?

Answer. Invariably; Dahlgren's guns hitherto have all been cast solid.

Question. And so with the columbiads, I suppose?

Answer. Yes, sir; I believe, however, that they now propose, since some recent experiments, to cast them hollow.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. On the Rodman plan?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman:

Question. Are all the guns now being made for the navy rifled?

Answer. No, sir; we ourselves make smooth-bores. The only guns we rifle are the bronze guns, but we buy from Mr. Parrott his rifled gun. We do not make large rifled guns.

Question. What I mean is, that you are procuring for the navy rifled guns as fast as you can, are you not?

Answer. Yes, sir, from Mr. Parrott; no one else.

Question. What is the calibre of the guns you are now procuring?

Answer. We are making 9, 10, and 11-inch Dahlgren guns, and a 15-inch gun after Rodman's method, and we are buying from Mr. Parrott his 20, 30, 60, 100, and 150-pounders. We have now in service about 650 of the Parrott guns.

Question. Have they reached as high as a 300-pounder Parrott yet ?

Answer. The army have two of them which are now in use on Morris island, but we never have had one.

Question. The 150-pounder is the largest in the navy ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When was this new method of making guns first discovered—this Rodman principle ?

Answer. I think experiments were first made by Major Rodman in 1849 or 1850 ; I am not very sure about the precise date.

Question. Was that an invention purely of this country, or had it been previously known in Europe ?

Answer. I think it has been conceded in Europe and here that it was purely Major Rodman's invention.

Question. Where are those Rodman guns constructed ?

Answer. They are made at Alger's foundry, in South Boston, at the Fort Pitt foundry, in Pittsburg, and also at the Scott foundry, in Reading, Pennsylvania.

Question. What amount of "royalty" is paid, and to whom, for the construction of those guns ?

Answer. I do not know ; we never have paid a penny ; but I presume that the "royalty," if any is paid, is paid to the Fort Pitt founders, who, as I understood, bought the patent from Major Rodman years ago.

Question. Do you intend to say that the government does not pay any "royalty" ?

Answer. Not for navy ordnance ; never a penny.

Question. Is it paid by some other bureau or department ?

Answer. Not to my knowledge ; it is impossible.

Question. There is none paid, then ?

Answer. We pay so much a pound for the gun.

Question. Does not that include a certain amount of "royalty," as they call it, for the invention ?

Answer. It may be so, but we do not pay it.

By Mr. Harding :

Question. You do not pay "royalty" as such, but you pay a certain price for a gun ?

Answer. We pay a certain price to Mr. Parrott, to the Fort Pitt foundry, and to Mr. Alger.

By the chairman :

Question. Then you do not know that "royalty" is paid by the government upon the manufacture of any of these guns ?

Answer. No, sir ; I do not.

Question. Not in that name, or in any other way ?

Answer. It might be included in the general price, but we do not recognize it, and know nothing about it ; we merely pay so much for a gun. Mr. Parrott has his own patents, and we pay him so many cents per pound for his guns.

Question. Are Rodman's and Parrott's guns both patented ?

Answer. They are ; Mr. Parrott's patents, however, I believe are contested ; not so with Major Rodman's patent. I have seen his patent, because we contemplated casting guns upon a similar principle ; but instead of introducing water, we cool the castings by means of atmospheric air. But upon looking at the patent we found that it comprehended every description of process by which a gun can be cooled from the interior.

Question. Is there any other satisfactory test of the strength of a gun except by actual trial of powder and ball ?



Answer. There is the water test, which we apply to all our guns; a certain pressure.

Question. Do you regard that as satisfactory a test as the powder and ball?

Answer. No, sir, not so satisfactory. But we judge more from the metal, and the treatment of it, and watching the various stages of the manufacture of a gun until it is completed. Then we have also certain mechanical tests which we apply.

Question. Will you state specifically what tests you apply to these guns—each in its order?

Answer. For the Dahlgren gun we enter into an agreement or contract with a founder to make, say 50 guns. We then determine the quality of his metal, and he is obliged to lay in enough of that metal to make 50 guns of the calibre agreed upon. We watch the treatment of his first gun closely, as in fact every other; but we select one of the first five guns and subject it to a powder proof of the ordinary service charge, up to 1,000 rounds. If the gun does not break or show signs of undoubted weakness under this firing, then we pay for the gun and lay it aside as the *standard*. The remaining 49 guns, which must all conform to the standard, we prove by firing 10 service rounds with shot.

Question. The "service charge" is the charge usually used in action?

Answer. Yes, sir; by the former system of proving, where we put in double charges, and double-shotted the gun, and fired it 10 times, at the last fire, though the gun did not burst, it might become so weak that it would break by the touch of a hammer—almost fall in pieces of itself. We have abandoned that system.

Question. Because it injured the gun?

Answer. It injured the gun very much.

Question. Do you contract with the founders to use any particular quality of iron in the construction of these guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where does the iron come from?

Answer. From various parts of the country. We find good iron in Massachusetts; we find excellent iron in the Bloomfield range in Pennsylvania; Tennessee iron is excellent iron; the Reading iron is excellent; all good irons; better irons than any known abroad.

Question. Have you ever tried any iron from Lake Superior?

Answer. We have tried to get enough of it for trial, and we have obtained one block; but it was made in a cupola furnace and did not give a fair result. We shall use in our gun hematite ores, and prefer pure cold-blast charcoal iron.

Question. You take this pains to ascertain that the metal and all is good, and then you test by service charges?

Answer. Yes, sir. We have an officer at the foundry whose duty it is to watch every pound of metal that is put in the furnace, note the time the fire is started, and trace the whole thing up to its completion, so that we know the life and biography of a gun as well as we know the history of anything else on earth.

Question. Do you believe that those tests are satisfactory?

Answer. They are not *absolutely* satisfactory in all respects.

Question. Could they be improved so as to be made more satisfactory? If so, how?

Answer. I do not know that they could; but we would like very much to discover some more satisfactory method. There is very little known of iron in its fluid state. We know as little of that now as was known 3,000 years ago, and it has to be almost by instinct that we judge when the metal is in a proper condition to be run from the furnace for a great casting; and the mechanical tests to which we subject iron are in some respects fallacious.

Question. Did you state what proportion of guns used by the navy are rifled guns?

Answer. At present about one-fifth rifled to the smooth-bores.

Question. Are you increasing the proportion of rifled guns; and if so, how rapidly?

Answer. I am not.

Question. You prefer about that proportion?

Answer. About that proportion.

Question. Has there been any delay in the construction of those rifled guns?

Answer. Never a moment, night or day, from the hour the rebellion broke out.

Question. When were those rifled guns introduced into the navy?

Answer. I think we got the first rifled gun, of small calibre, from Mr. Parrott, in May or June, 1861, after the rebellion broke out, and from that day to this we have never ceased getting them.

Question. Do you use the same strength of powder, according to the weight of projectile, in a rifled gun as in a smooth-bore?

Answer. No, sir; the proportion is different.

Question. What is the difference of proportion?

Answer. We use more powder in the smooth-bore gun than in the rifled gun, in proportion to the weight of the projectile—about two-thirds more in the smooth-bore. It may vary from that; different guns take different charges.

Question. Which of those guns will have the longest range, and which be the most effective?

Answer. The rifled gun has the greater range, but the ball from the smooth-bore *starts* with the greater velocity. In other words, the rifled projectile retains its flight longer than the smooth-bore ball. The effect which projectiles produce is different under varying circumstances. The rifled gun, with its projectile, can cut away masonry or brick-work. The round shot has a smashing power, and at a certain range, with its high velocity, it can penetrate as well as *smash*.

Question. Does not the spiral motion tend to make the rifled projectile penetrate furthest?

Answer. We do not find that to be the effect upon iron plating. We find that we have quite as much penetration with our round balls as with the heaviest steel-headed rifled bolts.

Question. If the initial velocity of the smooth-bore is greater than that of the rifled projectile, why is it that the rifled will go the furthest?

Answer. That is rather a nice question. The rifled projectile meets with less resistance on account of its shape, and, therefore, will maintain itself longer in the air, like an arrow.

Question. And yet the smooth-bore has the greater velocity to start with?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And the strength of the blow is in proportion to the velocity of the ball?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. The shape of the rifled projectile is different from that of the smooth-bore?

Answer. Entirely different; the one is round, and the other is elongated.

Question. You spoke of the one continuing its flight in the air longer than the other, or keeping up its velocity longer; is that in consequence of the difference in shape?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When was the rifled gun first introduced into use in this country?

Answer. It was not introduced into service until this war broke out. A great

variety of rifled guns have been presented and experimented with by us in the navy, and also in the army; but they never were put into service, with the exception of Dahlgren's boat howitzers, which have been rifled, and those pieces date about five years back.

Question. Was the rifled gun in use in other countries—in England and in France—before used here?

Answer. There were a few put on board as experiments, and Mr. Armstrong's breech-loading rifled guns were being largely introduced into the English service, but I believe they have all proved failures and been withdrawn.

By the chairman:

Question. What is the Whitworth gun?

Answer. It is a breech-loading piece; but instead of being rifled with grooves, its bore is hexagonal in shape, having flat surfaces, and the projectiles also have flat sides, to fit those fascets. It requires the most beautiful mechanical workmanship to adapt the Whitworth projectile to its bore.

Question. But there could be no such thing as "stripping," as it is termed, in such a gun?

Answer. No, sir; and the nice adaptation of the sides of the projectile to the flat fascets of the bore brings very little strain upon the gun, although the metals are the same; you bring iron and iron together.

Question. Do you regard that as a more powerful gun than our Rodman or Parrott gun?

Answer. We regard it as less powerful. We have in this country more powerful rifled cannon than any we know of abroad.

Question. Have you reason to suppose, from your tests, and all the other information you have been able to obtain upon the subject, that our guns are the best known in the civilized world?

Answer. We have every reason to believe so, because our experience in actual service and warfare shows conclusively what the guns have endured and can endure, and there are no evidences that we know of that the same tests have been applied to any other system of rifled cannon. Therefore, with these absolute results before us, we conclude that our guns are the best.

Question. Are you acquainted with the tests to which other nations subject their guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Describe their method, if you please.

Answer. They are believed to be very similar to ours in the actual powder test. I do not know whether, at present, the English apply the water test or not; that is an additional proof.

Question. How do their tests and ours compare? Which show the most powerful guns?

Answer. Our guns have a greater endurance than any English gun?

Question. Do you pay more per pound for the Rodman and Parrott guns than you do for the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. We do.

Question. How much more?

Answer. Rifled guns are more expensive than smooth-bores. We pay Mr. Parrott about seventeen cents a pound for his guns. That is somewhat more than the price per pound of guns cast after Rodman's method.

Question. What is the price of the Rodman gun?

Answer. Each of his 15-inch guns cost \$6,500, and they weigh, on the average, 45,000 pounds.

Question. You say you think there is no "royalty" paid. What is the price, per pound, of the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. About ten cents.

Question. Why is there that difference between that gun and the Parrott gun, and the Rodman gun, if there is no "royalty" paid?

Answer. The Parrott gun is a rifled gun, and also bound round with wrought-iron, a material much more expensive than cast-iron, and requiring more labor upon it.

Question. The Rodman gun is a cast-iron gun, and not rifled?

Answer. Yes, sir; but the risk is very great in these large castings. It cost \$60,000 for the plant alone to make the first 15-inch gun for the navy, and it is against the law to pay any "royalty." We never did it in the navy. We buy a projectile, or other article, and are frequently served with notices not to use it. We do not pay the least attention to that, however, but get the article, pay for it, and use it, and that matter is left entirely to the parties themselves. There is one thing very certain, that no gun of the class of 15-inch could possibly be made by any other method than the one invented by Major Rodman.

Question. None of our guns that you have described are breech-loading guns?

Answer. Not one of them.

Question. Have we any efficient breech-loading gun in our service?

Answer. Not one, and never had.

By Mr. Harding:

Question. Is there any efficient breech-loading gun anywhere?

Answer. Not in my opinion. The Armstrong gun, I understand, is being withdrawn.

By the chairman:

Question. Is there a gun called the Ames gun, or something of that kind?

Answer. Mr. Horatio Ames, of Falls River village, builds a wrought-iron gun, solidly welded, as he terms it. He made five or six guns under the order of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance. One of them, a 50-pounder, after being rifled, was put to proof and endured a number of rounds, sufficient to show that it had the strength required. And, although in the other guns some defects were observed in the bores of the guns, yet there was no doubt of their being strong guns. The difficulty, however, in wrought-iron guns is, that you may make one gun that will stand ten thousand rounds, and the next gun may not stand ten rounds. You cannot get the uniformity desirable.

Question. If a wrought-iron gun should be made perfect, would it not be much stronger than any cast-iron gun?

Answer. Very much stronger, for the difference in tensile strength is very great. Wrought-iron has a tensile strength of over 56,000; whereas, if we get a tensile strength in cast-iron of 30,000, we are doing very well.

Question. And the English are making these wrought-iron guns?

Answer. They are making a great number of experimental guns; but they do not seem to reach any results sufficient to authorize them to place those guns in actual service. Besides, the expense is enormous; it is the difference between ten cents a pound and a dollar a pound. And our cast-iron guns stand firing 1,500 rounds, and that is about as many rounds as a gun need be fired in an ordinary war.

Question. Could you not get increased efficiency by a greater charge of powder, if your gun would stand it?

Answer. I think we can put as much powder into our heavy ordnance as the gun will burn—of what is ordinarily called cannon powder.

Question. Is there any particular length of gun that is found to be better than any other, so that you adopt a particular length of tube?

Answer. Every designer of a gun adopts a certain proportion of calibres to the length of his bore, all different. No one has produced a gun yet which he can say positively is of the exact length that a gun should be. They differ in regard to the weight, calibre, and principle.

Question. The range of a gun will not be in proportion to the length of the tube?

Answer. By no means.

By Mr. Harding :

Question. Does the length of the tube seem to have anything to do with the range?

Answer. It does up to a certain point; that is to say, about five or six calibres in length of bore is considered by the best authorities who have studied this question to be sufficient to give range. We can only take the best that are produced at the time, both in regard to ordnance, projectiles, and everything else.

By the chairman :

Question. This 15-inch gun is strong enough to bear all the charge necessary to make it perfectly efficient?

Answer. Yes, sir. But I have modified the first navy gun by giving it more length.

Question. Have you any assurance that in these 15 and 20-inch guns you can give the spiral motion to the ball?

Answer. No, sir; we do not expect to rifle those guns. The guns that I spoke of as being rifled, and which are cast on Rodman's method, are 600-pounders. There are three of them, having the same external form and dimensions as the 15-inch gun, so that you may use a pair of those guns, and the same carriage will fit the one or the other.

Question. That enormous weight of ball is made up by its length?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What would be the weight of a round ball to fit that calibre?

Answer. Some two hundred and twenty pounds, or thereabouts, I should think.

Question. Have you in your office a record of the tests to which you have subjected these guns?

Answer. We have there the entire history of every gun that ever was made for the navy.

Question. Could you, without having it in too extended a compass, give us a summary of those tests?

Answer. We can give it to you; we have it all printed.

Question. In an extended form, I suppose?

Answer. Rather extended.

Question. We want it in as compact a form as we can get it.

Answer. I can give the test of one gun, which is the same as of every other gun.

Question. Can you, without too much trouble, give the tests of one of each kind of guns that you have?

Answer. I can, and will do so.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Is there any objection to making your tests public?

Answer. None.

Question. Have all the experiments with rifled guns in this country been made since this war commenced?

Answer. No, sir; a great many experiments were made previously.

Question. But nothing was adopted?

Answer. No, sir; except Dahlgren's rifled boat-howitzer.

Question. What guns are used now for harbor defences?

Answer. That subject is in charge of the army.

Question. Have the guns for 24, 32, and 42-pound solid shot, and 8-inch shell, of our former armament, been discarded?

Answer. In the navy the 24 and 42-pounder cast-iron guns have been discarded. We still use the 32-pounder.

Question. Why have those guns been discarded?

Answer. In the one case the gun was very weak in proportion to its calibre; and ships have now become so strongly built that we want heavier shot and shell to break through them.

Question. Do you require an entirely different armament for your iron-clads from what you did for wooden ships?

Answer. To a certain degree we do.

Question. It should be heavier?

Answer. It should, I think, be heavier. We use 150-pounders on board wooden ships, but not the 15-inch guns.

Question. The light projectile is about worthless, is it not, as against iron-clads?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why is it that we are now able to make guns of so much larger calibre than formerly and have them serviceable?

Answer. The necessity for a larger calibre had never presented itself before.

Question. Had not these large guns been attempted before?

Answer. Yes, sir; very large guns have been made for the last two hundred years, but they all failed.

Question. And has not our improved knowledge in relation to metals and the manipulation of them caused the change?

Answer. That has had a great deal to do with it, no doubt.

Question. What is the largest gun now used in our navy?

Answer. The 15-inch gun, in our or any other navy.

Question. Do you think it would be desirable to use a larger gun?

Answer. That is a question yet to be solved. We are going to try the experiment, at all events; we are about to cast a 20-inch gun—to be cast on Rodman's method, of the navy form.

Question. Could not the Dahlgren gun be made upon the Rodman principle and be improved?

Answer. Admiral Dahlgren is not of that opinion.

Question. Is there not a controversy between scientific men on that point?

Answer. There has been.

Answer. Would it not be an easy matter to test the question by making a Dahlgren gun on the Rodman principle?

Answer. It might be done. But a similar experimental test has been made with two army guns, all of which is reported in Major Rodman's book on the subject.

Question. Were the army guns of the shape of the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. They were not.

Question. Are we not now, in your opinion, making rapid progress and great improvements in the method of constructing guns?

Answer. I think we are.

Question. So that it is by no means certain that the best gun of to-day will be the best gun of next year?

Answer. By no means.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Have not those improvements been the result of our experience since the beginning of this war?

Answer. They have, except in the Dahlgren gun; and that gun is as nearly a perfect smooth-bore gun as can be made.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Unless it can be improved by being constructed upon the Rodman principle ?

Answer. Unless it can be improved by casting it upon some better method.

Question. Has the navy kept up with all the improvements in guns ? Has it introduced the best guns it could get, and as fast as it could get them ?

Answer. It has, in my opinion.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Can you furnish the committee with a statement of the number of guns made for the navy at each foundry, and the price paid ?

Answer. The prices paid are the same for the same kind of gun. It would take me some little time to get up the number of guns.

Question. And where there is any variation in price, will you state the reason for it ? Also, if there are now outstanding contracts, and with whom ? Also, at what places old guns have been rifled, and at what cost ?

Answer. Those for the navy have never been rifled, and never will be, as far as I am concerned.

Question. Also if "royalty" is paid ; and if so, how much, and to whom, for any appurtenances used in connexion with heavy ordnance ?

Answer. We pay nothing as "royalty." I do not know what the man who contracts with us may pay the inventor.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Will you describe the difference between the blow, or the concussion, produced by a projectile from a smooth-bore gun and a projectile from a rifle gun ?

Answer. That would depend very much upon the velocity. The smooth-bore, at the same velocity as the rifled projectile, would exert a smashing effect, while the rifled projectile would penetrate.

Question. And which would be the most effective ?

Answer. That would depend upon the substance against which the projectiles were fired.

Question. Take it in the case of an iron-clad.

Answer. I should prefer the smashing effect of the round ball from the smooth-bore.

Testimony corrected and hereby respectfully returned.

H. A. WISE,

*U. S. N., Chief of Bureau of Ordnance ad interim.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

*February 8, 1864.*

## APPENDIX.

*Number of navy guns made since the beginning of the rebellion, by whom made, and prices thereof.*

### IX-INCH GUNS.

Where made :	No.
C. Alger & Co., Boston.....	100
West Point foundry, Cold Spring, New York.....	5
Seyfert, McManus & Co., Reading, Pennsylvania.....	100
Fort Pitt foundry, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....	300
Total.....	505

The price of IX-inch guns was  $7\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound up to July, 1863; and the weight of each gun being about 9,200 pounds, makes the average cost \$690 per gun. In July the price of the same guns was raised to  $9\frac{1}{4}$  cents per pound.

## XI-INCH GUNS.

Where made:	No.
C. Alger & Co., Boston.....	89
Builders' iron foundry, Providence, Rhode Island.....	50
West Point foundry, Cold Spring, New York.....	16
Hinkley, Williams & Co.....	50
Seyfort, McManus & Co.....	50
Fort Pitt foundry.....	58
Total.....	<u>313</u>

Price paid for above XI-inch guns, except last fifteen manufactured, was  $8\frac{3}{4}$  cents; and the average weight of XI-inch gun being 15,900 pounds, makes the cost per gun \$1,391  $\frac{25}{100}$ . For the last fifteen  $11\frac{3}{8}$  cents per pound was paid.

NOTE.—The increase in the price of IX-inch and XI-inch guns was made in consequence of the increased price of labor and materials. The War Department first allowed this increased price, and this bureau was unable to make any new contracts with the founders without a similar increase, and in accordance with the instructions of the Navy Department this increase was consequently made.

## XV-INCH GUNS.

Where made:	No.
Fort Pitt foundry.....	<u>36</u>

Price, \$6,500 per gun; weight of gun, 42,000 pounds.

## PARROTT RIFLED GUNS MADE AT WEST POINT FOUNDRY.

Number.	Calibre.	Weight.	Price per gun.	Av'ge price per pound.
215.....	20-pounder.....	1,750 pounds.....	\$380	\$0 21.7
250.....	30-pounder.....	3,500 pounds.....	500	14.3
250.....	100-pounder.....	9,800 pounds.....	1,200	12.2
75.....	150-pounder.....	16,500 pounds.....	1,900	11. $\frac{1}{2}$

*Number of guns contracted for yet undelivered.*

## IX-INCH.

Where made:	No.
Fort Pitt foundry.....	300
Alger's foundry.....	25
Total.....	<u>325</u>

## XI-INCH.

Where made:	No.
Portland, Maine.....	50
Fort Pitt foundry.....	192
Builders' iron foundry.....	50
Hinkley, Williams & Co.....	50
Cyrus Alger & Co.....	25
Total.....	<u>367</u>





NOTE.—The proof gun is to be entered at head of each page.

No.	CHARGE OF FURNACE, IN POUNDS.								No.

No.	CHARGE OF FURNACE, IN POUNDS.			Total in pounds.	No.

No.	Date of casting.	TIME.				No.
		Required to obtain complete fusion.	Kept in fusion.	Of filling mould.	Remained in open pit.	

No.	EXCESS OF ROUGH OVER FINISHED DIMENSIONS.						GUN HEADS.			Time of boring.	Time of turning.	No.
	K. Excess at muzzle-face.	H. J. Excess at chase.	G. Excess at 3d curve.	E. Excess at 2d curve.	C. Excess at 1st curve.	A. Excess at breech and cylinder.	LENGTH.	DIAMETER.				
							Inches.	Inches.	Inches.			

No.	METAL WORKED.		Cavities, &c.	No.
	At foundry.	At Washington.		

No.	APPEARANCE AT FOUNDRY OF—				No.
	Fracture of core.	Core.	Bore.	Exterior surface.	

No.	WEIGHT OF GUN.	PREPONDERANCE.	DISTANCE FROM BASE-RING TO CENTRE OF TRUNNIONS.	MAXIMUM INDENTATION BY POWDER PROOF IN 1000THS OF AN INCH.	DIAMETER OF BORE BY STAR GAUGE, AFTER PROOF.		No.
	Pounds.	Pounds.	Inches.		Greatest.	Least.	

No.				NAME OF INSPECTOR.	ARE THE INSPECTOR'S MEASUREMENTS WITHIN REGULATION LIMITS?	No.

No.		REGISTER NO.	REMARKS.	No.

*Testimony of Captain S. V. Benét.*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1864.

Captain S. V. BENÈT sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service ?

Answer. I am captain of ordnance. For the last two years I have been instructor of ordnance and gunnery at the Military Academy at West Point ; and although I have been relieved by late order, I have not yet entered upon my new duties. I have also, for the last two or three years, been engaged a great deal at the West Point foundry, under Captain Parrott, in testing and experimenting with the Parrott gun.

Question. We are directed by the Senate to inquire into the condition of our heavy ordnance. I will read the resolution to you, so that you may understand the purport and extent of our inquiry.

(The resolution of the Senate, of January 25, was then read to the witness.)

What, in your opinion, is the efficiency of the heavy ordnance such as we use on our fortifications and in our navy ?

Answer. I think they are thoroughly efficient guns—that is, as compared with other heavy ordnance of other services.

Question. Is there a gun called the Rodman gun, that you know about?

Answer. I do not know whether it is officially called so; but it is commonly known by that name. That is a gun cast with a hollow core, an invention of Captain (now Major) Rodman. The object of that invention is to cool the gun from the interior when cast, so that the strains may be exactly the reverse of those produced when a gun is cast solid and then bored out. In the casting of a gun that is cast solid, the outside first becomes rigid and the metal there is compressed, while that of the interior is extended, so that it is actually in the proper condition to be burst by the action of gunpowder from the interior. The object of Major Rodman's plan is to reverse this action and have the metal compressed on the interior. In doing that the metal is necessarily somewhat expanded on the exterior, but you have the gun in a better condition to resist the action of gunpowder, the strains contributing to its strength. The tests to which those guns have been subjected show that their endurance is greater than that of solid castings, and within the last year or two all our heavy smooth-bore ordnance has been cast upon the hollow principle. I think it is the universal opinion in my department that the improvement of Major Rodman has been decidedly a great one; and we are also of the opinion that no guns of very heavy calibre can be cast except upon that principle. I know, from my duties at the West Point foundry, where the heavy rifled Parrott gun has been cast, that Captain Parrott himself—whom I consider one of the ablest and most experienced founders and artillerists—admits the excellence of the invention. During the past two years he has been of that opinion, and has been endeavoring to make preparations for the purpose of casting his heavy guns upon the hollow principle. I have always favored it myself, and while experimenting with his guns frequently urged it upon him, believing it would have a tendency to strengthen them. The country is indebted to Major Rodman for other most valuable improvements, and he deservedly stands first among the distinguished scientific artillerists of the age.

Question. Is there any difference between the Rodman gun, so called, and the Dahlgren gun, except in the method of manufacture?

Answer. There is a slight difference between them in what we would call the model; that is, the exterior surfaces are a little different. The Dahlgren gun, I think, is thinner in the chase than the Rodman gun. But the outline of both guns is pretty much the same—that is, a smooth curved surface, without any exterior mouldings or sharp angles.

Question. In your opinion, would it add strength and endurance to the Dahlgren gun to cast it upon this new principle?

Answer. It would be an advantage for all guns, and especially of large calibre. It would be very difficult to cast a very small gun with that hollow core, and in casting solid a small piece of ordnance, like a field gun, you can make a better casting, and the iron is more homogeneous, more solid, than in casting a large gun. There are therefore not the difficulties to be encountered in casting a small gun as in casting a very large one. And this principle of Major Rodman is not so absolutely necessary in a small piece of ordnance. Captain Parrott has now perfected his arrangements, and is casting all his heavy guns on the Rodman principle. He informed me a few weeks ago that he had cast very successfully one or two 300-pounders on that plan, and, I think, one 200-pounder also.

Question. What is the calibre of the guns the navy is being supplied with now?

Answer. I know the navy is using the 15-inch Dahlgren gun cast upon the hollow principle; and they also use the 9 and 11-inch guns; but I do not know whether they are cast hollow or solid. I am not so familiar with the ordnance of the navy.

Question. Have you the means of forming an opinion as to those 15-inch guns—whether they are sufficiently strong to endure the charge of powder in proportion to the weight of the ball used in guns of smaller calibre?

Answer. I have had no experience with the 15-inch gun; but I should think, from what I have learned of experiments at the navy yard here, that they could bear a very heavy charge of powder—I think nearly the usual proportion used in smooth-bore guns, which is from one-fourth to one-fifth the weight of the shot. I think that I heard the other day that they were using as high as 70 pounds of powder to a shell of about 300 pounds weight, which is about the ordinary charge of powder in proportion to the ball for smooth-bore guns.

Question. Have you any means of knowing the proportion of rifled to smooth-bore guns with which the navy is armed?

Answer. I have not. I know that a very large number of guns have been issued to the navy from the West Point foundry, where they make 8 and 10-inch guns and 100-pounders.

Question. These Rodman guns are smooth-bores?

Answer. They are all smooth-bores; there have been one or two rifled for experimental purposes—I think a 12-inch and probably an 8-inch; that is, a 15-inch gun was made with a bore of 12 inches, and then rifled and tested. I do not know to what extent that test has gone.

Question. Will you describe the Parrott gun?

Answer. It is nothing but a cast-iron gun with a wrought-iron hoop around the seat of the charge: the gun is usually made with a thickness of metal of about one calibre; then around that is put a jacket of wrought-iron of about one-half a calibre in thickness; that jacket or hoop is made by taking a long bar of square iron of the proper thickness. In the heavy guns this bar is heated; in the smaller guns it is used cold, and by means of machinery coiling it around a mandril; that coil is then put into a furnace and brought to a welding heat; then put into a cylinder and brought under heavy trip or steam hammers and welded together. It is then put into a lathe and turned upon the exterior and interior; it is afterwards heated and slipped upon the breech of the gun and allowed to shrink upon it.

Question. Those guns are rifled?

Answer. All the Parrott guns are rifled. Those are the guns that were used on Morris island for the reduction of Fort Sumter.

Question. Which gun do you consider the most powerful gun in use now?

Answer. Of smooth bores, of course our 15-inch gun is the strongest gun; the largest guns are necessarily smooth-bores. As to the rifled guns, I think those made on Parrott's system are the best used in the service; in forming that opinion, a great many things are taken into consideration—for instance, the price of the gun, which is a very important matter. We also consider the size of the gun, and the work it is able to perform. The price of the Parrott gun is comparatively very small—for instance, the 100-pounder, which weighs 9,700 pounds, costs only \$1,200. An Armstrong gun of the same size would probably cost as many pounds.

Question. Why is there that difference?

Answer. The Armstrong gun is made of wrought-iron. It is what we call a "built up" gun, and requires great care and expense in its manufacture.

Question. Is the Armstrong gun a breech-loading gun?

Answer. I believe Armstrong makes his guns breech-loading up to the 110-pounders; but beyond that he cannot make them breech-loading. For instance, the 600-pounders, of which you have seen accounts in the papers lately, are muzzle-loaders.

Question. Do you know what is the calibre of that 600-pounder?

Answer. I do not. I should suppose it was about 13 inches.

Question. It uses a bolt instead of a round shot?

Answer. In rifled guns we always use elongated projectiles, as they are called; that is, they are usually from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 calibres in length.

Question. What do you know about the policy now adopted by the government in regard to substituting rifled guns for the smooth-bores? Do they endeavor to get as many rifled guns as they can?

Answer. As far as I know, they do. At the Parrott foundry I was once on duty, inspecting and proving guns, until I was relieved by an officer especially detailed for the purpose. Since then I have been over at the foundry every day for months at a time, carrying on experiments under orders from the department. I know that at the first battle of Bull Run we had some of the Parrott guns. There were some few smooth-bore guns and some mortars made about that period, merely to complete some order previously given. But from that time to this, to my knowledge, Captain Parrott has made nothing in the world but rifled guns of all sizes. At first he made those of small calibre, 10 and 20-pounders; then in the fall of 1861 he brought out his 100-pounder; after that his 200-pounder, 8-inch; and then his 10-inch 300-pounder. He has used the full capacity of his foundry entirely for rifled guns and projectiles, and, as far as I have been informed, all the orders from the ordnance department have been of the most liberal character. As soon as Captain Parrott reported that he had his 100-pounder, or 200-pounder, or 300-pounder, ready for trial, there was an officer ordered to try it, and the gun was immediately taken into the service, and others ordered.

Question. What is the difference in the charges of powder in a smooth-bore and in a rifled cannon, to propel balls of the same weight?

Answer. In smooth-bores we use powder  $\frac{1}{4}$  or  $\frac{1}{5}$  of the weight of the shot; sometimes for breaching purposes, or with small guns, we run it up to  $\frac{1}{3}$  or  $\frac{1}{2}$  the weight of the shot. For rifled guns, the rule generally fixed upon in the service—at least, in our service—is to use  $\frac{1}{10}$  the weight of the projectile.

Question. Will the rifled ball be most effective at long range with that diminished charge of powder?

Answer. Altogether so. I have myself, in experimenting with the Parrott 100-pounder, with ten pounds of powder and  $35^\circ$  elevation, fired a shot weighing from 80 to 100 pounds over five miles.

Question. How far could you carry a smooth-bore of the same weight?

Answer. I presume a smooth-bore would hardly go over  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

Question. Is the initial velocity of the smooth-bore and the rifled projectile the same?

Answer. No, sir; the round shot always has a much greater initial velocity than the rifled shot. We use a much smaller charge of powder for the rifled gun, and there is a great deal of friction in taking the grooves; but it keeps up its flight longer. In firing the two shots together, the round ball would be ahead at first, but after a while the rifled shot would catch up, and then pass it.

Question. At close range, then, the smooth-bore might be as effective as the rifled gun?

Answer. For certain purposes it would be more effective; and as to the matter of accuracy, take the distance of 1,000 yards, and I presume a good smooth-bore gun would fire as accurately as a rifled gun; but then for that distance it has its greater velocity. I should think that for use against iron-clads, at that distance, its smashing effect would render it more effective than a rifled gun; but when you come to greater distances, you want accuracy as well as effect, and you must use rifled guns to obtain that.

Question. That would lead us to conclude that there must be a mixture of smooth-bore and rifled guns?

Answer. I think so; especially the 15-inch guns, throwing a projectile of great weight with very great velocity, would have a terrible effect at short range; but at great distances you want accuracy in order to attain your object.

Question. Can you prevent so heavy a projectile from stripping, running across the grooves, in rifled cannon?

Answer. That depends upon the projectiles you use. In trying new inventions we find that some projectiles will have that effect, and we reject them. It depends upon the metal and the grooves. With the projectiles Parrott uses in his guns there has never been any difficulty of that kind.

Question. Have the English or French, so far as you know, any gun in their service more efficient than our Parrott gun?

Answer. I do not think they have. In the first place, I do not think they have a gun that they can send into service that is larger than our 100-pounder. Those heavy guns of Armstrong, that we hear of, are merely experimental guns, while we are sending our 200-pounders into the service almost everywhere; and even the few 300-pounders which have been made have been introduced into and used in the field as siege guns.

Question. We are instructed to inquire as to the amount of "royalty" paid on those guns. Do you know the cost of the Rodman gun per pound?

Answer. I cannot tell about the "royalty." I know we were paying some  $6\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound for ordinary guns, and that for the Rodman gun we paid  $7\frac{8}{10}$  cents per pound. I should suppose the "royalty" was the difference between  $6\frac{1}{2}$  and  $7\frac{8}{10}$ .

Question. Say about one cent per pound?

Answer. It was meant to be 20 per cent. That information I got from the report of the commission to examine into contracts. That is all I know about it.

Question. Which is the cheapest gun, the Parrott or the Rodman?

Answer. I think the Parrott gun costs more per pound.

Question. Is that in consequence of its being rifled, and of this wrought-iron band around it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When was this Rodman gun invented?

Answer. He has been carrying on experiments for a great many years back—probably for the last ten years; but I think it was not much more than two years ago that his principle was ordered to be introduced into the service, and all those guns made on it.

Question. Was this principle known in Europe before he adopted it?

Answer. Not that I am aware of, although the principle was tried in Europe. I know there were two sets of mortars cast in Europe—two mortars were cast solid and two were cast hollow; those cast solid stood only some 700 or 800 rounds each, while those cast hollow stood over 2,000 rounds. And I think that has been the experience in this country. Our heavy sea-coast mortars—some of them on the Mississippi—have stood several thousand rounds each, and are good yet.

Question. What are the tests you apply to these heavy guns before they are adopted in the service?

Answer. The rule is this: of course, at first, when Parrott made his rifled guns, they took them, as they did whatever they could get in the hurry of the war. But as soon as time and opportunity offered, I was ordered to test his 10-pounders. The order was to fire it with service charges 1,000 rounds. The gun stood that, and could have stood several hundred—probably a thousand—more. When he introduced his 100-pounders, as soon as arrangements could be made, I was ordered to test them, in connexion with the navy. The order was to fire it a thousand rounds with service charges, to use 10 pounds of powder to 100 pounds of metal. I averaged that in the firing; the gun stood it, and I think would have stood several hundred rounds more. That decided that good guns could be made upon that system; therefore, all the inquiry now is, whether

the other guns of that calibre are made in the same way. The guns are all inspected and proved when made; we are expected to get the size of the gun, ascertain that it is of proper shape, and everything else in reference to its dimensions. Then each gun is fired 10 rounds with service charges; that is apt to develop any incipient crack in the gun, or anything else that may be wrong. The gun is then re-examined very carefully, and the bore measured very accurately; and if it comes up to that test the gun is received. After the smooth-bore is inspected we fire only three rounds, which is supposed to be sufficient to develop any defects. With the rifled gun ten rounds is necessary, because you must test the grooves also. Every gun, smooth-bore or rifled, that is admitted into the service must go through that test and inspection. For instance, having decided upon the Rodman principle, a founder, who wants to make guns for the government, says he will make them of a certain size, and out of such and such metal. The department orders one of his guns, and it is tested with 1,000 rounds. If the test is borne, specimens of the metal are taken and tested, and he is ordered to make all the rest of his guns exactly as he made that, and an officer is ordered to his foundry to inspect and prove his guns as they are made.

Question. Those tests are deemed satisfactory?

Answer. Perfectly so; I consider those tests perfectly satisfactory. The idea, as I understand it, is this: if you fire a gun a thousand rounds, and it stands the test, it will take a great many years in service, probably, before a gun of that kind is fired that many times.

Question. Has this 15-inch Rodman gun been sufficiently tested to prove that it is strong enough?

Answer. I should think so, although I have not experimented with the gun at all. But from what I have heard, and from the reports I have seen about it, I should think it was perfectly safe. Sometimes, in getting a number of guns into the service of a proper kind, you may come across a few that will yield sooner than expected, but that cannot be avoided, for even the best founders will sometimes get iron of unequal strength.

Question. There is a gun called the Ames gun, is there not? Do you know anything about it?

Answer. I believe it is a wrought-iron gun. I know nothing about it further than I remember having a conversation with Mr. Ames upon that subject many months ago. I think there is a gun of his patent at the navy yard here. I know nothing about it further than that; and I have understood that it has not been tried, and that it cost one dollar per pound.

Question. It seems to be assumed, by the resolution directing this inquiry, that there has been some delay in manufacturing these large rifled guns. Do you know how that is?

Answer. I do not think there has been the slightest delay. I refer principally to the Parrott foundry. I think the foundry has been kept employed to its utmost capacity. Indeed, it has been enlarged so that it works, probably, three times as many men as it did at the beginning of the war.

Question. How fast can they turn out these guns at that foundry?

Answer. That depends a great deal, of course, upon the size of the guns. Captain Parrott will turn out this year, if required to do so, over 2,000 guns of all sizes. Of that number he would probably turn out 600 of his heavy guns. At least, he could do that if the government happened to require them in that proportion.

Question. Is that foundry the only place where these Parrott guns are manufactured?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you acquainted with the tests to which the English and French have subjected their guns?

Answer. No, sir; I am not.



Question. I think I understood you to say that, from all you know about guns in Europe, they have none better than our 100-pounder Parrott and our Rodman?

Answer. I do not think they have any in service larger than our 100-pounder Parrott. I do not know how it is in the French service, but I am under the impression that they are using their old guns, running up to 42-pounders. In our service we are rifling all our old guns, and they will make very efficient guns. I experimented with them myself to see whether we could take all our old smooth-bore guns and make rifled guns of them; that is, the 24, 32, and 42-pounders. I found that it was perfectly safe to take our 24 and 32-pounders and rifle them and use them, without banding, up to 500 rounds; but that the 42-pounder was not safe unless it was banded. The War Department has, therefore, ordered that all the guns shall be rifled, and the 42-pounders to be banded at once; the others may be banded hereafter.

Question. That is not done in the navy, as we have understood?

Answer. I do not know what they have done.

Question. What is the expense of rifling the old smooth-bore guns?

Answer. It would not be over \$25 each, I presume; not much over that.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is the expense of banding a 42-pounder?

Answer. I do not remember; I remember the cost of the rifling.

Question. Would it be a heavy expense?

Answer. It would be a heavy expense to rifle and band one of those guns, because the outside of the gun is of peculiar shape, and it is necessary to turn it off to a cylindrical form to receive the band.

Question. Is it an object to rifle and band an old gun rather than get a new rifled gun of the same calibre?

Answer. I think it is an object to rifle it. But when you come to the expense of rifling and banding, the expense is so great that, if we are able to get new guns, I doubt whether there is much economy in changing the old guns into rifled guns.

Question. In the Parrott gun that you tested with 1,000 rounds were there any damages perceptible?

Answer. In the 100-pounder, for instance, the grooves were not worn perceptibly, although fired a thousand times—nothing to affect the efficiency of the gun at all in that respect. The vent is a point which we always examine very carefully; and it was examined after every twenty-five rounds throughout the firing. The vent showed signs of yielding at the three-hundredth round; that is, there were two or three little incipient cracks radiating from the vent. Impressions were taken at every twenty-fifth round until we got the thousand rounds fired. Those cracks enlarged, and at the thousandth round there were three of them; the longest crack being about an inch and a half long. But from the manner in which they enlarged we were led to the conclusion that they were surface cracks, and did not extend into the interior of the metal. We thought the gun would stand several hundred rounds more; and during all the firing I felt so confident that I did not get under cover at all, but stood within thirty or forty feet of the gun. Some of these guns on Morris island have stood as high as 1,400 rounds.

Question. Would it be possible, by any process, to determine whether those were surface cracks or not?

Answer. There is no way except by cutting the gun in two there and examining it. Of course the vent is always the weakest point in a gun, because you have made a hole in the metal there, and if the gun will yield at all it will be apt to burst through it; though old guns have burst without showing any fault at the vent.

By the chairman :

Question. And for that reason is not a breech-loading gun weaker than a muzzle-loading gun ?

Answer. I should think so.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. With a breech-loading gun, could you not determine if there was any deficiency existing in the gun, better than with a muzzle-loading gun ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I think so.

Question. So far as you know, the affairs of the Ordnance bureau have been conducted with energy and integrity in the procuring guns for the service ?

Answer. As far as I know, decidedly so.

By the chairman :

Question. What is the difference between the columbiad and the Dahlgren gun ?

Answer. There is no difference at all, further than in the exterior lines and the kind of chamber or bottom of bore. Captain Dahlgren, I think, gave that particular shape to his gun before the model of our columbiads was changed to its present form. At present, the exterior models of the two guns appear to be very much alike. There is some difference ; the Dahlgren gun is a little thinner about the chase for the quantity of metal at the breech. The model of the columbiads and Rodman guns was based on original experiments and researches made by Colonel Bomford and Major Rodman.

Question. Is there much difference between them in efficiency ?

Answer. I should think there would be none at all. Take one of each kind, of the same calibre and weight of metal, I should think there would be no difference at all, provided they are both cast hollow.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. From the result of your observations in experiment and practice, have many accidents resulted from the use of our ordnance ?

Answer. I should say very few indeed. So far as I am aware, I should judge that very few accidents have happened in the field from explosions.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Where large charges of powder are used in the large guns, is the large-grain powder considered preferable ?

Answer. The larger you make the grain the more progressive will be the burning and explosion.

Question. What is the large powder ?

Answer. It is called the mammoth powder, with grains, say, an inch in diameter.

Question. How large a charge of powder have you ever fired in a 100-pounder rifled gun ?

Answer. I have fired fourteen pounds of powder with, say, eighty pounds shot.

*Testimony of General William F. Barry.*

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1864.*

General WILLIAM F. BARRY sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service ?

Answer. I am a lieutenant colonel of the regular artillery of the army of the United States, and brigadier general of volunteers. I am at present acting as chief of artillery of the army of the United States.

Question. We are instructed by the Senate to make inquiries in relation to the heavy ordnance now in use in the service. [The resolution of the Senate, of January 25, was read to the witness.]

The first point to which we shall call your attention is, the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of fortifications.

Answer. Just at this time the ordnance in our fortifications is undergoing great change, in consequence of a recommendation of a board of officers assembled in the winter of 1861 and 1862, under the orders of General McClellan. General Totten was president of the board; General Barnard was one of its members, and I was another member. We considered the whole subject of the armament of our entire sea-coast. The board came to the opinion that the guns with which the forts were armed at that time were not powerful enough for the new class of vessels by which they would be likely to be attacked. In fact, at that time we had scarcely a gun that would be able to resist even the most slightly armored vessel. That board recommended, among other things, that there should be no gun bearing upon any important channel-way of smaller calibre than the 8-inch columbiad, and that gun was retained only because it was the largest gun in which we could conveniently use hot shot; but for that, we should not have retained it. Then the larger guns, 13 and 15-inch guns—and the 20-inch gun, if we ever have guns of that size—they are smooth-bore guns. At that time we had not a single rifled gun, that I am aware of, in any port, except the experimental gun that was down at Fort Monroe. There was no rifled gun that had been practically tested and decided to be an efficient and reliable gun. And I think there was but that one experimental gun in existence at that time. However, I am not entirely certain about that.

By the chairman:

Question. In this country, or in Europe?

Answer. I refer to this country entirely.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You have now described the condition of the armament of the fortifications at that time, and the decision of that board. Will you go on and state to us the character and efficiency of the guns that have been since introduced?

Answer. I believe the recommendations of that board have been entirely approved by the War Department—first by General McClellan, and afterwards by the War Department; and, so far as I am aware, those recommendations have been carried out as rapidly as the guns could be manufactured. The precise number of guns that have been introduced into the forts, I am unable to tell. We are substituting the 10-inch and the 15-inch gun. And latterly, they are commencing to rifle the old 32's and 42's and banding them after the method of Parrott. But the board that I allude to made no recommendation of that sort; that has been an after-thought.

Question. Do you know the proportion of rifled and smooth-bore guns now in our fortifications?

Answer. I do not. I do not think any proportion has been fixed, or can be fixed. One fort might have all rifled guns, and another all smooth-bore guns. It depends upon the situation of the forts, and the character of the object by which it would be attacked. I do not think any proportion has been fixed. I am unable to say how many rifled and how many smooth-bore guns have been actually issued. The ordnance department could tell that.

Question. Will you describe to us the different guns which have been approved and used in this country and in Europe as heavy ordnance?

Answer. To take the class of smooth-bore guns first, we have in this country

the 8-inch, 10-inch, and 15-inch guns. Those guns are now officially designated *Rodman* guns. I understand that that designation was intended as a compliment to Major Rodman in appreciation of the value of his invention. The 10 and 15-inch guns are cast on his method; that is, cast hollow and cooled from the inside. My opinion is, that a reliable 15-inch cast-iron gun cannot be made in any other way. There is too great a mass of iron in one of those guns to admit of a perfect gun being cast by any other method than that of Major Rodman. The ordnance department are making arrangements now to cast a 20-inch gun after the Rodman plan; but a gun of that calibre has not yet been cast. I should include among the guns not yet removed the 24's, 32's and 42's, old smooth-bores. I understand that nearly all of these are to be removed; but the government has not yet been able to replace them. I understand that they are being replaced just as rapidly as the new guns can be made, and I understand that most of these old guns, when replaced by others, are to be rifled and banded; and the attempt is to be made to make serviceable rifled guns of them. Whether they will succeed or not remains to be seen.

Question. Can you state the expense of rifling and banding a 42-pounder?

Answer. I could not tell the exact expense. Some officer in the bureau of the ordnance department could give the exact figures upon that point.

Question. Have you any opinion as to the efficiency of these guns after they have been rifled and banded?

Answer. I have an opinion, but that opinion may be changed. I do not at present think that these guns will become serviceable guns; but that opinion is liable to be changed entirely by the practice we may have with them. As far as range and accuracy are concerned, I believe that they will give very excellent results. The objection I have is in regard to the endurance of the guns; I do not think that even the wrought-iron band will make them safe rifle guns.

Question. That can only be determined by experiment?

Answer. In no other way.

Question. Will you describe to us the rifled guns now in use?

Answer. They are almost exclusively the guns that are popularly called 100, 200, and 300-pounder Parrotts, but as they do not now throw projectiles of that weight, those designations are therefore just now misnomers. Mr. Parrott made his project les of that weight at first; but it is ascertained that a projectile of less weight gives better results. The 100-pounder, so-called, now takes a projectile of 82 pounds; the 200-pounder, one of 150 pounds; and the 300-pounder, one of 250 pounds. These guns are now designated by the dimensions of the diameter of the bore as measured in inches. They are more properly 6 $\frac{4}{10}$ , 8, and 10-inch rifle guns. The 100-pounder gun is of the same diameter of bore as the old smooth-bore 32-pounder. And a 32-pounder spherical projectile can be used in a 100-pounder Parrott with very fair results; it does as well out of the 100-pounder Parrott as it does out of the 32-pounder.

Question. Is there any rifled gun in this country that can compete successfully with the Parrott gun?

Answer. At the present time I know of none; I consider it the best rifled gun of large calibre that we now have.

Question. How does that gun compare with the best rifled gun in Europe, and what are the best rifled guns in use in Europe?

Answer. As far as my knowledge extends, I think England is just now the only foreign nation that has entered very extensively into the manufacture of these heavy guns for sea-coast defence or naval uses. The best rifled gun which the English now have is the Armstrong 110-pounder. They are now experimenting with a 300-pounder, and even a 600-pounder, of Armstrong. But in getting up to that size Armstrong has been obliged to abandon one of his grand principles, which was that of breech-loading. I think the practice abroad has

shown that it is impossible to make a safe gun of large calibre which loads at the breech. This 110-pounder is a breech-loading gun; but there are very great objections to it, and I rather think the 110-pounders they are now making are muzzle-loaders.

Question. State the objections to breech-loading guns.

Answer. The movable part of the breech is objectionable; it lacks strength, and its mechanism is faulty. No correction of these objections that is entirely satisfactory has yet been devised. These objections increase with the calibre of the gun. When the gun is of large calibre these movable parts are too weighty to be handled conveniently. Then the shock of the discharge is so great that in a short time it injures to a greater or less degree the movable parts of the breech. These difficulties of construction seem to me to be inherent, and they are the more to be regretted, because the larger the gun the greater the necessity there is to have it load at the breech. There is scarcely any advantage in having a field-gun load at the breech; indeed, as far as rapidity of firing is concerned, it is a disadvantage. You can fire a field-gun more rapidly loading at the muzzle; but in fortifications time is saved by loading at the breech, and your men are not exposed so much; so also in ships. But a large charge of powder increases the chances of injury to this part in the large gun.

Question. How large a gun of the Armstrong pattern has been made breech-loading?

Answer. The 110-pounder, I think, is the largest.

Question. And the 600-pounder is the largest Armstrong gun experimented upon?

Answer. Yes, at the present time.

Question. Do you know the condition of that gun?

Answer. I only know from conversation with English officers whom I have met here within the last six weeks. They tell me that their impression is that that gun is now unserviceable; that some flaw has been discovered in it. The published accounts, however, make no mention of that. The official accounts published in the London Times speak of the gun as a great success. But I am told differently by officers who come here to see our artillery, and who, perhaps, are a little more frank for the purpose of getting information from us.

Question. Can you give us any information in relation to the results of experiments of intermediate guns between the 110 and 600-pounder Armstrong?

Answer. No, sir, further than I believe there has been a 300-pounder experimented with. Whether that is a breech-loader or a muzzle-loader I am not certain; but I think it is a muzzle-loader. So many objections have been urged to the 110-pounder breech-loading gun, that I believe they stopped at that.

By the chairman:

Question. Is not there an inherent weakness in a breech-loading gun over a muzzle-loading gun, from the fact that the metal is cut in two?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. It cannot be made as strong as a muzzle-loading gun of the same calibre?

Answer. I should think not. Then there is a difficulty inherent to all breech-loaders, whether small-arms or cannon, in the lateral escape of the gases, on account of the joint not being made perfect. And that difficulty increases with the size of the gun. If you make the joint very perfect when the gun is cool, when it becomes heated by repeated discharges the parts expand so that they cannot be worked with ease, and sometimes not at all.

Question. And the result is that you cannot work a breech-loading gun as rapidly as you can a muzzle-loading gun—that is, you are not sure of doing so?

Answer. That is the result. I ought to add that I have never seen one of

these Armstrong guns. My knowledge of them is acquired from reading, and from conversation with English officers. I have read the official accounts, and have conversed on the subject with all the English officers I have met, for the purpose of deriving all possible information from them.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Is there any obstacle in the way of our manufacturing the Armstrong gun for the purpose of testing it, with a view to introducing it into our service if found superior to the Parrott gun ?

Answer. I should say none at all. But I should think that, in view of all the objections entertained against the Armstrong gun, it would be hardly worth while for us to do so. I think it would be better to let England continue to experiment with it at her own expense. It has been a favorite gun with her, and Armstrong is apparently a pet with her government, and if the objections to the gun are such as to run it out of use there, we should be satisfied that there are really radical objections to it. It is, therefore, better to let England continue to experiment upon it at her own expense.

Question. In your opinion there has not been enough of merit discovered in that gun to lead us to experiment with it ?

Answer. That is my opinion.

Question. It is a wrought-iron gun ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; what is called a built-up gun.

Question. What gun in use in England ranks next to the Armstrong gun for heavy ordnance ?

Answer. There are three or four—I think five guns altogether ; the names of the different inventors I do not now recollect, beyond that of Mr. Whitworth. I think there has been a commission appointed in England to experiment with one gun of each of these inventors, but the experiment has not yet taken place.

Question. Will you describe the Whitworth gun ?

Answer. The Whitworth gun is a wrought-iron gun, the cross-section of whose bore is hexagonal, with a turn to produce the rifle motion. The projectile is turned in a lathe and very carefully shaped to fit that peculiar form of the bore. Without knowing the figures exactly, I should say that the Whitworth gun was a very expensive gun. I have never seen one of them of large size. We have in this country a battery of six Whitworth *field*-guns, which was purchased by loyal Americans abroad at the commencement of the war and sent over to this country as a present. They must have been sent over here before the first battle of Bull Run. I know that shortly after I was appointed by General McClellan his chief of artillery, I received a letter from a gentleman in New York, stating that these guns were on Staten Island lying neglected there, and he thought it was not proper treatment of those gentlemen abroad who had purchased them and sent them over here. I mentioned the matter to General McClellan and recommended that they be brought on here. They were brought on here, and I examined them. My opinion was that the mechanism was too delicate for field service. The directions that came with them required that the movable parts should be constantly oiled with the purest machinery oil. Now, in campaign such care is not always possible, and the dust or mud of our roads would be very likely to put them out of order ; and I found that even with care in the arsenal here in three or four weeks the movable parts of one or two of them became quite unmanageable. In regard to accuracy and range, they were quite successful. When General Hooker was down below at Budd's ferry I sent a couple of the guns down there, and they made very good practice with them ; they would hit an ordinary farm dwelling-house over three miles distant.

Besides the delicacy of the mechanism, which I suppose would render the

guns constantly liable to get out of repair in the field, from the rough treatment that guns necessarily get there, the diameter of the bore of those guns was rather small. I do not think it was an efficient gun for a hollow projectile. There were no projectiles but *solid shot* to use with them. It was a very long bolt the cross-section of which was a hexagon to fit the bore of the gun. It is very carefully turned in a lathe to make true surfaces. I have never seen a large gun of that kind, but I have a projectile of one. Two of the large guns were captured on a blockade-runner, going into Charleston, I think, with a lot of projectiles. The projectile is similar in shape to the small one of the 10 pounder; but having so much greater capacity, they can be serviceably used as hollow projectiles. The battery of 10-pounder guns was never put into active service in the field here. I sent a couple of them over to the forts across the river, where our men were annoyed by reconnoitring parties of the enemy coming up in their neighborhood, and they were used very successfully against them.

Question. Do you know how large those guns have been made breech-loading.

Answer. Of the Whitworth gun, a 100-pounder, or thereabouts.

Question. The same objections which apply to the small guns as breech-loaders would apply to the larger ones?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so.

Question. Take the Whitworth gun where it could be kept in fortifications and kept in perfect order—if it has the advantages you have spoken of, would it not be a good gun for a part of the armament of fortifications?

Answer. I can only answer that question in regard to the smaller guns. I should say that there were those radical objections to a breech-loading gun for any large gun—that the movable part of the breech would be constantly liable to derangement.

Question. Do you know how large a Whitworth gun has been tested?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you think of any other English gun?

Answer. Those are all I can designate by name. There are four or five other varieties, purely experimental guns.

Question. You think the Armstrong gun ranks first, and the Whitworth gun next?

Answer. I believe so. But I will add, that I have yet to learn that any foreign gun has any advantages over the Parrott gun of similar weight of projectile.

Question. Do you consider them the equal of the Parrott gun?

Answer. No, sir. I do not consider any breech-loading gun of large calibre equal to a muzzle-loading gun.

Question. Are all of these guns—the 110-pounder of Armstrong and the Whitworth gun—breech-loading?

Answer. I believe all of them are, although so many objections have been urged against them that I believe it has been determined to abandon the breech-loading principle in all Armstrong guns of greater calibre than the 40-pounder.

Question. What would you say of the Parrott gun as compared with the Armstrong and the Whitworth gun, all made muzzle-loading?

Answer. I would say that they have no advantages, that I am aware of, over the Parrott gun.

Question. Both are constructed of wrought-iron?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is the comparative expense?

Answer. The Parrott gun is much cheaper. I think, all other things being equal, the Parrott gun is the cheapest gun we have.

Question. The next point about which we are directed to inquire is, the tests to which these guns are subjected when received into the service, and the rea-

sons for believing those tests satisfactory—I refer to the guns which are now in use in our own service. Can you describe the tests applied to the smooth-bores and the rifles?

Answer. I cannot exactly, because they are constantly changing them.

Question. Do you know the tests applied to the Rodman gun?

Answer. No, sir; I cannot say what those tests at present are. The service charge of the Parrott 6.4, 8, and 10-inch guns has been reduced of late.

By the chairman:

Question. Have military men, acquainted with this ordnance, perfect confidence in the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I think the impression is that it would be perfectly safe to use larger charges in the Rodman gun than we use now. That is an objection that is urged against these guns, that the charge of powder is so small. I think the gun will stand a larger charge of powder than is now permitted to be fired out of it. I believe that Major Rodman is extremely anxious to have experiments made with that view. He thinks that larger charges can be fired with safety.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Who determines the size of the charge used now?

Answer. Officers of the ordnance department, called the ordnance board, who meet when called together by the Chief of Ordnance or the Secretary of War. All those matters are referred to what is called the Ordnance board—a committee of officers who are exclusively ordnance officers.

Question. The next point of inquiry is, What proportion of our sea and land armament is of rifled ordnance?

Answer. I should answer that pretty much as I have already answered it.

Question. When were rifled guns first introduced into our service?

Answer. As early as 1851, or thereabouts, I witnessed some experiments at Fort Monroe with a rifled sea-coast gun. I think that was the earliest effort made in this country. Those experiments were not successful.

Question. What gun was that?

Answer. It was one of our sea-coast guns, old pattern, rifled. I think the first attempt was with a 32-pounder; it may have been a smooth-bore 24-pounder, which had been rifled. The matter then appeared to sleep for many years, and I heard nothing of rifled guns, except in a conversational sort of way, until the time of the commencement of this rebellion. Then the Parrott rifled guns were introduced; it being considered at that time that those were the best rifled guns known. The officers of the army had been impressed for several years previous with the necessity of having such a gun. But it was a matter of experiment all over the world as to what kind of rifled gun was the best. When this rebellion broke out we were forced to adopt rifled guns at once, and the Parrott gun was then introduced.

Question. Since that time has the rifled gun been introduced into the service as rapidly as it could be obtained?

Answer. Yes, sir. With regard to field guns, since the first year of the war there has been no difficulty about procuring the number of rifled guns that were considered necessary. Opinions differ upon the proportion of rifled and smooth-bore guns to be used. Those opinions are based upon the different views of different officers, even under similar circumstances; and even the circumstances govern that proportion very much. It depends very much upon the character of the country you are operating in, and of the enemy you are operating against. If it is a level or cleared country, a larger proportion of rifled guns would be necessary. If it is a hilly country, or one that is wooded, the smooth-bore would do as well as the rifled gun under most circumstances, and even better under some circumstances.



Question. In your opinion, are there in the service as many rifled guns as are necessary in proportion to the smooth-bores ?

Answer. I think there are more. My opinion all along has been, that in such a country as ours the proportion should be not more than one-third rifled and two-thirds smooth-bore.

Question. State the reasons for that opinion.

Answer. Principally because our country is generally heavily wooded, and it is impossible to get a field of battle, for an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to operate upon, that is not broken up by patches of thick woods, where the rifled gun would not be as good as the smooth-bore gun.

Question. Are smooth-bore guns better at short range than rifled guns ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why ?

Answer. Because, other things being equal, the diameter of the bore is greater in the smooth-bore gun than it is in the rifled gun, and in firing canister, which is the projectile used for short range, you can use with a smooth-bore a canister containing a much larger number of bullets or small balls than you can use with the rifled cannon.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. Do not rifled cannon discharge canister with equal facility with the smooth-bore, and with equal fatality ?

Answer. They do with equal facility, but not with equal fatality, because they do not contain as many small balls, the capacity of the canister used being smaller.

Question. What is the proportionate difference between the diameter of the bore of a smooth-bore and that of a rifled cannon ?

Answer. For instance, the diameter of a 10-pounder Parrott is  $2\frac{9}{10}$  inches; the diameter of the regulation rifled 10-pounder is 3 inches, and the smooth-bore 12-pounder has a diameter of  $4\frac{6\frac{2}{10}}{10}$  inches.

Question. What is the difference in the weight of those guns, the  $4\frac{6\frac{2}{10}}{10}$  inches, 3-inch, and the  $2\frac{9}{10}$  inches ?

Answer. The Parrott 10-pounder weighs 900 pounds; the 3-inch regulation gun weighs about 830 or 840 pounds, and the 12-pounder gun weighs, in round numbers, 1,200 pounds.

Question. Then the increased bore of the smooth-bore gives an increased weight to the gun ?

Answer. The rifle gun is proportionately lighter than the smooth-bore, with the same weight of projectile.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. You say that the first experiments in this country with rifled guns were in 1851, and they were then considered a failure, and no further experiments were made, to your knowledge, until the rebellion broke out, or about that time. At that time was the Parrott gun first made ?

Answer. Parrott had been making experiments for a year or two previous, but I never heard of them until about the time the war broke out. The very first of his larger or siege guns was sent to Fort Pickens, while I was there, in April, 1861. A 30-pounder Parrott was the first gun of that sort I ever saw. When I came back here in July, 1861, just before the first battle of Bull Run, and joined General McDowell's army, I found there several batteries, or parts of batteries, of the 10-pounder Parrott gun, and those were the first I ever saw of those. There were also at that time a few of the old pattern 6-pounder guns, rifled, for James's projectiles.

Question. Is it the fact that rifled guns were immediately introduced into the service as fast as they could be obtained, both for field service and for heavy ordnance ?

Answer. Yes, sir; but more rapidly for field service than for sea-coast or fortification service, because there was greater necessity for it.

Question. Has there been, to your knowledge, any delay which could have been avoided in introducing these guns into service?

Answer. I think not.

Question. Can you tell us what progress had been made in Europe with rifled guns prior to 1860?

Answer. I think experiments there, in regard to rifled guns, had been confined entirely to field-guns. It is possible they may have had some experiments with guns of larger calibre; if so, I am not aware of it. But England, France, Prussia, and Austria I know had rifled field-guns in 1860, but they were all of different patterns—that is, each nation had its own peculiar kind of gun. Sweden has not to this day introduced the rifled gun into her service. In that country it seems to be still considered an open question; and, not having the necessity for introducing them, they are still experimenting with them. And I suppose we ourselves would still have been experimenting, but for this war.

Question. Will you describe to us the peculiarities of the Dahlgren gun, if you can?

Answer. The Dahlgren guns of corresponding calibres are shorter than the army gun, and its exterior form is very different from the army gun. The Dahlgren 15-inch gun is a much shorter gun than the army 15-inch gun; and I have understood that the reason for that was in order to get it into the turrets of our monitors. And I consider that the principal reason of the prejudice in many minds against the 15-inch gun, in regard to its efficiency, that it is the navy gun that has been experimented with, or, rather, the results derived from the practice with the navy gun are those upon which those opinions are based.

By the chairman :

Question. What is the difference between what is called the Rodman 15-inch gun and the 15-inch guns used on board our monitors?

Answer. The navy 15-inch gun is shorter than the army 15-inch gun. The distribution of the metal is different in the same sections of the two guns. In other words, the models of the two guns differ essentially.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. The navy 15-inch gun, although not the Rodman gun in form, is cast hollow, upon the Rodman principle of cooling from the inside?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is there a gun which, owing to the peculiarity of its shape, is called the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir. The 8, 10, 13, and 15-inch gun. The army 15-inch gun, I understand, was designed by Major Rodman. The navy 15-inch gun was designed by Admiral Dahlgren. The models of the two guns differ.

Question. Do you think the efficiency of the navy gun is impaired by being made shorter than the army gun?

Answer. Yes, sir. Its efficiency is impaired in this way: it has a lower initial velocity, and that is the great objection urged against the Rodman gun, that its initial velocity is too low.

Question. Is the shortening of the gun for naval use a necessity?

Answer. I understand it is, in order to get the gun within the turret of the monitors.

Question. In your opinion, is the distribution of the metal in the Rodman gun better than in the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. I think it is. It is my individual opinion that Rodman's model is best.

Question. If the gun is to be made only of the length of the navy gun, would

you then consider that the Rodman pattern would be better than the Dahlgren pattern?

Answer. I would, for the reason that I think he distributes the metal more advantageously for the endurance of the gun.

By the chairman :

Question. The initial velocity can only be increased by increasing the charge of powder?

Answer. The length of the gun has something to do with it.

Question. How is that? The longer the gun the greater the initial velocity?

Answer. Not always; you cannot carry that principle out.

Question. Do tests and experience both combined give you confidence in guns cast upon the Rodman principle as being efficient? I speak of the 15-inch guns, with which we are arming our monitors.

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you believe as heavy charges of powder are now used as can be used advantageously and with safety?

Answer. I think that in the army 15-inch gun a heavier charge might be used. That is my own opinion.

Question. Have you any information in relation to the navy gun in that respect?

Answer. I have not such information as would justify my speaking positively on that point.

Question. Are experiments now being made, with the view of determining whether heavier charges of powder can be used?

Answer. I understand there are with the army gun; and I have heard that such is the case with the navy gun. I know that they have increased the charge in Admiral Dahlgren's other guns, and they have found out that they can stand much heavier charges; and I think the opinion of the navy is, that had they known that at the time of the fight between the Monitor and the Merrimac a very different story would have been told. But the orders were very positive not to use heavy charges.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. Will you describe the difference between the Rodman gun and this that you call the navy gun, where there is a difference in the distribution of the metal, and wherein you think the advantage is in favor of the Rodman model?

Answer. It is hardly possible to describe it, except with plans of the two guns.

Question. Why do you think the model of the Rodman gun better than the model of the other?

Answer. I think the distribution of the metal in the Rodman gun gives greater strength than in the Dahlgren gun.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. In the Rodman gun is the metal more equally distributed throughout than in the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. What disadvantage, if any, results from shortening the gun to be used in these turrets?

Answer. I think that it lessens the initial velocity of the projectile.

Question. In what way?

Answer. I suppose by not keeping the projectile long enough in the bore of the gun for all the powder to act upon it. The ignition of the powder is gradual,

and the ball is being acted upon by these gases all the way out, and the moment it leaves the muzzle of course there is an end of that.

Question. What is the difference in length between the Rodman gun and the navy gun, the bore being the same in each?

Answer. I do not know the exact number of inches. I have always understood the reason that they made the gun shorter was because they wanted them just short enough to get inside the turret of the monitor. And I have always thought they would have had them longer but for that.

Question. And in consequence of the shortening of the gun you are inclined to think that the initial velocity is decreased?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And that would occur in any other gun of equal length?

Answer. Yes, sir. As to the difference in shape, I think it merely affects the endurance of the gun.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you know whether the government pays any "royalty" to any owner or patentee of any of the guns now in use?

Answer. Only from hearsay; I do not know officially. I have understood that the government pays a "royalty" for all guns cast hollow. What that "royalty" is, or to whom it is paid, I do not know. I understand that Mr. Charles Knap, of Pittsburg, owns the patent; but this is merely common rumor, and I cannot vouch for its accuracy.

*Testimony of Captain Alfred Mordecai.*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1864.

Captain ALFRED MORDECAI sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your position and rank in the service?

Answer. Captain of ordnance.

Question. Where stationed?

Answer. At Hilton Head; or in the department of the south, as it is designated. [The resolution of the Senate, of January 25, in relation to heavy ordnance, was read to the witness.]

Question. What have been your opportunities to know the efficiency of our heavy ordnance?

Answer. I have had a great deal of experience with the heavy rifled guns, but not much with the smooth-bores.

Question. I will ask the question in the very words of the resolution. What do you say in regard to "the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now used in the armament of our fortifications"?

Answer. The character of the ordnance: they are the smooth-bore and the rifled cannon. The smooth-bores, of the new ordnance, are confined to the 8, 10, 13, and 15-inch columbiads. The rifled guns used in the service are almost entirely the 100-pounder, the 200-pounder, and the 300-pounder Parrott.

Question. That is the character of the ordnance now being supplied for our fortifications and for the navy?

Answer. Yes, sir; the only additional gun, that I know of, that the navy has, is the 13-inch gun.

Question. Do you know anything of the gun called the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you describe the manner of manufacturing it, and the advantages it is supposed to possess?

Answer. The Rodman guns, which is the name given to the four columbiads,

the 8, 10, 13, and 15-inch guns, are cast hollow instead of solid, as formerly. The advantage of this mode of casting is supposed to consist, or does consist, in the extra strength imparted to the metal immediately about the bore of the gun; this being caused by the cooling taking place from the interior of the casting instead of the exterior.

Question. Where was this gun first introduced?

Answer. The first one I know of having been mounted for use in service was in 1861; that was in New York harbor, on Fort Richmond. It was experimented upon for several years previous.

Question. Where was that gun manufactured?

Answer. At Fort Pitt foundry, Pittsburg.

Question. What was its calibre?

Answer. I think it was fifteen inches.

Question. To what tests have these guns been subjected, to your knowledge?

Answer. The first one, or one of the first, cast, was subjected, at Old Point Comfort, to a series of experiments with large charges of powder; but I am not able to state the number of rounds fired, or the particulars.

Question. Are you acquainted with the guns with which the monitors are armed—the 11 and 15-inch gun?

Answer. No, sir, I am not.

Question. What reasons have you for supposing that those tests are satisfactory?

Answer. The experiments that have been made with those guns have proved that they will stand large charges of powder and heavy projectiles, and, to the best of my knowledge, those tests have been entirely satisfactory.

Question. This gun has been criticised—those in the navy—by insinuating that they would not bear powder enough to propel the ball with sufficient energy.

Answer. I think they have borne every test to which they have been subjected with perfect safety to the gun.

Question. Those are smooth-bore guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where are those large guns manufactured, so far as you know?

Answer. Those for the army are now manufactured at the Fort Pitt foundry, Pittsburg, and at South Boston; those are the only two places I know. The navy have guns of the same calibre manufactured at Reading.

Question. You have spoken of the manner of fabricating this gun. Was that method known in Europe, or anywhere else, previous to Major Rodman's invention?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question. Do you know about what time he invented this method of constructing guns?

Answer. I think it was in 1859; about that time.

Question. What do you know about the "royalty" that the government pays for those guns to the inventor, or his assignee?

Answer. I know nothing at all about it more than what I have seen in print, in congressional reports.

Question. Who would have charge of that matter so as to know about it?

Answer. The officers of the Ordnance Bureau. Captain Benton, I think, would know more about that than any other officer now in the city.

Question. You have described to us the Rodman smooth-bore gun, and have also mentioned that there was another gun that was principally used as a rifled gun; that was the Parrott gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When, so far as you know, was that Parrott gun invented?

Answer. The smaller Parrott guns were invented as early as 1857 or 1858;

perhaps 1858 would be about the date. The first heavy gun on the Parrott plan for sea-coast service was introduced in 1861.

Question. You are well acquainted with that gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was stationed a year at the foundry where the guns were first manufactured.

Question. In what does its specialty consist—in what is it distinguished from the old guns before that?

Answer. It is distinguished by being composed of both cast-iron and wrought-iron, and in being rifled.

Question. The body of the gun is cast-iron, and it has a wrought-iron jacket, as it is called?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And that is supposed to give it great strength?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know anything about the "royalty" paid for that gun?

Answer. There is no "royalty" paid; that is, there is nothing paid for the patent. The guns are rated at a certain cost, which was established when they were first introduced, and which has not been altered since.

Question. Do you know whether the cost to the government is increased by reason of the patented invention?

Answer. I think it is not.

Question. Do you know the price of those two guns, the Rodman and the Parrott, and which is the cheapest?

Answer. The best comparison would be between the largest of each, the 15-inch gun of Rodman and the 300-pounder of Parrott. The 300-pounder Parrott costs \$4,500, and the 15-inch Rodman costs \$6,000, or \$6,500, I am not sure which.

Question. Do you remember the weight of those two guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; the 300-pounder Parrott weighs 27,000 pounds, and the 15-inch Rodman weighs 49,000 pounds, in round numbers. The weights vary a little in different guns.

Question. Do you know anything of any wrought-iron gun constructed in this country?

Answer. No, sir; I do not.

Question. There was a man by the name of Ames that got up a wrought-iron gun, which I believe was tried?

Answer. I know there were some tried, but I do not know what the result was.

Question. Are you able now to give any approximate statement as to the proportion between our rifled and smooth-bore guns in our fortifications? I mean heavy ordnance.

Answer. No, sir; I am not. I know what it is in some, but very few, of our works.

Question. Do you know whether these new guns, the Rodman and the Parrott, are superseding our old guns, the columbiads and the Dahlgren guns?

Answer. They are superseding the columbiads, as they are commonly called—the columbiad with the chamber, as we designate it. But there is no clashing between the Dahlgren gun and the Rodman gun. The Rodman is being used entirely by the army, and the Dahlgren entirely by the navy.

Question. What is the difference between the Dahlgren gun and the columbiad?

Answer. Only in the exterior model, I believe; that is, in the new columbiads, the Rodman columbiads.

Question. What is the difference between the Dahlgren gun and the Rodman gun?

Answer. They are both cast upon the same principle, but the exterior forms differ somewhat.

Question. What advantage is one supposed to have over the other?

Answer. None whatever, that I know of. The one, in its exterior form, is supposed to be calculated upon theory principally, and the other principally upon practice.

Question. Which is theory, and which is practice?

Answer. The Dahlgren gun, I believe, is more of practice, and the Rodman more of theory.

Question. How fast are these guns being manufactured? Have you any idea of that?

Answer. No, sir; I have not. I know the rate at which the Parrott guns were being manufactured for the last year, but I am not able to state what the rate is at present.

Question. How was it during the last year?

Answer. During the last year the rate of manufacture was about one 100-pounder a day, or two 200-pounders a week.

Question. You mean all the manufactures we have in the country?

Answer. Yes, sir; of that gun.

Question. Do you know whether we have increased our works since then?

Answer. Yes, sir; we have.

Question. But you do not know to what extent we can now make those guns?

Answer. No, sir; I do not.

Question. Has there, that you know of, been any particular delay in the manufacture of those guns?

Answer. There has been no delay in the manufacture. There has been delay in furnishing the number required, arising from the fact that they were made only at one establishment, and that establishment was not able to supply them as fast as called for. I speak now of the Parrott gun.

Question. Is it the policy of the government to supersede entirely the old-fashioned guns, and substitute the new ones in their places?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know anything about the English and French improved guns?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You would not be able, then, to say whether our best guns are equal to the best they have?

Answer. I could say that my conviction is that our guns are the best; but I have no personal knowledge of the matter.

Question. Have you seen used what the English call their Whitworth gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; I have seen that gun used.

Question. What kind of a gun is that?

Answer. There are two Whitworth guns, one breech-loading and the other muzzle-loading. The general form of the two is the same. They are built-up guns, made of steel and wrought-iron. The breech-loading has a bore of one metal, a breech-piece, and three exterior bands, making in all five pieces.

Question. Has that gun a range and accuracy superior to our Parrott gun?

Answer. Those that I saw used had not. Two of them were captured by the navy, and were used against Fort Sumter. The guns both gave out, and their accuracy was not equal to that of the Parrott.

Question. That was shown on the actual trial of the guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you say of the English Armstrong gun? Have you any knowledge of that gun?

Answer. I have very little knowledge of it, indeed. I know it is a built-up gun; that is about all that I know about it.

Question. As to its efficiency and durability you cannot say?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. From your experience in the use of the Rodman and Parrott guns in actual service, have you reason to have full confidence in their efficiency, strength, and durability?

Answer. I have reason to believe them perfectly efficient; but in the strength of some of the Parrott guns I am not very confident. The 200-pounder Parrott, I think, should be improved upon in regard to strength.

Question. Some of them have given out?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Under what circumstances—in actual trial?

Answer. Some of the 100-pounder Parrotts gave out; but that was caused by the circumstances in which they were used. They were used in batteries where there was a great deal of sand in motion, and sand injures guns extremely. The 200-pounder Parrotts I do not think were injured so much by the sand, but their failure was due to the weakness of the guns.

Question. A great deal of experience must have been had at Charleston in the attack upon Fort Sumter?

Answer. Yes, sir, we have had a great deal of experience there.

Question. To what extent have those guns failed there?

Answer. I can give you the number that failed; but I do not recollect now the number that were used. The failures of the 200-pounders are six in number.

Question. They were playing upon Sumter?

Answer. One of them was playing upon the city of Charleston; the other five were playing upon Sumter.

Question. How many do you suppose were used there? You say you do not know exactly.

Answer. I think I have a memorandum here. (Referring to some papers.) There were ten 200-pounders used by the army, of which six failed.

Question. To what was the failure attributable, and in what did it consist principally?

Answer. It consisted principally in the blowing out of the breech.

Question. After how many rounds?

Answer. The number of rounds varied. In one case the gun failed after 35 rounds; but it had been fired entirely at an elevation of 35 degrees, and with an increased charge of powder. The others, which were fired at moderate elevations, failed after an average of 230 rounds.

Question. What weight of projectile do you fire from a 200-pounder? It is not really a 200-pound projectile, I understand.

Answer. No, sir; the shell used, when filled, weighs 155 pounds; the solid projectile weighs 150 pounds; the shell is the heaviest.

Question. How is it that the shell is the heaviest?

Answer. It is more elongated. They are of about the same weight before the shell is filled.

Question. What do you say in regard to the accuracy of this Parrott gun?

Answer. In accuracy it cannot be surpassed by any other gun. Of the 100-pounders thirteen in all were injured; one lost its muzzle, it being blown off by the explosion of a shell in the gun.

Question. That was really in consequence of no fault in the gun?

Answer. No, sir. All the others were injured by sand, and the shell exploding in the gun.

Question. So you conclude that the 100-pounders would be enduring enough?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.



Question. What do you know of the strength and durability of the 15-inch guns on board the monitors?

Answer. I know very little about them. They are fired, I know, by the navy in the monitors, if they can help it, not above 400 rounds each. But I know that some have been fired more than that.

Question. Do you know the proportion of powder to the weight of the projectile that they use, and whether it is equal to that of the Parrott guns?

Answer. I think the proportion of powder is greater in relation to the shot than in the Parrott gun. In the Parrott it is one-tenth the weight of the shot; in the Rodman gun it is greater than one-tenth. But the charge in the Rodman gun is varied more than in the Parrott gun.

Question. For what reason?

Answer. It requires a certain charge of powder to give the rifled motion to the rifled projectile to make it take the grooves, and above that, for general service, there is no extra charge required. In the smooth-bore gun a low charge of powder will project the shot as well as a high charge, only it will be at different velocities.

By Mr. Loan :

Question. I hardly understand your last answer. You say a low charge will propel the shot from the smooth-bore as well as a high charge, but at different velocities?

Answer. I mean that in the smooth-bore gun any charge of powder will send the shot from the bore and give it the motion desired; but you increase the charge to increase the effect.

Question. It would equally discharge the missile from the gun, you say, but at different velocities?

Answer. Yes, sir; but it would not be equally effective.

Question. Do you mean that a low charge of powder would send the ball, for instance, one mile, and a high charge would still send it only one mile?

Answer. No, sir; that is not what I mean.

By the chairman :

Question. Have you any further statements to make in regard to your experience with these guns and the observations you have made of their efficiency and usefulness?

Answer. The only gun in which I have a want of confidence is the 200-pounder Parrott. All the other guns, I think, will give all the results desirable.

Question. Have you reason to believe that they are as efficient as the improved guns in Europe?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think equally, if not more so.

Question. And you have full confidence in the 15-inch guns that are used on board the monitors?

Answer. My confidence in the 15-inch guns that are on board the monitors would be founded merely from comparison with those used by the army. I have full confidence in those used by the army, and I believe the others to be equally as good.

Question. You have been engaged in the siege of Charleston?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How long have you been engaged there?

Answer. I joined General Gillmore when he first started out on the Charleston expedition, and have been with him until I left, on the 15th of January.

Question. In what capacity did you act there?

Answer. As chief of ordnance for the department.

Question. Will you give us your observations upon the efficiency of the guns in actual service there in the field?

Answer. All the guns used in the siege of Charleston gave perfect satisfaction in regard to their accuracy and the effect of the projectiles, but the failure in the Parrott guns was found to be one great objection.

Question. Did you make use of any smooth-bores in the attack upon Sumter or upon the city?

Answer. We used against Sumter two 10-inch columbiads; but they were not cast by the United States government; they were cast by the confederates at Richmond; but they were of the same calibre, however, and the same construction as the 10-inch Rodman columbiads.

Question. How efficient were they in their long-range shots compared with the Parrott?

Answer. They were not used at long ranges; they were used only against the walls of Sumter, at a range of thirteen hundred yards.

Question. How did they work there?

Answer. They worked very well. The reason for using them was the advantage derived from the spherical projectile over the elongated projectile when fired into sand. The elongated projectile, it was found, would ricochet over the sand-bank, while the spherical projectile would remain in the sand-bank. I use the word "sand," although the walls were not all of sand, but partly of brick. In regard to these rifled guns, I should, perhaps, state more particularly the cause of their failure. The rifled guns complained of as failing were the 100 and 200-pounders of Parrott. In regard to the 100-pounders I have explained already.

Question. What kind of a gun was the one called the "swamp angel?"

Answer. That gun was a 200-pounder Parrott. It was fired thirty-five rounds, with eighteen pounds of powder and a 160-pound projectile, at an elevation of thirty-five degrees. The breech was blown out at the thirty-fifth discharge. The cause of the failure of that gun is attributed entirely to the high elevation.

Question. The strain is in proportion a great deal to the elevation?

Answer. It increases with the elevation.

Question. To what distance were you enabled to throw the projectile?

Answer. A distance of about five miles.

Question. Could you make it effective at that distance?

Answer. We could make it effective as far as striking in the city of Charleston is concerned, but not for striking any building, or even a fort, at that distance.

Question. But you could fire into the city?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When did you leave there?

Answer. On the 15th of January. I have mentioned that six of the 200-pounders had failed, one being what is commonly known as the "swamp angel." Of the other five, three broke in a similar manner, the breech being blown out. The cause of the failure of these three guns was thought to be weakness in construction. The other two 200-pounders that failed stood, the one 599 rounds, and the other 522 rounds. The three in which the breech blew out were fired an average of about 230 rounds. There were two 200-pounders, used by the navy in a similar battery on shore, which stood upwards of 660 rounds each without being injured. The difference in the endurance of the 200-pounders used in the navy and those used by the army was attributable to the use of grease or oil by the navy to lubricate the projectile and grease the bore, which was not done by the army. That, I think, embraces all the 200-pounders. In regard to the 100-pounders, there were twenty-nine of them used. Of this number one was injured by having its muzzle blown off, in consequence of the bursting of a shell in the bore. Two 100-pounders had the breech blown out in a manner similar to the 200-pounders. The causes of failure in these instances were sand in the muzzle of the gun, and the bursting of the shell in the bore at high elevation. The main cause was thought to be the explosion

of a shell in the bore of the gun, as, after the bursting of the guns, pieces of the shell were found in the bore of each. Of the remaining 100-pounders ten failed; eight of which were placed in batteries in which there was a great deal of sand in motion in the air; and in many instances shell were found to have exploded in the bore of the gun. To these two causes would be attributable the failure of the guns.

Question. Then, notwithstanding those failures in the 100-pounders, you still have confidence in them?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that is the general impression of those who used them.

Question. If I have understood you, you think the 200-pounder is not strong enough?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is my impression.

Question. And does that objection exist to a still greater degree in the 300-pounders?

Answer. I will explain about that. There were two 200-pounders used in the operations in Charleston harbor. One of those had eighteen inches of the muzzle blown off by the explosion of a shell in the bore. But after this accident it was fired upwards of 250 rounds, giving most excellent results. The gun was then rejected on account of a crack which had been caused at the time of the blowing off the muzzle, which crack extended back towards the breech more and more as the gun was used. The other 300-pounder is still in use, and has stood upwards of 500 rounds. In accuracy these 300-pounders are thought to surpass both the 100-pounder and the 200-pounder. I think that embraces about all the information I have to give.

Question. Suppose the body of these Parrott guns was made on the Rodman principle, would it not have a tendency greatly to strengthen them?

Answer. It would, and those guns are now being made on that principle—the 200-pounders and the 300-pounders, both.

Question. Still retaining what is called the wrought-iron jacket?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. The Parrott guns constructed in that form, that is, cast upon the Rodman plan, have not been tried as yet, to your knowledge?

Answer. They have not, though some are in process of being manufactured, and will be tried very shortly.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Those 300-pounders that have been in use were not cast on the Rodman principle?

Answer. No, sir; none of the Parrott guns yet in use were cast on that principle.

Question. Did the explosion of the shells in the bore of the gun result from a defect in the manufacture of the shell?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did the sand which was supposed to be in the muzzle of the gun contribute to that explosion?

Answer. It did not contribute to the explosion of the shell, but it contributed to increase the strain on the gun by the increased friction.

Question. You say that the 300-pounder Parrott gun which had eighteen inches of the muzzle blown off was used afterwards with most excellent effect?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was its range as great and as accurate as before?

Answer. Yes, sir, equally so. It was not fired, however, to its extreme range, and never has been. The only way we have of judging was by the elevation required.

Question. What was the range at which it was fired?

Answer. About 4,200 yards.

Question. Was the fact that this gun had a range apparently as good after

the accident as before, and as accurate, discerned by the scientific men who had knowledge of the fact, and any conclusion come to by them?

Answer. No, sir, it was not; not to my knowledge. It was merely taken as a hint, as you may say, an indication that a gun can be equally as good with a shorter bore.

Question. In your own opinion, and that of others competent to judge who saw the guns which had exploded, could the 100-pounders and 200-pounders Parrott be so constructed as to be made efficient? and if so, what is necessary to make them safe and durable guns?

Answer. It was considered that they could be strengthened by increasing the thickness of the cast-iron about the bore of the gun towards the breech.

Question. Still retaining the jacket?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Since the result of the practice with the guns used by the navy, has not the practice of lubricating the projectile and the bore of the gun been adopted by the army?

Answer. Yes, sir, it has.

Question. Was it practiced by the army before that?

Answer. No, sir. It was not considered absolutely necessary; but the experience had with these guns before Charleston showed that more importance should be attached to that matter than has heretofore been.

Question. Has that always been the practice in the navy?

Answer. Yes, sir. When I say "always" I mean to the best of my knowledge.

By the chairman:

Question. Do you know whether any apprehended weakness on the part of these large guns on board the fleet has been the cause of any delay there?

Answer. No, sir, not that I know of.

*Testimony of Captain James G. Benton.*

WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1864.*

Captain JAMES G. BENTON sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the service?

Answer. I am captain in the Ordnance department. From April, 1861, until September, 1863, I was stationed in the Ordnance Office in this city as assistant to the Chief of Ordnance. Since that time I have been on duty in command of the arsenal in this city.

(The resolution of the Senate, of January 25, 1864, was read to the witness.)

Question. Will you state to the committee the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now provided for the armament of fortifications?

Answer. There are two kinds of heavy ordnance now provided, the smooth-bore and the rifled gun. The smooth-bore guns are made of cast-iron, and are cast on the Rodman principle, of cooling from the interior. The rifled guns are principally of Captain Parrott's plan; the body of the gun being made of cast-iron and the breech reinforced with a band of wrought-iron. In addition to these guns, the department has been and is now rifling all the old smooth-bore cannon in the service, and banding or reinforcing, on Captain Parrott's plan, the 42-pounders. It is not considered necessary to band the 24's and 32's; they are considered to be sufficiently strong without it.

The smooth-bore guns now being used are the 8, 10, and 15-inch columbiads, throwing round projectiles weighing 64, 125, and 430 pounds, respectively. The rifled guns furnished by Captain Parrott for sea-coast defence are the 100-

pounder, 200-pounder, and 300-pounder. The weights of the projectiles now used in those guns are 86 pounds, 160 pounds, and 250 pounds, respectively. These guns were originally intended to carry heavy projectiles, weighing 100, 200, and 300 pounds, respectively; but it was found that shorter, and consequently lighter, projectiles answered a better purpose, with a lighter charge of powder, and have a better range. The charge of powder for the 100-pounder Parrott is 10 pounds, 16 pounds for the 200-pounder, and 25 or 26 pounds for the 300-pounder. For the smooth-bore gun the charge of powder is, for the 8-inch gun, 10 pounds; for the 10-inch gun, from 14 to 18 pounds, as may be necessary; and for the 15-inch gun, from 50 to 60 pounds.

The old guns now being rifled, the 24, 32, and 42-pounders are intended to carry projectiles weighing double the weight of their old round shot, with a charge of powder of about one-tenth the weight of the projectile.

The smooth-bore guns, I think, are all efficient guns for the service, within their proper sphere. Some of the Parrott guns have burst in service; but it is the opinion of those persons who have had the management of them in service, that their bursting may have arisen from being improperly loaded—it is difficult to say how; and perhaps there may have been some defect in the model of the 200-pounders, which are the guns which have failed principally. Of the smooth-bore guns, before referred to, none of them have ever failed in the service, that I am aware. I consider them very efficient guns indeed for sea-coast service. The rifled old guns will answer to take their places until heavy guns can be procured. It is the intention of the department, I believe, to use those guns only until heavier guns can be procured.

I consider the 15-inch gun the most formidable gun now in use for sea-coast service. It has not quite so long a range as the heavy rifled gun. Yet for most positions in sea-coast defence it is more effective than the rifle, because the range is oftentimes limited. Forts are situated so as to defend limited channels; and provided the guns have sufficient range for this purpose, it is all that is required. The 15-inch gun has great power for smashing in the sides of vessels, and I think it produces a more destructive effect than a rifled gun, within its range, against an iron-clad vessel; and smooth-bore cast-iron guns are the cheapest guns that are made for sea-coast service. The great tendency now is to get immense velocities. That seems to be the desire of all projectors of cannon. But to do that, they are obliged to use a large charge of powder, which strains their guns enormously. The consequence is, that they may get a gun which will stand a few rounds, but not a succession of rounds; a thousand rounds, for instance. That is the reason of the failure of guns abroad. The English Armstrong and Whitworth guns, and the steel guns of Krupp, in Prussia, were made at an enormous expense, but have failed to stand the heavy charges designed for them. The principle followed in this country is to use moderate velocities which will produce very considerable results, and get guns that will stand a repetition of firings; so that if we cannot produce the effect desired with one blow, do it with two or three. The strain on a gun increases very much with the increase of the charge of powder, while the velocity does not increase proportionately as the charge is increased. To illustrate what I mean: if we get a certain velocity with a certain charge of powder, increasing the charge of powder to twice the amount does not give twice the velocity, but we have a great deal more strain upon the gun. Therefore, the best plan is to keep the charge of powder within moderate limits, such as our guns will stand. I think the policy pursued by the ordnance department in this country is a better one than that pursued abroad, inasmuch as our guns are much cheaper than theirs, and at the same time do good service. Our 15-inch guns cost only \$6,500, and they weigh 50,000 pounds each. The 20-inch gun which the ordnance department is now making is intended to take a charge of one hundred pounds of powder, and to throw

a thousand-pound ball, and can be made for between \$12,000 and \$13,000. I do not think there has ever been a gun made that will have the power of this gun; and I have every confidence it will stand, judging from the 15-inch gun, which I know is a perfectly successful gun, and one which strikes a harder blow than any successful gun ever made. I will not say that it strikes a heavier blow than the Armstrong 600-pounder, which is made of wrought-iron at a very enormous expense, and which stood only a few rounds.

Question. Is it not oftentimes a necessity to increase the charge of powder beyond what you would desire to use in a gun, in order to accomplish what you wish to do?

Answer. I think it is. I think it may be desirable to increase the charge of powder to effect a certain object, and I think the gun will stand a few discharges of that kind, but not many. But in breaching, as at Fort Sumter, I would prefer to use moderate charges, because the accuracy of the gun enables us to hit the object nearly every time. A large charge would be likely to break the gun.

Question. Is it not often true that one shot with a great velocity will accomplish what six shots striking at the same point will not accomplish with a less velocity?

Answer. I do not think so; I think the six shots will produce more effect than the one. In the first place we have no target made yet that will stand against the 15-inch gun, fired with fifty or sixty pounds of powder, as I am informed; and there is no doubt the gun will stand sixty pounds of powder. Admiral Dahlgren latterly uses thirty pounds of powder in his 11-inch gun, which was originally intended for only fifteen pounds of powder. But I think it would not be safe to fire the gun very often with thirty pounds of powder. One shot against an iron-clad vessel may not penetrate much, but it shatters and loosens the rivets and plates, and the second shot is very apt to destroy everything if it strikes near the same place. Besides, all sea-coast batteries have a greater or less number of guns bearing upon the same point; so that if one shot does not succeed in destroying the vessel, the second, third, or fourth shot may do it, as all the guns may be fired at once upon the same vessel.

Question. When you say that no target has yet been made that will stand against the 15-inch gun, at what range do you mean?

Answer. I think the experiments have been made at a range of about two hundred yards. I have this from navy officers who conducted the experiments.

Question. Do you know what would be the result if the range were increased? would you not then require an increased charge of powder?

Answer. The diminution of the velocity of these large projectiles is comparatively slight for ordinary ranges. They retain their velocity in consequence of the large momentum they have stored up in them.

Question. Have you anything more to add to the statement you have been making?

Answer. I would state that the propositions made to the ordnance department to construct wrought-iron guns of a large size have been at a very high price, generally a dollar a pound. One of the guns which it was proposed to make was a 13-inch rifled gun, the weight to be 56,000 pounds, in round numbers, and the price to be paid for it was a dollar a pound, which would make it cost as much as four of the 20-inch or 1,000-pounder gun of the War Department. There has been no price submitted to the department for large wrought-iron guns less than eighty cents or a dollar a pound. I state this merely to show how expensive these heavy wrought iron guns are, and how much more work I think cast-iron guns can accomplish for the same amount of money expended. I might give the amount in 15-inch guns, which we know to be successful guns. The 1,000-pounder gun has not yet been made, and its success is still perhaps problematical. But the price of that wrought-iron gun would purchase about eight of the 15-inch gun—I mean the wrought-iron gun of

13-inch calibre. I think the War Department has ordered an experimental wrought-iron gun to be made at a dollar a pound.

Question. Will you now describe, so far as you have not already done so, each of the guns used for heavy ordnance in our fortifications, with its peculiarities?

Answer. In regard to the smooth-bore guns I have already given the calibre, the material of which, and the manner in which they are made—that is, upon Major Rodman's principle—the weight of the projectile, and the charge of powder; and I have given the cost of the 15-inch guns. I can give the cost of the others as it was when I left the Ordnance Office; but I am not certain that it has not been changed since then. I left about the middle of September last.

Question. I want you to describe the different guns used in this country for heavy ordnance, and then those used in Europe, and compare the two kinds as to merits, &c.

Answer. I have already stated that I think the guns used in this country are of larger calibre than those used abroad—certainly than those used in England. I am not familiar with those used in France or in Prussia at this time. But our guns are of larger calibre than those used in England, and are very much cheaper. And I consider them, in consequence of their larger calibre, to be more powerful than the guns now used there.

Question. How does the Parrott gun compare with the Armstrong and the Whitworth gun?

Answer. It is a much cheaper gun—very much cheaper; but it does not fire so heavy a charge of powder, and the range and penetration of its projectile is necessarily not so great as that of the Armstrong or of the Whitworth gun. In the first place, I think the Parrott gun a very effective gun when properly used, and in consequence of its cheapness more desirable than the Whitworth or the Armstrong gun. Those guns until lately have been made on the breech-loading principle; but that principle has been abandoned, and they make them now mostly muzzle-loading. The Armstrong and the Whitworth guns are constructed alike, I believe; they are built-up guns—that is, there is an inner tube of wrought-iron or steel, and other tubes very nicely turned and bored out, which are heated and then slipped over this tube and allowed to cool and shrink on it, one over the other, until the requisite thickness is obtained. But some of these have thus far failed, and have not been extensively introduced into the English service.

Question. Do those guns possess any peculiar merits on account of which you would deem it advisable that we should adopt some of them into our service?

Answer. I would not recommend their adoption at all. In the first place, I believe the English, although they are still experimenting with the Armstrong gun, have abandoned all the old breech-loading Armstrong guns except the 110-pounders. And if I understand correctly, they are making no more 110-pounders breech-loading, merely using such as they already have. They made a large number of them at a very great expense. I consider the Parrott gun, considering its cheapness, the most effective rifled gun there is. It has failed sometimes, but I do not know of any rifled gun that has not failed. It may be stated that quite a number of Parrott guns have failed in the hands of the army at Charleston. Captain Mordecai told me, I think, that something like twenty had failed altogether of the 100 and 200-pounders. But the navy, in their land batteries and on board their ships, have lost very few indeed, not more than one or two, if I am correctly informed. That has led many to suppose that those guns have not been properly treated and handled on the part of the army.

Question. What, in your opinion, is the best smooth-bore gun for heavy ordnance?

Answer. I think the cast-iron guns, cast on the Rodman principle, are the best.

Question. And the best rifled gun ?

Answer. As I stated before, I consider the Parrott gun the best rifled gun, considering its cheapness.

Question. Is there any advantage in the Rodman mode of manufacture ; and if so, what is it ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; it gives greater strength to the gun to resist the force of the discharge, and greater strength to the surface of the bore to resist the bounding of the projectile. That has been established for twelve or thirteen years past by experiments made at the government expense. They were commenced in 1849, if I am correctly informed, by casting a pair of 8-inch guns. They were cast from the same metal, melted in the same furnace, which ran into the same pool, from which there were two outlets, the one leading to the gun cast solid in the ordinary way, and the other to the gun cast hollow and cooled from the interior. Those two guns were tried, and though neither of them stood as much as they ought, the hollow-cast gun stood very much more than the other.

Question. At whose suggestion was that experiment made ?

Answer. It was made at the suggestion of the Chief of Ordnance ; General Talcott was the Chief of Ordnance at that time.

Question. Was that the first gun you ever knew to be cast hollow ?

Answer. No, sir ; that was not the first one ; but it was the first one cast by the government. Captain Rodman in 1843 or 1844 first advanced the theory of his method of casting guns. I was then stationed at the Watervliet arsenal, and I recollect seeing a letter from him in which he set forth this theory of his, and he told me that he sent a copy of that same paper to the Chief of Ordnance, General Talcott. It seems that General Talcott did not consider it of much value, and would not consent that the government should go to the expense of trying it. Captain Rodman, however, was so firmly convinced of the value of his discovery that he, with Mr. Knap, who was then one of the proprietors of the Fort Pitt foundry, in Pittsburg, went to the expense of trying it upon a pair of 32-pounders. Those two guns were made and tested, and the results were so satisfactory that the ordnance department then consented to try the principle at the government expense, and in 1849 this trial I have spoken of was made.

Since that time, up to 1858, seven pairs of guns, of 8 and 10-inch calibre, have been made and tried, and the result in every case was in favor of the hollow-cast gun, for hardness and endurance in every way. Those trials, however, developed the fact that the model of the then service guns was defective ; that it could not be relied upon ; that even though we might cast a gun on Captain Rodman's principle, we would not necessarily get a good gun, because there was not enough metal behind the bottom of the bore.

In 1857 the ordnance board concluded to change the form of the gun and to correct this defect. A pair of guns were cast, the one cast solid, and the other cast hollow. Those guns were fired over 4,000 times with solid shot, weighing 125 pounds, and with charges of powder varying from fourteen to eighteen pounds. Neither of the guns broke. But it was found that the solid-cast gun had enlarged to more than an inch in depth around the seat of discharge, while the hollow-cast gun was very slightly enlarged, not more than one-third as much. The experiments were made in this country.

In England some experiments were made to verify this mode of casting guns. You may recollect that during the Crimean war great difficulty was experienced with the mortars at Sweiborg ; they burst after 200 or 300 rounds, and very great complaint was made of them. Sir Charles Napier thought it was due to the too rapid firing ; others thought it was due to some defect in the metal. They finally tried Captain Rodman's plan, and had two pairs of 13-inch mortars cast, one of each cast hollow, and one of each cast solid. They were suspended



then, like a pendulum, so that they could be fired very rapidly. I am told that they fired them so rapidly that they kept one and two balls in the air at a time. The solid-cast mortars gave way after about 700 rounds, while the hollow-cast mortars were fired 2,000 rounds, and were then apparently as good as ever.

These are the facts which led the ordnance department to adopt that plan, and to require all guns of large calibre to be cast upon it. All the 15 inch guns of the navy are now required to be cast hollow.

I do not think it is possible to make a good gun of cast metal of large calibre, say 15 or 20 inches, without resorting to Captain Rodman's plan. The shrinkage of the metal is so great in cooling that sometimes large guns, cast solid, have burst open merely in cooling. The fact which first led Captain Rodman to investigate this matter was this: He observed that chilled rollers cooled very suddenly from the outside, sometimes burst open, and he concluded that a similar strain was produced in the casting of cannon solid, although in a less degree, because cooled more slowly from the outside. Cooling from the interior, you ought not only to obviate the bursting strain, but reverse it and give additional strength to the gun.

I am not certain whether they have yet adopted this principle of Captain Rodman in France, but I understand it is the opinion of the officer in the French navy who, by direction of the Emperor, has charge of experiments with cannon, that the best way to make a heavy gun is to cast it on Captain Rodman's plan, and then band it on the Blakesly plan, or the Parrott plan, which plans are much alike.

Captain Parrott is now proving this plan. His first guns were cast solid, bored out, and then banded. But he has now completed his arrangements, and is casting them hollow.

Question. Any gun can be strengthened by being banded, I suppose?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What tests are applied to those guns by the government?

Answer. In the first place, a test gun is fired with three proof charges, each of which consists of a solid shot, and a somewhat larger charge of powder than is used for ordinary service. After that the test gun is fired 1,000 rounds with service charges. If it stands it is accepted, and the contractor or founder is directed to go on and make the rest like it.

Question. What tests are applied to those other guns before they are adopted and used by the government?

Answer. There is an officer at each foundry who looks after the manufacture of the guns made there. He sees that the proper pig metal and fuel are used; that the metal is exposed to the fire in a state of fusion for a certain length of time. He measures the gun very carefully, and takes out specimens of the metal from different parts of the guns, pulls them apart to ascertain the tensile strength of the iron, and gets the specific gravity of the iron. After that the gun is fired three times with charges somewhat greater than the service charge. The service charges formerly used were very much larger. But it was found that guns were very much strained by such proof, and weakened unnecessarily, so much so that a gun which had passed proof might burst in three or four rounds afterwards.

Question. What proportion of our land and sea armament is of rifled ordnance?

Answer. I could not tell you that exactly without reference to the records; but I know that the ordnance department have endeavored to get all the heavy iron guns, both rifled and smooth-bore, that they could obtain. The rifled guns being made exclusively by Captain Parrott, they have, of course, been limited by his capacity to manufacture them. He has enlarged his establishment very much since the war commenced. I could not tell the number now furnished.

Question. Is the manufacture of that gun necessarily limited to Captain Parrott?

Answer. He is the patentee of the gun; he was told, when I was in the Ordnance Office, to go on and make all the guns he could; all the guns he could make in a year would be taken; and the same with all the other foundries for smooth-bored guns. Captain Parrott has had to make them for both the army and navy. My impression is, that he has made, for the army and navy, over a thousand heavy guns since the war commenced.

Question. Would it have been desirable to have had those guns furnished faster than they have been?

Answer. We could have used them. Yes, sir; it would have been desirable to have had them faster; that is, to meet the calls for them. I do not know that the service has suffered at all from not having those guns faster; but the ordnance department could not furnish them to meet the demands of the different cities along the sea-coast, particularly when they anticipated trouble with England. Nearly every seaboard town then wanted all its forts properly manned with the heaviest guns.

Question. If other founders had been permitted to manufacture that gun, could not they then have been furnished to the government more rapidly?

Answer. I think they could, if there were other founders who could have made them; I do not think that Captain Parrott would have objected to anybody's making the gun if any one had been prepared to do so. An advertisement was put in all the papers, offering to take guns from any person for a year—as many as they could make—at a certain price; none of them, however undertook to make the Parrott gun, although I presume they could have made them if they had desired, without any objection from Captain Parrott, by paying him for the use of his patent.

Question. You do not know that it was ever suggested to any other establishment to enter upon their manufacture?

Answer. I know that there was an establishment in New York that made some small guns on Captain Parrott's plain, for the State of New York, and some of them afterwards came into the possession of the United States; but it did not make many of them.

Question. Is there a necessity now for having the Parrott gun faster than they are being furnished?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think there is; I think they are furnished now about as fast as the appropriations admit of their being paid for. My idea is, that some better gun than the Parrott gun may be produced before long. Captain Parrott may improve his gun so as to make it a better one. I think they have been furnished about as fast as they should have been furnished.

Question. When were rifled guns first introduced into our service?

Answer. We had no rifle guns in our service up to the commencement of the war in 1861; they were introduced immediately after the war commenced. I was at that time, in April, 1861, stationed at West Point, and was requested by Colonel Craig, then Chief of Ordnance, to go over to Captain Parrott's foundry and examine some of his rifled guns which he had just invented, and of which he had made a few. I was told to go there and test them, and report upon them. I did so, and since that time Captain Parrott has been making them for the service as rapidly as he could. Those were the first rifled guns introduced into the service. General James had submitted a plan, and had made a contract with Mr. Floyd, when Secretary of War, for rifling all our old guns; but when General Ripley came into the office, one of the first things he did was to have that contract set aside; and it is very well that he did so, for all our old guns would probably have been ruined by this defective mode of rifling. The contract was for \$100 each for rifling the cast-iron guns, and \$50 each for the bronze guns; we know now that the actual cost of rifling an old gun does not amount

to \$10. I have been engaged at the arsenal here in rifling them for some time past.

Question. Do you know the reason why General Ripley had that contract set aside?

Answer. I do not; I think, though, it was from representations made to him of the defective character of the invention or improvement of General James. I know that I had a great deal of talk with him myself on this point. I had had much experience in experimenting with rifled guns at West Point; and although I had never seen any guns tried that had been rifled upon General James's plan, yet I knew, from comparing the results, that that plan was very inferior to those that had been tried at West Point.

Question. Was there known at that time, or prior to that time, any plan of rifling that had been tested and proven?

Answer. None in this country; none but the Arms rong gun. I burst three large guns at West Point of different kinds, showing defective modes of rifling. One of them was a gun rifled on the French plan, which burst after a few discharges; but there was nothing adopted until the commencement of this war.

Question. Has there been, to your knowledge, any unnecessary delay in introducing rifled guns into the service?

Answer. No, sir; I think the department has sought to get all the good rifled guns it could; at least those that were reliable, and those that were reasonable in price, for that was one consideration.

Question. Do you know what "royalty" is paid to any of the inventors or manufacturers of any of the guns now in use by the government?

Answer. I know about the "royalty" on Captain Rodman's improvement in manufacturing guns. When Mr. Floyd was Secretary of War he decided to adopt Captain Rodman's plan, and required all cast-iron guns to be cast on that plan. He agreed to pay to the proprietor of the patent, who is Mr. Charles Knap, of the Pittsburg foundry, twenty per cent. over the then cost of cast-iron guns. That was afterwards confirmed by General Ripley; and, in making his arrangements with different foundries, he added  $1\frac{2}{10}$  cents per pound to the cost of the gun, in order that the manufacturer might use that patent without any extra cost to himself. The old price was  $6\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound, and  $1\frac{2}{10}$  cents per pound were added, and afterwards paid for these guns. Since then the price has been increased, I am told, to  $9\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound, on account of the increased expense of manufacture.

Question. Has the "royalty" been increased?

Answer. I do not think it has.

Question. So you understand the "royalty" now to be, and always to have been,  $1\frac{2}{10}$  cents per pound?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How about the Parrott gun?

Answer. He, being the owner of the patent, is paid a fixed price for his guns; we do not know how much profit he makes. His prices, however, have always been reasonable for his guns and for his projectiles.

By the chairman:

Question. Do you know the difference between the price of the Rodman gun and the price of the Parrott gun?

Answer. I cannot tell you exactly. For the 10-inch Rodman gun, I think, they pay now  $9\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound. They pay Captain Parrott, for his guns, not far from double that price. The reason for that is, that there is a large amount of wrought-iron in the gun, which increases the expense.

Question. And the rifling also makes some difference?

Answer. Yes, sir; but very little, however. It would not cost more than ten dollars to rifle the gun.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Do you know the amount of "royalty" paid to Captain Parrott for the guns of which you spoke, which were manufactured by other parties?

Answer. None whatever, I presume; Captain Parrott receives a fixed price for his guns?

By the chairman :

Question. Is there any "royalty" on the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. None that I know of. That gun is used by the navy, and not the army. That gun has always cost more than the Rodman gun, for the reason that Captain Dahlgren has required it to be cast very full in the chase, and a great deal of the metal was turned off and lost. While the ordnance department of the land service has been paying  $6\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound for its columbiads, the navy has been paying the founders  $8\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound for the Dahlgren gun, in consequence of the peculiar mode of manufacturing them.

Question. Then his gun is more expensive than the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. With the "royalty" added?

Answer. That has been the case.

Question. What is the difference between the Dahlgren gun and the columbiad, and which was the more expensive of the two?

Answer. The Rodman gun is the columbiad modified; the difference between Rodman and Dahlgren guns is in the exterior form, in the chamber, and the mode of casting. The old columbiad was cut off square at the breech, in order to get a high elevation in firing; it is capable of being fired at an angle of thirty-five degrees elevation. Captain Dahlgren's gun is not intended to be fired at an angle of more than 10 or 15 degrees.

Question. You have stated the difference in price of those two guns?

Answer. Yes, sir. While the ordnance department were paying  $6\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound for the columbiad, the Navy Department were paying  $8\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound for the Dahlgren, of nearly the same weight, in consequence of its being required to be turned down a great deal in the chase, and a great deal of the metal wasted.

Question. You have said that there was no "royalty" on the Dahlgren gun that you know of?

Answer. Not that I know of. I have always understood that Captain Dahlgren invented that as an officer of the government; that it was a part of his duty, and he claims no "royalty." Whether he has a patent or not for it, I do not know.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you any means of judging of the comparative merits of the distribution of the metal in the Rodman and the Dahlgren guns?

Answer. I think the distribution of the metal is better in the Rodman gun. I do not think there is any very essential difference, however, in the two forms. Captain Dahlgren's gun has the metal tapering off more suddenly in advance of the reinforce, and Captain Rodman's gun tapers more gradually towards the muzzle.

There has been quite a long correspondence between Captain Rodman and Captain Dahlgren in regard to the forms of the guns. Captain Dahlgren has accused Captain Rodman of plagiarism in adopting his (Captain Dahlgren's) form for his (Captain Rodman's) gun. Captain Rodman denied it, and had a drawing made representing his 15-inch gun full size, the Dahlgren 11-inch gun with its bore enlarged to 15-inches, and the old 10-inch columbiad, which was originally invented by Colonel Bomford. Those three guns had the same axes, and the same outlines of bore. The outsides of the three guns were contrasted

so as to show wherein they differed, and it was shown that Captain Rodman's 15-inch gun more nearly resembled the old 10-inch columbiad than Dahlgren's 11-inch gun.

Question. Have the affairs of the Ordnance Bureau, so far as your knowledge extends, been conducted with intelligence, energy, and integrity?

Answer. Yes, sir; certainly with integrity and with great zeal, I may say, on the part of the former chief of ordnance with whom I served. He may have erred sometimes; and he may have created a great many enemies by refusing to adopt inventions which he thought were unfit or not suited to the service, or were too expensive. But I am very confident, in fact I know, that he was actuated solely by the interests of the service, because I have been in a position to know the fact.

Question. Have the James gun and the James projectile both proved failures?

Answer. Yes, sir. The original plan was to rifle all the old guns in the service. There was no distinct James gun that I know of. There was a James projectile, which has been abandoned long since in the service. It has done very well on one or two occasions, but there are others which are considered much superior, and it has been thrown aside.

Question. What are the peculiarities and qualities of the Ames gun, so far as you know?

Answer. Mr. Ames's guns are made of wrought-iron, in the shape of rings, welded together. Each ring is carefully turned down, and then it is put in a furnace and heated to a welding heat. It is then placed upon a mandrel, and welded by a steam hammer working horizontally, or "a bumper," I think he calls it. In that way the gun is made up by a succession of rings. He has made some very strong guns in that way, but they were very expensive. Some of them have failed from large cavities forming in the bore. If there is any small flaw in the metal of the bore, it is liable to be enlarged very rapidly by the firing. The gun has not been adopted in the service. It has been tried by the navy, but it has never been tried by the army. I have understood that they have refused to make any further contracts on account of the enormous expense.

The War Department, I believe, is having a very large gun made on this principle, with a view to test it. It is not made by Mr. Ames, however, but by a man in New York, who, I am told, is the original inventor of the plan.

*Testimony of Commodore John Rodgers.*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1864.

Commodore JOHN RODGERS sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the naval service?

Answer. I think I am commodore now; I have been nominated and approved by the Senate to that rank, but not yet commissioned. I have acted heretofore as captain in the navy.

[The resolution of the Senate, of January 25, 1864, in relation to heavy ordnance, was read to the witness.]

Question. Where have you been performing service for some time past?

Answer. I have been both in the James river and in the South Atlantic blockading squadron.

Question. What have been your opportunities of knowing about the strength and usefulness of the fifteen-inch gun used in the navy, sometimes called the Rodman gun?

Answer. I have seen it used in action.

Question. To what extent?

Answer. I saw it used in the attack by DuPont on Charleston, and I afterwards had an opportunity of seeing it used on a rebel iron-clad.

Question. On the Atlanta?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you say of the strength, durability, and usefulness of that gun?

Answer. Only the heaviest ordnance which a vessel can carry ought to be used against other iron-clads. But against wooden vessels I should prefer a lighter gun.

Question. I am speaking now of the gun itself—whether it will stand a sufficient charge of powder to send a ball with the requisite force.

Answer. The special case, probably, about which you want information, is the fight with the Atlanta. She came down to attack two monitors, one of which, named the Weehawken, was the vessel I commanded. The Atlanta came down deliberately, confident that she could take two monitors. Captain Webb, her commander, told me after the fight that he was in Norfolk when the fight came off between the Merrimack and the Monitor, and, because the Merrimack withstood the Monitor, he had no doubt that the Atlanta could take two monitors. I presume he was referring to the reputed greater strength of the Atlanta.

Question. The Atlanta was an iron-clad?

Answer. Yes, sir. The first shot that was fired from the Weehawken was a fifteen-inch cored shot, with a charge of thirty-five pounds of powder. The cored shot is a fifteen-inch shot, with a six-inch sphere taken out of the middle; hollowed to the extent of six inches, or of thirty-two pounds less weight than a solid shot.

Question. Is it a shell?

Answer. To that extent it is; but it is not loaded. The iron men thought that as a hollow casting is more perfect than a solid casting, the strength of the cored shot would be equal to that of the solid shot. Experiments, however, with the trip-hammer here at the navy yard have proved that the solid shot is very much the stronger.

The first shot that was fired by the Weehawken at the Atlanta was at a distance of between three and four hundred yards, and, as I have said, with thirty-five pounds of powder. It broke a hole through the side of the Atlanta some four or five feet long, knocked in about a couple of barrels of splinters of wood and iron, wounded a whole gun's crew, and prostrated between forty and fifty men, including those that were wounded. Those who were stunned by the mere concussion remained insensible for some ten minutes. It completely demoralized the crew. They had fancied they were in a secure castle—they found they were in a paper house; and their running below I attribute, in a great degree, to their surprise. The effect of the shot I do not know of my own knowledge, of course, because I was not on board the ship; but it was reported by the officers of the Atlanta.

I have come to the conclusion, and I believe target experiments here at the Washington navy yard bear it out, that nothing which covers the ships of England and France can resist a 15-inch shot. Indeed, I think that a shot closely delivered at either the Warrior, the Gloire, or any of those vessels, would quarry a hole through the side, and if it hit at the water's edge the vessel would go down like the shot itself. Against iron-clads, nothing can compensate for weight of blow. The English, I think, have been led to fear that possibly their best guns would not answer against ours; and Sir William Armstrong has made a 600-pounder gun, which report says has failed in strength.

Question. Was the object of making that 15-inch ball hollow to diminish the weight and consequent strain upon the gun, or was it merely because it was supposed it would strengthen the ball?

Answer. I think the object was mainly to diminish the weight of the shot. I

had some solid shot on board at the time. I was importuned to put in solid shot, but I said no, put in the cored shot; it will have somewhat higher velocity, and I am convinced it is quite as strong. I was mistaken as to the strength.

Question. How many shots did you fire at the Atlanta before she surrendered?

Answer. The first shot demoralized the crew, and they ran below; the next discharge, of two shots, knocked in the pilot-house—she had two pilots and two helmsmen—wounded both pilots and one of the helmsmen, and all the four men fell down insensible upon the little platform in the pilot-house, thus preventing access to it. She lost her directive power, and they ran up the white flag and surrendered; but in the smoke, or from some other cause, their white flag looked blue, which I thought was their battle flag. I came down from the pilot-house, where I had been to examine more closely, when they sang out from the pilot-house, "It is the blue flag, Captain Rodgers, it is the blue flag!" I then said "Go on," and we fired one discharge more, which consisted of two shots, after the vessel had surrendered. In firing at the Atlanta the first shot was the 15-inch cored shot only; the next discharge was two guns, 11 and 15-inch; that made three shots, and after the second discharge the vessel surrendered. After that I fired two more guns through mistake, not recognizing the flag, and not anticipating any such speedy end to the contest.

I will give you a little anecdote related by one of the Atlanta's officers in regard to that first shot. He was a lieutenant, who had been in our service. He said that he saw the Weehawken coming up, and the captain of the gun said to him, "That round thing is turning, sir." He looked, and saw the "round thing" turning; he then saw the ports trained on him, saw the flash, saw the ball coming, heard the report, and almost simultaneously had an intense sensation at the pit of his stomach. The next thing he found himself lying on the deck; he presumed he had been there about ten minutes; he said to himself, "Am I hurt?" he ran his hands over his legs, his body, and his arms, and said, "No, I am not hurt;" he jumped up and looked around for his gun's crew, and he found them all lying at his feet. With a few applications of his toe he would wake a man up, saying, "Get up, get up," and the man would start to his feet. At first the man would stare about him wildly, not knowing what was the matter, but as soon as he got a little speculation in his eye he would dive below.

Question. You were engaged in the attack on Fort Sumter, or on Charleston, with Commodore DuPont?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was also at the taking of Port Royal.

Question. Did you have those large guns there then?

Answer. No, sir; they were not in service at the taking of Port Royal. There was nothing used there larger than the 11-inch guns. The Wabash was the most formidable vessel, on account of the greater number of her guns, and the consequent weight and concentration of her fire. She had 9-inch guns, and one 10-inch pivot gun on her upper deck, and one rifle gun.

Question. Will you tell us about the attack by DuPont in Charleston harbor? What was the effect of your guns on the fortifications there?

Answer. It was very difficult to determine what was the effect. I looked and saw the fort pitted, as if marked with small-pox, but I could not tell the extent of the damage. The walls might have been broken very extensively, without our being able, at the distance at which we were, to detect the cracks. I saw no hole through the walls, and no cracks.

Question. At what distance did you attack the fort?

Answer. I suppose we were some 500 yards from it.

Question. What is the range of those 15-inch guns—their effective range?

Answer. That would depend entirely upon what you fire at. If you were firing against wood, a very low velocity would crush it in; and even at the

extreme of its range it would be very formidable indeed against any wooden structure. Against an iron-clad it would have a very slight effect at its extreme range.

Question. Is there any difficulty about the charge of powder you put in? Dare you put in as much powder as you think would be necessary to render the ball effective?

Answer. There is no difficulty at all; the powder is arranged before the vessel leaves port, in what the ordnance officers have decided by experiment to be the proper charges. An ignorant man, for instance, would burst his gun if the amount of powder to be used were left to his own volition. The powder is weighed out and put up into cartridges of proper size.

Question. I did not know but, to a certain extent, you increased the charge according to the distance.

Answer. That is not allowed, because the ordnance officers try all the charges properly in a battery where no lives would be lost. But if an ignorant man should burst his gun and destroy his ship it would be a national loss. All their experiments are first tried in an experimental battery, and then the proper charges are made up.

I stated that in firing against the Atlanta I used 35 pounds of powder; I am told in the Ordnance Bureau that since then they find that the guns will bear a very much higher charge of powder than that which I used; and against another iron-clad I should not hesitate to use 60 pounds of powder in that same gun.

Question. And that would add very materially to the weight of the blow?

Answer. Very materially; but the stunning effect even of that blow with 35 pounds of powder is, as far as I know, unique. There is nothing else like it that I ever heard of, of a number of men being stunned by simple concussion, without receiving any permanent injury, or any actual blow.

Question. What do you say in regard to the accuracy of the gun?

Answer. It is very accurate.

Question. How does it compare in point of accuracy with the old 42-pounder, for instance?

Answer. It is quite as accurate.

Question. And is its range quite as long as that of the old smooth-bore 42-pounder?

Answer. It is essentially the same.

Question. The range, of course, is not equal to that of the rifled gun?

Answer. It is not equal. But in an action between two ships, one armed with smooth-bores, and the other with rifled guns, I am convinced that the smooth-bores will take the rifles.

Question. Especially if the ship is fast enough to choose her distance?

Answer. Yes, sir; the smooth-bores will take the rifles.

Question. Suppose that the ship that is armed with the rifles had the greater speed, and could choose a long distance out of the range of the other?

Answer. She would rarely hit. On shore you may hit at long distances with a rifle; but a ship has three motions which tend to disturb the accuracy of the shot. She rolls; she yaws, or changes her direction; and she pitches. All these motions affect the accuracy of firing, and the extreme accuracy which is attained on shore cannot be had under ordinary circumstances at sea.

Question. And consequently at sea you have to encounter at closer range?

Answer. You have; and all the histories of naval fights, so far, show that no action at very long distances is decisive. A man involuntarily closes up with his adversary until he wants to get away from him. While he has fight in him he wants to fight closely.

Question. Are they using rifled guns to any considerable extent in the navy?

Answer. Not as broadside guns; the effect of the smooth-bore is to make a larger and more dangerous hole than the other; and it has greater accuracy at



sea, for a reason which would not, at first, be taken theoretically into account. It is found the rifled shots, as soon as they strike the water, turn away or are deflected from their line of fire. The reason is very plain, as they are long projectiles. Any one accustomed to fencing knows that a light touch on the point turns away the fiercest thrust. I have seen a rifled shot turn off at right angles after touching the water; the round shot rolls over and goes on, and is not deflected by the same cause. Then in order to avoid shooting over the enemy sailors are carefully instructed to fire low. The chances of hitting are not very much diminished by the ball first touching the water, but if you shoot too high your shot is, of course, entirely thrown away; and in order to insure the requisite lowness many of the shot will hit the water first, because, the vessel being in motion, a man can only form a judgment according to his skill, more or less accurate, of the proper moment for firing. Now, these rifled shot which touch the water first will be mainly lost, while most of the round shot will be effective. Then, in consequence of the greater simplicity of the smooth-bore, it will fire more rapidly than the rifled gun; you thus have from the smooth-bore, within a reasonable distance, a more dangerous projectile because a larger one, greater rapidity of firing, and a greater proportion of shots that will strike the enemy.

Question. You do not know, then, that they are getting any large number of rifled guns on vessels in the navy?

Answer. Everybody does not think as I do; some people think that large guns are the best, while other people prefer smaller guns; some prefer rifles, and some prefer smooth-bores; each is but for certain purposes.

Question. You are acquainted, undoubtedly, with the opinions of a great many officers in the navy about the Rodman gun and guns formed on that fashion; what is the prevailing sentiment among your men of experience upon that subject about the merits and usefulness of that gun?

Answer. The Rodman gun, as I understand it, means a gun that is cast hollow and cooled from the inside. The general impression is that that is very much stronger than one cast solid and cooled from the outside, as by the old process. The Rodman gun is cooled from the inside. Imagine a gun divided into as many layers or concentric hoops as you please; the inside one is cooled first, and consequently contracts to certain dimensions first; the one next outside, being more heated, when it cools is shrunk on to the central one, and so the successive layers or hoops reinforce one another, and you get the whole strength of the metal. Where you cool from the outside the process is reversed, and the tendency of cooling from the outside is of itself to break apart the gun.

Question. The strain is in the same direction as that exerted by the charge of powder when the gun is fired?

Answer. The same. Of course the gun when cooled from the outside is carefully annealed to do away with that as far as they can; still, to the extent to which the annealing is imperfect, the gun is weaker for the greater thickness. There is a very good exemplification of the effect of cooling from the outside in a little philosophical toy which is called "Prince Rupert's drop." Melted glass is poured into water, and is cooled suddenly in the form of a drop or globule; it is very hard on the outside, but upon a small scratch it immediately flies to powder.

Question. Larger guns are being used now, are they not, than were ever before used in the history of warfare?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I do not believe that the large-sized guns ordinarily used on our wooden vessels are advantageous. My own opinion is that in the case of a vessel found with very large guns, and one with guns of comparatively moderate size, the vessel armed with the large guns will be taken by the one which has a battery of smaller guns. Take a vessel of the Wabash class, one of the large frigates which has been the admiration of the world; her battery is of 9-inch guns. Now, the question is debated whether you shall put 8-inch guns

or 9-inch guns on board of her, wishing, of course, to give her the most formidable battery. The frigate is constructed to, and will, carry a certain deck-load of iron in the shape of guns; and, as far as her sea-going qualities are concerned, it is obviously a matter of entire indifference whether you put on her the same weight in one sized guns or another, provided it be sufficiently distributed—not all in one spot. The weight of a gun bears a certain proportion to the weight of its shot. For instance, a 100-pounder gun with 100 pounds of metal to one pound of shot would weigh 10,000 pounds; and in making a given class of guns they ordinarily speak of so many pounds of gun to one pound of shot. The weight of a 9-inch shot is about 92 pounds; the weight of an 8-inch shot is 64 pounds, or about as 2 is to 3, leaving out fractions. It is obvious, then, that if a vessel carries a given weight of metal, of 9-inch guns she could carry in the proportion of but two, while of 8-inch guns she could carry three. Then, in consequence of the greater lightness of the 8-inch gun itself, and of all its equipments and ammunition—a lighter gun, a lighter sponge and rammer, a lighter shot and a lighter cartridge—the one shot being 60 pounds and handled with comparative facility by a strong man, and the other being 90 pounds and handled with great difficulty, the 8-inch gun would fire somewhat faster than the 9-inch gun. Let it be supposed that the three 8-inch guns fire five times each, while the two 9-inch guns fire four times each; then the proportions of shots which would be delivered by the two classes of guns would be as 8 to 15. Now I do not know a person who would not rather take his chances to receive eight shot from a 9-inch gun, than fifteen from an 8-inch gun.

Question. But if they should get a poke from your 15-inch gun you would demoralize the whole crew?

Answer. You cannot carry batteries of the 15-inch gun in broadside vessels; it can only be carried on the monitor class, and for this reason: a man carries more on his shoulder than he will in his extended hand. In the monitor the weight is supported by the whole strength of the boat; when in broadside it has a leverage. You carry a gun out on the side of the vessel and it pries on the keel or backbone of the ship, and tends, to a certain extent, to break the vessel apart. In the other case the weight is supported on the keel, which they make as strong as they please by seven and sometimes nine strips, or keelsons, as they call them, supported by the whole column of water united under the whole vessel, and not merely by the film of water, as you may say, out on the side. Now, too, if you take two weights and put them in the scales of a balance and oscillate them, you will find that they move with a certain degree of force; remove those weights and put them over the centre, and the thing will oscillate with a very different force. The reason is well understood; there is less momentum in the one case than in the other.

Question. Then is it your opinion, in short, that lighter batteries are the best?

Answer. No, sir; not that. My opinion is that circumstances alter cases; that, for certain purposes, I would use the heaviest guns that can be made; for certain other purposes I would generally use lighter batteries than those now employed in our ships—lighter in individual guns, but amounting to the same weight of metal, and throwing the same weight of shot as at present. But, for particular cases, such as in the monitor class, which carry central turrets and can carry heavier guns, and as against iron-clads, I would use only the heaviest gun that I could get.

Question. You are acquainted, undoubtedly, from your study of the subject—for I perceive you have made it a study—with the guns of other nations than ours. In short, what gun, in your judgment, is best on shipboard? I see you would use different guns for different purposes. But has any nation got a gun superior to ours, that you know of?

Answer. I think that no nation casts such good guns as ours. I think, how-

ever, that the broadside batteries of England and France, in wooden ships and against wooden ships, are far more formidable than our pivot batteries.

Question. Are they more formidable than our broadside guns?

Answer. No, sir; because our broadside guns are the same. But we cannot use our heaviest guns in broadside.

Question. Because they strain the ship too much?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. The pivot gun may be used near the centre?

Answer. They are pivoted to carry in the centre; but when you want to use a pivot gun you use it on either side, running it out to its place with one or two reaches. It is pivoted in the centre, and the carriage may be made long enough to go from the centre out to the proper place at the side, so that you pivot it with one motion. But, with a very large vessel, more than one pivoting is often necessary. And I object to pivot guns because the weight of the battery, as carried on one side, brings the vessel very much down in the water; and then, having pivoted your guns on one side, the other side is entirely unarmed; and any quick ship, finding that you have all your guns pivoted on one side, by running to the side that is unarmed, will, for a part of the time, have an opportunity to fight you without your having any means to defend yourself, and exposing you to all the demoralization consequent upon such a situation. Besides, if one shot from the enemy pierces near your water-line, you cannot afterwards pivot your guns to that side without danger of filling with water. Then, after you pivot the guns on one side, and thus get your vessel down, it is difficult to get them up hill to pivot them on the other side.

Question. Do England and France use these pivot guns?

Answer. Not so extensively; not mainly, as we do in many of our vessels. I think that is a mistake on our part. Dahlgren, I believe, does not think so. It is a matter of opinion.

Question. And you think that no nation has more formidable guns than we have?

Answer. Our guns themselves, I believe, are the best in the world. We only use the Rodman principle, which, I think, is the strongest manner of making guns. But gun-making is not my speciality.

Question. But gun-using is?

Answer. My information leads me to believe that our guns stand better tests than theirs; I think our modes of testing are more refined than theirs; and, in a word, our guns are better.

Question. What was the effect of the enemy's shot upon our monitors in Charleston harbor? They are a new thing, and there has been some controversy as to what extent our monitors were injured in that fight.

Answer. The question of the extent to which they were injured, whether much or little, will be answered according to your point of view. You get a patent arm, and go out with it to fight for your life. You find, after you have fired a few times, that the gun will not go off. After the action you bring it back to the gun-maker, and say to him: "I don't like this gun; it don't go off." He looks at it, and says: "It is a mere nothing; it is only this little screw. I will fix it for you in a moment." Now, it is a very little matter in the gun-maker's opinion; but to you, who are fighting for your life, it is quite an important affair. Now, the mechanic may say that these vessels received very little damage; the man who had to take them into action might think the damage great. There are two points of view: the one, a mechanical point of view; the other, a point of view as to their ability to continue fire.

Question. I take it for granted that when a ship is rendered useless to annoy the enemy it is injured?

Answer. There were four monitors out of seven more or less injured. In two of them, I think, the port stopper—ball stopper—was jammed while closed, so

that a gun in each of them could not be used at all; and in two of them the turrets were more or less jammed. There were very good reasons for thinking these monitors, which were injured, inefficient, or *hors de combat*, after that action. It may be found that the remedies which they have applied to obviate those difficulties have obviated them.

Question. Then they have endeavored to do that?

Answer. They have endeavored to do that. For instance, they have put on a heavy rim of iron in places that were beat in, and certain points of weakness have been strengthened. I suppose it is a subject which engages a great deal of the thought of the country; it surely costs a great deal of money, making iron-clads. And the relative merits of monitors and of vessels of the Ironsides class, or the Warrior class, has been the subject of a great deal of attention. England and France have gone in for the Warrior class; we, in this country, have principally gone in for the Monitor class.

Question. Which do you prefer?

Answer. I was going on to state. The Monitor class has, say twenty inches of surface, above water, to be plated. The Warrior class has, say twenty feet of surface to be plated. Now, with equal hulls to bear the weight, it is obvious that you might make the Monitor class twelve times thicker than the Warrior class; or, more exactly, the increased thickness would be proportionate to the diminished surface. As you make the surface to be plated less, having the same hull to bear up the weight, the thickness may be greater. In other words, having the least possible surface to plate in the monitor, you may make the impregnability the greatest possible; and because you have a central turret, supported from the keel, and nearer the centre of motion, you may carry a heavier gun there than it is possible to carry in broadsides.

The Monitor class, then, will have greater impenetrability and heavier ordnance; and, other things being equal, hull and speed, if you have developed in each class of vessels their utmost strength, the Monitor class will take the Warrior class.

Question. Can you give the monitors as much speed, and will they be as good sea-going vessels as the others?

Answer. The other vessels have their particular advantages. They have a better battery for ordinary battering purposes; are far more formidable against ports; will probably be found to be more healthy, and will probably be able to endure the sea longer. And for certain purposes the Warrior class of vessels are much the best. But when you come to measure the two vessels, the one against the other, then the Monitor class will take the Warrior class; and possibly, as fighting ports may be considered the exceptional case, and fighting ships the regular one, the Monitor class may be considered the more formidable vessel for navy service.

Question. But suppose you cannot get the same speed on the monitor; would not that be a great defect?

Answer. Yes, sir, that would be a great defect. But I do not know how far that difference of speed is inherent; I do know that the raft, the over-hang; of the monitor is a very great drag; but I think that that, to a very great degree, can be obviated. But it is plain enough, as you will see, that the Monitor, with its less surface to plate, and consequently thicker plating, with its central turret carrying heavier guns, and throwing heavier shot, must, with other things equal, overpower the Warrior class.

Question. Is it your opinion that the monitor will ever be a sea-going craft?

Answer. Yes, sir. However, that depends upon what you mean.

Question. I mean could it go to the West India islands or to Europe?

Answer. This is inherent in the monitor: that, built near the surface of the water, at sea the water will wash over the decks, and the people will be forced mainly to live below, with all the consequent disadvantages. But I have no

doubt at all of their entire safety in a gale of wind if they are strongly built. Everything that is lighter than water will float upon it at the top. A cake of ice, which is about the same specific gravity of the monitors, with as much floating above as below the surface, as it comes down from the arctic seas, is overwhelmed by waves which pass entirely over it; but submerge it as deep as you may, being lighter than water, it continues to come to the top, until finally it is dissolved. A raft, as the waves dash over it, comes up again on top of the water. When I was making my first trip in the Weehawken I perceived, from my previous experience, that she would be very much covered up by the waves; but I said: There is no harm in that, because she is bound to come up; it would be a miracle if she did not.

Question. But in the mean time the crew must have some breathing place?

Answer. Undoubtedly; and if the vessel leaks more than the pumps will throw out, then it is clear enough that she will go down, and so would any other vessel. But as she starts out lighter than the sea, she is going to remain on top until water enough is added to make her heavier than the sea; and, therefore, so long as you can keep the water out of the monitor, she must float through any hurricane that ever blew. The problem is to devise such pumps and such tightness that the water in her shall not increase faster than you can throw it out. In regard to the monitors which have sunk, especially the old monitor, the water came in too fast, and down she went; and I think that in the old monitor the overhang broke apart from the hull.

Question. Is not there a tremendous strain on that projection, and can you really overcome it, and make the vessel strong enough?

Answer. That is a problem which the sea and engineers have to solve. It is a very great strain. Mr. Stevens, an eminent English engineer, tested the percussive force of the sea, and found, by means of a diometer, that it was about 6,000 pounds to the square foot. The diometer is an instrument which may be seen in museums and other places, which a man strikes to determine the force of his blow, with the means of registering the degree to which the spring is driven back. Three tons to the square foot is a very heavy strain. That, however, was on an island, where the breakers rolled up, and where the force was much greater than would ever be found in the open sea. It was a moving wave, instead of a mere undulation.

Question. Is it your opinion that these heavily armored iron-clads will be safe sea-boats with which to cross the Atlantic?

Answer. You want to attain a given object, and you wish men and money to attain it. If I were the government, in a grave resort I would send iron-clads across the Atlantic without hesitation. Precisely as when you make an attack you expect to lose some men: here you have a certain prospect, if you get to the scene of action; if you do not get there, it is the fortune of war. I do not see any difference. I do not think it likely that it will ever be necessary to send such vessels across. I would only do it in grave emergencies; because, as far as public opinion has gone, it has established that they are not as good sea-boats as wooden vessels. Still I have seen times when an ordinary sail-boat, or even a skiff, except from starvation that would ensue, might have gone safely across the Atlantic. That occurs, probably, for some little time nearly every year.

Question. But you would not say it was a proper craft to undertake such a voyage?

Answer. Certainly not; but the Dictator monitor would offer great temptation to try. I think she would take the Warrior, Gloire, and Black Prince all together. In other words, the Dictator would be impenetrable to their shot, while each of her shot would make a hole through either of them. But none of the monitors now in use carry coal enough to cross the Atlantic.

Question. Her efficiency, at the same time, would depend very much upon

her speed, would it not? If they could run two miles to her one, they could choose their own distance.

Answer. The Dictator, it may be safely presumed, would be faster than either of those vessels, because her horse power is excessive. Ordinarily two horse power to three tons is considered a large allowance. That is quite as much, I believe, as the Collins line of steamers had; quite as much as the Cunarders have; and the North river steamboats have somewhere about that. The Dictator has five horse power to three tons. What that will do on this particular craft remains to be seen.

Question. Will the Dictator carry more than two guns?

Answer. Only two. She has so much machinery, and is so much given up to horse power, that little room remains for guns. But it may be presumed that she has attained higher speed than the other vessels. If she has, her guns will pierce their sides, while their guns will not pierce hers.

Question. Do you know how many shots were fired from these large guns, say the 15-inch guns, in that attack upon Charleston?

Answer. I have seen the number stated; I think it was not far from sixty.

Question. In all your experience with these guns, have you known any of them to be disabled—I mean by the charge, not by the enemy?

Answer. No, sir; the charge used there was light. Subsequent experiments in battery here establish that much heavier charges can safely be used than those which have been employed in service.

Question. On the whole, if I have understood you correctly, we are now arming our sea-craft with guns of a heavy calibre; and you would rather have it more distributed?

Answer. I think so. But there is now a move in the other direction. The opinion of many officers since the war has begun to set very strongly in favor of broadside batteries instead of pivot batteries, and, as I said, the bureau is coming into that view to a considerable extent, and modifying the batteries accordingly.

Question. We were directed to inquire principally about the efficiency and usefulness of these guns. The Parrott gun you have not said so much about, I believe. Do you use that gun very much on board ships?

Answer. Yes, sir; it is used quite extensively.

Question. What do you say of the Parrott gun as a useful and durable gun?

Answer. I think it is useful and durable; but, as I said before, I think that for general services the smooth-bore is preferable, and for the reasons I have given: that is, greater accuracy of fire at any close distance, in consequence of the shot not being deflected upon the ricochet; greater simplicity, and consequently greater number of shots fired; and more formidable results, on account of the larger hole.

Question. It is your opinion, then, if I gather your idea, that the Parrott gun is better adapted to land service, and the smooth-bore to sea service?

Answer. I mean to say that every ship should have some few rifled guns, to be used in occasional cases. The long shots ordinarily are not worth their powder; they amount to little. The long shot on shore, where you can see whether the shot falls short or goes over, and you can correct your range by elevation or depression, is of more value; but you cannot do that at sea, on account of the motion of the vessel.

Question. Therefore, I supposed that your idea was, that because the ship had a motion that prevented the accuracy that can be obtained on the land, you think the Parrott gun is better adapted to the service on land?

Answer. Many of the artillery officers, I believe, prefer to use the smooth-bore, on account of its greater simplicity, greater rapidity of fire, and a larger shell; therefore, it must be put down, as a general rule, that each gun is best under some peculiar circumstances. But, as a general rule, the smooth-bore is

the preferable gun on board ships. In the case of two frigates, the one armed with rifles and the other armed with smooth-bores, I should consider the one armed with smooth-bores the more formidable vessel.

Question. Is it your opinion that General Gillmore, from the position he attained in the harbor of Charleston, could have reached and destroyed Sumter with smooth-bores?

Answer. I think not. My opinion is based solely upon what the engineers say, who have a thousand sieges recorded, in which the distance of effective fire is accurately measured, and who would tell you to a very few yards what was the effective distance. They all state that Sumter was safe from any fire from smooth-bores. Of course, they had reference to ordinary siege guns. What the larger guns would have done can only be determined by trial. And, indeed, engineering, and all knowledge of artillery, is now in a kind of transition state. We have not had a sufficient number of experiments with these guns for men to form accurate conclusions; and consequently the opinions of different men vary. Up to the last few years, if you take artillery men, there was no difference of opinion among sound people, because so many accurate experiments are recorded of sieges where feet are measured, and all the incidents known, that they were able to tell you how long it would take to capture any given place. At the siege of Antwerp, the French general said exactly how many days it would take him to capture the place, which was one of the strongest fortifications in Europe. And he actually did it on the very day which he had predicted. They can tell you how many men it will take to capture a place, and how many men will be lost. In making this parallel, for instance, at such a distance, they find from the comparison of so many sieges that a certain number of men will be lost, and so on.

But all that is now changed, because things are in a transition state, in consequence of this new artillery which has lately been introduced into service, and scarcely used at all in Europe. Indeed, they do not have these large guns in Europe.

Question. It is your opinion that we are improving in our artillery over the old method that you have been speaking of?

Answer. Undoubtedly; it is an advance, that a 15-inch gun made such a hole in the Atlanta and produced an effect different and greater than any known before.

Question. If the French general had had guns of our calibre and effect, he would probably have taken Antwerp quicker than he did?

Answer. They have fine roads and great means of transportation there. But it may be doubted whether carrying very heavy guns is practicable, for you have to consider the difficulty of getting them into position. Where you have motor transportation it is another affair.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. I wish to see if I have understood you correctly when speaking of the Warrior and ships of that class. You have stated that they have superior battering powers over the monitors.

Answer. I meant by that to refer to the larger number of guns that they have; not that each gun was more formidable. For reasons that I have already stated, while the individual guns are not so large as the 15-inch guns, they have more manageable guns, for they cannot carry such large guns in battery.

Question. I understood you to say, speaking in regard to forts, that they had superior battering capacity; by which I understood that they would knock down a fort quicker than a monitor would.

Answer. I can say what people report in relation to fighting duels. A man who ordinarily can knock spots out of a card, when he has another man standing up before him with a pistol in his hand cannot shoot so accurately; and I

have observed several times that the enemy begin to shoot wildly when we begin to shoot at them. In the Monitor class the firing is exceedingly slow. They see you turn the turret; they see the ports open, and when you fire the people have gone, and you do not demoralize the men at all. But with this heavy broadside, men do become demoralized. I saw the terrible effect of the Wabash battery at Port Royal; it was so rapid in its fire that the rebels on shore reported in their papers that the Wabash was twice on fire; it was merely the flames coming out from her batteries. I took a powerful spyglass at the time and looked through it, and saw the shells falling at a rate that perfectly astonished me; so that nothing could live there. The men were driven away from their guns. Now, if the Wabash had had a slow fire, she might have been destroyed, even if she had fired a 10,000-pound shot.

Question. The fire of those broadside batteries is more effective when directed against masses of men?

Answer. Yes, sir; but when you want to destroy a single ship, you must use such guns as will be most effective. Each gun of the Warrior is a terrible gun, but will not pierce the Dictator; while the guns of the Dictator will pierce the sides of any ship of the Warrior class.

Question. If I understand you, the increased thickness of plating on the monitor does not increase the weight any, it being only the same weight over a smaller surface. Why is it, then, that the Warrior possesses greater speed and sea-going qualities?

Answer. Because the overhang of the monitor, or the raft, meets with much greater resistance from the water than its mere cross-section would indicate.

Question. The effect produced by the wind is avoided by cutting down the vessel. Does that in any way compensate for the overhang?

Answer. It does not compensate in regard to speed, or it has not yet. The monitors have all been slower than their calculated speed. The slip of the screw is excessive, arising, of course, from excessive resistance; and as the model of an ordinary hull beneath the water is perfectly well known, and its resistance thoroughly established by very many experiments accurately recorded, it is obvious that the excess is due to the overhang or unrecorded addition. Why that should be so, we do not exactly know; but the fact has been found in a great many cases.

By Mr. Gcoch:

Question. What is the reason that our navy does not now, or has not heretofore operated actively against the city of Charleston?

Answer. I do not know the reasons why they have not. I know the reasons which would operate with me if I were commander. They may have acted upon different reasons. Ordinarily and popularly, to take a place means to take its defences. General Gillmore was forty-eight days on Morris's island acting against Fort Wagner, with some 10,000 or 12,000 men against a garrison of about 1,500, more or less, assisted by the monitors and by artillery which excited the wonder of Europe. After forty-eight days he took the place, not by his artillery nor by monitors, but by making military approaches and threatening to cut off their means of escape and take the place by assault. And when he took it it was not so greatly damaged as to be untenable. Now, if General Gillmore on the same island, assisted by his artillery and the whole force of the monitors, in forty-eight days, could not capture Fort Wagner by them alone, it is perfectly certain that the monitors alone never can take the much stronger defences which line James's island and Sullivan's island. In going up to Charleston, therefore, he would have to run by the defences and leave the harbor, so far as they constitute the command of it, in the power of the enemy; and when he got up to the city he could not spare a single man from his monitors, even if they should consent to receive him. And if he burned the town,



he would burn it over the heads of non-combatant women and children, while the men who defend it are away in the forts. I should be reluctant to burn a house over a woman's and child's head because her husband defied me. Dahlgren, if he burns Charleston, will be called a savage by all Europe; and after the heat of combat is over, he will be called a savage by our own people. But there are obstructions in the way which render it doubtful whether he can get there. And if he goes up under the guns of those fortifications, sticks upon the obstructions, and is finally driven off by any cause, leaving one or two of his monitors there within their power, they will get them off, repair them, and send them out to what part of the coast they please, and give a new character to the war. The wooden blockade will be mainly at an end; unlimited cotton going out, and unlimited supplies coming in. I see no good to compensate for that risk, except it be in satisfying the national mind that retributive justice has been done against the city of Charleston—the nursery of the rebellion. He might possibly go up there and burn the town, in which there are no combatants, and a place which, in a purely military point of view, as far as I know, possesses no value. To do that he risks losing vessels upon the obstructions; and if they should be so lost and fall into the enemy's hands, a new phase will be given to the war. In a word, I do not think the game is worth the candle. Whether these reasons operate with him I do not know; they would with me.

Question. Do not the same objections obtain to General Gillmore shelling the city as do to the navy doing it?

Answer. I think so.

Question. Is General Gillmore now making any progress in the destruction of the defences of Charleston beyond what they are repaired by increased fortifications?

Answer. I presume not. I presume the defences of Charleston are growing stronger every day.

Question. Then is it not a useless contest on our part?

Answer. No, sir; we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold on to him nor let him go without great inconvenience. You have stopped blockade-running, and I presume it is expected abroad that you must hold on to what we have. If General Gillmore should leave, it would, to a certain extent, be interpreted into a reverse.

Question. Cannot the navy stop the blockade-running without the army?

Answer. The two play into each other's hands, though it is difficult to estimate the degree. But it is obvious that the army cannot stay there without the navy, because the iron-clads of the enemy come out and cut off the supplies of our army, and it would either have to starve or get out. The army, therefore, needs the navy, and the army is convenient to the navy. The army prevents the occupation of the sand-hills on Morris island, on which, otherwise, the enemy would erect very heavy batteries, of course, and be unseen until they were unmasked, which would render it impossible for our vessels to lie inside; so that if you withdraw either arm, you must take off both, and then resort to the previous outside blockade.

Question. Can the outside blockade be made effective?

Answer. Not so effective. The blockade now, however, is mainly effective all over the coast, as the price of foreign articles of luxury and necessity in the Confederate States goes to prove. It is obvious that a steamer or two entering their ports, so far from serving any useful purpose of allaying their wants, only keeps up the starvation, as it were.

Question. Do you see any prospect of a success on our part in our operations against Charleston and its defences, with the army and navy as they now are, or as it is proposed they shall be?

Answer. It is obvious that Charleston may be taken by force enough. But we must get our right arm free elsewhere before we can employ it there. The

need is more troops. Now that is a point which we can very well afford to wait for, and for which the country is in no great hurry. There are other points—the army of the Potomac and Grant's army—which, I should think, are far more important; and I presume that we cannot send General Gillmore more troops, as that point can wait, and they would rather take the men that can be spared and send them to places where they fancy they are more needed.

Question. Have you any opinion of the number of troops it would require to take Charleston?

Answer. No, sir; for this reason: that there are a certain number of troops now in Charleston, and when we get a greater number of troops before it they will also have more there. It depends upon their power at a given moment to concentrate troops there to meet our increased force. When I was there they said that they could get in a short time between 40,000 and 50,000 men in Charleston; that is, they would summon by telegraph all the troops from Savannah and places in the vicinity within a day's reach of the railroad, and while Gillmore had about 12,000 available men, these 40,000 or 50,000 troops would be opposed to him in elaborate and skilful fortifications.

Question. If Charleston is taken, will it be taken by operations in the direction in which they are now being made by General Gillmore?

Answer. That is a matter on which I am not competent to give an opinion. It involves the studying of the various lines of approach, with accurate maps, and belongs rather to the army than to the navy. But if I had the requisite force I certainly would not, with my present views, go up in front of those batteries; I would go around them. I think the rear of the town is not defended as the front is, because all the menace has been from the front.

Question. Can the monitors as at present constructed carry sufficient coal to go across the ocean?

Answer. No; not as at present constructed.

### *Testimony of Mr. Charles Knap.*

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1864.*

MR. CHARLES KNAP sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. The Senate have instructed us to inquire as to the efficiency of our heavy ordnance. What do you say in regard to the heavy ordnance we are now manufacturing, as regards its efficiency, durability, and usefulness?

Answer. I cannot answer that question directly, perhaps, but I can answer it generally. I am proprietor of the Fort Pitt foundry, Pittsburg. I made the first of those heavy guns, and have continued to make them since, and am still employed exclusively in that business.

Question. On what principle are you making those guns?

Answer. On the principle called the Rodman principle.

Question. Will you explain the mode of manufacture?

Answer. This whole question has been pretty thoroughly investigated, so far as regards the patent process, in the report of Messrs. Holt and Owen; and in my answer to it. As far as the other matter is concerned, I am ready to answer any question you may put in regard to the durability of the gun, &c. I think there is plenty of evidence to show the superiority of the gun.

Question. How does the mode of constructing this gun differ from other modes of manufacturing guns?

Answer. Ordinarily cannon are cast solid and then bored out. The Rodman patent is for casting them upon a hollow core. The core barrel, as we call it, is, as you may say, a water-pipe, in which is inserted a pipe, generally of cop-

per, running down to within a few inches of the bottom, down through which water flows, rising up outside of the copper pipe to the top, and then running out, and we keep up a fire outside of the casting. In other words, it cools from the interior instead of the exterior.

Question. And which, according to the results of experiments, gives greater strength to the metal?

Answer. Yes, sir. According to all the experiments of the government and of myself, it is very decidedly superior. Here is a table showing very exactly what the superiority is, the actual results of experiments, and the percentage of superiority.

The trial tests commenced in 1848, and continued to 1858; and the comparative results, with the superiority of the hollow over the solid-cast cannon, show the following percentage :

	Solid.	Hollow.	Percentage.
1848—8-inch columbiads.....	85 rounds;	251 rounds;	295
1851—8-inch columbiads.....	73 “	1,500 “	1,105
1851—10-inch columbiads.....	20 “	249 “	124
1856—10-inch columbiads.....	26 “	315 “	120
1857—10-inch Columbiads.....	399 “	1,600 “	401
1857—10-inch West Point.....	169 “	1,600 “	903

Mean superiority in six pieces, 491 percentage. Additional to this, in three of the six cases, the hollow guns remained unruptured, and would, if carried to extremity, have increased this mean superiority largely. Total number of fires endured by six solid-cast cannon (all broken) 772. Total number of fires endured by six hollow-cast cannon (three unbroken) 5,515.

These are actual powder tests. Mechanical tests and powder tests do not invariably agree.

Question. What are the mechanical tests—the hydraulic, or water test?

Answer. Yes, sir, and the pulling the iron apart by strain, showing the tensile strength.

Question. Are those mechanical tests resorted to to try the strength of the guns?

Answer. We always do that to test the metal previous to using it, and as we go along. We never made a gun that we did not take a specimen out of it and test it. Relatively the mechanical test is a very good test.

Question. It does not agree with the powder test, you say?

Answer. Not entirely, for we sometimes get very superior mechanical tests, and very inferior powder-tests; that is a matter of experience. I have been in that business twenty years, and we still keep up the tests; but we have to judge by our experience. I do not rely altogether on the results of tests.

Question. Has this Rodman principle of manufacture been patented?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is Rodman the discoverer and patentee?

Answer. Yes, sir. I say he is the discoverer, for I think he is. I know he is the patentee.

Question. How long has this method of manufacturing guns been in use?

Answer. The principle was announced to me in 1845 by Major Rodman, then Lieutenant Rodman. And after making experiments to satisfy myself of the value and practicability of the principle, I obtained letters-patent in his name in August, 1847.

Question. How long has the government been proving guns constructed on this principle?

Answer. Our first experiment, in which the government took any interest, was in 1848.

Question. About how many guns do you suppose you have manufactured on this principle?

Answer. So far as I have received any compensation from the government for them, up to January, 1861, I manufactured thirty-nine 8-inch columbiads,

Question. About how many have you manufactured since January, 1861 and what is the capacity of your establishment to manufacture guns?

Answer. We have made about thirty 8-inch columbiads, two hundred 10 inch, and one hundred and thirty 13-inch mortars. My capacity is two 10-inch or 8-inch guns per day, three 15-inch guns per week, and two 20-inch guns per month.

Question. Is this mode of manufacturing guns practiced in any other establishment than yours?

Answer. I have permitted the South Boston foundry to manufacture guns on this principle, and they have manufactured mortars, and 15-inch and some 10-inch columbiads, on this principle. Mr. Parrott, of the West Point foundry, who is manufacturing the so-called Parrott guns, for which he has a peculiar patent, when he came to manufacture his large calibres, desired to use this principle, and I have allowed him the privilege of using it in the manufacture of what is called the 200 and 300-pounders; when he gets up to that capacity he finds it desirable to manufacture them in this way.

Question. Are those the only establishments where this method is practiced?

Answer. I am quite sure they have made some in the Scott foundry, at Reading, Pennsylvania, though I have had no returns from there.

Question. What is the price of guns made on this principle, as compared with the price of guns manufactured on the old principle; or perhaps it would be the same to ask, What amount of "royalty" for the invention is added to the price of the gun?

Answer. The "royalty" added is one cent per pound. I would suggest that there is another question you might ask with pertinence. There is the Rodman and the Dahlgren gun, of very nearly the same calibres.

Question. Well, I will inquire the difference in cost between the Rodman and the Dahlgren guns of the same calibre, with the "royalty" included for the Rodman gun?

Answer. I will speak of the prices of 1861, before the war prices came on. The 9 and 11-inch Dahlgren guns cost about ten per cent. more than the 8 and 10-inch Rodman guns with the "royalty" included.

Question. What causes that difference?

Answer. Dahlgren endeavored to reach the same result in a different way. In other words, he required the founders to cast his gun as nearly cylindrical as was possible—as large in the chase nearly as it was in the breech—in order to obtain equality in cooling. Then they had to put the gun in a lathe and turn off all this extra metal.

In 1847 or 1848 Commodore Morris invited the founders, then consisting of Mr. Alger, of Boston, Mr. Parrott, of West Point, Mr. Anderson, of Richmond, and myself, of Pittsburg, to meet him and decide upon what would be a fair price for these guns. We took the standard price of the old columbiad, six and a half cents per pound, as being a fair standard, and made our estimates so that we did not care whether we had an order from the War Office or from the navy; it was pecuniarily the same thing. The result was that the prices we decided upon for the Dahlgren guns, and which have been allowed ever since, were, I think, ten or fifteen per cent. more than the price for the Rodman columbiad, with the "royalty" added, owing to this great waste of metal in making the Dahlgren—not only the waste of the iron, but the additional cost of cutting it off after the gun was cast. There is very conclusive evidence everywhere that the Rodman is the better gun.

Question. How did the Dahlgren gun differ from the old army columbiad?

Answer. In its finished state?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. Not very materially on the exterior, with the exception of what was necessary in the cascable. All we want in the way of a cascable in the army gun is the means of elevating and depressing. The form of the Dahlgren gun is not very materially different from the others. There has been a controversy between Dahlgren and Rodman in regard to that; Dahlgren thought Rodman had stolen a little of his thunder. Interiorly the guns differ; Dahlgren's chambers have been different. Rodman has discarded chambers; he does not have chambers. His bore is a regular straight bore, with a cylindrical or ellipsoidal end. I am persuaded that the chamber is mischievous.

Question. Is the price of these guns enhanced by the reason of their bigness or weight?

Answer. Yes, sir, very considerably.

Question. So that the heavier guns cost the most per pound?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what proportions?

Answer. We have the same price per pound for the 8 and 10-inch columbiads; those we do not consider differ materially. The difference between the 9 and 11-inch navy guns is about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  cent per pound. When we get up to the larger calibres, say the 15-inch gun, then we increase the price per pound very materially.

Question. What are you receiving for the 15-inch guns from the government?

Answer. They weigh twenty-five tons, and we are getting \$6,500 each.

Question. I have understood that you are constructing a 20-inch gun on this Rodman principle?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Has any gun ever before been cast in this country as large as that?

Answer. No, sir; nor anywhere else, except the bronze guns at the Dardanelles, that throw stones.

Question. How many of those guns are being constructed, so far as you know?

Answer. There is no order out but for the one. It is considered an experimental gun. Preparations have been made for it, and the day fixed for casting it.

Question. It is not already cast, then?

Answer. It is not cast. The metal is ready, and we will cast it next Wednesday.

Question. Do you know whether this principle of Rodman has been known or practiced in Europe?

Answer. It is known in Europe, but I do not believe it has been practiced there; certainly never before the invention here by Rodman. But the reports, which have been published by the Ordnance Office, of Wade and Rodman, have been seen in Europe, and the principle, of course, is known there. And we have had a great many European officers at the foundry witnessing the operation. But I do not think it has been practiced in Europe.

Question. All these large guns are smooth-bores, I suppose?

Answer. Not necessarily. In 1860 I made what is called the "Union" gun, a 15-inch gun exteriorly, bored to twelve inches and rifled; and I have recently made three navy 15-inch guns exteriorly, bored to twelve inches and rifled on the plans of different inventors, to show which method of rifling is the best.

Question. What does the rifling add to the cost of one of these guns?

Answer. I should say about \$200; perhaps a little more, but about that.

Question. In so large a gun as that will the projectiles take the grooves and have the rifle motion?

Answer. That is what we have just made those three guns for, in order to experiment upon them. I have always told them I did not believe in them;

but I suggested, that where there were so many people determined they would have rifled guns, it would be an easy way to settle the matter to have guns made with different modes of rifling and different projectiles, and if they were valuable it would be a good thing for the government. I suggested that view, and the government is acting upon it now.

Question. You have been in the habit of casting guns on the old principle for a long time, I believe?

Answer. I commenced casting guns in 1842, and I have continued it ever since. I commenced casting them hollow in 1845, but not for the government until 1858 or 1859.

Question. Have you witnessed extensively the testing of these guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know much about the Parrott gun? Have you constructed any on that principle?

Answer. I have not constructed any. Mr. Parrott constructs all those guns himself.

Question. Do you understand his to be a patent gun?

Answer. He has patented the reinforce, which is a wrought-iron band, and the mode of putting it on; and I suppose some portions of his patent are valid.

Question. Do you know what "royalty" we pay for his patent?

Answer. I think none whatever, because he charges so much per gun.

Question. Which is the dearest gun to the government, the Rodman or the Parrott gun?

Answer. I furnish now the 8 and 10-inch guns—which are equal to the 200 and 300-pounder Parrotts—for  $9\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound. I think Mr. Parrott's prices (he sells by the gun) would be 17 cents per pound.

Question. That is caused, in some measure, by this wrought-iron band?

Answer. The cost to the manufacturer is enhanced, of course, by that, for the wrought-iron band is very expensive; and, to say nothing of this patent, the band of itself, to make it and bore it out and shrink it on, is worth probably 25 cents a pound.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What proportion of the Parrott gun is made up of wrought-iron?

Answer. I have no data with me.

Question. Give an approximate result.

Answer. I can give an approximate answer, but not an exact answer. I should say that fifteen per cent. of the weight of the gun is of wrought-iron; that is, the jacket increases the weight fifteen per cent.

By the chairman:

Question. And the rifling process adds something more to the cost of the gun over the smooth-bore?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that depends upon the size of the gun.

Question. You say that the government pays no "royalty;" but is it not manifest, from the price of the two guns, that the price to the government is enhanced by the patent of Mr. Parrott and his monopoly of it?

Answer. I do not know. For instance, Mr. Alger, of Boston, and the Scott foundry at Reading, charge no "royalty" to the government. They charge the same that I do, but they pay me. The government does not pay me any "royalty," and does not pay Mr. Alger or Mr. Parrott any "royalty." Mr. Parrott pays me a "royalty" on his 200 and 300-pounders.

Question. But the government pays that at last?

Answer. Certainly; that is an element of the cost of the gun. Really, so far as I know, the government pays no "royalty," as "royalty," for any cannon they purchase.

Question. But they pay an enhanced price for those guns in consequence of their being a patent, and of the patentee having a monopoly?

Answer. Yes, sir, so far as the 200 and 300-pounder Parrotts go, and so far as the 8 and 10-inch columbiads and the 15-inch navy go.

Question. And that enhancement of price, as I understand you, is about a cent a pound?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What calibre of guns are you manufacturing now, principally?

Answer. The last report from the foundry is, 7 9-inch navy, 6 10-inch army, 3 11-inch navy, 1½ 15-inch army, and 1½ 15-inch navy, per week.

Question. You have known a great deal about guns, and I perceive that your mind and attention has been turned to that subject for a great many years past. Do you know of any guns of any other nation that you have reason to believe to be superior to our Parrótt gun, or to our Rodman columbiad?

Answer. No, sir; not on the face of the earth.

Question. Have you ever tried to manufacture the Armstrong gun?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You have seen it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is your opinion of it?

Answer. It is a very good gun, but excessively expensive, and not very durable.

Question. Do you consider it any better than our first-class guns?

Answer. I would ask you what you mean by "better."

Question. I mean in point of strength, efficiency, and durability.

Answer. They do not compare with ours; of course, cost is an element.

Question. Not exactly; I want to know, regardless of cost.

Answer. Well, sir, I do not think any of their guns are better, so far as regards strength, durability, and efficiency.

Question. If it was thought best to do so, could you, at your establishment, manufacture the Armstrong or the Whitworth gun?

Answer. No, sir; they are wrought-iron guns, and I confine my manufacture to cast-iron. I could not make them with my present means of manufacture.

Question. They could be made in this country?

Answer. Certainly. Did you ever hear of a Yankee that could not make anything that anybody else could?

Question. What do you say about the Whitworth gun?

Answer. As a toy it is the most wonderful gun in the world, but it is not fit for actual service, for it requires such accuracy and delicacy of construction. The bore is an octagon, and it has an octagonal projectile, and it requires very delicate manipulation, and common soldiers in action are not very delicate fellows in handling their projectiles, and those guns would be very apt to jam. Mr. Whitworth himself, so far as I have seen, has got the best results we have ever had. It is a perfect thing to show the state of the art, but for actual service, in my opinion, it is not worth carrying into the field.

Question. Do you know anything about the Ames wrought-iron gun?

Answer. I have heard of the gun, but I do not know anything about its structure or capacity.

Question. Is there anything further that you would desire to state in reference to this inquiry?

Answer. I would say, as my opinion as a manufacturer, and from my examination of these guns, that there is not known any method of procuring the same efficiency at the same cost and the same risk to life of your own men as the heavy ordnance cast upon the Rodman principle. You may take a cast-iron gun or wrought-iron gun, or anything else of very heavy calibre, and I will be willing to hang my gun alongside of it, and let them be fired, and if mine fails

before the others do I will give up; while the cost of my gun will be 25 per cent. less than the wrought-iron.

Question. How small a gun are you manufacturing on this Rodman principle? I suppose that when the gun is very small you do not make it on this principle?

Answer. We are not manufacturing less than 8-inch calibre on this principle. It might be valuable for the 6-inch gun, or what is known as the 32-pounder; but in fact the government does not order any 32-pounders now.

By Mr. Loan:

Question. In regard to this "royalty" that is spoken of, as I understand, you are the sole proprietor of the Rodman patent, as it is called?

Answer. Yes, sir, I am the proprietor of the patent; Rodman shares in the prosperity of the patent.

Question. What is the percentage that he receives?

Answer. The original agreement was that he should receive one-half; I was to have one-half for conducting the original experiments and getting the patent. That proportion still holds good, but, as you will find from the documents, I have a transfer of the whole patent from him.

Question. I understand, then, that you have the legal right to the patent?

Answer. Yes, sir; but he has one-half of the profits of the patent.

Question. That is, his beneficiary interest in it is equivalent to one-half the profits received?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman:

Question. If Major Rodman was an officer of the government at the time he made this discovery, why is a "royalty" charged to the government, or what is equivalent to it?

Answer. Captain Rodman disclosed his invention to the ordnance department of the government—that is, his idea of the matter—and solicited their aid in testing the practicability of it, and offered to give the government the benefit of his invention. Colonel Bomford and Colonel Talcott, the one the head and the other the assistant of the Ordnance Bureau, declined to give the aid of the government to testing the theory—not simply because there was no available money, but because they regarded the proposed new mode of casting hazardous, impracticable, and valueless. I then took the matter up, and agreed to carry out all the experiments and develop it at my own cost, if I was allowed the one-half interest, and if it was found to be a valuable invention.

Question. It was, therefore, tested at private expense, and without cost to the government?

Answer. Yes, sir; the practicability of the invention was tested at private expense. The government, however, has since experimented with it at its own expense.

*Testimony of Rear-Admiral Samuel F. DuPont.*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1864.

Rear-Admiral SAMUEL F. DUPONT sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your position in the navy of the United States?

Answer. I am a rear-admiral.

Question. Where have you served in this war, and in what actions have you been engaged?

Answer. I first served in command of the Philadelphia navy yard, and then in command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron, its station comprising



the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and East Florida to Cape Canaveral. In reference to the actions in which I have been engaged, I commanded at the capture of the Port Royal forts and the taking possession of Fort Clinch and Fernandina, Fort Marion, and St. Augustine, and other ports and inland waters of those coasts; I also commanded at the attack on the defences of Charleston on the 7th of April, 1863.

Question. What kinds of guns were used in the actions in which you were engaged?

Answer. At Port Royal the 8, 9, 10, and 11-inch smooth-bore guns, the three last known as the Dahlgren gun, with a few of smaller calibre.

(The resolution of the Senate of January 25, 1864, was read to the witness.)

Question. Have you any knowledge of the gun called the Rodman gun?

Answer. I know the 15-inch gun of the navy, so far as it formed part of the armament of the iron-clad fleet under my command at the attack on Charleston of April 7, 1863.

Question. What do you say of the efficiency of that gun in actual service, especially against fortifications?

Answer. I think its initial velocity decidedly too low; that, so far as my experience goes, it requires to be very close to be effective.

Question. What amount of powder did you use in that 15-inch gun?

Answer. The charge was 35 pounds.

Question. Could you not increase the initial velocity by a larger charge of powder?

Answer. That would no doubt increase the velocity. I learn that experiments are now being made with increased charges, but I have not heard the results. The charge of 35 pounds was very effective in the action with the rebel iron-clad Atlanta, when the distance was short; yet, short as it was, the ball did not penetrate, though producing great results which led to her capture.

Question. Is this 35 pounds what is called a service charge?

Answer. Yes, sir, that is what we then used as directed.

Question. Unless you could use safely more powder in that gun, what would you say as regards its efficiency?

Answer. It would be deficient in range, though it might be very effective against wooden vessels and iron-clads at short distances.

Question. What would be its effective range with 35 pounds of powder?

Answer. As I have already stated, it was very effective, in the action with the Atlanta, at a distance of about 350 yards. In the action at Charleston, it was generally estimated that the distance at which the monitors were engaged was from 700 to 750 yards.

Question. What did you observe of the efficiency of the gun at that distance?

Answer. I was entirely disappointed in its destructive effect.

Question. Was it more effective at that distance than the 11-inch gun, which I believe is the mate to it in the monitors?

Answer. I think it was not so effective as the 11-inch gun, and much slower in firing. It was difficult, of course, to judge accurately.

Question. What kind of a gun is that 11-inch gun?

Answer. It is well known as the Dahlgren gun, smooth-bore; it was placed on the new screw gunboats, and I had a high opinion of its effectiveness.

Question. Are those 11-inch guns made on this Rodman principle?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Instead of being cast hollow, they are cast solid and bored out?

Answer. Yes, sir; while the Rodman gun is cast on a core and cooled from the inside.

Question. What is your opinion of the 15-inch gun? Would you prefer having on board ship guns of 15-inch calibre, or guns of a smaller calibre and more of them?

Answer. I think one of the defects of the 15-inch gun is its great weight, for it cannot be used as a broadside gun; while in the monitors in which they have been placed, carrying but the two guns, we lose rapidity and continuity of firing. I would not wish, however, to be understood as condemning this gun; there are positions where it may be used with advantage, on forts especially, and against iron-clads and wooden vessels. But the slowness in loading them, and the slowness of fire in consequence, is a great disadvantage afloat. To attack forts—I do not mean to “run them”—you require great initial velocity and rapidity of fire.

Question. What would be your judgment, suppose you could use safely 60 pounds of powder, instead of 35 pounds, in the 15-inch gun?

Answer. I could not give a precise answer to this question, as I have stated before. I have not heard the results of the experiments that have been made, or are now in progress. I understand that 50 pounds of powder have been tried in the gun.

Question. Some witnesses have stated that 60 pounds of powder have been tried in the gun?

Answer. These charges, if considered in reference to the weight of shot, have been greatly reduced, and even 60 pounds is much below the old ratio. But what charge this gun will stand, what increase of initial velocity will be obtained, and whether the increased amount of powder will be burnt effectively, experiments alone can decide.

Question. You use a species of coarse powder for this gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; what is known at the navy ordnance bureau as No. 7.

Question. Do you use the same kind of powder on the 15-inch gun as in the 11-inch gun, on the monitors?

Answer. Yes, sir; we do on my station.

Question. Has that kind of powder lately come into use?

Answer. It is the same kind or quality of powder we have always had; the only change is in the size of the grain.

Question. Do you consider that an improvement on powder for those large guns?

Answer. I believe that No. 7 has been well tested by the ordnance officers of the navy, and found better for heavy ordnance than the smaller size, known as “navy cannon powder.” In the army what is known as the mammoth powder is used in the Rodman guns; and if I am not mistaken, the grain is six times the diameter of No. 7.

Question. If I understand you, it is your opinion that these monitors would be more effective with guns smaller than 15-inch, and more of them?

Answer. I have an impression that a 13-inch gun with a larger charge of powder would be a more effective gun. I think, besides, that the 15-inch gun does not suit the monitors as I saw them tested. When they approach forts close enough to render the 15-inch gun effective, then the vessels themselves are no longer invulnerable.

Question. Do you know whether any of these Rodman guns were injured in your attack on Charleston?

Answer. I believe not.

Question. They all stand the charges that were used in them?

Answer. I do not think any of the guns themselves were injured; some of the gun machinery suffered.

Question. I do not mean injured by the enemy, but by the charges used in them.

Answer. The guns themselves did not yield any; they were examined afterwards.

Question. What do you know of the Parrott guns? have they been used on shipboard much?

Answer. Yes, sir; they have been gradually introduced as part of the battery of ships, latterly, I believe as fast as they could be procured from the foundry.

Question. Up to what size are they used on shipboard?

Answer. The largest is what we call the 150-pounder rifle; we had one or two of that size in the summer of 1862. In one of the monitors, only, a Parrott rifle was used in the place of the 11-inch gun. I have the highest opinion of these Parrott guns, so far as I have had the opportunity of judging, though I have never witnessed any special experiments with them.

Question. Do you consider its range and efficiency to be greater than that of the Rodman smooth-bore?

Answer. Yes, sir, its range is decidedly greater; its relative efficacy would depend upon circumstances, such as distance, substance to be penetrated, &c. The ponderous effect of the 15-inch gun was exemplified in a wonderful manner in the action with the Atlanta, where the distance was very short; at long range the Parrott rifle would have greatly the advantage, as exemplified on Pulaski, and later on Sumter.

Question. What sized guns were used on shipboard in our own service previous to this rebellion?

Answer. Of the improved guns, what were known as the 8-inch, 9-inch, and 10 inch guns; the 9 and 10-inch were Dahlgren guns; the 8-inch was of a different form, but a very effective gun.

Question. Were the old guns effective in battle?

Answer. They were very effective, particularly in a relative point of view, for other navies had none better.

Question. From your knowledge of the Rodman and the Parrott guns as used on shipboard and in battle, have you full confidence in them as effective weapons of warfare?

Answer. I have great confidence in the Parrott gun for particular purposes, as I have before mentioned. To the Rodman gun, or what is known in the navy as the 15-inch gun, I have stated some objections, that it cannot be used as a broadside gun; its initial velocity is too low, and it takes too long to load. Yet, as I have observed in replying to a previous question, this gun has also its sphere of action, such as against iron-clads at short distances, and I think it would prove especially effective on fortifications commanding channel-ways, particularly where the channel was near to the fort.

Question. You are of course well conversant with our fleet. Is the armament on board of it generally such as the profession approves?

Answer. The armament of our frigates I believe is generally approved. There are often differences of opinion between those who invent or make instruments and those who have to use them, but I think much has been done under the circumstances. The armament of the smaller vessels I learn is under discussion, and I believe some changes are now being made in conformity with the views of the profession.

Question. From all your knowledge upon the subject of heavy ordnance, have you reason to believe that the United States have as effective weapons of this kind as any other nation?

Answer. I think they have, on the whole; and I deem the inventive genius of the country in this line equal to any abroad. In reference to the proper distribution of these weapons, the number and the description of the guns to meet particular circumstances and emergencies, that should be placed on the different vessels of the navy, there may be differences of opinion. At one time in naval warfare uniformity of calibre was deemed a great improvement; this is no longer so considered.

Question. What do you know of the English Armstrong and Whitworth guns?

Answer. I have seen them, but am not familiar with them, other than through the information that has been published. The Whitworth gun, with its steel-pointed shot, I think has good range and penetration. I am under the impression we were struck by some in Charleston harbor; but there is no certainty of this. The Armstrong gun has the objection of loading at the breech, which is a serious objection in my opinion.

Question. What was the effect of the enemy's fire upon the monitors in that action in Charleston harbor?

Answer. It was very severe, and produced effects I did not anticipate when I went into the action. The armor was broken and the wood-work laid bare; the turrets were prevented from turning, the decks were furrowed, and in one case entirely penetrated; five of the iron-clads, one of them the Keokuk, were wholly disabled, and all the fleet injured more or less. The published reports of the commanding officers of the monitors show the extent of their injuries more fully and accurately than I have stated. It was the certainty of these injuries recurring again, and our very slow fire from the monitors and the defective range of the guns, causing an inability to injure seriously the batteries of the enemy, which induced me not to renew the attack, satisfying me that the defences of Charleston could not be overcome by a purely naval attack with the force under my command.

Question. For defensive purposes which would you prefer, an iron-clad on the principle of the Ironsides, or the monitor with a turret?

Answer. Each of these classes has its peculiar adaptation, and the service to be performed would decide the selection. The Ironsides is armed with solid plates, which I deem very superior in resistance. I believe no other kind have been used abroad except in experimental targets.

Question. Which would be most effective in an attack upon a fortification, a craft like the Ironsides, or one like the Monitor?

Answer. The Ironsides would be very preferable for that purpose, from having a broadside firing eight guns rapidly, instead of two guns slowly, like the monitors. It would take four monitors to equal her number of guns alone on one broadside, with the additional advantage of firing much more rapidly.

Question. When brought to the actual test of battle, did these monitors have the resistive power that they were supposed to have before they were put to the actual test?

Answer. No, sir; nothing like it. Yet, in comparison with wooden vessels, they might be called invulnerable. I had been impressed in their favor, and was disappointed at the extent of the injuries they received. The previous trials against Fort McAllister, on the Ogeechee, had already shown that their aggressive power was less than I anticipated as against forts. But it should be remembered that no vessels before had been under such a fire.

Question. Suppose a hundred-pound ball strikes the turret of one of these monitors; is it not likely to make such an indentation as to prevent its turning?

Answer. It is almost certain to do so if, coming with a full velocity, it strikes the hinge or junction with the deck or pilot-house. After the action of the 7th April, the turret of one of the monitors was not in the usual working order for nearly a month; not until the 5th of May could it be turned with less than thirty pounds of steam.

Question. How many monitors did you have engaged in that action?

Answer. Seven. The Ironsides and Keokuk were not monitors.

Question. Had you any means of knowing what impression you made upon Fort Sumter with your monitors?

Answer. I tried hard myself to discover what impression we had made before withdrawing, and I remember Captain Drayton telling me he had also looked earnestly with his glass from the Passaic for the same end. To both of us the fort had the appearance of having been pitted with small indentations. After-

wards, from the Morris island anchorage, on a clear day, I thought there was evidence of more injury; but Brigadier General Seymour, who was on board the Ironsides with a superior glass and practiced eye, assured me it was the effect of shadows. I obtained information a couple of months later, to which I gave some credit, that two shot had penetrated three feet into the masonry.

Question. Do you remember how many shot were thrown from the monitors during that engagement?

Answer. The whole number fired were only 139, if I remember right.

Question. At what distance were the monitors from the fort?

Answer. It is difficult to be accurate in estimating distances when you have no opportunity of using your instruments or measuring an angle. I think the commanding officers of the monitors generally reported the distance at from 700 to 750 yards. The Keokuk, which was of different construction, got in closer, I suppose within some 550 yards, but she was very soon disabled, and only had a chance to fire five times, was cut all to pieces at the water's edge, and sunk the next morning.

Question. What was the calibre of the guns of the enemy?

Answer. I cannot answer accurately. The officers measured various indentations; some of these measurements gave 8-inch rifled projectiles; this mode, however, is liable to error. One 7-inch projectile was picked up on the Ironsides. A large shell exploded amid the sand-bags which had been placed under the wooden ends of that ship. The enemy had heavy smooth-bores. I will take occasion to mention here that the monitors have their merit and special qualities, but, in my judgment, are not calculated to attack forts with success; and if a message which I received from Mr. Ericsson was correctly delivered immediately after the attack on Charleston, he did not expect them himself to withstand forts.

Question. What did he expect of them?

Answer. I could not say what his expectations were, further than above stated. My own opinion is, they might be important adjuncts to forts in a system of national defence, to cover and protect obstructions—to meet the iron-clads of an enemy if they attempted to enter our bays, rivers, and harbors.

Question. Can they be made sea-going craft?

Answer. No, sir; they are not so now—at least none that I had in my squadron—and the government has not chosen to risk them without a steamer to tow and to be at hand in case of accidents occurring to them.

Question. Must not that want of speed be an almost insuperable defect in them when they encounter vessels of greater speed, that can choose their own distance?

Answer. It is a very great defect; and in any encounter with vessels where there would be room to avail of superior speed it would be of the utmost importance. But all our iron-clads have so far proved slow. Some now building are expected to be faster.

Question. Iron-clads like the Ironsides have more speed and greater sea-going qualities than the monitors?

Answer. Yes, sir. If I remember right, she is about two knots faster than the monitors under steam. She is, moreover, fitted with masts and sails, behaves well at sea, and can take care of herself without a tow.

Question. And if I understand you, they are, in your opinion, the best form, all in all, of making armored vessels?

Answer. I prefer the Ironsides for certain purposes to the monitors; she carries a formidable broadside battery, but she also has great defects. This building an iron-clad navy I deem in its infancy, and we should go into it with caution. No one form or mode can be said to be superior to all others for *all* purposes; and as we should not confine ourselves to one kind of gun on shipboard, neither should we restrict ourselves to one form or class of iron-clads. The casemated

vessels, with broadside guns, have their advantages. The sea-going iron-clad frigates of the French, such as the Solferino and Magenta, with batteries on two decks, and mounting fifty-two guns each, thirty of these rifled, and with great speed, have a still wider field; even the revolving turret has its sphere and merit; though, as I have before stated, their limited number of guns gives them no telling effects against forts.

Question. And if the enemy gets one shot at them and stops the revolving of the turret, that stops their aggressive power?

Answer. Entirely. In two cases, also, we had the port-stopper, while closed, jammed in that position by a shot striking the turret, preventing any use whatever of the guns during the action.

Question. What are the difficulties in approaching the harbor of Charleston with a fleet, or what were they when you were there, besides the obstructions?

Answer. The obstructions brought us up, and confined the attack where I had not intended it to take place—that is, within the range of the greatest number of forts and guns that could be brought to bear upon the fleet; and the obstructions were placed by the enemy for this purpose. I think, and so did some of my commanding officers—I do not know but all of them did—that the fire alone of the batteries would have been sufficient to have kept out that small number of vessels which were being injured so rapidly. We had but thirty-two guns in all, and from this number we could not keep up that rapidity and continuity of fire which had proved so effective at Port Royal; causing little or no injury to the enemy, while receiving much damage ourselves. More recent events have thrown light upon this subject. Batteries of the most improved ordnance, assisted by the iron-clad fleet, failed to capture, for 48 days, 7 guns of the many hundreds we had to encounter on the 7th of April. And Fort Wagner only surrendered after a siege and regular approaches with an overwhelming number of troops as compared with the garrison ready to assault. I may add, that the disparity between forts and vessels is well established. With the new ordnance, and certain modifications, the former will maintain their supremacy in general.

Question. Do you know anything about the “royalty” paid by the government for the construction of these guns?

Answer. No, sir; I have not the slightest idea. I have no knowledge of the price paid for them. I would say here, that the machinery to work these guns gave way, while the guns themselves stood the test, and the only rifled gun we had broke down on the fifth fire.

Question. Did the gun itself give way?

Answer. No, sir; part of the machinery, the saddle which held the trunnions, and some cap square bolts.

Question. How heavy a rifled gun did you have?

Answer. We had only one, a 150-pounder rifled gun, on board the Patapsco, in lieu of the 11-inch gun.

Question. You have already said that you consider the Parrott rifled gun a very effective gun?

Answer. I think it a very effective gun; I like it very much, and the service of those guns on the land at Morris island has been a conclusive proof of their great superiority in range and effectiveness against forts at great distances. Of course, I do not mean that rifled cannon should be used exclusively on ship-board except in very special cases; where ships carry many guns the bulk of the battery should be smooth-bore.

Question. If I have understood you correctly, from all your knowledge and experience, you think our guns are such as you and the profession generally repose confidence in?

Answer. Entire confidence, with the exceptions before stated.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Had there been no obstructions in Charleston harbor, would there have been any difficulty in your going up to the city ?

Answer. I have stated that the obstructions brought us up or stopped us. I think, and so did some of my commanding officers, that the iron-clads were injured so rapidly, even without obstructions, we could not have reached Charleston by running the forts. As for capturing them or effectually silencing them, this could not be done, in my opinion. I have said in a previous part of this examination, when the monitors were carried close enough to make their 15-inch gun at all effective, the vessels themselves were no longer impenetrable ; and when from any cause an iron-clad is detained under the guns of a fort, it became a target of iron instead of wood ; and if prevented from using its own guns, it is a mere question of time—the shore batteries must prevail.

Question. Were the monitors kept in motion during the action ?

Answer. They were moving steadily up until stopped by the obstructions ; they then swung around and did the best they could from where they were against the forts. Finding that they had made little or no impression, I made a signal late in the afternoon to withdraw, intending to renew the action next morning. Before making the signal, two of the monitors had to withdraw, being helpless, so far as their aggressive powers were concerned. Notwithstanding the exertions of a brave and skilful pilot, I could not place the Ironsides where I wanted her, and could not bring her battery to bear as I desired. She was, however, about one thousand yards from Sumter, and about nine hundred yards from Moultrie, and was struck 93 times.

Question. With how many of your monitors could you have renewed the engagement next morning ?

Answer. There were two that were not so very much damaged. The others were wholly or partially disabled for the time ; those which had to some extent repaired their injuries could have moved up, but under disadvantages and with a certainty of the immediate renewal of their injuries ; these injuries were also of such a kind that if struck again anywhere in or near the same places the damage would have been infinitely greater than at first. For example, the turret and pilot-house of one of the monitors had over eighty bolts driven out or broken which could not be replaced, and the commanding officer was of opinion, officially expressed, that four more shots such as the pilot-house had received would have demolished it.

Question. Then you would have renewed the contest at a very great disadvantage ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; so great a disadvantage, with so little prospect of doing injury to the enemy, that I did not renew the attack as I intended doing until I had received the reports of the commanders of the extent of their damages ; and I beg leave to add that my judgment has been borne out by subsequent events.

*Testimony of Major T. J. Rodman.*

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1864.

Major T. J. RODMAN sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?

Answer. I am what may be called an unconfirmed major. I have been nominated and passed examination, but have not been confirmed by the Senate.

Question. How long have you been connected with the army ?

Answer. Since July 1, 1841.

Question. In what branch of the service have you been the most ?

Answer. I have been in the ordnance department all the time.

Question. It has been said that you are the inventor of what is called the Rodman gun ?

Answer. I believe myself to be so.

Question. About what time did you make that discovery ?

Answer. In the latter part of the year 1844 and 1845. If the committee desire, I will give a history of the invention.

Question. Do so, if you please.

Answer. My attention was first called to this matter by the bursting of the "Peacemaker" on board the Princeton.

Question. What was the calibre of that gun ?

Answer. My recollection is that it was a 12 inch gun. I had been taught at West Point to stand by any cast-iron gun for 2,000 fires, and the idea of investigating the endurance of a gun never occurred to me until the bursting of that gun. My attention was then called to it.

Question. Where was that gun cast ?

Answer. That was a wrought-iron gun, made in England, I believe.

Question. It was not a breech-loading gun ?

Answer. No, sir; it was a muzzle-loader.

Question. I did not know that they had made any wrought-iron guns at that time, at least of that calibre ?

Answer. Commodore Stockton, of the navy, had that gun made to arm his vessel the Princeton.

Question. Was that gun made on the building-up principle, of concentric rings ?

Answer. No, sir; my recollection is, that it was a solid forging, bored out.

Question. Do you remember the charge that burst that gun ?

Answer. I do not remember what amount of powder was used. The shot would weigh about 216 pounds.

Question. Not so heavy as are fired now ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you take a patent out for this; and what is the date of it ?

Answer. I took out a patent, and, if you will allow me, I will state all the circumstances.

Question. I wish you would do so.

Answer. I was placed to superintend the manufacture of, I believe, 92 8-inch guns at Fort Pitt foundry, in the years 1845 and 1846, if I remember rightly. At that time, in consequence of the bursting of the "Peacemaker," I became interested in this subject, and paid more close attention to the manner of cooling, and from my observation on the appearance of the gun, and of the sinking head, seeing the metal come down, sometimes to the depth of ten or twelve inches, the metal torn and pulled away, it occurred to me that there was a wrong principle there. I then investigated the laws of the strain to which guns were subjected under fire, and I became satisfied the system was wrong.

I first proposed to make an iron or steel core, and wrap it with wire of peculiar shape; it was an H-shaped wire. What I proposed was to make a core of sufficient thickness and strength to resist the longitudinal strain. Then, to prevent the bursting of the gun, I proposed to cut a screw on this core the whole length, make a roll of the H-shaped wire and lap it around. One leg of the H would take into each thread and fill it half full, and as it came around the next turn the leg of the wire would enter the thread and fill it full, leaving a screw still on the surface. Then we would start another layer of wire, and so on, which would bind the whole together longitudinally, as well as circumferentially. I had investigated it, until I became satisfied that this wire should be wound on with a constant tension, in order that the exterior of the gun



might be under a force of extension, while the interior was under a force of compression.

The law of development of strain or resistance in a gun by the action of the evolved gases requires this, in order to cause the whole thickness of metal to act in concert, and not be broken in detail.

I found that Barlow had established, theoretically, the law that the strain developed by the action of a central force upon the thin concentric cylinders, of which we may conceive a gun to consist, is inversely as the squares of the radii of the cylinders, the gun being free from strain before the application of the central force. I wanted, therefore, to bring the gun into conformity with this law, or into such a condition that, under the law of development of strain, the interior would be relieved from its strain of compression and brought under one of extension, and to the breaking strain at the instant as the exterior. Under those circumstances, the whole thickness of metal would offer resistance in proportion to its tenacity.

Question. One of the witnesses here, in describing it, said that you might consider the gun to be formed of concentric rings, and in cooling first from the inside they would be shrunk one over the other.

Answer. That is very true. I wrote to the Watervliet arsenal, where Colonel Baker was in command, to get the views of older officers about it. The view of Colonel Baker was, that the breach would blow out. While I was not fully satisfied that that would be the case, I found it difficult to get any one to say that this wire could be made in that form, and that the gun could be so made. There was, apparently, great difficulty in the way.

It then occurred to me, that if we could cool a cast-iron gun from the inside, we could accomplish the same thing. By causing the innermost layer to cool first, then cool the next layer and shrink it on, as you shrink tires on wheels, the shrinkage would be from the exterior to the interior, and the metal would be thrown upon the same strain as I have heretofore described, so that the entire thickness is brought into action instead of breaking the interior first, and the remainder in detail afterwards.

Question. In the old-fashioned way, the interior was already strained as much as it could bear?

Answer. In the old-fashioned way it was the interior that was strained, while the exterior was under a force of compression, the powder acting in conjunction with the compression of the exterior to break the interior; and I have no doubt that, in many cases, the interior of your gun is broken before the exterior is relieved from the strain of compression to which it was subjected in the process of cooling. The principle I advocated was to reverse the order of strain.

About that time I was ordered to Richmond, Virginia, to superintend the manufacture of cannon there. On my way I stopped at the Ordnance Office here and laid my plan before the acting chief of ordnance, General Talcott, at that time, Colonel Bomford being the head of the department. The idea was discussed, but not thought to be practicable.

I again offered my plan when Colonel Bomford was about to cast his 12-inch gun, which he cast in 1846, in Boston. I had a long conversation in the Ordnance Office on the subject. I urged him to cast his 12-inch gun in that way. He spoke encouragingly of the idea, and I left the office with the impression that he would cast his gun on that principle. He, however, did not do so.

I then conversed with Messrs. Knap & Totten, who were then the proprietors of the Fort Pitt foundry; especially with Mr. Totten, who was the practical man of the establishment at that time. I asked them if they thought the thing could be done. They were of the opinion that it might be done, and that it would be desirable to cast guns in that way; but that there would be some risk in undertaking to cast with a water core.

I was afterwards in Washington, and again proposed to General Talcott to cast cannon in this way, stating that I was satisfied it would make a better gun than could be made in the old way. He said the department was not in a condition to try it at that time. I then asked him if there would be any impropriety in, or objection to, my getting this done by private enterprise, and securing the invention by letters patent. He said "Certainly not," and appeared to be very glad indeed to get rid of the subject in that way and on those terms.

I then entered into an agreement with Messrs. Knap & Totten. They agreed to incur all the expense of testing the practicability of making guns in that way; they would make all the arrangements, and run what was thought to be the risk of burning down their foundry by the operation, if I would take out letters patent for the invention, and transfer to them one-half the interest in it; they would be at all the expense of taking out the patent, and incur every risk and expense in testing the invention, and we would be equal owners of the patent. That was done, and the invention was perfected. That is the idea of the thing in 1845, and between that time and August, 1847, those three offers of the invention were made to the ordnance department, and I insisted upon their taking it up and carrying it out. Had they done so, I should never have had a patent. But they declined it, and in August, 1847, I took out a patent, and conveyed to Messrs. Knap & Totten one equal half interest in it.

The thing ran on in that way until three years ago, I believe, when, not being in a condition to manage or take any share in conducting the business of manufacturing guns, I transferred to Mr. Knap the full control of the patent, he obligating himself to pay to me one-half cent per pound for all finished guns, hydraulic presses, or anything else that might be made under that patent, and on which he collected a "royalty."

Question. At what time was this method of making guns adopted by the government?

Answer. The first service guns that the government ordered made in this way were cast in 1859 or 1860; I do not remember the precise date.

Question. Do you know how many of those guns have been cast for the government since that time?

Answer. I do not know; I cannot tell. I know that at the South Boston foundry they have cast seventeen fifteen-inch guns, a number of ten-inch sea-coast mortars, and eight and ten-inch siege mortars; some siege howitzers, and a few ten-inch guns, not to exceed five or six.

Question. What facilities are there for constructing guns on this principle in the United States, and where are they made?

Answer. Mr. Knap, at his establishment in Pittsburg, is prepared to cast guns; I do not know to what extent. He has facilities for making them. So have C. Alger & Company, at South Boston. They have also certainly cast ten-inch guns in that way at the Scott foundry, at Reading, Pennsylvania; also thirteen-inch navy guns; and I received a letter from Mr. Parrott the other day, stating that he had cast a 300-pounder, I believe, in that way. So that he is now prepared to cast guns in that way—to what extent I cannot tell.

Question. He intends to improve his gun by first casting it upon your principle and then putting the band or jacket on it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is it supposed that that will improve his guns to any considerable extent?

Answer. I think it will make an improvement in his guns.

Question. There are four places, then, where guns are made on your principle?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is the additional expense, where guns are now cast on the old plan, to adapt your method to the casting of heavy guns?

Answer. To get up the core-barrel, as we term it, for the ten-inch-guns, would involve a cost, I suppose, of from three to five hundred dollars.

Question. Then there is no great difficulty in turning from the old method to the new, wherever they have establishments?

Answer. Not at all. They must have water, or a blast, arranged for using air. Air may be used for cooling, as well as water, and is comprehended and embraced in the patent. The first gun we cast hollow was cooled with air.

Question. The principle being the same?

Answer. Yes, sir—merely to extract the heat from the interior.

Question. What amount of "royalty" does the government pay on these guns now?

Answer. I do not know anything about what Mr. Knap receives from the government. My impression is that he receives so much per pound for the gun.

Question. I do not suppose that it is under the name of "royalty," but it is an enhanced price in consequence of this discovery?

Answer. I think the enhanced price that Mr. Knap charges for the use of the patent is one cent per pound on the finished gun.

Question. Of which you have one-half?

Answer. He pays me one-half cent per pound; whether he gets more or not I do not know. My impression is that he does not.

Question. What is the difference to the government, in the price of these guns, between the old and new method of casting? Is it anything more than the cent per pound?

Answer. I think nothing more than that. The only difference would be, if you were in a place where you had no water, and had to get up machinery for pumping water, or using a blast to cool with, that would be added. The preparation of the core-barrel, setting it, and removing it, would, for say a 10-inch gun, be about compensated for by the amount of metal that would be saved, which they would not have to buy, and melt, and bore out. The gun is more quickly bored out when cast hollow than when cast solid. My impression is that the 15-inch gun can be made at less expense by casting it hollow, if you are prepared to make it, than to cast it solid. I have had some experience in superintending the manufacture of guns, and, if it were left to my choice, I would rather, considering it entirely as a pecuniary question, make a 15-inch gun hollow than solid.

Question. Then the increased expense to the government would be merely this "royalty," paid for the discovery?

Answer. Nothing more.

Question. Do you recollect at what price these guns are offered to the government? It depends, I suppose, somewhat on the size of the gun?

Answer. It does depend upon the size of the gun. The 8 and 10-inch guns, I believe, are now furnished at  $9\frac{3}{4}$  cents per pound. The 15-inch guns are, I believe, \$6,500 each.

Question. It costs more per pound to get up one of those large guns than a smaller one?

Answer. Yes, sir, it does, in the preparation for handling a gun of that kind—the handling of it in the foundry and the boring of it; you cannot touch it with less than 20 men, or you must have the corresponding machinery in their place. And another thing, we are as liable to lose a 15-inch gun as a 10-inch gun, and when you do lose it you have trouble on your hands. It is a big thing to get rid of, and the increased risk must be made up in the increased price of the gun.

Question. The materials selected for these guns are the same in the one case as in the other?

Answer. Yes, sir. The material with which you start is the same. It requires a little different treatment to make a large gun.

Question. In selecting your iron for guns is there any preference—any iron

in the country more particularly adapted to those guns than any other? If so, from whence do you get it?

Answer. Guns have been made from iron from quite a number of localities. Formerly, Hanging Rock, in Ohio, furnished as good iron as made anywhere in the western country. But the furnace got out of practice in some way; got into other hands that were less careful, and up to within two or three years that iron has not stood high. The best iron that we have found that has been used at Pittsburg is made from the hematite ores from Blair county, Pennsylvania. What we call the Bloomfield Furnace made an iron from which we made the first 15-inch gun. That iron gave a tensile strength in the 15-inch gun of from 33,000 to 35,000 pounds to the square inch, which is 5,000 pounds better than the old iron from which we used to make solid guns. Iron from the Salisbury ores, in Massachusetts, is used at Alger's establishment, South Boston; some of it at Parrott's establishment, along with the Greenwood iron; and at Providence, where, I believe, they are making guns for the navy. I have found the Salisbury iron to be an excellent iron; it gives in the 15-inch gun a tensile strength of from 34,000 to 36,000 pounds; it is a very uniform, excellent iron. These four localities yield the principal ores from which gun-iron has been obtained for the northern States.

Question. Have you ever tried any of the Lake Superior iron?

Answer. I have not. I have had no experience at all with iron from that ore.

Question. These guns could be made, then, if the government should want them, with as much facility as the old-fashioned ones?

Answer. With quite as much facility. The 15-inch, as I have said before, can be made with more facility, for it takes less time to bore them, and only about half as long to cool them. As for the mortars, if they were in great straits and wanted them in a great hurry, I should not hesitate at all to furnish them as they were cast, without boring them out at all, for I could cast a bore for a mortar good enough for an emergency.

Question. Have you any particular acquaintance with the Parrott rifled gun?

Answer. I know it from seeing the drawings of it. I have seen several of these guns, but have never seen but two fired, one ten and one thirty-pounder. I have had no practice with them at all.

Question. Would there be any difficulty in rifling the guns made on that principle, if thought best?

Answer. No, sir, not at all. They are better adapted to rifling than guns cast solid, for the reason that the metal of the interior is harder and closer, and will not be so readily abraded by the passage of the shot along the grooves.

Question. You have had, from your official position, a long experience with guns of all kinds. What, in your judgment, are the best heavy ordnance guns in our service, for efficiency, durability, &c.?

Answer. I must say that I believe the hollow-cast gun for heavy ordnance is the best gun we have; for all guns of heavy calibres you may undoubtedly make a very efficient gun, if you go to the expense of building up, as Armstrong does; and if you make a cast-iron gun of a given thickness of metal, cooled from the interior, and then shrink a band on the outside, as Parrott does, you undoubtedly increase the strength of the gun. But if you were to cast a gun, originally, of the same exterior dimensions of a gun with the ring or band added to it, I believe the cast-iron gun would be as strong as the one with the wrought-iron band on it; and I will give the reason why I think so. In banding a gun you do not get the full benefit of the transverse resistance which the metal of the gun offers to rupture. To illustrate: Take a beam of timber and lay it down on its two ends, it will bear a certain load in the middle. Now, if you saw that stick of timber into a dozen boards, and lay the pile of boards down in the same way, it will sag down in the middle; it has no transverse resistance; the boards slip on each other. Now, in the case of a gun, when the shot is two

calibres from the bottom of the bore, and the gases from the powder are pressing out in all directions, the tendency is to form the space that the gases occupy into a sphere to bend the metal of the gun outward, and the power of transverse resistance operates to prevent that bending out. If, therefore, your gun is cut into layers, as in a built-up gun, or if it consists of a cylinder of cast-iron, with a wrought-iron band shrunk on it, these layers have a tendency to slip upon each other, affording a less transverse resistance; whereas, if your gun is in one piece it cannot bend out; so that the resistance which the gun can offer to the maximum effort of the powder, before the shot is moved a great distance, is greatly increased by having it of one solid piece, rather than in bands. And another objection to banding is, that after a while the band will become loose, for there is no material of which to make the band that has an indefinite elasticity. Any man that has ever had tires shrunk upon carriage wheels is familiar with the fact that he has occasionally to have the tires cut and reshunk. In heavy rolling mills, and places of that kind, where bands are shrunk upon iron in machinery, it is notorious that, shrink the band on as tight as you please, it will, after a time, become loose. The tires on locomotive wheels, after a time, become loose, and I am satisfied that the bands on these guns will, after a time, cease to exert any strain.

Question. And while it retains its place, it is not as strong as it would be if incorporated with the rest of the gun?

Answer. I think it is not.

Question. But there is this in its favor, is there not? It is wrought-iron, and the strain is in the direction of the grain of the iron.

Answer. Yes, sir. It is better to build up wrought-iron guns in that way than in the other way. But cast-iron is equally strong in any direction. Then there is another thing: if you put on these rings, or bands, in large masses, you have to keep them under heat for some time in order to weld them. If you are to band a 15-inch gun, you must have a band of some eight inches in thickness, and you cannot get out such a band and forge it so as to be always sure that it is properly welded; and if properly welded even, the length of time it takes to cool from a welding heat will afford an opportunity for the iron to assume its natural condition, which is a crystalline structure, and I venture to say that if you cut into or break a band for a 15-inch gun, or a 300-pounder Parrott, you will find it crystalline, instead of fibrous, in structure, and its tenacity will not be greatly in excess of good cast-iron, and you are liable all the time to find weak places in it, bad welds, and cinder streaks.

Question. Do you not believe that Parrott's method of banding has added greatly to the strength and efficiency of his rifled guns?

Answer. I believe it has made the guns on which he has placed the bands stronger than they would be without. But, as I said before, I believe if he had made the gun originally of the same exterior dimensions that it is with the band on, cast hollow, and cooled from the interior, he would have a stronger gun.

Question. Your idea is that you can make a rifled gun of cast-iron as strong as his guns are with wrought-iron bands?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And if you can do so the guns would be cheaper, would they not?

Answer. Yes, sir; materially cheaper.

Question. Why has not that been tried in rifled guns, since rifled guns are so much in vogue?

Answer. We have had an 8 inch and a 12-inch rifled gun at Old Point since the early part of 1861. The 12-inch rifle is of the exterior dimensions of a 15-inch gun. That gun has never been tested. It was fired a few times. General Butler, I believe, was the first to fire it with some of James's projectiles, but they stripped and turned over, and did not perform well.

Question. Did not follow the grooves?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was not that owing to the great weight of the projectile?

Answer. Perhaps so.

Question. Do you think you can get a rifled motion on a 15-inch ball.

Answer. Yes, sir; but I am not sure you would do it with the expanding principle. By order of the ordnance department I have sent twenty-five 12-inch and the same number of 8-inch projectiles to Old Point to be fired from these rifles. These projectiles have grooves cut in them, so that they are locked with the gun, and cannot get out without rotating.

Question. That is somewhat on the principle of the Whitworth gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; but the Whitworth gun is not grooved; it has a hexagonal bore. It amounts to the same thing, though his is the harder form for the gun.

Question. The rifled gun is subjected to a greater strain, with the same weight of ball or projectile, than the smooth-bore?

Answer. It is, from the form of the projectile. There is a greater quantity of metal in front of your powder per square inch of area pressed upon by the gases in the rifled projectile than in the smooth-bore, because it is an elongated shot.

Question. Independent of that, how is it?

Answer. It presses against the barrel of the gun, producing friction, and that is to be overcome by the force behind it.

Question. And that would cause a greater strain on the gun?

Answer. Yes, sir, all other things being equal; and the expanding of the material into the grooves where you depended upon expanding it, in a large projectile, produces more friction than where you allow it to move down without being wedged in, in which case the band of the shot fills the groove of the gun within a certain point; the shot is perfectly free to move, but sufficiently tight to stop the windage—enough for all practical purposes.

Question. And in consequence of that they do not use so much powder behind a rifled ball as behind a smooth-bore?

Answer. No, sir; and the rifled ball attains a greater range than the smooth-bore, owing to its form, being more in the form of an arrow.

Question. How do you account for the fact that the rifled ball, with less initial velocity, will maintain its flight longer than the round shot?

Answer. That is just what I was speaking of. It is of a better form to overcome the resistance of the air. It is like a sharp-pointed vessel passing through the water in comparison with what is termed a "broad horn." In firing the rifled shot, in passing along from the gun it retains its axis of rotation, and remains parallel to its position in the gun, and, as it goes along, what resistance it meets with from the air tends to buoy it up and keep it from falling.

Question. A round shot may roll over?

Answer. Yes, sir; but in these large guns the rolling over is very trifling, indeed, and the accuracy with smooth-bore guns increases with the increased diameter of the calibre. What causes the shot to deviate, as a general rule, is its rotation as it passes through the air. It is almost impossible to discharge a shot without some rotation.

Question. I had supposed that the difference in accuracy between the rifled ball and the round ball consisted in the mere fact of the one having a rifled or spiral motion, while the other had not?

Answer. You can hardly get a ball exactly balanced in the air.

Question. And this spiral motion tends to keep it in position?

Answer. Yes, sir. If one side was lighter than the other, thus giving it a tendency to deviate, the spiral motion keeps it in its position, like the whirling of a top. The accuracy of the smooth-bore increases with the calibre, for the mass is much greater in proportion to the surface that meets with resistance from the air. Both the accuracy and the range of a smooth-bore, for a given initial

velocity, increases with the size; for while the area of resistance which the air opposes to the shot increases as the squares of the diameters of the shots, the weight or ability to overcome that resistance increases as the cubes of the diameters; therefore, in the larger sizes, the shot is less liable to deviate from the same causes than are the smaller sizes.

Question. Have you taken out a patent in Europe for your invention?

Answer. I have not. Mr. Knap is to do that if it is done at all. I have arranged with him to do so, and I believe he is now negotiating on that subject. I did not do it for the reason that I did not like to go abroad and attempt to introduce a thing that I had not been able to introduce at home.

Question. Has Mr. Parrott made an arrangement with you or Mr. Knap to manufacture guns on your principle?

Answer. He has made no arrangement with me. He advised me the other day, by letter, that he had cast one gun on that principle. I believe he has spoken with Mr. Knap on the subject.

Question. That will be a great improvement on his gun, even with the jacket or band?

Answer. It will be an improvement. It will be virtually substituting my gun for his. As I said before, if you assume a gun to be of a given diameter, and then put your wrought-iron ring outside of that, you will have a stronger gun than if you had put no wrought-iron on it.

Question. But you think that by casting the gun of a larger diameter you would have a still better gun?

Answer. By making a cast-iron gun on my principle as large in diameter as his is, after he has put on his band, I think you would have a gun as strong as his.

Question. Suppose the initial velocity of a ball from your 15-inch gun was too low, it would be increased of course by using an additional amount of powder?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And suppose your gun as it has been cast was not thought to be strong enough for that additional charge of powder, is there any difficulty about increasing the strength of the gun somewhat?

Answer. It may be increased somewhat, I suppose, by adding a very large band.

Question. Or by making the casting thicker?

Answer. Yes, sir. There is no difficulty about that, except merely adding weight to the gun.

Question. If it was found, in practice, that such was the difficulty, you could remedy by strengthening the gun by putting additional weight in it?

Answer. Yes, sir; and if I were going now to model a gun to do the greatest amount of work, I should make it thicker than we have been making.

Question. From all your acquaintance with and study of the subject of guns, both in this country and in Europe, would you say our guns were ahead or behind the most improved guns of the most martial nation?

Answer. Our guns are ahead of theirs, in my opinion. I should dislike very much, indeed, to exchange with any nation I know of.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You keep the outside of your gun heated while you are cooling the inside?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At about what temperature?

Answer. We aim to keep the flask at a dull red heat; that is, keep it at as high a temperature as is consistent with the requisite strength of the flask to hold the fluid metal in it.

Question. And you consider your method of casting and cooling of as much advantage to the rifled gun as to the smooth-bore?

Answer. Quite as much—I will say of more advantage.

Question. Do you know whether, in rifling, the increased hardness of the gun is shown to be more than in the solid gun?

Answer. I know that the inner surface of the smooth-bore guns is harder when cast hollow, and, of course, it must rifle harder.

Question. If a gun were to be made upon the plan you have indicated, sufficiently large for the 15-inch gun, and rifled in the best manner, what would there be in it that any person could claim except yourself?

Answer. There would be nothing in it that anybody else could claim.

Question. Then, if I understand you, you, or Mr. Knap, or anybody else, with the right to cast guns upon your method, can manufacture a 15-inch rifled gun without paying any "royalty" to anybody else, or infringing upon another person's rights?

Answer. Yes, sir, unless they took some peculiar method of rifling; I believe there are some peculiar methods. I believe a gentleman by the name of Atwater has a peculiar method of rifling.

Question. The whole peculiarity of the Parrott gun is in the band?

Answer. In the band, and in the manner of cooling it while he is banding it, and in that I claim that he interferes with my patent.

Question. So that if the government wants now to use a 15-inch rifled gun, or a rifled gun of any other size, without banding it, it can be manufactured by using your method of casting it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Would you not, then, recommend that the government should make such guns and test them?

Answer. I would. I have already done so. I made application not over three months ago for that to be done, but I was refused it in my own ordnance department. The navy, however, are testing the matter. They are making a gun, and rifling it on the principle I proposed, and I believe the gun is now complete at Pittsburg.

Question. In the firing of the Parrott gun is there not a tendency, at every discharge, to separate whatever connexion there may be between the band and the solid or cast part of the gun?

Answer. Unquestionably.

Question. Suppose that separation be to any considerable extent, is not, then, the whole power of the band destroyed?

Answer. It is all nullified. The gun then begins to break on the inside; and when it begins there the band does not stop it.

Question. Then it is true in relation to the banded gun that, just at the time when you need the service of the band, after the gun has been fired a considerable number of times, you lose all benefit from it?

Answer. I think so; that is exactly my opinion. I would like to make one remark upon this matter. I do not want to be understood as being opposed, at all, to rifled guns. My opinion on that subject is, that we should have them on all our fortifications; especially those that are in localities surrounded by bodies of water, where a hostile vessel, or fleet, might lie at anchor beyond the effective range of our smooth-bore guns. There we want some large rifled guns, of the most effective character and perfect construction, to reach those positions; but, for the main armament of our forts, and for the principal reliance for the destruction of vessels, we must depend upon smooth-bore guns.

Question. Then it is true that, when the object which you wish to destroy comes within the range of our smooth-bore guns, they are superior to the rifled guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.



Question. But you can attain a range in rifled guns beyond what you can attain in a smooth-bore ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And whether you want a rifled or a smooth-bore gun depends upon the distance at which you desire to operate ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know whether any attempt is now being made in Europe to construct guns upon your plan, or upon the Parrott plan ?

Answer. I do not know ; my opinion is that Captain Blakeley constructs his guns substantially, if not identically, upon the same principle as Mr. Parrott.

Question. So far as you know, is there any foreign gun which has any such merits over our guns that it would be advisable for us to introduce it into our service for any particular or special purpose ?

Answer. I would think it well to take an Armstrong gun, or a gun built up of wrought-iron in that way, and make the best cast-iron gun we can along with it, and subject them both to extreme proof.

Question. And you would recommend that we should, by trial, compare the merits of that gun with our best guns ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; for it is only by comparing these things that we arrive at the truth. I advocate the cast-iron gun for the reason that I believe we can make about as good guns of cast-iron as we can in any other way, especially large guns ; the larger you go the more in favor of cast-iron ; and, when it comes to doing a given amount of battering, you can do it with cast-iron guns for less money than with any other guns that can be made.

Question. Would you recommend that we should test the Whitworth gun ?

Answer. I would not. I think its hexagonal bore condemns it. You there have the interior of the gun with sharp corners, where fracture is sure to begin. The gun is weakened by having these angles. There should be no angles in the interior of the gun. In the rifled gun it is absolutely necessary, but I would avoid it if I could.

Question. So far as you know, have the affairs of the ordnance department, since the war commenced, been conducted with energy, fidelity and ability ?

Answer. I do not know anything to the contrary of that. I have no evidence of a want of fidelity in any part of it. There are some things I would have done that have not been done. I may be wrong and the department right.

Question. Merely a question of difference of judgment ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I would instance the proving of these rifled guns at Old Point. If I had been in charge of the department I would have had those guns tested before this, and known what they would do. I would have had the 15-inch gun proved to extremity, as was recommended two or three years ago. I merely give that as illustrating what I mean.

Question. Is there any material difference in the weight of a gun of the same external maximum diameter, banded according to the method of Captain Parrott, and one made all of cast-iron, as indicated by you ?

Answer. I do not think the difference would be great. The change in the model of the gun as now made, to the form I should make it, to be equal in its maximum diameter to that of the banded gun, would increase its weight, I think, beyond that of the banded gun.

Question. Will you state to the committee what you deem to be a proper charge of powder for your guns of the several calibres ?

Answer. What is ordinarily termed the service charge of a gun is fixed, or intended to be fixed, so low as to render the gun absolutely safe. The service charges fixed for the 8 and 10-inch guns are ten pounds of powder for the 8-inch, and fifteen pounds for the 10-inch ; the 8-inch gun throwing 64 pounds of metal, and the 10-inch 126 pounds. The service charge for the 15-inch guns was fixed, after the experiments made with the gun, at 35 pounds, I believe. I am not

positive of that, but that is my recollection ; but any of these guns may be fired with heavier charges, and it is intended that the intelligent artillerist will always use and exercise his judgment as to the proper charge to be used in the accomplishment of a given object, and he should be acquainted with the maximum limit of the charge to which he can go. A 10-inch gun, a trial gun, made at South Boston, has been fired a thousand rounds with fifteen pounds of powder ; one-fourth of the rounds with solid shot weighing 126 pounds, and three-fourths of the rounds with shell of about 100 pounds weight. This same gun, after these thousand rounds, was then fired 100 rounds with twenty pounds of powder and solid shot, then 100 rounds with twenty-five pounds of powder and solid shot, and then 200 rounds with thirty pounds of powder and solid shot. The gun now shows no sign of deterioration. The 15-inch gun has been fired with as high as fifty pounds of powder, and my impression is that it was fired with sixty pounds of powder, but I am not positive of that. The intention was to demonstrate the endurance of the 15-inch gun, up to a certain number of rounds, with such charges as would be likely to be fired from it in service ; the purpose of those large guns, at that time, being to strike objects near at hand. I have no doubt at all that the 15-inch gun, with the large-grained powder which we use in it, may be fired with safety 500 times with seventy-five pounds of powder. On the subject of powder, I would state here that the powder used in this gun, if we should use seventy-five pounds, or if we should use only forty pounds, would not all be burned *in the gun*. It is not intended that it should all be burned in the gun. The object in increasing the size of the grain of powder is to diminish the initial burning surface, and thereby diminish the maximum pressure exerted upon the gun, and cause the difference between the maximum pressure and the minimum, or that exerted when the shot leaves the gun, to be as small as possible ; and in order to do this, to the best advantage that grained powder will admit of, the larger the grain when it leaves the gun, or the more that is thrown out unburned, the more nearly uniform will be the pressure from the bottom of the bore to the muzzle of the gun, and the less the strain upon the gun in producing a given velocity. This amounts to saving your gun at the expense of powder. It is believed that another form of projecting charge, of which some have been tried, and which is denominated, in my report of experiments, as "perforated cake," will accomplish this object, with the minimum strain upon the gun, and with no undue expenditure of powder ; the charge in this case being all burned in the gun. I would add, however, that the cost of this "perforated cake" powder is something more than that of grained powder.

Question. What is the size of the cake of powder, or what should it be ?

Answer. The size of the cake should be such as to permit it to go into the bore of the gun, leaving proper windage, so as to be always sure of its going down. Those made for the 15-inch gun were made in hexagonal cakes, and then built up, in the style of mosaic pavement, until we got it as large as would go into the bore of the gun. And from the fact that its initial burning surface is at its minimum, at the moment of ignition, and increases until the charge is wholly consumed, that kind of projecting charge gives you the nearest approximation to uniformity in pressure along the bore of the gun that can be obtained within my knowledge.

Question. What would be the difference of cost between that powder and the powder now in use ?

Answer. My impression is that the difference in cost would be about three or four cents per pound. If prepared to manufacture it on a large scale, I have no doubt the cost would be reduced.

Question. Have ordnance officers devoted themselves, to any considerable extent, to the improvement of ordnance, since the commencement of the war ?

Answer. No, not to any great or practical extent. Their duties have been

so much increased in meeting the demands consequent upon the present war, since its commencement, that ordnance officers have not been able to devote their attention to that subject; and most of the attention they have given to the subject has been in testing and considering the plans proposed by inexperienced persons, the result being that they thus have had no opportunity of carrying out any digested system of experiments.

By the chairman :

Question. Have not ingenious men, outside of the military profession, had their attention very much directed to this subject, and brought in a great many inventions—more than usual?

Answer. They have; and another thing in reference to the series of trials that we have been speaking of. My opinion is that the proper course to arrive at practical and valuable results, in any trials of that kind, is to give to one or two officers of experience and ability the means and authority to make such experiments as are necessary to decide any point it is desirable to ascertain in connexion with these matters.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have we competent officers who can be spared for that purpose?

Answer. We have competent officers; it is not for me to say whether they can be spared or not.

Question. Would, in your judgment, the services of such competent officers be worth as much to the government, if employed in that way, as they are now?

Answer. I should say they would be worth more than in any other capacity. I would like to add that on the completion of the experiments with the 15-inch gun, seeing that they had demonstrated its capability to endure a sufficient number of service charges, I recommended that it be now put to extreme proof, to determine its endurance and its effect upon targets of different kinds. Those experiments have not yet been made. The recommendation will be found in my printed reports.

The foregoing is the corrected testimony given by me before the joint committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, on the sixth day of February, 1864.

F. T. RODMAN, *Major of Ordnance.*

*Testimony of Major A. B. Dyer.*

WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1864.*

Major A. B. DYER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major of ordnance.

Question. What have been your opportunities to make yourself familiar with the character and efficiency of our heavy ordnance—say the Rodman gun first?

Answer. I have had a great deal of experience in firing to extremity some of our large guns, particularly one pair of 10-inch guns, which were made at the Fort Pitt foundry. They were sent to me as having been cast from the same metal, and at the same time.

Question. On this Rodman principle?

Answer. One on the Rodman principle, and the other cast solid, and then bored out. I understood that the guns were tested at Pittsburg before they were sent to me at Old Point, where I was then stationed. I fired them at Old Point, with the same charges precisely, a great number of times. Neither was burst, and both gave evidence of great strength. But the two guns were very unlike in condition at the conclusion of the firing. When I commenced the firing,

the solid cast gun was very much worn about the seat of the shot, and the wearing afterwards continued, while the other gun at the end of the firing exhibited very little evidence of having been worn, or abraded by the gases. I fired these guns with the same weight of powder and the same weight of projectile several times, under the same circumstances, and obtained the ranges, and also the maximum pressures upon the bores, by means of an instrument which had been devised by Major Rodman. The ranges and the pressures obtained from the hollow cast gun were considerably greater than the corresponding ranges and pressures obtained from the solid cast gun. I attributed this to the difference in the wear of the bores of the two guns, and I am convinced that, at the conclusion of the firing, the hollow cast gun had really endured much more than the solid cast gun, and that it had sustained much less injury from the firing. I have had no other experience in testing the endurance of pairs of guns made from the same metal upon the two principles.

Question. Have you tested other large guns—the Parrott gun, for instance?

Answer. I have never tested the Parrott gun; believe I never saw one fired.

Question. What is your confidence in the efficiency of our large guns, such as we use now in fortifications and on shipboard?

Answer. In regard to the guns which are used on shipboard, I know very little. I am satisfied that the large guns we are now making are reliable guns. I believe they are the best guns we have ever had, and equal to any guns which have ever been made.

Question. Have you had any experience with the large 15-inch Rodman gun?

Answer. I have. I was at Old Point when the first gun was sent there to be tested, and I superintended the firing of it for, I think, 512 rounds.

Question. What was the effect of that firing upon the gun?

Answer. At the conclusion of the firing I had the gun star-gauged with great accuracy. The star-gauge is an instrument which is used to determine the diameter of the bore. The measurements were made with great accuracy, and at a great many points, and the bore was found to be uninjured.

Question. What amount of powder did you use in these trials?

Answer. I think the first charge in the 15-inch gun was 25 pounds. We fired a few times with that charge, and then increased the charge more and more up to 50 pounds.

Question. What shot did you use, solid shot or shell?

Answer. Shell weighing, I think, about 350 pounds each.

Question. Have you an idea that it would be safe to use a charge of 60 pounds in that gun?

Answer. I have every reason to believe it would be. I think the fact that there was no enlargement whatever in the bore, after the gun had been fired upwards of 500 times, is conclusive evidence that 60 pounds might be used with safety.

Question. It has been said by some of our military men that the service charge for that gun was 35 pounds, and they thought the initial velocity of the ball was too low. What is your idea about that?

Answer. For some purposes 35 pounds would give sufficient velocity. If great penetrating power, or great range was necessary, a greater charge would have to be used, perhaps more than 60 pounds. In the experiment I made with the 15-inch gun I obtained an initial velocity of about 1,100 feet per second.

Question. What was the charge you put in to obtain that velocity?

Answer. Fifty pounds.

Question. Are the guns we manufacture now made pretty much all on the Rodman principle?

Answer. I have no means of knowing absolutely, but I have understood and I believe that all large guns for the army, and all 15-inch guns for the navy, are made on the Rodman principle.

Question. How do you account for the increased strength of this Rodman over the old-fashioned gun cast solid, and then bored out?

Answer. I understand that the Rodman gun is cast upon a core or metal tube, which is covered with clay to protect it from the heat of the melted iron, and that it is cooled from the interior by means of a stream of cold water, which passes through the bore, while the heat on the exterior is kept up by a fire in the pit. The inner layers or cylinders cool first, and those exterior to them in cooling afterwards contract, and press upon and hug them, thereby relieving them from all strain of extension. This continues until the mass is cooled, at which time I believe the inner portions of the gun are compressed, while the outer parts are extended. In the solid-cast gun, the cooling being wholly from the exterior, the reverse takes place, and the interior of the casting is subject to a strain of extension, which increases towards the centre of an axis. The spongy appearance of the metal, and the fissures or cracks near the axis of large solid-cast guns, furnish conclusive evidence that the metal of the central part is highly strained in cooling.

Question. Does it not also harden the inside of the gun; make it harder than it otherwise would be?

Answer. Unquestionably it does.

Question. Something on the principle of chilling the outer rim of car-wheels?

Answer. I think there can be no doubt of that; the results of the experiments I have referred to, as having been made by me at Old Point, furnish evidence of that.

Question. How do you compare our improved ordnance with that of Europe, so far as you understand? Is it superior or inferior?

Answer. I am satisfied that it is superior to the heavy ordnance of any European nation. During the Crimean war a considerable number of large guns, especially the 13-inch English mortars, burst, and those guns were generally regarded as unsafe. Many of our 13-inch mortars have been fired a great many times, and, I believe, not one has burst. I have not heard that any of the Rodman guns have burst except one, under very peculiar and extraordinary circumstances, at Frankford arsenal. A year or two ago I had a conversation with Colonel Wilmot, of the English artillery, who at one time had superintended the construction of cannon at the Woolwich arsenal, in relation to ordnance. He inquired what I thought of the Rodman method in comparison with the Dahlgren method. I told him that my experience satisfied me that the Rodman method was the best, but I gave him no reasons why I thought so. He told me that his government had made and tested two pairs of 13-inch mortars, one of each pair being cast solid, and the other cast hollow and cooled from the interior; that each pair was fired together, and, as nearly as possible, under the same circumstances; that both solid-cast mortars burst before reaching 500 rounds, and that both of the hollow-cast mortars had endured 1,000 rounds. He said he was convinced that guns made in that manner were superior to the solid-cast guns.

Question. From whence did the English get this idea of casting hollow?

Answer. They may have obtained it from this country. The experiments of Captain Rodman have been published, and are, of course, known in Europe.

Question. That was since his invention?

Answer. Yes, sir; Colonel Wilmot told me the trials took place after the Crimean war. He did not say the hollow-cast mortars were made on precisely the Rodman principle. He did not give the details, but only said that one of each pair was cast solid, and the other cast hollow and cooled from the interior.

Question. Do you know anything about the efficiency of the Parrott gun?

Answer. I really know very little about it. I have had no opportunity whatever of seeing those guns, or of seeing them fired.

Question. Have any of the large 15-inch guns been rifled and tried in that way?

Answer. They have not been tried. One gun, of the exterior dimensions of

the 15-inch gun, with a bore of twelve inches, was made and rifled at the Fort Pitt foundry some two or three years ago. It was sent to Old Point, as I understood, for trial immediately after the breaking out of the war. I was ordered away from Old Point very soon afterwards, and do not know how often it was fired. I believe it has been fired a few times only. I have regretted that it, and also an 8-inch rifled gun, made on the Rodman principle, which was sent to Old Point for trial about the same time, were not fired to extremity to test their endurance and fitness for service immediately after they were sent to Old Point.

Question. We are directed by this resolution to ascertain about the price of those guns, the cheapness of them, and the amount of "royalty" paid by the government. Do you know anything about that?

Answer. I know nothing about the price; I have had no opportunities of knowing what price has been paid; I have never inquired. As to the "royalty," I have understood that a charge is made upon the patent. I have every reason to believe that it is so. There are parties who can give you that information.

Question. I suppose that, perhaps, we have that information; but, as you are an ordnance officer, I thought I would ask you the question.

Answer. I will say that I wrote to General Ripley, the chief of ordnance, about two years ago, urging the importance and necessity of having our heavy ordnance made upon the Rodman principle; and, in a subsequent conversation, I told him that the advantages which would be derived from the change would more than compensate for any royalty or increase in price which might be consequent thereupon. I told him that the cost of those guns would not exceed that which was paid by the navy for the Dahlgren guns, and that I felt assured that we should get better guns. General Ripley told me that he would have the large guns made upon the Rodman plan, and I shortly afterwards heard that orders had been given to that effect by the department.

Question. I would inquire whether all men acquainted with the properties and manufacture of iron agree as to the principle on which these guns are claimed to be the strongest?

Answer. I do not know that all such persons do agree upon it. I believe it would be difficult to propose any question unless it be one of pure mathematics, upon which different views and opinions would not be entertained, and it is not unlikely that some persons acquainted with working cast-iron, and with many of its properties, do not agree as to the principle. I believe, however, that most persons acquainted with iron and its properties are convinced of the correctness of the principle. I have conversed with many scientific gentlemen in and out of the army who are. I believe all the experiments which have been made tend to establish the correctness of the theory upon which the plan is founded.

Question. From all your acquaintance, as an ordnance officer, with our guns, are you of the opinion that, as a general thing, we are improving over the old method? Is what we are doing now an improvement on the old-established way of doing things?

Answer. A very decided improvement, in my opinion. I think our guns now are really worth much more than any guns we had fifteen, or ten, or even five years ago.

Question. Is there any further information which you deem important which you can give us on this subject?

Answer. I believe none of the hollow cast guns have burst in service during the war. Many of the 13-inch mortars, and some of the other guns have been fired a great many times. I have already stated that many 13-inch English mortars burst during the Crimean war.

Question. Are those 13-inch mortars the largest calibre used by the English?

Answer. One monster mortar has been made, but it has never been used; it

has been fired a few times with very light charges. The 13-inch mortars are the largest service mortars they have.

Question. And they are the largest mortars we have?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And ours, so far, have all stood the test?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think if any one had burst I should have heard of it.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. In your opinion, has the matter of banding guns, in the mode adopted by Captain Parrott, been fully tested, so that it is demonstrated that a gun with a band is stronger than would be a gun all of cast-iron of the same exterior maximum diameter?

Answer. I do not think it has been; some trials have been made with a view to that end, and I believe the banded guns have shown the greater endurance; but all the conditions were not precisely alike, and, in my opinion, the variations were sufficient to account for the difference in endurance. Pairs of guns made several years ago, at the same foundry and about the same time, were selected for these trials, and were fired with the same charges. The banded guns had copper vent-pieces, which were very little worn by the firing. The vents of the unbanded guns were drilled in the cast-iron and were greatly and rapidly enlarged by the firing. I think, in some instances, the gases acted as a wedge in the enlarged vent and the fissures about it, and assisted largely in bursting the gun. In the guns which burst through the vent, I have but little doubt that their endurance would have been increased if they had had copper vent-pieces. I think a series of experiments might be made at a moderate cost, which would demonstrate conclusively whether any benefit is derived from banding guns; and if there is, whether it is commensurate with the increased cost of the gun. To do this, I would have several pairs of large guns cast, each pair being cast from the same pool of melted iron, the only difference between the guns of each pair being, that one gun should be banded and the other should have an increased thickness of metal to compensate for the band. I would have these pairs fired at the same time, with the same charges, and with all the other conditions as nearly alike as possible. I believe the information to be derived from such a series of experiments, properly conducted, would fully justify the expense of making them.

By Mr. Harding :

Question. The copper vent in the banded guns, after the unbanded guns had been burst, was not cut away at all?

Answer. Very little; scarcely enough to be observed. Pure copper resists well the action of the gases, while cast-iron, especially in rifled guns, is worn away very rapidly.

The foregoing is the corrected testimony given by me before the committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, on the 6th of February, 1864.

A. B. DYER, *Major of Ordnance.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *April 30, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith the reply of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren to certain inquiries of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made under date of the 3d of February last.

Very respectfully, &c.,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy*

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, U. S. Senate.*

U. S. FLAG STEAMER HARVEST MOON,  
*April 15, 1864.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of your honorable committee, enclosing a resolution of the Senate, in relation to the rifled and smooth ordnance used in the United States navy and army.

It would be a very agreeable duty to me to meet the requirements of the committee as completely as the importance of the subject deserves; but to do so would be equivalent to writing a history of the progress and condition of ordnance for many years past, the most prolific in radical changes that have occurred since artillery became of any importance, making no doubt a considerable volume.

This, I am sure, the committee do not desire, and will, therefore, limit my reply to a brief notice of the principal points involved.

1st. I am unable to say positively what kinds and calibres of rifled ordnance are used by the army or are assigned to our fortifications, having no official connexion with that department of ordnance.

2d. I am not aware that any proportion of rifled ordnance has yet been established for the armament of vessels here or abroad; nor is there likely to be, until some kind of rifled ordnance has been devised which will more fully accomplish their purpose than any now in existence.

3d. No heavy rifled cannon has been made which meets, even in a moderate degree, the requirements for arming ships-of-war. This I can affirm of my own knowledge, so far as the United States are concerned; and I insert here some extracts from statements very recently made by British authorities, which will show to the committee that the great naval power of Europe is quite as much at fault as we are, after having spent immense sums during the last few years in order to obtain suitable rifle cannon of sufficient calibre.

The first extract is from the speech of the Marquis of Hartington, under-secretary of war, explaining to the English Commons the war estimates for 1864.

[House of Commons, March 2 to Friday, March 4, 1864.]

ARMY ESTIMATES.

The Marquis of Hartington said that before he asked the committee to agree to the resolution with which he should conclude, it was fair that he should state that he should that evening have to lay upon the table a supplementary estimate for the year 1863-'64, which in a few days he should ask the house to vote. \* \* \* \* \*

He had stated that their stores in respect to small-arms were everything that they could desire. When they came to the article of artillery he was not able to give the house so consolatory an assurance. The report of the ordnance select committee which sat last year showed very accurately how the ordnance question stood at that time. As the result of their expenditure on Sir W. Armstrong's guns, they had the whole of their field batteries armed with the Armstrong gun. Those guns, he might safely say, were now almost universally approved and liked by the troops who possessed them. In New Zealand they were being supplied, and certainly they heard no complaints; the guns, as far as they knew, giving satisfaction. It was quite true that at one time in 1863 there was some doubt, some dislike felt, in regard to them among the artillery, on account of some failure, or rather symptoms of failure, in those guns; but it turned out that this applied only to some of the very earliest that had been produced, when the manufacture had not reached the perfection subsequently attained; and not even among those guns, he believed, was there ever any accident involving loss of life or personal disablement. Further experience had convinced the artillery, he believed, that they were in possession of an arm which could be trusted to for rough, actual service, and which, when they had learnt, as they were now learning, to use it, was one of the most extraordinary accuracy and power. Besides the guns belonging to the field batteries, they had a large number in store, with a considerable number in depot at Woolwich, ready to be sent out at any moment if required. Besides the 12-pounders in possession of the troops and in store, they had a large number of 20 and 40-pounders, and of those guns, and especially of the 40-pounders, it was, he thought, impossible to speak too highly. He believed that the troops, wherever they had



them said they were a most excellent gun, and very far superior to those they had sup-  
planted. For new works, such as those of the land defences at Portsmouth, and also to  
accompany an army in the field, or to be used as guns of position, they were very valuable.  
Coming next to the 110-pounders, it was perfectly true they were not so popular or so  
greatly approved as the guns he had previously enumerated. The report of the ordnance  
committee had informed honorable members of what was supposed to be the overwhelming  
political necessities of the time which required those guns to be adopted and manufactured  
in large quantities without any very mature consideration or very extended system of ex-  
periment. It was believed that foreign nations had obtained rifle guns of great power,  
and that it was necessary, above all things, that we should have powerful rifle guns to  
compete with them. Therefore, the only gun of that kind which we knew of was adopted,  
perhaps with too much haste. But, although there were many objections to those guns,  
he believed that those objections were being gradually overcome. The question of the  
vent-pieces—one of the most difficult questions of all—was being gradually settled. The  
improvements in the manufacture of steel had enabled the gun factory at Elswick to pro-  
duce a vent-piece of superior durability. Although the 110-pounder, as far as they had  
yet tried it with cast-iron shot, was not of any material use against armor-plated vessels,  
still there were a great many positions in which it would be a most useful weapon. He  
thought that almost all the naval witnesses examined before the select committee, although  
they deprecated the use of the 110-pounder of Sir W. Armstrong as a broadside gun, yet  
stated that he would like to have some gun of that description in his ship for purposes of  
distant bombardment. For many works of land fortification also these guns would be ex-  
tremely valuable. There were many positions requiring defence where it was not necessary  
to have a gun that was capable of piercing an iron-clad ship; and, therefore, although  
those guns would not do all that they could wish, yet their defects were being overcome.  
As to the gun which they were going to make, it was true they had not yet in the service  
a gun capable of doing effective work against armor-plated ships; but the experience they  
had had in regard to the 110-pounder ought to caution them against going too fast in that  
matter. There certainly was no immediate pressure to make them adopt a new gun for  
that purpose without the fullest consideration. If they had not got a gun capable of  
making effectual practice on iron-plated ships, they had reason to believe—nay, they felt  
perfectly certain—from all the information they could obtain, that no other nation had in  
its service such an arm. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, there was no overwhelming necessity  
for hurrying on in that direction. But if affairs should look more threatening than they  
did—if there should be any immediate occasion for iron-clads being called into action, it  
might be consolatory for the house to know that, as the result of their experiments, they  
had a system of construction which would give them a strong heavy gun and a mode of  
rifling which, although it might not be the best that might hereafter be discovered, would  
yet enable them to make guns fulfilling all the conditions they required in a rifle gun, and  
strong enough to pierce any target yet manufactured. They knew now that the principle  
of making a muzzle-loading gun, the barrel of which was composed of cast-steel, strength-  
ened by wrought-iron coils, was capable of producing a strong gun, and that the inventions  
of Sir W. Armstrong combined almost perfectly all the requisites of a system of rifling  
(Hear, hear.) However, as scientific and military men were very much divided into the  
followers of Sir W. Armstrong and Mr. Whitworth, it was considered desirable, as he stated  
to the house the other evening, that, before proceeding any further with the great question  
of artillery construction, the merits of these two great artillerymen should be tested by an  
impartial committee specially chosen for that purpose, and at the same time the ordnance  
committee were engaged in a series of experiments as to the other best known systems of  
rifling and construction. He had explained the reasons why so long a delay had occurred be-  
fore the announcement of these experiments. They were now fixed for the 1st of April. They  
would have to be most carefully conducted, and would probably extend over a considera-  
ble period of time. It would be some months, perhaps near the conclusion of the year,  
before the Armstrong and Whitworth select committee concluded their investigations with  
reference to the competing guns; but in order that we should not lose more time than  
was necessary, orders had been given to the royal gun factory that a considerable quantity  
of material should be prepared for the system on which the committee should decide. The  
committee, no doubt, were aware of the performances of the 600-pounder or 13-inch gun,  
as it would now be called, and which had been extremely satisfactory in a limited number  
of experiments. Further experiments would take place in a few days; but, although the  
results were very satisfactory, it would be quite premature to enter largely into the manu-  
facture of so expensive an arm until the fullest tests had been applied to its capability of  
endurance. If it should continue to exhibit all the excellences it was supposed to possess,  
two, three, or four more experimental 600-pounders would be ordered, that the govern-  
ment might feel quite certain that its excellences were not confined to one gun, but that  
they could be produced on a considerable scale and degree of perfection. If that gun.

could be reproduced and answered all the expectations raised by the trials hitherto made, then, he thought, we might feel certain we could produce a gun capable of fairly blowing any ship ever created out of the water. (Hear, hear.) The gun tried at Shoeburyness had almost destroyed the Warrior target. It was quite certain that with steel projectiles there was no ship floating on the water that could resist at 1,000 yards the shot fired by that 13-inch gun. He believed that in future warfare conducted against iron-plated ships the quality of projectiles would exercise quite as important, if not more important, influence than the gun itself. It had been found by experience that no gun, however powerful, could produce much effect on iron plates with only cast-iron shots. However heavy the blow struck, the shot itself was shattered to pieces without much injury to the plates. There was no manufacture in the country which had progressed with such rapid strides of late years as that of cast-steel. He believed improvements of the very greatest importance had been made within the last twelve, and even within the last six months. The ordnance select committee had been associated with the iron plate committee for the purpose of instituting and carrying out experiments with different kinds of steel formed into different projectiles and fired from different kinds of guns. They found that with steel projectiles fired from guns of very much inferior power to the 13-inch gun, such as the Duke of Somerset's gun, the smooth-bore 100-pounder, very satisfactory results had been obtained on iron-plated ships. He had stated at the commencement that he could not give a perfectly satisfactory account of our position as regarded guns; but he had endeavored to show that, if we were not in possession of a more perfect gun—more perfect as against iron plates—the fault was not that of the government, or the advisers of the government. They had prosecuted with the utmost diligence a series of experiments, and they were still going on with them. The fault—if fault there was—was to the manufacture of iron plates and projectiles to be fired from guns. There must be a limit to the thickness of iron plates, and he thought they had proved that there was scarcely any limit to human science and improvement. (Hear, hear.)

[House of Commons, Thursday, March 10.]

#### ARMAMENT OF THE ROYAL NAVY.

Mr. Berkeley rose to call attention to the defective state of the armament of the royal navy. The welfare of the navy was naturally a matter of such deep interest in this country that he felt he need make no apology for bringing this subject under the notice of the house. He trusted he might assume that a British ship ought to leave her port built, manned, and armed in a proper manner. As regarded the construction of ships, they were for a long time disgraceful in that respect, the models being largely borrowed from foreign nations, and the best of them from France. Of late years the admiralty had, however, made great improvements, and we now possessed the finest navy belonging to any civilized power. For many years there were also good grounds of complaint as to the manning of the navy. Lord Dundonald once drew attention to the very bad state of things which prevailed, but it continued for some time afterwards. So disgraceful was it that one of the board of admiralty resigned his seat because he held that the board did not do its duty on this point. At present, however, no ship was sent out without being perfectly well manned with a crew worthy of the British navy. He now came to the third branch of the subject—the armament; and here he regretted that he could not give the same approbation as in the two other cases. We had fallen behind foreign countries, and particularly the Americans, in the armament of our ships. At the time when Lord Dundonald was complaining that our ships were manned with the sweepings of the jails and by dint of press-gangs, the armament was also in a very defective state. We then sent our frigates carrying 18-pounders to cope with powerful ships carrying 24-pounders, and it was owing to that great mistake that the Americans were able to take into port, with the British ensign lowered, our Macedonia, Guerriere, and other vessels. The admiralty unfortunately did not find out the blunder till too late. They despatched the *Endymion*, armed with 24-pounder guns, which fully vindicated the honor of our flag in the contest with the *President*. It could not be said that the latter was vanquished in fair fight, for the odds were against her, but she was cut in pieces by the guns of the *Endymion*. The next improvement was the equalization of the calibre of the guns throughout the navy, the 32-pounder being taken as the standard. For some time the Americans did not gain any great advantage over us, though they secured a very powerful gun called the columbiad. We then introduced the Paixhan shell-gun into our navy, which was also used by the French, who, however, in addition, had 36-pounders instead of 32-pounders, as we had. The Americans were determined to procure a more powerful armament, and they succeeded. A very clever naval officer, Admiral Dahlgren, invented a gun on the Paixhan plan of nine-inch calibre; and they equipped the whole of their ships with shell-guns of

one calibre. Although our frigates were more shapely to look at, the Americans contended that their ships, armed with the shell-guns, could pour forth a more formidable broadside. There could be little doubt of the prodigious effect produced by shells. At Sinope the Russians destroyed the Turkish fleet entirely by shells, and with one shell the Alabama sent the Hatteras to the bottom of the sea. We had now arrived at the epoch of iron ships. He did not wish to criticise the building of iron ships; he presumed we were at least on an equality with the other nations, and he was contented to believe that every board of admiralty would carry on the best system of construction. But he trusted we should not fall into the great mistake of supposing that if we could build iron ships, the Americans could not do the same. Their iron was superior to ours, and the Americans were an ingenious go-ahead people, who would never allow themselves to be beaten by us in any work of this sort. (Hear, hear.) At the battle of Solferino the Emperor of the French made a complete revolution in the armament of the world. He there produced a rifled gun which had a greater trajectory power than any that had ever appeared in a field of battle before. So great was the improvement supposed to be that all the nations of Europe set to work to arm their navies and armies with rifled guns. The French had already armed their navy with these weapons. What had we been doing on our side? We had spent £3,000,000; we had been six years hard at work, and now at last we were going back to the old gun which had been well termed the Brown Bess of the navy. The history of our operations was rather curious. It appeared that the Duke of Newcastle met somewhere an engineer named Armstrong who made a few guns. The honorable and gallant member for Huntingdon during his administration at the War Office laid hold of the same Armstrong, and it must be confessed that he got more out of him than any one else, for he set Armstrong upon doing that which Armstrong could do, and did not try him beyond his means. Under the superintendence of the honorable and gallant gentleman Armstrong produced 12-pounders which were excellent field-pieces, and he also turned out 40-pounders. It was for competent persons to decide whether the breech-loading principle was the one that ought to be preferred above all others, but it was not the general opinion throughout the artillery service that the breech-loading system was the best. However that might be, Armstrong made 100-pounders and 110-pounders for the navy, but it was a remarkable fact that all the guns he produced other than those ordered by the honorable and gallant member for Huntingdon were dead failures. As our seamen said, they fired at both ends; they blew away their breech-plugs, and destroyed the hair of our artillerymen with what was called a "mild escape of gas." (A laugh.) Captain Wainwright, when examined before the ordnance committee, declared they were the worst guns he ever saw in our navy, and his evidence was confirmed by the proceedings at Japan, where the guns were devious in their firing, and in some cases actually refused to go off. What was to be done? Were we to go to sleep in the happy belief that the Americans were in the same position as ourselves? He hoped we should do nothing of the kind. The Times always befriended Armstrong; but it was remarkable for its excellent correspondence, and it not unfrequently happened that its correspondents went very much in opposition to the gentlemen who wrote the leading articles. In one of his letters the Richmond correspondent of the Times had stated that Parrott guns in the north and Brooke guns in the south possessed penetrative powers against which no armor plates could avail, and had expressed his astonishment at the apathy of our War Office and admiralty, which did not send over competent persons to watch the progress of armament in America, and see it brought to proof in actual warfare. The same gentleman in a second letter had written as follows:

"Again I feel tempted to raise a warning voice about the disparity of the armament on board of the English and American navies. It is impossible for those who have been many months absent from England to be well informed as to the actual state of public opinion at the present moment upon this vital subject. But, judging from the officers of her Majesty's navy who have at rare intervals brought vessels of war into confederate ports, it appears still to be held that the 68-pounder, or 8-inch smooth-bore, is England's best weapon of offence against iron-clad vessels. The experience gained at Charleston enables me confidently to affirm that as well might you pelt one of the Yankee monitors or the Ironsides with peas as expect them to be in any way damaged by their 8-inch shot. Another disagreeable question forces itself upon an Englishman's attention, when he is cognizant of the terrific broadside thrown by the eight 11-inch guns of the Ironsides—one of the most formidable broadsides, in the opinion of the defenders of Charleston, which has ever been thrown by any vessel. Have we any ship in existence which could successfully resist such a broadside, and respond to it with anything like commensurate weight and vigor? I should be faithless to my duty if I did not mention that it is the universal opinion of all the English officers serving in the confederate army, with whom I have conversed, that England is behind America in the weight and power of the guns sent by both nations to sea."

The other day there sailed from Portsmouth one of our armor-clad ships, the Hector, of 34 guns, but now with 24, of which 20 were the old 68 pounders and 4 were Armstrong rifled 110-pounders. The facts were given by the Times's correspondent at Portsmouth, and the Times remarked that when it was considered that the guns on board the Hector only fired cast-iron projectiles it could be of little consequence, as against armor-clad ships, whether she carried 1 or 50 of such weapons. That ship was going to the Mediterranean, and would anchor alongside the Solferino and the Magenta, which were armed with 6½-inch guns, on the pattern of a certain gun that was tried in 1860 near Lorient, which carried 27 pounds of powder, and which, at 1,100 yards, sent its shot through and through a target representing the sides of La Gloire. Suppose a war to break out, and the Hector fell in with either the Solferino or the Magenta, what would become of her? But how were we in that state? Because in this age, when our ministers propounded the doctrine of throwing everything open to competition, they yet allowed a profound monopoly to exist in guns, shutting out all our most competent engineers. Everything must be done by Sir S. W. Armstrong, who when he made an expensive failure was not discharged, but was left to try again; whereas everybody who opposed him received the cold shoulder. Mr. Whitworth had never had a fair trial, though it was said he was now about to get one. Yet Mr. Whitworth had declared that he had no faith in the persons whom the War Office trusted in these matters. Again, there was the Mersey Iron Works Company, represented by the honorable member for Liverpool, and which had made the Horsfall gun—a weapon allowed by engineers to be of the finest malleable iron that ever came out of a workshop. Their gun had stood every test, and it was presented in the handsomest manner by the company to the government. Yet when it was done with it was thrown into the mud, and the company were never thanked for what they had done, nor employed to make other guns, because that would interfere with Sir William Armstrong. The Mersey Iron Works Company were now making excellent guns for foreign governments, and Captain Blakeley also was making guns for the Russians—offering, Englishmanlike, to back his weapon for a thousand guineas. Our government, he repeated, gave the cold shoulder to native talent, and that talent was now seeking a market elsewhere.

*Reply of Lord Paget, an Admiral of the Navy, Secretary of the Admiralty, and its organ in the House of Commons.—March 10, 1864.*

LORD C. PAGET. Vessels masted as she was have gone all over the world. What ground is there for the declamation against the admiralty—that there was a want of proper administration, and that if the admiralty had had a responsible head these things could not have happened? I will tell the house that the responsible officer who sent these vessels to sea was the Duke of Somerset, who is quite willing to take the responsibility for doing so. (Hear.) Now as to the Prince Consort there were reports that certain vessels in the Mersey would probably put to sea, and it was necessary that these ships should not be allowed to go. The Prince Consort was not unfitted. She was ready; and, moreover, the controller of the navy had expressed a wish that she should have a trial at sea under steam. The crew was put on board—for under our present arrangements we can put a crew on board in 24 hours—and she went to sea. It is true that the men, having been only so short a time on board, did not know all the various arrangements of the vessel with respect to stores, and hatches, and matters of that sort; and, unfortunately, the moment she left Devonport there came on a very heavy gale of wind, and when she rounded the Land's End she experienced one of the heaviest gales that have been known for a great number of years. She rolled; I need not tell you that our armor ships do roll; it is a peculiarity of our armor ships that they do roll. Had she been in a long sea—had she been on the Atlantic, probably she would not have shipped any water, because we know that a long sea is better than those short seas which prevail in the channel for a large vessel like the Prince Consort. Well, she got into the Race of Holyhead, where, as every one knows, the sea boils. She did take in water in the Race of Holyhead; the water was over her engine-room, and matters began to look serious. (Hear, hear.) She came up to the south stack, but the captain, finding that he could not bear into Holyhead with safety, hauled his wind and made for Dublin. It so happened that for some time the vessel lay to; and while she lay to she did not take in water; but when her head was forced against the sea she took in water over her bows and over her sides; in fact she shipped a great deal of water; and when they reached Dublin all on board were very glad (hear, hear,) and they got their pumps out and worked them. (Hear, hear.) It was found that the vessel had not leaked, but it was reported that there had been some straining. I will state what really was the case. We did not like to put scuppers high up on these armor ships, and the consequence was they were carried below, coming out under the armor plates in the Prince Consort; but the result proved to be, I believe, that there was no free escape for the water. Having found by experience that this plan of placing the scuppers

is not a secure one, we have made a change, with the view of avoiding a recurrence of what took place in this instance. (Hear.) When the Prince Consort came back, wishing to see her with my own eyes, I went and saw her in dock. Nautical men know that if a vessel is strained, you can tell that by the streaks which appear on the copper of her bottom; but there was nothing like an appearance of straining about this vessel. (Hear, hear.) I had better inform the house that I shall not be understating the matter when I say that the cost of repairing the accident to the Prince Consort will be under £1,000. It is quite true that while she has been in dock we have laid out a great deal of money on her; but that has nothing to do with the gale, but is for work done to prevent galvanic action from taking place between the copper bottom and the iron plates. I do not suppose my honorable friend means that we should condemn one of the finest vessels in the English fleet. We have proved the Royal Oak, which is her sister ship in every respect. The Royal Oak is out in the channel squadron, and the captain reports that she is a first-rate sea-boat. I think that is an answer to my honorable friend with regard to the misfortune which happened to the Prince Consort. (Hear, hear) With regard to the question of the honorable member for Bristol, I should have wished that my noble friend, the under-secretary of war, had an opportunity of answering the remarks of the honorable member, because we are not in charge of the manufacture of guns. All we do is to make requisitions on the War Office, and we grumble if we are not well served. (A laugh.) I do not disguise from the house that on several occasions we have been disposed to grumble at the armaments we have had to carry, but the honorable member seems to think that for some time past the Americans have had guns more efficient than ours, and carrying more effective projectiles. I must, however, inform him that for a great number of years we have had shells for every gun in our ships, our 32-pounders, our 68-pounders—in fact, for all our guns; and therefore we are not behind the Americans in that respect. (Hear.) I do not mean to deny that the Americans have attached more importance than we have to guns for shells only, but this raises a very important point of dispute between the Americans and ourselves, which I am not now going to discuss. The Americans attach great importance to what they call “smashing effects,” (a laugh, and “hear hear,”) but they do not estimate as we do that high rate of velocity which we strive to obtain in our guns. There is much to be said on both sides of this question, and I do not mean to enter on it; but ever since we obtained those shell guns we have attached much importance to guns of great range. Their guns have not the same range. The honorable member said that we had nothing but the old Brown Bess. He could not have attended to what I said in moving the navy estimates, or he would not have arrived at such a conclusion. I said on that occasion that the admiralty was not satisfied with the 110-pounder Armstrong; but while I said that, I did not say that we disapproved it. I frankly say that we do not like it; but I do not wish the honorable member to think that we condemn it entirely. (Hear.) This gun was used during the action at Kagosima. They had one on board the flag-ship, and the report of its performance was this—that the vent-pieces blew out, and that in one case the vent-piece did what was a great deal worse than blowing out—it jammed. The consequence was that the gun was *hors de combat* for some time—for about half an hour. But it stated that its precision and range were extraordinary, and likewise that the precision in the bursting of its shells was something marvellous. That was the report from the flag-ship. On board the other ships they did not give so good a report. They said that the gun did not show very great precision. In fact, they condemned the 110-pounder Armstrong. On reading these reports I am disposed to admit that there are great defects in this gun; but, at the same time, I think that it has considerable advantages in respect of its extent of range. Still, we have not been satisfied, and consequently the Duke of Somerset within the last two years communicated to the War Office—and he did so before the death of Lord Herbert—his earnest desire that there should be a good, wholesome, simple, smooth-bore gun for the navy. He said, “I shall be very glad to use Mr. Whitworth’s guns and Captain Blakeley’s guns if they succeed; but meantime, while all these difficulties exist, let us at least have for the navy something simple which will pierce these armor-plates.” Accordingly the War Office prepared drawings for a gun of this description. They were limited to 6½ tons, because we considered that that was the limit of the weight which sea-going ships should carry in their broadsides. The War Office said that for that weight they could give us a 9-inch gun, a smooth-bore, to carry a spherical shot weighing 100 pounds. With that gun we were satisfied, for the time, at all events. We have had very successful trials of it; that is to say, it has pierced 5½-inch plates; and accordingly we have made our requisition upon the War Office for a certain number of these guns for the armament of our ships. But we have not rested satisfied with this, and our very heavy ships, the Minotaur and the Bellerophon, will be armed, experimentally, with 300-pounders—that is to say with 12-ton guns, carrying spherical shot of 150 pounds weight. The honorable member would say that Mr. Parrott’s or Mr. Brooke’s guns were better than these. I am not prepared to say, upon the

whole, whether they are or are not in advance of ours. As regards America, I give my honest opinion to this house that we are not in a position to say which country has the best of it. With regard to the French, my honest belief is that we are more advanced than they are. That is the state of the case, and if you ask any intelligent French officer I believe he will tell you the same. I know the French navy have tried breech-loading guns on board the *Magenta* and *Solferino*, but I likewise know that their officers do not like them, and I do not think those guns successful. (Hear.) By the courtesy of the American government we have been able to send an intelligent officer of the navy over to that country. He is looking at their gun manufactures, and I hope we shall have full information as to what guns the Americans prefer and what progress they have made. I can assure the house, however, that in this matter of guns, notwithstanding what is said out of doors, it is very doubtful yet whether any country is much more advanced than we are. (Hear, hear.)

Sir F. Smith said that the honorable member (Mr. Berkeley) seemed to be under the impression that Mr. Whitworth had not had fair play. Now, having served for two years upon the ordnance committee, he could say that the whole case had been most closely investigated, both Mr. Whitworth and Sir W. Armstrong being examined; but the fact was, Mr. Whitworth never seemed to be ready with his guns for the trials that were thought necessary. Certainly the guns made by Sir William Armstrong had not answered as well as was expected. It was acknowledged before the committee by the first lord of the admiralty, and the commander-in-chief, that we had no gun of large calibre which was reliable. It was quite clear that the charge of the 110-pounder must be reduced if it was to be used as a breech-loader, and possibly it would have to be used as a shell gun, and not for shot. It would be a most unfortunate thing if one of these guns were to burst between decks in action; it would be difficult then to get the men to go on fighting with the other guns. He hoped the admiralty and the War Department would continue to give their attention to the improvement of this gun. (Hear, hear.) He had not the least doubt that if they would offer a suitable reward to any one who would make this 110-pounder a safe breech-loader, some mechanical genius would be found to do it. (Hear.)

*[Editorial of the London Times, from the Evening Mail.]*

If the question of the guns has yet to be solved, their story, at any rate, has been fairly and candidly told. On Thursday evening Lord Hartington explained the whole state of the case, and described without reserve or disguise the circumstances in which we are now placed. In a few words, we may say that our field ordnance is in as satisfactory a condition as could be expected during a period of endless invention and constant change; but that in ordnance for sea service we have made no progress commensurate with the actual exigencies of the time. We know, or at least we have persuaded ourselves, that armor-plating will be found ineffective against the artillery of the future; but, although we believe these guns to be producible, they have not yet been produced. Happily, however, we are in this respect no worse off than our neighbors, and there is, we hope, no reason to apprehend that our success will be long delayed.

Lord Hartington informed the house that all our field batteries were now completely armed with the Armstrong gun, and that these pieces "were now almost universally approved and liked by the troops who possessed them." He did not conceal the fact that this feeling had not always prevailed, but he stated unhesitatingly that experience and practice had brought our soldiers to a belief in the good and serviceable qualities of the gun. This being the case, it becomes satisfactory to hear that our supplies of this approved ordnance are abundant. Besides the guns actually in use, we have a large number in store, "and a considerable number in depot at Woolwich, ready to be sent out at any moment if required." Nor is this the whole of the story as regards the land service, for, in addition to the 12-pounders forming our field batteries, we have 20-pounders and 40-pounders also in large numbers, of which a very good report can be given. Of the 40-pounders, especially, Lord Hartington thought it was "impossible to speak too highly." We have good reason, therefore, to be satisfied with the state of things up to this point. Our field artillery is as well armed and provided as we could wish it to be, nor do we know of any foreign models superior to our own.

Here, however, terminates our success. For naval purposes we have no gun of which we can speak as we have spoken of the Armstrong field-piece, and it is simply in default of any satisfactory substitute that the old 68-pounder holds its place. The only fresh introductions have been the 40-pounder above mentioned, and the 110-pounder, also on the Armstrong pattern; but the former of these, though formidable in position on the field, is ineffective against the armor of an iron-clad, and the latter is also powerless for this special purpose. It is a good and useful gun for either kinds of service, but it will not send its shot through the strong plating of a modern frigate. Consequently, as regards naval ord-

nance we have made little or no progress in adapting our armaments to the tactics of the day. The only guns actually carried by our ships are guns which could certainly not be relied upon for piercing the sides of a good iron-clad on the European model.

Nevertheless, though Lord Hartington made this free confession, and though he at once admitted, in introducing the subject, that he could not say as much as he should wish to say for the actual state of things, he did mention two circumstances which render the result less unsatisfactory than it would otherwise have been. In the first place, he distinctly asserted, what we have repeatedly surmised, that such a gun as we were now in search of for sea service had not been produced in any other country. To appreciate the importance of this statement, we must remember that government has been diligently seeking information in other countries, and especially in America, respecting the progress made in artillery, and that the department which Lord Hartington represents must be presumed to be well acquainted with all that has been done abroad or at home. Now, his words leave no doubt about the intelligence received. "If," said he, "we have not got a gun capable of making effectual practice on iron-plated ships, we have reason to believe, nay we feel perfectly certain, from all the information we can obtain, that no other nation has in its service such an arm." This, therefore, decides the question of our relative position. We are not behind the world in this matter. Other countries are just as much at fault as we are. The desired gun has yet to be produced, and the next piece of consolation is that we are likely to produce it at least as soon as our rivals.

It is now stated, on the authority of the War Department, that our experiments have, at any rate, conducted us to a satisfactory "system of construction." In other words, though we have not yet got a gun with all the power we desire, we know how to set about getting it. We have arrived at certain principles of manufacture which will give us the result proposed. We have discovered the proper material and the proper method of manipulating it, and therefore we can proceed to make guns "fulfilling all the conditions we require in a rifled gun, and strong enough to pierce any target yet manufactured." This, however, is clearly more than half the battle. If nothing is now required beyond the application of principles already ascertained, the rest of the work ought to admit of easy expedition in a country like ours. It will probably, indeed, be asked why, if so much has been done, so much should still be left undone. Assuming that we know exactly what gun we want and how to make it, our arsenals ought to be very quickly supplied with the finished article. But it is plain that our authorities are fearful of committing themselves to another mistake. They made a mistake with the 110-pounders, having ordered them in large quantities, "without any very mature consideration or very extended system of experiment," and having then found themselves with an imperfect article on hand. So now they are timorous and circumspect, and though they believe that the 600-pounder 13-inch gun recently produced is really successful, they are afraid to give large orders for so costly an implement until they have felt their way a little further.

This hesitation is natural, but it may be carried too far. It must not be forgotten that at present we have really no effective gun for sea service; and though it may be perfectly prudent to extend our experiments before definitely adopting the pattern proposed, it will be equally prudent to lose no time in obtaining the assurance still desirable. Nor can we omit to observe that even the adoption of this formidable model will still leave us with much to do, for it is by no means certain that we possess ships which can carry cannon of such enormous weight. It is true that our naval architects express themselves confidently on this point, and undertake to find vessels for any guns which artillerymen can produce; but, at any rate, this work has to be done, and when the gun is forthcoming the ship will have to be built. This, however, is the real state of the gun question at present, and it is much as Lord Hartington described it—not a satisfactory state, and yet not one which need create alarm or provoke complaint. We find ourselves in a perpetual dilemma. If we act "energetically" in the "reconstruction" of our artillery, we expose ourselves to the chance of getting a huge store of expensive and unsatisfactory guns; if we hesitate to decide, and accumulate experiments upon experiments, we remain without any guns at all. There is a middle course, no doubt, in this as in most other cases, but it is very hard to hit. All we can say is, that under these difficulties we have been successful in creating a field artillery, and that in creating a marine artillery we have not been more unsuccessful than other people.

These present to the committee a fair view of the *progress and present condition of heavy rifled cannon in England*, after an enormous expenditure, (Mr. Berkeley says fifteen millions of dollars,) and must be accepted as authoritative, coming as they do from the highest official sources, and intended to satisfy Parliament of the necessity of adding to an outlay already sufficient, one would

think, to have decided, experimentally, the whole question of rifled ordnance from beginning to end.

The statement made concerning the rifled cannon of other countries is, of course, to be taken with qualification.

The committee will perceive that whatever may be assumed in favor of what we or other nations may have of heavy rifled cannon, nothing of the kind is yet in existence which is at all satisfactory or reliable. While, therefore, it is indispensable to place *some* on shipboard, the number will properly be limited to the *minimum*.

Efforts have not been wanting here to investigate this difficult subject, and to provide some kinds of rifled cannon for our navy.

The solution of the question is, at least, quite as advanced here as in other countries, which is precisely the consolation that the British authorities are compelled to be satisfied with, poor as it is, though we have not spent fifteen millions for what we do know.

It was my wish to have entered upon the investigation of this subject long before I was allowed to do so. And in 1856 I submitted a draught of a 10-inch rifle cannon to the Bureau of Ordnance, but it was not until the results with the Armstrong gun had attracted general attention that the necessary consent was given me, and then on a scale too contracted to be satisfactory.

In December, 1860, I sent to the Bureau of Ordnance a statement of results,\* from which it will be seen that though the time allowed me had been very brief, I had been able to reach a satisfactory conclusion in regard to light rifle artillery. The pieces of this class have been used exclusively in the navy ever since, and have stood the ordeal of the whole war. The iron cannon were the 50-pounder, 80-pounder, and 150-pounder. All of these were completed, as far as the interior construction was concerned, and had great accuracy, particularly the 150-pounder. But the 50-pounder alone had the necessary endurance, being the only class that I had been able to carry through the process of casting entirely under my own direction. How far I should have succeeded with the heavier guns I am unable to say, for the outbreak of the rebellion compelled my attention to other duties. The same exigency unavoidably precipitated us headlong into all the embarrassment of resorting to imperfect rifle ordnance for service afloat, and large numbers were ordered at once of such as could be had most conveniently, and to such an extent that I doubt if any naval service has half the number afloat.

The true causes that have interposed to delay the introduction of rifled cannon into ships-of-war, and do now prevent their greater and perhaps exclusive use, are comprised in the fact that there is no heavy rifled cannon now known which will fully and safely combine the indispensable conditions of service. The committee will, no doubt, be told differently, but I feel assured that my opinions in this respect are well based.

Fourth. The committee further expresses its wish to obtain from witnesses their opinion upon the subject of ordnance generally, so as to enable the committee and Congress to come to an intelligent conclusion in reference to the subject of heavy ordnance.

The very general remarks just made will afford a clue to the committee in arriving at conclusions as regards rifle cannon.

Of smooth-bore cannon there is no difficulty whatever in obtaining any kind or calibre that may be needed. The hindrance is in not knowing what work is to be done, and therefore what kinds of cannons are needed.

The smooth-bore cannon of the navy are the 9-inch and 11-inch guns, which, though designed chiefly for shells, are strong enough to bear shot with charges

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of 13 pounds and 30 pounds of powder, respectively. Besides these, I have designed three classes of guns to meet the possible solution of the iron-clad problem.

First. The 15-inch gun used in the turrets of the monitors, and cast on the method of Major Rodman.

Second. The 13-inch, of 34,000 pounds, which throws a shot of 280 pounds, with fifty pounds of powder, has not been in action yet, but one of them has been proved to 500 fires, which I look on as very satisfactory.

Third. A 130-pounder, throwing a shot with thirty pounds, and even forty pounds of powder, it has pierced six inches of iron at 200 yards.

These seem to embrace the elements of ordnance power in all the various combinations that are sought by theorists or experts.

In one the momentum is produced by *maximum weight* and *minimum velocity*; in another by *minimum weight* and *maximum velocity*; and the third is a *mean* to these extremes.

One or the other will certainly answer the purpose. The 15-inch has already exhibited serviceable qualities, requiring but a few minutes to decide the fate of the Atlanta, and doing good service, from the monitors under my command, on Wagner, Sumter, and Moultrie.

But shall these facts decide that the 13-inch would not have been as effective for the same purpose; and more so, perhaps, for other and different purposes? Or, that the 10-inch might not combine a more general efficiency?

In some cases, I am satisfied, from considerable experience, that monitors armed even with 11-inch guns would be more effective than with the 15-inch or 13-inch. Thus it is, in operating against open earthworks, when the chief object is to silence their cannon and drive the men from the guns, for which purpose rapidity of fire is most desirable.

During the whole of the naval operations against Wagner it was manifest that the eight guns in the broadside of the Ironsides told more powerfully than the same number of guns in the monitors; not because of any advantage in the style of vessel, but because the 11-inch gun could be fired faster than the 15-inch gun.

Among other conditions, upon which the committee have desired an opinion, are those of *range and accuracy*.

These are generally associated, but are by no means synonymous.

Accuracy is always necessary, and range only desirable when accurate. It may not only be possessed without accuracy, but beyond certain limits cannot be accurate. And to this I beg the attention of the committee, for it is a fact, that beyond certain distances it is not possible to hit the object fired at *sufficiently often* or, with *sufficient force* to produce any useful effect; which will explain the contradictory opinions which are so often heard.

You will be told, for instance, that one gun will throw its shot ten thousand yards, (six miles;) but it is not stated, at the same time, that the objects which are likely to be subjected to the fire of artillery are imperceptible over the sights of a cannon, when so distant, and that at six miles it would hardly be possible to hit a ship or a fort once in a hundred fires—both being fixed objects; but if the ship is moving, the chances of her hitting or being hit are decreased enormously; and if two ships are in movement and firing at each other, to hit may be considered impossible.

The chances of striking, and of striking effectively, increase as the distances decrease; and the question naturally arises, What is the distance at which artillery fire does become efficient?

Nelson, and Perry, and Hull, with their solid shot of twenty-four and thirty-two pounds, would have told you one hundred or three hundred yards; with 9-inch and 11-inch shell guns, this might be extended to 1,000 and 1,300 yards; and so far as wooden ships, in motion, only are concerned, it may be question-

able whether rifled cannon would be more destructive at the latter distance than smooth-bores of like calibre.

If the objects were at rest, afloat, or ashore, the power of inflicting certain damage, total or partial, might be extended to 2,000 yards, and, with some few exceptions, I should be inclined, from present experience, to limit artillery fire to this distance.

But whatever may be the limit of effective fire, I would not sacrifice an iota of power *within* that limit, merely to *extend the range* to any point *beyond* it.

It is of no consequence, therefore, whether a gun can throw four miles, or five miles, or six miles; the question is, *what accuracy and power* has it at the distance where any gun is effective—that is, will inflict certain damage within reasonable time.

Until the latter is ascertained, the other is not worth notice. It is the vision of an enthusiast, or the sophistry of an interested party.

Again, the effective distance for naval artillery is modified by the introduction of iron-clad ships; and here arises a serious complication; it is in fact the vexed question of the day.

Two hundred yards are generally used in the English experiments, but I presume the great inventors would not be willing to admit their cannon to be inoperative beyond this limited scope.

Of course, if a gun is good for anything in such service, it should penetrate at two hundred yards. But what shall it penetrate?—four inches or five inches, or six inches, of iron on broadside ships, or ten inches and fifteen inches of iron turret, like the monitors?

Millions of dollars have been spent to decide this; and only the other day, after a multitude of costly experiments in England, it resulted, from some trial, that previous decisions in favor of more iron and less wood were erroneous, and a reversal of judgment became indispensable.

The artillerist, therefore, must wait on the ship-builder in order to settle many primary conditions for his gun.

The constructor was first driven to iron armor because of the introduction of shells; in turn, he compels the ordnance officer to revert to solid shot, and even holds the final decision in abeyance, as to the kind of shot, until he determines on the armor which is most advisable.

Without discussing this, but merely assuming that the distance usually practiced at *may* be the effective distance, (not the possible, but the certain distance,) please to note its unavoidable influence. At 800 or 1,000 yards, or 1,500 and 2,000 yards, it was indispensable to have *accuracy* as well as *power*; but at 200 yards we need *power* alone. One cannot fail to hit, for the development of power sufficient to pierce iron at 200 yards will always confer sufficient accuracy for that distance; in fact, there is little or no divergence then with any respectable cannon. If the determination of the problem should so result finally, the committee will perceive that it will operate directly upon the use of very heavy rifle cannon in armored ships; for if the accuracy of smooth-bored cannon is sufficient for effect upon iron-clads at the limited distances, where penetration is certain, then rifle cannon will no longer be indispensable on account of their *accuracy*, but the choice between them and smooth guns must be determined entirely by the *power* which either can exercise with the greatest degree of effect, safety, and convenience.

The committee will find, accordingly, that the experimental practice in England is influenced by these considerations, admitting them *in fact* if not in terms; for on such occasions smooth-bored cannon are brought forward as often as rifled, and it is now announced that heavy smooth-bore 9-inch guns will be adopted for the armament of the last great armored British ship, (Achilles,) thus adopting the United States peculiar calibre for a gun of greater weight.

If this is done, then will that British broadside be clearly inferior to our

own, in case the 10-inch of 16,000 pounds, already referred to, is chosen by our own authorities.

The committee will perceive, from what I have stated, that nothing is certain in ordnance, except that all previous conclusions and systems are likely to be abandoned; but what shall replace them no man can say.

As the best artillerists have been unable to arrive at any conclusions, it is not surprising that men of eminent abilities in other pursuits should step in to settle the difficulty; but the results of Armstrong and Whitworth give no promise that skilful engineers and mechanics are likely to succeed better than artillerists.

The *durability* of cannon will depend entirely on the style of ordnance that it will become necessary to adopt; if rifled cannon of large calibre, then must the question be answered by better results than have yet been attained.

We have nothing now to warrant the belief that such can be obtained with uniform endurance by means of any process of fabrication yet tried; neither cast-iron, nor cast-iron banded with wrought-iron, (like the Blakeley,) nor wrought-iron solid or built up, (like the Armstrong and Whitworth,) have furnished series of large rifle cannon, capable of uniform and sufficient strength.

The English admit that the skill of Armstrong has not carried them beyond the 40-pounder; Whitworth has not been able to obtain the confidence of the government sufficiently to introduce his gun at all; I can myself bear witness to the inefficiency of three of his 70-pounders—one tried at the experimental battery here, and two placed in the naval battery on Morris island to play on Sumter—all becoming dangerous after *very* limited firing.

On the other hand, if smooth-bore guns are to be used, there will be no difficulty in making them of proper strength.

Only one positive recommendation would I make upon this subject, which is, that none but absolutely cold-blast iron shall be used in the manufacture of iron cannon, and that all iron smelted with a blast, warmed in the least degree, shall be prohibited in the most explicit terms.

Excellent cannon have been made of some kinds of warm-blast iron used by some founders; but, on the other hand, there is such a latitude of carelessness or design in the use of warm blast, that a wider door is opened for abuse, so that it is in all respects most advisable to adhere to *absolutely* cold-blast iron; it has been the rule for many years, but never closely followed, and the sooner we return to it the better it will be for the interests of ordnance.

*I would also recommend, as the only aid which legislation can give in the matter, that the Navy Department be authorized to purchase the right of use or the possession of iron mines of suitable quality, and to have the ores smelted by its own ordnance workmen; this will be a move in the right direction, and will, I feel certain, insure the best material for fabricating cannon. It would also facilitate the general investigation of this subject.*

The committee desire to be informed in regard to the payment of a royalty for the use of invention. For myself, I can say I have never received anything of the kind, though the arm was, for a long period, of my invention, and still is, so far as smooth-bores are concerned, and are entirely so as regards the smooth and rifled light artillery of the navy, (12-pounder and 20-pounder.)

The above paper has been drawn under circumstances of great affliction, which will, I am sure, plead strongly for its imperfection.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
JNO. A. DAHLGREN,

*Rear-Admiral, Com'dg South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War, U. S. Senate.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 3, 1864.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, stating that the Committee on the Conduct of the War, having under consideration the use of heavy ordnance in our fortifications and navy, request to be furnished with any information on the files of this department touching the subject.

In compliance with the request of the committee, I transmit herewith a memorandum embracing data taken from the records of, and furnished by, the Bureau of Ordnance, respecting the origin of the 15-inch guns.

Very respectfully, &c., &c.,

GIDEON WELLES,  
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War.

*Memorandum from the Navy Department.*

In reference to the question as to the origin of the 15-inch guns, the following data are taken from the records of the Bureau of Ordnance:

(1.) March 17, 1862, the department informs the bureau that it "requires for the class of vessels like the 'Monitor' at least 20 15-inch guns, and for another class at least 10 of 20 inches diameter;" and directs that "immediate measures to produce these guns in the least possible time" be taken. It also required the bureau to "recommend to the department whether or not a gun of less than the usual length should be used."

(2.) Under date of March 19, 1862, the bureau received a communication from Admiral Dahlgren, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the letter from the department to the bureau in regard to the fabrication of 15-inch and 20-inch guns for iron-clad vessels, in which he says:

\* \* \* \* \*

"A subject so important cannot be perfected without much reflection and extensive experiment. But we lack almost the preliminary information indispensable to commence with."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Wherefore, to meet the requirements of the Navy Department, the fabrication of these guns should be conducted with great care, and extreme proof must also be resorted to in several cases, in order to determine the course of proceeding needed to insure a proper endurance.

\* \* \* \* \*

"I confess myself, however, averse to this hasty mode of proceeding.

"Using all despatch, it would be impossible to fabricate the first 15-inch gun in less than seventy or eighty days, whilst the present urgent necessity must pass away in the third of that time, and cannot arise again for a considerably larger period—having reference, of course, to foreign nations."

"The plan I should prefer would be: 1st. To place 11-inch guns in all the turrets until the heavier ordnance were fully prepared. 2d. Construct proper targets to ascertain what size and kind of projectile is needed to pierce, injure, or destroy plates of the thickness in use or likely to be used. 3d. Fabricate guns of the size thus indicated, *whatever be the calibre*, using the form and process needed to give uniform and proper endurance."

(3.) March 20, 1862, the bureau acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and directed him [Admiral Dahlgren] to prepare targets to be fired at.

(4.) March 26, 1862, Admiral Dahlgren forwards to the bureau a sketch of the 15-inch gun, made to conform to the length required by Captain Ericsson.

(5.) April 4, 1862, the bureau informed Admiral Dahlgren that this sketch had been forwarded to Captain Ericsson, and that an agreement had been entered into with the Fort Pitt foundry to make 50 15-inch guns, the preparations for which were being urged forward for casting as soon as practicable, and requesting him to forward drawings for the casting.

(6.) April 4, 1862, Admiral Dahlgren forwards another sketch, "adapted as near as possible to the dimensions required by Captain Ericsson."

(7.) Under date of April 7, 1862, he writes to the bureau on the subject, as follows:

"In compliance with the directions contained in a communication from the Navy Department to the bureau, of March 17, 1862, and of the bureau to me, dated April 4, 1862, I transmit herewith the draught of a 15-inch gun, the dimensions of which have been restricted, as far as possible, to the requirements of the turrets in which they are to be placed

\* \* \* \* \*

"It is proper for me to remind the bureau that this can only be considered as an experiment on a large scale, unsupported by any of the data usually considered important to the introduction of new ordnance, and for a piece of this size indispensable.

"Circumstances, however, seem to impose the necessity of proceeding without full experiment, and I feel it my duty to meet the views of the Navy Department to the best of my ability.

"I shall, therefore, in the first place, adhere as closely as possible to the method practiced in manufacturing the only 15-inch gun yet made, and request that, in making the gun which I now transmit, the founder shall use the same kind of iron as was used for the present 15-inch, the same grades of that iron, the same process of casting, and shall produce the same tensile strength, density, and other characteristics."

(8.) April 9, 1862, in reply to a letter from the bureau, the admiral states that "it was not my (his) intention to have all of the 15-inch guns cast in the same way, but only those which would be needed before any experiments could be instituted."

(9.) May 13, 1862, he transmits draught of 20-inch gun, "as desired by the Navy Department," and speaks of it as an untried experiment.

(10.) May 13, 1862. The bureau addressed the Navy Department on the subject of these guns; and Commodore Harwood reminds the department that on the 20th March, 1862, he "submitted to it a detailed opinion of Commander Dahlgren on the subject of the fabrication of guns of increased calibre;" and, after expressing his own views, concludes by saying: "The department is aware that there is more difficulty in making safe large cast-iron guns than small ones, and that especially in close iron-clad turrets the consequences of explosion would be disastrous in the extreme, and the demoralizing effect upon the service at large worse than the disaster itself. I hope the immunity from accidents by explosion of naval guns during the rebellion will be my excuse for requesting the department to adhere to the proposition referred to it on the 20th March."

(11.) May 13, 1862. In a letter to Admiral Dahlgren, Commodore Harwood says: "I had already explained, personally and by letter, the difficulties attending such an unusual and large increase of calibre, and, as I understand the Secretary of the Navy has been furnished with a copy of your letter of the 13th to the bureau, the question may be considered as fairly before him."

The 15-inch guns were cast, and, as designed by the department, were placed in the turrets of the "monitors," but so little reliance upon their endurance was felt by the admiral, that while chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, under date of January 5, 1863, he issued to the navy the following circular:

Memorandum No. 6.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, January 5, 1863.

The bureau deems it indispensable to draw the attention of officers concerned to the use which may be made of the 15-inch guns.

It is the first time that cannon so large have been brought into the service of any navy, and the extent to which they may be safely fired is by no means finally ascertained. One of them has endured two hundred and sixty rounds, chiefly with shell, and exhibits no sign of weakness.

The consequences of rupturing such a piece in an iron-clad turret would be immediately fatal to every one near, and very probably to the vessel itself.

In order, therefore, to economize the use to which these ordnance should be put, and to husband their assured powers for present special purposes, care must be taken:

First. Only to fire solid shot from the 15-inch gun, when iron-cladding or other equally resisting objects are under fire.

Second. In action, on other occasions, to use the lowest charges that will serve, and with all the deliberation required to strike with accuracy.

Third. Not to fire out of action, unless when required occasionally to verify the working of the machinery.

Fourth. To use the 11-inch gun whenever it will perform the work efficiently.

Fifth. To examine the interior of the vent, and of the gun about the charge; the more frequently also as the use of the gun progresses, or if many shot be used.

Thirty-five pounds of good cannon powder, grain of ordinary size, and the initial velocity 1,400 to 1,500 feet, is the highest charge that is to be used with the shell.

If there had been time to make sure of the full endurance of this class of guns, it would have been ascertained by firing to the extreme; but the pressing and instant necessity for their employment left no alternative. All has been done that was possible to make them serviceable, and now it only remains to use them with the utmost prudence.

JNO. A. DAHLGREN,  
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.

Finally, as articles frequently appeared in the newspapers condemning the 15-inch guns, and censuring the Bureau of Ordnance for introducing them into service, Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, published the following letter in the *New York Times* :

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Thursday, May 28, 1862.*

"To the Editor of the *New York Times* :

"Several days since an article appeared in your paper (and similar articles have appeared in other papers) censuring the Naval Ordnance Bureau for introducing the 15 inch calibre into the navy. I cannot say what influenced the Secretary of the Navy to adopt this heavy calibre, but I know that the distinguished chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, did not advise it. Whatever responsibility attaches to those who strenuously urged it belongs to me, and not to the admiral.

"Very respectfully,

"G. V. FOX, *Assistant Secretary.*"

It was not very long, however, before the judgment of the advocates of the 15-inch gun was signally vindicated in actual battle by the capture of the *Atlanta*, (iron-clad.) And the department's appreciation of the victory thus gained through the agency of the new gun was expressed in its official letter of thanks to Commodore Rodgers, under date of June 25, 1863, and in which occurs also the following passage :

"For inland operations the monitor turret was immediately adopted, and the 15-inch gun of Rodman, being the only gun of greater weight than the 11-inch yet tested, was ordered to be placed in the turrets of the vessels that were constructing."

This letter was published in all the newspapers of the day.

Under date of June 29, 1863, Admiral Dahlgren addressed the following letter to the department :

"NEW YORK, *June 29, 1863.*

"SIR: In the well-deserved complimentary letter of the department to Captain Rodgers I note the following expression :

"For inland operations the monitor turret was immediately adopted, and the 15-inch gun of Rodman, &c., was ordered to be placed in the turrets of the vessels that were constructing."

"I beg leave to state that the 15-inch gun carried by the *Weehawken* in her late contest with the *Atlanta*, as well as all the guns of the same class in the new monitors, was designed by my direction and under my own eye. It conforms to the same principles of form and general construction as were followed in the 9-inch and 11-inch guns of the navy, modified so far only as was necessary to adapt them to the diameter of the turret,

"When the gun was manufactured, the cooling process invented by Captain Rodman was used by the founder.

"A copy of the letter sent by me to the Bureau of Ordnance with the draught of the gun is herewith enclosed.

"I have the honor to be, &c ,

"JOHN A. DAHLGREN, *Rear-Admiral.*

"HON. GIDEON WELLES,

"*Secretary of the Navy.*"

To this letter the Navy Department replied, on the 9th July, as follows :

"SIR: I have your letter of the 29th ultimo, relative to the 15-inch guns in the turret of the *Weehawken*, and other iron-clads, alluded to in the letter to Captain Rodgers, and therein styled the 'gun of Rodman.'

"I had supposed you were unwilling to take the paternity of the 15-inch gun, from all the conversations we have had, and there was consequently some embarrassment in defining the piece, and relieving you of responsibility. It was a part of the original plan of Mr. Ericsson, as you are aware, to have guns of a large calibre in the turrets; but your opinion was against it, and you were unwilling to take the responsibility of recommending the 15-inch gun. But others, and particularly the Assistant Secretary, adopting Mr. Ericsson's suggestions, earnestly advocated it, and it was decided that the experiment should be made.

"Under this decision the Ordnance Bureau took the necessary measures to have them built, and you, as stated in your letter, designed the pattern, making it to conform to the diameter of the turret. I supposed you wished it distinctly understood that you were acting

under orders, and that this turret 15-inch gun was not a Dahlgren, and that you were in no way responsible for its success or failure.

"The form of gun is after your design, but you had made no guns of that calibre. Rodman had, and, as you observe, 'when the gun was manufactured, the cooling process invented by Captain Rodman was used by the founder.'

"Strictly, perhaps, it is neither a Dahlgren nor Rodman. As, however, you had never identified your name with a 15-inch gun, but had expressly disclaimed it, while Rodman had designed them, it seemed proper that allusion to him should be made, to relieve you quite as much as to identify him. The particular gun had its origin in Mr. Ericsson's invention, which made it a necessity, and was ordered by the department irrespective of inventors.

"There was no intention to do injustice to either, I assure you, in the allusion made to the gun in the letter to Captain Rodgers.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"GIDEON WELLES,  
"Secretary of the Navy."

As a substitute for the 15-inch guns, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren designed the 13-inch guns; and these were also to have the "teat chamber" adopted by him in the 15-inch and other guns.

Trial guns of this calibre, and cast *solid*, were made by the Fort Pitt foundry, and the Builders' Iron-works at Providence, Rhode Island, while at the same time similar trial guns were cast at the Reading foundry, but *hollow*, and on the Rodman plan. In proof, the trial gun at Fort Pitt, and the one at Providence, gave way after a few rounds. The *hollow* cast gun, however, made at Reading, did not give way at five hundred rounds.

Now, the demand at this time for guns for the monitors was most urgent. To wait for experimental results with the 13-inch guns was out of the question, while, at the same time, it was found necessary to reduce the opening of the ports in the turrets as much as possible, and to permit the muzzle of the gun to *protrude through them*, thus doing away with the troublesome smoke-box hitherto used, and which was indispensable with the shortened 15-inch gun originally designed.

During this dilemma it also became apparent, from repeated results with the "teat chamber," that it was not only most inconvenient in service, but it really hastened the rupture of the gun instead of preventing it.

It thus became necessary to act—and promptly, too.

Therefore the present chief of the Ordnance Bureau *ad interim* directed the first 15-inch cast for the navy, and which was then undergoing a series of experimental firing at the ordnance yards in this city, to be placed upon the lathe, the "teat chamber" reamed out, so as to leave a chamber nearly parabolic in form, and to reduce the diameter of the chase and muzzle to correspond with that of the model of the 13-inch gun.

The result was most satisfactory; the gun enduring heavy charges of 50, 60, and two of 70 pounds of ordinary cannon powder with shells and shot, the latter weighing 440 pounds, and did not give way until it had reached nearly 900 rounds.

This was decisive. The order was immediately given to rechamber and turn down in the same way all the original 15-inch guns, and to cast as soon as possible a lot of these guns on the new pattern.

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NEW YORK, April 20, 1864.

SIR: I enclose copy of the plan of a twenty-foot diameter turret with two 15-inch guns, which I forwarded to you on the 22d of March, 1862. With reference to these guns I have to state, that the calibre was determined by yourself, and that the outline and proportions were made to correspond as near as possible with the 11-inch Dahlgren gun.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. ERICSSON.

Hon. G. V. FOX,

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

*Testimony of Horatio Ames.*WASHINGTON, *January 13, 1865.*

Mr. HORATIO AMES sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your place of residence, and what is your occupation?

Answer. I live in Salisbury, Connecticut, and my business is that of a manufacturer of iron; lately a manufacturer of iron guns.

Question. Have you ever made any cannon or heavy ordnance for the government?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you describe the guns you have made for the government, and give all the particulars in relation to them, and what has been done with them?

Answer. In 1861 I had an order from the Navy Department for five wrought-iron cannon, (50-pounders,) as an experiment, the department assuring me that if I succeeded in producing a wrought-iron gun that would stand the test, I should have all I could make. In the spring of 1862 I delivered the first gun, which was fired under the direction of Admiral Dahlgren. It was fired 1,630 times and is but little injured. On this result he ordered me to send another gun here, which I did. Dahlgren had this gun bored out from a 50 to an 80-pounder; said gun was in all respects like the first one. This last gun was then fired, with 80-pounder charges, 438 times. He, Dahlgren, then took the five guns ordered, and another of the same class, and paid me for them, but declined giving me further orders on account of the price. Yet he had all the time told me he must have them at any price, if they were better; and at the same time offering me one dollar per pound for one gun of a different calibre, so that I should be worried out by the delays in proof and augmenting expense, in making but one gun at a time. I all the time insisted that were my guns a success, I should have sufficient quantity to keep my works employed. These two guns were examined by Captain Benton, of the ordnance department, in the spring of 1863, and pronounced good.

In September, 1863, I took an order from the President for fifteen guns, to be not less than 100-pounder calibre, with a tacit understanding that I should make the largest gun I could with my present works. I concluded to make a 7-inch calibre gun, which is called a 125-pounder. This gun was finished and ready to fire the 1st of September last, and we began to fire it on the 15th of September. We used the strongest cannon powder, (No. 7,) and Hotchkiss shot. It was fired with a few charges of 13 to 19 pounds of powder for about 30 times. It was then fired with 19 pounds of powder about 400 times. It was then increased to 25 pounds of powder, and fired with high elevation 200 times, and also a few charges of 30 pounds. It was fired 700 times by the board, consisting of Major General Gillmore, Commodore T. A. Hunt, and Major Laidley. They reported to the President, at the end of the test, "that it was the longest range gun known, the strongest gun, both lengthwise, and the most enduring gun known." It was the opinion of the board that any ten fires from a Parrott gun, charged as my gun was, and with the same elevation, would burst it. The committee also recommended that this gun should be bored out to an 8-inch gun, or a 200-pounder, and be subjected to a further test, with a view to burst or destroy it; and then that it be cut in half and examined, as to how the iron in the gun had been affected. The gun is now being bored out at my works, and will soon be ready for further proof.

These guns are made wholly of wrought-iron, being worked so that the iron is all made fibrous. It is then bent and welded into rings or hoops six inches wide and of proper thickness, which rings are turned and bored so that each ring is fitted perfectly into the other, to make a cross section of the gun of the



proper diameter for the gun when forged. The gun is then forged, (the breech port,) and these rings are heated in one furnace, and the but end of the gun in another. When both are at the proper heat they are brought together by the aid of cranes and tongs, and welded by a horizontal hammer or steam ram. At the same time an upright hammer hammers the iron so as to make the iron close and sound. The seeming great expense of the gun consists in the labor and waste of iron in working the iron over so much and the fitting of the rings.

I believe there is no gun ever made worth a fiftieth part as much as this gun. It will throw a 125-pound shot seven miles, which enables you to reach the enemy before he can reach you; and the gun will not burst by any charge of powder you choose to fire. Nor does its safety depend on such things as a shell bursting in the gun, or the ball not being rammed home.

Cast-iron will not stand for rifled guns; it is the cheapest but most unreliable metal known—granulous and brittle in all respects. A cannon is a hoop. Who ever thought of using a cast-iron hoop? The report of the board who tried my gun gives a true account of the test and worth of my gun better than I can describe it here.

Question. What was the price of the guns you delivered to the government?

Answer. I charged seventy-five cents per pound.

Question. At what price can you make those guns now?

Answer. Iron, labor, and everything have risen in price a great deal. The guns I made under the order from the President were eighty-five cents a pound. I can make such guns now at a dollar a pound.

By the chairman:

Question. Were those guns rifled?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How many large guns have you made in all?

Answer. I have made the fifteen for the President, and six for Admiral Dahlgren.

Question. How many of your guns have been tested?

Answer. All but four. Admiral Dahlgren tested two; one was fired 1,630 times, what was called "extreme proof," and they stopped firing it. He then ordered another one to be bored out from  $5\frac{1}{10}$  to 6 inches diameter, and he then fired that gun until he found he could not burst it and then stopped firing.

Question. What was the weight of the guns delivered to Admiral Dahlgren?

Answer. About 5,500 pounds.

Question. What is the weight of the guns which you made under the order of the President?

Answer. 19,500 pounds.

Question. Do you know the number of times the department have felt it safe to fire the heavy cast-iron guns?

Answer. They do not fire any such charges of powder as they fire in my guns, and at no such elevations.

Question. How does the charge of powder in the cast-iron gun compare with the charge in your gun?

Answer. We use as much again powder in proportion. The charge for the Parrott gun is one-tenth the weight of the shot; our charge is one-fifth. But the Parrott guns do not have much elevation, while ours have a great deal, which makes as much difference as the difference in the charge.

Question. Do you know where is the report of the commission of which you have already spoken?

Answer. It is with General Dyer, Chief of Ordnance.

Question. How long since was that report submitted to the ordnance department?

Answer. About the 10th or 12th of November.

Question. Have you had any interviews with the chief of the ordnance department in relation to the management of those guns since that time?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What has been the result of your interviews?

Answer. I asked him for more orders, as I had worked out all my orders. The reply was that they could not give me any orders until my new guns had been fired. They wanted to try them further.

Question. Were the guns ready?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why did they not go on with the experiments?

Answer. They said they had no star-gauge to measure the bore of the gun. They measure the bore of the gun by a star-gauge, to see whether there is any defect in it. The star-gauge came to my place last Saturday. But Commodore Hunt was ordered here, and is now here on a commission. He had before been detailed to fire the guns I have on hand. Some of my guns have been ready since the first of November. They are not to be fired now until the first of February, if they are to be fired then.

Question. With that star-gauge could they not have tested some of those guns as the other guns have been tested?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. They could have tested the range of those guns at any time, could they not?

Answer. They do not propose to fire those guns; they are satisfied that they will not burst. But it is a rule to fire each gun ten times.

Question. And then they examine them with the star-gauge?

Answer. Yes, sir; the difficulty seems to be to get anybody to do it.

Question. How fast could you deliver those guns, such as you made under your order from the President?

Answer. I could deliver one a week.

Question. How fast could you deliver the smaller guns, such as you made for Admiral Dahlgren?

Answer. Two or three a week.

Question. Could you deliver one of the large and two of the small guns each week?

Answer. No, sir. They all have to be made with one set of works at present.

Question. Do you know when the test of those guns that you have already made is to be completed?

Answer. Commodore Hunt tells me that as soon as he gets through with this commission he will be there and test them.

Question. Do you know how long he is to be detained on this commission?

Answer. I suppose about eight or ten days. The particular merit of my gun is the amount of powder that can be used in it with safety, and the execution they will do by being strong enough to withstand such a heavy charge of powder. Those guns made for Admiral Dahlgren proved to be as well manufactured—as to carrying the ball true—rather better than any other they ever had before. Those I have now are supposed to be the same. There is no trouble, I apprehend, on that score, if I can only get anybody to prove them.

Question. Did the ordnance officers of the War Department have any knowledge of the guns which you delivered to Admiral Dahlgren?

Answer. No more than I told them, and also from this: They sent down Captain Benton to measure them. Admiral Dahlgren said they had stretched in consequence of the firing; and Mr. Watson, the Assistant Secretary of War, sent Captain Benton down there with me, and we measured the guns and found that they were not stretched.

Question. Where are those guns now ?

Answer. Three of the guns made for Admiral Dahlgren are now at the navy yard, and I think three of them are in the service.

Question. Do you know what has been done with the three guns in the service ?

Answer. I do not ; I cannot find out.

Question. Have you tried to find out ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they say that one is on the Mississippi, and that two are on the South Atlantic fleet.

Question. From whom have you inquired ?

Answer. Mr. Hubbard, our member of Congress, applied to Captain Wise, of the Navy Ordnance Bureau. The effect of a ball going seven miles and one going five miles from a gun is to give a very great additional strain to the gun. The theory is promulgated by cast-iron gun men that you cannot burn over so much powder in a gun ; but we have put into my gun, for five hundred times firing, about as much again powder as is used in the cast-iron gun.

Question. Will your gun carry a ball seven miles with as much accuracy as a cast-iron will carry it five miles ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and, with an ordinary elevation, you will get at least one-third more range. The common elevation would be from seven to twenty degrees—what they call fighting distance. Now if we can fire a mile further on the enemy than their guns can reach, the victory is won before we reach the battle-field.

By the chairman :

Question. What amount of powder is used in your 50-pounder guns ?

Answer. Admiral Dahlgren fired only three and a quarter pounds ; I told him that he should use ten pounds.

Question. What is the ordinary charge used in your own trials ?

Answer. The ordinary charge is three and a quarter pounds.

Question. What charge have you tried in your gun ?

Answer. I have tried twenty pounds. I fired a gun with a view to burst it. I put in twenty pounds of powder and a 200-pounder shot turned to fit the bore of the gun. The shot and the powder filled up the whole bore of the gun, so that the shot stuck out about an inch beyond the muzzle ; against that I set a cast-iron block weighing about 2,800 pounds, and then fired it off.

Question. What was the effect ?

Answer. The gun was kicked back about sixty feet, and the cast-iron block was driven twelve feet through a bank of earth.

Question. What was the effect on the gun ?

Answer. We could not see but the gun was as good as ever it was. I made a shot about seven feet long, weighing 450 pounds, and fired it from one of my guns with twenty pounds of powder. It went through two earthworks, one twelve feet thick and the other ten feet thick, and then went off into the river. I think it would have penetrated fifty feet into an earthwork.

Question. What is the service charge of a 100-pounder Parrott gun ?

Answer. Ten pounds.

Question. Do you say that three and a quarter pounds is the ordinary charge of a 50-pounder Dahlgren ?

Answer. Perhaps five pounds.

Question. How much for a 100-pounder ?

Answer. Ten pounds of powder, and for a 200-pounder fifteen pounds.

Question. There is not so much powder required for a rifled gun as for a smooth-bore ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What charge would you deem perfectly safe in a 100-pounder gun of your manufacture?

Answer. Twenty pounds; double the usual charge.

Question. What in a 200-pounder gun of your manufacture?

Answer. Thirty pounds; twice the service charge for a Parrott gun of that size. The Parrott 200-pounder I believe is used with sixteen pounds of powder. I would not object to thirty-two pounds in my gun of that size.

Question. How large could you construct a gun on your plan? Could you make a 15-inch gun on your principle?

Answer. Yes, sir, but you would have to build works on purpose for that. There are now no works in the country to build such a gun as that.

Question. How large a gun can you construct with the works you have?

Answer. A 200-pounder.

Question. What is the calibre of a 200-pounder?

Answer. Eight-inch.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What is the range of your 200-pounder?

Answer. I think it would carry seven miles.

Question. With precision?

Answer. When you elevate a gun to throw that distance you lose somewhat of your precision; you must have experience and practice to get your range at long distances.

Question. All the object of so long a range as seven miles is to show the force of the powder you can use, and what power you can exert at short distances?

Answer. No, sir, not that.

Question. Can you see a house at seven miles distance?

Answer. Yes, sir, you can see a house across Long Island sound, where it is eighteen miles wide. You can see a vessel eight and ten miles off. I suppose the Parrott gun fired at thirty degrees of elevation, with such charges of powder that we use, would burst at every third fire.

By the chairman:

Question. Do you know anything about the English Armstrong gun?

Answer. I have never seen any of them. I have only seen drawings and accounts of them.

Question. They are wrought-iron guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. They are not made on your principle?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. They are made of rings?

Answer. They are made of sleeves put over one another, each sleeve extending the whole length of the gun.

Question. And the Whitworth gun is a wrought-iron gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is that gun constructed upon your principle?

Answer. No, sir; they are made of sleeves like the Armstrong gun, not welded together.

Question. Do you consider your gun a stronger gun than either of those?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is the thickness of your gun as compared with the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. Just about the same. The rule is, I think, four calibres; mine is quite as heavy as any of them.

Question. How does the weight of your gun compare with the Parrott or Dahlgren gun of similar calibre?

Answer. Mine is heavier, for wrought-iron is heavier than cast-iron. I think my 50-pounder is about 400 pounds heavier. There is no other gun like my large gun; it is different in shape from any other gun. I got no directions from here, but made it according to my own notions.

Question. It costs a great deal more than the cast-iron gun, of course?

Answer. Yes, sir; about six times as much. But a cast-iron gun can be made in a very short time, while it will take a week to make one of our large guns. The difference is in the heating, labor, and time used on it. Then, all the sections of our gun must be forged, bent, welded, and turned before you put them over the gun, when they are welded again.

Question. Your gun is considerably stronger than the Rodman gun?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you consider a gun made on the Rodman principle as much stronger than a cast-iron gun made on the old principle?

Answer. I cannot say that I do; you cannot make much out of cast-iron more than cast-iron.

Question. But you can have cast-iron strained or not strained in casting?

Answer. That is so.

Question. Is a cast-iron gun, cooled from the inside, outwardly strained as much as one cooled from the outside inwardly?

Answer. I do not know; it all shrinks.

Question. What is the object of cooling from the inside then?

Answer. I think Mr. Rodman's theory is that it makes the grain of the iron a little finer by cooling from the inside, and therefore he calls it better; but in my opinion it does not make it much better.

WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1865.*

HORATIO AMES recalled and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How fast can you furnish your guns to the government, and of what size, and at what price?

Answer. I can make for the government fifty 100-pounder wrought-iron guns per year, and deliver the first gun by the first of May next, and one gun each week thereafter. Should the government want seven or eight-inch guns, I could make preparations, and make of either of those kinds twenty-five guns per year, and deliver one each two weeks, beginning to deliver in nine months from receipt of order. All these guns to be rifled. The price will be one dollar per pound. A 100-pounder will weigh about 12,000 pounds; a 150-pounder about 17,000 pounds, and a 200-pounder about 28,000 pounds, according to drawing.

*Testimony of Robert C. Parrott.*

WASHINGTON, *January 18, 1865.*

ROBERT C. PARROTT sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. State what you know of the gun that goes by your name—the Parrott gun.

Answer. In 1860 I made the first of those guns. I made it from my own ideas upon the subject of what would make a gun of moderate cost and of good strength. That was a gun of the smallest size, and I tried it about a hundred firings; and it was exhibited to some of the officers at West Point, which was near me. That was a 10-pounder, the smallest size I ever made. Previous to the breaking out of the rebellion I had made a 20-pounder and a 30-pounder

gun—the same kind of guns now known in the service by that name. In making those guns I took as my guide, very nearly, the well-established proportions of the ordinary cast-iron gun; that is to say, I made the thickness of the gun around the charge about equal to the bore of the gun—if anything, a little more. Then, desiring to rifle the gun, I knew I must get additional strength, and to do that I put on a wrought-iron band around the breech, so that it is a cast-iron banded gun. When the war came on it was known to some of the officers of the army, and particularly to Major Benton, who was stationed at West Point, that I had these guns. Major Benton had seen some firing from them.

These were rifled guns, as are all the guns I make. At the sudden breaking out of the war inquiry was made for these guns. I suppose it arose from the reports which had been made to the proper authorities, and their having been fired two hundred rounds. They were ordered by the ordnance department of the government, and were sent to the arsenal at Washington. After some subsequent firing with them, I was ordered to go on and make some more, and during the spring and summer of 1861 I made a number of guns of each of those sizes, just as they were called for, according to the exigencies of the service. Everything was under a great pressure and hurry here, and when those guns got to Washington the present General Ricketts, who had a battery at this place, upon conferring with Major Benton, requested that he should have his battery composed of those 10-pounder guns, and that was the battery of Parrott guns which was in the fight at Bull Run. He also had some 20 and some 30-pounder guns in the same battery. If they did not give entire satisfaction, they were considered very valuable guns. The general opinion is that they are very reliable, as much so as anything of the kind; and, on the whole, they have given great satisfaction. I am now making those guns and a large number of projectiles for them.

Question. You were the inventor of those guns, were you?

Answer. Yes, sir. I do not pretend to be the inventor of the idea of putting a band on the gun, because that thing had been tried before; but I believe my gun is the first banded gun that was ever actually introduced into the service of any country as a part of its armament.

Question. Were these guns ever tried by the ordnance department before they adopted them?

Answer. The ordnance department can hardly be said to have adopted them. They were called for in the pressure of the times, and got into the service in that way, but in the summer of 1861 they fired a 10-pounder as many as a thousand times as an experiment, and it stood it well. By that time the guns had been in a great many engagements, and the 20 and 30-pounders had been fired two and three hundred rounds. The navy had by that time taken up the 20 and 30-pounders also. Those guns, I believe, are satisfactory in every way. Of course, people have different opinions about guns, as about everything else, but I believe the opinion of the service generally is, considering all things, that they are good guns.

Question. Have you any contract with the government for making those guns?

Answer. I had not at that time.

Question. Have you had since?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What number of guns have you made for the government?

Answer. In all about 2,500, but a very large proportion of them have been of the small and lighter calibre.

Question. When did you commence making the 100 and 300-pounders?

Answer. Before answering that question I desire to state that when I furnished the government with these guns—the 10, the 20, and the 30-pounders—I stated to them the exact price I should charge, and I have not altered the

price from that day to this. Though the rise in the price of material has increased so much that I have not received any large profit on those guns, yet I have preferred, as a matter of personal feeling, to continue to furnish those three guns at the original price.

Question. State the price of those three guns.

Answer. The 10-pounder is \$180; the 20-pounder \$380, and the 30-pounder is \$520.

Question. Did you claim any seigniorage for the invention?

Answer. I never did. I took out a patent which, after considerable trouble, they allowed me on account of the peculiar proportion and manner of banding the gun, but I have never charged directly anything for the invention; I have charged only a fair manufacturing price. In the summer of 1861 I went to work upon the 100-pounders. In the fall of 1861 I tried one of those guns, and then informed the ordnance department and the army generally that I had such a gun, and that it had done pretty well. They then ordered the gun to be tested, and after they had fired it two hundred rounds, they bought it of me as an experimental gun. It is in that way that my guns have been introduced into the service. For the 100-pounders I charged, I think, \$1,200 then; now the price is \$1,300. I was so well satisfied with that gun that I went on and made some others on my own account, and before I had finished many, a call came for them. I had by that time—the winter of 1861—made a 200-pounder, which is a gun of eight-inch bore. That gun was brought to the notice of the department, and tried in the same way as the 100-pounder. The ordnance department ordered four or five of each of those guns. There was a great call for them. Many officers had seen them fired at the foundry, and, as you know, there was a great desire to get hold of everything in the shape of efficient artillery; and when General McClellan's army was moved to the Peninsula, some of these guns were sent along, and were placed in battery near Yorktown, and fired upon Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and the water-batteries there. As a new gun they were considered very successful indeed. At all events, they were looked upon as very much in advance of anything they then had. I do not profess to think they are the best gun in the world, but I think they were the best practical thing that could be got at the time, and I suppose that was the great reason for getting them. These guns have been reported upon by many officers, both our own and foreign officers; and among the rest, by Prince de Joinville, a man well versed in the artillery of the French navy, in which he served. All the trials of the guns at the foundry have been satisfactory to the officers who witnessed them. But before that time even the navy had ordered the guns, and the army had ordered them, and I have since been constantly engaged in the manufacture of these guns, and of projectiles for them.

Question. Is there any peculiar projectile for these guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that is also a design or invention of my own.

Question. How does it differ from the ordinary projectile?

Answer. These guns are rifled, and the projectile is cylindrical—the front end being pointed and the back end flat; around the circumference of the back end there is a ring of brass which the powder, when the gun is fired, forces into the grooves of the gun, and that imparts the spiral motion to the shell and prevents windage.

Question. Is that patented?

Answer. I have a patent, but I have pursued the same course with that as with my patent on the gun, and until a very great rise in the price of materials took place I continued to charge for the shell the first price put upon it. I suppose it would average from six to eight cents per pound. The large projectiles were about six cents per pound. That included the finishing and the brass ring, which is of considerable weight and somewhat expensive. I do not consider that I have charged—and those familiar with those things agree with

me—more than a fair manufacturer's profit. I have never charged directly to the government any patent-fee or seigniorage either on guns or shells.

Question. How does your shell differ from the James shell?

Answer. The James shell has a coating over nearly all the outside, of lead back of the shell, through which the gas from the powder gets under the lead or other substance, and a canvas covering over that. Holes are made in the

and forces it outwards, as I understand it.

Question. But your ring is forced into the grooves by an opposite motion?

Answer. Yes, sir; by the powder driving behind.

Question. Is your shell much used?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you also make solid shot?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Is that made in the same way?

Answer. Yes, sir; but with no hole in it.

Question. Do you charge the shell yourself?

Answer. No, sir; I furnish the shells to the government empty, but all ready for the charge and fuze.

Question. Are the large guns furnished at the same price per pound as the smaller ones?

Answer. They are worth about the same price per pound. I have omitted to state that the first of my largest guns—the 300-pounder—was made in the winter of 1862-'63. That is a 10-inch gun. The government took that for the purpose of an experiment in the service, and sent it down to Morris's island.

Question. Is that the gun which Gillmore used, and which was known as the "Swamp Angel?"

Answer. No, sir; that was an 8-inch gun.

Question. Was that one of your guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; but it was a 200-pounder.

Question. How many of those 300-pounders have you made?

Answer. About ten now.

Question. How many of the 200-pounders?

Answer. I should think some one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty, for the army and navy.

Question. How many of the 100-pounders?

Answer. About six hundred, I should think.

Question. Do you make intermediate ones between that and the 30-pounder?

Answer. I now make a 60-pounder for the navy. That is a gun quite recently made, and not yet much introduced into the service.

Question. Have you ever endeavored to strengthen your guns by cooling them from the inside upon the Rodman principle?

Answer. Yes, sir; a little with the heavy guns.

Question. Do you consider that that contributes considerably to the strength of the gun?

Answer. So far as I can judge, it does.

Question. Does any other person make guns upon your principle?

Answer. I presume that all the guns that go by my name are of my manufacture. I have seen guns captured from the enemy very much like them; but all the guns spoken of in our army and navy as my guns are made by me.

Question. I hear it stated that some of your large guns failed in the recent attack on Fort Fisher. Have you heard anything about that?

Answer. I have heard a great deal about it. I came to Washington partly on that business. The Navy Department ordered a board of officers, experienced in ordnance matters, to assemble here upon that subject.

Question. Have they acted upon the matter?

Answer. They have, and are about making a report.



Question. To what do they ascribe the cause of the failure ?

Answer. I cannot tell you what conclusion they have come to ; but I can tell you to what I ascribe the difficulty with the largest guns : it is the bursting of the shells in the bore of the guns. I ascribe all, or nearly all, the accidents to the premature explosion of the shells in the guns.

Question. Have you had an opportunity to examine those guns since they were burst ?

Answer. Some of them I have.

Question. I mean those burst in the navy lately.

Answer. No, sir, I have not. They may have been engaged in operations since, and I do not think the authorities will get reports accurately in regard to the main point, which is, how many shells were actually burst in those guns. It has been a matter of much concern with me, and I would rather not make a gun than have any accident occur. I ascribe the difficulty to the friction of the powder in the shell itself. At first it was natural enough to ascribe the difficulty to bad shells, bad castings, or bad fuzes, &c. But upon full trial it appears above all question that the difficulty arises from the powder exploding in the shell within the gun by friction caused by the striking of the powder against the inside of the shell. A 300-pounder shell is ten inches in diameter. A round shell of that diameter holds about three pounds of powder. My 300-pounder shell holds about seventeen pounds of powder. Now, when you fire a gun, and strike the butt of the shell suddenly with the immense force of the charge, there is a reaction of the powder within the shell against the bottom of the shell ; and if there is any roughness so as to cause friction at the bottom, the powder will be exploded in the shell while it is within the gun. Thinking that to be the case, I have for a long time been endeavoring to coat the inside of the shell with varnish or lacquer, and now I am able to do it with entire success. A great many people were skeptical about it, and precautions have not been taken in regard to it as quickly as they might have been. I now melt together rosin, tallow, and common brown soap, forming a thin liquid mixture, and pour it into my shells, and pour it out again, leaving a coating on the inside which covers over the rough iron ; and when that is done, I find the shells can be fired without premature explosion. Some two months ago Captain Temple, one of the officers of this very fleet of Porter's, came to the foundry and became aware of this fact. He had two 100-pounders on board his vessel. When he got back he found that his shells had no such coating, and he immediately set to work and lined them with asphaltum, &c. He fired his guns fifty or sixty times each during the engagement, and not a single shell exploded prematurely in his guns, while in some of the other vessels around him shells were exploded prematurely, and thrown out of the guns in fragments. That is so stated in a letter of his which I saw yesterday.

Question. You say you have made some 2,500 of these guns altogether ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you any means of knowing how many of them have failed ?

Answer. I do not know, but about fifty I should think. A good many have failed by blowing off the muzzle. The 300-pounder, the first one which went to Charleston, had its muzzle blown off, and that was attributed very correctly to the bursting of a shell in the gun. It had been fired only twenty-seven times. They went to work and dressed off as well as they could the rough broken end, and fired it three hundred times more ; and from that time the gun began to crack from the muzzle end, which was very natural. They then gave up firing the gun. The other 300-pounder sent there was fired 1,004 times at Morris island.

Question. How much is the service charge of a 300-pounder ?

Answer. Twenty-five pounds of powder.

Question. Is the charge the same for round shot as for shell ?

Answer. If used for round shot the amount should be increased.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. Have any of your guns exploded with the round shot?

Answer. No, sir. They are not often used with round shot, but they can be. I should not be surprised, however, if it should happen, for this reason : a gun does not always burst at the time you break a shell in it, but the bursting of the shell injures and weakens the gun. There is the difficulty. You do not know how much the gun may be injured ; it may be broken half through, and the next time it is fired it may break entirely, and then you say it burst by what ought not to have burst it. You do not know what effect previous discharges may have had upon the gun, and that is one of the great difficulties in this matter.

By the chairman :

Question. Is there more tendency to burst these heavy guns than the lighter ones?

Answer. Yes, sir ; for you cannot make a gun stout in proportion to its calibre in my opinion. The bursting of a shell containing seventeen pounds of powder in a gun is a different thing from bursting one containing only a few ounces.

Question. And I suppose the strain upon a gun depends something upon the degree of elevation.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Your gun is made with a wrought-iron band around it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. The gun and the band are not one solid piece of metal?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Upon firing the gun until it gets hot, you expand the metal ; and when it cools, it shrinks. Does not that create a tendency in the band to get loose?

Answer. No, sir ; I do not know that that has occurred in a single instance. It is made a little smaller than the cast-iron, finished very accurately ; the cast-iron over which it is to be fitted is turned very accurately, a certain difference being allowed in the size of the two, and then the wrought-iron band is heated until it becomes sufficiently large to slip on the gun. In cooling and contracting it binds upon the gun very much as you put a tire on a wheel. The cast-iron is in such close and intimate contact with the wrought-iron that they are very nearly like one piece of metal, and the heat of the one is extended to the other. I do not know that any case has ever been reported of the starting of the band.

Question. Is there any other rifled ordnance except yours now used by us?

Answer. Not to any great extent. Some other rifled guns have been introduced into the service, and some of the old guns of the army have been rifled. In doing that, however, they adopted my plan of rifling, and I believe my projectile is now used for them.

Question. Do you mean that when they rifle the old guns they put your band on?

Answer. No, sir. They have used my band in some cases. I mean to say that in rifling the old guns they have done it latterly according to my plan—that is, giving the same twist I employ.

Question. What do you know about the Whitworth gun?

Answer. I have seen them, and know something about them. That is a rifled gun also.

Question. Is it a breech-loader?

Answer. It was originally, but latterly they have been made otherwise. The tendency in England is to abandon the breech-loader.

Question. Is that a wrought-iron gun?

Answer. It is wrought-iron or steel.

Question. Do you consider that gun an improvement upon yours in any way?

Answer. It is a very costly gun. So far as we have had any specimens of them in this country—we have captured some—I should not prefer them to mine. You are probably aware that the rifling is not by grooves in a circular bore, but the bore is made hexagonal and with a twist, and the ball is made with the same twist; and in driving the ball out you make it rotate on its axis. The difficulty is, that that brings an enormous strain on the gun. A great many serious accidents have happened with those guns. There were two of them at Morris's island, used in firing on Fort Sumter, and both of them became disabled. They were made in parts, and, somehow or other, one part slipped from the other.

Question. How does the Armstrong gun differ from yours?

Answer. That is a wrought-iron gun and a breech-loader. Latterly Armstrong has made his heavy guns muzzle-loaders. He has also lately made some heavy smooth-bore guns; but his original contrivance was a breech-loader.

Question. Have the English or French invented any guns which, for accuracy and endurance, are better than yours?

Answer. I should suppose that the Armstrong heavy wrought-iron gun, if well made, would endure longer than mine. They are very costly, and they are even yet an experiment with them. With the exception of the small size guns, I do not know that they have introduced them into the service as a regular thing.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. How does the cost of those guns compare with yours?

Answer. We can hardly compare their relative cost now, owing to the derangement of our currency; I suppose, however, they are much more costly in England than our guns are here.

By the chairman:

Question. Do you know anything about the Ames gun?

Answer. I only know what has been casually mentioned to me. I have not seen the gun, or any drawing of it. The opinion of officers, however, who have seen the gun, is that it is a very strong one; and gentlemen in whose opinion I have confidence say that it is.

Question. You are aware of the manner in which it is made—by concentric rings?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I think that should make a strong gun.

Question. What is its comparative cost?

Answer. I do not know, but I should presume it would be a very costly gun. I look upon my gun as one which can be rapidly produced, and, when properly used, safe, efficient, and very accurate. I consider it, at any rate, as something a great deal better than we had, and perhaps as good as we were likely to get, but I shall be very glad, I am sure, to see any improvement upon it. I think I should do the gun justice, however.

Question. What do you say about the Dahlgren gun? Is there anything peculiar about that? What is the difference between that and the columbiad?

Answer. I give Captain Dahlgren the credit of introducing that gun into the navy. I made the first 9-inch and first 11-inch Dahlgren guns that were introduced into the service. He is deserving of the credit of introducing that gun. The model of that gun is admirable; that is, of what is properly called the Dahlgren gun, which are the 9 and 11-inch guns, and lately they have introduced larger sizes. I believe Captain Dahlgren thinks the army have taken the models of his guns, as the columbiads are made essentially as the Dahlgrens were. The old columbiads were very different indeed. They were flat behind, and very clumsy compared with the Dahlgren gun.

Question. Are your guns made after the shape of the Dahlgren?

Answer. No, sir; they cannot be very well. They are very simple in their form. The rear part is cylindrical—about a calibre thick—a thickness about equal to the diameter of the bore. Then the breech is rounded off much as usual for heavy guns, and the muzzle part is thicker than the Dahlgren guns are, because mine have a rifle groove.

Question. Are they using rifled guns much in the navy?

Answer. Not much, and especially now since the action of the Kearsarge. They use some for chase guns and for occasional distant firing. For main batteries they think they had better rely upon smooth-bore guns with projectiles of large diameter, round or spherical, because they *ricochet* better upon the water; whereas, when a rifled shot hits the water, it bounds off in any direction. When a round shot strikes the water it will continue on in the direction in which it was fired.

Question. Your gun is becoming all the time more and more used in the army, is it not?

Answer. I think it is, but I do not think the use is increasing as rapidly as at times heretofore, partly because there is less urgency for guns and partly for other reasons. I think there has arisen a party feeling about them, as about other things. However, I think that a great majority of the officers who have been in the service with the guns generally prefer my guns to any others. I dare say others will be induced to try other guns. I do not object to that at all, I am sure.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you ever fired one of your guns before it was hooped to see how much it would bear?

Answer. No, sir. In that shape it is very much like an ordinary cast-iron gun.

By the chairman :

Question. What is the comparative cost of your gun with other guns in the service?

Answer. I do not think my gun is near as costly as other guns compared with the actual expense of making them.

Question. Are rifled guns more expensive than smooth-bore guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How much per pound?

Answer. A cast-iron rifled gun, not different from others except in being rifled, would cost but little more. The difference would be the cost of rifling the bore. But putting the cast-iron of my heavy guns at the same price with that of the ordinary cast-iron guns, and add the bare cost of the wrought-iron band, and my guns are as cheap as the ordinary guns. The wrought-iron is worth at least double the cast-iron.

Question. How much does the band weigh in comparison with the gun?

Answer. About twenty per cent. of the whole weight, I should think.

Question. Have you inspected these large 15-inch Rodman guns they are making?

Answer. No, sir; I have seen, however, the 20-inch gun in New York.

Question. I am told that the initial velocity of the projectile from a smooth-bore is greater than that from a rifled gun. Is that so?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And yet the rifled gun carries the furthest. How is that?

Answer. The projectile of a smooth-bore gun is much lighter, compared with the charge of powder, than that of the rifled gun. For instance, take a round shell and a round shot; the shell will leave the gun with the greatest velocity, but the shot will go the furthest at a moderate elevation, because the shell being lighter than the shot, the resistance of the air stops it more quickly than it does

the shot. The great weight of the shot, once the shot is in motion, carries it further than the shell.

Question. If I understand it, the charge of powder in the smooth-bore is much larger than that of the rifled gun?

Answer. It is not always so; but it may be. The service charge of my 200-pounder is more than that of the 8-inch columbiad, smooth-bore. The charge of my 8-inch gun, the 200-pounder, is sixteen pounds, while the charge of the cast-iron 8-inch columbiad is less than sixteen pounds. I could put into my gun more than that if I used a round shot. One principal reason for the greater range of the rifled projectile is found in its elongated form. A rifled projectile of the same diameter as a spherical projectile moves more easily through the air, just as a well-modelled boat will move through the water easier than a tub.

Question. A rifled projectile in receiving the spiral motion from the groove of the gun opposes a greater resistance to the propelling power, and hence causes a greater strain upon the gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that must be taken into consideration in constructing a rifled cannon. Rifled guns have hardly been yet used in any service but ours.

Question. The use of these large guns, the 100, 200, and 300-pounders, is a modern thing, is it not?

Answer. Yes, sir; they have not heretofore been used in war.

Question. How large guns did they use in the war of the Revolution?

Answer. The largest was a 42-pounder, a 7-inch gun, and that was not so much a heavy gun as a carronade. They introduced an 8-inch carronade which was called a 68-pounder. But it is since the great wars in Europe, terminating in 1816, that most of the modern artillery, except the 32 and the 42-pounders, has been introduced.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you ever made any guns of the same size and shape as your banded gun all of cast-iron?

Answer. No, sir; not exactly.

Question. Could you make a gun substantially similar in size, shape, and weight to the banded gun, all of cast-iron?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. If you could do so, and then test the two guns side by side, you could determine whether there was any superiority in the banded gun?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I must say I consider that pretty much determined already. I know there is a difference of opinion on that point, but any officer who would receive into the service a cast-iron gun, and use the same charge of powder that is always used in guns of that bore, and a shot equal in weight to three ordinary 6-pound shot, would be thought to be a madman. Now, my 20-pounder is exactly the bore of the 6-pounder gun, old fashion. Now, if I should make a cast-iron 6-pounder, and ask them to fire it with two pounds of powder, a full charge, and three shots in the gun, they would think me a madman. And yet that is precisely the difference between the two guns. My 20-pounder fires the same charge of powder as the 6-pounder smooth-bore gun, and a projectile equal to three 6-pound shots. And, besides, my gun is rifled. I am aware of the fact that it has been said that the gun is no stronger for being banded than if it had been all cast-iron.

Question. You say you now cast your heavy guns on the Rodman principle. Do you consider that there is any particular advantage in that?

Answer. I think there is in heavy guns.

Question. Why?

Answer. Because the bore of the gun, which you want to have of the strongest and closest metal, then becomes surface metal. Every one familiar with castings

knows there is a great difference between the centre and the outside of a casting, and that the strongest metal is on the outside. By casting the gun hollow the interior of the bore becomes outside or surface metal, and is much closer grained, and probably better than if you cast the gun solid and then bored it out. And it is the metal nearest the bore that receives the greatest strain. For this reason I have adopted that principle in casting the 100, 200, and 300-pounders.

Question. If it is the better plan in reference to the larger guns, why not in reference to the smaller?

Answer. The same difficulty is not encountered in making the smaller guns. The castings of the smaller guns are very solid to the very centre. That depends upon the mass of iron. That process of casting is somewhat troublesome, and is not often used by Rodman himself. The 100-pounder is a smaller gun than he has ever applied it to.

Question. Have your smaller guns burst in the service?

Answer. I think not beyond blowing off the muzzle occasionally; and they have had a great deal of hard usage. They have put into them a great many experimental projectiles. They have been liable to accident heretofore much more than they will be hereafter.

Question. Can you determine from the examination of a gun, after it has been burst, whether it was burst by the charge, or by the bursting of a shell in it?

Answer. I do not think you can. The strain might be thrown upon a gun so that it would begin to break at the weakest part. You cannot always tell what the cause is. You can sometimes tell by the location of the fracture, or from the pieces coming out at the muzzle.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Does the rifling of your gun run at the same angle its whole length?

Answer. No, sir, but the twist increases at the muzzle. I have been obliged to take out a patent for many things, which patents perhaps are of no use to me at all, for unless the government use the gun it is of no value. I consider that the merit of my gun consists in the combination of all the different parts. The banding, the increasing twist, and the peculiar projectile constitute a sort of whole which I think perform well, and which I think will be made to perform extremely well, and as that increasing twist is a part of the whole, I am glad to mention it.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington City, January 20, 1865.

SIR: In answer to your letter of the 13th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a communication from the chief of ordnance, together with a copy of the report of the commission appointed to examine the Ames gun, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

It will be perceived, from the communication of the chief of ordnance, that no report of the Ericsson gun has yet been received at that office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
Secretary of War.

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
Chairman of Committee on Conduct of War.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, January 20, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge reference to this office of a letter from Hon. B. F. Wade, asking for copy of the report of the commission appointed to examine the Ames gun at Bridgeport, and, in obedience to instructions, to transmit a copy of said report. No report on the "Ericsson gun" has been received at this office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MAYNADIER,  
Colonel and Acting Chief of Ordnance.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, August 21, 1864.

Mr. Ames having constructed certain wrought-iron cannon of 7-inch calibre, which he desires to have inspected and tested with a view to determine their fitness for the United States service, it is

*Ordered,*

First. That a board of officers, to consist of Major General Gillmore as president of the board, a competent ordnance officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, and a competent officer to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, shall be organized, and meet at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the first day of September next, with a view of inspecting and testing the aforesaid cannon and determining the capacity and fitness for the United States service, with such tests and trials as they shall deem proper, and make report to the President of their opinion in respect to said cannon, and their value and fitness for the service.

Second. That the ordnance bureaus of the War and Navy Departments shall provide suitable shot, shells, and ammunition for making the aforesaid tests, and provide all the necessaries for a careful and fair test of the aforesaid cannon.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 25, 1864.

SIR: By direction of the President you are hereby appointed a member of a board to meet at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the 1st of September next, of which Major General Gillmore, U. S. A., is president, for the purpose of testing and inspecting certain wrought-iron cannon with a view to determine its fitness for the United States service.

You will proceed and report for this duty accordingly.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Commodore T. A. HUNT, U. S. N.,  
*Boston, Massachusetts.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, August 23, 1864.

SIR: I transmit herewith a copy of an order from the President, directing that a board of officers meet at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the 1st of September next, to inspect and test a cannon made by Mr. Ames, with the instructions of the Secretary of War thereon, designating you as the ordnance officer on said board; also directing that all necessary ammunition for the trial be furnished. You will conform to the order and directions, and you are authorized to call on any arsenal for such ammunition as may be required to make such trials as the board may desire.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE D. RAMSAY,  
*Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance.*

Major T. T. S. LAIDLEY,  
*Inspector of Cannon, &c., No. 710 Broadway, New York.*

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT, *October 27, 1864.*

In pursuance of the foregoing orders, and subsequent orders from the Secretary of War, postponing the meeting of the board until the 15th day of September, 1864, the board met and the trials commenced at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the day last mentioned. All the members of the board were present.

The gun to be tested was in readiness and suitably mounted. It is of wrought-iron, weighs, according to Mr. Ames's statement, 19,400 pounds, is bored to a 7-inch calibre, and is rifled with a uniform twist of one turn in thirty-five (35) feet.

The gun is built up from the cascabel on the end of a long cylindrical port bar. The end of this bar is first enlarged by welding pieces around it. It is then enlarged still further by placing two wings on the end one over the other concentrically, and welding them there in succession. Against the end of the cylinder, thus increased to twenty-eight (28) inches in diameter, is welded a circular plate or disk, also twenty-eight (28) inches in diameter, and four inches thick. This disk is composed of a centre piece ten inches in diameter, surrounded by two concentric rings, one outside of the other, all accurately fitted together by turning. The bottom of the bore terminates against this disk. Upon this disk is welded a ring of twenty-eight (28) inches exterior diameter, four inches interior diameter, and five inches thick, compounded of three concentric rings, accurately fitted together by turning. The inner one is ten inches in exterior diameter, and about six inches in thickness, so that its ends project on either side about half an inch beyond the faces of the other two rings. This is intended to secure a perfect weld next the bore, and force out the slag.

Other compound rings, made in the same manner, are welded on one after the other, until the gun is of the required length.

In making the compound rings for the small part of the gun, between the trunnions and muzzle, the outer ring is omitted.

The gun remains in a horizontal position during this process of construction, and is handled by means of the bar projecting from the cascabel.

The welding on of the disk and rings is done with a hammer worked horizontally by steam; a hammer working vertically is also used against the sides of the piece.

The inner ring of the compound rings is made from a block six (6) inches by ten (10) inches by boring a hole four inches in diameter through it, and turning off the corners. The fibres and laminae of the metal lie in planes at right angles to the axis of the gun. The centre and outer rings are made like a tire by bending the bars and welding the ends together, thus placing the layers of the metal in cylindrical surfaces.

The trunnions are attached by being screwed into the sides of the piece three inches.

The grooves of the piece submitted to trial were found to be only (0.58) fifty-eight thousandths of an inch in depth, which was not sufficient to confer a rotary motion upon the projectile with certainty, as was ascertained after a few trials. The board therefore adjourned to have the grooves cut to one-tenth of an inch in depth. This having been accomplished, the trials were resumed on the 27th day of September.

Considerable delay and many interruptions in the progress of the trials were occasioned by the want of suitable projectiles. Those of the Hotchkiss pattern, which have been officially proscribed for rifles of a large calibre on account of their excessive strain upon the gun, were almost exclusively used. In weight they varied from 104 to 127 pounds.

The powder used is what is known as No. 7 experimental powder, giving a pressure of 5,700 pounds per square inch in an 8-inch gun.

The charges were varied increasingly from 13 to 30 pounds, although it was frequently necessary to reduce the higher charges in order to accommodate the projectiles, from which the packing would often strip or the cap break, even with comparatively low charges.

The proper instruments for determining the ranges of the shot, fired, as they were, over the water, were not received until the gun had been fired 600 times, and was much enlarged, giving a windage of more than three-tenths of an inch over the shot, and thereby causing great loss of velocity and range.

The initial velocity of the shot fired with 19 pounds of powder was determined by means of the Vitzwotte chronoscope when the gun had 130 rounds. The velocity thus obtained was 1,480 feet.

Owing to the difficulty experienced from the fragments of the lead thrown from the shot cutting the wires prematurely, no efforts were made subsequently to obtain the velocities with other charges.

The greatest enlargement of the bore of the piece for the first 100 rounds was one hundred and twenty-one thousandths (0.121) of an inch, and at fifteen (15) inches from the bottom. After this the enlargement was slight for each additional one hundred (100) rounds, until we had reached five hundred (500) rounds, and began to use twenty-five (25) pound charges.


After the six hundredth (600) round the enlargement exceeded three-tenths of an inch,





AMES'S WROUGHT-IRON RIFLED GUN—BORE, 7 IN. DIAM.; WEIGHT, 19,400 LBS.

No. 2.



Cross section of Forging.

Scale of 2 1/2 feet to the inch.

OCTOBER 27, 1864.


which is the greatest measurement the star-gauge would record; this maximum enlargement extended for a distance of three (3) inches along the bore, beginning at a point 20 inches from the bottom.

When the trials commenced the vent was in the metal of the gun, there being no vent-piece, and was so much enlarged by the first 100 rounds that it had to be bouched; a copper vent-piece secured by a steel plug screwed in was inserted, and answered for the rest of the firing.

At about the 560th round it was first discovered that the metal of the gun had been so much stretched laterally at the place of maximum interior enlargement that it was plainly visible in a swell on the outside entirely *encircling* the piece. There was an increase of  $\frac{1}{8}$  of an inch in the exterior diameter at that place. This swell gradually diminished to nothing at a distance of 4 inches on either side of the circle of greatest enlargement.

When the gun had been fired but 19 rounds, and before the grooves had been cut to the required depth of one-tenth of an inch, a crack in the inside, sufficiently wide and deep to be easily felt with a steel point, appeared, *running* a little more than half way round the bore, at a distance of 25 inches from the bottom. This crack was partially taken out of the grooves in re-rifling the piece. Subsequent firing did not materially alter its appearance, or in *any way* enlarge it on the surface of the bands; while in the grooves it was *gradually* merged into or replaced by a series of holes or cavities—one in each groove—which appeared, one after the other, as the trials progressed. The first one that attracted attention grew wider and deeper until, at the 200th round, it measured three-eighths ( $\frac{3}{8}$ ) of an inch in depth and about (1) inch in width at the surface of the bore. After the 300th round it was one and three eighths ( $1\frac{3}{8}$ ) inch deep, and had evidently penetrated entirely through the tube formed by the inner rings. Its progress was then apparently arrested in a greater or less degree by the metal of the middle rings. After the 600th round this cavity measured one and three-quarters ( $1\frac{3}{4}$ ) inch in depth, and about one and one-eighth ( $1\frac{1}{8}$ ) inch in width.

After the 700th round these cavities measured as follows: The largest,  $1\frac{3}{8}$  inch in depth and  $1\frac{1}{8}$  inch wide. The others have enlarged slightly, but are, apparently, no deeper. They average about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of an inch deep and 1 inch wide. At the close of the trials, (700th round,) the vent piece having been used 600 times, the interior orifice of vent measured 0.25 inch in diameter. Radiating from the entrance of the vent-piece into the bore are three cracks—one in front and two in rear—thus:


 and measuring in length 0.9 inch and 0.9 inch, and 0.6 inch, respectively, and about 0.08 inch deep.

The edges of the bands are at present but slightly worn, and the rifling of the piece not much impaired.

It is the unanimous opinion of the board that Ames's wrought-iron guns possess, to a degree never before equalled by any cannon of equal weight offered to our service, the essential qualities of great lateral and longitudinal strength, and great powers of endurance under heavy charges; that they are not liable to burst explosively and without warning, even when fired under very high charges; and that they are well adapted to the wants of the service generally, *especially* wherever long ranges and high velocities are required.

It is also the unanimous opinion of the board that Ames's 7-inch guns, of which he has now fifteen (15) nearly finished, possess sufficient weight and strength to receive an 8-inch bore, and even greater, although not heavy enough for a 10-inch bore.

The board recommend that in any future contracts for these guns the limits of weight for certain calibres be fixed by the agent of the United States.

The board further recommend that the gun which they have tried be rebored to eight inches and rifled, and then submitted to another series of tests similar to those through which it has just passed; to be then cut up for examination.

#### Summary of firing.

Gun fired 700 times as follows:

380 times with 19 lbs. No. 7 powder.	3 times with 18 lbs. No. 7 powder.
114 do. do. 25 lbs. do. do.	2 do. do. 24 lbs. do. do.
65 do. do. 20 lbs. do. do.	37 do. do. 25 lbs. cannon do.
20 do. do. 13 lbs. do. do.	24 do. do. 20 lbs. do. do.
12 do. do. 15 lbs. do. do.	6 do. do. 19 lbs. do. do.
6 do. do. 30 lbs. do. do.	3 do. do. 15 lbs. do. do.
5 do. do. 21 lbs. do. do.	3 do. do. 17 lbs. do. do.
5 do. do. 22 lbs. do. do.	2 do. do. 13 lbs. do. do.
4 do. do. 23 lbs. do. do.	6 do. do. 25 lbs. do. and mortar
3 do. do. 17 lbs. do. do.	powder.

In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Ames states that he fired from the gun before the board assembled, 13 rounds, as follows :

10 times with 13 lbs. No. 7 powder.	1 time with 20 lbs. No. 7 powder.
1 do. do. 16 lbs. do. do.	1 do. do. 25 lbs. do.

The board have the honor to submit this report of its proceedings to this date, and have adjourned to await further instructions.

Q. A. GILLMORE,  
*Maj. Gen. Vols., and President of Board.*  
 T. A. HUNT,  
*Commodore of United States Navy.*  
 T. T. S. LAIDLEY,  
*Major of Ordnance.*

The PRESIDENT of the *United States,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

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BRIDGEPORT, CONN., *October 22, 1864.*

SIR : I have the honor to transmit herewith a record of firing with a 7-inch wrought-iron gun made by Horatio Ames, at Falls Village, Connecticut, of ———, from 15th of September to 26th of October, 1864.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE,  
*Maj. Gen. Vols., President of Board.*

The PRESIDENT of the *United States,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

EXPERIMENTS WITH CANNON—CLASS I.

Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun, at Bridgeport, Conn., from September 15 to October 26, 1864.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
1	1864.											
2	Sept. 15	Hazard's No. 7	13 lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss shell	110 lbs. oz.	5°				24.5 inch		Fragments flew from shell, supposed to be pieces of lead.
3	do.	do.	13	do.	110	5				21.5		Flight regular.
4	do.	do.	13	do.	110	5				22.0		Do.
5	do.	do.	13	do.	110	5				23.5		Do.
6	do.	do.	13	do.	110	5				27.5		Do.
7	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				23.5	7½ sec.	Flight irregular. Time of flight 7½ seconds.
8	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				23.5	7	Flight regular. Time of flight 7 seconds.
9	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				24.5	6½	Flight very irregular. Time of flight 6½ seconds.
10	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				24.5	7	Flight irregular. Time of flight 7 seconds.
11	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				18.5		Flight regular.
12	do.	do.	13	do.	109	5				24.0	7½	Flight regular. Time of flight 7½ seconds.
13	do.	do.	13	do.	109	10				24.0		Do.
14	do.	do.	13	do.	108	10				21.5		Flight regular.
15	do.	do.	13	do.	110	10				22.5		Do.
16	do.	do.	13	do.	110	15				24.0		Do.
17	do.	do.	13	do.	108	15				19.5		Do.
18	do.	do.	13	do.	108	15				18.5		Do.
19	do.	do.	13	do.	109	15						Flight not regular.
20	Sept. 27	Cannon.	106 lbs.	do., 3 flutes	106	10						Went well.
21	do.	do.	15	do.	105	8					12½	
22	do.	do.	15	do.	106	10					12½	
23	do.	do.	17	do.	106	10				13.5		Do.
24	do.	do.	17	do.	107	8				16.0		Do.
25	do.	do.	17	do.	105	10					13	
26	do.	do.	19	do.	107	10					13	
27	do.	do.	19	do.	106	8				20.5	12½	Lead band flew off.
28	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Lead band and cap flew off.
29	do.	do.	19	do., no flutes	110	10					12½	Went well.
30	do.	do.	19	do.	110	10					13½	Do.
31	do.	do.	20	do.	110	10				26	12½	Do.
32	do.	do.	20	do.	110	10						Do.
33	Sept 29	Hazard's No. 7	15 lbs.	do., 3 flutes	106	10					12½	Do.
34	do.	do.	15	do.	107	10					13½	Do.
35	do.	do.	15	do.	105	10					13	Do.
	do.	do.	17	do., 5 flutes	110	8					13½	Do.

## Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun, at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
36	1864											
37	Sept. 29	Hazard's No. 7	17	Hotchkiss 5 flutes	109 8	10°					13 sec.	Went well.
38	do.	do.	18	do.	121	10					13	Do.
39	do.	do.	18	do.	122	10					12½	Do.
40	do.	do.	18	do.	121	10					13½	Do.
41	do.	do.	18	do.	121	8					12½	Do.
42	do.	do.	19	do.	119 8	10					12½	Flight irregular.
43	do.	do.	19	do.	no flutes	123	10				13½	Went well.
44	do.	do.	19	do.	123	10					12½	Pieces came off from shell.
45	do.	do.	19	do.	110	10					14	Went well.
46	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	10					13½	Do.
47	do.	do.	19	do.	109	10					13½	Do.
48	do.	do.	19	do.	5 flutes.	109	10				13½	Do.
49	do.	do.	13	do.	116 8	10					9½	Flight irregular.
50	do.	do.	13	do.	116 8	10					11½	Do.
51	do.	Cannon	13	do.	116 8	10					13½	Do.
52	do.	do.	13	Schenkl	110 8	10					13½	Flight very irregular.
53	do.	Hazard's No. 7	19	Hotchkiss	110 8	10					13½	Went well.
54	do.	do.	19	do.	5 flutes.	108 8	10				13½	Do.
55	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	109	0				33½ in.	Fired into a butt of sand.
56	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	109	0				Do.	Do.
57	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	110	0				Do.	Do.
58	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	109	0				Do.	Do.
59	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	110	0				Do.	Do.
60	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	110	0				Do.	Do.
61	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	110	0				Do.	Do.
62	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	109 8	0				Do.	Do.
63	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	108 8	0				Do.	Do.
64	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	109 8	0				Do.	Do.
65	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	110	0				12	Band flew off; flight irregular.
66	October 1	do.	19	do.	do.	108	10				12.75	Flight irregular.
67	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	108	10				12.5	Band flew off.
68	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	108 8	10				12.1	Cap broke.
69	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	3 flutes.	119 8	10			13½	Went well.
70	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	120 8	10				13	Do.
71	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	118 0	10				13½	Do.
72	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	118	0				13½	Fired into a butt of sand.
73	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	118	0				Do.	Do.
74	do.	do.	19	do.	do.	119 8	0				Do.	Do.



## Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun, at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
125	1864.											
126	October 6	Hazard's No. 7	Lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss 3 fl. shot	Lbs. oz.	0°						Fired into a butt of sand.
127	do.	do.	19	do.	115	0						Do.
128	do.	do.	19	do.	116	4						Went well.
129	do.	do.	19	do.	115	4						Do.
130	October 7	do.	19	do.	117	4						Small piece came off.
131	do.	do.	19	do.	117	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
132	do.	do.	19	do.	118	0						Do.
133	do.	do.	19	do.	116	0		1,482 feet				Do.
134	do.	do.	19	do.	116	0		1,478 feet				Do.
135	do.	do.	19	do.	112	0						Do.
136	do.	do.	15	do.	115	0						Flight very irregular.
137	do.	do.	15	Schenkl	125	5½					7 sec.	Do.
138	do.	do.	15	do.	125	5½					7.2	Do.
139	October 8	do.	19	Hotchkiss	115	8					6.9	Fired into a butt of sand.
140	do.	do.	19	do.	117	0						Do.
141	do.	do.	19	do.	114	8						Do.
142	do.	do.	15	Mann	96	10						Flight irregular.
143	do.	do.	15	do.	96	10					14.1	Do.
144	do.	do.	15	do.	105	10					14.9	Do.
145	do.	do.	19	Hotchkiss shell	105	10					15.4	Do.
146	do.	do.	19	do.	106	10					14.9	Went well.
147	do.	do.	19	do.	105	10					14.8	Do.
148	do.	do.	19	do.	105	24					28.3	Do.
149	do.	do.	19	do.	106	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
150	do.	do.	19	do.	105	0						Do.
151	do.	do.	19	do.	106	8						Do.
152	do.	do.	19	do.	106	8						Do.
153	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
154	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
155	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
156	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
157	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
158	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
159	do.	do.	19	do.	106	8						Do.
160	do.	do.	19	do.	105	8						Do.
161	do.	do.	19	Hotchkiss shot	116	5					8.3	Shot broke.
162	do.	do.	19	do.	117	8					7.2	Went well.
163	do.	do.	19	do.	118	5					7.8	Shot broke.





Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun, at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
216	Oct. 10.											
217	do.	Hazard's No. 7.	19	Hotchkiss shell.	109 8	7°						Went well.
218	do.	do.	19	do.	111	7						Do.
219	do.	do.	19	do.	107	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
220	do.	do.	19	do.	107 8	0						Do.
221	do.	do.	19	do.	107 8	0						Do.
222	do.	do.	19	do.	112 8	7						Shot broke.
223	do.	do.	19	do.	105 8	7						Went well.
224	do.	do.	19	do.	105	0						Do.
225	do.	do.	19	do.	105 8	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
226	do.	do.	19	do.	105 8	0						Do.
227	do.	do.	19	do.	105 8	0						Do.
228	do.	do.	19	do.	107	0						Do.
229	do.	do.	19	do.	106	0						Do.
230	do.	do.	19	do.	105 8	0						Do.
231	do.	do.	19	do.	106 8	0						Do.
232	do.	do.	19	do.	107 8	0						Do.
233	do.	do.	19	do.	107 8	4						Broke in pieces.
234	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	4						Do.
235	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	4						Went well.
236	do.	do.	19	do.	106 8	4						Broke in pieces.
237	do.	do.	19	do.	104 8	4						Do.
238	do.	do.	19	do.	109 4	4						Went well.
239	do.	do.	19	do.	109 4	4						Went well; 12° 35'.
240	do.	do.	19	do.	108 0	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
241	do.	do.	19	do.	109 8	0						Do.
242	do.	do.	19	do.	109 0	0						Do.
243	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	0						Do.
244	do.	do.	19	do.	107	0						Do.
245	do.	do.	19	do.	109	0						Do.
246	do.	do.	19	do.	109 0	0						Do.
247	do.	do.	19	do.	109 0	0						Do.
248	do.	do.	19	do.	106 7	7						Went well.
249	do.	do.	19	do.	106 7	7						Do.
250	do.	do.	19	do.	106 7	7						Shot broke.
251	do.	do.	19	do.	109 7	7						Cap came off.
252	do.	do.	19	do.	107 7	7						Do.
253	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	7						Went well.
254	do.	do.	19	do.	108 8	7						Do.
254	do.	do.	19	do.	109	7						One large piece came off.



Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun, at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
	1864		Lbs. oz.		Lbs. oz.							
307	Oct. 12	Hazard's No. 7	19	Hotchkiss	124	8°						
308	do.	do.	19	do.	124	0						Went well; slightly irregular.
309	do.	do.	19	do.	122	0						Fired into a bank of sand.
310	do.	do.	19	do.	124	0						Do.
311	do.	do.	19	do.	123	0						Do.
312	do.	do.	19	do.	121	0						Do.
313	do.	do.	19	do.	122	0						Do.
314	do.	do.	19	do.	124	8						Do.
315	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						No pieces; not perfectly regular.
316	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Do.
317	do.	do.	19	do.	125	8						Quite irregular.
318	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Went well.
319	do.	do.	19	do.	124	8						Do.
320	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Do.
321	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Do.
322	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Not perfectly regular.
323	do.	do.	19	do.	122	8						Do.
324	do.	do.	19	do.	120	8						Do.
325	do.	do.	19	do.	122	8						Went well.
326	do.	do.	19	do.	122	8						Not perfectly regular.
327	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Went well.
328	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Do.
329	Oct. 13	do.	19	do.	124	8						Not perfectly regular.
330	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Went well.
331	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Do.
332	do.	do.	19	do.	120	8						Do.
333	do.	do.	19	do.	125	8						Went well; chassis wet.
334	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8			5 feet			Went well; not perfectly regular.
335	do.	do.	19	do.	121	8						Do.
336	do.	do.	19	do.	122	8						Do.
337	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Went well; primer failed—wire broke.
338	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Went pretty well; not perfectly regular; small piece came off.
339	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Went well.
340	do.	do.	19	do.	124	8						Do.
341	do.	do.	19	do.	124	8						Do.
342	do.	do.	19	do.	123	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
343	do.	do.	19	do.	123	8						Do.
344	do.	do.	19	do.	122	0						Do.
					124	8						Do.



Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
397	Oct. 13	Hazard's No. 7	Lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss shot	Lbs. oz.	0°						Fired into a butt of sand.
398	do.	do.	19	do.	119 8	0						Do.
399	do.	do.	19	do.	124 8	0						Do.
400	do.	do.	19	do.	130 8	0						Do.
401	do.	do.	19	do.	116 8	0						Slightly irregular.
402	do.	do.	19	do.	122	10						Went well.
403	do.	do.	19	do.	125 10	10						Do.
404	do.	do.	19	do.	125 10	10						Do.
404	do.	do.	19	do.	123 10	10						Do.
405	do.	do.	19	do.	119 10	10						Do.
406	do.	do.	19	do.	121 10	10						Do.
407	do.	do.	19	do.	125 10	10						Slightly irregular.
408	do.	do.	19	do.	124 10	10						Went well.
409	do.	do.	19	do.	122 10	10						Do.
410	do.	do.	19	do.	124 10	10						Fired into a butt of sand.
411	do.	do.	19	do.	123 0	0						Do.
412	do.	do.	19	do.	123 0	0						Do.
413	do.	do.	19	do.	125 0	0						Do.
414	do.	do.	19	do.	123 0	0						Do.
415	do.	do.	19	do.	124 0	0						Do.
416	do.	do.	19	do.	122 0	0						Do.
417	do.	do.	19	do.	122 0	0						Do.
418	do.	do.	19	do.	122 0	0						Do.
419	Oct. 14	do.	20	do.	121 0	0						Do.
420	do.	do.	20	do.	123 8	8						Went well.
421	do.	do.	20	do.	122 8	8						Went well; slightly irregular.
421	do.	do.	20	do.	121 8	8						Went well.
422	do.	do.	20	do.	121 8	8						Do.
423	do.	do.	20	do.	120 8	8						Went well; slightly irregular.
424	do.	do.	21	do.	123 8	8						Went well.
425	do.	do.	21	do.	122 8	8						Do.
426	do.	do.	21	do.	122 8	8						Went well; slightly irregular.
427	do.	do.	21	do.	123 8	8						Do.
428	do.	do.	21	do.	121 8	8						Went well; slightly irregular.
429	do.	do.	22	do.	121 8	8						Went well.
430	do.	do.	22	do.	121 8	8						Irregular.
431	do.	do.	22	do.	121 8	8						Went well.
431	do.	do.	22	do.	121 8	8						Do.
432	do.	do.	22	do.	124 8	8						Went well; slightly irregular.
433	do.	do.	22	do.	125 8	8						Went well.
434	do.	do.	23	do.	122 8	8						Do.
435	do.	do.	23	do.	124 8	8						Do.
435	do.	do.	23	do.	125 8	8						Do.



## Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
488	1864 Oct. 15	Hazard's No. 7.	Lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss shot.	Lbs. oz.	0°						Fired into a butt of sand.
489	do.	do.	20	do.	124							Do.
490	do.	do.	20	do.	122							Do.
491	do.	do.	20	do.	122							Do.
492	do.	do.	30	do.	122							Do.
493	do.	do.	30	do.	121 8							Do.
494	do.	do.	30	do.	124							Went well.
495	do.	do.	30	do.	123							Went well; slightly irregular.
496	do.	do.	20	do.	120							do.
497	do.	do.	20	do.	122							Went well.
498	do.	do.	20	do.	123							Do.
499	do.	do.	20	do.	124							Do.
500	do.	do.	20	do.	124							Went well; slightly irregular.
501	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8					32½ sec.	Went well.
502	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8					33	Went well; cartridge 19 inches long.
503	do.	do.	25	do.	124	10					13.9	Do.
504	do.	do.	25	do.	123	10					13.2	Went well; slightly irregular.
505	do.	do.	25	do.	123	10					13.3	do.
506	Oct. 18	do.	25	do.	119	8						Went well.
507	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8						Do.
508	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8						Do.
509	do.	do.	25	do.	124	8						Do.
510	do.	do.	25	do.	125	8						Do.
511	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Do.
512	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8						Do.
513	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Do.
514	do.	do.	25	do.	125	8						Do.
515	do.	do.	25	do.	124	8						Do.
516	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Fired into a butt of sand; top of vent-plug broke off about one inch of top part.
517	do.	do.	25	do.	123	8						Fired into a butt of sand.
518	do.	do.	25	do.	109	8						Do.
519	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Do.
520	do.	do.	25	do.	121	8						Do.
521	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Went well.
522	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Do.
523	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Went well; small piece of lead flew off from shot.
524	do.	do.	25	do.	106	8						Went well.
525	do.	do.	25	do.	124	8						Do.





## Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven inch gun at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
578	1864											
579	Oct. 19	Hazard's No. 7.	Lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss shot	Lbs. oz.	15°					19½ sec.	Slightly irregular.
580	do.	do.	25	do.	124	15					20	Do.
581	do.	do.	25	do.	122	15					20	Very irregular.
582	do.	do.	25	do.	121	15						Do.
583	do.	do.	25	do.	122	10						Do.
584	do.	do.	25	do.	123	10						Fired into a butt of sand.
585	do.	do.	25	do.	124	0						Do.
586	do.	do.	25	do.	122	10						Slightly irregular.
587	do.	do.	25	do.	124	10						Went well; small pieces came off.
588	do.	do.	25	do.	122	10						do.
589	do.	do.	25	do.	120	8						Went well.
590	do.	do.	25	do.	120	8						Do.
591	do.	do.	25	do.	120	10						Do.
592	do.	do.	25	do.	121	10						Do.
593	do.	do.	25	do.	130	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
594	do.	do.	25	do.	120	8						Do.
595	do.	do.	25	do.	133	0						Do.
596	do.	do.	25	do.	123	0						Fired into a butt of sand; vent closed up.
597	do.	do.	25	do.	123	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
598	do.	do.	25	do.	126	10						Went slightly irregular. New shot.
599	do.	do.	25	do.	125	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
600	do.	do.	25	do.	122	8						Do.
601	Oct. 20	do.	25	do.	125	0			7,735 yds.		35 sec.	Went well.
602	do.	do.	25	do.	122	30			7,385			Do.
603	do.	do.	30	do.	125	30			8,960		36.2 sec.	Do.
604	do.	do.	30	do.	121	30						Went very irregularly.
605	do.	do.	30	do.	121	33½					33	Went irregularly.
606	do.	do.	30	do.	123	33½					32.5	Do.
607	do.	do.	30	do.	123	33½					33	Do.
608	do.	do.	30	do.	123	33½			6,750 yds.		34.5	Do.
609	do.	do.	25	do.	125	33½			7,680			Went slightly irregular.
610	do.	do.	25	do.	125	34½			8,150		37 sec.	Went well.
611	do.	do.	25	do.	106	34½			9,200		39.2	Went slightly irregular.
612	do.	do.	25	do.	107	34			8,840		38	Do.
613	do.	Cannon	25	do.	107	34			8,198			Went well.
614	do.	Hazard's No. 7.	25	Hotchkiss shot.	124	0						Fired into a butt of sand.
615	do.	do.	25	do.	123	0						Do.
616	do.	do.	25	Hotchkiss shell.	106	13½						Went irregularly.



## Target record of firing with Ames's wrought-iron seven-inch gun at Bridgeport, Connecticut—Continued.

Order of fire.	Time.	POWDER.		PROJECTILE.		Elevation.	Pressure.	Velocity.	Range.	Recoil.	Time of flight.	Remarks.
		Kind.	Weight.	Kind.	Weight.							
669	1864											
670	Oct. 25	Cannon	Lbs. oz.	Hotchkiss shot.	Lbs. oz.	13°						Went well; many pieces flew off.
671	do.	do.	20	do.	125	13						Went well; a little irregular.
672	do.	do.	30	do.	125	13						Went well.
673	do.	do.	30	do.	126	31						Do.
674	do.	do.	30	do.	125	31						Do.
675	do.	do.	30	do.	124	8						Went well; very slightly irregular.
676	do.	do.	25	do.	123	13						Went well.
677	do.	do.	25	do.	125	13						Do.
678	do.	do.	25	do.	124	13						Do.
679	do.	Cannon & mortar	25	do.	123	13						Went well..... } 10 lbs. cannon powder at bottom of
680	Oct. 26	Cannon	25	do.	123	13						Slightly irregular. } bag and 15 lbs. cannon on top of it.
681	do.	do.	25	Gillmore	124	4						Slightly irregular.
682	do.	do.	25	do.	124	4			8,270 yds.			Do.
683	do.	do.	25	Hotchkiss	125	304						Went well.
684	do.	do.	25	do.	125	304						Do.
685	do.	do.	25	Mann's	126	304						Do.
686	do.	do.	25	do.	96	304						Went irregularly.
687	do.	do.	20	do.	304	304			8,600 yds.			Do.
688	do.	do.	25	Hotchkiss	124	304						Went well.
689	do.	do.	20	do.	106	304						Do.
690	do.	do.	20	do.	107	304						Do.
691	do.	do.	20	do.	125	304			6,425 yds.			Do.
692	do.	do.	20	do.	120	304						Do.
693	do.	do.	20	do.	124	304						Do.
694	do.	do.	20	do.	126	304						Do.
695	do.	do.	25	do.	126	304						Do.
696	do.	do.	25	do.	125	304			6,400 yds.			Do.
697	do.	do.	25	do.	126	304			6,355			Do.
698	do.	do.	25	do.	126	304						Went well; slightly irregular.
699	do.	do.	25	do.	124	304			8,140 yds.			Went well.
700	do.	do.	25	do.	125	304			7,585			Went well; slightly irregular.
	do.	do.	25	do.	125	304						do.

*Measurements of the bore of Ames's wrought-iron rifle gun.*

Distance from muzzle.	DIAMETER OF THE BORE AFTER—							
	0 rounds.	100 rounds.	210 rounds.	300 rounds.	400 rounds.	500 rounds.	600 rounds.	700 rounds.
<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>
136	7.027	7.000	7.020	7.027	7.049	7.055	7.070	.....
134	.034	.014	.023	.042	.069	.068	.085	.....
132	.037	.018	.028	.045	.075	.070	.075	.....
130	.037	.024	.043	.053	.080	.080	.098	.....
128	.033	.073	.068	.074	.076	.083	.190	.....
126	.034	.087	.076	.091	.092	.105	.134	.....
124	.028	.121	.093	.136	.122	.138	.183	.....
122	.032	.087	.089	.089	.116	.134	.197	.....
120	.040	.108	.097	.110	.158	.197	.300	.....
						.200		
118	.033	.057	.049	.051	.103	.142	.300	.300
						.206		
116	.032	.052	.048	.048	.074	.123	.273	.300
114	.030	.042	.040	.037	.054	.079	.272	.300
112	.024	.035	.036	.034	.053	.067	.292	.220
110	.022	.030	.030	.028	.050	.060	.124	.171
108	.019	.028	.027	.021	.047	.053	.105	.128
106	.017	.024	.027	.030	.056	.049	.084	.099
104	.016	.023	.024	.029	.039	.046	.078	.083
102	.015	.022	.024	.027	.036	.040	.058	.064
100	.015	.019	.022	.024	.033	.034	.046	.053
98	.015	.017	.021	.024	.031	.032	.038	.047
96	.015	.020	.020	.024	.030	.033	.037	.045
94	.015	.021	.021	.024	.030	.036	.040	.043
92	.021	.021	.023	.032	.034	.031	.034	.043
90	.017	.018	.019	.026	.030	.027	.030	.037
88	.017	.018	.019	.026	.030	.026	.030	.033
86	.018	.018	.017	.026	.026	.024	.038	.030
84	.017	.016	.018	.022	.024	.023	.025	.027
82	.017	.017	.....	.022	.022	.021	.024	.026
80	.017	.018	.....	.022	.021	.018	.024	.027
70	.018	.016	.....	.....	.022	.017	.020	.023
60	.017	.017	.....	.....	.018	.016	.019	.023
50	.018	.016	.....	.....	.017	.015	.018	.023
40	.015	.017	.....	.....	.018	.016	.017	.023
30	.015	.....	.....	.....	.018	.017	.018	.023
20	.016	.....	.....	.....	.017	.015	.017	.021
10	.016	.....	.....	.....	.016	.015	.017	.021

*Testimony of Captain G. V. Fox.*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1865.

Captain G. V. FOX, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. In the light of all your observation and experience in the navy with heavy ordnance, which do you consider to be the best gun now known ?

Answer. The best shell gun is Admiral Dahlgren's nine and eleven inch guns. Those will not bear rifling. The Parrott rifled gun has burst so often that many of our officers and men have less confidence in it. It is a great risk to use it with the present charges. In my opinion, the result is that we must have a wrought-iron gun, and Mr. Ames, in my opinion, has made the best wrought-iron gun in the world.

Question. Is there any American inventor of wrought-iron guns except Mr. Ames ; and if so, who ?

Answer. I do not know of anybody else who has been successful. Captain Ericsson made us a gun, and though it has not burst, it is opening so as to render its use dangerous. The plan of longitudinal forging in one piece has no safety in its results.

Question. Do you know anything about the Armstrong and Whitworth guns ?

Answer. We have a Whitworth gun in the navy yard, but I never saw an Armstrong gun. The Whitworth gun is of steel, with a wrought-iron band upon it.

Question. Do you consider that as good as the Ames gun ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. You say the Parrott gun has failed frequently. Does that remark apply to any of his guns except the 100-pounders and over ?

Answer. Our experience is with the 100-pounders.

Question. Is there any complaint of the 60-pounders and smaller guns ?

Answer. There is no complaint of any gun which is of small calibre. They are like a pistol, and it makes no difference whether it is made of brass, or iron, or steel.

Question. Do I understand you to mean that the larger the calibre, the greater the danger of bursting ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Then in reference to our larger guns, the 15-inch guns for instance, there is some danger that they will not prove sufficiently strong ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the larger the mass of metal, the more danger there is attached to firing the gun with charges in proportion to its size.

Question. From what you know of Ames's wrought-iron gun, would it bear any charge which you would deem sufficient for our guns of the largest calibre ?

Answer. I think it is a fair inference from the experience we have had with the small guns and 100-pounders which he has made, that he has the correct principle of manufacture, and that guns manufactured by his method will bear any amount of charge that can be consumed in the gun.

Question. It is said that the cost of his gun is about six times that of a cast-iron gun of the same calibre. How is that ?

Answer. He has been making those guns for eighty cents a pound, and he says he can make them now for one dollar a pound. If a 15-inch gun weighed 42,000 pounds, it would cost \$42,000, made of wrought-iron, upon his plan. The contract price of a cast-iron gun of the same calibre is \$7,500. But it must be taken into consideration that a wrought-iron gun will last ; that there is scarcely any limitation to its endurance ; and the calibre will be increased so much that fewer guns will be used.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Is not the cost of the gun a small item in the general account, considering the ship and everything else ?

Answer. Certainly. In reference to the cost of the guns, as I said after the disaster at Fort Fisher, where we lost forty-two men killed and wounded by the bursting of guns, better that the guns were of gold than that the sailors should think that, under any circumstances, the guns could burst. You might lose a battle by going into action with a gun around which stood twenty-five men entertaining the idea all the time that it might burst.

By Mr. Odell :

Question. What has been the result of the experience of your department with the guns now in use ?

Answer. We have now in the service about three hundred 100-pound Parrott guns, and I think we have lost nineteen of them by bursting.

Question. Is that a much larger proportion of loss by bursting than should occur ?

Answer. There ought not to have been any, really. I do not think we have had, during the war, a 9 or 11-inch gun burst. I do not recollect of any.

Question. What do you recommend to obviate that serious difficulty ?

Answer. My opinion is that we have got to come to wrought iron or steel guns, and abandon cast-iron.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, February 6, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, touching the subject of the draught of a bill relative to the construction of the Ames wrought-iron gun.

In my conversation with the committee, I believe that we agreed as to the necessity of some action on the part of Congress to enable the War and Navy Departments to construct the Ames wrought-iron gun. I am fully and painfully impressed with the importance of taking immediate action in regard to the introduction of wrought-iron guns, but I confess to some hesitation as to the precise method of accomplishing this without recommending a measure, the cost of which would be likely to insure its rejection.

I find, upon inquiry, that Mr Ames has the machinery and tools necessary to manufacture 6 or 7-inch wrought-iron guns, and the department has directed the Bureau of Ordnance to contract with Mr. Ames for one 6 $\frac{1}{16}$ -inch wrought-iron gun, (100-pounder,) to weigh about 12,000 pounds, with the assurance that if this gun stands the test, the department will take ten similar ones, making eleven guns in all, at one dollar per pound. This is the least number that he will agree to manufacture, and under the ordinary appropriation for the naval ordnance, the department feels justified in paying this large sum on account of the serious bursting of the cast-iron guns in the attack upon Fort Fisher. This gun, no doubt, will be very successful, and will take the place of the present pivot rifled guns in the navy; but it does not assist us in obtaining the large smashing gun, which is indispensable against iron-clads, and which finds a temporary substitute in the 15-inch gun of cast-iron.

A gun of that calibre, capable of using safely the greatest quantity of quick-burning powder which can be consumed in the piece, is a desideratum, and no reasonable expense ought to be spared in obtaining it.

The machinery for making such a gun, upon Mr. Ames's principle, will have to be got up and made at considerable expense. Then comes the question of locality. It will hardly be economical to erect such machinery at Mr. Ames's place, away from tide-water, where the transportation of coal, and such heavy ordnance, will be a most serious item of expense.

I enclose herewith a draught of a bill prepared by the Bureau of Ordnance, but it does not meet my views. I rather incline for a joint resolution as follows :

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the Secretary of the Navy be, and hereby is, authorized to contract for the construction of wrought-iron cannon, after the patent of those manufactured by Horatio Ames, and tested before a joint board of military and naval officers: *Provided,* That the eleven guns of similar manufacture ordered by the Naval Bureau of Ordnance shall first be thoroughly tested before a board of ordnance officers, and favorably reported upon, and a

further manufacture recommended: *And provided further*, That the contract shall not be for more than one hundred guns; to be paid for on delivery, after a satisfactory test, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*Chairman Com. on Conduct of War, U. S. Senate.*

*Testimony of Captain James Alden.*

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1865.*

Captain JAMES ALDEN sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What number and calibre of guns had you on board the Brooklyn in your expedition against Fort Fisher?

Answer. We had twenty 9-inch guns, two 100-pounder Parrotts, and two 60-pounder Parrotts—all four of the Parrotts rifled.

Question. How many times were those guns fired in the two attacks upon the fort?

Answer. I threw into that fort 3,400 9-inch shells—over one hundred and twenty tons.

Question. How did the guns bear that shelling?

Answer. As soon as I heard of the 100-pounders bursting, I put mine on the opposite side of the ship from that with which I was fighting, and put in their places the 9-inch guns, so that I had twelve 9-inch guns in battery all the time.

Question. Then you did not use those 100-pounder Parrotts?

Answer. Not after I heard of the accidents with them on the other ships. I never fired them again.

Question. Were those 9-inch guns made on the Rodman principle?

Answer. They were Dahlgren guns.

Question. Were they cast hollow, or otherwise?

Answer. They were the Dahlgren 9-inch guns, the best gun ever made.

Question. What effect had that firing upon them?

Answer. I never discovered that any of them were injured.

Question. Did none of them fail?

Answer. Not in the slightest degree. The men stand around them and fight with them with as much confidence as they drink their grog.

Question. Did you see any of the Parrott guns burst?

Answer. No, sir.

*Testimony of General John G. Barnard.*

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1864.*

General JOHN G. BARNARD sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. What is your rank and position in the service?

Answer. My position in the regular service is that of lieutenant colonel of engineers. I am a brigadier general of volunteers.

Question. Where are you now stationed, and what are your duties?

Answer. I am stationed in Washington. I am the chief engineer of the defences of Washington, and have other incidental duties.

Question. What is the character and efficiency of the heavy ordnance now in our fortifications?

Answer. The ordnance in our fortifications now may be said to be in a transition condition, in which nothing is positively settled. We have been displacing



the old light guns, such as 24, 32, and 42-pounders, and the 8-inch shell guns, by heavy guns, as rapidly as possible. And though I have no intimate knowledge of the exact armament of any one of the fortifications now, not having recently been connected with them, I believe that the armament has been increased in efficiency as rapidly as it possibly could have been; and the armament of our sea-coast works is the best armament of any sea-coast works in the world at the present moment.

Question. What changes are being made in the heavy ordnance of the fortifications?

Answer. The most noticeable change is the introduction of the 15-inch gun of Rodman. I might remark here that for twenty-five years past the engineer department have been calling for heavy guns, heavier than the old guns I have mentioned. The difficulty in getting them has been owing to the fact that the means of manufacturing heavy wrought-iron guns has been wanting, and we have waited for the ordnance department. The principle has been that cannon should be used of such calibre that a single shot would destroy a vessel, or inflict serious damage to it, instead of doing comparatively little injury. We know very well that wooden vessels have received an incredible number of 24 and 32-pounder solid shot without being seriously affected. The idea has been to put guns in forts of such calibre that a single shot would do immense damage.

Question. What is the calibre of the new guns?

Answer. The 15-inch smooth-bore, carrying a shell of nearly 400 pounds, or a solid shot of 430 pounds; the 13-inch smooth-bore, carrying a shell of perhaps 250 pounds; the Parrott rifled 300 and 200-pounders, and also some of the Parrott rifled 100-pounders, which we consider too light for sea-coast fortifications. I believe—I have no official knowledge—that the government are making arrangements to alter, or, perhaps, are actually altering now, the old 32 and 42-pounders, by rifling them, to make them efficient rifled guns.

Question. Are they changing the character of the guns on the interior fortifications, here about Washington, for instance?

Answer. Some changes have been ordered recently, to withdraw a great many of those old sea-coast guns, 24 and 32-pounders, with which the works were originally armed, for want of others, and replace them with siege guns and field-guns more fitted for field-works. Works of this kind do not require guns of this heavy calibre. We put these in because, at the time we got up the works, there were no others to be had; the demand for field and siege guns for army purposes was so great that we could not get any others.

Those heavy guns were not introduced earlier into our sea-coast fortifications because the means of manufacturing them were not perfected. The engineer department was constantly calling for heavy guns, and through the experiments of the ordnance department in relation to the means of manufacturing cast-iron, and obtaining the best results from different ores, and the mixture of different ores, &c., great advance has been made in the art of casting cast-iron guns. And, finally, through the invention of Major Rodman, the means of casting guns of enormous calibre have been effected. The difficulty to be overcome was this: When a mass of cast-iron beyond a given diameter cools, the result is, that the outside cools first, and the inside remains in a fluid state; afterwards the inside cools; a contraction takes place in cooling, and a large mass cooling in this way does not contract simultaneously; there is an irregularity of contraction; and there is a great strain upon the interior—so much so that, in cooling, very large guns will oftentimes crack. Captain Rodman invented a process of casting a cannon hollow; the ordinary way being to cast it solid, and then bore it out. By casting a gun hollow, with cold water in the metallic core around which the metal is poured from the furnace, the gun is cooled from the inside; and instead of having to cool a thickness of three feet of metal, which would be the case in cooling from the outside, you have only to cool a thickness

of from 12 to 15 inches from the inside. I regard his method as one of the greatest improvements that have been made in the art of manufacturing cast-iron guns, and it has proved a more complete success than any other process of making heavy guns. In fact, without it, guns of more than 10 inches calibre cannot be successfully cast, and they never have been cast anywhere else.

Question. Was that an invention solely of Major Rodman, or was it previously known in Europe?

Answer. The first cast-iron guns, made in the fifteenth century, were cast hollow, and this method was universally practiced till the middle of the eighteenth century, (1744,) when the method of casting solid was introduced. But there was no *principle* recognized in the matter. A cast-iron tube was to be made, and the most natural way was to cast it as a tube. It was afterwards found easier to cast solid and bore out the core. Besides, there was really no advantage in the ancient method of hollow casting. The ordinary substance which forms the internal mould could have no cooling effect. Captain Rodman was the first to discover the necessity of *cooling* from the interior, and providing, in connexion with hollow casting, a means of so cooling the casting.

Question. Have such tests been applied to that particular gun as to satisfy military men that it is serviceable and useful?

Answer. I think so. I do not say that the gun has been fully proved to be all that a gun should be, or may be made; but it has been so far tested, I think, as to justify an affirmative answer to your question. It has been the most complete success, so far, of any process of making heavy guns in any country.

Question. How long have these guns been in use in this country?

Answer. The first experimental gun was completed in 1860. A board was ordered by the Secretary of War to attend the trial experiments. The board consisted of General Totten, chief engineer of the United States army; Major (now General) Anderson; Captain H. G. Wright, of the engineers; myself; Captain Tallmadge, of the artillery; Captain Carlisle, of the artillery, and Captains Dyer and Rodman, of the ordnance, and the traitor Gorgas.

Question. Describe briefly the tests you applied.

Answer. Our test was simply to fire it with ordinary service charges. I should remark that we considered that such a gun could only be really tested by long enough use to show its endurance. We fired it—I do not recollect the exact number of times—I suppose 50 or 60 times, trying it at various elevations, with different charges of powder, never exceeding, I believe, thirty pounds of what Rodman calls his compressed cake powder, which is a very slow burning powder.

Question. You say you tried it with ordinary service charges, such as you would use in battle, both powder and ball?

Answer. Yes, sir; we recommended the continuance of those firings, and after we left the firing was continued under charge of the ordnance officers, until the number of rounds had reached some 500 or 600, in the same way with ordinary charges. During all this time different tests were applied, in order to ascertain whether the firing had produced any effect upon the gun. You are aware, perhaps, that by repeated firing the interior of the bore, particularly about where the ball rests, wears away. The violent escape of gases about it enlarges the bore, and the touch-hole is enlarged. It was found, so far as my recollection serves, that up to the last time at which I recollect having received any account—after the gun had been fired 500 or 600 times—no perceptible change had taken place in the gun, showing great hardness of the interior surface, as was expected to be derived from cooling it from the inside.

Question. Did you use in those tests the same weight of powder and projectile, in proportion to the calibre, that you do in smaller guns?

Answer. We used a less weight of powder in proportion to the weight of the projectile. In light guns, smooth-bores, the ordinary charges of powder are

from one-quarter to one-third of the weight of the projectile. As the calibre increases, it has been found that that proportion could not safely be used. In the 10-inch calibres, which had been in use for many years, it was never considered safe to use over fifteen or eighteen pounds of ordinary cannon powder, which would be about one-sixth of the weight of the shot. In the 15-inch guns, in which the shell used weighs about 400 pounds, it was not considered safe to use over forty or fifty pounds of Rodman's slow-burning powder, about one-eighth or one-ninth of the weight of the projectile. Most of the shells he was using at that time did not weigh over 350 pounds.

Question. What was the range of those guns, with such charges, at an elevation, say, of five degrees?

Answer. At five degrees we got pretty much the same result as with other smooth-bore guns—about 1,800 yards, if I recollect aright. At six degrees we got about 2,000 yards. At low elevations the range is not superior, perhaps not so great, as that of a 32 or 42-pounder. At high elevations the range is somewhat superior.

Question. How do you account for that?

Answer. From the fact that we use proportionately less powder and give less initial velocity. If we could get the same initial velocity with all those heavy guns that we do with the 24 and 32-pounders, we could get much greater range, from the fact that the resistance of the atmosphere to a large sphere is less in proportion to its weight than to a small sphere. But for the resistance of the atmosphere we could throw a ball fifteen or twenty miles with an ordinary piece of artillery.

Question. Consequently, the energy and efficiency of these large guns are not in proportion to the weight of the projectile? It is not propelled with the same initial velocity?

Answer. That is certainly an objection. It would be very desirable to throw them with as great a velocity as we can throw a six-pound ball, and perhaps it may yet be done.

Question. Could it not be done, provided you could use the same proportion of powder to the weight of the projectile?

Answer. I think it could.

Question. It has been suggested that those large 15-inch guns are inefficient, for the reason that they dare not put in powder enough to make them effective. What do you say in regard to that?

Answer. The gun which was adopted in the navy—although it is essentially a Rodman gun—is not of his model. It was, if I mistake not, made shorter, in order to introduce into monitors—I am not quite certain about the fact—and made of somewhat lighter dimensions than the Rodman gun; but experiments at the Washington navy yard, with a Rodman gun of navy pattern, indicate that these 15-inch guns are really capable of bearing much heavier charges than was supposed. One of these guns has been fired a great many times with 60 pounds of *ordinary cannon powder*—one-sixth to one-seventh the weight of the shot. If such charges are shown to be safe, quite high initial velocities may be had with these guns.

Question. Are those Rodman guns manufactured by anybody but Major Rodman, that you know of?

Answer. Major Rodman does not manufacture himself. They are manufactured by Knap, Rudd & Co., of Pittsburg, who are, if I mistake not, the owners of the patent. They are manufactured by Alger & Co., in Boston, and they are now manufactured in Providence, and there may be others now who manufacture them.

Question. Have you any idea how many of those large 15-inch guns we now have in the service?

Answer. I cannot give you any definite statement as to that.

Question. You say you were on the board that tested those guns. In your opinion have they been sufficiently tested now, so that it would be prudent for the government to adopt them to supersede other guns; are you yourself so far satisfied with the tests and experience of those guns?

Answer. I am satisfied that the government should adopt them to a certain extent. I do not say, by any means, that I would propose to make the whole armament of the fortifications of such guns, but I consider them the most powerful class of cast-iron guns that there is, and a very important gun—the best gun of its peculiar class that there is; we know of nothing that we could put in its place. At the same time it ought to be perfectly understood that the art of artillery is in transitu; that the demand has outstripped the march of science; that to perfect artillery and bring it up to what is now demanded requires experiment and laborious research, and we must use the best we can get and run some risks. But so far I have never heard of one of those guns bursting, nor of any accident from them.

Question. Has any more than the service charge ever been used in them?

Answer. They have been tested at the navy yard here with heavier charges, sixty pounds of ordinary cannon powder, and it is probable they may be safely used with this charge.

Question. You have spoken of the powder you use in those guns, a coarse powder; is that a new invention?

Answer. I think it is an invention of Captain Rodman. His opinion was that the ordinary cannon powder burned too rapidly for these great guns; the effort at the very commencement was too violent—was not distributed along the length of the bore. By using a slower burning powder the first effort was less violent, but it kept up a more continuous effort. Captain Rodman made two kinds of powder, one of very large grains, almost if not quite as big as hazelnuts, and another kind in compressed perforated cakes. The latter kind has never been adopted practically; it costs a great deal more to make it than the other kind.

Question. Does this coarse powder propel a ball with the same force that the old-fashioned powder would?

Answer. The perforated cake powder requires a heavier charge than the large-grained powder, and the large-grained powder requires a heavier charge than the ordinary cannon powder, to obtain the same result.

Question. Do all these great grains burn?

Answer. I do not think they do; many are thrown out not fully burned.

Question. Now, in regard to the matter of "royalty;" what "royalty," and to whom, does the government pay for these guns?

Answer. I know nothing about that.

Question. Then you don't know about the amount of "royalty" that the government pays for those guns?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. That, I suppose, is what is paid by the government to the inventor or discoverer for the use of his patent.

Answer. I do not even know that the government pays anything. I have never heard anything about it.

Question. Those Rodman guns are always smooth-bore?

Answer. They are; but not necessarily so. After the first experimental gun, another was made immediately afterwards of the same pattern exactly, of the same exterior dimensions, and rifled. That gun was sent to Fortress Monroe at the beginning of the rebellion; one or two shots were fired from it by General Butler at the enemy's works on Sewell's Point, and there it lay for a year or two. I have heard that the ordnance department were lately beginning experimenting with it. I saw that Mr. Parrott was making some projectiles for it; what the result has been I do not know.

Question. But with that exception, they are smooth-bore guns.

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, these large guns.

Question. How small guns do they make on this Rodman principle?

Answer. They apply that method of casting to the 10-inch guns, and anything above that, and Mr. Parrott is now applying it to his 300-pounder rifled gun.

Question. Would not that method applied be an improvement in casting all our ordnance, take the Dahlgren gun for instance?

Answer. Yes, sir; anything above an 8-inch gun; perhaps anything above a 42-pounder; perhaps the 42-pounder itself. But below that the evil which I spoke of in the cooling of the casting is not so apparent; you can get a very satisfactory gun of the 32 or 42-pounder calibre by the method of solid casting.

Question. Do you know enough about the manufacture of these guns to be able to state whether they can be made as cheaply as the others, barring the "royalty" to the inventor? In other words, which is the cheapest, to cast guns hollow upon this Rodman principle, or cast them solid, and bore them out in the old way?

Answer. I do not think it would make very much difference. It costs rather more, probably, to make them hollow; the amount of the labor of boring is about the same in both cases, although in the one case you have the hollow core. The founders tell me that they would about as willingly bore out a gun cast solid as one cast hollow.

Question. This method of cooling from the inside leaves the interior surface harder than it otherwise would be, and, therefore, you have to work the harder to finish out the bore?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Which gun do you consider the most energetic and efficient, the Rodman or the Parrott gun?

Answer. They both have their peculiar qualities; we consider them both necessary. That is, we consider both smooth-bores and rifled guns necessary.

Question. The Parrott gun has always heretofore been a rifled gun?

Answer. Yes, sir. The Parrott gun is of smaller diameter in proportion to the weight of its projectile, and simply for the purpose of penetrating armor, making a hole through it, it is superior to a smooth-bore of larger calibre. But we believe that for smashing in the frame of a vessel the large round shot would be superior; in fact, all experiment, here and abroad, shows that a round shot is more destructive to iron plates than an elongated one. We believe that greater damage would be done by a 15-inch round shot than by the 300-pounder Parrotts. But the 300-pounder Parrott has a greater range and accuracy than the other. You can throw a 300-pounder Parrott  $2\frac{1}{2}$  and 3 miles with a great deal of accuracy. Whereas, at that distance, a smooth-bore gun would not hit anything; you may throw your shot that distance, but you have no certainty of hitting the object fired at. But within the distance of a mile, the accuracy of a smooth-bore is quite sufficient, and its effect would probably be greater. On the other hand, the 300-pounder Parrott gun is a lighter gun than the 15-inch gun, and more easily handled.

Question. Do you know which is the most expensive gun according to the weight of its projectile, the Rodman gun or the Parrott gun?

Answer. The Rodman gun, I think.

Question. How about the Dahlgren gun?

Answer. The Dahlgren guns are all intended for the navy. I do not know of any of them suited for the land service.

Question. We are in a transition state, I understand you to say, in regard to ordnance, and are replacing our old coast guns with these Rodman and Parrott guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; and rifling the old guns, as I understand.

Question. I understand they are doing that for the land service, but the navy has not adopted that plan as yet?

Answer. The fact of the matter is, that we must have more powerful guns than our old ones, and we must get them some way as fast as we can.

Question. We are directed to inquire what proportion of our sea and land ordnance is rifled. Can you tell about that?

Answer. I cannot answer that question. I presume it depends upon what we can get. There has been a great call from the large cities, New York and Boston, and great pressure upon the government to supply improved artillery; and the government has supplied it as fast as they could get it from Parrott and the different foundries. What the proportion of rifled guns is, I could not say. I do not think any rule has been established yet.

Question. When were these rifled guns first introduced into our service?

Answer. I do not think we had any rifled guns in the service before this war commenced. General Barry is better authority on that point than I am. We commenced about that time to make rifled guns. If I recollect right, no heavy rifled gun had been made in 1860, except this 12-inch gun at Fortress Monroe, which I have spoken of. Mr. Parrott gradually perfected his means of manufacturing his heavy guns, succeeding first in making a 100-pounder, then a 200-pounder, and finally a 300-pounder. Therefore, it has been within the space of two years that heavy rifled ordnance has been made.

Question. How long have heavy rifled guns been in use abroad—say in England and France?

Answer. About contemporaneously with us. They had commenced rifling their field artillery and introducing it into service earlier. I do not recollect now of hearing of any heavy rifled guns before we commenced having them; probably, however, Armstrong's 100-pounders are a year or two earlier than Parrott's 100-pounders. We were rifling our cast-iron 32's and 42's as early as 1859 or 1860.

Question. Have you a knowledge of the heavy ordnance now in use in France and England—their latest improvement in heavy guns? If so, I would inquire whether they have any gun which, in your judgment, is superior to our Rodman or Parrott gun?

Answer. The most powerful gun that I have read of as being experimented upon is the last gun of Armstrong, a rifled gun of 13-inch calibre, and throwing a 600-pound projectile. The accounts of its effects and accuracy were very satisfactory; but we have nothing to show how durable the gun would be.

Question. Is that a breech-loading gun?

Answer. It is not a breech-loading gun. There is a great deal of discrepancy about the accounts we get of the Armstrong gun; at any rate, no Armstrong or other foreign gun has undergone the practical tests that our guns have. I do not think they have made anything equal, in durability and efficiency combined, to the Parrott gun. Some of the English journals give very flattering comments upon our rifled artillery, as known by the result of the bombardment at Charleston.

Question. It has been said that they were thrown by their Armstrong guns?

Answer. There is a different opinion about that gun. The original breech-loading Armstrong gun I never had any faith in, and the building-up principle upon which he makes his guns I do not think has proved very satisfactory so far. As to the French guns, I have heard of nothing larger than the guns which they have upon their iron-clads, called 30-pounders, and is their old 30-pounder cast-iron gun rifled and reinforced by a band at the breech, and throws an elongated projectile of about 54 pounds weight. They are supposed to be making, or at least experimenting upon, larger rifled guns; but keep their results secret.

Question. The Senate, in this resolution, wants to know if there has been any particular delay in the manufacture and introduction of these guns ; and if so, the cause of it. Do you know of any delay ?

Answer. No, sir ; I have had nothing to do with the manufacture and supplying of them.

Question. You have heard of no particular delay in the matter ?

Answer. I have heard that everybody in the country that could make a gun was employed, to meet the demands of the government.

Question. I will ask one question about the manufacturing of these guns : does it require great outlay to establish a manufactory of these guns ? Is such a manufactory a costly and expensive concern ?

Answer. It requires considerable outlay in machinery for lifting and handling these great guns.

Question. What, under favorable circumstances, would be the expense of setting up such a manufactory ?

Answer. I could not tell ; it would take a great deal of money. In regard to the delay, I will say, that the only delay I know about was in first commencing the manufacture of these 15-inch guns. The engineer department desired them to be made ; and a board sat here upon the subject two years ago, which adopted them for the armament of fortifications, and desired them to be made ; but none was made or ordered until after the Merrimac affair, when the authorities seemed to receive a new impulse.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. All things considered, what do you consider the best rifled gun known to the world ?

Answer. I have not the data upon which to answer this question. To the best of my knowledge no rifled gun of large calibre has yet satisfied all the conditions of durability. Parrott's guns have not ; and yet I believe it to be equal to any rifled gun made, and have confidence that the defects may be remedied. Yet I see no reason why we may not make large rifled guns of cast-iron alone, by Rodman's method, as successfully as we have made large smooth-bore ones ; indeed, it seems to me a much easier problem to make a 400-pounder cast-iron rifled gun than to make a 15-inch smooth-bore gun. In range and accuracy and efficiency combined, I believe Parrott's guns to have equalled any in the world. To breach masses of masonry at the distance Fort Sumter was breached (two miles and over) was certainly an extraordinary performance ; and yet, from what I saw of these guns at Yorktown, where we contended with the enemy's rifled guns at 3,900 yards, (2½ miles nearly,) and received some of his shot in the parapet of our battery, the result did not surprise me. Some of Parrott's heavy rifles have endured over a thousand discharges, at high elevations and with full service charges ; but I apprehend they are not all so durable. I have heard of no failures in his 300-pounders, though one was fired five hundred times nearly.

By the chairman :

Question. Have you heard of any other rifled gun in use with as large calibre as these largest Parrotts ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the recent Armstrong gun of which I spoke has a 13-inch calibre, and throws a 600-pounder projectile.

Question. I speak of those in actual use—not merely experiments.

Answer. I am not aware that any rifled gun has been brought into actual use in the British service larger than the Armstrong 100-pounder breech-loader, of which we have very conflicting statements, but which is maintained, by what seems to be good authority, to be an efficient gun. The Armstrong muzzle-loading 300-pounder rifled gun is now intended for the new iron-clads, such as

the Bellerophon, Royal Sovereign, (an old frigate altered to a turret ship,) and I presume the new 600-pounder will also be adopted for sea-coast forts and iron-clads, (it is said the Bellerophon is to have one on each broadside,) if it prove to be a reliable gun. As yet, however, but one of the latter has been made, and very few of the former, and they can hardly be said to be "in actual use."

I know of no rifled gun in the French service larger than their 30-pounders, which constitute the actual armament of some, perhaps all, of their iron-clads now afloat, and which is about equivalent to 32-pounder James guns. Krupp's 9-inch cast-steel rifled guns, made in Prussia, have been extensively ordered by the Russian government for their forts and ships, and, I suppose, may be considered in actual use.

Captain Blakely makes very large guns on the "reinforcing" or hooping principle—quality doubtful. Mr. Lynall Thomas has also made a very large rifled gun, but we have no satisfactory account of it.

The Armstrong 300-pounders carry a somewhat heavier shot than our Parrott 300-pounders.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. What do you consider the best smooth-bore gun of heavy calibre now known ?

Answer. The Rodman gun. That is the only method of making guns of heavy calibre of cast-iron. The method of building up guns of wrought-iron of that calibre has not yet been used.

Question. Which have experience or experiment taught us to be the best material of which to make guns of heavy calibre, cast-iron or wrought-iron ?

Answer. Our opinions in this country, I think, are in favor of cast-iron. In England, however, nearly all their modern guns are made of wrought-iron, on the Armstrong building-up principle. The best material, and the best way of making a gun of large calibre, is not decided. We have given the preference to cast-iron, and have obtained results such as no other nation has obtained.

In England they are unable to make a large gun of cast-iron, from inferiority of material or of skill, and their efforts have been to *build up* guns of wrought-iron.

In Prussia, Krupp has made rifled guns of 9-inch calibre (about 200-pounds) of cast-steel, which is probably the strongest of all materials, the steel being cast upon a core and afterwards forged. The Russian government have given him extensive orders, and I recommended the governor of Massachusetts to import a few of them. It is a very expensive material, and the process of forging large masses seems yet to be uncertain. I have since observed that one of them recently burst at St. Petersburg, and it is disputed whether the bursting is the fault of the gun or projectile. Mr. Ericsson is making 13-inch guns for the Dictator entirely of wrought-iron. We have not had sufficient proofs of—or, rather, we have had too many causes to doubt—the durability of built-up guns, and we yet adhere to cast-iron guns, which are, besides, much cheaper. But it is quite likely that the means of manufacturing wrought-iron or steel guns may be perfected so as to make better guns than cast-iron; or, perhaps, a combination of wrought-iron or steel and cast-iron may be effected. The 11-inch wrought-iron gun, the Prince Alfred, built at the Mersey Iron-works, for the London exhibition, has endured the most satisfactory test.

We know of no heavy guns made in France. The largest rifled guns that we know of are their old cast-iron 30-pounders, rifled and hooped, which I mentioned before. It occurs to me at this moment that I have seen it stated, on what appeared to be good authority, that the Magenta and Solferino (new iron-clads) have 100-pounder breech-loaders, rifled. An 8-inch rifled gun is spoken



of as having produced extraordinary results at Vincennes, but their experiments are not made public.

It would appear that Spain has remodelled her marine artillery lately—that the smooth-bore gun is retained as more efficacious for destroying armor plates than rifled guns. Their largest smooth bore is of eleven inches calibre. I do not know how large rifled guns they have made, though none, probably, anything like as large as this. The largest I have seen mentioned is of 16 centimetres bore, (about  $6\frac{4}{10}$  inches, or that of our old 32-pounder.)

It is stated that all their new guns, rifled or smooth-bore, will be of cast-iron, reinforced or hooped at their breech with wrought-iron bands, the same as our Parrott guns.

In conclusion, experience, so far as it has gone, has, I think, taught us that we can obtain guns from cast-iron alone, equal to if not better than any made here or elsewhere from any other material, and at much less cost than of wrought-iron or cast-steel; and that until it is proved that a gun of superior safety, durability, or capable of enduring heavier charges, can be made some other way, we are right in adhering to cast-iron guns made by Rodman's process.

By the chairman :

Question. Do you know anything about a wrought-iron gun called the Ames gun?

Answer. I have heard it spoken of; I am not acquainted with it.

Question. You do not know whether it has been examined or not?

Answer. I do not.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Considering the experiments made on both American and English guns of large calibre, which do you think has the greatest endurance, the wrought-iron or the cast-iron gun?

Answer. My impression is that our cast-iron guns are more durable than their wrought-iron guns. But I have not gone thoroughly into that matter; I have not seen all the experiments and their results.

By the chairman :

Question. Have we ever experimented with the English Armstrong or Whitworth gun, so as to compare them with our own?

Answer. We had a battery of light field artillery, Whitworth's, with us on the Peninsula. This was a battery given to us by Americans abroad. Three or four of them are in the forts here. The impression has not been favorable to the gun for general efficiency. It has some very peculiar qualities, such as very great accuracy and range. It carries a very elongated solid projectile, but so small that it does not do any damage beyond just where it hits. Except for special purposes it is not a valuable field gun; it is not available as a field gun for general purposes. At Yorktown I had prepared positions for the two Whitworths we had with us, to use them when we opened the fire of our batteries, to dismount the enemy's guns. For this purpose they would have been very useful on account of their great accuracy. I do not know whether we have experimented with the Armstrong gun; I only know this, that Mr. Parrott made an Armstrong gun for the Russian government, about four years ago, I should think, in which he got all the results of range which Armstrong himself did. About that time the method was published, and Mr. Parrott made it from the published accounts of the matter; but he made no others of that kind.

Question. He thought his own gun a better gun, all things considered?

Answer. He had not then completed his own gun. The Armstrong breech-loading gun is too delicate in its breech-loading apparatus to be adapted to the rough usage of the field.



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